When and why do domestic respondents oppose AD petitions?
Cassing, James H. and To, Theodore (1999) When and why do domestic respondents oppose AD petitions? Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation. Working papers (University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation) (No.37/).
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In the evolving global trade environment where traditional forms of protection have been falling as a result of multilateral trade agreements such as the Uruguay Round and NAFTA, antidumping policy has quickly become the protective policy instrument of choice. In the United States, there is evidence that domestic non-filing firms do not always support dumping investigations. In the absence of information asymmetries, domestic fims have an unambiguous incentive to support petitions filed by other domestic producers. We argue that in cases where the respondent is not a significant importer or exporter, the most plausible explanation is that non-support acts as a costly signal of private information.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Alternative Title:||When and why do domestic respondents oppose antidumping petitions?|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
J Political Science > JZ International relations
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||International trade, Dumping (International trade), Information asymmetry, Information measurement|
|Series Name:||Working papers (University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation)|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||July 1999|
|Number of Pages:||23|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
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