UNSPECIFIED (1992) IDENTITY, NECESSITY AND A-PRIORICITY - THE FALLACY OF EQUIVOCATION. HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC, 13 (1). pp. 91-109. ISSN 0144-5340

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to discuss Kripke's reasons for declaring the existence of both necessary a posteriori as well as contingent a priori statements, thus breaking the traditional extensional coincidence of the two pairs of concepts: necessary-contingent and a priori-a posteriori. As I shall argue, there is no reason, from Kripke's work at least, to reject the usual picture of the topic. The appeal of his arguments rests on the ambiguity with which his expressions are used and on the introduction of new senses for old notions. This does not mean, however, that all Kripke's and Putnam's intuitions on singular terms and natural kind nouns are wrong. Once Kripke's ideas are properly understood, they are much more harmless than they are presented to be and they do not pose a threat to traditional relations between modal and epistemological categories.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics Q Science B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
Journal or Publication Title:	HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC
Publisher:	TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
ISSN:	0144-5340
Date:	1992
Volume:	13
Number:	1
Number of Pages:	19
Page Range:	pp. 91-109
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/22270

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