The institutional paradoxes of monetary orthodoxy: reflections on the political economy of central bank independence
Watson, Matthew. (2002) The institutional paradoxes of monetary orthodoxy: reflections on the political economy of central bank independence. Review of International Political Economy, Vol.9 (No.1). pp. 183-196. ISSN 0969-2290
WRAP_Watson_ripe(cbi)_(2).pdf - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09692290110101153
There can be no doubting the increasing importance of central banks to processes of international economic management.1 Whilst the names of prominent central bankers may be less well known than those of politicians, and whilst the functions their banks perform receive scant public recognition, the decisions taken by central bankers have a significant bearing on the conduct of everyday life.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HG Finance|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Politics and International Studies|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Banks and banking, Central -- Research, International economic relations, Inflation (Finance), Fiscal policy, Economic policy|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Review of International Political Economy|
|Official Date:||March 2002|
|Page Range:||pp. 183-196|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
* 1. See Alesina, Alberto and Summers, Lawrence (1993) 'Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: some comparative evidence', Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 25: 151-62.
Actions (login required)
Downloads per month over past year