ON LIMITING THE MARKET FOR STATUS SIGNALS
UNSPECIFIED (1994) ON LIMITING THE MARKET FOR STATUS SIGNALS. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 53 (1). pp. 91-110. ISSN 0047-2727Full text not available from this repository.
In many societies, individuals care how others view them. In their efforts to impress, such individuals engage in consumption signals which attempt to establish higher levels of status than their true status type. This leads to an inefficiency which offers the possibility of a Pareto-improving tax policy. The impacts of tax policy and benefits on the signalling equilibrium are considered.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS|
|Publisher:||ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA LAUSANNE|
|Number of Pages:||20|
|Page Range:||pp. 91-110|
Actions (login required)