Harrison, Mark (2002) Coercion, compliance, and the collapse of the Soviet command economy. Economic History Review, Vol.55 (No.3). pp. 397-433. doi:10.1111/1468-0289.00226

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Abstract

Are command systems that rest on coercion inherently unstable, and did the Soviet economy collapse for this reason? Until it collapsed, the Soviet economy did not appear unstable. Why, then, did it collapse? A game between a dictator and a producer shows that a high level of coercion may yield a stable high–output equilibrium, that stability may rest in part on the dictator's reputation, and that a collapse may be brought about by adverse trends in the dictator's costs and a loss of reputation. The facts of the Soviet case are consistent with a collapse that was triggered by the strike movement of 1989.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions D History General and Old World > DK Russia. Soviet Union. Former Soviet Republics
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Soviet Union -- Economic conditions -- 20th century, Dictatorship
Journal or Publication Title:	Economic History Review
Publisher:	Blackwell
ISSN:	0013-0117
Official Date:	4 March 2002
Dates:	Date Event 4 March 2002 ["eprint_fieldopt_dates_date_type_modified" not defined]
Volume:	Vol.55
Number:	No.3
Page Range:	pp. 397-433
DOI:	10.1111/1468-0289.00226
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access

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