The Library
From a self that controls to self-control: paradigm shifts in early Buddhism and in cognitive science
Tools
Federman, Asaf (2008) From a self that controls to self-control: paradigm shifts in early Buddhism and in cognitive science. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.
Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b2282566~S9
Abstract
This thesis describes two similar paradigm shifts––one between Brahmanism and Buddhism and the other between Cartesian and non-Cartesian perspectives in contemporary mind-science. These shifts are characterized by a similar transition from the view that there is a Self that exercises ultimate control, to the view that the entire person engages in limited self-control. Both the Cartesian and the Brahmanical perspectives accommodate notions of ultimate free will, immaterial souls, a ‘Self’ that transcends mundane causality and bears similitude to the divine; control is seen metaphorically as the power of an absolute monarch. On the other hand, both the Buddhist and the cognitive-scientific perspectives reject ultimate free will, ultimate Selves and divine transcendence. Instead, they promote the idea that self-control is possible within causally regulated reality, and that people have limited free will; control is seen as a property of the whole agent, not as an ultimate power of an internal monarch. These similarities may explain why Buddhism appeals to cognitive science: both systems are situated at similar positions within similar paradigm shifts. For different reasons, and reflecting different motivations, Buddhism and cognitive science have developed similar outlooks on self-hood and on self-control. The comparison of these two frameworks also helps to clarify a particular conceptual issue regarding self-control and determinism. It exposes the Cartesian assumption under some scholarly concerns that the Buddhist not-Self doctrine practically eliminates the possibility of self-control, self-development, free will, and moral responsibility. Contemporary compatibilist arguments are used to show why this is not so and that in both early Buddhism and in cognitive science self-control can exist in a deterministic reality.
| Item Type: | Thesis or Dissertation (PhD) |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology |
| Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Descartes, René, 1596-1650, Buddhism -- Psychology, Brahmanism -- Relations -- Buddhism, Buddhism -- Relations -- Brahmanism, Mind and body, Philosophy and cognitive science |
| Date: | 30 October 2008 |
| Institution: | University of Warwick |
| Theses Department: | Department of Psychology |
| Thesis Type: | PhD |
| Publication Status: | Unpublished |
| Supervisor(s)/Advisor: | Pickering, John, 1946- |
| Sponsors: | University of Warwick (UoW) |
| Extent: | 240 leaves : ill. |
| Language: | eng |
| URI: | http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/2271 |
Actions (login required)
![]() |
View Item |
Tools
Tools

