Nietzsche’s Substantive Ethics: Towards a New Table of Values

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

University of Warwick, Department of Philosophy
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Declaration by the Author

I hereby confirm that I have never used or published any material contained in the thesis, and that the thesis has not been submitted for a degree at another university. I also confirm that no material included in the thesis has been submitted for another degree.
Abstract

My thesis focuses on Nietzsche’s ethics. More precisely, its main objective is to explore Nietzsche’s substantive ethical framework in a comprehensive, detailed, and systematic manner. Furthermore, the thesis also attempts to examine the epistemological, non-ethical ground of the Nietzschean substantive ethics. Also, it deals with Nietzsche’s critique of conventional morality, and explains Nietzsche’s criticism of morality in terms of his substantive ethics. The central argument of the thesis is, very briefly, that Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole does have a distinctive, substantive ethical system. Its constitutive elements or contents, being coherently related, are rich, complicated, and concrete. The major category Nietzsche employs in his ethics is the notion of ‘value’ understood as merit or desirability; he is not much concerned with the right or obligatory. Nietzsche views some human qualities, abilities and states and a style of life as noble and desirable for us. Specifically, the creative way of life, creative capacity, self-discipline, the capacity for ‘self-commanding’, knowledge, health, strong affectivity, and vitality constitute the core of Nietzsche’s evaluative standard. Moreover, a variety of dispositions, such as honesty, solitude, courage, and magnanimity, position themselves within his theory of value and are posited as crucial virtues. Finally, my thesis aims at analysing these particular contents of Nietzsche’s substantive ethical system and to examine how the system as a whole works. As such, the thesis is fundamentally an exposition based upon Nietzsche’s own texts, especially, his later works including Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, The Genealogy of Morals, Twilight of the Idols, and The Antichrist.
### Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used for references to Nietzsche’s own works in the thesis:

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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</tr>
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<td>BGE</td>
<td><em>Beyond Good and Evil</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>BT</td>
<td><em>The Birth of Tragedy</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td><em>Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality</em></td>
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<td>GM</td>
<td><em>On the Genealogy of Morals</em></td>
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<td>GS</td>
<td><em>The Gay Science</em></td>
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<td>HAH</td>
<td><em>Human, All Too Human</em></td>
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<td>SE</td>
<td><em>Schopenhauer as Educator</em></td>
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<td>TI</td>
<td><em>Twilight of the Idols</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>UDHL</td>
<td><em>The Use and Disadvantage of History for Life</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>UM</td>
<td><em>Untimely Meditations</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td><em>The Will to Power</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td><em>Thus Spoke Zarathustra</em></td>
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INTRODUCTION

Nietzsche is famous (indeed notorious) for his severe criticism of conventional morality, which many of us still take for granted. It is often said that Nietzsche has an extremely harsh attitude towards conventional morality (or rather, he loathes it), and attempts to subvert it. He is sharply contrasted with major traditional moral philosophers, who never doubted the validity of morality and tried to justify it through various ethical theories. His *Genealogy* seems to be one of his texts best known to the public; it is often cited as the culmination of Nietzsche’s assault on morality. I believe that there is much truth in such a general perception of Nietzsche, though with some reservations. True, Nietzsche questions the epistemological status of morality, denying its self-evidence and revealing the arbitrary or absurd character or falsehood of the various theses functioning as its logical ground (including traditional moral philosophical theories). Moreover, he appears to maintain that conventional morality is,
for the most part, wrong or false. In practical terms, Nietzsche repeatedly expresses his deep concerns about the influences that morality has on certain types of individual.

As is well known, Nietzsche also problematises morality’s origin; he explains its emergence and development in social-psychological terms, more precisely, in terms of the conflicts between the powerful minority and the weak majority and various antagonistic, psychological forces of the latter against the former. In the first place, Nietzsche makes it clear that conventional morality is not the sole form of morality in the history of mankind. Prior to it, there was a different form of morality, which constituted the mentality of the powerful; rather, conventional morality originated from the weak as a reaction to the pre-established, different form of morality. The ‘powerful’ (in physical, mental, and affective terms) dominated the weak or the ‘herd’ in harsh and brutal ways, and the oppressed herd’s strong affects or motives of many kinds, which are ‘evil’ or ‘immoral’ from the perspective of morality itself, found their expressions in the reaction. Specifically, the herd’s aggression, envy, sense of inferiority, vanity, and more importantly, need for the manipulation of, or control over, the powerful are involved in the generation of conventional morality. What he presupposes in accounting
for the origin in this ‘naturalistic’ fashion is that, as a matter of fact, conventional morality has certain influences upon the powerful, but these actually serve the motives of the herd and in this sense are in the interests of the herd. His explanation thus excludes any reference to a supernatural entity, practical reason or rationality, ‘conscience’, the \textit{a priori} apprehension of moral principles, and universal human sentiments, the notions of which dominate traditional moral philosophers.

Nevertheless, the public perception of Nietzsche’s ethics seems to be limited or distorted. That is to say, he is not offering a ‘mere’ critique of morality (and traditional moral philosophies), and the criticisms briefly mentioned above by no means exhaust Nietzsche’s ethics as a whole. Rather, in brief, he has his own (substantive) ethical standard as an alternative to morality and those moral philosophies, and that standard can be construed as a rich, complicated, and concrete ‘system’. But in my view this is barely recognized by many. Some seem to deny the existence of such a standard in Nietzsche’s philosophy. They read Nietzsche as an ethical nihilist, who does not believe in any ethical value or obligation and thinks that there is neither good or bad nor right or wrong. According to this reading, strictly speaking, Nietzsche criticises pre-dominant
morality and other ethical theories without having any alternative to them in mind, and he does so from the perspective of an ethical nihilist. However, even some of his critical remarks on morality themselves seem to suggest the contrary. For one thing, he argues for the contemptibility or badness of certain values of morality. Also, he bestows negative evaluative-normative meaning upon morality itself in consideration of its destructive influences on the strong; he not only loathes morality and worries about its impact but also regards it as despicable or bad. Others, on the other hand, do not appear to have any clear and comprehensive idea of what the Nietzschean standard exactly is. For example, it is sometimes said that the ‘overman’ symbolizes Nietzsche’s ethics. But where does this ‘ethics of the overman’ lie? Or, if he indeed idealises the overman what would such a man be like? Similarly, the notion of ‘power’ or ‘will to power’ is introduced for describing his substantive ethics. Yet again, if he insists that we should acquire or increase power, what is this power? It is something of a common practice in the debates on Nietzsche to provide vague (or worse, misleading) answers to such questions. For instance, ‘power’ is often believed to be something ‘political’, that is, subordination, domination, control, etc.
I believe that there is a distinct, substantive ethical system in Nietzsche’s philosophy, although it cannot be said that he ever presents this in a systematic manner. Its content is richer, more complicated, and more concrete than one may at first assume it is. Broadly speaking, this ethical system contains an evaluative standard or theory of ‘value’, understood here both as merit or excellence (the notion of which corresponds to **arete** in Greek, and is roughly equivalent with ‘greatness’, ‘nobleness’, ‘praiseworthiness’, ‘respectability’, etc) and as a person’s good or benefit (the notion of which, implying ‘ought-to-be-promoted’, seems to be close to ‘desirability’). The standard thus can be said to be divided into two parts: the theories of ‘excellence’ or ‘merit’ and of (a person’s) good or benefit. The theory of ‘value’ in the former sense, namely, excellence, merit, or worth, constitutes the major part of the evaluative standard, and moreover, of Nietzsche’s substantive ethics as a whole. To put this in another way, the main concern of Nietzsche’s ethics is with what is great or noble, rather than with what is good for/to us (or we ought to pursue) and what kind of act is right (or ought to be done). In this theory, to anticipate, Nietzsche asks himself what type of human being is great or noble; he confers the evaluative meaning on some
human capacities, dispositions and states, and more importantly, on a way of life.
Nietzsche thus treats certain dispositions as virtues or excellences of character, and the discussions of the virtues are central to Nietzsche’s evaluative discourse.

The theory, however, is closely related to the other axis of Nietzsche’s evaluative standard, that is, the theory of a person’s good, benefit, or interest. Nietzsche relates what he posits as great or noble to the category of ‘good(-for)’ or ‘desirable’ and in so doing, he gives these things normative significance or the meaning of ‘ought(-to-be-promoted)’. The Nietzschean virtues (as excellences of character or noble dispositions), for instance, are also good for us and thus we ought to possess or cultivate them. But is Nietzsche’s substantive ethics reducible to the evaluative standard thus construed? In fact, it would be hard to find a statement formulating a ‘practical principle’ or ‘theory of rightness (or conduct)’ comparable with those in Kantian or utilitarian ethics, in Nietzsche’s ethical discourse. Rather, Nietzsche does not seem to be concerned with telling us what we ought to do in a given, particular situation, or what types of act are ‘right’, ‘obligatory’, or ‘dutiful’. In my view, nevertheless, it is reasonable to suspect that he has some such theory, which can count as a ‘prescriptive’ standard. On a fundamental
level, he appears to endorse so-called consequentialism and thus stands in opposition to ‘deontology’. Based on consequentialism and his theory of goodness or desirability, he holds to some ‘prudential’ practical principles. In addition, the ‘implicit’ theory of conduct rules out any categorical law or principle positing an intrinsic duty, which is right regardless of the value of its consequences.

Broadly speaking, Nietzsche’s substantive ethics is comparable to Aristotelian ethics in some respects. Above all, a form of life as a whole seems to constitute the foundation of Nietzsche’s system, or to make up the locus of ‘value’. More precisely, a creative way of life, whose main ingredient is the active and prolific pursuit of an original and influential work, is intrinsically valuable. Aristotle, on the other hand, also confers intrinsic or ultimate value on a certain way of life or activity, although this is distinguishable from the Nietzschean creative way of life. As is well known, Aristotle idealizes a form of life as ‘happiness’ or ‘eudaemonia’, and this can be interpreted as the life or the entirety of activities in which one’s flourishing lies and subjective feelings of happiness are inherent. Secondly, both Nietzsche and Aristotle can be taken as ‘virtue-ethicists’, in a broad sense of term. They present a variety of dispositions as virtues.
Those excellences of character form the major parts of their ethical systems and the focal points of their ethical discourses. Moreover, their theories or ‘lists’ of virtue have some similarities even in their specific contents. They think that virtues play (constitutive or instrumental) roles in an ideal way of life and that their unity can be found in this, that is, the contribution to the intrinsic valuable whole. Whereas Aristotelian virtues in general ‘constitute’ the way of life he idealises as ‘eudaemonia’, all Nietzschean virtues seem to contribute to the creative way of life as its important ‘means’. Thirdly, the notion of ‘rightness’ or ‘duty’ is not a main category of the ethical systems of both the philosophers; their chief concerns are not with the right or obligatory, but with the great or honorable and the good.

There are some readings of Nietzsche’s ethics that are broadly in alignment with my interpretation. These readings have particularly inspired and influenced my understanding of Nietzsche as a significant, substantive ethicist comparable to Aristotle. First of all, Schacht, who will be frequently cited throughout the thesis, emphasizes that Nietzsche has to be read not only as a destructive critic but also as a constructive ethical
theorist\textsuperscript{1}. Schacht presents a quite thorough and systematic analysis of the constructive aspect, and shows that *creativity* and (the ability or disposition for) “self-overcoming” are important Nietzschean values. Although I highly respect his endeavours, it seems to me that the discussions of some other important elements of Nietzsche’s substantive ethics, for instance, Nietzschean virtues, are not adequately dealt with. Secondly, Solomon insightfully draws attention to similarities between Nietzsche and Aristotle\textsuperscript{2}. In particular, Solomon argues that virtues form the focal point of Nietzsche’s ethics. The former presents a “list” of virtues, and attempts to analyse the individual items in comparison with Aristotle. I also appreciate Solomon’s efforts and insights, though with some reservations. His analysis of these items appears to be rather brief and hasty; he hardly explains their presence in the standard or list, so the readers might think that Nietzsche gives them the status of virtue arbitrarily.

Now, the following thesis will be primarily concerned with the intrinsic nature of Nietzsche’s substantive ethical system as a whole. The main objective of the thesis is to

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\textsuperscript{1}Nietzsche, 1984

explore and systematize his substantive ethical thoughts, in particular, his evaluative standard or theory of value, in a comprehensive and detailed manner. Whilst there have been several important contributions, not enough attention has been paid to his substantive or normative ethical ideas, relative to his treatments of other matters. The focus has been on the ‘destructive’ or negative aspect of Nietzsche’s ethical project, i.e. his critique of conventional morality (and other ethical theories), rather than on its constructive or positive aspect. I also think that the discipline of ethics or the history of ethics has neglected to explore Nietzsche’s substantive ethics.

The thesis consists of six chapters. Briefly, the first half covering Chapters 1, 2, and 3 will be devoted to the task of exploring Nietzsche’s theory of ‘value’ understood as excellence or merit, which is the central part of Nietzschean ethics as a whole. The chapters will thus share the aim of answering what Nietzsche finds noble, great, or honorable, and what the Nietzschean “higher man” consists of. It will present the Nietzschean locus of value and capacities, states, and dispositions that Nietzsche posits as merits, and examine why he confers value on these human qualities. Chapter 1, as an initial overview, will focus on the creative way of life (as the intrinsically valuable
whole) and crucial Nietzschean merits such as creative capacity, self-discipline, a form of personal ethos, the capacity for ‘self-commanding’, strong and manifold affectivity, and finally, knowledge. Chapters 2 and 3 will try to illuminate Nietzschean ‘virtues’ (as noble dispositions or excellences of character): honesty, solitude, “mask”, courage, cheerfulness, magnanimity, and “ideal selfishness”.

Chapter 4 is devoted to the discussion of the other aspect of this evaluative standard, i.e. the theory of a person’s good (or desirability). The qualities analysed in the previous chapters will be reintroduced and taken to possess normative or action-guiding import. In Chapter 5, I will try to make Nietzsche’s account of rightness or theory of conduct explicit. I will explain the kind of ‘consequentialism’ Nietzsche appears to hold, and construe what practical principles he would endorse. Having thus explored the internal nature of his substantive ethics as a whole, I will attempt to answer an important question relevant to the main theme, that is, whether or not Nietzsche has any theoretical justification for the locus of value he presents, and hence, for the entire ethical system. In Chapter 6, the final chapter, I will engage with Nietzsche’s critique of conventional morality. The focus is on Nietzsche’s critique of the content and of the practical impact
of morality, as this critical endeavor reflects his substantive ethical thoughts. It will thus examine the relation between Nietzsche’s critique and his substantive ethics, explaining the former in the light of the latter. Finally, I will close the thesis with some brief concluding remarks, which are my own personal assessment of Nietzsche’s ethics.

What I would like to emphasise before starting our discussions is that the thesis is primarily an exposition of Nietzsche’s ideas and texts. I do not propose to carry out a comparative study of Nietzsche and any normative ethicist, here. Although I will refer to other ethicists and ethical perspectives in discussing Nietzsche, such references will function only to supplement the writing. It also has to be made clear that my main aim is not to ‘assess’ Nietzsche’s ethics: I am not concerned to criticize or justify his ideas, either. Nor can the thesis be viewed as an argument for, or against, a particular reading of Nietzsche’s ethics. In these respects, the thesis pursues a modest approach. Yet I hope that my present, focused approach will have its own merits; I expect it to contribute to a clearer, deeper, and wider understanding of Nietzsche’s substantive ethics.
CHAPTER 1: Nietzsche’s Theory of Value as Merit: An Initial Overview

1. The Locus of Value and Crucial Merits

1) Preliminary Remarks

As I have briefly mentioned in Introduction, Nietzsche puts forward a theory of value, and the latter can be divided into the two parts: a theory of excellence and that of a person’s good (or benefit). And the former part, the theory of value as merit is central
to, or representative of, Nietzsche’s substantive ethics as a whole. In this theory, again, Nietzsche appears to posit a way of life, which consists in a kind of activity, as the sole ‘intrinsic value’ or ‘value in itself’, in the strict sense of the terms. That is, for Nietzsche, the way of life as a whole is valuable independently of its relation to another valuable thing, and ultimately explains the value of everything else valuable. As such, it accounts for the determination of the value of the other values situated within the standard. Furthermore, Nietzsche also presents a variety of human qualities as ‘merits’ or ‘excellences’ (in the sense of arete in Greek). Broadly speaking, the qualities Nietzsche finds noble are valuable not in themselves but as constituents or means of the intrinsically valuable life. For instance, some affective or behavioral ‘dispositions’, in accordance with which the agent would feel, desire, or act in certain ways, contribute to the intrinsically noble way of life as its means. Precisely due to their (instrumental) roles in the form of life, they count as virtues or excellences of character in Nietzsche’s evaluative standard. In addition, some of the merits he presents make up the necessary (internal) condition for the intrinsically valuable way of life. As such, those “ever higher, more remote, tenser, more comprehensive states” characterise the “higher man”, who can live the noble way of life (under certain external circumstances) (BGE 257, p.192).
In other words, individuals of the “higher type” can be specified in terms of the merits fundamental to the way of life. Now, I propose to devote the first half of the thesis to the discussion of Nietzsche’s theory of merit thus outlined. I will concentrate on crucial Nietzschean values: the locus of value and excellences that contribute to it as its essential constituents or significant means. In this opening chapter as an initial overview, I will engage with the intrinsically valuable way of life and capacities, states, and attitudes which, as necessary, internal conditions for the way of life, define the “higher man”. In the following two chapters, I will examine Nietzschean virtues in a detailed manner.

2) Creativity

What, without more ado, does the intrinsically noble way of life (as the sole locus of value) consist in? What is the nature of the activity in terms of which this way of human existence is characterisable? Nietzsche seems to hold that the intrinsic value is a (special) form of creative life. According to Nietzsche, “men of great creativity” are “the really great men” (WP 957, p.501), and he even identifies “greatness” with
“creativeness” (Z 1, 12, p.78). Nietzsche thus suggests that “creativeness” or “creativity” is an intrinsic value. But it is reasonable to interpret “creativeness” or “creativity” here, on which he confers intrinsic value or “greatness”, in terms of a form of creative life. Hence, for Nietzsche, human greatness consists in living the form of creative life, and the great human being is one who lives it. The creative form of life Nietzsche now has in mind is, of course, a life ‘as a whole’ or the entirety of activities and experiences over a long-term period. As such, it lies primarily in intensive and powerful creative activity: its major component is the act or process of making something new: the creative way of life is definable in terms of the active and effective pursuit of an original work. That is to say, roughly speaking, a person who lives the creative way of life actively commits himself to, or pursues, the goal of an original work; he spends most of the time working for it. Not only does he make enormous efforts for the goal, but his efforts are also richly rewarded: as a result of his endeavors, he produces such a work and accomplishes his goal. Genuinely valuable creative ones, who live the form of life at issue, are thus distinguished from “productive men” as those who “have only the ability to do something” and who “insatiably” “act like hens, cackle and lay eggs and cackle again” (WP 943, p.497). Nor should they be identified with the (merely) “industrious” or hard-
working. The creative way of life Nietzsche honours goes beyond (merely) ‘productive’ or ‘industrious’ life, let alone existence per se or ‘well-being’ defined in terms of ‘comfort’ or ‘the absence of pain’.

As was suggested above, the notion of the creative way of life is determinable in terms of activity the outcome of which is an ‘original work’. Yet the nature of this needs to be further clarified. That is to say, the intrinsically valuable creativity basically involves creative thinking. As such, the creative form of life produces a (new style of) work capable of conveying or communicating one’s own original and profound ideas on life and the world. Thus, first of all, Nietzsche attaches great evaluative significance to the creativities exhibited by rare and gifted artists, such as Homer, Beethoven and Goethe (cf. TI 11, 49~51, p.p.114~115). Furthermore, Nietzsche would highly praise creative endeavors in other ‘cultural’ or ‘spiritual’ domains. For instance, Nietzsche would admire philosophers who can and do “create values” for us, (BGE 211, p.142), educators represented by his Zarathustra (TI 5, 8, p.p. 74~75), and scientists or ‘knowledge-seekers’, not confined to ‘objective facts’, capable of presenting innovative perspectives or explanatory frameworks of wide ranges of phenomena. Politicians or
‘legislators’ who, like Caesar and Napoleon, impose new ‘forms’ on human life, would also count as possessing higher value.

Moreover, the creative way of life can hardly be specified independently of the relevant *power*, namely, the (heightened) capacity for making an ‘original work’, which can communicate or reflect fresh and significant ideas on life and the world. Creative capacity construed as such is an *essential constituent* of the intrinsic valuable whole. Thus, the creative way of life or genuine “creativity” consists in activity that manifests, or is based upon, creative capacity. In other words, those who live the way of life not only possess the capacity but also actively express or employ it. Precisely because this is the case, i.e. it *constitutes* the creative way of life as the intrinsic value, the capacity counts as an excellence. Technically and strictly speaking, however, it is valuable not ‘intrinsically’ but extrinsically or relationally, in the sense that its value is contingent upon its (constitutive or instrumental) relation to another thing valuable. Nietzsche often mentions and emphasizes “power”, and it seems to be primarily in terms of the kind of capacity or ability that the notion has to be understood. A person with the capacity by nature possesses the intellectual resources necessary for creating an original
and significant work. In virtue of his intellectual constitution, if he willed or wished to make something new and meaningful, then (under some specifiable, external conditions) he would do so, i.e., carry out certain activities conducive to such a work. Nietzsche might say that imaginative power, insightfulness, (a high level of) intelligence, skills and knowledge are these resources necessary for creation, and therefore, that they jointly form the power of creation or creative capacity. Nietzsche does praise “great intelligence”, “insight”, and “knowledge” and it seems to be for this reason that he values these qualities.

Again, for the reason that creative capacity, in conjunction with powerful and intensive creative activity, constitutes the creative way of life (rather than causally producing the intrinsic value), it is an excellence: the power is a ‘constitutive’ value, not an instrumental one. It is valuable ‘non-instrumentally’ or independently of its usefulness or necessity for something else valuable (It is an ‘intrinsic value’ in this broad or loose of the term) Nietzsche implies this, saying:

Whether it be hedonism or pessimism or utilitarianism or eudaemonism:
all these modes of thought which access the value of things according to pleasure and pain, that is to say, according to attendant and secondary phenomena, are foreground modes of thought and naiveties which any one conscious of creative powers and an artist’s conscience will look down on with derision … (BGE 225, p.p. 154~155)

Nevertheless, Nietzsche would not say that the capacity is valuable independently of the formation of an intrinsically valuable whole of which it is a part. Thus, it possesses value only insofar as it contributes to the creative way of life as its constituent, and its value is dependent upon the existence of the other essential constituent of the creative way of life, that is, (powerful and intensive) creative activity. Nor are the elements of the given capacity (such as insightfulness) valuable in isolation: each of them has value if and only if it serves as a part of the capacity, and moreover, of the creative way of life.

Furthermore, the form of creative life or creativity Nietzsche honours by nature consists in the production of not only original but also influential works. The (potential) influence of the ‘creature’ or original work a given creative life or creativity yields is, for
Nietzsche, an important matter of consideration for the determination of its value. Hence, Nietzsche explicitly denounces the motto of *l’art pour l’art* (TI 9, p.p.92–93) and that of “disinterested knowledge” or ‘knowledge for its own sake’ (BGE 207, p.134). The genuinely venerable creative way of life has the potential for great contributions to human life and humanity, or in Nietzsche’s own terminology, for “formative influence” (BGE 61, p. 86) on both oneself and others (See, for instance, BGE 207, 208, 295; p.135, p.137, p.p.218–219) That is to say, the ‘creative men’ or ‘creators’ Nietzsche takes to be ‘great’ are essentially those who can and do create things capable of promoting our own creativities, or in other words, of the “artistic reshaping of mankind” (BGE 62, p.89). In various ways, their works can help us cultivate creative powers and lead us to actively exercise them. For instance, the works can inspire or encourage our growth and creative activities. The geniuses (such as Goethe and Beethoven) towards whom Nietzsche expresses his great admiration all seem to fulfill this criterion, namely, that of the ‘creativity capable of formative influence on human life’: this is one important category unifying those extraordinary creators. Nietzsche implies it when he says:

He [the future ‘noble’ or ‘great’ man] must yet come to us, the
redeemer of great love and contempt, the creative spirit whose compelling strength allows him no rest in any remote retreat and beyond, a spirit whose seclusion is misunderstood by the common people, as if it were flight from reality – while it is only a further steeping, burrowing, plunging into reality, from which he may at some time return to the light, bearing the redemption of this reality …

(GM II, 24, p.76)

When, in Zarathustra, Nietzsche speaks of “bestowing virtue”, which both Zarathustra and the overman symbolise, he seems to have in mind precisely that sort of creative life, that is, the life capable of serving “the meaning of the earth”, which can be understood in terms of the growth of creative powers and powerful and intensive creative activities (Z 1, 22, p.p.99~103). Having said that, it is reasonable to doubt if Nietzsche would hold such affirmative attitudes towards the ‘creative activities’ that our contemporary culture praises most, especially, those of the modern technology and of the commercial or economic realm (cf. GM III, 3, p.92).
Finally, it is worth stressing that the form of ‘influence’ at issue does not need to be ‘actual’ in order that a given creative life or creativity may be regarded as in possession of value (TI 9, 50, 51, p.115). That is why Nietzsche took pride in his own creative endeavors, which seem to have failed to exercise the ‘formative influence’ he himself sought, as far as his lifetime was concerned. Similarly, he does not confer instrumental value on the creative way of life construed above. He does not appear to think that the value of the latter ‘derives’ from the intrinsic value of its (immediate) outcome, namely, the original and influential work it produces. Nor does he value the way of life for the ‘contribution’ it can make to society, or from the perspective of ‘public interest’: the value-determination here should not be taken as guided by utilitarian reasoning (Ibid.). In addition, despite of its ‘contributive’ character, the creative way of life Nietzsche values does not consist in an ‘altruistic’ or ‘other-regarding’ intention, either. That is, while for Nietzsche, “prodigality” or magnanimousness, which is the sign of overflowing strength, characterises higher men and is reflected by their creative activities (TI 9, 44, p. 109), the former is by no means the reason why Nietzsche admires these activities.
3) Self-Discipline

‘Self-discipline’ in its ordinary sense is also at the heart of his evaluative framework, and is posited as an important value (GS V, 347, p.206; BGE 41, p.70; Ibid. 188, p.p.110~112; Z 2, 12, p.p.138~139). The quality at issue can be construed as a capacity, more precisely, the capacity to act lawfully or pursue a long-term, demanding goal. The person with the capacity would resolutely perform a particular pattern of action or course of action deemed to be conducive to a goal, if he willed or decided to do so, however demanding it might be. That is to say, he would follow or ‘obey’ one’s own self-command thoroughly, or act in accordance with his own practical norm or plan of action for a goal. Hence, the same quality can also be viewed as the faithfulness to one’s self-comands or the tendency or disposition for ‘self-obedience’. As Nietzsche writes, “the essential thing ‘in heaven and upon earth’ seems to be a protracted obedience in one direction” (BGE, 188, p.111). Self-discipline as such is a noble capacity or disposition. For this is, in short, necessary for the creative way of life. Together with some other qualities, it forms the immediate basis of the active and thorough pursuit of an original work, in terms of which the intrinsically valuable whole is defined; under certain
conditions involving those other qualities, it produces intensive creative activity and thus renders the active employment of creative capacity possible. Furthermore, this quality plays important, instrumental roles in the cultivation and enhancement of other Nietzschean merits, in particular, creative powers. In these ways, self-discipline contributes to the creative way of life. Thus, it counts as an instrumental value (rather than an intrinsic or constitutive value). In addition, it makes up the condition for what we normally mean by ‘autonomy’ and what Nietzsche understands by “self-mastery” or “freedom” (GM II, 2, p.41), in the state of which one is master over oneself and lives in accordance with ‘self-commands’ (or rules and plans that one imposes upon oneself).

Now, having said that, let us try to further analyse this quality, which Nietzsche himself seems to call “spiritual discipline”. This analysis will naturally introduce us to other Nietzschean values, and show why these are posited as such.

What, then, constitutes or underlies self-discipline or the disposition to ‘obey oneself’ or follow one’s own decisions or plans? Nietzsche, in the first place, would reject any attempt to explain the kind of faithfulness in terms of ‘free will’. According to this explanation, self-obedience lies in ‘free will’ as a practical “faculty” constitutive of
disembodied soul or “ego-substance” (TI 3, 5, p.48), which would freely determine our volition, intention, or ‘choice’ of particular actions. Further, as the theory tells us, such “acts of will” are the necessary and sufficient conditions of actions, in the face of desires and personal norms (cf. BGE 19, p.48). This theory would thus explain the occurrence of particular actions prescribed in accordance with personal norms or plans on the basis of the will’s free choice between these actions and ‘desired’ ones incompatible with them. Nietzsche explicitly rejects the notion of such a metaphysical entity or ‘ego’, and urges us to “get beyond the peasant simplicity of this celebrated concept free will and banish it” (BGE 21, p.51). Furthermore, Nietzsche believes that the notion of ‘will’ as volition, implicated in the free-will hypothesis, is itself problematic, in the sense that whereas there exists such an affect, the latter is neither necessary nor sufficient for the occurrence of an action (BGE 19, p.49; TI 6, 3, p.p.60~61). Nietzsche even seems to deny that ‘will’ as volition is a factor causally explaining actions. As he puts this, “the will no longer moves anything, consequently no longer explains anything – it merely accompanies events [i.e. actions], it can be also absent” (TI 6, 3, p.60). Besides, as Nietzsche suggests, an action is “free”, neither in the sense of ‘could-have-been-otherwise’, nor in the sense of ex nihilo. Rather, actions are conditioned by varying conscious, unconscious, and
non-conscious factors, such as desires, impulses, tendencies, forces, and physiological constitutions (cf. BGE 21, p. 51; TI 6, 3, p.60; Ibid. 4, p.62).

Nietzsche, instead, would argue that self-discipline or the disposition for ‘self-obedience’ consists partly in “hardness” or ‘severity’ (BGE 269, p.207). In other words, Nietzsche now points to the readiness to assume the great sense of “responsibility” for what one has decided to do, and to ‘endure’ various desires, impulses, and feelings (TI 11, 38, p.p.103–104). So the quality of hardness would allow a person to follow his own particular prescriptions, despite internal forces resistant to the prescribed actions, and to “resist” such internal “stimuli” in accordance with his proscriptions (TI 8, 6, p.76). This quality seems to be identifiable with what Nietzsche calls “the strength of will”. He further detects such ‘strength’ in religious ‘saints’, and in this respect, seems to be ready to express ‘reverence’ for them. He says:

Hitherto the mightiest men have still bowed down reverently before
the saint as the enigma of constraint and voluntary final renunciation:
why did they bow? They sensed in him … the superior force that
sought to prove itself through such a constraint, the strength of will in which they recognized and knew how to honour their own strength and joy in ruling: they honoured something in themselves when they honoured the saint (BGE 51, p.79).

But what is the nature of this ‘will’? Of course, as the foregoing remarks imply, the term ‘will’ in the present context has to be defined in a different way. The latter does not carry either the meaning of a faculty, or that of volition as the choice of particular actions which is also an affect (BGE 19, p.48). Rather, that term here seems to be used to denote a posited goal, purpose, norm, plan, or decision, *qua* a form of motive or affect (cf. GM III, 28, p.136) and to designate the “affect of command”, in Nietzsche’s own language (GS V, 347, p.206). He thus equates the state of “willing no more” with “being a subject without *aim and purpose*” (WP 84, p.52). In Nietzsche’s account, the mental phenomenon called ‘purpose’, ‘aim’, ‘goal’, ‘decision’, or ‘plan’ is not a ‘cold’ idea or pure thought. That is, it is not only inseparable from certain “sensations” such as “constraint, compulsion, and pressure”, but also has *influence* on the agent, and performs

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As has to be noted, for the following analysis of the notion of ‘will’, I benefitted a lot from Schacht (1983, p.p.296–309).
the function of directing his actions, i.e. leads him to ‘purposive’ activities. ‘Will’ understood as such could be translated as the ‘sense of responsibility’ for established objectives or decided actions, and, as a type of affect, is comparable with psychological states such as ‘desire’, ‘drive’, ‘instinct’, or ‘impulse’. One is thus entitled to call it an internal ‘force’, though figuratively, just as one is with respect to the other ‘motives’. It would be also intelligible to speak of its ‘strength’, considering not only its ‘firmness’ and the ‘strength’ of sensations it involves, but also its ‘practicality’ or influence on the agent: “strong will” could be thus taken to be a “predominant impulse” (WP 46, p.28) or an “iron pressure” (TI 9, 41, p.107). A ‘purpose’, connected with so-called ‘practical reasoning’ or the thought of means-end relations, can generate other ‘purposes’; for instance, from the long-term goal of producing a piece of writing can derive the plan of reading a text for a certain period. A will, either in this way, i.e., through its derivative ‘wills’, or directly, brings about concrete actions that conform to, or cohere with, what it intends in particular situations. Hence, Nietzsche regards ‘will’ construed in this way, as “the cause of acting in a certain way, in a certain direction” and terms the former “directing force” (GS V, 360, p.225). He further differentiates ‘directing force’ from ‘driving force’, which is the ‘force’ in the literal sense of the term, that is, “a quantum of
dammed-up *energy* waiting to be used somehow” (Ibid.). According to Nietzsche, “in accordance with” the former, the ‘directing force’, “this quantum discharges itself in one particular way” (Ibid.). In this manner, the “directing force” functions as a determining ground of actions. Having said that, a goal or a sense of responsibility for something is identified as a psychological manifestation or correlate of ‘a quantum of energy’ which is directed towards, or ready to be discharged into, purposive actions.

Therefore, the ‘strength’ of will mentioned above is in essence “the affect of superiority over him who must obey” (BGE 21, p.48). In other words, the former consists in the efficacy, or strength of the influence, of a ‘directing force’, e.g., a goal, aim, or norm, as opposed to “the lack of gravity” (WP 46, p.29), or to be precise, the strength of driving force discharged in accordance with the directing force. It also seems to lie in ‘resoluteness’ or the ‘enduring’ character or firmness of determination, contrasted with “oscillation” (Ibid. p.28) or the “slackening of the will” (GS V, 347, p.206; GM II, 2, p.p.40–41). Thus, the will enables one to resolutely *endure*, or take in a stride, the resistant desires and feelings, e.g. fatigue, depression, and tension, and further, to motivate the ‘control’ of these affects. Nietzsche writes in this connection that “the will is
precisely that which treats cravings as their master and appoints to them as their way and
measure” (WP 84, p.52), and that it is also the “decisive mark of sovereignty and
strength” (GS V 347, p.206). Hardness, or the readiness for that sort of strength, thus
underlies self-discipline or the tendency for thorough obedience to self-imposed norms
and plans. Since this is the case, hardness or the strength of will is one of Nietzschean
‘excellences’ (understood here as ‘praiseworthy’, ‘noble’, or ‘great’ qualities); it forms
the ground of self-discipline, which is necessary for powerful creative activity, and thus,
for the intrinsically valuable life. It is thus an instrumental value rather than a value ‘in
itself’. In addition, according to Nietzsche, hardness differs significantly from person to
person, so that he distinguishes the strong-willed from the weak-willed. And these
differences in strength are, for Nietzsche, responsible for the differing degrees of
consistency in following norms shown by people. Moreover, the quality can develop, and
the degree of one’s potential for such development itself also differs from those of others.
The growth or unfolding of the potential depends on protracted “practices”, that is, actual
rule-following processes (BGE p.p.110~112; Z 1, 15, p. 86; WP 995, p.518). Further,
Nietzsche points out that ‘moralities’ have functioned as the condition for such growth by
establishing inner circumstances (e.g. goals, norms, bad conscience, shame, pride, etc.)
under which people have been able to ‘practice’ self-control or to undergo “overcomings” of internal obstacles for the sake of goals and norms. The desire to master (or “rule” and “obey”) oneself, according to Nietzsche, has used that function, and thus, is one explanatory factor of the establishment and maintenance of moralities (Z. 1, 15, p. 84, p.86). Nietzsche puts this as follows,

Once the peoples hung a table of values over themselves. The love that wants to rule and the love that wants to obey created together such values as these (Ibid. p.86).

As was suggested earlier, with respect to the faithfulness to one’s own commands, whether they are prescriptive or proscriptive, all-too-human desires are seen as ‘obstacles’ or ‘problems’. We often attribute the failure to keep such personal plans or resolutions to these resisting or compelling internal forces, and Nietzsche would completely agree with this problematisation of basic human drives and feelings. Towards the end of self-mastery or self-obedience, in short, these necessarily have to be ‘overcome’, in one way or another. For Nietzsche, in other words, self-mastery or self-
obedience presupposes, or is inseparable from, certain forms of the overcoming of these obstacles, and one form of this process is naturally the ‘endurance’ of internal resistance for which the ‘hardness’ we discussed earlier is responsible. Thus, the valued quality of self-discipline is nothing but the disposition for self-overcoming understood as self-obedience with respect to, or in the face of, resistant affects. Hence, according to Nietzsche, in “the highest type of free man”, “the greatest resistance is constantly overcome” (TI 6, 38, p.104). However, Nietzsche is convinced that the process of ‘self-overcoming’ understood as such is much more complex. Indeed, that process lies in properly handling our ‘affectivity’ with respect to our own goals or norms (BGE 284, p.214). Thus, the refined ‘art’ of dealing with all-too-human desires and feelings constitutes self-discipline or the disposition for self-overcoming (as self-obedience ‘in the face of affects’). Just as hardness does, this capacity or art counts as an excellence in Nietzsche’s evaluative system, for, by making up self-discipline or the disposition for self-overcoming, it further constitutes the internal condition of the possibility of powerful creative activity or the active exertion of creative capacity. Furthermore, it renders possible the acquisition of other valuable qualities constitutive of, or conducive to, the creative way of life. In particular, it supports the struggle for the growth of
creative powers. Before proceeding further, it is worth noting that ‘self-overcoming’ excludes ‘extirpating’ desires. Nietzsche would say that the latter process intended for the complete realisation of asceticism, at least in the long run, would damage our life itself, let alone the faithfulness to one’s own commands (GS 4, 304, p.173). Summarising these points, Nietzsche says: “Domination of the passions, not their weakening or extirpation! – The greater the dominating power of a will, the more freedom may the passions be allowed” (WP 933, p.492).

But then, what does this capacity or art consist of? Relevant to this, what underlies self-discipline or the disposition for ‘self-overcoming’? To begin with, let us hear what Nietzsche tells us:

The highest man would have the greatest multiplicity of drives, in the relatively greatest strength that can be endured. Indeed, where the plant “man” shows himself strongest one finds instincts that conflict powerfully (e.g., in Shakespeare), but are controlled (WP 966, p.507).
Greatness of character does not consist in not possessing these affects – on the contrary, one possesses them to the highest degree – but in having them under control (WP 928, p. 490).

Speaking of the ‘control’ of impulses as in the above passages, Nietzsche seems to refer to a flexible and moderate form of the ‘repressive’ constraint of them (in a certain sense of the term). The ‘control’, construed as such, characterises the ‘healthy’ form of ‘asceticism’, which creative, task-oriented individuals typically assume in accordance with their own codes of conduct and plans (GM III, 8, p.p. 88–91). This is thus distinguished from the rigid and irritable repression of them into the level of the unconscious. It is, however, not the case that Nietzsche stops with this: the self-overcoming he has in mind transcends the mere, tactical constraint of desires, as commentators such as Hollingdale stress⁴. Above all, Nietzsche affirms the possibility

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⁴ Hollingdale seems to think that “self-overcoming” Nietzsche extols is identifiable as “power over oneself” (1973, p.91), and as such, consists in “the process of ‘sublimation’ – the basic idea behind which is that activities of a distinctively human sort are made possible by the transformation in man of the drives he shares with the animals, and that these drives are capable of an almost limitless degree of transformation” (Ibid, p.100).
and significance of the ‘transformation’ of desires problematic with respect to one’s projects. That is to say, as he suggests, through some sort of art or skill, one could transform or sublimate such desires into ‘motivating’ forces of the struggle for those projects (Z 3, 10, p.207; BGE 229, p.p.159~160; WP 820, p.434). Hence, for example, “lust for power” as the desire to dominate, or feel power over, others, could change its object, and take the form of the desire to control, or feel mastery over, oneself, which could serve as another ‘directing’ force of the rule-governed struggle. That is, the latter modification would be able to urge one to submit oneself to a given self-imposed rule or goal, and thus, to aid the fulfillment of the rule or goal itself. Or this could generate a long-term longing for the relevant quality we have discussed so far, that is, the disposition for self-overcoming or self-obedience, which would motivate severe ‘persistence’ in rule-following or goal-oriented activities in general, as ‘practices’ for the disposition (Z. 2, 12, p. p. 137~ 138; Ibid., 3, 10, p.207). And cruelty aiming at another person’s distress could be changed into a ‘healthy’ or moderate self-cruelty, for instance, a “kind of cruelty of the intellectual conscience”, which could be expressed in “stern discipline” and employed to pursue demanding, ‘painstaking’ tasks, e.g. “knowledge” (BGE 229, p.160; Ibid. 230, p. 161). Such art, on which this transformation depends,
thus constitutes the foundation of self-discipline or the disposition for self-overcoming.

Similarly, we can constructively and strategically derive motivating forces from our affects, and change their directions (or ways of venting their energy) into goal-oriented activities, based on the knowledge of “how to press these magnificent monsters into service” (WP, 933, p.492), which, as a component of the basis of the disposition for self-overcoming, counts as a value, too. Explaining this point, Nietzsche would say that a posited ‘goal’ or a personal rule of conduct alone would be ‘pale’ or insufficient for the performance of actions the goal or rule prescribes, and hence, the former has to be given some support by other ‘directing’ forces, e.g. desires. By conferring on our goals and planned actions ‘instrumental’ meanings for some ‘desired’ objects, the desires can be directed into, or push, our task-oriented activities. So, for instance, ‘the desire to charm women’ could motivate the pursuit of the goal of being a great writer, which, if realised, would be capable of attracting their attention. With the aid of the wisdom of such mechanisms of our affectivity, a person’s cruelty, envy, or hatred, so to speak, could serve the goal of a destructive ‘critique’ or a work of art overwhelming others or superseding their works. Likewise, the love of others and the desire to control or direct
them could converge on the long-term project of “bestowing”, that is, one’s task capable of having positive influence (as a form of control or mastery) on others (Z 3, 10, p.208).

Moreover, we can also use temporarily repressed or endured desires by “condescending to have”, or ‘satisfying’, them in proper ways, at proper times (BGE 284, p.214). For one thing, the “restorative” function of ‘pleasure’ that we can take in venting desires cannot be ignored. Nietzsche writes: “Sensual pleasure: innocent and free to free hearts, the earth’s garden joy, an overflowing of thanks to the present of the future” (Z 3, 10, p.207).

Nietzsche makes similar remarks on the case of personal tendencies or traits. To begin with, he affirms that it is possible to ‘create’ one’s “second nature”, that is, transform oneself, through a “great and rare art” and strenuous “practices” (GS 4, 290, p.p.163 ~ 164), as Foucault would surely agree⁵. In other words, we can ‘destroy’ those aspects of our character judged to contradict our fundamental goals or projects. We can be “ugly” in this respect, and can ‘create’ new characteristics conducive to the goals or projects. Even if we fail in the sort of self-destruction, we can still ‘control’ habitual

⁵Refer to “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice Freedom” (1997, p.p281~301), in particular, in this connection.
stimuli arising from these inappropriate tendencies, and even, use them in some occasions (Ibid.). Nietzsche might say that the disposition for self-overcoming is also founded on such ‘arts’, which are concerned with reshaping oneself or giving “style” to one’s character, and with controlling and using one’s tendencies.

4) Strong Affectivity and Vitality

According to Nietzsche, “powerful affects” are “valuable” (WP 931, p.491), and the greatest “multiplicity of drives” characterise the “highest men” (WP 966, p.507). The foregoing account of ‘self-overcoming’ could help to clarify Nietzsche’s valorisation of strong affectivity, which stands in contrast to the conventional evaluation of it. Also, we could see why he denies the value of the complete realisation of ‘asceticism’, which would represent the nothingness of ‘motivating forces’ of goals or the sickening of the life-struggle, or mean the death of the spirit. In short, strong affectivity can be translated as *vitality*, ‘vigor’, or ‘force’, which Nietzsche thinks highly of. Insofar as affects in
particular, desires, are capable of being dealt with in an adequate manner as hinted above, they become innocuous, and cease to be perceived as annoying obstacles to our various purposes, and moreover, can strengthen our goal-oriented struggles. Nietzsche seems to confer instrumental value on the strength of affectivity, because affects have the potential to help accomplish our self-imposed commands in general and thus the Nietzschean “freedom” or “self-mastery” as autonomy. Affectivity, in other words, constitutes the ground of the disposition for self-overcoming and thus, the condition of self-mastery. It further makes up the internal condition necessary for powerful creative activity, in terms of which the creative way of life as the ultimate source of value is specifiable. Moreover, strong affectivity can also be seen as an important means of acquiring and enhancing other lofty qualities; especially, it is the fertile soil of the (further) growth of creative powers. In this way too, it contributes to the creative way of life, which explains Nietzsche’s valorisation of strong affectivity more comprehensively (WP 1033, p. 533). Nietzsche’s emphasis on the ability to deal with affects also has to be understood along these lines. He writes as follows:

Once you had passions and called them evil. But now you have only
your virtues: *they grew from out your passions*. You laid your highest aim *in the heart of these passions*: then they became your virtues and joys … At last all your passions have become virtues and your devils angels. Once you had fierce dogs in your cellar: but they changed at last into birds and sweet singers … (Z 1, 5, p.64) *Emphases added.

First of all, in particular, “will to power” as a sort of affect motivates the growth of Nietzschean merits and their active exertion, and for this reason, Nietzsche emphasizes this affect. He suggests that whether explicitly or implicitly, and whether strongly or weakly, we do or can desire to possess and exert “power”. The desire for “power” is indeed fundamental to us, and is not a ‘derivative’ one. But, as was briefly indicated earlier, “power” here, which is the object of the will to power, seems to be definable in terms of *creation* (cf. BGE 211, p.143). That is, the will to power Nietzsche presents as the fundamental drive of human life is in essence the desire for creative capacity (or what Nietzsche himself calls “creative powers”) and intensive creative activity (as its active exertion). The will to power construed as such thus directly motivates the growth of creative capacity and the creative way of life as its active manifestation or exertion.
Furthermore, the will to power generates the desire for the cultivation of other valuable qualities conducive to the creative way of life, which would enable us to be “master within itself and around itself” (BGE 230, p.160). In this respect, the will to power can also be formulated as the will to “become more” (WP 688, p.367), “increase”, or “grow stronger” (WP 689, p.367), or as “impulse towards the higher, more distant, more manifold” (Z 2.12, p.138). The fundamental drive thus renders it possible to will the cultivation of the Nietzschean excellences involving creative powers in the first place, to strengthen their pursuits, and to actively use them for creative activities.

Secondly, as was suggested earlier, properly transformed, channeled, or vented, other forms of desire could motivate one to develop those noble qualities involving the power of creation, and to intensify the struggle for them in numerous ways (BGE, 257, p.192; Ibid., 259, p.194; Z 1, 12, p. 138). To take one form of desire as an example, according to Nietzsche, the “pathos of distance”, understood as the desire to confer ‘higher’ value on oneself or to heighten one’s evaluative ‘order of rank’, can motivate one to be engaged in a “competition in growing”, on the condition that these qualities and their elements are affirmed as ‘values’ (BGE 257, p.192; Ibid. 261, p.201). From
that instinct, in other words, arises the “longing for an ever-increasing widening of distance within the soul itself” or the desire for “the formation of ever higher, more remote, tenser, more comprehensive states”, and therefore, the pathos of distance is the “precondition for the elevation of the type, ‘man’” (Ibid. 257, p.192). Next, in virtue of affects, for instance, ‘fear’, we can, as it were, throw ourselves into the war of life, that is, into varying forms of life-struggle, through the involvement in which the noble qualities and their ingredients, say, wisdom and the strength of will, can grow. Finally, they can also transform our style of life into a creative, task-oriented one and support the creative way of life, by leading us to posit the goal of ‘creation’, and directing our energy into creative activities thus willed. For instance, as we have already seen, one’s magnanimity or “wanting to give”, (Z 1, 22, p. 100), and ‘will to rule others’ could be directed into creative endeavors capable of influencing or transforming others in positive ways, which transcend both ‘good-willed’ actions futile or even dangerous to others and ‘domination’ in its negative sense (cf. BGE 211, p.p. 142 ~ 143).
5) A Healthy Ethos and the Capacity for Self-Commanding

“Self-mastery”, in which the Nietzschean “free spirit” or “freedom” lies, is constituted by commanding oneself, or imposing goals, norms, or responsibilities on oneself, as well as self-discipline or the faithfulness to such self-commands, which we have discussed above. The ground of the latter capacity or disposition, to summarise, is composed of ‘hardness’ (as the readiness to assume great responsibility or effect “willing” in the given sense) and the capacity for dealing with various internal resistances. It is the former element of self-mastery or freedom, that is, how one commands oneself that we are going to pay attention to. According to Nietzsche, an ethos in the sense of the system of self-commands (or self-imposed goals, practical rules or norms and action plans for the goals), in conjunction with self-discipline and other qualities, renders intensive creative activity possible, and in this way, contributes to the creative way of life as a whole. Furthermore, it helps sustain or enhance the Nietzschean merits. For these reasons, this form of ethos is valuable: it is an important, instrumental value.
Of course, the personal ethos Nietzsche considers to be valuable consists in commanding oneself _per se_, but _in a certain way_. Nietzsche concedes that the valuable form of ethos is much more difficult to find among people than the disposition for self-overcoming or self-obedience, which is tantamount to saying that genuinely significant self-mastery as the synthesis of the ethos and the disposition is indeed _rare_. What, then, is the intrinsic nature of the healthy form of ethos? To begin with, as for the ‘formal’ aspect of the ethos, what matters seems to be to establish and maintain the coherent, complicated, and elaborate _system_ of an individual’s personal goals and norms, with which the later Foucault was greatly concerned. Such a praiseworthy ethos is composed of some formal, fundamental, and “protracted” or long-term “decisions” or goals. These fundamental projects are prior to, and explanatory of, the presence of the other ends, specific action plans, and norms or rules of conduct within the ethos. In particular, the specific plans of action and rules of conduct (e.g. “Let’s do this everyday” or “Never eat junk food”) derive ultimately and coherently from the pre-established projects: the courses or patterns of action corresponding to the plans and rules are judged to be conducive to these goals. The codes of conduct, in this respect, could be conceived to be ‘tactical’: their presence in the system depends on (the belief in) the (possible)
contribution of the relevant actions to the fundamental aims, and thus, they are not rigid. Furthermore, the fundamental goals are demanding and the rules of conduct derived from them are stern and manifold. More importantly, the determination of the derivative ends and codes of conduct is based upon knowledge (which Foucault would call “technologies of the self”\textsuperscript{6}) or in Nietzsche’s own terminology, refined “arts and stratagems” (BGE 262, p. 201). The judgment of the serviceability of a type of act or object for a fundamental project is, in other words, neither false nor arbitrary. With regard to the content of the system, an ethos that includes the goals corresponding to the table of values Nietzsche himself puts forward would be healthy or praiseworthy, from Nietzsche’s perspective. Therefore, above all, the healthy ethos commands intensive pursuits of creative works. It thus contains specific, demanding action plans for the works. Furthermore, the ethos refers to Nietzschean merits, which are useful or necessary for these activities and the tasks: the person in possession of the healthy ethos would aim to maintain or enhance creativity, self-discipline, powerful affectivity and virtues. Moreover, the healthy ethos is composed of the prescription of sets of practices as the practical means of maintaining or further developing the valuable qualities, and of

\textsuperscript{6}1994, p.225
the proscriptions of actions harmful for these qualities. That the healthy ethos is essentially that which refers to the Nietzschean values, seems to follow from his ethical premises which we have discussed. For Nietzsche himself would hold that since one’s ethos has practical significance, that is, performs the function of directing one’s actions, an ethos encouraging the attainment or enhancement of these values would (best) serve to actualize them.

But what underlies the healthy form of ethos? Nietzsche considers some internal resources to play important roles in the establishment or maintenance of the ethos, and for this reason, he values these qualities. Firstly, Nietzsche seems to think that (what can be called) the capacity for self-commanding, or in his own terminology, “inventiveness in schemata” (BGE 41, p.70) are absolutely crucial for the described, healthy ethos or system of self-commands. This quality lies in the ability to establish goals and action plans or rules of conduct in accordance with some fundamental projects independently of external influences. Thus, a person in possession of the quality would independently set up plans or rules of conduct for a posited goal. Precisely because of its (instrumental) role in the formation of the ethos, according to Nietzsche, the capacity also counts as an
important merit, which seems to underlie Nietzsche’s claim that “one must test oneself to see whether one is destined for independence and command” (Ibid. p.70). The capacity, which is in essence the capacity for “independence” as such (Ibid; WP 984, p.514), functions as the foundation of the healthy form of ethos, and in this way, contributes to powerful creative activity and the maintenance or enhancement of the Nietzschean excellences. From Nietzsche’s observations, in addition, ordinary people lack the capacity for the sort of independence, so that in a sense they still “must be commanded” (GS IV, 347, p.206). Rather, although they do have personal norms, goals, or plans, and a substantial number of them show a good level of faithfulness to the latter, basically, it is still external forces that account for their existing commands. In other words, their goals and norms are either the result of their unreflective or uncritical submissiveness to others’ moral opinions, the dominant culture, knowledge-claims, and prescriptions of some authoritarian figures, or accountable for in terms of the internalisation of others’ ‘wills’ through varying forms of external ‘obligation’ or suppression. If they had not been given such external influences, they would not have established their ethos in the first place, and would have “waited” for others’ opinions or commands. Their ‘commands’, in these manners, are heavily dependent on others (BGE 261, p.p.
Furthermore, since the healthy ethos can be characterized in terms of its *demanding* projects, naturally, it requires the disposition to impose the greatest responsibilities or heaviest burdens on oneself, and further, to “extend” them, rather than giving them up easily in the face of expected, inevitable difficulties, sufferings, or dangers (BGE 212, p.143). The disposition lies in the spirit of “a warrior”, the “will to self-responsibility”, or a certain kind of ‘indifference’ to “hardship, toil, privation”, and even, “life” itself (TI 6, 38, p.p.103~104). Or again, it could be identified as the determination or ‘instinct’ to “live dangerously” in this sense (GS 4, 283, p.161). The disposition, making up the ground of the valuable ethos, counts as one of excellences. Thus, Nietzsche writes that “being noble, wanting to be by oneself, the ability to be different, independence and the need for self-responsibility pertains to the concept ‘greatness’” (BGE 212, p.144).

More importantly, a healthy ethos is supported by a table of *values* and thus Nietzsche lays great emphasis on this. For this reason, Nietzsche would further argue for the evaluative significance of the ability to generate (or “create”) or to sustain the table
of values. The notion of ‘value’ in this context designates ‘goodness(-for/to)’ or ‘desirability’, which implies ‘ought-to’ and thus performs an ‘action-guiding’ function.

The table of values Nietzsche now has in mind refers to some ‘genuine’ values; it thus affirms that the items constitutive of Nietzsche’s evaluative standard (such as creativity, self-discipline, and affectivity) are indeed good. Yet it would relate to only the individual concerned (or the holder of the table of values himself) and thus, would be the individual’s table of his own values: it would tell him what are good or bad for him and what he should be or do. The table of values would render concrete the rather abstract ‘ideal’ of creativity or creative activity in consideration of the individual’s own particularities, and thus, his own ideal would be specified and ‘individuated’ (cf. BGE 262, p.201). It would determine what sort of creative capacity he should develop, and similarly, what kind of creative work he should pursue. Also, it would also articulate what particular activities or processes are (most) appropriate to the production of the work, and thus, would further specify the ‘creative activity’ he ought to be engaged in.

Finally, this table would confer instrumental evaluative significance on other objects and sets of actions, in accordance with the posited values. The paths to a shared ideal could also be different according to personal and situational differences. What one should
achieve or do for the sake of one’s ideals, e.g. (the enhancement of) creative powers, could differ significantly from another’s missions or “duties” (BGE 272, p.210). Nietzsche’s belief underlying such an emphasis on ‘value-determination’ is that ‘values’ thus posited would not only function as the determining and supporting ground of one’s goals and norms, but also constitute the motive for the pursuit of already established ones (for instance, through ‘bad or good conscience’, ‘shame’, ‘pride’ or the “pathos of distance”).

In addition, the healthy ethos presupposes the freedom or immunity from conventional morality, which is, according to Nietzsche, incompatible with the healthy table of values. What could be called ‘critical mindedness’, which is constitutive of this non-submissiveness, and is represented by the “lion” of the “second metamorphosis” in Zarathustra, enables one to “create freedom for new creation” and to “seize the right to new value” (Z 1, 1, p.55). For Nietzsche, particularly, one should be able to “liberate” oneself from “some rule and its prejudices” (BGE 44, p.73), or to go beyond the “good and evil” of conventional morality for the sake of a healthy form of evaluative standpoint and its relevant ethos (BGE 56, p.82). To this end, one would even have to
keep a distance from the ancient ‘noble’ morality Nietzsche admires (though not wholeheartedly). One reason for this is that the noble morality itself is a form of *culture*, which, lacking the principle of ‘individuation’, by nature preaches *universal* ideals or ‘good’ things *for all* (BGE 262, p.201). Furthermore, the healthy ethos also depends upon other forms of “the ability to be different” or non-submissive, in which one would neither frivolously adopt others’ goals, follow others’ paths to a shared goal, disregard personal and situational differences, nor blindly trust their ‘wisdom’ and knowledge-claims.

2. The Value of Knowledge

1) Empirical Knowledge

Here, let us move on to another crucial value in Nietzsche’s evaluative scheme on which he lays great emphasis but towards which he expresses a rather complicated or ‘ambivalent’ attitude. As has been repeatedly suggested above, Nietzsche confers great

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7 My account of Nietzsche’s conception of knowledge presented here was inspired by Clark (1990, p.p.127~203)
evaluative significance on ‘knowledge’ (as opposed to false, absurd, groundless, or ill-grounded beliefs), and admires the state of being equipped, or put in another way, ‘armed’ with knowledge (A 59, p.p.194~195; D 3, 195, p.115). He considers “knowledge” as characteristic of “the most venerable kind of human being” (A 57, p.190), of “intellectual well-constitutedness” (Ibid. 52, p.181) and of “a higher age” (GS 4, 283, p.160). Thus he thinks highly of the role of “education” and “educators” (TI 8, 3, p.73). Related to this value, that is knowledge, such qualities as truthfulness or intellectual conscience, the passion for knowledge, and the pursuit of knowledge, also position themselves in Nietzsche’s evaluative framework. It is Nietzsche’s concern with ‘knowledge’ that seems to explain their presence in there, and it can be said that for Nietzsche, their value derives from the value of knowledge. More importantly, at the same time, knowledge constitutes, promotes, or upholds other values including those already introduced. Thus, these other values constitute the reasons for the presence of knowledge in the evaluative scheme. Now, I propose to discuss the value of knowledge at length, taking into account its centrality in Nietzsche’s evaluative discourse, his rather complicated (evaluative) attitude towards it, and finally, its manifold relations with other values within the scheme. Firstly, I will attempt to clarify Nietzsche’s appreciation of
knowledge. This will involve the examination of the kind of knowledge Nietzsche has in mind, and the attempt to clarify whether knowledge is an ‘intrinsic’ value or an extrinsic one, in the light of his criticism of the spirit of modern science. Next, I will explore what constitute Nietzsche’s reasons for the appraisal of knowledge. I will discuss which other values in the scheme give knowledge worth, and explore the ways in which the values are linked to knowledge.

Praising knowledge, Nietzsche primarily points to ‘empirical’ knowledge or that grounded ultimately in the “evidence of the senses” (TI 3, 3, p. 46) or sense-experience (which comprises ‘science’ as systems of empirical knowledge based on “scientific methods”) (A 59, p.194). Nietzsche seems to take mathematics and logic, which he calls “science of formulae” as non-empirical or a priori disciplines, or more precisely, purely ‘analytic’ ones, which by themselves do not give us any information about “reality” (TI, 3, 3, p.46). As Nietzsche tells us: “In these [logic and mathematics] reality does not appear at all, not even as a problem; just as little does the question what value a system of conventional signs such as constitutes logic can possibly possess” (Ibid.). Despite this, rather interestingly, he does confer evaluative significance on such “sign-systems”, as
well. Thus, for instance, Nietzsche says, “If only we had been taught to revere these sciences [mathematics and mechanics], if only our souls had been made to tremble at the way in which the great men of the past had struggled and been defeated and had struggled anew, at the martyrdom which constitutes the history of rigorous science!” (D 3, 195, p.115). Nonetheless, it would be sensible to read Nietzsche as placing far greater emphasis on empirical knowledge than on purely analytic knowledge, considering not only the relative frequency of his ‘eulogies’ of the former throughout his texts, but the reasons why he values ‘knowledge’ as such, which we will examine soon. In addition, very briefly, the knowledge Nietzsche appreciates excludes the ‘synthetic’ a priori character. Or rather, he does not seem to affirm the possibility of ‘synthetic’ a priori cognition in the first place. Nietzsche rejects the notion of ‘self-evidence’, or in his own terms, that of “immediate certainty” or “intuitive knowledge” as the “seduction of words” (BGE 16, p.46) and consequently denies the possibility of a deductive system of knowledge founded on such ‘truths’. So Nietzsche writes: “I approve of any form of skepticism to which I can reply, ‘Let’s try it!’ But I want to hear nothing more about all the things and questions that don’t admit of experiment. This is the limit of my ‘sense of truth’” (GS I, 51, p.62). Especially, Nietzsche would warn against any attempts to
answer metaphysical or moral questions *a priori* or independently of experience.

Nietzsche observes the following modes of empirical cognition and confers value on them: 1. “Facts” as descriptions of particular, existent things that are grounded in perception, observation, “experiment” (GS IV, 324, p.181), testimony, memory, and inference (from certain perspectives and other descriptive reports on such things derived empirically, e.g., from the foregoing sources). 2. “Perspectives” which, including scientific laws or theories and sustained ultimately by facts or ‘empirical evidence’, concern regularities or ‘orders’ of things, or explain these characters, and are thus capable of “interpreting” or explaining ‘facts’ and of predicting future events or states of affairs. 3. “Perspectival knowledge” as interpretation or explanation, which states the reason, cause, or “origin” of a thing, event, or state of affair, and is constituted by a certain perspective and facts (cf. GM 3, 12, p.98). Now, on one hand, Nietzsche recognises the value of facts, and for this reason, he emphasises the “sense for facts” (A 59, p.194) and “learning to see” or “learning to investigate and comprehend the individual case in all its aspects” (TI 8, 6, p.76). On the other hand, he appears to believe that facts are not intrinsic values but merely instrumental ones, which explains his
derogatory talks about “factum brutum” or “petits faits” (GM 3, 24, p. 127; TI 9, 7, p.82). Nietzsche writes, “To stand oneself submissively before every petty fact, to be ever itching to mingle with, plunge into other people and other things … , is bad taste, is ignoble par excellence” (TI 8, 6, p.76). Rather, according to Nietzsche, the value of facts derives mainly from the value of interpretative perspectives, perspectival knowing, and predictions or anticipations that they constitute or render possible. For Nietzsche, a “born”, praiseworthy investigator is someone who does not experience “from a desire to experience”, “knows nothing of the arbitrary abstraction from the individual case”, but instead, pursues observations or collects data, being “conscious only of the universal, the conclusion, the outcome” (TI 9, 7, p.82). In other words, Nietzsche would say that facts, unless they are incorporated into perspectives, or constitute interpretations or predictions in conjunction with such perspectives, are of little worth. In this sense, Nietzsche gives higher status to interpretative perspectives, interpretations, and predictions, than to mere facts. Finally, man, society, and nature are the objects of empirical knowledge to which Nietzsche now pays attention; in particular, disciplines such as history, anthropology, (empirical) psychology, sociology, physics, physiology, and biology, are extremely significant.
2) The Status of the Value of Knowledge

However, Nietzsche’s valorisation of empirically sustained frameworks of man, society, and nature has to be qualified, and distinguished from what he regards as constitutive of the spirit of modern science. According to Nietzsche, a perspective on the value of (scientific) knowledge characterises, and is deeply rooted in, people including scientists. From his observations, people tend to express blind respect for every sort of knowledge and to fervently idealise it, which explains their “unconditional will to truth” (GS 5, 344, p.201). Beneath this idolisation and idealisation, they confer the highest, ‘intrinsic value’ (in its strict sense) on knowledge. In Nietzsche’s terms, they hold “the belief in the value of truth in itself” (GM 3, 24, p.127), and “the faith that truth is divine” (GS 5, 344, p.201), or that “in relation to it [truth], everything else has only secondary value” (Ibid. p.200). For them, any given piece of knowledge is praiseworthy independently of its relation to something else valuable, i.e. regardless of whether it ‘constitutes’ an intrinsically valuable whole and of whether it ‘brings about’ an intrinsic value. In other words, according to the common perspective on the value of knowledge,
“truth is above evaluation and criticism” (GM 3, 25, p.128). Also, knowledge or truth is what one ought to acquire both “for its own sake” (BGE 64, p.90), and “at any price” (GS 5, 357, p.217), i.e., whether or not its pursuits may be incompatible with those of other interests and no matter what its achievement may demand. It is thus widely held that “science has no ideal above it” (GM 3, 23, p.124). Having said that, this faith in the value of knowledge can be viewed as containing within it the elements of severe asceticism or a ‘disguised’ form of ascetic ideal. For the faith in the value of knowledge implicitly encourages and praises self-denial, i.e., the renouncement of the pursuits of other competing goals and desires, the repression of the desires, and even, their extirpation. Now, Nietzsche criticises this faith in the absolute, intrinsic value of knowledge or truth, or in Clark’s vocabulary, the conferment on it of “overriding”\textsuperscript{8} worth on it, both theoretically and practically (GM III, 23–27, p.p.123–135; BGE 64, p.90). In other words, that faith is not only an “enthusiastic folly” (GS 5, 344, p.201) or an “overestimation” (GM 3, 25, p.128), but also an “awe-inspiring catastrophe” (Ibid. 27, p.134).

\textsuperscript{8}1990, p.184,
In Nietzsche’s view, even ‘scientific’, interpretative frameworks are not ‘intrinsic values’ in the strict sense of the term, i.e. in the sense of those valuable independently of their relations to other values. Again, Nietzsche declares that “science itself requires justification” (GM 3, 24, p.128). That is to say, to focus on the former aspect of the meaning of ‘value’ that our discussion has mainly addressed, namely, praiseworthiness, honorability, or greatness, Nietzsche does not seem to hold that scientific knowledge is to be universally approved in itself or irrespectively of its (actual or potential) relations. This also underlies Nietzsche’s harsh denunciations of men of knowledge, knowledge-seekers, and modern scientists, especially in BGE, We Scholars. For instance, Nietzsche counts “the man of science” as “an ignoble species of man” (p.133). Furthermore, “To the scholar”, he writes, “one concedes respectability, by way of compensation as it were – one emphasises the respectability … and experiences the same feeling of annoyance at having been constrained to this concession” (Ibid.). For him, therefore, knowledge is (only) a relational or extrinsic value. Its value is dependent upon its relation to something else valuable, more precisely, upon the formation of an intrinsically valuable whole of which it is a part, or its usefulness or necessity for an intrinsic value. Indeed, it is conducive to, or constitutive of, certain other values Nietzsche has in mind, and only
insofar as this is the case, it is of genuine worth. But Nietzsche would reject the belief in
the “absolute usefulness of knowledge” for these other values; in other words, the idea
that any given piece of knowledge is, or will be, of some kind of use for something else
valuable (GS 1, 37, p.55; Ibid. 5, 344, p.p.200−201). Nor does he seem to think that it
‘necessarily’ contributes to an intrinsic value as its part. Consequently, he would also
object to the conception of knowledge as an ‘unconditional’ value. That is to say, while
Nietzsche affirms its constitutive or instrumental roles in the formation of certain other
higher-order values, he maintains that its actual or potential contributions to them
depend on complex conditions involving the knowing agent himself. Nietzsche might
tell us that to understand this point we have only to imagine a person who lacks the
ability to deduce something from an empirical scientific framework or to apply the
knowledge to his own situations. And there cannot be anything ‘noble’ or ‘honorable’
about one’s knowledge or erudition, unless such complex conditions are met and thus,
the knowledge ‘functions’ or serves other values (cf. BGE 207, p.134). Moreover, one’s
knowledge about something could be even burdensome, “harmful”, “dangerous”, or
“disastrous” (GS 5, 344, p.200), and be instrumentally ‘bad’. Qualifying his own belief
in the value of knowledge, Nietzsche, so to speak, would claim that knowledge is a
‘conditional’, extrinsic or relational value. That is to say, it is valuable only insofar as it actually or potentially contributes to an intrinsic value either as its means or as its constituent. Furthermore, since its instrumental or constitutive ‘contribution’ depends on manifold factors, so does its worth⁹.

3) Why Knowledge?

It would be by now sensible to ask questions such as “Why does Nietzsche think that knowledge is valuable?” and “What does it have value for?” And again, these questions concern those higher-order values that are related to knowledge, and how they are related to it. Preliminarily, it is worth stressing that Nietzsche seems to honor knowledge for quite different reasons from those that modern industrialised society often

⁹ Stern presents a similar view on Nietzsche’s conception of the value of knowledge. According to Stern, “[t]he idealist ethic of knowledge, taken over by our scientists, is to be reversed. It is not man that is to be the servant of truth and knowledge shall be the servants of man. It is not knowledge and the pursuit of it that are absolute but ‘life’ and the personal being of those who heed its demands” (1978, p.66). Stern adds to this that “science and the pursuit of knowledge” “are approved when they further the cause of ‘life’ and denounced when they encroach upon it” (Ibid. p.69).
adduces in justifying or praising it. It is, in other words, not the case that Nietzsche is so much concerned with knowledge, for commercial, economic or technological reasons: because knowledge is the essential means of getting or keeping a job, producing goods, selling products or effecting technological innovations. Moreover, even though Nietzsche would agree that knowledge could produce ‘pleasure’, “joy”, or ‘happiness’, in a variety of ways (e.g. by fulfilling ‘curiosity’ or the ‘passion’ for knowledge) (GS 4, 324, p.181; 327, p.p.182~183), this does not seem to underpin Nietzsche’s respect for knowledge.

Above all, Nietzsche appears to value knowledge for its service for our ‘life’ itself⁴⁰. Nietzsche thus claims that “the value [of knowledge] for life is ultimately decisive” (WP 493, p.272), and that “knowledge” is “necessary for the preservation of life” (WP 494, p.272). Again, suggesting this point, he emphasises knowing “how to conserve oneself” (BGE 41, p.70). In view of the Nietzschean values that we discussed previously, it is obvious that Nietzsche would agree that ‘life’ itself or ‘its being preserved’ is extrinsically valuable. For, very simply, without our ‘existence’, the

⁴⁰Stern argues that for Nietzsche, “life is that which is enhanced and sustained by the true and authentic” (1978, p.70).
aforementioned ‘powers’, their growth, and creative way of life would be ‘impossible’; rather, life is the logical, necessary condition for all other values. And yet it can be doubted that Nietzsche believes that ‘life’ itself is also an ‘intrinsic’ value, in the strict sense of the term. But for Nietzsche, ‘life’ is definitely one of the values that give knowledge a meaning. We could agree with Nietzsche on the “life-preserving” character of knowledge, on empirical grounds. One of these could be that in virtue of the predictive force of empirical ‘facts’ and frameworks, we can avoid, or protect ourselves against, various things and events: direct ‘threats’ to life, e.g., poisonous foods, floods, fierce animals, or traffic accidents. Nietzsche himself might also have in mind this function of knowledge for ‘security’ in mentioning the life-preserving power of knowledge (WP 513, p.277). However, it is Nietzsche’s observation of the function of knowledge for both physiological and psychological ‘health’, which is also one of the things he appreciates so highly (TI 9, 20, p.90; Ibid. 33, p.96), that constitutes his argument for the necessity of knowledge for life. Health is itself one of the crucial values in his evaluative scheme, and since this is the case, naturally, this observation also directly supports Nietzsche’s valorisation of knowledge. By virtue of knowledge, we could prevent mental or physical ‘sickness’ as the combination of certain ‘symptoms’
characterisable by such terms as malfunction, dysfunction, decay, “degeneration”, “dissolution”, ‘vulnerability’ (the likeliness to fall into these states), or lack of resilience. Also, knowledge helps us effect cures (D 3, 202, p.p.121~122). Nietzsche thus stresses the role of genuine “physicians for whom that which has hitherto been called practical morality will have to have been transformed into an aspect of their science and art of healing”, and the teaching of “the care of the body or dietary theory” (Ibid. p.122).

It may be that Nietzsche emphasises the significance of scientific, ‘causal’ perspectives on forms of sickness, e.g. chronic “depression” or “listlessness”, which link these forms to other states as their coincident conditions, e.g. “physiological inhibition” or “distemper” and the further knowledge of the variables relevant to these conditions. For Nietzsche, a desirable cure for a given illness lies not in the temporary alleviation of its symptoms, but in their annihilation through effecting a change or removal of the underlying root, or in Nietzsche’s own terminology, “real cause” (GM 3, 16, p.107; Ibid. 17, p.108). The causal perspective stating the factors constitutive of the sufficient condition(s) of the type to which it pertains, being translatable into an ‘etiology’ enumerating the possible roots of the type would render it possible to correctly
“interpret” the given illness, or identify states on which it relies. Further, with the knowledge of what brings about the removal or change of these factors, one could reliably ‘predict’ the positive impact of a measure on the identified cause of the illness, and thus, on the illness itself (Ibid. p.109). Those forms of knowledge, thus constituting sound diagnoses and prescriptive predictions, would lead to an effective “combat” against the cause of the illness, and consequently, provide a genuine cure for it. It goes without saying that from the knowledge of variables involved in the generation or inhibition of the conditions of the illness, one could also infer which measures one should take in order to prevent it. In addition, Nietzsche contrasts etiologies composed of scientific, causal frameworks of sickness with ‘ignorant’, ‘religious’ ones, the preeminent example of which is, according to him, the Christian view of sickness as ‘punishment’ or the result of moral failures, sins, or depravities (A 49, p.177~178). Naturally, such an ignorant etiology propagated by fake “physicians”, which denies the real conditions of sickness or even postulates its ‘imaginary’ connections, through the false ‘interpretation’ of a given sickness would leave the causes intact and the sickness uncured. Moreover, since such a view, by means of falsity, exclusion, or negation, conditions the exposure and subjection to not only futile or superficial but also
‘aggravating’ measures, especially, moral and religious ones, that could make a sick person sicker. Nietzsche thus considers the inappropriate “causal sense” of sickness as the very obstacle to ‘scientific intervention’ and as the soil of the dependence on fake “saviors” (Ibid. p.177).

Nietzsche, however, might want to be more specific about the form of knowledge serving to maintain or restore our health and the way in which it does so. Here, let us re-start our discussion of the link between knowledge and health and the latter from the ‘objective’ side of the link, namely, health. Nietzsche keeps reminding us that both the effective combat of sickness and its prevention rely on our own repetitive, ‘bodily’ practices, or in his words, “countless little exercises” and abstinence from certain sorts of behaviour (D 5, 462, p.193). Nietzsche, for instance, says, “The means by which Julius Caesar defended himself against sickness and headache: tremendous marches, the simplest form of living, uninterrupted sojourn in the open air, continuous toil – these, broadly speaking, are the universal preservative and protective measures against the extreme vulnerability” (TI 9, 31, p.96). Also, he emphasises that even so-called ‘mental’ health heavily counts on such ‘corporeal’ measures of self-care. Speaking of ‘spiritual’
“beauty”, which for Nietzsche, consists in health (Ibid. 20, p.90), he argues that “the right place is the body, demeanor, diet, physiology: the rest follows”, and that “a mere disciplining of thoughts and feelings is virtually nothing” (Ibid. 47, p.112). In short, Nietzsche suggests that it is ‘knowledge’ that ultimately enables such healthy or “preservative and protective” patterns of behaviour. He implies this in saying:

The body purifies itself through knowledge; experimenting with knowledge it elevates itself … Physician, heal yourself: thus you will heal your patient too. Let his best healing-aid be to see with his own eyes him who makes himself well (Z 1, 22, 2, p.102). *Emphases added.

What matters here seems to be the knowledge of the connections between certain forms of practical measures of self-care and the recovery from types of unhealthy state or the connections between some forms of behaviour and those types or their conditions. For instance, we could reach such wisdom as “If one did regular exercises and some other conditions were met, then one would be cured of obesity” or “If one smokes
heavily for a considerable amount of time, it is highly likely that the one will get heart disease”. The knowledge of such general connections is nothing but what constitutes, or can be deduced from, the aforementioned ‘etiologies’ and the knowledge of the variables relevant to the conditions of sicknesses. But how is an individual’s repetitive performance of beneficial practices or his abstinence from harmful behaviours linked to his knowledge of the generally applicable connections involving the healthy practices or the harmful behaviours? What is the exact mechanism, in other words, involved in the link? Briefly, Nietzsche would say that through the process of “assimilating” the knowledge or “making it instinctive” (GS 1, 11, p.37), the individual can effect the practices or avoid the behaviour, and in this way, eventually, take advantage of the knowledge for his own health. In broad terms, the knowledge, through its application to himself and the prediction concerning his own case based on the application, can be, as it were, transformed into practical norms or plans and incorporated into his ethos as a system of such norms and goals. By acting in accordance with the norms, and by “experimenting” with the knowledge in so doing, he can turn these practices or abstinences into his “habits” (as opposed to actions or restraints based merely on his norms or rules) (D 5, 462, p.193). However, here, it would be sensible to ask exactly
what role the “experiment” plays in the achievement of healthy or protective habits. In relation to this question, Nietzsche seems to suggest the following. There may be a case where a person in need of a cure for an unhealthy state is given an empirical framework, which, involving the connection between the state and some measures, is a broad ‘generalization’, statement of probability, or ‘law’ with ‘indefinite’ conditions, and moreover, on the basis of which he cannot decide the appropriateness of the measures to his own situations. As such, the framework may not allow him to hold the anticipatory belief that he will benefit from the relevant measures as others do, after his reflection on the belief and its ground. Nevertheless, despite such an instability or disbelief, the person can decide to perform these practices. More precisely, he can at least resolve to “experiment” with the practices for the time being, and to postpone his decision to be fully committed to them. In acting in accordance with the short-term prescription of the practices, he will be able to see if some anticipated, positive changes will have actually happened, and to estimate the suitability of the measures for his own internal and external situations. Having undergone this ‘testing’ process, as Nietzsche suggests (D 5 453, p.191), the person will be in a ‘better’ position to make a further prediction, and thus, the person’s initial resolution or norm can be extended and precisely modified to
the decision to further his commitment to them. Or he can decide not to depend on them, and look for some sources to give him other experimental measures. In the former case, through further ‘obeying’ the norm imposing the practices, he can eventually make these habitual or “instinctive”.

So far, we have had a rather lengthy discussion of the relation between ‘life’ and knowledge and of that between ‘health’ and knowledge. Now, let us to turn to the other Nietzschean values that make knowledge meaningful or valuable. For Nietzsche, knowledge is one of the crucial components of the noble capacities introduced earlier. Further, it also promotes these capacities, or in Nietzsche’s own terms, helps us to “become what we are”, by informing us of various practices or exercises conducive to their growth (GS IV, 335, p.189). In other words, knowledge can be employed to devise “one’s own arts and stratagems for self-enhancement” (BGE 262, p.201). In these ways, it yields or constitutes the creative way of existence. Now, it is necessary to probe further into these points. First of all, as we have already seen, knowledge supports the healthy table of one’s own values and ‘ethos’ (as the system of self-regulative norms and goals). Knowledge is the material for the elaboration of the table and ethos, and for the creation
of new values, norms, and goals. In Nietzsche’s own terms, knowledge is useful for the “creation of tables of what is good and that are new and all our own”, and for the formation of “laws” (GS IV, 335, p.189). Knowledge thus constitutes the ‘self-commanding’ capacity and the ability to create the table of values, which are conducive to the creative way of life. To recapitulate, the healthy table of values or ethos, which contributes to the creative way of life as its important means, is, to focus on its formal aspect, coherent, complicated, and well-grounded, as opposed to that which is unsystematic, lacking in contents, ill-grounded or groundless. To be precise, what an individual’s healthy table of his own values or ethos consists in is the individual’s reliable prediction that forecasts what he himself should do in order to actualise his own ‘values’ (especially those judged to be good or desirable for him). That is to say, the former is composed of his ideals or goals and the prescriptions of some patterns of actions or norms imposing the patterns, and the latter are sustained by the anticipation of the ‘usefulness’ of the patterns for the ideals or ends (cf. BGE 262, p.201). In this sense, the healthy ethos is coherent, and its elements are systematically related to one another. Furthermore, the ideals or goals in the table of values or ethos Nietzsche now has in mind are themselves those specified, ‘individuated’, and made concrete by a similar type
of prediction. For instance, if the individual has decided to live as ‘a writer’, the anticipation, “I will be able to write novels far better than poems” can help to specify or make concrete his prior goal or ideal of ‘being a writer’. More significantly, this prediction or anticipation in which the sound table of values or ethos lies is based upon some correct knowledge, and in this sense is reliable or well-grounded. Now, to return to our main issue, Nietzsche would affirm that ‘self-knowledge’ in a certain sense is capable of constituting the right sort of ground of such anticipations, and thus, of making up or upholding the healthy table of values or ethos. The form of self-knowledge is sustained by the individual’s direct experiences of the effects of various sets of his own actions. Since this is the case, Nietzsche regards active self-experiments in everyday life or ‘experimental’ spirit as very important (D 1, 61, p. 37). He argues that for the realisation of our “new ideals”, “the best thing we can do is … to be as far as possible our own reges and found little experimental states”, and that “we are experiments” (D 5, 453, p.191). That is to say, the individual can literally “experiment” with practical measures supposedly or hypothetically suitable for his ideal or goal. In other words, he can adopt such measures to see whether they are indeed applicable to his own situations. Furthermore, he can also try various forms of activity pertaining to, or subsumed under,
his rather abstract, indefinite, or undifferentiated value or goal, e.g. ‘a creator’ or ‘creative life’. In this manner, he can estimate his own ability or aptitude for these activities. Such ‘experimental’ measures may be taken from various sources, namely, observations of others’ cases, others’ recommendations, “moralities” (D 1, 61, p.37), “religions” (BGE 61, p.86), and some scientific generalisations I mentioned earlier.

Secondly, the other form of knowledge Nietzsche regards as capable of forming or maintaining a healthy table of values or ethos, of course, is the empirical framework concerning the universal order of things which we have already addressed. As Nietzsche writes:

We, however, want to become who we are – human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, create themselves! To that end we must become the best students and discoverers of everything lawful and necessary in the world – we must become physicists in order to be creators in this sense – while hitherto all valuations and ideals have been built on ignorance of physics or in contradiction to it. So long live physics! (GS 4, 335, p.189)
Considered simply in its context, “physics” in the above quotation should not be taken literally. It rather represents general empirical frameworks stating universal orders or regularities of various types of thing, especially, ‘causal’ ones, from which we can deduce something and take up some practical implications for our own situation. However, as Nietzsche implies, these frameworks do not have to be classifiable as ‘strict laws’ containing only a limited number of variables and completely excluding indefinite conditions. We should also appreciate the role of empirical knowledge that takes the form of generalization, and concerns various connections or regularities broadly applicable to human beings or those belonging to a certain class. The typical examples are psychological ‘laws’ (in the loose sense of the term) or theories. That is to say, some of the former, once their implications for us are taken up, are able to properly ground anticipations concerning our own cases, and thus to form or sustain our healthy tables of our own values or goals. On the other hand, some others, by giving us opportunities for our experiments on certain measures, and rendering the examined sort of self-knowledge possible, can also contribute to the construction or strengthening of the ground of our own values.
Next, Nietzsche suggests that knowledge also has great worth as a component of self-discipline or the disposition for self-overcoming. Remember that the capacity or disposition involves various arts or skills of controlling, sublimating, or employing desires and feelings, and those of transforming one’s troublesome personal tendencies or propensities. And knowledge contributes to these arts, that is, the knowing of *how to* overcome oneself with respect to one’s affectivity. Finally and most importantly, some true empirical frameworks (or empirically sustained true beliefs) form the process of the production of an original and influential work itself, and thus, *constitute* creative power or capacity, as was briefly mentioned earlier. In this respect, knowledge contributes to creativity or the creative way of life as its *part*, and therefore, it is a constitutive value. This is perhaps the most important reason that Nietzsche has for valuing knowledge. He implies this, in letting Zarathustra say that “you should learn only for creating” (Z 3, 12, 16, p.223). Let us also appreciate the following passages in this connection:

In knowing and understanding, too, I feel only my will’s delight in begetting and becoming; and if there be innocence in my knowledge it
is because will to begetting is in it (Z 2, 2, p.111).

And you too, enlightened man, are only a path and footstep of my will: truly, my will to power walks with the feet of your will to truth (Ibid.,12, p.138)

Nietzsche would say that great intelligence, imaginative power, insightfulness and refined sensitivity or sensibility, are indeed constitutive of creative capacity and the creative way of life. However, he would also contend that innovative works capable of promoting our growth and transforming our life into an intense, creative one could not be expected from an ‘ignorant’ or ill-educated ‘creator’. Nietzsche seems to be convinced that this holds true even of the realm of ‘artistic’ creation. For instance, he observes that Goethe “called to his aid history, natural sciences, antiquity” (TI 9, 49, p.114). Nietzsche, in particular, links knowledge to the creativity of philosophers, precisely, to their creations of philosophical systems, especially, ethical ones including perspectives on value. With respect to the relation between value-creation and knowledge, Nietzsche argues that “their [philosophers’] ‘knowing’ is creating, their
creating is a law-giving, their will to truth is – *will to power*” (BGE 211, p.143). Again, Nietzsche contends that “*all* disciplines have to prepare the future task of the philosopher: this task being understood as the solution of the *problem of value*, the determination of the *hierarchy of values*” (GM 1, 17, p. 38). Of course, the ‘values’ that Nietzsche regards as the most significant objectives of philosophical creativity do not count as an individual’s own or personal values which we discussed in the context of the personal ethos and *self*-commanding capacity. Rather, these significant values concern *us*, and have a broad range of application, not limited to particular individuals, in particular, their creators. But why is knowledge relevant to the form of value-creation? How can we make sense of Nietzsche’s call for “the most amicable and fruitful exchange” between “philosophy”, “physiology”, “history”, and “medicine” in the creation of our values? (Ibid. p.37) Obviously, Nietzsche would agree that as in the case of the creation of an individual’s own values, empirical knowledge helps to establish *connections* between some patterns of behaviour and those which are desirable or ideal for us or our values already posited in a normative ethical system. In this way, knowledge can give birth to some ‘instrumental’ values, and by the same token, constitute a good, solid *ground* or reason for the latter. One could, however, ask further, “Is that all that one can expect
from knowledge in constructing an ethical system?" or “Can a perspective of intrinsic or ultimate values be supported by empirical knowledge?” I do not intend to discuss Nietzsche’s position on this matter now. I will engage with such questions in Chapter 5, where I will consider whether or not Nietzsche himself puts forward any justification for his own perspective on intrinsic value.

Thus far, we have discussed the creative way of life as the locus of value in Nietzsche’s evaluative standard and some crucial merits that are constitutive of, or necessary for, it. To summarise, the creative way of life consists in creative capacity (which Nietzsche seems to mean by “power”) and powerful and intensive creative activity (or the active and fruitful pursuit of an original and influential work). Thus it can also be defined in terms of the active exertion or expression of the sort of capacity. Precisely because this is the case, i.e. it is an element essential to the intrinsically valuable whole, creative capacity is an excellence. It is a constitutive value rather than an instrumental one. Self-discipline, the capacity for self-commanding and the healthy form of ethos, as qualities underlying Nietzschean ‘self-mastery’, ‘autonomy’ or ‘freedom’, play significant, instrumental roles in the way of life. Rather, they form the
basis of organized and intensive creative activity, of which the creative way of life consists. Strong affectivity, vitality, and health, functioning as (direct) sources of such activity, are necessary for the intrinsic value, too. In addition, they are conducive to “growth” in the sense of the cultivation or enhancement of the praiseworthy capacities, especially, the power of creation. Finally, knowledge contributes to the creative way of life, by constituting the noble capacities. The merits discussed above thus form the necessary (internal) condition for the creative way of life. As such, they characterize the “higher man”, who is “rare exception” and is able, or internally well prepared, to live the form of life: the ‘higher’ type of individual is in essence composed of those merits. By contrast, people of the “herd” type, which accounts for the vast majority of people and is the antithesis of the higher type, are lacking in them.

Now, however, the aforementioned Nietzschean excellences do not exhaust his evaluative standard. On the contrary, a large part of his theory of merit has not been illuminated: his theory of virtues (as excellences of character or noble dispositions). Indeed, as was mentioned in Introduction, virtues constitute a major part of his evaluative standard and their discussion is central to Nietzsche’s ethical discourse.
Broadly speaking, Nietzschean virtues seem to be (merely) *instrumental* values. They are valuable only insofar as they are *conducive* to the creative way of life, which is the intrinsically valuable whole. They function as (direct) sources of the kind of activity in which the way of life consists. Or they are useful for the attainment or further enhancement of the noble capacities, especially, creative powers. In Nietzsche’s own terminology, virtues are the “most personal necessity” (A 11, p.133) and “conditions of precisely our own [creative] existence and growth” (WP 326, p.178). Hence, despite Nietzsche’s great emphasis on virtues, it seems to be fair to discriminate between him and traditional or classical virtue ethicists (such as Aristotle). To put this in another way, Nietzsche’s ethics is not classifiable as a ‘virtue ethics’ in the *strict* or narrow sense of the term. Whereas Nietzschean excellences of character are (merely) ‘instrumental’ values, for the traditional virtue ethicists, virtues are ‘constitutive’ ones. According to the latter, that is to say, virtues (such as courage, honesty and generosity) are *essential constituents* of the intrinsically valuable whole, namely, ‘human flourishing’. Living in a flourishing way, as the locus of value, *consists in* the possession of the dispositions and the activity that manifests them. Human flourishing lies in activity *in accordance with* the virtues, which explains the ‘value’ of these dispositions. But they are valuable only
insofar as they jointly constitute the intrinsic value, namely, human flourishing (or ‘happiness’ in the objective sense of the term): they are valueless in isolation or without one another. Thus, for these ethicists, the virtues are extrinsic or relational values; yet, they are constitutive values rather than instrumental ones. However, again, the Nietzschean creative way of life (as the ultimate locus of value) seems to be specifiable independently of virtues, or the latter are not treated as constitutive ingredients of the former. Rather, they are valuable only as means towards the intrinsically valuable life.

Some of the virtues Nietzsche presents seem to be those which play significant (instrumental) roles in the creative way of life. These Nietzschean virtues are indispensable or highly effective sources of the activity of which the creative way of life is composed: they are either necessary for powerful and intensive creative activity, or highly contributive to its further intensification or maximization. In Nietzsche’s own vocabulary, they are “conditions most appropriate” for the most active or fullest employment of creative capacity, and thus, for a creative person’s “most beautiful fruitfulness” (GM III, 8, p.88). Furthermore, these virtues are largely conducive to the attainment or enhancement of the noble capacities, especially, creative powers. In
addition, naturally, the Nietzschean virtues ‘necessary’ for the creative way of life (e.g. honesty, solitude, courage and magnanimity) also make up the essence of the “higher man”. Now, in the following two chapters, I will try to examine Nietzsche’s theory of virtue in a detailed manner. I propose to focus on crucial Nietzschean virtues, which play the significant roles in the intrinsic value.

CHAPTER 2: Nietzsche’s Theory of Virtues I

1. Honesty

1) The Nature of Honesty

Let us now explore Nietzsche’s theory of virtues. I wish to begin the discussion
with a virtue closely related to knowledge, namely, “honesty”\textsuperscript{11} (D V, 556, p.224)\textsuperscript{12}, which he does seem to equate with “intellectual conscience” (BGE 230, p.161; GS I, 2, p.p.29~30) or “truthfulness” (GS V, 357, p.219)\textsuperscript{13}. Nietzsche affirms its value, saying, “Honesty – granted that this is our virtue, from which we cannot get free, we free spirits – well, let us labour at it with all love and malice and not weary of ‘perfecting’ ourselves in our virtue, the only one we have” (BGE 227, p.156). Moreover, honesty is an essential characteristic of the “higher man”; in Nietzsche’s own vocabulary, the quality “separates the higher human beings from the lower” (GS I, 2, p.30). To begin with, it is necessary to articulate what this value consists in. Roughly speaking, honesty could be formulated as the tendency to strive to tell oneself truth, or more precisely, to believe what is known to be true. In virtue of the disposition taken as such, in certain circumstances, one is not only strongly motivated for truth, but also engaged in activities

\textsuperscript{11} Redlichkeit

\textsuperscript{12} Speaking of ‘honesty’ in his evaluative discourse, Nietzsche mostly points to honesty with oneself rather than towards others. And the former, honesty with oneself, is what we are going to discuss here.

\textsuperscript{13}Commentators such as Maudemarie Clark (1990, p.196), Richard Schacht (1983, p.442), and Bernard Williams (2001, xvii) also appear to take Nietzsche as identifying honesty with intellectual conscience or truthfulness. But Alan White, in his article on honesty entitled The Youngest Virtue, objects to this and argues that “Redlichkeit” “must be something more or other than truthfulness” (2001, p.65). I will make some comments on this objection later.
conductive to, or constitutive of, the attainment of truth: in brief, one is “hard” in pursuing truth (Ibid.)\textsuperscript{14}. As such, it is the main characteristic of the “man of knowledge” (D V, 551, p.222). Negatively put, intellectual conscience is also identical with the tendency to strive not to tell oneself untruth, in particular, not to lie to oneself. It thus underlies one’s aversion to untruth and patterns of behaviour aimed at avoiding, or escaping from, untruth, or in Nietzsche’s own expression, at keeping or restoring “intellectual cleanliness” (GS V, 357, p.219).\textsuperscript{15} However, the relevant notion still

\textsuperscript{14} According to Williams’s formulation, honesty “embraces the need to find out the truth, to hold on to it, and to tell it – in particular, to oneself.” (2001, xvii).

\textsuperscript{15} As I believe, however, honesty should not be confused with what Nietzsche means by “will to truth”. By the latter notion, Nietzsche would appear to point to the ‘resolution’ to pursue truth or such a striving that is based on the internalisation of the relatively new ingredient of the dominant morality that we discussed earlier, namely, the appreciation of truth or knowledge as an overriding, intrinsic value (See, for instance, GS V, 344, p.p.200–201). As we already saw, Nietzsche harshly criticises the modern idealisation of truth, and repudiates it as a disguised form of ascetic ideal, for which reason he often problematises the will to truth. Clark seems to understand the will to truth in a similar way, and thus, identifies it as “a moral commitment to truthfulness [i.e. the pursuit of knowledge or truth] regardless of its long term utility” (1990, p.187) or “the commitment to truth at any price” (Ibid. p.195). By contrast, ‘honesty’ qua virtue is an (emotional) ‘disposition’, rather than a moral-evaluative commitment. Similarly, one does not have to endorse the particular mode of evaluation of knowledge or truth in order to qualify as ‘honest’. In addition, Nietzsche also believes that honesty has something to do with prevalent, conventional morality, and precisely, that the latter is a condition under which the former can be fostered. As Nietzsche puts this, “among the forces cultivated by morality was truthfulness” (WP 5, p.10). In particular, the rigorous
remains elusive and needs to be clarified. In further analysing the notion, for the purpose of exposition, I will portray a person who Nietzsche has in mind when speaking of ‘honesty’, and contrast this person with people who he often criticises for lacking the quality at issue.

(1) Firstly, one ‘moment’ of honesty consists in the objective towards both others’ and one’s own views, and the ability to abstain from blindly accepting others’ opinions (A 54, p.p.184–185; GS V, 347, p.206). Thus, it is wanting to see the truth or falsity of others’ or one’s own views, that is, to judge their truth-value on some right sorts of ground that represents the spirit of honesty. But honesty is not just the desiring of this ‘end’ in such a circumstance. It also involves the ability to achieve such ends, and as such, is in essence the readiness to do certain forms of behaviour constitutive of, or conducive to, truth-determination. But what would an honest person’s typical behaviour be like, if he had chosen to exert, or behave in accordance with, his honesty construed in this way? Or how does his “virtue” manifest itself in concrete situations? With respect to his relations to prescription of telling truth (to others) and valorisation of the character of truthfulness helps to develop the disposition at issue (cf. Schacht, 1983). According to Nietzsche, “the concept of truthfulness” of “Christian morality” “was taken ever more rigorously”, and “the father confessor’s refinement of the Christian conscience” was “translated and sublimated into a scientific conscience” (GS V, 357, p.219).
external views, confronted with another’s opinion, this honest person will first assume “neutrality of sentiment” or “objectivity” (D II, 111, p. 66). In other words, he will take a neutral stance on the opinion. He will not accept the other’s view immediately, that is, without any ‘objective’ engagement with it. Even if he is immediately ‘attracted’ to an external view merely subjectively, the honest man will soon reflect on his agreement with it, think of the possibility of its being false or of his prior, opposing view being right, and suspend the positive attitude taken. In this sense, the “truthful man” is a “skeptic” (A 54, p.p.184~185). But not limited to viewing the other’s opinion skeptically in such a way, he will further attempt to rigorously determine its truth-value. So, to begin with, he will try to determine it through the other’s and his own “reasons” (GS I, 2, p.30). He will thus demand reasons from the other, check their coherence, and “question” them thoroughly (Ibid.). And if the given opinion is indeed tenable or objective, and the other has acceptable reasons, through the careful examination of which its truth is universally decidable, these procedures will naturally help the honest person to establish the truth of the opinion. Or the honest person will search for his own possible reasons for or against the opinion, and access them. However, if he cannot judge the truth-value of the opinion based on the available reasons, by reminding himself of this in his ordinary life, he will try
to hold a neutral or relaxed attitude towards the relevant matter, until he encounters some
decisive evidence for or against the opinion. Moreover, he will be inclined to carry out
some independent ‘enquiries’ to find out whether the opinion in question is indeed true or
false: he does not, so to speak, “easily let go of the questionable character of things” (GS
V, 375, p.240). Similarly, concerning his relations with his own beliefs, the honest man is
aware of the conceivability of their falsity, and is thus able to view them from the third-
person standpoint. He is able to demand reasons for the beliefs from himself, and to
challenge them. In particular, this capability expresses itself in his confrontation with
external views incompatible with his own beliefs. That is, instead of dogmatically and
self-righteously asserting ‘No’ against competing views, he, standing in the middle
between these and his own views, or “withdrawing to a neutral corner”\footnote{Clark, 1990}, listens to the
grounds for the former, and examines his own reasons for the latter. In such a reflective
process, he may be able to find himself committed to a groundless or ill-grounded belief,
in which case, by reminding himself of the groundless or ‘unbinding’ character of the
belief, he will neutralise or weaken his attitude towards the relevant matter in his ordinary
life. In Nietzsche’s own terms, he will “maintain” himself “on light ropes and

\footnote{Clark, 1990}
possibilities” (GS V, 347, p.206). In so doing, he will be inclined to further strive for the truth of the matter. To this end, for instance, he will carry out some “experiments” (GS IV, 319, p. 179): seeing that the truth or falsity can be revealed or is knowable through certain procedures - and the direct observations of their results - he will try these procedures.

By contrast, people lacking intellectual conscience, whom Nietzsche would also call “believers” (GS V, 347, p. 206), “the antagonists of the truthful man”, or “men of conviction” (A 54, p.185), would not behave in these ways in similar circumstances. In their encounters with others’ opinions, they, depending on merely subjective states or the authority of the latter, tend to immediately endorse these opinions. Neither reflecting on their endorsement, nor thinking of other possibilities, the opinions soon become incorporated into their belief systems operating in their ordinary lives. Even if they have some ‘doubts’ here, they do not proceed further: they hardly enquire into the ‘reasons’ for the external views. They, so to speak, “would rather see gestures than listen to reasons” (Ibid.). As for their own beliefs, they likewise rarely think of possibilities other than those which their doxastic views affirm. Though they sometimes do, they do not extend these ‘objective’, doubting states of mind for long nor do they try to judge
whether the beliefs are true or false: they easily put aside the problems of the truth of their beliefs. Since this is the case, they normally live their lives without realising that they merely believe some things, not knowing them. One psychological factor involved in their “not wanting to know what is true” (A 52, p.181) is their fear for the negation or destabilising of their long-standing beliefs that their doubts may cause, and eventually for some negative consequences of this fear. As Nietzsche puts this, “the believer is not free to have a conscience at all over the question of ‘true’ and ‘false’: to be honest on this point would mean his immediate destruction” (A 54, p.185).

(2) Secondly, however, ‘seeing what is true’ is not what honesty ultimately aims at, as our initial definition of honesty, namely, the tendency to strive for ‘beliefs’ known to be true, implies. That is to say, the other aspect or moment of honesty is the inclination and ability to ‘believe’ in accordance with what one has thus seen or established. Relevant to this, as was implied in the foregoing analysis, honesty also consists in the awareness of the in ability to see what is true about a matter, and it thus involves intellectual ‘modesty’ in a certain sense. Specifically, if the honest person can establish the truth or falsity of another’s or his own belief in the manner described above, he will be able to assimilate or reject it, so that his belief system can mirror that judgement of truth. One might think that honesty construed as such is not particular to some people, and thus, cannot count as a virtue. Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly, Nietzsche suggests that honesty understood as such is not shared by everyone. Rather, many people,
after having grasped the truth or falsity of a belief in objective or neutral manners, hold attitudes *incompatible* with these judgements of truth in their everyday lives. These attitudes will depend on various psychological factors, e.g. ‘interests’ in the attitudes themselves, their ‘habitual’ nature, and peer pressure. Here, Nietzsche seems to hold that honest or not, one can fall into a kind of distortion under such subjective conditions. But ‘dishonest’ people Nietzsche problematises here are neither inclined nor able to correct such states of disintegration, and instead, keep them throughout their lives. He also assumes that in such a case, certain inner circumstances need to be created in order to *believe* something as one has *seen* or grasped it, and that these indeed distinguish honest men and the others, or explain the difference in the degree of consistency between the two.\(^{17}\) In other words, the honest person is the one who, by creating some such inner conditions, is able to prevent or overcome this disintegration or inconsistency. By contrast, dishonest people tend to keep repressing or inhibiting these psychological conditions so as to maintain their illusions, the negation of which appears to them to be threatening. In this sense, they *deceive* themselves and are ‘dishonest’ (GS I, 29, p.51). According to Nietzsche, “in order to lie” to oneself, “one would have to be able to decide *what* is true” (A 55, p.186). Further, Nietzsche writes:

> I call a lie: wanting *not* to see something one does see, wanting not to see *as* one sees … The common lie is the lie one tells to oneself; lying to

\(^{17}\) Probably these internal circumstances include repeatedly saying ‘No’ to oneself: more precisely, to one’s own habitual, illusory voices.
others is relatively the exception. Now this desiring not to see what one sees, this desiring not to see as one sees, is virtually the primary condition for all who are in any sense party: the party man necessarily becomes a liar (Ibid.).

In addition, Nietzsche detects the “tremendous dishonesty” particularly in those he calls “the apostate[s] of the free spirit”, and harshly criticises them for this (D I, 56, p.p.34~35). These people abandon their own beliefs and submit to others’ incompatible views that they know to be false, out of the recognition that the former are impermissible or the latter are “prevalent” (GS 1, 25, p.50). In such ways, they can be “honest” with others since they no longer need to hide their views, but in exchange for this, they become dishonest with themselves (TI 9, 18, p.88).

2) Is Honesty an Intrinsic Value?

So far, we have tried to make sense of Nietzsche’s notion of honesty. Now it is time to raise the questions of whether honesty possesses intrinsic worth or not, and of
why Nietzsche values it if it is an extrinsic value. Even though Nietzsche praises this disposition as the “youngest virtue”, “a virtue in the process of becoming” (D V, 456, p.191), or “that which separates the higher human beings from the lower” (GS I, 2, p.30), he does not appear to believe that it is an ‘intrinsic’ value even in the broad sense of the term. That is to say, for Nietzsche, it is a merely instrumental value: it is valuable only insofar as it contributes to other values as their means. One rationale for interpreting Nietzsche in this way is that as we already saw in discussing his appraisal of knowledge, he expresses an extremely scornful attitude towards “men of knowledge” or modern scientists, but at the same time he would attribute the same ‘honesty’ as described above to those people. Nietzsche thus seems to suggest that one could not confer value on their ‘honesty’, since the latter, that which facilitates or motivates ‘pursuits’ of truth, hardly functions in ways which produce worthwhile fruits: They, the “men of knowledge”, misuse or abuse the quality. Or rather, their ‘honest’, habitual inclinations lack value, for they fail to impose proper, higher ‘ends’ or directions on those ‘urges’. Further, let us consider the following passages:

Our honesty, we free spirits – let us see to it that our honesty does
not become our vanity, our pomp and finery, our limitation, our stupidity! Every virtue tends towards stupidity, every stupidity, towards virtue … let us see to it that through honesty we do not finally become saints and bores! (BGE 227, p. 157)

…we ourselves are likely to be least inclined to dress up in moralistic verbal tinsel and valences of this sort: all our labour hitherto has spoiled us for this taste and its buoyant luxuriousness. They are beautiful, glittering, jingling, festive words: honesty, love of truth, love of wisdom, sacrifice for the sake of knowledge, heroism of the truthful – there is something about them that makes one’s pride swell. But we hermits and marmots long ago became convinced that this worthy verbal pomp too belongs among the ancient false finery, lumber and gold-dust of unconscious human vanity … (BGE 230, p.162)

In the former quoted passage, Nietzsche appears to suggest that one’s honesty can lose its genuine worth and become a mere stupidity and a ‘fake’ virtue, if one employs it in
some stupid ways (like those in which “saints” and “bores” use their honesty). In the second one, Nietzsche seems to say that a certain mode of the valorisation of the same honesty or truthfulness (rather than its valorisation per se) is false, and further, this form of value-judgement is merely reflective of “human vanity”. But how is Nietzsche’s own evaluative perspective of the same quality distinguished from the perspective he objects to here? It would be reasonable to read Nietzsche as disagreeing with the ordinary perspective in that conferring unconditional, ‘intrinsic’ worth on ‘honesty’ or ‘truthfulness’, it often pays ‘undue’ respect to the quality, or makes one ‘undeservedly’ pride oneself on it.

3) The Roles of Honesty

Having said that, for Nietzsche, what makes honesty (as construed in the above manner) an honourable quality? First of all, the value of honesty derives from that of knowledge as one of its ‘immediate’ consequences, or put in another way, that honesty is indeed ‘conducive’ to knowledge. Implying this, Nietzsche contends that the honesty or “scientific conscience” of the man of knowledge has helped to overcome various Christian,
religious-moral doctrines, by ‘falsifying’ them, i.e., by revealing truths as their antitheses or rendering knowledge against them possible (GS IV, 357, p.219). He also claims that people who are devoid of honesty are “not predestined for knowledge” (Ibid. I, 25, p.50).

Now, if our above analysis of the notion of honesty is correct, it seems that given that analysis, we may easily understand why for Nietzsche honesty is conducive to the attainment of knowledge. Nietzsche would first tell us that an honest person, by definition, is not only strongly inclined, but also able to establish the truth or falsity of others’ or his own opinions on reliable grounds. In other words, the active ‘pursuits’ of such aims which the honest man exhibits are neither useless nor arbitrary, although this does not mean that his search for truth is ‘necessarily’ successful. Further, as we also have seen, the person is in essence capable of incorporating opinions thus known to be true in his ordinary life or ‘live with’ them without inconsistency. But this seems to be tantamount to saying that the person is able to know something, not merely believe it: beliefs thus assimilated, founded on some right sorts of grounds, would satisfy the criteria of knowledge, and indeed, denote what we mean by the word, ‘knowledge’\textsuperscript{18}.

However, we have already seen that for Nietzsche, the value of knowledge itself derives from, and is contingent upon, its constitutive or instrumental *contributiveness* to other values, namely, creativity, self-discipline, the capacity for self-commanding, the table of one’s own values, the preservation of life, and health. Hence, the latter, not truth or knowledge *per se*, make up the source of the value of honesty, and thus, constitute Nietzsche’s ‘ultimate’ reason for the appreciation of the quality. Accordingly, Nietzsche would deny that one’s honesty is praiseworthy even if the knowledge or truth that it produces has little use, and especially, hardly contributes to the maintenance or achievement of the above higher-order values. Honesty, in other words, attains worth, insofar as it eventually leads to these values, *through* producing knowledge or truth. It is based on these evaluative considerations that Nietzsche devalues the honesty of the majority of modern scientists or men of knowledge, and ridicules that of saints and ‘bores’. As Nietzsche seems to hold, their honesty does not deserve applause or respect. The reason is that they do not ‘benefit’ from their massive knowledge produced from the ceaseless struggles. In summary, from Nietzsche’s perspective, their honesty is nothing but an exhaustive, blind obsession with ‘truth’.
The second reason that Nietzsche believes in the value of honesty is that it serves the immunity or liberation from ‘untruths’, more precisely, falsifiable beliefs and those beliefs whose truth is unknown or unknowable. According to Nietzsche, “the occasional will of the spirit to let itself be deceived” is “counteracted by that sublime inclination in the man of knowledge who takes a profound, many sided and thorough view of things” (BGE 230, p.161). Honesty frees one from illusions, for by definition it involves the ability to falsify a given opinion, to protect oneself from, or give up, beliefs known to be false, and to abstain from a rigid, dogmatic view of a matter whose truth is not decidable. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Nietzsche does not appear to consider falsities or mere opinions as despicable in themselves (GS V, 344, p.201). Rather, according to him, untruth is merely ‘instrumentally’ so, or in other words not every untruth is a disvalue. Moreover, he holds that some false beliefs or mere opinions do possess instrumental worth under certain conditions (involving the type of the knowing agent), and in this sense, like their antitheses, truths or knowledge, they are conditional, extrinsic values. More precisely, they are (merely) instrumental values (Ibid.). With respect to ‘falsehood’ in general, Nietzsche writes:
The falseness of a judgement is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgement … The question is to what extent it is life-advancing, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-breeding; and our fundamental tendency is to assert that the falsest judgements … are the most indispensable to us …, that to renounce false judgements would be to renounce life, would be to deny life. To recognize untruth as a condition of life: that, to be sure, means to resist customary value-sentiments in a dangerous fashion (BGE 4, p.p.35~36)

Also, as for mere faiths, Nietzsche regards “conviction” as a “means” and declares that “there is much one can achieve only by means of a conviction”, and that “grand passion uses and uses up conviction” (A 54, p.184). Conversely, some falsities or mere opinions are instrumentally indecent because they hinder the advent of the Nietzschean values and are extremely detrimental to life and growth, which is indeed what constitutes Nietzsche’s argument for the value of honesty. According to Nietzsche, the Christian moral-religious doctrines (including that of the ‘moral world-order’ that we discussed in
connection with ‘health’ and ‘knowledge’), from which he thinks the honesty of the modern scientific spirit has liberated us, instantiate such falsities or mere faiths. Now, since untruth is not intrinsically disgraceful, Nietzsche would ‘disapprove’ of a person’s honesty, if out of it, the person renounces untruths that are innocuous, and moreover, serve the person’s preservation, growth, or intensification. Moreover, as Nietzsche believes, under some conditions, honesty undermines even such ‘healthy’ untruths and in this sense, “we must not refuse the disadvantages it brings” (WP 945, p.498), which means that it can be dishonorable. For him, in other words, honesty as a genuinely venerable quality is not the ‘blind’ hatred for untruth or the unconditional pursuit of “intellectual cleanliness”.

Finally, Nietzsche suggests that the value of honesty depends heavily on some capacities of the agent to whom it belongs or who uses it. First of all, in order for a person’s honesty to be worthwhile, he should be able to reflect on the ‘meaning’ of the truth of the matter that his honesty habitually desires to see in a situation. Furthermore, he should have the capacity to decide whether to pursue that urge in the light of his other ‘needs’ or ‘ends’ (involving the Nietzschean values, of course), and to ‘control’ the quality, if he has decided not to act in accordance with it in this manner. Otherwise the
person would be engaged in ‘chaotic’ struggles for truth, and only dangerous, meaningless, or trivial pieces of knowledge could arise from his honesty, which underlies Nietzsche’s great emphasis on the mastery of one’s virtues (BGE 212, p.144; Ibid. 284, p.214)\(^{19}\). Next, since the value of knowledge relies on the person’s ability to actively employ it, so does that of his honesty. In particular, his knowledge and honesty can possess splendour, on the condition that he is equipped with the ability to

\(^{19}\) Though he does not clearly formulate the notion of honesty, Alan White appears to regard the notion itself as involving the sort of mastery mentioned here, which seems to underlie his claim that honesty “must be something more or other than truthfulness”. For him, it seems, honesty by definition is, or contains, something over truthfulness. That is, he thinks that honesty has to do with the ‘will to life’ and is the pursuit or incorporation of truth in the interests of life, or what renders this possible (2001, p.72). As he suggests this, “Redlichkeit requires insisting on the absence of utterly reliable stabilities or identities. But it requires as well denial that life in a world without stabilities must be horrible…To the few, the death of God appears as the obliterating of the horizon. To Nietzsche and his fellow ‘philosophers and free spirit’, it appears at least potentially as the opening of the horizons of a host of fascinating ways of thinking and living” (Ibid. p.76). Although I fully agree that for Nietzsche, the ‘mastery’ over truthful inclinations is very important and the pursuit or assimilation of truth guided by the question of life eventually matters, as my discussion of honesty above implies, I do not accept White’s account of the notion. For me, the form of mastery is not a defining characteristic of the notion of honesty, and honesty is something that needs to be guided or controlled by the consideration of the interests of life. Recall BGE 227 that I quoted earlier. There, Nietzsche warns us that “through honesty (Redlichkeit)” we could “finally become saints and bores” (p.157). Further, Nietzsche even says that “honesty (Redlichkeit)” could “lead us to nausea and suicide” by leading us to, or reminding us of, “insights into delusion and error as a condition of cognitive and sentient existence” (GS II, 107, p.104).
appropriate the practical implications of his knowledge. He can then exploit them for the
discovery of the means of his posited goals and thus for the establishment of new goals
and prescriptive norms.

2. Solitude and the “Mask”

1) What Does Solitude Consist in?

So far, we have discussed Nietzsche’s appraisal of honesty or truthfulness. Now, let us
turn to what Nietzsche might categorise as a ‘social’ virtue or a virtue relevant to our
relations with others, namely, “solitude”.20 Indeed, Nietzsche greatly emphasises the
virtue, and consistently argues for its value in many of his works. For example, he writes:

20 Robert Solomon, in his article, “Nietzsche’s Virtues: A Personal Inquiry”, rightly counts solitude as one
And to remain master of one’s four virtues: courage, insight, sympathy, solitude. For solitude is with us a virtue: it is a sublime urge and inclination for cleanliness which divines that all contact between man and man – ‘in society’ – must inevitably be unclean (BGE 284, p.214).

He declares that ‘nobleness’ consists in “solitude” (WP 943, p.496), and that “solitude” is one of the principal characteristics of “free spirits” or “new philosophers” for whom he shows respect (BGE 44, p.73). Furthermore, as was mentioned earlier, it also characterizes the “higher” type of man. But what is the nature of this virtue? Firstly, the notion of solitude here could be defined as the tendency to “be alone” (D IV, 249, p.143), or put in a negative way, to refrain from being or communicating with others. Secondly, as the above quoted passage suggests, the notion of solitude here can be also defined in terms of the inclination and ability to “be by oneself” and to abstain from being with others (BGE 212, p.144). Specifically, a solitary person, as Nietzsche understands him, does not contact others frequently, and normally spends time alone. But the normal state of being alone
cannot be said to be entirely against his wishes or desires: he experiences little ‘fear’ or abomination of the state, and on the contrary, knows how to ‘enjoy’ going his way alone (D V, 566, p.277). Moreover, he often feels reluctant or indifferent to the communication with others available to him (GS V, 364, p.229). Finally, he has the ability for the “endurance” of such feelings as ‘loneliness’ that he may occasionally undergo in remaining alone (D V, 443, p.188), and can be thus contrasted with those who, oversensitive to such feelings, constantly escape from the state, in situations where it is necessary or inevitable.

Some qualifications, however, have to be made with respect to the solitary man’s inclination not to be with others. That is to say, it should be noted that this ‘aversion’ or indifference Nietzsche posits as constitutive of solitude is that to the communication with a type of people, namely, those whom Nietzsche calls the herd, rather than others per se. (The herd by nature lacks the qualities characteristic of the “higher” type of individual, and as such, is deficient in the aforementioned noble capacities and states) Nietzsche seems to appear to approve of the inclination and ability for the authentic or “honest” communication with “friends” of the “higher” nature, or those in possession of those
capacities and states and virtues (GS II, 61, p.72; IV, 329, p.183, Z I, 16, p.86). Thus, it would not be quite right to regard the solitary man as ‘unsociable’. Rather, the solitary man, as Nietzsche depicts him, keeps meaningful, enjoyable relationships with a few honorable people, feels ‘inclined’ to see them, and welcomes contacts with new people like them. Nevertheless, he does not contact such people frequently, which means that he is able to ‘control’ his desire to approach, or open his arms towards, them. By contrast, he keeps his distance from the mediocre that surround him, and feels reluctant to approach them even in his prolonged state of being alone. In addition, the solitary people Nietzsche has in mind here are not necessarily Robinson Crusoes or Zarathustras in caves, who keep their ‘distance’, or are ‘hidden’, from others and society in a purely physical sense of the term. Nor do they have to be those who even avoid formal or official communications necessary for their subsistence ‘in society’ (GM III, 8, p.p.88-89).

2) The Functions of Solitude

It does not seem that for Nietzsche, solitude understood as such counts as an intrinsic value, or constitutes the ultimate locus of value. In other words, it seems to be
treated as a merely instrumental value in Nietzsche’s evaluative standard: it is praiseworthy or noble only insofar as it does, or is expected to, contribute eventually to the intrinsically valuable whole, namely, the creative way of life. According to Nietzsche, the social quality is a virtue only with some types of individual (cf. BGE 284, p.214). Especially, it is a virtue with an individual in possession of the other Nietzschean merits constitutive of the necessary condition for the creative way of life. In other words, the quality is lofty with the “higher” type of individual or the latter’s own solitude has merit. For if one possesses it and pertains to the higher type, the quality does, and is expected to, function as the ground of one’s own creative way of life: the higher individual can live the way of life thanks to the quality. Furthermore, it is praiseworthy with one, if one is the ‘potentially higher’ or ‘promising’ type, and thus, can become a member of the higher type in the long term, since, in this case, one’s possession of the quality can lead to the creative way of life eventually (by helping one to grow and by supporting one’s creative activity). Nietzsche, on the other hand, seems to consider that if the same quality belongs to the other types of man, i.e. those who are neither actually nor potentially higher, and thus, can never attain all the merits essential to the higher type, it can hardly be approved. For, if so, it never functions, and moreover, can be merely harmful or destructive to them.
Bearing in mind this sort of ‘discrimination’, let us examine why Nietzsche thinks that the quality is necessary or useful to the ‘higher’ individual or how it serves the individual’s own creative way of life.

Above all, Nietzsche seems to hold that solitude is necessary for the pursuits of creative works and of the (further) growth of the noble capacities (Z I, 17, p.p.88~91; D III, 177, p.107; GM II, 24, p.76). Suggesting the point, Nietzsche lets Zarathustra exclaim:

You yourself [solitary man] lie in wait for yourself in caves and forests … Solitary man, you are going the way to yourself … Solitary man, you are going the way of the creator: you want to create yourself a god from your seven devils! … (Z I, 17, p.90)

In other words, for Nietzsche, ‘being with others’ is simply ‘incompatible’ with most of the demanding, task-oriented activities characteristic of the creative way of living and those activities constitutive of the ‘ascending’ life, for instance, the “search for knowledge” (GS IV, 283, p.161). This underpins Nietzsche’s contention that “a human
being who strives for something great regards everybody he meets on his way either as a means or as a delay and hindrance – or as a temporary resting-place” (BGE 273, p.222).

Similarly, in Nietzsche’s view, being with others is an exposure to the “tyranny of stimuli” (WP 916, p.484), such as “the trash of the market-place” or “the contemporary” (GM III, 8, p.89), that are ‘distractions’ to such pursuits. For this reason, solitude or the “desert” is necessary for the “optimum existence” and the “most beautiful fruitfulness” of “all great, fruitful, inventive spirits” (Ibid. p.88).

Secondly, from Nietzsche’s perspective, the ‘herd’ itself signifies “bad air” (GM I, 12, p. 28) to the higher type of man, and solitude protects the latter from that air (Ibid. III, 14, p.p.103~104; BGE 271, p.210). What worries Nietzsche here is that the relation of the higher individual with the herd would induce some negative, unhealthy ‘feelings’ in the former. That is to say, the higher man’s communication with the herd would reveal to him their ‘weaknesses’ or the fact of their being ‘small’, and this revelation itself would make him feel depressed and ‘disgusted’ (Z II, 6. p.121). As Nietzsche goes on to explain, such emotional circumstances that the “sight” of the herd creates, rather than being bad in itself, ‘wearies’ the higher individual and thus disturbs his activities (GM I, 12, p.28).
Furthermore, he believes that the higher man would feel “great compassion for man” in their relations with the herd (GM III, 14, p.104), implying that the ‘weak’ or ‘lower’ in value are also mere ‘sufferers’, or those who suffer meaninglessly and without the hope for joy, owing to their very ‘low’ qualities. ‘Compassion’, as we will see in detail later on, is itself an ‘enervating’ and ‘distracting’ affect like the aforementioned feelings of disgust and of depression. More importantly, compassion delays the growth of the powers of the higher man and interrupts the pursuit of his own creative tasks. It drives him into the suffering herd and directs his energy into ‘altruistic’ behavior with short-term and narrow-ranged effects (GS IV, 338, p.192).

Thirdly, and more significantly perhaps, Nietzsche values solitude for its protection of the higher person from the culture of the mass, especially, conventional ‘morality’\textsuperscript{21}, and at the same time, for its service in the maintenance of their own values (WP 970, p.508; GM III, 14, p.103). Nietzsche here pays attention to solitude understood as not being with the herd, and he affirms its service in the sort of protection or maintenance.

\textsuperscript{21} Here, of course, Nietzsche implicitly devalues conventional morality itself or its value judgements, and this devaluation supplements his argument for the value of solitude. I propose to discuss extensively the arguments for the disvalue of morality in the final chapter, which is to be devoted to the examination of Nietzsche’s critique of morality.
According to him, the contact of the higher individual with the herd is itself a condition under which the individual accepts the conventional codes of conduct and evaluative standard, and abandons his own opinions on the relevant matters. In Nietzsche’s words, the weak “succeed in forcing their own misery, the whole of misery as such into the conscience” of the higher individual, so that the latter “one day begin to feel ashamed of their good fortune” (Ibid.). But why is it the case? What is the mechanism involved in the connection between being with others and the adoption of morality? Nietzsche, to begin with, plainly assumes that the herd, constitutive of the majority of society, is naturally a fervent supporter of morality, and explicitly or implicitly expresses its morality in the social realm. What is particularly problematic in this context is the fact that the herd is intolerant of any ‘doubt’ about morality, let alone any competing perspective. It simply speaks as if its moral beliefs were a priori ‘given’ or ‘axioms’ and there was something going wrong in the heads of doubters or heretics. The moralist herd moreover views non-believers from the perspective of morality and thus repudiates them as ‘immoral’ or dangerous persons.

Now, a higher individual’s awareness that morality is a ‘prevalent’ or ‘common’ view
in his repeated exposures to the herd, could make him ‘internalize’ it. However, what Nietzsche is more concerned about is the emotional injury, rejection, and isolation. He is also concerned about the connection of morality with such consequences, or the ‘fear’ of these consequences which the individual may undergo in and through the interactions with the moralist herd. For Nietzsche, in other words, it is these psychological factors that chiefly explain the internalisation and maintenance of morality or the change of opinions on moral matters. That is to say, in front of a group of people (as holders of morality), the individual can, behaving naturally and honestly, ‘betray’ his disbelief or doubt about morality. As a consequence, he can be given the label of an indecent person and be rejected by the group. In the bitterness of infamy, cold rejection, and isolation, it is likely that he will (consciously or not) desire to endorse morality. For the ‘tactic’ of morality, if he is too naïve, or not good at deceiving others, will be the only way to ‘appear’ to the disapproving group to possess a ‘sound’ mentality. He will be thus able to clear his name, and this will restore the normal relationship with the group. Nietzsche implies this, claiming that “when faith is more useful, effective, convincing than conscious hypocrisy, hypocrisy instinctively and forthwith becomes innocent” (TI 9, 42, p.107). Further, the individual may think that the adoption of morality will help him enter into a relationship
with another group and to avoid similar, bitter experiences in this new relationship. In
addition, if the individual remains honest not with himself but with others, morality,
accepted in this way, will be infused by the same sort of fear or the desire to avoid
negative experiences. According to Nietzsche, this fear, if not counteracted by the
disposition of honesty with oneself, will prevent him from ‘doubting’ morality, or from
reminding himself of its arbitrary or groundless character (GS I, 25, p.50).

The discussion so far has been concerned with Nietzsche’s claim that solitude *qua*
not being with the herd is necessary for protection from morality. It dealt with the reason
for the claim, presenting Nietzsche’s account of the mechanism involved in the connection
between being with others and the submission to morality. This discussion implicitly
indicates that for Nietzsche, the tendency not to ‘fear’ being alone (as another element of
the virtue of solitude) is also a particularly significant sort of protection. For that
mechanism involves fear, and the less fear or abomination one tends to have of being
alone, the less one is likely to ‘demand’ the restoration, initiation, or maintenance of a
relationship with others as ‘moralists’, and consequently, the adoption of morality as a
strategy for that purpose. In addition, it is worth noticing that the discussion further
implies that, in Nietzsche’s account, ‘dishonesty with others’ in some sense plays an important role in keeping one’s freedom of conscience in the social realm. That is, if one is not too naïve and is instead capable of abstaining from telling truths about oneself, or even ‘pretending’ to agree with the morals of the herd, one could manage to hold a skeptical stance or a different moral-evaluative framework ‘intact’ (TI 9, 18, p.88).

Nietzsche says:

Hypocrisy has its place in the ages of strong beliefs: in which even when one is compelled to exhibit a different belief one does not abandon the belief one already has. Today one does abandon it; or, which is more common, one acquires a second belief – one remains honest in any event. Beyond doubt, a very much larger number of convictions are possible today, than formerly: possible, that means permitted, that means harmless (Ibid.)

In fact, perhaps contrary to ordinary taste, Nietzsche ‘values’ this way of
communicating with the herd (using the metaphor “mask” to signify it) and counts it as an important social ‘virtue’ together with solitude (WP 943, p.496). As Nietzsche contends, “it is part of a more refined humanity to have reverence ‘for the mask’” (BGE 270, p.209), and “when not speaking to himself, he [a great man] wears a mask” (WP 962, p.505). The tendency or ability to assume masks, more precisely, is a conditional, instrumental value, and is valuable insofar as it pertains to a higher individual. The consideration of the role it plays in protecting the freedom of conscience of the higher individual seems to be one of the central reasons for Nietzsche’s great emphasis on it. Before proceeding further, rather digressively, it is perhaps necessary to portray the ‘man of mask’ in more detail, to gain a fuller understanding of the notion. The man of mask normally listens, and keeps silent. Sometimes, being unnoticed, he tries to avail himself of the contact with others from the herd, and in particular, to observe them or read their minds for the “study of the average human being” (BGE 26, p.57). When he speaks, he refrains from communicating his most intimate and personal thoughts, e.g. what he genuinely and passionately believes, the way he feels inside, and how he exists. He thus tells others ‘superficial’ things, assumes “apparent frivolity in word” (WP 943, p.496), and in some situations, behaves ‘dishonestly’: he “rather lies than tells the truth” (WP 962, p.505).
Fourthly, Nietzsche seems to be concerned about the impact of the ‘moralistic’ atmosphere of interaction with the herd on the ways higher individuals behave or live, and this concern constitutes Nietzsche’s emphasis on solitude (D IV, 323, p.160; Ibid. V, 491, p.201; GM III, 14, p.102). Whereas his third argument for the value of solitude, which we have just examined, ultimately concerns the obedience of such individuals to morality through its internalisation, the present one can be said to thematise their subjection to it prior to or without its internalisation. Let us try to make sense of what Nietzsche means to say here. Again, for him, the herd is characterised in terms of a rigid standpoint of morality and often expresses morality in its interpersonal relations. In particular, it frequently speaks and behaves moralistically, i.e. as if it were a moral ‘judge’. Its discourse is often filled with expressions of moral-evaluative judgements over others’ qualities and behavior (in accordance with morality, of course) and of the accompanying feelings. Furthermore, the herd has the strong tendency to communicate ‘negative’ judgements over (present or absent) higher individuals, especially, their qualities, employing the words ‘evil’ or ‘blameworthy’ (D IV, 323 p.160)\textsuperscript{22}. And in so doing it

\textsuperscript{22} Nietzsche would explain the ‘tendency’ to pass negative judgements over ‘higher’ individuals (rather than the herd), in ‘cognitive’ terms. That is to say, according to him, those individuals are easy targets of
expresses strong emotions, such as disapproval, contempt, and the so-called “righteous indignation” (GM III, 14, p.102). Moreover, as was said in the earlier discussion, it often ‘punishes’ those it ‘labels’ as immoral, blameworthy, or evil, by ostracizing them. In Nietzsche’s view, either becoming an easy target of such negative judgements or witnessing harsh blames on other higher individuals, in his relationships with the moralistic herd, the higher individual is likely to be subjected to morality even without internalising it. The mechanism involved in this is very similar to that which we have already discussed. Injury, rejection, isolation, the connection of certain qualities with such consequences, and the ‘fear’ of the consequences are the crucial factors determining the subjection to morality. And ‘honesty with others’ is again an important relevant variable which underpins Nietzsche’s appreciation of “masks”. Under such circumstances, one can wish not to ‘be’ or ‘become’ what morality depreciates, rather than to conceal one’s ‘depravities’ (seen from the perspective of morality) in front of the others. Nietzsche criticism, because many of the ‘high’ qualities of the individuals are themselves ‘logically’ capable of being disapproved from the perspective of morality. But he would add that this explanation is insufficient.

That is, for Nietzsche, many interpersonal ‘psychological’ factors are involved in the herd’s tendency for the harsh denunciation of the individuals. Chief among those is the subtle and complicated state called ‘ressentiment’, which is at the heart of Nietzsche’s ‘infamous’ account of the ‘origin’ of morality itself (cf. GS V, 359, p.224).
writes:

The reproach of conscience is weak in even the most conscientious people compared to the feeling: ‘This or that is against the morals of your society’. Even the strongest person still fears a cold look or a sneer on the face of those among whom and for whom he has been brought up. What is he really afraid of? Growing solitary! This is the argument that refutes even the best arguments for a person or a cause –

Thus the herd instinct speaks out in us (GS I, 50, p. 62)

‘Positive’ judgements that the herd makes frugally, and the expressions of their accompanying feelings, however, also seem to be problematised by Nietzsche. According to him, one suffers “from one’s environment”, and “from its praise as well as its blame” (WP 970, p.508). The indulgence in one’s reputation and in others’ ‘love’ or warm approval, and the “ambition to emulate the virtues of others” (WP 921, p.487) based on the expectation of such moral ‘rewards’ are likewise determining grounds of the obedience to morality through the relation with the moralistic herd. And this observation, too, seems
to constitute Nietzsche’s argument for the value of assuming masks. For as Nietzsche implies, letting others know one’s deeds or qualities that are ‘congruous’ with what the morality prescribes or praises can make one’s vanity swell, and thus ‘reinforce’ those deeds or qualities.

Finally, Nietzsche links solitude with the “independence” from others, which also appears to lie behind his conferment of value on solitude. According to him, “independence” is “a privilege of the strong”. As Nietzsche goes on to say, “he who attempts it” “multiplies by a thousand the dangers which life as such already brings with it in any case, not the smallest of which is that no one can see behold how and where he goes astray” and “is cut off from others” (BGE 29, p.60). Also, speaking of independence, Nietzsche writes:

Expressing his “uncomfortable” feelings towards Nietzsche’s appreciation of solitude, Robert Solomon writes: “Herd-like behavior is possible in isolated individuals as well as in mobs and in what are usually called (in non-Nietzschean contexts) ‘communities’. Indeed, that is where solitude becomes least a virtue …” (2001, p.143). Personally, I accept the main point Solomon is making here. But, to be fair, I believe that Nietzsche might also say similar things. I cannot find any evidence for Nietzsche’s arguing that solitude ‘guarantees’, or is the necessary and sufficient condition for, complete freedom from the culture of the herd.
Not to cleave to another person, though he be the one you love most

– every person is a prison, also a nook and corner (Ibid. 41, p.52).

Here, Nietzsche seems to point out the ‘danger’ of ‘dependence’ that being with others as honorable persons (or those in possession of the Nietzschean values or merits) contains. It indicates to us why he appreciates the abstinence from contacting even such seemingly harmless persons. Nietzsche might present the following arguments for this type of danger.

First, a higher individual’s contact with his equals (or other higher individuals) is an occasion in which the former could resolve his own needs or problems by means of the latter. For instance, these higher men can help him to make choices or set up goals by offering their wisdom, or give him some emotional support by sharing his feelings.

Nevertheless, their ‘help’ with solving his problems or satisfying his needs does contain poison. Their help naturally deprives him of opportunities to struggle towards doing things for himself, and thus, to acquire new skills, arts, or knowledge, or to enhance his capacities. In so doing, the help can prevent his further growth in certain respects. Also, through the repeated acceptance of their aid, he is likely to develop strong, habitual inclinations to ask them for similar help again, and on the other hand, to become lazy in
the face of his needs or problems. In summary, “our ‘benefactors’ diminish our worth and our will more than our enemies” (GS IV, 338, p.191). Furthermore, his contact with higher individuals could endow him with many kinds of enjoyable things, e.g. their presence itself, respect, love, the mutual understanding of ideas or feelings (insofar as the contact is that with ‘higher’ individuals24), the communication of knowledge, and a sense of belonging. However, the excessive enjoyment of those pleasant things can make him emotionally attached to others. Such addiction to being with others, which the contact with others may entail, constitutes ‘dependence’ taken as the state where one keeps approaching others and feeling perplexed and unsatisfied without them. For Nietzsche, this state not only represents one’s inability to be by oneself but also involves the danger of one’s subjection to the others’ power or control.

3. Courage

24 For Nietzsche, ‘being with the herd’ is not only ‘harmful’, but also ‘meaningless’ to the higher individual. The contention that fundamentally, the higher one is ‘incommunicable’ with the lower seems to be the primary reason for Nietzsche’s argument for that ‘meaninglessness’. That is to say, the ideas or feelings of the higher cannot be understood or shared by the lower.
1) The Meaning of Courage

Let us move on to a different characteristic to which Nietzsche accords great respectability: “courage” (BGE 284, p.214) or “bravery” (GS IV, 283, p.160). To begin with, it is necessary to clarify what Nietzsche means by the notion of courage here. He seems to identify the quality with the disposition to “live dangerously” (Ibid. p.161), or figuratively, to “wage wars” (Ibid. p. 160), and to symbolise it by the metaphor, “warrior” (Z I, 10, p.75). According to Nietzsche, further, he who “possesses courage” “sees the abyss” “with an eagle’s eyes” and “grasps the abyss with an eagle’s claws” (Z IV, 13, 4, p. 298). Nietzsche thus suggests that courage consists in the tendency to choose painstaking, sacrificial, or dangerous courses of actions and to resolutely follow such choices. So a courageous man is distinguished from those who fail to see the inevitability of difficulties or dangers in the first place, and also from those who easily become timorous in front of their weighty goals, and are likely to hesitate to take chosen actions by reminding themselves of the ‘unpleasant’ consequences. But the notion of courage seems to be composed of much more complicated elements than those of this formulation. That is to
say, for Nietzsche, courage also has to do with ‘fear’ and contains some disposition related to that particular emotion, and especially in this respect, Nietzsche’s usage of the relevant term seems to be similar to the ordinary one. Briefly, courage contains ‘fearlessness’, “self-possession” (BGE 284, p.214) or composure. A courageous person is thus contrasted with a “cowardly” one who is “always worrying, sighing, and complaining, and “who gleans even the smallest advantages” (Z III, 10, 2, p. 208). However, that ‘fearlessness’ as a defining characteristic of courage should be further qualified. Firstly, Nietzsche’s courageous men are in essence ‘fearless’ in the sense that they do not fear irrationally or absurdly. It is this reason Nietzsche associates courage with “knowledge” (D V, 551, p.222). That is, courageous men do not wrongly attach the significance of pain or risk to painless or safe things, and are thus distinguished from those who experience fear due to their superstitious thoughts. Nor do the courageous ‘exaggerate’ the pain or danger of future courses of events or states. Secondly, and more significantly, courageous men are fearless, not in the sense that they are pathologically “cold-spirited”, but in that if they ‘rightly’ experience the emotion of fear in their awareness of a painful or risky course of action, they succeed in subduing their fear, and thus, restore calmness. Hence, they can be contrasted with those who are overwhelmed by fear, and who keep thinking of the dark
sides of their willed actions. Now, fearlessness or self-possession construed as such is relevant to the ‘tendency’ we have just discussed: the former emotional disposition is one constituent of the tendency to pursue demanding or dangerous decisions. Nietzsche writes:

Do you possess courage, O my brothers? Are you stout-hearted? … I do not call cold-spirited, mulish, blind, or intoxicated men stout-hearted.

He possesses heart who knows fear but masters fear … (Z IV, 13, 4, p.298).

However, our definition still seems to be lacking and it is essential to present some supplementary remarks on the intrinsic nature of courage. Strictly speaking, courage, as Nietzsche does seem to define it, consists in the tendency to resolve to do dangerous or painstaking actions not only likely to achieve given ends, but also capable of being taken (WP 918, p.486). That this constitutes the intrinsic nature of courage could be inferred from the fact that Nietzsche does conceive of self-confidence or self-esteem as the condition of the possibility of courage (WP 918, p. 468). Moreover, as Nietzsche suggests in distinguishing courage from ‘mulishness’ in the above passage, courage can also be
defined negatively, and the courageous person would *not* dare to take such a painstaking or dangerous action, if the person cannot perform it or it is not necessary for the person’s cause or goal. And this presupposes the reflection on his belief in the ‘necessity’ of the difficult or dangerous action, and the correct estimation of the possibility of the attainment of his aim through the action conceived to be helpful. Courage thus involves the ability to make *reasonable* choices as well as bold ones. Similarly, figuratively put, courageous men would dare to “wage wars”, *only* if the latter are possible, necessary, and winnable. By contrast, those who lack courage tend to choose or act boldly but do so *recklessly*, that is, in accordance with their wrong beliefs in the ‘possibility’ or ‘necessity’ of dangerous or painstaking actions. Those people often choose or attempt such actions, in cases where the latter are impossible or utterly *useless* for their causes, e.g. in hopeless situations. For instance, they could plunge into water in order to save drowning persons, not knowing how to swim. Furthermore, courage by definition involves the correct *anticipation* of the negative consequences of actions that are necessary for, or instantiate, desired or willed objectives. Courageous men thus necessarily “see the abyss”, that is, are fully aware of the dangerous, painful, or sacrificial characteristics of the possible actions necessary for their causes. Accordingly, they accept pain or danger *despite* the anticipation of these, and do
not operate blindly. Nietzsche says:

“Should one follow one’s feelings?” – That one should put one’s life in danger … under the impulse of the moment, that is of little value and does not even characterises one. Everyone is equally capable of that- and in this resolution, a criminal, a bandit, and a Corsican certainly excel decent people. A higher stage is: to overcome even this pressure within us and to perform a heroic act not on impulse – but coldly, raisonnable, without being overwhelmed by stormy feelings of pleasure (WP 928, p.490).

Finally, and most importantly, as the foregoing passage also suggests, Nietzsche’s courageous men are *not* those who decide to pursue *any* demanding or risky cause, that is, to pursue such ends regardless of their dangers or the difficulties involved. Rather, Nietzsche would seem to further qualify courage as the tendency to commit oneself to ‘noble’ or ‘honorable’ causes, and not to run risks for ‘unworthy’ ones. Having said that, Nietzsche’s notion of courage, like that of Aristotle, seems to contain ‘evaluative’
significance within itself. Put in another way, according to Nietzsche, a genuinely courageous man would not choose to achieve demanding things, if these were of ignoble or dishonorable nature. As Nietzsche puts it:

I love the brave: but it is not enough to be a swordsman, one must also know against whom to be a swordsman! And there is often more bravery in containing oneself and passing by: in order to spare oneself for a worthier enemy! (Z III, 12, 21, p.226)

“To give one’s life for a cause” – a great effect. But there are many things for which one would give one’s life … Whether it be compassion or anger or revenge – that one stakes one’s life on it does not make any value difference. How many have sacrificed their lives for pretty girls – and, worse, their health (WP 929, p.490)

For Aristotle, as is well known, “courage” is one of the excellences of character. Explaining its nature, he says: “The man who faces and fears (or similarly feels confident about) the right things for the right reason and in the right way and at the right time is courageous … it is for a right and noble motive that the courageous man faces the dangers and performs the actions appropriate to his courage” (1976, p.129)
It seems to be suggested that a courageous man, as Nietzsche sees him, not only correctly anticipates the consequences of his actions but shares Nietzsche’s evaluative perspective, *not* the conventional one. That is to say, the man is able to judge the *value* of what he desires or wills in accordance with the former standard. Or similarly, given that definition and his own standard of value, Nietzsche would not count those who thoroughly and boldly commit themselves to the values of conventional morality, e.g. ‘ascetic ideal’ and ‘selflessness’, as ‘courageous’. Instead, for Nietzsche, those who choose such demanding things as knowledge and creative works could exemplify courage.

2) The Basis of Courage

Now, it will be meaningful to consider what constitutes, or explains the complicated disposition, before examining the reasons why Nietzsche values it. Firstly, Nietzsche links courage with ‘self-respect’ or ‘self-confidence’, and argues that the “lack of reverence for oneself revenges itself through every kind of deprivation” including “courage” (WP 918, p.486). Indeed, for Nietzsche, self-respect is itself an honorable
quality, and the observation of its close link with courage seems to underlie this evaluation. We have just seen that courage, seen as the disposition not to will or take dangerous actions merely thought to lead to desired things, presupposes the correction of the wrong attitude based on the estimation of the effectiveness of these actions, that is, the knowledge of their being vain or useless. Here, Nietzsche would seem to mean that this sort of estimation is also necessary for courage qua the disposition to will or take risky actions through which it is possible to attain goals. That is to say, in order for a person to choose sets of actions that are difficult, but necessary for the attainment of his objective, he should naturally first believe that these will lead to the objective. The maintenance of the resolution will depend upon the same anticipation. Nietzsche seems to suggest this when he says:

Every thing good, fine, or great … is first of all an argument against the skeptic inside them. They have to convince or persuade him, and that almost requires genius. (GS IV, 284, p.161)

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26 According to Nietzsche, “some fundamental certainty which a noble soul possesses in regard to itself” is “decisive” and “determines the order of rank”, and further, “the noble soul has reverence for itself” (BGE 287, p.215).
Further, as Nietzsche seems to hold, the knowledge that there is a good possibility that this will be the case can found or sustain this anticipatory belief. Without the knowledge, the person may not hold the belief in the first place, or may suffer from its instability or negation, and consequently, he may not resolve to achieve the desired thing, or extend his demanding goal. One constituent of this ‘possibility’ (the knowledge of which is essential for courageous choices or actions) is the ‘ability’ of the agent himself. Therefore, the proper confidence in ability is a factor decisive for courage, and thus characterises courageous men. Suppose that a person desires to produce an excellent work, the kind of which requires some sacrificial, difficult things, say, independent enquiries, and moreover, because of previous success, is expected to achieve excellence. In order to choose or undertake to do these things, he has to know the possibility of his achievement, by recalling his past achievements. This knowledge is nothing but the due appreciation of his ability for such work. Moreover, courage qua the tendency to choose or attempt difficult or dangerous actions of which one is capable, naturally presupposes the knowledge of one’s ability for the type of actions, which is constitutive of self-respect.
Secondly, from Nietzsche’s observations, courageous men are those who embrace the “abyss”, or in other words, their courage is based on some ‘affirmative’ attitude towards anticipated sufferings (WP 852, p.p.450–451; GS IV, 338, p.p.191–192). Preliminarily, this affirmative attitude that Nietzsche now links with courage is neither that which reflects the view that sufferings are values *in themselves*, nor does it hold that pain is intrinsically valuable. Nor is it that of a ‘masochist’. Thus, a person with the affirmative attitude would not regard his future pain as the immediate source of pleasure or think that pleasure is ‘inherent’ in pain. Rather, first of all, courageous men “see the abyss with an eagle’s eyes”; they calmly contemplate the inevitability of pain for their ends, and thus persuade themselves to take it in their stride. But such thoughts of the ‘inevitability’ of pain are not the sole constituent of the ‘affirmative attitude’ Nietzsche takes as explanatory of courage. As he argues further, courageous actions are also effected by the affirmation of the use, function, or even, instrumental ‘value’ of sufferings, which reflects the general perspective of suffering that posits “abyss” as the condition of the birth of some values.27

27Nietzsche considers the general view of suffering (as the ground of the affirmative attitude towards a particular suffering) as both theoretically sound and practically significant. Or rather, according to him, he wants to “teach” people this view, which is “today understood by few”, in order to “make them braver, more preserving, simpler, more full of gaiety” (GS IV, 338, p.193). I will re-visit this theme and examine it in more detail, in the next stage of the thesis devoted to ‘cheerfulness’. 
In particular, this form of affirmative attitude concerns the antithesis of pain, namely, pleasure, and posits that a given suffering will yield or contribute to one’s joy. In this sense, people with this attitude “experience suffering as a pleasure” (WP 852, p.450). It is based on the general view that out of sufferings, joy is born, or pleasure cannot be conceived in separation from pain or the “abyss”. In other words, “happiness and misfortune are two siblings and twins who either grow up together or remain small together” (GS IV, 338, p.192). Now, by virtue of the apprehension of the positive or ‘bright’ sides of anticipated sufferings, one can also ‘emotionally’ embrace the latter, and thus “grasp the abyss”. It could therefore be said that in this form of affirmative state, one’s emotional attitude towards future sufferings is ambivalent: one not only fears the suffering but also is ‘well disposed’ towards it. Nevertheless, according to the general perspective of sufferings that grounds the conferment of instrumental value on given pains, pain does not necessarily lead to other values and joy; these depend on so many complex conditions including pain. Chief among these are the agent’s internal condition: the abilities and qualities on which Nietzsche confers value, or their possibilities. Having said that, the affirmation of a given, anticipated pain, more precisely its utility for other values based on this perspective, is
contingent primarily on how the agent views himself and thus, on how he actually is or can become. For this reason, according to Nietzsche, the use of this attitude for courageous actions is indeed a privilege of certain types of individual.

Thirdly, as Nietzsche does suggest, positive ‘affects’ are crucial for courage, and these affects include the ‘well-disposedness’ towards anticipated sufferings or risks that derives from the affirmative attitude. For Nietzsche, courage is a ‘hot’ tendency: it involves various forms of emotional disposition, and courageous actions are, as it were, the manifestations of pathos as well as logos. Nietzsche first regards the strength of the desire, or to borrow his own expression, “longing”, the fulfillment of which requires difficult or dangerous actions, as very significant for the performance of these actions (Z III, 12, 28, p.p.229~230). As Nietzsche figuratively puts this,

Now you shall be seafarers, brave, patient seafarers! Stand up straight in good time, O my brothers, learn to stand up straight! …

The sea is stormy: everything is at the sea. Well then! Come on, you old seaman-hearts! … Our helm wants to fare away, out to where our
children’s land is! Out, away, more stormy than the sea, storms our
great longing! (Ibid.)

Nietzsche might argue that a courageous man would feel strong passion for the desired or
willed object, and by conferring further meanings on it, that is, making connections
between it and other desired objects, would amplify his initial passion. Also, the man
would actively induce such passion, by reminding himself of the desired consequence of
his painstaking actions in the face of his occasional hesitations to initiate these actions.
And it is such strong passion or the ‘use’ of it that renders his courage possible.
Furthermore, as Nietzsche would immediately add, “cheerfulness”, which will be our next
topic, is decisive for courageous actions (GS IV, 283, p.160; Z I, 7, p.p.67~68). For
Nietzsche (to anticipate) one’s cheerful state is translatable as ‘force’, which constitutes or
intensifies one’s motivations for actions or causes. At the same time, it means the
‘negativity’ of depression, lethargy, or “gravity”, which prevents one from taking powerful
actions and instead makes one collapse or ‘withdraw’. A courageous man, as Nietzsche
seems to view him, is able to maintain cheerfulness in the midst of his sufferings that he
voluntarily undergoes. The courageous man is resilient, too. In other words, even when he
gets immersed in depressive moods in contemplating his pain that he will face pursuing his goals, he is not overwhelmed by such moods. He cheers himself up and restores his joyousness. He is, in other words, able not to “perish of inner distress” when he “inflicts great suffering and hears the cry of this suffering” (GS IV, 325, p.181). And such “gaiety” that he assumes in front of demanding goals might be the optimistic view of the future, that is, the hope for the realisation of the goals (Ibid, 343, p.199).

3) What Gives Courage Meaning?

Finally, it is time to answer the question of why Nietzsche values courage. It is, to begin with, doubtful whether he considers the disposition as an ‘intrinsic’ value (in any sense of the term), although it can be confidently said that for him, the quality possesses extrinsic, instrumental worth. In Nietzsche’s view, rather, the quality functions as an (indispensable) means of other values, the consideration of which seems to base his argument for its value: it appears that for Nietzsche, the quality is a merely ‘instrumental’
value. But which values give courage meaning? First of all, Nietzsche would claim that courage is necessary for the active pursuit of creative works and the (further) growth of the noble capacities, in particular, “creative powers”. It is thus required for the creative way of life, which can be defined in terms of intensive creative activity, and which is supported by the capacities (Hence, it characterizes the Nietzschean higher man, as well) Nietzsche implies that creative works (capable of the “formative” influence we discussed) and growth are in short worthy but hard, demanding tasks, requiring sacrifices, pains, and dangers. He implies this, exclaiming, “The secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment is - to live dangerously!” (GS IV, 283, 161) And one’s courage, by definition, would allow one to commit oneself to the tasks and to resolutely face the inevitable difficulties, if one desired or willed them. In addition, Nietzsche also points out, the achievement of creative tasks not only requires but entails such difficulties, which also underpins his argument for the necessity of courage for the creative way of life (GS IV, 311, p.176; Z I, 10, p.p.74–75). In particular, Nietzsche has in mind provocative, destructive critiques intended to influence some authorities and their supporters, or in his own language, “enemies”, and compares these critical endeavors to “wars” (Ibid.). For instance, a person’s critics can damage his reputation, or even,
Secondly, Nietzsche emphasizes that it is conducive to (the pursuit of) “knowledge” (GS IV 283, p.161). Knowledge itself entails varying sorts of ‘danger’, which explains why, according to Nietzsche, people often do “not want to see” the truth of matters, or remain uncritical about their own or others’ opinions: they deceive themselves (WP 465, p.257). Nietzsche holds that some truths are hard to assimilate or ‘believe’. For example, as moral-evaluative perspectives incompatible with the conventional one do, truths against ‘common-sense’ or prevalent views, once incorporated, may cause some unpleasant consequences such as isolation and rejection. Furthermore, some truths will undermine false beliefs or mere faiths that are unhealthy or deserve to be destroyed. But these false beliefs ‘function’ in some way, e.g. they give one the sense of security, comfort, or consolation. Or some hypotheses, if they are proven to be true, may cause similar troubles. And unless one is courageous enough, one will not be able to strive for seeing the truth of a given matter, or ‘believing’ some things. In this way, too, courage, together with honesty, contributes to the pursuits of knowledge. Summarising the points, Nietzsche writes:
“How much truth can a spirit endure, how much truth does a spirit dare?” this became for me the real standard of value. Error is cowardice – every achievement of knowledge is a consequence of courage, of severity toward oneself, of cleanliness toward oneself (WP 1041, p.536).

Finally, Nietzsche argues that living in accordance with one’s own values and thus going beyond conventional morality does need courage. Again, for Nietzsche, an individual’s own table of values (posited in accordance with the evaluative-normative perspective he himself puts forward) grounds one’s healthy ethos and in this way, contributes to the creative way of life. Nevertheless, as we already saw in discussing ‘solitude’, living in this manner and not conforming to conventional morality in a society where the latter is dominant, means fighting against many social challenges: one may suffer from derogation, repudiation, isolation, or ‘dishonesty with others’. Only a courageous individual, if he felt the need of this ‘beyond’, would dare to face these challenges and go his own way. To listen to Nietzsche’s own words in this connection:
To accommodate oneself, to live as the “common man” lives, to hold right and good what he holds right: this is to submit to the herd instinct. One must take courage and severity so far as to feel such a submission as a disgrace (WP 458, p.252)

CHAPTER 3: Nietzsche’s Theory of Virtues II

1. Magnanimity and “Ideal Selfishness”

1) The Nature of Magnanimity

Let us now shift our attention to another important virtue, which could count as one of Nietzschean ‘social’ virtues: magnanimity. Nietzsche regards magnanimity or generosity (i.e. the tendency for a strong inclination for giving) as a virtue and characteristic of a noble or “higher” man. That is to say, Nietzsche would express respect for a person who tends to be willing to do a particular action to help others,
despite the awareness of its disadvantage to him. A ‘magnanimous’ person, whom Nietzsche would praise highly, recognising another person’s actual or possible need, would want to help. And if he found certain actions to be necessary for the other’s interest or need, he would be inclined to undertake them. Such a person is thus contrasted with those who are ‘callous’ or utterly indifferent to others’ interests, or who “unflinchingly keep sight of” their own advantage; Nietzsche would view the latter with contempt (GS I, 3, p.31). In Zarathustra, Nietzsche often speaks of “bestowing virtue”, and extols it; and the virtue does appear to be identifiable with ‘magnanimity’. He declares that “the highest virtue is a bestowing virtue” (Z I, 22, 1, p. 100) and exclaims:

Oh who shall find the rightful baptismal and virtuous name for such a longing! ‘Bestowing virtue’ – that is the name Zarathustra once gave the unnamable (Ibid. III, 2, p.208)

The virtue that Nietzsche has in mind, being an emotional or affective disposition,
consists in a sort of “longing”, that is, “wanting to give” or the aspiration to provide “sacrifices and gifts” (Z I, 22, 1, p.100). Furthermore, Nietzsche says that “the great human being” “is necessarily prodigal”, and he suggests that the “prodigal” nature to which he now accords respectability involves the emotional disposition construed as such, by adding:

His greatness lies in the fact that he expends himself … The instinct for self-preservation is as it were suspended; the overwhelming pressure of the energies which emanate from him forbids him any such care and prudence (TI 44, 9, p.109)

Finally, according to Nietzsche, the “noble” person is in essence “magnanimous” and “self-sacrificing” (GS I, 3, p.31). In addition, as he goes on to say, the noble, magnanimous person takes enormous “pleasure” in his ‘altruistic’ actions themselves, and the anticipation of such pleasure or enjoyment is constitutive of his habitual, benevolent ‘urges’ (Ibid. p.p. 30~31).
However, it does not seem that Nietzsche values magnanimity *qua* an altruistic ‘behavioral’ tendency or the ‘habit’ of giving without reservation. On the contrary, Nietzsche would repudiate ‘magnanimity’ in this sense, or in other words, the tendency to ‘give’ unconditionally or indiscreetly in response to the recognition of others’ needs or in accordance with one’s own “magnanimous feelings” (cf. GS I, 21, p.43; Ibid. 55, p.64).

For Nietzsche, the lack of ‘control’ over such feelings, as a rule, is not only dangerous but also ‘despicable’. By contrast, the ability or disposition to control them constitutes the “noble” mind. Nietzsche devalues those who fail to see the negative sides of actions posited as helpful for others. Section 928 of *The Will to Power*, which I quoted in relation to ‘courage’, nicely expresses these points. Nietzsche writes:

“Should one follow one’s feelings?” That one should put one’s life in danger, yielding to a generous feeling and under the impulse of the moment, that is of little value and does not even characterise one … A higher stage is: to overcome even this pressure within us and to perform a heroic act not on impulse – but coldly, raisonnable, without being overwhelmed by stormy feelings of
Blind indulgence of an affect, totally regardless of whether it be a generous and compassionate or a hostile affect, is the cause of the greatest evils.

Greatness of character does not consist in not possessing these affects – on the contrary, one possesses to the highest degree – but having them under control (WP 928, p.490).

In addition, it has to be noted that the virtue of magnanimity and other ‘altruistic’ motives are, as Nietzsche often stresses, inseparable from other excellences. The virtue and the relevant motives are born out of the praiseworthy or noble capacities, especially, creative powers, or are the ‘privilege’ of the strong or ‘well-constituted’. This consideration underpins Nietzsche’s claim that “the great human being” or “genius” is “necessarily prodigal”, and that the prodigal emotions and deeds of such an individual are explained by the fact that “he flows out” or “overflows” (TI 9, 44, p.109). Furthermore,
according to Nietzsche, “[t]he lofty goodness towards his fellow men which is proper to him becomes possible only when he has reached his height and he rules” (BGE 273, p.210). As Nietzsche suggests, the ‘overflowing’ person tacitly and strongly seeks to “expend” himself towards others, i.e. ‘exert’ his creative powers and ‘discharge’ his accumulated force towards others or so as to influence them. This form of “will to power” or “lust for power” manifests itself in his habitual inclinations for ‘giving’. Nietzsche tells us that “the height longs to stoop down after power” (Z III, 10, 2, p.208). So a person who has reached such a height, acting in accordance with his generous motivations, “uses himself up”, and “does not spare himself - with inevitability, fatefully, involuntarily, as a river’s bursting its banks is involuntary” (TI 9, 44, p.109). Also, this explanation of magnanimity lies behind Nietzsche’s suggestion that the ‘higher’ individual can feel “melancholy” or discontent unless they exercise their powers or “superabundance” properly (Z III, 14, p.p.239–240)28.

28 Aristotle glorifies “greatness of soul” (megalopsychia), the notion of which, according to Huge Tredennick, is translatable as “magnanimity”, “proper pride”, or “self-respect” and for which “there is no real English equivalent” (1976, p.153). “Greatness of soul” seems to be indeed a complicated excellence of character, and as such, to comprise something similar to the quality of magnanimity Nietzsche now valorizes. The “magnanimous” or ‘great-souled’ man, as Aristotle portrays him, in essence “takes great risks” (Ibid. p.156), “is disposed to help others”, and is “moderate towards those who have an intermediate position in society” (Ibid. p.157).
2) The Functions of Magnanimity

Is this altruistic, emotional tendency, however, valuable in itself, according to Nietzsche? The straightforward answer to this question is that like other ‘virtues’ or excellences of character, for him, it is merely a conditional, instrumental value. That is to say, the quality at issue is praiseworthy, because, under some conditions, it produces actions conducive to, or constitutive of, Nietzschean higher-order values. It deserves honor, only insofar as one of these conditions is met, and thus, involves and produces such ‘genuinely valuable’ altruistic actions. Also, as was suggested above, it is harmful, that is, it disrupts these higher-order values. This occurs in certain circumstances, for instance, if the agent lacks the control over it and his generous feelings involve dangerous helps. It can attain praiseworthiness only if being well controlled, it does not malfunction in this way; otherwise, it can be a mere “vice” (cf. WP 928, p. 490). Nietzsche writes:
Not to cleave to our own virtues and become as a whole the victim of some part of us, of our ‘hospitality’ for example, which is the danger of dangers for noble and rich souls who expend themselves prodigally, almost indifferently, and take the virtue of liberality to the point where it becomes a vice (BGE 41, p.70)

But then, what are Nietzsche’s reasons for valuing the quality, and in particular, what is it valuable for? First of all, Nietzsche would say that what he calls “descent” or “descending” in Zarathustra, which seems to be identifiable not with ‘degeneration’ but with the ‘creative way of life’, gives the quality meaning. In brief, according to Nietzsche, magnanimity supports the creative way of life (Z III, 10, 2, p. 208; Ibid. II, 13, p.141). In Daybreak 552, Nietzsche makes it clear that the creative way of life is praiseworthy and advisable, and further, suggests that a ‘benevolent’ or ‘other-regarding’ motivation is fundamental to it.

… It is in this state of consecration that one should live! And
what is expected is an idea and a deed – towards every bringing forth we have no other relationship than pregnancy … This is ideal selfishness: continually to watch over and care for and to keep our soul still, so that our fruitfulness shall come to a happy fulfillment! Thus, as intermediaries, we watch over and care for to the benefit of all (p.223)

He adds that “the fairest virtue of the great thinker is the magnanimity with which, as a man of knowledge”, “he offers himself and his life as a sacrifice” (D V, 459, p. 192). That is to say, one’s magnanimity can form the motivation or desire for the creative way of life as a special sort of ‘giving’, ‘self-sacrifice’, or ‘altruism’. Nietzsche assumes that ‘growth’ in creative powers and the creative way of life (as their active exertion or manifestation) pertain to our fundamental needs. Furthermore, as we will see shortly, ‘happiness’ or ‘joy’ and the liberation from the ‘spirit of gravity’, which is definable in terms of depression, weariness, or lethargy, also rely upon growth and the creative way of life. Nietzsche’s point seems to be that one can share these views, that is, recognise that the way of life and creative powers would gratify and redeem fellow higher (or promising) individuals. Thus, if one is really in possession of magnanimity or “bestowing
virtue”, one can be strongly motivated to serve those interests. Further, if one finds a
certain creative task (e.g. an art work, education, a new “table of values”, and an
innovative perspective of the world) capable of promoting the values in such individuals,
one will be naturally inclined to pursue it. One will, at the same time, be well disposed to
accommodate the hardships involved in its pursuits. In this manner, one’s magnanimity
makes it possible for one to ‘will’ or decide to pursue a long-term task. Moreover, it will
intensify and support one’s strivings for it, or in other words, help one to be passionately
devoted to the goal of such tasks. And since magnanimity, as we saw above, is a sign of
the overflowing nature, one’s pursuits will be fruitful. Recall, however, that the goal of an
excellent, original, demanding task capable of “formative” influence, its active, thorough
and fruitful pursuits, and the full employment of creative powers constitute the essence of
the creative way of life Nietzsche appreciates. In summary, it is for these reasons that
Nietzsche considers magnanimity as an important condition for the creative way of life.

Moreover, according to Nietzsche, magnanimity plays an important role in one’s
‘further’ growth, which also explains his reverence for the quality. It appears that for him,
one’s magnanimity, by motivating one to will such creative, ‘beneficial’ tasks, could
make one strive to ‘appropriate’ intellectual resources that would be translated into the enhancement of creative powers (and the other noble capacities). Nietzsche tells us that one’s “bestowing virtue” enables one to “thirst to heap up all riches” in [one’s] soul”, and that “a bestowing love must become a thief of all values” (Z I, 22, 1, p.100). These considerations of the roles of magnanimity played in one’s own life, however, do not seem to be Nietzsche’s ‘sole’ reason for the emphasis he places on it. Of course, one’s magnanimity, by enabling one to live the lofty form of life, will give birth to an original work capable of influencing others in the positive way, and consequently, may help others to grow, and to direct their lives appropriately. This function of one’s magnanimity for others’ noble capacities, qualities, and creative lives also seems to be constitutive of Nietzsche’s argument for its honorability. In Zarathustra, Nietzsche links the virtue with “the meaning of the earth”, which, in the text, is identified with the ‘overman’, the personification of which, representing Nietzschean values, could be oneself or another. In this connection, Nietzsche exclaims, “May your bestowing love and your knowledge serve towards the meaning of the earth!” (Ibid. p.102)

Having said that, what lies behind Nietzsche’s derogatory view of the ‘habit’
of giving and his ‘ambivalent’ attitude towards the emotional need to give? Above all, according to Nietzsche, the emotional disposition, if it is not under control, can prevent the agent from leading the creative way of life. The habit, which is constituted by the ‘uncontrolled’ emotional disposition, results in the same negative consequence.

Nietzsche seems to imply this, pointing out that “benevolence” is one of “many hindrances to a sovereign disposition, great inventiveness, heroic purposiveness, and noble being-for-oneself” (WP 358, p.196). He suggests that a person in possession of the emotional disposition can feel the motivations for helping others ‘incompatible’ with the pursuit of a goal. Naturally, those ‘benevolent’ affects may delay the pursuits or distract the person: the person may not be able to keep his path to his own goals (cf. GS V, 338, p.192). Furthermore, magnanimity can lead him to sacrifice the necessary conditions for living a creative life such as his energy, health, material possessions, and “life” itself. Nietzsche links magnanimity with ‘solitude’, and regards the former as the enemy of the latter; this supports his argument for the harmfulness of magnanimity for the creative way of life (D V, 464, p.194). Others’ dependence upon, or ‘gratitude’ to, a magnanimous person hinders the person’s solitude. Secondly, Nietzsche would say, the disposition can ruin others in the long run, as well. As was implied in our discussion of
solitude, others’ repeated acceptance of the magnanimous person’s help, may make the recipients powerless, lazy, and *dependent*. In addition, we should note that arguing for the disadvantages of magnanimity, Nietzsche is mainly concerned about generous actions that would interrupt one’s creative pursuits, harm one’s life (in solitude), or ‘damage’ others in these ways. This concern seems to underlie his emphasis on the ability to “control” magnanimous feelings. The ability thus turns out to be that by means of which one can refrain from following the urges for these particular sorts of ‘benevolent’ actions.

3) The Value of “Ideal Selfishness”

Before closing our discussion, it is worth noticing that in many places, Nietzsche also affirms “selfishness”, which is ‘seemingly’ at odds with his valorisation of “prodigality” or “magnanimity”. He writes:

So what makes a person noble? … Certainly not making sacrifices … Certainly not following some passion … Certainly not
that one does something for others without selfishness: perhaps no one
is more consistently selfish than the noble one (GS I, 55, p.64).

And then it also happened – truly, it happened for the first
time! that his [Zarathustra’s] teaching glorified selfishness, the sound,
healthy selfishness that issues from a mighty soul (Z III, 10, 2, p.206)

What does “selfishness” that Nietzsche praises consist in? By the expression, first of all,
he does seem to designate the tendency which constitutes or comprises the
aforementioned control over magnanimous feelings: namely, the disposition for the care
for oneself or one’s own life, rather than the lack of such ‘feelings’ or the deficiency of
the disposition of magnanimity. Nietzsche, more precisely, would praise a “selfish”
person, who (not only internally but also externally) cares for his own creative task,
further growth, and the sustenance of his own existence, and who, due to this, tends to
effect control over his magnanimity. To return to the relevant quotation, Daybreak,
section 552, Nietzsche here does suggest that his “ideal selfishness” is in essence “to
watch over and care for” one’s own life for the sake of “fruitfulness” or “a happy
fulfillment”. Nietzsche also appears to equate “healthy and holy selfishness” with “compel[ling] all things to come to you and into you” (Z I, 22, 1, p.100). Next, speaking of “selfishness”, Nietzsche could be also taken as seeing it leading to the creative way of life itself. For Nietzsche, as we have seen, this way of life lies in the pursuit of a long-term, ‘demanding’ task to ‘help’ a wide range of others. It can be, for this reason, duly conceived as ‘altruistic’ or ‘self-sacrificing’. Nevertheless, it can be also viewed as ‘selfish’, in the sense that it essentially lacks ‘self-sacrificing’ or ‘selfless’ actions of a different kind: that is, particular actions aimed at short-term or immediate interests of others. In other words, it is a style of life not devoted to the latter form of altruism or care for others which ordinary people would seem to be more ready to call “selfless” or “unegoistic”.

Now, having said that, it is nothing but the creative way of life and the further growth that make up the ‘ultimate’ ground of Nietzsche’s esteem of “selfishness”. So he values “selfishness” for the same reasons as those for which he values “magnanimity”. Finally, rather interestingly, Nietzsche points out that “selfishness” arises out of magnanimity or “bestowing love”, implying that magnanimity, as it were, overcomes
itself. He writes:

You compel all things to come to you and into you, that they may now flow back from your fountain as gifts of your love. Truly such a bestowing love must become a thief of all values; but I call this selfishness healthy and holy (Z I, 22, 1, p. 100).

As Nietzsche here implies, magnanimity, given the object of long-term creative tasks to serve the growth of others and the genuine ‘enhancement’ of their lives, allows one to care for one’s own life and growth, just as a pregnant woman’s concern with her baby makes her well look after herself.
2. Cheerfulness: Nietzsche’s Account of Happiness

1) The Nature of Cheerfulness

Thus far, we have discussed Nietzschean virtues of which the higher man is composed: honesty, solitude, mask, courage, magnanimity and ideal selfishness. These qualities, again, make up the necessary, internal condition for living the creative way of life, and thus, thanks to them, the higher man can live the way of life now. I propose to close this chapter and end the discussion of Nietzsche’s theory of ‘value’ (understood as nobleness or greatness), with an exposition of another virtue, namely, cheerfulness. Nietzsche lays great emphasis on this virtue (in view of its significant roles in the intrinsic value), although he hardly seems to regard it either as what the higher man consists in, or as a ‘necessary’ condition for the intrinsic value. Now, to begin with, Nietzsche appears to value the emotional, transitory state or “affect” of “joy” as distinguished from both pain (especially, depression or lethargy) and ‘happiness’
understood as the peace of mind, the mere *absence* of pain, or comfort (WP 1033, p.533). Moreover, he considers cheerfulness *qua* an emotional pattern related to happiness, which consists of the feelings of joy, that is, the ‘sunny’ or ‘bright’ *disposition*, as a praiseworthy quality or ‘virtue’\(^{29}\). That is to say, Nietzsche would praise a person who leads an exuberant, ‘happy’ life (in the positive sense of the term), or who ordinarily lives in good spirits. Nietzsche hence ‘idealises’ one who is “always tickled by some sunray of happiness” (WP 1039, p.535). Further, in *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche extols “a dancer’s virtue”, which consists in “golden-emerald rapture”, “laughter”, (Z III, 16, 6, p. 247), and “happiness” (Ibid. IV, 19, p.305). Also, there, Nietzsche employs the metaphor of the “child” (Ibid. I, 1, p.55) and affirms what this represents. The expression seems to point to the bright or sunny disposition construed in the above manner\(^{30}\), and thus, to be identifiable with the metaphor of the ‘dancer’. Furthermore, Nietzsche praises a “bird-like” spirit, and moreover, ‘contrasts’ it with what he signifies as “the spirit of gravity”

\(^{29}\) Solomon would seem to make a similar point. According to him, “(exuberant) playfulness” is one of “distinctively Nietzschean” virtues, and “the virtue of playfulness”, “should be understood not in the current academic sense of intellectual self-indulgence, but rather in terms of the rich, buoyant enthusiasm of a child” (2001.p.p.141~142)

\(^{30}\) Again, in the same context, Solomon writes, “The child metaphor in Zarathustra’s ‘Three Metamorphoses’” “represents not so much newness as this exuberant playfulness. Nietzsche is not a fan of innocence as such” (Ibid. p.142)
or “camel”, the nature of which appears to lie primarily in the absence of joy, staunch seriousness, chronic depression, or weariness (Ibid. III, 1, 2, p.p.210–212). Finally, Nietzsche expresses his respect for Emerson (TI 9, 13, p.86) and Schopenhauer (UM, SE, p.p. 135–136) for the trait of “cheerfulness” (Heiterkeit).  

Now, the following discussion will be guided by two main questions. First, I will try to answer how, in Nietzsche’s view, happiness is possible, which will involve a discussion of what Nietzsche views as the ‘sources’ of the feeling of joy. Not only does this question in itself seem to be of great interest to Nietzsche, but our attempt to answer it will give us a hint as to what Nietzsche would posit as constitutive of cheerfulness qua a disposition, which is our main topic. Secondly, and rather briefly, as in the discussions of other values, I will raise the questions of whether cheerfulness as such is an intrinsic value and what it is valuable for.

31 To make some terminological points, the German term, ‘heiter’ or ‘Heiterkeit’, in common usage, carries several meanings. As it seems, these include the happy ‘disposition’ construed as such, the ‘state’ of gaiety, the quality of ‘amusing’ others, and a serene or calm disposition and state. Nietzsche often employs the term, and he does appear to point to the sunny disposition or state, rather than serenity or calmness and the quality of giving pleasure (cf. BT 9; TI 8, 3; WP 990, 991, GS Pref. 4; Ibid. 5; EH 2, 10). In particular, in these contexts, where he praises Schopenhauer and Emerson for their ‘Heiterkeit’, I believe that it is sensible to take the term as conveying the meaning of the ‘sunny’ disposition, assuming that Nietzsche follows the common usage of the term and considering the contexts themselves.
2) The Conditions of Happiness

Praising cheerfulness and viewing it as a virtue, Nietzsche of course implicitly affirms that ‘happiness’ (taken as a sum of feelings of pleasure) is a human possibility. He thus rejects pessimistic pictures of ‘this-worldly’ life including the Schopenhaurian one, according to which, briefly, ‘happiness’ in any ‘positive’ sense of the term is impossible in this world and the essential feature of human existence is ceaseless suffering (cf. GS IV, 326, p.182). But then, how is happiness or joy possible, according to Nietzsche? Indeed, Nietzsche himself introduces many factors, and here I propose to

[32]For Schopenhauer, in brief, “all life is suffering” (1969a, p.310). He writes: “[W]e frequently shut our eyes to the truth, comparable to a bitter medicine, that suffering is essential to life, and therefore does not flow in upon us from outside, but that everyone carries around within himself its perennial source … For we untiringly strive from desire to desire, and although every attained satisfaction, however much it promised, does not really satisfy us, but often stands before us a mortifying error, we still do not see that we are drawing water with the vessel of Danaides, and we hasten to ever fresh desire” (Ibid. p.318). He adds that ‘happiness’ as it really exists is determinable merely in terms of the (temporary) absence of pain or desire. In his own expressions, “[a]ll satisfaction, or what is commonly called happiness, is really and essentially always negative only, and never positive. It is not a gratification which comes to us originally and of itself, but it must always be the satisfaction of a wish … the satisfaction or gratification can never be more than deliverance from a pain, from a want” (Ibid. p.319)
Above all, Nietzsche would say, in agreement with Aristotle, that whether or not one is ‘happy’ (in the positive sense) in a given period of one’s life is dependent upon how one lives, in particular, what kind of activity one is engaged in then. In Nietzsche’s own words, we should not “separate action from happiness”, and “activity is necessarily calculated into happiness” (GM I, 10, p.23). More precisely, while, for Aristotle, ‘theoretical’ or contemplative activity and the exercise of practical wisdom and ‘moral’ virtues are the main components of ‘happiness’ in the ‘objective’ sense of the term, Nietzsche seems to believe that happiness (understood as such) consists in the intrinsically valuable whole, namely, the creative way of life that we have discussed.\(^{33}\)

\(^{33}\)As I briefly mentioned in Introduction, Aristotle declares that the ultimate human good, which is also what the human being seeks in itself, is “happiness” (1976, p.66). Happiness, roughly identifiable with “doing well or faring well” (Ibid, 73), is “something in itself completely satisfying” and honorable (Ibid. p.73). Happiness definable as such, according to Aristotle, is “a kind of life, viz., an activity or series of actions of the soul” “in accordance with its proper excellence” or “virtue” (Ibid. p.76), which is “of two kinds, “intellectual and moral” (Ibid. p.91). For Aristotle, thus, happiness consists in morally fine and just acts and theoretical contemplation (Ibid.p.p.326–329).
For Nietzsche, thus, the fulfilling or happy life is that which is composed of the active and efficient pursuit of original and formative works, or the major elements of which are activities making up the *path* to such a goal. Suggesting this point, Nietzsche says:

> And you yourselves should create what you have hitherto called the World: the World should be formed in your image by your reason, your will, and your love! And truly, it will be to your happiness, you enlightened men! … Creation – that is the greatest redemption from suffering, and life’s easement … No more to will and no more to evaluate and no more to create! Ah, that this great lassitude may ever stay far from me! (Z II, 2, p.p.110~111)

> Formula of my happiness: a Yes, a No, a straight line, *a goal* (TI, “Maxims and Arrows” p.31)

Explaining the ‘happy’ nature of the sort of activity (i.e. powerful and intensive creative activity), Nietzsche would add that joy is inherent not only in ‘formative’, original works
as the fruits of such pursuits, but also in the latter ‘activities’ themselves. According to Nietzsche, one can be “cheerful” (heiter), when one “has conquered the hardest task by thinking” (UM, SE, p. 136), and “there is cheerfulness (Heiterkeit) only where there is a victory” (Ibid. p.135). He further tells us that “work” itself is more than a means of achieving some pleasant things to “rare individuals” such as “artists and contemplative men of all kinds” and “inventive spirits” (GS I, 42, p.57). Moreover, in reflecting upon his own life, Nietzsche writes, “I do not know any other way of associating with great tasks than play: as a sign of greatness, this is an essential presupposition” (EH, 2, 3, p. 258). Furthermore, happiness also consists in creative capacity or what Nietzsche means by “power”, which, together with powerful and intensive creative activity, constitutes the creative way of life: the “power” is a crucial source of happiness, too. Nietzsche seems to hold that pleasure accompanies the “feeling” or sense of the capacity and that happiness (as a sum of such feelings) is inherent in the possession of the power.

(2) The Excellences
As one may anticipate, Nietzsche would say that the aforementioned human merits in general contribute to happiness in significant ways. As Nietzsche implies this:

The highest and most illustrious human joys, in which existence celebrates its own transfiguration, come, as is reasonable, only to the rarest and best-constituted men (WP 1051, p.540)

Here, in the extremest height, the fountain of delight gushes up for me … A summer at the extremest height with cold fountains and blissful stillness: Oh come, my friends, that the stillness may become more blissful yet (Z II, 6, p.122)

As we have seen, pertaining to the nature of the higher man, they are necessary for powerful and intensive creative activity, in which happiness lingers. Specifically, creative capacity or “power”, in which the creative way of life as a whole consists, forms the (direct) necessary condition for the kind of activity. More precisely, it makes one’s pursuit of original works fruitful or effective. Knowledge is an essential constituent of
the power, for which reason it is also necessary for happiness. The other merits, broadly speaking, contribute to the way of life by intensifying creative activity: they render it possible for a person with creativity to activity or fully exert the power and thus to achieve a high degree of fruitfulness. According to Nietzsche, that is to say, self-discipline, the healthy ethos, the capacity for self-commanding, health, strong affectivity and virtues (such as solitude, honesty, courage and magnanimity) are necessary for the active pursuit of an original and influential work: without those values, thorough, daring, and uninterrupted creative activities (including the pursuits of ‘knowledge’) are hardly possible. Before proceeding further, it should be noted that for Nietzsche, ‘happiness’ cannot be conceived in separation from values. In this respect, his perspective of ‘happiness’ resembles those of the Greek philosophers, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. To put it in another way, Nietzsche would say that there can hardly be genuinely ‘happy’ existence in ‘disgrace’ or valuable existence in ‘misery’. Repeatedly, for Nietzsche, happiness is inherent in, and dependent upon, his major values, namely, the creative way of living and the excellences. Accordingly, cheerfulness taken as the relevant disposition is closely linked with the values; it requires the form of life, and thus, the possession of the excellences. Or rather, it is a privilege of the ‘higher man’.
Moreover, according to Nietzsche, the phenomenon of growth is extremely relevant to human happiness in a twofold sense. Firstly, since the praiseworthy capacities (in particular, creative powers), in which happiness or the happy life consists, presuppose the steady process of ‘becoming’ (as the development of the potential for them), happiness naturally depends upon that process. Nietzsche would thus add that life and human happiness demand the prior, ‘elevating’ life constituted by various forms of ongoing, long-term practices and disciplines. Next, as Nietzsche would seem to hold, the creative way of life itself entails the phenomenon of growth, and growth is another important explanatory factor of the cheerful character of the creative way of life. More precisely, the creative pursuits essential to a fulfilling life also involve activities conducive to the growth or enhancement of the praiseworthy capacities, in particular, *creative powers*. Joy accompanies the feeling of their growth or the “increase of power” (WP 702, p.373), and thus, produces ‘happiness’ as the sum of such feelings. For instance, as Nietzsche observes, the search for “knowledge”, which is constitutive of the
creative task, by enhancing creative capacity and thus rendering “the feeling of growth” (BGE 230, p.160) possible, produces “heroic feelings” (GS VI, 324, p.181) or “delight” (Z III, 12, 16, p.223). In addition, it is worth noticing that Nietzsche’s philosophy of joy is opposed to ascetic or anti-naturalistic accounts of human happiness (some of which he himself explicitly criticises), which seek ‘salvation’ in the liberation from natural affects and sheer ‘passivity’ taken as the renunciation of life-struggles. For according to Nietzsche, ‘activities’, goal-oriented behaviors, and consequently, affects, (in particular, ‘drives’) are conditions of the possibility of human happiness. Recall that in Nietzsche’s view, all-too-human desires, insofar as they are properly channeled or controlled, render it possible to will growth and creative tasks in the first place and further, to strengthen their pursuits. Similarly, Nietzsche’s perspective here is also contrasted with the

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34Briefly, Schopenhauer thinks that we (meaninglessly) suffer all the time, because we constantly and blindly desire some things, and thus strive for them. He says, “The more intense the will, the more glaring the phenomenon of its conflict, and hence the greater the suffering” (1969a, p.395). Further, according to him, only the complete renunciation of our natural desires, or in his own vocabulary, “the denial of the will-to-live” (1969b, p.606), which is a possibility only for some of us, would lead to the freedom from suffering, the peace of mind, or “salvation” (Ibid. p.605). As he puts it, “[t]rue salvation, deliverance from life and suffering, cannot even be imagined without complete denial of the will. Till then, everyone is nothing but this will itself, whose phenomenon is an evanescent existence, an always vain and constantly frustrated striving, and the world full of suffering” (1969a, p.397).
pessimistic attitude towards human nature (exemplified by Buddhism and Schopenhauerian philosophy) that repudiates human desires and strivings as merely the very roots of meaningless suffering.

(4) Leisurely Activities

Nietzsche implies that “leisure” activities (as opposed to the above task-oriented pursuits) play a crucial role in living cheerfully (GS IV, 329, p.184). They are enjoyable in themselves, and “joy”, which is inherent in them, sustains or intensifies the creative pursuits and thus contributes to further joy. Having said that, they are also essential constituents of the joyful life, and thus, this life could be compared to (the recurrence of) “war and peace” (Ibid. 285, p.162). But Nietzsche would not seem to accord ‘joy-potential’ to every way of ‘spending leisure’. On the contrary, he observes that ordinary men are too unconcerned with their leisure, and their so-called leisurely activities are vulgar and distant from the kind of feeling he has in mind (Ibid. 329, p.184). In brief, they do not possess the ability to entertain themselves nor do they know how to ‘play’ or relax. But then, how do we have to spend our leisure? Nietzsche, in particular, regards
the genuine appreciation of art works and natural beauties or aestheticism (Ibid. 326, p. 182), and authentic communication with others (‘honorable’ people), as enjoyable activities. This, of course, implies that most people approach art works and natural beauties in incorrect or “crude” ways. Therefore, in Nietzsche’s view, the ‘abilities’ for genuine appreciation and for authentic communication, which are indeed rare, are decisive for joy.

(5) Pain or Suffering

According to Nietzsche, joy or happiness cannot be discussed without reference to “tragedy” or “abyss” (TI 10, 4, p.p.120~121; GS IV, 338, p. 191). He thus confirms the validity of the ‘affirmative’ perspective of human sufferings, the practical significance of which, as we have seen in connection with courage. In other words, that perspective, for Nietzsche, is not a ‘healthy’, encouraging, or healing untruth. To recapitulate, according
to the perspective, suffering is indeed *inevitable* for joy, or joy demands pain. What constitutes this position is that the conditions of joy, in particular, the *pursuits* of creative tasks, of knowledge, and of the growth of the relevant qualities, all *entail* pain or suffering. Nietzsche says:

\[
\text{… who today could grasp from how profound a seriousness a hermit is now relaxing – The most incomprehensible thing about us is our cheerfulness (TI, 8, 3, p.73)}
\]

But that the creator may exist, that itself requires suffering and much transformation (Z II, 2, p.111)

However, we were further told that pain *itself* is a precious *source* of joy and the latter is dependent upon the former. But, one might ask, why is this the case? He presents a number of reasons for this rather intriguing argument in various places. His main reason is constituted by the phenomenon of ‘self-overcoming’. That is to say,
Nietzsche maintains that the *process* of overcoming oneself (taken as remaining faithful to one’s own posited goals or rules of conduct in the face of inner *resistance*), itself produces a feeling of joy or great pleasure. The sense of self-control or “self-mastery” gained by overcoming internal obstacles ultimately explains this pleasure. The distress a goal-oriented person undergoes constitutes such an obstacle: that is, a drive operating ‘against’ his pursuits. So Nietzsche tells us that “happiness” lies in “the feeling that a resistance is overcome” (A 2, p.127). Nietzsche regards self-discipline, which enables this form of self-overcoming as necessary for the creative way of life; it is the result of repeated *practices* of self-overcoming involving the endurance of suffering. Hence, according to Nietzsche, it would be correct to say that pain *hardens* us. As Nietzsche’s puts this, “that tension of the soul in misfortune” “cultivates its strength” (BGE 225, p.155). Moreover, Nietzsche affirms the positive contribution of human suffering to the preservation of life, which is of course the necessary condition of joy, and which enables the growth of other Nietzschean values. In Nietzsche’s own terms, pain is a “species-preserving” and “species-enhancing” force (GS IV, 318, p.179). Explaining this, Nietzsche might say that pain is a sign of life-threatening internal states (e.g. burning skin). The deficiency or *negativity* of Nietzschean values (e.g. ill health,
ignorance, dependence on others, submissiveness, cowardice, etc) causes displeasure, which results in “the breaking open” of “new needs” (Ibid. 338, p.191). That is to say, one who suffers from such negative states feels the needs to alleviate the suffering and may strive to eradicate or correct the underlying states. Finally, pain or distress makes one wise (GS Pref. 3, 4, p.p.6~7). In particular, the need to alleviate distress (created by the distress itself) impels the sufferer to find out what causes the state, and to learn how to remove or correct its sources. Thus it contributes to the attainment of the precious wisdom of the connection between the negative states and displeasure, and of how to promote Nietzschean values. Further, from the same need to heal oneself one derives eagerness for cheerfulness. Nietzsche says: “The deeply wounded have Olympian laughter; one has only what one needs to have” (WP 1040, p.535). This need for “laughter” leads one to ‘learn’ to how to live cheerfully and to share the philosophy of joy Nietzsche puts forward. It is, for instance, an internal condition under which one learns how to approach art works and achieves “a more delicate taste” (GS Pref. 4, p.7). Now, since joy is dependent upon painful activities, experiences, and states in these ways, a ‘cheerful’ person, as Nietzsche suggests, has naturally been through deep suffering. That is, the person lives in happiness, despite, or rather, in virtue of, the
hardships he does undergo (cf. WP 911, p.517; TI 8, 3, p.73). Furthermore, he must have actively intended or *exploited* pain, for his growth or enhancement, unlike many others, who were merely overwhelmed by pain. It is these past struggles that ultimately explain his ‘cheerfulness’. In summary, it could be said that for Nietzsche, the nature of the disposition of cheerfulness also lies in *suffering*.

(6) Life-Affirmation

Life-Affirmation in Nietzschean sense

Nietzsche links joy with what he would call “Dionysian” “affirmation of life”: it is “joyous” (EH, 3, “The Birth of Tragedy”, 2, p.272) or “ecstatic” (WP 1050, p.539). A person with this attitude, he suggests, would embrace, love, or be ‘thankful’ for, his own life as a whole or most of its aspects. Negatively put, the affirming person would neither view the painful elements of his own life, in disgusted, hateful, or ‘revengeful’ eyes, nor suffer from self-pity. Furthermore, for Nietzsche, the attitude makes it possible for one to “lust for eternity” (Z III, 161, p.244): to desire to live the same life again and again (GS IV, 340, p.194). But what does this “affirmation of the total character of life” (WP 1050,
p.539), which renders such ‘benevolent’ emotional response to one’s own life possible, consist in? It seems that the thought of happiness rather than ‘value’ is essential to the structure of the form of affirmation (cf. Z III, 16, 1–7, p.p.244–247; IV, 19, 10–12, p.p.332–333)\textsuperscript{35}. Nietzsche suggests this in the section entitled The Seven Seals (or The Song of Yes and Amen) of Zarathustra. Here, we see the reason why Zarathustra desires the “eternity” of his own life or “the Ring of Recurrence”. For all bitterness it has given him, he has, nonetheless, rejoiced in it. For instance, Zarathustra exclaims:

If my virtue is a dancer’s virtue, and I often leap with both feet in

\textsuperscript{35}Some commentators would agree with this account of Nietzschean life-affirmation related to Zarathustra’s “lust for eternity” and to the ‘doctrine’ of eternal recurrence. For instance, Hollingdale, speaking of what he calls the “total affirmation of life” in his Introduction to Zarathustra, claims that according to Nietzsche, “[h]e who had attained joy would affirm life and love it however much pain it contained” (1969, p.27). Kaufmann tells us that “those who achieve self-perfection and affirm their own being” “want an eternal return out of the fullness of their delight in the moment” (1974, p.p. 322–323). Also, see Schacht (1983, p.p.259–261). However, there are those who deal with the matter differently. In Leiter’s account of “Dionysian” or “life-affirming attitude” that he relates to “eternal return”, ‘joy’ or ‘happiness’ seems to be missing (2002, p.119). Likewise, Clark, in her discussion of the theme, appears to take what is essential to Nietzschean affirmation as the conferment of “intrinsic” ‘value’ on life (1990, p.p. 272–273). But as is implied above, the notion of ‘value’ does not seem to me to be constitutive of the semantic structure of ‘life-affirmation’. 
golden-emerald rapture:

if my wickedness is a laughing wickedness, at home among rose
bowers and hedges of lilies
for in laughter all evil is present, but sanctified and absolved
through its own happiness,

...

Oh how should I not lust for eternity and for the wedding ring of rings –
the Ring of Recurrence. (Z III, 16, 6, p.247)

That is to say, if a person ‘affirms’ his life as a whole, this means that he views it as a
whole as constitutive of, or necessary for, the happiness and feelings of joy. In other
words, the ‘affirming’ person *attributes* his happiness to all (or most) of its elements.
Also, he confers a similar significance on the painful features or “questionable aspects”
of his life (WP 1052, p.542). Specifically, the person believes that he has lived cheerfully
or happily, and that all the ingredients of his present life, namely, his activities,
relationships, and experiences, contribute to happiness. And even if he experiences a
period of the past as joyless and painful to him, he takes the life he lived then as
‘necessary’ for the happiness experienced in the later stages.

The Conditions for Life-Affirmation

But it is sensible to ask who is expected to take the affirmative stance (as the very basis of the “lust for eternity” or “will to immortalise”), or what kind of life is capable of being ‘affirmed’ in the above sense. First of all, as may be easily anticipated given our analysis of the structure of the form of life-affirmation, Nietzsche links happiness or living cheerfully to the affirmative attitude. He suggests that an individual who has lived “cheerfully”, reflecting upon his own life, will be able to say ‘Yes’ to it or view it in an ‘affirmative’ manner, not ending up with saying “Life is a disease”, as “the dying Socrates” did (GS IV 340, p.194). Secondly, according to Nietzsche, the creative way of life is decisive for this attitude. Nietzsche says that in order to “redeem” “all that was past”, one has to “create” (Z III, 12, 3, p.216), and that “the continually creative” is a “means” of “enduring” the idea of eternal return, that is, of embracing one’s own life as it is and was (WP 1059, p.545). Finally, Nietzsche also seems to relate the noble qualities (defining the “higher” type of man) to life-affirmation. Those who partake of these values
are capable of this attitude. In connection with this, he argues that the “gratitude and love”, which founds the “will to immortalise”, arises from “a superabundance of life” (GS V, 370, p.p.234~235). Also, according to Nietzsche, “a well-constituted and ecstatically overflowing spirit”, being capable of “a form of thanksgiving and affirmation of life”, “takes into itself and redeems the contradictions and questionable aspects of existence” (WP 1052, p. 542). However, what underpins the arguments for all these connections? Nietzsche’s account of the conditions for happiness, which has been explored, lies behind these arguments. And we could construe the constitutive ideas in the following way:

Firstly, if a person is ‘higher’ or in possession of such capacities, state, and dispositions, it is likely that his present life exemplifies the style or pattern essential to a ‘happy’ and ‘valuable’ life. Remember that the style of life is comparable to the recurrence of “war and peace”, and that its main components are prolific creative pursuits and good leisurely activities such as authentic relationships with others and refined approaches to art works. Furthermore, if he has lived in this way, then, it must be the case that his present life is on the whole happy, in the sense that he has lived full of gaiety and
his happiness (including feelings of joy) is attributable to the ‘majority’ of the elements of his life. At the same time, since, as we have seen, the pursuit of creative tasks is a hardship, or rather, it is a process of self-overcoming: his present life must involve pain, too. Now, this being the case, the idea reflective of this could correspond to the structure of the ‘affirmation’ of the ‘present’ life. In other words, he may then be in a position to ‘affirm’, or entitled to love, the life (as a whole) he has lived, despite all its suffering. And insofar as he attempts to reflect on the present life in concrete terms, and he is equipped with the right sort of framework concerning happiness or joy and Nietzschean values, he can form this ‘affirmative’ idea. For under these circumstances, he will be able to posit the concrete elements of his life, and to estimate that he has been joyful, which, in conjunction with the perspective, will constitute a due affirmation of the present life as a whole. Moreover, if his present life is happy on the whole, even if he was devoid of joy and full of agony in a period in the past, under he will be able to embrace it and thus to affirm his entire life. For then, even the ‘problematic’ elements of his past life made up the process of becoming and helped his growth or enhancement; the past life as a whole explains the excellences he (as a higher human being) now exhibits, and thus, the present, happy life.
Conversely, as Nietzsche suggests, the life-affirmation as a rule is not a ‘casual’ matter. That is to say, it reflects that the ‘affirming’ agent lives cheerfully. Further, it is expressive of the character of the affirmer’s entire life, and what the agent is. It, more precisely, reveals that the agent’s present life is fruitful or ‘creative’, and thus, ‘fulfilling’. It confirms that he is a higher individual, and thus, in possession of the Nietzschean merits, and that his past life was dedicated to self-transformation or self-creation, and thus, formed the path to the present one. And, from what has been mentioned above, what constitutes these present and past state-of-affairs causally accounts for this life-affirmation. In other words, the latter is normally the consequence of such factors as the agent’s happiness or joy, creative pursuits, powers, qualities, and struggles for growth. Nietzsche implies this, when he says that the “highest affirmation” is “born out of fullness” (EH, 3, “Birth of Tragedy”, 2, p.272) and that the “redemption” of life consists precisely in “creating” (Z III, 12, 5, p.216).

“Eternal Recurrence”
As was suggested, the affirmative attitude towards life, which is both ‘dependent’ upon happiness and ‘conducive’ to ‘further’ happiness, is closely related to Nietzsche’s famous “doctrine” of “eternal recurrence”. Considering Nietzsche’s great emphasis on the practical significance of this idea, we need to deal with it at some length in this particular context, and our discussion will naturally involve the illumination of the relation between life-affirmation and the doctrine. According to this idea, all the past and present elements of this world will recur eternally without any change, which implies that one will live the exactly same life as that one has lived, again and again. Personally, I do not believe that Nietzsche is, theoretically speaking, seriously committed to this metaphysical idea. That is, Nietzsche seems neither to have ‘justifications’ for the idea, nor, even if he has any, to regard it as a ‘tenable’ or well-founded doctrine: he does not appear to make any ‘knowledge-claims’ about it, as far as his published works are concerned. Further, since this is the case, I doubt that he passionately ‘believes’ in the idea itself. Rather, I suspect that Nietzsche views it as a practically significant ‘myth’, and I agree with many other commentators on Nietzsche in thinking that it is devised mainly as a ‘test’ (GS IV, 341, p.p.194~195)\textsuperscript{36}. But what is it a test of? And how is it related to the life-affirmation that

we have discussed? To begin with, Nietzsche assumes that the idea may lead one to think of the eternal return of one’s own life as a whole - which is one of the implications of the idea - on a concrete level. In other words, presented with the idea, one may reflect on the life one has lived so far, positing its particular elements and imagining their return. The reflection and imagining will trigger certain emotional responses which are crucially of interest to Nietzsche. As he holds, if and only if one, explicitly or implicitly, affirms one’s own life on this particular reflective occasion, one will take pleasure in the panorama of its constituents. Moreover, one will enjoy the thought of their recurrence and desire to live these again and again. By contrast, if one fails to view one’s life in this way, and especially, concludes that one has lived joylessly and ‘merely’ “suffered from life” (GS IV, 340, p.194), one will feel mere displeasure or ‘disgust’ in the image of the life. And thus, one will find the ‘doctrine’ of eternal recurrence itself disastrous, and deny its truth with harsh emotions. Such negative emotional reactions to the idea typically reflect the failure to affirm life, and especially, ‘pessimistic’ life-denial, which in effect says, “Life is a disease” (Ibid.). Hence, firstly, the idea of eternal return will help determine whether or not a person possesses the readiness to affirm and embrace his entire life, and whether he will deny it and hate it. Suggesting this, Nietzsche says, “How well disposed would you
have to become to yourself and to life to long for nothing more fervently than for this eternal confirmation and seal?” (GS IV, 341, p.p.194~195). Furthermore, more importantly, recall that normally, life-affirmation, for Nietzsche, expresses, or is explained by, the happiness, creative way of living, and excellences of the affirming agent. So if one affirms one’s life as a whole on this particular occasion for reflection, it is likely that one has actually rejoiced in a creative way of life, partaking in Nietzschean greatness. By contrast, if one regards one’s life as utterly painful, then one must have merely “suffered”, and therefore, must have lived an uncreative life, in which case one either lacks Nietzschean excellences (characteristic of the higher man), or has failed to use such values properly. Therefore, the given person’s emotional response to the idea of eternal return would serve to make a judgement as to whether or not he lives cheerfully and creatively as a valuable and “higher” individual. Hence, the idea of eternal return also functions as the test for how one actually lives and what one is.37

What are the other main functions of the idea of eternal recurrence for Nietzsche?

37 Schacht presents a similar interpretation of the idea of eternal recurrence. As he views the matter, it serves “as a test, and more generally, as a touchstone of strength and affirmativeness”. He adds: “It is a challenge, the ability to meet which is also ability to live joyfully without any hope that life and the world will ever have a significantly different character than they do” (1983, p.259)
Firstly, as he might say, the idea of eternal return will prompt a cheerful and “higher” individual, who, as we have seen, is entitled or able to affirm life, to actually do so, and to love it. In other words, the idea will provide the individual with an opportunity to reflect upon his life, and by doing so, make him contemplate life as a whole in an ‘affirmative’, and thus, ‘cheerful’ manner. It will, in particular, help him to affirm the redeemable aspects of the life that he has otherwise viewed with pain, and as a consequence, to love them. Hence, it will produce further joy, for the thoughts of the particular moments of his life thus affirmed will recur to him: the idea will thus reward him for his present life. Secondly, and relevant to this, the idea of eternal return will encourage him to (further) enhance or maintain his own merits, and to sustain his creative way of living, by functioning in the above way. This conception of the practical significance of the doctrine seems to underpin Nietzsche’s argument that it is a “selective principle in the service of strength” (WP 1059, p.545) or “the cultivating idea” (WP 1053, 1056, p.544). For one thing, his reflection on his present life, which the idea will occasion, will allow him to make connections between happiness or joy and his present style of life and between the former and his own noble qualities (if he has not done so yet). And this will strengthen his motivation for the creative style of life and the underlying merits.
Moreover, his enjoyment of affirming his present life and love of its moments will 
reinforce him to live the style life, by motivating him to make the future ‘redeemable’. 

On the other hand, for a joyless (potentially higher) individual, the idea of eternal return 
may be the source of additional agony: he may, confronted with the idea, suffer from the 
images of the present, that is, view them with discontent, regret, or self-pity. Nevertheless, 
as Nietzsche might say, these negative feelings may perform some healthy functions in 
the long run. Because of them, he may learn the relations between life-denial and 
suffering, and between the former and the joyless character of his life itself. This will 
intensify his desire to live cheerfully, and in this manner, lead him to cultivate himself or 
to exert his powers actively and appropriately.38

(7) “Forgetfulness”

Having discussed the relation between happiness and life-affirmation in Nietzschean

sense, let us briefly consider some other variables that he seems to conceive of as relevant

38 This interpretation was inspired by Kaufmann’s account of the service of eternal recurrence. According
to him, “[t]he problem is plainly not one of devising a criterion for particular acts but, insofar as it [the
idea of eternal recurrence] concerns our behavior at all, to provide an incentive for man to raise his state of
being across the cleft from the animals to true humanity or to become an overman” (1974. p.325).
to happiness. Firstly, Nietzsche counts “forgetfulness” as an important condition for living cheerfully (Z I, 1, p.55; UM, UDHL, 1, p.p.60~61). He writes:

… one may appreciate immediately to what extent there could be no happiness, no serenity, no hope, no pride, no present, without forgetfulness (GM II, 1, p.39)

But what does this ‘ability’ consist in? How is it linked to “happiness” or cheerfulness? It seems that the forgetfulness Nietzsche now has in mind primarily concerns the knowledge of one’s own past life, particularly, its painful aspects, and in this sense, is related to the idea of life-affirmation already discussed. The life-affirmation, again, involves and presupposes the thoughts of one’s past life: by giving positive meanings to its painful aspects, it makes it possible to ‘enjoy’ the thought of them. On the other hand, forgetfulness functions as an “inhibiting apparatus” in relation to such thoughts (Ibid.). In particular, this capacity inhibits the thoughts of troublesome moments of the past that are ‘irredeemable’ (due to their fixed nature) or that one knew lacked meaning. It thus keeps one from falling into, or being caught in, a depressive state and in this manner helps
secure or restore a cheerful state of mind. Those who possess what Nietzsche calls the ‘spirit of gravity’ as the antitheses of the cheerful are characterisable in terms of the lack of forgetfulness (Z III, 11, 3, p.212). They, so to speak, are unable to properly digest what they experienced or knew, or to assimilate them selectively, so that they constantly suffer from the irredeemable and unchangeable moments of the past. ‘Cheerful’ people, though they are not ‘innocent’, in the sense of not knowing pains (D IV, 329, p.162), refrain from reminding themselves of sufferings of the past.

(8) The Freedom from Morality

Nietzsche relates the freedom from conventional morality to happiness. Rather, from Nietzsche’s perspective, morality leads to the “spirit of gravity”, which implies that it is a source of depression or weariness and is incompatible with happiness (Z I, 1, p.54; Ibid. III, 11, p.211). According to Nietzsche, “life seems” “a desert” to a man who “has laden too many foreign heavy words and values upon himself” (Ibid.). The devastating impact of morality on the ‘higher’ individual constitutes Nietzsche’s argument for his conception of morality. That is to say, generally speaking, conventional morality disturbs the
(further) growth of such higher individuals. Moreover, it also hinders them from living the creative way of life.\(^{39}\) And because ‘joy’ depends upon growth and the way of life, morality is the enemy of joy, or can be seen as its absence. Nietzsche might add to this that even if the higher individual tried to live the style of life, without having been liberated from morality, he might suffer from feelings of self-contempt and of guilt, which could cause depression or weariness. Some of his noble qualities and the elements of his life would be blamed by his internalised morality. Relevantly, he might find some requirements of morality extremely ‘burdensome’ or hard to fulfill. Moreover, Nietzsche would say that morality’s constitutive evaluative judgements, in particular, its encouragement of ‘pity’, asceticism (or anti-natural character), and the emphasis on self-punishment, remorse, and bad conscience, produce acts or states which cause depression.

(9) A Perspective on Suffering

Finally, the Nietzschean philosophy of happiness that we have examined so far, which consists of an affirmative perspective of human ‘suffering’, is itself an important

\(^{39}\) I propose to further explain these points especially to examine why Nietzsche thinks that this is the case, in a detailed manner, in the final chapter devoted to his critique of morality.
condition for living cheerfully. Our discussion of life-affirmation, of course, implies this (cf. WP 852, p.p.450~451, GS IV, 338, p.p.192~193). Again, the philosophy is a ‘subjective’ condition for the affirmation of one’s life as a whole, and it is essential to the life-affirmation qua a form of self-knowledge (WP 1060, p.p.546~547). In particular, unless one shares the insight into the “large-scale economy” of pain Nietzsche emphasises (WP 852, p.451), one cannot possibly see any contributions or the fruitful sides of the painful moments of one’s life, let alone “love” them, as Nietzsche did (cf. EH 2, 10, p.p.257~258). As was suggested, the philosophy of joy renders it possible for one to assume gaiety, in the face of one’s particular, present or anticipated sufferings that are deemed ‘necessary’ or ‘inevitable’. It constitutes the conferment of positive meanings on these, and thus, the genuine ‘content’ with them. By contrast, without this philosophy of joy, and thus, without taking such a stance towards suffering, one is likely to deeply suffer from one’s own suffering, or in Nietzsche’s own expressions, to “perish of inner distress and uncertainty when one inflicts great suffering and hears the cry of this suffering” (GS IV, 325, p.181). Nietzsche suggests that the philosophy of joy and ‘affirmative’ attitude towards suffering based on it, are an essential component of the disposition of cheerfulness. That is to say, as Nietzsche holds, a ‘cheerful’ person by
nature assumes gaiety, despite his ‘awareness’ of present sufferings or ‘heavy responsibilities’ (D IV, 329, p.232). He can remain bright under such circumstances, that is, “exuberant and encouraged even by misery”, (WP 1039, p.535), because he is able to “experience suffering as a pleasure” (WP 852, p.450).

2) The Roles of Cheerfulness

Before closing our discussion of cheerfulness, it is necessary to deal with an unanswered question, namely, whether or not, for Nietzsche, cheerfulness is an intrinsic value, and why he thinks it is valuable, if it is merely extrinsically so. In brief, it does not seem that from Nietzsche’s perspective cheerfulness is an intrinsic value, despite his great emphasis on it. It is not, in other words, praiseworthy in itself, and is valuable only insofar as it functions in some way, or more precisely, it is conducive to certain other values. It thus counts as a merely instrumental value. Denying that it is an intrinsic or ultimate value, Nietzsche writes:
Whether it be hedonism or pessimism or utilitarianism or eudaemonism – all these modes of thought that assess the value of things according to pleasure and pain, that is to say, according to attendant and secondary phenomena, are foreground modes of thought and naiveties (BGE 225, p.p.154~155).

What, however, makes cheerfulness meaningful or worthwhile? It seems that in Nietzsche’s view, cheerfulness is neither a necessary condition for the creative way of living, nor an essential characteristic of the higher man. Rather, Nietzsche might say that (one’s possession of) the quality relies on one’s living the life and being a higher individual. Nevertheless, cheerfulness makes significant contributions to the intrinsic value. That is, it is a very effective means of the further intensification or maximization of creative activity. It thus helps maintain or enhance the noble capacities constitutive of, or necessary for, the way of life. So Nietzsche says that the spirit of a “child” “is needed for the sport of creation” (Z I, 1, p.55). Above all, as we saw in discussing ‘courage’, Nietzsche holds that broadly speaking, joy or cheerfulness (qua an emotional state) carries out a “restorative” function, or it is translatable as force, and as such,
intensifies various forms of pursuits (cf. GS Pref. 4, p.p.7–8). Moreover, as the account of the idea of eternal return has already implied, feelings of joy, which in fact result from the way of life, reveal this ‘mechanism’ and thus reinforce the higher individual’s creative pursuits.

CHAPTER 4: Nietzsche’s Theory of a Person’s Good

In the foregoing chapters, I discussed Nietzsche’s account of ‘greatness’ or ‘nobleness’. As I indicated at the outset, however, the Nietzschean theory of value is irreducible to this account, although in some senses, the latter is central to the former. That is to say, Nietzsche judges certain things to be ‘good’ or ‘desirable’ for us; according to him, they pertain to our proper ‘ends’ or genuine ‘interests’. On the basis of the judgements of their ‘value’ definable in these terms, Nietzsche does prescribe the things in the language of ‘ought’ or ‘should’. More precisely, he insists that we should achieve or promote these things, precisely because they are good or desirable for us (or
they benefit us). In this chapter, I will examine Nietzsche’s theory of a person’s good or benefit, which possesses the prescriptive, normative, or ‘action-guiding’ import, and will thus complete the discussion of his evaluative standard. Now, however, one may raise questions about the meanings of the ethical terms. That is, what does ‘good(-for/to)’ or ‘desirable’ mean? What do ‘prescriptive’ or ‘ought-to’ statements purport to express? Before proceeding further, I will first present my understanding of these terms, which are used throughout my discussion of Nietzsche’s substantive ethical thought. It must be made clear at the outset that my analysis of the concepts is not original. On the contrary, they are influenced or inspired by the definitions of the notions put forward by those ethicists, who ‘identify’ ethical properties or facts with those analysable in non-ethical, descriptive terms.

1. The Preliminary Conceptual Analysis

1) The Notion of ‘Good(-for/to)’ or ‘Desirable’

I personally endorse the (reductive) ‘naturalist’ meta-ethical view that
'goodness' (roughly in the sense of 'desirability') is reducible to a 'natural' property, or that the property of goodness as such is identical with a natural property that can be expressed in non-ethical terms. More precisely, the notion seems to point to a form of 'subjective', affective or emotional phenomenon, namely, 'desire', 'want', or 'need', which many ethical naturalists hold. That is to say, broadly speaking, applied to a type of object, a state, a state-of-affairs, a quality, and a way of life, the notion of 'good(-to/for)' or 'desirable' may designate the capability of being desired. And to describe the ontological implication of this understanding of the concept in general terms, the 'good' or 'desirable' must constitute objective desire, want, or interest\textsuperscript{40}. As MacIntyre puts it, whatever is good of necessity has such a characteristic, as "a matter of the internal relationship of the concept of being good and being an object of desire".\textsuperscript{41}

Bearing that general meaning of good in mind, let us examine the specific uses of the term. To begin with, if a thing is said to be intrinsically or extrinsically good for an

\textsuperscript{40}Indeed, many ethicists seem to account for the notion of 'good(-for/to)' or 'desirable' in terms of such a 'subjective' phenomenon as 'desire', 'want', 'need', or the constitution involving this. For instance, see Aristotle (1976, p.63), Spinoza (1994, p.199), Kant (1991, p.77), Mackie (1977, p.59), MacIntyre (1998, p.p.57–58), Williams (1985, p.p.58–59), and Pidgen (1991, p.p.427–428). For a general account of such a view, I referred especially to Darwall (1998) and Miller (2003)

\textsuperscript{41}1998, p.p.57–58
individual, it is meant that the individual would by nature desire to have, possess, or relate to it, “were he under ideal (though naturalistically specifiable) conditions”\(^\text{42}\), or in other words, were he fully informed of its nature and free from self-deceptive or distorting emotions. According to the speaker using the notion of goodness, the individual concerned would desire the thing for its own sake or independently of its consequences under such conditions or ‘rationally’, which is tantamount to saying that it is intrinsically good for that individual. Or the person could do so because of its possible (constitutive or instrumental) contribution to what he would ultimately and objectively want. So if and only if an object is intrinsically or extrinsically good for an individual, it constitutes his or her own ‘intrinsic’ or ‘derivative’ objective interests. On the other hand, if a thing or state-of-affairs is said to be good to an individual, it is meant that he would objectively or rationally desire that it be realised, happen, or exist, rather than that he would desire to have or appropriate it. Thus the meaning of being constitutive of one’s own good or genuine interest, which ‘good-for’ carries, is not intrinsic to the phrase. As such, it typically expresses the idea that to an agent, an object, state, or quality as it pertains to the agent himself, others around him, his

\(^{42}\) Darwall, 1998
community, or even, every human being, ‘matters’ or is the object of his ultimate or derivative desire. For instance, by saying that the well-being of others is intrinsically good to an individual, the speaker expresses the belief that the individual would rationally and objectively want them to be happy regardless of its expected consequences.

Now, people often say that certain things are good, *period:* they use the notion of good without mentioning particular individuals. In so doing, they seem to ‘universalise’ the desire for the things, and thus be committed to the idea of a human ‘constitution’ or ‘nature’ related to the desire, *not* just that of given persons. In ontological terms, if and only if a thing or state of affairs is ‘good’, necessarily it is concerned with, or “satisfies”, an “intrinsic requirement”, i.e. one’s fundamental, objective, and necessary desire, need, or want \(^{43}\), which is implied by the analysis of the use of the term. And it is this use of the notion of good, which consists in the commitment to the ideas of ‘objectivity’, of ‘necessity’, and of ‘universality’ that constitutes the main business of ‘ethics’, as Mackie rightly observes. That is, what the assertion that a thing or state of affairs is good implies

\(^{43}\)Mackie, 1977
may be that it is itself the object of such an “intrinsic requirement”, which is tantamount to saying that it is ‘intrinsically good’. Or this may suggest that we could, if certain conditions are met, desire it, because, under these conditions, it would serve what is intrinsically good or what one could ultimately want. So the proposition “X is good”, normally, in effect asserts either that X is intrinsically good for or to one or that X is extrinsically good for or to people of a certain type or under certain conditions

Some ethicists have similar conceptions of the notion of good as used in this way. Firstly, Aristotle suggests that the notion of good essentially contains that of a universal, fundamental inclination or drive, determining “the Good” as “that at which all things aim” (1976, I, p.63). Secondly, Spinoza implies that human, universally communicable desire or want is constitutive of the concept of goodness, saying that “we call it [i.e. an object] good, because we desire it” (1994, III, P39, p.175), and proposing a definition of goodness, according to which the “good” is “what we certainly know to be useful to us” (Ibid, IV, p.199). Thirdly, Mill suggests that the good is definable in terms of human desire or inclination, more precisely, as what “human nature is so constituted to desire” (2001, p.39). In analysing the concept of good, John Mackie writes that “good” “characterizes something as being such as to satisfy requirements or interests or wants of the kind in question”. He goes on to say: “[S]omeone uses the concept of objective moral value will suppose that there are requirements which are simply there, in the nature of things … To be morally good will then be such as to satisfy these intrinsic requirements” (1977, p.59). Furthermore, according to Bernard Williams, “To value something, even relatively to your own interests, as you do in thinking that it would be better ‘for me’, is always to go beyond merely wanting something”, and “[t]he idea of something’s being good imports an idea, however minimal and hazy, of a perspective in which it can be acknowledged by more than one agent as good” (1985, p.58–59). Finally, Nagel also seems to understand the notion of “value” (identifiable with ‘good’) in terms of objective and rational “want” or desire. According to him, “that something has agent-neutral or impersonal value” “means anyone has
Finally, however, we are also told that some sorts of thing are ‘morally good’, the notion of which sounds elusive. The statement that a thing or state of affairs is ‘morally good’ may simply express the meanings implicated in the described use of the term, that is, universality, objectivity, and necessity. But it may assert that it is good from the “moral point of view or “social point of view”, as Railton would say\textsuperscript{45}. That is to say, in making the statement, the speaker may mean that reflecting upon everyone else’s intrinsic, genuine interest or ‘good’ rationally and impartially, one would desire the thing or state of affairs in question, \textit{out of} the concern or care for the interest. And the moral point of view consists in such a universal and impartial concern or care, which transcends ‘egocentricity’. For instance, the typically ‘utilitarian’ statement that everyone’s happiness or happiness \textit{per se} is intrinsically morally good to any given individual may assert that he would like everyone including himself to be happy, being

\textsuperscript{45}1986, p.p.189–190
rational or objective about their own good. And behind this lies the assumption that happiness is intrinsically good for everyone, or that everyone rationally or objectively desires to be happy. Furthermore, it also appears to rely on the idea that everyone’s own intrinsic good, whatever it is, matters to any given individual, that is, would be rationally desired by the latter, which seems to be presupposed by, or constitute, the affirmation of moral goodness in general. Thus, in making the statement, what the speaker suggests is that since any given individual would desire everyone’s own intrinsic good, and happiness is intrinsically good for everyone, he would objectively or rationally like everyone including him to be happy. In this manner, the application of the notion of moral goodness presupposes that one could assume a “moral point of view”, in the sense of an “impartial, equal concern” for anyone else’s own good. Hence, in summary, what is morally good or desirable is that which “would be desired by any person were she to be both fully informed and viewing things from this perspective”, i.e. “that of equal, impartial concern for all human (perhaps all sentient) beings”\textsuperscript{46}

2) The Notion of ‘Ought-to’

\textsuperscript{46}Darwall, 1998
Let us move on to the meaning of ‘should’ or ‘ought’ which, applied to an action or course of actions, is in an ethical context definable in terms of ‘right’. Preliminarily, ordinary ‘ought-to’ propositions implicitly or explicitly involve some clauses referring to the ‘current’ or ‘present’ desires or ends of the agents concerned. They typically take the form, “X ought to do A, if (or because) X (now) desires B”. And such an ordinary ought-to claim, which can be called ‘hypothetical imperative’, is essentially grounded in the belief in the causal connection between the object of the agent’s current desire and the proposed action, or in the usefulness of the latter for the former. But some ought-to statements do not take this form, that is, they neither implicitly nor explicitly count current desires as constituents of the ‘reasons’ or ‘conditions’ for the ought-to. Rather, they assert that some actions ought to be done independently of the agents’ current wants or goals. It is the latter use or form of ‘ought-to’, which is the ‘categorical imperative’ in its ‘broad’ sense which is relevant to the notion of ‘rightness’ or ‘normativity’ in ethics. And as I suspect, the meaning of ‘ought’ that appears in hypothetical imperatives is different from that of the ethically and normatively significant ‘ought’. But what is the meaning of the latter? According to the doctrine of ‘naturalistic fallacy’, which, as a
general meta-ethical thesis, is held by the so-called ‘intuitionists’, the identification of ethical properties or facts (such as ‘goodness’) to natural or metaphysical properties that can be captured by non-ethical descriptive terms is ‘fallacious’. It thus rejects both the idea of ‘analytic’ or conceptual identity between ethical properties and ‘non-ethical’ ones (in the given sense) and that of a ‘synthetic’ identity between them. In particular, it ‘bans’ any attempt to define ‘ought’ (as it appears in the ‘categorical imperative’ in the above, broad sense) in terms of ‘is’, or the thought that ‘ought’ ‘by definition’ or ‘conceptually’ follows from ‘is’. But despite the ban, I endorse the view that the notion of the given form of ‘ought-to’, like those of ‘good’ and of ‘praiseworthy’, is composed of some non-ethical or descriptive ingredients. In brief, it seems to point to human ‘motivation’. What is essential to the structure of the notion seems to be the concept of will, choice, decision, or determination as a phenomenon that consists in a ‘self-regulative’ constraint or pressure, rather than the notion of (intersubjective) ‘pleasure’ or that of ‘desire’, which is constitutive of ‘praiseworthiness’ or ‘goodness(-for/to)’.

Some ethicists, who deny the doctrine that intuitionists regard as ‘axiomatic’, seem to explicitly or implicitly define ‘ought-to’ in terms of ‘reason’, and I find this
move plausible\textsuperscript{47}. That is to say, if one ‘should’ or ‘ought to’ do a particular action or achieve a thing, other things being equal (or all things considered), in the ethically relevant sense of the term, then it must be that one has a good (or overriding) reason for doing so. But what does the state of affairs of having a ‘reason’ for doing or achieving something consist in? Regarding the nature of a reason for an ‘act’, if and only if one has a good (or overriding) reason for performing an act, then, one would rationally ‘will’ to do this act, in one’s deliberation or ‘decision-making’ process, other considerations being absent (or absolutely)\textsuperscript{48}. Hence, ‘ought-to’ can also be defined in such terms as, will, determination, or resolution contingent upon the agent’s objectivity or practical rationality. In Bernard Williams’ view, ‘should’ or ‘ought’ thus represents a “deliberate priority” from the perspective of an agent, or “practical necessity and the experience of


\textsuperscript{48}Kant would seem to favour this formulation. He thinks that the language of “ought” carries the significance of ‘goodness’, viewing “imperatives” or ought-to claims as stating the ‘goodness’ of proposed actions (1991, p.p. 77–78). But as we saw earlier, for Kant, the ‘good’ is in essence an object of “will” as “a power to choose”. That is, it is what one could objectively will, or in his own terms, “that which determines will by concepts of reason”, either as a means to some end or in itself (Ibid. p.77). Falk, interpreting Kant in this way, also understands ‘ought’ in terms of rational or objective ‘will’ (1986, p.p.187–197)
reaching a conclusion with that force”. Specifically, in saying that making an ought-to assertion about a particular action without reference to the agent’s current desires, the speaker assumes that the action is at least performable by the agent, or is one of the practically possible options available to the agent. More importantly, at the same time, it is implied that the particular action has a certain intrinsic or extrinsic characteristic: it either serves an end or is an instance of a type or pattern of behavior. Now, according to the speaker, if the agent were rational or objective in the situation, that is, knew the intrinsic or extrinsic characteristic of the action and its practical possibility, and properly contemplated the object it serves, he would will the action. In addition, in many cases, ordinary ought-to claims concerning acts seem to contain or conceal the other-things-being-equal phrase, and to be in fact ‘conditional’ in this sense. Such an ‘ought-to’ claim means that unless other considerations or factors that could make the agent resolve not to perform the act are present, the agent would choose the act. By contrast, an ‘all-things-considered’ ought-to statement, being absolute or unconditional, asserts that the knowledge of the characteristic of the action the speaker has in mind and of its practical possibility would function as the ‘conclusive’ or ‘sufficient’ ground of the choice of the

\[49\] 1985, p.185; Ibid., p.188
act. That is, if the agent possessed the knowledge about the act, he would be necessarily or absolutely determined to carry it out. Finally, when ‘ought-to’ or ‘should’ is applied to an object or state of affairs rather than a particular act, this seems to carry similar significance. The claim that a person should achieve or actualise a thing implies that it is achievable by means of the person’s efforts or that there exists some behavioral means of attaining it. Furthermore, according to the speaker, the person would choose to achieve the thing, rationally or objectively, i.e. knowing the possibility of its achievement, and properly contemplating the conceived end.

The above accounts of goodness or desirability and of ought-to seem to have a number of significant implications. I propose to close the present, preliminary conceptual discussion, clarifying some of these. Above all, evidently, ‘goodness’ or ‘desirability’ and ‘ought’ are intimately connected or the former ‘evaluative’ property is a source of normativity. As has been implied, an ordinary (non-hypothetical) ought-to assertion involving an object or state of affairs may have as its own justification the affirmation of the intrinsic or extrinsic ‘goodness’ or ‘desirability’ of the object. It can thus take the form of a ‘prudential’ imperative. For instance, in an attempt to answer the
question, ‘Why should I have this?’ one might typically and simply say, “It is good for you”, rather than “You just ought to”. Or such an ought-to claim may in effect assert that the object ought to be achieved by the agent, because it is intrinsically or extrinsically good (for the agent), and is achievable. But what underlies this logical transition from goodness to ought or the explanation of ought in terms of good? Behind this lies the fundamental, commonsensical assumption that if a thing is intrinsically or extrinsically good for any given agent, then he ought to achieve it, other things being equal. Similarly, an ordinary ought-to assertion about an act may be grounded in the logical presupposition that if an object is intrinsically good or desirable for one, then one should take an action conducive to it. In other words, in conjunction with such a general framework, the judgements of the goodness or desirability of an object, of the contributiveness of a proposed action to the object, and of the practical possibility of the action seem to deductively found a prudential ought-to claim involving the action. The common presupposition of the link between intrinsic ‘goodness’ or ‘desirability’ and ‘ought-to-be-attained’ sounds trivially true, but seems undeniable or evident.

Our earlier definitions or identifications of ‘goodness’ and of ‘ought-to’ seem to
be able to ‘explain’ or ‘justify’ the intimate connection between the two, and moreover, the objective and perhaps necessary truth of the apparently trivial proposition affirming the connection. Or rather, this proposition is sustainable through the commonsensical idea of the explanatory relevance of ‘desire’ to ‘will’ or to ‘reason’, and the identifications of goodness and of ought-to in terms of these factors. At the same time, these identifications seem to give us hints as to how we do or can ‘know’ the truth of the relevant proposition. That is to say, in particular, it seems to be evident that if any given agent is expected to ‘desire’ some object or state of affairs upon proper reflection, and an action is necessary for it, he has a good ‘reason’ for doing the action. Or if so, and if he knows these things about the action and properly reflects on, or contemplates, the object, he will definitely ‘resolve’ to do the action, other considerations being absent. For in that case, naturally, he will have the objectively sustainable desire for the end and the knowledge of the usefulness of the possible action. This desire and the knowledge will indeed constitute a solid determining ground of the choice of the action. Hence, the (intrinsically) good can be identified roughly as what ought to be attained or as what ought to be pursued or promoted. In other words, whatever is good is that which would be not only ‘desired’ or ‘wanted’ but also ‘aimed at’ or ‘willed’, under ideal conditions,
as Kant argues\textsuperscript{50}. In epistemological terms, since the connection between goodness and ought is thus objective or tenable, the knowledge of the goodness of an object, and that of the behavioral means of attaining the object could establish an \textit{ought-to} conclusion, and provide it with the status of knowledge.

Since goodness or desirability is determinable in terms of the ‘capability of being desired’ or the object of ‘objective’ and ‘necessary’ desire or need, the judgement ascribing the latter property to an object or state-of-affairs, if sustained, can establish the attribution of goodness or desirability to the object. Moreover, granted that ‘goodness’ (or ‘desirability’) and ‘ought-to’ are thus closely linked, the same judgement may enable one to defend a general or particular ought-to claim involving the object: for instance,

\textsuperscript{50} According to Kant, the good is an object of our “liking”, by which he means “desire” or “interest” as well as “pleasure” or “approbation”. He writes, “what we call good must be, in the judgement of every reasonable man, an object of the faculty of desire” (1993, p.63). Nevertheless, by “desire” or “interest”, in terms of which he defines ‘good’, he does not mean what the former ordinarily refers to, namely, a sort of affect or passion, or in his own language, something “pathological” (1991, p.77). Rather, he seems to point to “will”, and thus to define ‘good’ as what one could rationally will as a means to some end (“indirectly”), or in itself (“immediately”). As he puts it, “the good is the object of will (a power of desire that is determined by reason)” (1987, p.51).
“We ought to act so as to maximise happiness per se, other things being equal”. But if the property described as such really exists, how can one have access to this? As I believe, whether something indeed possesses the property (i.e. the capability of being desired) can be decided purely by empirical scientific means, and in this sense, the property itself or the fact about it is a ‘natural’ one. Therefore, empirical disciplines or investigations appear to be indeed epistemologically relevant to ethical enquiries. For the knowledge of what is capable of being desired, which founds the knowledge of what is good or ought to be achieved, one seems to need to answer of what thing or state of affairs is commonly, actually desired or sought. This is an ‘empirical’ question and can be the concern of ‘scientific’ disciplines (such as sociology, psychology, and anthropology), as Aristotle and Mill would agree. This, of course, does not mean that the fact of some thing’s being actually desired (by most people) could ‘guarantee’ the conclusion that the thing relates to human nature or constitution. And yet, that fact could serve as significant, inductive evidence for that conclusion, and thus, for the thing’s goodness or desirability. Both of the philosophers seem to mean this when they argue for the evidential relevance of such facts to ethical enquiries.
One might, however, ask whether Nietzsche has any view on the conceptual issues dealt with thus far. Unfortunately, Nietzsche does not seem to put forward his own definitions of ethical terms or accounts of the natures of the relevant properties. Nevertheless, I suspect that Nietzsche implicitly maintains that the notion of goodness or desirability is analysable in descriptive terms and that the relevant ethical property is (conceptually) identical with an empirically accessible (or ‘natural’) property. More precisely, Nietzsche could be interpreted as suggesting that the evaluative notion is definable in the foregoing manner, i.e. in terms of one’s fundamental desire, interest, or need, or the human constitution. He may also believe that the property of goodness is of necessity identical with a natural property describable in such vocabulary (as a matter of analytic fact). Further, this (reductive) ‘naturalistic’ definition or identification seems to play an important role in his ethical system, that is, to constitute the ultimate, non-ethical ground of his ethical claims. I propose to revisit these rather controversial points later on.

2. What is Good for Us?
1) The Creative Way of Life and “Power”

Let us now try to answer the question of what sorts of thing or state-of-affairs Nietzsche actually applies the notions of ‘good(-for/to)’ or ‘desirable’ and of ‘ought-to’ to. Broadly speaking, the Nietzschean account of the desirable cannot be considered separately from the other axis of his theory of value, namely, his account of ‘greatness’ or ‘noble-ness’. That is to say, he takes up the things he posits as ‘noble’ or constitutive of a ‘great’ human being again and confers the meaning of desirability upon them. In brief, the noble way of life, capacities, states, and dispositions that we have already discussed in the previous chapters seem to be, from Nietzsche’s perspective, (either intrinsically or extrinsically) good or desirable for us and what we ought to promote.

Specifically, first of all, Nietzsche holds that the ‘creative way of life’ as a whole, whose essential constituents are “creative powers” and intensive creative activity (or the active pursuit of an original and formative work), is good for us. According to Nietzsche, the best or “optimum existence” for “all great, fruitful, inventive spirits” consists in “their most beautiful fruitfulness” (GM III, 8, p.88). He would also confer extrinsic
(more precisely, ‘constitutive’) goodness or desirability on individual creative ‘acts’ as the components of the way of life he praises and encourages. Nietzsche insists that “one should live” “in this state of consecration”, which lies in the complete devotion to a creative task (See section 552 of Daybreak, which I have already quoted in connection with his valorizations of magnanimity and of “ideal selfishness”). Furthermore, it seems reasonable to interpret Nietzsche as endowing this way of life with the significance of ‘intrinsic’ goodness or desirability, in the strict sense of the term. In other words, our final end or ideal in self is the creative way of life as a whole, which can be defined as the active employment or manifestation of creative capacity: the latter is good independently of its relation to another valuable thing, i.e. whether it constitutes a valuable whole and whether it produces something else valuable.

For one thing, it is hard to locate any ‘higher-order’, intrinsic value (for or to us) from which the value of the way of life could be derived within the Nietzschean ethical system. Moreover, Nietzsche seems to consider that to be a great human being is one’s ultimate, proper end, or that “human greatness”51 is intrinsically good or desirable for

51Leiter, 2002
one. As Nietzsche himself claims, “the great human being is a terminus” (TI, 9, 44, p. 109). But arguably, from Nietzsche’s perspective, the great human being is the ‘creative’ human being or “creator”, who not only possesses the “creative fullness of power” (BGE 212, p.144), but also exerts it in a manner that matches the way of life at issue. To put this in a different way, if, and only if, one lives or leads the creative style of life as a whole does one have human greatness. Again, Nietzsche does suggest this, saying that the “greatness” of the “genius” or the “great human being” “lies in the fact that he extends himself” and that “he flows out, he overflows, he uses himself up, he does not spare himself” (Ibid.). Furthermore, according to Nietzsche, “men of great creativity”, whose “will[s] of the first rank ha[ve] the power in [their] hands and who “can make [their] creative will[s] prevail through long periods of time, in the form of laws, religions, and customs” are “the really great men” (WP 957, p.501). Moreover, Nietzsche also holds that human greatness itself is identifiable with the characteristic of “creativeness”, which can be interpreted in terms of (living) the creative way of life. He writes: “people have little idea of greatness, that is to say: creativeness” (Z I, 12, p.78). And it seems that in conjunction with this identification, the belief in the intrinsic desirability of the way of life seems to underlie the contention that the great human being is an ultimate end.
Further, as Nietzsche might argue, the creative way of life, in which human greatness consists, is a person’s *sole* intrinsic good. He seems to hold that the goodness or desirability of other things, e.g. the noble capacities, dispositions, and states, derives from, and depends upon, their *constitutive* or *instrumental contributions* to the creative way of life: they are good only insofar as they are constitutive of, or conducive to, the creative way of life. It appears that there is little evidence that Nietzsche regards any of the other posited values including the individual qualities as good or desirable ‘in themselves’ or independently of their relations to the creative life. Furthermore, Nietzsche writes: “No more to will and no more to evaluate and no more to create! ah, that this great lassitude may ever stay far from me!” (Z II, 2, p.11). Of course, here, Nietzsche does not make it explicit that the state in which one neither has any creative task to pursue nor creates anything is undesirable or bad. But as can be argued, it is doubtful that Nietzsche would call such a state that he himself *never wants* and even abominates, ‘good’ or ‘desirable’. The creative way of life, in summary, can count as the *sole* locus of ‘value’, in Nietzsche’s ethical system. Now, creative power is one of the qualities that contribute to the creative way of life, and thus, is good or desirable for us.
Nietzsche argues:

What is good? All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man … Not contentment, but more power; not peace at all, but war; not virtue, but proficiency … (A 2, p.128)
Obviously, Nietzsche here declares that heightened “power” or “proficiency” is good for us. But, as was mentioned at the outset, it is reasonable to say that what Nietzsche designates by the term “power” here is basically (the active employment of) creative capacity. As such, it consists in, or comprises, the intellectual resources necessary for the production of original and influential works. To recapitulate, these resources, or in Nietzsche’s own terminology, “creative powers” involve “great intelligence”, “insight” and knowledge. Creative capacity, which can be analysed in this way, is indeed necessary for creative activity or the process of making something new and influential. But it can hardly count as an instrumental value. Rather, it is good, for it constitutes the creative way of life that Nietzsche regards as our final end. It is thus good independently of its ‘usefulness’ for something else valuable. Naturally, the qualities of which the capacity consists are non-instrumental, constitutive goods, too.

2) Conditions for Self-Mastery: Self-Discipline, the Healthy Ethos and the Capacity for Self-Commanding
Nietzsche seems to relate the aforementioned qualities involved in the state of “self-mastery” or “freedom” to the category of good, and to lay great emphasis on them. Thus, self-discipline, which is identifiable with the disposition for “self-overcoming”, is also one of our crucial goods. To remind ourselves of its nature, the ability or disposition consists in “hardness”, resoluteness, or the strong sense of “self-responsibility” and in the capacity for controlling or employing strong drives, emotions, and virtues. It is valuable, because it renders possible the active employment of creative capacity, in terms of which the creative way of life is definable. It is necessary for the creative way of life, and thus, is an instrumental value. Secondly, the healthy personal ethos and table of one’s own values contribute to the creative way of life as its important means, for which reason they are also (instrumentally) good. By giving creative capacity and self-discipline proper directions, they help to intensify creative activity; they also serve the (further) growth of creative powers and the maintenance or cultivation of other merits including virtues. Finally, Nietzsche would say that the capacities for self-commanding and for positing one’s own values duly count as (instrumental) personal goods, for they give birth to the healthy ethos and the table of values.
Nietzsche would insist that precisely because these qualities involved in self-mastery are good or desirable for us, we ought to acquire and enhance them. He thinks that they are good for us (only) because they play instrumental roles in our creative lives. Despite Nietzsche’s great emphasis on them, as was suggested, they do not seem to be treated as ‘intrinsic’ or ultimate values, even in the broad sense of the term. They are merely instrumental values, in the sense that their value is contingent upon their potential usefulness or necessity for a value or valuable whole. Thus, Nietzsche would say that the desirability of each of the noble qualities for the agent is indeed dependent upon whether it would lead to the (present or future) creative way of life (and whether the agent can possess it). But its conduciveness or usefulness depends upon the other Nietzschean merits characteristic of the “higher” type, which can be defined in terms of the necessary, internal condition for the creative way of life. Hence, qualifying his argument for its value, Nietzsche would further claim that the given quality is valuable for the agent only if he is, or can become, a member of the “higher” type. In particular, it is of little value for those who pertain to the “herd” type (or are devoid of the essential characteristics of the higher type of man) and who can never become higher. Nietzsche seems to consider this ‘irredeemable’ or ‘hopeless’ herd type to account for the vast
majority of population. However, Nietzsche affirms its value for individuals of some other types, because their possession of the quality would serve their (further) growth and powerful and intensive creative activities. Especially, it is under some external circumstances good for persons of the “higher” type, who possess the necessary, internal conditions for the creative way of life, and thus, whose actuality is determinable in terms of creative powers, self-discipline, the capacity for self-commanding, the healthy ethos, strong affectivity, health, and virtues (such as honesty, courage, solitude and magnanimity). Also, under certain circumstances, it is good for those who can possess all these merits and thus become higher individuals in the long term. For the quality will contribute eventually to their future creative lives, by helping them with their (further) growth and by forming the ground of their active pursuits of original works.

3) Noble States: Health, Vitality and Strong Affectivity

Health, vitality, and strong, manifold affectivity, which belong to the states to which Nietzsche accords nobleness, also seem to position themselves in his account of desirability. They serve the active employment of creative capacity or intensive creative activity, and thus, contribute to the intrinsically valuable whole, for which
reason Nietzsche attributes desirability or goodness to them. Furthermore, they are all conducive to the (further) growth of the noble capacities, especially, the power of creation. Regarding ‘health’ in particular, according to Nietzsche, “for a new end”, that is, to be a creator such as “an artist, a saint, a lawmaker, sage”… one “also needs a new means” and “one thing above all – the great health” (GS V, 382, p.246). Further, arguing for the value of affects in general, Nietzsche says:

The affects are one and all useful, some directly, others indirectly; in regard to utility it is quite impossible to fix any scale of values – even though in economic terms the forces of nature are one and all good, i.e. useful, and also the source of so much terrible and irrevocable fatality. The most one could say is that the most powerful affects are the most valuable, in as much as there are no greater sources of strength (WP, 931, p.491)

Those states, namely, health, vitality, and strong affectivity, characterise the “higher” or “strong” individual. As such, they render it possible for the individual to exert his creative powers in an active and thorough manner. Furthermore, those states
will help the promising individual with his struggles for “growth”; they help him to
cultivate the resources necessary for creative activity. Hence, with respect to powerful
affectivity or affects, Nietzsche affirms that “any kinds of hatred, jealousy, … , greed,
and violence belong to the favourable conditions without which any great growth even
of virtue is scarcely possible”, and that “the poison from which the weaker perishes
strengthens the strong man – he does not call it poison” (GS I, 19, p.43). Although
Nietzsche’s emphasizes those internal states, it could also be doubted whether he counts
them as ‘intrinsically’ desirable or good even in the broad sense of the term, or in other
words, as good independently of its usefulness for an intrinsic value. As Nietzsche seems
to suggest above, they are good only as a “means” towards some ultimate end. Thus,
according to Nietzsche, they are good insofar as they are “useful” or necessary for one’s
own creative way of life, which is the sole intrinsic value to one. To put this in another
way, based on the denial of its ‘intrinsic’ value (in the broad sense of the term),
according to which its value for one counts on its usefulness to an ultimate value to one,
Nietzsche would conclude that its value is determined by, and dependent upon, its
usefulness or necessity for one’s own creative way of life. This consideration would lead
him to argue that like other merits, each of the states is good for some types of people,
not for others, or that it is desirable for one in some situations, not in others. Especially, each state has evaluative or normative meaning for ‘higher’ individuals, who are only “rare exception” (BGE 61, p.88), and whose nature can be determined in terms of Nietzschean merits constitutive of the necessary, internal condition of the creative way of life. Also, it is, in certain circumstances, desirable for individuals of the ‘promising’ or ‘potentially higher’ type, who can possess all these excellences in the long term, for it will lead to their creative lives eventually; it will help them to cultivate the noble capacities and to intensify their pursuits of original works. By contrast, the given state does not have such evaluative meaning especially for people of the ‘incorrigible’ or ‘irredeemable’ herd type, who (qua the herd) lack the qualities essential to the higher type of man, and moreover, cannot attain all these merits; even if they possess the state, they will not lead the creative life.

4) Knowledge

Knowledge or truth, being one of the crucial Nietzschean values, is given similar evaluative status, as we have seen earlier. According to Nietzsche, it is not desirable ‘in
itself’ in its strict sense of the term or independently of its relation to another thing valuable. Denying the ‘intrinsic’ goodness of knowledge in this sense, Nietzsche argues that “science itself requires justification” (GM III, 24, p.128), and that it first requires a value-ideal, a value-creating power, in whose service it is allowed to believe in itself” (Ibid, 25, p.128). Reflecting the denial, he also warns us against the modern doctrine of “truth at any cost” (GS V 344, p.201) or “knowledge for its own sake” (BGE 64, p.90), or “belief in the value of truth in itself” (GM III, 24, p.127). Nevertheless, as Nietzsche holds, not knowledge per se, but knowledge of some sorts is not only essential to higher men, but also desirable for them. Furthermore, knowledge of these sorts is a constitutive or instrumental good. Nietzsche’s conferment of the meaning of desirability or goodness on knowledge is coherent with his assertion that “we must become the best students and discoverers of everything lawful and necessary in the world” (GS V 335, p.189) and that “knowledge” is undeniably a “task” (BGE 230, p.162). In addition, this evaluation of knowledge explains very well his ascription of evaluative or normative significance to the qualities that “compel us to it [knowledge]”, such as “honesty” (GS V 335, p.189; BGE 227, p.156) or “intellectual conscience” (Ibid, 230, p.161). As Nietzsche would add, knowledge is good exclusively for individuals of certain types. In particular, again, it is
good for the higher type – which denotes Nietzsche himself and which he also designates by the first-person pronouns “we”, “us”, and “our”. Knowledge’s goodness for such individuals stems from, and relies upon, its (constitutive or instrumental) contributions to their own creative lives. Nietzsche seems to imply this when he insists that we “should learn only for creating”, (Z III, 12, 16, p.223), and in saying: “In knowing and understanding, too, I feel only my will’s delight in begetting and becoming … if there be innocence in my knowledge it is because will to begetting is in it” (Ibid. II, 2, p.111). To recapitulate, in particular, knowledge is an essential component of the noble capacities conducive to, or constitutive of, the creative way of life, and the acquisition or incorporation of knowledge naturally means the growth of the capacities. Most of all, it functions as a part of creative capacity, and in this manner, constitutes the creative way of life. Furthermore, knowledge grounds one’s practical wisdom as to how to create original works, to cultivate the Nietzschean merits and to transform or control one’s affects and traits. Thus, it also forms self-discipline and the capacities for self-commanding and for making a table of one’s own values, which are necessary for the creative way of life.
5) Life-Preservation

‘Life’, taken as the state of being alive or its preservation, is also one of the values on which Nietzsche lays emphasis. His belief in the value of life underlies the claim that “one must know how to conserve oneself” (BGE 41, p.70). But, according to Nietzsche, should one preserve one’s life independently of its relation to an intrinsic value? Nietzsche sometimes gives us the impression that he thinks it is our end ‘in itself’ in this strict sense, stressing “the value for life” and arguing that “the value for life is ultimately decisive” (WP 493, p.272). Nevertheless, it does appear to me that from Nietzsche’s point of view, life per se is also a (merely) extrinsic value, more precisely, a constitutive one; it is desirable or good for one, only insofar as it contributes to one’s own creative way of life as its part. For this reason, Nietzsche, rather cruelly, suggests that life does not possess value for people in general (or the vast majority of the herd). Nietzsche, at the beginning of The Gay Science, thus mocks “teachers of the purpose of existence”, who try to “promote faith in the life” of the “species” or the “herd” (GS I, 1, p.p.27~29). He implies that it is not the ‘responsibility’ of the general public (or the majority of the herd) to preserve their own existence, or that it is not the case that they ought to survive.
What underlies this point seems to be Nietzsche’s assumption that the public are classifiable into the ‘hopeless’ or ‘irredeemable’ herd type. That is to say, as members of the herd, they lack the merits essential to the higher type (e.g. creative powers, self-discipline, the sound ethos, the capacity for self-commanding, powerful affectivity, health, vitality, honesty, solitude, courage and magnanimity) At the same time, unfortunately, they are ‘hopeless’ or ‘irredeemable’: they can never possess all these characteristics, of which they are actually devoid, and as a consequence, can by no means live the creative way of life even in the remote future. Nietzsche also suggests that the herd in general are indeed ‘hopeless’ in this sense. Therefore, naturally, the survival of the general public (or the vast majority of the herd) would never form, or function as a part of, the intrinsically valuable form of life. According to Nietzsche, by contrast, one should seek to preserve oneself, if one belongs to the “higher” type of man, which accounts for a tiny minority of population, for reasons similar to those explaining his affirmation of the value of things such as health, affectivity and virtues.

6) Virtues or Excellences of Character
Furthermore, Nietzsche also regards virtues in general as desirable or good for us. Thus, according to Nietzsche, we ought to cultivate or maintain the aforementioned virtues. In other words, the dispositions count as ‘virtues’ also in the sense of dispositions that are desirable or good for us. In addition, Nietzsche attaches similar evaluative significance to the cognitive or emotional states or acts that the dispositions in essence involve, for instance, the feelings of “joy” and of “pride” corresponding to the virtues of ‘cheerfulness’ and of ‘self-respect’ (WP 1033, p.533). Thus, in summary, honesty, solitude, the “mask”, courage, self-respect, cheerfulness, the life-affirmative attitude, forgetfulness, magnanimity, and “ideal selfishness” or “healthy egoism” are all desirable for us.

Now, although these noble dispositions form the focus of Nietzsche’s ethical discourse and are representative of his ethics as a whole – and Nietzsche counts as a ‘virtue ethicist’ in this respect – they do not seem to be treated as ‘ends in themselves’ even in the broad sense of the term. Rather, regarding ‘virtues’ in general, Nietzsche does not appear to believe in any disposition that is good (or ought to be acquired)
independently of its usefulness or necessity for something else valuable: virtues are good
only as means of something intrinsically good or what ought to be achieved for its own
sake. He is thus distinguishable from traditional or classical ‘virtue ethicists’ (including
Aristotle), who believe that virtues constitute ‘human flourishing’ as the intrinsic good
(or our ‘final end’), and that as such, they are constitutive values rather than instrumental
ones. When Nietzsche contends that the notion of “virtue free of moralic acid” is only
acceptable, Nietzsche seems to imply that no disposition is an end “in itself” in its broad
or loose sense, or in other words, that the goodness of a disposition is dependent upon its
conduciveness to something else that is intrinsically good (A 2, p.128). Also, he writes
that “a virtue has to be our most personal defense and necessity: in any other sense it is
merely a danger”, and that “impersonal and universal” “virtue” and “duty” are nothing
but “phantoms” (A 11, p. 133). To put this in a different way, according to Nietzsche,
given any quality or disposition, it is valuable for one, if and only if one’s possession of
it is likely to function as a means towards some ultimate end, which is identifiable with
one’s own intrinsic good. Thus, he seems to maintain that the noble qualities described
above (e.g. “honesty”) are desirable for persons of certain types, in particular, for those
of the ‘higher’ type: the higher individual ought to keep or cultivate the qualities.
Nietzsche in fact calls them “our” virtues, and in so doing, he suggests this. By contrast, each of the qualities is of no evaluative or normative significance to people of the other types, especially, the ‘incorrigible’ or ‘hopeless’ herd. It is the significant contributiveness of the given virtue to the higher individual’s (further) growth in creative powers and creative way of life that constitutes Nietzsche’s reason for believing in its goodness or desirability for the individual. Broadly speaking, it motivates him to enhance his creative powers, and facilitates or reinforces his pursuit of original and formative works: it creates ‘affective’ or ‘emotional’ environments necessary or most suitable for his further growth and creative activity. On the other hand, the idea that nothing intrinsically valuable will arise, even if one who is neither actually nor potentially ‘higher’ has the virtue, appears to underpin Nietzsche’s refusal to ‘absolutise’ its value and his denial of its ‘universal’ value.

7) Pleasure and Happiness

In spite of his frequent derogative treatment of hedonism or hedonistic utilitarianism (Cf. BGE 225, 228), Nietzsche would admit that the feeling of pleasure,
especially, ‘joy’, is good (WP 1033, p.533; GS IV, 329, p.184; Z III, 10, 2). Moreover, he seems to hold that ‘happiness’ understood as the sum of such positive feelings (experienced over a certain period of time) is desirable. Nietzsche writes that although “one should not wish to enjoy, “one should have” “enjoyment” (Z III, 12, 5, p.217). Furthermore, according to him, a new “ideal” is basically a “good dancer”, that is, a ‘cheerful’ person who is “always tickled by some sunray of happiness, and who is “exuberant and encouraged even by misery” (WP 1039, p.535). Whereas for hedonists such a positive, subjective state is the sole intrinsic good, Nietzsche holds that it is merely instrumentally good. For instance, the feeling of joy is good for the higher individual, who is in essence in possession of creative capacity, self-discipline, the capacity for self-commanding, the sound ethos, vitality, health, strong affectivity, honesty, solitude, courage and magnanimity. It is good for him, only insofar as it will serve his creative life, by intensifying or reinforcing his creative pursuits or struggles for (further) growth. As Nietzsche might say, since the feeling would not eventually yield anything intrinsically valuable to people of other types, especially, those who pertain to the herd and can never acquire all the merits essential to the higher type, it is not good for them, nor is it the case that they should have it.
Moreover, unlike hedonists, Nietzsche would not accept that ‘pain’ or ‘suffering’ is intrinsically bad for us. Instead, in opposition to those ethicists, he would say that pain is, under certain circumstances, (instrumentally) good especially for the ‘promising’ or ‘potentially higher’ type of individual, to whose possibility all the noble characteristics of the higher type belong (BGE 225, p.155). Such an individual, according to Nietzsche, as a “creature”, “has to be formed, broken, forged, torn, burned, annealed, refined, and thus, “has to suffer and should suffer” (Ibid.) Nietzsche, in addition, often expresses his contempt for the idea that “happiness” or “wellbeing” (understood as the absence of pain or “comfort”) is good or ideal; this seems to reflect his distinctive evaluative position on pain (BGE 225 p.155; 228, p.158). As was shown in detail in our discussion of cheerfulness, for Nietzsche, some sorts of pain or suffering can serve the growth of the noble capacities in various ways, and by doing so, contribute eventually to the creative way of life. Above all, pain ‘hardens’ the promising individual, and thus enhances his self-discipline, by presenting obstacles to his goals and rendering the practices of self-overcoming possible.
8) Practices

According to Nietzsche, one’s acquisition of the praiseworthy capacities, in particular, creative powers, does presuppose the process of *becoming* or the gradual development of the relevant potentialities. It is strenuous, painstaking, and long-term *discipline* that makes this process possible or allows the potentialities to actually unfold. Nietzsche would, nevertheless, qualify this claim, arguing that the disciplinary measures or “paths” most appropriate for the growth of a given individual (in the capacities) may *not* be so for the growth of another. In a section of *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche recommends us to learn to “wait for” ourselves, thus suggesting that to reach a certain ‘height’ or to acquire the noble capacities is a painstaking, demanding, and long-term ‘task’. He also tells us that he himself has accomplished the task “by diverse paths and diverse ways”. And yet, closing the section, he adds: “This – is now my way: where is yours? Thus I answered those who asked me ‘the way’. For the way – does not exist (Z III, 11, p. 213).

Furthermore, the attainment or cultivation of the ‘virtues’ relies upon such practices, especially, *bodily* ones. That is, according to Nietzsche, these virtues are
“acquired one by one through protracted discipline and practice” (BGE 220, p.150), and human beauty, in which they consist, is not an “accident”, but the result of “accumulatory” “labour and exertion”. He goes on to say:

... one must not mistake the method involved here: a mere disciplining of thoughts and feelings is virtually nothing ... one first has to convince the body. The strict maintenance of a significant and select demeanor, an obligation to live only among men who do not ‘let themselves go’, completely suffices for becoming significant and select ... the right place is the body, demeanor and diet, physiology: the rest follows. (TI, 9, 47, p.112)

Like Aristotle, Nietzsche appears to believe that the emotional dispositions or patterns of feeling or inclination in which the excellences of character consist can be acquired through repetitively practicing or performing the behaviors that the dispositions involve. In order to become genuinely virtuous or to ‘feel’ or ‘desire’ as a virtuous

52Aristotle claims that moral virtues, such as courage, justice, and temperance, are “the result of habit”, and that “none of moral virtues is engendered in us by nature” (1976, p.91). He goes on to say: “[L]ike
person would, one has to act as if one were virtuous, in the relevant situations. For instance, simply put, in order to become a ‘courageous’ person, one has to start with courageous or bold acts, even if one experiences great fear or reluctance. Nietzsche appears to make this point, identifying “dissimulation” as a “duty” and saying:

The lie is, if not the mother, then the nurse of goodness. Honesty has likewise been reared mostly by the requirement to seem honest … What is dissimulated for a long time at last becomes nature: dissimulation in the end sublimates itself … (D IV, 248, p.143)

As Nietzsche would argue, the practices most conducive to a given (higher or promising) individual’s attainment or enhancement of the noble capacities – the “arts and strategems” (BGE 262, p.201) for his ‘self-transformation’ – are instrumentally good for that individual, although they may not be good for others. Hence, as Nietzsche would add, the psychological or cognitive conditions of such arts and stratagems (e.g. the self-regulative rules or norms prescribing the appropriate practices, and the awareness of activities produce like dispositions. Hence we must give our activities a certain quality, because it is their characteristics that determine the resulting dispositions” (Ibid. p.92)
their effectiveness) are extremely significant to the individual. In addition, the form of self-knowledge, that is, the knowledge of the “way” appropriate for the individual can be attained through the individual’s own self-experimentation. For this reason, Nietzsche seems to believe in the significance of self-experimentation (as a means of self-discovery) and in the desirability of the independent, ‘experimental’ spirit. He writes, “The best we can do in this interregnum is to be as far as possible our own reges and found little experimental states. We are experiments.” (D V, 453, p.191)

3. Others’ Personal Goods

So far, we have discussed Nietzsche’s theory of a person’s good. To recap, in the evaluative standard, the creative way of life is posited as the sole ‘intrinsic’ or ultimate value in the strict sense of the term. The other goods, which are constitutive of, or conducive to, the creative way of life, position themselves as merely extrinsic (constitutive or instrumental) values. All the values have the meaning of goodness or desirability especially for the ‘higher’ type of individual, whose actuality is
characterisable in terms of the possession of some of them, to be precise, the noble capacities and states and virtues. Now, arguing for the intrinsic goodness of the way of life at issue for such an individual, what Nietzsche in effect affirms is that the individual’s own creative life in itself is good to the individual. As Nietzsche would insist, the individual himself should live the form of life or promote it, for its own sake. But here, it is apt to raise the question: “Does Nietzsche also believe that equally, others’ creative lives intrinsically matter, or is desirable, to the given individual?” To put this in a different way, should the individual, according to Nietzsche, pursue others’ creative lives for their own sakes or regardless of their usefulness to one’s own creative way of life? To borrow Nagel’s words, is the creative life an “agent-neutral” or “impersonal” value, not a merely “agent-relative” one?53 As was suggested above, it does not seem that Nietzsche’s answers to these questions would be affirmative. In other words, he would not say that the creative life per se is one’s end in itself, let alone “power” or virtue per se.54 However, he seems to be ready to admit that one’s own creative way of

54 Richardson seems to present a similar interpretation. He believes that for Nietzsche “power” is the sole intrinsic or ultimate good, and that only one’s own power intrinsically matters to one (1996, p.p.149–154) Richardson thus characterises Nietzsche’s ethics as a “power egoism” (Ibid. p.153). Wilcox also appears to suspect that in Nietzsche view, to “each of us”, “his own power” is “the good” (1974, p.199).
life and creative capacity and those of others are inseparably related: the former and the latter can positively influence each other. Since this is the case, Nietzsche might well concede that others’ (more precisely, other higher individuals’) creative lives and growth can be also of great importance to one, and thus, that one should care for or promote them, too. Nevertheless, Nietzsche would appear to maintain that they are only derivative, non-moral ends, and their goodness or importance to one is contingent upon their conduciveness to one’s creative way of life, which is one’s own intrinsic good.

It is sensible to understand Nietzsche in this way, as (at least virtually) denying the intrinsic evaluative or normative significance of others’ creative lives and powers to the agent, since we can attribute to Nietzsche a position that entails this. That is, on a fundamental level, he seems to hold that only one’s personal good intrinsically matters to one, which means that others’ intrinsic good (whatever that may be) is not what one ought to promote for its own sake. And this view seems to contradict an element of

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55It seems that in *Human, All Too Human*, section 94, Nietzsche is suggesting this point. According to Nietzsche, a person “at the highest stage of morality hitherto” cares for “general utility” and thus, respects others’ own good. He says that “knowledge qualifies him [the person] to prefer the most useful, that is to say general and enduring utility, to personal utility” and that “he lives and acts as a collective individual” (p.50).
conventional morality, which is the logical presupposition of specifically moral values. Nietzsche clearly suggests these points in some places (D II, 132, p.p.82~83; GS I, 21, p.p. 43~45). There, Nietzsche implies that from the perspective of morality, the ultimate “advantage of others” or “common good” is one’s intrinsic end, and one ought to promote it for its own sake, or irrespectively of its relations to one’s own good. Based upon this ‘principle’, from Nietzsche’s observations, morality takes “generally useful social” actions or qualities to be morally good irrespectively of their influences upon the individual agent himself. As Nietzsche says, according to morality, “that which benefits it [i.e. a community] the most – and second most, and third most – is also the highest standard of value for all individuals. With morality the individual is instructed to be a function of the herd and to ascribe value to himself only as a function” (GS III, 116, p.p.114~115). Nietzsche further detects the mode or structure of the evaluation which is in accordance with the basic principle of morality. Nietzsche writes: “Hitherto the impersonal has been regarded as the actual distinguishing mark of the moral action; and it has been proved that at first it was on account of their general utility that impersonal actions were universally commended and accorded distinction” (HAH I, 95, p.50). He also points out that “a person’s virtues are called good with respect to their presumed
effects not on him but on us and society” (GS I, 21, p.43). But Nietzsche seems to emphatically reject the principle of “vivre pour autrui” fundamental to morality, regarding it as a “cult of philanthropy” (D II, 132, p.82). Moreover, Nietzsche suggests that one’s own intrinsic good is the sole locus of value; something’s usefulness or necessity to an individual is its criterion for the value to the individual. He says:

To make of oneself a complete person, and in all that one does have in view the highest good of this person – that gets us further than those pity-filled agitations and actions for the sake of others … Even now let us work for our fellow men, but only to the extent that we discover our own advantage in this work: no more, no less (HAH I, 95, p.p.50~51)

If education is successful, each virtue of the individual is a public utility and a private disadvantage with respect to the highest private end … The praise of the selfless, the self-sacrificing, the virtuous – that is, of the person who does not apply his entire strength and
reason to his own preservation, development, elevation, promotion, and expansion of power, but rather lives, as regards himself, modestly and thoughtlessly, maybe even with indifference and irony – this praise is not born out the spirit of selflessness … If the neighbor himself thought ‘selflessly’, he would reject his decrease in strength, this harm for his benefit; he would work against development of such inclinations … (GS I, 21, p.45)

Now, Nietzsche’s denial of the intrinsic significance of anything other than one’s own intrinsic interest seems to ultimately ground his determination of the value of the merely extrinsic goods, in particular the ‘virtues’ of his evaluative standard. That is to say, one implication of the denial appears to be that a thing (which is not intrinsically bad) has value or goodness for a given agent, if his possession of, or relation to, it is in his personal intrinsic interest, regardless of whether or not it may also contribute to others’ personal good. From this, and Nietzsche’s theory of one’s own intrinsic good, it could also be inferred that a thing is good for one, if it, belonging to one, contributes to one’s own creative way of life (as its means or part), irrespectively of whether or not it
may also lead to others’ own creative ways of life. As we have already seen, Nietzsche’s affirmation of the contribution of those extrinsic values (e.g. ‘virtues’) to the intrinsic value of the creative way of life, constitutes his arguments for, or explanations of, their value for individuals of the ‘higher’ type. And it is this implication of the idea that may further constitute, or be presupposed by, these arguments or explanations, as the criterion for the value of those things. Furthermore, as may have already been anticipated, Nietzsche’s denial of the intrinsic significance of anything other than one’s ultimate, genuine self-interest, also seems to found his argument for the absence of the value of the same qualities for people of different types, especially, those who belong to the herd-type, and moreover, can never become higher. That is, based upon the denial, Nietzsche might adduce the principle that the value of a thing (not intrinsically valuable) for one is dependent upon its contribution to one, or that such a thing is valuable for one, only if it is likely to serve one’s own creative life. This principle, in conjunction with Nietzsche’s rejection of the instrumental or constitutive significance of such hopelessly or incorrigibly ‘low’ or ‘weak’ people’s possession of the qualities to their own ‘creative lives’, may form his arguments for the ethical or normative irrelevance of the qualities for them. Having said that, Nietzsche would tell us that the ‘virtues’ that he puts forward
are thus merely ‘non-moral’, extrinsic ones: their value (for some individuals) is inexplicable in terms of the ‘intrinsic’ significance of public or common interests to these individuals. Put in another way, the goodness of those interests to the individuals does not constitute the ultimate source or explanatory ground of their value. Rather, their value is dependent upon their usefulness to these individuals or for their own creative lives; it stems ultimately and exclusively from the goodness of the individuals’ intrinsic, objective self-interests, namely, their own creative lives. It is these considerations that seem to lie behind Nietzsche’s ‘definition’ of a virtue as the “most personal necessity” (A 11, p.133), and his contention that virtues are good only as “conditions of precisely our own existence and growth” (WP 326, p.178).

By contrast, as Nietzsche himself observes, conventional morality presupposes that everyone else’s personal, intrinsic good (as well as one’s own) is one’s end in itself. This seems to imply that in principle, a thing may not be good for one, even if overall, one’s possession of it is in one’s own intrinsic interests. More precisely, it is not good, and on the contrary, ‘bad’ or ‘evil’ even in this case, if one’s possession of it has a negative impact upon society as a whole or is harmful from the perspective of society. The
determination of the goodness or desirability of some object or thing, according to
morality, is thus contingent upon a further consideration: that is, the consideration of
whether or to what extent it may harm others. Moreover, the same fundamental
presupposition renders it possible to hold that in principle, any given thing may obtain
value, even if it is of little use to one or it harms one: in this sense, its value is not
dependent upon its usefulness or necessity to one alone. That is to say, it is good if one’s
possession of it is in a social, intrinsic interest. Now, according to Nietzsche, the
presupposition itself as described above, upon which, as we have seen, he himself casts
doubts, founds the determination of the ‘value’ or ‘disvalue’ of the ‘values’ (for example,
moral virtues) of conventional morality. In particular, according to morality, some
qualities are desirable for any given individual not only intrinsically but also
instrumentally. But their ‘instrumentality’, which explains their value, is basically of a
social nature or consists in the fact that one’s possession of them would result in
furthering others’ or social interests. Or alternatively, as morality may argue, these
qualities, e.g. “industriousness”, “selflessness”, and “piteousness”, are desirable for one,
and thus, one should cultivate them, for they would lead to others’ interests such as
welfare and happiness, which intrinsically matter to one. Hence, they are specifically
‘moral’ virtues: their value derives ultimately from the desirability of others’ interests to one or their value is explained in terms of the intrinsic goodness of those interests (to one). Again, finally, Nietzsche would reject the fundamental logical presupposition of moral values. In rejecting it, as we will see in detail, he deprives them of value or transforms the status of their value. Moreover, Nietzsche appears to reject the possibility of a ‘moral value’ or ‘moral virtue’ in the narrow sense, and it is the denial of the fundamental presupposition of morality that constitutes the rejection.

4. Relativism in Nietzsche’s Theory of Value

Before closing our discussion of Nietzsche’s account of a person’s good (or genuine interest), it is worth noting that his theory of value is characterisable in terms of a ‘relativistic’ tendency. That is to say, according to him, the values are, for the most part, ‘conditionally’ good: they are good for one only in certain circumstances, or exclusively for some types of person. He would make evaluative claims about these that take the form of universalisation in ‘logical’ terms and yet involve complicated conditionals or
qualifications concerning internal and external environments of the agent. Furthermore, it has to be also emphasised that the Nietzschean values have limited worth, or rather, lack value for the *vast majority* of people. In addition, on the basis of the theory of value, he would also make relativistic, normative or prescriptive statements concerning the posited values. He would prescribe the valued objects in the language of ‘ought’ in relativistic fashions; his prescriptions would also include complicated conditionals within themselves. Nietzschean injunctions as such could not be practically applied to the majority of people, either: the general public does not have to aim at any of the posited values. Nietzsche criticizes or denies the absolutist and universalistic ‘spirit’ of conventional morality, according to which “what is good for one is good for another” (BGE 221, p.151). Such a criticism is reflective of Nietzsche’s ‘relativistic’ position in the above sense as much as on the values he himself puts forward.

Specifically, it seems that Nietzsche holds such a relativistic perspective on the value of the sole *intrinsic* or ultimate value in his ethical system, namely, the creative way of life. In principle, this is desirable or good for one, independently of its conduciveness to something else valuable, if and only if it is *possible* for one to achieve it sooner or latter.
If living the way of life is a mere dream to a person, it cannot be properly regarded as his personal good or ideal. According to Nietzsche, again, the way of life is rendered possible by some merits, namely, creative capacity, self-discipline, the healthy ethos, the capacity for self-commanding, strong affectivity, health, and virtues such as honesty, solitude, courage and magnanimity. Thus, the creative way of life is (under some external conditions) good for the higher individual, who actually possesses all these merits. Also, it is desirable for individuals of the ‘promising’ or ‘potentially strong’ type, who can possess all these internal conditions (or can become members of the higher type) in the long term. By contrast, for those who are neither actually nor potentially higher (or do not and cannot possess all the merits), the noble style of life is an unachievable or impracticable thing. Especially, therefore, it hardly has value for people of the ‘hopeless’ or ‘irredeemable’ herd type, who are devoid of the merits, and can never achieve all of them. But as was indicated in our discussion of Nietzsche’s account of the value of life or survival, Nietzsche seems to observe that in reality, the general public is classified into this particular type. Thus, Nietzsche would argue that the intrinsic value at issue is not a universal, human ideal: it is not good for everyone. On the contrary, as he is ready to admit, it is meaningless to the vast majority of people; it is
Now, based on the value-judgement about the creative way of life, Nietzsche does ‘prescribe’, or make ‘normative’ statements about, the intrinsic good: he encourages us to live the creative way of life in terms of ‘ought’ or ‘should’, or in ‘imperatives’ (cf. *Daybreak* 552). For instance, Nietzsche says, “you should be creators!” (Z I, 22, 2, p.102)” and “you yourselves should create what you have hitherto called the World (Ibid. II, 2, p.120). But, since the given ideal itself is not universalisable, it is sensible to say that the point he wants to make in so doing is in fact conditional or relativistic, too. He does not mean to contend either that one ought to pursue it, period, or that everyone shares the responsibility of achieving it. Rather, according to him, one should achieve it conditionally or should promote it only in the situations. That is, if one belongs to the higher type of man, then (certain external conditions being met) one ought to live it now. Also, the promising type of individual, for whom all these merits are viable, ought to actualize the way of life and to promote it now to this end. On the other hand, it would be unreasonable to prescribe the same value in the same way to the others, i.e. those who are neither actually nor potentially ‘higher’. In particular, the incorrigible or hopeless
herd is not bound to promote the ideal. Hence, it is not the case that the vast majority people ought to live or promote the creative way of life: only a small number of individuals are bound to do so.

Similarly, Nietzsche’s ethical relativism in the above sense is applied to the value and normative significance of the other values, in particular, the merely instrumental values such as virtues. The ‘universal’ value-judgments about the instrumental values (in purely logical terms) in his ethical system also include complex conditionals or qualifications. Broadly speaking, again, each of the values is desirable for the ‘higher’ individual (in the sense repeatedly determined above) Also, the given value is good for the potentially higher or promising type of individual; in other words, it is desirable for those who can become members of the higher type in the long run. But the value lacks goodness or desirability for people of the other types (including the hopeless herd). What lies behind the relativistic evaluative position on each of these values (say, the virtue of ‘honesty’) is that its value for an individual is contingent upon, and determined by, its serviceability for the individual’s own intrinsic value. If one is classifiable into the ‘higher’ or ‘promising’ type, one’s possession of honesty will contribute to the creative
way of life, by serving one’s (further) growth and intensifying creative activity. However, for those who are neither actually nor potentially higher, it is not meaningful to say that the virtue will bring about an intrinsic value. For simply, to them, there is no genuine, intrinsic good; as we have seen, the ideal of the creative way of life, which is the sole intrinsic value, is not applicable to them. Therefore, again, none of the posited (instrumental) values is a ‘universal’ value or value for all (cf. A 11, p.p.133~134). Since this is the case, Nietzsche would make relativistic or conditional ‘ought-to’ or normative claims about all these values, his ‘imperatives’ involving them are valid only for some types of individual. For instance, the ‘higher’ individual should try to maintain or acquire the virtue of honesty, for the sake of his own creative life. By contrast, in particular, the hopeless or irredeemable herd, who can never become higher, are not bound to promote the quality: it is neither intrinsically nor extrinsically desirable for them.
CHAPTER 5: Nietzsche’s Theory of Conduct and the Ground of Nietzsche’s Substantive Ethics

1. Nietzsche’s Theory of Conduct

Thus far, I have tried to illuminate Nietzsche’s evaluative standard or theory of value. By now, one might say: “Well, but does his theory of value exhaust his substantive ethics? That is, to answer the question of what one ought to do in a given, particular situation or what type of individual act is right is also an important task that might be expected of a substantive ethicist. Does Nietzsche himself have any theory of conduct or rightness that is meant to answer such questions in a comprehensive and coherent way? And if so, what kind of act ought to be done or has normative significance? As I
indicated in the Introduction of this thesis, it is hard to discover in Nietzsche a straightforward statement or formulation of an abstract, ‘practical law’ comparable with those of other normative ethicists such as Kant, the utilitarians, and Ross. Instead, we often hear Nietzsche talking about what characterises a “great” human being, or what types of personal quality are ‘noble’ or ‘base’.

Nevertheless, Nietzsche does seem to have something to tell us about what ought to be done, or at least, to ‘virtually’ hold a theory of conduct. Thus, Nietzsche, in the section entitled “We Immoralists” of BGE, writes:

We are entwined in an austere shirt of duty and cannot get out of it – and in this we are ‘men of duty’, we too! Sometimes, it is true, we may dance in our ‘chains’ and between our ‘sword’; often, it is no less true, we gnash our teeth at it and frown impatiently at the unseen hardship of our lot. But do what we will, fools and appearances speak against us and say ‘these are men without duty – always have fools and appearances against us (BGE 226, p.156).
It appears to me that his implicit or explicit positions suggest some such normative theory; and, as was indicated earlier, the latter has a close connection with his account of value as goodness or desirability. Now, I propose to devote the rest of the present chapter to an attempt to make Nietzsche’s own theory of conduct, or in his own vocabulary, “duty” explicit.

1) Consequentialism

To begin with, Nietzsche seems to endorse a teleological theory of rightness or a form of ‘consequentialism’, whose constitutive element is the notion of good or desirable as opposed to ‘deontology’ that constitutes, and is represented by, conventional morality. But what does the form of consequentialism, with which Nietzsche seems to agree, consist in? To begin with, according to the theory, the greatest contribution of a possible act to one’s ultimate, proper end (or what is intrinsically good to one)

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56 For the following analysis of theories of rightness such as ‘consequentialism’ (or ‘teleology’ in ethics), ‘deontology’, and ‘ethical egoism’, I benefitted particularly from Shelly Kagan’s illuminating, general exposition, *Normative Ethics* (1998, p.p.25~186)
necessarily or unconditionally determines its rightness. To put this in another way, one ought to perform the act that will contribute most to what is ‘intrinsically good’ to one, all things considered. One implication of consequentialism construed as such is that if among all the possible actions open to an agent, only one option is conducive to, or constitutive of, the good or desirable, then, necessarily, the agent is ethically required to take it. However, this position, according to which an act’s overall best consequence necessarily determines, or is a ‘sufficient’ condition of, its rightness, seems to be logically founded upon other ideas. These further constitute consequentialism as a whole or are defining characteristics of the notion of consequentialism. First or all, consequentialist ethicists affirm that the greatest contribution to the agent’s end in itself, or what is intrinsically good to him, is a ‘normative factor’ understood as a ‘right(or wrong)-making’ feature pertaining to acts. According to those ethicists, the agent ought to perform the act with the feature in any given situation, other things being equal. They thus accept that one ought to take the behavioral option with the best consequences, unless either this is an intrinsically wrong act or any of its alternative acts is intrinsically

57 According to Kagan, “what consequentialism holds” is “that one should perform the act with the best consequences, period”, or in other words, that “in any given choice situation, the agent is morally required to perform act with the best consequences” (1998, p.61).
right. This is tantamount to saying that any such behavioral option ought to be done all things considered, unless either (1) there is another normative factor that determines a given act’s rightness *independently of* its contribution to the good (absolutely or under a certain condition involving the act) and there exists a particular act without the ‘best’ consequence which nonetheless possesses the normative factor (and satisfies the condition) or (2) there is a normative factor to make a given act ‘wrong’ *regardless of* the value of its consequences (necessarily or under a certain condition concerning the act) and the type of act defined in terms of the wrong-making factor (and the condition) actually denotes any act *with* the best consequences. Alternatively, one ought to perform the act with the best consequences all things considered, if there is *neither* any particular act without the best consequences which is intrinsically right, *nor* any act with the best consequences which is wrong in itself. These ethicists would also accept that if either of these possibilities is the case, even the act with the best consequences may not be, or is not necessarily, right.

However, consequentialism denies both of the possibilities; according to it, one is *not* required to do an act, *only* if this best contributes to what is intrinsically good to one
(either as its means or as its part). Conversely, if it is genuinely the case that one ought to
do an action in a certain situation, the act must have some connection with one’s end in
itself. More precisely, it must be expected to make the greatest (constitutive or
instrumental) contributions to what is intrinsically good to one. In this sense, an act’s
rightness or normative significance consists in its contribution to what is intrinsically
good to the agent. The ‘right’ can be defined in terms of the ‘good’, in this sense.
Similarly, they seem to hold that no wrong act stands in such a positive relation to the
good, or equivalently that if an act is wrong, it is not what will result in the ‘best’. They
thus deny the existence of any determining ground (understood as ‘sufficient condition’)
of a given act’s rightness (or wrongness) that excludes the factor of the maximal
contribution of the act to the intrinsic good and that some acts without (or with) the best
consequences satisfy. To put this in another way, according to them, no type of act that
has at least one particular act without (or with) the ‘best’ consequences as its instance is
right (or wrong) ‘in itself’ or independently of its best consequences. Therefore, these
ethicists reach the stronger claim that one ought to do an act with the best consequences
or most contributive to one’s intrinsic ends all things considered, which entails the
proposition with the ‘other-things-being-equal’ phrase. In summary, the consequentialists
affirm that an act’s greatest contribution to the good or its overall, ‘best’ consequences is the *necessary and sufficient* condition for its rightness. In so doing, they deny that (1) there *are* situations where one ought to do acts not most contributive to what is good to one and that (2) in *some* cases, one ought not to do, or ought to refrain from, acts with have the best consequences⁵⁸.

In addition, the consequentialist framework, thus construed, stands in sharp contrast with the ‘deontological’ position, which is characteristic of conventional or ‘common sense’ morality. To begin with, deontology does not deny that the overall, best consequence of an act makes up a determining ground of its rightness, or that the greatest serviceability to one’s intrinsic end is a normative factor. However, it does *not* go beyond the claim that one ought to perform the act with the overall, best consequences, *other things being equal*. Rather, one ought to perform the act, *only* under a certain condition involving it, i.e. if and only if it is devoid of some features and its alternatives exclude other qualities. Such an act, i.e. an act with the best consequences *may not* satisfy the condition. So the greatest value (as goodness or desirability) of an

act’s consequence alone is not a sufficient condition for its rightness, but merely constitutes such a condition, and a performable act with the best consequences is not necessarily right⁵⁹. But what are the claims constitutive of this relatively modest and ‘qualified’ position on the normative status of the act with the ‘best’ consequences, which denies that an act’s maximal contribution to the intrinsic good is a sufficient condition of its rightness? First, as may have been anticipated, the modest position is constituted by the notion that there are certain other normative factors to make an act right independently of its being most contributive to the good in itself. Each of the types or forms of act constituted by these factors actually has its instances some particular acts ‘without’ the best consequences. In other words, some types of act (that denote particular acts without the best outcomes) are right or wrong regardless of the value of their consequences. Hence, according to the deontologist, if a given act is right, it may not be,  

⁵⁹According to Kagan, “deontology”, which commonsense morality holds, can be characterized “in terms of constraints”. He writes: “[D]eontologists, unlike consequentialists, believe in the existence of constraints, which erect moral barriers to the promotion of the good … it won’t quite do to label as deontologists all those who accept additional normative factors beyond that of goodness of results: we must add the further stipulation that in at least some cases the effect of these additional factors is to make certain acts morally forbidden, even thought these acts may lead to the best possible results overall. In short, we must say that deontologists are those who believe in additional normative factors that generate constraints” (1998, p.73)
or is \textit{not necessarily}, what will produce the best consequences. The deontological perspective thus presupposes the postulation of some specific normative factors that make given acts absolutely or conditionally right ‘in themselves’ or ‘independently of their relations to the (intrinsic) good’: deontology postulates some intrinsic, positive ‘duties’. For instance, according to conventional or ‘common sense’ morality, one of whose ingredients is the deontological view, one should try to protect another person in danger, conditionally (i.e. if this act does not have a certain quality, and none of its alternatives has another quality), even if this is not the behavioral option to lead to what is best to one.

This modest or qualified position on the normative significance of the type of act contributive to the good, is further constituted by the notion that there are intrinsic wrong-making normative factors, or determining grounds of an act’s \textit{wrongness} exclusive of the goodness of its consequences. Furthermore, each of the types or forms of act defined in terms of the factors actually denotes some acts with the best consequences (Deontologists thus imply that even an act with the best consequences \textit{may} be wrong) The deontological perspective, naturally, also presupposes the postulation of
specific ‘proscriptive’ laws or principles of conduct exclusive of, or without reference to, the factor of a given act’s contribution to the good. For example, the conventional morality considers some sorts of acts such as ‘killing an innocent person’, ‘adultery’, ‘breaking a promise’, ‘fraud’, ‘lying’, to be ‘wrong’ or what ought not to be done, regardless of the value of their consequences (absolutely or on certain conditions). According to morality, one must not kill another person, even if it yields the best consequences on the whole.\footnote{Many ethicists seem to hold that ‘deontology’ construed as such characterizes the conventional ‘theory’ of rightness, and moreover, that it is constitutive of the notion of ‘morality’ or the ‘moral’ itself. And I find this interpretation of the notion quite plausible. For instance, Kant observes that ordinary morality consists of a set of ‘categorical imperatives’. And he defines ‘categorical imperative’ as “an imperative which, without being based on, and conditioned by, any further purpose to be attained by a certain line of conduct, enjoins this conduct immediately”. He goes on to say that “[t]his imperative”, “concerned, not with the matter of the action and its presumed results”, “may be called the imperative of morality” (1991, p.80). Bernard Williams presents a similar analysis of morality. He argues that “[m]orality is distinguished by the special notion of obligation it uses and by the significance it gives to it, and calls “this special obligation” “moral obligation” (1985, p.174). Further, according to him, “morality” is in essence “deontological” (Ibid. p.179) and “moral obligation” is “categorical” in character (Ibid. p.178). Finally, Mackie defines “moral ‘ought’” in terms of “intrinsic requirements”. He says: “[T]here are commonly believed to be intrinsic requirements, the situation itself or the nature of things as demanding some action (or refraining from action); an agent is felt to be half bound to do something, and yet not by his own [current or possible] desires or by any specifiable institution or by the speaker’s attitude, or at any rate not only by these …When ‘ought’ refers to reasons or semi-bindings of this supposed sort, it is thought to be a peculiarly}
Now, it might be asked on what basis one could attribute to Nietzsche the teleological or broadly ‘consequentialist’ framework mentioned above. Let us draw attention to some sections of one of the texts from his ‘middle period’, *Daybreak*, which gives us hints as to the basis and structure of Nietzschean ethics.

Everywhere today the goal of morality is defined in approximately the following way: it is the preservation and advancement of mankind; but this definition is an expression of the desire for a formula, and nothing more. (Preservation of what? Is the question one immediately has to ask?. Advancement to what? Is the essential thing- the answer to this of what ? and to what? – not precisely what is left out of formula?)

So what, then, can it contribute to any teaching of what our duty is that is not already, if tacitly and thoughtlessly, regarded as fixed? Can one deduce from it with certainty whether what is to be kept in view is the longest possible existence of mankind? (D II, 106, p.p.61~62)

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moral ‘ought’” (1977, p.76).
Here, what Nietzsche implies is that considered epistemologically, an articulate and solid determination of one’s ultimate goal, of what is intrinsically ‘good’ to one, would found conclusions as to what one’s duty is or what one ought to do. In addition, in this section, he appears to complain about contemporary ethical claims or ‘formulae’ on one’s ultimate end or what is intrinsically good to one, that they are ambiguous and unsustainable, and precisely for this reason, incapable of telling us exactly what to do. Hence, it seems to be sensible to suspect that Nietzsche, as ordinary morality claims, presupposes, and takes it for granted, at least that the greatest, overall intrinsic value of the consequences of an act is identifiable as one thing constitutive of a determining ground of its rightness. Thus, if an act is most contributive to what is intrinsically good to one, the act is right or ought to be done all other things being equal. Also, Nietzsche writes as follows:

To construct anew the laws of life and action – for this task our sciences of physiology, medicine, sociology and solitude are not yet sufficiently sure of themselves: and it is from them that the foundation-
stones of new ideals (if not the new ideals themselves) must come (D V, 453, p.191)

This makes it clear that the establishment of “laws of life and action”, understandable as practical principles concerning what ought to be done, constitutes Nietzsche’s ethical ‘tasks’. And Nietzsche can be interpreted here as implying that such a task, i.e. the construction of some such principle, can be accomplished though the discovery of an intrinsic goal or “ideal”, for which he believes the role of empirical science is crucial.

But the problem now is whether or not Nietzsche, going beyond this, admits that the normative factor of the greatest contributiveness of a particular act for one’s intrinsic end, is ‘sufficient’ for its rightness, or determines it absolutely and irrespectively of its other features. To put the question another way, does Nietzsche hold, just as commonsense morality does, that a doable act with the best consequences may not be, or is not always, right? Nietzsche, to begin with, assumes that one ought to do whatever is most contributive to the good, unless either (1) the act itself is intrinsically wrong (i.e. possesses an intrinsic wrong-making factor) or (2) any of its alternatives, which,
naturally, lack the ‘greatest’ contributive character, is right in itself (i.e. pertains to an intrinsic right-making type of act). But Nietzsche would seem to deny both of these possibilities. In brief, he appears to deny the existence of any possible act wrong or right only in itself, and thus, that of any form of act that incorporates some such particular acts with (or without) the best consequences as its instances and that is absolutely wrong (or right) independently of its contributiveness to the overall intrinsic good. Nietzsche seems to hold the view, in other words, that the necessary condition of the rightness of any given act is its greatest serviceability for the good, and an act’s wrongness is determinable in a similar manner, that is, in terms of the value of its consequences.

This position naturally involves the rejection of conventional morality’s postulation of the specific, absolute, and intrinsically obligatory types of particular act, or in short, positive or negative unconditional duties ‘in themselves’ that denote even acts with or without the best consequences. Therefore, as Nietzsche might conclude in a rather simplistic way, one ought to do any act most contributive to what is good to one ‘all things considered’, or in other words, if a practically possible act has the characteristic, then, ‘necessarily’, it is right. If Nietzsche made only a ‘conditional’ or ‘qualified’ claim
on the normative significance of an act with the greatest contributiveness for one’s intrinsic end, he would have in mind a particular normative factor to make an act ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, absolutely or conditionally and independently of its maximal contributiveness to one’s intrinsic end. Only the identification of such a factor would properly account for the conditional or qualified claim. But Nietzsche does not seem to do so, that is, to postulate any such factor: one could hardly locate any law of conduct involving it in Nietzsche’s ethical system. Let us try to make sense of the following in this connection.

Only if mankind possessed a universally recognized goal would it be possible to propose ‘thus and thus is the right course of action’… for the present there exists no such goal. It is thus irrational and trivial to impose the demands of morality upon mankind. To recommend a goal to mankind is something quite different: the goal is then thought of as something which lies in our own discretion; supposing the recommendation appealed to mankind, it could in pursuit of it also impose upon itself a moral law, likewise at its own
discretion. But up to now the moral law has been supposed to stand
above our own likes and dislikes …(D II, 108, p.63)

Nietzsche could be taken to mean here that in principle, unless an act is practically
possible and is most contributive to one’s end in itself or what is intrinsically good to
one, *whatever type of act it may pertain to, it is not right*. According to Nietzsche, an act
is right, *only if* it has such a connection to one’s end in itself, which implies that there is
no type of act that is ‘right’ independently of the goodness of its consequences (and that
has acts without the best consequences as its denotations). Thus, any given type of act,
e.g. “keeping a promise”, is indeed right in certain situations, or the imperative involving
it is valid and meaningful, only if the type of act itself has such a (constitutive or causal,
instrumental relation) to one’s intrinsic goal in those situations. Also, the above writing
seems to tacitly indicate that Nietzsche takes the significance of ‘wrongness’ (equivalent
with ‘ought-to-be-avoided’) as determinable in similar ways, that is, in terms of the
disvalue or badness of the possible consequence. If an act is wrong, or should not be
done, then, whatever form of act it may belong to, the act is expected to result in overall
‘bad’ consequences, and to harm or disrupt what is intrinsically good. Thus, there exists no act that yields the best consequences and yet is wrong only on its account, nor is there any normatively significant type of act that both denotes such acts and determines an act’s wrongness regardless of the value of its consequences. Nevertheless, at this stage of his career, Nietzsche seems to have been doubtful about the objectivity or tenability of the proposals of any such intrinsic goals. Thus, he finds it difficult to put forward or sustain any claim about what to do, let alone those involving the types of behavior which conventional morality prescribes or proscribes.61

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61 In addition, it is worth noting that here, Nietzsche also tells us that practical principles, which are possible only through the recognition or identification of an intrinsic goal or what is intrinsically ‘good’ to one, are in essence intimately related to our own “likes” or “dislikes”. It is reasonable to read Nietzsche as expressing something broadly like ‘naturalistic’ ethicists. That is, Nietzsche links one’s goal or what is ‘good’ to one with one’s desire or inclination in either conceptual or ontological terms. Nietzsche might mean that, as could be taken for granted, whatever is good to one or one’s goal is reducible to, or identifiable with, the object of one’s desire (more precisely, perhaps, one’s possible, objective or rational desire). Having said that, according to Nietzsche, the knowledge of what the object of one’s desire is, through sustaining the belief in something good, could establish “moral laws” or practical principles
Furthermore, Nietzsche seems to observe that conventional morality is basically ‘deontological’ in the sense described above, and that as such, it is constituted by some “categorical” or specifically ‘moral’ laws (in the strict sense of the term) according to which some sorts of act ought to be performed or avoided regardless of the value of their consequences, (absolutely or other things being equal). He *criticizes* morality for these laws, especially, those positing intrinsic, “unconditional duties”, which one ought to perform all things considered or absolutely (GS I, 5, p.p.32~33). That is to say, he seems

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concerning what one *ought to do*. Further, any valid moral law *in essence* involves the prescription or proscription of a type of action *linked* ultimately to one’s own “likes” or “dislikes”. Section 453 of the same book quoted earlier can be read in this similar way. There, as was seen, Nietzsche assumes that the discovery of one’s “ideal” or what is good to one, which would render it possible to “construct anew” one’s “laws of life and action”, relies ultimately on the empirical *sciences*. And he may take the nature of ‘goodness’ or ‘ideal’ itself to consist in one’s *desire* (neither accidental nor current, but objective and possible), the subject matter of which seems to be amenable to, or accessible through, such a scientific discipline.
to think that these particular ‘moral’ laws themselves are not only untenable or arbitrary, but also wrong or false, and in this sense, to reject them altogether. Behind his rejection of the moral or categorical laws lies Nietzsche’s fundamentally consequentialist or teleologist notion according to which the necessary condition of the possibility of normativity (‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’) of any given act is its connection with the intrinsically ‘good’ or end in itself. To put it another way, his denial of the existence of any intrinsically right (or wrong) act (that is not connected with, and thus, not explicable in terms of, the good), seems to ultimately account for the criticism of the laws of morality (Ibid, p.p.32–33; D II, 107, p.p.62–63). Moreover, Nietzsche seems to reject ‘morality’ per se or the notion of the ‘moral’ itself. He declares to be an “immoralist” (BGE 226, p.156) and claims that “there are no moral facts whatever” (TI VII, 1, p.66).

Kant seems to be not only a deontologist but also a defender of the particular categorical or moral laws of conventional morality. He believes that these laws themselves are deducible from, and sustainable through, one fundamental, formal practical principle (1991, p.p.84–86), to which Nietzsche objects. This principle is itself a “categorical imperative” and “a synthetic a priori practical proposition” (Ibid. p.83). Or rather, Kant appears to believe that the concrete, conventional laws are in fact founded ultimately on this Categorical Imperative, which we implicitly hold. Kant himself formulates this fundamental moral law as follows: “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Ibid. p.84). Further, this law can be reformulated, or “may also run”, in this way: “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become though your will a universal law of nature (Ibid).”
In addition, he often denounces ‘moralists’. Since deontology or the deontological character can be seen as an element constitutive of ‘morality’ or the ‘moral’ in its strict sense, it is sensible to interpret Nietzsche as denying deontology (and the existence of any ‘duty in itself’) and thus as affirming the consequentialist framework.

2) Ethical Egoism

Therefore, Nietzsche’s theory of conduct could be formulated as follows: one should perform the act most contributive to what is intrinsically good to one in a given situation. But what kind of thing or state of affairs is determinable as ‘intrinsically good to one’? As we have already seen, Nietzsche would deny that others’ own or personal good is also intrinsically good to one, or in other words, that their possession of what are good for them is not the thing or state-of-affairs which one ought to pursue or promote for its own sake. Rather, Nietzsche would insist that only an individual’s own intrinsic good or interest in itself matters to the individual himself. It follows from this denial of the intrinsic significance of anything other than an individual’s personal good that if an
act is to benefit the individual himself most, it will best serve, or contribute to, what is intrinsically good to him (whether or not it may also best serve others’ own interests). As a consequence, Nietzsche can be considered to hold a perspective that can be classified as an ‘individualistic’ teleological theory or ‘ethical egoism’. That is to say, as Nietzsche might argue, one ought to perform the act most beneficial for oneself, *all things considered*. What constitutes this is the idea that if an act that an individual can perform in a particular situation best serves the individual’s own good, regardless of whether or not it may best serve others’ own goods or maximize social interests, one ought to do it. Conversely, an individual should *not* do (and thus is *not* bound to do) any act from which he will not benefit most, even if it may have the greatest positive impact upon others or society as a whole. This implies that if an act is utterly useless or harmful to him, even in such a case, he is never bound to do it: an act’s rightness consists in its greatest serviceability or contributiveness to the individual. Some writings of Nietzsche seem to indicate that not only does Nietzsche’s own individualistic theory of value (or

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63In an attempt to define ‘ethical egoism’, John Hospers writes: “According to all forms of ethical egoism, the goal of a person’s actions should be his own self-interest [i.e. his personal good]: the promotion of whatever is to his own long-term advantage should be the end at which he aims” (1967, p. 600)

64Richardson also suggests that Nietzsche can be described as an ‘ethical egoist’ in the present sense (1996, p.p.151~154)
goodness), in conjunction with his teleological theory of rightness, logically entail ethical egoism, but also he seems to hold it. As we have already seen, Nietzsche criticizes conventional morality for its deontological nature, which indicates that according to him, the question of “to what end am I to act?” is absolutely necessary for the decision as to what to do. Moreover, he argues that the kind of question is basically of an “individual” nature, suggesting that the end to which one ought to act has to be determined in terms of one’s own good or interest (D II, p.107, p.p.62~63). Moreover, Nietzsche seems to mean that if one ought to do a particular act or a type of act, this must be contributive to one’s own good, arguing that just as “virtue” is in essence “personal defense and necessity”, so is a “duty” (A. 11, p.p.132~133),

Ethical egoism, construed as such, is clearly distinguished from ‘universalistic’ teleological theory or ‘consequentialism’ in the narrow and typical sense of the term, as well as from common sense morality. Utilitarianism, representing consequentialism in this narrow sense, holds that the act most conducive to the good per se is right, even if this may not be in one’s best interests. Also, according to utilitarianism, one is obliged not to do an act that would not be in the best interests of the society, even if this may
maximise one’s own good. Unlike ethical egoism, it thus appears to entail constraints on pursuits of self-interest in particular situations. Although it does not disregard the normative significance of such pursuits, it implies that one should perform an act contributive to one’s own intrinsic end, if and only if this also best serves the interests of the community as a whole. One ought not to do any act that is expected to do considerable harm to others, even if one may benefit greatly from it. That ethical doctrine is rooted in the presupposition that anyone else’s good, as well as one’s own, ultimately and equally matters, which, being the ground of ‘moral’ goodness, is contrasted with the precepts of ethical egoism. On the other hand, as may be anticipated, conventional morality reaches a rather different conclusion, although it accepts the same presupposition. That is, according to morality, one ought to do an act that will result in the greatest good per se in a given situation, other things being equal. For, again, it postulates things right or wrong ‘in themselves’ or regardless of the value of their consequences. Having said that, utilitarianism and common sense morality share the belief that an act to serve social or communal interests is ‘morally’ right, in a strict and narrow sense: it is right, because those interests are also intrinsically and equally significant to the doer or they are what the doer ought to promote for their own sake.
Now, both consequentialism and egoism, in conjunction with a theory of a person’s intrinsic good logically entail more concrete theories of rightness. Or in other words, a theory of goodness or desirability can provide the teleological theories of rightness with determinate contents. For instance, if we accept ‘happiness’ as the sole intrinsic good and endorse one of those teleological frameworks, we will be deductively led to the principle either that one ought to always act so as to maximize “the general happiness” (Mill’s utilitarianism)\(^{65}\), or that one should promote one’s own happiness in any given situation (Epicurean ethical egoism). As we examined earlier, Nietzsche himself has his own distinctive table of ‘values’ (in the sense of a person’s good or what is good for one). Likewise, this theory and ethical egoism appear to imply, or be able to deductively found, some such determinate, ‘practical’ principles or ethical ‘laws’. Thus, granted that

\(^{65}\)Explaining the “greatest happiness principle”, in which his utilitarianism lies, Mill writes: “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals ‘utility’ or the ‘greatest happiness principle’ holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote [the general] happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” (2001, p.7). In addition, Bentham defines his utilitarianism or “principle of utility” in a similar fashion. He says: “By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness (1988, p.2).
Nietzsche endorses something similar to ethical egoism construed above, and given our previous analysis of his theory of values, we can now construct some such principles Nietzsche suggests or virtually holds. This having been said, how can we formulate the practical principles or “laws of action” Nietzsche would put forward? To begin with, if the above analysis is correct, for Nietzsche, the sole intrinsic value is the creative style of life as a whole, which is constituted by creative activity and “power”. Thus, we can assume that Nietzsche holds a practical principle that can be construed in terms of the notion of the creative way of life.

3) The Construal of Nietzsche’s Practical Principle

Nietzsche (at least) virtually holds that in any given situation, one ought to perform the practically possible act to best serve, or contribute most to, one’s own creative way of life, period. Alternatively, if one’s practically possible act best serves one’s own creative life, one ought to do it all things considered. Furthermore, on the basis of this principle, Nietzsche would first impose a ‘duty’ or practical ‘law’ upon the “higher” type of individual, who possesses the necessary internal conditions for the
creative way of life, i.e. creative powers, self-discipline, the healthy ethos, the capacity for self-commanding, health, strong affectivity, vitality, honesty, solitude, courage and magnanimity (Nietzsche draws special attention to this type of person in his normative ethical discourse). According to Nietzsche, the higher individual ought to act so as to create or produce an original and formative work. But Nietzsche would say that a different form of practical law is applicable to those who have not yet reached the ‘height’. That is to say, as a rule, the ‘promising’ individual, who is potentially strong or higher, and can possess all these merits in the long term, ought to act so as to best promote his own growth: he ought to take an action to cultivate what he lacks among these merits constitutive of the higher man. For generally speaking, such an action would best serve the individual’s future creative way of life, which is his ideal possibility. In addition, Nietzsche seems to hold that such a higher or promising individual normally has a particular duty, in the sense that there normally is some act or course of action the individual ought to do, which will be in essence constitutive of, or conducive to, the creative way of life. In Nietzsche’s own vocabulary, such an individual, as a “man of duty” is “entwined in an austere shirt of duty and cannot get out of it” (BGE 256, p.156). Nietzsche thus implies that normally, there is an act that such an individual is in a
position to do, and at the same time, that will be conducive to, or constitutive of, the individual’s own creative way of life.66

Nietzsche would admit that the ‘principle’ as formulated at the beginning of the last paragraph (according to which one ought to act so as to promote the creative way of life) is not able to govern everyone; on the contrary, it is not applicable to the practical life of the vast majority of people. For its proper application to a concrete situation depends upon the existence of some performable type of act contributive to the intrinsic end in that situation, and no such act is possible for those who are neither actually nor potentially higher or strong, especially, for the hopeless or irredeemable herd. Similarly, the general ‘duty’ to promote growth or to pursue a creative task in accordance with the principle is not the duty of such weak or mediocre people. This appears to underlie Nietzsche’s contention that “what is right for one cannot by any means be right for another” (BGE 228, p.158). Nietzsche holds that one is not bound to take any action unless it is connected with one’s own creative way of life. Further, if no possible action contributes to one’s own creative life, then, one is not obliged to take any action.

66Compare my construal of Nietzsche’s prescriptive standard with Richardson’s. According to Richardson, Nietzsche advises you to “act so as to maximize your own power” (1996, p.151)
Nietzsche thus suggests that the vast majority of people have no positive duty or obligation in any given situation.

4) ‘Altruism’ in Nietzsche’s Ethics

Several points should be made before closing our discussion of Nietzsche’s theory of conduct. First of all, contrary to probable concerns, Nietzsche’s practical principle and its implications (for the higher man and for the promising individual) do not seem to lead Nietzsche to ‘egoism’ in another sense, that is, the theory of conduct permitting one to harm others or denying the normative significance of acts carried out in the interests of others. On the contrary, Nietzsche’s principle does appear to entail a form of ‘altruism’. To make sense of this point, let us remind ourselves of what Nietzsche would tell the types of individual to do in a given moment. Normally, the higher man, who has acquired the lofty capacities and states and virtues, ought to pursue a task-oriented act to
make up his creative way of life as a whole. Moreover, according to Nietzsche, the ‘promising’ type of individual (definable in terms of the achievability of all these merits) ought to promote his own growth and thus to prepare himself for the goal of his future creative way of life. But what does the creative way of life or creative activity Nietzsche has in mind consist in? As we have already seen, one’s “magnanimous” concern with helping others (more precisely, one’s equals) with their own further growth and creative lives (and thus, in accordance with Nietzsche’s theory of value, promoting their own intrinsic goods or genuine interests) seems to ground the form of life Nietzsche considers as an ultimate or intrinsic value. Furthermore, an original and “formative” work capable of strengthening others and of leading them to creative styles of life is implicated in the notion of the way life thus extolled. Having said that, the ‘laws’ or ‘imperatives’ Nietzsche would impose on individuals of the type at issue could be reformulated or translated roughly as: ‘Act so as to promote a life (also) for the good of others!’ and ‘Act so as to create a great work for others!’. Thus, these laws are surely ‘altruistic’.

Moreover, Nietzsche would say that the duty that the higher or promising type of
individual normally has, namely, to do what is constitutive of creative activity, or to promote his own growth, by no means involves or entails any harm to others. Rather, Nietzsche would advise individuals of these types to avoid performing acts to obstruct others’ good or insist that as a rule, they should not do harm to others. And yet he would give them such proscriptions for prudential reasons. Nietzsche believes that as a matter of empirical fact, such an act, that is, an act to harm others’ growths or creative lives, is eventually likely to do harm to one, by inhibiting one’s growth or creative activity. However, the following question might be raised. Even if it may be accepted, given that Nietzsche shows an extremely derogatory and harsh attitude towards people of the herd-type, is it true that Nietzsche would say the same thing with respect to our actions towards those people? He would say that the higher individual is also bound to respect their own ‘interests’, not either ‘morally’ or ‘categorically’, but for prudential reasons. Nietzsche maintains that such an individual, as a rule, should not do what is to be detrimental or dangerous to the health, vitality, welfare, or life of the herd, which accounts for the majority of society. Moreover, Nietzsche would posit such ‘interests’ or ‘advantages’ of the general public as ends or goals that the individual ought to aim at or promote, even if they are not intrinsically good to the individual. For, as Nietzsche is
well aware, the growth or creative way of life of the individual himself could hardly be achieved without a flourishing and healthy community. According to Nietzsche, society is a “foundation and scaffolding upon which a select species of being is able to raise itself to its higher task and in general to a higher existence” (BGE 258, p.193), and “[a] high culture can stand only upon a strong and healthy consolidated mediocrity” (WP, 864, p.462). He further writes:

A higher culture is a pyramid: it can stand only on a broad base, its very prerequisite is a strongly and soundly consolidated mediocrity. The crafts, trade, agriculture, science, the great part of art, in a word the entire compass of professional activity, are in no way compatible with anything other than mediocrity in ability and desires …. It would be quite unworthy of a more profound mind to see an objection in mediocrity as such. It is even the prime requirement for the existence of exceptions; a high culture is conditional upon it. When an exceptional human being handles the mediocre more gently than he does himself or his equals, this is not mere politeness of the heart – it is simply his duty
Having said that, based upon this, Nietzsche might insist that the higher individual should devote himself to a creative ‘task’ capable of enhancing or securing those interests of the “herd” or the general public, as well as promoting the good of his ‘strong’, exceptional equals. In summary, Nietzsche’s ‘egoist’ or individualistic teleological framework does suggest a form of altruism or non-‘egoistic’ theory of conduct in a different sense of the term.

5) The Conventional Codes of Conduct

The Nietzschean theory of conduct does take up the codes of conduct that constitute the deontology of conventional morality. That is to say, generally speaking, Nietzsche does not deny the normative significance of what these ‘moral’ rules command or their prescriptions or proscriptions, such as ‘to keep promises’, ‘reciprocal justice’, ‘to obey laws’, ‘not to harm others’, not to commit suicide’, ‘not to steal anything from others’, ‘not to kill’, and ‘not to lie’. Nevertheless, he seems to ‘accept’ most of these rules,
having removed the ‘categorical’, ‘moral’ or ‘deontological’ flavour from them, and the
rules, incorporated into his ethical system, take the form of ‘rules of thumb’. To put this
in a different way, a higher individual should follow these rules in normal cases or under
certain conditions, (only) for prudential reasons, because normally or under these
conditions, the individual, as an existence always situated in ‘social’ contexts, would
benefit most from doing so. Thus, Nietzsche’s point here is not that the individual ought
to act in accordance of these rules independently of the goodness or badness of the
consequences. His acceptance of these rules or their presence in his ethical system
appears to be ultimately explained by the ethical egoist, teleological framework and his
theory of goodness. Let us hear what Nietzsche says in this connection.

I also deny immorality … It goes without saying that I do not
deny - unless I am a fool – many actions called immoral ought to be
avoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought to be done and
encouraged – but I think the one should be encouraged and the other
avoided for other reasons than hitherto. We have to learn to think
differently- in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more:
feel differently (D II, 103. p.60)

Finally, although according to Nietzsche, one should always take the action that will ‘best’ serve one’s own good or that will contribute most to one’s growth or creative activity, he does not mean that we should always try to consciously ‘calculate’ the outcomes of possible behavioral options, and compare these, before we take action. On the contrary, according to Nietzsche, we should refrain from such calculative attempts, since it is unlikely that this would help us to take the actions with the ‘best’ consequences; on the contrary, they might prevent us from doing so. One might end up doing nothing significant, or just thinking about ‘what to do’ next. Nietzsche advises us to devise our own concrete, articulate, and simplistic rules of conduct and plans the adherence to which would be normally most beneficial to us and to abide by them ‘instinctively’ and unhesitatingly. The following statements by Nietzsche can be understood along these lines:

… the appearance of moral scruples (in other words, the becoming-conscious of the values by which one acts) betrays a
certain sickliness; strong ages and peoples do not reflect on their rights, on the principles on which they act, on their instincts and reasons. Becoming-conscious is a sign that real morality, i.e. instinctive certainty in actions, is going to the devil … the moralists are a sign of damage, impoverishment, disorganization. The deeply instinctive are shy of logicizing duties … (WP 423, p.228)

2. The Ground of Nietzsche’s Ethics

So far, we have explored Nietzsche’s substantive ethical system, in particular, his theory of value, which is the main theme of my entire thesis. Recall that not only does Nietzsche have what we can count as a ‘substantive’ or ‘normative’ ethics, but it is also quite systematic, complicated, and concrete (even though it is fair to say that Nietzsche does not present it in a systematic way). As has been shown, Nietzsche confers ‘intrinsic’ or ‘ultimate’ value on the creative way of life, which consists in the active exercise of creative powers, and this value-judgment is central to his substantive ethical system.
That is, the conferment of intrinsic value on the way of life ultimately founds other ingredients of his system, especially, the value-judgments about the examined capacities (involving creative capacity), states and disposition, and the implicit practical principles. In this sense, it functions as a ‘unifying’ principle within the system. However, does Nietzsche have any justification for the fundamental proposition about intrinsic value, upon which his substantive ethics as a whole is founded? This question is meaningful but extremely elusive. Above all, it seems to be very hard to locate in his works an ‘explicit’ or ‘direct’ non-ethical statement about why the creative way of life is valuable. Moreover, again, he does not attempt to ‘define’ the relevant ethical notions, or analyse the intrinsic nature of what they designate in some ‘non-ethical’ terms of our natural language. If he did so, it would be decisive for the settling of this controversial issue. Since this is the case, I have to concede that I am not in a position to give a definitive answer to the question about the ground of Nietzsche’s ethics. Nevertheless, tentatively, I believe that Nietzsche has some reasons for his substantive ethics, as has already been briefly mentioned in several places. Having said this, I wish to further specify the foundation on which his ethics stands, and to present my rationale.
To start with, it appears that Nietzsche endorses some psychological assumption, which logically grounds his evaluative or normative claims. In brief, according to this assumption, if one belongs to the higher type, one can ‘desire’ the life for its own sake; one will desire it independently of (the thought of) its relation to something else, under ideal, naturalistically specifiable conditions. More precisely, the higher individual would invariably desire or want to live it, if he were fully informed of its nature (or he had a lucid idea of what it is like), properly imagined living it, knew that it is his practical possibility, and were free from self-deceptive emotional influences. The inclination for the way of life, which lies in the active exercise of what Nietzsche himself calls “power” (i.e. creative capacity), may not belong to the ‘actuality’ of the type of individual. On the contrary, as Nietzsche might point out, many of these individuals do not actually desire to live the noble way of life, and moreover, have never done so. Even if some may desire the constituent “power”, they desire to exert it in a way incompatible with the noble form of life as a whole Nietzsche has in mind. But the ‘failure’ to wish to live it is attributable to the fact that the notion of the creative way of life is alien to them or that the idea is repressed. Now, he may presuppose that what is ‘intrinsically’ good, desirable, or ideal for a person in the strict sense of the term, is nothing but the object of such an
‘essential’ and ‘objective’ desire or want of the person: it is identical with that which the
person would invariably desire for its own sake under such ideal conditions as described
above. The logical transition from these premises (that is, the psychological assumption
and the proposition concerning the identity of the ‘good’ or ‘desirable’) to the idea that
the way of life is intrinsically good for the higher type seems to be indeed valid. It is
sensible to regard these two premises as the ‘direct’, non-ethical, and deductive logical
ground underpinning Nietzsche’s ethics.

However, what enables us to interpret Nietzsche as arguing for the intrinsic
goodness or desirability of the creative life from the above two premises? Regarding the
major premise, i.e. the psychological assumption that one is capable of ‘desiring’ to live
the form of life if one belongs to the higher type, Nietzsche does imply this in several
places. For instance, he in effect says that “all great, fruitful, inventive spirits” are by
nature inclined ultimately for their most beautiful fruitfulness”, which is “their optimum
existence” (GM III, 8, p. 88). Further, according to Nietzsche, the higher individual is
characterisable in terms of “maternal instinct” or the “secret love for what is growing
within him”, and the individual “accumulat[es] and stor[es] up everything” “only for
that” [his own future creature or work] (Ibid. p.90). Moreover, as was suggested earlier, I suspect that the form of desire or inclination or the relevant constitution is in fact what the notion of “will to power” points to. Nietzsche seems to hold a psychological, human ontological, or philosophical anthropological principle involving the ‘will to power’ taken as such, and this principle seems to imply or constitute the supposed major premise of his argument for the intrinsic goodness or desirability of the creative way of life. Nietzsche appears to suggest that the “will to power”, pertaining to the constitution essential to the human being, functions as a *fundamental* factor explanatory of its motives, emotions, and behaviors. He argues that “life is will to power” and that “the will of life” is “the intrinsic will to power” (BGE 259 p.194). Furthermore, the “will to power” here consists in a sort of *desire*, affect, or inclination, which can have different degrees of strength. The will to power, of course, has “power” as its intentional object. Nietzsche writes:

I consider life itself instinct for growth, for continuance, for accumulation of forces, for power: where the will to power is lacking there is decline. My assertion is that this will is lacking in all the supreme values of mankind (A 6, p. 129)
Thus, it is sensible to interpret Nietzsche as meaning that the inclination for “power” pertains to the human essence: if one properly contemplates the nature of “power” as such, and thinks that it is one’s practical possibility, one will desire it for its own sake (consciously or subconsciously, and strongly or weakly).

But what matters now is the nature of this “power” (as the intentional object of the will to power). As Wilcox also seems to point out⁶⁷, “power” lies in “creative powers” (BGE 225, p.155) or creative capacity which is constituted by some intellectual resources necessary for ‘creation’ – in the sense of producing something new, or transforming, refashioning and influencing things). As such, the “power” Nietzsche has in mind seems to comprise knowledge, great intelligence, imaginative power, and insightfulness. Nietzsche thus identifies the “will to power” with the

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⁶⁷ Arguing that “power” is the “ultimate norm” in Nietzsche’s ethics, Wilcox analyses the nature of power in terms of creativity. Wilcox writes: “[M]y own hunch is that, to do justice to Nietzsche’s examples, it [i.e. power] must be explicated in terms of the cultural context of the self as well. What makes Beethoven great, or ‘powerful’, has to do with music, with what music had come to by the time of Beethoven, and what was able to create out of the musical materials at his disposal…. Power is the good; its examples are the creative heroes of culture; somehow it can be construed as physiological” (1974, p.196)
inclination for “self-elevation and strengthening” (WP 402, p.218). Moreover, the “power” here seems to further designate the active exercise of creative capacity thus understood, not its mere possession. Nietzsche appears to imply that will to power is basically the desire for activity or the use of strength, claiming that “a living thing desires above all to vent his strength – life as such is the will to power: self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent consequences of it” (BGE 13, p. 44).

Furthermore, Nietzsche tacitly equates the will to power with the desire for the use of the ‘creative’ powers (including knowledge), saying:

*Actual philosophers, however, are commanders and law-givers:*

ey say ‘thus it shall be’, it is they who determine the Wherefore and Whither of mankind … they reach for the future with creative hand, and everything that is or has been becomes for them as a means, an instrument, a hammer. Their ‘knowing’ is creating, their creating is a law-giving, their will to truth is – *will to power.* … Must there not be such philosophers? ... (BGE 211, p.142~143)
In summary, the “will to power” here can be thought of as the desire for both creative activity and the relevant capacity, or in other words, for the active manifestation or employment of heightened creative capacity. Nietzsche’s theory of the will to power seems to ascribe the possibility of this desire to man, and more precisely to affirm that man is disposed to possess the internal resources for creation and to exercise them in a proper and active way. It is the theory of “will to power” thus construed that appears to constitute the direct logical ground of the argument for the intrinsic ‘value’ of the creative form of life, according to which the higher individual (who can live this form of life) would invariably desire it, if he were fully informed of its nature and were uninfluenced by self-deceptive or distorting emotions.

Having said that, let us turn our attention to the second premise that I believe Nietzsche ‘implicitly’ holds. According to this, what is good or desirable (for one) is identical with something possessing the capability of being desired. If Nietzsche really ‘identifies’ the intrinsically good in the way in which our earlier naturalistic definition does and if the preceding analysis of Nietzsche’s theory of the “will to power” is accepted, it is sensible to interpret Nietzsche as arguing for his ethics from the theory of
the will to power and from the identification itself. Conversely, if Nietzsche logically moves from the theory of will to power to his ethical conclusions or explains the ethical in terms of the theory, it is also plausible to consider that he ‘identifies’ the good in the ‘naturalistic’ way. But is it indeed the case that Nietzsche conceives of the nature of the good in this way? There are several reasons for which I think that Nietzsche does so. Firstly, my perspective on ethical notions such as ‘good’ is itself a reason. If the previous, ‘naturalistic’ analysis of the meaning of ‘good(-for/to)’ or ‘desirable’, which I find convincing, is right, the premise identifying the good or desirable in terms of essential and objective human desire is an analytic, objective, and necessary truth, which Nietzsche himself would endorse, and moreover, might take for granted.

Secondly, it can be suspected that Nietzsche ‘derives’ his ethical conclusions from his theory of the ‘will to power’68. There are some unpublished writings where Nietzsche

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68John Wilcox understands Nietzsche’s ethics in a similar way. According to Wilcox, Nietzsche justifies the evaluative “standard of power” with recourse to “the theory of the will to power”. Wilcox writes: “How is it [i.e. the standard of power] validated or confirmed? Nietzsche may have thought that it needs no confirmation, because we all, in effect, accept it and must accept it - iif his theory of the will to power is correct” (1974, p.198). As Wilcox adds to this, “[in] the tradition of ethical philosophy in the West, philosophers often base their principles upon theories of motivation; if, for example, happiness, pleasure, or self-preservation is what we most fundamentally desire, that, they argue, is the good. Ethics, they argue,
seems to ‘explicitly’ argue from his theory of the will to power for his ethical propositions or to explain his ‘values’ in terms of this non-ethical theory. For instance, let us appreciate the following.

There is nothing to life that has value, except the degree of power – assuming that life itself is the will to power (WP 55, p.37)

I should add, “one must want to have more than one has in order to become more” For this is the doctrine preached by life itself to all that has life: the morality of development. To have and to want to have more – growth, in one word – that is life itself (Ibid p.125).

Standard by which the value of moral valuation is to be determined.

The fundamental fact that has been overlooked: the contradiction between “becoming more moral” and the elevation and strengthening of the type of man

rests upon psychology (or even metaphysics). Nietzsche may have thought that his norm of power gained support in some analogous way from his doctrine of the will to power” (Ibid, p.p.198–199).
Nevertheless, as far as Nietzsche’s published works are concerned, Nietzsche never links
the will to power to his values in such explicit ways. He never says that the “will to
power” is human essence therefore, “power” is good or that this is the case, because “life
is will to power”. Partly due to this, it is by no means certain that the theory deductively
founds his ethics and that Nietzsche genuinely presupposes the ‘identity’ of what is good
(for one) with the object of “will” or desire essential to man. However, even in these
texts, he does ‘juxtapose’ ethical claims with ‘non-ethical’ statements concerning the
“will to power” (Cf. BGE 259, p.194; GM II, p. 59). He thus gives us the strong
impression that he logically ‘moves’ from the theory of will to power to his ethical
claims. For instance, Nietzsche points out that Schopenhauer’s “fundamental ethical
proposition” is “neminem laede, immo omnes, quantum potes, juva” [harm no one, rather
help everyone as much as you are able] and criticizes the latter’s attempt to “furnish the
rational ground” of this (BGE 186, p.109). As Nietzsche adds, “this proposition” is
“insipidly false and sentimental in a world whose essence is will to power” (Ibid). Here,
he seems to imply that the theory of the will to power is capable of falsifying an ethical
thesis. Nevertheless, it may be that even if Nietzsche seeks to persuade or convince us with the ‘non-ethical’ theory of the will to power in juxtaposing the latter with his ethical claims, this attempt is merely Nietzsche’s rhetoric. And yet one cannot rule out the possibility that he expresses his ‘sincere’ belief in the necessary link between the ethical and the non-ethical, either.\(^69\)

\(^69\) Schacht thinks that Nietzsche’s ethics is founded ultimately upon the theory of “will to power”, too. According to Schacht, “the standard he [Nietzsche] proposes” is “derived from his reflections on the fundamental nature of life and the world as will to power (1983, p.454). That is, as Schacht argues, “on his [i.e. Nietzsche’s] view, there is an ultimate standard of value, which is to be conceived in terms deriving directly from a consideration of the essential nature of reality generally – and so of life and the world – and the character of which he indicates by means of his notion of will to power” (Ibid., p.396). Also, Richardson makes similar points. He says that “Nietzsche posits values in very much the traditional way, hence quite centrally or basically in his ontology”, [i.e. “a power ontology”] (1996, p.142), and that “these values are embedded within” “the ontology” (Ibid. p.144). As Richardson believes, “[s]urely he [Nietzsche] simply argues from ‘is’ to ‘ought’: from the claim that each being is (essentially) will to power to the claim that power is the objective good” (Ibid. p.152). However, as also has to be noted, there are many interpreters of Nietzsche who do not see the matter in this way. For instance, Leiter denies that Nietzsche’s evaluative standard is grounded in the theory of will of will to power, and thus casts doubts upon the view that Nietzsche has a non-ethical, rational justification for the standard (2002, p.p. 138~144). In addition, Leiter further argues that for Nietzsche, the problem of value cannot be settled: no perspective on value can be an objective truth or knowledge (Ibid. p. 146~155). According to Leiter, “like certain radical anti-realists, he [i.e. Nietzsche] tends to equate evaluative questions with matters of taste” (Ibid, p.147). MacIntyre seems to read Nietzsche in the same way as Leiter does in this context (1984, p.114~115). MacIntyre argues that for Nietzsche, “[t]he rational and rationally justified autonomous moral
Furthermore, as was mentioned in the previous discussion of his implicit theory of
rightness, there are some textual evidences suggesting that Nietzsche maintains meta-
ethical views coherent with the premise concerning the identity of the good or desirable
in question. In *Daybreak*, Nietzsche implies that the determination of what is ultimately
good, desirable, or ideal for one does depend upon the knowledge about one’s own
‘feelings’ (more precisely, ‘desires’ or ‘wants’), or in Nietzsche’s own terms, “likes” and
“dislikes”, and thus that what is good or desirable is, as a matter of fact, something
determinable in such terms (D II, 108, p.63). Moreover, in the “Note” to GM I, 17,
Nietzsche argues that the empirical scientific disciplines are necessary for philosophers’
normative, ethical tasks, especially, the task of the re-evaluation of conventional values.
In so doing, Nietzsche would appear to imply that not only the determination of the
extrinsic value of things, but the judgment about intrinsic value or the locus of value as the ultimate criterion that the value-determination presupposes also requires such
disciplines. Nietzsche writes as follows:

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70 Wilcox reads the material at issue in a similar way, and in so doing, he argues that Nietzschean values
On the other hand, it is admittedly just as necessary to secure the interest of physiologists and physicians in the exploration of this problem (of the value of previous evaluations) … The question: what is the value of this or that table of commandments and ‘morality’ should be examined from the most varied perspectives; in particular, the question of its value to what end cannot be examined too closely …. The welfare of the greatest number and the welfare of the few represent opposed points of view on value: to hold the former as of intrinsically higher value may be left to the naivety of English biologists … From now on, all disciplines have to prepare the future are “supported” by “neutral” “knowledge” or “truth” (1974, p.p.198–199). Leiter, on the other hand, presents a reading of the same material opposed to this. Quoting BGE 211, he says that for Nietzsche “the philosophers are precisely the ones who ‘create values’, who are commanders and legislator”. Then, in connection with the “Note”, Leiter argues: “What Nietzsche must be calling for is for scientific illumination of the effect of particular values on different types of persons… as an aid to the philosopher’s creative work. But the values themselves are creations; the ‘physiologists and doctors’ simply help the philosopher understand the effects of different sorts of values” (2001, p.143). However, it seems to me that it depends on how we understand what Nietzsche means by the notion ‘creating values’, and that we do not have to interpret the notion of value-creation here as carrying the narrow sense Leiter has in mind.
task of the philosopher: this task being understood as the solution of
the problem of value, the determination of the hierarchy of values (GM I, 17, p.p. 37~38)

CHAPTER VI: Nietzsche’s Critique of Conventional Morality

In this Chapter, I propose to discuss Nietzsche’s critique of conventional morality. His critique makes up the core of his philosophical ethics and arguably, of his entire philosophy. It is one of the things that have made him such a famous, notorious and influential philosopher. As such, his critique of conventional morality is an important and huge topic. It can be seen as involving some mutually related parts, each of which engages with a different dimension of morality and is indeed far-reaching and complicated. One of those parts is the well-known ‘genealogical’ critique, which analyses and problematises the ‘origin’ of morality. The present chapter will focus on two other significant aspects of Nietzsche’s criticism: (1) his denial of the particular
content in morality, that is, its constitutive value-judgments and practical principles as a form of ‘theoretical’ critique, and (2) his ‘practical’ critique of morality, which assesses the value of morality itself. The theoretical critique lies in the critical reflection on the internal features of ‘common-sense’ beliefs about noble/ignoble, good/bad, and right/wrong. It also lies in the ‘opposition to’ or ‘denial of’ them on the basis of a different perspective on value which Nietzsche himself endorses and which we discussed in the foregoing chapters. The task of the “revaluation of values” (EH, I, 1, p.223; III, 9, p.254) Nietzsche so often emphasizes (which consists in the re-assessment of things morality views as values and in the conferment of new evaluative-normative meanings to these) indeed appears to be closely related to this form of critique. On the other hand, the latter critical approach to morality, i.e. ‘practical’ critique, aims at the determination of the ‘value’ of morality itself not what morality finds valuable for us. It thus reflects upon an external feature of morality, namely, its ‘influences’ upon us, and re-determines its value on the basis of this reflection and Nietzsche’s own standard of value. One reason for paying attention to those two parts of the Nietzschean critique of morality in particular is that they seem to constitute the centre of his entire critique and of his ethics as a whole. Above all, they appear to correspond to the ultimate goals of Nietzsche’s
ethical enterprise, and to be ones of the tasks Nietzsche himself finds of higher-order importance (GS V, 345 p.p.202~203; BGE 203, p.p. 126~128; GM Pref. 5, 6, p.p. 6~8; I, Note, p.p.37~38). The genealogical critique, for which Nietzsche is perhaps best known, occupies a ‘secondary’ status in his ethical project, as he himself confesses. For instance, he writes:

  [M]y real concern was with something more important than my own or anyone else’s hypotheses about the origin of morality (or to be more precise: the latter concern was completely subordinate to a single goal [i.e. the critical assessment of moral values and morality itself]

For me, what was at stake was the value of morality … At issue was the value of the ‘unegoistic’, the instincts of compassion, self-abnegation, self-sacrifice, those very instincts which Schopenhauer had for so long made golden, godly, and transcendent, until finally they became for him ‘values in themselves’ (GM Pref. 5, p.p.6~7)

More significantly, those kinds of criticism are of particular relevance to Nietzsche’s
‘substantive’ ethical system, which is, of course, the main theme of this thesis. As has been indicated, firstly, the criticisms do presuppose Nietzsche’s own evaluative-normative standard, especially, his distinctive perspective on the locus of value understood as ‘intrinsic’ value Next, those criticisms are constituted by some ingredients of his substantive ethical system that we have not dealt with at length, especially, his arguments for the disvalue or badness of some things. So to illuminate Nietzsche’s denial of morality and practical critique here will also serve to draw a fuller picture of Nietzsche’s substantive ethics.

1. Nietzsche’s Denial of Morality: “Revaluation of Values”

1) An Outline

Let us deal with the first part of Nietzsche’s critique, that is, the critique of the intrinsic features or content of morality which consists in their negations or denials and which transcends the criticism of them for their untenable, arbitrary, or groundless character. In this sort of critique, to make some preliminary remarks, Nietzsche’s main
attack seems to be on the conventional or common-sense ‘theory’ of value (or disvalue). Nietzsche focuses particularly on the behavioral or emotional ‘dispositions’ that morality posits as supreme ‘virtues’ and attempts to re-assess them. As was indicated earlier, for some reason, he does criticise the practical laws or codes of conduct that morality puts forward, and yet they seem to form relatively minor critical concerns for Nietzsche. Thus, our discussion here will concentrate on his criticisms of the dominant, conventional theory of value, especially, ‘virtue’. Further, as was briefly indicated in the foregoing paragraph, Nietzsche’s critique of the conventional theory of value in this particular form is closely connected to his ‘revaluation’ of its values and disvalues in some ways. That is to say, the entire outcome of the ‘revaluation’ of a valued or disvalued item does seem to be constituted by the denials of ordinary evaluative judgements concerning the item itself. Also, the outcome involves claims that entail or ground such denials, and thus, renders it possible for Nietzsche to say ‘No’ or object to some evaluative-normative judgements of morality. However, what exactly are the ingredients or value-judgments of morality Nietzsche particularly problematises? What are the values and disvalues in its standard that he re-evaluates? What does the re-evaluation consist in, or in other words, what new meaning does Nietzsche bestow on each of these values and disvalues?
Finally, what are Nietzsche’s reasons for the denials of conventional value-judgments or for the revaluations of the values and disvalues concerned?

2) Items Valued by Conventional Morality

With respect to the values posited in the standard of morality, to begin with, Nietzsche seems to observe that they are for the most part treated as ‘absolute’ values. That is to say, they are, according to morality, absolutely or unconditionally good or desirable for everyone. Nietzsche observes this, arguing that all the existing moralities are “one and all baroque and unreasonable in form – because they address themselves to ‘all’, because they generalize where generalization is impermissible – speaking unconditionally one and all, taking themselves for unconditional” (BGE 198, p.119). Further, each of these alleged values is also an ‘intrinsic’ value in the following, strict sense of the term. It is good or desirable, under some conditions or necessarily, independently of its relations to things valuable in themselves, especially, its usefulness
for something else valuable. In addition, it is not necessarily useful for what is good for one. Conventional morality thus implies that for some people, it is good or desirable only on its own account, or despite the absence of its conduciveness to what is ultimately good. However, Nietzsche denies that they are ‘intrinsic’ values in this sense, based on the argument that the value of each of them is dependent upon, and determined by, its overall contribution to something intrinsically good to one. He further argues that its disvalue (or badness) for one relies on its harmfulness to the intrinsically good. Based upon these arguments and his own conception of intrinsic value, Nietzsche attempts to determine whether or not each of these allegedly good or desirable things indeed possesses value, or whether or not on the contrary it is bad or undesirable. As a consequence, Nietzsche attaches the significance of extrinsic conditional goodness or desirability to some of these items. The others, on the other hand, are judged to possess no value whatsoever, and on the contrary, to be extrinsically bad. Such a re-assessment of each of the ‘valued’ items, in the end, leads Nietzsche to the negation of conventional morality’s conception of it as an absolute or unconditional value, according to which it is good for everyone. It is nothing but the bestowal of limited or conditional goodness or badness upon the given item that constitutes Nietzsche’s ‘revaluation’ of the values of
morality. Thus, it could also be said that broadly speaking, Nietzsche’s re-assessment of
the value of the ‘values’ of conventional morality takes two forms.\(^{71}\) Nietzsche
considers some of the posited values as merely extrinsic and conditional values. In this
sense, he transforms the status of their value, rather than depriving them of value per se.
According to Nietzsche, the others do not have value; rather, they are extrinsically and
conditionally bad.

(1) Conditional Values

As Nietzsche would say, knowledge, life, happiness, pleasure, the emotional or
affective dispositions of courage, of generosity, and of truthfulness, and finally, public or
social welfare are indeed merely extrinsic and conditional values. Although the standard
of conventional morality finds them absolutely and intrinsically good, Nietzsche above
all deprives ‘intrinsic’ goodness of these values, holding that each of them relies for its
value upon a positive (constitutive or instrumental) connection with something good or
desirable on its own account. But, according to Nietzsche, in certain circumstances, there

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\(^{71}\) Leiter seems to make similar observations (2002, p.p.128–129).
is no such connection between each of the alleged values and the creative way of life as a whole, which is the one and only intrinsic value. For instance, if the agent belongs to the ‘incorrigible’ or ‘hopeless’ herd type, which is devoid of the lofty characteristics of the higher man, and moreover, cannot achieve all of them, in strictly ethical terms, pleasure does not possess any ‘value’ for him. Therefore, each of these posited values is not necessarily good for one, and in this sense, is not a universal or absolute value. Nevertheless, Nietzsche believes in the conditional, limited and extrinsic value of these alleged values. Each of the values is good for the agent, if the agent is a higher type of individual, and thus, possesses the Nietzschean merits pertaining to the (necessary) condition for the possibility of the creative way of life. Furthermore, it is, under certain circumstances, good for those who are potentially higher, and thus, can become members of the higher type in the long term. Specifically, knowledge and life are essential constituents of the creative way of life as the sole intrinsic value. The conventional virtues (i.e. courage, generosity and truthfulness), the state of pleasure or happiness and others’ welfare are conducive to (further) growth or creative activity, and as such, are (merely) instrumental values. It is such considerations that constitute Nietzsche’s belief in the conditional and extrinsic value of these values situated within
In addition, as Nietzsche would argue, some of the aforementioned, alleged values are ordinarily considered to have ‘moral’ significance in the narrow and strict sense of the term. According to common-sense morality, the qualities of generosity and of courage (qua emotional or affective dispositions) in particular have that meaning, and thus exemplify ‘moral’ virtues. That is to say, these dispositions are not only intrinsically good or desirable for one, but are so ‘from the moral perspective’, in the sense that they are good, since one’s possession of them is conducive to others’ or social intrinsic good, which one ought to promote for its own sake. Thus, they are virtues whose value is ‘ultimately’ explicable in terms of an intrinsic public interest. However, as was shown earlier, Nietzsche would repudiate the notion that constitutes, or is presupposed by, that of ‘moral’ value or ‘moral’ virtue. According to him, to reiterate, public or social interests do not intrinsically or ultimately matter. Moreover, Nietzsche would deny the existence of what might be called an ‘impersonal’, intrinsic good itself. Whatever has ‘intrinsic’ or ‘ultimate’ goodness to one is, as Nietzsche would argue, one’s personal good. Therefore, according to Nietzsche, the given qualities are non-moral, extrinsic
values, and the ‘non-moral’ significance makes up the new meaning which Nietzsche gives to them.

(2) Mere Disvalues

Compassion

Let us now draw attention to the things subsumed under the second category, i.e. those in which conventional morality finds supreme value, and yet which Nietzsche would count as ‘valueless’, and moreover, conditionally bad. Unlike those pertaining to the first category we have just examined, these traditional values, which can also be seen as part of his substantive ethics, have not been properly examined so far. Hence, we need to deal with these items one by one in a more detailed manner. To start with, as Nietzsche points out, conventional morality finds some qualities that might broadly be termed ‘altruistic’ or ‘other-regarding’ tendencies, as crucial ‘virtues’. Morality also
emphasizes the ethical significance of their constitutive sentiments, motives, or actions. One of the altruistic tendencies is ‘pity’ or ‘compassion’. Nietzsche attacks it in an explicit and harsh way, and views it as not only ignoble or base but also bad or undesirable. The sentiment of pity or compassion, and acts performed ‘out of pity’ are also alleged intrinsic values that Nietzsche views with suspicion (GS IV, 338, p.p. 191~192)\textsuperscript{72}. He writes:

There exists almost everywhere in Europe today a morbid sensitivity and susceptibility to pain, likewise a repellent intemperance in lamentation, a tenderization which, … would like to deck itself out as something higher – there exists a downright cult of

\textsuperscript{72}Schopenhauer defends the morality of compassion. He believes that the sentiment of compassion and the relevant disposition are both praiseworthy and desirable. For him, “compassion, as the sole non-egoistic motive, is also the only genuinely moral one” (1995, p.167). And he seems to attempt to explain all other things he finds morally valuable, in particular “the virtue of justice” (Ibid. 148) and “the virtue of loving-kindness” (Ibid. p.162), in terms of compassion. Compassion, in other words, is the foundation of all these, and in this sense, is “the primary ethical phenomenon” (Ibid. p.148). Moreover, he thinks that only actions performed ‘out of’ compassion are morally praiseworthy. He writes: “It is simply and solely this compassion that is the real basis of all voluntary justice and genuine loving-kindness. Only insofar as an action has sprung from compassion does it have moral value; and every action resulting from any other motives has none” (Ibid p.144).
suffering. The unmanliness of that which is in such fanatic circles
baptized ‘pity’ is, I think, the first thing which leaps to the eye –
This latest species of bad taste must be resolutely and radically
excommunicated (BGE 293, p.218)

But what does pity or compassion consist in? Perhaps, as was suggested above, the
quality at issue here is understood as a relatively high degree of “sensitivity” to others’
pain or suffering. That is, a person exhibiting pity would sympathetically react to others’
painful states; he would not only be quick to perceive their condition, but would
empathise with them. Always reminding himself of their distress, he would be likely to
fall into a deep, long-lasting sadness or depressive mood, and in this respect would be
‘vulnerable’ to the scene or image of pain. Moreover, he would be tempted to relieve
them of their painful state. Nietzsche would deny that the disposition of pity construed
as such is intrinsically and absolutely good for one, and thus, claim that without its
(instrumental or constitutive) contributiveness to the intrinsic good, it does not have
value to the agent concerned. But, as Nietzsche further argues, whoever it belongs to, it
makes no such contribution, and therefore, it is not good for anybody, which entails the
denial of morality’s conception of it as a universal or unconditional virtue. Of course, beneath his denial of its being contributive to anything intrinsically good lies the idea that there does not obtain any positive relation between one’s possession of it and one’s creative way of life (which is the sole intrinsic good to one). In particular, if the ‘higher’ individual, on whom Nietzsche’s evaluative discourse focuses, owned the quality, it would eventually disrupt the individual’s creative life.

Moreover, Nietzsche’s observation of the ‘detrimental’ nature of the quality to such exceptional individuals also grounds his argument for its badness for these individuals. That is, according to Nietzsche, pity is bad especially for the higher type of individual, and thus, such individuals ought not to be compassionate, since it would hinder them from living the creative way of life. But in what ways would it harm their creative lives? Above all, it would inhibit their struggles for his own further growths, and delay or weaken their creative activities. According to Nietzsche, “this depressive and contagious instinct [i.e. pity] thwarts those instincts bent on preserving and enhancing the value of life” (A 7, p. 130). Nietzsche might give us some further explanations. For example, a pitying person is by nature apt to be cognitively and emotionally distracted by the
presence of his pained neighbors and acquaintances. Furthermore, the depressive mood into which the pitying person often gets immersed produces a state of inertia or enervation. As Nietzsche suggests, one can “suffocate from pity”, which is antithetical to “hardness and cheerfulness” (BGE 269, p. 207). He also writes, “Pity stands in antithesis to the tonic emotions which enhance the energy of the feeling of life; it has a depressive effects. One loses force when one pities” (A 7, p.130). More importantly, the person’s compassion is likely to lead him to altruistic acts incompatible with the planned pursuit of growth or creative works. As Nietzsche points out, the quality makes it impossible “to keep to one’s own path” and instead, causes one to “deviate from [one’s] goal” (GS IV, 338, p.192). Nietzsche would add that the higher individual’s possession of pity would be harmful not only to his own creative life and further growth, but also to those of his neighbors, which are also good (GS IV, 338, p.191). For Nietzsche, in particular, pain or suffering is not only ‘inevitable’ to those pursuing growth, but necessary for it, so that ‘helping’ a ‘promising’ (or potentially higher) individual to avoid or escape pain is likely to mean depriving the latter of valuable opportunities for growth. In Nietzsche’s own words, the “pampering and weakening” of the “creature” in the individual, “which has to be formed, broken, forged, torn, burned, annealed, refined - that which has to suffer and
Self-Sacrificing

Another form of altruism conventional morality praises and encourages is ‘selflessness’ or ‘self-sacrificing’, which is closely linked to the quality of pity. Self-sacrificing is equivalent to ‘generosity’ taken as a disposition involving a behavioral habit, as well as an emotional pattern, and lies in unconditionally ‘giving’ others what are dear to one in response to their needs or demands (BGE 220, p.150; 260, p.197; GM II, 18, p.68). Nietzsche would emphatically deny the value of such a behavioral disposition, holding that it is useless or harmful to everyone, whereas as we saw previously, he thinks very highly of “magnanimity” or “generosity” qua an emotional or affective disposition. This denial also corresponds to the structure of Nietzsche’s critique of morality’s table of values and the revaluation of them already described: the denial
seems to be based upon his rejection of morality’s fundamental belief in the *intrinsic* value of self-sacrificing for everyone (in the strict sense of the term), and his argument for its uselessness or harmfulness to everyone. According to Nietzsche, “a personality” “that denies itself and its own existence is no longer good for anything good”, and “selflessness has no value in heaven or on earth” (GS V, 345, p.202). Moreover, Nietzsche appears to attach extrinsic (more precisely, instrumental) *badness* to the quality construed as such, and to believe that the higher person, in particular, *ought not* to have it. Nietzsche claims:

> An altruistic morality, a morality under which egoism languishes- is under all circumstances a bad sign … The best are lacking when egoism begins to be lacking, To choose what is harmful to oneself, to be attracted by ‘disinterested’ motives, almost constitutes the formula for decadence (TI 9, 35, p.98).

It can happen, said a pettyfogging moral pedant, that I honour and respect an unselfish man … Enough: the question is always who he is
and who the other is. In one made and destined for command, for example, self-abnegation and modest retirement would not be a virtue but the waste of virtue (BGE 221, p.151).

This argument for the badness or undesirability of self-sacrificing or selflessness, which constitutes the negation of morality’s conception of it as a universal or absolute value also appears to correspond to the structure of Nietzsche’s critique of morality’s table of values. The former argument is grounded in his claims that its disvalue is determined by its harmfulness to the ‘higher’ man (or his own creative life) and that it would actually harm him. But what, according to Nietzsche, explains the nature of its debilitating impacts on the higher man and his creative lives? The mechanism involved in the harmfulness of selflessness to the creative life appears to be similar to that which accounts for the link between pity and the creative life. First of all, the ‘selfless’ disposition would interrupt the higher individual’s planned pursuits of tasks, by dissipating his energy to various acts intended to help others. It would also drive him into ‘altruistic’ acts that would interfere with his struggles for his own further growth and cause delay. Furthermore, displaying selflessness, the individual might ‘sacrifice’ the
basic conditions for his own life including material ones. In summary, the higher individual would “not apply his entire strength and reason to his own preservation, development, elevation, promotion, and expansion of power” (GS I, 21, p.45). As was mentioned earlier, it might make him fail to maintain “solitude” or keep a ‘distance’ from others, especially, the ‘herd’. Finally, as Nietzsche would say, one’s generosity can cause ‘harm’ even to others, in particular, ‘promising’ persons, who can become members of the higher type in the long term. Nietzsche writes, “Our benefactors diminish our worth and our will more than our enemies do” (Ibid, 338, p.191), and thus he suggests that repeated ‘help’ offered to others makes such persons negligent, dependent, and incompetent in practical matters.

Asceticism

‘Asceticism’, together with ‘altruism’, also forms the core of the conventional table of values. Conventional morality devalues ‘affects’ (as drives or desires), especially, those whose intentional objects involve ‘self’ or its own ‘bodily’ states and sensations. It
also views the state of strong, manifold affectivity and dispositions determinable in
terms of the intensity of particular sorts of desire (e.g. ‘aggression’, ‘vanity’ and ‘lust’),
as “evil” or ‘vicious’ (TI, 5, 4, p.55; A 5, p. 129). Morality blames these affects and their
relevant states or dispositions for the ‘dangers’ or potential harms to society. It thus treats
them as extrinsically and morally evil (WP 343, p. 189, 383, p. 207; 870, p.p.465~466)\(^7\). As Nietzsche observes, however, according to morality, these affects are evil or vicious
also ‘in themselves’, and one ought not to adopt them without regard to the value of their
impact. On the other hand, various ‘ascetic’ states or dispositions are idealized.
Especially, “the mean and average in desires” (BGE 201, p.123) is encouraged, and
moreover, the ‘liberation’ from, or “extirpation” of, them is posited not only as an end in
itself but also as a moral, extrinsic one (WP 383, p.206~207). Nietzsche further deprives

\(^7\)As I mentioned earlier, for Schopenhauer, the ascetic state or “the denial of the will to live” is the
precondition for “salvation” understood as the peace of mind, serenity, or the freedom from pain or
suffering. But he not only links the extirpation of earthly desires with the absence of pain, but appears to
praise and encourage the ascetic state as the means of achieving “salvation”. Furthermore, he suggests that
natural affects (as the manifestation of the “will to live”) are evil and blameworthy, because they form the
root of human suffering. For instance, he writes: “[S]ince we are what we ought not to be, we also
necessarily do what we ought not do, We therefore need a complete transformation of our nature and
disposition, i.e. the new spiritual birth, resignation, as the result of which salvation appears” (1969b,
p.604).
such ascetic states of value *per se*. The weakening of, or liberation from, desires is absolutely valueless, because it *never* contributes to anything intrinsically good. More importantly, it is *bad* or undesirable for the higher or promising individual, and he ought *not* to renounce or weaken his own desires, because this is detrimental to the (further) “growth” of the noble capacities, cultivation of virtues, or creative “life” (WP 343, p.189). According to Nietzsche, affects in general “belong to the *favourable* conditions without which any growth even of virtue is scarcely possible. The poison from which the weaker nature perishes strengthens the strong man” (GS I, 19, p.43). As we have seen, for Nietzsche, affects constitute the necessary condition for the possibility of *purposive* activities in general, and are translatable as ‘forces’ that drive human beings into various activities in the first place. Nietzsche writes, “[t]he decay of our hostile and mistrust-arousing instincts represents only one of the effects attending our general decay of *vitality*” (TI 9, 37, p.101). As such, on the condition that they are properly *transformed*, *sublimated* and *controlled*, they function as ultimate sources of self-cultivating or creative activities. First of all, they render it possible for such an individual to set up the goal of his own growth or of an original and formative ‘task’, to sustain the goal, and to intensify the struggle for it. So the extirpation or weakening of a desire would be the
deprivation of an important source of such pursuits.

Humility

Humility or modesty is also posited as an intrinsic, absolute ‘virtue’ in the table of values of conventional morality (BGE 201, p. 123, 260, p.197; GM I, 14, p.31). And yet, it is one of the things Nietzsche finds not only disgraceful but also bad or undesirable. Nietzsche encourages a quality opposed to it, namely, ‘self-respect’ or ‘pride’ (BGE 287, p.215; WP 919, p.486). To begin with, let us briefly clarify the ‘humility’ which Nietzsche objects to, and also the notion of ‘pride’ which he promotes. Basically, the two are different modes of ‘attitude’ towards oneself and as such, consist in how one evaluates oneself in such terms as ‘noble’/‘ignoble’, ‘great’/‘small’, ‘praiseworthy’/‘blameworthy’, and so on. A person with humility tends to depreciate or despise himself. He views himself as unworthy or ugly, and thinks that the qualities,
abilities, or possessions constitutive of his own ‘self’ are valueless. By contrast, a ‘proud’ or ‘self-revering’ person confers value on his own perceived qualities or possessions, and through this, judges his own self to be ‘high’ in value, ‘noble’ or ‘honorable’.

Nietzsche’s critical point concerning ‘humility’ is that it is ‘problematic’ in the following senses, only when it relates to the “higher” type of man. Firstly, provided that ‘humility’ pertains to an individual who, being classifiable into the higher type, shares the qualities constitutive of the necessary internal condition for the creative way of life, and moreover, in virtue of those merits, has lived the form of life, then, the attitude is ‘incorrect’ or ‘inappropriate’. That is to say, not only can the individual’s actual way of life be seen as great in itself, but the powers and qualities he manifests also have the significance of (extrinsic) nobleness or praiseworthiness, because of their contributions to, or roles in, the great form of life. Precisely for this reason, according to Nietzsche, the individual is duly countable as a great or noble person. In addition, if the individual does have the attitude of humility and thus depreciates himself, this reveals either that he fails to see his own internal resources, or that he does not share the standard value
Nietzsche puts forward.

Next, more significantly to the present context, Nietzsche emphasises that ‘humility’ is instrumentally and non-morally *bad* for the higher type of individual, and the latter *ought not* to hold the attitude. And what forms Nietzsche’s argument for the badness of the attitude for such an individual is, of course, that it is highly likely that it will have a destructive impact on the individual’s furtherance of the creative way of life. Suppose that he views himself as vicious, ugly, or ‘lower’ in value (owing to the acceptance of a standard of value contradictory with Nietzsche’s standard, e.g. conventional morality). First of all, he will feel uncomfortable with this image of himself and his low self-esteem may lead him to self-hatred or depression. More critically, his own merits themselves will be in danger, since he will be motivated to ‘renounce’ them. Nietzsche suggests this, saying that the “law of the dangerousness of impersonally understood, objective virtue applies also to modesty: many of the choicest spirits perish though it” (WP 326, p.178). As he also points out:

For what does one have to atone most? For one’s modesty; … for
having mistaken oneself; for having underestimated oneself; for having
lost a good year for one’s instincts: this lack of reverence for oneself
revenges itself through every kind of deprivation; health, friendship,
well-being, pride, cheerfulness, freedom, firmness, courage (Ibid 918,
p.486).

Nietzsche might add to this that on the other hand, the opposite, ‘pride’ or ‘self-respect’
is ‘healthy’ in some senses when it comes to the same type of individual. On the
condition that a ‘flourishing’ higher individual, who actually lives the creative life using
his own merits, knows how to praise his own self, and takes pride in what he possesses,
then, it can be said that he has ‘genuine’ pride, and deserves this attitude74. In addition, it
reflects both his capability of perceiving his own excellent resources and his acceptance
of the standard Nietzsche suggests. More importantly, ethically considered, self-respect

74“Greatness of soul” in Aristotle’s theory of excellences, which we discussed in connection with
‘magnanimity’, is constituted by ‘self-respect’ or ‘pride’ understood as such. Rather, ‘self-respect’ as a
‘due’, positive attitude towards oneself seems to be a crucial element of the virtue of greatness of soul.
According to Aristotle, greatness soul is in essence “the proper estimation of one’s own worth” (1976,
p.153). and a person counts as a great-souled one, “if he thinks that he is worthy of great things, provided
that he is worthy of them” (Ibid)
is also desirable for the higher individual. For the latter will benefit from it for the intensification and maintenance of his creative way of life. He will *cherish* his own valuable resources (for instance, creative capacity, self-discipline and vitality) in virtue of which he has sustained his way of life. Furthermore, he will have positive feeling towards himself or feel “satisfaction” with himself, and the positive feeling or satisfaction, as “one thing needful”, will reinforce the creative way of life (GS IV, 290, p.164).

Sociability

In Nietzsche’s view, ‘sociability’ is widely believed to be one of the absolute and intrinsic social ‘virtues’; however, he believes that it is not only ignoble but also bad. To begin with, ‘sociability’ lies in what Nietzsche calls the “herd-instinct”, that is, in the strong inclination for relationships with *others* (GS I, 50, p.62). A ‘sociable’ person is characterisable in terms of the need to be with others or in a group, and at the same time, of a reluctance to be alone. He is apt to experience the feeling of discomfort, emptiness, or discontent, when left alone, and hence, to seek others with whom to socialise. As a
result of this interior propensity, he normally spends much time with others and enjoys doing so. This, obviously, stands in opposition to the tendency for ‘solitude’, on which Nietzsche lays tremendous emphasis despite conventional morality’s ‘suspicious’ view of it (GM III, 18, p.113–114; WP 918, 970, p. 486, p.508; Z I, 17, p.88). From Nietzsche’s point of view, the characteristic has no value (let alone the intrinsic and absolute value morality attaches to it). On the contrary, it is one of the poisons from which the ‘higher’ individual must protect himself. In Nietzsche’s own words, the higher one ought “not to cleave to another person though he be the one you love most – every person is a prison, also a nook and corner” (BGE 41, p.70). Nietzsche adds: “all company is bad company except the company of one’s equals” (Ibid. 26, p.57).

What underpins Nietzsche’s claims (which entail the negation of morality’s view of sociability as a universal or absolute value) is of course the idea that ‘being with others’ could undermine the higher man and his creative life. And this seems to be further constituted by the idea underlying Nietzsche’s belief in the ‘necessity’ of solitude, which we have already discussed in some detail75. The creative life that Nietzsche

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75See Chapter 2
idealises is in essence a ‘solitary’ one in which one is detached from others: its normality is composed of creative, task-oriented activities which in general exclude ordinary relations with others. Naturally, a life that consists of frequent socialising with others is simply incompatible with the creative way of life, and entails the negation of the latter. Similarly, being with other people can also be a considerable obstacle to the growth of the ‘promising’ kind of man, who can become a member of the Nietzschean higher type; activities making up the path towards the noble capacities and states and virtues required for the creative way of life are in general incompatible with being with others. It is his deeply rooted mistrust of the ‘herd’ that underpins Nietzsche’s objection to sociability.

The herd, as the fervent advocate of conventional morality, tends to ‘moralise’ about other people, particularly, exceptional, ‘higher’ individuals, and to behave in ‘moralistic’ ways in social settings. It does so for manifold purposes involving the security of the herd and its sense of superiority. In contacts with the herd as such, those higher individuals could be contaminated by morality itself, and suffer from humiliation, low self-esteem and ‘bad conscience’.

Honesty with Others
Nietzsche’s concern about the relationship of the higher individual with the herd (which we have examined in connection with his critique of ‘sociability’ in the preceding paragraph) is relevant to his problematisation of another personal characteristic, namely, ‘honesty’ or ‘truthfulness’. Indeed, his fundamental mistrust of the herd appears to lie beneath the argument for the bad or undesirable character of honesty. Nietzsche would argue that though conventional morality worships it as one of the supreme, intrinsic and absolute virtues (Cf. GS V, 357, p.219; GM III, 27, p.p.134–135), it is extrinsically and conditionally bad for the exceptional individual, because of dangers it would pose to him. ‘Honesty’ or ‘truthfulness’ here is taken in the normal sense of the term, i.e. a behavioral pattern or regularity with respect to others rather than oneself. In accordance with honesty taken as such, a person would never tell a lie to anybody in any situation, and on the contrary, would always tell the truth in the face of others. The higher individual’s rigorous avoidance of untruth or blind adherence to truth-telling would easily disclose his own ‘higher’ nature, style of life, and distinctive table of values to others of the ‘herd’-type, who, being suspicious of such exceptional individuals, seek to manipulate and hurt them, or in Nietzsche’s own words, seek “to weaken and pull down the
“stronger” through the “chief means” of morality and “the moral judgment” (WP 345, p.189). Despite Nietzsche’s devaluation of ‘honesty’ in this ordinary sense, however, it has to be made clear that he does not mean that the higher individual should be ‘dishonest’ or ‘mendacious’. Rather, the individual needs to have freedom from a blind or ‘unconditional’ avoidance of untruth and from the obsession with telling the truth. Indeed, the individual is in need of ‘flexibility’, which would enable him to refrain from telling self-destructive truths about himself. In addition, it is exactly in these terms that the aforementioned virtue of the “mask”, which Nietzsche opposes to ‘honesty’ with others, can be identified.

3) Items Depreciated by Morality: Conditional Values

So far, we have discussed Nietzsche’s attack on the ‘values’ of conventional morality, especially, its posited ‘virtues’, which is part of the task of ‘re-evaluation’ as a whole, and which is inseparable from his critique of morality’s ‘theory’ of value. Let us now move on to a different dimension of the task, namely, Nietzsche’s re-assessment of
the ‘disvalues’ of conventional morality. Nietzsche suggests that the things which morality discourages or blames *in general* are ordinarily treated as intrinsic and absolute disvalues; he expresses his disagreement with this fundamental tendency of morality. He writes, “In so far as morality *condemns* as morality and *not* with regard to the aims and objects of life, it is a specific error with which one should show no sympathy” (TI 5, 6, p.56). Nietzsche holds that some of these devalued items are in fact extrinsically and conditionally desirable and praiseworthy. But what exactly are the ‘disvalues’ in the standard of morality which Nietzsche re-evaluates in this way, or in other words, to which he attaches the significance of conditional and extrinsic goodness? In summary, according to Nietzsche, “selfishness” or “egoism”, pain or suffering, “pride” or self-respect, “great intelligence”, strong affectivity, all-too-human desires in general, “powerful physicality”, and solitude are instances of the ‘disvalues’ of morality (GS 328, p.183; BGE 201, 260, p.123, p.p.195~197; GM I, 7, 8, p.p.19~21; Z III, 10, p.p.206~209). And yet, as Nietzsche argues, they are *good* for the higher man, as they are constitutive of, or useful for, his further growth and creative life. The items in the list have already been dealt with in the foregoing chapters, where we discussed Nietzsche’s own substantive theories of greatness or nobleness and of a person’s good. Hence, we
need not discuss each of them in detail here. Rather, I will expound the structure common to Nietzsche’s arguments related to the conferment of the positive meaning on these items.

Again, from Nietzsche’s point of view, these items are ordinarily taken as ‘absolute’ and ‘intrinsic’ evils or vices. In other words, according to common-sense morality, each of these items is ‘unconditionally’ bad. Furthermore, it is evil or bad for an individual even if its overall consequences are not bad to him. But Nietzsche, in the first place, denies this common-sense belief in its ‘intrinsic’ disvalue in this sense, holding that its badness does rely upon the badness of its overall consequences. Furthermore, according to him, its goodness or desirability is determined by, and dependent upon, its contributiveness to what is intrinsically good for the individual. On the basis of these views and his own theory of a person’s good, he attempts to determine the value of the item. First of all, he judges each of the items in the list to be conditionally bad for a given ‘higher’ agent, i.e. only in some internal or external situations. The badness is dependent upon, and determined by, its harmfulness for the agent’s own creative way of life, and it harms the latter only under these circumstances.
A certain sort of strong affect, for instance, will be merely burdensome to him if it is difficult to handle it, i.e. to provide it with proper direction or control. At the same time however and more importantly, Nietzsche judges the given item to be conditionally good. It is good or desirable for the higher man under other conditions. Its goodness for such an individual consists in its overall contributions to his own (further) growth and creative way of life. And it is these re-evaluative considerations of the allegedly evil items that found Nietzsche’s denial of conventional morality’s conception of them as ‘unconditionally’ or ‘universally’ evil (Cf. Z III, 10, p.p.206~209).

4) The Duties of Conventional Morality

We have discussed Nietzsche’s critique of the traditional theory of value, and in connection with this, his ‘revaluation’ of its constitutive values and disvalues. Let us now turn to the relatively ‘minor’ aspect of Nietzsche’s critical enterprise, namely, the critique of the theory of ‘rightness’ of conventional morality and its constituent ‘duties’. To start with, Nietzsche rightly points out that the positive or negative duties of morality are in essence ‘intrinsic’ or “categorical”, in the sense that one ought to do or avoid these
acts, which are not defined in terms of the goodness or badness of their consequences, absolutely or other things being equal, regardless of the value of their consequences (DI, 108, p.63; A 11, p.p.133–134; GS I, 5, p.p.32–33). In conventional morality, some of these ‘duties in themselves’ are unconditional or absolute, in the sense that they ought to be done or avoided no matter what. According to Nietzsche, morality is characterisable in terms of “a kind of formal conscience which commands: ‘thou shalt unconditionally do this, unconditionally not do that, in short ‘thou shalt’”. (BGE 198, p.120). That is to say, with regard to the positive duties, e.g. ‘keeping a promise’, ‘telling the truth’, ‘obeying the law’, ‘helping others in need’ and ‘protecting children’, morality’s ‘prescriptions’ involving them could be considered to take this form: in any given particular situation, one ought to do, other things being equal, an act of type X, whether or not this may yield the overall best outcome. And the phrase ‘other things being equal’ here expresses the condition that the given act of type X is not an act of type of Y, which is wrong in itself, and none of the other optional acts is Z, which overrides X. In addition, according to morality, not every act of type X yields the best consequences. On the other hand, regarding morality’s negative duties (‘telling a lie’, ‘killing an innocent person’, ‘breaking the promise’, ‘fraud’, ‘suicide’, and ‘harming others’), the proscriptions
involving these could be formulated as follows: ‘one ought not to do (or ought to avoid doing) any act of type X, even if it yields the best outcomes, all things considered or if there is any other option that is not Y, which must not be done in any situation’ (And some acts of type X most serve the intrinsic good). Finally, based upon the particular practical rules, morality concludes that an act without the best consequences may be right and that even the act most conducive to the good is not necessarily right.

On a fundamental level, Nietzsche seems to hold that the rightness or wrongness of any particular act, whatever it may be, is dependent upon whether it will contribute most to the intrinsic good, or respectively, whether it will thwart it. He thus denies morality’s claim that there is some act not constitutive of, or useful for, the intrinsically good but right or wrong nonetheless, or that there is some act right or wrong only ‘intrinsically’ or ‘in itself’ (D II, 63, p.108). Furthermore, the general principle which affirms the dependence of the rightness of an act upon the value of its consequences, and which is equivalent to the above negation, also constitutes another principle that Nietzsche does appear to hold, namely, that one ought to do an act with the best consequences all things considered, as was mentioned in the preceding chapter. Thus,
Nietzsche, *qua* a consequentialist or teleologist, thus holds that the *necessary and sufficient* condition of an act’s rightness is its maximal (constitutive or instrumental) contribution to the intrinsic good. More importantly, based upon this consequentialist or teleological framework and his own theory of value, he further seems to reject the specifically ‘moral’ or ‘categorical’ practical principles themselves, some of which ‘absolutely’ or ‘unconditionally’ prescribe to everyone some sorts of act defined in terms of behavioral properties *other than* the contributiveness to the intrinsic good. In particular, the ‘absolute’ principles are false, or the sorts of acts morality finds unconditionally right for everyone are *not necessarily* right or wrong for an individual, because these are not always contributive to what is best to him.

Nevertheless, we have seen that Nietzsche *does* attach normative significance *per se* or that of ought-to-be-done (or avoided) to the ‘duties’ conventional morality postulates (D II, 103, p.60). Recall that he attempted to determine whether or not the ‘valued’ (or ‘disvalued’) objects of morality’s table of values indeed have *value* (or *disvalue*) despite their lack of ‘intrinsic’ value. Likewise, he tries to determine whether the types of act believed to be right or wrong are actually so, on the basis of his own
theory of value and his ethical egoist framework. As a consequence, Nietzsche judges the positive or negative duties of morality to be ‘conditional’ positive or negative ones, and this judgment also constitutes the rejection of the particular moral laws. That is to say, in general, they are duties (especially) for the higher individual: such an individual ought to do the deeds concerned in certain situations, because, in these situations, these will be most conducive to the individual’s own development and creative lives. Furthermore, Nietzsche would insist, those individuals are ethically required to carry out the duties for the same, prudential reasons, not for the duties’ own sake. However, those who cannot live the creative way of life – who account for the vast majority of the population – are not ethically required to perform the same deeds in any circumstance. For these are by no means contributive to the ‘intrinsic good’ of those people in the strict ethical-evaluative sense of the term.

As has been suggested, despite the fact that in this sense Nietzsche ‘accepts’ common-sense morality’s duties, he confers normative significance on the duties concerned in a way considerably different from that which morality does. This also explains his denial of the typically ‘moral law’ character of the duties. Firstly, though
conventional morality considers that some of the duties are indeed ‘unconditional’ or ‘absolute’ ones, which ought to be performed or avoided no matter what, none of these is of an unconditional or absolute nature. This is because, strictly speaking, each of the types of particular act concerned best serves the intrinsic ideal, which is the agent’s own creative way of life, only under certain circumstances involving what type of person the agent is. Next, even though morality finds the other duties, e.g. helping a person in need, conditional, the ‘conditions’ it has in mind are capable of being represented by the ‘other-things-being-equal’ phrase, and as such, can be fundamentally distinguished from those upon which Nietzsche thinks the obligatory force of the duties depends. Morality, so to speak, assumes that each of the ‘conditional’ obligations (or in Kantian terms, “imperfect duties”\textsuperscript{76}) ought to be performed, only under certain conditions specifiable in terms of other conditional or unconditional duties, not in terms of the factors Nietzsche finds decisive for the normative significance of the obligations, such as internal or external situations where it is useful for one’s own intrinsic end. For instance, morality virtually insists that in any given situation, one should do X, if X is not Y (or Z), whatever type of individual one may be. But Nietzsche’s point is that even if the

\textsuperscript{76}1991, p.84
condition that morality has in mind is met, unless one belongs to certain types (involving the ‘higher’ type), one is not required to do X. Finally, Nietzsche thinks that although according to morality, the duties are obligatory not only intrinsically but also extrinsically (i.e. for the reason that they are in general conducive to the good of society), they are devoid of a ‘moral’ significance in this sense. According to Nietzsche, the ultimate source of their ‘normativity’ is the agent’s own or personal intrinsic good (cf. D II, 107, p.62; TI, 5, 6, p.56; A 11, p.p.132–133).

2. Nietzsche’s Practical Critique of Morality

1) The Badness of Morality

Until now, I have examined one of the axes of Nietzsche’s critique of morality, namely, his ‘denial’ of its constitutive value-judgments and rules of conduct. I propose to close the present chapter with a relatively brief discussion of Nietzsche’s practical critique of morality. The primary question Nietzsche poses is whether or not morality
*itself has value* (rather than whether the things that morality values actually have value).

Is morality (as a set of evaluative or normative ideas) itself *good* for us? Is it what we *ought to* maintain or adopt? Nietzsche’s answers to these questions are negative, as my term, ‘practical critique’ suggests. That is to say, according to Nietzsche, it is not only ‘unteachable’ and ‘false’ in theoretical terms, but it is also ‘ignoble’ and ‘bad’ in practical terms. And since morality is bad or undesirable for us, we ought to renounce it.

According to Nietzsche,

> If we think away our delicacy and belatedness, our physiological ageing, then our morality of ‘humanisation’ too loses its value at once – no morality has any value in itself – we would even despise it (TI 9, 37, p.101)

> Whoever reflects upon the way in which the type man can be raised to his greatest splendor and power will grasp first of all that he must place himself outside morality; for morality has been essentially directed to the opposite end: to obstruct or destroy that splendid evolution where it
has been going on (WP 897, p.477)

To be precise, Nietzsche maintains that morality is conditionally bad; it is bad for the higher individual, in the sense that he ought to “shatter” or “overcome” the set of beliefs (Z III, 12; Ibid, IV, 13, p.298). Furthermore, it is also undesirable for individuals of the ‘promising’ type, who are potentially strong or higher, and thus, can possess the merits essential to the higher type. People of other types however are not ethically required to do so. And as the quotations suggest, morality is of course instrumentally bad; it is bad for such (higher or promising) individuals, because it will have a disastrous impact on them, more precisely, on their own (further) growth, existence, and (present or future) creative lives (GM Pref. 5, p.7; I, 11, 12, p.p.27~28; I, 16, p.p.35~36; BGE 62, p.p.87~89; A 5, 6, p.129; WP, 343, 345, 390, 400, p. 189, p.210, p.216; Z III, 5, p.p.187~190). Nietzsche writes:

What if there existed a symptom of regression in the ‘good’ man, likewise a danger, a temptation, a poison, a narcotic, by means of which the present were living at the expense of the future? ... So that
none other than morality itself would be the culprit, if the *highest power and splendor* of the human type, in itself a possibility, were never to be reached? So that morality would constitute the danger of dangers? (GM Pref. 6, p.8)

The important issue to be discussed now centres on what, according to Nietzsche, these negative influences are and in what way morality harms the (further) growth and creative life of the higher individual. Our preceding discussion of Nietzsche’s repudiation of morality (and his re-evaluation of its values and disvalues) does seem to contain the key. Nietzsche’s critique of the sort – which involves the descriptive analysis of its particular contents, i.e. table of ‘values’ and ‘duties’, and the problematisation of morality’s values based upon his own theory of value – forms a crucial part of his argument for its harmfulness to the higher individual. Morality could lead the higher individual to qualities, states, and actions that harm his own further growth and creative way of life. For morality finds them *good* or *right* for all people. These things which, from Nietzsche’s perspective, are extrinsically bad for the individual are of course those
we have already discussed, e.g. the moderation of desires or their extirpation, a self-sacrificing character or act, compassion or pity, humility, and comfort. At the same time, morality would make it hard for the higher individual to maintain, or further develop, those abilities, states, and dispositions that are constitutive of, or necessary for, the individual’s creative life and yet believed to be of little ethical significance or bad, for example, great intelligence, physical strength and health, suffering, self-respect, affects or strong affectivity, and egoism. Led by morality, he would avoid activities that are believed to be of little value or bad but are actually good or desirable for him; he would, for instance, neglect the pursuit of creative tasks, or activities necessary for the further unfolding of his own merits, which, according to morality, are ‘bad’ for the reason that they are ‘painful’. Thus, in summary, morality could eventually transform the higher individual into a herd-type person, who is self-sacrificing, careless for himself, self-despising, oversensitive to others’ distress, reluctant to face hardships and solitude, unfruitful, disoriented, lowly motivated, stagnant, pale, unhealthy, and physically frail: a person who is far from the image of the ‘higher’ or ‘great’ human being Nietzsche envisages. This explanation of the way in which morality harms the higher individual presupposes that morality discourages genuinely valuable things, and encourages those
problematic ones (in universalistic or absolutistic ways). More importantly, it presupposes that a value-judgment or rule of conduct imposed upon, or internalized by, the higher individual could have considerable, practical influence upon his own character and behaviour.

More precisely, Nietzsche appears to assume that given the above bad qualities, if the higher person believes that any of them is ‘good’ and he ought to maintain or further develop it, then he is likely to do so. By contrast, if the person takes any of the good qualities to be ‘bad’ or ‘valueless’, then it is highly likely that he will renounce it. But how would Nietzsche explain this presupposition, on which his argument for the ‘badness’ of morality seems to count? To begin with, he would argue that there are, as a matter of fact, certain courses of action or ‘practices’ by means of which the higher individual can enhance or renounce these qualities. Furthermore, Nietzsche would adduce the general ‘moral psychological’ assumption that links the judgment of what to do or achieve in accordance with a form of morality (understood as a system or set of universal evaluative or normative beliefs) to human will or motivation. In other words, according to this, if one believes that some thing is good for one, then one aims at it.
Moreover, knowing how to achieve this, one wills its behavioral means. According to Nietzsche, “our opinions, valuations, and tables of what is good are certainly some of the most powerful levers in the machinery of our actions” (GS IV, 335, p.189).

Moreover, Nietzsche would explain the negative impact of morality on the higher individual, and thus, its badness for him, in terms of psychological states constituted by evaluative or normative judgments and negative feelings, for instance, “remorse of conscience”, “bad conscience”, ‘the sense of guilt’, and ‘humility’ (BGE 62, p.p.88~89; GM II, 24, p.75; Ibid. III, 14, p.103) According to Nietzsche, once the higher individual who lives the creative form of life and exercises his own enhanced capacities and virtues, shares morality, he will suffer from judgments about themselves in devastating ways. Of course, this presupposes that morality consists of the judgments doubting about the ‘value’ of the style of life, capacities and dispositions the higher individual actually manifests. Furthermore, it is likely that the life he has lived involves ‘failures’ to carry out the ‘intrinsic’ duties of morality, such as ‘helping others in need’. The incongruence between what one is or does and one’s internalized morality is the ground from which bad conscience, a sense of guilt, or low self-esteem arises. This
psychological state (such as bad conscience) consists in the consciousness of one’s own actual self, deed, quality, or state from the perspective of one’s table of values and rules of conduct, and more precisely, in the belief that one should have done (or avoided) something, that one is not what one ought to be, or that one is ugly, contemptible, or small. Again, the state can produce depressive or enervating states disruptive of the pursuit of the creative way of life. Nietzsche seems to be also worried that negative feelings involved in the state may cause the higher individual to desire not to maintain or improve his own merits.

2) The Advantages of Morality

Before closing our discussion of Nietzsche’s practical critique of conventional morality, I wish to make some remarks on his apparent admission of the value of morality, so as to prevent possible misunderstandings. Although, as we have seen, Nietzsche attacks morality in both theoretical and practical terms in a severe and consistent manner, there are also senses in which Nietzsche is nonetheless a defender of morality. Nietzsche confesses:
I have declared war on the anemic Christian ideal (together with what is closely related to it, not with the aim of destroying but only of putting an end to its tyranny … (WP 361, p.197)

Nietzsche appears to think that traditional morality (as a whole) is good or valuable for those who can never live the creative way of life and thus to whom the values that he posits are not applicable. Especially, it is good for people of the ‘incorrigible’ or ‘hopeless’ herd type, which accounts for the vast majority of the entire population. That is to say, those pertaining to this particular type are, qua the herd, actually deficient in the merits constitutive of the necessary, internal condition for the creative way of life: they are uncreative, dependent, unhealthy, unwise, ignorant, cowardly, dishonest, sociable, and so on. They are the antithesis of the higher man, who is in possession of all these merits, and is internally well prepared to live the creative way of life. As such, they are unable to live the creative way of life now. Furthermore, they are ‘hopeless’, ‘irredeemable’, or ‘incorrigible’, in the sense that they can never become higher ones, and as a result, by no means live the way of life even in the long term, either. Moreover,
from Nietzsche’s observations, the herd in general belong to this type, or in other words, they are, for the most part, are hopeless or incorrigible in the above sense. Therefore, the Nietzschean values do not possess ethical significance to people of this incorrigible herd type (or the vast majority of the herd). Now, Nietzsche’s point here is that such ‘hopeless’, herd-type people (or the herd in general) ought to conserve their own morality. According to my interpretation of Nietzsche, he does not appear to believe in anything intrinsically valuable that they ought to promote for its own sake and that would serve to give an ethical meaning to their existence. This is precisely because the creative way of life never pertains to their possibilities. Thus, if our previous interpretation is correct, Nietzsche would say that conventional morality also has little ethical significance for these people and that it is neither good nor bad for them. The notion of ‘goodness’ or ‘ought-to’ in the present context has to be understood in a different way. Nietzsche seems to believe that conventional morality is ‘good’ for, or ‘ought to’ be maintained by, the herd in general, in a non-ethical sense. That is, it is good for them, in the sense that it will be in their actual interests and will satisfy their current needs. Or it is useful for some things pertaining to the herd (in general), such as the ‘wellbeing’, ‘welfare’, ‘health’, ‘security’, ‘comfort’, ‘peace’, and ‘subsistence’.

According to Nietzsche, the value-judgments of conventional morality are the “conditions of preservation and growth” of the herd (WP 390, p.210), and it is precisely in this sense that “morality is hardly dispensable” for the (incorrigible) herd (GS V 352, p.210). If it is true that according to Nietzsche, morality is “hardly dispensable” for the herd (in general) only in such a non-ethical sense, what then constitutes or underpins this claim? Nietzsche’s point seems to be that the internalization of morality will help the herd-type person to conserve or achieve his own ‘wellbeing’ or ‘welfare’ (determinable in such objective terms as security, peace, comfort, material possession, and a longer life). Furthermore, morality will protect the person from things harmful or dangerous to that end. This is due to the fact that conventional morality is furnished with norms that encourage ‘wellbeing’ or ‘welfare’ and things useful for the herd’s possession of it, as well as with codes which prohibit things detrimental to it.

What is conducive or harmful to the (hopeless) herd’s own welfare, and in this sense, what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for the herd? It is reasonable to suppose that for Nietzsche “the kind and helping hand”, “pity”, “humility”, moderation in desires, honesty (with others), sociability, “industriousness” (understood as ‘working hard’ in any given profitable job
or task), which he thinks are worthless for the higher man, are representative of the characteristics “useful” to, or ‘necessary’ for, the herd. (BGE 260, p.197). On the other hand, their opposites, i.e. ‘egoism’ or self-care, indifference to others’ suffering, self-respect, dishonesty with others (similar to what Nietzsche calls “mask”), solitude and strong affectivity, instantiate the things disadvantageous to the herd. Nietzsche argues that “what serves the highest type of man as food or refreshment must to a very different and inferior type be almost a poison” (Ibid. 30, p.61). It is, however, not quite clear exactly why Nietzsche thinks that the above items are good or bad for a herd-type person, or how they contribute to (or harm) the person’s welfare. What underpins this, broadly speaking, may be the idea that those characteristics which morality values (such as pity, humility and moderation) render it possible for the herd to be tame and to live in harmony with other members of society, which is a prerequisite for their welfare understood as a reasonably healthy and comfortable subsistence. That is to say, the (hopeless or incorrigible) herd is basically not self-sufficient, and need others’ help and support for its wellbeing. People of this type are quite fragile in many respects, and require harmless and peaceful neighbors. To live in an innocuous and helpful social environment is thus absolutely crucial, and to this end, they need to make sure that they
are “tame”. That is, they must keep good relationships with others, and cooperate with others; they need to care for or actively help their neighbors and they should refrain from harming or injuring them. The following writing supports these points:

The European disguises himself with morality because he has become sick, sickly, maimed animal which has good reasons for being ‘tame’; because he is almost a monstrosity, something half, weak, awkward …

It is not the ferocity of the beast of prey that needs a moral disguise, but the herd animal with its deep mediocrity, fear, and boredom with itself (GS V, 352, p.210)

If our analysis of Nietzsche’s understanding of the value of morality for the herd (in general) is correct, then Nietzsche means that the herd-type person’s internalisation of conventional morality will contribute to the person’s own interests, by leading the person to do good to his community (or to refrain from doing harm to it). More precisely, it will lead them to possess qualities and states conducive to the public interest, and in Nietzsche’s own expressions, to have “qualities through which
he [the herd-type person] is tame, peaceable and useful to the herd[-community]” (BGE 199, p.121). In other words, Nietzsche’s argument for the value of morality for the herd-type person is constituted by the affirmation that his internalization of conventional morality is also good for his neighbors (of the same type) or the herd community as a whole, in the sense that it is in the latter’s own actual interests (BGE 201, p122). Nietzsche further argues that morality’s being a ruling idea or culture of the community as a whole is also in the best interests of the community itself. This position is coherent with his argument for the value of the herd-type person’s internalization of morality for both the person and his own community as a whole.

However, some supplementary comments are in order, so that one may not be misled by the foregoing remarks. It is worth emphasizing Nietzsche’s point that the herd-type person’s own conventional morality is advantageous to the person himself and to his community. It is not the case that Nietzsche’s admits the non-ethical value of morality entirely or without any reservation: according to him, not every particular aspect of it is ‘good’. Nor does he appear to think that it is an ‘ideal’ morality for the herd-type person. Above all, Nietzsche would point out that conventional morality
contains some ingredients disastrous even to the herd (in general). In particular, the severe ascetic norms of conventional morality can have a catastrophic impact upon the life of the herd. As we have seen, morality values ‘moderation’ in affects and views strong affectivity with suspicious eyes. Nietzsche would say that a herd-type individual can benefit from this mild form of asceticism: the person is short of self-control or ‘self-overcoming’ disposition, and thus, strong affectivity would be likely to drive him into actions dangerous to the community and to the individual himself. From Nietzsche’s perspective, however, morality goes far beyond this and encourages one to extirpate, or be liberated from, one’s own desires. To this end, morality advises one to constantly monitor one’s inner world, to punish oneself through the feeling of bad conscience or the sense of guilt and to repress every desire. Morality tends to harshly denounce one’s given desire per se, regardless of its actual or potential impact. It is this extreme form of asceticism that Nietzsche would problematise with respect to the herd as well (GM III, 20–21, p.p. 117–118; TI 5, 4, p.55), since the extirpation of desires would mean the loss of direction and force and the demise of every form of life-struggle to the herd, too.

It is clear that Nietzsche criticises morality in this context because of its
factual, ‘universalising’ tendency. It has already been mentioned that in Nietzsche’s view, morality by nature prescribes or proscribes things without any discrimination between types of person. It is precisely owing to this structure of morality that the herd’s internalization of it can have a negative influence upon the higher. By internalising morality, a herd-type individual tends to perceive things which are suitable for his own welfare and that of the herd-community and yet which are ethically bad for the exceptional type, as being good for his higher neighbors. To put in a different way, the weak tend to try to instill morality into the higher, who may, in accordance with it, seek or do such self-destructive things. But why, one may ask, would Nietzsche say that the negative influences upon the strong are problematic with respect to the herd’s own welfare? It does appear that though he may well admit that the herd can take certain advantages of these influences which lead to the obstruction of the growth or creative life of the higher type, Nietzsche nevertheless believes that from the broader perspective, the obstruction also means a very great loss to the herd-community itself. Without such obstructive influences, the higher can grow to the maximal degree and exert their heightened powers for creative, formative tasks, from which the herd itself can hugely benefit. We can conclude that for Nietzsche, conventional morality will be in the best
interests of both the herd and the higher man if it is formally modified so as to prevent the herd from imposing its values on the higher man. It should be modified to encourage the higher man to hold onto his own path instead, with the toxic items, including the radical form of asceticism, removed from it.

Nietzsche’s ideas concerning the advantages of conventional morality do seem to have genuinely ethical implications for the individuals of the higher type. That is to say, from these ideas, Nietzsche seems to draw the evaluative or normative conclusion that the community’s maintenance of conventional morality as its collective idea – provided that it undergoes such modifications mentioned – is ethically significant or good to the higher individual. Thus the individual ought to seek to ‘foster’ morality within the community. Nietzsche actually insists that “the ideas of the herd should rule in the herd – but not reach out beyond it” (WP 287 p.162). The following passage can be interpreted in a similar way:

The continuance of the Christian ideal is one of the desirable things there are – Thus we immoralists require the power of morality; our
drive of self-preservation wants our opponents to retain their strength.

(WP 361, p.197)

Nietzsche is suggesting that creative and formative works capable of securing morality within the community are worthy of the higher individual’s pursuit. As we have seen, Nietzsche also considers the welfare of the community as a whole to be of considerable, extrinsic and non-moral value to the higher man: it is the “scaffolding” upon which the higher man can flourish in his creative way of life or “a select species of being raised itself to its higher task and in general to a higher existence” (BGE 258 p.193) In summary, Nietzsche encourages the higher man to secure the conventional belief-system within the herd-community because this will be in the interests of the community and consequently serve the good of the higher man.
CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have explored Nietzsche’s substantive ethical system. I have tried to illuminate what it consists in, and how the system as a whole works. I have focused predominantly on its evaluative standard or theory of value. The relational or extrinsic nature of the system has also been considered, and I have explicated Nietzsche’s critique of conventional morality in terms of his substantive ethics. In addition, arguing for the existence of its non-ethical and non-moral epistemological ground, I have attempted to make the ground explicit. Finally, I intend to close the thesis with a rather brief, ‘personal’ assessment of this ethical system. To start with, I am generally sympathetic to Nietzsche’s ideas. In particular, I find the notion of the creative way of life, which
constitutes the core of his ethics, extremely fresh, fascinating and worthy of serious consideration. In agreement with Nietzsche, I believe that the form of life or creative activity is a value in the sense of both praiseworthiness and goodness, although I doubt that it is ‘intrinsically’ valuable. But if it is not intrinsically valuable, why does the form of life possess value? I believe in its value from the perspective of a form of ethical hedonist, a form which Nietzsche himself rejects. The fundamental principle I personally endorse is that the locus of value comprises ‘happiness’ in the positive sense of the term which Nietzsche approves (i.e. in the sense of a sum of subjective feelings of pleasure such as “joy” over a period of time). Further, pleasure or a positive subjective feeling is (as the essential constituent of happiness) also extrinsically valuable for us. As we have seen, Nietzsche links happiness understood as such to the creative way of life: the latter is the life in which “joy” and happiness can inhere, and in this sense, is a ‘happy’ or ‘fulfilling’ life. I strongly agree with this argument for the intimate connection between happiness and the creative way of life. For this reason, therefore, I think that the creative way of life or its constitutive activity is extrinsically valuable for us.

Specifically, it seems to me that whether or not one is happy (in the positive sense,
not that determinable in terms of the absence of pain or suffering), relies upon what kind of activity one performs, as Nietzsche and Aristotle would concede. One’s task-oriented activity or work, which defines one’s style of life, seems to be decisive for one’s happiness, or in other words, one cannot expect to be genuinely happy without doing anything. But it does not appear that every kind of work is enjoyable, and as such, has ‘happiness-potential’. On the contrary, ordinary people seem to fail to find pleasure in their own jobs, on which they spend most of their time and energy, and instead, expect to enjoy themselves only in their leisure. They thus tend to equate their work with sheer hardship or boredom to be endured; the idea of enjoyable or pleasant work is alien to them. Here, the creativeness of one’s work appears to be a significant factor. From my point of view, work identifiable as a prolific or effective pursuit of something original and reflective, or expressive of one’s own ‘self’ or one’s own ideas and passions, is indeed enjoyable. Joy can be inherent both in the outcomes of such pursuits and in the processes or activities in themselves. Furthermore, whether or not this work can influence others in a positive, overall manner, or ‘benefit’ them in this sense, is also a meaningful question. Genuinely rewarding work seems to be that which can produce something beneficial or contributive. Thus, from my perspective, ‘creative’ and
‘beneficial’ work in the above sense is a source of great pleasure or joy.

Moreover, my view is that it is activity or work definable in this fashion in which happiness consists in. The experience of happiness is dependent upon creative and beneficial work. In addition, there are other sources of pleasure that determine happiness together with work or activity of this kind: happiness is inherent in the life definable in terms of a combination of creative and positively influential activity with these sources of pleasure. For instance, as Nietzsche himself points out, leisurely activities such as the appreciation of various art works, and self-contained and refined communication with others are indeed enjoyable, and thus, lead to happiness. But this is equivalent to saying that Nietzschean creative way of life, whose major ingredient is work or activity, leads to happiness, under certain conditions, i.e. if it comprises such sources. Therefore, as one could conclude, the way of life is extrinsically good for us under these conditions. Furthermore, the value of the Nietzschean excellences could be argued for in a similar way. I also approve of the Nietzschean excellences in general, primarily because I accept that they play crucial roles in the creative life, which contributes to happiness. In particular, I agree that the creative form of life is made possible by internal resources
that Nietzsche regards as praiseworthy, namely, creative capacity, self-discipline, the capacity for self-commanding, knowledge or truth, the table of one’s own values, health, vitality, and strong affectivity. The Nietzschean virtues that we have discussed are indeed useful or necessary for the growth in these resources and for their effective and organized exercise in the way of life. For this reason, I also appreciate the dispositions Nietzsche himself values.

The Nietzschean substantive ethics I have explored has some important practical implications, but he himself rarely mentions or emphasises them. Finally, I would like to discuss these, as a way of supplementing and developing the Nietzschean ethical system. In connection with these implications, I intend to make some critical comments. To begin with, it is sensible to argue that the creative existence Nietzsche idealises is made possible by numerous external factors, as well as internal ones including the capacities, virtues, and states which he stresses. Nietzsche would also agree that some ‘material’ conditions are necessary for the sustenance of the pursuit of creative tasks or for a long-term creative way of life; so the possession of ‘financial’ resources is also a prerequisite for the way of life. Thus, if one is to lead the creative form of life over a certain long
period but one has not accumulated sufficient finance to cover the entire period, one
naturally has to acquire income or funds while engaging in creative activity. Or one’s
creative activity (as the major constituent of the way of life) should coexist, or go in
hand in hand, with the acquisition of such income.

But one can raise the question of how a higher individual in the arts and the
humanities (to which disciplines Nietzsche himself draws attention) can acquire the
necessary financial resources while sustaining a creative form of life. Firstly, the higher
individual can acquire funding necessary for his creative life, if there is anybody who
wishes to invest in it to ‘commercialise’ his planned work or launch it on the relevant
cultural market. Secondly, his ‘employment’ in a cultural, educational, or academic
institution is also a possible way to maintain the creative style of life. Finally, the
government or any public organization of the higher individual’s own society can show
the willingness to provide financial support for the individual’s project. Conversely,
unless the individual has access to any of these sources, the acquisition of necessary
finance and the maintenance of creative activity would seem to be incompatible.
Therefore, if Nietzsche is right in arguing that the way of life is the locus of value, those
external circumstances can also be regarded as extrinsic (or more precisely, instrumental) ‘values’. That is, sufficient finance (as a reward of his creative activity) is good for the higher man. For this reason, a post in an institution, private investment or public support is desirable for him, too. By contrast, exterior environments impose constraints on the individual’s creative living, and therefore, from Nietzsche’s ethical perspective, they are extrinsically bad for or to the individual. For example, if the probability of the commercial success of his works is low and he is unemployed by an appropriate institution, then the absence of public fund is bad for the individual.

Similar points can be made with respect to the growth of a young individual who has a great creative potential. As Nietzsche rightly observes, such an individual’s acquisition of the qualities constitutive of the higher man presupposes the individual’s own long-term, strenuous practices. But the condition of the possibility of these practices seems to be constituted by manifold, external circumstances. If Nietzsche’s standard for value is correct, the external circumstances, in which the individual’s potential can unfold, are also of relevance. First of all, needless to say, material conditions form the basis of the growth of such a youth, as we have seen with the creative way of life. Thus,
sustainable growth is rendered possible by a situation where such basic material conditions are expected to coexist with, or follow, his ascending form of life. But this situation also depends upon the young individual's family environment. To be precise, his family's ability and willingness to provide him with unconditional and full material support is decisive and naturally, it is desirable to him. Moreover, a form of education is essential for the 'growth' of the youth in the Nietzschean sense, and thus, is ideal for the youth. More precisely, education has to aim at the cultivation of the Nietzschean merits, in particular, creative powers, and to encourage or constitute the disciplines useful for these. Further, it needs to help assimilate and apply various types of knowledge (especially, knowledge about humanity) to train the power of profound, independent, refined, and insightful thinking, and finally, to elevate artistic sensibility. Since an educational institution (e.g., a school or university equipped with a number of qualified instructors and with good facilities) renders it possible for such a higher individual to receive the suitable form of education, it is highly desirable for the individual.

Whether or not a young individual with great potentials will receive the form of long-term education (and moreover, after having reached certain heights through this,
will devote himself to creative activity ‘for living’) is a social matter, and is conditioned by social contexts of various kinds. Let us reflect upon the relationship between a society and its young members, especially, those in possession of creative potentialities appropriate for the arts and humanities. If in the society, the higher members’ prospects for good, long-term education and for appropriate carriers are poor, as was suggested above, they are unlikely to develop their full potentials and to lead creative lives. Unfortunately, in my view, this is the case with many of the nation-societies today, in particular, the so-called ‘undeveloped’ or ‘developing’ countries. But what in such a society makes the prospects so poor? With respect to the education of the ‘potentially creative’ members, the quality of the education that state schools offer is low; the schools are ill equipped, the ratio of teachers to students is low, and qualified instructors are lacking. Moreover, in such societies, higher education at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels is generally unsatisfactory, and the subjects pertaining to the arts and humanities are often marginalized. More seriously, education at the tertiary level is so expensive, and opportunities for scholarship are so scarce, that a considerable number of young people from disadvantaged backgrounds are forced to renounce their studies.
Even those who can afford education at the tertiary level may hesitate to choose these disciplines, since suitable posts or carriers are lacking, so that very few of them would have the opportunity to work in their fields afterwards. Above all, within these societies, there are few cultural, educational, or academic institutions providing study opportunities in these disciplines. The arts and humanities are, in this manner, marginalized and discriminated, for the primary reason that they are considered ‘unprofitable’. Secondly, most of the young, potentially creative individuals find it difficult to meet anyone willing to invest in their projects. As may be anticipated, the market for cultural or artistic products, such as literature, films, plays, music albums, philosophical writing and quality journals, is extremely narrow. The demand for the kind of product is low, since there is a tiny minority of people who has a genuine interest in these disciplines, have financial room for recreational activity or (self-) education, exhibit intellectual maturity, and possess sufficient leisure. Finally, moreover, there is no significant public policy or program for these disciplines, which would compensate for their ‘market-failures’.

However, what underlies these realities of such a society, which make it difficult
for the majority of its young members with great potentials to expect a good education or suitable work? First of all, it seems to be the case that the economic situation of the general public is ultimately and partially responsible for these problematic realities. That is to say, the economic situation of the vast majority of its members is poor or moderate, even though they work extremely hard. Typically, in the society, only a small number of people are rich and the gap between the rich and the moderately well off or poor is enormous. Secondly, some ‘structural’ or ‘systemic’ defects also underpin the problems. A radical or vulgar form of capitalism or ‘liberalism’ prevails in the society. As was suggested, distributive fairness fails structurally, which explains the wide gap and the difficult economic situation of the general public. Moreover, the wealth of the economically strong is not re-distributed properly either, so that public funding is scant. Besides, the role that the government plays in the promotion of the common interest is limited or inactive in legislative or structural terms; its public welfare systems in general are coarse and weak. Finally, to make matters worse, the general public is impoverished not only economically but also intellectually or spiritually: the public is shallow, dull, and ignorant, and has little academic, cultural, or artistic concern or respect for intellectual endeavour. In summary, all these macroscopic features of the given society
may contribute to the difficulties its young members face, namely, the inaccessibility of higher education, the narrowness of the cultural market, the marginalization of the arts and humanities in cultural or educational institutions, the poor quality of state schools, and the lack of public policies or programs for the arts and humanities.

Having said this, what are the social and ethical implications of the above for such members of such a society, which exemplifies a majority of the current nations? Firstly, if my observations are correct and the Nietzschean ethical standard is accepted, certain changes and reforms in the macroscopic features of the society are indeed of fundamental ethical significance to its young members with great creative potentials in general. As was suggested above, broadly speaking these members would be able to flourish, on the condition that the society had opposite attributes. More precisely, if their own society took the form of a cultured, ‘welfare’ state – which is rich not only economically but also spiritually, just in the (re-)distribution of its wealth, and equipped with solid welfare systems – these individuals could keep the paths proper to them throughout their lifetimes. For instance, the quality of its educational institutions would be improved and higher education would be more affordable; there would be more
demand for human resources in the relevant intellectual domains. If it represented such a welfare state, the society would be ideal for these young individuals; it is therefore vital that their own society should be transformed into such a welfare state.

Secondly and more importantly, the account also has some social-ethical implications for the extremely rare, ‘higher’ individuals, in particular, ‘philosophers’ (who do and can live the creative way of life). That is, if the Nietzschean ethical perspective is right, it seems to be reasonable to insist that the creative tasks of these ‘privileged’ individuals should also aim at the transformation of such societies. According to Nietzsche, as we have seen, the creative life, which the higher man ought to live, consists in the ‘magnanimous’ task capable of helping others to achieve their own good. In particular, Nietzsche seems to believe that a philosopher ought to create work that can contribute to the “artistic refashioning” of the nature or life of the present or future, potentially higher individuals; he holds that the philosophers doing this represent genuinely honorable higher men. But the transformation of those societies into such welfare states would benefit not only their contemporary, young members, but also those of the next generation. Thus, in conclusion, it could be maintained that if one’s
creative project is capable of effecting these desirable changes to such ‘bad’ societies, the philosopher should pursue the task.

Now, as I have argued, many current societies exemplify the bad form of society which is impoverished in both material and spiritual terms, unjust in the distribution of its wealth and devoid of a solid welfare system. Some sorts of task seem to be capable of effecting changes in such societies. Therefore, from the Nietzschean ethical perspective, these tasks constitute the proper vocation of philosophers today. But what tasks, one may ask, are capable of this social change, and thus, worthy of being pursued by today’s philosophers? Most of all, of course, social or political philosophical writings can play important roles here. In particular, a philosopher can devote himself to the ‘critique’ of the problematic macroscopic or microscopic aspects that dominate such societies and restrict their higher or potentially creative members. For example, the critique can attack the vulgar capitalism, liberalism, or commercialism which underpins such problems as re-distributive injustice, widespread poverty, and the exploitation of labor. Furthermore, the political and economic powers responsible for the reinforcement of the pre-established systems can be the targets of his critique. Theoretical and practical criticisms
of their absurd or false ideological instruments which serve the interests of the powerful
are particularly relevant here. The philosopher, however, also needs to be able to suggest
a new social paradigm and various social-political devices that will constitute or serve
his new ‘vision’ rather than confining himself to criticism.

In his ethical discourse, Nietzsche rarely mentions the social-political philosophical
role of the higher individual, in particular, the philosopher. We do not hear Nietzsche
urging his fellow philosophers to seek to create work of the kind enumerated above.
Thus, it seems reasonable to suspect that Nietzsche ‘disregards’ the importance of this
social-political role (although it does not mean that he denies it). Instead, he repeatedly
stresses the ethical or moral philosophical contribution of the philosophers, e.g. the
critique of conventional morality, the re-evaluation of its values and of the particular
form of morality itself, and more importantly, the creation of a new table of values for
individuals of the higher kind. In so doing, he believes that these tasks constitute the
primary focus of the philosopher. What explains this belief is, of course, his conviction
that to promote the growth or creative lives of the higher or potentially creative
individuals of the present or future is the genuine responsibility of the philosopher today,
and they need to strive for tasks capable of leading towards this end. Moreover, the freedom from traditional morality and the acceptance of a table of personal values are prerequisites for the creative growth of these individuals. Finally, from Nietzsche’s observations, conventional morality, as a matter of fact, prevails in our world. I cannot agree more with this view of the ethical role of the philosopher. Nevertheless, I regret that Nietzsche disregards the significance of other kinds of contribution and exclusively emphasises the ethical role. But if this is really the case, what lies behind it? Nietzsche may not have noticed that many societies do share the problematic macroscopic or microscopic features I have outlined, although he was acutely aware of the hegemony of conventional morality. Whatever explains this, i.e. the absence of the prioritization of the social-political sphere or the failure to recognise the social-political role of the philosopher, it could be taken as a flaw in both theoretical and practical terms. If Nietzsche conferred due value and laid emphasis on these other responsibilities, it would be coherent, in my view, with his ultimate evaluative-normative standard and would thus make his ethics even richer. It would also better serve his own goal: that of the “artistic refashioning” of the human animal.
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