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REPUTATION EFFECTS WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC MODELS
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UNSPECIFIED (1993) REPUTATION EFFECTS WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC MODELS. OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, 45 (1). pp. 42-57.
Research output not available from this repository, contact author.Abstract
We solve lor the reputational equilibrium in a class of linear quadratic, gaussian dynamic games with noisy control. This equilibrium is particularly simple to describe and tractable. There is imperfect monitoring but a sequential equilibrium is found where the uninformed agents always smoothly learn the type of the informed agent. Reputation effects are temporary in the infinite horizon case for positive discount rates; as the discount factor tends to unity there is a permanent reputation.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions | ||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES | ||||
| Publisher: | OXFORD UNIV PRESS UNITED KINGDOM | ||||
| ISSN: | 0030-7653 | ||||
| Official Date: | January 1993 | ||||
| Dates: |
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| Volume: | 45 | ||||
| Number: | 1 | ||||
| Number of Pages: | 16 | ||||
| Page Range: | pp. 42-57 | ||||
| Publication Status: | Published |
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