IDENTITY, NECESSITY AND A-PRIORICITY - THE FALLACY OF EQUIVOCATION
UNSPECIFIED (1992) IDENTITY, NECESSITY AND A-PRIORICITY - THE FALLACY OF EQUIVOCATION. HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC, 13 (1). pp. 91-109. ISSN 0144-5340Full text not available from this repository.
The aim of this paper is to discuss Kripke's reasons for declaring the existence of both necessary a posteriori as well as contingent a priori statements, thus breaking the traditional extensional coincidence of the two pairs of concepts: necessary-contingent and a priori-a posteriori. As I shall argue, there is no reason, from Kripke's work at least, to reject the usual picture of the topic. The appeal of his arguments rests on the ambiguity with which his expressions are used and on the introduction of new senses for old notions. This does not mean, however, that all Kripke's and Putnam's intuitions on singular terms and natural kind nouns are wrong. Once Kripke's ideas are properly understood, they are much more harmless than they are presented to be and they do not pose a threat to traditional relations between modal and epistemological categories.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
|Journal or Publication Title:||HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC|
|Publisher:||TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD|
|Number of Pages:||19|
|Page Range:||pp. 91-109|
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