UNSPECIFIED (1992) SUBOPTIMALITY OF M-STEP BACK STRATEGIES IN BAYESIAN GAMES. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 21 (1). pp. 57-74. ISSN 0020-7276

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Abstract

We consider the Bayes optimal strategy for repeated two player games where moves are made simultaneously. In these games we look at models where one player assumes that the other player is employing a strategy depending only on the previous m-move pairs (as discussed in Wilson, 1986). We show that, under very unrestrictive conditions, such an assumption is not consistent with the assumption of rationality of one's opponent. Indeed, we show that by employing such a model a player is implicitly assuming that his opponent is not playing rationally, with probability one. We argue that, in the context of experimental games, these m-step back models must be inferior to models which are consistent with the assumption that an opponent can be rational.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions Q Science > QA Mathematics H Social Sciences
Journal or Publication Title:	INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY
Publisher:	PHYSICA VERLAG GMBH
ISSN:	0020-7276
Date:	1992
Volume:	21
Number:	1
Number of Pages:	18
Page Range:	pp. 57-74
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/21827

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