REPUTATION EFFECTS WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC MODELS
UNSPECIFIED. (1993) REPUTATION EFFECTS WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC MODELS. OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, 45 (1). pp. 42-57. ISSN 0030-7653Full text not available from this repository.
We solve lor the reputational equilibrium in a class of linear quadratic, gaussian dynamic games with noisy control. This equilibrium is particularly simple to describe and tractable. There is imperfect monitoring but a sequential equilibrium is found where the uninformed agents always smoothly learn the type of the informed agent. Reputation effects are temporary in the infinite horizon case for positive discount rates; as the discount factor tends to unity there is a permanent reputation.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES|
|Publisher:||OXFORD UNIV PRESS UNITED KINGDOM|
|Official Date:||January 1993|
|Number of Pages:||16|
|Page Range:||pp. 42-57|
Actions (login required)