Is the WTO's article XXIV a free trade barrier?
Zissimos, Ben, 1970- and Vines, David (2000) Is the WTO's article XXIV a free trade barrier? Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation. (Working papers (University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation)).
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Why is further multilateral trade liberalisation proving so difficult to achieve? This paper shows that Article XXIV itself, the set of WTO rules governing trade block formation, undermines the multilateral liberalisation process. Trade block formation under Article XXIV can be thought of as a coalition formation game with negative externalities. We suppose that the usual mechanism through which block formation exerts a negative externality on non-members - a rise in external tariffs - is precluded by Article XXIV. But essentially the same effect is created by internal tariff reduction. From this it follows that free trade is not an equilibrium.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Alternative Title:||Is the World Trade Organization's article twenty-four a free trade barrier?|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
J Political Science > JZ International relations
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||World Trade Organization, Free trade, Protectionism, Non-tariff trade barriers, International economic relations|
|Series Name:||Working papers (University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation)|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Number of Pages:||46|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Funder:||Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC), University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR)|
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