Harrison, Mark and Kim, Byung-Yeon (2005) Plans, prices, and corruption : the Soviet firm under partial centralization, 1930 to 1990. Journal of Economic History, Vol.66 (No.1). pp. 1-41. doi:10.1017/S0022050706000015

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Abstract

The level of corruption in an economy is generally thought to influence
economic growth adversely. We show that the performance of the Soviet
economy was affected not only by the level of corruption but also by its
quality, that is, how corrupt incomes were used. In the context of a partially
centralized economy, changes in a government control mechanism influenced
the quality of corruption and thus economic performance. On the basis of new
historical research on the Soviet command system we analyse the choices of a
plan-setter and an effort-setter who interacted with each other and an external
market to determine real output, hidden inflation, and the level and quality of
corruption simultaneously. Our results explain rapid Soviet economic growth
despite high corruption levels, and why slower economic growth in the 1970s
was accompanied by increased privatization of rents.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Corruption -- Soviet Union, Soviet Union -- Economic policy
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal of Economic History
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
ISSN:	0022-0507
Official Date:	8 April 2005
Dates:	Date Event 8 April 2005 ["eprint_fieldopt_dates_date_type_modified" not defined]
Volume:	Vol.66
Number:	No.1
Page Range:	pp. 1-41
DOI:	10.1017/S0022050706000015
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access

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