Leech, Dennis (2001) Members' voting power in the governance of the International Monetary Fund. Working Paper. University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Coventry.

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Abstract

This note shows that in the Sodrow-Miesowski-Wilson model, the Nash equilibrium in capital taxes depends on whether these taxes are unit (as assumed in the literature) or ad valorem (as in reality). In a symmetric version of the model with cobb-Douglas technology, public good provision is higher, and residents in both countries are better off, when countries compete in unit taxes.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance J Political Science > JZ International relations
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	International Monetary Fund, Corporate governance, Voting research, Keynesian economics, Power (Social sciences)
Series Name:	Working papers (University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation)
Publisher:	University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	February 2001
Number:	No.68/
Number of Pages:	29
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick. Dept. of Economics
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/2057

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