UNSPECIFIED (1993) REPUTATION EFFECTS WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC MODELS. OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, 45 (1). pp. 42-57. ISSN 0030-7653

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Abstract

We solve lor the reputational equilibrium in a class of linear quadratic, gaussian dynamic games with noisy control. This equilibrium is particularly simple to describe and tractable. There is imperfect monitoring but a sequential equilibrium is found where the uninformed agents always smoothly learn the type of the informed agent. Reputation effects are temporary in the infinite horizon case for positive discount rates; as the discount factor tends to unity there is a permanent reputation.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES
Publisher:	OXFORD UNIV PRESS UNITED KINGDOM
ISSN:	0030-7653
Date:	January 1993
Volume:	45
Number:	1
Number of Pages:	16
Page Range:	pp. 42-57
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/21296

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