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Political Party Development in Post-War Societies:

The Institutionalization of Parties and Party Systems in El Salvador and Cambodia

Jeroen de Zeeuw

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and International Studies

University of Warwick
Department of Politics and International Studies
February 2009
“Just as men bear all their lives the mark of their childhood, so parties are profoundly influenced by their origins”

Duverger, *Political Parties*, p.xxiii
# Contents

List of Tables, Boxes and Figures iv

List of Acronyms v

Acknowledgements x

Abstract xi

1 Introduction 1
1.1 Why Study Post-War Party Development? 1
1.2 Theoretical Foundations 3
1.3 Hypotheses and Research Questions 9
1.4 Research Design and Methods 12
1.5 Key Concepts 19
1.6 Chapter Outline 21

2 Parties and Party Systems in Established and New Democracies 23
2.1 Variety in Origins and Development of Political Parties 24
   Party Origins and Development in Established Western Democracies 26
   Party Origins and Development in the Developing World 30
   Conclusion 36
2.2 Functions, Organizations and Types of Political Parties 37
   Party Functions 37
2.3 Party Institutionalization 50
2.4 Interaction between Parties: The Party System 56
   Different Methods for Counting and Classifying 57
   Consolidated Party Systems 62
   Unconsolidated Party Systems 68
   Conclusion 73
2.5 Party System Institutionalization 76
2.6 Theoretical Explanations of Party and Party System Development 82
   The Electoral Competition Approach 83
   The Sociological Approach 85
   The Institutionalist Approach 87
   Evaluation of the Three Approaches 93
2.7 Conclusion 96

3 The Development of Parties and Party Systems in Post-War Societies 99
3.1 What the Conflict Literature Says –Or Doesn’t Say– About Political Parties 100
   Political Parties and Conflict Causation 103
   Political Parties and Conflict Settlement 109
   Political Parties and Post-War Transition 112
   Political Parties and Post-Conflict Democratization 117
   Conclusion 130
3.2 Post-Conflict Environments: Definition, Characteristics and Political Context 133
   ‘Post-Conflict’: An Accepted Misnomer? 133
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1 Political Parties: Different Backgrounds, Similar Gaps in Institutionalization</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 Party Systems: Different Make-Up, Similar Outcome</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 Impact of War...</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... On Parties</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... And On Party Systems</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4 Scope of Findings</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5 Conclusion</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Conclusion</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1 Main Findings</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2 Implications for Theory</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3 Implications for Policy and Practice</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4 Suggestions for Further Research</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix I Interview Strategies and Structure</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix II List of Interviews</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix III Election Results El Salvador, 1982 – 2006</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix IV Election Results Cambodia, 1993 – 2008</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix VI Total ODA Disbursements to Cambodia (USD million) (1991-2007)</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Tables, Boxes and Figures

Table 2.1 Functions of Political Parties 39
Table 2.2 Gunther and Diamond’s Typology of Parties 46
Table 2.3 Sartori’s Integrated Typology of Party Systems 72
Table 3.1 Selected Data on ‘Post-War’ (and ‘Lapsed Post-War’) Countries (1989-2008) 136
Table 3.2 Party Systems in Post-War Countries (1989-2008) 155
Table 5.1 Voter Registration and Turn-out in Cambodia (1993-2008) 275
Table III.1 Results Legislative Elections El Salvador (1982-1991) 350
Table III.2 Results Legislative Elections El Salvador (1994-2006) 350
Table III.3 Results Municipal Elections El Salvador (1994-2006) 351
Table III.4 Results Presidential Elections El Salvador (1984-1989) 351
Table III.5 Results Presidential Elections El Salvador (1994-2004) 351
Table IV.1 Results Parliamentary Elections Cambodia (1993 – 2008) 354
Table IV.2 Results Municipal Elections Cambodia (2002 – 2007) 355

Box 2.1. Classification for Consolidated Party Systems 64
Box 2.2. Classification for Unconsolidated Party Systems 69

Figure 4.1 Results Municipal Elections in El Salvador (1994-2006) 182
Figure 4.2 Results Legislative Elections in El Salvador (1994-2006) 183
Figure 4.3 Results Presidential Elections in El Salvador (1994-2004) 184
Figure 5.1 Results National Assembly Elections in Cambodia (1993-2008) 249
Figure 5.2 Results Commune Council Elections in Cambodia (2002-2007) 250
List of Acronyms

Text presented in italics provides the name in the original language.

ADB  Asian Development Bank
ADHOC  Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association
ALN  Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance
   *Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense*
ANEPI  National Association of Private Enterprise (El Salvador)
   *Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada*
ANS  National Sihanoukist Army (Cambodia)
   *Armée Nationale Sihanoukienne*
APC  All People’s Congress (Sierra Leone)
ARENA  Nationalist Republican Alliance (El Salvador)
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AV  Alternative vote
BLDP  Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (Cambodia)
BPR  Revolutionary Popular Block (El Salvador)
   *Bloque Popular Revolucionario*
BV  Block vote
CA  Constituent Assembly
CBC  Christian Base Communities (El Salvador)
   *Comunidades Eclesiasticas de Base*
CCE  Central Elections Council (El Salvador)
CD  Democratic Convergence (El Salvador)
   *Convergencia Demócrata*
CD  Democratic Change (El Salvador)
   *Cambio Democratico*
CDRI  Cambodian Development Resource Institute
CDU  United Democratic Centre (El Salvador)
   *Centro Democrático Unido*
CEC  Commune Election Committee (Cambodia)
CGDK  Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CPK  Communist Party of Kampuchea (Cambodia)
CPN-M  Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist
CPN-UML  Communist Party of Nepal–Unified Marxist Leninist
CPP  Cambodian People’s Party
COENA  National Executive Committee
COMFREL  Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia
CSJ  Court of Justice
   *Corte Suprema de Justicia*
DK  Democratic Kampuchea
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
EG  Encounter for Guatemala
   *Encuentro por Guatemala*
### List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EPRDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERP</td>
<td>People’s Revolutionary Army (El Salvador)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUEOM</td>
<td>European Union Election Observation Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberation (El Salvador)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FALANGE</td>
<td>Wars of Elimination Anti-Communist Liberation Armed Forces (El Salvador)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAPU</td>
<td>United Popular Action Front (El Salvador)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARN</td>
<td>Armed Forces of National Resistance (El Salvador)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARO</td>
<td>Agrarian Front of the Eastern Region (El Salvador)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDC</td>
<td>Forum for Democratic Change (Uganda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDR</td>
<td>Democratic Revolutionary Front (El Salvador)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FE</td>
<td>Faith and Hope party (El Salvador)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FES</td>
<td>Friedrich Ebert Stiftung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMLN</td>
<td>Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (El Salvador)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPL</td>
<td>Popular Liberation Forces (El Salvador)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>First-past-the-post</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Liberation Front of Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRETILIN</td>
<td>Revolutionary Front for an Independent East-Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Guatemalan Republican Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSLN</td>
<td>Sandinista National Liberation Front (Nicaragua)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FUSADES</td>
<td>Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development</td>
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<td>GPC</td>
<td>General People’s Congress (Yemen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>Hans Seidel Stiftung</td>
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<td>HRP</td>
<td>Human Rights Party (Cambodia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IADB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRI</td>
<td>International Republican Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUDOP</td>
<td>University Institute of Public Opinion</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAS</td>
<td>Konrad Adenauer Stiftung</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDP</td>
<td>Khmer Democratic Party (Cambodia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFP</td>
<td>Khmer Front Party (Cambodia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNP</td>
<td>Khmer Nation Party (Cambodia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPNLF</td>
<td>Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (Cambodia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPRC</td>
<td>Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPRP</td>
<td>Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (Cambodia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KR</td>
<td>Khmer Rouge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPOP</td>
<td>Latin American Public Opinion Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEMNA</td>
<td>Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly (Cambodia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LICADHO</td>
<td>Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP-28</td>
<td>Popular Leagues of 28th February (El Salvador)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUGUA</td>
<td>United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSTHA</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>MNR</td>
<td>National Revolutionary Movement (El Salvador)</td>
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<td>MOLINAKA</td>
<td>National Liberation Movement of Kampuchea (Cambodia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>member of parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPSC</td>
<td>Popular Social Christian Movement (El Salvador)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUDC</td>
<td>Democratic Christian Unification Movement (El Salvador)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADK</td>
<td>National Army of Democratic Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>Nepali Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCDS</td>
<td>Norwegian Center for Democracy Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Congress Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Election Committee (Cambodia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIFEC</td>
<td>Neutral and Impartial Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMD</td>
<td>Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMD</td>
<td>National Movement – Democrats (Georgia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRM/A</td>
<td>National Resistance Movement/Army (Uganda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRP</td>
<td>Norodom Ranariddh Party (Cambodia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official development assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUCA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Group in Central America</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORDEN</td>
<td>Nationalist Democratic Organization (El Salvador)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANIZ</td>
<td>Organización Democrática Nacionalista</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Acronyms

PAN  National Action Party (El Salvador)
     Partido Acción Nacional

PAN  National Advancement Party (Guatemala)
     Partido de Avanzada Nacional

PCN  National Conciliation Party (El Salvador)
     Partido de Conciliación Nacional

PCS  Communist Party of El Salvador
     Partido Comunista Salvadoreño

PCT–FDU  Congolese Labour Party – United Democratic Forces (Republic of Congo)

PD   Democratic Party (El Salvador)
     Partido Demócrata

PDC  Christian Democratic Party (El Salvador)
     Partido Demócrata Cristiana

PDK  Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia)

PDMC People’s Movement for Democratic Change (Sierra Leone)

PDPT People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan

PEC  Provincial Election Committee (Cambodia)

PFDJ People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (Eritrea)

PLC  Constitutionalist Liberal Party (Nicaragua)
     Partido Liberal Constitucionalista

PLD  Liberal Democratic Party (El Salvador)
     Partido Liberal Democrático

PNL  National Liberal Party (El Salvador)
     Partido Nacional Liberal

PPL  Popular Labour Party (El Salvador)
     Partido Popular Laborista

PPP  Pro-Patria [‘for the homeland’] Party (El Salvador)
     Partido Pro-Patria

PR   proportional representation

PRK  People’s Republic of Kampuchea

PRTC Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (El Salvador)
     Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centroamericanos

PRUD Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification (El Salvador)
     Partido Revolucionario de Unificación Democrática

PSD  Social Democratic Party (El Salvador)
     Partido Social Demócrata

PVM  Green Party of Mozambique

RENAMO Mozambican National Resistance
     Resistência Nacional Moçambicana

RPF  Rwandan Patriotic Front

RUF  Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)

SLPP Sierra Leone Peoples Party

SNC  Supreme National Council

SNTV Single non-transferable vote

SOC  State of Cambodia

SRP  Sam Rainsy Party (Cambodia)

SWAPO South West Africa People’s Organization (Namibia)
<table>
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>TRS</td>
<td>Two-round system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSE</td>
<td>Supreme Electoral Tribunal (El Salvador) <em>Tribunal Supremo Electoral</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDN</td>
<td>Nationalist Democratic Union (El Salvador) <em>Unión Democrática Nacionalista</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGB</td>
<td>White Warriors Union (El Salvador) <em>Unión de Guerreros Blancos</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCRO</td>
<td>United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIOSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
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<td>UNMIN</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Nepal</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor</td>
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<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor Leste</td>
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<td>UNMOT</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan</td>
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<td>UNO</td>
<td>United National Opposition (El Salvador) <em>Unión Nacional Opositora</em></td>
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<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USD</td>
<td>United States dollar</td>
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<td>VWP</td>
<td>Vietnam Workers’ Party</td>
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</table>
Acknowledgements

As in any major project, this study would not have been possible without the help and kind support of a large number of people. First of all, I owe thanks to my mom and brother, former colleagues at the Clingendael Institute and good friends such as Luc van de Goor and Krishna Kumar, who urged me to think about ‘doing a doctorate’ and have supported me throughout the research process.

At the University of Warwick I received a warm welcome by Richard Youngs and my supervisor, Peter Burnell. I am particularly grateful to Peter, whose extensive comments, intellectual guidance and always stimulating questions were not only invaluable, but also instrumental for the timely completion of this study. At Warwick I was also fortunate to have several good friends among fellow PhD students whose company helped keep me sane, and made my stay in this beautiful part of the UK an overall pleasant experience.

The two case study chapters in this thesis have benefited from the input, suggestions, feedback and other forms of support from a large number of people. I am grateful to all those interviewees in El Salvador and Cambodia listed in Appendix II, who kindly took time out of their busy schedules to provide their views and answers to my long list of questions. Second, I would also like to thank Loly de Zúniga, Geraldina Avelar, José Caballero, Caroline Hughes, Sorpong Peou and Tuy Chakriya who all helped me in tracking down contact persons and getting access to senior politicians in El Salvador and Cambodia. Thanks also to Christine Wade, Ralph Sprenkels, Roger Henke, Kim Sedara and Kristina Chhim who provided extremely useful comments on earlier drafts of the case study chapters. And I owe thanks to Martina Huber whose kind hospitality and friendship made my stay in crazy San Salvador an unexpected joy.

Finally, I am deeply grateful to Ananda van Wessel, whose support has been a crucial factor in the completion of this thesis. She has given up a lot during the past three and half years and patiently endured many of my research frustrations. Fortunately, she gladly accepted my ‘bribe’ to share the joys of travelling and join me on foreign adventures. Inspired by her love and happiness I know look forward to embarking on the next journey in our life.

Declaration of Authenticity

I declare that this thesis is my own work of research. To the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made. Moreover, this thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university, and is less than 80,000 words in length. In preparing this thesis, I followed the guidelines established in the Guide to Examinations for Higher Degrees by Research of the University of Warwick.

Jeroen de Zeeuw, Leamington Spa
February 2009
Abstract

Jeroen de Zeeuw

Political Party Development in Post-War Societies: The Institutionalization of Parties and Party Systems in El Salvador and Cambodia

This thesis argues that civil war has a significant, lasting impact on the formation, development and institutionalization of parties and party systems. Through in-depth examination of the cases of El Salvador and Cambodia it shows that dominant party systems and uneven institutionalization of individual political parties prevalent in post-war societies can to a not insignificant extent be attributed to war-related factors such as war-time origins of parties, the way in which war ended, the nature of the peace agreement, and post-war design of electoral, media and other public institutions.

Its focus on party and party system institutionalization is rooted in the Western-oriented party politics literature, which suggests that the nature of electoral competition, the impact of societal cleavages and the workings of formal political institutions are primary explanatory factors. By contrast, this thesis argues that in non-Western developing countries affected by civil war, war-related factors and post-war security, socio-economic and political conditions are equally if not more important for understanding post-war party development.

Through a structured focused comparison of party and party system institutionalization in El Salvador and Cambodia based on extensive interviews and field research, the thesis demonstrates that the war-time origins of the main Salvadoran and Cambodian parties have left a deep imprint on their organizational structures and leadership style, just as war-time political exclusion set the tone for unbalanced party competition after the war. Although El Salvador’s party system is more institutionalized than Cambodia’s and there are many other differences, there are also clear cross-national patterns of unequal individual party institutionalization and ruling party dominance that are a product of the war. Given that institutionalized parties and a competitive party system are important ingredients for a healthy democracy these findings are important for understanding the challenges and prospects of democratization in these and other post-war countries.
Introduction

This thesis argues that civil war has a significant, lasting impact on the formation, development and institutionalization of parties and party systems. The purpose of this introductory chapter is to show why the study of post-war party development matters, share the theoretical underpinnings of the study and the main questions that structured the research, introduce the research design and methods, and establish the key concepts that are used.

1.1 Why Study Post-War Party Development?

Political parties have a poor reputation, especially in places like Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nepal, Afghanistan, Guatemala and other countries that have experienced or are still experiencing long periods of major armed conflict. In such post-war societies, political parties are often associated with the monopolization and abuse of power, corruption and the incitement of (ethnic) hatred.

Yet, these same parties are also considered an important part of the solution to the conflict. Stable and representative political parties are vital for the development of a sustainable and democratic peace after civil war just as they are important to building representative democracy in its own right. They can
represent urgent popular demands, mediate in group conflicts and deliver and prepare the new leaders that are needed to address the huge post-war governance challenges. Considering the important role parties play in healthy democracies, it should therefore not come as a surprise that there has been growing attention in the academic and policy communities for ways to regulate party political behaviour and make party competition less conflict-prone.¹

What is surprising, however, is that there has been little attention to how political parties in post-war societies develop in the first place and what particular challenges they face. Until recently our understanding of political parties was mainly informed by the trajectories of party development in Western established democracies.² Only in the last two decades or so has there been more attention for party formation in the so-called ‘Third Wave’ or ‘new democracies’ of Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa.³ But the parties and party systems of countries ravaged by civil war in these regions have not received much attention.⁴ Systematic information about what influences party

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¹ See for example Reilly and Nordlund, *Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development*.
² Ware, *Political Parties and Party Systems*.
⁴ A notable exception is the work by Carrie Manning at Georgia State University, who has done a lot of work on the internal organizational challenges of rebel-to-party transformation in post-war societies. In contrast to this thesis, however, Manning’s research does not systematically assess alternative theoretical explanations to party formation and seems less interested in party and party system categorization. See Manning, “Party-building on the Heels of War: El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo and Mozambique”; and Manning, *The Making of Democrats. Elections and Party Development in Postwar Bosnia, El Salvador, and Mozambique*. 
development in post-war societies is lacking. This is all the more surprising given the fact that more than 50% of new democracies are post-war countries.\(^5\)

The primary aim of this thesis is to fill this gap in information and to explain how the post-war situation makes post-war party development so special. More specifically, it seeks to identify what factors are particularly important in the development of parties and party systems in post-war countries. By examining the cases of El Salvador and Cambodia, it explains how the main political parties emerged, assesses how institutionalized they are and evaluates the relevance of different causal explanations offered by the party politics literature.

Crucially, this study argues that although electoral competition, social cleavages and formal institutions matter there are other, war-related factors that are equally, if not more important. In doing so, it shows that war has a lasting impact on the formation, development and institutionalization of parties and party systems as well as on the behaviour and interactions of party leaders.

1.2 Theoretical Foundations

In an attempt to theorize post-war party development, this study builds primarily on two relatively separate literatures, namely the literature on party politics and the conflict and peace-building literature. Where relevant it also refers to the more specialized writings about international democracy promotion. Until recently there has been remarkably little exchange between these bodies of knowledge and scholars in one field do not usually engage with the questions raised in the other fields, or vice versa.

\(^5\) Bermeo, “What the Democratization Literature Says –Or Doesn’t Say– About Post-War Democratization”, p.159. See also chapter 3.
The party politics literature, for example, does not generally address the (violent) conflict potential of competitive elections and multi-party interactions in volatile situations, which is a topic of great concern to scholars working on post-conflict peace-building. Rather, studies in the field of party politics have focused on understanding the nature of political parties by comparing their organization, function and strategic behaviour in various geographical locations. This has led to different typologies of parties and party systems and produced sophisticated analyses about how parties relate to their voters, the state and other organizations. It has also highlighted the crucial role of political parties and other domestic actors in democratic transition and consolidation. More recently, attention has focused on how political parties adapt to increasing voter detachment and the changing socio-political context in many countries. Characteristically, however, most studies in this field focus on Western established democracies and the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, where civil war has been largely absent in the past fifty years. But even when the focus shifts to the parties and party systems of the new, more conflict-prone democracies of the Balkans, Caucasus, Latin America, Asia and Africa—as is

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6 See for example Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy. Dilemmas of Peacebuilding.
9 Katz and Mair, How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies; Webb, Farrell and Holiday, Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Societies.
increasingly the case—countries that have experienced civil war are often excluded from the analysis.

There are only a few studies that have explicitly recognized the importance of conflict history in explaining party development. Mohamed Salih, for example, indicates that the organizational structures, leadership and ambitions of former African liberation movements turned into political parties are still influenced by their conflict experience and “the ethos of the liberation ideology”. Similarly, analysts such as Manning and Allison refer to the distinct civil war backgrounds in rationalizing the differences in party system stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Mozambique, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. But these studies are exceptions and they do not explain how war and war-related factors impact on the growth and institutionalization of parties and party systems per se. In general, the party politics literature gives no systematic treatment to post-war societies and the arguments and theories put forward by it are predominantly based on Western, non-conflict experiences of party development. This thesis builds on those few studies that do take the distinct context of post-war countries seriously and focuses on the links between war and the origins, organization and institutionalization of political parties and party systems.

Similarly, analysts in the field of conflict and peace-building generally pay inadequate attention to the writings by party politics specialists about the effects of party organization and functioning on the stability and institutionalization of

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11 Allison, “The Transition from Armed Opposition to Electoral Opposition in Central America”; and Manning, “Party-building on the Heels of War”. 
party systems. Huntington, for example, already demonstrated in the 1960s that “by regularizing the procedures for leadership succession and [assimilating] new groups into the political system, parties provide the basis for stability and orderly change rather than for instability”.\(^\text{12}\) This conflict mitigating role of parties has been confirmed in a recent study, which argues that “the capacity of parties to manage incipient or actual conflicts depends crucially on the nature of the party system and the structure of individual parties”.\(^\text{13}\)

Nevertheless, most studies in the field of conflict and peace-building tend to ignore these nuances and highlight the dangers of political party competition, particularly in societies with deep ethnic divisions. Moreover, they argue that what is needed first and foremost in post-war societies is not political party development or democratization for that matter, but the development of a strong state that can provide security, ensure the rule of law and deliver basic services.\(^\text{14}\) Although this thesis will not examine the controversy about the conflict potential of party competition as such, it deserves mention here as it is one of the reasons why the international community has been reluctant to engage more actively with political parties in post-war peace-building processes.

Another characteristic of the conflict and peace-building literature is the strong focus on the role of international actors, including international peacekeepers, third-party mediators and regional organizations in ending

\(^{12}\) Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p.405.

\(^{13}\) Reilly, “Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies”, p.823.

\(^{14}\) Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War”; and Ottaway and Mair, *States at Risk and Failed States. Putting Security First*. For a critical review of this argument, see Carothers, “The Sequencing Fallacy”.
hostilities and creating a durable peace.\textsuperscript{15} To some extent this is logical as the international community has played a large role and has often had significant influence in post-war settings. However, the peace-building literature has given little attention to important domestic actors such as political parties, let alone analyzed the impact of international peacebuilding assistance on political party development. This is an omission that needs to be addressed, even if the findings of research only served to confirm that their importance is minimal. Therefore this study explicitly focuses on domestic actors and critically reviews the party political impact of international peacebuilding activities.

Finally, this thesis is also informed by the relatively new literature on international democracy promotion.\textsuperscript{16} Although this literature in general does not focus on post-war societies as such, it is an important source of information about the policies and practices of international aid agencies supporting processes of democratization and political party development in post-war settings. From this literature it has become clear that, until recently, only a handful of agencies were directly involved in specific ‘international party assistance’ activities, including the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS).\textsuperscript{17} Political sensitivities and the bad reputation of

\textsuperscript{15} See for example Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens, \textit{Ending Civil Wars. The Implementation of Peace Agreements}; and Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, \textit{Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict}.


\textsuperscript{17} See Carothers, \textit{Confronting the Weakest Link. Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies}, pp.78-82; Burnell, “Globalising Party Politics in Emerging Democracies”, p.6; and Burnell,
Introduction

parties in many places kept other democracy assistance organizations away from political parties and steered them in the direction of civil society instead. However, with the growing realization that civil society organizations alone have not provided the ‘magic bullet’ for democratization or peacebuilding and cannot substitute for political parties this attitude seems to have changed. Nowadays political parties are said to be back on the international policy agenda, where they are recognized as “a keystone of democratic governance”. Yet despite a significant number of lessons learned about party assistance, it remains clear that there is a “shortage of systematic knowledge about the impact of such assistance, particularly in post-conflict societies”.

This thesis seeks to contribute to the literatures outlined above in several ways. First, it aims to fill the gap in information in the party politics literature about parties and party systems in post-war countries. More specifically, by comparing the trajectories of party development in Western and non-Western democracies with the organizational development of political parties in countries affected by civil war, it will identify a specific set of conditions and factors that are largely unique to post-war countries. Second, the thesis makes an empirical contribution


20 Dervis, “Foreword”, p.v; and Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link, p.89.
21 Comment made by a senior NDI representative during an international expert meeting on ‘Political Party Assistance to Post-Conflict Societies’ organized by NIMD and the Clingendael Institute on 5 July 2007 in The Hague.
to both the party politics and conflict and peacebuilding literatures by taking a
closer look at previously understudied political parties in El Salvador and
Cambodia. Third, it will apply and evaluate the relatively new theoretical
concept of party institutionalization in two post-war settings by systematically
assessing and comparing the degree of development of the main political parties
in El Salvador and Cambodia. And finally, the thesis sheds light on several party
assistance programmes in El Salvador and Cambodia, which helps to expand the
knowledge base about the role of international actors in post-war party
development.

1.3 Hypotheses and Research Questions

The analysis in the following chapters is motivated by a number of assumptions
or hypotheses that need to be made explicit here. The first crucial assumption is
that war and the political conditions after civil war have a significant influence
on the organization, functioning and interaction of individual parties in post-war
societies. This stems from a belief that the post-war socioeconomic and political
context in these countries is fundamentally different from non-war established
and new democracies and that this context matters for post-war party
development. It is also grounded in the idea that war can be seen as a
“historically defining moment”, which can have an independent effect on how
parties and party systems subsequently develop and institutionalize.\textsuperscript{22} Although we can never know the counterfactual and it is virtually impossible to establish that the nature of party politics in post-war societies is a direct consequence of the war, this study attempts to demonstrate that key aspects of parties’ organizational structures and their behaviour in the political arena today have persisted since their founding during the period of war and war resolution. In other words this study is rooted in the belief that party development in post-war societies is significantly path dependent.\textsuperscript{23}

Existing theories of party development do not take into account this specific historical context and generally do not pay attention at all to parties and party systems in non-Western developing countries with a history of civil war. Based on the experiences of (early) party development in Western established democracies, the party politics literature emphasizes the role of electoral competition, the influence of socioeconomic cleavages and the impact of formal political institutions in party and party system development.\textsuperscript{24} This study shows that these factors are also important in countries that experienced civil war, but that they cannot fully explain why certain post-war parties are more institutionalized than others and why most post-war party systems are dominated by one or two strongly institutionalized parties.

\textsuperscript{22} This is based on of the core arguments by Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner in their seminal 1960s volume about world-wide party development. They argue that certain historical-situational developments or ‘crises’ “not only provide the context in which political parties first emerge but also tend to be a critical factor in determining what pattern of evolution parties later take”. LaPalombara and Weiner, \textit{Political Parties and Political Development}, p.14.

\textsuperscript{23} For a discussion of path dependency and its grounding within historical institutionalist theory see Peters, \textit{Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New’ Institutionalism}, pp.71-86.

\textsuperscript{24} See for example, Duverger, \textit{Political Parties}; and Lipset and Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments”.
Introduction

Therefore what is needed is an approach that is more sensitive to the unique civil war background of post-war societies. This thesis argues that there are important war-related factors, which carry at least as much, possibly more weight in explaining the institutionalization of post-war parties and party systems. Such factors include, for example, the war-time origins of parties, the way in which the war ended (military victory or peace agreement), and the design of post-war institutions. The second major hypothesis of this thesis therefore holds that an historical-institutionalist perspective that takes into account the war-related dynamics of party development can complement mainstream theories of party politics that rely on election competition, class-based socioeconomic cleavages and formal political institutional factors and fail to fully capture the institutionalization of party politics in post-war societies.

To operationalize the hypotheses, the following research questions will guide the analysis:

- What historical, political-institutional and socioeconomic factors (both domestic and international) have influenced political party development in various parts of the world, how and to what effect?
- What most clearly distinguishes post-conflict developing countries from other countries with regard to the development of political parties and party systems?
- To what degree are parties and party systems institutionalized in post-conflict countries, and what explains the degree of institutionalization?
- Why are dominant party systems so prevalent in post-conflict countries, and which strategies of parties to become or remain dominant can be distinguished?
Introduction

- To what extent and how has engagement by the international community contributed to party development and institutionalization?
- What is the impact of war on the organization and functioning of parties and party systems?

An obvious additional research question would have centred on the implications of party institutionalization and one-party dominance for political stability and democratization in post-conflict countries. Given that it seems reasonable to presume that dominance by one party or highly unequal institutionalization between various parties in the long term has a negative impact on democratization, such questions certainly deserve further study. However, when it comes to the study of post-war party politics, about which little is yet known, this for now is one step too far. The focus of this study is therefore primarily on the factors influencing the nature and institutionalization of post-war parties and party systems, not on the role or influence of parties and party systems on political stability or democratization. The next section will explain how the above research questions will be answered and what methods will be used for collecting the necessary data.

1.4 Research Design and Methods

To gain a better understanding of party development in post-war societies, this research uses the comparative method. Focusing on only a few cases (‘small-N’), this method has important advantages over the alternative statistical and

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25 See Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method”.
single case study methods and seems more appropriate for the specific focus of this thesis.

For example, the focus on a limited number of cases enables a more in-depth examination than is possible with the statistical method with its large-N design. The latter gives only scant attention to historical processes of change and country-specific explanations. By contrast, a small-N analysis can delve much deeper into the process of post-war party development and study the various factors that influence it in greater detail. The richer data resulting from this analysis is particularly useful for an unexplored field of study such as post-war party politics. Yet by focusing on a few cases it is still possible to identify cross-national patterns of post-war party development and highlight important variation. It also increases the possibility of generalizing conclusions, at least to some extent. This is not possible with the single case study approach.

Focusing on a small number of cases is also more feasible in an area of study about which little information or theory yet exists. The almost complete absence of reliable data on post-war parties and countries makes it extremely difficult to use a large-N statistical method, despite the potential benefits that this method could have had for the topic of study.26 Although the empirical part of this research required extensive field work and foreign language training, this still compared favourably with the data and time needed for compiling a comprehensive quantitative dataset.

26 A statistical analysis of the total number of post-war cases would not only have allowed for better control of variables and the detection of ‘deviant’ cases, but would also have enabled, at least potentially, stronger inferences that have a wider applicability. See Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles. Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics.
The specific comparative strategy used is that of a ‘most different systems design’ with El Salvador and Cambodia as the two case studies. Arguably, two cases may not be an ideal number but it is appropriate to the formal constraints governing a research project of this nature. The objective of this strategy is “to identify those features that are the same among different countries in an effort to account for a particular outcome”. The main reason for choosing this strategy, and not the alternative ‘most similar systems design’, lies in the difficulty of finding similar post-war cases. In addition, the most different systems design has the advantage of making generalizations of findings to other post-war countries easier.

El Salvador and Cambodia are two post-war countries that diverge in several important areas, including historical context, culture, socioeconomic development as well as geographic location. However, they share the more or less same outcome of an unbalanced party system that is dominated by one highly institutionalized political party. By identifying the key factors that account for this same outcome in these two very different cases this research makes it possible to learn more about what determines post-war development, not only in El Salvador and Cambodia but also in the many other post-war cases that share this outcome. In other words, political parties and party systems are treated as the dependent variables in this research. Independent variables include factors already highlighted in the party politics literature, namely electoral competition, socioeconomic cleavages and formal political institutions, as well as new (war-

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related) factors such as international engagement, the war-time origins of parties, the way in which the war ended, and post-war institutional design.

There are, however, two main methodological risks with this research design. One is that there are more variables than cases, which if not addressed makes hypothesis-testing impossible. The other is selection bias, which potentially limits the validity of conclusions.\textsuperscript{28} Although these problems cannot be completely avoided, this research tries to mitigate them by employing the methods of structured focused comparison and process tracing as well as by identifying the wider universe of post-war cases and carefully choosing case studies from it.

Structured focused comparison refers to the use of standardized, general questions that are asked of each case.\textsuperscript{29} Here this is done by assessing all the main political parties in El Salvador and Cambodia on the same four dimensions of party institutionalization and examining the same potential causal factors for party and party system institutionalization in the two cases. This not only increases the number of observations of post-war party development but also facilitates a cross-national comparison with more generalisable conclusions. Process tracing helps to make sense of the large number of variables by identifying the causal process between independent and dependent variables within the two cases.\textsuperscript{30} Here, it is used to explain the different ways in which party and party system institutionalization in El Salvador and Cambodia is

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29 George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison”.

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related to the war and post-war context of each country. Finally, the discussion about other post-war cases in chapter 3 gives an overview of the range of variation in post-war party and party systems. This makes it possible to identify unique and more representative cases.

The reasons for selecting El Salvador and Cambodia as the two main case studies are fivefold. First, El Salvador and Cambodia have party systems that are more or less representative of the range of party systems found in post-war societies. As is demonstrated in chapter 3, most post-war party systems can be categorized as dominant party systems that revolve around one highly institutionalized ruling party. With the strong ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) dominating the country’s political scene, Cambodia is one of the clearest examples of a dominant party system. At first sight, El Salvador’s party system seems slightly more balanced with two parties competing for power. In practice, however, the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) has clearly dominated El Salvador’s post-war period (at least until 2008).

A second reason for choosing El Salvador and Cambodia has to do with the relative political stability of these two post-war countries. Many of the other post-war cases are unsuitable for an in-depth assessment because their wars have ended only in the last few years or so and their parties and party systems have not had time to sufficiently crystallize. El Salvador and Cambodia, by contrast, were among the first post-war cases after the end of the Cold War. In both countries the main political parties have had more than 15 years to develop between the
end of the war and the most recent national elections, which allows for a more meaningful long-term assessment.  

Third, both El Salvador and Cambodia have had a particularly intense and long-drawn-out war, which has turned these countries into some of the most difficult settings for post-war party development. In El Salvador the war lasted for more than 10 years, claiming more than 75,000 lives and leading to the electoral exclusion of almost all left-wing political parties. In Cambodia, the period of war was spread out over more than 30 years, claiming more than 1.5 million lives and bringing party development almost to a complete stop. By choosing two of the most conflict-affected cases the research can highlight the influence of war-related factors more clearly.

A fourth reason for choosing El Salvador and Cambodia is because this allows us to study the role of international actors in post-war party development. In both countries there has been large-scale international involvement in the peace building process and international actors have actively engaged in elections and democratic reform that influenced party competition. More importantly, there has been significant direct international political party assistance in El Salvador and in Cambodia, unlike in other post-war cases. 

Finally, there has been relatively limited scholarly attention for the main political parties and party systems of these two countries. Although various aspects of the post-conflict reconstruction and democratization processes of El Salvador and Cambodia have been studied before, there is little systematic

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31 The period of study for party development in Cambodia starts with the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991 and ends with the country’s fifth national post-conflict elections in 2008. In El Salvador it starts with the Chapultepec Agreement in 1992 and ends with the country’s sixth national post-conflict elections in 2006.
information available about the development and institutionalization of their parties and party systems. This and the fact that both countries share the outcome of an unbalanced party system make El Salvador and Cambodia an interesting pair for comparison.

The material presented in this thesis comes from a variety of sources. The theoretical parts are based on a review and analysis of primary sources, including political party documents, party and news websites and official publications, as well as secondary sources, which include academic books and journal articles, and non-academic working papers, reports and survey data from think tanks and non-governmental organizations. An overview of all primary and secondary sources used is presented in the References at the end of the thesis. The empirical parts of this study are informed by more than 70 semi-structured interviews with party leaders and staff, government and electoral officials, civil society leaders, academic experts, and representatives of international agencies. Additional information has been obtained through informal conversations with a number of international country specialists and through observation of election campaign activities and party-related formal meetings. By checking the validity of research findings against a variety of sources (triangulation) I have attempted to make the account as reliable and comprehensive as possible. For an explanation of how the semi-structured interviews were designed, how methodological problems were addressed and who was interviewed see Appendices I and II.
1.5 Key Concepts

To minimize confusion it is helpful to define some of the concepts used in this thesis. The concept of political party is the most frequently used term and arguably in need of defining most because of its variety of meanings in different contexts and time periods. One of the most famous and widely used definitions is that by Edmund Burke, who defines a party as “a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed”. However, the emphasis on a shared ideology among party members in this definition does not seem to apply to most parties in non-Western, post-war societies –nor to some parties in contemporary Western democracies– that lack a clear ideological profile, have a much more fluid membership and operate on a more pragmatic, clientelist basis. A more minimalist definition that still captures the crucial representational function of political parties is more appropriate. This thesis therefore uses Giovanni Sartori’s definition: “a party is any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office”. A party system subsequently refers to a collection of parties competing with other parties in elections for the control of public office.

The term political party development is defined as the process through which a political party originates, evolves into an organized structure and becomes either more or less electorally accountable. It is important to note that in

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32 Burke, “Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents”, p.317.
34 See also Wolinetz, “Party Systems and Party System Types”. 
practice this is a non-linear, multi-dimensional process. A closely related concept is that of institutionalization, which is primarily used in the context of party and party system institutionalization. Following Randall and Svåsand’s analysis, it is here defined as “the process by which the party [or the party system] becomes established in terms both of integrated patterns of behaviour and of attitudes, or culture”.35 This concept is further elaborated in chapter 2.

When talking about political culture, this research refers to the predominant beliefs, attitudes and actions of political elites regarding their role and capacities within the political system of their country.36 It here particularly refers to the supposedly prevailing norm of authoritarian leadership of political elites in many post-war countries.

Finally, this research concentrates on post-war countries. These can be defined as countries that have concluded major armed conflict throughout their territory, which ended by a peace agreement signed by the main warring parties or a military victory by one of the warring parties.37 The term, which is used interchangeably with post-conflict countries, is further discussed in chapter 3.

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36 This is based on Coleman and Rosberg, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, p.662. See also Pye and Verba, Political Culture and Political Development.
37 Following the widely used definition of the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, major armed conflict or war is here defined as “a contested incompatibility, which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year”. See http://www.ucdp.uu.se.
1.6 Chapter Outline

This thesis is organized into seven chapters, including this introduction. The following chapter reviews the academic literature on party politics. It first highlights important differences in parties’ historical background in consolidated Western democracies and new democracies in the developing world. It then gives an overview of the functions, organizational structures and types of political parties and discusses some of the main theories and typologies devised by scholars to understand them. Chapter 2 also reviews the different methods and classifications for understanding party systems. The key concepts of party and party system institutionalization are introduced as useful analytical tools. It concludes by reviewing the main analytical approaches for explaining party and party system development.

Chapter 3 examines the conflict and peace-building literature and concentrates on parties and party systems in post-war countries. It examines the distinctive socioeconomic, political and security context of post-war countries and shows that there is wide variety. It also highlights the particular challenges for party development in these settings. The chapter discusses the different kinds of parties present in post-war countries. It does the same for party systems and then presents a unique classification of the party systems of all post-war countries. The final section briefly introduces the two case studies of El Salvador and Cambodia.

Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the post-war politics of El Salvador and Cambodia and use the concepts of party and party system institutionalization introduced in chapter 2. The two chapters have a similar structure. Each one
Introduction

traces the origins and ‘paths of development’ of the main political parties in the two case study countries. They also give an overview of the peace process and the results of post-war elections. Based on interview and field research findings, chapters 4 and 5 then assess the degree of party and party system institutionalization on a number of dimensions. Finally, both chapters compare the different degrees of party institutionalization and the nature of party competition against various theoretical explanations, and make an assessment of how much explanatory weight the different explanations actually provide in each case.

Chapter 6 pulls the case study findings together by outlining some of the key differences and similarities in terms of party and party system institutionalization in El Salvador and Cambodia. It also analyzes how war has impacted on individual parties and the overall party system. In addition, it revisits where the two cases belong in the bigger universe of post-war cases, and how the research findings of this thesis relate to other post-war countries.

Chapter 7 presents the main conclusions of the research. It highlights the major findings and compares them with the key hypotheses and research questions informing this thesis. It then identifies important implications of the research for theory and policy. The chapter concludes by proposing several suggestions for future research.

Finally, appendices I, II, III, IV, V and VI provide important background material about interview strategies and structure, the names and positions of people interviewed, the official electoral results as well as international assistance to El Salvador and Cambodia, respectively.
Parties and Party Systems in Established and New Democracies

In order to find out what makes post-war party development special, we first need to know more about the emergence of political parties in countries that have not recently suffered from civil war, or at least not in such large measure. This chapter therefore reviews the literature on political party development that has traditionally focused on the more established democracies of Western Europe and North America, and in recent years has been extended to the new democracies of Central-and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa.

The analysis in this chapter is structured around five basic questions: when, why and under what conditions did political parties emerge? (section 2.1); how did they organize themselves? (section 2.2); and what patterns of interaction between different political parties can be distinguished? (section 2.4). The answers to these questions on party development, party function, party organization and party systems provide some of the key themes in the current literature on party politics. The chapter also introduces the concepts of party and party system institutionalization (sections 2.3 and 2.5) and discusses the various analytical approaches that have been used to explain them (section 2.6).
The extensive literature review below helps identify the main theories and concepts of previous research on party development that can assist the empirical investigation in this thesis. Moreover, it provides an understanding of party development in ‘non-war’ contexts—a sort of ‘control group’ if you like—that will serve as an important point of reference when analyzing party development in post-war societies later on.

2.1 Variety in Origins and Development of Political Parties

The academic literature on party politics has traditionally focused on the experiences of a limited group of Western countries, which reflects the belief among political scientists that West-Europe and North America are the ‘heartlands’ of political party development and democratization. As a consequence, much of this literature concentrates on parties in Britain, France, Germany and the United States. Closely related to the interest in the ‘third wave of democratization’ and the role of political parties in consolidating democracy, there has recently been a growing interest in the study of parties in Latin

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Parties and Party Systems in New and Established Democracies

America, Central-and Eastern Europe, and to a somewhat lesser extent, also Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa.⁴⁹

The early to mid-twentieth century literature on party politics focused mainly on how political parties and party systems in those countries originated and how they subsequently developed, both organizationally and programmatically.⁴⁰ The recent academic literature pays more attention to the various types of parties and party systems, their functioning in elections, as well as their linkages with other political institutions, notably the state. Other recent topics of study include the funding of political parties and their apparent ‘decline’ in the current age of globalization.⁴¹

Many of the recent comparative studies have indicated that not only are there large differences between political parties in different regions of the world, but also that there is a large variation in how parties emerged and developed.⁴² The next section will highlight some of the main geographical differences in party development. For the sake of argument this chapter makes generalizations about regional experiences and/or ‘paths’ of party development. However, it is

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important to remember here that in the end each political party is a unique product of its own historical, political, socioeconomic, and cultural background.

Party Origins and Development in Established Western Democracies

Organized political parties in West-Europe and North America roughly date back some 150 years. Before that, there were loosely structured political factions organized around a set of singular, narrow interests. In countries like Britain, France, Germany and the United States, political parties – at least in the form of structured groups of people sharing and representing certain societal interests and competing for government power in competitive elections– did not emerge until the mid-nineteenth century. At the time political parties developed in response to the needs of national governance systems that were changing from loosely organized smaller regions to bigger and more structured nation-states. In order to account for the adequate representation of the broad range of interests of people living in the new West-European and North American states, these states required an institution that could link “voters to political office-holders and hold those in power accountable to the mass electorate”. By unifying a group of leaders that could represent the population, channel their interests and by being elected into public office could put their ideas into practice, political parties proved to be the most appropriate vehicles for interest representation and government formation. Yet, largely as a result of the particular country context, the parties that emerged developed in different ways.

In the United States, for example, the earliest political groupings such as the Federalists and Jeffersonian Democratic Republicans emerged in the eighteenth century as a reflection of opposing views over what the new nation should look like, over how power should be distributed and over how the federation of states should be run. At first, the American parties consisted of loose, weakly organized and rather elitist structures that were nevertheless capable of representing a large variety of societal interests.\(^{45}\) This changed in the early nineteenth century, when the electorate expanded significantly and party competition increased. To help mobilize the new voters, the two parties established ‘party machines’ that were able to recruit large numbers of party activists with various incentives, including jobs and other party-channelled favours.\(^{46}\)

In Britain, structured political parties did not materialize until the Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867, which widened the franchise and enabled the electorate to grow significantly. This caused the elitist and loosely structured political groupings in parliament, the then Tories (the predecessor of the Conservative Party) and the Whigs (the predecessor of the Liberal Democrat Party), to create electoral committees to register party supporters among the electorate and to form extra-parliamentary organizations to attract new party members outside parliament. It also led to introduction of ‘party whips’, which helped foster greater party discipline needed for garnering majority support in votes over important policy decisions. However, universal suffrage was not introduced in Britain until 1928.\(^{47}\)

\(^{46}\) Ware, *Political Parties and Party Systems*, p. 91.
In Germany, the formation of political parties did not start until after the establishment of a parliament in the mid-nineteenth century and the formation of the Second Reich in 1871. The earliest German parties represented only a small elite in society, however. In contrast, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) that originated in 1863 represented the interests of a growing working class and is considered as one of the first examples of the ‘mass party’.

France shows a somewhat different picture to other European countries in that most of its early political parties did not depend on large memberships. Most of the groups that had consolidated themselves into parliamentary political parties after the Revolution of 1789 remained highly elitist, loosely organized and disapproved of party discipline and membership obligations. In addition, in nineteenth century France few people were allowed to vote and “the election took place (...) amongst gentlemen”. Although this situation changed somewhat when suffrage was expanded in 1848 and finally extended to all adults in 1919, most French political parties did generally not develop a mass party organization and establish closer links with voters until after the Fifth Republic of Charles de Gaulle (1958-1969).

There are a number of factors that influenced the emergence and development of political parties in Western Europe and the United States. A first important factor was the introduction and gradual extension of the right to vote (suffrage) to the wider population. According to some scholars, the resulting growth in the electorate increased the formal responsibilities of the legislature

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which, in turn, gave rise to the formalization of parliamentary groups representing certain interests.\textsuperscript{51} The second important factor was ‘parliamentarization’, which refers to the process whereby national assemblies gained increasing influence and control over the executive branch of government. This latter factor has been highlighted by those who argued that political parties grew out of parliamentary groups. According to this view parties’ formal structures evolved as a result of competition with other parties to gain the votes of a growing electorate.\textsuperscript{52} Although there is a debate in the literature over the exact influence of each of the two factors, there is a general consensus that both factors strongly influenced early party development in Europe and the United States.\textsuperscript{53}

Where suffrage and parliamentarization played an important role in early party development, industrialization and urbanization were important factors in later party development in the early and mid-twentieth century. The growth of political parties and the consolidation of the early British two-party system, for example, was particularly influenced by the emergent national press, new and improved transport facilities, the simple majority electoral system, the introduction of party manifestoes and changing patterns of employment (from agricultural to industrial labour) related to the processes of industrialization and urbanization at the end of the nineteenth century. Seeking better working-class representation in a parliament dominated by Liberals and Conservatives, various


British trade unions in 1900 established the Labour Representation Committee (LRC), which later became the Labour Party.\textsuperscript{54}

Needless to say, not all political parties in the West have undergone the same evolutionary process of party development as described above. Over time, each country has had a variety of political parties with a broad range of organizational, electoral and/or ideological characteristics. In addition, in some West- and South European countries party development has been seriously hampered by wars, authoritarian rule and legal provisions restricting organized political activities. And finally, in East- and Central Europe party development has been heavily shaped by the different varieties of communist rule.\textsuperscript{55}

Important to note here is that in the majority of Western countries political parties have mainly been affected by changes in their domestic political settings. This stands in sharp contrast to the situation in non-Western developing countries, to which we will now turn.

\textit{Party Origins and Development in the Developing World}

Compared to party development in the Western world, political parties in regions such as Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa are of a much more recent origin and typically have not benefitted from decades of parliamentary experience. In Latin America there is a somewhat longer history of party politics. However, in all

\textsuperscript{54} Industrialization played a particularly important role in stratifying British society in different social classes, making class divisions the dominant factor shaping British politics at the time. See Fisher, \textit{British Political Parties}, p. 4 and pp.9-10; and Ball, \textit{British Political Parties}, p.27 and p.47.

three developing world regions the political, economic and socio-cultural context is fundamentally different from Western societies.\footnote{The ‘developing world’ refers to countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and the Middle East that generally score low to medium on the United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI). The term is admittedly problematic because of the large political, socioeconomic and cultural variety of the countries in these regions, but is used here for lack of a better term. See also Burnell and Randall, \textit{Politics in the Developing World}, pp.2-3.}

In political terms, many of the sovereign states in developing countries are fairly new and gained their independence from colonial administrations only in the last half century or so. The political parties that emerged in these countries have been profoundly affected by these external forces. Economically, the majority of developing countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, have not experienced the same level of growth as countries in Europe and North America. As a result, economic factors such as industrialization and technological development have not (yet) had the same impact on party development as in the West. And finally, developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have different political, social, religious and other norms than Western countries that reflect their unique history and cultural heritage.

These different conditions, in combination with the immense cultural and historical variation of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America make it much more difficult to come up with a generalized theory of party development for these regions. Extrapolating the emergence of political parties from the experiences of a few major countries in each region –let’s say South Africa, Brazil, or India– seems inappropriate as well, as these countries are not wholly representative of the different political systems found in those areas. Moreover, it
would not do justice to the sheer variety of origins, forms and structures of political parties found within Asia, Latin America and Africa.

Another problem that hinders the analysis is the lack of detailed knowledge about political parties and party systems in these regions, especially in Southeast Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa. In contrast to the scholarly attention for all aspects of Western parties, there are few systematic studies on the party politics of Southeast Asian and African countries, even by scholars hailing from these regions.\textsuperscript{57} And although there is an emerging literature on non-Western party politics that is careful not to be Euro- or ethnocentric, many of the concepts and references used in this literature are still taken from analyses of Western party development. In addition, so far there has been no alternative body of literature or single generally accepted theory about party politics in developing countries. The latter does not necessarily have to be a problem, as long as we are aware that the context for party development and the nature of political parties themselves can be very different in the various regions. The next paragraphs identify some of the most distinctive features of (early) party development in each of the three main developing regions.

Latin America has some of the oldest political parties and party systems in the world. But because of the strong influence of (Spanish) colonial rule as well as the region’s diverse cultural heritage and historical experience, political systems have often been shaped in different ways than in Europe and/or North America. Currently, most countries in Latin America are either consolidated democracies or are in a process of political flux. In both situations, political

Parties play a crucial role. Though many of them have remained weak, elitist and clientelistic, overall, political parties in Latin America have institutionalized significantly over the last four decades. Nevertheless, the political influence of parties varies heavily per country, and particularly in Central America, this is not always very high. This has partly been attributed “to parties’ relations with other institutions in the political system”, in particular the military that has played a long-lasting and dominant role in Latin American politics. In addition, countries in Latin America differ in the degree to which party competition has become institutionalized with some highly institutionalized party systems in countries like Costa Rica and Uruguay and less institutionalized systems such as in Peru and Bolivia.

Asia is probably the most diverse of the developing regions, not only in demographic and socioeconomic terms, but also when it comes to its political context. The political regimes found in this region vary from the liberal democracies of Japan and Taiwan, the ‘soft-authoritarianism’ of Singapore and Malaysia, to the communist regimes of China and Vietnam and the military dictatorship of Burma/Myanmar. Similar to Africa, many Asian countries are known for their distinct (political) culture, comprising among others a group or communal orientation, the extensive use of religion in daily life, and affinity with more ‘managed’ or authoritarian-led government, together often captured under

59 Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions, p.1.
the ill-defined concept of ‘Asian values’. With regard to political party development, political parties in Asia are a much more recent phenomenon than in West-Europe, North and Latin America. With the exception of a few ‘stable’ political parties like Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) and Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that originated during the 1940s and ‘50s, or the Communist parties of China and Vietnam that go back even as far as the 1920s and ‘30s, the majority of parties in Asia are still relatively young, weakly institutionalized and not very programme-oriented.

Sub-Sahara Africa is the region where the development of political parties is probably furthest removed from the West-European or North American experience, in the sense that the wider socioeconomic and political context differs markedly from most Western societies. Despite the impressive economic and technological progress made by some African countries, most of the continent has experienced limited economic growth and industrialization. The majority of households lives in the rural areas and survives on subsistence farming. In addition, the political context in many African societies is characterized by weakly institutionalized states run on a non-bureaucratic, ‘neo-patrimonial’ form of governance. Although there are a few notable exceptions, the origins of most African political parties lay in the period of decolonization.

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61 For further discussion on the ‘Asian values’ debate, see Inoguchi and Newman, “Introduction: Asian Values and Democracy in Asia”; and Diamond and Plattner, Democracy in East Asia.
64 Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works. Disorder as Political Instrument; and Thomson, An Introduction to African Politics.
after the Second World War. Therefore, in contrast to their Western counterparts, the majority of African political parties are only several decades old.

Before the period of decolonization, African party development was rather limited as several key conditions for political mobilization and party formation, such as competitive elections, suffrage and parliamentary representation either did not exist or were restricted under European colonial administrations. Because of this, a lot of African parties did not emerge from domestic political pressures, but emerged in response to what was increasingly perceived as the repression by Western, imperialist powers. Several of the most prominent African political parties that emerged during the 1950s and ‘60s can directly be traced to national liberation movements aimed at achieving independence from the European colonial authorities. Other important factors that influenced party development in Africa were the relatively late introduction of universal suffrage as well as the contacts between new African political movements and reformist intellectuals in France, the Arab-Muslim world, the USSR, Britain and the US.

Regarding the nature of party politics in the developing world, a number of general characteristics can be distinguished. Notwithstanding important country variations, developing world politics has for a long time been characterized by

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65 The True Whig Party in Liberia (founded in 1860) and the African National Congress in South Africa (founded in 1912) are two of the African parties that existed before colonial times.
single-party, military or one-party dominant rule. Particularly in African and Asian societies these uncompetitive forms of politics were often justified by distinct political ideologies. Other common features of party politics in the developing world include the personalization of power by party leaders and presidents; the limits placed on the role of interest groups, especially trade unions, both by the colonial authorities and the new post-independent rulers; the subordination of the party to the state; the use of clientelist networks in mobilizing party support; and, particularly in the African context the emergence of parties based on ethnic cleavages.

**Conclusion**

Party development in established Western democracies has been heavily influenced by the introduction and extension of suffrage, parliamentarization, and several technological developments including industrialization. Moreover, Western parties and party systems have been consolidated over a long period of mostly stable electoral competition. The development of political parties and party systems in Latin America, Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa has been subject to forces internal as well as external to their political context. Colonial administration, in combination with periods of military rule and civil war, have in many cases been restraining factors on the emergence and institutionalization of competitive party politics in these regions. Due to the absence in several developing countries of political institutions such as parliaments and competitive

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elections until the mid-twentieth century, political parties have often played a marginal role in the decision-making process, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Late industrialization and low levels of economic development have further impeded the growth of parties. The result is a diverse picture of party development in the developing world with some significant differences from Western experiences.

2.2 Functions, Organizations and Types of Political Parties

Having highlighted the variety in origins and development trajectories of political parties around the world, the next important step is to see what functions parties perform in different contexts. Related to this is the nature of party organization and the different types of parties that can be distinguished on the basis of organizational structure and other important criteria.

Party Functions

Political parties perform a number of functions. Some theorists have clustered the main functions per arena in which parties operate while others have provided a more general overview of functions represented by parties across the world. In general, parties play a crucial role in articulating, aggregating and representing

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70 Randall and Svåsand, for example, distinguish between functions of parties oriented towards the electorate, functions of parties that link the electorate to the government or state and parties’ functions related to government. According to Gunther and Diamond, universal party functions include candidate selection, mobilization of supporters, issue structuring, group representation, aggregation of interests, government formation and political participation. Randall and Svåsand, “Introduction: The Contribution of Parties to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation”, p. 4; and Gunther and Diamond, “Types and Functions of Parties”, pp. 7-8.
the demands and interests of individual voters. They also recruit and train candidates for public office. And they hold the government accountable for its policies and actions. All of these functions are considered crucial for the maintenance of a democratic political system and are therefore core tasks of political parties in new and established democracies. This means that political parties are indispensable in a democratic political system. For many, “political parties created democracy and (...) modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties”.

However, in many emerging democracies, including most post-war countries, there is as yet no established democracy to be maintained. There, a democratic political system first needs to be created and the functions of parties might not be the same therefore. Moreover, it is likely that in these settings there are other functions that are more important in the short term. This has been reflected in studies that emphasized the role of political parties in fostering political stability, national integration, and/or nation- and state-building. Of special interest is the analysis of authors that have highlighted the conflict management role of parties. Reilly, for instance, indicates that “because they channel, aggregate, and express political demands, political parties play an important role in the management of conflict in societies divided along cultural, linguistic, religious, regional or other lines”. In a similar fashion, Burnell says that “in divided societies seeking to establish democracy out of the ruins of

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violent conflict, interest aggregation is one of the most vital public goods that can easily be undersupplied".74

Suffice to say here that different authors have identified different functions of parties, as summarized in table 2.1 below. The relevance of each function in a particular context depends on the overarching aim (democratization, nation-building, conflict management) that parties are trying to achieve –or should be aiming at. However, it may also depend on the perspective that analysts are trying to impose on the analysis. In some cases, parties or their leaders may not be motivated by any grand public service objectives, but are simply trying to achieve power. Attributing certain functions to parties might then be more a question of what the analyst reads into them than reflecting parties’ actual function(s).

Table 2.1 Functions of Political Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of function</th>
<th>Main proponents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>representation of popular demands</td>
<td>Key (1964), Diamond (1999), Dalton and Wattenberg (2000), Gunther and Diamond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integration of voters into political system</td>
<td>(2001), Randall and Svåsand (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aggregation of interests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recruitment and training of political leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>making government accountable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizing opposition</td>
<td>Gunther and Diamond (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nomination of candidates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mobilization of electoral supporters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>structuring societal and policy issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state- and/or nation-building</td>
<td>Huntington (1968); Coleman and Rosberg (1966); LaPalombara and Weiner (1966)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>creation of political stability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political communication between people and government</td>
<td>Tordoff (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>providing benefits in exchange for electoral support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unite social groups and contributing to societal cohesion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democratization of global governance</td>
<td>Scholte (2006)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Party Organization

In order to perform its various functions a political party needs a structure as well as human and financial resources. This is normally referred to as the party organization and includes the various organizational organs of a party, its rules and regulations, its financial resources, its cadre, supporters, members and activists, and its linkages with other institutions. The study of organizational aspects of parties has a long history and is usually associated with the work of four authors.

The first is Mosei Ostrogorski whose work dates from the beginning of the twentieth century. Ostrogorski highlighted the growing influence of ‘party machines’ and caucuses of senior party leaders as organizational mechanisms for collective interest representation, particularly in the United States and Britain. This was followed by the work of Roberto Michels, who after analyzing the organizational structure of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Germany concluded that the specialist knowledge and interests of party leaders ensures their domination over rank-and-file supporters. According to Michels any type of organization will eventually controlled by a small elite (‘iron law of oligarchy’).

A few decades later, Michel Duverger made the first typology of parties based on their organizational structures. Distinguishing between parties that are unitary (direct structures) and parties that are an amalgamation of different organizations (indirect structures), he identifies four basic organizational

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75 Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties*.

‘elements’ from which parties are formed: the caucus, the branch, the cell and the militia. Duverger concludes that, despite the large variety in existing party organizations, there has been a general transformation from elite parties based on restricted caucuses to mass parties with a more open branch structure.\textsuperscript{77}

The most recent and most comprehensive examination of party organization is that of Angelo Panebianco. In contrast to Duverger and others who argued that the structure and form of party organizations is determined by the competition for votes, Panebianco traces the organizational structure to the origins of the party and its early development. According to his ‘genetic model’ of party organization, the formation of a ‘dominant coalition’ (party elite) and the degree of internal cohesion are influenced by the way in which a party grows –from the centre to the local level, vice versa or a combination of the two. Moreover, he argues that the presence or absence of an ‘external sponsor institution’ and charismatic leadership are important variables in early party development.\textsuperscript{78} In the subsequent control for power within the organization, selective and collective incentives are said to play a key role. Selective incentives are ‘private goods’ that consist of jobs, money, patronage, prestige, which aim to recruit and retain party

\textsuperscript{77} Duverger referred to this organizational transformation as “contagion from the left”. See Duverger, \textit{Political Parties}, p. xxvii and pp. 4-40; and Ware, \textit{Political Parties and Party Systems}, pp. 94-97.

\textsuperscript{78} Panebianco distinguishes between a situation wherein the central organization creates local and intermediate party associations (‘territorial penetration’) and a situation wherein local elites and small associations integrate into a national organization (‘territorial diffusion’). In his view, parties that develop through territorial penetration have a cohesive centre of relatively few party leaders with strong and centralized control over the wider party organization. Party organizations developing through territorial diffusion are generally more decentralized with a larger, less cohesive group of party leaders that is divided by a constant struggle for power and control. Panebianco, \textit{Political Parties: Organization and Power}, pp.51-53.
leaders and party activists. Collective incentives, on the other hand, are ‘public goods’ such as appeals to identity, solidarity, ideology, and even fear.\textsuperscript{79}

By underscoring the importance of the formative phase for a party’s current functioning, organization and power configuration, Panebianco’s analysis of party organization is strongly path-dependent. In his words: “the crucial political choices made by its founding fathers, the first struggles for organizational control, and the way in which the organization was formed, will leave an indelible mark”. His analysis is particularly interesting from a political studies point of view because of his emphasis on “explaining the functioning and activities of organizations [as well as the changes they undergo] above all in terms of alliances and struggles for power amongst the different actors that comprise them”.\textsuperscript{80} Together with the origins and historical development of parties (the ‘genetic model’), the intra-party dynamics between followers and party elites not only determine the type of party organization, but also influence the degree of party institutionalization according to Panebianco (see below).

Despite his focus on Western European parties, Panebianco’s genetic model and power analysis is highly relevant for studies that aim to investigate the relationship between the origins of parties, their subsequent organization and functioning. Considering the explicit aim of this thesis to relate post-war party organization to historical periods of conflict, Panebianco’s operationalization will therefore gratefully be used in this thesis.

\textit{Party Types}

\textsuperscript{79} Panebianco, \textit{Political Parties}, pp.9-10.

\textsuperscript{80} Panebianco, \textit{Political Parties}, pp. xii-xiii.
In order to study the main characteristics of political parties, political scientists have developed numerous party typologies or party models. In this connection, the elite party, the mass party, and the catch-all (electoralist) party are most commonly used models in the literature.81

The *elite (or cadre) party* is characterized by its loose organizational structure with local autonomous party associations and no real central party office. Its core consists of a closed caucus of prominent individuals representing the party in public office. This is the party model associated with the early parliamentary parties that operated in late nineteenth century Britain, United States and some other West-European countries.82

The expansion of the franchise in the early twentieth century in most Western countries stimulated the emergence of another type of political party, the *mass party*. This party type is characterized by a more structured organization with a professionalized central office and local branches with dues-paying members. Moreover, political parties described by the mass party model were generally more ideologically oriented and had stronger links with ‘extra-parliamentary’ institutions, such as professional associations, trade unions or church groups.83

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The third model, the *catch-all party*, represents those parties that “originate from mass parties that have professionalized their party organization and downgraded their ideological profile in order to appeal to a wider electorate than their original class or religious social base”. The strong focus of these parties on winning votes across broad segments of the population on less strictly ideological and more interest-based political platforms, has led some scholars to define them as ‘electoralist catch-all’ or ‘electoral-professional parties’. Catch-all parties have emerged in many Western countries since the mid-twentieth century, handily making use of new technologies for mass communication such as radio and television. Nowadays, many if not most parties in established democracies are of the catch-all type, and characteristically they are arguably more interested in vote maximization than interest representation. They are also a common phenomenon in emerging democracies in non-Western countries.

It is important to emphasize here that all of the above-mentioned party models are ‘ideal types’ that by emphasizing the defining features of each specific party type serve as analytical tools for better understanding the differences between various parties. However, because of this these models also have their problems. First, their highly abstract nature is also their main weakness. Political parties throughout the world might share some of the traits of these models, but this does not necessarily mean that their characteristics exactly ‘fit’ all the main criteria of the particular model. We should therefore be extremely careful when categorizing real world parties as belonging to certain models, and not automatically assume that these parties will behave in the same

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way or develop in the same direction as their ideal type models presume they will.\textsuperscript{85}

Another problem with the distinction between elite, mass and catch-all parties is their almost exclusive focus on organizational aspects. Although the typology provides useful information on how parties belonging to a certain type normally emerge and are subsequently structured, it says little about the type of strategies used to mobilize supporters or the intra-party power struggles.

The final problem with the above mentioned typology lies in its narrow geographical basis. The three ideal types of parties were largely conceptualized in a Western-oriented analysis of party politics and therefore mainly reflect the experiences of party development in the United States and a small number of Western European countries.\textsuperscript{86} As described earlier, political parties in Africa, Latin America, Asia and other parts of the world have emerged and developed in different historical, socioeconomic, and political contexts with particular impacts on their organization and functioning. As a result, they defy easy classification on the basis of the above party types. In contrast to the relatively limited variety of Western political party types, research indicates that the situation is perhaps more complex and certainly more diverse in the developing world.\textsuperscript{87} A less

\textsuperscript{85}See also Montero and Gunther, who argue that typologies can be useful for the identification of parties’ distinguishing characteristics, but that their ideal-type nature can easily lead to methodological problems, such as an assumed sequencing and evolution of party types and an oversimplification of party characteristics. Montero and Gunther, “Introduction: Reviewing and Reassessing Parties”, p.15

\textsuperscript{86}Krouwel, “Party Models”, p. 249. The idea that the Western (European) experience of political party formation can be described as a unilinear developmental trajectory from elite-to-mass-to-catch-all party has been heavily criticized in the literature. See Katz and Mair, “The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office”, p. 114.

\textsuperscript{87}Randall, Political Parties in the Third World, pp. 175-183.
Western-centric, more inclusive analysis therefore requires a different typology that accounts for the great variation in party formation, organization and functioning in Latin America, Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa.

One typology that is specifically designed to do this is that by Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond. In addition to focusing on the degree of formal organization, their typology also takes into account the nature of the party’s programmatic commitment as well as its strategies and behavioural norms. The outcome is a typology of five party ‘genera’, including elite-based types, mass-based types, ethnicity-based types, electoralist types, and movement party types. Each of these types can be subdivided on the basis of their organizational, programmatic and strategic criteria, resulting in fifteen different ‘species’ or subtypes (see table 2.2 below).

Table 2.2 Gunther and Diamond’s Typology of Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Degree of organization</th>
<th>Programmatic commitment</th>
<th>Strategy / Behaviour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thick/mass</td>
<td>Thin/elite</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elite–based parties:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Traditional local</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>notable party</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Clientelistic party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mass-based parties:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Leninist party</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Class-mass party</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Pluralist-nationalist</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ultranationalist party</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Denominational party</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Fundamentalist party</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from recognizing and further specifying the main party types found in the established Western democracies, Gunther and Diamond’s typology also captures political parties found in non-Western countries. Parties resembling the ethnic congress party type, for example, can be found in India (Congress Party), Nigeria (People’s Democratic Party) and South Africa (African National Congress). In Africa, the (pluralist) ethnic congress party is said to be the most common type of political party. In contrast, parties belonging to the purely ethnic party type, which by definition is based on one ethnic group only, are much rarer. Examples include the Inkatha Freedom Party in South Africa and the (Sikh) Shiromani Akali Dal in India. The typology also enables the identification of personalistic parties whose “only rationale is to provide a vehicle for the leader to win an election and exercise power”.

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Gunther and Diamond’s typology is certainly not perfect, as they themselves honestly admit. Although it does pay attention to non-organizational criteria, their typology can, for example, not escape a bias in focus on organizational elements. In addition, their typology can be criticized for being too broad, too deterministic and still too Western-oriented. However, these criticisms seem slightly exaggerated. After all, only by being more comprehensive and less parsimonious can the limitations of the earlier tripartite typology be seriously addressed. Also, the use of genera of party types does assume a certain path-dependency, but this is not necessarily the same as being deterministic. Gunther and Diamond state that “a political party comes into existence within a specific social and technological context that may evolve over time, and this ‘founding context’ can leave a lasting imprint on the basic nature of the party’s organization for decades to come”. And finally, the use in Gunther and Diamond’s typology of certain labels and categories taken from the existing literature on Western parties should be seen as an attempt to bring the plethora of different typologies and their categories together, not as the application of a Western lens for looking at political parties in non-Western contexts. Exactly for

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93 Gunther and Diamond, “Species of Political Parties”, pp. 173-174. This underlines the importance of understanding a party’s origins, echoing Panebianco’s notion of the ‘genetic model’ of party organization and the path-dependent nature of party development. However, Gunther and Diamond are also careful to note that “neither do we assert that one party type is likely to follow a predictable trajectory, evolving into another type”. They subsequently give two reasons for why a transformation from one party type to another does not necessarily have to take place: “the basic nature of the party’s organizational structure may be ‘frozen’ and therefore become resistant to pressures for change” and “the relationship between social or technological change and the programmatic or strategic motivations of party leaders is much more tenuous or non-existent”.

these three reasons – the typology’s comprehensiveness, its recognition of path
dependency, and its integrated nature– this thesis will refer to some of Gunther
and Diamond’s party types when analyzing the organizational, programmatic and
strategic characteristics of some of the main political parties in post-conflict
developing countries.

It is important to make one caveat here, however. The use of a single
typology should not disguise the fact that political parties, as has been
highlighted before, are very distinct entities in different parts of the world.
Although we might be dealing in all cases with organizations that present
electoral candidates for public office, most political parties in Latin America,
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa differ significantly from parties in Western Europe,
the United States and other established democracies, not only in organizational
and ideological terms, but also in their strategies for gaining and maintaining
public support. The older ruling parties, such as the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico, the Kenya African National Union
(KANU) and the Ba’ath Party in both Syria and Iraq, for example, could be
classified as mass parties because of their extensive party organization with local
branches and a large network of (grassroots) supporters. In this view they would
resemble, at least in organizational terms, the classic mass parties of Western
Europe.

However, in reality these are of course elite-based organizations providing a
(semi-democratic) ‘party façade’ for different factions of powerful leaders that
often have limited direct links with grassroots members. Their programmatic
focus is often unclear and their ideological stance can generally not easily be

94 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, pp. 126-128.
measured in terms of the ‘left-right’ spectrum common in established democracies. In addition, because of the semi-democratic or non-democratic contexts in many African, Asian and Latin American countries, ruling parties often use a broad range of official and non-official strategies to compete for and maintain power in what are often flawed elections. Similarly, many of the smaller catch-all parties in Africa, Asia and Latin America that present themselves as ‘opposition’ parties provide no real programmatic alternative and are often nothing more than urban-based political vehicles for power-hungry leaders. Many of them lack the grassroots support and organizational capacity to maintain a political presence in between elections and are true ‘flash parties’, which emerge just before the elections, only to disappear soon after. In exceptional circumstances, as has apparently been the case during several past elections in Uganda, organizations posing as ‘opposition’ parties are in fact surrogates or ‘fronts’ for the ruling party.95 Whatever their exact nature, the essential point here is that ‘political parties’ can be very different sorts of organizations in different parts of the world.

2.3 Party Institutionalization

The mere existence of a political party as an organizational structure is usually not sufficient for it to perform its functions, whether it intends (or is supposed to) to manage societal conflicts or aims to contribute to democratic consolidation. In order to become functionally meaningful, a political party needs to transform

from an organization into an institution, i.e. its procedures and activities must become routinized and durable over time. This process of *institutionalization* has been defined in various ways, including “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability” and “the way the organization ‘solidifies’ (…) [and] becomes valuable in and of itself”. When focusing on the institutionalization of individual political parties, Randall and Svåsand’s definition captures not only structural-organizational but also attitudinal dimensions: “the process by which the party becomes established in terms both of integrated patterns of behaviour and of attitudes, or culture”.

Randall and Svåsand’s comprehensive analytical framework draws from the work of four authors who have written about (party) institutionalization. Huntington defined the political institutionalization of any group or procedure, including political parties, on the basis of four criteria or scales: adaptability-rigidity, complexity-simplicity, autonomy-subordination, and coherence-disunity. The logic being that the more adaptable, complex, autonomous and coherent a party is, the more institutionalized it is. Conversely, the more rigid, simple, subordinated and less unified, the lower its level of institutionalization. Panebianco identified two measures for party institutionalization, including a party’s degree of autonomy in relation to its environment and its degree of ‘systemness’, which refers to the internal coherence of the party organization.

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96 Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New Institutionalism’*, p.29; See also March and Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics*.
100 Panebianco, *Political Parties*, p.55.
Arguing that institutionalization does not solely concern the routinization of organizational aspects of a party, Levitsky argues that it is also important to look at ‘value infusion’, i.e. the extent to which a party becomes “infused with value beyond the technical requirement of the task in hand”. Finally, Janda draws attention to the external dimension of institutionalization, which refers to the societal perception of a party. After an in-depth comparison of these different conceptualizations, Randall and Svåsand propose a straightforward framework that outlines four central dimensions of party institutionalization covering the structural/attitudinal and the internal/external aspects of the process. Considering the importance of the concept of party institutionalization in this study, it is worth exploring Randall and Svåsand’s framework in greater detail.

Systemness is the structural-internal dimension of party institutionalization and refers to the “scope, density and regularity of interactions that constitute the party as a structure”. It captures both Panebianco’s measure of systemness and Huntington’s criterion of complexity. Systemness is said to be influenced by the origins and subsequent growth of a party, the resources (including funding) available to it, the relationship between party leader and party organization, the degree of factionalism and the degree of clientelism. These factors have usually impacted party development in developing countries differently than in Western (European) contexts. In the absence of dues-paying members, for example, many political parties in developing countries have had to rely on

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104 Randall and Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”, pp.13 and 17.
parties and party systems in new and established democracies

private or public sources of funding. Because of their incumbency and access to power, ruling parties have often relied on profitable links with business groups or used their clientelist networks for securing popular support during elections, or, indeed, used public resources directly. Opposition parties, however, usually lacked financial resources, unless they were able to secure the sponsorship of wealthy business men. The absence of a sustained and reliable source of income has negatively impacted on the organizational capacities of many political parties in the developing world, particularly in countries emerging from war as we shall see later.

The level of “freedom from interference in determining its own policies and strategies”, or decisional autonomy, is the second structural dimension of party institutionalization. It is an external aspect insofar as it says something about a party’s strength and position vis-à-vis actors outside its own structures. This is a slight adaptation of the autonomy criterion by both Huntington and Panebianco in the sense that it is more responsive to different possible forms of interdependence between parties and other actors. The two aspects said to influence decisional autonomy are the existence of linkages between the party and other actors, such as the state or civil society groups, as well as the presence of so-called ‘sponsoring institutions’. Traditionally, the latter include trade unions, professional associations or other extra-parliamentary institutions from which parties can draw support. More recently these have included diaspora groups and transnational party networks. Nevertheless, in many countries in
Africa and Asia, the linkages between parties and other civil society actors often remain limited and weak.\(^{105}\)

*Value infusion*, the third attitudinal-internal dimension, refers to “the extent to which party actors and supporters (..) acquire an identification with and commitment to the party which transcend more instrumental or self-interested incentives for involvement”. In the context of developing countries it is usually not class that is the key issue of identification, but other issues such as ethnicity, region, religion and/or language. The degree to which supporters therefore can identify with a political party very much depends on whether that party is recognized as representative of a particular ethnicity, religion or language. In addition, value infusion is also influenced by a party’s ability to use clientelist practices as “party support would be conditional on the expectation of tangible benefits to the individual or community”.\(^{106}\)

The fourth and final attitudinal-external dimension is *reification*. This refers to “the extent to which a political party becomes installed in the popular ‘imaginary’ and as a factor shaping the behaviour of political actors”. This covers Janda’s notion of the importance of party’s external relations. The degree of reification is said to be shaped by whether a party is seen as having a certain (unique) place in a country’s history and symbolizes particular values; how well it can project its message, especially through effective use of the media; and its

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\(^{106}\) Randall and Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”, p.13 and p.22.
longevity, i.e. its ability to survive over time. As with the other dimensions, these factors are assumed to play out differently in developing countries than in Western developed countries. Referring to the latter factor, longevity, this is generally a problem for most parties in the developing world. Although there are parties with a long history, the majority of political parties in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia date from the period of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s. Many did not even emerge until the ‘third wave of democratization’ of the 1980s and 1990s and are therefore only several decades old at the most. This short life span usually has a negative effect on how well parties ‘stick’ in the minds of people, and even whether they are considered a factor to reckon with by other more established institutions like the state and the military.

Randall and Svåsand’s model does seem to represent a clear step forward in comparison with the other measures of institutionalization offered in the party politics literature and has a number of advantages. The distinction between external and internal as well as structural and attitudinal dimensions, for example, not only helps to broaden the scope beyond the narrow view of a party as an isolated entity, but also provides a much-needed correction to the emphasis on organizational-structural aspects in the study of political parties. Also, because their model builds on and integrates other notions of party institutionalization put forward in the literature without trying to replace or discard them entirely, it allows the researcher to remain flexible in the exact application of the model depending on the particular theoretical interests or empirical circumstances. In addition, because of the clear distinction made between party and party system institutionalization at the outset of the

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framework, it also removes any potential analytical confusions between the two (see also section 2.6 below). And finally, because Randall and Svåsand focus specifically on the situation in new democracies in ‘Third World’ contexts, the model is well-suited for the analysis of party development in post-war developing countries as well.

The only potential problem with the model lies in the empirical application of the two attitudinal dimensions, ‘value infusion’ and ‘reification’. These dimensions are not as straightforward to analyze or measure as the other two dimensions, and might by some perhaps be considered as effects rather than characteristics of party institutionalization. Nevertheless, the overall model covers all the main aspects of the institutional strength of individual parties and is therefore a useful analytical tool for this research.

2.4 Interaction between Parties: The Party System

When we shift our attention from individual political parties to the nature of party interactions within a political system, our unit of analysis becomes the party system. This section reviews some of the key concepts and methods used in the party politics literature to distinguish between different types of party systems. This is useful not only for showing how scholars have tried to make sense of the wide variety of party systems, but also for gaining a better

108 This observation is shared by Basedau and Stroh, who argue that when it comes to measure party institutionalization “it is very difficult to differentiate between preconditions, defining elements, and immediate consequences”. Basedau and Stroh, Measuring Party Institutionalization in Developing Countries: A New Research Instrument Applied to 28 African Political Parties.
understanding of the specific party system typology that will be used in the next chapter on post-war societies as well as the subsequent case study chapters.

Different Methods for Counting and Classifying

The variation between party systems across the world is substantial. Current systems range from the one-party regimes in China, Cuba and Vietnam to different forms of multi-party systems in Britain, the Netherlands and Lebanon. Generally speaking, party systems vary on a number of aspects, including the number of parties in elections and parliament, the relative size and strength of political parties, the ideological distance between parties, their willingness to cooperate in government formation and governance, the degree of openness of competition over government, and the degree of institutionalization.\(^\text{109}\)

In order to analyze the ways in which parties interact, scholars have developed different classifications of party systems. A first well-known typology of party systems is that by Jean Blondel, whose main contribution is his distinction between different types of two- and multiparty systems. Focusing exclusively on the party systems of established Western democracies, Blondel distinguishes between two-party systems, two-and-a-half party systems, multiparty systems with a dominant party and multiparty systems without a dominant party.\(^\text{110}\) Although his classification seems a step forward in comparison with the older, more general typologies of Duverger and Neumann,


\(^{110}\) Blondel, “Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies”.
Blondel’s typology has been criticized for not being distinctive enough and putting together party systems whose dynamics can be very different.\textsuperscript{111}

A more elaborate and comprehensive classification was subsequently developed by Giovanni Sartori. The significance of his work lies in the use of four criteria for classifying party systems: the number of parties, the relative size of parties, the ideological polarization of parties and the interaction pattern between parties. By using these criteria and distinguishing between the consolidated party systems of ‘formed states’ and the unconsolidated party systems of ‘unformed or fluid polities’, Sartori has developed two separate, but related typologies, each subdivided into different classes of party system (further explained below).\textsuperscript{112}

Other, more recent classifications are those by Alan Ware, Peter Mair and Alan Siaroff, who in addition to numbers, relative size and ideological polarization of parties also take into account the extent to which parties penetrate societies, the closed or open structure of competition for government, and the size and relative strength of parties.\textsuperscript{113}

It is important to recall here that most classifications of party systems focus on the numerical criterion, i.e. how many parties there are in a system. But among these classifications, there are different methods for counting the relevant number of parties. Some of the most well-known methods use quantitative, mathematical rules for establishing the number of relevant parties. These include


\textsuperscript{112} Sartori, \textit{Parties and Party Systems}.


Rae’s fractionalization index and Laakso and Taagepera’s method for measuring the relevant or ‘effective’ number of electoral or parliamentary parties.114 By measuring parties’ weighted vote or seat share in elections both methods provide a continuous measurement of the relative size of parties.

But there are also methods that use qualitative rules for assessing how many relevant parties there are. The simple counting method, for example, consists of nothing more than counting all political parties that are registered or represented in parliament within a particular country. A more widely used method is to include only those parties that obtain a certain number of votes or seats in parliament. Common thresholds in this regard are 3%, 5% or 10%. The problem with both methods, however, is that they say little about a party’s political strength or relevance in the overall party system. For example, small parties that are unable to obtain 3%, 5% or 10% of the seats in parliament can still play an important role in the creation of a coalition government with parliamentary majority. That is why a third qualitative method is more useful.

According to this method by Sartori, parties should not only be counted on the basis of their relative size (vote or seat share), but also on the basis of their potential to influence the formation of government coalitions and direction of party competition. In this view, only those parties are relevant that find themselves “in a position to determine over time, and at some point in time, at least one of the possible governmental majorities” (coalition potential), or whose “existence, or appearance, affects the tactics of party competition and particularly when it alters the direction of the competition –by determining a switch from

114 Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*; Laakso and Taagepera, “‘Effective’ Number of Parties. A Measure With Application to West Europe”.
Parties and Party Systems in New and Established Democracies

centripetal to centrifugal competition either leftward, rightward, or in both
directions—of the governing-oriented parties” (blackmail potential).\textsuperscript{115} In
practice, the coalition potential of a party can easily be deduced from the fact
whether it has taken part in a government coalition or whether a party has
provided a government with the necessary political support for it to take or stay
in office. The blackmail potential of a party can be inferred by its ability to veto
legislation within parliament.

Sartori’s measure of relevance has the benefit that it draws attention to the
interactions between parties and outlines the power configuration within party
systems. This stands in sharp contrast with the other counting methods which
focus mainly on the format (numbers of parties) and do not really capture the real
essence of a party system, i.e. the workings and interactions between parties.
This is important because a party system is more than the sum of its individual
component parties. After all, it is “the forms and modes of their coexistence
[that] define the ‘party system’”.\textsuperscript{116}

The value of the various typologies and counting rules becomes noticeable
when identifying party systems that are dominated by a single party. As is
highlighted by Bogaards, definitions of these so-called ‘dominant party systems’
vary significantly in the party politics literature, depending on what classification

\textsuperscript{115} Sartori, \textit{Parties and Party Systems}, pp.108-109. In the case of centripetal competition,
positions taken by political parties gravitate towards the centre of the (‘left-right’) political
spectrum; in the case of centrifugal competition, parties are less attracted to the centre and take
more extreme positions. See Ware, \textit{Political Parties and Party Systems}, p.170.

\textsuperscript{116} Duverger, \textit{Political Parties}, p.203.
or counting rule is used. Coleman, for instance, applies a relatively high threshold and argues that in a ‘one-party dominant system’ the dominant party holds more than 70% of the seats and the opposition is fragmented. In Ware’s classification, a predominant party system is characterized by “more than one relevant party but only one party ever controls the legislature”. Blondel characterizes a multi-party system with a dominant party as having “one very large party (...) [obtaining] about 40 per cent of the electorate and generally [gaining] about twice as many votes as the second party”. Pempel, finally, argues that we can speak of dominant party rule if there is “electoral dominance for an uninterrupted and prolonged period, dominance in the formation of governments, and dominance in determining the public agenda”.

The problem with these definitions is that the reasons for a particular vote or seat threshold remain vague and arbitrary. They also say little about the relation between threshold and the power balance between the different political parties. In addition, it is not always clear what the unit of analysis is; the individual party or the party system? Sartori’s definition, on the other hand, addresses most of these problems. According to him, in a dominant party system there is only one relevant party that has won an absolute majority of seats in parliament over at

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118 Coleman, “The Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa”.

119 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, p.159 and p.162.

120 Blondel, “Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies”, p.186.

121 Pempel, Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes, quoted in Giliomee and Simkins, The Awkward Embrace. One-Party Domination and Democracy, p.xvi.
Parties and Party Systems in New and Established Democracies

least three consecutive elections. The absolute majority criterion indicates the dominant party’s power to govern alone, while the time requirement reflects its endurance. The main advantage of Sartori’s definition, however, is that it allows for a further specification of different types of dominant party system, including (consolidated) predominant and hegemonic party systems as well as (unconsolidated) dominant-authoritarian and dominant non-authoritarian systems.

Consolidated Party Systems

Recognizing that there are major differences in the nature of party systems across the world, Sartori proposes two different typologies: one for what he terms “formed states with consolidated party systems”, and another for “fluid polities with unconsolidated party systems”. Despite the differences in consolidation, the two typologies are closely related. Sartori even assumes that the various classes within the unconsolidated party system typology will crystallise into the corresponding party systems of the consolidated typology. For our purposes it is useful to briefly review both of them. We start with the typology for consolidated – i.e. moderately to highly institutionalized – party systems, which applies to

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122 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, 171-177; Bogaards adds that Sartori’s counting rules mainly apply “to parliamentary systems in which the government rests on parliamentary majorities”. According to him, in presidential systems “the parties that count are simply the ones that make a difference in helping (or obstructing) the president’s election, and that determine his having (or not having) a majority support in the legislative assemblies”. The latter addition is of particular relevance to post-conflict developing countries, many of which have presidential forms of government as we shall see in chapter 3. Bogaards, “Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party Systems in Africa”, p.175. and p.184, quoting Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry Into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes. p.34.
Western established democracies plus a few other countries with “solidly entrenched mass parties”\textsuperscript{123}

Based on the above-described rules for establishing the relevance (‘r’) of parties, Sartori proposes a classification with seven different ‘types’ of party system (see box 2.1 below). The first main distinction being made is whether the party system is competitive or not. In competitive systems, there are no restrictions on the contestation between different political parties, and “electoral contests are unrestrained and bitterly fought”. In non-competitive systems on the other hand, there is no real contestation for power between political parties. In Sartori’s words, “(…) competition ends, and non-competition begins, wherever contestants and opponents are deprived of equal rights, impeded, menaced, frightened, and eventually punished for daring to speak up”.\textsuperscript{124} In practice, the distinction between competitive and non-competitive systems largely corresponds with the distinction made between democratic and non-democratic or authoritarian regimes. This is one of the reasons why regime type is used by many scholars as an indicator of, or even one of the explanatory variables for the nature of a party system.

**Box 2.1. Classification for Consolidated Party Systems**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-competitive party systems</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One-party (r = 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic party (r = 1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competitive party systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predominant party (r = 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two party (r = 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited (moderate) pluralism (r = 3 – 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme (polarized) pluralism (r = 6 – 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomised: (r = &gt; 9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In one-party, hegemonic party and predominant party systems, there is really only one relevant political party (r = 1). But because open party competition is prohibited in one-party systems and strictly controlled in hegemonic party systems, these first two systems are essentially non-competitive whereas predominant party systems are (slightly) more competitive. One-party systems, where there is only one official party, include countries such as China, Vietnam, the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia.

In hegemonic party systems, there are usually other minor parties in addition to the ruling or hegemonic party. However, the hegemonic party does usually not allow for an unrestrained electoral competition and actively makes it difficult for other parties to contest its dominant power position. In one-party and hegemonic party systems the level of party fragmentation is usually rather low due to the very limited number of relevant parties.\(^\text{126}\) Although it is impossible to characterize the ideological distance of a party system when it only has one

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\(^\text{125}\) Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems*, p.110. ‘r’ refers to the number of relevant parties, i.e. those parties having either coalition or blackmail potential.

\(^\text{126}\) According to Sartori, a party system is fragmented “only when it has many parties, none of which approaches the absolute majority point”. Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems*, p. 110
A political party, the ideological content of these party systems may vary. For the purposes of this study this subdivision is of lesser importance, however.

The category of competitive party systems is divided into five different types. In a *predominant party system* there are various parties that exist and regularly compete for power, but there is one party that manages to win an absolute majority (more than 50% of the seats in parliament) during at least three consecutive elections. The key difference between a predominant party system and the earlier-mentioned hegemonic party system lies in the nature of the regime. In case dominance is achieved through competitive (democratic) elections, it is a predominant party system. However, if dominance is “achieved through political repression and the denial of civic rights to actual or potential competitors”, it clearly belongs to the hegemonic variant. Research has shown that hegemonic and/or predominant party systems are relatively rare in industrialized and semi-developed (industrializing) countries. Mexico (with the Institutional Revolutionary Party between 1929 and 2000), Japan (with the Liberal Democratic Party between 1955 and 1993) and Sweden (with the Social Democratic Labour Party between 1951-1993) are among the few countries that have had dominant party systems. This stands in sharp contrast with less developed, particularly post-war countries. As we will see in the next chapter, there dominant party systems are much more common.

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When there are two major relevant parties, with one having a parliamentary majority large enough to govern alone, we speak of a two-party system. The main distinction between this and a predominant party system is that the margin in seat share between the two largest parties is so small that the expectation of governmental turnover is very real.\(^{130}\) In other words, in a two-party system there are two major parties alternating in power. Only if one party rules for more than three consecutive elections, the system becomes predominant. In addition, it is important to realize that there are usually more than two political parties in a two-party system. However, the other parties are usually much smaller and not strong enough to rule by themselves. In case a third minor party is able to draw a significant share of the vote it is sometimes described as a two-and-a-half party system.\(^{131}\)

In the next two types of party system there is no single party that dominates the party interactions or can control government because of its seat share. Instead, there is a multiplicity of smaller independent political parties that have to create coalitions in order to create a parliamentary majority or form a government. In a situation of limited pluralism there are between three and five political parties that compete for power. This is the situation in countries like Belgium and Germany. Where there are more than five relevant political parties the system is usually described as extreme pluralism. The party systems of the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy are cases in point. Factoring in the

\(^{130}\) Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p.165.

\(^{131}\) Blondel, “Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies”. Classic examples of two-party systems are the United States, New Zealand and Britain (until 1970). Because of the electoral strength of a third party, Britain now more resembles a two-and-a-half party system.
ideological distance between the multiple political parties, Sartori further refines this class by distinguishing between ideologically moderate pluralism (fragmented, but not polarized) and ideologically polarized pluralism (fragmented as well as polarized). The latter, polarized pluralist class is characterized by a number of aspects.

First, there are anti-system parties that contest the legitimacy of the regime and the system of government. Also, there are multiple opposition parties at different ends of the political spectrum, making a unified opposition joining forces against a governing party extremely difficult. Third, the system is multipolar, having not only a clear left and right-wing party, but also a party or a group of parties occupying the political centre. In addition, the system is polarized because of its large ideological distance. In other words, the two main parties are “literally two poles apart, and the difference between them covers a maximum spread of opinion”.132 Fifth, as the political centre is occupied by weak parties—or at least parties with a weak ideological message—while the parties at the extreme ends are much stronger, votes tend to go to one or both of the extremes (centrifugalism). As a result, the fundamental (ideological) differences between parties are so big that there is almost no room for pragmatism, which is another characteristic. A seventh feature is that there is no real alternation of power by alternative coalitions of parties. The only thing that exists is a ‘peripheral turnover’, i.e. a permanently ruling party that changes its governing partner. And finally, in a polarized pluralist system the main opposing parties tend to outbid each other for electoral gains without being able to deliver

132 Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems*, p.120.
on their promises. Although primarily found in Western established democracies this form of party competition can also be found in post-war societies, including El Salvador as we will see later in this study.

The final type identified under the typology for consolidated party systems is the atomised party system. This is more a residual category than a proper class as it comprises situations in which “the number of parties – whether ten, twenty or more – makes little difference”. In this category, parties are loose coalitions of largely independent candidates, which come and go at different elections.

**Unconsolidated Party Systems**

Sartori’s second typology covers the unconsolidated – i.e. weakly to non-institutionalized – party systems found primarily in Africa, Asia, and parts of Latin America. Many countries in these regions not only have party systems that are still embryonic, but also individual political parties that, with a few exceptions, are characterized by weak organizational structures, unprogrammatic and vague ideological profiles, and a strong focus on personalistic leadership.

The typology distinguishes between four types, including dominant, dominant-authoritarian, non-dominant and pulverised party systems (see box 2.2 below). Sartori developed this typology specifically for African countries, but it seems to apply also to other developing countries where individual political parties are weak and the party system is still in flux. As will be seen in chapter 3,

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it applies particularly well to most post-war countries in Africa, Southeast Asia, Central America, and even Southeast Europe.

**Box 2.2. Classification for Unconsolidated Party Systems**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant party systems</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominant authoritarian (r = 1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominant non-authoritarian (r = 1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other party systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-dominant (r = 2 – 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulverised (r = &gt; 9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this typology there are two types of dominant party system. The *dominant authoritarian* type represents the most restrictive variant, both in terms of the number of (relevant) parties and in terms of inter-party competition. Sartori includes in this type a dominant party that “results from mergers and tends to be characterised by an aggregative outlook” as well as “the typically coercive single party (…) that has banned all the other parties, tends to be closed, and generally abides by exclusionary policies”. In the first case opposition parties are still allowed to exist, although their presence makes little difference. In the second case there is usually no more than one party. Even in case opposition parties do exist, the dominant party puts in place severe restrictions, effectively denying opposition parties the possibility to challenge the party in power. Examples include Guinea, Tajikistan and Yemen.

The *dominant non-authoritarian* party system is the less restrictive, more pluralistic version of a dominant party system. There is still only one relevant party (r=1) that has an absolute parliamentary majority over at least three

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consecutive elections, but there are also various other political parties. Most importantly, in this situation there is a substantial degree of competitiveness. Parties compete for votes more or less freely during elections and opposition parties are generally not (directly) restricted to challenge the power of the ruling (dominant) party. This type more or less corresponds with the predominant party system in the earlier typology for consolidated party systems. Recent examples of countries with a dominant non-authoritarian party system include South Africa since 1994 and Mozambique since 1992.

In practice there are various strategies for achieving and maintaining dominance, ranging from the use of preferential access to the media, the utilization of state resources and personnel in election campaigns, the co-optation of specific interest groups, to outright vote rigging and attacks on opposition supporters. What is important to stress here is that in dominant non-authoritarian situations such strategies are employed within the confines of the electoral or democratic framework. In other words, a party becomes dominant by repeatedly winning (relatively free and fair) elections, which can be a result of the strength of the dominant party or the weakness and fragmentation of opposition parties. This is not the case in dominant-authoritarian systems. There the dominant party generally uses all means necessary to stay in power, even if this means taking extra-democratic measures that restrict the competitive nature

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138 See, for example, Arian and Barnes, “The Dominant Party System: A Neglected Model of Democratic Stability”.
of elections or lead to the harassment and banning of opposition parties. Both types exist in post-war countries as well.

In situations where there is no single party with a parliamentary majority, the party system is characterized as *non-dominant*. In that case the party system comprises “relatively few relevant parties that actually counterweigh one another (i.e. none of which is dominant)”. Sartori does not specify exactly how many relevant parties this category entails. However, based on his assumption that this type of party system might later evolve into a two-party, limited pluralist or extreme pluralist system, it seems logical that in practice it comprises between two and eight relevant parties. Because of this rather broad range, real world examples include very diverse party systems, such as those of Malawi, Kenya since 2002, and Senegal.

Finally, there is a residual category of *pulverised party systems* that have a very high number of small and weak parties. Following the counting rules identified above, these party systems generally have more than nine political parties that all receive some share of the parliamentary seats while none of them

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139 Examples of how –particularly African– dominant parties have consolidated their position include actions to convert, neutralize or eliminate political opposition forces, the ‘nationalization’ of non-party associations, adaptation of constitutional and electoral regulations, and the development of a rationale “defending, rationalizing, or affirming the virtues of a one-party system”. For a more extensive analysis on this issue, see Coleman and Rosberg, *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*, pp.664-668; and Erdmann and Basedau, *Problems of Categorizing and Explaining Party Systems in Africa*.

140 Erdmann and Basedau put the threshold for a pulverised party system at more than 5 parties. This does not follow directly from Sartori’s classification, however. Taking into account that the category of atomised party system starts where the polarized pluralism category ends, the corresponding category of a pulverised system should start where the non-dominant category ends, i.e. around more than 9 parties. Erdmann and Basedau, *Problems of Categorizing and Explaining Party Systems in Africa*, pp.26-28.
is able to make a decisive political impact. The pulverised party system corresponds with the atomised party systems in the earlier typology for consolidated party systems. Current examples arguably include countries like Benin, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Afghanistan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

When we integrate the two typologies for consolidated and unconsolidated party systems, as shown in table 2.3 below, the correspondences between the various categories “from fluidity to crystallisation” become clear. We can now see that – under the assumption that “each inchoate pattern is allowed to develop ‘naturally’ without interference from exogenous variables” – the loose, provisional categories of the unconsolidated situations might over time transform into the more structured, specific categories of the consolidated party systems, albeit in practice this does not always happen.\textsuperscript{141}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & \textbf{Monopartism} & & \textbf{Polypartism} & \\
 & (non-competitive) & & (competitive) & \\
\hline
\textbf{Initial stage} & Dominant authoritarian party system & Dominant non-authoritarian party system & Non-dominant party system & Pulverised party system \\
(fluidity) & \\
\hline
\textbf{Structural stage} & One party dictatorship & Hegemonic party system & Predominant party system & Two-partism – limited pluralism & Atomised party system \\
(crystallisation) & & & & Extreme pluralism & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Sartori’s Integrated Typology of Party Systems\textsuperscript{142}}
\end{table}

The essential point to emphasize here is that party systems can change over time.

As multiple elections are held and competition between parties becomes more

\textsuperscript{141} Sartori, \textit{Parties and Party Systems}, p.231.

regular and stable, the general pattern emerging is from a fluid to a more consolidated party system. However, in some cases it is possible for party systems to “de-institutionalize” and reverse from consolidated to a more fluid pattern of party interaction.\footnote{On party system change within institutionalized party systems, see Mair, “Party System Change”; on the reversal of stable systems to fluid party systems (deinstitutionalization) in African and South American countries, see Lindberg, “Institutionalization of Party Systems? Stability and Fluidity among Legislative Parties in Africa’s Democracies”; and Sanchez, “Transformation and Decay: the De-Institutionalisation of Party Systems in South America”.

As we will see in the next chapter, party systems in post-war societies differ quite substantially in terms of their institutionalization. Some of these countries have a history of competitive party politics, and therefore have moderately institutionalized party systems. Others, however, have weakly institutionalized fluid party systems with no stable and structured pattern of inter-party competition. These different cases will therefore have to be dealt with by different typologies. In order to decide which typology to use, we will need a measure for assessing the degree of consolidation of party systems. The measure proposed in the literature for this is party system institutionalization, which will be discussed in the next section.

**Conclusion**

The study of party systems has spawned different typologies for characterizing the patterned interactions between parties. This thesis uses Sartori’s counting rules and party system typologies as its main reference point for analyzing the party systems of post-war developing countries, for a number of reasons.
First, Sartori’s qualitative rules for counting parties have several advantages over other quantitative rules. Sartori’s numerical criteria of coalition and blackmail potential, for example, not only allow us to distinguish between parties that are (politically) relevant and irrelevant, but also give an indication of how these parties affect the political competition within party systems. In contrast, the methods that use mathematical indices only provide a measure of relative size. Other problems with these latter methods are that different party constellations can hide behind the same value of fractionalization or effective number of parties, that they do not take into account the relative value (identity) positions of parties, and provide little information about the power dynamics of different types of party systems.\footnote{Wolinetz, “Party Systems and Party System Types”, p. 59; Bogaards, “Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party Systems in Africa”, p.184; and Dunleavy and Boucek, “Constructing the Number of Parties”} Finally, the quantitative methods repeat their calculations for each new election but fail to indicate whether certain parties are dominant over longer periods of time, or whether there is alternation of parties in government.\footnote{Bogaards, “Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party Systems in Africa”, p.187.} Sartori’s detailed specification –especially of dominant party systems– does not have these limitations and is therefore particularly helpful for identifying the different types of post-war party systems.

Another reason is because Sartori’s approach provides one coherent analytical framework that systematically integrates counting rules with a party system typology. As a result, it becomes possible to infer the type of party system directly from the number of relevant parties. Party system typologies based on effective number of parties by contrast have to rely on conversion rules
that use arbitrary cut-off points to identify the type of party system. Moreover, because the latter methods provide a continuous party number, these party system classifications are ill-suited to the discontinuous “jump, or the all-or-none threshold (…)” of the “majority that wins a share (…) and the absolute majority that wins all” in the real world of politics.

A third reason that makes it attractive to use Sartori’s framework is because it is also used by several scholars who write about party system institutionalization, which will be one of the main concepts applied in this thesis for assessing the strength and development of post-war party systems.

And finally, Sartori’s framework is particularly valuable because of its separate typology for unconsolidated party systems. The latter enables us to analyze the interactions between parties on the basis of concepts that are not necessarily Euro- or Western-centric and can therefore ‘travel’ more easily to the political arenas of the developing world, arguably even to the highly volatile and weakly institutionalized party systems of post-war countries.

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146 For example, a party system with a value between 1.8 and 2.4 in the measurement of effective parliamentary parties corresponds with a two-party system, whereas a party system with a value between 2.5 and 2.9 would be classified as a two-and-a-half party system. See Bogaards, “Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party Systems in Africa”, p.189, referring to Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions.


148 Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions; Erdmann and Basedau, Problems of Categorizing and Explaining Party Systems in Africa.
2.5 Party System Institutionalization

In this section we will concentrate on the institutionalization of the overall system of party interactions. It is important not to confuse this with (individual) party institutionalization, which would lead to the wrong conclusions as party and party system institutionalization are not necessarily mutually reinforcing.\(^{149}\) Party system institutionalization has mainly been used in the literature on democratization where a regular and stable form of inter-party competition is considered particularly important for democratic consolidation.\(^{150}\)

There are different criteria to assess the degree of consolidation or institutionalization of party systems. Some scholars use a temporal criterion, categorizing party systems as institutionalized when a certain period of time has passed, specified with or without a certain number of elections.\(^{151}\) An alternative criterion is the existence of “solidly entrenched mass parties”.\(^{152}\) The problem with this latter criterion, however, is that it seems to discount the relevance of different types of political parties, such as electoralist catch-all or ethnic parties, which might not have a broad mass basis but do receive popular support in elections and do participate in government in many countries. Measuring party system consolidation exclusively on this criterion would classify many party systems – including several party systems in more established democracies! – as

\(^{149}\) Randall and Svåsand, “Introduction”.

\(^{150}\) See, for example, Dix, “Democratization and the Institutionalization of Latin American Political Parties”; Kuenzi and Lambright, “Party System Institutionalization in 30 African Countries”.


\(^{152}\) Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p.217.
a priori unconsolidated whereas in practice several of them do display a certain degree of established inter-party competition.

Arguably the most useful definition of party system institutionalization has been put forward by Mainwaring and Scully. In their view there are four conditions for an institutionalized party system: stability in the rules and nature of inter-party competition; ‘rootedness’ of parties in society; acceptance of parties and elections as the legitimate institutions that determine who governs; and the existence of party organizations with reasonably stable rules and structures. Each of these dimensions can subsequently be operationalized on the basis of several qualitative and quantitative indicators.

One of the most widely used methods to assess the degree of stability of inter-party competition is Mogen Pedersen’s index of electoral volatility. This measures “the net change in seat (or vote) shares of all parties from one election to the next”. Another, qualitative method is to analyze the occurrence of splits within parties or the emergence and disappearance of parties just before and after elections. Finally, regular and stable party competition can also be gleaned from other indicators, such as the organization of several subsequent elections in the absence of coups, serious civil unrest and violent conflict. The reasons for the varying degrees of stability in inter-party competition differ per country, but possible explanations include the introduction of new legislation regulating the

153 Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions.
154 Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions, p.1 and p.5. See also Mainwaring and Torcal, “Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory After the Third Wave of Democratization”.
registration and composition of political parties as well as the organizational strength of individual parties. The exact causes are a matter for further empirical analysis, however.

The second dimension, the extent to which parties have stable roots in society, can be assessed by analyzing the linkages between parties and other societal actors. Mainwaring and Scully propose to measure this by calculating the difference between presidential and legislative voting, assuming that where parties are deeply rooted in society voters will vote for the same party label in legislative and presidential elections. A different, perhaps more interesting approach is to take a closer look at wider survey results and check how parties are regarded by the population or to what extent ideological voting plays a role in elections. In case voters have weak ideological or programmatic attachments to parties and rather vote “because of sympathy for the personality traits of a candidate” – which seems to be the case in many new (electoral) democracies – political parties are not anchored in society. This would generally reflect a weakly institutionalized party system. Another option would be to look at the linkages that exist between parties and “major social organizations, including unions, student groups and neighbourhood associations”. Strong linkages imply that parties are deeply rooted in society, and the party system is thereby more institutionalized. Potential explanations for variations on this dimension are the different backgrounds or origins of political parties, their participation in or association with locally popular initiatives, as well as their longevity.

The third dimension of party system institutionalization is the extent to which parties and elections are considered legitimate institutions for deciding who governs. This is slightly more difficult to gauge. One option is to analyze whether electoral outcomes are generally accepted by party leaders, or in case they are rejected, whether the dispute is settled via the appropriate legal channels, such as the court system. Another method is to examine the degree to which political parties, or alternatively personal connections, are central for gaining access to state power.160 Possible explanations for this third dimension are the prevalence of a clientelist elite political culture, and the existence and level of enforcement of a legal framework for party regulation and elections.

Finally, an institutionalized party system should have political parties with relatively strong party organizations. As indicated in the earlier section on (individual) party institutionalization there is a large variety of indicators to measure this aspect, including the existence and functioning of a (nationwide) network of party offices, the regularity of party meetings, secure access to financial resources, the degree of factionalism and ‘floor crossing’, and the degree of party discipline. Most of these indicators are relatively easy to measure.

The concept of party system institutionalization as defined by Mainwaring and Scully is useful for a number of reasons. One of the main advantages is that it allows for a continuous measurement of institutionalization, in contrast to the static dichotomy of consolidated or unconsolidated systems suggested by Sartori’s criterion of the presence of mass parties. A continuum of institutionalization better reflects reality where there is not only significant

160 This is also suggested by Mainwaring and Scully, *Building Democratic Institutions*, p.14.
variation in the degree of party system institutionalization between countries, but where this can also vary within countries over longer periods of time. This is also the case in post-war countries where parties and party systems usually have a relatively short history and party interaction is often extremely volatile.

Mainwaring and Scully’s concept does have some drawbacks, however, although these mainly have to do with their preference for using quantitative data. In their assessment of the institutionalization of 18 Latin American party systems, for example, they use Pedersen’s index for electoral volatility as a tool for measuring the stability of inter-party competition, and the difference between presidential and legislative voting as a measure of parties’ societal penetration. The problem with these indicators is that they heavily depend on the availability of reliable and consistent time-series data, which is often not available in the case of post-war developing countries. To redress this problem this thesis makes use of quantitative material where it is available, but also utilizes qualitative data from other sources, particularly from interviews in the two selected case study countries. Another problem with applying quantitative indicators in post-war settings is that they do not work well in non-democratic regimes, where authoritarian control over elections generally favours the governing party. In any case, the fact that many post-war countries at the time of writing have not had more than three subsequent elections since the end of the conflict makes their classification as fluid (non-institutionalized) party systems slightly easier.

The second problem is that Mainwaring and Scully’s measures are specifically designed for competitive party systems. Countries with

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uncompetitive party systems, including hegemonic or dominant-authoritarian systems, are placed in a residual category not belonging to either the institutionalized or the inchoate party system categories.\textsuperscript{162} This seems odd, because the level of competitiveness, although extremely important, does not necessarily determine the level of institutionalization. After all, a dominant-authoritarian or hegemonic system with one dominant party and several minor opposition parties can still be well-entrenched over time, despite the fact that elections and the party system itself are largely uncompetitive. This seems to have happened in several African countries where multi-party elections have taken place, albeit under un- or semi-competitive circumstances, and where the lack of alternation has left undisturbed the relatively institutionalized pattern of interaction between dominant and minor parties.\textsuperscript{163} Anticipating a similar outcome for party systems in several post-war developing countries, we therefore need to keep in mind that there is a distinction between an uncompetitive, but institutionalized party system and an uncompetitive and weakly institutionalized party system.

Despite these shortcomings, Mainwaring and Scully’s conceptualization remains the only systematic model of party system institutionalization available and has been widely used in analyzing the party systems of Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, as well as post-communist countries.\textsuperscript{164} This thesis uses

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{162} In Latin America this is, for example, the case with Mexico and Paraguay. See Mainwaring and Scully, \textit{Building Democratic Institutions}, pp.20-21.
\item \textsuperscript{163} Bogaards, “Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party Systems in Africa”; and van de Walle, “Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa’s Emerging Party Systems”.
\item \textsuperscript{164} See, for example, Coppedge, “The Dynamic Diversity of Latin American Party Systems”; Kuenzi and Lambright, “Party System Institutionalization in 30 African Countries”; and Bielasiak, “The Institutionalization of Electoral and Party Systems in Postcommunist States”.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
The fact that political parties are organizationally, ideologically and behaviourally different to a large extent boils down to their unique historical background and the socioeconomic and political conditions of the countries in which they emerge. The same goes for the nature and patterns of inter-party competition. However, apart from the many differences there are also several similarities in the ways in which individual parties and party systems emerge, develop and institutionalize. With regard to the emergence and development of political parties, we already discussed the limited number of ‘genetic models’ and the ways in which parties institutionalize. With regard to the organizational, ideological and behavioural aspects of political parties we made distinctions between elite-based, mass-based, ethnicity-based, electoralist, and movement type parties. And with regard to party systems we identified different patterns of party competition and different levels of institutionalization.

But until now we have not fully addressed the question why parties and party systems are what they are. More specifically, what exactly explains why some parties are more institutionalized and have strong party structures, a unified political leadership and a clear political identity, while other parties are weakly institutionalized with poor links between the different organizational units, with a
leadership divided into factions and a political identity which is too vague for voters to identify themselves with? Similarly, how can we explain that the patterned interactions between parties in some cases lead to a dominant party system while in other cases the party system is pulverised? Regime type –i.e. the extent to which a polity is democratic or not– obviously matters. It is an important factor in how political parties interact and compete for votes to form a new government. Therefore party systems in democratic countries develop and operate differently than party systems in semi-democratic or non-democratic countries. However, considering the fact that there are several countries with similar regime types but different party systems, even in non-democratic settings, regime type by itself seems insufficient to explain the difference.

In the party politics literature many explanations have been provided for the type and institutionalization of individual parties and party systems. For practical purposes these can roughly be grouped into three different analytical approaches. These are related to the nature of electoral competition, the existence of important socioeconomic cleavages and the influence of (formal and informal) institutions.\textsuperscript{165} Each approach has different things to say about parties and party systems.

\textit{The Electoral Competition Approach}

The first approach argues that parties’ main function is to mobilize popular support during elections and that their organizational structures are a reflection of

\textsuperscript{165} Ware, \textit{Political Parties and Party Systems}, pp. 94-105 and pp.184-202. See also Lawson, \textit{The Comparative Study of Political Parties}, pp. 4-16; and LaPalombara and Weiner, \textit{Political Parties and Political Development}, pp. 7-21.
the way in which parties compete for votes in election campaigns. According to some it is therefore logical, particularly in times or places where mass media are not yet introduced, that parties will develop an extensive party organization with many local branches subordinate to a strong party centre in order to create a wide base of members and supporters that can be mobilized during elections. 166 Other scholars in this field have argued that political parties are nothing more than electoral machines, which become increasingly active during electoral campaigns but are largely dormant in the period between different elections. In this view, there is a natural tendency for parties to move towards more flexible electoral organizational arrangements with a small core of party cadre and a limited party organization because of the high expenses involved in maintaining a large, membership-based organizational structure. 167 In reality both types of parties exist –organizationally thick and organizationally thin– and sometimes even coexist in the same country.

With respect to the overall party system, scholars adopting the electoral competition approach have argued that the type of party system is primarily the result of the way in which parties compete and cooperate to maximize the number of votes they can get during elections. As we have seen above a particular party system type is influenced not only by the number of parties participating in elections and government formation, but also by the relative size in terms of votes and seats, and the ideological distance between parties. The latter is argued by scholars like Downs and Budge who emphasize the ‘spatial

166 Duverger, Political Parties, pp.23-27.
167 Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies.
competition’ of parties on one or multiple ideological spectrum(s).\textsuperscript{168} Despite their differences in emphasis, most scholars adhering to the electoral competition approach see parties as rational actors aimed at maximizing their electoral support. Therefore, there is a strong (behaviouralist) focus on the influence of choices by party leaders and (expected) voting behaviour. In addition, these scholars all underscore the importance of electoral competition as the key explanatory variable for structuring party organizations and party systems. This distinguishes their analyses from the other two approaches, in which social factors and certain formal and informal institutions are considered the main driving forces behind the organization and institutionalization of parties and party systems.

\textit{The Sociological Approach}

The second approach draws attention to a party’s human and financial resources and its linkages with other important actors, such as trade unions or the state. According to this so-called sociological approach, the organizational structure of an individual political party reflects its possession of or access to funding, personnel (cadre and supporters), charismatic leadership, and state resources. In Ware’s words: “how a party responds to the challenge of developing its organization in a way that enables it to maintain (or improve) its electoral competitiveness depends on where it perceives its potential new resources residing”\textsuperscript{169}. As a result, a political party with close links to rich businessmen or

\textsuperscript{168} Downs, \textit{An Economic Theory of Democracy}; and Budge, Robertson and Hearl, \textit{Ideology, Strategy and Party Change. Spatial Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies}.

\textsuperscript{169} Ware, \textit{Political Parties and Party Systems}, p.106.
preferential access to state resources will not immediately need a large membership-based organization, and can rely on a limited, but well-funded and professionalized party organization to mobilize popular support during elections. In contrast, a political party that does not have such links will try to maximize its electoral support by focusing on the establishment of ties with trade unions, professional associations or other groups with a large body of supporters.

With regard to party systems, the sociological approach highlights the importance of certain divisions or cleavages in society. Although earlier studies in this tradition stress the importance of class divisions in explaining voting behaviour and interactions between parties, later studies emphasize that in addition to class there are other societal divisions that shape party and party system development. Theorizing about the importance of societal divisions or cleavages is mainly associated with the work of Lipset and Rokkan, who identified four main cleavages in Western societies related to the Reformation, the creation of nation-states, the industrial revolution and the Russian Revolution.

The first cleavage between ‘centre and periphery’ refers to regionalist (religious and linguistic) divisions within societies, particularly the extent to which these divisions are integrated into one (state) religion and/or (national) language or are allowed to exist in separate religious and/or linguistic communities. The second line of cleavages concerns religious divisions between the ‘state and church’ over citizens’ loyalties and their education. Closely related to the nineteenth century process of industrialization in Western Europe, the third set of divisions identified by Lipset and Rokkan concerns conflicts between interests over ‘land versus industry’, including societal divisions between urban
and rural areas. Class divisions between ‘owner and worker’ interests provide the final line of cleavages. Countries have coped with these major societal divisions in various ways and as a result have come up with different solutions. According to Lipset and Rokkan the important point is that political parties that emerged in early twentieth century Europe organized themselves around one of the cleavages mentioned above (national religion/language, industry, worker). The interactions between parties took place along the same ‘fault lines’ and the resulting party system basically reflected the resolution or persistence of those deep divisions in society. This has since become known as the ‘freezing hypothesis’.170

A key argument in sociological analyses of party politics is that no amount of institutional engineering (such as changing the electoral system or the type of government) or actions by party leaders will fundamentally alter the nature of parties or the party system.171 In contrast to the other two approaches, the sociological approach argues that the major societal divisions are so determining that neither institutions nor choices by individual political actors really matter.

The Institutionalist Approach

The institutionalist approach highlights the influence of important political institutions. This includes formal institutions such as electoral systems and the type of government as well as informal institutional arrangements such as

170 Lipset and Rokkan argued that divisions are sometimes so deeply ingrained in society that political parties will still use these divisions as key reference points in their interactions long after these divisions have stopped being salient. As a result, many of the party systems in Western Europe in the 1960s were considered ‘frozen’, reflecting the main cleavages in society of the 1920s. Lipset and Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction”. See also Mair, “The Freezing Hypothesis: An Evaluation”.

171 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, pp. 189-190.
clientelism. In contrast to the sociological approach, institutions as well as the relevant actors initiating and maintaining them do matter in this view and are believed to have an important if not decisive influence on parties and party systems.

But before explaining how this works, it is important to emphasize that, like the other two approaches, the institutionalist approach is not a homogenous school of thought and actually covers a variety of different institutionalisms.\(^\text{172}\)

*Rational choice institutionalism* is premised on the assumption of instrumental behaviour of individual actors to maximize certain preferences. In this view a specific type of party system, for example, is considered a consequence of strategic interaction between relevant actors and will survive in a particular institutional form because it provides the optimal amount of benefits for the relevant actors given the constraints in a particular context. *Sociological institutionalism*, on the other hand, provides a much broader definition of institutions, and highlights the importance of symbols, cognitive scripts and moral templates. It argues that institutional forms and procedures should not solely be seen as the logical outcome of rationality or efficiency, but primarily as ‘culturally-specific practices’. A certain institutional practice (clientelism) or form (party system) in this view can be explained by the high value and legitimacy attached to them by the broader cultural environment. Finally, *historical institutionalism* is slightly more eclectic in that it accepts both the ‘calculating’ and the ‘cultural’ view of human behaviour. Its analysis focuses

more on the asymmetries of power embedded in political institutions and the persistent nature of those institutional arrangements. In this view a clientelistic arrangement between a certain party and its supporters, for example, reflects the way in which power is distributed among political actors. This view also argues that institutions can be traced back to particular ‘critical junctures’ or ‘founding moments’, after which they have tended to follow a certain path of historical development.173

Most of the institutionalist analyses related to party politics have focused on electoral systems, which are essentially formal institutional formulae for translating votes into seats, and whose primary effect is to determine which candidates are elected and which parties gain power.174 The strongest argument in this connection is presented by ‘Duverger’s Law’, according to which there is “an almost complete correlation” between a simple-majority single ballot electoral system and a two-party system.175 In Duverger’s view, the emergence of a two-party system is not due to underlying social cleavages, but can be explained by the ‘mechanical’ and ‘psychological’ effects of the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system. In the same vein he argues that proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, particularly those that allow multiple ballot choices, generally favour a multi-party system and stimulate the emergence of many

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175 In a FPTP or simple majority electoral system, where the party with the most votes wins, the percentage of seats for smaller (third, fourth, fifth) parties under-represents their percentage of votes, even more so than in the case of the second party (‘mechanical effect’). Because voters realize that “their votes are wasted if they continue to give them to the third party”, or other small parties, they will only vote for one of the two major parties (‘psychological effect’). Duverger, Political Parties, p.217 and pp. 224-226.
smaller parties, though many of them will find it difficult to gain seats in parliament.\textsuperscript{176} Despite criticisms over the ‘law-like’ nature of such effects and objections over the generalization of these effects across different political contexts, the central idea behind Duverger’s original argument that the choice for an electoral system has a certain (lasting) effect on the formation and consolidation of party systems is still widely accepted.\textsuperscript{177} More recently, scholarly attention has shifted to other party effects of electoral systems, including effects on party organization (internal cohesion or factionalism), party behaviour (discipline, campaign strategies) and interaction between parties (coalition formation and conflict management).\textsuperscript{178}

Another formal political institution highlighted in institutional analyses is the nature of executive-legislative design. Here the focus is on how parties and party systems are influenced by a parliamentary, a presidential or a mixed (semi-presidential) system.\textsuperscript{179} In the few parliamentary systems with a plurality electoral system, such as the United Kingdom, there is usually a (strong) single-party government. More common, however, are parliamentary systems that organize elections on the basis of proportional representation. This generally

\textsuperscript{176} Duverger, \textit{Political Parties}, p.245-255. This is sometimes referred to as the ‘Second Law’ of Duverger.

\textsuperscript{177} Ware, \textit{Political Parties and Party Systems}, pp. 191-192; and Sartori, “The Party Effects of Electoral Systems”.

\textsuperscript{178} Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis, \textit{Electoral System Design}, p.6.

\textsuperscript{179} The key differences between a parliamentary and presidential type of government are the way in which the head of government is elected (indirectly by the legislature in the former, directly by voters in the latter), their autonomy in office (dependent on support in parliament in the former, strong and with fixed office terms in the latter), and the nature of decision-making (collective or collegial in the former, solitary in the latter). Lijphart, \textit{Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries}, pp. 117-118 and Lijphart, \textit{Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government}. 
results in a multi-party system and a (more fragile) coalition government. In contrast, presidential systems, particularly in African and Latin American countries, are generally associated with more personalized and weakly-institutionalized dominant party systems. This is often a result of the concentration of executive powers in the hands of a directly elected president with a more limited influence for political parties, particularly opposition parties. Despite these archetypical differences, however, it is important to realize that both parliamentary and presidential systems come in many different forms and shapes, each of which has different implications for the development and functioning of parties and party systems.180

In addition to electoral systems and types of government, there are several other institutions which are addressed in institutional accounts of parties and party systems. The federal nature of a state, for example, may impact on the strength of political parties at different levels in society. Also, political party laws that regulate the rules and procedures related to registration, organization, election campaigning and party financing can have a significant effect on the type of parties that emerge and the nature of their competition.181

Moreover, there are certain (historical) institutional legacies that can also play an important role, both at the level of the individual party and the level of the wider party system. First, political parties can themselves be considered as institutions, in that they consist of certain norms, rules, procedures and decisions. Particularly the choices made at the birth of a new political party often have a

180 Mainwaring and Shugart, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America; and Randall, “Case Study One: Political Parties, Their Social Ties and Role in Political Change”.

181 Reilly and Nordlund, Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development.
Parties and Party Systems in New and Established Democracies

lasting effect on the nature of the party organization, its decision-making and leadership structures and behaviour, as well as its political ideas and programme. Although the degree of institutional ‘lock-in’ of such structures, behaviour and ideas can differ per party, Panebianco’s research on different types of party organization indicates the strong path-dependent nature of early choices made by the dominant coalition within a party.\(^{182}\)

Second, as parties themselves are parts of a larger party system, any (major) change in the nature of individual parties is likely to have an impact on the systemic level, shaping and influencing the interactions with other parties and thereby influencing the nature of the party system.

Third, important institutional outcomes or decisions that are not directly related to the electoral system, the type of government or regulatory framework, but have more to do with the broader (external) context in which party politics takes place can also have an important effect on parties and party systems.\(^{183}\) The collapse of the Soviet Union and its effects on communist and communist successor parties in Eastern and Central Europe is an example. In the case of post-war countries in Africa, Asia and Central America, examples may include regional peace initiatives, the type of conflict ending (military victory or negotiated settlement) as well as the nature of the peace agreement and power-sharing arrangements.

Fourth, informal practices such as clientelism also impact on how party organizations develop and particularly on how party systems operate. Access to state resources, including funding, personnel and the privilege to make political

\(^{182}\) Panebianco, *Political Parties*.

\(^{183}\) See Gourevitch, “International Influences on Domestic Politics: The Second Image Reversed”.
appointments, all favour those parties that control government and gives them an important advantage over other parties in mobilizing electoral support and in maintaining their (dominant) position in the party system.¹⁸⁴

And finally, in some cases the direct and indirect engagement from international actors can also have an influence on the type of party organizations emerging and particularly the resources made available to them. Such international engagement does not only include linkages with parties in the region and organizations like the liberal, socialist and Christian-democratic ‘party internationals’, but may also consist of a wide variety of political, technical and financial party support often provided by specialized party assistance agencies as part of wider democracy assistance programmes.¹⁸⁵

Evaluation of the Three Approaches

Each of the three above-mentioned approaches has some value when it comes to explaining the nature of parties and party systems in countries across the world. The electoral competition approach has mainly been applied in (liberal) established democracies, where political systems are (usually) highly competitive. In situations where this is not the case, the electoral competition approach seems to lose much of its value, however.

¹⁸⁴ Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, p.196. These factors could also be included under the sociological approach. It is important to note here that clientelist practices in party politics are not only prevalent in many African, Asian and Latin American countries, but have also been reported in several political parties in established democracies like the United States, Japan and Italy. See also Randall, “Party Systems and Voter Alignments in the New Democracies of the Third World”, p.248.

¹⁸⁵ For a discussion of this, see Burnell, “Promoting Parties and Party Systems in New Democracies”; Burnell, “Political Parties, International Party Assistance and Globalisation”; and Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link. See also section 3.1 in chapter 3.
For example, in many non-western emerging democracies in Africa and Asia, characteristics of a party organization or the nature of a party system are only partly a result of electoral competition. They usually have more to do with a party’s links with powerful economic interests, its access and control over state resources (including the security apparatus), and its ability to shape the institutional environment which regulates party politics. In the same way, ‘spatial competition’ explanations which assume an ideological basis for party competition during elections have seemingly little relevance in African and Asian contexts, where party differences cannot easily be characterized in ‘left-right’ ideological terms. But despite these limitations, it would be wrong to deny that electoral competition and the management of electoral processes have influence on the institutionalization of parties and party systems in Africa, Asia and Latin America even if elections are held there under suboptimal competitive conditions. Though it will not be the primary focus, the analysis of post-war party development in subsequent chapters will therefore also give attention to the effects of electoral competition and the way the elections are conducted.

The application of the sociological approach beyond Western Europe is arguably also limited. This is mainly because the significance of certain social cleavages differs in other parts of the world. The four main lines of cleavages identified above – region, religion, rural-urban, and class – are to some extent part of most societies. However, their degree of influence varies greatly per region. In most African countries economic class cleavages are less significant than ethnic and regional differences. In contrast, ethnic and religious divisions are less sharp in many Latin American countries, due to the reduction of the indígena population and the installation of Catholicism as the official religion over the
past few centuries. At the same time, economic class divisions are much more pronounced in Latin America than in Africa, due to the former’s earlier industrialization. Irrespective of the existence of certain cleavages, however, the important point here is that –while they may exist– societal cleavages in Africa, Asia and Latin America are not corresponding with the development of parties and party systems in the same manner as they did in Western Europe. In many countries the picture is much more varied, and parties and party systems are not merely a reflection of societal cleavages. In addition, the sequence of party development in many non-Western developing countries has been less stable over the past century than in Western countries, with party competition interrupted by colonial administration, military coups and extended periods of violent conflict.  

The institutionalist approach does not generally share the geographical limitations of the other two approaches. In addition, it has the big advantage of being much more attentive to the influence of not only formal and informal institutions, but also the actions of important actors such as party leaders. With its focus on asymmetrical power relations, path dependence and acceptance of both calculating and culturally-specific behaviour, the historical institutionalist variant seems particularly well-suited to the broader context of political party development in post-conflict developing countries. In these environments the dominant nature of the majority of party systems seems to be more a reflection of the configuration of power related to the conflict and the way in which it was resolved by strategic actors, than directly attributable to the outcome of electoral

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competition or to societal cleavages. This is at least one of the main hypotheses of this thesis, which will be put to the test in the case study chapters (and found to have corroborating evidence there). Important institutional legacies, such as the origins of parties, the nature of the conflict, the type of conflict ending, the nature of the peace agreement, clientelism, and the nature of international engagement are all assumed to be important independent variables for explaining the institutionalization of parties and party systems in post-conflict developing countries. However, in order to establish whether the historical institutionalist approach indeed holds the biggest explanatory power with regard to party development in post-conflict societies, it will be necessary to pay at least some attention to the other two approaches as well.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of the literature on party politics by describing the nature of party development in Western Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa. It has highlighted the main functions, different organizational forms and types of political parties, as well as explained how the institutionalization of individual parties can be analyzed with the Randall and Svåsand model. Moreover, it has focused on the nature of different party systems and has selected Sartori’s framework for consolidated and fluid party systems as the most useful typology for analyzing party systems in (post-conflict) developing countries. In order to analyze the strength and durability of patterns of party interaction, Mainwaring and Scully’s concept of party system institutionalization has been introduced. And finally, the previous
section has reviewed three main analytical approaches for explaining the nature of parties and party systems around the world.

It concluded that in comparison with the electoral competition and the sociological approach, the institutional approach has several advantages for analyzing the development and institutionalization of parties and party systems in developing countries. Moreover, it asserted that the historical institutionalist variant with its emphasis on asymmetrical power relations and path dependence provides the most meaningful ‘lens’ for analyzing party development in post-war developing countries. The following chapters will apply the most relevant concepts and typologies introduced in this chapter, albeit that some of the concepts will be slightly modified –in ways that will be clearly spelled out– in order to fit the specific context of post-war developing countries.
The Development of Parties and Party Systems in Post-War Societies

This chapter focuses on the development, functioning and institutionalization of political parties and party systems in a specific subset of developing countries, namely post-war developing countries in Africa, Asia and Central America. The parties and party systems of post-war countries share many of the organizational, programmatic and behavioural characteristics of their equivalents in non-war developing countries discussed previously. However, as we will see below, the context in which post-war parties and party systems emerge is different and profoundly shaped by the specific causes, intensity and duration of the armed conflict. This results in a unique set of historical, political and socioeconomic conditions for party development.

With a few exceptions –all of them very recent– there has been little attention to the development of political parties and party systems in countries emerging from war. The literature on party politics, reviewed in the previous chapter, does not usually address the specific conditions of post-war societies.

Conversely, the literature on armed conflict and peace-building discusses a broad variety of topics relevant to post-war societies, but gives scant attention to political parties. This chapter identifies relevant party- and conflict-related aspects by drawing on both literatures.

In contrast to a general tendency to lump together all post-war countries and treat parties and party systems as homogenous entities that exist as “given” after war, this chapter demonstrates for the first time that –although there are similarities– post-war parties and party systems vary substantially across different settings. And not least because war and post-war can mean different things in different situations or societies. In addition, it argues that the institutionalization of parties and party systems has been shaped by their origins and power-configuration during and after the war. This particular chapter addresses these points for post-war countries in general. Chapters 4 and 5 subsequently focus on specific post-war contexts, and check whether the argument actually holds in the cases of Cambodia and El Salvador.

3.1 What the Conflict Literature Says –Or Doesn’t Say– About Political Parties

What is sometimes referred to as the ‘conflict literature’ is actually a very diverse set of writings belonging to and crossing the boundaries of security studies, conflict resolution, politics and international studies, development studies and various other social science sub-disciplines. The broad focus of this literature,

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188 With apologies to Bermeo, “What the Democratization Literature Says –Or Doesn’t Say– About Post-War Democratization”.
ranging from conflict motivation and manifestation to international peacekeeping, economic reconstruction, transitional justice and even state-building, reflects the wide range of issues related to the four key phases of conflict and peacebuilding: conflict causation, conflict settlement, post-war transition and post-war democratization.  

A comprehensive examination of all these areas exceeds the scope of this thesis and would not necessarily be relevant to the specific topic of this investigation. A selective review of the conflict literature that explicitly refers to political parties and the context in which they emerge seems more appropriate. In order to be useful, however, such a party-focused analysis of the conflict literature has to be guided by a number of questions that help us to identify what we already know and what we do not know (but need to know) about political party development throughout these four different phases of conflict and peacebuilding. The answers to these questions can give us important clues as to how we should proceed to fill in the gaps in information and, more specifically, to gain insight into the impact that conflict can have on the subsequent development of parties and party systems.

When it comes to conflict causation, political parties are believed to play a role, but the exact nature of their involvement as well as their organizational development during war remains unclear. Therefore, the first two important

189 Sambanis, “A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War”, p.218; and Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution. See also Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens, Ending Civil Wars. The Implementation of Peace Agreements; Junne and Verkoren, Postconflict Development. Meeting New Challenges; Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy. Dilemmas of Peacebuilding; and Burke, Recovering From Armed Conflict: Lessons Learned and Next Steps for Improved International Assistance.
Development of Parties and Party Systems in Post-War Societies

questions that need to be asked are what do we already know about the causes of conflict and the role of political parties therein, and is there any knowledge about the origins of parties before, during or after conflict that says something about their subsequent institutionalization?

Wars are ended in different ways and under the influence of different factors, the actions of political parties presumably being one of them. Many studies refer to the crucial role played by the international community in helping to settle conflicts. Given the fact that the presence and assistance programmes of the international community can have a substantial effect on war-torn countries, it makes sense to analyze how this relates to the role of domestic actors – including political parties – in conflict management and what, if any, the effects of international engagement are on party development.

The immediate post-conflict transition period between the conclusion of a ceasefire or peace agreement and the installation of a new legitimate government through post-conflict elections is said to be another crucial interval. Although much of the literature on this topic concentrates on the role of external actors, we know that the latter cannot substitute for domestic political will and commitment to reform.\(^\text{190}\) It is therefore crucial to also consider the actions of domestic actors, in particular those of political parties. This gives us two additional questions for the literature review: what role do political parties play in the early post-conflict transition process, and how is their behaviour and organization influenced by the various transition tasks?

Finally, once the post-conflict transition period is over and the challenge of building long-term peace begins, new institutional arrangements are designed in

\(^{190}\) de Zeeuw and van de Goor, “Findings and Recommendations”, p.282.
order to prevent the reoccurrence of violent conflict and stimulate the development of democratic inter-party competition. Such efforts at post-war democratization are often supported through international democracy promotion. Considering that there is a growing body of knowledge about –applying both to war and non-war societies– it is worthwhile to ask what this literature has to say about the effects of institutional design and international democracy promotion on the organization and behaviour of political parties in post-conflict societies.

Political Parties and Conflict Causation

Scholarly inquiry into the causation of war has provided different explanations for why and under what conditions armed conflict arises and how it is perpetuated by various actors. Focusing primarily on intra-state violent conflicts—which have been the most prevalent form of conflict since 1945– there are three main perspectives.191

Theories highlighting political explanations of violent conflict concentrate on the repressive, non-inclusive and unaccountable nature of certain political regimes, state structures and other political institutions. Although autocratic regimes can be either more or less stable, undemocratic governments, for example, that allow little to no popular political participation and/or forcibly limit the input of opposition voices to decision-making are widely believed to

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191 Singer, “Armed Conflict in the Former Colonial Regions: From Classification to Explanation”, p.35; Smith, Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict, p.5; and Sambanis, “A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War”. For an informative overview of the extensive literature on the causes of war, see Gardner, “Diagnosing Conflict: What Do We Know?”.
increase the risk of conflict. The same goes for states that are weak or “vacuous”, particularly common in many African countries, which either do not have the capacity to accommodate the varying interests and demands of different societal groups, or according to Chabal and Daloz are simply façades that “conceal the patrimonial and particularistic nature of power”.

Many of these problems can be traced to historical developments. The post-World War II decolonization process, for example, has created a residue of disputed territories “leading inevitably to conflict over the adjustment of boundaries and over the legitimacy of states”. This has led some analysts to argue that the roots of conflict in many developing countries lie in the process of state formation and nation-building. According to Ayoob “the two imperatives of consolidation of state power and democratization” are often difficult to reconcile. Other scholars attribute the outbreak of wars to unaccountable single-party governments, or the military’s ambitions for political power and the violent response from society that it can sometimes provoke, as has been the case in many Latin American and African countries.

A different set of theories focuses on the linguistic, religious, and ethnic differences between different groups in society as the main source of tension and violence. Partly in response to the outbreak of identity-related conflicts in the early and mid-1990s in places like Rwanda, Liberia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Kosovo, and Sri Lanka commentators such as Huntington and Kaplan have argued that post-Cold War conflicts should be understood as ‘ethnic wars’ that can be traced back to primordial animosities between socio-cultural groups, and are influenced by environmental pressures related to land degradation and/or population density.\(^{197}\)

This view has been challenged from several fronts, however. Some have qualified the argument by asserting that what leads ethnic groups into conflict are not the cultural differences per se, but the fears and anxieties of one group over their security, political and economic position vis-à-vis other groups.\(^{198}\) Anthropologists such as Richards and Bowen have formulated a more vehement critique to the cultural explanations of war. Richards argues that Kaplan’s ‘new barbarism’ thesis is seriously flawed and that the war in Sierra Leone, for example, is not caused by ethnic hatred, population pressure or environmental collapse, but is “a product of protracted, post-colonial, crisis of patrimonialism”.\(^{199}\) Referring to the conflicts in the Balkans, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka, Bowen demonstrates that the assumptions that ethnic identities “are ancient and unchanging, (…) motivate people to persecute and kill, and that ethnic diversity itself inevitably leads to violence” are incorrect. He argues that ‘ethnic conflict’ is in fact a product of choices by leaders of parties and other


\(^{198}\) This is the argument of the various contributions in Lake and Rothchild, *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict. Fear, Diffusion and Escalation*.

\(^{199}\) Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest. War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone*, p.xv and p.xviii.
groups seeking to capture or consolidate power.\textsuperscript{200} Fearon and Laitin’s quantitative analysis of more than 120 conflicts has confirmed these arguments and refutes the claim that ethnic or religious diversity by itself causes violent conflict.\textsuperscript{201}

The final component of the causes of war literature focuses on economic explanations of rebellion and war.\textsuperscript{202} Earlier theories in this field primarily discuss the relationship between violent conflict and rapid economic growth, economic inequality, and poor economic conditions, such as low per capita income or a country’s vulnerability to world price changes of primary products.\textsuperscript{203} More recent economic theories are based on rational choice models and focus on the economic rent-seeking and criminal behaviour of rebel groups and individual rebel leaders in explaining violent conflict. Perhaps the best-known argument in this connection is put forward by Paul Collier, who argues that economic factors, such as a country’s economic dependence on natural resources, low levels of education, a high proportion of young men, as well as economic decline are the main drivers of conflict. On the basis of large-scale statistical analysis, Collier and others conclude that political and socio-cultural grievances over income and asset inequality, ethnic and religious divisions and political repression are less important in the explanation of civil war than the


\textsuperscript{201} Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War”. See also Horowitz, \textit{Ethnic Groups in Conflict}, which argues that the relationship between ethnically-based parties and conflict depends heavily on context.

\textsuperscript{202} For a useful overview see Sambanis, “A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War”.

economic greed of certain rebel groups.204 This argument has since spawned a substantial literature on the political economy of intra-state and regionalized conflict that fiercely debates the salience of greed and grievance factors.205

Despite continuing debate between the proponents of the various perspectives outlined above, there is a growing understanding that conflicts are multi-dimensional, and that the outbreak of violence is the result of a combination of factors, not limited to single political, historical, socio-cultural, economic, or even environmental factors.206 Referring to the fact that not all countries that display certain political, socio-cultural or economic conditions associated with conflict actually experience violent conflict, some have concluded that we should therefore shift the focus from causes of conflict to vulnerability to conflict. In this view, the most vulnerable cases are those “where there are severe horizontal inequalities, that is, inequality in political, economic, and/or social conditions among culturally and/or geographically distinct groups”.207 The complexity and multi-dimensionality of conflict is now even confirmed by some of the earlier advocates of the greed thesis, who have started to agree that “contemporary civil wars simply cannot be reduced to ‘resource

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205 For example, Berdal and Malone, Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars; Keen, “Incentives and Disincentives for Violence”; and Cramer, “Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War”.


207 Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities as a Source of Conflict”, p.106.
Development of Parties and Party Systems in Post-War Societies

wars’ sparked by the predatory designs of governments and/or the actions of greedy, loot-seeking rebels”, and that there is a clear need to move beyond the greed versus grievance debate.

But what does this specific subfield of conflict literature say about political institutions such as parties and party systems? Frankly, not much. The majority of writings in this field concentrate on the actors that are directly involved in violent conflict, notably government forces, rebel groups, and criminal gangs. Some theorists do take into account the actions of political elites, including representatives of political parties. They argue that it is these elites engaged in power struggles that often exacerbate existing political, cultural and economic tensions and can even instigate violence among different societal groups in order to strengthen their power position. But political parties and the nature of party competition are usually not the subject of analysis per se. In this view, political party organizations are seen as the pawns or casualties (put differently, a dependent variable), not the main players (an independent variable), and in this branch of the literature largely ignored for that very reason.

Nevertheless, the political theories about conflict causation provide some information on how the elite-based, unrepresentative and unaccountable nature of some political (party) systems—and in some cases the absence of parties—can create tensions and cause conflict. This helps us to understand why certain groups that are totally excluded from politics decide to rebel, or why certain

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209 See, for example, Ali and Matthews, “Conclusion: Conflict, Resolution and Building Peace”; and Brown, “The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict”.

parties, represented in parliament but marginalized by the governing elite, choose to transform their political opposition into armed opposition forces.

Political Parties and Conflict Settlement

Another major subfield in the study of conflict concentrates on the ending of civil wars and the creation of peace. This field can be divided into two parts. 210 Studies focusing on conflict prevention and conflict resolution on the regional or grass-roots level are one part. Here theorists concentrate mainly on ‘bottom-up’ approaches to conflict settlement and conflict transformation, aimed at overcoming deep-rooted sources of conflict between individuals, groups and communities. 211

The other, better-known part focuses primarily on state-level efforts at ending civil wars and consolidating peace by domestic elites and international actors. Based on the classic distinction between preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building, this literature concentrates on the various actors and institutions that can help to end the hostilities and “strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. 212

An important component of this latter research concentrates on the way in which wars end, and on why the majority of conflicts do not end via

211 Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization; and Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. For an extensive overview of the conflict resolution field, see Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution; and Reychler and Paffenholz, Peace-building: A Field Guide.
212 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, p.11.
negotiations. King, for example, explains that deep-seated hatreds and emotions of the belligerents, their incompatible values and identities, and the ‘structure’ of the conflict itself (including the incentives for continuing violence and the disincentives for compromise) can provide strong obstacles to a negotiated settlement.

Others focus on the question why some peace agreements succeed while others fail, highlighting in particular the role of international actors. Hampson argues that sustained third-party engagement during the negotiation and peace implementation phase is the most important success factor. Barbara Walter adds that it is not just the engagement of third-party actors as such, but the extent to which they are able to provide credible security guarantees for the warring parties which determines a successful outcome. The latter argument has been disputed by Stedman, however. In his view, there are some groups, which regardless of the provision of security guarantees by international actors, are intent on ‘spoiling’ the peace agreement in order to win the conflict or profit from its continuation. Finally it has become clear that peace-building success, in addition to the factors mentioned above, strongly depends on “the difficulty of

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214 King, Ending Civil Wars, pp.25-28.
215 For example, Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis”. For an extensive overview of this specific literature, see Stedman, “Introduction”, pp.3-20.
216 Hampson, Nurturing Peace. Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail.
217 Walter, Committing to Peace. The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars.
218 Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”. For a recent critical review of the ‘spoiling’ behaviour of not only rebel groups, but also of criminal gangs, diasporas, and even governments, see Newman and Richmond, Challenges to Peacebuilding. Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution.
the implementation environment and the willingness of international actors to provide resources and risk troops” 219.

But what does this mean for political parties? According to most of these studies, political elites that include representatives of political parties play a crucial role in civil war settlement and peace implementation. As we have seen in the previous section, it is the actions of political elites that can motivate certain groups to take up arms over certain political, socio-cultural, economic grievances, and/or greed. In a similar fashion, it mainly comes down to political elites to diffuse the tensions again between these groups and their warring factions, and to make sure that certain grievances can be addressed through non-violent, political dialogue. In practice, however, political elites and the political parties they represent often do not choose automatically or unequivocally for either war or peace. A realistic chance that they can preserve in the post-conflict period their power position built up during the war is a key requirement for elites and parties to actually enter into peace negotiations.

In addition, as research has shown, strong international intervention is usually needed to cajole parties into coming to an agreement. 220 However, to have a chance of being successful in this endeavour international actors must understand the local political alignments and divisions in their full complexity, for they can be both many and subject to a conflict dynamic even as a peace process proceeds. Often this means that political parties are not the unitary actors they may present themselves to be, as we will see below and also in the two case

220 Jones, “The Challenges of Strategic Coordination”. See also the various other contributions in Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens, Ending Civil Wars.
Development of Parties and Party Systems in Post-War Societies

studies. Different factions within the party are sometimes pulling in opposite directions, and as a result parties often waver between pro-war and pro-peace positions during the negotiations. Once a peace agreement has actually been signed, and a timetable for the first post-war elections has been set, the various elites then face the challenge of mobilizing electoral support that will give their particular party the mandate to implement the peace deal and set out the new policy priorities. Manning shows that party organizational motivations and intra-party dynamics are important factors in peace-building success, but she is one of very few to pay attention to such issues.\textsuperscript{221} And although the primary focus of this thesis differs in that it is not how parties impact on peace-building, these considerations are relevant to the question of how parties emerge and develop in post-conflict situations, because of the typically fluid and interactive nature of these situations. Yet the main focus of the conflict settlement literature remains on structural factors and the role played by international actors, not on political party development.

Political Parties and Post-War Transition

The transition process between the signing of a peace agreement and the first post-war elections can also have a critical influence on the success and long-term sustainability of peace-building, and more immediately on how parties develop. Three factors are believed to be particularly influential for the required “demilitarization of politics”: the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants and reform of the security sector, the transformation of rebel groups into political parties, and the establishment of (conflict-managing

\textsuperscript{221} Manning, “Party-building on the Heels of War”.
and electoral) interim institutions. The exact implementation of each of these tasks has a direct bearing on how political parties and inter-party competition develop.

A great deal of the security problems and lack of trust between former warring parties in post-conflict societies is caused by the presence of armed fighters and the widespread availability of arms. Therefore in most cases, a DDR process is set up to address these problems by “controlling and reducing the possession and use of arms, by disbanding non-state armed groups and rightsizing state security services and by assisting former combatants to reintegrate into civilian life”. The main aims of the disarmament process are to prevent the renewed outbreak of violent conflict and the creation of a secure and stable environment that can help to address the deep mistrust between ex-combatants. The latter can have a positive effect on the initiation of dialogue between those political parties that have been supporting different sides in the war, or even have had close links with armed militias. The creation of a secure environment is also a necessary condition to start or resume political party activities, many of which are often suspended during times of conflict.

The demobilization phase intends to break the command structures between rebel leaders and their armed militias, and to reduce the size of government-controlled army and police forces. This is done either by integrating ex-combatants from rebel and army forces into new (joint) army and police units, or by splitting up some units and reforming them. The aim of this second phase is to

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222 Lyons, *Demilitarizing Politics. Elections on the Uncertain Road to Peace*, pp.3-7.
initiate the first steps towards a functional, capable and civilian-controlled security sector. For those former rebel groups that aspire to a political role as normal political parties in the new post-conflict setting, this demobilization phase is a crucial step in the rebel-to-party transformation process. In addition, the development of a new security apparatus that is accountable to civilians also involves the building and/or strengthening of key oversight institutions, such as ministries and parliaments. Because political parties play an important role in these institutions, both in terms of staff provision and accountability, this process can help boost their status in the new post-conflict context.

Reintegration is a largely socioeconomic process that helps former fighters with training, land, employment or other resources in order to help them sustain themselves as normal, civilian members of society. The link between this aspect of DDR and political party development is less clear, although the way in which this process is handled, and by whom, is likely to have an effect on voters’ party support, for example if resources are allocated on a partisan basis.

The conversion of armed rebel groups from militarized organizations into non-armed political organizations that can take part in democratic elections is the

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225 The reintegration phase is usually preceded by a short-term reinsertion phase aimed at covering the immediate basic needs (food, shelter, clothes, medical assistance) of former combatants after they are discharged from their military units, and before they enter the long-term socioeconomic reintegration process. Ball and Van de Goor, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, p.2. See also: Lyons, Demilitarizing Politics, pp.148-149.
second major post-conflict transition process. Rebel-to-party transformation is directly related to the previously mentioned DDR process in the sense that the disarmament of former rebel fighters and the disbanding of military command structures is a core element. Three other core structural and attitudinal elements of the transformation process include the development of a new party organization, the adaptation of organizational strategies, and the democratization of the former armed group’s decision-making processes. A recent comparative study by the Clingendael Institute concludes that the full, partial or non-implementation of these four aspects can lead to different types of rebel-to-party transformation.

To understand the organizational change that underlies the transformation of rebel groups into political parties some authors have referred to Panebianco’s distinction between selective and collective incentives. Both types of incentives are said to be crucial not only for political parties but also for armed rebel groups in order to “help overcome the collective action problem and facilitate mobilization”. However, the exact content and mix of these


227 This includes a successful rebel-to-party transformation, a partial transformation, a façade transformation and a failed transformation. See the various contributions in de Zeeuw, From Soldiers to Politicians. Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War.

228 Panebianco, Political Parties, pp.9-10.

229 Lyons, Demilitarizing Politics, p.41.
incentives in the post-conflict period is likely to be different from those used during the war. For example, war-time sources of funding for distributing patronage among party leaders may no longer exist after the war, just as the leadership of a post-conflict party might have to be different from that party’s war-time equivalent in order to have legitimacy and develop a new political organization that is able to attract popular support during elections. In this view, put forward by Carrie Manning, rebel-to-party transformation is a process of organizational adaptation, in which increased electoral competition forces the new parties to adjust the relations between party elites and revisit their strategies for mobilizing popular support.230

A final aspect of post-conflict transition concerns the building of interim institutions, such as electoral administrations, transitional authorities, and other consultative mechanisms for managing the transition period immediately after the ceasefire or peace agreement. A recent study of various domestic interim institutions argues that “to the extent that transitional regimes operate on the basis of joint decision-making and collaborative problem-solving and create norms that protect the interests of key constituencies, they can build confidence in the peace process and provide an institutional context that encourages the demilitarization of politics and successful elections”.231 A special type of interim institution are the so-called international transitional administrations, such as those in East-Timor (UNTAET), Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and Kosovo

231 Lyons, Demilitarizing Politics, p.110.
In these cases international actors assume most or all decision-making powers, leaving only limited authority to domestic stakeholders.

According to some, post-conflict settings with an international interim administration are likely to limit the autonomy and institutionalization of domestic actors, including political parties. Others have challenged this view for being too deterministic and indicate that domestic actors often have sufficient capacity to resist change, both in international and domestic transitional institutions. Stanley, for example, argues that in Guatemala and El Salvador a variety of actors in the security forces, judiciary and political-economic establishment “with vested interests in the previous order” successfully resisted key democratic reforms laid down in the internationally-brokered peace accords for the two countries. Going a step further, Manning indicates that incumbent parties and former armed groups often predominate in the decision-making over interim governance arrangements and argues that this is likely to have a lasting and positive effect on their institutionalization and competitive advantage.

**Political Parties and Post-Conflict Democratization**

The final phase of conflict and peacebuilding concentrates on the broad range of institutions that need to be built or reformed in order to stimulate socioeconomic


233 See Stanley, “Multiple Transitions and Interim Governance in El Salvador and Guatemala”; and Manning, “Interim Governments and the Construction of Political Elites”.
development, prevent future conflict and contribute to sustainable peace.\textsuperscript{234} The building of democratic political institutions after conflict often receives special attention in this regard, especially from international actors.

International democracy promotion has become the umbrella term for a wide range of political, diplomatic, economic, technical and even military initiatives by different international actors to support democratization in emerging democracies, including post-conflict societies. Democracy assistance, which covers the various grant-aided, logistic, training and technical assistance programmes, is one of the most visible aspects of democracy promotion. It covers not only assistance for the organization, administration and monitoring of elections, but also aid for civil society, media, human rights, political parties, the rule of law sector (including police, judiciary and prison system), among others.\textsuperscript{235} In countries emerging from war, democracy assistance covers many of these activities but is generally more targeted to specific post-conflict needs, such as capacity-building of electoral administrations, the establishment of war-crime tribunals and truth commissions, support to conflict resolution organizations and political party capacity-building.

\textsuperscript{234} Taking into account the different stages of post-conflict recovery, many of the earlier studies on this subject have used a sectoral approach by highlighting, amongst others, the significance of restoring security, providing emergency aid and reviving the healthcare system, jumpstarting the (formal) economy, reconstructing infrastructure, the organization of elections, and the monitoring and protection of human rights. See Kumar, “The Nature and Focus of International Assistance for Rebuilding War-Torn Societies”; and Junne and Verkoren, \textit{Postconflict Development. Meeting New Challenges.}

\textsuperscript{235} For a broad overview of the field of democracy promotion and a critical review of the achievements and problems of democracy assistance, see Carothers, \textit{Aiding Democracy Abroad. The Learning Curve}; and Burnell, \textit{Democracy Assistance. International Cooperation for Democratization}. 
In the absence of systematic and independent evaluations, the exact impact of such democracy and party assistance programs on political party development in post-war societies remains unknown.\textsuperscript{236} Recently there have been a few scholars that have looked at international aid in relation to party development, albeit from different perspectives. One recent study that focuses on new (non-war) democracies concludes that political party assistance has generally had a modest effect on parties’ campaign techniques, organizational development and acceptance of their role in a democratic political system, but at the same time has not had any “transformative impact”.\textsuperscript{237} Another study that does look at post-war societies, particularly in the cases of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, argues that in spite of far-reaching governing powers international administrations have generally not exerted “substantial impact on political parties and their (democratic) development in either institutional or cultural dimension”.\textsuperscript{238} Broadly similar conclusions are presented by studies that look at other aspects of international engagement with political parties in post-conflict societies, such as

\textsuperscript{236} Apart from a general institutional reluctance to be self-critical, Andrew Greene and Richard Kohl attribute the limited number of democracy and party assistance evaluations to a range of practical problems including a lack of resources, internal capacity and expertise, as well as methodological problems of attribution, and data availability. See Greene and Kohl, “Challenges of Evaluating Democracy Assistance: Perspectives From the Donor Side”, pp. 153-160.

\textsuperscript{237} According to Thomas Carothers, “[party] aid is transformative if it helps a leader-centric, structurally debilitated, ideologically incoherent, weakly rooted party establish genuine internal party democracy, build a strong organizational structure, embrace and embody a clear ideologically rooted platform, and develop an extensive social base”. Carothers, \textit{Confronting the Weakest Link}, p.163, and pp.184-189.

\textsuperscript{238} Nenadović, “An Uneasy Symbiosis: The Impact of International Administrations on Political Parties in Post-Conflict Countries”, p.20.
party regulation and electoral system design.\textsuperscript{239} The overall lesson from this literature therefore seems to be that political party development is primarily an internal, domestic process in which the role of international actors is largely peripheral.\textsuperscript{240}

Nevertheless, advocates of post-conflict democracy promotion argue that support to these types of programmes is (still) justified and desirable because of the domestic demand for political change, because a democratic political system is conducive to economic development and because in the long run it is the best institutional mechanism to deal with disputes in a non-violent manner.\textsuperscript{241} To support the latter argument, reference is often made to the democratic peace thesis, which argues that (liberal) democracies are less likely than non-democracies to go to war, as a result of the democratic checks and balances acting as a brake on executive decisions to do so.\textsuperscript{242}

\textsuperscript{239} Reilly, “Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies”, p.823; and Manning, “Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties”.

\textsuperscript{240} See De Zeeuw, “Projects Do Not Create Institutions: The Record of Democracy Assistance in Post-Conflict Societies”.


\textsuperscript{242} Key texts on this topic include Rummel, \textit{War, Power, Peace}; Russett, \textit{Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World}; and Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics”. For an extensive review of the democratic peace literature, see Chan, “In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise”. 
However, post-conflict democracy promotion also has its critics who have raised serious questions about its strategies, effectiveness and legitimacy. Some scholars assert that the scope of international democracy assistance programmes has become too large for it to be effective. Ottaway, for example, claims that international actors have increasingly predicated their programming on a ‘maximalist democratic reconstruction model’ that –because of the enormous challenges in post-conflict societies– is often too complex, too costly and therefore politically unrealistic. In addition, Manning argues that in places like Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq the focus of international democracy and state-building strategies to facilitate the emergence of ‘desirable’ parties and party leaders and “shoehorn them into power” is too voluntaristic and ignores the importance of economic, social and cultural context factors that can lead a political transition in a different direction. Others claim that some recent forms of international action have actually undermined the legitimacy of democracy promotion. They focus their critique on international efforts to block some groups from entering into power, and to support undemocratic regimes in the interest of anti-terrorism or other security objectives.

A particularly powerful challenge to the international democracy promotion agenda is put forward by those who claim that under particular conditions the

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243 The special issue on ‘securing democracy in complex environments’ of the journal *Democratization* in December 2006 highlights a number of critical perspectives on international democracy promotion. See Buxton, “Securing Democracy in Complex Environments”.

244 In Ottaway’s view, the only option is to scale down on ambitions in post-conflict settings and focus on a more modest, minimally acceptable political system, at least in the short run. See: Ottaway, “Promoting Democracy after Conflict: The Difficult Choices”, p.315 and p.321.

245 Manning, “Political Elites and Democratic State-Building Efforts in Bosnia and Iraq”, p.725.

Development of Parties and Party Systems in Post-War Societies

The process of democratization can be dangerous. Disputing the validity of the democratic peace thesis particularly in young and democratizing states, Mansfield and Snyder assert that when democratization takes place in settings without strong political institutions such as—as is usually the case in post-conflict environments— the process itself can create new tensions which might easily lead to violent conflict. According to them, in contrast to consolidated democracies (and even autocracies), democratizing states without an effective state, rule of law, organized parties and professional news media are particularly vulnerable to violent conflict. In a similar fashion, Roland Paris indicates that international action has sometimes been part of the problem, arguing that “the very strategy that peace-builders have employed to consolidate peace—political and economic liberalization—seems, paradoxically, to have increased the likelihood of renewed violence in several of these states”.

These scholars argue that, particularly in post-war settings, more attention should be given to the often contradictory objectives of international action, the timing and sequencing of political reforms, and that as a general rule democratization should not be started before some basic governance structures

247 Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight. Why Emerging Democracies Go To War, p.2; and Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War”.

248 Paris, At War’s End. Building Peace After Civil Conflict, p.6. See also Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism”.
are in place and function adequately. Effective state institutions that actually hold the monopoly on the use of violence and have the capacity to deliver basic social services are believed to be most crucial in this respect. International actors are therefore increasingly advised to focus on ‘state-building’, aiming to create new or strengthening already existing state institutions such as the police, the army, the judiciary and civil service. Nevertheless, despite the current trend towards what has been described as ‘stateness first, democracy later’ and the related debate about ‘democratic sequencing’, there is also recognition that the two agendas of democracy promotion and state-building cannot really be separated in post-conflict societies. What is clear therefore is that the exact balance between democracy promotion and state-building remains a difficult one and will strongly depend on the particular circumstances.

A final body of literature in this field concentrates on how formal rules and institutions –not internal transition processes or external actors– can influence the behaviour of political actors and thereby contributes to conflict management and democratization. The underlying assumption here is that conflict, in terms of

\[\text{249} \] Larry Diamond, for example, argues that the failure of many post-conflict democracy building initiatives often emanates from a failure to acknowledge and mitigate the tensions endemic in some of its key tasks, including the establishment of an authoritative security sector (capable of providing order but subject to civilian control and respecting human rights and the rule of law), the installation of a transitional authority (necessary for stabilization and administration, but potentially an impediment to a locally-chosen and democratically legitimate post-conflict government), and the organization of quick elections (needed for legitimating government, but when ill-timed and ill-prepared risking political instability and even new conflict). Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States. Lessons and Challenges”, pp.97-101.

\[\text{250} \] For a critical discussion of the current international focus on post-war state-building, see Paris and Sisk, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding. Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations.

diverging opinions and goals, is not necessarily a negative thing and is actually part and parcel of healthy democratic debate. What needs to be avoided is that such conflict is expressed violently. In this view, democracy can help to express differences and divergences between groups in society in non-violent ways and is therefore seen as a “workable system for the positive management of conflict”. However, in order to perform this conflict management function, the design of political institutions is of particular importance. The main institutions highlighted in this regard include the structure of the state, the type of government, the type of democracy, and the electoral system. Each of these can influence party competition and party behaviour in different ways.

In order to manage conflict in deeply divided and post-conflict societies – most notably in mid-sized to large countries– some form of federalism, often in combination with a certain level of autonomy for particular regions, is usually suggested. Because power is devolved to the subnational level in a federal system, regional or local minorities and ethnic groups have easier access to the political system and therefore potentially a bigger say in state decision-making and the distribution of state resources. Because political parties are (ideally) the vehicles for interest representation of such minorities and ethnic groups, a federal system will generally not only boost the number of parties at the local and regional level, but may also lead to the formation of coalitions between parties representing different groups with similar demands. However, federal arrangements can be problematic, as they may give rise to the mobilization of

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Development of Parties and Party Systems in Post-War Societies

Communities along ethnic lines, lead to new single ethnic parties, and further fragment the party system.253

The nature of executive government (parliamentary or presidential) is another important aspect of institutional design. In relation to conflict management and democratization, parliamentary and presidential systems have their own strengths and weaknesses. Depending on the type of electoral system used, parliamentary systems are generally better able to include into government coalitions a broad range of groups and minorities represented in the legislature. This inclusive nature of parliamentary systems can have an important conflict-mitigating effect, in so far as all major groups can have their say and no one feels excluded. It is mainly for this reason that parliamentary systems are believed to be particularly suited for societies that are deeply divided by ethnic cleavages or violent conflict. At the same time, the inclusive nature of parliamentary systems may also lead to deadlock “caused by the inability of the various parties to agree on a coherent position on issues of disagreement”.254 And because governing coalitions have the tendency to change quickly in parliamentary systems, they may sometimes lead to weak and unstable governments.

Presidential systems, on the other hand, are usually associated with higher degrees of stability and more decisive governance. But because the presidency is often captured by a single political or ethnic group, and is not always subject to real checks and balances, a presidential system can also become a major obstacle for bridging divisions and reducing tensions in divided and post-conflict


254 Reilly, “Executive Type: Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism”, p.182.
societies. In this connection, it has been argued that a concentration of power in the hands of directly elected presidents tends to inhibit party development, for instance through giving parties (especially opposition parties) very little influence between elections. However, this is contingent to some extent on such factors as whether president and parliamentarians are elected concurrently.\textsuperscript{255}

Recognizing the different nature of parliamentary systems, a further distinction is usually made between majoritarian democracies and consensus (power-sharing) democracies. In majoritarian democracies, represented most clearly by Britain’s Westminster model, parliamentary power is concentrated in the hands of the majority and the government is formed by a one-party majority cabinet. Consensus democracies, on the other hand, operate on the “principle to let all or most of the important parties share executive power in a broad coalition”.\textsuperscript{256} In contrast to majoritarian forms of democracy where the ‘winner takes all’, consensus or power-sharing democracies are more inclusive and are therefore often seen as better suited to (ethnically) divided and/or post-conflict societies. The way in which power is shared between groups can vary, however.

In countries using a consociational approach to power-sharing, groups or segments of society that are divided by ethnicity, religion, language or other characteristics are explicitly recognized and power within government is shared between them. This is usually done by the establishment of a grand coalition representing the elites of all the main groups, the provision of autonomy to these

\textsuperscript{255} Reilly, “Executive Type: Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism”, pp.184-185; see also Van Cranenburgh, “‘Big Men’ Rule: Presidential Power, Regime Type and Democracy in 30 African Countries”.

\textsuperscript{256} Lijphart, \textit{Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries}, p.34.
groups, ensuring proportionality (e.g. via a PR electoral system or through quotas for jobs and government spending), and giving minority groups the power to veto proposals on the most vital issues affecting their rights and autonomy.\textsuperscript{257} Because in this form of power-sharing ethnic, religious, linguistic or otherwise divided groups are treated as the building blocks of society, political parties representing these groups will tend to organize themselves along the same divisions, usually creating mono-ethnic parties. However, as a premium is put on the differences between societal groups, this can sometimes lead to ‘centrifugal’ party politics in which parties and party leaders look for more extreme positions instead of searching for the middle-ground (as happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example).\textsuperscript{258}

The alternative, integrative approach to power-sharing aims to transcend the various societal divisions, by building political alliances among the different groups, “creating incentives for political leaders to be moderate on divisive ethnic themes, and enhancing minority influence in majority decision-making”. This can be achieved by the use of certain electoral systems that encourage ‘vote-pooling’ across ethnic lines (such as the alternative vote, AV), non-ethnic federalism with regional autonomy, and preferential educational, business and employment policies to reduce ethnic disparities.\textsuperscript{259} Another way of stimulating cross-ethnic cooperation and moderation is to ‘regulate’ party formation,

\textsuperscript{258} Reilly, “Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies”; and Manning, “Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties”.  
registration and behaviour through formal rules, constitutions and party laws.\textsuperscript{260} Whatever the incentive, when it is successful the outcome of this form of power-sharing tends to be multi-ethnic parties or party coalitions that integrate societal divisions. Because party leaders are stimulated to accommodate differences and look for less extreme positions in the political centre, this approach is said to lead to a more ‘centripetal’ type of party politics.\textsuperscript{261} Nevertheless, depending on the specific circumstances, both the consociational and the integrative approach have their strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, debate remains about which of the two power-sharing approaches is best for divided and post-conflict societies.

Much of the influence that these different forms of institutional engineering have on party politics depends on the choice and functioning of the electoral system. This is because electoral systems are not only the institutional mechanism through which elected representatives are held accountable, but also because they determine the degree of “proportionality between votes cast and seats won”, and “give incentives for those competing for power to couch their appeals to the electorate in distinct ways”.\textsuperscript{262}

Plurality-majority systems such as FPTP favour the small number of winning parties (usually only one), and hinder a large group of losing parties. Because of their mechanical and psychological effects (see chapter 2), they tend to result not only in a (stable) single-party government, but also in an adversarial two-party system. Under a presidential system, this may result in the situation

\begin{itemize}
  \item For a recent study of party regulation in conflict-prone societies, see Reilly and Nordlund, Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development.
  \item Reilly, “Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies”.
  \item Reilly and Reynolds, “Electoral Systems for Divided Societies”, p.192.
\end{itemize}
that both parliament and the presidency are held by one single party. Although this can create problems with presidential accountability, it maximizes government efficiency. PR systems also have their strengths and weaknesses. Because it is more difficult to gain a majority under PR, proportional systems tend to lead to less adversarial coalition governments. Because it is easier for smaller (minority) parties to gain seats, PR systems are typically more inclusive and are therefore often seen as one of the crucial elements of a (consociational) power-sharing package for deeply divided or post-conflict countries.²⁶³ At the same time, large coalition governments can be unwieldy and the emergence of many new parties may contribute to party system fragmentation.

Although each of the different institutions mentioned above has a particular effect on the behaviour of individual political parties and the dynamics of inter-party competition, there is a lot of variation, depending on the specific country context and the presence of moderate elites for example. Therefore, the actual effectiveness of initiatives to purposively ‘engineer’ certain outcomes, particularly in volatile post-conflict environments, remains a matter of debate. Where some are more positive and point to the capacity of governmental, electoral and other institutions to manage conflict and consolidate democracy, others are more cautious and point out that “the institutional devices selected by constitution makers seldom function quite in the way intended”.²⁶⁴ In this context it is important to realize that institutional choices are not crafted in a

vacuum but often reflect the power distribution that already obtains, as political actors seek to fashion the institutional environment to personal and partisan political advantage. Particularly when such institutions have over time become deeply entrenched, ‘engineering’ them to obtain a different outcome will be extremely difficult.\textsuperscript{265} This caveat is also reflected in the focus of this thesis, as it argues that the particular dynamics of post-war party politics is the sum of a complex set of factors, many of which have proven to be difficult to manage by formal institutional incentives alone.

\textit{Conclusion}

Coming back to the overall question of what the conflict literature tells us about party politics in post-war environments, we can draw a number of conclusions. First, it is clear that the development and institutionalization of political parties and party systems as such has not received much attention in studies about conflict causation and conflict settlement. The role of political parties in conflict causation is generally not spelled out in the literature, and their organizational history usually receives limited attention. Even when the behaviour of political elites that include representatives of political parties are examined, the nature of party politics is at best an indirect object of analysis.

The only exceptions are the few studies that focus on shifts in intra-organizational structures and leadership behaviour during post-conflict transition and rebel-to-party transformation, as well as the institutionalist analyses that focus on the effect of power-sharing arrangements and electoral systems. This

\textsuperscript{265} Randall, “Party Regulation in Conflict-Prone Societies: More Dangers Than Opportunities?”, p.248.
still small specialized conflict literature by the likes of Timothy Sisk, Carrie Manning, Benjamin Reilly and Jeroen de Zeeuw does take into account the origins and historical background of parties, and thereby provides important insights into how political parties develop and how inter-party competition is affected by internal and external pressures, as well as formal and informal rules.  

Second, the strong focus on international actors in conflict management and peace-building seems to have come at the expense of attention to the role of domestic actors, including political parties. Also, notwithstanding the importance of third-party mediation and security guarantees provided by international peacekeeping forces, the willingness (or reluctance) of all main domestic actors to settle the conflict is often underplayed. International actors are often couched in terms of ‘peace-makers’ whereas domestic actors are seen as obstacles or even ‘spoilers’ of peace.

Third, studies increasingly recognize that rebel-to-party transformation is a crucial aspect of the war-to-peace transition. Recent research on this topic demonstrates that intra-party dynamics matter for a successful transformation from an armed rebel group to an unarmed political party.

Fourth, the effect of international engagement with political party development remains largely untested, including the common assumption that assistance for elections and other forms of democracy promotion benefit political party institutionalization. With regard to the effects of institutional design on the

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organization and behaviour of political parties, the findings point in different
directions. On the one hand, it is clear that certain institutional arrangements are
more inclusive for new or smaller (minority) parties and thereby can have an
important conflict-mitigating effect in divided and post-conflict societies. At the
same time, such institutional design can also entrench societal divisions into the
political system, thereby making it more difficult for multi-ethnic parties and
centripetalist party competition to emerge. Because of the large number of
factors at play in volatile post-conflict party politics, the extent to which
institutional design really can influence the behaviour of party leaders in
particular directions remains undetermined.

To conclude, it seems fair to say that most of the conflict literature pays little
attention to the origins, development and functioning of political parties during
and after conflict. Nor does it specifically address the impact of violent conflict
on the type and institutionalization of parties and party systems that emerge after
conflict. Nevertheless, by extracting relevant information about political parties
and party systems from the rich case study literature on specific conflicts, it is
possible to fill in these gaps in information. The next three sections therefore
present a general picture of the context and nature of party development in
different post-war environments.
3.2 Post-Conflict Environments: Definition, Characteristics and Political Context

‘Post-Conflict’: An Accepted Misnomer?

The term ‘post-conflict’ (or ‘post-war’) is widely used in the academic literature on peace and conflict studies and judging from its use in policy speeches and even special organizational units it is also widely accepted in international policy circles. However, as a few concrete examples illustrate, this does not mean there is a single shared understanding of what ‘post-conflict’ means.

For instance, the conclusion of the 23-year civil war in Afghanistan by the removal of the Taliban and the signing of the Bonn peace agreement in 2001 led many to describe Afghanistan as a post-conflict country. But although conflict indeed ended in some parts of the country, fighting continued between government and international military forces, local armed militias, and Taliban fighters and since 2006 escalated into a full-blown war again, especially in the southern provinces of Afghanistan. As a result, more and more observers now question the official interpretation of Afghanistan as a ‘post-war’ country.

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267 See Pouligny, “Promoting Democratic Institutions in Post-Conflict Societies: Giving Diversity a Chance”; Nieminen, “The Difficult Equation of Long-Term Peace and Post-conflict Governance”; and Brinkerhoff, Governance in Post-Conflict Societies. Rebuilding Fragile States. Examples of organizational units dedicated to post-conflict reconstruction issues include the United Kingdom’s former Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) and the World Bank’s former Post-Conflict Unit, recently renamed the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit. See also United Nations, Secretary-General’s Statement to the Security Council Meeting on the Role of the UN in Post-conflict Situations; and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Global Governance as Part of Crisis Prevention.

268 See, for example, Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop. The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan.
Uganda provides another example. Some consider it as a post-conflict country on the basis that it concluded its civil war with the military victory of the National Resistance Army (NRA) in 1986. Others still regard Uganda as a country in conflict and point to the conflict zones of Northern Uganda, where until recently the Ugandan army has been fighting the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). And finally there are those who refer to Uganda, after twenty years of relative political stability and a ‘minor, localized conflict’ in the North, as a ‘normal’ developing country. Similar problems of categorization exist in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and other places where a peace agreement exists between the main warring parties, but where fighting in major parts of the country continues. As these examples illustrate, without a clear definition and criteria for the term ‘post-conflict’ it has almost become a bit of a misnomer.

The term ‘post-conflict’ also raises the important questions of what conflict exactly is, and when it can be considered ‘over’. In general, conflict can range from minor non-violent disputes between two or more people all the way to major armed conflict or war between various armed groups. In this thesis, conflict refers to major armed conflict or war. Following the widely used definition from the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) and the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), war is here defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government

For a discussion of the problematic nature of the term ‘post-conflict’ in the case of Uganda, see Barya, Opolot and Otim, The Limits of ‘No-Party’ Politics. The Role of International Assistance in Uganda’s Democratisation Process.
of a state, results in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year". On the basis of this definition, we can in theory limit the term ‘post-conflict’ to those situations where the number of battle-related deaths per calendar year has dropped below 1,000.

But a numerical criterion alone says little about whether a violent conflict has actually ended, and is therefore not sufficient. It also leaves the problem of the continuation of violent conflict in certain sub-national regions unresolved. A more comprehensive definition of a ‘post-conflict’ country therefore needs to take into account the existence of a peace agreement, ceasefire or, alternatively, a clear military victory that brings a complete end to the violent contestation. The definition of a ‘post-conflict’ (or ‘post-war’) country that is used here meets most of these criteria: a country that has concluded major intrastate armed conflict throughout its territory, which ended by a peace agreement signed by the main warring parties or a military victory by one of the warring parties. On the basis of this definition we can identify approximately 30 post-war countries emerging since the end of the Cold War (see table 3.1 on the next pages).

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region/Country</th>
<th>War Period(^{272})</th>
<th>Estimated Casualties(^{273})</th>
<th>Main Conflict Issue(^{274})</th>
<th>Conflict Ended Through</th>
<th>International peace mission(^{275})</th>
<th>Ranking UNDP Human Development Index 2005(^{276})</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Sahara Africa (14)</td>
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<td>MONUA (1997-1999)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>1997 – 2003</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>National power</td>
<td>Ceasefire</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>142 (medium HD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Kinshasa)*</td>
<td>1996 – 2002</td>
<td>1.5 – 3 million</td>
<td>National power, resources</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
<td>MONUC (1999–)</td>
<td>167 (low HD)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{271}\) The table includes both ‘recent’ post-war countries –i.e. where the civil war ended between 1989 and 2008– as well as ‘lapsed’ post-war countries, i.e. post-war countries that have fallen back into war either throughout the country or only in some parts of the country. The latter are marked with an asterisk (*).

\(^{272}\) The time periods presented in this column for some countries cover separate periods of civil war, sometimes interrupted by (short) ceasefires. For presentational purposes, such consecutive war periods with intermittent ceasefires are treated here as one single civil war period.

\(^{273}\) Figures in this column are rough estimates based on Lyons, *Demilitarizing Politics*, p.14, p.18, p.20, and p.34; Leitenberg, *Deaths in Wars and Conflicts in the 20th Century*, p.77-78; and various tables from research centres studying conflict trends, mentioned in note 278. ‘n.a’ means ‘data not available’


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
<th>Cause of Instability</th>
<th>Settlement Method</th>
<th>Implementation Date</th>
<th>Outcome Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1961–1991</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>Military victory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>161 (low HD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1974–1991</td>
<td>250,000–1  million</td>
<td>System/ideology, national power</td>
<td>Military victory</td>
<td></td>
<td>170 (low HD)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1966–1990</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>Decolonization</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
<td></td>
<td>125 (medium HD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda*</td>
<td>1980–1986</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>National power</td>
<td>Military victory</td>
<td></td>
<td>144 (medium HD)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Europe (4)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia (Abkhazia)</td>
<td>1990–1993</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>Secession</td>
<td>Ceasefire</td>
<td>UNOMIG (1993– )</td>
<td>100 (medium HD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Americas (4)</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td>Nature of Conflict</td>
<td>Type of Agreement</td>
<td>Agreements/Initiatives</td>
<td>HD Classification</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Asia (5)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1975 – 1990</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>National power</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
<td>UNIFIL (1978– )</td>
<td>81 (medium HD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Secession</td>
<td>Military victory</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>151 (low HD)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Variation in Intensity, Nature and Ending of War

Often post-conflict countries are analyzed as one category. But as table 3.1 above indicates, the historical, political and socioeconomic background of post-conflict countries differs widely, not only in terms of conflict duration, the scale/intensity of violence, and the nature of conflict, but also with regard to the type of conflict ending, and the way in which peace was restored.

Many of the conflicts that ended in the early or mid-1990s were started in the late 1970s and 1980s. In exceptional cases, such as Eritrea and Guatemala conflicts have lasted for more than two decades. The number of battle-related deaths also varies significantly per conflict, ranging from 13,000 in Nepal to more than 3 million in the DRC.277

The nature of war also differs per country. Major academic studies focusing on the long-term trends of armed conflict, such as those conducted by the Correlates of War Project (COW), the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachen Forschung (AKUF) and the earlier mentioned UCDP/PRIO, have come up with several useful categorizations to distinguish conflicts for example on the basis of their intensity (low, medium, high) and type of parties in dispute (inter-state, extra-systemic, intrastate/civil war).278 However, as perspectives and definitions of conflict continue to differ, there is no consensus as to how each conflict should be classified.

277 It should be emphasized, however, that much of this data consists of rough estimates, and that the total number of long-term battle-related deaths –due to illness, disability, and other problems related to conflict– is likely to be much higher in many cases. Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett, “Civil Wars Kill and Maim People – Long After the Shooting Stops”; and Leitenberg, Deaths in Wars and Conflicts in the 20th Century.

278 For more information, see http://www.correlatesofwar.org/; http://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/lpw/Akuf/index.htm; http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/. Other conflict-related data sets are produced by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management, see: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc.
Categorizations on the basis of causes, motivations and triggers of conflict have led to expressions such as ‘class conflict’, ‘ethnic conflicts’ or ‘resource conflicts’. Such popular labels have been highly controversial, however, because they do usually not reflect “the complex and dynamic nature of most conflicts [where one] factor can rarely be singled out as the root cause”.279 For the purposes of this research, which is interested in the broader war context and does not seek to explicitly link the nature of conflict to the type of parties or party systems, the relatively straightforward method by the Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research (HIIK) is arguably the most useful. HIIK’s Conflict Barometer distinguishes 10 key ‘conflict issues’ over which conflicting parties hold different views and are prepared to fight. These are ‘territory’, ‘secession’, ‘decolonization’, ‘autonomy’, ‘system/ideology’ (including the type of political, economic or religious regime type ideology), ‘national power’, ‘regional predominance’, ‘international power’, ‘resources’ and ‘others’.280 For practical purposes table 3.1 lists only the most important conflict issue per case.

A final important difference between post-conflict countries concerns the type of conflict ending. There are cases where one of the parties gains a military victory, cases where a ceasefire is reached in order to end the hostilities, and cases where a more comprehensive peace agreement is signed. Although since 1945 the majority of wars have ended by military victory, “between 1995 and 2004 negotiated settlements were three times as likely to end war as outright victory” as is also reflected in the fifth column of table 3.1.281

279 van de Goor, Rupesinghe and Sciarone, “Introduction to the Themes”, p.2.
280 Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research (HIIK), Conflict Barometer 2008.
281 Call and Cousens, Ending Wars and Building Peace, p.3.
Based on the outcome of the war and the nature of the settlement, a study by the Chr. Michelsen Institute for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) distinguishes 3 types of post-war situations in this connection. In cases of ‘self-enforcing peace-building’, such as Rwanda, Ethiopia and Uganda, there is a clear victor that installs itself as the new government, usually with only limited support from the international community. In ‘mediated’ cases, like Cambodia, Mozambique and El Salvador, where “war is fought to a standstill and ends with a compromise”, the international community plays a much larger role in the peace process by building trust between the former warring factions and providing substantial support. And finally, there are ‘conflictual’ cases where “the war ends with military victory of one side, but the peace settlement does not incorporate the defeated party and/or the populations associated with it”. In these cases, peace-building is usually extremely problematic and, because the underlying conflict issues are not addressed, often leads to new violence (such as in Afghanistan).282

This categorization is not perfect, as categories one and three are not mutually exclusive, for example. Also, it probably has more value to offer to the designing of policy options for international actors than as a comprehensive typology for analyzing different post-war situations. Nevertheless, it is useful for this research in that it sheds light on the political starting conditions of old and new parties in the post-war period. For example, where conflict is ended through a military victory and peace can be ‘self-enforced’ it is likely that most if not all state resources will accrue to the victorious party, which will benefit its organizational capacities and strengthen its dominance in the political party arena. This is probably not the case in mediated cases, where financial resources and political power are usually much more

282 Chr. Michelsen Institute, Governance Interventions in Post-War Situations: Lessons Learned, pp. 3-4.
fragmented and will have to be shared among the main political groups taking part in the peace negotiations. There, it is not unlikely that the significant involvement of international actors—in the form of assistance, political pressure, or even (imposed) transitional administration—affects the organizational development of certain parties. Finally, in the more conflictual cases, political development will most likely be skewed in favour of the victorious party. In contrast to the first category, however, that development can be undermined by renewed violence from armed militias and other groups not represented in the peace settlement.

What has become clear from the above discussion is that the term ‘post-conflict’ remains poorly conceptualized and in practice covers a wide variety of situations. The choice in this thesis to focus on two ‘mediated cases’ has—apart from the reasons already identified in chapter 1—to do with the facts that ‘mediated cases’ are the most common type of post-war situation, that they allow us to study the role of international actors and that they are arguably the most interesting category due to their uncertain outcome (in terms of party institutionalization). However, a more comprehensive treatment of party development in all post-war societies—which unfortunately is outside the scope of this particular study—would have to include ‘self-enforcing’ and ‘conflictual’ cases as well.

*The Adverse Post-War Environment for Party Development*\(^{283}\)

From the perspective of political party development, there are a number of conditions that are quite similar in post-war settings. Although some of these conditions are also prevalent in other emerging democracies, their intensity and

\(^{283}\) This section is a revised version of Kumar and De Zeeuw, “International Support for Political Party Development in War-Torn Societies”, pp.263-264.
complexity is usually much greater in post-war societies and are therefore likely to have a more pronounced effect on party development.

First, the security and governance situation in societies emerging from conflict is usually not conducive to the growth of political parties.\textsuperscript{284} The risk of war recurrence, for example, is much higher in post-conflict societies, which may not only dissuade groups from organizing themselves, but also makes competitive party politics potentially more dangerous.\textsuperscript{285} Even in case major armed conflict can be avoided, the law and order situation remains problematic and with state institutions having little or no presence in many parts of the country, crime rates often soar in former war zones.\textsuperscript{286} Ineffective and/or corrupt law enforcement agencies further compound the situation. A subculture of impunity can exist for many years in post-war societies, eroding the legitimacy of public and political institutions. The limited trust people have in public institutions also translates to political parties, which are often seen as part of the conflict. In addition, the lack of security in remote and rural areas restricts movements of political parties and hinders their capacity to recruit and educate party members or mount election campaigns to attract popular support.

A second common condition of post-conflict societies is the severe economic problems they face, which is partly reflected in their unfavourable scores on UNDP’s Human Development Index (see the final column in table 3.1). Wars tend to have devastating effects on the physical and institutional economic infrastructure of countries. During the war, economic resources are diverted from productive to

\textsuperscript{284} For a recent overview of the various governance challenges in post-conflict societies see Brinkerhoff, \textit{Governance in Post-Conflict Societies}.

\textsuperscript{285} Between 33\% and 50\% of all ended conflicts are estimated to revert to war within five years. See: Call and Cousens, \textit{Ending Wars and Building Peace}, pp.3-4; and Collier \textit{et al.}, \textit{Breaking the Conflict Trap}.

\textsuperscript{286} Call and Stanley, “Protecting the People: Public Security Choices After Civil Wars”.
destructive use. Whatever economic development programmes were launched prior to conflict are halted or disrupted. One study estimates that gross domestic product in post-conflict societies is typically reduced by 15% in comparison to non-conflict countries.\textsuperscript{287} In addition, post-conflict societies invariably face high inflation, widespread unemployment and budgetary deficits. These poor economic conditions negatively affect the institutionalization of party organizations. Because of the scarcity of financial resources, most political parties find it difficult to establish local offices or take part in expensive electoral campaigns. Some political parties are co-opted by powerful economic actors. Under such conditions, political corruption can easily become rampant and public disillusionment over the performance of parties is often high.

Third, many post-war societies suffer from widespread social disorganization. The traditional bonds of family, kinship and community are adversely affected by prolonged war and bloodshed and trust across different socioeconomic, political and ethnic groups is eroded. Moreover, ethnic, linguistic, religious and other cleavages in society are often deepened during conflict and become entrenched in post-war politics. War-torn societies such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Afghanistan are examples of situations where ethnic identities, and more importantly groups’ allegiance to such identities, have changed and become politicized during the war.\textsuperscript{288} For political parties in these and other post-conflict countries it has therefore become more common to align themselves with these separate societal groups, instead of representing groups across different social, cultural or ethnic cleavages. As a result,

\textsuperscript{287} Collier, \textit{Post-Conflict Economic Recovery}, p.2.

\textsuperscript{288} Aitken, \textit{Cementing Divisions. The Impacts of International Interventions on Ethnic Identities and Divisions}, pp.3-7.
inter-party dialogue and cooperation between political parties representing different groups is more problematic in post-conflict societies.

Another important feature of many post-conflict societies that affects party development is the existence of a peace agreement or some form of power-sharing. These arrangements provide an important part of the post-conflict institutional framework for all political actors, in particular for political parties. Peace agreements can also contain rules or regulations about the registration, membership distribution, organization, and financing of political parties that not only influence party behaviour during the transitional period, but may also have an enduring effect on longer-term party institutionalization. And in some cases, like in Burundi, peace agreements comprise specific quota for the political representation of ethnic groups, women and other minorities that directly impacts the membership composition of political parties as well as the make-up of their leadership. In addition, such quotas are usually specifically designed to influence the distribution of power between different political parties.

Finally, there is often a strong international (military) presence in post-conflict countries. Since the early 1990s there has been a large increase in the number of international peace missions, ranging from monitoring or observing missions (such as the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador, ONUSAL), traditional military peacekeeping missions (such as the UN Operation in Burundi, ONUB), to multi-dimensional peace-building missions that comprise a wide range of military and civilian tasks (such as the UN Operation in Mozambique, ONUMOZ) (see also table 3.1 above). Countries such as Cambodia, East Timor, and Kosovo, moreover, have had special international transitional administrations to help manage the various

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military, political, economic and social tasks during the post-conflict transition period. Depending on their mandate, these international missions have provided technical, material and financial assistance for DDR, refugee repatriation, police and military reform, the organization of elections and a broad range of civil society capacity-building programmes. As part of electoral and other democracy assistance programmes, such international aid has sometimes also included training and capacity-building support for political parties.

To conclude, post-war environments present unique challenges for political parties. Problems with security, financial resources and lack of trust hinder the growth of political parties in these situations. Although the presence of international troops and external support through party assistance programmes can to some extent mitigate such challenges, the effects of such programs have generally been very modest (as discussed in section 3.1). Overall, it appears therefore that post-war countries remain some of the most difficult settings for party development.

3.3 Political Parties in the Aftermath of War: Types and Institutionalization

The previous section has outlined a number of conditions prevalent in post-war societies, many of which are hindering or limiting the emergence of political parties. But in spite of the adverse conditions in the aftermath of war and with the exception of countries like Uganda and Rwanda –where political parties have been banned or their development severely restricted–, political parties have mushroomed in many post-war societies.

In Afghanistan, for example, more than eighty political parties registered for the 2005 elections for the *Wolesi Jirga*, the Afghan parliament. In the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), more than 250 political parties took part in the 2006 parliamentary elections. However, most of these parties are unlikely to survive as the experience from post-war Guatemala suggests. There, “since 1985, fifty-seven different political parties have been formed (...) but few have been able to stay alive or establish themselves as stable institutions.” This rise and fall of so many political parties can be attributed to parties’ institutional weaknesses, the ease with which party leaders switch parties or form new ones, and the fact that political parties often serve more as “temporary vehicles to access power rather than as permanent vehicles to represent citizen interests”.\(^{290}\) But despite the fact that all political parties in post-war countries face challenging conditions whose precise nature will differ from case to case, based on their organizational histories and war background I distinguish between three different groups of parties: long-time ruling parties, political parties that emerged out of armed rebel groups, and new post-war political parties.

The first group comprises parties that have been able to secure an absolute majority of seats in each consecutive election since the end of the war, and sometimes even before. Long-time ruling parties such as the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Cambodian People’s Party, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A) in Uganda would probably score relatively high on each of the four dimensions of Randall and Svåsand’s measure of party system institutionalization (see chapter 2).

First, these political parties have relatively strong party organizations with clear hierarchical structures and members and leaders that meet occasionally. Most of these parties maintain an extensive network of party offices throughout the country.

\(^{290}\) Azpuru et al., *Democracy Assistance to Post-Conflict Guatemala. Finding A Balance Between Details and Determinants*, p.23.
and have members in key political and administrative positions inside and outside the government. Second, they are generally not dependent on other institutions such as the state or trade unions, at least not in a way that affects these parties’ autonomy. As a matter of fact, these parties often directly control state institutions to such an extent that decisions taken by the parties’ executive committees have a direct effect on government policies, thereby almost blurring the line between party and state institutions. The control that these parties have over key state institutions and access to economic resources ensures their dominant role in the post-war party system. Third, the high degree of electoral support they receive from the population indicates that significant parts of the population identify themselves with these ruling parties, although it is not always clear whether such support is a result of the political values and positions these parties espouse, their privileged position in the political system, or their offers of financial and material benefits to potential supporters. Finally, long-running ruling parties are often strongly embedded in the minds of people and seen as the dominant factor shaping post-conflict politics. Because of their historical background as anti-colonial liberation movements, some parties like FRELIMO and the MPLA have become national symbols of sovereignty and nation-building. Other parties, such as the NRM/A and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) are credited with defeating unpopular and brutal regimes and have long symbolized a new style of African politics, by either banning competitive ethnicity-based party politics (Uganda) or, in contrast, by institutionalizing it via ethnic federalism (Ethiopia).

A second group of parties almost unique to post-conflict societies consists of those political parties that emerged out of politico-military groups or armed rebel

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291 See, for example, Ottaway, *Africa’s New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction*. 
movements. The Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador are two examples.\textsuperscript{292} Their degree of institutionalization depends strongly on the nature of rebel-to-party transformation as indicated earlier. However, in general these parties do not (yet) have a strongly developed party organization with regular meetings of party officials and members. Many of the organizational structures within such parties are highly centralized and not open to democratic decision-making, reflecting their background as military organizations in which a clear top-down chain of command is considered more effective.\textsuperscript{293} Moreover, in case the rebel-turned-party is an amalgamation of different previously armed groups, the party organization can become factionalized, as is the case with the FMLN (as we will see in chapter 4).\textsuperscript{294} The decisional autonomy of this type of party can vary, again depending on the nature of transformation. In case there still is a strong link between the party and its armed militias, the political wing’s autonomy to take decisions can be severely restricted by the strategies and actions of the militias’ military commanders. The degree of value infusion tends to be relatively high with this type of party, particularly when such parties have fought the war representing the grievances of certain socioeconomic, regional or ethnic groups. Finally, because of their background rebels-turned-parties are often seen as symbols of resistance to the wrongs of a political system. In case the rebel-turned-party was widely supported during the war, there is good chance that the party can use this symbolic appeal and translate it into popular electoral support after the war.

\textsuperscript{292} Some of the earlier mentioned ruling parties also belonged to this type of party in the past, but their incumbent position and longevity now puts them in a different category.

\textsuperscript{293} De Zeeuw, “Understanding the Political Transformation of Rebel Movements”, p.14.

\textsuperscript{294} Wade, “El Salvador: The Success of the FMLN”
And finally, in many post-conflict countries there is a plethora of new small political parties that have emerged only after the end of the war. Most of these parties pride themselves for not being involved in the conflict and actively use their relatively ‘clean’ reputation for attracting voters and party supporters. Some of them, such as the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) in Cambodia and the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) in Uganda, are established by (diaspora) intellectuals or democrats disillusioned by the existing state of affairs. Others, such as the Encounter for Guatemala (EG) and the Green Party of Mozambique (PVM) are founded by special interest groups, and focus on, for example, anti-corruption issues, women’s and indigenous peoples’ rights, territorial unity and the environment. Because of their young age, urban or foreign basis, and narrow-interest agenda, the degree of institutionalization of these new post-conflict parties is generally low. As a result, many of these parties turn out to be “flash parties” that come and go whenever there are elections. Only some of them are able to survive by gradually building up popular (and economic) support.

This tripartite distinction is important not only because the three groups more or less cover the broad range of parties found in post-war countries, but also because it draws attention to the war background of particular parties, which as this thesis argues matters for party development. Some of the parties in these groups might resemble one of the fifteen party subtypes outlined by Gunther and Diamond (see section 2.2 in chapter 2). Post-conflict countries in Sub-Sahara Africa, for example, are often home to what Gunther and Diamond describe as mono-ethnic and ethnic congress parties. In these and other societies where conflict was triggered or influenced by identity issues related to religion, race, linguistic or tribal affiliations,
such ethnicity-based parties still have a strong popular appeal. But because the actual degree of organization, programmatic commitment and strategy/behaviour of post-war political parties is so difficult to assess, classifying each one of them on the basis of conventional typologies is practically impossible. The alternative three group categorization based on historical background seems to be more appropriate. Although it is not ideal, it does draw attention to the origins of parties before, during or after the war, which as we will see later on is a fundamental aspect of party institutionalization.

Similar to the caveat made with regard to political parties in developing countries in chapter 2, it is important to emphasize again that political parties in post-war societies cannot be easily compared with their counterparts in Western established democracies. The latter are traditionally associated with membership-based organizations with clear ideological profiles, even though that profile might be less relevant today. By contrast, political parties in post-war societies –if they can be considered “parties” at all– are often elite-based, embryonic political organizations that draw their support mainly from urban areas and do not have strong roots in society. The larger ruling parties that have extensive party organizational structures and mass memberships are an exception. Moreover, similar to other parties in “new democracies” almost all of the parties found in post-conflict societies revolve around charismatic leaders and rely on personal patronage for political support.

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295 This has also been the case, for example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina where ethnic parties have continued to dominate the political scene since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995. See Manning, “Political Elites and Democratic State-Building Efforts in Bosnia and Iraq”. 
3.4 Post-War Party Systems: Types and Institutionalization

Having focused on the characteristics of individual political parties, it is now time to take a closer look at party systems in post-conflict societies. In order to be able to systematically analyze these party systems of post-war societies, we need to have a comprehensive framework that can cover the broad variation of post-war party contexts. The framework of Sartori provides arguably the only framework capable of categorizing the complexity of post-war party systems.296

Because a systematic dataset on post-conflict party systems does not yet exist, it is necessary to collect the information needed for each aspect of the framework from different sources. To assess the relative size of parties in a particular country, we first need data on the main parties’ vote and seat share in various post-conflict elections. This information can be found in several databases, including the Election Guide from the International Foundation of Electoral Systems (IFES), the Political Database of the Americas from Georgetown University, Adam Carr’s Election Archive, the African Elections Database, and the specialized election data handbooks edited by Dieter Nohlen and others.297

This vote and seat share data provides important information. First, the difference between vote and seat share per party gives an indication of the proportionality of the electoral system; the smaller the difference, the more

296 See section 2.4 in chapter 2.
proportional the electoral system generally is. Second, the vote share value tells us whether a certain party has gained an absolute majority in parliament. In case of an absolute majority, the vote share has a value of 50 percent or more. This information is a basic element for deciding whether a certain party system is dominant or not. Finally, the difference between the seat share of the winner and the seat share of the runner-up is an important indicator for the largest party’s political power vis-à-vis its nearest competitor.

Following Sartori’s counting rules, the number of relevant parties in a party system is equal to the number of parties that have coalition or blackmail potential. In dominant party systems where one party has gained an absolute majority of parliamentary seats in three consecutive elections and is capable of governing alone, the number of relevant parties is by definition 1. In that case the dominant position of the majority party is not affected by the presence of other parties that might have also gained a significant (but less than the absolute majority) share of seats. In cases where two parties have coalition and/or blackmail potential, parties tend to rotate in and out of power during consecutive elections. These cases are categorized as two-party systems. Where there are more than two but less than five relevant parties, the party system is categorized as either non-dominant or limited pluralist, depending on the degree of system institutionalization. Where there are more than nine relevant parties –with their actual ‘relevance’ a big question mark– party systems can be classified as pulverised.

Finally, in order to determine the competitiveness of party systems we need information about the regime type of post-conflict countries. This can be found by analyzing the annual Freedom House scores, which although problematic are one of
the most frequently used indicators for this.\textsuperscript{298} In so-called ‘free’ countries, political competition between parties can take place unhindered both during and between elections. In ‘non-free’ countries political party competition is severely restricted, with opposition parties and their supporters often being harassed, threatened and their activities being impeded. Even in case restrictions are temporarily lifted and party competition is allowed during elections, the party systems of non-free countries remain non-competitive. This difference in competitiveness determines whether a dominant party system is classified as dominant authoritarian or dominant non-authoritarian (see also chapter 2).

When all this information is inserted for each post-conflict country identified earlier in table 3.1, we get a clearer picture of the nature of post-conflict party systems. Table 3.2 on the next three pages provides an overview of the election results of almost 30 post-conflict countries between 1989 and 2006 as well as a characterization of their party systems. It is arguably the first attempt by anyone to present this information on post-war party systems all around the world in one single table.\textsuperscript{299}

\textsuperscript{298} The Freedom House scores provide a rating for political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) on a 1 to 7 point scale. Countries whose combined average rating of PR and CL falls between 1.0 and 2.5 (from 2003: 3.0) are designated as ‘free’ (F), between 2.5 (from 2003: 3.0) and 5.5 ‘partly free’ (PF) and between 5.5 and 7.0 as ‘not free’ (NF). For a critical review of the accuracy and scope of the Freedom House scores see Mchenry and Abdel-Fattah, “A Critique of Quantitative Measures of the Degree of Democracy in Israel”.

\textsuperscript{299} A similar overview for emerging party systems in Africa alone has been presented in Bogaards, “Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party Systems in Africa”, pp.180-181.
### Table 3.2 Party Systems in Post-War Countries (1989-2008)\(^{300}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region / Country</th>
<th>Form of Gov’t</th>
<th>Electoral System(^{301})</th>
<th>Election Year (legislative elections)</th>
<th>Vote Share Winner</th>
<th>Seat Share Winner</th>
<th>Seat Share Runner-up</th>
<th>Number and Names of ‘Relevant’ Parties</th>
<th>Freedom House scores(^{302})</th>
<th>Degree of Party System Institutionalization</th>
<th>Type of Party System</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
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\(^{300}\) ‘n.a.’ means data not available. Numbers marked in bold indicate a change in party winning the highest number of votes or seats. ‘Mod. Institution.’ stands for moderately institutionalized; ‘Dom. aut.’ stands for dominant-authoritarian; ‘Dom. non-aut’ stands for dominant non-authoritarian; ‘Non-dom.’ stands for non-dominant; ‘Lim. pluralism’ stands for limited pluralism. Most abbreviations are spelled out in the main text, apart from TRS (Two Round System), SNTV (Single Non-Transferable Vote), BV (Block Vote) and CA (Constituent Assembly). Party acronyms are included in the list of acronyms at the beginning of this document.


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<th>System</th>
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<th>Election Year 2</th>
<th>Election Year 3</th>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Fluid</td>
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303 The 1996 and 2001 National Assembly elections in Uganda were officially non-partisan and boycotted by opposition ‘parties’. 
<p>| Region          | Type            | List PR      | Year 1 | Year 2 | Year 3 | %1 | %2 | %3 | %4 | %5 | %6 | %7 | %8 | %9 | %10 | %11 | %12 | %13 | %14 | %15 | %16 | %17 | %18 | %19 | %20 | %21 | %22 | %23 | %24 | %25 | %26 | %27 | %28 | %29 | %30 | %31 | %32 | %33 | %34 | %35 | %36 | %37 | %38 |
|-----------------|-----------------|-------------|--------|--------|--------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Europe/Caucasia (4) |                 |             |        |        |        |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | Presidential | List PR      | 2000   | 17.7   | 21.4   | 19.0 | &gt; 9 | &gt; 9 | PR 5 / CL 4 (PF) | Fluid | Pulverised |
|                  |                 |             | 2002   | 23.7   | 23.8   | 14.2 | &gt; 9 | &gt; 9 | PR 4 / CL 4 (PF) | Pulverised |
|                  |                 |             | 2006   | n.a.   | 21.4   | 19.0 | &gt; 9 | &gt; 9 | PR 3 / CL 3 (PF) | Pulverised |
| Croatia          | Parliament      | List PR      | 2000   | 26.8   | 32.4   | 30.5 | &gt; 9 | &gt; 9 | PR 2 / CL 3 (F) | Fluid | Pulverised |
|                  |                 |             | 2003   | 33.9   | 43.7   | 28.5 | &gt; 9 | &gt; 9 | PR 2 / CL 2 (F) | Pulverised |
|                  |                 |             | 2007   | 36.6   | 43.1   | 36.6 | &gt; 9 | &gt; 9 | PR 2 / CL 2 (F) | Pulverised |
| Kosovo           | Presidential    | List PR      | 2001   | 45.6   | 39.2   | 21.7 | 4 – 5 | PR 6 / CL 6 (NF) | Fluid | Non-dom. |
|                  |                 |             | 2004   | 45.4   | 39.2   | 25.0 | 4 – 5 | PR 5 / CL 5 (PF) | Non-dom. |
|                  |                 |             | 2007   | 34.3   | 30.8   | 20.8 | 4 – 5 | PR 6 / CL 5 (NF) | Non-dom. |
|                  |                 |             | 2004   | 67.0   | 90.0   | 6.3  | 1 (NMD) | PR 3 / CL 4 (PF) | Dom. non-aut. |
|                  |                 |             | 2008   | 59.2   | 79.3   | 11.3 | 1 (NMD) | PR 4 / CL 4 (PF) | Dom. non-aut. |
| Americas (4)     |                 |             |        |        |        |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| El Salvador      | Presidential    | List PR      | 1994   | 45.0   | 46.4   | 25.0 | 2 – 3 (ARENA, FMLN, PCN) | PR 3 / CL 3 (PF) | Mod. Institution. | Lim. pluralism |
|                  |                 |             | 1997   | 35.4   | 33.3   | 32.1 | 2 – 3 (ARENA, FMLN, PCN) | PR 2 / CL 3 (F) | Lim. pluralism |</p>
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<th>3rd</th>
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<th>Majority</th>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>30.3</td>
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304 Despite a parliamentary majority of the FMLN, the presidency was won by ARENA (‘divided government’). ARENA has held the presidency continuously since 1989.

305 The number of congressional seats in Guatemala changed several times; from 80 to 113 for the 1999 elections, and from 113 to 158 for the 2003 elections.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
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[^1]: Despite the electoral result in which FUNCINPEC won a majority of the votes and was thereby entitled to form the new Cambodian government, the CPP refused to accept the outcome and forced FUNCINPEC into agreeing with a unique coalition government with two prime ministers. For more details, see chapter 5.
A closer look at table 3.2 brings out a number of interesting findings. First, most post-war countries have fluid party systems. This means that competition between political parties both as norm and as practice have not yet taken root, and that the nature of inter-party competition tends to be rather volatile. This should come as no surprise considering the fact that most post-conflict countries have only experienced a limited number of electoral rounds since the end of the war, with countries like the DRC and Liberia having had their first post-war elections as recent as 2006. The table shows that only 10 out of 29 post-war countries have had three or more rounds of elections, and that 8 post-war countries have only had one round of elections so far. Moreover, in some countries that have experienced multiple rounds of post-war elections since the early 1990s, such as Ethiopia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia, party systems are still best characterized as fluid (or weakly institutionalized).

Second, the large majority of post-conflict party systems can be categorized as either ‘dominant’ or pulverised. 9 countries have a dominant-authoritarian party system, 2 countries have a predominant system, and 5 countries have a dominant non-authoritarian party system. This makes ‘dominant-party’ systems the most prevalent type of post-conflict party system, much more common than in industrialized, consolidated democracies. Important to note here, however, is that within the group of post-conflict countries parties have become dominant in very different ways. In some cases parties came to power through a military victory, had time to consolidate themselves and subsequently legitimized their rule via elections (e.g. Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda). In other cases, there was a negotiated settlement to the war and parties had to compete with each other in elections right from the start (e.g. Burundi, Mozambique). Moreover, there is
significant variety in terms of the strategies employed by parties to remain dominant once they were in power. The NRM in Uganda, for instance, introduced a ‘no-party system’ that legally prohibited multi-party electoral competition and allowed only non-party affiliated individual candidates to stand in elections. In Mozambique, on the other hand, FRELIMO did allow for multi-party electoral competition, but used its executive authority and access to state resources for campaign purposes.  

Pulverised party systems, where there are more than nine political parties represented in parliament with none of them capable of governing alone, are the second-most prevalent. Guinea-Bissau, Afghanistan, Guatemala and Lebanon are clear examples of such extremely fragmented party systems. The fragmentation can in many cases be related to the working of the (proportional) electoral system, which in most of these countries has led to a large number of parties (and individual candidates) gaining representation. Nevertheless, the exact outcome in each country depends not only on the electoral system but has also to do with the structure and degree of institutionalization of the party system as well as the nature of society.

Another noteworthy finding is that, with the exception of countries with pulverised party systems, there has been limited alternation in government in most post-conflict countries. FRELIMO in Mozambique, the EPRDF in Ethiopia, SWAPO in Namibia, the NRM/A in Uganda, and the CPP in Cambodia have ruled with (mostly absolute) majorities for extensive periods of time, all more than twelve years. Mozambique’s FRELIMO is one of the longest-ruling post-

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war parties, controlling government since the country gained its independence from Portugal in 1975.

A look at the earlier table 3.1 also shows that a large majority of post-conflict countries have a presidential form of government. In Africa and Central America, all post-conflict countries have presidential systems. Post-conflict countries in Europe, Asia and the Middle East show a slightly more varied picture, although the presidential form of government still dominates. Whether there is causal link between low degrees of party system institutionalization and strong presidents in countries that operate a presidential system –as suggested by the literature on established and new democracies– is difficult to establish from the general data provided. Countries such as Nicaragua and El Salvador with moderately institutionalized party systems in fact seem to indicate that presidential systems do not necessarily undermine the development of stable inter-party competition, although even in these countries presidentialism seems to have had a negative effect on the institutionalization of individual parties, particularly opposition parties.308

Finally, it is important to note that as a tentative generalization, there does not appear to be a simple correlation between the nature of conflict (as identified in table 3.1) and the type of party system (as indicated in table 3.2). However, there does seem to be a correlation between the type of conflict ending and party system, in that dominant-authoritarian party systems are –perhaps not surprisingly– most prevalent in countries that have ended their wars through military victory. Nevertheless, the strength and explanation of this relationship would have to be further investigated before conclusions can be drawn,

308 For El Salvador, see chapter 4. For Nicaragua see Dye, Democracy Adrift: Caudillo Politics in Nicaragua.
especially as there are also a few countries with dominant-authoritarian party systems that have ended their wars through peace agreement (including Sudan and Cambodia).

3.5 Introduction to Case Studies

The previous sections have provided a general overview of the background, types and degree of institutionalization of parties and party systems in post-war societies. In order to gain a deeper understanding of not only how certain post-war parties and party systems develop, but particularly why they develop in the way they do, it is necessary to analyze a number of cases in greater detail. This also allows us to check the various alternative explanations offered by the party politics literature for the institutionalization of parties and party systems.

As already explained in chapter 1, El Salvador and Cambodia provide a suitable pair for analysis because of their representativeness and variation, political stability, the intense and protracted nature of their wars, the post-war engagement of international actors as well as the relatively limited attention for their parties and party systems. The next empirical part of this investigation therefore focuses on party development in these two countries, in both cases concentrating on the post-conflict period of the early 1990s until 2008.

Each of the two chapters starts with a short country and historical background. The main part of the analysis, however, focuses on both countries’ political context and the characteristics of their party politics. The chapters first describe the origins and organizational development of the main political parties represented in parliament in the post-conflict period. In El Salvador, the
investigation concentrates on the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and the National Conciliation Party (PCN). In Cambodia, the analysis focuses on the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), and the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP). Other parties in the two countries are only discussed in the context of certain electoral coalitions, but do not feature as key objects of analysis.

The second part of each chapter analyzes the institutionalization of the various parties by examining each party’s systemness, decisional autonomy, value infusion and reification, and explaining the variation between parties on these dimensions. The third part analyzes the institutionalization of the party systems in both countries and focuses on the stability of inter-party competition, the rootedness of parties in society, and the popular legitimacy of multi-party competition and elections. The chapters conclude by explaining the difference in institutionalization by reference to the design of the electoral system, the cleavages in society, the formal institutional framework, and crucially, various conflict-related factors (including the role of international actors). A more explicit comparison of the two cases is elaborated in Chapter 6.
Post-War Party Politics in El Salvador:
The Institutionalization of Polarized Pluralism

This chapter focuses on party and party system institutionalization in El Salvador and specifically on how the differences in individual party institutionalization can be explained. Drawing on original field research comprising an extensive number of interviews (see Appendix II) and consultation of local archival sources (see References), the chapter makes the following three key arguments.

First, it shows that post-war party competition in El Salvador cannot be understood without reference to the country’s conflict history and pre-war party development. Second, it demonstrates that the development of individual political parties has been directly influenced by the broader political and institutional post-war context of the country. And finally, it argues that traditional theoretical approaches –focusing on electoral competition, societal cleavages and formal institutions– cannot fully explain the nature of party and party system institutionalization in El Salvador. Instead the chapter demonstrates that post-war party and party system institutionalization is primarily shaped by war-related factors, such as the war-time origins of parties, the nature of conflict ending and peace agreement, and design choices in key post-war institutions.
4.1 Introduction

Deep socioeconomic inequalities and political exclusion lie at the roots of much of the instability, civil war, and criminal violence that El Salvador has experienced in the past half century. Concentration of land, labour and other economic resources in the hands of family oligarchies and business elites, in combination with market-oriented political regimes and an authoritarian military establishment, have led to a strongly polarized political system.

Sixteen years after the 1992 Chapultepec peace accords, El Salvador is no longer ravaged by war and institutionalized political exclusion has largely disappeared. From a post-war peace-building perspective, El Salvador’s transition is therefore often considered a success story. However, since 1992 criminal violence has replaced political and military violence. A high number of homicides, kidnappings, and robberies have turned El Salvador into one of the most violent countries in the western hemisphere. In addition, the socioeconomic paragraphs of the peace accords have failed to address the chronic income and social inequalities that continue to affect large parts of the Salvadoran population. And finally, the politicization of state and non-state institutions is again benefiting the power of a small elite of politicians and businessmen.

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309 Call, “Assessing El Salvador’s Transition From Civil War to Peace”. However, looking at the Salvadoran transition from a democratization perspective, the assessment seems to be less positive. See, for example, Holiday, “El Salvador’s ‘Model’ Democracy”.

310 In response to the rising crime levels caused particularly by maras [criminal gangs], the authorities have adopted tough mano dura [iron fist] policies. See Cruz, Street Gangs in Central America; and Hume, “Mano Dura: El Salvador Responds to Gangs”.
Since the end of the war competition between political parties has been more pluralist and competitive than ever before in El Salvador’s turbulent history. Yet not all parties have achieved the same degree of institutionalization. Some parties have developed strong party organizations, have become well-known throughout the country and are seen as clear political symbols. Other parties are only weakly organized, lack broad recognition and are seen as marginal players. Electoral competition has been dominated in the post-conflict period by the two strongest political parties, the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). The nature of the party system in El Salvador can probably best be characterized as a moderately institutionalized form of limited pluralism, for reasons that will be explained below.

4.2 Conflict Background and Early Party Development

Since its independence from Spain in 1821, El Salvador’s political and economic spheres have been dominated by a small, but influential elite of business leaders, right-wing politicians, and military officers. Benefiting from the export sales of indigo and coffee, non-official kickbacks as well as the import taxation of luxury goods, the Salvadoran government considered the plantation holder elite as its principal backer and financial supporter.

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When world prices for coffee fell sharply during the Great Depression in the early 1930s, the coffee elite tried to make up for its falling profits by lowering the already marginal wages of plantation workers. In combination with the 1931 coup by General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez against pro-reform President Arturo Araujo, this led to a series of rural uprisings. One particular revolt in January 1932 that was encouraged by Marxist intellectual and leader of the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS), Augustín Farabundo Martí, was violently put down by Martínez’ military forces. The resulting massacre of more than 30,000 indígenas, peasants and political opponents became known as La Matanza [the Slaughter]. It provided the start of an almost fifty year long period (1932-1980) of direct and indirect military rule, in which successive governments would continue to protect the interests of the economic elite and (violently) resist socioeconomic reforms propagated by church leaders, labour unions, peasant organizations, and other progressive political groups.

In that period, elections for the national assembly and presidency were held only occasionally and manipulated in such a way that opposition parties were unable to challenge the dominant military-economic elite. While mass-based left-wing political organizations were repressed, or banned outright as in the case of the PCS, various new right-wing parties emerged between 1932 and 1960. Many of these parties served only a particular military leader or parts of the civil-military elite.

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313 Wade, “El Salvador: The Success of the FMLN”, p.34.
The Pro-Patria ['for the homeland'] Party (PPP) established by General Martínez, for example, “did not have a life of its own” and served mainly as a “[highly personalistic] instrument of social control”.314 Between 1948 and 1960, the military ruled through the Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification (PRUD). Supposedly created to promote democratic political reform, in practice the PRUD provided the military with abundant patronage resources and electoral advantages.315 In 1961, the National Conciliation Party (PCN) emerged out of the PRUD as the new ‘official’ governing party. Overseeing a period of rapid economic growth during the 1960s –partly facilitated by the US-sponsored regional economic support programme Alliance for Progress– the PCN further concentrated land and other sources of wealth in the hands of the civil-military elite.316

During the 1960s and 1970s, economic growth, US pressure for agrarian reform and a slightly more open political arena led to the emergence of several new left-wing opposition parties and other progressive popular organizations. These parties included the Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN), as well as the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR). The main opposition party to emerge in this period was the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Established in 1960, it quickly attracted support from not only “conservatives disenchanted with the official party” and other middle-class professionals, but also benefited from

314 Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, p.38.
315 Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition, p.35.
316 Booth, Wade and Walker, Understanding Central America, p.97.
lower- and middle-class voters “whose preferred alternatives were not available [as the parties of the Left were illegal]”.  

When the separate candidates of the three opposition parties proved unable to defeat the official PCN candidate during the 1967 presidential elections, they decided to form the United National Opposition (UNO) in the run-up to the 1972 elections. But when PDC/UNO’s José Napoleón Duarte defeated PCN candidate Colonel Arturo Molina in the 1972 presidential elections, the government rejected the election results and had the Legislative Assembly quickly appoint Molina as the new president. Despite complaints of massive electoral fraud and a mutiny of San Salvadoran army officers, the government’s candidate finally prevailed and Duarte was sent into exile.

In the subsequent period things changed, particularly in terms of party development. The fraudulent 1972 elections and the surrounding political tensions spawned a variety of mass organizations that used demonstrations, strikes, occupation of official buildings and other forms of civil disobedience to protest the unequal socioeconomic conditions and the increasing restrictions of political space by the military-oligarchic elite. In 1977, the Catholic church –

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319 According to Cristina Eguizabal: “If the period 1963-1972 marked progressive institutionalization of political activity, the following period corresponded with a process of disintegration of the party political sphere”. Quoted in Ulloa, Ramos and Cruz, *El Salvador. Elecciones 1997*, p.54.

320 Mass organizations included the large Revolutionary Popular Block (BPR), with a basis of 60,000-80,000 members within the rural-urban proletariat, the urban-based United Popular Action Front (FAPU), and the much smaller Popular Leagues of 28th February (LP-28). López Vallecillos, “Fuerzas Sociales y Cambio Social en El Salvador”, pp.572-573.
although strictly speaking not a political mass organization– joined the political protest with the support of Christian base communities and the critical voice of Catholic Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero. In addition, groups that no longer believed in a peaceful political reform established armed guerrilla organizations, using kidnappings, political assassinations and killings of military and police personnel in order to try and defeat the military-oligarchy and establish a revolutionary (socialist) government. The five main guerrilla groups, most of whom had close links with the above-mentioned mass organizations and the PCS, included the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN), the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC), the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), and the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL).³²¹

At the other end of the political spectrum there were the increasingly militant PCN, the National Association of Private Enterprise (ANEP), broadly representing the oligarchy and bourgeoisie, and the more radical Agrarian Front of the Eastern Region (FARO), representing the traditional (coffee) oligarchy.³²² The military meanwhile set up or expanded already existing paramilitary organizations, some of which also doubled as “death squads”. These included the Nationalist Democratic Organization (ORDEN) –an approximately 100,000 strong peasant militia force set up in the 1960s to counter the activities of rural opposition organizations–, the White Warriors Union (UGB), as well as the

extremist Wars of Elimination Anti-Communist Liberation Armed Forces (FALANGE).323

Under pressure from the economic elite “to deal more firmly with the opposition” the government implemented a tough Public Order Law in 1977. This law expanded the activities of the paramilitary organizations and gave them “practically a license to kill”.324 And while these new legal powers contributed to a higher number of killings and disappearances, they did little to accommodate whatever moderate political parties and mass organizations still existed. In fact, they only hardened the guerrilla’s resolve. When tensions between conservative and more extreme rightwing elements in the military-oligarchic coalition started growing and international pressure from international organizations and the Catholic Church to address the human rights abuses mounted, the government looked increasingly fragile. Supported by a US administration that wanted to “prevent another Nicaragua”, a group of junior army officers toppled the government and replaced it with a different military junta in October 1979.325 But when that junta initiated an ostensibly reformist programme, hard-line elements within the oligarchic elite and military again took over. The result was a quick succession of several military juntas, until eventually a new (civilian) government was elected in 1982.

By that time the popular mass organizations and political-military opposition had entered into a transition phase and started to unite and prepare themselves for

323 Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, pp.54-67.
324 Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition, p.66.
325 In July 1979 in Nicaragua the left-wing Sandinistas managed to push the US-supported Somoza regime from power and take over the government. Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition, p.86.
an armed revolution. A month after Archbishop Romero was assassinated in March 1980, a coalition of centre-left political parties, labour unions, and other non-governmental organizations established the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR).326 With the FDR acting as their political voice, a few months later, in October 1980, the five guerrilla organizations decided to unite themselves in the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). Each of the five organizations maintained its own command structures and distinct revolutionary ideology. But major offensives and strategy were coordinated by the FMLN’s General Command, which comprised five commanders, one from each group.

In January 1981, the FMLN started its first major military offensive against government-supported military and paramilitary organizations. Having learned the lessons from other revolutionary struggles in Nicaragua, Cuba, Bolivia and elsewhere, the FMLN developed an effective grassroots governance system and made sure it could count on the support of the peasant population throughout large parts of the country.327 At the height of the war in the mid-1980s approximately 12,000 FMLN rebel fighters were pitted against an approximately 56,000 strong Salvadoran army force, kept alive by large amounts of technical and logistic military assistance from the United States.328 Despite these large disparities in force size, it soon became clear that neither side would be able to

326 The FDR comprised the Popular Social Christian Movement (MPSC), the Revolutionary National Movement (MNR), and the National Democratic Union (UDN). Wade, “El Salvador: The Success of the FMLN”, p.51, n.6.
327 Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, pp.115-126.
win the war militarily. However, the war dragged on and it would not be until 1989 for the first direct negotiations between the two sides to take place.

Surprisingly, electoral and political party competition continued during the 1980s, albeit in a rather artificial and severely restricted manner. Artificial because many people were unable to exercise their right to vote, electoral fraud was common, and results did generally not reflect the will of the people. Moreover, competition was restricted as it excluded centre-left and extreme left parties, either by (forcefully) exiling opposition leaders or by prohibiting parties with armed militias and those with links to armed groups from participating in elections. In retrospect, the main purpose of the ‘demonstration elections’ of the 1980s seems to have been the legitimization of the civilian-military government, and to “[convince] the citizens of the United States that their client government is freely chosen”.

During the 1982 constituent assembly elections, the PCN, several other extreme right-wing parties and the recently established ARENA party created a parliamentary majority coalition that succeeded in defeating the PDC. ARENA founder Roberto D’Aubuisson was put forward as the new presidential candidate. However, because of his alleged ties to paramilitary organizations and death squads, D’Aubuisson’s nomination was blocked under heavy pressure from the United States. Instead, a banker with close connections to the military, Alvaro Magaña, was installed as (provisional) head of government until the 1984 presidential elections. In those elections, the PDC candidate Duarte beat ARENA

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329 For an overview of electoral results between 1982 and 1989, see Appendix II.
candidate D’Aubuisson in the second round with 53 to 46 percent. The US government responded by significantly increasing military assistance to the country and bolstering the Duarte government financially and politically.

However, in the following years the Duarte government squandered its position by becoming increasingly corrupt and proving unable to bring the war with the FMLN to an end. These failures led to a resounding defeat of the PDC in the 1988 legislative elections, in favour of the increasingly popular ARENA party. From then on ARENA controlled the assembly in coalition with the PCN.

As we will see below, this conflict history and the violent nature of early party development had profound effects on the institutionalization of political parties and El Salvador’s party system.

4.3 The Peace Process

A combination of developments at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s changed the conditions in which the war between the FMLN and the Salvadoran government took place and made a negotiated solution more attractive.

At the national level, the newly elected ARENA president, Alfredo Cristiani, almost immediately announced new peace negotiations with the FMLN. Part of the moderate faction within the ARENA party, Cristiani realized that in order to

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331 Zamora, El Salvador: Heridas Que No Cierran. Los Partidos Políticos en la Post-Guerra, p.149; and Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, pp.185-211.
stimulate economic growth—one of his key campaign promises—the war had to be ended. In addition, weakened by the gain of the new Democratic Convergence (CD) party in the 1991 legislative elections, the ARENA-PCN coalition could no longer ignore the voice of the centre-left opposition.333

The FMLN, meanwhile, adapted its revolutionary tone and changed its position about taking part in electoral competition. El Salvador expert Tommie Sue Montgomery attributes this apparent “ideological metamorphosis” to the FMLN’s awareness of the changing international context as well as to the fact that the FMLN had always been more pragmatic than ideological.334 Joaquín Villalobos, a former member of the FMLN General Command and ERP leader, ascribes the change to an internal power struggle: “towards 1990, when they were in a strong position again, the more moderate tendency was again able to promote a liberal democratic project, and this programme made negotiations viable and helped bring peace to El Salvador”.335

But despite several face-to-face meetings between the government and the FMLN-FDR as early as 1984 and 1987 and pledges by both parties to negotiate, peace talks broke down in October 1989. Only after a renewed nationwide FMLN offensive in November 1989 and the murder of six prominent Jesuit priests by members of the US-trained Atlacatl battalion in that same month, did talks restart in early 1990. This time under strong pressure from the United Nations and the United States.

333 The Democratic Convergence (CD) party comprised the MPSC, MNR and the Social Democratic Party (PSD).
335 Villalobos, “The Salvadoran Insurgency: Why Choose Peace?”.
Engagement between the government and the guerrillas also received a boost by developments taking place in the region. The main stimulus came from the Esquipulas peace process during 1987 and 1988. This process consisted of a series of talks between Central American presidents that sought a regional, negotiated solution to the various conflicts in Central America. The resulting agreements put pressure on both the Salvadoran government and the FMLN to start negotiating too. The electoral loss of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua was another important regional development. For the FMLN the Sandinista government in neighbouring Nicaragua had been an example of what a socialist country could look like. With its demise in 1990, the FMLN not only lost an important political supporter, but also one of its reference points.

At the international level, most of the pressure for a negotiated solution came from two actors. With the ending of the Cold War, the United States became somewhat less inclined to see the war in El Salvador in ideological terms. Moreover, the H.W. Bush administration came under increasing pressure from US Congress to push for a negotiated solution to the conflict and suspend military assistance, particularly after the murder of the Jesuit priests. In addition, the United Nations had become actively involved as a mediator in the Salvadoran peace process. With the organization’s reputation and UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar’s commitment as a fellow Latin American on the line, United Nations officials pushed hard for a peace deal.336

Finally, on 16 January 1992 the Salvadoran government and the FMLN signed the Chapultepec Accords, which officially ended the Salvadoran civil

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war; a war that lasted for more than 11 years and left more than 75,000 people dead and 1 million displaced. The purpose of the accords was “to end the armed conflict by political means as speedily as possible, promote the democratization of the country, guarantee unrestricted respect for human rights and reunify Salvadoran society”. 337 To these ends the peace accords included a broad range of provisions for the reform of existing security and judicial institutions, the creation of new electoral institutions, and government support to address the socioeconomic problems of former combatants. All these initiatives were supervised by the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).

One of the primary reforms concerned the restructuring of the armed forces, which according to testimonies collected by the Truth Commission had been responsible for an overwhelming majority of the deaths and human rights abuses during the war. 338 The peace accords led to a new doctrine and educational system for the armed forces, ‘purified’ the security apparatus from some of the most notorious human rights abusers, and replaced forces such as the National Guard, Treasury Policy and other paramilitary bodies with a new National Civilian Police.

The peace agreement also referred to the need for electoral reform, which included a more proportional electoral system and the replacement of the heavily

338 Of the more than 22,000 complaints of serious acts of violence, 85 percent was attributed to “agents of the State, paramilitary groups allied to them, and the death squads”. 5 percent of the cases were attributed to the FMLN. Over 60 percent of the complaints concerned extrajudicial executions; the rest included enforced disappearances (more than 25 percent) and torture (more than 20 percent). United Nations, *De la Locura a la Esperanza: La Guerra de Doce Años en El Salvador*, p.43. However, an amnesty law adopted a few days after the publication of the Truth Commission’s report effectively exonerated all members of the armed forces as well as the FMLN from prosecution.
politicized Central Elections Council (CCE) with a broader-based Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE).

Finally, the peace accords explicitly mandated the legalization of the FMLN as a legitimate political party, and gave the organization “the freedom to canvass for new members, the right to set up an appropriate infrastructure (premises, printing works, etc.), free exercise of the right of assembly and mobilization for FMLN leaders, activists and members, and freedom (...) to purchase and use advertising space in the mass media”. This clause in the peace agreement was not only important in pressuring the FMLN to disarm and demobilize its armed combatants, but also proved essential in transforming the former armed rebel group into a viable political party.


Once the peace agreement was signed, elections were quickly organized. In the 1992–2008 post-war period El Salvador has had eight rounds of elections, including five municipal and legislative elections and three presidential elections. The 84 diputados [deputies] of the Legislative Assembly are elected

340 This section does not include the results of the most recent 2009 elections, which had not yet been held at the time of writing. It is important to note, however, that at the end of 2008 the FMLN had gained a significant advantage over ARENA in the polls and was even expected to win both the parliamentary and the presidential elections slated for 18 January and 15 March 2009 respectively.
341 According to the constitution of El Salvador, elections for president are held every five years, with re-election not permitted. Legislative and municipal elections are held every three years. Republic of El Salvador, Constitución de la República de El Salvador de 1983, art. 79, 80.
on the basis of (closed-list) proportional representation.\textsuperscript{342} For election to the country’s 262 municipal councils, a simple majority system is used. To win the presidential elections, a candidate needs an absolute majority of the votes, secured in a maximum of two rounds.

Largely as a result of the end of military and political repression, post-war elections in El Salvador have become more open and competitive in comparison with previous periods. This is mainly reflected in the higher number of parties participating in elections. In addition, the rights and liberties of the participating parties have been less restricted, making the post-war electoral environment freer and fairer than before.\textsuperscript{343} But the main indicator for greater openness and competitiveness has been the electoral participation of left-wing opposition organizations, in particular the former armed guerrilla organization, the FMLN.

The first post-war elections in 1994 saw the number of right- and particularly left-wing parties participating almost double in comparison to the elections in the 1980s at the height of the war. As a result, El Salvador’s party scene expanded beyond the three-party clique of the ‘official’ PCN, the opposition PDC and the young ARENA party to include the rebel movement-turned-political party FMLN, and the United Democratic Centre (CDU) (later Democratic Convergence, CD). Other smaller political parties have come and

\textsuperscript{342} Before the legislative elections in 1991 the number of seats in the Legislative Assembly were expanded from 60 to 84 diputados.

\textsuperscript{343} The improved electoral context can partly be deduced from El Salvador’s improved scores on the Freedom House index in the post-war period, showing significant improvements in the respect for political rights and civil liberties (see also chapter 3, table 3.2).
gone, mainly because they have not been able to reach the minimum 3% of the vote necessary to remain registered as a political party.³⁴⁴

More importantly, however, is the fact that some of the new (left-wing) parties have been able to challenge the much older, ‘traditional’ (right-wing) parties, which has led to the decline of the once-powerful PCN and PDC. ARENA consolidated, the CD/CDU entered as a small centre-left opposition party, and the FMLN became the strongest left-wing opposition party. Based on the official electoral results presented in Appendix III, the following three sections give a more detailed description of these developments.

**Municipal Elections**

Presenting the outcome of the 1994-2006 municipal elections, figure 4.1 below shows the sharp fall in the number of PDC mayoralships just after the war and the subsequent stabilization in support in approximately 15 municipalities, representing roughly 6% of the total 262 municipalities. The PCN, in contrast, managed to increase its share of mayoralships, from a low of 10 (4%) in 1994 up to 50 (19%) in 2003. The young CDU/CD was unable to win any mayoralships in 1994 and 1997, but gained control over 3 municipalities in the most recent elections (2000-2006). ARENA and the FMLN are clearly the strongest parties at the municipal level, together controlling more than 200 municipalities, covering a large part of El Salvador’s territory. In the first eight years after the war ARENA lost some of its support. The FMLN, either alone or in coalition with other parties, quickly managed to raise the number of municipalities under its

control from a mere 16 (6%) in 1994 to an impressive 79 (30%) in 2000. But in the most recent two elections, ARENA has regained some of its earlier losses. In 2006 the party controlled 147 (56%) of all municipalities. Most of the lost municipalities by the former centre-left but now centre-right PDC seem to have been taken up by the much more left-wing FMLN. On the other side of the spectrum, loss for the PCN has meant gain for ARENA and vice versa.

**Figure 4.1 Results Municipal Elections in El Salvador (1994-2006)**

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**Legislative Assembly Elections**

At the legislative level, trends have been very similar (see figure 4.2). Declining electoral support has resulted in a clear downward trend for the PDC, the ruling party of the 1980s. The PCN’s support during the four most recent legislative elections has fluctuated somewhat, with the party taking between 12 and 19% of the seats in the Legislative Assembly. The CDU/CD is the smallest party in parliament with an average of only 2.6 seats (3%). Similar to the situation at the municipal level, ARENA and the FMLN are clearly the biggest parties at the legislative level as well. The main difference, however, is that at the legislative level the gap between ARENA and the FMLN is much smaller, with an average
difference of only 2.25 seats in the last four elections. In 2000, the FMLN gained 31 seats, for the first time becoming the largest political party in parliament. However, none of the two main parties has come close to securing the ‘magic number’ of 43 seats needed for an absolute majority. Only by enlisting the support of the PCN and PDC have successive ARENA governments managed to obtain a ‘governable’ parliamentary majority.

**Figure 4.2 Results Legislative Elections in El Salvador (1994-2006)**

![Graph showing legislative elections results from 1994 to 2006 for ARENA, FMLN, PCN, PDC, and CDU/CD.]

**Presidential Elections**

Finally, at the presidential level it is clear that competition over votes has been dominated by ARENA and the FMLN (see figure 4.3). In its first-ever presidential elections in 1994 the FMLN, in coalition with the CD and MNR, managed to force ARENA into a second round. However, in the second round FMLN-CD-MNR candidate Rubén Zamora lost against ARENA candidate Armando Calderón Sol. In the run-up to the 1999 presidential elections and against a background of infighting between the party’s internal factions of *ortodoxos* and *renovadores* [orthodox and reformists], it took the FMLN three conventions to finally nominate party coordinator and reformist, Facundo
Guardado, as its presidential candidate. Pitted against the business-oriented ARENA candidate Francisco Flores, the FMLN’s Guardado lost in the first round with 29% to ARENA’s 52% of the votes. In 2004, after having purged the party from most reformist elements, the former Communist Party chairman and political hard-liner, Schafik Handal, became the FMLN’s presidential candidate. ARENA pushed forward Antonio (Tony) Elías Saca as its presidential candidate. After a bitter electoral campaign characterized by the use of fear and propaganda by both parties and strong anti-Handal sentiments expressed by the United States, the FMLN lost again, this time in the first round. As a result, ARENA controlled the presidency for the fourth time since it entered government in 1989.

Figure 4.3 Results Presidential Elections in El Salvador (1994-2004)

4.5 Institutionalization of Individual Parties

We know now that ARENA and the FMLN have dominated post-conflict elections and that the PDC and PCN have lost much of their popular support. But

345 Wade, “El Salvador: The Success of the FMLN”, pp.40-41; and additional information from an interview with Gerson Martínez, 16 October 2007, San Salvador.
the core focus of this chapter is not about the electoral performance of Salvadoran parties. Instead, it is about the organizational development of the individual political parties, which is related to elections but includes other aspects as well.

In order to get a deeper understanding of the extent to which individual parties have become established in terms of their structure as well as patterns of behaviour and attitudes, we need to focus on their institutionalization. The earlier introduced framework of Randall and Svåsand is a useful tool in this regard.346 By applying this framework on already existing and new empirical material collected during interviews in San Salvador in September and October 2007, we can systematically assess the degree of institutionalization of all five main political parties in El Salvador.347

Systemness

One of the first ways to evaluate the degree of institutionalization of an individual political party is to analyze its ‘systemness’. This requires us to focus on the organizational development of a specific political party, including aspects such as the regularity of interactions between leaders, members, activists and other supporters within the party structures, the degree of factionalism as well as party discipline.

Of all the main Salvadoran political parties ARENA has the most elaborate and stable party organization. The party has offices or representatives in all of the

346 Randall and Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”. See also section 2.3 in chapter 2.
347 For a complete list of people interviewed for this chapter, see Appendix II.
country’s 262 municipalities, controls 147 municipal councils since 2006, and has more than 8,000 committees throughout El Salvador.\textsuperscript{348} The reported number of party affiliates, including party members, varies from a low of 80,000 to a high of 1 million people.\textsuperscript{349}

ARENAs party structure is divided into six major party organs, and eight ‘nationalist sectors’.\textsuperscript{350} The main organs are the General Assembly and the National Executive Committee (COENA).\textsuperscript{351} COENA is in charge of the structuring and functioning of all party organs and nominates all official electoral candidates to the General Assembly. ARENA’s elaborate party structure, particularly at the departmental and municipal level, provides ample room for consultation and relatively open, ‘bottom-up’ policy-making. In practice, however, major policy decisions and nominations are taken behind closed doors by a small group of people, all members of the powerful COENA and presided

\textsuperscript{348} Interview with Milena Calderón Sol, 1 October 2007, San Salvador.

\textsuperscript{349} Achard and González, \textit{A Challenge for Democracy. Political Parties in Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic} (Anexo 5. Partidos Incluido en la Sección I), p.460; and interview with Amílcar Mejía, 11 October 2007, San Salvador. In the absence of reliable data, figures on party membership for ARENA and all other Salvadoran political parties should be treated with caution.

\textsuperscript{350} In order to capture the main social groups in Salvadoran society, the party has sectors for workers, business, agro-industry, rural peasantry, youth, women, professionals and most recently, Salvadorans residing abroad. Each of these sectors can nominate a representative to the party’s highest institutional organ, the COENA.

\textsuperscript{351} The General Assembly comes together on an annual basis, whereas the COENA usually meets every sixty days or more, if needed. Lower-level party organs, such as the Collective Departmental Assemblies and Collective Municipal Committees meet more regularly, almost on a monthly basis. ARENA, \textit{Estatutos Alianza Republicana Nacionalista}, art.11-23.
over by the party president, which is usually the same person as the President of the Republic.352

The density of ARENA’s party organization is demonstrated by the existence of specific party officials within COENA for ideology, organization, campaigning and other party tasks. These officials disseminate the party’s positions among its members and activists, as well as reinforce the party’s links with the electorate. Policies set out by COENA are usually strictly followed by party members, making party discipline within ARENA (very) high. Nevertheless, there have been a number of bitter disputes in the mid-1980s and late 1990s that led to members defecting to other parties or withdrawing from politics. But in contrast to the FMLN, disputes between ARENA party members are rarely made public and most are quickly solved internally. In general, therefore, the degree of factionalism within ARENA is relatively low.353

The FMLN comes as a close second in terms of systemness. Governing 59 municipal councils in 2007, including 5 councils in coalition with other parties, the FMLN’s territorial control is significantly less than ARENA’s. But similar to ARENA the organization maintains a presence in all of the 262 municipalities and operates several thousands of municipal and base committees throughout the country. Since 1997 the FMLN is in power in San Salvador, the largest and most

352 ARENA, Estatutos Alianza Republicana Nacionalista, art. 22f and art. 16a; see also Urquilla, “Regulación Jurídica de los Partidos Políticos en El Salvador”, pp.469-470.

353 Several ARENA members have defected to the PCN. Others have protested their displeasure about COENA by withdrawing from politics as happened with the Founder’s Faction of ARENA in the late 1990s. However, many of these people returned to ARENA before the 2004 out of fear that the FMLN’s Schafik Handal would win the presidency. I am grateful for this information received from Christine Wade and Ralph Sprenkels in e-mail correspondence between April and May 2008.
important municipality in the country. Its membership consists of approximately 100,000 card-carrying afiliados [members].354

In terms of party structure, the FMLN’s organization has probably changed the most of all political parties over the past 15 years. During the war, the FMLN’s General Command was the main policy- and decision-making body and consisted of five members –one from each of the five guerrilla organizations constituting the FMLN. After the signing of the 1992 peace accords, guerrilla members were disarmed and demobilized. Their leaders were subsequently integrated into a new Comisión Política [Political Commission] and the FMLN as such was transformed from a coalition front into one unified (unarmed) political party.355 The FMLN’s daily and most powerful decision-making body is the 18-member Political Commission, which is in charge of the development and execution of party policies and the nomination of party candidates to the National Convention.356 Party discipline in the FMLN is quite high, with the leader of the parliamentary fraction and the general coordinator usually dictating the main policy directions. In contrast to ARENA, however, the FMLN has seen numerous, very public disagreements among party members that have often resulted in expulsion and party splits. Therefore, the degree of factionalism

355 For an in-depth analysis of the FMLN’s transformation into a political party, see Wade, “El Salvador: The Success of the FMLN”.
356 The FMLN’s highest party organs are the annual National Convention and the quarterly National Council. At the lower-level, there are various other party organs, including Municipal Committees and Base Committees that meet more regularly. FMLN, Estatuto de Partido Político Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, FMLN, art.17-50.
within the FMLN has been relatively high, which has significantly weakened the party as an organization.

The PCN still has a moderately developed party organization, despite its sharp decline and serious organizational problems in the 1980s. The party has succeeded in maintaining its electoral-organizational capabilities throughout the country, mainly because of its historical background and territorial power as the ‘official’ military government party. After the war, the party has handily exploited its organizational capacities and remaining territorial base with an estimated 135,000 afiliados.\(^{357}\) Since 2006 it controls 39 municipalities and has 10 legislative deputies. In terms of organizational structure, the PCN is hierarchically organized, similar to ARENA. According to the PCN’s statutes, the annual National Assembly brings together all the main party committees and is the party’s primary organizational body.\(^{358}\) In practice, however, key decisions are made by the National Executive Council, presided over by a powerful Secretary General.

The PDC’s post-war party organization is only a ghost of what it was before the war. Originating in 1960 it is one of the oldest political parties in El Salvador and until the late 1970s it was the most organized opposition party. However, as a result of its participation in the military-led government and its association with counterinsurgency strategies and corruption problems in the 1980s, much of its social, political and organizational support quickly eroded. After the war, the PDC has seen several ideological disputes and leadership squabbles between different party factions, which have severely weakened its organizational


\(^{358}\) PCN, *Estatutos y Declaración de Principios y Objetivos*. 
development and institutionalization.\textsuperscript{359} Since 2006 it leads a modest 14 municipal councils and has only 6 deputies in the Assembly. Its current membership is estimated at 30,000.\textsuperscript{360} The National Convention is officially the party’s highest organ. In practice, however, nomination, policy-making and decision-making revolve around a few people in the National Political Commission, chaired by the PDC’s Secretary General. As a political organization the PDC is only weakly institutionalized.

Finally, the CD has the least structured party organization of all. Although this is probably more a reflection of its limited territorial and political size than internal organizational problems. Since the 2006 elections, it controls only 3 municipalities –all located in the department of Sonsonate–, occupies just 2 seats in the Assembly and has an estimated 7,000 party afiliados.\textsuperscript{361} Its organizational structure is limited to a Congress –which was convened for the first time in August 2007– a National Council that meets approximately every two months, and a small Political Commission.\textsuperscript{362} Nevertheless, despite the fact that the organization emerged out of three previous political parties in the early 1990s, the CD seems to have had significantly less leadership problems or factional disputes than the FMLN, PDC or other, smaller post-war political parties.

\textsuperscript{359} The most public and damaging post-war dispute within the PDC has been the internal conflict between the ‘new political class’ and the ‘old guard’. This at one point led to the appointment of two Secretary Generals, each supported by one of the two camps. Ulloa, Ramos and Cruz, \textit{El Salvador. Elecciones 1997}, pp.56-58. See also PDC, \textit{Historia del Partido Demócrata Cristiano}.

\textsuperscript{360} Achard and González, \textit{A Challenge for Democracy}, p.469.

\textsuperscript{361} Achard and González, \textit{A Challenge for Democracy}, p.462.

\textsuperscript{362} CD, \textit{Partido Cambio Democrático. Estructura Nacional}. 
The large differences in the degree of systemness among the five main political parties in El Salvador can be attributed to several factors. Political-military presence and control over large parts of territory during the war has provided the basis for the extensive party structures of ARENA and the FMLN. This is also true for the PCN, with its peak in power before the war. After the war, all three parties used their existing networks of departmental and municipal representatives, activists and offices to consolidate and expand their base of supporters and turn them into electoral supporters.

But because it had already started to gain crucial electoral experience in the mid-1980s, by the time of the first post-war elections in 1994 ARENA had a ten-year head start on the FMLN. ARENA’s control of the presidency from 1989 onwards and its close links with the economic elite, gave the party’s organizational structures a much larger pool of political and financial resources to draw from, helping it to quickly outgrow that of its competitors. Moreover, ARENA’s easier access to the media and greater financial capacity to hire campaign advisors further contributed to its electoral success.363

Another factor in determining the parties’ systemness is – perhaps somewhat paradoxically– the flexibility of their organizational structure and culture. Parties whose organization is characterized by rigid structures, procedures and behaviour –such as the FMLN, PDC and PCN– have proven more vulnerable to internal destabilization and splits. The clearest example of this is the FMLN, whose hierarchical structures and procedures as well as the inflexible, dogmatic attitude of some of its key leaders have clearly been detrimental to its organizational

363 I am grateful to Ralph Sprenkels for pointing out several of these issues in email correspondence in May 2008.
cohesion and unity. Although not less hierarchical or dogmatic than the FMLN, ARENA’s party organization and leadership has proven much more flexible and pragmatic in this regard. In the case of ARENA, existing divisions and ideological disputes between different party factions have been accommodated within the party structures instead of expelling dissident factions. The bitter and quite public dispute between two presidential candidates in the run-up to the 2009 election campaign was therefore somewhat a surprise to many observers.364 But in general, the rotation of power between different groups and the willingness to accept caras frescas [new faces] into the party have been crucial elements of ARENA’s successful organizational strategy of creating a unified political alliance.365

**Decisional autonomy**

The degree to which a party is able to shape its own policies and strategies without interference from actors outside the party (decisional autonomy) is the second important element of party institutionalization.366 The influence of extra-party actors such as civil society groups, trade unions, state institutions, private companies and other ‘sponsoring’ institutions on party policy and decisions of the five main political parties in El Salvador is not easy to assess, however. Detailed information about how the parties are connected to other organizations


or societal sectors is either not publicly available or tends to be of an anecdotal nature. Nevertheless, some points can be made.

The FMLN nowadays seems to have only a small number of non-partisan actors directly influencing the party’s policies and key decisions. This was different in the past. In the 1970s and during the war in the 1980s, many of the political-military organizations that constituted the FMLN were closely linked to left-wing social movements, workers unions and professional associations, human rights organizations and church groups. It remains unclear exactly how much leverage these groups had on early political decision-making within the FMLN. But because the leadership of these groups and the guerrillas were close and sometimes even overlapping, it is safe to assume that FMLN’s war-time leaders felt compelled to take views from outside the organization into account.

After the war the FMLN’s ties with left-wing civil society groups weakened. Partly because of a preoccupation with transforming its divided political-military structures into a single political party, the organization and its leaders became more inward-looking. In the process the party alienated itself from many of its former civil society supporters. The many splits and purges of senior, more moderate party leaders in the past 15 years have further narrowed the FMLN’s links with actors outside the organization. Only since 2004 has it started to re-engage with civil society. Overall, the FMLN as a party organization seems to be relatively autonomous and slightly isolated, despite the strong ideological support it still has from the broader left-wing civil society sector.\(^{367}\)

With ARENA the situation is slightly different. Its original set-up in the 1980s as a political alliance of different societal sectors has been maintained over

\(^{367}\) Interview with Ralph Sprenkels, 4 and 26 October 2007, San Salvador.
the years. And its extensive party organization is firmly controlled by the principal executive organ, COENA. The strength of COENA and its key role in decision-making has been indicated earlier. One of the reasons why COENA is so strong is because the COENA chairman, party president and the President of the Republic are all the same person. The resulting amalgamation of party and state under a strong presidential system has significantly boosted the party’s position vis-à-vis other actors.

But this does not make ARENA completely autonomous. In fact, there is a small and supposedly influential group of businessmen that operates largely behind the scenes and is not directly part of the party’s structures. In the past this group mainly comprised the traditional oligarchic coffee and agro-industrial elite. Nowadays, it is much more diverse and includes prominent representatives of the service sector, including major transport, retail, banking and insurance companies. And although the exact political influence of this economic elite remains unknown, it is widely held that from the mid-1980s onwards it provided a significant part of ARENA’s campaign finances, played a key role in the party’s neo-liberal reform agenda –together with the US– and had an important say in nominations of the party’s presidential candidate. Towards the end of 2007, there were some who signalled a more autonomous position by COENA and the party’s president. But even though this might be changing now, ARENA’s decisional autonomy does seem to be somewhat lower than that of its political opponents in the post-war period.

368 For an in-depth analysis of the close relationship between prominent Salvadoran families, networks of large-scale companies and political parties, see Paniagua Serrano, “El Bloque Empresarial Hegemónico Salvadoren”.  
With regard to the PCN, PDC and CD, there is much less information related to aspects of their decisional autonomy. Because of its close historical ties with the armed forces and the continuing presence of former military officers in its party structures, it is not unlikely that some of the PCN’s policy- and decision-making is still somewhat influenced by the more traditional elements in the armed forces. However, as a small political party with very limited influence on major governmental or legislative decisions it now operates relatively autonomously, just like the PDC and CD.

Value infusion and Reification
The degree to which the identification and commitment of officials, activists, members and supporters to their party goes beyond their own personal interests (value infusion) as well as a party’s strength as a political symbol and its recognition as an established organization by the population and other political actors (reification) are the final two dimensions for assessing the institutionalization of individual parties.³⁷⁰

Value infusion is generally dependent on whether a party is recognized as representative of a particular ethnicity, religion, language or even class. It is also influenced by a party’s (perceived) ability to deliver tangible benefits to the individual or the wider community. Reification is shaped first and foremost by the party’s (perceived) place in a country’s history and the extent to which it symbolizes particular values. In addition, it is dependent on how well a party can project its message—especially through effective use of the media. A party’s longevity, i.e. its ability to survive over time, also plays a role. Because these two

elements of party institutionalization are less related to the organizational structures of parties and more to attitudinal aspects and perceptions, they are less visible and therefore more difficult to assess in practice.

ARENA and the FMLN are both political entities with large numbers of officials and supporters that have a strong commitment to the ideas and policies of the respective party. Opinions over important governmental and legislative policies of party activists from both parties are generally couched in diametrically opposed, highly ideological terms rather than more neutral, technical terms. For example, representatives from both parties discussed the dolarización –the wholesale conversion of the colón-based economy into a US dollar economy in 2001– as well as the conclusion of the free trade agreement with the United States in 2006 with direct reference to party slogans about the defence of liberties and anti-communism (ARENA) or anti-imperialism and socialism (FMLN). More factual information about the pros and cons of dollarization and free trade was rarely discussed by the parties.

In addition, ARENA and the FMLN are currently probably the two most important political symbols in Salvadoran politics. The ubiquitous pinta y pega [painting and stickering] of electricity poles, curb stones, and other landmarks in ARENA or FMLN party colours and the habit of people to dress themselves in white-blue-and-red (ARENA) or red (FMLN) clothes during party activities are clear examples of this. Both parties are seen as icons that set the tone of national debate over important political and socioeconomic issues, such as violence, employment, education and healthcare. During election time their positions –for example, mano dura [iron fist] versus prevención social del delito [social

prevention of crime]– become the markers of electoral debate among voters and other political parties. Because of the strength of commitment and political symbolism, both ARENA and the FMLN can therefore be said to have high degrees of value infusion and reification.

The PDC, PCN and CD score much lower on these elements of party institutionalization. Although each of these parties has its own group of core supporters, their identification with the particular party and commitment to its ideological positions is just not as strong as in the case of ARENA and the FMLN. The PDC, PCN and CD often define their political positions in relation to those of ARENA and the FMLN rather than independently developing new proposals. In addition, the smaller parties lack the almost iconic status of the two main parties. The PDC was considered a strong political symbol during the 1960s and 1970s, but because of its association with a repressive government and corruption scandals in the 1980s has lost a lot of its popular attraction and has not fully recovered since. The same goes for the PCN, which also lost a lot of its status and support. However, the PCN has been able to maintain some of its old status and is still considered a traditional political symbol among parts of the rural peasant population. Finally, the CD does not have such iconic status. Being just 15 years old, the CD is a relatively new party that has not (yet) become a household name. In addition, the party has a more nuanced and perhaps too intellectual political image that, until now, has not chimed well with the majority of Salvadoran voters.

By applying the Randall and Svåsand framework for the first time in the case of El Salvador, we can conclude that the institutionalization of the five main
Salvadoran political parties differs substantially. With a very high degree of systemness, a moderate level of decisional autonomy and high degrees of value infusion and reification, ARENA is the most institutionalized political party in El Salvador. The FMLN is close behind although its factionalization after the war has lowered its degree of systemness significantly. The PCN can be considered moderately institutionalized, with a relatively high degree of systemness but only moderate levels of decisional autonomy, value infusion and reification. The PDC and CD –despite their differences in age and history– are both weakly institutionalized.

4.6 El Salvador’s Polarized Pluralist Party System

If we focus only on the presidential level, which ARENA has dominated for more than 19 years (1989-2008), El Salvador seems to have a predominant party system. But if we take into account the legislative and municipal levels the picture changes. In the Legislative Assembly the seat margins between ARENA and the FMLN are so small that one could easily conclude there is a two-party system. However, neither ARENA nor the FMLN has ever held an absolute parliamentary majority necessary for such a conclusion. Moreover, there are two
or three other relevant parties with the potential to form or block coalition
governments. At the municipal level, the picture is even more varied.372

Nevertheless, in systemic terms pluralism is limited in El Salvador, as the
country does not have the extreme fragmentation of party competition prevalent
in post-conflict countries such as Guatemala and Afghanistan. Moreover, as we
shall see in the next section Salvadoran party competition is also more
institutionalized than other (neighbouring) post-conflict countries. Centred on
two strong ideological poles, the nature of party competition in El Salvador can
therefore best be described as a polarized pluralist system. Albeit one with
dominant-party tendencies. A number of characteristics outlined by Sartori are
proof for this.373

First, there is one party (the FMLN) that at least until recently had an anti-
system attitude, contesting the legitimacy of the regime and the system of
government. This is not to say, however, that the FMLN is a classic anti-system
party. During the 1980s, the FMLN violently resisted the legitimacy and the
undemocratic nature of the respective military, PDC and ARENA governments.
However, upon signing the 1992 peace accords it gave up its violent resistance,

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372 At the legislative level there are four politically relevant parties, including ARENA, the
FMLN, PDC, and the PCN. At the presidential level there are only two relevant parties, namely
ARENA and the FMLN. In contrast to the other parties, the CD –albeit having parliamentary
representation as well– has almost no influence on the formation of coalitions or the blocking of
legislation. At the municipal level it is unclear, among others because of multi-party coalitions.
Using Laakso and Taagepera’s index of effective number of parties, Artiga-González comes to a
similar conclusion, with an average score of 3.7 effective parties for the five legislative elections
and 2.6 effective parties for the two presidential elections in the period 1994-2006. Artiga-

373 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, pp.116-124. For an overview of the characteristics of a
polarized pluralist party system, see section 2.4 in chapter 2.
transformed itself into a political party and was integrated in the political system. But although it no longer contested the democratic legitimacy of the ARENA-led governments, it continued to resist ARENA’s neo-liberal and in its view ‘authoritarian’ system of government. One clear example of the FMLN’s anti-system tendencies has been its continuing propensity to define itself as a “democratic revolutionary force that believes in a socialist future”. With the nomination of a more moderate presidential candidate in 2007 the anti-system image of the FMLN seems to be slowly changing, however.

A second feature of the Salvadoran party system is the multi-polarity of party competition. There is not only a clear left and right-wing party but also a party or a group of parties occupying the political centre. According to Ulloa, Ramos and Cruz the “emergence of new political parties and the fractionalization of the traditional parties” changed “the composition and plurality of political actors”. Interviews conducted for the present study, however, show that this has not led to the unification of opposition forces. Despite the fact that the FMLN, CD, PDC and PCN together could muster a parliamentary majority and could thereby block government legislation or hypothetically even create a rainbow coalition government, they have not done so. The obvious reasons for this are the large ideological distance between the various opposition parties and the attractive ‘cash for parliamentary support’ deals that ARENA is widely believed to have made with the PCN. Because of this, even temporary alliances for

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374 Interview with Salvador Sánchez Cerén, 23 October 2007, San Salvador.
376 Interviews with Carlos Ramos, 12 October 2007; and Antonio Cañas, 1 October 2007, both in San Salvador.
electoral or parliamentary purposes between the opposition parties have been
difficult to achieve and usually not lasted very long.

Third, the Salvadoran political system is highly polarized. This has mainly to
do with the large ideological distance between the two main parties, ARENA and
the FMLN. With its emphasis on individual freedom and its belief in a very open,
free-market economy with a minimum role for the state and a maximum role for
private enterprise ARENA is a conservative right-wing party. The FMLN, in
contrast, is clearly positioned at the left end of the political spectrum, as it strives
for a socialist society with an influential state that redistributes wealth and
guarantees social justice. The resulting competition between these two parties
has become a fierce ideological battle for the hearts and minds of the voter. The
polarization on ideological issues is related to the highly unequal socioeconomic
structure of Salvadoran society, visible in sharply contrasting living conditions
for rich and poor. But this does not mean that the party system is a simple
reflection of these divisions. The relationship between societal inequality and
political polarization is much more complex than that (see also section 4.8
below).

It is important to note, for example, that it are mainly political parties and
individual politicians that present the socioeconomic problems in extreme
ideological and highly polarizing terms. Rooted in the long history of armed
resistance, violent conflict and a repressive state, the discourse of Salvadoran
politicians is strongly characterized by ‘friend or foe’ thinking. This polarizing
elite political culture is seen by many as a key characteristic of El Salvador’s
post-war party system and an obstacle to democratization.\footnote{See the various contributions in Artiga-González et al., La Polarización Política en El Salvador.} Somewhat surprisingly, however, Salvadoran society itself is not as polarized as its political party system. Despite the high levels of poverty and growing discontent over insecurity, unemployment, corruption and unevenly spread economic growth, there is little evidence of deep divisions or tensions between different societal groups. Although it is undoubtedly connected to the unequal structure of Salvadoran society, polarization seems to be mainly a political phenomenon whose primary actors – including some of the main political parties and the government – use it as an instrument to consolidate and expand their power.\footnote{See, for example, Zamora, “Polarización y Democracia. ¿Un Mal Necesario?”.}

Another characteristic of a polarized pluralist system clearly visible in El Salvador is the tendency of centrifugal competition, with popular support in terms of votes tending to go to one or both of the extremes. During the legislative elections in the period 1994-2006 ARENA and the FMLN together received on average 70\% of the votes. The concentration of votes by the two main parties during the presidential elections was even higher and rose from 74\% in 1994 and 81\% in 1999 to more than 93\% in 2004.\footnote{Artiga-González, “Las Elecciones 2006 en Perspectiva”, p.240; and interview with Álvaro Artiga-González, 21 September 2007, San Salvador.} The strong centrifugal nature of the Salvadoran party system can partly be explained by voter preference in combination with voter manipulation through the media. Another reason lies in the organizational and ideological weakness of the centre-right and centre-left opposition parties. In the period that ARENA and the FMLN have become stronger and attracted more votes, support for center-left and traditional-right
parties has diminished and they have become more fragmented. Whereas the PCN and PDC can still rely on some electoral and financial support due to their historical role, the much smaller and more recently established CD and FDR do not have these advantages. As a result, their resources are much smaller. Their centre-left message and more nuanced, social-democratic political positions are also easily lost in the intense ideological battle between the more extreme ARENA and FMLN discourses.

One result of the high degree of polarization and the centrifugal tendency of party competition is that there is almost no room for pragmatism, at least in practical political terms. Political bargaining, making compromises and working towards consensus are uncommon in Salvadoran political life and even negotiations over the creation of electoral alliances are usually preceded by long, principled discussions. The above-mentioned polarizing political culture stands in the way of pragmatism between the main political actors even when in practice differences over policy are often small and mainly motivated by electoral considerations.

A sixth feature of the Salvadoran post-war party system is that in the 1994-2008 post-war period there has been no alternation of power between different individual parties. The governing ARENA party has controlled the government

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381 Rubén Zamora shows that the starkly contrasting discourses of ARENA and FMLN elites during the past two elections did not correspond to their more moderate and even congruent party programmatic proposals. Zamora, “Polarización y Democracia”, pp.90-94. This can also be explained by the personal commitment and style of some leaders. For example, according to Christine Wade it is clear that “there was a greater sense of pragmatism and cooperation between ARENA and the FMLN under Calderon Sol and Cristiani than under the Flores and Saca administrations”. E-mail correspondence in April 2008.
four consecutive times since it won the presidential elections in 1989. At most there has been a peripheral turnover in the sense that the ruling party has changed its governing partners, namely the PCN and PDC. But this has never affected ARENA’s dominant party position. In fact, the combination of such coalition deals and the financial, political (and media) resource advantages that come with the presidency have only strengthened ARENA’s hold on power and made an alternation to the FMLN extremely difficult. That is until now. Since the announcement of the popular TV interviewer Mauricio Funes as the FMLN’s presidential candidate in late 2007 the FMLN’s electoral odds have slowly improved. So much so that at the time of writing, in late 2008, the FMLN is ahead of ARENA in the polls and seems to have a good chance of winning the parliamentary and presidential elections for the first time in 2009.382

Finally, party competition in El Salvador is characterized by the ‘politics of outbidding’ with particularly ARENA and the FMLN trying to surpass each other with direct citizen appeals and governance promises, most of which are eventually not met. This is most visible in electoral campaigns. During the 2004 presidential election campaign, for example, candidates of both parties presented ambitious proposals to reduce poverty, improve security, combat corruption, and protect the environment.383 Asked in a 2005 public opinion poll whether the ARENA government complied with its campaign promises, less than half (47%) of the respondents indicated it complied with some promises. Only 25% stated it complied with all promises and 27% said the ARENA government did not

comply with its promises. One year later, the number of respondents saying that the government of President Saca has not complied with any of its promises rose to more than 30%. The degree of compliance with campaign promises by the FMLN is more difficult to measure, largely because it has not been in government. However, with some caution we can use evaluations about the municipal (ten-year) administration of greater San Salvador –with 2.2 million people the country’s largest and most important municipality– as a proxy indicator for the FMLN’s compliance with electoral promises. In a 2005 poll, respondents living in San Salvador indicated that the mayor and municipal council responded only little (45%) or not at all (22%) to popular demands. Although these figures do not provide a fully comprehensive picture, they do give an indication of the significant discrepancy between electoral promises and actual compliance by ARENA and the FMLN. This reinforces the view that outbidding is above all a political tool for parties to stay ahead in El Salvador’s highly polarized party system.

4.7 Institutionalization of the Party System in El Salvador

The characteristics mentioned above help us to understand the nature of El Salvador’s post-war party system, but they do not tell us how institutionalized it


385 In the 2005 poll, another 24% indicated that the mayor and municipal council responded ‘to some extent’ and approximately 9% indicated ‘a lot’. IUDOP, Encuesta de Evaluación del Primer Año de Gobierno de Elías Antonio Saca, Asamblea Legislativa y Alcaldías, p.90.
is. The next section will use the framework of Mainwaring and Scully introduced before to identify key aspects of party system institutionalization and to establish whether El Salvador’s post-war party system is highly, moderately or weakly institutionalized.\textsuperscript{386}

The first condition for an institutionalized party system is stability in the rules and nature of party competition. A quantitative indicator for assessing such stability is Pedersen’s index of electoral volatility, which measures the net change in vote and seat share of all parties from one election to the next.\textsuperscript{387} A recent analysis of party system institutionalization in Latin America indicates that El Salvador’s mean electoral volatility over the 1984-2004 period is approximately 19, meaning that while some parties lost 19\% of parliamentary seats or presidential votes from one election to the next, other parties won 19\%. This is somewhat higher than Nicaragua (13\%) but significantly lower than Guatemala (48\%), the two other post-conflict countries in Central America.\textsuperscript{388} What is more, between 1997 and 2006, seat volatility in El Salvador has dropped significantly from 26 to 11.5.\textsuperscript{389} This smaller difference in party seat share is an indication of the higher degree of stability in party competition and the growing consolidation of the Salvadoran party system.

But there are also other, qualitative indicators that seem to support the relatively stable nature of inter-party competition in El Salvador. First, in the past

\textsuperscript{386} Mainwaring and Scully, \textit{Building Democratic Institutions}, pp.4-6. See also chapter two, section 2.6.

\textsuperscript{387} Pedersen, “On Measuring Party System Change”. See also chapter two, section 2.6.

\textsuperscript{388} Payne, “Party Systems and Democratic Governability”, p.154.

\textsuperscript{389} Calculating the aggregate net percentage change (Volatility, V) in legislative seats for 1997 and 2006 from the data in Appendix III results in Seat V_{1997} = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \sum | (13) + (7) + (8) + (13) + (1) + (10) | = 26, whereas Seat V_{2006} = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \sum | (8) + (1) + (7) + (2) + (4) + (1) | = 11.5.
16 years there has not been much variation in the number of relevant political parties. The main five political parties have been the same since 1992, and there are only a handful of additional political parties that have come and gone since the end of the war. Second, splits within some of the main parties occurred regularly, but this has seemingly not affected the nature of party competition. Party factions breaking away from the party and setting up new parties have particularly damaged the systemness of the FMLN and PDC. Nevertheless, it has not significantly altered the power configuration between the parties. Finally, since 1992 there have been regular elections with no major disruptions in the form of coups, serious civil unrest or violent conflict. Judged on all these main indicators El Salvador has a stable form of party competition.

The ‘rootedness’ of parties in society is a second important condition for an institutionalized party system. The previous two sections already made clear that four of the five main parties have long historical ties with certain groups in society and are generally well recognized by voters. For the PCN and the PDC, established in 1961 and 1960 respectively, this is mainly due to the fact that they have been around for almost five decades and are considered part and parcel of the Salvadoran political landscape. The societal rootedness of ARENA and the FMLN, established in 1981 and 1992 respectively, relates more to their role as the two opposing protagonists in the war and subsequent peace process. Much of the electoral support for these four parties is therefore contingent on their

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390 These include, among others, the National Action Party (PAN), the Democratic Party (PD), the Liberal Democratic Party (PLD), the National Liberal Party (PNL), and the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR).
historical role. Lacking such a background and not having been established until 1991, the CD’s roots are much shallower.

But strong roots between political parties and society do not only depend on the age and historical role of parties. It also depends on whether voters have affinity with parties and vote for the same parties over a long period of time.\textsuperscript{391} Party affinity in general has proven to be rather low in El Salvador, with almost 70\% of respondents in a survey of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) saying that they do not sympathize with any political party. This corresponds with the lack of interest in politics and political parties among the Salvadoran population, as will be further explained below. However, of the 30\% of respondents who do sympathize with a party, 29\% feels somewhat close and 34\% feels very close to that party.\textsuperscript{392} When we look at voting patterns in legislative elections between 1982 and 2006 presented in Appendix III, we see that there are three parties (ARENA, PDC and PCN) that together have received between 93\% and 52\% of the votes. Since 1992, the remainder of the votes has been taken up mainly by one party, the FMLN. In other words, over the past 25 years it has been almost the same small group of political parties that have received almost all of the votes. Overall, these data on party age, the historical role of parties, party affinity and voting support indicates that the main parties have relatively stable and in some cases strong roots in Salvadoran society.

A third requisite of an institutionalized party system is that political parties and elections are considered as the legitimate institutions for determining who

\textsuperscript{391} Achard and González, \textit{A Challenge for Democracy}, p.33.
governs. In this regard, almost all recent surveys show that political parties rank bottom in terms of citizens’ confidence in public institutions. But although many Salvadoran citizens have a low opinion of political parties, this does not mean they are considered irrelevant. Informed observers interviewed for this study attribute this low degree of trust to the tendency of political parties to represent partisan and elite interests rather than citizens’ interests. Alleged corruption among party officials and the large distance between citizens and politicians, which is exacerbated by the closed party lists used in elections, also plays a role. In addition, there is widespread popular discontent over a political system that has not addressed the deep socioeconomic inequalities in society and has not led to a more participatory form of democracy.

As for trust in elections, this is also relatively low. Asked before the 2004 presidential elections, 42% of respondents in an IUDOP survey replied that they had little trust in the electoral process and 46% believed that there would be fraud. Similar figures were reported just before the 2006 municipal and

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393 In contrast, the Catholic Church, the attorney general and the armed forces are the three institutions with the highest degree of citizen confidence. See Córdova, Cruz and Seligson, Cultura Política de la Democracia en El Salvador, p.61; Achard and González, A Challenge for Democracy, pp.114-116; and Latinobarómetro, 1995-2005, A Decade of Public Opinion. 176,554 Interviews. Ten Waves in 18 Countries, pp.59-61.

394 According to one survey, 66% of Salvadoran respondents say that democracy cannot exist without political parties, which is much higher than in Nicaragua and Guatemala. Latinobarómetro, 1995-2005, A Decade of Public Opinion, p.48.

395 Under the closed list system ballots do not show the names of individual candidates but only the party symbol. Originally intended to make voting easier for the still high number of illiterate voters, this system gives the party leaderships almost total control over candidate selection. Marsh, “Republic of El Salvador”, p.406.

396 This is reported in many Latin American countries. See UNDP, Democracy in Latin America. Towards a Citizens’ Democracy; Achard and González, A Challenge for Democracy.
legislative elections. As a result, voter turn out has fluctuated significantly and popular interest in elections and politics seems to have subsided. Therefore, on the aspect of trust in parties and elections as legitimate institutions, it seems fair to conclude that El Salvador’s party system shows signs of weak institutionalization.

Finally, for a party system to be institutionalized it must have parties with strong party organizations. This is roughly equivalent to parties having high degrees of systemness. Based on the previous discussion on this aspect, it is clear that there is only one party (ARENA) with a very strong party organization, two parties with reasonably strong party organizations (FMLN and PCN), and two parties with moderate to weak party organizations (PDC and CD).

The relatively high stability of inter-party competition and the rootedness of the majority of parties makes some parts of the Salvadoran party system relatively well-institutionalized. However, this is off-set by the low levels of trust in parties and elections, and the high degree of factionalism and organizational rigidity of some of the main parties. Taking into account all the four conditions outlined

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397 IUDOP, Encuesta de Preferencias Políticas para las Elecciones Presidenciales de 2004, p.27 and p.21; and IUDOP, Encuesta de Evaluación del Primer Año de Gobierno de Elías Antonio Saca, Asamblea Legislativa y Alcaldías, p.67. Despite this significant degree of distrust in the cleanliness of elections, El Salvador takes a middle position in comparison with other Latin American countries. See Payne, “Party Systems and Democratic Governability”, p.162.

398 The number of voters voting in legislative elections has fallen from 53.6% in 1994, to 38.8% in 1997 and 38.5% in 2000. Only in 2003 and 2006 did the number increase again to 41% and 54.2% respectively. In presidential elections, which are generally considered more important, voter turn out has been slightly higher, with 53.6% in 1994, 38.6% in 1999, and 69.4% in 2004. See Artiga-González, “Las Elecciones 2006 en Perspectiva”, p.239; and Artiga-González, Dos Décadas de Elecciones en El Salvador (1982-2003).
above, the post-war party system in El Salvador is therefore best described as moderately institutionalized.

4.8 Explaining Party and Party System Institutionalization in El Salvador

We now know that El Salvador has five political parties with varying degrees of institutionalization and a polarized party system that is moderately institutionalized. However, we have not fully addressed the deeper questions why ARENA became the most institutionalized political party, how it managed to create such a strong party organization, and why the other parties did not or could not? Similarly, why is it that El Salvador ended up with a moderately institutionalized pluralist party system, while most of the other countries that experienced protracted violent conflict usually have much weaker and less pluralist party systems? To answer these questions and explain the rather unique case of party and party system institutionalization in El Salvador the three theoretical approaches discussed in chapter two can help.

The Limits of the Electoral and Sociological Approaches

The electoral competition approach argues that the structure of individual party organizations is a result of how parties mobilize voters in competitive elections and that the configuration of the overall party system stems from the number of parties participating in elections, their relative size and ideological distance.399

In the case of El Salvador truly competitive elections have not been held until after the war. However, the party organizations of the PCN, PDC and

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399 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, pp. 94-105; and see chapter 2, section 2.7.
ARENA were established long before that. As a result, their organizational structures were primarily shaped by an authoritarian political system that restricted the number of parties allowed to participate in elections and (pre-) determined the outcome of electoral competition. The relative size between parties in terms of votes and seats depended less on electoral competition than on parties’ links with powerful economic elites and state institutions like the military and the police. Also, under this system there was no free ‘spatial competition’ on ideological positions, as political actors representing (extreme) left-wing positions were banned. The pre-1982 dominant-authoritarian party system had therefore little to do with electoral competition.

Only with the introduction of a more democratic political framework in 1992 has electoral competition become more important as a factor influencing individual party organizations and the party system. Since then, parties like the PCN and ARENA have modified their organizations and turned them into structures to maximize votes and win elections. With its recognition as a political party, the FMLN has also tried to build an electorally strong party organization. However, the FMLN’s post-war party organization has been influenced more by the difficult rebel-to-party transformation process than by electoral competition itself. Overall therefore, the impact of electoral competition has certainly been noticeable but not determining for party and party system institutionalization in El Salvador.

The sociological approach argues that the organizational structure of an individual party reflects that party’s control or access to financial, human and state resources. With regard to the party system it argues that the configuration of
party competition reflects major societal cleavages.\textsuperscript{400} When we look at how the party organization of the five main Salvadoran parties developed, access to money, people and executive powers, or the lack of it, certainly seems to have had an influence. For example, one of the main reasons why ARENA, in comparison with the other parties, has a well organized and generously funded party organization is because of its close almost cartel-like ties with the economic elite, big businesses and important media outlets. The FMLN and to a certain extent the PCN also have extensive party organizations, but these are less connected to other important economic or societal actors. For the PDC and particularly the CD a lack of financial, human and material resources has been an important contributing factor to their weak and underdeveloped party organization.

But when it comes to the party system, the sociological approach seems to have only limited validity, however. Although societal cleavages certainly exist and are important in political discourse, the divisions between rich and poor, urban and rural, worker and owner have not determined or even shaped the Salvadoran party system in the way the sociological approach envisages. In the early phase of party development between 1960 and 1992, political parties aligned themselves mainly on the basis of their position in favour or contra the military regime and the export-focused capitalist system. Deep ethnic, religious or geographic divisions did either not exist or were almost not expressed politically.\textsuperscript{401} With the collapse of the military regime during the war, the regime

\textsuperscript{400} Ware, \textit{Political Parties and Party Systems}, pp.105-108. See also Lipset and Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments”; and chapter 2, section 2.7.

division became less important. The continuously growing socioeconomic inequalities meant that socioeconomic divisions became more important, especially when the war was over.

But this does not mean we can say that El Salvador’s party system is now based on socioeconomic cleavages. For example, the right-wing ARENA party, whose policies generally cater more to the interests of the middle- and upper class, in fact receives electoral support across all socioeconomic groups, notably also from less-educated voters in poorer, rural areas. The left-wing FMLN, one of whose primary aims has been to reduce poverty and redistribute wealth, actually attracts more support among higher educated, urban middle-class voters than among the rural and urban poor.\(^402\) In other words, voting support for the two Salvadoran political parties cuts across classes, socioeconomic and geographic cleavages. This is also the case for the PCN, PDC and to a lesser extent the CD.

All Salvadoran parties operate as electoral machines that favour the maximization of votes among as many groups as possible over the representation of narrower interests of different socioeconomic groups. It therefore seems that the configuration of the Salvadoran party system –apart perhaps from an existing pro- or anti-neoliberal system cleavage– is mostly related to the political-pragmatic positions of parties rather than pre-existing societal cleavages. The sociological approach can therefore not fully explain the nature of the party system in El Salvador.

\(^{402}\) IUDOP, Encuesta de Preferencias Políticas, p.15; and IUDOP, Encuesta de Evaluación del Segundo Año de Antonio Saca, p.19.
The Greater Relevance of the Institutionalist Approach...

The institutionalist approach, on the other hand, seems to have greater explanatory value in the case of El Salvador. This approach argues that the party system is mainly shaped by the workings of formal institutions, most importantly the electoral system and the type of government regime (presidential or parliamentary). According to the historical institutionalist variation of this approach, moreover, the founding moment and origins of political parties are also said to play a key role in parties’ organizational development.403

The proportional electoral system used for legislative elections in El Salvador has indeed stimulated the participation of smaller political parties, although only one of them (CD) has managed to win enough votes to gain seats in the Legislative Assembly. However, the 3% threshold for winning seats, the closed list nature of balloting, and the ever increasing concentration of votes by ARENA and the FMLN makes that the PR system in practice does not automatically benefit all political parties. Also, because of the high degree of polarization, the PR system’s centripetal or coalition-building advantages are usually underutilized in Salvadoran politics. Moreover, the formula used for translating votes into seats and the uneven distribution of seats among departments works to the advantage of the three largest parties –i.e. ARENA, the FMLN and PCN– that can field electoral candidates wherever they want.404

Finally, the majoritarian systems for presidential and municipal elections have clearly favoured the two largest parties, ARENA and the FMLN. Overall,

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403 Ware, *Political Parties and Party Systems*, pp.190-199; Duverger, *Political Parties*; Panebianco, *Political Parties*.

therefore, the electoral system is an important factor when it comes to party competition in post-war El Salvador.

The presidential system is another important institutional factor. Under the 1983 constitution, the President of El Salvador has several executive powers, including the right to issue decrees, veto legislation as well as nominate and fire ministers. According to the constitution all presidential decrees and initiatives have to be authorized and communicated by the relevant ministers and approved by the Legislative Assembly. But because the president’s party (ARENA) has held a relatively reliable legislative majority in collaboration with the PCN, the last four presidents have had few problems in gaining parliamentary approval for their policies.

But the impact of presidentialism on party and/or party system institutionalization is mixed, however. The combination of being the president’s party and having the President of the Republic functioning as party chairman has certainly contributed to the high institutionalization of ARENA as a political party. But because it has not won sufficient votes for an absolute legislative majority, ARENA’s power position in the overall party system has strongly relied on patrimonial coalition arrangements with other parties, in particular the PCN. The latter party’s organization has clearly benefited from such lucrative arrangements. However, the organizational development of the other political

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405 Republic of El Salvador, Constitución de la República de El Salvador de 1983, art. 137, 163 and 164.
406 ARENA’s ‘partisan powers’, based on “the extent to which the president’s party holds a reliable majority in the legislature”, seem significant therefore. Mainwaring and Shugart, “Introduction”, p.5.
parties has suffered from the financial, political (and media) resource advantages that ARENA has accumulated as a result of it being the president’s party.  

...and Particularly of War-Related Institutional Factors

Apart from these ‘conventional’ explanations, there are several other institutional factors that have had a significant, if not more important influence on party development and party competition. Crucial for the argument of this thesis, all of these factors are directly related to the war and the post-war institution-building process.

The first factor concerns the war-time origins of ARENA and the FMLN. The fact that both parties were established in the repressive environment of the early 1980s and are therefore *hijos de la guerra* [sons of the war] has had important effects on the nature of their party organization, their leadership culture, as well as their political ideas and programmes.  The highly institutionalized party organization of ARENA, for example, can to a large extent be traced back to its establishment in mid-1981 as a tightly controlled and strongly hierarchical party organization.  The rather closed and authoritarian political culture that has characterized the party throughout its existence was mainly instilled by its charismatic founder, Roberto D’Aubuisson. The continuous reactionary ideological positioning of ARENA is partly a result of its

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408 Interviews with Jorge Villacorte, 14 September 2007; and Rubén Zamora, 24 October 2007, both in San Salvador.
409 ARENA’s establishment between May and September 1981 by intelligence chief and alleged death squad organizer, Roberto D’Aubuisson, was supported by prominent business leaders and senior military officers as well as by New Right elements from the US Republican Party. Montgomery, *Revolution in El Salvador*, p.157.
(earlier) anti-reformism and anti-communism that rejected “doctrines that extol class struggle” and vehemently resisted the “Marxist-Leninist aggression of which El Salvador is a victim”.\footnote{La Historia del Futuro; and Principios y Objetivos de ARENA, no. 13. http://www.arena.com.sv Accessed on 24/09/07. See also Ulloa, Ramos and Cruz, El Salvador. Elecciones 1997, p.65.}

A similar assessment can be made of the FMLN. Its high degree of factionalization and faltering institutionalization as a party organization in the post-war period partly stems from the ‘united but divided’ front structure that was created in October 1980 by the five constituent guerrilla organizations. The fact that the FMLN had initially been set up as an armed (political-) military organization further complicated its development as a political party. The hierarchical and semi-authoritarian behaviour of some of the FMLN leaders after the war has its roots in the political military background of the organization. And finally, the FMLN’s earlier revolutionary, anti-system ideas continued to inspire the organization’s political ideology and programmes even when it became a political party after the war.

This is not to say that ARENA and the FMLN have not changed over the years. Both parties have undergone major structural and attitudinal changes since the end of the war. Nevertheless, among the various factors that have shaped the institutionalization of individual parties and the party system in El Salvador, the war-time origins of the two main parties seem to be one of the most salient.

A second ‘institution’ that has had an important influence on the shape of post-war party politics is the way in which the war ended and the nature of the subsequent peace agreement. The fact that the war ended in a (mutually hurting)
stalemate instead of a decisive victory for one of the main actors created a situation in which neither ARENA nor the FMLN could fully dominate the negotiations and/or dictate the terms of the peace settlement. This implied that both organizations would have to tolerate each other’s political existence and that the FMLN could no longer be excluded from elections.

As for the peace agreement itself, that not only ensured the transformation of the FMLN into an unarmed political party but also provided the first democratic political framework in Salvadoran history. As a direct result of the peace agreement, a new party emerged –i.e. the FMLN– and El Salvador’s party system became more pluralistic and competitive. The FMLN replaced the PDC as the main left-wing opposition party and now became ARENA’s primary political opponent. However, the peace agreement was not a broad consultative process. It was primarily an elite agreement between the FMLN and the ARENA-led government that focused mainly on political and military-security issues. Other political parties and civil society actors had little say in the process. Moreover, the deep socioeconomic inequalities that had been at the roots of the armed conflict were largely unaddressed by the peace agreement. This gave the parties the possibility to continue their fight over the nature of the economy and the role of the state. So although it enabled free party competition, the peace agreement also contributed to the intense political polarization between ARENA and the FMLN that followed.

The third series of factors consists of design choices and weaknesses in some of El Salvador’s post-conflict legal, electoral, public and media institutions. Arguably one of the most serious weaknesses is the absence of a law on political parties or a set of clear legal principles that regulates the democratic functioning,
financing, and campaigning of political parties. Largely because it was considered too sensitive and problematic during the peace negotiations, the articles of the Código Electoral [Electoral Law] dealing with aspects of parties’ organization and behaviour were kept procedural and vague, leaving much freedom to the political parties themselves.\textsuperscript{411}

There are no clear guidelines on internal party democracy, for example, except for an unclear constitutional article indicating that the norms, organization and practices of parties should conform to the principles of representative democracy.\textsuperscript{412} Until recently, the FMLN was the only party whose statutes provided for a direct, secret vote of party members on all major party decisions and appointments of officials and electoral candidates. However, in late 2006 this article was deleted from the party statutes in order to ensure greater control for the Political Commission over party decision-making.\textsuperscript{413} Internal democracy among the main Salvadoran parties is therefore rather weak in practice.

Party finance regulations in El Salvador are also very limited. Apart from the so-called deuda política [political debt], there are no legal norms that regulate or limit financial contributions to political parties by private donors. Nor are there

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{411} See Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE), Código Electoral. Elecciones 2006, Título VII, Capítulos I-VI.
\item \textsuperscript{412} Republic of El Salvador, Constitución de la República de El Salvador de 1983, Título III, Art. 85.
\item \textsuperscript{413} The cancellation of article 64 in December 2006 was apparently motivated by hard-line elements in the party to suppress reformist proposals and regain control over the party’s top leadership, including the Political Commission. A similar thing seems to have happened in early 2000 with the elimination of regulations for gender and minority representation within the FMLN. FMLN, Estatuto de Partido Político Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, FMLN, art.68; and interview with Facundo Guardado, 17 October 2007, San Salvador.
\end{itemize}
any obligations to disclose the origins, name or identity of such donors. As a result, there is little transparency in how Salvadoran political parties finance their electoral campaigns and party activities. Other norms that are regulated, such as the rule that party campaigns should not be started earlier than 3 months before the elections, are not enforced and therefore easily played down or simply ignored by the parties.

Another institutional weakness is the deeply politicized nature of the electoral administration and other public bodies. The most important electoral institution, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) has a ‘mixed’ composition with three representatives from different political parties and two ‘independents’. Immediately after the war this was seen as the best institutional guarantee for the integration of the FMLN into the political system. But because of the strong partisan umbilical cord of most TSE magistrates and the TSE’s simple majority voting system, in practice the ruling ARENA party can easily block or delay unwelcome proposals for electoral reform by

\[414\] The *deuda política* is a form of public party funding, in which a party receives a certain amount of money for each vote it received in the previous municipal, legislative, presidential and Central American Parliament elections. Urquilla, “Regulación Jurídica de los Partidos Políticos en El Salvador”, pp.474-475. See also Tribunal Supremo Electoral, *Código Electoral. Elecciones 2006*, Titulo VII, Capítulo VI, Art.187; and interview with Álvaro Artiga-González, 21 September 2007, San Salvador.

\[415\] Interview with Amílcar Mejía, 11 October 2007, San Salvador.

\[416\] For example, asked about the renewed *pinta y pega* [painting and stickering] in ARENA colours in October 2007 –almost one and a half years before the 2009 elections– ARENA’s vice-president of ideology indicated that “orderly painting is no propaganda because no vote is asked; therefore it is legal”. *La Prensa Gráfica*, “ARENA Intensifica el Pintado de los Postes”, 8 October 2007, p.18.

\[417\] Here, politicization refers to the use of public institutions for partisan political purposes, not the more common infusion of public institutions with partisan political content.
opposition party representatives.\textsuperscript{418} Similarly, in key government ministries like the Ministerio de Gobernación [freely translated as the Ministry of Public Affairs] and the Ministerio de Seguridad Pública y Justicia [Ministry of Public Security and Justice] many employees are ruling party members or ‘motivated’ to vote for ARENA during elections.\textsuperscript{419}

A last institutional problem impacting on party politics is the post-war trend towards privatization and ownership concentration of media institutions. Despite significant improvements in media freedom since the end of the war, the concentration of media institutions in a few politically well-connected hands has led to more restraint in critical reporting and investigative journalism, as well as greater media exposure and access for the ruling party.\textsuperscript{420} As a result of this and the other institutional problems mentioned above, some political parties have had more opportunity to strengthen their organization, to reinforce their status and support, and ultimately improve their position.

\textsuperscript{418} Three of the TSE’s five magistrates are directly appointed by the three largest political parties in parliament (ARENA, FMLN and PCN). The remaining two magistrates are nominated by the Supreme Court of Justice [Corte Suprema de Justicia – CSJ], which in practice tends to be controlled by ARENA and the PCN. The political manipulation of the TSE is considered to be one of the main causes for the poor management of the electoral register, the slow implementation of residential voting, and the absence of a specific voting system for the estimated 2 million Salvadorans living abroad. Interviews with Roberto Rubio-Fabian, 11 September 2007; Jorge Villacorte, 14 September 2007; and Antonio Cañas, 1 October 2007, all in San Salvador.

\textsuperscript{419} In some ministries government membership of ARENA seems to be a tacit requirement when applying for a job or promotion. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that in election times employees that have not registered as party members are asked to hand in their DUI [ID and voting card], making it impossible for them to vote. Information obtained during various personal interviews in the period September-October 2007 with people who requested anonymity.

The Role of International Actors

Finally, the overall context influencing the development of the parties and party system has been shaped by the engagement of international actors. Over the entire post-war period (1992-2007) the international community has disbursed more than USD 3.6 billion in official development assistance to El Salvador.421

The United States has arguably been the most important donor. In the 1980s, US political and financial support for the ‘demonstration elections’ as well as extensive military assistance helped topple the PCN-led military regime and ensured the domination of first the PDC and later ARENA. The US also played a role in blocking the emergence of left-wing political parties such as the old FDR. At the same time it supported ARENA’s efforts for neo-liberal reform by financing and helping establish the Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development (FUSADES), one of the country’s most influential policy think tanks. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, ARENA governments could count on the strong political and financial support of successive US administrations.

More recently, domestically unpopular government policies such as the deployment of Salvadoran troops to Iraq and the support for a Central American Free Trade Agreement have strengthened ties between the ARENA-led government and Washington D.C. The latter has reciprocated not only by protecting the interests of Salvadoran immigrant workers in the US –many of whom are ARENA supporters– but also by openly backing ARENA candidates

421 For a more detailed overview of the top 15 aid donors to El Salvador, see Appendix V.
during elections. Through large-scale economic and infrastructural assistance programmes, the Inter-American Development Bank and Japan have also been major donors to the Salvadoran government.

Left-wing political parties and political-military organizations such as the FMLN benefitted in the 1980s from the military support and training from Cuba and Nicaragua and gained important international legitimacy from the political and moral support of countries like Mexico and France. Contacts and support from the Socialist International and several German Stiftungen [political foundations] allegedly also played a role in this. At the end of the 1980s, there was significant pressure on the ARENA-led government to open up the political system from Central American actors promoting the regional Esquipulas peace process. After the war, it was the United Nations through its observer mission (ONUSAL) and UNDP that helped ensure the FMLN’s participation in the political process. Since then, a variety of international organizations, NGOs, political foundations and Salvadoran diaspora groups have provided a broad range of party assistance and election observation activities, benefiting not only the FMLN but all main political parties.

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423 Grabendorff, “International Support for Democracy in Contemporary Latin America: The Role of the Party Internationals”.

424 Party assistance activities included training of party leaders, provision of office space and computers, legislative assistance and parliamentary exchange programmes. Organizations involved include UNDP, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Norwegian Center for Democracy Support (NCDS), the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) and the Hanss Seidel Stiftung (HSS). Wade, “El Salvador: The Success of the FMLN”, pp.47-48; and interviews in San Salvador with Manuel Vásquez, 8 October 2007; Rosamaría de Colorado, 20 September 2007; and Ingrid Schlaffke de Escobar, 23 October 2007.
International assistance and other forms of engagement certainly has been an important contextual factor therefore. But the majority of that assistance has often not focused on direct party-related activities, which makes it extra difficult to assess how international action has impacted on the institutionalization of individual parties and the overall party system. What is clear, however, is that some of the largest post-war donors, including the United States, Inter-American Development Bank and Japan, have mainly been interested in funding infrastructural reconstruction, economic liberalization and administrative reform. These donors gave limited support to programmes aimed at creating democratic institutions, reinserting ex-combatants in society and implementing socioeconomic reforms, such as land distribution and agricultural development, which were considered key elements of the Chapultepec Accords, especially for the FMLN. Moreover, their assistance was given to the ARENA-led government with little or no political or peace implementation conditionalities attached. Although a more definitive conclusion about the impact of international engagement on party institutionalization requires further study, it seems fair to conclude that this largely unconditional international support has indirectly strengthened ARENA’s position vis-à-vis its competitors.

4.9 Conclusion

425 The problem of attribution is endemic to the study of political party support in general. Burnell, “Political Parties, International Party Assistance and Globalisation”; and Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link. See also note 236.
426 For a fuller analysis of donor funding in post-war El Salvador, see Rosa and Foley, “El Salvador”.
This chapter has demonstrated that the institutionalization of political parties and party system in El Salvador has been profoundly shaped by the war and its aftermath.

Fifteen years of post-war party politics in El Salvador has been characterized by an elitist form of electoral competition, a pluralist but highly polarized party system as well as a weak and highly politicized institutional environment. As the two mostly institutionalized parties in post-war El Salvador, ARENA and the FMLN have benefited most from these problematic ingredients of the Salvadoran party system. Both have seen their electoral support grow, their party organizations strengthened and their popular image as the two key national political symbols confirmed. Because of its control of the presidency and its close ties with the economic elite of El Salvador, ARENA is clearly the most dominant and institutionalized party of the two. The PCN has significantly recovered from its earlier electoral loss and remains moderately institutionalized. The PDC and CD have suffered from the electoral growth of the other main parties and remain little institutionalized. At the systemic level, party competition in El Salvador is relatively stable, with several strongly rooted and well-organized parties. Trust and legitimacy of parties is limited, however. This makes the overall party system in El Salvador only moderately institutionalized.

In trying to explain the post-war party politics of El Salvador, this chapter has indicated that the introduction of competitive elections after the war played some role in shaping the party organizations of Salvadoran political parties and changing the configuration of inter-party competition. But contrary to conventional thinking about party development, societal cleavages have only been of limited influence. In line with the overall argument of this thesis, the
chapter has shown instead that war-related factors such as party origins, the way in which the conflict ended, the nature of the peace agreement, and design choices in legal, electoral, public and media institutions give a fuller explanation for party and party system institutionalization in El Salvador.

The next chapter utilises a similar framework to the one employed for examining El Salvador and applies it to the case of Cambodia.
Post-War Party Politics in Cambodia:
The Institutionalization of a Dominant-Authoritarian Party System

This chapter analyzes the degrees of institutionalization of the main political parties and party system of Cambodia. It specifically concentrates on the various factors that have influenced party development in the post-war period and looks at possible explanations for the differences in institutionalization. Based on an extensive number of interviews (see Appendix II) and examination of party documents and other primary sources (see References), the chapter makes the following three key arguments, similar to the El Salvador chapter.

First, it shows that post-war party competition in Cambodia cannot be understood without reference to the country’s conflict history and pre-war party development. Second, it demonstrates that the development of individual political parties has been strongly influenced by the power configuration and institutional choices made in the immediate post-war period. And finally, it argues that traditional theoretical approaches – focusing on electoral competition, societal cleavages and formal institutions – cannot fully explain the nature of party and party system institutionalization in post-war Cambodia. In doing so, the chapter shows that war-related factors – such as the war-time origins of
parties, nature of conflict ending and peace agreement, and design choices for key post-war institutions—have played a significant role in shaping the institutionalization of Cambodia’s parties and party system.

5.1 Introduction

A weak state controlled by all-powerful leaders with a strong political machine features prominently in Cambodia’s long conflict history. After independence in 1953, successive Cambodian regimes espoused different types of authoritarian leadership and single-party rule. In combination with repeated foreign (military) interventions, this formed the basis for two decades of war that engulfed the country between 1970 and 1989. Not until the Paris Peace Accords in 1991 was Cambodia finally set to enter a new phase of peacebuilding, post-conflict development and a more democratic form of multi-party politics.

In 2008, the violence of the 1970s and ‘80s has indeed disappeared and Cambodia now enjoys relative political stability. Those considered most responsible for the mass killings under the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979) have recently been put on trial in the hope of offering justice and some form of closure to the millions of victims and survivors. The country is also witnessing spectacular economic growth, due in large part to growing tourism, as well as a boom in large-scale construction and foreign direct investments. However, much of this growth benefits a small, urban elite of well-connected people and the double-digit macro-economic growth figures disguise the continuing high rural
Moreover, high levels of corruption, a weak judicial system and related problems such as land grabbing and illegal logging need to be set against the positive effects of economic development.\textsuperscript{428}

On the political front, party competition has become more pluralist in the post-war period and more or less free elections are now regularly organized by Cambodians themselves. Yet, the degree of institutionalization of the different parties differs widely. The Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) is the only opposition party with a reasonably developed organization, but is eclipsed in every aspect of party organization by the far more institutionalized ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). What is more, competition between the various political parties remains skewed in favour of the CPP, which continues to dominate Cambodia’s weakly institutionalized dominant-authoritarian party system.

One note of caution is in order here. As was indicated in chapter 2, Cambodian political parties cannot easily be equated with parties in more established democracies. Similar to parties in other (post-conflict) developing countries – albeit perhaps less so in El Salvador – Cambodian political parties generally lack an ideological profile, a consistent political platform or concrete governance proposals. In Cambodia, as we will see below, ruling as well as opposition parties are first and foremost patronage networks that allow members to gain


\textsuperscript{428} According to Transparency International, Cambodia ranks among the most corrupt countries in the world. In 2008 it occupied the 166\textsuperscript{th} place of 180 countries surveyed. Transparency International, \textit{Corruption Perceptions Index 2008}. See also United Nations Development Programme, \textit{Tackling Corruption, Transforming Lives. Accelerating Human Development in Asia and the Pacific}.
access to certain services and resources in return for loyalty, political support and, crucially, votes.

5.2 Conflict Background and Early Party Development

Cambodia’s political development over the past centuries has been characterized by foreign interventions and domestic turmoil, interrupted by periods of relatively stable, but predominantly (semi-) authoritarian rule. Between the end of the Khmer empire in the 14th century and the mid-19th century, Cambodia was repeatedly fought over and controlled by its larger and more powerful neighbours, Thailand and Vietnam.

From 1863 until 1953 Cambodia was temporarily ‘protected’ from the expansionist policies of its neighbours by becoming a protectorate in French Indochina. France’s “mission civilisatrice” for Cambodia consisted of preserving Khmer cultural heritage, preserving but steadily weakening the country’s dominant royalist elite, while exploiting its limited natural resources (rubber, corn). Under French rule, Cambodia’s indigenous political-administrative structures were left fragmented and undeveloped while Vietnamese workers were brought in to serve as (junior) civil servants in the French colonial administration. The period of French colonial rule perpetuated what one observer has described as Cambodia’s “unstable hegemonic [power structure]”, consisting of a dominant political leader, party or organization trying to control a weak state and fragmented socio-political environment.\textsuperscript{429} This almost structural imbalance in power –exacerbated by the various foreign military interventions– is clearly

\textsuperscript{429} Peou, \textit{Intervention and Change in Cambodia. Towards Democracy?}, pp.119-121.
visible in each of the subsequent periods of Cambodia’s post-independence history.

In the period 1953–1970, immediately following independence, the country’s political, economic and socio-cultural life was dominated by King Norodom Sihanouk. After abdicating the throne for the first time in 1955, Sihanouk and his advisers established the Sangkum Reastr Niyum [People’s Socialist Community], a national political movement based pragmatically on Buddhist socialist principles. Until then, Cambodia’s politics had been dominated by a handful of elite-oriented political parties. The earliest parties were established in 1946 and included the Liberty Party, the Democratic Party and the Progressive Democrats. Of these three, the Democratic Party was the most popular and well-organized, being the only one with a nation-wide party organization and coherent (nationalist) political message.430 Later parties included the more royalist Khmer Renovation Party and the Victorious Northeast Party. Inspired by the emerging communist and radical left organizations in China, France and Vietnam, the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) – later renamed the Communist Party of Kampuchea or CPK – was formed in the early 1950s and directly supported by the Vietnam Workers’ Party (VWP).

By allowing only non-party affiliated supporters as members, Sihanouk succeeded in co-opting the majority of prominent politicians into the Sangkum. This effectively halted the development of Cambodia’s nascent political parties.431 The predominantly left-wing parties that refused to merge into the

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431 Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, p.79.
Sangkum, such as the Pracheachon and the KPRP/CPK, could only continue
their activities clandestinely. With the opposition intimidated into silence, the
Sangkum easily won the 1955 elections. It gave Sihanouk the mandate to run the
country and push through his policies virtually unopposed for the next 15 years.
Sihanouk’s paternalistic rule created a short period of relative political stability
and economic prosperity, but at a cost of wide-spread corruption, heavy-handed
suppression and persecution of anti-royalist and radical opposition groups,
newspapers and other dissident voices.432 However, by the end of the 1960s
Sihanouk’s complex manoeuvres to keep his political opponents at bay, the
country’s peasants happy, and Cambodia’s territory from being used by North
Vietnamese forces and ‘secretly’ bombed by US warplanes, were no longer
working.433

In March 1970 Sihanouk was finally deposed by a group of conservative
politicians led by General Lon Nol. Almost immediately, the country’s political
system was changed from a parliamentary monarchy into a presidential Khmer
Republic (1970-1975). Despite the adoption of a more democratic constitution
and the allowance of opposition parties, Lon Nol’s Khmer Republic quickly
turned repressive, however. In response to the adoption of an undemocratic
election law, the 1972 elections were boycotted by the Democratic Party and the
Republican Party. The result was a landslide victory for Lon Nol’s Social

432 Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History, p.89; Peou, Intervention and Change in
433 Osborne, Sihanouk. Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness, pp.185-201; Chandler, The Tragedy
of Cambodian History, p. 173 and pp.178-191. For an extensive analysis of the US bombing raids
in Cambodia –during which more than three times as much bomb tonnage was used as in the
World War II bombing of Japan– see the aptly titled book by Shawcross, Sideshow. Kissinger,
Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia.
Republican Party in what had almost become a single-party system. After the elections political rights were further curtailed and attacks on royalist and communist opponents increased.\textsuperscript{434}

Self-exiled in Beijing, Sihanouk meanwhile agreed to a secret alliance with the Chinese and Vietnamese governments to foster a national resistance front under his command in exchange for allowing the North Vietnamese and Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) forces to expand their operations on Cambodian soil. Growing increasingly more hard-line in its anti-Vietnamese and anti-communist policies, Lon Nol’s regime stepped up attacks, effectively pushing the country further into conflict with the much better trained Vietnamese forces. When North Vietnamese troops withdrew in 1972, the armed resistance was taken over by CPK forces –also described as ‘Red Khmer’ or ‘Khmer Rouge (KR)’– that continued to be heavily supported by political advice and military assistance from Hanoi. Despite large-scale US military assistance, Lon Nol’s poorly trained and badly coordinated troops failed to fight back the Khmer Rouge forces.\textsuperscript{435} Eventually, Lon Nol’s army was defeated and in their final offensive of 17 April, 1975, the Khmer Rouge took control of the capital, Phnom Penh.

With the subsequent establishment of the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime (1975-1979), the Khmer Rouge embarked on an all-encompassing project of political, economic and social transformation aimed at creating a self-reliant communitarian peasant society. Violently and rapidly breaking with Cambodia’s

\textsuperscript{434} Peou, \textit{Intervention and Change in Cambodia}, pp.48-54; and interview with Uk Phourik, 9 July 2008, Phnom Penh.

\textsuperscript{435} Chandler, \textit{The Tragedy of Cambodian History}, p.229.
past history and way of life, the borders were closed and foreigners expelled, the market economy dismantled, agriculture collectivized, and people’s free thinking and behaviour replaced with KR revolutionary doctrine and strict codes of conduct. In order to make Cambodia’s rice-based economy fully self-supportive, large sections of the population were uprooted from the cities and put to work in agricultural labour camps in the countryside. Intellectuals, professionals such as judges, lawyers, doctors as well as Buddhist monks, civil servants and high-ranking officials and former politicians were considered threats to the new regime. Most of them were imprisoned, tortured and/or killed.436

Competitive party politics –to the limited extent it had still existed under the Khmer Republic– was replaced with a communist party state. During the first few DK years, the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) did not publicly declare itself and was only referred to as Angkar Loeu [the Upper Organization]. Only later did it become clear that the regime’s hierarchy was led

436 Experts on Cambodia continue to differ in their assessment of the regime the Khmer Rouge established between 1975-1979, characterizing it alternately as a ‘peasant revolutionary state’ (Michael Vickery), a ‘racialist, nationalist state’ (Ben Kiernan); or a ‘Stalinist, totalitarian state’ (David Chandler). This difference in opinion has led to an acrimonious debate in the Cambodian studies literature between advocates and opponents of a so-called ‘Standard Total View’ that accuses the Khmer Rouge of a systematic campaign of genocide. Vickery, Cambodia: 1975-1982; Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime. Race, Power and Genocide in Cambodia Under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979; and Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot. For a wider discussion of these different evaluations, see Peou, Intervention and Change in Cambodia, pp.54-58.
by Saloth Sar, better known for his revolutionary name Pol Pot. After its early ‘successes’ in eliminating its political enemies, the CPK soon fell victim to internal factionalization or at least the perception thereof by its leaders. This resulted in widespread purges and executions of ‘suspect’ –i.e. disloyal and pro-Vietnamese– local and regional cadre at the hands of the dominant Pol Pot and Ieng Sary faction.

In 1977, the Khmer Rouge leadership’s antipathy against their former backers in Hanoi and other pro-Vietnamese Khmer reached a new height and finally led to a full-scale war with Vietnam. By that time, the CPK’s radical ‘Four-Year Plan’ of increasing agricultural production through collectivization and forced labour had led to “administrative chaos and exhaustion from overwork and malnutrition”. Internally weakened, KR forces were unable to defeat the much more powerful, recently united Vietnamese army –despite the strong support of Maoist China. After Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia at the end of 1978, the DK regime collapsed on 7 January, 1979. The remaining KR forces were pushed towards the western and north-western border areas, where they would remain until their final defeat in 1994.

With the establishment of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) (1979-1989) the war in Cambodia did not end, however. With much of the country’s physical infrastructure destroyed by the Khmer Rouge, the country’s

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437 The CPK’s central committee consisted of secretary-general and DK prime minister, Saloth Sar (Brother Number One), deputy party secretary and DK deputy prime minister, Nuon Chea (Brother Number Two), DK deputy prime minister in charge of foreign affairs, Ieng Sary (Brother Number Three), DK defense minister, Son Sen (Brother Number Four), and DK head of state, Khieu Samphan (Brother Number Five). Chandler, *Brother Number One*; and Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*.

economy in ruins and large sections of the population killed or displaced throughout the country, the Vietnamese-backed Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Council (KPRC) started a significant state-building project, including the creation of a centralized, party-led bureaucracy. In an effort to reconnect with the original communist party of the early 1950s and distance itself from Pol Pot’s CPK, the KPRC established a new Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP), modelled on the Vietnamese Communist Party, in 1979.439 The members of the party’s small central committee, comprising “an assortment of Khmer Rouge defectors and Hanoi-trained revolutionaries”, soon became –and some still are– the most powerful politicians in Cambodia.440 In an effort to distance itself from the Khmer Rouge and gain much-needed domestic and international legitimacy, the PRK regime quickly organized a trial denouncing the genocidal regime of ‘the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique’. The trial also served the purpose of trying to co-opt other KR commanders and absolving the many lower- and mid-level KR cadres in the PRK’s own ranks from personal responsibility of crimes (‘blood debts’) committed during the DK period.441

440 According to Evan Gottesman, the PRK(P) inner circle consisted of PRK president and head of state, Heng Samrin; vice-president, minister of defense, prime minister as well as party secretary, Pen Sovan; minister of the interior, Chea Sim; chairman of the party’s central organization committee, Say Phouthang; Bou Thang; and finally foreign minister, Hun Sen. Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge. Inside the Politics of Nation Building, pp.45-48. Since the end of the war in 1991, Heng Samrin has become president of the National Assembly and honorary chairman of the CPP; Chea Sim serves as president of the Senate and chairman of the CPP; and Hun Sen has continued his role as prime minister (since 1985) and vice-chairman of the CPP.
441 Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, pp.60-69.
Although the PRK’s socialist policies were a far cry from the violent totalitarianism of the Khmer Rouge, domestically the regime was still perceived as restrictive, among others because of its ban on the formation of political opposition parties. At the regional and international level, it had to deal with two opposing forces. On the one side, there were Vietnam and the Soviet Union that credited the Heng Samrin-led group of communist leaders for overthrowing Pol Pot’s radical DK regime and restoring political stability. These actors supported the PRK regime with military, economic, and political assistance that according to several experts significantly aided Cambodia’s post-DK recovery. On the other side, there were China and the United States, which considered the PRK a puppet regime of the Vietnamese and refused to recognize it as the legitimate government of Cambodia. By the mid-1980s the PRK regime faced not only an international boycott but also opposition from three externally-supported armed groups. These included the republican Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF), the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK or Khmer Rouge), and the National Sihanoukist Army (ANS), an umbrella organization of royalist forces that also comprised the

442 Peou, Intervention and Change in Cambodia, pp.63-65.
444 In response to the Vietnamese occupation and subsequent Vietnamese-Soviet backing of the PRK regime, China, the United States, France and other Western countries recognized the CGDK as the only legitimate Cambodian government. Cold War dynamics within the United Nations Security Council subsequently ensured that the de facto regime in Phnom Penh was denied legitimacy of Cambodia’s seat at the United Nations. Instead it was given to the CGDK, which controversially included Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge.
National Liberation Movement of Kampuchea (MOLINAKA) and the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC).

Opportunistically allied in the Sihanouk-led Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), the ‘resistance front’ was able to hold out against the PRK and Vietnamese troops through the diplomatic, monetary, logistical and even military support offered by China, major Western powers, countries from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as by gaining income from illegal logging. Meanwhile, the PRK’s growing state apparatus and the consolidation of power of the PRK elite was made possible both through economic assistance from Vietnam and the Soviet Union as well as via a large-scale patronage network ‘serviced’ by contributions and payments from private investment and smuggling activities. At the province and commune level, the PRK elite gave military commanders and other authorities widespread autonomy over taxation and the exploitation of natural resources such as timber and rubber; this was one of the decisions with far-reaching implications for the distribution of power and related governance problems in Cambodia today. Slowly, the accumulation and consolidation of power by the small PRK elite became less dependent on ideological and party commitment, but more on hierarchical patterns of patronage and loyalty. As a result, “the Party became more fractious (…). Personal relationships held the system together”.445

Towards the end of the 1980s, with the Cold War slowly coming to an end, the political situation started to change. Motivated by a desire to normalize its relations with other countries in order to improve its economic problems, the

Soviet Union decided to lower its involvement in Indochina. Recognizing the indispensability of Soviet support for its own survival, Vietnam finally withdrew its troops from Cambodia in late 1989. The new situation forced the regime in Phnom Penh – now ‘re-branded’ as the State of Cambodia (SOC) – to finally look for a political solution to its conflict with the CGDK resistance.

### 5.3 Imposing Peace

With the Cold War coming to an end and the major powers seeking a normalization of their relations, the US, China, and Soviet Union started to put more pressure on their respective ‘clients’ in Cambodia to come to a negotiated solution to their conflict. After PRK/SOC prime minister Hun Sen and CGDK head Norodom Sihanouk had met previously, two informal meetings between the four main warring parties took place in Indonesia in July 1988 and February 1989. But because of fundamental disagreement between the parties over how to share power during the transitional period, over whether to include the Khmer Rouge in a quadripartite coalition government and over what role was acceptable for a large UN peacekeeping force, the talks soon stalled. The deadlock was compounded by the fact that the US and China rejected any agreement that excluded the Khmer Rouge, while the SOC and Vietnam wanted to prevent “the return of the genocidal regime [of Pol Pot]”. 446 A second important attempt to bring all the parties together in Paris in July 1989 again resulted in failure.

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because of the unwillingness of the parties and their external sponsors to make concessions on any of the key issues.

The negotiations for a political solution received a new boost, however, with an Australian proposal to create a UN interim authority for Cambodia intended to oversee the country’s civil administration during the transitional period. This was soon further elaborated by the permanent members of the UN Security Council. They suggested the creation of a quadripartite Supreme National Council (SNC) providing domestic legitimacy and authority to the UN’s role. With stronger political messages and sharply reduced financial and military assistance from China and the Soviet Union, the Cambodian parties were further pressured to find a middle ground. Despite continued heavy resistance from the various parties, compromises over the wording of the KR legacy, the SNC’s composition and the UN’s control over state administration were soon reached. These compromises finally enabled the parties to sign the Accords on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (referred to as the ‘Paris Peace Accords’) on 23 October 1991. The agreement concluded two decades of war in Cambodia, which reportedly claimed the lives of more than two million Cambodians, and led to more than half a million refugees located along the Thai, Lao and Vietnamese borders and many more abroad.

The Paris Peace Accords comprised a large number of “special measures to assure protection of human rights, and the non-return to the policies and practices

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447 Song, “The Political Dynamics of the Peacemaking Process in Cambodia”, pp.68-76.
448 Depending on definitions and sources used, estimates of battle-related deaths for the 1970-1991 war period range from 2 to 3 million, with more than 1 to 1.5 million deaths reported for the DK period alone. See Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, pp.456-460; Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History, p.215 and p.236; and Leitenberg, Deaths in Wars and Conflicts in the 20th Century, p.76.
of the past”, the latter euphemistically referring to what the PRK/SOC government and others had described as the ‘genocidal regime’ of Pol Pot. 449 Key provisions focused on the withdrawal of foreign (i.e. Vietnamese) forces, the cessation of outside military assistance, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegation of a substantial part of all armed factions, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic infrastructure and public utilities, as well as the organization of free and fair elections aimed at forming a constituent assembly to be tasked with the formulation of a new constitution. In addition, the accords stated that “Cambodia will follow a system of liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism”. 450 Significantly, however, the accords did not provide much clarity on how such pluralism would be achieved and remained silent about how to transform the various armed factions into political parties.

To ensure implementation of the accords, a United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was mandated to supervise the various tasks. It received the unprecedented authority to control Cambodia’s civil administration with the consent and consultation of the quadripartite SNC, headed by King Sihanouk. With an 18-month budget of USD2.8 billion and 15,900 troops, 3,600 civilian police monitors, 1,000 international civilian staff—and at the time of the elections an additional 1,400 international election observers and 56,000

449 United Nations, Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, p.8. Whether or not the atrocities committed during the DK regime can be considered as ‘genocide’ continues to be the subject of acrimonious scholarly, legal as well as political debate.


Though the debate over the impact, success and legacy of UNTAC continues, there is general agreement that the execution of UNTAC’s mandate was more difficult than originally expected.\footnote{For a more extensive analysis of UNTAC, see Findlay, \textit{Cambodia. The Legacy and Lessons from UNTAC}; Heder and Ledgerwood, \textit{Propaganda, Politics and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition Under United Nations Peace-keeping}; Peou, \textit{Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballot-Box}; Doyle, Johnstone and Orr, \textit{Keeping the Peace. Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador}; Roberts, \textit{Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99}; and MacLeod (2006).} UNTAC’s control over the country’s civilian administration, including defence, public security, finance, information and foreign affairs, proved particularly challenging. For example, the UN failed to separate the almost completely merged structures of the SOC and the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP, formerly KPRP). Moreover, the SOC’s vast state, administrative and security apparatus soon comprised various parallel structures, set up to evade UNTAC control. Similarly, UNTAC had almost no control over the other factions –in particular the Khmer Rouge whose forces were located in more remote areas and resisted every attempt to disarm them. In the fields of human rights, UNTAC was doing slightly better. Its interventions facilitated the adoption of important human rights covenants, a press law and helped raise awareness over key human rights issues. But it was unable to stop continuing human rights violations, abuse and attacks against Vietnamese immigrants, opposition party activists and other Cambodian citizens. UNTAC’s electoral component on the other hand was more successful and in 1993 the UN
managed to organize and supervise elections despite widespread violence and intimidation in both the pre- and post-electoral period.\textsuperscript{453}

The improved political and security environment under UNTAC –albeit far from peaceful and stable– did allow each of the four factions to prepare themselves for Cambodia’s first-ever ‘free and fair’ elections in May 1993. FUNCINPEC was recognized as an official political party before the elections and was led by Prince Ranarridh, who had taken over the party presidency from his father King Sihanouk. The KPNLF was transformed into the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) and led by KPNLF founder, Son Sann. The ‘Khmer Rouge’ Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) refused to participate in the elections, claiming that the SOC had not complied with their promise in the Paris Accords to withdraw all Vietnamese forces.\textsuperscript{454}

The 1993 elections were eventually won by the royalist FUNCINPEC party, but its win was not sufficient to give the party the 2/3 majority constitutionally required to form a government by itself. With the BLDP and MOLINAKA not having received enough seats either, a coalition between FUNCINPEC and its erstwhile enemy, the CPP, was soon considered as the only realistic option. At first, the CPP refused to accept the results, accusing UNTAC of anti-CPP bias. But with the help of Sihanouk a power-sharing deal between FUNCINPEC and the CPP was eventually reached, locking both parties into an unwieldy coalition government with two prime-ministers and parallel structures of authority throughout the state bureaucracy.

\textsuperscript{453} Doyle, “Authority and Elections in Cambodia”, pp.140-156.
\textsuperscript{454} Vickery, \textit{Cambodia: A Political Survey}, p.59.
Although the Paris Accords ended the war between three of the four main protagonists, low-intensity conflict between the FUNCINPEC-CPP government and the still armed Khmer Rouge continued for another four years. In addition, tensions between the two coalition partners accumulated and finally came to a head in 1997. On July 5–6 of that year, violent clashes took place between different army factions loyal to the CPP and FUNCINPEC respectively. The clashes resulted in the deaths of dozens of FUNCINPEC soldiers and senior officers and led to the self-exile of Prince Ranarridh. Whereas most observers have described this event as a coup by Hun Sen and the CPP to silence the opposition and strengthen the prime minister’s power position, others have suggested that the attack was a response to an attempt by FUNCINPEC and Khmer forces to overthrow the CPP.\textsuperscript{455} Whatever the truth, the result was that the fragile government coalition collapsed, the last remaining KR forces defected to the new, Hun Sen-led government and the CPP further consolidated its control over the Cambodian state.

5.4 ‘Post-Conflict’ Elections (1993-2008)

In the 17-year period since the Paris Peace Accords, Cambodia has experienced six rounds of elections under universal suffrage, including two commune council elections and four legislative elections. In addition, there has been one round of non-universal senatorial elections. Under Cambodia’s electoral law, the (at least)

120 members of the National Assembly as well as the members of the 1,621 commune councils are elected every five years via proportional representation (PR) using closed party-lists and provincial member districts.\(^{456}\) The 61 members of the Senate are elected directly by members of the National Assembly and commune councils. Based on the official electoral results presented in Appendix IV, the following paragraphs provide an overview of the election results over the past two decades for the two most important levels of government, the National Assembly and the commune councils.\(^{457}\)

**National Assembly Elections**

Figure 5.1 below presents the results of the last four National Assembly elections in terms of seats won by each of the main Cambodian parties. The upward trend line of CPP seats clearly shows the continually growing support that the CPP has received since the 1993 elections. After losing the 1993 UNTAC elections to FUNINCPEC with a lower-than-expected 38% of the vote, the CPP won the 1998 elections and secured 64 seats in the National Assembly. In 2003 the CPP gained an additional 9 seats, giving it a plurality of seats but still not sufficient to

\(^{456}\) The final number of seats in the Cambodian National Assembly is decided by a special committee that takes into account changes in demographic, geographic, social and economic factors since the last elections. Under the (closed) party list system, votes are given to a specific party (not to candidates directly) and each party selects its National Assembly or commune council members based on the percentage of votes received in each province. Kingdom of Cambodia, *Amended Law on Elections of Commune Councils*, art. 5 and 22; and Kingdom of Cambodia, *Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly (LEMNA) and Amended Law of the Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly*, art. 7 and 37.

\(^{457}\) In the 2006 (non-universal) Senate elections, the CPP gained 43 seats (70%), FUNCINPEC 9 seats and SRP 2 seats. The other 4 senators were appointed by the King and the National Assembly.
rule alone. The refusal of FUNCINPEC and the SRP to join a CPP-led government led to political deadlock which lasted for almost one year. Ostensibly to prevent future post-election deadlocks, in early 2006 the CPP managed to convince the other parties to accept a constitutional change that lowered the required seat share for a party to form a government by itself from the original 2/3 majority to a simple 50% + 1 plurality. The latest round of elections, on 27 July 2008, resulted in an overwhelming victory for the CPP. With only 58% of the vote the CPP secured 73% (90) of the available 123 seats, giving it enough seats to govern alone –although it has asked FUNCINPEC to join its government once again.

By contrast, FUNCINPEC’s seat share has dropped sharply over the past decade. After winning the elections in 1993 with 45% of the vote and 58 seats, it was severely weakened by the violent clashes with its coalition partner, the CPP, in July 1997. In 1998 FUNCINPEC lost almost a quarter of its seats. Electoral support dropped further in 2003, with the party obtaining only 26 seats. In 2008 support for FUNCINPEC plummeted. Obtaining just 5% of the votes, the party received a meagre 2 seats, turning the winner of the 1993 elections into one of the smallest parties in Cambodia.

The Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), which had been founded in 1995 as the Khmer Nation Party (KNP) by former Finance Minister, Sam Rainsy, has steadily increased its number of seats over the past four elections. In its first election in 1998, the party gained an impressive 15 seats. In 2003 the SRP fell just 2 seats short of FUNCINPEC and managed to convince the latter to join the party in an ‘Alliance of Democrats’ aimed at removing Hun Sen from power. Eventually, however, FUNCINPEC gave in and decided to join the CPP in yet another
unequal coalition government. In 2008, the SRP received 22% of the vote, giving
the party an additional 2 seats. It now has 26 seats in the National Assembly,
making it Cambodia’s largest opposition party.

Other parties have had little success in Cambodia’s national elections. After
a strong showing in the 1993 elections, the BLDP, for example, split into two
parties that subsequently failed to gain any seats in the 1998 elections and finally
disappeared. The FUNCINPEC splinter party MOLINAKA experienced a
similar fate. The 2008 elections saw the emergence of several new (splinter)
parties, including the Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP), which is led by former
FUNCINCPEC president and son of King Sihanouk, Prince Ranariddh, as well
as the Human Rights Party (HRP), which is led by former BLDP Secretary
General and FUNCINPEC Deputy Secretary General, Kem Sokha. But despite
high expectations and high-profile election campaigns, these new parties each
gained less than 6% of the vote in 2008, resulting in only 2 seats for the NRP and
3 seats for the HRP.458

458 Roberts, Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99, p.80; Vander Weyden, “Parliamentary
Elections in Cambodia 1998”, pp.617-618; Sullivan, “The Parliamentary Election in Cambodia,
July 2003”, p.134; NEC, Official Election Results. 4th Mandate Election of the Members of the
Commune Council Elections

At the commune level, the difference in electoral support for the CPP and the two main opposition parties is even more striking. As shown in figure 5.2 below, the CPP has overwhelming control over commune councils. With 8 political parties participating in Cambodia’s first-ever commune council elections in 2002, the CPP received 61% of the vote. This was enough to secure 1,598 (98.6%) out of a total of 1,621 commune council chief positions. In addition, it won 789 deputy commune chief positions and seated 5,162 ordinary council members. In contrast, the SRP won only 13 council chief positions (0.8%) whereas FUNCINPEC gained no more than 10 positions (0.6%). The five other participating parties obtained no chief positions at all and together only seated 1 (ordinary) commune council member.

In the 2007 elections, the CPP lost control of 7 commune councils. FUNCINPEC lost 8 commune council chief positions, in addition to many of its other council members. The SRP, on the other hand, more than doubled its commune council chiefs from 13 to 28, increased the number of SRP first deputy
chiefs from 285 to 403 and tripled the number of SRP council members from 433 to 1,266. The royalist NRP benefited strongly from FUNCINPEC’s loss and gained a reasonable number of first, second deputy chiefs and council member positions. Nevertheless, with 1,591 chiefs elected in 2007, the CPP still controls almost all (98.1%) commune councils and remains the most powerful party throughout Cambodia.

Figure 5.2 Results Commune Council Elections in Cambodia (2002-2007)

In comparison with the pre-1991 regimes, elections in the 1993-2008 period have generally been more democratic. According to international and domestic election observer reports, the electoral administration, the electoral campaign and the balloting itself has slowly become more professional and better organized. However, the increasingly positive verdicts about the free and fairness of the elections on polling day seem to stand in sharp contrast with more critical

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assessments of the pre- and post-electoral periods. Independent assessments have highlighted continuing structural problems related to voter registration, gift-giving and vote buying, limited opposition party access to the media, as well as the disputed neutrality of key electoral institutions. The widespread use of intimidation and violence against opposition party supporters – particularly prior to the elections – are other oft-cited problems. In combination, these problems have placed severe restrictions on political party competition in Cambodia.\(^ {461}\)

5.5 Institutionalization of Individual Parties

The patterns of electoral competition discussed above are important for the main focus of this chapter, namely the organizational development of individual political parties. In order to assess the degree of institutionalization of the main Cambodian parties I will again make use of the Randall and Svåsand framework that was introduced in chapter 2. Most of the material presented in the section below is derived from interviews with a large number of senior politicians, electoral officials, and representatives of civil society and international organizations in Phnom Penh, Battambang and Kampot between April and August 2008.\(^ {462}\)


\(^ {462}\) For a complete list of people interviewed for this chapter, see Appendix II.
Systemness

The CPP has the most extensive and developed party structure of all Cambodian parties. It has a large number of representatives at all levels of state administration and has multiple offices in each of the 1,621 communes of the country’s 24 provinces. In addition, it has an estimated 4–5 million card-carrying party members, including many ministry and government employees.463

The formal structure of the CPP is divided into a central, provincial, district and grassroots level, with each level having a party committee that meets on a monthly or sometimes weekly basis and a party assembly that meets once or twice every five years. Modelled on the Vietnamese Communist Party, the CPP’s most important party organ, at least formally, is the Party Central Committee. This committee comprises 263 members who meet every six months and are responsible for all the major decisions related to party policy, recruitment, organization and finances. According to one well-informed observer, de facto decision-making power lies with a dozen or so people that were part of the KPRP Politburo and are now part of the Permanent Committee.464 This 30-member committee meets on an almost weekly basis and is responsible for all major party initiatives.465 The Permanent Committee regularly invites governors, ministers and other high-ranking officials to account for their actions and/or to question

463 Interviews with Som Soeun, 12 June 2008; Koul Panha, 6 June 2008; and Ke Bun Khien, 31 July 2008, all in Phnom Penh. Membership of the CPP is widely seen as a requirement for employment in public institutions and has been boosted by gift-giving and the use of threats in several large-scale voter enrolment efforts. However, as Cambodian voters often sign up as members for different political parties in the hope to pocket gifts –often in the form of a small amount of money–, ‘official’ party membership figures are not necessarily a reliable indicator of actual political support. See Hughes, “Parties, Protest and Pluralism in Cambodia”, pp.172-173.

464 Interview with Kristina Chhim, 7 July 2008, Phnom Penh.

and brief them before they speak in the National Assembly. It also has an important disciplinary function for party members that do not comply with the party’s strict regulations.\(^{466}\)

A unique aspect of the CPP’s party organization is its dense and elaborate network of party cadres below the central level. Each district, commune and village in Cambodia has CPP party branches and sub-branches [sakha]. Each branch consists of a committee that ranges from 5–9 members at the village level to 27–33 members at the district level. The branches are responsible for keeping track of, managing and addressing the problems of ordinary citizens, often in close coordination with the local CPP-affiliated authorities. If a certain problem cannot be resolved at the lower level, it has to be reported up to a higher level.\(^{467}\) Conversely, all decisions taken at the central level are passed down through the party hierarchy. Following the Leninist principle of ‘democratic centralism’, party members are allowed to debate the appropriate response to certain problems. But after a party decision is adopted –particularly at the central level– “the minority must follow the majority”.\(^{468}\)

Therefore, the CPP places strong emphasis on each member’s respect for the party hierarchy and individual responsibility as well as the party’s collective leadership. Because of strict party discipline, factional strife within the party seems to be relatively low. And even if it exists it remains hidden from the public eye. Though several (violent) clashes between different factions loyal to Prime Minister and CPP Vice-Chairman Hun Sen and CPP Chairman Chea Sim have

\(^{466}\) Interview with Cheam Yeap, 6 August 2008, Phnom Penh.

\(^{467}\) Interview with Cheung Sin, 16 June 2008, Battambang.

\(^{468}\) CPP, The Statutes of the Cambodian People’s Party, chapter VII, art.10.
been reported, this rivalry has not led to party splits or fundamentally challenged party unity.\footnote{Some argue that both leaders’ patronage networks have become so intertwined that it prevents the CPP from splitting openly, out of fear that it will hurt their (lucrative) business and personal interests. Interviews with Chea Vannath, 3 June 2008; and Kristina Chhim, 7 July 2008, both in Phnom Penh.} Overall, the CPP has a densely structured, unified and disciplined party organization with many interactions between party leaders, members, activists and other supporters. It is therefore highly institutionalized.

FUNCINPEC’s party structure is significantly less institutionalized in comparison with the CPP, particularly in terms of unity, discipline and interactions with people living in the villages. Since its transformation into a political party in the early 1990s FUNCINPEC has suffered from infighting between different competing factions, sometimes instigated by CPP infiltrators. The result has been a splintering of FUNCINPEC into various new parties. The party still has a nation-wide network of party offices, but due to neglect of its rural networks and the poor showing in the 2007 commune council elections FUNCINPEC has lost the political authority over the many villages and districts it controlled in the past. Moreover, many of FUNCINPEC’s local party structures do not function effectively. As a result, the party lacks the type of close connection between party officials and ordinary citizens that is so typical of the CPP. Correspondingly, FUNCINPEC’s membership has declined from an
estimated 1–2 million in the mid-1990s to an estimated 500,000–800,000 party members in 2008.\(^{470}\)

The main party organs within FUNCINPEC are the Congress and the National Board of Directors. The former, which in principle is convened annually, is responsible for the approval of party policy and major amendments to the party’s procedures and organization. The main decision-making power rests with the 15-member National Board of Directors, which is responsible for the daily implementation and initiation of party policies. The 120+ member National Advisory Board reviews the National Board of Directors’ compliance with party policies. The President is the chairman of both boards, and is assisted by a Secretary General, who is responsible for the overall leadership of the party.\(^{471}\)

The president of the party has historically been the most important position in FUNCINPEC’s hierarchy. In the 1980s this position was occupied by King Sihanouk. In the period 1991–2006 Sihanouk’s son, Prince Ranariddh, took over. Both leaders were treated as ‘historic presidents’ whose term was unlimited and their rule almost absolute. For a long time FUNCINPEC’s party structure only seemed to have a nominal existence. Particularly under the presidency of Prince Ranariddh the party’s structure is said to have suffered from the lack of

\(^{470}\) Interviews with Long Sarin and Suon Khieu, 5 August 2008; Koul Panha, 6 June 2008; Tep Nytha and Khan Keomono, 3 June 2008, all in Phnom Penh. As mentioned before, however, the high number of party supporters cited by FUNCINPEC party leaders is not an accurate reflection of political support. For example, in the most recent elections (2008) the party obtained just over 300,000 votes.

management and internal democracy. The highly personalized nature of decision-making and the limited appreciation from senior leaders for the grassroots network of supporters have significantly weakened the party. Whether Ranariddh’s departure from the party in 2006 and the recent reform measures by the new party leadership are sufficient to reinvigorate the party structures remains to be seen. The party’s devastating defeat in the 2008 elections gives little reason for optimism. In any case, FUNCINPEC’s party organization remains weakly institutionalized.

The party structure of the Sam Rainsy Party is more mature and a lot more developed than that of FUNCINPEC. In the first few years of its existence, between 1998 and 2003, the party relied heavily on its urban supporters and lacked a real grassroots network. However, since 2003 and with support from the US-based International Republican Institute (IRI), the SRP has paid significant attention to the strengthening of its party organization throughout the country. This seems to have paid off for the first time in the 2007 commune council elections. The SRP now has offices and representatives in almost all 1,621 communes across the country and enjoys the support of an estimated 500,000–700,000 party members. Unlike most of the other parties, it has a reasonably developed youth and women wing as part of its party structures.

At the top of the SRP’s party organization there is a congress which meets annually and is responsible among other things for the election of the party president. That president is elected every three years and is assisted by a

472 Interviews with Hun Ly Oeur, 6 June 2008; Long Sarin and Suon Khieu, 5 August 2008, all in Phnom Penh; and Yok Sithoun, 17 June 2008, Battambang. See also Hughes, “Parties, Protest and Pluralism in Cambodia”, p.171.
Secretary General. The next organizational level consists of the 13-member Permanent Committee, which is responsible for all major decisions. The SRP also has a Steering Committee, which acts as a board of advisors and comprises 100 members. Finally, the party has provincial, commune and village committees that regularly bring together party representatives from each of the administrative levels.

In response to internal and external criticism, the SRP has implemented a number of reforms in the past few years to make decision-making more participatory, democratic and less top-down. Whether those reforms are having the desired effect is unclear and perhaps too early to tell. Interviews with former party members and other informed observers show that criticism over the allegedly domineering influence of the party president continues to exist. The considerable number of SRP members of parliament (MPs) and other senior SRP officials defecting to other parties in 2007 and 2008 is often cited as proof for this discontent. However, the last-minute defections of some SRP members in the run-up to the elections in 2008 had probably also to do with the lucrative advisory and government positions offered by the CPP. Nevertheless, what is clear is that the SRP is the most institutionalized opposition party and probably the only Cambodian political party that organizes serious internal elections for most of its official positions. Somewhat perversely, however, the latter also seems to have made the SRP more vulnerable to infighting and infiltration by

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474 For a more extensive assessment of Sam Rainsy’s leadership, see Un, “Sam Rainsy and the Sam Rainsy Party: Configuring Opposition Politics in Cambodia”.
members from other parties. This would indicate a potential trade-off between intra-party democracy and party institutionalization.  

The organizational structures of the other parties are still weakly developed. Both the Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP) and the Human Rights Party (HRP) have offices in all of the 24 provinces but have been struggling to find experienced people to run them. Other parties such as the Hang Dara Democratic Movement Party, the Society of Justice Party, the League for Democracy Party, the Khmer Anti-Poverty Party, the Khmer Republican Party, and even the much older Khmer Democratic Party do not have country-wide representation. Their structures are often revived in the run-up to elections but in the period between elections are limited to a part-time party president and a handful of party cadres.

Decisional Autonomy

The second important element of party institutionalization is a party’s ability to shape its own policies and strategies without interference from external actors. The influence of state institutions, private companies, civil society groups, including trade unions and NGOs, and other ‘sponsoring’ institutions on party policy- and decision-making is difficult to assess, just like in El Salvador. But unlike in El Salvador, in Cambodia this is mainly because there is no strongly developed civil society. Most civil society actors are Western-modelled NGOs that focus on human rights, education and other development issues. Many of

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475 This finding raises the important question whether internal democracy is always a necessary condition for party institutionalization – as is often assumed in the literature as well as in party assistance programmes – or whether there are also situations where a more open, democratic party organization can undermine the institutionalization of a party. This question exceeds the scope of this thesis, but will briefly be addressed in the concluding chapter.

them associate party politics with corruption and personal interests and therefore try to stay away from political parties. In the absence of publicly available and interview material about this dimension of party institutionalization, only a few points can be made here.

Several of the opposition parties have—or used to have—links with non-party actors. The royalist FUNCINPEC party, for example, has traditionally had strong links with Cambodia’s much revered royal family. For a long time it could count on the support of the many princes and princesses who are part of the royal family as well as their countless advisors and supporters. The new Human Rights Party (HRP), whose president used to be the director of a prominent internationally-supported human rights NGO, has the support of many human rights activists and intellectuals. The Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP), which since 2006 is the new name of the student-led Khmer Front Party (KFP), draws a lot of its support from students and former FUNCINPEC supporters. The largest opposition party, the SRP, has ties with several newspapers, non-governmental organizations as well as labour unions. The latter are mainly active in the garment factories, many of whose workers are SRP supporters. However, in general most of the links between parties and non-party actors are informal and limited to provision of supporters and activists and political support at elections. Cambodian opposition parties are therefore generally very autonomous, with only a few examples of external pressure on party policy- and decision-making.477

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477 One such example of pressure from extra-party actors includes the strong objection of trade union representatives to the re-election of Eng Chhay Eang as SRP Secretary-General in September 2007.
In the case of the ruling party the situation is slightly different. Whereas opposition parties stand on a more or less equal footing with non-party actors and have to negotiate the terms of their ‘partnership’ with them, the CPP tends to ‘absorb’ most of the actors it works with. According to a representative of an international organization active in Cambodia, the CPP seems to have adopted Indonesian President Suharto’s ‘corporatist model of control’. This has led to the party’s ‘branching out’ in various directions, particularly towards the media and business sector.\textsuperscript{478} The only institution that does seem to have an influence on CPP policies is the government itself, most of whose senior members are also prominent CPP officials. But because of the near merger between the government and ruling party it is difficult to determine who influences who. Nevertheless, we can safely conclude that of all Cambodian political parties the CPP has the highest degree of decisional autonomy.

\textit{Value Infusion and Reification}

The degree of identification and commitment of officials, activists, members and supporters to their party (value infusion) as well as a party’s strength as a political symbol and its popular and political recognition as an established organization (reification) are the final two dimensions for assessing the institutionalization of individual parties.\textsuperscript{479}

The commitment of its large number of cadres, members and supporters to the party is relatively high in the case of the CPP, albeit not for ideological

\textsuperscript{478} Interview in Phnom Penh between April – August 2008 with an observer who requested anonymity.

\textsuperscript{479} Randall and Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”, p.13 and p.23.
reasons. Having exchanged its communist agenda for a more market-oriented profile at the end of the 1980s, the CPP has essentially become a non-ideological party that is characterized by a high degree of pragmatism. In Cambodia’s relatively culturally homogeneous society, political parties do generally not represent specific ethnic, religious or minority groups –although the issue of Khmer nationalism combined with anti-Vietnamese sentiments has been an important constant in Cambodian politics.\textsuperscript{480} The lack of ethnic or minority representation is also visible in the case of the CPP. Although there are no longitudinal survey data available on this issue, voting patterns suggest that the CPP receives support from broad sections of the Cambodian population, not only from the rural poor but also from the small and quickly growing economic elite. The party’s popularity is closely linked to its ability to spend (government) money on desirable infrastructural projects, including roads, bridges, schools, and hospitals (see also below).\textsuperscript{481} So overall, the CPP scores high on value infusion. However, it is important to emphasize that this is not so much because people strongly identify with the party’s political positions, but mainly because the CPP is believed to be the only party capable of delivering tangible results.

As one of the oldest political parties with a recognized position in Cambodia’s turbulent history, the CPP also scores high on the aspect of reification. The CPP is, for example, credited by many of its supporters for “liberating Cambodia from Pol Pot’s genocidal regime” and for having brought

\textsuperscript{480} Un, “Sam Rainsy and the Sam Rainsy Party: Configuring Opposition Politics in Cambodia”.
\textsuperscript{481} This can be deduced from a survey by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in August 2007. See International Republican Institute, \textit{Survey of Cambodian Public Opinion, July 27 – August 31, 2007}. 
“stability and reconciliation”. Its detractors disagree with this self-ascribed qualification and are quick to point out that the CPP was a “puppet of the Vietnamese authorities” in the 1980s and that its heroic self-portrayal is reinforced by state-controlled media. Nevertheless, it remains to difficult to deny that the CPP is a strong political symbol in Cambodia with a highly recognized party organization.

FUNCINPEC and the SRP score only modestly on these dimensions of party institutionalization, albeit for different reasons. The until recently strong commitment and identification of FUNCINPEC supporters with their party was mainly related to the party’s link with its much revered founder, King Sihanouk. With King Sihanouk no longer politically active and Prince Ranariddh having set up his own party in 2006, FUNCINPEC has recently lost much of its appeal to voters and party activists. And because of its long-time position as the CPP’s junior coalition partner, people have often found it difficult to make a distinction between the political agenda of FUNCINPEC and the CPP.

Established much later than the CPP and FUNCINPEC, the SRP has quickly become a strong political symbol and is now well-known among a large part of the Cambodian population. Running on a somewhat populist platform of anti-corruption, anti-immigration, and the promise of higher wages, the party has gained broad support among factory workers, teachers, and students, especially in urban areas. However, because the party has never been part of the government, only of the National Assembly and a relatively small number of commune councils, it has few people with governance experience.

combination with the large number of defections in the run-up to the 2008 elections, this seems to have negatively affected the party’s perceived political strength.

With regard to the other much younger opposition parties, such as the HRP and the NRP, there is not enough information to evaluate their institutionalization on these dimensions.

The above assessment reveals a large gap in institutionalization between the main Cambodian political parties. With (very) high degrees of systemness, decisional autonomy, value infusion and reification, the CPP is highly institutionalized and clearly the most organized party in Cambodia. With a reasonable degree of systemness, a relatively high degree of decisional autonomy, but medium to low scores on value infusion and reification, the SRP is only moderately institutionalized. Despite its historical role, FUNCINPEC scores medium to low on all the four dimensions and should therefore be classified as weakly institutionalized, similar to the much younger HRP and NRP.483

5.6 Cambodia’s Dominant-Authoritarian Party System

As there are at least three ‘politically relevant’ parties (CPP, FUNCINPEC and SRP) that have competed with each other in a series of relatively free and fair elections, Cambodia at first sight seems to have a non-dominant party system. At

483 For a similar conclusion based on different measures of institutionalization, see Peou, *International Democracy Assistance for Peacebuilding. Cambodia and Beyond*, pp.100-111.
closer inspection, however, Cambodia has several typical features of what Sartori defined as a dominant-authoritarian party system.\textsuperscript{484}

First, having won the past three legislative elections with an absolute majority of seats already makes the CPP a ‘dominant party’ according to Sartori’s definition. However, the real source of the CPP’s dominance lies in its de facto control over state institutions and personnel, especially local authorities and security forces whose loyalty is assured through patronage.\textsuperscript{485} The fact that the CPP did not obtain the necessary 2/3 parliamentary majority to form a government by itself (until 2008) and the presence of two other parties with the power to block a coalition government has not prevented the CPP from monopolizing government decision-making. Partly as a result of international pressure, opposition parties have been allowed to exist and participate in elections since 1993. However, at moments when those parties directly challenged the CPP’s power position – such as FUNCINPEC’s electoral victory in 1993, armed clashes between pro-FUNCINPEC and pro-CPP forces in 1997, and the mass SRP-led demonstrations in 1998– the CPP has used armed force and other non-democratic measures to protect its interests and prevent a potential transfer of power.\textsuperscript{486}

A second, related feature of Cambodia’s party system is the widespread use of intimidation by CPP officials and/or local authorities aimed at reducing

\textsuperscript{484} See Sartori, \textit{Parties and Party Systems}, p.229-231; and section 2.4 in chapter 2.


popular support for opposition parties and sabotaging their organizational growth. Such intimidation comes in different forms and has changed over time. In the first decade or so after the war ended, cases of harassment, threats, arbitrary arrest, attacks and even killings of non-CPP politicians, opposition party supporters, human rights workers and journalists by security forces and other pro-government actors were widespread and often quite public. This was particularly the case during the first highly unstable CPP-FUNCINPEC coalition government between 1993 and 1998. The March 1997 grenade attack during an opposition party rally added to the climate of fear that prevented opposition party supporters as well as voters in general from expressing their opinions freely.

After the CPP was able to consolidate its power in the 1998 and 2003 National Assembly elections, political intimidation became more subtle and perpetrated by actors other than the security forces. But although the number of violent attacks and politically-motivated killings in the past two elections has fallen sharply in comparison to the elections of the previous decade, CPP-supported anti-opposition activities are still very common, particularly in rural areas. Examples include the tearing down of opposition party signs by local authorities, delays by commune councils or village chiefs in granting certain permissions to opposition party members, and the use of the non-independent
court system to silence and punish opposition party members and other critics.\textsuperscript{487} A series of recent speeches by Prime Minister Hun Sen indicating that “if the people vote for me [the CPP] there is no war” and other, similar references to war and instability are other examples of a more subtle, but no less clear form of intimidation.\textsuperscript{488}

A particularly powerful instrument in the hands of the CPP is the broadcasting media. TV and radio stations, which enjoy a far greater reach and popularity among the poor and often illiterate rural population of Cambodia than newspapers, are strongly biased towards the CPP. According to a recent report by a local human rights organization, all of the seven TV stations in Cambodia are currently “either owned or closely affiliated to the government and more particularly to the CPP”.\textsuperscript{489} The CPP’s control over Cambodia’s airwaves in practice means that news programmes are mainly filled with reports about visits and speeches by CPP officials, praising government and CPP achievements. Opposition party requests for radio licenses are almost always denied, while


\textsuperscript{489} Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO), \textit{Reading Between the Lines: How Politics, Money and Fear Control Cambodia’s Media}, pp.10-18.
programmes and stations that are critical of the government are regularly closed down and their editors or owners arrested. There have been various international efforts to promote more equitable media access for all political parties, but these programmes have been limited to election campaign periods and do generally not compensate for the inequality in media access in the long period between elections.⁴⁹⁰

A third characteristic of Cambodia’s party system is the non-programmatic, non-ideological form of party competition and the related personalization of power. Political parties do generally not have a coherent political platform that guides their policies or actions. The only thing that parties produce before elections is an eclectic set of ‘principles’. These often lack prioritization, explanation, financial motivation and rarely guide party behaviour. The same goes for ideology. The CPP is the only party with strong ideological roots, but since it abandoned communism at the end of the 1980s the party has an essentially non-ideological platform. Today all Cambodian parties have highly pragmatic, populist agendas to which standard ideological labels such as ‘centrist’, ‘left-wing’ or ‘right-wing’ are not applicable.

Instead of ideology, competition between parties revolves mainly around political leaders and their power. What the CPP, FUNCINPEC, SRP and also the NRP and HRP have in common is the dominance of their leaders over all aspects of party life. The almost ‘absolutist’ form of leadership that often results, is not unique to the particular individuals, however. It has long been considered a key attribute of Khmer political culture, in which leaders see themselves as ‘kings of

⁴⁹⁰ See Hughes, “Candidate Debates and Equity News: International Support for Democratic Deliberation in Cambodia”.
the people’ who can rule by divine right. They want to control power, but generally do not want to share it with others. This combination of absolutist leadership and lack of a power-sharing tradition has resulted in an extremely personalist form of zero-sum politics. According to one observer, the importance of party leaders is also reflected in voting behaviour: “when people vote, they vote for a certain leader, not for a party”.491

Underpinning the power bases of the main political leaders and parties are informal (neo-) patrimonial networks, which are a fourth key feature of the Cambodian political system.492 These networks essentially consist of a variety of relationships between political patrons and their ‘clients’ who exchange favours, benefits, protection, loyalty, and other resources in order to accumulate wealth and power. Traditionally limited to personal relationships of kinship and affection within rural communities, patron-client relations today pervade almost all aspects of Cambodian society and play a particularly significant role in the functioning and survival of political parties.

At the village level, for example, politicians regularly hand out gifts to rural villagers in the form of a sarong, krama [type of scarf], rice and small amounts of money. The expectation is that the recipients will vote for their party in the next


Post-War Party Politics in Cambodia

269

Although this practice is common among all Cambodian parties, because of its control over state resources and administrative structures the CPP has had far greater opportunity to institutionalize and exploit this informal practice of ‘gift-giving’ to buy votes. At government level, the CPP has made sure to look after the patronage system that was originally created in the 1980s to ensure loyalty to the ruling regime. Particularly after the events of 1997, the CPP has extended its control over almost all the major institutions of the country, including the army and police, the judiciary, the civil service, and the media. Nowadays, the CPP and its leaders continue to use their authority to create new high-level positions for loyalists from their own networks as well as defectors of other parties, in the process making the current government cabinet one of the world’s largest.

A final defining feature of Cambodia’s party system is its limited competitiveness, which is first of all a consequence of the small number of relevant opposition parties. Although 53 parties are nominally registered with the Ministry of the Interior, only five of them now have seats in the Assembly or municipal councils. Moreover, in the last decade the overall number of parties participating in elections fell from 39 to 11. Some observers have attributed this decrease to the growing maturity of Cambodia’s party system. But as long as there has not been a peaceful transfer of power between different political

493 This expectation is not always guaranteed as Cambodia has a system of secret balloting. As a result, voters can still vote for another party than the one they have received gifts from. Anecdotal evidence from the 2008 election campaign, for example, suggests that there were many people who accepted gifts from the ruling party, but eventually voted for opposition parties.

494 Cambodian Development Resource Institute (CDRI), Accountability and Neo-Patrimonialism in Cambodia, p.59.
parties, there might be doubts as to how democratic Cambodia’s party system is. Instead, unequal access to human, financial and other resources seems a more plausible reason for the short lifespan of most political parties.

The preceding analysis has shown that its patrimonial governance style, its control over almost all state institutions and its astute leadership have turned the CPP into the strongest party of Cambodia, not only in political and financial terms, but also organizationally. The CPP’s incumbent position and use of party infiltrators has given it an ability to foster splits among its political opponents, in the process strengthening the CPP’s support in all of the post-1991 elections. Nevertheless, the limited competitiveness of Cambodia’s party system is also related to the behaviour of opposition parties themselves. If the main opposition parties had paid more attention to the strengthening of their grassroots networks, the democratization of their decision-making and the development of concrete political plans earlier on, their performance in elections, parliament and local governance would likely have been better. As we have seen above, the SRP, other opposition parties and FUNCINPEC in particular have generally not capitalized on their electoral gains and failed to work together. Therefore, Cambodia’s uneven dominant party system is for some almost as much a consequence of the opposition parties’ weaknesses as it is a result of the CPP’s supremacy.495

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495 Several interviewees referred to the “missed opportunities” of party building and party strengthening of FUNCINPEC in the mid-1990s and the SRP in the early 2000s. Many of them described the opposition parties’ weaknesses as a “blessing for the CPP”. See also Un, “Sam Rainsy and the Sam Rainsy Party”; and Hughes, “Parties, Protest and Pluralism in Cambodia”.
5.7 Institutionalization of the Party System in Cambodia

Following Mainwaring and Scully’s framework, there are four criteria for establishing the degree of institutionalization of Cambodia’s party system.496

A stable form of party competition is the first condition for an institutionalized party system. Applying Pedersen’s quantitative index of electoral volatility shows that Cambodia’s overall mean volatility over the period 1993-2008 is only 9.9. This means that while some parties lost 9.9% (of seats in the Assembly or chief positions in the commune councils) from one election to the next, other parties won 9.9%. Mean electoral volatility for the four rounds of parliamentary elections is slightly higher at 18.3, reflecting the fact that there have been several new parties entering and leaving the National Assembly and that one party (FUNCINPEC) has seen its seat share sharply reduced.497 Compared to other (post-conflict) developing countries –for example Guatemala, where the net percentage change in seats has been as high as 50%—volatility is rather low in Cambodia.498 As a result party competition has been relatively stable, at least from an electoral point of view.

The relative stability of inter-party competition in Cambodia is also noticeable by other, qualitative indicators. For example, over the past 15 years

496 Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions, pp.4-6. See also chapter 2, section 2.6.
497 Calculating the aggregate net percentage change (Volatility, V) for legislative seats from the data in Appendix IV results in Seat $V_{1998} = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \sum| (9) + (13) + (12) + (8) + (1) = 21.5$, Seat $V_{2003} = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \sum| (7) + (14) + (8) = 14.5$ and Seat $V_{2008} = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \sum| (14) + (19) + (1) + (2) + (2) = 19$. The aggregate net percentage change for commune council chief positions is Council $V_{2007} = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \sum| (1) + (1) + (1) = 1.5$. The overall mean volatility figures follow from taking the average of these outcomes.
the number of politically relevant parties has remained constant, which is similar to the situation in El Salvador. Although there are many smaller political parties that have come and gone since the end of the war, the three largest parties have long been the same. Only in the most recent 2008 elections has the composition of the small group of politically relevant parties changed, with the SRP taking over from FUNCINPEC as the second largest party and the HRP becoming the third largest party. Another indicator of the party system’s increasing stability is the fact that internal splits within some of the parties have not significantly affected inter-party competition. Although party factions breaking away from the party and setting up new parties has certainly damaged the systemness of the SRP and FUNCINPEC in particular, it has not significantly altered the power configuration of the Cambodian party system as such. Finally, since the war ended there have been regular elections, which have slowly become more peaceful. Whereas elections in 1993 and particularly 1998 were still marred by high levels of violence, the 2003 and 2008 elections were considerably less violent.

Nevertheless, a relatively stable form of party competition does not mean that Cambodia’s party system is now institutionalized. As noted before, intimidation and politically-motivated killings continue to exist and still prevent a completely free and fair competition between parties. Moreover, as the main party is too entrenched to be dislocated from power anytime soon, Cambodia’s party system is likely to remain stably dominated by one political party for some years to come.

The degree to which parties are ‘rooted’ in society is a second important indicator of party system institutionalization. Although this is partly related to the
age of political parties, the shallow roots and limited popular support for the Khmer Democratic Party—with its 1946 establishment Cambodia’s oldest political party—indicate that longevity alone is not enough. For a long time there were only two Cambodian parties that were well-known throughout the country and had strong roots in society, i.e. the CPP and FUNCINPEC. Established around the same time in the early 1980s, both parties were known for their historical role in the post-Khmer Rouge civil war period: the CPP for its self-acclaimed role as ‘liberator of the Pol Pot regime’ and FUNCINPEC for its royalist resistance against ‘the Vietnamese-backed PRK puppet regime’. However, whereas the CPP has become deeply rooted in all aspects of the Cambodian state and society, FUNCINPEC’s ties with the population and state institutions have drastically weakened over the years. Established in 1998, the SRP is much younger and does not have the same historical role as the other two parties. However, as a result of its well-publicized fight against corruption, impunity and other major problems in Cambodian society the SRP’s grassroots support has grown quickly in the past decade, particularly among young, urban voters. At the time of writing, at the end of 2008, the SRP’s societal roots were much stronger than those of FUNCINPEC, but still significantly weaker than the CPP’s. Except for the CPP and SRP, political parties are generally not well entrenched in Cambodian society.

The perceived legitimacy of elections and political parties in determining who governs is another factor in assessing the institutionalization of Cambodia’s party system. The typical rejection of election results by opposition parties and the organization of large mass demonstrations to challenge the results after each of the past three elections is an indication that Cambodian elections are not
considered legitimate by many actors, despite the earlier mentioned positive assessments of international election observers. In addition, some interviewees have indicated that the legitimacy of parties themselves is limited, mainly because personal connections with powerful leaders are often more important for gaining access to government resources than party membership. And finally, in accordance with their deep lack of trust in state institutions the Cambodian population also seems to be increasingly wary of political parties and elections. As shown in table 5.1 below, the number of registered voters that actually voted has decreased from a high of 94% in 1998 to a low of 68% in 2007. Although this significant decrease in voter turn-out can be related to various issues, one important factor is the Cambodian people’s dissatisfaction with the high levels of corruption and their general disillusionment with elections as the means to change the current political leadership. On this particular aspect, therefore, the Cambodian party system seems only weakly institutionalized.

499 Interviews with Chea Vannath, 3 June 2008, Kristina Chhim, 7 July 2008 and Im Francois, 4 August 2008, all in Phnom Penh.
501 This view was expressed by Thun Saray, President of the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC), during a press conference of the Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL) on 28 July 2008. Other reasons often cited for the decreasing voter turn-out in Cambodia include personal problems (no money, work, and illness), the high prices of fuel and transportation, and problems faced at the polling station (such as people not being able to find their name on the voter list, as happened regularly in the 2008 election).
The final aspect of party system institutionalization is the strength of the organizational structures of parties. As indicated before, the CPP and the SRP are the only two parties in Cambodia with a structured, nation-wide network of party activists, who meet regularly from the grassroots level up to the national level. The other parties have weak party organizations that do not extend to all parts of the country, are generally poorly staffed, under-funded and beset by factionalism. On this aspect therefore the party system is only moderately developed.

To conclude, Cambodia’s party system is characterized by a relatively stable form of party competition, but has a majority of parties that are not rooted in society, parties and elections that are often not considered legitimate or trustworthy, and only two parties with a strong party organization. This means that, on the basis of the Mainwaring and Scully criteria at least, Cambodia’s party system is weakly institutionalized.

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502 National Election Committee (NEC), Election of the National Assembly, Sunday, July 28, 2008; and National Election Committee (NEC), NEC Adds 1,138 Voters’ Names to the 2007 Voters List for the 4th Election of the Members of the National Assembly, 2008.
5.8 Explaining Party and Party System Institutionalization in Cambodia

Having established that Cambodia has only one institutionalized party and a weakly institutionalized party system dominated by that same party, we should now turn to the various factors that might explain this situation and determine which ones are the most relevant. In the process, I will also evaluate the relevance to the Cambodian context of the three theoretical approaches for party and party system institutionalization that are offered in the academic literature on party politics.

The Limits of the Electoral and Sociological Approaches

As we have seen before, the electoral competition approach argues that the structure of individual party organizations is a result of how parties mobilize voters in competitive elections and that the configuration of the overall party system stems from the number of parties participating in elections, their relative size and ideological distance.503

Similar to the situation in El Salvador, competitive elections in Cambodia did not take place until after the war ended in 1991. The CPP and FUNCINPEC were both established during the 1980s when a restricted communist political system allowed only one party to exist. At that time the main raison d’être of both parties was not to contest elections but to fight the enemy and gain control over the country’s territory. The initial organizational structures of the CPP and FUNCINPEC were therefore not shaped by electoral competition but rather by the lack of it.

503 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, pp. 94-105; and see chapter 2, section 2.7.
Electoral competition became more important with the introduction of multi-party democracy by UNTAC in 1993. Since then, several Cambodian parties – most notably the SRP – have set up structures, changed tactics and attracted some new people to mobilize popular support and maximize votes. However, most of the structures and senior leadership of the CPP have remained the same. Electoral competition only strengthened its already strong ties with local authorities. FUNCINPEC has not capitalized on the opportunities offered by a more open political system and increased electoral competition. Because of that it has largely failed its rebel-to-party transformation.

Due to the introduction of electoral competition in 1993 Cambodia’s party system has changed from a communist one-party system to a (semi-) democratic multi-party system. Nevertheless, party competition remains highly opportunist and non-ideological in character, making the measurement of parties’ ideological distance –a key element of the electoral competition approach– impossible and even irrelevant. Increased electoral competition therefore has had an effect on the institutionalization of some parties and it has certainly changed the dynamics of party competition. But it has not had the decisive impact on the institutionalization of individual parties and the overall party system that the electoral competition approach wants us to believe.

The sociological approach argues that the organizational structure of an individual party reflects that party’s control or access to financial, human and state resources. With regard to the nature of party competition it argues that the configuration of a party system essentially reflects major societal cleavages.504

504 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, pp.105-108; Lipset and Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments”; and see chapter 2, section 2.7.
It is indeed clear that not all parties have the same amount of human resources. The CPP has a large number of well-trained, experienced and well-paid staff. As the principal political master of the country’s bureaucracy and security apparatus, the party can informally avail of several thousands of additional supporters, including many police, army and local government officials. Furthermore, the elaborate grassroots structure of the CPP and its close relationship with village chiefs is a reflection of the party’s belief that local party activists and state officials are crucial in mobilizing electoral support in the rural areas.

The other parties generally have much fewer party staff or supporters. Convinced that its future was mainly dependent on the support of urban, more educated voters, the SRP for a long time cultivated its ties with trade unions and student associations. Recognizing somewhat belatedly that the rural vote was too important to ignore, the party has recently expanded its grassroots structures and party activities. But like other Cambodian opposition parties, the SRP does not have the same degree of access to people as the CPP and is therefore not in the position to increase its membership or popular support as easily.

A similar situation applies to the financing of political parties. Due to the lack of regulation and transparency of party financing in Cambodia, there is no reliable data on exactly how much the CPP, FUNCINPEC, the SRP or any of the other parties collect and spend during and between election campaigns. However, it is widely acknowledged that the CPP makes little distinction between party and state activities, and indirectly uses income from corporate and public taxes,
investments and even foreign aid for party political purposes.\textsuperscript{505} FUNCINPEC and the SRP generally do not have access to such resources. They depend for most of their income on fundraising activities among the Cambodian diaspora that lives in the United States, Canada, France, Australia and elsewhere. Additionally, in the run-up to elections it is quite normal for an opposition party candidate to provide a significant monetary contribution that covers the candidate’s campaign spending as well as other party activities in return for being selected as an official party candidate. This arrangement is often perceived as ‘buying’ seats.\textsuperscript{506} It also means that central party leadership loses influence over individual candidates.

Finally, the CPP enjoys a degree of access to the media that the opposition parties simply do not have. As discussed earlier, the direct and indirect control of the CPP over the country’s broadcast media gives the party a disproportionately large advantage in promoting its policies, in disseminating the speeches of its leaders, and in projecting its image across the country; all key issues benefiting a party’s institutionalization.

So in terms of explaining the variety in party organization, the sociological approach’s focus on access to resources seems definitely relevant in the case of Cambodia. But so far as the configuration of the Cambodian party system is concerned, this is not shaped by major societal cleavages in the way described by the sociological approach. Divisions between rich and poor citizens, urban and


\textsuperscript{506} Interview with Kristina Chhim, 7 July 2008, Phnom Penh. See also the interview with the Human Rights Party president, Kem Sokha, in the weekly French newspaper \textit{Cambodge Soir}, 19 – 25 June 2008, p.5.
rural dwellers, workers and owners are growing rapidly in Cambodian society, but they do not (yet) form the foundations on which political parties are based. Unlike the party systems of Western Europe, where at least historically such socioeconomic divisions were clearly recognizable and represented by different parties, Cambodia does not have typical labour, rural, communist or conservative parties that cater to the interests of particular groups in society. As indicated before, Cambodian parties are all pragmatist, ‘catch-all’ organizations that seem more interested in delegitimizing their opponents and maximizing votes and power than genuinely representing the interests and socioeconomic concerns of groups in society.507

The relevance of the sociological approach to the Cambodian context seems limited therefore to explaining how some parties have structured their organizations. Similar to the electoral competition approach, it fails to give a full rationalization of why the Cambodian party system developed as it did in the post-war period.

*The Greater Relevance of the Institutionalist Approach…*

The institutionalist approach argues that individual party organizations as well as the overall party system are mainly shaped by the workings of formal and informal institutions, including the electoral system.508 This approach seems to be more relevant for explaining the party situation in Cambodia.

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507 See also Hughes, “Parties, Protest and Pluralism in Cambodia”.

The replacement in the early 1990s of Cambodia’s former single-member district system with a new system of proportional representation based on multi-member provincial districts only marginally opened the party system to smaller parties. The first elections under the new system introduced by UNTAC in 1993 resulted in a total of four parties obtaining seats, including two parties that each received less than 4% of the vote. However, several aspects of Cambodia’s electoral law have gradually made it more difficult for smaller parties to gain seats.

In 1997, under circumstances that remain unclear, the so-called Hare quota for calculating seat allocations was changed to a ‘highest average method’ formula. This formula awards any remaining seats in a provincial district to the party with the highest average number of votes. Instead of giving smaller parties a relatively bigger chance to gain seats, the highest average formula effectively over-represents the largest party, which in almost all provinces is the CPP. The workings of this method have made Cambodia’s electoral system increasingly less proportional, as reflected in the fact that the CPP during the most recent elections managed to obtain 73% of the seats with only 58% of the vote. Another factor working against smaller parties is the increasingly uneven distribution of voters and seats between the 24 provinces. This malapportionment is largely caused by the fact that the total number of National Assembly seats has remained almost the same since 1993, despite significant increases in the overall

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509 Rowley, “Cambodia”.
population and the number of registered voters. The net effect is that it takes more and more votes to obtain a seat in parliament, which is particularly problematic for the smallest parties.

The closed-list nature of Cambodia’s PR system has contributed to the highly in-ward looking nature of most party organizations. As the position of elected representatives in commune councils and the National Assembly ultimately depends on the party and senior government officials, their primary focus is pleasing—or at least not angering—the party leadership. This not only adds to the already strong influence of some party leaders, but also gives little incentive to party representatives to be more accountable or responsive to ordinary citizens.⁵¹²

And finally party competition has been shaped by the requirement that a government could only be formed if it had the support of a 2/3 majority in the National Assembly. Considered by most as a mechanism to stimulate power-sharing between rivalling parties, but by some as a clever tactic by Hun Sen to prevent FUNCINPEC and the BLDP from forming a government after the CPP unexpectedly lost the elections in 1993, the 2/3 majority rule has had a mixed effect on party competition.⁵¹³ On the one hand, it has forced the two largest parties—CPP and until recently FUNCINPEC—into a coalition government for more than 15 years, preventing the country from slipping back into a one-party regime. On the other hand, however, the rule never fostered any degree of

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⁵¹² This conclusion was supported by several people interviewed for this study. However, there is some evidence that this effect might be less strong in the case of the SRP. See also Un, “Patronage Politics and Hybrid Democracy”; and Cambodian Development Resource Institute (CDRI), Accountability and Neo-Patrimonialism in Cambodia, p.26 and p.59.

reconciliation between the former warring parties. It only added to the political instability of the immediate post-war period.

With the replacement of the 2/3 majority rule by a 50% + 1 formula the need for unstable coalition governments came to an end in 2006 – and with it the last institutional obstacle to single-party government has now been removed.\(^{514}\)

...and Particularly of War-Related Institutional Factors

In addition to these formal rules, there are other ‘informal’ institutions that are just as, if not more, important to an understanding of Cambodia’s party context. Many of these factors are directly related to the war and the post-war institution-building process.

The period and circumstances in which the parties originated, for example, have had a significant influence on how they subsequently developed. The CPP emerged during the period of war in the 1980s. Crucially, according to in-depth studies by Gottesman and Chhim, its predecessor, the KPRP, was created at the same time as the PRK state structure. Under the tutelage of Vietnamese advisors the KPRP’s party organization was subsequently expanded “with branches in every state institution, from ministries to local government offices, military units, schools and hospitals”. Soon, most party and state structures – though separate in theory – had in fact merged with the numerous substructures “[serving] as

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\(^{514}\) The 50% + 1 formula was reluctantly accepted by SRP members of parliament in early 2006 in an apparent *quid pro quo* for Prime Minister Hun Sen’s approval of a royal pardon to Sam Rainsy, who had earlier been sentenced to 18 months in prison for defaming the government and the PM.
extensions of each leader’s personal authority”. This process of ‘state-cum-party’ building continued throughout the war and post-war period and has resulted in the formidable party organization that the CPP is today.

Despite having been established around the same time as the CPP, FUNCINPEC did not succeed in developing a well-structured party organization. This is partly related to the fact that in its early years, due to the war and the repressive PRK policies of the 1980s, the organization was unable to organize itself as a political party. But even when it was given the opportunity in 1991 to transform its military structures and rural support into a democratic political party, FUNCINPEC leaders failed to do so. As late as the end-1990s, the main focus of FUNCINPEC was the consolidation of power for its leaders, not party-building.

The SRP and most of the opposition parties emerged in the post-war period and are therefore still relatively young. For example, the NRP was only created in 2006 and the HRP as recently as 2007. With the CPP’s party organization firmly rooted since the 1980s and an overall atmosphere of fear and intimidation present throughout Cambodia, it has been difficult for these new parties to create groups of local supporters and build up their organizations. The SRP has been the only party that managed to do so in a relatively short period of time.

These party histories show that the war-time (or post-war) origins of the parties have had a strong influence on their organizational development. As in

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515 Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, p.48; Chhim, Die Revolutionäre Volkspartei Kampuchea 1979 bis 1989.

516 Admittedly, this explanation does not fully account for the SRP’s growth, but it does show how the SRP’s organizational development was affected by other parties that were established much earlier.
the case of El Salvador then, this conclusion supports the key historical institutionalist argument in this thesis that there is a degree of path dependence in post-conflict party development.

A second important institutional factor is the way in which the war ended and the nature of the subsequent peace agreement. Early talks and closer engagement between the main warring parties neither came about spontaneously nor as a result of changed views on how the groups saw each other. It was almost exclusively initiated by foreign powers that wanted to extract themselves from the Cambodian conflict by weaning off their client factions from the international recognition and financial and material support they had so long enjoyed. The Paris Peace Accords were therefore primarily an imposed agreement among four parties that remained reluctant to share power.\textsuperscript{517} And although UNTAC and the quadripartite Supreme National Council were nominally in charge of administrating the country and disarming all armed factions during the 2-year transitional period, the SOC/CPP did not give up its control over the country’s security and administrative apparatus, FUNCINPEC retained its army and the Khmer Rouge continued its armed attacks. Security remained the key priority for all factions, and as a result there was little attention for party-building.

When free and fair elections were organized in 1993 under the supervision and military protection of UNTAC they did introduce a new chapter of multi-party politics in Cambodian history. However, the regulatory framework provided by the Paris Peace Accords, including a new Electoral Law and Law on Political Parties, did not create the peaceful, competitive and democratic party system the international community had hoped for. The internationally-brokered

\textsuperscript{517} Ashley, “Between War and Peace”; and Roberts, \textit{Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99}. 
power-sharing deal between FUNCINPEC and the CPP after the 1993 elections proved highly unstable. With the renewed violence of 1997 it became clear that the battlefield, not the ballot box was still determining who controlled power. From a party political perspective therefore, the Paris Peace Accords and the UNTAC intervention have had a long-lasting effect in that they helped make political pluralism possible. But in contrast to peace processes in other countries, it did not fundamentally alter the configuration of power between the key political players nor create a more balanced party system. Against this background the early 1990s can therefore only be seen as a brief, rather exceptional period in Cambodian political history.

The post-war institutional design of Cambodia’s most important electoral institution has also impacted on how parties developed and competed. The National Election Committee (NEC) was established in 1998 and at the time consisted of 11 members. Because of the deep suspicions and lack of trust between the parties, it was decided that the committee would comprise 4 members representing the 4 parties in the National Assembly, 1 member representing NGOs and 6 so-called ‘independent’ members. In 2002 the membership of the NEC was reduced to 5 members while in 2006 it was again increased to its current level of 9 members. Formally it has changed from a party-based to an apolitical institution. According to the most recent version of the electoral law, the NEC members are “competent in politics, have [relevant]
work experience and have a good reputation and are not representing political parties”.

But because NEC members are selected by the Ministry of the Interior, their nominations approved by the Council of Ministers and ratified by the National Assembly—all of which are controlled by the CPP—the NEC has continuously been accused of favouring the CPP. The fact that it is still located within the powerful, CPP-controlled Ministry of the Interior has also not helped. Moreover, formally the Provincial Election Committees (PECs), the Commune Election Committees (CECs) should be comprised of non-partisan officials. But the perception of many people interviewed for this study is that a lot of the electoral officials are biased towards the CPP. This is apparently particularly the case with commune clerks, who are responsible for the important process of voter registration. The almost systematic rejection of opposition party complaints during election campaigns is another indicator of the NEC’s lack of independence, at least according to domestic election monitoring organizations.

518 Kingdom of Cambodia, Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly (LEMNA), art.13; and National Election Committee (NEC), Election of the National Assembly, Sunday, July 28, 2008.

519 Election stakeholders, including a large number of opposition parties and NGOs, identified the alleged pro-CPP bias of local government and electoral officials as one of the key problems of Cambodia’s election administration. Information based on personal observation of three Conflict Prevention in Cambodian Elections (COPCEL) meetings in Battambang and Phnom Penh between May and August 2008.
This allegedly unfair treatment is said to have resulted in an electoral playing field that is heavily tilted towards the ruling party.\textsuperscript{520}

To be fair to the NEC, however, it should be said that the committee has over the years become more professional, transparent and accessible to parties and the media. The NEC now has an elaborate procedure for dealing with electoral complaints and is capable of organizing “logistically and technically competent elections”, with only limited support and advice from international consultants.\textsuperscript{521} Nevertheless, continuing doubts over its neutrality and its reluctance to intervene in some of the most problematic areas of Cambodian politics – such as party financing and party access to the media outside the campaign period – indicate that it is not (yet) universally accepted as the “independent, neutral and impartial electoral body” it claims to be.\textsuperscript{522}

Lastly, the divergence in party institutionalization can be attributed to political leadership. Hun Sen in particular is recognized for having a talent of


\textsuperscript{521} Bartu, “Cambodia: Tensions Around the National Election Committee”, p.288.

\textsuperscript{522} According to article 16, point 17 and point 18 of the Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly (LEMNA), the NEC is responsible for “auditing the income and financial expenses incurred by candidates and political parties during election campaigns” and for “taking measures and facilitating to ensure equal access to the public media”. During an interview on 3 June 2008 in Phnom Penh with two senior NEC officials, the Secretary General of the NEC confirmed his organization’s mandate in these two areas. But he also indicated that because parties did not submit the account book of income and expenses (as stipulated in article 82 of LEMNA) and because the law did not clearly specify what campaigning outside of the campaign period constituted, the NEC was not in the position to address these issues. See Kingdom of Cambodia, \textit{Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly (LEMNA)}; and the NEC website at: \url{http://www.necelect.org.kh}
building networks based on patronage and loyalty as well as for outmanoeuvring and weakening political opponents—both inside and outside the CPP. Despite the continuous struggle for power between the more ideological traditionalist Chea Sim and the non-ideological pragmatist Hun Sen, the CPP as an organization has strongly benefited from the leadership skills of both. Crucial, moreover, is that the top leadership positions of the CPP are deeply embedded in the institutional structures of the party, in line with the principles of Leninist party organization. The accumulation of power by leaders like Hun Sen and Chea Sim has therefore been an integral part of the process of creating a strongly rooted and centralized party. It has not come at the expense of party building, as in the case of some of the other parties.523

FUNCINPEC’s leadership, for example, has been disastrous for party-building. Under Ranariddh’s 14-year leadership there was little attention for the construction of a well-functioning party organization, particularly at the grassroots level. In various interviews with FUNCINPEC representatives and other, non-party-related observers the party is described as a loosely structured organization, which is still reeling from years of weak, highly personalist management, internal splits and defections. The situation is slightly better at the SRP, whose leader has given considerable attention to party building at an early stage. However, as reported above, Sam Rainsy’s assertive leadership style has also alienated several prominent party members and negatively affected the SRP’s internal cohesion. As Cambodian politics revolves mainly around the actions of party leaders, the personalities, management styles and power bases of

523 This finding is supported by the observations of Roger Henke in an email communication with the author on 23 October 2008.
those leaders have therefore had a disproportionately large influence on the institutionalization of the various parties.

The Role of International Actors

The actions—and oftentimes lack thereof—of different types of international actors have also influenced the political landscape in Cambodia. Over the entire post-war period (1992-2007) Cambodia received more than USD 6.8 billion in official development assistance. The most intrusive forms of foreign intervention in Cambodia’s political context took place in the early 1990s during the negotiations leading up to the Paris Peace Accords and the subsequent transitional period under UNTAC. At that time, the permanent five members of the UN Security Council actively engaged with all main Cambodian parties and party leaders in order to cajole them into compromise. UNTAC was able to back this up with significant manpower and financial resources to develop an electoral law, educate and register voters, register parties and organize the 1993 elections.

But once UNTAC left at the end of 1993, the influence of international actors over Cambodian politics gradually subsided. Although international leverage in the mid-1990s was potentially high because of the Cambodian government’s dependence on foreign assistance, major donors such as Japan, France, the European Commission, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) did not tie their aid to progress on key democratic reforms affecting party competition, such as improvement of the rule of law, implementation of anti-corruption measures and equal access to the media.

524 For a more detailed overview of the top 15 aid donors to Cambodia, see Appendix VI.
For example, when fighting between the CPP and FUNCINPEC resumed in 1997 the international response was muted. The serious human rights violations reportedly committed by the government in that period did not impede Cambodia’s membership of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) two years later. And when violence and major irregularities were reported in the 1998 and 2003 elections, most international observation teams quickly accepted the elections as ‘free and fair’. The United States, Canada and the Nordic countries have generally been more critical, but in general the donor community has remained reluctant to openly criticize the CPP-led government. Disagreements over the effectiveness of aid conditionalities as well as different national interests have not only made it difficult to adopt a united, consistent international approach for stimulating democratic party competition in Cambodia, but also allowed the Cambodian government to become skilled at playing out donors against each other.525

At the moment, the vast majority of bilateral, multilateral and international non-governmental organizations present in Cambodia do not engage directly with Cambodian political parties. Assistance activities that relate to political parties and party competition indirectly include voter education, election monitoring, decentralization and other issues. The only international actors that have worked and are mostly still working on political party issues in Cambodia directly are UNDP, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International

525 The limited direct international engagement with political parties and the ‘pro-stability/CPP’ stance of most international donors was highlighted by several party leaders and independent analysts interviewed for this study. See also: Hendrickson, “Institutions Versus Personalities: International Peacebuilding Dilemmas”, p.85; St John, “Democracy in Cambodia – One Decade, US$5 Billion Later: What Went Wrong?”; and Peou, International Democracy Assistance for Peacebuilding, pp.193-206.
Republican Institute (IRI) and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS). Their political party assistance activities have included constituency dialogue programmes, training on how to do public opinion polling, organize election campaigns and election observation by party agents, women leadership training and equal-access radio and TV programmes.\textsuperscript{526} Although some of these programmes have been targeted at specific parties, most training workshops have been open to all parties. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this type of international engagement –often in combination with monetary support from the Cambodian diaspora– has benefited opposition parties in particular and provided them with a degree of credibility and legitimacy.\textsuperscript{527} But in the absence of more detailed information and due to difficulties in measuring the impact of such activities, it is difficult to say what specific effects international party assistance has had on the development of individual parties or on the nature of party competition.

Overall, the reluctance of many international actors to take a critical stance towards the CPP-led government and the only limited amount of attention given to party development activities by the main donors seems to have been of most benefit to the CPP. With increasing investments from China, growing income from tourism and construction, and potentially large revenues from future oil and

\textsuperscript{526} Information from interviews with representatives of NDI, IRI and UNDP between May and July 2008 in Phnom Penh.

\textsuperscript{527} On the important role of the Khmer diaspora in supporting opposition parties see Un, “Sam Rainsy and the Sam Rainsy Party”. 
gas exploitation, international aid’s already limited leverage is likely to diminish further and the CPP’s ability to do as it pleases will continue to grow.528

5.9 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the institutionalization of political parties and party system in Cambodia has been profoundly shaped by the war and its aftermath.

Two decades of post-war politics in Cambodia has been characterized by a relatively stable but personalized form of party competition in which a bitter power struggle, uneven access to resources, and poor leadership in opposition parties have led to a dominant authoritarian party system.

With an elaborate party structure that from its war-time beginnings has been closely intertwined with the state, the CPP has become the most institutionalized political party in Cambodia. Over time, the CPP has seen its electoral support grow, its party organization strengthened and its position as ruling party further consolidated. This has largely come at the expense of the other Cambodian parties, in particular FUNCINPEC. Over the years the latter has been significantly weakened and more than 15 years after its transformation into a political party it remains weakly institutionalized. The SRP, in contrast, has gradually become stronger and is now moderately institutionalized. Other parties, including the NRP and HRP that obtained seats only recently, are still weakly developed. At the systemic level, party competition in Cambodia has for a long

time been unstable, with parties that are poorly organized and have only shallow roots in society. In addition, there has been a growing scepticism about the legitimacy and trustworthiness of elections and parties among the population. For these reasons, the Cambodian party system can only be described as weakly institutionalized.

As explanations for this assessment, this chapter has highlighted that the introduction of multi-party elections competition at the beginning of the 1990s has changed the dynamics of party competition. However, it also concluded that this has not fundamentally altered the structures of individual parties nor corrected the dominant-authoritarian political system. Some sociological factors such as the access to resources were also found to be important, whereas other factors such as societal cleavages are not considered particularly relevant for understanding the nature of Cambodia’s party system. Rather, this chapter has demonstrated that for a fuller understanding of Cambodian party politics particular attention should be given to war-related institutional factors, including the war-time origins of parties, the nature of the peace process, the institutional design of key electoral bodies and last but not least, the quality of leadership.
Cross-National Patterns and the Impact of War

The preceding analysis about post-war party development in El Salvador and Cambodia has shown that in each country political parties and party systems were shaped by a variety of factors, in particular war and post-war institution building processes. But whereas the previous two chapters mainly used a ‘within-case analysis’, this chapter will go a step further by identifying some of the cross-national patterns of post-war party development as well as exploring how far the findings can be generalized to other post-conflict cases.

It is important to remember that the primary aim of this study was to assess the relevance of three conventional theories and an additional ‘war-focused’, historical-institutionalist approach for explaining political party development in two very different post-war countries. El Salvador and Cambodia were selected as the most interesting pair for comparison because of the intensity and protracted nature of their wars, the significant number of years passed since their wars ended, the substantial international peacebuilding and electoral engagement in both cases, as well as the relatively limited scholarly attention for political party development in the two countries.

El Salvador and Cambodia are obviously very different as they neither have a comparable cultural and socioeconomic background nor share the same regional context. Moreover, the previous chapters have shown that the nature of
the war and the political history of the two countries differ substantially. Nevertheless, both countries have experienced a long and turbulent conflict history that has profoundly affected the institutionalization of ruling and opposition parties as well as their interactions. This chapter will show that despite clear differences in their background, war has had a number of similar effects in El Salvador and Cambodia.

6.1 Political Parties: Different Backgrounds, Similar Gaps in Institutionalization

Due to their unique historical, cultural and geographical backgrounds, Salvadoran and Cambodian political parties are quite different. Generally speaking, parties in El Salvador have a clearer ideological profile, are more policy- and interest-oriented and are therefore closer to the elusive ‘model’ of a Western political party than parties in Cambodia. Nevertheless, as we have seen before, most Salvadoran and Cambodian political parties operate on a similar patrimonial logic and both perform essentially the same role in presenting candidates for public office during elections. In addition, there are a number of other interesting similarities.

One of the most salient parallels between the two countries is the similar gap in the degree of individual party institutionalization. The two ruling parties of El Salvador and Cambodia are each politically and organizationally significantly stronger than the various opposition parties. ARENA’s strength is a function of its organizational set-up as an alliance of influential societal sectors and its popular recognition as a symbol of anti-communist nationalism. The CPP derives
much of its strength from its hierarchical and centralized (communist) party structure pervading all administrative levels and institutions in Cambodia. Because of its relatively open alliance structure, ARENA has been able to adapt more quickly to new challenges and allowed for the emergence of new leadership within the party than the structurally more rigid CPP.

Despite these differences, however, the organizational strength and privileged position of ARENA and the CPP vis-à-vis other parties is in both cases related to how the ruling parties came to power. In El Salvador and Cambodia alike the ruling party won government authority and managed to take control over the state long before the end of the war. In El Salvador, ARENA obtained governing power by winning the elections in 1988. In Cambodia, the CPP attained governing power by forcing the Khmer Rouge out of government with the help of the Vietnamese army in 1979. This early capture of power enabled ARENA and the CPP not only to extend their political control over state policies but also over the state’s administrative and security apparatus. In both cases this led to deep penetration of the party into the state; in Cambodia, it led to an almost complete merger of party and state structures.

With the institutionalization of the ruling parties has come a weakening of the opposition parties. More than 15 years after both wars ended, opposition parties in El Salvador and Cambodia are only weakly to moderately institutionalized. As the previous two chapters have shown, there are big differences in the organizational and political strength of the opposition parties. The PDC in El Salvador, for example, is stronger than the CD, just as the SRP in Cambodia is stronger than the NRP. But more important is the huge gap in institutionalization between the various opposition parties on the one hand and
the two ruling parties on the other. In El Salvador and Cambodia, as perhaps in other post-conflict societies, this gap seems to be much bigger than in even the most asymmetrical party systems of more established democracies.

If we compare, for example, ARENA and CD in El Salvador on two rudimentary indicators of political and organizational strength indicated in chapters 4 and 5, ARENA outperforms CD with a ratio of 49:1 in terms of control over municipalities (since 2006) and 142:1 in terms of estimated number of party members. In Cambodia this gap is even wider, with the CPP outnumbering the NRP with 1,591:0 in terms of municipal control (since 2007) and 7:1 in terms of party membership.\(^{529}\) For the two more moderately institutionalized opposition parties, the FMLN in El Salvador and the SRP in Cambodia, these ratios are much lower but still significant.

As we have seen before, this lack of organizational strength is mostly related to the unequal access to (state) resources and in some cases poor leadership in the two respective countries. But what this also shows is that opposition parties in El Salvador and Cambodia have faced similar challenges in building and strengthening their organizational structures and have struggled to expand their political base vis-à-vis the highly institutionalized ruling parties.

\(^{529}\) See section 4.4 in chapter 4 and section 5.4 in chapter 5. It is important to remember that these numbers are rough estimates taken from various interviews. For example, the number of 700,000 NRP party members mentioned by Deputy Secretary-General, Suth Dina in an interview for this study seems to be grossly exaggerated if we consider that the NRP received less than 420,000 votes in the 2007 elections. Therefore, rather than intending to provide an accurate picture of party membership, these numbers are only used as an indication of organizational strength.
6.2 Party Systems: Different Make-Up, Similar Outcome

The two countries also exhibit a number of commonalities in their overall party systems. Cambodia clearly has all the features of what Sartori calls a dominant-authoritarian party system. El Salvador’s party system is more difficult to classify, however. In chapter four we concluded that it seems to correspond most with Sartori’s category of a polarized pluralist party system. But, looking beyond classifications, we can question the different nature of party competition in the two countries. At first sight, when analyzing El Salvador and Cambodia as two distinct case studies, the ostensibly more competitive form of party interaction in El Salvador –especially between ARENA and the FMLN–appears to have little in common with the relatively uncompetitive nature of party interaction between the CPP, FUNCINPEC and the SRP in Cambodia. However, when we consider the two cases from a more comparative perspective and look more closely at how party competition works out in practice, it becomes clear that ‘party dominance’ is a crucial aspect of both countries’ party systems.

In Cambodia, none of the opposition parties can compete with the CPP’s access to and use of the state and other resources. Chapter 5 has shown how the CPP relies on elaborate patronage networks to have access to state personnel, equipment and financial resources to support its party activities. In order to retain its dominant position, the CPP has also not hesitated to use the security forces and media outlets to attack and undermine the work of political opponents. The CPP has been able to do this not because of its formal position in parliament – where it did not have the necessary 2/3 majority to rule until 2008– but because
of its informal, de facto control over almost all state, security and media institutions.

Similarly in El Salvador –where ARENA has not had an absolute majority of seats– the ruling party has dominated the political arena. The data from chapter 4 suggests that ARENA’s dominant position in the Salvadoran party system is also more a result of the party’s success in exploiting its control over the presidential office, state bureaucracy and the country’s media than stemming from its 30-odd seats in the Legislative Assembly. ARENA has tended to use this privileged access to strengthen its position not only during election campaigns but also between different elections. So although it theoretically does not qualify as such, the Salvadoran party system of the past two decades has come very close to a (pre)dominant party system. And despite the presence of a much stronger opposition party in El Salvador, the strategies employed by ARENA to maintain its dominance are not unlike those used by Cambodia’s ruling party.

This comparative analysis of the Salvadoran and Cambodian party system shows that an exclusive focus on elections and seat shares (as in Sartori’s definition) might not always be appropriate. Findings from El Salvador in particular indicate that the relative access to and control over state resources among parties have a much greater influence on the degree of party dominance than exactly how many seats the ruling party has.

The unbalanced development of the party systems of El Salvador and Cambodia has also been made possible because of the relative absence of international pressure on the two ruling parties to stick to the ‘democratic rules of
the game’. In the early 1990s, major powers had a strong desire to reduce their military involvement and to exit and disengage themselves from the domestic politics of the two countries. For a long time therefore the primary focus of international post-war assistance to both countries was peacebuilding, not democratization and/or political party development. Not wanting to jeopardize the fragile political stability, important bilateral actors such as the US, EU, France, and Japan were reluctant to criticize the partisan use of state resources by ARENA and the CPP and ‘tolerated’ all but the most egregious limitations put on competitive politics. The channelling of massive international aid packages through party-controlled government agencies further boosted the organizational development of ARENA and the CPP. However necessary for peacebuilding this strategy may have been, the consequence was that ARENA and the CPP could expand their control over the state, media and other institutions virtually unchecked and thereby strengthen their position vis-à-vis other parties.

The extent to which the ruling parties have been allowed a free hand by the international community has varied per country, however. Despite its public support for ideologically like-minded ARENA governments, the US has made it clear that it wants El Salvador to become a more democratic state with fair and unrestricted electoral competition. ARENA therefore knows that there are limits to how far it can go. There has been no such message from the international actors in Cambodia. As the two largest post-war donor countries Japan and

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530 As highlighted in chapters 4 and 5 international actors have engaged in different ways with El Salvador and Cambodia. Despite the occasional critical remarks, on balance this international engagement has been mainly accommodating and sympathetic towards the two ruling parties.

531 This view is supported by several of the personal interviews conducted for this study. See also Roberts, Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99; Peou, International Democracy Assistance for Peacebuilding; and Wade, “The Challenge of Being Left in Neoliberal Central America”.
France have not wanted to interfere in any way in Cambodia’s political development. The US has been more critical towards the CPP government, although this position seems to have changed since oil was discovered off the coast in 2005. Generally positive assessments of international election observation missions, which have tended to play down widespread electoral irregularities such as in 1998 and 2003, further contributed to legitimize the CPP’s rule. In the absence of a strong, unified message from Cambodia’s international donors, it is therefore likely that the CPP has felt it enjoys more licence to use and abuse power for its own partisan interests than ARENA has.

Finally, it is clear that the post-war party systems of the two countries are not fully institutionalized. Compared to the volatile and at times violent party politics of Cambodia, party competition in El Salvador has certainly been more stable and peaceful in the post-war period. Yet in both countries opposition parties remain weak, people have little trust in political parties and are becoming more and more disillusioned with elections as the mechanism to change government leadership. This lack of institutionalization in combination with the dominance of the ruling party has in both countries contributed to an uneven form of party competition.

6.3 Impact of War...

The previous two chapters have indicated that conventional theories cannot fully account for how parties and party systems developed and institutionalized in post-war El Salvador and Cambodia. Arguments centred on the nature of electoral competition, the presence of socioeconomic cleavages and the workings
of formal electoral and government institutions have been found wanting. War-related factors and war itself have proven to be a key missing element in the explanation of the uneven degree of party institutionalization and the unbalanced form of inter-party competition in El Salvador and Cambodia. If we look closer at the empirical findings from the two case studies, we can see that war has had a relatively similar impact on the political parties and party systems of El Salvador and Cambodia.

... On Parties

With regard to individual political parties, war has had three specific effects. First, in both cases the war has provided a distinctive context for party development as postulated in chapter 3. Because of continuous violence it was virtually impossible for political parties to organize themselves and canvass mass support during the war. In El Salvador, only the right-wing and centre-right parties (PCN, ARENA and PDC) competed for votes, while the FMLN was excluded from elections. In Cambodia, no competitive elections were held between 1972 and 1993 and only one political party was allowed to exist. Even in the post-war period poor security hindered political parties in building up a local support base, establishing local offices and organizing their electoral campaign. In the run-up to the 1994 elections in El Salvador, dozens of political activists were killed, many more intimidated and party property damaged or destroyed, despite pacts signed by all the main political parties.\footnote{Montgomery, \textit{Revolution in El Salvador}, p.258; Rubio-Fabián et al., \textit{Democratic Transition in Post-Conflict El Salvador. The Role of the International Community}, p.22.} In the months before the 1993 elections in Cambodia, there were hundreds of allegedly
politically-motivated murders and violent attacks against (opposition) party members and property. In some parts of the country artillery attacks by the Khmer Rouge made it almost impossible for political parties to conduct any party activities. Overall therefore, war and its aftermath had a generally negative *environmental effect* on political party development, either by disrupting or stifling the normal growth of already existing political parties or by altogether denying organizations the possibility to become a political party. Because of their incumbent position, ARENA and the CPP are the only two parties in Cambodia and El Salvador that have been less affected by this effect.

Second, in both countries war has influenced and shaped the organizational structures of political parties. The highly centralized and disciplined party organization of the PCN in the 1960s in El Salvador, for example, was significantly weakened as a result of the conflict. During the war the party became increasingly dominated by the decentralized para-military ORDEN militias that were set up to control the rural population and repress guerrilla activities. As a result, central authority weakened and the party organization became much more militarized. Such a *structural effect* of war on party organization is visible in most parties, but has been greatest for those parties that emerged during the war itself.

In the case of ARENA and the CPP the war has been a primary factor in the establishment of their party organizations. ARENA was set up to ‘defend’ El Salvador against the armed resistance of the left-wing guerrillas. The CPP’s predecessor, the KPRP, was created to ‘liberate’ Cambodia from the Pol Pot

534 Zamora, *El Salvador: Heridas Que No Cierran*, p.97
regime and install a different regime. As their political opponents were either weakened or outlawed, ARENA and the CPP could take over the state administration and security apparatus relatively easily and build up a nationwide network of party cadre and supporters. This required a high degree of formal organization and a hierarchical, tightly controlled party structure to link the local and regional party branches and state institutions to the higher-level central party committee. From this perspective, the war put a premium on political-administrative development of the ruling parties as one of the ways to gain as much control as possible over the state, territory and population. The war provided the ‘ideal’ conditions for young parties like ARENA and the CPP to grow quickly, attract and train new people and embed them in the most important state and non-state institutions. As a result, by the time the war ended ARENA and the CPP had highly institutionalized party organizations with a large number of experienced, well-trained party cadre and administrators.

For the former rebel groups FMLN and FUNCINPEC the war gave a similarly strong impetus for organizational expansion. But because they were not allowed to participate in the political and electoral arena, their initial focus was to build up military structures and capabilities. Although political development was certainly part of their activities –for the FMLN even more so than for FUNCINPEC– the development of their political wings was trumped by the focus on the military part of the organization. Both rebel groups had few trained and experienced political staff and their senior leadership was mainly comprised of military commanders. In order to maximize operational effectiveness, the various armed groups –whose ideologies were sometimes very different– were united into a single resistance front under a unified command structure based on
strict military discipline. But despite this unified structure at the top, during the war the FMLN and FUNCINPEC were by nature relatively loosely organized structures with different (regional) power bases.

When the war ended, the FMLN and FUNCINPEC struggled to make the transformation from an armed rebel group to political party. Both faced an acute shortage of staff trained and experienced in governance and party administration. In addition, the unified structure that had kept the organizations together during the war disintegrated to a large extent. Old personal and ideological rivalries between groups and leaders quickly re-emerged and translated into a high degree of party factionalism. The FMLN became consumed in an internal power struggle between the ideologically strict ortodoxos and the more reform-oriented renovadores, which led to a number of splits. Groups united under the FUNCINPEC umbrella first split into different royalist (FUNCINPEC, MOLINAKA) and non-royalist political parties (e.g. BLDP). A few years later, FUNCINPEC splintered further into as many as eight different parties.\(^{535}\) In both cases, the military-oriented, decentralized structures of the FMLN and FUNCINPEC as rebel organizations had a detrimental impact on their post-war institutionalization as party organizations.\(^{536}\)

The third effect of war on political parties is *attitudinal*, meaning that war influences the behaviour of party leaders. The previous two chapters have already indicated the important role of leadership in the institutionalization of individual political parties in El Salvador and Cambodia. A large part of that

\(^{535}\) Wade, “El Salvador: The Success of the FMLN”, pp.40-44; Rowley, “Cambodia”.

\(^{536}\) For a more extensive analysis of the challenges faced by former rebel groups turning into political parties, see the various contributions in de Zeeuw, *From Soldiers to Politicians*. 
leadership is made up of how a particular leader manages certain problems and which methods he/she uses to deal with these problems. This leadership style ranges from an authoritarian, confrontational approach to a more consensual, give-and-take approach. If we look at the behaviour of some of the main Salvadoran and Cambodian politicians it is obvious that most of them have a very forceful, confrontational leadership style that leaves little room for dissent. This has partly to do with the authoritarian political culture and tradition of ‘strong leaders’ common to many Latin American and Southeast Asian countries. But the already existing undemocratic leadership styles of Salvadoran and Cambodian politicians were also exacerbated by the long period(s) of war in these countries.

ARENA’s founder and early leader, Roberto D’Aubuisson, became more reactionary and repressive in his views and tactics when the longstanding conflict between the right-wing government and left-wing guerrillas spilled over into an all-out war in the 1980s. At the same time, prominent FMLN leaders such as Joaquín Villalobos and Salvador Sánchez Cerén also hardened their views and became increasingly intolerant of those who resisted armed struggle. Later party leaders, such as Alfredo Cristiani, Armando Calderón Sol (ARENA) and Facundo Guardado (FMLN), were markedly more moderate but their willingness to compromise with their political opponents remained limited.

The KPRP/CPP’s Hun Sen emerged when the country had just been devastated by the extremist Khmer Rouge regime and was now trying to fend off attacks from an externally-supported armed resistance front that included KR forces. Right from the beginning Hun Sen’s leadership was therefore primarily focused on how to defeat his enemies –both in- and outside the party– and how
to consolidate a one-party socialist state. Key rebel leaders such as the KPNLF’s Son Sann and FUNCINPEC’s Nhiek Bun Chhay also concentrated on military affairs and were less interested in making compromises with the enemy. Norodom Ranarridh and even Sam Rainsy have continued this winner-takes-all attitude in the management of their own parties as well as in their interactions with political opponents.

This analysis shows that leadership is not an unchangeable constant, but is rather something dynamic that can be influenced by other factors, including war. The uncompromising and confrontational leadership style of most Salvadoran and Cambodian politicians is certainly rooted in the respective country’s history of undemocratic, zero-sum politics. But the long period of war seems to have undermined the limited power-sharing or compromise elements there were and aggravated the authoritarian tendencies in leaders’ behaviour.

... And On Party Systems

The long and violent period of war in both countries has also shaped the way in which the various parties interact, or failed to interact. First, war has had a detrimental effect on the institutional environment that provides the rules and regulations under which party competition takes place in El Salvador and Cambodia. By establishing extra-legal paramilitary structures to undermine opposition forces (El Salvador) or by banning non-ruling political parties outright (Cambodia) the war further weakened already fragile constitutional and other legal safeguards for free and fair party competition. After the war, new more democratic institutions were adopted, but both countries continued to have a weak regulatory framework with regard to political parties. In El Salvador, there
is still no specific law that regulates the formation, functioning and financing of political parties. In Cambodia such a law does exist, but is ambiguous when it comes to crucial areas such as intra-party democracy and party finance. Moreover, because of a biased and extremely weak judiciary – another legacy of the war – the law is just not enforced.

Similar institutional weaknesses exist in the election administrations that in both countries are not considered neutral and independent. In an effort to appease formerly warring parties both countries opted for the establishment of election committees with non-independent, party-affiliated compositions. However, by basing their membership on party affiliation, the Salvadoran Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) and the Cambodian National Election Committee (NEC) institutionalized old war-time divisions. This has made it very difficult for these institutions to be the neutral organizers and arbiters of elections the law requires them to be. After several changes, the Cambodian NEC now formally consists of independent experts only. The Salvadoran TSE has a mixed composition of party-affiliated members and independent experts. In practice, however, both electoral management bodies are still heavily politicized and their decisions generally indicate a bias towards the ruling party.

A second common legacy of the war on Salvadoran and Cambodian politics is the hostile nature of party competition, especially during election campaigns. This is, for example, audible in the insulting, polarizing and abusive language party leaders use to discredit each other or their parties. ARENA and the CPP commonly brand their political opponents as ‘terrorists’ whose rule will ‘once again lead to instability and anarchy’, whereas the FMLN and the SRP accuse the ruling parties of being ‘corrupt oppressors’ and ‘puppets backed or installed by
foreign regimes’ (i.e. the US and Vietnam respectively). Many of these labels are directly associated with the war period, during which parties were each other’s military opponent. These rhetorical devices appear to have been effective to some extent as they help cement support among party cadres as well as party supporters. The hostility of party interactions is also visible in the continuation of violent attacks on active party members and ordinary supporters in the post-war period, although this has been worse in Cambodia than in El Salvador. What is clear is that as a result of the war, attempts to undermine, block and attack political opponents by any means have almost become second nature to most parties.

A final, related similarity at the party system level is that the war in El Salvador and Cambodia has reduced the willingness of parties to cooperate substantively. As mentioned above, many party leaders have an uncompromising leadership style, which hinders closer engagement of parties. This lack of engagement is exacerbated by the total lack of trust between party leaders, which can often be traced back to the war or immediate post-war period. Because the war is a relatively recent phenomenon, many politicians still consider their political opponents as ‘enemies’ and find it difficult to cooperate with them. As a result, plenary and committee debates in parliament in both countries generally result in acrimonious disputes between the ruling party and opposition parties with none of the sides wanting to give way. The concepts of ‘accountable government’, where the ruling party is held to account by the opposition, and
'loyal opposition', whereby parties agree to set aside their partisan differences for the greater good, seem anathema to Salvadoran and Cambodian party politics.

The only sorts of collaboration that can be found are the patrimonial arrangements between the ruling parties and their junior coalition partners, such as ARENA-PCN in the case of El Salvador and CPP-FUNCINPEC in the case of Cambodia. But these arrangements are usually very unequal and have more to do with political expediency and personal gain than with genuine policy dialogue or teamwork. Moreover, this lack of cooperation is not only limited to interactions between ruling and opposition parties. Multi-party coalitions or even electoral alliances among opposition parties themselves – quite common in established democracies – are extremely rare in El Salvador and Cambodia. When such alliances do occur, such as the joint 1994 FMLN-CD-MNR bid for the presidency or the 2003 Alliance of Democrats between FUNCINPEC and the SRP, they are usually short-lived because leaders do not trust each other and are reluctant to compromise.

These findings show that war has had a significant impact on parties and party systems in El Salvador and Cambodia. Moreover, they demonstrate that its effects on party development are remarkably similar across the two cases. The next section will look at whether these findings might in principle also apply to other cases.
6.4 Scope of Findings

The analysis in this thesis is primarily based on empirical data from El Salvador and Cambodia. The conclusions drawn from that data in this and the previous two chapters are therefore first and foremost pertinent to these two cases alone. But knowing that the experience of long and violent conflict has not been limited to El Salvador and Cambodia, it is fair to ask what the relevance of this research is for other post-conflict countries. Moreover, it is logical to ask whether there is the potential to generalize some of the findings and patterns of political party and party system development beyond the two cases studied here.

Realizing that conflict history, societal divisions and the electoral as well as political-institutional framework are usually quite distinct among countries, we should be very cautious in making generalizations, particularly if they concern countries from different parts of the world. Nevertheless, by treating the cases of El Salvador and Cambodia as examples of certain types of post-war party systems and by concentrating only on relatively similar cases it is possible to highlight a few modest beyond-case inferences without incurring too great a risk of over-generalization.538

Table 3.1 in chapter 3 identified 29 countries that can be defined as ‘post-conflict’. This universe of post-conflict cases is very diverse and ranges from Guatemala, Haiti to Liberia and East-Timor. This diversity makes classification

538 According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, “contingent or typological generalizations are often the most useful kind of theoretical conclusions from case studies, as they build on and go beyond improved historical explanations but present limited risks of extending these conclusions to causally dissimilar cases”. George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, p.110-111.
into neat, distinct party system types rather difficult. Nevertheless, from table 3.2 we learned that post-war countries can be subdivided into four or five different types of party systems. Dominant-authoritarian and pulverised systems turned out to be the most prevalent post-war party systems.

At first sight, El Salvador’s polarized pluralist party system seems rather exceptional in the wider group of post-conflict cases, partly because it is more institutionalized and partly because ideological differences play a bigger role than in the other cases. However, certain aspects of El Salvador’s party system are arguably representative of two different party system types, depending on our focus. If we focus solely on the close and ideologically charged electoral competition between ARENA and the FMLN, the dynamics of the Salvadoran party system are not unlike those of its eastern neighbour, Nicaragua, which also has a polarized pluralist party system.539 If, however, we focus more on the institutional strength of the main parties and the de facto dominance of ARENA, El Salvador’s party system seems quite similar to that of Mozambique, which has a predominant party system.

Cambodia is a clearer case of a dominant-authoritarian party system and exemplifies several typical features, including highly unequal access to media, state and financial resources among parties and weakly institutionalized opposition parties. These same features can also be seen in the dominant-

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539 This would be even more so in case of an electoral victory of the FMLN in 2009, something which is not entirely unlikely according to recent polls. Dada, “Tres Encuestas Confirman Ventaja de Funes Sobre Ávila”.
authoritarian party systems of Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda, whose dynamics resemble those of Cambodia’s party system.\textsuperscript{540}

The absence of fully comprehensive comparative data means that the relevance of the war-related factor approach vis-à-vis the three conventional theoretical approaches discussed before is difficult to assess for post-war countries that have similar party systems as El Salvador and Cambodia. In Nicaragua, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda comparable arguments can probably be made with regard to the role and influence of electoral competition, societal divisions, formal political institutions and war-related factors on party and party system development. But because the institutional, political and socio-cultural contexts of these countries are mostly very different from El Salvador and Cambodia, the relevance of the various theories is likely to differ as well. For example, the salience of ethnic divisions in party formation in Ethiopia, Rwanda and other African post-war countries might give a greater weight to the sociological approach in these cases. Therefore, although it seems plausible that one of the main conclusions of this thesis –namely that the explanatory power of the three conventional theoretical approaches on party and party system development is limited in post-war countries– is valid beyond the two cases of El Salvador and Cambodia, we cannot be absolutely certain in the absence of detailed information about the other cases.

This also goes for the generalisability of the impact that war and war-related factors have had on individual parties and the overall party system in El Salvador

\textsuperscript{540} Just like in Cambodia, the ruling parties of Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda have all come to power through a military victory, which has arguably played a major role in their subsequent institutionalization and dominant position. See also Manning, “Party-building on the Heels of War”, p.270, n.1.
and Cambodia. The three groups of parties found in these two countries—ruling parties, rebels-turned-parties and new post-war parties—can be found in most post-war countries as indicated in section 2.2 of chapter 2. Because of similarly devastating and traumatic war experiences, it is therefore probable that the individual parties of countries such as Nicaragua and Ethiopia, for example, will also have been affected by the environmental, structural and attitudinal effects of war as described above. The role of the war in the continuing factionalization of opposition parties and the no-compromise, (semi-) authoritarian leadership styles of many Nicaraguan and Ethiopian politicians are clear parallels.541 And the wars in Mozambique and Rwanda are likely to have had a similarly detrimental effect on the institutional environment of party interaction, and contributed to the hostility of party competition and the unwillingness of parties to cooperate, as in El Salvador and Cambodia. But further studies would be needed to confirm these extrapolations in full.

6.5 Conclusion

Parties and party systems in El Salvador and Cambodia are different, not in the least because of their varying history, cultural background and location. But despite the many differences there are important similarities. Both countries have ruling parties that are much more institutionalized than opposition parties, because of the same reason of capture of power during the war. Moreover, both countries have a party system that is dominated by a ruling party which has

541 On Ethiopia, see Abbink, “Discomfiture of Democracy? The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia and its Aftermath”; on Nicaragua, see Dye, Democracy Adrift: Caudillo Politics in Nicaragua.
exploited its incumbent position during and after the war against its opponents. Massive and largely unconditional international aid packages channelled through the national government have further reinforced the position of the two ruling parties.

The cross-case analysis in this chapter has demonstrated that the war that both countries have experienced has had a significant, lasting impact not only on the formation, development and institutionalization of parties and party systems, but also on the behaviour and interactions of party leaders. Generalizing these conclusions beyond El Salvador and Cambodia is possible but problematic. It is plausible that war and war-related factors have had a similarly important impact on the parties and party systems of other post-war countries, particularly in those countries with similar party and party system characteristics as El Salvador and Cambodia. Nevertheless, a more rigorous extrapolation of conclusions from this thesis requires further empirical research.
Conclusion

Although there is growing scholarly interest in political party development in young democracies, there are almost no studies that specifically address the growth and institutionalization of parties and party systems in post-war developing countries. Moreover, there exists no single-authored study that explicitly assesses existing theories of party formation and investigates the impact of war and post-war institution-building on parties and party systems from a comparative perspective.

This study has attempted to fill this gap, at least in part, by reviewing the validity of three widely accepted theories of party development that focus on electoral competition, socioeconomic resources and cleavages, and formal institutions in El Salvador and Cambodia. The purpose of this exercise was to establish whether war has an influence on the political parties and party systems of these two post-war countries.

The principal findings of the research are that not only are the mainstream explanations inadequate, but also that for a fuller understanding of post-war politics in El Salvador and Cambodia we need to take into account specific war-related factors, especially the war-time origins of certain political parties. Another principal finding is that war has indeed had a significant impact on the formation, development, behaviour and interactions of parties in El Salvador and
Conclusion

Cambodia. The overall conclusion of this study is that civil war is an important part of the explanation for the development and institutionalization of parties and party systems in post-war societies.

This final chapter will briefly revisit the key propositions we started out with and highlight the main findings from each chapter that support the above conclusion. Subsequent sections will identify what the implications from this study are for theory and policy, and provide suggestions for future research on this topic.

7.1 Main Findings

As outlined in the introduction, the present study was informed by two hypotheses that linked war to party development. Reflecting the belief that war is more than just context and should be considered as an important independent variable in explaining post-war party development, the first proposition held that conflict history and the political conditions after civil war have a significant influence on the organization, functioning and interaction of individual parties in post-conflict societies. Challenging the Western-oriented, formalistic accounts of most academic studies of party development, the second proposition claimed that a historical-institutionalist perspective that takes into account the conflict-related dynamics of party development can complement mainstream theories of party politics, which rely on election competition, class-based socioeconomic cleavages and formal political institutional factors and fail to fully capture the institutionalization of party politics in post-conflict societies. Based on these two hypotheses, chapter 1 defined a number of research questions that guided the
subsequent literature review and helped the structured, focused analysis in the two (very) different cases of El Salvador and Cambodia.

Chapters 2 and 3 reviewed the existing literature on party and party system development in consolidated and new democracies as well as in post-conflict developing countries. Chapter 2 made clear that in Western established democracies electoral competition, the nature of socioeconomic cleavages and the workings of formal institutions, such as the electoral system and parliamentary or presidential form of government, were key factors in the development of parties and party systems. It discussed the strengths and weaknesses of different attempts to categorize parties and party systems. Also, it highlighted the importance of the two concepts of party institutionalization and party system institutionalization. The chapter concluded that it is possible to use these concepts in trying to understand post-war party politics, as long as we are aware that they have certain methodological limitations and that not all their aspects are easily transferable to non-Western contexts. Based on the limited number of studies available about post-war politics, chapter 3 indicated that political parties in post-conflict countries face a unique set of challenges that shapes and/or hinders their growth. It argued that the key factors for Western party development are probably less significant for the development of political parties in post-conflict settings. Moreover, it concluded that the type and degree of institutionalization of post-war parties and party systems differ significantly from those in non-war contexts.

The empirical part of this study focused on the development and institutionalization of parties and party systems in post-war El Salvador and Cambodia. Findings from extensive field research presented in chapters 4 and 5
have shown that the protracted and extremely violent period of war in both
countries has shaped their post-war party politics in a way that cannot be
explained by the nature of electoral competition, social cleavages and formal
institutions alone. The chapters have demonstrated that Salvadoran and
Cambodian post-war party politics can only be understood by taking into account
specific war-related institutional factors, including the war-time origins of
parties, the way in which the war ended, the nature of the peace agreement, the
post-war design of key electoral, media and other public institutions as well as
the quality of leadership. The involvement of international actors should not be
forgotten either. By doing so, the findings from these two chapters essentially
confirm the two propositions outlined at the beginning of this study.

Comparative analysis in chapter 6 has shown that despite clear differences,
there are also important similarities with respect to post-war party development
in El Salvador and Cambodia. Both cases show a similar pattern of uneven
institutionalization of ruling and opposition parties with significant gaps in
organizational and political strength between the two. Also, in both countries the
ruling parties have used their war-time incumbent position to expand their
control over state resources and institutions in the post-war period, which up
until now has led to de facto dominant party systems. Massive and largely
unconditional international aid packages channelled through the Salvadoran and
Cambodian national government have further reinforced the position of the two
ruling parties. Finally, chapter 6 re-affirmed the first proposition of this study by
explaining how war in both countries has had lasting effects on the formation,
development, behaviour and interactions of parties and party leaders. It was
argued that such effects are likely to be similar in other post-war countries as well.

### 7.2 Implications for Theory

Apart from the specific empirical findings about patterns of post-war party politics in El Salvador and Cambodia, the outcome of this research has a number of implications for academic thinking about parties and party systems as well as for ongoing research on conflict and peacebuilding.

First of all, this study has drawn attention to a gap in knowledge about post-war party development that exists in the party politics literature. A few recent studies have gone beyond the ‘heartland’ of party development in Western established democracies and have focused on new areas of interest. Slowly but surely, more scholarly attention is being given to party development in young democracies, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, but also in Africa and Asia. Remarkably, however, the countries deeply affected by long and violent conflict within these new areas have been largely omitted from academic theorizing.542 This might be because data is often absent or unreliable, because war is seen as merely ‘difficult context’ not as a key factor, or even worse, because post-war political systems do generally not lend themselves to neat classification. This study has shown that it is possible to collect relevant information from these areas, that war should be treated as an important

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542 See, for example, the otherwise very comprehensive analyses of Pridham and Lewis, *Stabilising Fragile Democracies*; and Basedau, Erdmann and Mehler, *Votes, Money and Violence*. 
independent variable, and above all, that there are certain cross-case patterns in post-war party development that merit further systematic analysis.

A similar gap in information and analysis exists in the literature on conflict and peacebuilding. Political parties have often not been included in the analysis, or if they have, are unhelpfully grouped together with other domestic actors, including civil society and government. Nowadays there are a few scholars working on post-conflict transition and electoral system design that have highlighted (but not yet fully explored) the important role of parties, their behaviour and interactions for the creation of a sustainable and democratic peace. But this type of research is rare and in the absence of larger systematic comparisons remains tentative. By looking at a broader set of cases, building on the data about post-war party-systems presented in table 3.2 in chapter 3, and following up on the many other leads presented in this study, it is possible to gain a deeper understanding of the development of post-war parties and party systems. Such attention is long overdue in both bodies of research.

A second implication of this research is that some of the existing theories of party development seem inadequate in certain contexts and therefore need to be revisited. This study has shown that in post-war societies elections are often not free and fair, that parties’ access to the media is unequal and that electoral competition does usually not revolve around ideological differences between parties. As a result, the structure of individual party organizations and the overall party system is not influenced by electoral competition in the same manner as in

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established democracies. Similarly, socio-economic, cultural and other societal cleavages do not translate in the same way into post-war party systems as they have been said to do in many West-European countries at least in the early period of party development.

Cambodia’s party system, for example, is not built on the socioeconomic divisions in society that have been steadily growing since the end of the war. Rather than interest representation, Cambodian parties’ main aim is vote and power maximization and, in the CPP’s case, voter control. In El Salvador socioeconomic cleavages ostensibly have influenced the make-up of party competition, but not in a clear-cut one-to-one way. Finally, formal institutions like the electoral system, system of government and power sharing agreements have had an impact on the post-war parties and party systems. But because they are often accompanied by informal practices related to non-transparent party finance, partisan composition of election committees and patrimonial coalition arrangements, this study has shown that such institutions tend to work differently than a parsimonious theoretical model would suggest. The role of informal politics is obviously not unique to post-war situations. But because institutions that regulate party behaviour are either non-existent, underdeveloped or directly associated with the violent past, there is much greater tendency to resort to informal arrangements in countries coming out of war. Therefore, if mainstream theories of party development are to be relevant for non-Western, post-war contexts, they need to take into account the informal practices as well.

Thirdly, this research has demonstrated that post-war parties and party systems cannot be easily classified, which presents a challenge to existing typologies. Even the two most extensive classifications available cannot fully
capture the variety of post-war politics. An organizationally thick, non-ideological, hegemonic party like the CPP in Cambodia, for example, does not fit any of the 15 different party species in the elaborate typology of Gunther and Diamond.\textsuperscript{544} Similarly, El Salvador’s moderately institutionalized, highly polarized pluralist party system with clear one-party dominant tendencies seems to fall in between three different categories in Sartori’s typology of party systems.\textsuperscript{545} Because post-war countries so far have not been recognized as a separate ‘universe’ with highly distinctive, possibly unique contexts for party development, existing typologies cannot easily accommodate all the specific parties and party systems found in these settings. In order to address such shortcomings, more thought should be given to what it means for existing typologies that there are certain parties that have originated during war, that (partly because of their distinct origins) use specific, sometimes violent strategies to acquire and maintain a dominant position, and that fail to or only marginally interact with one another. If it is found that these aspects are significantly important for party development in a large number of cases, as this study might be thought to suggest, then we need to think carefully about whether and how existing typologies should be improved.

Another related implication concerns the need to further refine or perhaps revise the criteria for assessing party and party system institutionalization. This study has found the concept of party institutionalization as proposed by Randall and Svåsand very useful, in that it covers the most important dimensions of

\textsuperscript{544} Gunther and Diamond, “Species of Political Parties”.

\textsuperscript{545} The closest fit with El Salvador’s party system is Sartori’s polarized pluralist system. However, as indicated in section 4.6 in chapter 4, it also has several elements of a two-party and even a one-party dominant system. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems.
political party development and facilitates comparison of individual party strength within and across countries.\textsuperscript{546} However, two of its dimensions –namely value infusion and reification– have proven extremely hard to assess in practice. This might partly have to do with the choice of cases. Both in El Salvador and Cambodia political parties are generally not seen as representative of certain ethnic, religious or socioeconomic groups, nor are many of them sufficiently old and established enough to be considered as political givens. This naturally limits the extent to which supporters identify themselves with the party (value infusion) and reduces parties’ potential symbolical value (reification).

However, it might also have something to do with the fact that in post-war and developing countries in general there is limited survey data available on people’s attitudes towards parties, which makes detailed assessment of the two dimensions practically impossible. Unlike in established democracies, in these countries there are few opinion polls that regularly ask about how voters feel about parties, why they vote for certain parties, which parties they think are most important and why.\textsuperscript{547} Inclusion of more specific party-related questions in future surveys is a first step in addressing this problem. Such information would presumably also make it easier to assess the perceived legitimacy of elections and political parties, which is a key aspect of Mainwaring and Scully’s theory of

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{546}]Randall and Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”.
\item[\textsuperscript{547}]Even the widely respected and used surveys by the Latinobarómetro, Afrobarometer, Asiabarometer, and World Value Survey include only limited information about political parties. Despite their focus on democratization, many of the survey reports lack specific data on voting behaviour and party preference (though the World Value Survey questionnaire does include a few questions about these aspects). Moreover, most of them do not include post-war countries, presumably because of difficulties with data collection. See: http://www.latinobarometro.org/; http://www.afrobarometer.org/; https://www.asiabarometer.org/; and http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/.
\end{itemize}
party system institutionalization. Subsequent clarification and further operationalization of value infusion and reification in concrete, measurable indicators is a second necessary step in order to improve the practical value of the party institutionalization concept defined in this way.

Finally, this research shows that the evaluation of a political party or party system as weakly, moderately or highly institutionalized is rather subjective. The various dimensions and conditions spelt out by Randall and Svåsand as well as Mainwaring and Scully provide useful indicators of party and party system institutionalization. However, they give limited guidance on how to value the overall degree of institutionalization and fail to establish the thresholds or benchmarks that would enable us to determine what stage of institutionalization has been reached in any particular case. For example, when a party system has a relatively stable form of party competition, a few parties with strong party organizations, but with only shallow roots and limited legitimacy –as in the case of Cambodia– is such a system weakly institutionalized or moderately institutionalized? Do all the aspects carry an equal weight in deciding the degree of institutionalization, or are some more important than others? How should we value, rank or compare the various significant (and, possibly, opposite) changes in a party’s degree of systemness and other institutional dimensions, in practice?

Mainwaring and Scully, *Building Democratic Institutions.*

For a recent attempt at operationalizing the concept in an index of party institutionalization, see Basedau and Stroh, *Measuring Party Institutionalization in Developing Countries.* The authors propose a modified version of Randall and Svåsand’s model by replacing the dimension of ‘reification’ with ‘roots in society’ and by treating ‘autonomy’ and ‘coherence’ as the external and internal dimensions of ‘value infusion’. However, in the process of attempting to clarify party institutionalization, Basedau and Stroh lose the structural-attitudinal perspective and seem to mix up or conflate various concepts, making their model –at least in the view of this author– rather fuzzy.
And how many (time series) measurements do we need to conclude that a certain party is indeed institutionalized or not? The literature remains largely silent about these issues. Although this outcome confirms that any party or party system assessment remains above all a subjective judgement –affirming this author’s view that comparative politics is just as much art as it is science– it should not prevent us from building on the existing literature and trying to obtain a more precise account.

This thesis makes no pretence to address let alone resolve all these outstanding issues, but it does make clear that in order for there to be further progress along these lines, further refinement and development of the concepts of party and party system institutionalization might be a first requisite, especially if they are to apply equally across all societies.

7.3 Implications for Policy and Practice

The outcome of this research is also relevant to the design of international assistance policies and programmes that aim to foster stable and democratic parties and party systems. Although there is a growing recognition among democracy assistance actors that political parties play a key role in the development of more responsive and participatory governance systems, this has not always translated into more specific or appropriate assistance policies or programmes.

This study shows that knowing how and under what conditions political parties emerge is extremely important for understanding their subsequent development and institutionalization. However, when looking at how party
assistance programmes are designed in many countries, it is somewhat surprising to see that there is generally little systematic effort to learn about the historical background of individual political parties or to identify the long-term patterns of power distribution between parties and non-party actors. Yet, to know the origins and early decisions taken by parties makes it easier to understand why, for example, certain parties are so highly centralized (CPP) or particularly prone to factionalization (FMLN, FUNCINPEC). Sensitivity to such knowledge and the related respect for the difficult history of most post-war parties among their international ‘partners’ would be appreciated by party leaders; several of those interviewed claimed to be offended by the generic capacity-building programmes of most Western democracy assistance organizations.\footnote{Information from several author interviews with party leaders in El Salvador and Cambodia.} In addition, a more detailed assessment of parties’ historical development can identify the main internal obstacles to change, which in turn can help to design better targeted and more realistic assistance programmes.

Second, findings from this research corroborate the conclusions of two other recent studies that the current party assistance approach has had little direct impact on the institutionalization of individual political parties.\footnote{See Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link, pp.163-166; and Burnell, “Looking to the Future. Practice and Research in Party Support”, p.200.} This is partly a result of the overriding influence of domestic factors and actors that often run counter to international efforts or are aimed at undermining party development. But it probably also has to do with the ‘business-as-usual’ nature of the many internationally supported (and designed) training and capacity-building programmes, which fail to take seriously enough the special organizational and
Conclusion

political difficulties many post-war parties face. In this connection, evidence gleaned from Cambodia suggests that for a party like the SRP efforts to democratize and open up the party to (Cambodian) outsiders might have increased the level of infiltration by opponents and defections. In circumstances such as these, then, an ‘automatic’ focus by foreign assistance on encouraging greater intra-party democracy might be misplaced and even undermine the prospects for party institutionalization.

More finely targeted programmes that take into account the distinctive post-war conditions are therefore required. Based on the responses of several interviewees in El Salvador and Cambodia, there is an urgent need for more confidence building initiatives in order to address the lack of trust in and between parties after conflict, and to stimulate the necessary measure of inter-party cooperation. Special training and organizational development programmes that cater to the needs of those former armed groups that are genuinely interested in becoming normal (unarmed) political parties is another area of support that merits further attention. Moreover, in El Salvador, Cambodia and undoubtedly also in other post-war countries the institutionalization of opposition parties is negatively affected by a lack of money, unequal access to the media and the pro-ruling party bias of the official election committee. In order to strengthen such parties and help create more stable, representative and balanced party systems, assistance providers should therefore also address the broader institutional environment influencing party competition, especially with regard to party

552 The Conflict Prevention in Cambodian Elections (COPCEL) programme –which comprises a regular series of meetings between a broad range of Cambodian election stakeholders and has generally been positively evaluated by the participants– could serve as a positive example in this regard. See Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), “What is COPCEL?”.
finance, media access as well as the professionalism and neutrality of electoral institutions.

Finally, this study points out that international efforts to support the development of well-organized, representative parties and a democratic party system have often been undermined, not only by domestic governments and party leaders being resistant to change but also by the trade and security agendas of the same donor countries professing support for democratization. Aligning the various agendas of all these actors is not easy and perhaps even impossible. But it is certainly worthwhile to make the conflict between the different agendas more explicit in order to be able to isolate areas where compromise and/or coordination could be possible. In addition, we have to think about the justification for international actors giving direct and indirect support to political parties. Directly assisting political parties is something that remains highly controversial and can easily backfire, particularly in post-war societies where the political stakes are already extremely high and the risk of a relapse into violence is significant. Findings from El Salvador and Cambodia indicate, however, that indirect assistance such as international election observation and technical assistance to election commissions has done little to counter the pro-government—and by extension pro-ruling party—bias of most bilateral development assistance programmes. In order to redress the structural imbalances in many post-war party systems in a way that is not too destabilizing, a more balanced, gradualist party assistance approach is needed.553 Moreover, if international party assistance is to have a greater and constructive impact on party and party system

553 See also Carothers, “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy”; and ten Hoove and Pinto-Scholtbach, Democracy and Political Party Assistance in Post-Conflict Societies.
development it should no longer be offered as an isolated activity. Instead, it should become an integral part of the broader democratic governance agenda.

7.4 Suggestions for Further Research

To address the gaps in knowledge, understanding, policy and programming, further research about post-war party and party system development is needed. Such research could explore a variety of aspects and take different shapes.

In terms of empirical research, the most logical first step would be to increase the number of case studies, which will help to check whether the conclusions drawn in this study can indeed be generalized to other post-war countries. A broader set of cases would also allow us to examine whether there are others patterns or anomalies in post-war party development that have not been brought forward by the particular focus on El Salvador and Cambodia in this study. In addition, by looking at all post-war cases it becomes possible to see the entire range of post-war parties and party systems, which helps to assess the relevance of existing typologies and/or identify what must be done in order to make them more comprehensive.

A combined quantitative and qualitative research design would be particularly well suited to address the relative absence of systematic information about post-war party development. Quantitative research could help to spot similar and outlying cases and statistically measure relationships between the large number of factors already highlighted in this study. A parallel or subsequent detailed qualitative analysis of several representative and deviant
cases could help to explain how the factors work and interact in a variety of post-war settings.

Apart from the issues mentioned above, there are several additional questions that could feature in future research. As was flagged up in the introductory chapter, one topic particularly relevant to post-war politics concerns the links between party and party system institutionalization, peacebuilding and democratization – links that might run in either direction. This could include questions such as “is one-party dominance a necessary condition for political stability and democratization in post-war countries; and if not always the case, what are the circumstances that do make it necessary?”; “can political stability in post-conflict countries also be achieved without one-party dominance, i.e. through multi-partyism?”; and “what is the significance of party institutionalization and party dominance for democratization in post-conflict countries?” These are all big questions that merit much further attention.

Another fruitful topic for research concerns the (clientelistic) relationships between post-war parties and other societal actors and their implications for party and party system institutionalization. Following a similar interest already present in the mainstream party politics literature, such research could focus on parties’ links with the state and civil society. More specific to post-war contexts, it could also study party linkages with (para)military groups, armed militias and criminal organizations. It would be interesting to learn more about how these actors influence party behaviour and organization, and what causes such relationships to change.

Finally, more thought could be given to the role and influence of international actors on post-war party and party system development. Empirical
evidence from El Salvador and Cambodia suggests that in this regard we should not only focus on bilateral and multilateral agencies or specialized party assistance foundations, but also pay attention to diaspora groups and regional actors such as the OAS and IADB in the case of El Salvador and ASEAN and the ADB in the case of Cambodia. Possible questions could be: “what different actors are there and how does their engagement with parties differ, both in content and in impact?”; “what is the significance of the diaspora in party development in post-war countries?”; “is there evidence that post-war parties emulate the growth strategies of successful parties in neighbouring countries, and if so, what are the implications of such a ‘diffusion effect’?”

This study has taken a first step to understand the institutionalization of parties and party systems in post-war societies. It has established that war has a significant impact on the formation, development, behaviour and interactions of parties and that war-related factors are an important part of the explanation for the institutionalization of post-war parties and party systems. This has been arrived at by independent research, posing and addressing questions and gathering information over and above what can be found in the existing literature. However, for practical reasons, the research here could only focus on two cases of post-war party development and a limited number of causal relationships. The many questions that still remain, including new questions that the research for this thesis and its findings have brought to light possibly for the very first time, are an indication that there is much scope for further research that could make a significant contribution to knowledge in this area. To reduce the gap in our knowledge about post-war parties and party systems and make sure
that its findings will benefit future assistance programmes, such research should now move forward as soon as possible.
Appendix I Interview Strategies and Structure

The two main research methods used for this study are literature analysis and semi-structured, elite interviews. Where conclusions or judgements are made on the basis of existing party documents, official documents, reports as well as academic literature, these inferences can be verified by checking the footnote references systematically used throughout this thesis. It is therefore not necessary here to further elaborate on this method. However, where inferences are made on the basis of interviews with senior representatives of different organizations, this information is more difficult to verify. In view of the importance of elite interviewing for this study, and to be as transparent as possible, this appendix takes a closer look at how this particular research method has been applied. The first section discusses some of the main methodological problems and pitfalls of semi-structured, elite interviews and describes the strategies that were used in this study to mitigate them. The second section of this appendix gives an overview of how the actual interviews were structured.

Methodological Challenges and Solutions

As described by Burnham et al., elite interviewing comprises a four-step process of deciding who you want to see, getting access and arranging the interview, conducting the interview and analyzing the results. Each of these steps has its own practical and methodological challenges, but fortunately there are several ways to deal with them.

Different types of selection bias are the main problem in the first step of deciding who to interview. There is a risk of political bias when interviewing only or mainly people from one particular political persuasion. Closely related, an organizational or institutional bias creeps in when only one type of organization or institution –such as a political party, a university or an NGO– is targeted for interviewing. A geographic bias occurs when interviewees are exclusively from one particular region, city or village. And finally, interviews can have an elite bias when only the most senior leaders or staff of certain organizations are consulted. To mitigate these biases and to make sure that the final selection of interviewees was as representative as possible, a number of measures were taken in this study.

Because of limited time and resources I only had one opportunity to visit each case study country. Before deciding on whom to interview in El Salvador and Cambodia, I first contacted a number of recognized country specialists and asked them for suggestions. Having met or worked with some of them before this was not too difficult and resulted in a first tentative list of names of contact persons and potential interviewees. Going through that list I subdivided the names in three different categories, including a first category of political party

\[554\] Burnham et al., Research Methods in Politics, pp.205-220.

\[555\] One practically-oriented guide to interviewing that was particularly helpful for this study is that by Kumar, Conducting Key Informant Interviews in Developing Countries. Other works consulted include Rubin and Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing. The Art of Hearing Data; and Arksey and Knight, Interviewing for Social Scientists.

336
representatives, a second category comprising academic experts, independent political analysts (including journalists) and civil society representatives, and a third category of staff of international organizations, including international NGOs. Later I added a fourth category of electoral officials. The main reason for this categorization was to increase the number of different perspectives on the research topic.

At first the list of names was limited, with only a few potential interviewees for each category. But after contacting and interviewing several key informants the list of names quickly expanded until at the end it comprised more than 50 experienced and knowledgeable potential interviewees per country. At that stage I became more critical and started to identify the people whom I assumed were the most relevant in terms of seniority, professional and/or personal background and the organization or perspective –academic, official/governmental, practitioner, etc. – they were representing. As political parties were my main points of interest most of my interviewees would have to be party representatives. To avoid any political bias in my selection I made certain that the list included a similar number of interviewees for each political party, particularly in the case of the two or three largest parties. Moreover, I took care that the list comprised people from different levels in the party hierarchy and from different factions (if any). For the other three categories I used the same criteria and mainly focused on those people or organizations that were working on or directly with political parties. The final, fairly representative list of people included just over 70 interviewees and can be found in Appendix II.

To get access to people and arrange the interview, I used two strategies. The first was to hire at local rates a well-connected research assistant or intermediary, who would retrieve contact details, contact the interviewee –or in most cases their ‘gate keeping’ secretaries– and make the appointment. This arrangement worked extremely well in Cambodia, where because of the language barrier and the limited use of e-mail by political party representatives I was often unable to contact people directly. In El Salvador, my Spanish language skills were sufficient enough to contact people directly and make appointments by e-mail or telephone myself. Nevertheless, also here I could still contact someone who would help me trace people’s whereabouts. Both strategies worked well and made it possible to contact and interview a relatively large number of people in a limited period of time.

The interviews were conducted using a semi-structured interview guide with mostly open and a few closed questions. The use of this flexible but structured guide gave a certain freedom to dig deeper on certain aspects while maintaining a clear focus on key issues and core research questions. In El Salvador most of the interviews were fully recorded by using a digital recorder and taking additional notes. In Cambodia only notes were taken. The main reason for this difference is that it is less common, and perhaps culturally less accepted, to use a recording device during personal interviews in Cambodia. There, using a recorder would probably have made interviewees more reluctant to speak openly. In El Salvador, by contrast, using a recorder was not an obstacle and many people, especially politicians, were accustomed to being interviewed and their comments recorded by journalists. The interviews took place at different locations in the capital or another major city of El Salvador and Cambodia, usually in the office of the interviewee. Exceptions included two interviews of opposition party politicians.
in Cambodia, one of which took place on the campaign trail and the other one during the opening of a new regional party office.

After an interview was finished I prepared a summary, or if appropriate, full transcript on the basis of my notes or the digital recording and tried to present the responses of each interviewee as accurately as possible. The format of each interview was generally the same because it followed the standardized structure of the interview guide. This uniform structure of the resulting transcripts made quick comparison easy and helped to highlight new or interesting findings. In case of conflicting or unexpected results I made an effort to ask about the finding’s accuracy in subsequent interviews and/or check it by consulting relevant documentation, including party documents, websites, official documents and reports as well as academic books and articles. Only when the same finding was reported in multiple interviews by trustworthy people, had been cross-checked against other sources where possible and seemed plausible considering the wider context, did I conclude that the information was reliable.

Where findings or conclusions presented in this study are based on interview material, this is clearly indicated in footnotes by mentioning the name of the interviewee as well as the date and location of the interview. Where only one interviewee is identified in a footnote, the information gained was subject to the same process of checking for verification against other sources.

Finally, and in line with the University of Warwick’s Guidelines on Ethical Practice and Research Code of Conduct, I have made every effort possible to protect my interviewees from any harm as a result of my research, informed them in advance about the nature of my research, obtained their consent when recording data, and honoured guarantees made for confidentiality and anonymity during the interviews.556

**Interview Guide**

Almost all interviews conducted for this study followed the same structure based on a list of open and closed questions outlined below. The nature and content of the questions are derived from issues highlighted in the literature and were refined several times after the first interviews and after consultations with my supervisor. Not all questions were asked (or answered) in each of the interviews. Depending on the professional background, experience, expertise and initial responses of the interviewees as well as the time available for the interview some (sub-) questions were left out and/or shortened. In line with the focus of the research, priority was given to those questions that addressed the historical development of parties and the explanation for the nature of post-conflict party politics (see Parts II and V below).

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557 The more informal conversations I had with country specialists were more loosely structured and, in addition to data collection purposes, also served to obtain further suggestions on how to approach certain research questions in El Salvador and Cambodia and who to contact on which particular issue.
Appendix I Interview Strategies and Structure

Preamble
Including:
- Opening / formal introduction:
  - my name is Jeroen de Zeeuw and I am a doctoral student in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick in the United Kingdom. [where useful: I am also a research associate at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ in The Hague, where I have worked on several research projects about the building of democracy in post-conflict societies]
  - My current, doctoral research focuses on the development of political parties and party systems in post-conflict countries, and particularly addresses the effects of civil war on party organization and inter-party competition.

- Purpose:
  - I would like to ask you a few questions in order to learn more about the origins, development, and nature of political parties and party competition in [name of country].

- Scope and expected time needed for interview:
  - The interview consists of five parts, each with a small number of questions. The entire interview will probably not take more than 30-45 minutes, depending on the discussion

- Permission to record:
  - Would it be okay if I would electronically record this interview and/or take some notes during our conversation? I do this because I believe your views are extremely important and do not want to forget what is being said. Nevertheless, I want to reassure you that the recording/notes taken during the interview will only be used for my own personal research purposes and will be kept safe through electronic encryption on my computer.
  - Please feel free to stop me recording or taking notes in case you would like to say something ‘off the record’
  - Finally, I want you to know that everything said during the interview will be treated confidentially and will not be used or distributed without your permission.

Part I – General Introduction and Context

1. Could you tell me a bit more about your own personal background; what is your current position in [name of party, organization, etc.]; and what previous positions have you held?

2. Why did you become involved in party politics?

3. Cast your mind back to the early 1990s [end of the war]; were you optimistic or pessimistic at the time about party politics?

4. Can you describe some of the main developments in the field of party politics that have taken place since the end of the conflict?
5. In your view, what are the major issues and problems for political parties in general in [name country] today?

Part II – Party Origins and Organizational Development

[specifically for party representatives]

6. How did [name party] originate and what were the key motivations for its establishment? Have there been any changes in the party’s aims/objectives over the years?

7. How is the party organized? How have the party’s organizational structures changed since the end of the conflict? How would you characterize the organizational structure of the party now (non/hierarchical, de/centralized, etc.)? How do you consult your members?

8. Some people would say all political parties look like a pyramid with the party members and supporters at the bottom and the party leadership at the top. If you would have to make a drawing that represents your party’s structure, what would it look like, and where does the decision-making power lie?

[specifically for staff of international (non-governmental) organizations]

9. How does your organization help the development of political parties in this country?

[specifically for other interviewees (from civil society, media, academia)]

10. On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being weakly developed, 5 being strongly developed, how would you categorize the organizational development of the main parties in [name country] today? In your opinion, what explains the difference in organizational development between the parties?

Part III – Party Institutionalization

[The institutionalization of a political party gives an indication of its routine functioning and durability over time, and is considered to be a function of its organizational strength, its autonomy, the identification and commitment of its members and supporters, and its symbolic and political value as an important political actor]

11. What would you say the main achievements of your party are?

12. How important is public funding to your party? Who do you regard as your main backers?

13. Would you say your party is better organized than the other parties? Please give examples? How do you explain this difference?
Part IV – Relations With Other Parties and Party System

Institutionalization

14. How would you characterize your party’s relationship with the other main parties? Does your party have any formal or informal links with other parties in parliament (or political groups outside parliament), and what do these links consist of? (sharing ideological goals, coalition voting, etc.)

15. Would you say there is a level playing field for all parties? Is it always obvious who will win the election (same for presidential, parliamentary, municipal elections)?

16. Do the people of this country accept political parties as legitimate? How would you characterize their attitude towards party politics?

Part V – Explaining Post-Conflict Party Politics

There are different explanations for the nature of political party development and inter-party competition in a particular country. One theory argues that the structure of political parties and the party system reflects the main social divisions or cleavages in society. Another theory asserts that the organizational structures of parties and the nature of party competition results from the workings of the electoral system. A third theory claims that the institutionalization of political parties and party competition can be explained by the particular origins of parties and their historical legacy.

17. In your view, what has been the most important influence on political parties and party competition in [name country] over the past fifteen years? What is the most important determinant for a party to be successful (now and in the past)?

18. Can you think of ways in which the civil war period still influences political parties today?

19. Do you anticipate any significant developments to take place in the near future (in terms of number of parties, balance of power between them), and why?

Closing

We have almost come to the end of the interview.

20. In trying to understand the essence of political parties in [name country], is there something I left out/overlooked? Are there any remaining issues you would like to raise that we have not yet discussed? And are there any publications or documents relevant to my research that you could recommend?

A few small issues to finish with:
If I decide to use some of the material from this interview as literal quotes in my thesis report, may I attribute the information to you personally, or alternatively would you prefer to remain anonymous?

If I have any further questions, would it be okay to contact you again?

Thank you very much for taking time out of our busy schedule to talk to me.
Appendix II List of Interviews

Interviews El Salvador (September – October 2007)

1. Political party representatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Interviewer</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date and Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA)</strong></td>
<td>Milena Calderón de Escalón</td>
<td>President of External Affairs Committee</td>
<td>1 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luis Cardenal</td>
<td>Former Minister of Tourism (2004-2005), former Director of Center of Democratic Studies (CEDEM)</td>
<td>13 September 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armando Calderón Sol</td>
<td>Former President of the Republic (1994-1999), President of the Union of Latin American Parties (UPLA)</td>
<td>24 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN)</strong></td>
<td>Salvador Sánchez Cerén</td>
<td>Coordinator Parliamentary Fraction and vice-presidential candidate, FMLN</td>
<td>23 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gerson Martínez</td>
<td>Secretary of the Board of the National Assembly, representing the FMLN</td>
<td>16 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blanca Flor Bonilla</td>
<td>Diputada (member of parliament) for San Salvador</td>
<td>1 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Walter Durán</td>
<td>Diputado for Usulután</td>
<td>2 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN)</strong></td>
<td>José Antonio Almendariz</td>
<td>Secretary of the Board of the National Assembly, representing the PCN</td>
<td>23 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC)</strong></td>
<td>Ana Guadalupe Martínez</td>
<td>Deputy-Secretary PDC; former FMLN comandante</td>
<td>2 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cambio Democrático (CD)</strong></td>
<td>Jorge Villacorte</td>
<td>Diputado Central American Parliament (PARLACEN), long-term diputado for CD</td>
<td>14 September 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ruben Zamora</td>
<td>Long-term diputado for CD, and former presidential candidate for CD-FMLN (1994) and CD</td>
<td>24 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frente Democrático Revolucionario (FDR)</strong></td>
<td>Julio Hernández</td>
<td>General coordinator FDR; former FMLN campaign coordinator</td>
<td>1 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partido de Movimiento Revolucionario (PMR)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

344
## Appendix II List of Interviews

### 2. Academic experts, political analysts, civil society representatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
<th>Date and Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alvaro Artiga-González</strong></td>
<td>Director Masters Programme in Political Science, Universidad Centroamericana ‘Jose Simeón Cañas’</td>
<td>21 September and 25 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeanette Aguilar</td>
<td>Executive Director Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP), Universidad Centroamericana ‘Jose Simeón Cañas’</td>
<td>18 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eduardo Sancho</td>
<td>Researcher, Universidad Francisco Gaviria (UFG), and former leader of Resistencia Nacional (FMLN)</td>
<td>26 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amílcar Mejía</td>
<td>Journalist and Coordinator of the Political Section, <em>La Prensa Gráfica</em></td>
<td>11 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anne Germain Lefèvre</td>
<td>Independent consultant</td>
<td>17 September 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inés Ortiz</td>
<td>Independent consultant</td>
<td>25 September 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberto Rubio-Fabían</td>
<td>Executive Director Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo (FUNDE)</td>
<td>11 September 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Cañas</td>
<td>Independent consultant, former programme officer UNDP</td>
<td>1 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerardo Balzaretti Kriete</td>
<td>President, Center for Political Studies “Dr. Jose Antonio Rodríguez Porth”</td>
<td>4 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuel Vásquez</td>
<td>Executive Director, Center for Political Studies “Dr. Jose Antonio Rodríguez Porth”</td>
<td>8 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberto Ortiz Avalos</td>
<td>Vice-president Banco Cuscatlán</td>
<td>8 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlos Ramos</td>
<td>Researcher, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO)</td>
<td>12 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wim Savenije</td>
<td>Researcher, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO)</td>
<td>26 September 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Sprekels</td>
<td>Programme coordinator for Interchurch Organization for Development Co-Operation (ICCO), and researcher, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO)</td>
<td>4 and 26 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christine Wade</td>
<td>Assistant professor of political science and international studies, and El Salvador specialist, Washington College (USA)</td>
<td>Several e-mail conversations between December 2006 and October 2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3. Staff of international organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
<th>Date and Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rosamaria de Colorado</td>
<td>Programme Officer Governance, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</td>
<td>20 September 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claudia Dubón de</td>
<td>Programme Officer, United Nations</td>
<td>2 October 2007, San Salvador</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Interviews Cambodia (April – August 2008)

#### 1. Political party representatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Interviewee Details</th>
<th>Date and Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cambodia People’s Party (CPP)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheam Yeap</td>
<td>Member of Standing Committee of Central Committee and Member of Parliament, CPP</td>
<td>6 August 2008, Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ke Bun Khieng</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Central Commission of Propaganda and Education, CPP</td>
<td>31 July 2008, Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Som Soeun</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Cabinet of the CPP Central Committee</td>
<td>12 June 2008, Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choeung Sin</td>
<td>Vice Governor Sangker district (Battambang)</td>
<td>16 June 2008, Battambang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sam Rainsy Party (SRP)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mu Sochua</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary General, SRP</td>
<td>14 June 2008, Kampot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eng Chhai Eang</td>
<td>Secretary General, SRP</td>
<td>31 July 2008, Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keo Phirum</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Cabinet, SRP</td>
<td>31 July 2008, Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khem Sita</td>
<td>Reserve Candidate for Battambang province</td>
<td>16 June 2008, Battambang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yok Sithoun</td>
<td>Vice Provincial Director FUNCINPEC (Battambang)</td>
<td>17 June 2008, Battambang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hun Ly Oeur</td>
<td>Advisor to Keo Puth Reasmey (Party President and Deputy Prime Minister)</td>
<td>6 June 2008, Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Sarin</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary General</td>
<td>5 August 2008, Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suon Khieu</td>
<td>Advisor to Nhek Bun Chhay (Deputy Secretary General)</td>
<td>5 August 2008, Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suth Dina</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General, Chairman of Electoral Task Force, Battambang</td>
<td>13 June 2008, Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muth Chanta</td>
<td>Official spokesperson, NRP</td>
<td>5 August 2008, Phnom Penh</td>
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### Human Rights Party (HRP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Position</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ou Chanrath</td>
<td>Secretary General, HRP</td>
<td>7 June 2008</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pen Sovan</td>
<td>Vice-President HRP, former Prime Minister of People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK)</td>
<td>13 June 2008</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun Kimhun</td>
<td>Provincial Director HRP (Battambang)</td>
<td>17 June 2008</td>
<td>Battambang</td>
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### Khmer Democratic Party (KDP)

<table>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Position</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uk Phourik</td>
<td>President, KDP</td>
<td>9 July 2008</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
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### Khmer Republican Party (KRP)

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<th>Name</th>
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<th>Location</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lon Rith</td>
<td>President, KRP</td>
<td>12 June 2008</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
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</table>

2. **Electoral officials**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Position</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tep Nytha</td>
<td>Secretary-General, National Election Committee (NEC)</td>
<td>3 June 2008</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan Keomono</td>
<td>Chief of Public Information Bureau (NEC)</td>
<td>3 June 2008</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vorn Porn</td>
<td>Chairman Provincial Election Committee (PEC), Battambang</td>
<td>17 June 2008</td>
<td>Battambang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luy In</td>
<td>Administrator Provincial Election Committee (PEC), Battambang</td>
<td>17 June 2008</td>
<td>Battambang</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. **Academic experts, political analysts, civil society representatives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Position</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koul Panha</td>
<td>Executive Director, Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL)</td>
<td>6 June 2008</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Im Francois</td>
<td>Head, Elections and Parliamentary Unit, Center for Social Development (CSD)</td>
<td>4 August 2008</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chea Vannath</td>
<td>Independent political analyst, former director of Center for Social Development (CSD)</td>
<td>3 June 2008</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ok Serei Sopheak</td>
<td>Political analyst and independent consultant</td>
<td>4 July 2008</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Sedara</td>
<td>Research Fellow, Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI)</td>
<td>6 May 2008</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han Phoumin</td>
<td>Programme Manager, Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI)</td>
<td>6 May 2008</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sok Sethea</td>
<td>Programme Officer, Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI)</td>
<td>6 May 2008</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kristina Chhim</td>
<td>Political analyst and independent consultant</td>
<td>7 July 2008</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kheang Un</td>
<td>Assistant Director and Cambodia specialist, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University (USA)</td>
<td>21 July 2008</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hean Sokhom</td>
<td>President, Center for Advanced Studies</td>
<td>5 August 2008</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caroline Hughes</td>
<td>Lecturer and Cambodia specialist, Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of</td>
<td>1 April 2008</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix II List of Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix II List of Interviews</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Henke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinator, Democratization and Peacebuilding Programme, ICCO</td>
</tr>
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</table>

4. Staff of international organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jerome Cheung</td>
<td>Resident Country Director, National Democratic Institute (NDI)</td>
<td>4 June 2008, Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Willis</td>
<td>Resident Country Director, International Republican Institute (IRI)</td>
<td>25 June 2008, Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicole Sayres</td>
<td>Deputy Country Representative, Asia Foundation</td>
<td>14 July 2008, Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khut Inserey</td>
<td>Senior Programme Officer, Asia Foundation</td>
<td>14 July 2008, Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aamir Arain</td>
<td>Project Manager, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</td>
<td>6 May 2008, Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan Kelleh Sesay</td>
<td>Elections Adviser, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</td>
<td>6 May and 21 July 2008, Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarah Dietch</td>
<td>Voter Education Advisor, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</td>
<td>6 May and 21 July 2008, Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Observation of Meetings

Observation of formal meetings between election stakeholders – including representatives of political parties, NEC/PEC, government officials and civil society organizations – organized by the Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI) under their Conflict Prevention in Cambodian Elections (COPCEL) initiative:

- COPCEL Provincial Meeting, 27 May 2008, Battambang
- 35th COPCEL Enlarged Meeting, 29 May 2008, Phnom Penh
- 37th COPCEL Enlarged Meeting, 24 July 2008, Phnom Penh
### Appendix III Election Results El Salvador, 1982 – 2006

#### Table III.1 Results Legislative Elections El Salvador (1982-1991) (Valid Votes and Seats)\(^{558}\)

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>546,218</td>
<td>505,338</td>
<td>326,716</td>
<td>294,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARENA</td>
<td>402,304</td>
<td>286,665</td>
<td>447,696</td>
<td>466,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCN</td>
<td>261,153</td>
<td>80,730</td>
<td>78,756</td>
<td>94,531</td>
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<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>127,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>95,980</td>
<td>89,498</td>
<td>77,591</td>
<td>68,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,305,655</td>
<td>962,231</td>
<td>930,759</td>
<td>1,051,481</td>
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</table>

#### Table III.2 Results Legislative Elections El Salvador (1994-2006) (Valid Votes and Seats)\(^{559}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARENA</td>
<td>605,775 (45%)</td>
<td>396,301 (35%)</td>
<td>436,169 (36%)</td>
<td>446,279 (32%)</td>
<td>783,230 (39%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCN</td>
<td>83,520 (6%)</td>
<td>97,362 (9%)</td>
<td>106,802 (9%)</td>
<td>181,167 (13%)</td>
<td>228,196 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLMN</td>
<td>287,811 (21%)</td>
<td>369,709 (33%)</td>
<td>426,289 (35%)</td>
<td>475,130 (34%)</td>
<td>785,072 (39%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>240,451 (18%)</td>
<td>93,645 (8%)</td>
<td>87,074 (7%)</td>
<td>101,854 (7%)</td>
<td>138,538 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CD</td>
<td>59,483 (4%)</td>
<td>39,145 (3%)</td>
<td>65,070 (5%)</td>
<td>89,090 (6%)</td>
<td>61,022 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,305,655</td>
<td>962,231</td>
<td>930,759</td>
<td>1,051,481</td>
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</tr>
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</table>


### Table III.3 Results Municipal Elections El Salvador (1994-2006) (Number of Mayoralships)\(^{560}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARENA</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMLN</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>54 (a)</td>
<td>79 (c)</td>
<td>74 (c)</td>
<td>59 (e)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCN</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19 (b)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18 (b)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 (d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>262</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Table III.4 Results Presidential Elections El Salvador (1984-1989) (Valid Votes and Percentages)\(^{561}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>votes: 549,727</td>
<td>338,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%: 43.41</td>
<td>36.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARENA</td>
<td>votes: 376,917</td>
<td>505,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%: 29.77</td>
<td>53.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCN</td>
<td>votes: 244,556</td>
<td>38,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%: 19.31</td>
<td>4.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>votes: 95,076</td>
<td>57,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%: 7.51</td>
<td>6.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>votes: 1,266,276</td>
<td>939,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%: 100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table III.5 Results Presidential Elections El Salvador (1994-2004) (Valid Votes and Percentages)\(^{562}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARENA</td>
<td>votes: 651,632</td>
<td>614,268</td>
<td>1,314,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%: 49.11</td>
<td>51.96</td>
<td>57.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMLN</td>
<td>votes: 331,629 (a)</td>
<td>343,472 (b)</td>
<td>812,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%: 24.99</td>
<td>29.05</td>
<td>35.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^{560}\) 1994 results from Centro de Información, Documentación y Apoyo a la Investigación (CIDAI), “Las Elecciones del 12 de Marzo”, p.244; 1997-2006 results from Centro de Información, Documentación y Apoyo a la Investigación (CIDAI), “Las Elecciones Legislativas y Municipales de 2006: Polarización Sociopolítica y Erosión Institucional”, p.209. Notes: (a) 6 mayoralships in coalition; (b) 4 mayoralships in coalition; (c) 12 mayoralships in coalition; (d) 1 mayoralship in coalition; (e) 5 mayoralships in coalition.

\(^{561}\) Results from Artiga-González, *Dos Décadas de Elecciones en El Salvador*, p.120.

\(^{562}\) 1994 results from Artiga-González, *Dos Décadas de Elecciones en El Salvador*, p.120; 1999 and 2004 results from Córdova, Cruz and Seligson, *Cultura Política de la Democracia en El Salvador: 2006*, p.9. Notes: (a) in coalition with CD and MNR; (b) in coalition with the USC; (c) in coalition with PD, PPL, MUDC and FE; (d) coalition of PDC and CD.
### Appendix III Election Results El Salvador

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>votes</th>
<th>PCN</th>
<th>PDC</th>
<th>CDU/CD</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCN</td>
<td>70,854</td>
<td>5.34</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>2.71</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>215,936</td>
<td>16.27</td>
<td>5.68</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU/CD</td>
<td>- 88,640</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>56,785</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,326,836</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix IV Election Results Cambodia, 1993 – 2008

Table IV.1 Results Parliamentary Elections Cambodia (1993–2008) (Valid Votes and Seats)\textsuperscript{563}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>votes</td>
<td>seats</td>
<td>votes</td>
<td>seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>1,533,471 (38%)</td>
<td>51 (43%)</td>
<td>2,030,790 (41%)</td>
<td>64 (52%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,447,259 (47%)</td>
<td>73 (59%)</td>
<td>3,492,374 (58%)</td>
<td>90 (73%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,824,188 (45%)</td>
<td>58 (48%)</td>
<td>1,554,405 (32%)</td>
<td>43 (35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,072,313 (21%)</td>
<td>26 (21%)</td>
<td>303,764 (5%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>1,824,188 (45%)</td>
<td>58 (48%)</td>
<td>1,554,405 (32%)</td>
<td>43 (35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,072,313 (21%)</td>
<td>26 (21%)</td>
<td>303,764 (5%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>699,665 (14%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,130,423 (22%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,316,714 (21%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26 (21%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLDP</td>
<td>152,764 (4%)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 (8%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOULINAKA</td>
<td>55,107 (1%)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>6,808 (0%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>337,943 (6%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>397,816 (7%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 (2%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>446,101 (11%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>518,842 (10%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>617,628 (13%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>161,666 (3%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,011,631 (100%)</td>
<td>120 (100%)</td>
<td>4,902,488 (100%)</td>
<td>122 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,168,837 (100%)</td>
<td>123 (100%)</td>
<td>6,010,277 (100%)</td>
<td>123 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table IV.2 Results Municipal Elections Cambodia (2002–2007) (Valid Votes and Number of Commune Council Chief Positions)\textsuperscript{564}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>votes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>2,674,303</td>
<td>3,148,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>chiefs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,598</td>
<td>1,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>958,326</td>
<td>277,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>chiefs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>731,150</td>
<td>1,303,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>chiefs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>419,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>chiefs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8,934</td>
<td>27,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>chiefs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,372,713</td>
<td>5,176,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>chiefs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,621</td>
<td>1,621</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{564} National Democratic Institute (NDI), \textit{The 2002 Cambodian Commune Council Elections}; National Election Committee (NEC), \textit{Official Results of the 2007 Commune Council Elections}; National Election Committee (NEC), \textit{Total Number of Votes for Political Parties for the 2007 Commune Councils Election}. Voting figures for 2002 are taken from an internal CPP document obtained during an interview with Mr. Som Soeun on 12 June 2008 in Phnom Penh.
## Appendix V Total ODA Disbursements to El Salvador (USD million) (1992 – 2007)\(^{565}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>230.0</td>
<td>207.0</td>
<td>142.0</td>
<td>115.0</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>114.8</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>1,394.2</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>586.0</td>
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<td>8.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>19.7</td>
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<td>27.5</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>412.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>30.0</td>
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<td>14.5</td>
<td>15.9</td>
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<td>33.9</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>386.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>15.2</td>
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<td>12.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>318.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>102.6</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
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<td>7.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>94.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>68.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDB Spec. Fund</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
<td>-14.4</td>
<td>-12.5</td>
<td>-15.6</td>
<td>-16.1</td>
<td>-19.2</td>
<td>-21.1</td>
<td>-19.3</td>
<td>-19.5</td>
<td>-18.3</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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\(^{565}\)Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprises grants or loans to recipient countries and territories that are undertaken by bilateral and multilateral donor agencies at concessional terms –i.e. with a grant element of at least 25%– and that have the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as their main objective. In addition to financial flows, technical cooperation is also included in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Data from the online Query Wizard for International Development Statistics by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC), available at: [http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/](http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/). Accessed on 23/02/2009.
Appendix VI Total ODA Disbursements to Cambodia (USD million) (1991-2007)\textsuperscript{566}

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