Members' voting power in the governance of the International Monetary Fund
Leech, Dennis (2001) Members' voting power in the governance of the International Monetary Fund. Working Paper. University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Coventry.
WRAP_Leech_wp6801.pdf - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/wo...
This note shows that in the Sodrow-Miesowski-Wilson model, the Nash equilibrium in capital taxes depends on whether these taxes are unit (as assumed in the literature) or ad valorem (as in reality). In a symmetric version of the model with cobb-Douglas technology, public good provision is higher, and residents in both countries are better off, when countries compete in unit taxes.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HG Finance
J Political Science > JZ International relations
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Faculty of Social Sciences > Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||International Monetary Fund, Corporate governance, Voting research, Keynesian economics, Power (Social sciences)|
|Series Name:||Working papers (University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation)|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Number of Pages:||29|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Funder:||University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick. Dept. of Economics|
|References:|| Banzhaf, John F, “Weighted Voting Doesn’t Work: A Mathematical Analysis”, Rutgers Law Review, vol 19, 1965, 317-343  Brams, Stephen J. Game Theory and Politics, 1975,Free Press.  Coleman, James S., “Control of Collectivities and the Power of a Collectivity to Act,” in Social Choice, (Lieberman, Ed.), 1971, pp 277-287, Gorden and Breach.  Dreyer, Jacob S and Andrew Schotter, “Power Relationships in the IMF: the Consequences of Quota Changes,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 62, 1980, 97- 106.  Dubey and L.S.Shapley, “The Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Index”, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol 4, 1979, 99-131.  Felsenthal, Dan S. and M. Machover (1998),The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes, Edward Elgar.  Felsenthal, Dan S. and M. Machover, Enlargement of the EU and Weighted Voting in its Council of Ministers, LSE Voting Power Programme Report, VPP 01/00, Centre for the Philosophy of Natural and Social Sciences, London School of Economics, 2000.  Garrett, G. and G. Tsebelis, "An Institutional Critique of Intergovernmentalism," International Organization, 1996, 50: 269-99.  Gold, Joseph, Voting and Decision in the International Monetary Fund: An Essay on the Law and Practice of the Fund, IMF, 1972, Washington DC.  --------- “Weighted Voting Power: Some Limits and Some Problems,” American Journal of International Law, 1972, vol. 68, pp. 702-804.  --------- “The Origins of Weighted Voting Power in the Fund”, Finance and Development, March 1981, pp. 25-28.  Hosli, M., "The Admission of the European Free Trade Association States to the European Economic Community," International Organization, 47, 1993, 629-43.  -----------, "An Institution's Capacity to Act: What are the Effects of Majority Voting in the Council of the EU and in the European Parliament?," European Institute of Public Administration, 1998.  Keynes, John M. Speech to House of Lords, 18 May 1943, in D. Moggridge, The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Cambridge University Press, 1980, vol. XXV, p. 278.  ---------. Letter to J Viner, 12 July 1943, in D. Moggridge, The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Cambridge University Press, 1980, vol. XXV, p. 328.  Lane. Jan-Erik and Sven Berg, "Relevance of Voting Power", Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1999, vol. 11, no. 3, 1999, 309-19.  Laruelle, Annick and Mika Widgren, “Is the Allocation of Voting Power among EU States Fair?”, Public Choice, vol. 94,1998, 317-339.  Leech, D., “Power Relations in the International Monetary Fund: A Study of the Political Economy of A Priori Voting Power Using the Theory of Simple Games", Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, University of Warwick, CSGR Working Paper No. 06/98 (revised March 2000).  ----------"An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices," Warwick Economic Research Papers, no. 563, University of Warwick, June 2000.  --------- "Computing Classical Power Indices for Large Finite Voting Games," Warwick Economic Research Papers, no. 579, revised July 2000, University of Warwick.  Lucas, W F , “Measuring Power in Weighted Voting Systems,” in S Brams, W Lucas and P Straffin (eds.), Political and Related Models, 1983, Springer.  Nurmi, H. "The Problem of the Right Distribution of Voting Power", in M.J.Holler (ed.) Power, Voting and Voting Power, 1981, Physica-Verlag.  Owen, Guillermo, Game Theory,(3rd Edition), 1995, Academic Press.  Penrose, L.S., "The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting", Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 109, 1946, 53-57.  Roth, Alvin E., The Shapley Value, 1988, Cambridge U.P.  Sadako, Ogata, “Shifting Power Relations in Multilateral Development Banks,” The Journal of International Studies (Institute of International Relations, Sophia University, Tokyo), Number 22, 1989, January, 1-25.  Shapley, L. S. and M. Shubik, “A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System,” American Political Science Review, 48, 1954, 787-792, reprinted in .  Straffin, Philip D., “Power and Stability in Politics,” in R.J.Aumann and S.J.Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory (Vol. 2), 1994, Elsevier, pp. 1128-1151.  Strand, Jonathan R., David P. Rapkin and David B. Wood, “The Political Economy of A priori Voting Power in the World Bank and IMF,” mimeo, 1997.  Sutter, Mathias, “Fair Allocation and Re-Weighting of Votes and Voting Power in the EU Before and After the Next Enlargement”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12(4), 2000, pp433-449.  Zamora, Stephen, “Voting in International Economic Organizations,” American Journal of International Law, 74, 1980, 566-608.|
Actions (login required)