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BECOMING-BODY

THE REPETITION OF KANTIAN CRITIQUE
IN THE PHYSIOLOGICAL THINKING OF NIETZSCHE

by

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This dissertation seeks to substantiate the thesis that Nietzsche's physiological thinking constitutes a radicalisation of Kantian critique. To this end it attempts to mark out some of the salient points of the latter project and to examine the ways in which it falls short of its own potential radicality.

In chapters one and two the categories of relation - in which Kant articulates his theory of the temporal connection of phenomena explicitly - are traced through the Analytic and Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason and are read against the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding which implicitly contains another theory of time.

Since the Critique of the Teleological Faculty of Judgement complements Kant's theory of the temporal cohesion of phenomena, the third chapter offers a reading of it under the aspect of its relation to the wider project of critique.

Chapter four draws together the multiple strands around which Kantian critique can be shown to mutate into Nietzsche's philosophical physiology and the theory of temporality implicit in it. Finally, Nietzschean physiology is presented in terms of his thinking of the becoming of matter, in terms of the will to power as eternal recurrence.
Meiner Mutter, in Liebe und Dankbarkeit
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List of Abbreviations

Works by Kant in German

KtU Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft in KU.

English Translations of Kant's Works

CTJ Critique of Teleological Judgement in CJ.

Works by Nietzsche in German

ASZ Also sprach Zarathustra. Vol. 4 in KSA.
FW Die fröhliche Wissenschaft. Vol. 3 in KSA
GD Götzendämmerung. Vol. 6 in KSA.
GdM Zur Genealogie der Moral. Vol. 5 in KSA.
JGB Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Vol. 5 in KSA.
English Translations of Nietzsche's Works


Note on Translations

Although I have consulted existing translations whenever possible, for two reasons I have found it necessary to quote both in the original German and in English. Firstly, as concerns the material from the KSA I quote, a substantial part of Nietzsche's unpublished notes, the so-called Nachlaß (volumes 7 to 13), has not yet been translated and I felt it was necessary to give the reader access to the interpretative decisions I obviously had to make in translating this material and that this access could only be guaranteed if the reader was given both versions. Secondly, although we have The Will to Power, as translated by Hollingdale and Kaufmann, I disagree with their interpretative decisions in such a large number of cases that I have felt it necessary, more often than not, to modify their translations or even to completely re-translate. And again I felt the reader should be made aware of the nature of these changes.

Although Norman Kemp Smith's translation of the first Critique and Werner Pluhar's translation of the third Critique are on the whole much more reliable than those of Hollingdale and Kaufmann, some modifications were still necessary.

I have indicated throughout whether an existing translation has merely been modified (t.m.), hence this term encompasses the entire range from
minor adjustments to complete rewriting, or whether the English is my translation altogether (m.t.).

As concerns quotes from Nietzsche in German, I have made what might appear a rather daring orthographic decision but one which common sense seemed to dictate. Throughout the KSA Colli and Montinari retain Nietzsche's spelling which appears rather archaic by modern German standards. On the other hand, Wilhelm Weischedel, the editor of the German edition of Kant's works I have used, to a large extent modernises Kant's spelling along the lines he explains on pp. 826-830 of volume XII of the Werkausgabe. Since I have not had access to Kant's original script and hence had to quote from his texts as presented by Weischedel, the anachronism of Nietzsche's German appearing more archaic than Kant's loomed large. I felt it would be less disturbing to modernise Nietzsche's spelling (although I have not tampered with any capital initial letters used by him for emphasis). I can only hope that readers agree with, or at least accept this decision.
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INTRODUCTION
This text offers a reading of Kant's theoretical philosophy from the perspective of Nietzsche's physiological thinking. It is not always readily accepted that there is a significant connection between Kant and Nietzsche's thought and although there are well over two hundred and fifty references to Kant and his works throughout Nietzsche's oeuvre (and innumerable other ones which make implicit reference to Kant), doubts are sometimes cast on whether Nietzsche was a particularly thorough or attentive reader of Kant. Although Nietzsche's writings are obviously not concerned with producing detailed textual studies of the works of Kant, we should not ignore the strong subterranean ties between them. Nietzsche himself puts the case with forceful simplicity when he says 'I would not be possible without Kant' ("Ich wäre nicht möglich ohne Kant." KSA 13, 25 (7), m.t.). One aspect of this thesis will therefore be to unfold this pronouncement and to draw out the sense in which Nietzsche's thought is a continuation, but also a transformation, of Kant's. To do so serves a dual purpose. It shows Nietzsche to be part of a particular historical and philosophical trajectory when even to this day it is not always acknowledged that Nietzsche's thinking can and must be understood in relation to (as well as, of course, in conflict with) the philosophical tradition. One of the assumptions which guides my readings of Nietzsche is that the significance of much of what he says is not finally comprehensible when it is not placed against the background of the Kantian edifice against which it is so often written. A second consequence of this reading strategy is, I hope, that the Kantian critical text is in turn enriched when its Janus-headed position in the history of philosophy and in the trajectory of thought, is foregrounded. This point is taken up and developed below.
I do not of course claim that to read Nietzsche's thought as in some respects a radicalisation of that of Kant is a wholly original move. Gilles Deleuze, in *Nietzsche et la philosophie* (1962), devotes an entire chapter to Nietzsche's 'method', critique, and to its derivation from the figure who is thereby portrayed as one of Nietzsche's most influential predecessors, namely Kant. Although this dissertation does not for the most part follow Deleuze's procedure very closely, it understands itself to be in implicit dialogue with his overall project of a re-reading of the philosophical tradition in these terms. Other works which could be mentioned in this context include Jean Granier's *Le problème de la vérité dans la philosophie de Nietzsche* (1966) which, although tending towards the scholastic, has the distinction of being another 'early' text to place Nietzsche alongside Kant; and a little known text by Olivier Reboul with the auspicious title *Nietzsche critique de Kant* (1974) which gives substance to many of Deleuze's comments in the above-mentioned text.

Furthermore, this dissertation is not of course the only one to offer a detailed textual study of some aspects of the Kant-Nietzsche relation. But in a recent register of West European and North American academic theses on Nietzsche, written between 1900 and 1980⁴, only ten concentrated on this relation and none of these worked through the textual and thematic areas which are discussed in the present study. For rather self-evident reasons, most of the texts which explore the Kant-Nietzsche relation focus on Kant's ethical writings and on Nietzsche's re-interpretation of the issues raised in them. But a consideration of Kant's practical philosophy, or even any aspect thereof, would have extended the scope of this study beyond the bounds of the acceptable.

At any rate, another, equally challenging and important project seemed to me the exposition of Nietzsche's reflections on Kant's critical conception of natural science and on the philosophical conceptuality with which Kant
underwrites it. In other words, I wanted to trace the development of thinking which leads Nietzsche to expose the shrivelled, timid little god lurking in the crevices of Kant's critical theory of nature, to observe him driving out the old idol and releasing nature from the tyranny of god into the delirium of a material becoming.

Nietzsche himself on occasion implies that natural science is the next receptacle for anxieties about human self-definition, that it is the next dispenser of reassurance and security, after the gradual erosion of morality with the realisation of the death of God:

"Die Wissenschaft - das war bisher die Beseitigung der vollkommenen Verworrenheit der Dinge durch Hypothesen, welche alles 'erklären' - also aus dem Widerwillen des Intellekts an dem Chaos. - Dieser selbe Widerwille ergreift mich bei Betrachtung meiner selber: die innere Welt möchte ich auch durch ein Schema mir bildlich vorstellen und Über die intellektuelle Verworrenheit herauskommen. Die Moral war eine solche Vereinfachung: sie lehrte den Menschen als erkannt, als bekannt. Nun haben wir die Moral vernichtet... Die Physik ergibt sich als eine Wohltat für das Gemüt: die Wissenschaft (als der Weg zur Kenntnis) bekommt einen neuen Zauber nach der Beseitigung der Moral - und weil wir hier allein Konsequenz finden, so müssen wir unser Leben darauf einrichten, sie uns zu erhalten."

"Science - that was until now the eradication of the complete confusedness of things through hypotheses which 'clarify' everything - hence out of the aversion of the intellect to chaos. - This same aversion seizes me in the contemplation of myself: the inner world I would also like to represent to myself pictorially, by means of a schema, and come out of the intellectual confusedness. Morality was such a simplification: it taught the human being as understood, as known. - Now we have destroyed morality... Physics reveals itself as a restorative for the spirit: science (as the path to knowledge) attains a new magic after the eradication of morality - and because solely here we find a consequence, we have to arrange our lives accordingly, in order to preserve science for us." (KSA 10,24 [18], my omissions, m.t.)

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The contention is, then, to put it in general terms, that 'god', the Platonic-Christian two-world theory, has fled the site of theology (driven out, not least, by Kant's critical delineation of its legitimate domain) but has secretly found refuge in the allegedly objective conceptuality which underlies Kant's critical projection of the rational natural sciences, as offered in the first Critique and (the second part of) the third Critique. And although Nietzsche diagnoses that, paradoxically, it is the will to truth which overcomes Truth (God) (eg. GdM/GoM III.), it is not a will to truth which hunts down the God that lurks in the interstices of Kantian (theoretical) critique but rather an intense desire to affirm the materiality and mortality of the body which Kant, and Platonism, so forcefully seek to suppress. To recognise, affirm and establish the suppurating, aching, dying body of the thinker as the basis, even as a perverse 'ground' for thinking, this I take to be the chief task of philosophy after Nietzsche.

It must also be remembered, though, that Kant understands critique as a propaedeutic to the system of philosophy (eg. KrV/CPR A841,B869), and as not yet actually carrying out the metaphysics for which critique determines the legitimate scope. In a distant echoing of this, the present reading of Kantian critique merely understands itself as a quasi-propaedeutic to the (wholly unsystematic) affirmation of physiology. I have only attempted to show some of the philosophical elements which minimally had to be in place in order for that affirmation to become possible at all - and, at any rate, perhaps an academic dissertation would not be the most conducive setting for such an attempted affirmation...

But before we can turn to the four chapters which carry out the detailed readings of Kant and Nietzsche which seek to substantiate this thesis, it is necessary to outline in broad terms my understanding of their respective
philosophical projects and with it the reading strategies employed throughout.

Modern philosophy commences with Kant. It is with his critical works that philosophy gets its first taste of freedom from speculative theology and begins to throw off the shackles of perennial concern with proofs for the existence of god and seeks instead, so to speak, proofs for the existence of man.

But it is not only the destabilisation of a theologised philosophy which distinguishes Kantian critique. More generally, it seeks to curb speculative reason's 'natural', seemingly unavoidable tendencies to assume an unconditioned as given. Hence Kant proposes to examine the ideas of reason about the soul or the I, about the nature of causality in the world, and about God in order to banish their claims to foundational status from the domain of the legitimate formation of knowledge. But the question is whether Kant's theoretical Critiques really succeed in their critical aspirations or whether an illegitimately assumed unconditioned merely resurfaces at other points in the text. Hence one of the subsidiary theses of this dissertation is that Kant is able to apply the critical method he develops to the most blatantly transcendent claims of speculative reason but that at certain points throughout his own critical project his text relapses into equally unfounded, transcendent assumptions. It is of course from the Nietzschean perspective of the will to power, of a perpetual production without producer, that this re-examination of Kant's critical project becomes possible in the first place.

To my mind, then, it is the Kantian distinction between transcendent and transcendental or illegitimate and legitimate claims to be productive of phenomena, which is of central importance in his entire philosophical project. Because as a result of this distinction the differences between Platonistic, recuperative strands of philosophy and strands of uninhibited
productivity of thought are activated. Although he does not explicitly name them as such, it is true to say that Platonistic forms of thought can only become the object of philosophy because of this distinction introduced by Kant. And again it is Nietzsche's thinking which makes explicit what lies dormant in that of Kant and it is with and after Nietzsche that it becomes possible to assess Kant according to the criteria introduced by his own critical philosophy. So on one level the question, posed from a Nietzschean vantage point, of how critical Kantian critique really is, runs through the four chapters of this study.

A second set of questions arises from a tension which pervades parts of the first Critique. For without unduly reducing the polyvocility of the first Critique, it may be said that there are essentially two deeply conflictual strands in it. On the one hand it is an exposition of those rational structures which Kant sees as constitutive of knowledge. This aspect of the text is obviously most strongly represented by the categorial system and the organisation it imposes throughout the text (for instance in the Principles and the chapters on the Ideas of Reason).

But alongside the rational elements of the critical text there runs the thought of synthesis which arises most emphatically in the context of the 'Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding' (KrV A94 - B169, hereafter referred to as the Transcendental Deduction). In Kant's text synthesis is initially merely a structural requisite. After he has isolated what he calls the two stems of knowledge (intuition and concepts), Kant needs to demonstrate that and how their respective material can be integrated in the formation of distinct phenomena and this happens in a synthesis, according to Kant. But with the aid of Nietzsche (and Deleuze) it is possible to read synthesis as an early (as yet, by Kant, unrealised) instance of an unconscious productive process which both precedes and
contributes to different forms of individuation.

Closely connected with this reading of the critical text in terms of the structures of consciousness and rationality as against the unconscious processes which are productive of them are the Kantian theories of time which permeate his critical texts. One of the chief claims of this study is that throughout the theoretical Critiques at least two conflicting conceptions of temporality vie with each other. One of them supports the rational structures Kant elaborates whereas a second, much more concealed, subterranean conception of time attaches to the synthetic processes Kant outlines. My contention is that this second type of temporality can be seen to filter into Nietzsche's non-Platonistic rethinking of temporality, into his thought of the eternal recurrence of the same. That chapters one, three and four keep returning to a discussion of the Transcendental Deduction is intended to echo the manner in which synthesis returns as phenomena and the manner in which recurrence recurs in the same. I hope to have clarified these repetitions in chapter four.

Even a fleeting glance at the contents sheet should indicate that the readings of these issues are, on one level, concentrated around the categories of relation. True to the spirit of the age, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* systematically poses the question of how it is possible for an object of experience to appear to consciousness or, more precisely, what the necessary constituents of the production of knowledge of such an object are. Foremost among these constituents (together with the forms of outer and inner sense, namely space and time transcendentally conceived) are of course the categories as introduced in the Transcendental Analytic. With his characteristic love of symmetry Kant pares down Aristotle's rather more sprawling system of categories to four groups of three and designates them quantity, quality, relation and modality. It is in the third of these, in
the group of categories called relation, that the possibilities, as they present themselves to Kant, of thinking the causal nexus of an object are thematised. Furthermore, the relations which are thematised in this group of categories are emphatically those of "all time relations of appearances" (KrV/CPR A177). This means that they should offer particularly rich insights into Kant's notions of temporality, especially given their implicit nature in the Analogies, as opposed to their explicit formulation in the second part of the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first Critique, to which they are occasionally compared in this study.

The categories of relation also centrally structure the Dialectic of the first Critique, in the three chapters of which Kant thematises the illegitimate claims of the ideas of reason in terms of the three types of relation, namely categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive, on which the erroneous syllogisms of speculative reason are based (cf. KrV/CPR A323,B379 where Kant states this). Hence the categories of relation present a singularly useful thread along which it becomes possible to unravel the structure of Kant's critical theory of nature.

On another level, the discussion, in chapters one and two, of Kant's conception of mechanical causality and accompanying notions of temporality in the first Critique is complemented, in chapter three, by a reading of the theory of teleological causality in the Critique of the Teleological Faculty of Judgement with which Kant finds it necessary to complement his theory of mechanism.

The aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy which this dissertation focuses on is that of physiology. This is an as yet strangely neglected feature of Nietzsche's thought. When it is discussed at all this is frequently in the context of the Nietzschean physiology of art. But several strong reasons can be cited why it is necessary to concentrate on physiology itself.
Before these can be enumerated it has to be pointed out that this text does not start from the assumption that it is known what Nietzsche's physiological thinking consists of or what it implies. This means that one of the tasks of this text is to elaborate what I understand to be the chief elements of Nietzsche's physiological thinking. As regards the Nietzschean interface with Kant, this raises the questions whether the categories of substance and of (mechanical) causality or the Kantian concept of teleology offer an appropriate conceptuality for thinking a Nietzschean physiology. Chapters one, two and three seek to answer each of these three questions respectively.

Although Nietzsche's writings are directed against a great many things, perhaps the chief target of his thought is Platonism in all its forms. There are many different aspects to a Platonistic thinking and throughout the history of Western philosophy it has of course found articulation in very different guises. But four closely related aspects common to all forms of Platonism can preliminarily be isolated.

There is first of all the structure of Platonism, the two-world theory, in which the realm of the forms (of the ἄθρα) is opposed to that of 'this' world and a whole set of values is then distributed between these two realms. The forms are associated with purity, eternity and a transcendent productive capacity, whereas 'this' world is by comparison fallen, transient and unproductive (the details of this distribution are discussed in the following chapters, particularly in chapter one). Although it is of course possible (and usual) to understand the following three elements as mere effects of this original structuring move, for strategic reasons it is important to discuss them as separate problems in their own right.

Chief among these, and hence this is the second aspect of Platonism to be mentioned, is its hatred of all that is material. Nature is made up of merely inferior copies of a pristine original form, the body is merely an
inferior shell which temporarily houses the superior, eternal soul. This fear and hatred of materiality expresses itself in moral judgements on what are initially simply natural processes. Thus, for instance, the naturally occurring putrefactory processes of organic matter are drawn into the moral realm: in this Platonistic scheme 'corruption' is not a mere physical necessity but a moral and spiritual evil.

A third element is the suppression of time which occurs in Platonism. As was mentioned above, the realm of the forms is designated as eternal and unchanging and this is in fact another mark of its purity. The forms are not themselves in time, although they effect that which is 'merely' temporal, the things of 'this' world. Whatever is in time and hence subject to change and, finally and most importantly, subject to death, is thereby considered deficient and morally inferior. Hence the greatest good, the highest moral instance, God, is of course eternal and unchanging.

A fourth element concerns the conception of productivity or production. In a Platonistic form of thinking the things which make up this world do not have any significant or ultimate productive capacity. This is reserved for the 'real' world, whose status as primary is underwritten precisely by the fact that it alone has this originary productive capability. This point is taken up further on in this introduction and it is also discussed in greater detail in chapter three.

It is obvious that the last three elements of Platonism are intimately related and that they in fact all mutually imply one another. But in order to understand the mechanisms of thought through which Platonism holds sway and, for our purposes more importantly, in order to appreciate exactly what are the obstacles for any overcoming of Platonism, I consider it important to enumerate them separately. Throughout the present study they are also treated separately, albeit on the understanding that they form a common nexus of problems.
Although all these aspects of Platonism (and several other ones which will be mentioned) undergo a rethinking in Nietzsche's attempt to overcome Platonism, it is the second of the factors mentioned above, namely the Platonistic hatred of all materiality which I consider to be of central importance to Nietzsche⁹. My claim is that his answer to the Platonistic suppression of the body is to develop an explicitly physiological thinking. This has several effects and implications which I consider to be highly desirable. One of these is that this new emphasis on the body reminds philosophers that thinking is never a purely spiritual activity, but that it is finally only yet another bodily activity, however strenuously philosophers attempt to deny and forget that fundamental fact. Nietzschean physiology reminds philosophy that, historically speaking, pure consciousness, ideality or spirituality have only ever been attained on the basis of a violent prior denial of physicality. In Nietzsche's physiological thinking, the body (even that of the philosopher) is named as the site on which the struggles of Platonism, the fight to the death between the attempted eradication of an excessive materiality and that materiality are fought.

It is by means of the thought of the will to power as physiology that Nietzsche can begin the eventual overcoming of Platonism. By 'will to power' I understand the economic differential through which a material becoming plays itself out, and not a metaphysical, explanatory principle like the forms, reason or Spirit¹⁰. The will to power is formative and primary insofar as nothing is 'given' prior to it but it, on the other hand, describes the formative, differential play of forces that is productive of all becoming, a becoming which is perpetual, unconscious, pre- and trans-individual. On the basis of the thought of the will to power, the body emerges as the typical instance of such a becoming. It,
too, is a becoming without anything stable or pre-given that only subsequently undergoes change''. In a becoming-body there is nothing substantial that becomes and nothing prior that is transformed into a body. But as becoming-body it emerges as the 'model' on which to think the formations of the will to power. By reinstating the body as the starting point for philosophy, Nietzsche simultaneously displaces one of the founding moves of Platonism (the denial of the body) and puts the thought of the will to power on a firmly materialist footing. All four chapters of this study attempt to draw out some of the minutiae of this crucial reversal.

Probably the most ignored aspect of the will to power is the radically anti-humanist stance from which alone it makes sense as a constituent in a new kind of thought which is no longer a cosmology or an ontology of a recognisable kind – it does not seek to explain or account for the (human) world, it seeks to undo it. It cannot be overemphasised that to identify the will to power with any human faculty, proclivity or perspective is to reduce it to the most simplistically metaphysical modes of thought and to miss entirely the affirmative sense of this force, beyond the petty concerns of this impoverished species. Consequently, the physiological perspective which is elaborated here should not be taken as yet another reassuring confirmation of a philosophical anthropocentrism. On the contrary, in the displacement of the anti-materialist impulse of Platonism, in its replacement by a physiological thought, the anthropomorphisation of nature is also overcome. In its place arises the conception of an excessive materiality to which human life is only ever utterly incidental.

Here it needs to be emphasised that to think matter as intrinsically ('self'-)excessive is one of the most fundamental implications of a Nietzschean physiological thinking which is, after all, not merely a vulgar
materialism. The issue of Nietzschean physiology is closely bound up with the philosophical task of rethinking the transcendental, that is to say with one of the central tasks philosophy has traditionally set itself, namely to determine that which exceeds experience, to explore the excesses of experience. These have historically been understood to precede and to be logically prior to experience and, importantly, to be located in a 'higher' realm than that of experience. This implies that matter is conceived as deficient, that it can only be understood by recourse to another realm, another explanatory instance which supplements this alleged intrinsic deficiency of all materiality. As opposed to both vulgar materialist and idealist impositions on the nature of materiality, Nietzsche's physiological thinking is based on the presupposition that matter is 'itself' intrinsically self-excessive or self-transcending - and that the will to power is the type of thinking with which matter can be understood in this way. For this reason the comparison between Kant's notions about the categories (of relation, in our case) as the transcendental constituents of experience and Nietzsche's complete re-thinking of them in terms of the non-causal auto-production of the will to power is also of considerable import. The radicality of Nietzsche's re-thinking of physiology can be brought out when it is shown which transformations the categories of relation have undergone by the time his post-metaphysical thought of the body is produced. The aim of this thesis is therefore to show the historical roots, in Kant's critical works, of Nietzsche's physiological perspective and to contrast these Kantian preconceptions concerning the transcendental constitution of 'reality' with the Nietzschean thought of a perpetual physiological productivity beyond all two-world theories.
Since Nietzsche pronounces the death of god, it is widely accepted that this is a purely secular, non-theistic philosophy. What is, however, all too often overlooked is the fact that it is not the overt or implicit belief in and justification or proof of any traditional notion of God that is the mark of theistic philosophies, but the participation in those structures of thought which formally repeat the key elements of theism. Because it is the way in which any two-world theory distributes its values between the two strata which is fundamentally theistic, as well as profoundly nihilistic. In this projection the lesser ("apparent", "fallen") of the two worlds is thought to be diminished in its productive power, all of which is located in the other ("real") world which is itself unproduced. It is this distribution between one stratum as passive and produced, as suffering inhibited productivity, as against another, higher one which is unproduced and which enjoys undiminished productivity which is the essential characteristic of such dualistic, theistic systems.

Thus, even though Kant's critical philosophy emphatically dismisses the fundamental tenets of previous speculative theology, it still participates in the structures of Platonism. Insofar as the critical system is entirely predicated on the theoretical distinction between the conditions of possibility of objects of experience and those objects themselves, the former of which are productive but not themselves produced, the latter of which are fundamentally divested of productivity, transcendental idealism does not break with a tradition which stretches back to Plato. Furthermore, since the realm of transcendental productivity is identified with the human faculties this has the further effect that all significant productivity is reduced to the realm of anthropomorphic, human productions.

To this type of philosophy Nietzsche contrasts a physiological thinking in which the productions of the will to power are understood as an ongoing synthetic activity, the important aspect of which is that it envisages a
production without a producer and hence a nature liberated from all anthropocentrisms.

A further question which animates this dissertation is what the effects of the death of 'god' (the Platonistic two-world theory) on the project of critique are, and specifically on Kant's version of it as immanent critique. The contention, substantiated particularly throughout chapter four, is that with the death of 'god' the self-overcoming of Platonism which begins to become explicit in immanent critique, can and must be further radicalised to encompass the hitherto unexamined claims of rationality themselves. The claim is that this process of the radicalisation of critique issues in Nietzsche's physiological thinking.

Another effect of this physiological mode of thought can only be fully comprehended in the context of the discussion below (especially in chapters one and four). This concerns the fact that in Nietzschean physiology, the temporal and the economic or materialist aspects of thinking are no longer separated in the way they are throughout the philosophical tradition stretching from Plato to Kant. Insofar as Nietzsche's thinking encompasses a temporalising aspect in the thought of the eternal recurrence of the same and a materialist, economic element in the thought of the will to power, Nietzsche is able to heal the rift between them, opened up by the violently anti-materialist thinking of Platonism and, crucially, he is able to do so on the terrain of the physiological which is capable of incorporating both aspects.

A final point concerns the notion of repetition which this text only discusses explicitly in passing. I take this to be the element of Nietzsche's thought which is most resistant to any traditional notions of comprehension because it is intrinsically unsubsumable to the categories of
the understanding. Although this thought is indisputably of central importance in Nietzsche's philosophy, the present study only touches on it tangentially, and only to the extent that it has any bearing on the project of circumscribing Nietzsche's physiological thinking.

Nietzsche thinks repetition as productive of difference. Insofar as the eternal recurrence of the same thematises a becoming in which the reproduction of self-differing utterly precedes all seeming identities, repetition is thought as productive of both difference and the same. In this type of repetition there is nothing substantial which is repeated. It is instead the repetitious process 'itself' which is productive in the sense that it reproduces 'itself' and, as a by-product, produces what appears as the same, as identities, at least to a Platonistic thinking oriented towards the assumption of identities rather than to the play of difference.

It must also be pointed out that the body is an instance of such a form of repetition, that it too marks a perpetual self-differing in which what are only ever relative stabilities are constantly displaced by interlacing reproductive processes. In other words, a becoming-body is the most immediate model for a non-metaphysical repetition in which differential, temporalising matter reproduces its reproduction and more or less incidentally also leads to bodily formations.

On a 'hermeneutic' note, using this basic model, my aim has been to show the textual effects of reading the Kantian critical text in terms of the repetition it undergoes in Nietzsche's writings. It follows from this very specific set of issues with which this thesis concerns itself that the readings of both Kant and Nietzsche which are carried out here are highly selective and that no claims for a comprehensive interpretation of the first or third Critique or of Nietzsche's notes are made.
Before we can turn to the detailed discussions of the next four chapters a brief note on the nature of the texts considered here is required. It is obviously the case that on one level the shift which occurs from Kant to Nietzsche concerns the nature of their respective texts and the conception of what constitutes a philosophical writing. In this regard, the most striking difference between the two thinkers is that Kant's belief in the validity of a philosophical system as an appropriate way of articulating thought is as absolute as Nietzsche's suspicion of it. This is, as Kant explains in the Architectonic of Pure Reason:

"Weil die systematische Einheit dasjenige ist, was gemeine Erkenntnis allererst zur Wissenschaft, d. i. aus einem bloßen Aggregat derselben ein System macht."

"Because systematic unity is that which first turns vulgar knowledge into science, i.e. which turns a mere aggregate of it into a system." (KrV/CPR A832, B860, t. m.)

And according to Kant (loc. cit) it is Reason which demands that knowledge be thus integrated into a system, without which it remains 'vulgar' and merely 'rhapsodic'. For Kant Reason, and the system it dictates, is that which guarantees the scientificity, and hence the universal validity of knowledge through which alone it is possible to surpass the superstitions, prejudices and unfounded beliefs of dogmatic speculative theology. For Kant it is Reason which alone can lead to the emancipation of thinking and to the Enlightenment which surpasses the Dark Ages which preceded it. For Kant it is the infallible sign of an intellectual maturity asserting itself that thinking articulates itself systematically under the rule of Reason, and consequently, as this absolute belief in reason wanes, so the adherence to a systematic philosophy diminishes.

This movement reaches its pinnacle in Nietzsche's writings and it is on
the basis of the thought of the will to power as physiology that quite another picture presents itself. Here unity, or the drive for unification, is read as a symptom of a weakening of the will to power and it is, conversely, by sustaining an exhaustive differentiation that a body or a thinking demonstrates its undiminished force:

"Je größer der Drang ist zur Einheit, um so mehr darf man auf Schwäche schließen; je mehr der Drang nach Varietät, Differenz, innerlichem Zerfall, um so mehr Kraft ist da."
"The greater the urge to unity is, the more one may deduce weakness; the more urge to variety, differentiation, inner decay, the more force is there." (KSA 11,36 [21], WM/WP no. 655, t. m.)

It follows that Nietzsche's philosophy, especially when it is in note form (which is of course the case with the vast majority of his writings), should not be considered as lacking systematicity and hence, the implication is, intellectual rigour, but that it should be considered positively, as having overcome the intellectual weakness which requires recourse to a system. For Nietzsche a system is only ever a defence mechanism, an extended spasm, with which thinking seeks to protect itself against difference itself, against life. The deeply moral impulses which lie behind such schematisations are dissected in the following note which, although he is not mentioned by name, clearly implies a reference to Kant:

"Es gibt schematische Köpfe, solche, welche einen Gedankencomplex dann für wahrer halten, wenn er sich in vorher entworfene Schemata oder Kategorien-Tafeln einzeichnen läßt. Der Selbst-Täuschungen auf diesem Gebiete gibt es unzählige; fast alle großen 'Systeme' gehören hierhin. Das Grundvorurteil ist aber: daß die Ordnung, Übersichtlichkeit, das Systematische dem wahren Sein der Dinge anhaften müsse, umgekehrt die Unordnung, das Chaotische, Unberechenbare nur in einer falschen oder unvollständig erkannten Welt zum Vorscheine komme -kurz ein Irrtum sei:- was ein moralisches Vorurteil ist, entnommen aus der Tatsache, daß der
wahrhaftige zutrauenswürdige Mensch ein Mann der Ordnung, der Maximen, und im Ganzen etwas Berechenbares und Pedantisches zu sein pflegt. Nun ist es aber ganz unbeweisbar, daß das Ansich der Dinge nach diesem Rezepte eines Muster-Beamten sich verhält."

"There are schematic heads, such as consider a thought-complex more true when it can be inscribed in previously designed schemata or tables of categories. The self-deceptions in this area are innumerable: almost all great 'systems' belong to this. But the basic prejudice is: that order, clarity, the systematic have to attach to the true being of things, conversely disorder, the chaotic, incalculable only appears in a false or incompletely known world - in short, that it is an error - which is a moral prejudice, derived from the fact that the truthful, trustworthy human being has the habit of being a man of order, of maxims, and all in all something calculable and pedantic. Yet it cannot at all be proven that the in-itself of things behaves according to this prescription of a model civil servant." (KSA 11,40 [9], m.t.)

The contrast between 'the true being of things', as opposed to another world which 'only appears', and then only as an error, and the fact that this division of 'worlds' follows from a moral impulse, echoes Nietzsche's innumerable reflections on Platonism. The implication is that a systematic articulation of a philosophical project is itself the effect of Platonistic modes of thinking. Nietzsche's philosophical project, on the other hand, is at all times oriented towards the overcoming of Platonism, and as such it requires a non-systematic writing \(^1\), such as can be found in the Nachlaß\(^2\).

It should be self-evident that this dissertation is in some respects the amalgam of many philosophical perspectives. It is impossible for me to point to any one figure to whom I am exclusively indebted and, moreover, the mention of a writer does not necessarily imply unqualified agreement with their reading of either Kant or Nietzsche. But the intellectual atmosphere in which this work has grown has been redolent of Heidegger,
Deleuze and, to a lesser degree, Klossowski, despite the fact that their respective responses to what is termed 'the tradition' have differed so markedly. Although this dissertation is deeply parasitic on their thought, any explicit consideration of their responses to the points raised here would have resulted in a completely unwieldy, monstrously bloated body of work. Equally, although many important secondaries have been read and are cited in the select bibliography, it has unfortunately been impossible to include a discussion of them in this study.

Finally, my aim throughout has been to offer readings of the primary texts of Kant and Nietzsche which would cast a new light on their work. This is based on the assumption that their texts still present the greatest challenges for thinking today.
"Unsere heiligsten Überzeugungen, unser Unwandelbares in Hinsicht der obersten Werte sind Urteile unserer Muskeln."
"Our most sacred convictions, that which is unalterable for us as regards the highest values, are judgements of our muscles."
(KSA 13, 11 [376]), WM/WP no. 314, t. m.)
I. The Principle of Substance

"Whole were we who celebrated that festival, unspotted by all the evils which awaited us in time to come, and whole and unspotted and changeless and serene were the objects revealed to us in the light of that mystic vision. Pure was the light and pure were we from the pollution of the walking sepulchre which we call a body, to which we are bound like an oyster to its shell." (Phaedrus 250b, c)

This dirge ends Socrates' account of the myth of fallen souls in the Phaedrus. It is immediately preceded by his proof of the soul's immortal, uncreated and indestructible nature (245c - 246a). Its immortality is proven by its self-moving capacity: it is perpetually in motion, it is that which moves the parts of the body, but that motion is not itself caused by another preceding it. It is uncreated because self-creating in its motion. Since it is self-moving it cannot cease to exist without negating its own nature.

It is clear that at every turn, this 'proof' relies on according the body absolute passivity even to the extent that the very notion of the soul, here identified entirely with motion, is predicated on the body's incapacity for self-caused activity if it is not endowed with soul.

But it is the tone of the passage quoted above which leaves little doubt as to the ultimate value of this idea of the soul: it has to be devised to cope with the horror which this suppurating, foetid matter, the body, which appears here as little more than a chute towards extinction, instils in the author of those lines.

Some two thousand years later the tone has calmed considerably, even if the sentiments remain unabated:
"Bei allem Wechsel der Erscheinungen beharret die Substanz, und das Quantum derselben wird in der Natur weder vermehrt noch vermindert."
"In all change of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished." (KrV/CPR A182, B224)

This is of course Kant's formulation of the principle of the permanence of substance of the first Analogy which occurs in the section of the first Critique entitled 'Analogies of Experience'. The general principle of the Analogies is that "Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions" (KrV/CPR A176, B218). The necessary connection (Verknüpfung) demanded here is in each case a temporal relation and this formulation of the general principle of the Analogies thus constitutes a reiteration, in terms of the explicitly temporal aspect under which judgements are now being looked at, of the demand for a third term (ein Drittes) which is necessary for the association of subject and predicate in a synthetic judgement (in the section which deals with their highest principle, KrV/CPR A154f, B193f). This third term, the "medium of all synthetic judgements" (ibid) is nothing other than time itself. The readings of the Analogies which follow will therefore pay particular attention to the theory of time which is implicit in them as well as to the nexus of temporality and natural production which they thematise overtly.

In the above formulation of the general principle of the Analogies of Experience, the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions is said to enable experience. In fact, though, this general demand for such a representation finds three different articulations, in that there are three types of representation which fulfil this criterion, namely substance, causality and reciprocity. So much for an introductory remark to the Analogies. We can now pick up the thread of an argument which sees Kant in fundamental agreement (or collusion) with certain Platonic strands.
It is perhaps not immediately obvious that the two statements above (Plato and Kant's) are in any way related. In what follows, the connection will be established. This will initially involve drawing out the meaning of the quote from Kant but, on a more subterranean level, the sense, directionality or impetus it derives from the Platonic project will also have to be shown.

The proof of this principle of the permanence of substance to which Kant proceeds immediately is, as we remind ourselves, necessitated by the initial heterogeneity of, on the one hand, empirical intuitions and, on the other hand, the pure, a priori concepts of the understanding (KrV/CPR A137f). What is to be proven is the possibility of the subsumption of the former under the latter. The apriority of time - as pure, a priori form of intuition - had already been shown in the Transcendental Aesthetic and, equally, that of the categories in general in the Transcendental Deductions. What is required at this stage of the first Critique is the demonstration of the possibility of their combination by the faculty of imagination which already and in general provided the median term for sensibility and understanding in the Deductions (KrV/CPR A124, B151). Hence Kant now launches the Transcendental Doctrine of Judgement in which the possibility of this principle of subsumption is to be shown in respect of each category in turn.

The particular character of the Analogies (as of all of the first Critique) is imposed on them by the implications of Kant's Copernican revolution. According to this, objects of experience do not exist in formal independence of the subjective modes of their perception or, for that matter, of their conceptual formation in a consciousness. The apriority of the modes of perception (which Kant calls 'receptivity', for instance at KrV/CPR A19, B33) means that what are now re-thought as the forms of their
sensible intuition, space and time, can no longer be thought to appertain to objects of experience as their attributes. Instead, and this is what constitutes the revolutionary character of this reversal, objects of experience qua objects of intuition are produced as objects of intuition in space and time; space and time exist logically prior to the objects which sensibility receives in and through them. This is referred to as the transcendentally ideal nature of space and time.

The Analogies are entirely predicated on this transcendental ideality of time and can only be comprehended, as Kant wishes them to be taken, by keeping this prerequisite constantly in mind. Before proceeding to a more fully developed reading of the first Analogy, I shall simply summarise the main points of the argument, as I understand it.

The major premise of Kant's proof of the permanence of substance (KrV/CPR A182, B224f) is itself developed out of two previously given tenets, the first of which is the result of the Copernican turn with which Kant's critical philosophy gets underway, namely that all appearances are in time (rather than time appertaining to them), but the second of which is merely the reiteration of one of philosophy's oldest prejudices, namely that the only modes of time are co-existence and succession (KrV/CPR A183, B226). Appearances can only be perceived in temporal relations of co-existence and succession - these are the modes within which there is articulated the "representation of a necessary [temporal!] connection of perceptions", demanded by the introductory section to the Analogies (KrV/CPR A176, B218, my insertion). But necessity can never originate in appearances, in the realm of the empirical, but only in the a priori constituents of experience. Thus the temporal modes of co-existence and succession are only made possible by the form of inner intuition which in this context is required to have the character of permanence.
The minor premise (KrV/CPR A182, B225) is simply that time itself cannot be perceived. That is to say that not only can time in its transcendental ideality not be the object of perception (to say this would be tautological since the status of all that is accorded transcendentality as being prior to, and never itself the object of experience is definitional) but that even, strictly speaking, co-existence and succession, the empirical determinations of time, cannot be perceived in themselves, that is to say apart or in abstraction from appearances in which alone a change or concurrence of features can be observed.

The conclusion to these premises (KrV/CPR A182, B225), namely that the substratum which represents time in general must be found in appearances and that this substratum is substance in its temporal articulation of permanence, is demanded firstly by the assumption of an a priori, and hence necessary, form to underlie the empirically observable temporal relations of co-existence or succession and secondly by the fact that only substance allows for the attribution of permanence to it so as to provide within the understanding a concept by means of which a substrate to regulated extension in time can be thought. Needless to say, the former sums up the argument from the point of view of sensibility and the latter from the point of view of the understanding, thereby indicating the harmonious interaction of the two faculties which it was this Analogy's task to prove in the first place.

Although the argument is prima facie entirely coherent in the framework established by the first Critique, it nonetheless carries certain implications, some of which prove troublesome for the critical project itself and some of which highlight its position within the trajectory of a Platonistic metaphysics.

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In the explanatory paragraphs to this proof it is stated that "...the permanent is the substratum of the empirical representations of time itself, in which all determination of time is alone possible;" (KrV/CPR A183, B226, t. m.) and "Permanence expresses time generally as the abiding correlate of all existence of appearances, of all change and all concomitance." (ibid, t. m.) and "If one wanted to ascribe a succession to time itself, one would also have to think another time in which this succession would be possible." (ibid, t. m., my emphasis). Here it is explicitly stated that time in its apriority must only be associated with permanence and never with succession. But under b) in paragraph 6 of the Transcendental Aesthetic 'Conclusions from these concepts', the following characterisation of time occurs - I quote in full:

"Die Zeit ist nichts anders, als die Form des innern Sinnes, d. i. des Anschauens unserer selbst und unsers innern Zustandes. Denn die Zeit kann keine Bestimmung äußerer Erscheinungen sein; sie gehört weder zu einer Gestalt, oder Lage etc., dagegen bestimmt sie das Verhältnis der Vorstellungen in unserm innern Zustande. Und, eben weil diese innre Anschauung keine Gestalt gibt, suchen wir auch diesen Mangel durch Analogien zu ersetzen, und stellen die Zeitfolge durch eine ins Unendliche fortgehende Linie vor, in welcher das Mannigfaltige eine Reihe ausmacht, die nur von einer Dimension ist, und schließen aus den Eigenschaften dieser Linie auf alle Eigenschaften der Zeit, außer dem einigen, daß die Teile der erstern zugleich, die der letztern aber jederzeit nach einander sind. Hieraus erhellet auch, daß die Vorstellung der Zeit selbst Anschauung sei, weil alle ihre Verhältnisse sich an einer äußern Anschauung ausdrücken lassen."

"Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state. For time cannot be the determination of outer appearances; it belongs neither to a shape nor position etc, but determines the relation of representations in our inner state. And just because this inner intuition yields no shape, we seek to replace this want by analogies and represent the time sequence by a line progressing to infinity in which the manifold constitutes a series which
is of one dimension only and we infer from the properties of this line to all the properties of time, except for the one, that the parts of the former are simultaneous while the parts of the latter are at all times successive. From this it also becomes clear that the representation of time is itself intuition because all its relations allow of being expressed in an outer intuition." (KrV/CPR A33, B49f, t.m.)

Kant here makes four moves which, when compared with his comments in the first Analogy, are to varying degrees problematic.

If we recall that the second part of the Transcendental Aesthetic (from paragraph four onwards) has the function of establishing the apriority and transcendentality of time, it is reasonable to assume that the time mentioned in the passage just cited refers to time in its a priori and transcendental aspect. This is underwritten when it is called the form of inner sense and when it is said of it that it determines the relation of the representations in our inner state. But the contention that "because this inner intuition yields no shape we seek to replace this want by analogies" according to which the succession of time is represented by a line stretching into infinity, incurs several problems.

Firstly (and least of all), the 'analogies' mentioned here cannot refer to the terminus technicus later used in the chapters bearing that name. At this point in the text the categories have not yet been introduced and since 'Analogy' in the later sense designates the employment of certain categories (under the restrictions imposed on them by the pure form of inner sense), it is misleading to use this term here.

But leaving such a relatively trivial point aside, Kant here seems to leave unannounced his sudden shift from speaking of time in its transcendental, to speaking of it in its empirical employment - if that is indeed what he is doing. He can only mean time in its empirical employment since he speaks of succession of time (Zeitfolge), that is to say one of
the modes or empirical determinations of time (cf. KrV/CPR A182, B226). If, however, he does not mean empirical time when speaking of Zeitfolge - and since he says of it that the manifold makes up a series in it, he may well not mean empirical time - he would be blatantly contradicting his own later contentions of a non-empirical time as the permanent substrate of all appearances.

Thirdly and most importantly, the implication of this passage is that time 'itself' cannot be represented at all in its own terms (or at least not in the terms set out by the critical project) but only in terms of space, as linear².

Thus it may be inferred that time as such cannot be subject to representational thought, that it escapes representational schemas altogether and, conversely, that it can only be thought as properly temporal, as prior to its translation into spatial terms, in a non-representational framework. Here, though, it must be observed that just as with one hand Kant gives the specificity of time's transcendentality, he takes it away with the other by again reducing time to the representation of it in terms of outer sense, although rather than describing this manoeuvre in terms of a serious defect, Kant mentions it positively, or at least neutrally by simply saying that all representations of time "allow of being expressed in an outer intuition".

But fourthly and lastly, after translating time into a representation in space, he then claims that inferences concerning the - essentially unrepresentable - nature of time can be made from this, "...we infer from the properties of this line to all the properties of time" (my emphasis) - except for the one that in the representation of space simultaneity is dominant whereas in the representation of time in spatial terms simultaneity is replaced by succession.
It is difficult to imagine that Kant seriously advocates such an utterly simplistic operation in order to arrive at what he terms the properties of time. What might in fact be meant by this comment becomes clearer when we recall that the table of concepts of the pure understanding is derived from the table of judgements (KrV/CPR A70, B95 - the end of A83), in the latter of which Kant offers a systematic account of the merely logical functions of thought, that is to say those judgements which do not lead to any knowledge of objects of experience because they do not engage in the operations of sensibility.

Thus from the categorical judgement which expresses the relation of predicate to subject there is derived the category of substance which expresses the relation of accidens to substantia. It is clear that the judgement which Kant classifies as categorical simply encapsulates the form of judgement in general, that form of thought which follows the demands of logic, the foremost of which is of course the law of contradiction according to which the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect. It may therefore be said that in its categorial employment (category of substance) this law represents nothing other than the demand of non-contradiction of Aristotelian logic transferred to a theory of time which draws out the implications for critical philosophy of the requirement 'at the same time' which centrally organises the law of contradiction.

Thus the demand for a permanent time to underlie the (empirical) representation of time as sequential directly results from the adherence to the axioms by which identity, in this case the identity of time, is critically established (Kant) or assumed as originarily given (Aristotle). In other words, time represented lineally expresses time as self-identical.
We have seen how the internal requirements of the reversals at the heart of the critical project demand time as permanence to be posited as the substance underlying all appearances. Change occurs on the basis of the permanence of time but time itself does not change, "...the time in which all change of appearances is to be thought, remains and does not change." (KrV/CPR A182, B224f, t.m.). It is obvious that time thought transcendentally in the manner of Kant cannot itself be conceived as subject to change, which Kant shortly thematises under the heading of causality, because if it were so conceived this would lead to the transcendent employment of (one of) the categories against which Kant warns his readers most vociferously throughout and especially in the chapter on 'Phenomena and Noumena'.

Towards the end of the first Analogy (KrV/CPR A187f, B230f) Kant seeks to correct some common misunderstandings about the nature of alteration and change. Closely following Aristotle's procedure in his reflections on these issues (in De Generatione et Corruptione) Kant distinguishes alteration from change by saying that only the permanent, substrate or substance, is altered - in respect of its accidentia. This is not to say that substance itself is effectively subject to alteration but only that it is solely on the basis of the unchanging substrate that alteration can be perceived at all. Whereas the accidentia (here momentarily, and only for the purposes of the argument, thought in abstraction from their substrate) do not themselves alter but undergo a change qua a commencing or ceasing of some of their determinations. This is summed up as "all that alters persists and only its state [the entirety of its determinations] changes" (KrV/CPR A187, B230, my insertion).

Kant, again following Aristotle, separates alteration into two modes, coming to be (Entstehen) and passing away (Vergehen). Objects, qua subjectively derived formal determinations of that which affects our senses, come to be or pass away but that which is the ground of the modes
of their alteration, that which affects our senses, namely matter itself, does not itself come to be or pass away. If we consecutively make the following observations: 'the oak is now an acorn' - 'the oak is now a large tree' - 'the oak is now firewood', it is clear that the formal determinations, the articulations in space and time, of the underlying substance (in this example 'the oak') undergo changes but, and this is the crucial point, the oak, substance, matter itself, does not come to be or pass away, although the consecutive states we perceive it to be in change.

This must surely constitute one of the greatest triumphs of Platonism, to have arrested time into an unchangeable permanent state and to have simultaneously divested matter of that which makes it most repulsive from the Platonic perspective, namely the identification of it with incessant becoming, which constitutes its essential fallenness in a Platonistic cosmos.

We can only begin to interrupt the Platonic trajectory which occupies such a central role in the Kantian text, if we realise not only its impetus, that is to say the values which organise it, but also the mechanisms by which these values are played out and through which they appear self-naturalising.

The impetus behind these operations is clearly fear and hatred of time, of change and of the unpredictable nature of matter as long as it remains unfixed by the type of terms which Kant associates with necessity and universality, viz. apriority, and which alone are considered guarantors of the possibility of knowledge - where the desirability of knowledge, or at least of the type of knowledge in which correspondence of cognition and object is demanded, remains unquestioned.

Of the mechanisms which perpetuate that series of values, the most important one is the division of becoming into the object which becomes, or
rather ceases to truly become as a result of this move, and the time of its becoming, now reduced to change and lineally conceived time. This means nothing other than the separation of becoming from itself and it is effected precisely by the imposition of an object (of knowledge) which changes or, which amounts to the same thing, of a subject of change upon a 'pure' process, a process which does not know of the division of matter into distinct entities and for which that which we refer to as 'time' only exists as the rate of its self-overcoming.

It should perhaps be emphasised that this non-Platonic conception of becoming, which is freed from division into an object and the time in which it exists and changes, cannot be approached gradually, cannot be learnt or otherwise assimilated over time. It is rather a matter of a sudden and momentous leap or lapse in which a previously self-possessed consciousness - without being prepared for it - forgets itself.

In other words, a proposition which approximated to such a lapse could never be a merely analytic proposition. Instead it would repeat the formal requirements of a synthetic, or expansive judgement (Erweiterungsurteil KrV/CPR A7, B11) in that in it the ground for the relation of subject and predicate would not be the law of identity (as is the case in analytic judgements, cf. KrV/CPR loc. cit.). Instead, another unknown (but here unknowable) = X (as Kant calls it, KrV/CPR B13) may be projected and sought in what is no more than a playful repetition of the quest central to the first Critique, namely the search for the a priori conditions of possibility of synthetic a priori judgements.

Apart from such formal requirements, though, the perspective in which such a non-Platonic conception of becoming opens up can be approached obliquely only, as happens for instance in this passage from Nietzsche's notebooks:

"To be comprehended: that every kind of decay and disease has continually cooperated in the comprehensive value judgements: that in the value judgements that have become the ruling ones decadence has even gained predominance: that we not only have to fight against the consequences of all present misery of degeneration, but that all decadence hitherto has remained residual, has remained alive. Such a comprehensive aberration of humanity from its basic instincts, such a comprehensive decadence of the value judgement is the question mark par excellence, the essential riddle that the human animal poses for the philosopher."

(KSA 13, 11 [227], WM/WP no. 39, t.m.)

Here the site from which this riddle can even be perceived to exercise philosophy is clearly very far removed from the site of any Platonistic preoccupations. The question arises at the instant of the lapse of consciousness and, furthermore, it is formulated in terms of physiological occurrences, those of decay and disease. The significance of these two aspects of this passage can not yet be drawn out without anticipating unduly the results of reading the relevant parts of the first Critique - in light of this, and other remarks of Nietzsche's like it.

But for the moment it must suffice to say that only through such an instant of consciousness's lapsing from itself can the vision of the consummation of becoming by itself be opened up. This vision, which is here designated by the title of 'physiology', is preoccupied by the processes of
generation and corruption in an entirely different manner from the Kantian
treatment of these terms. The latter, following the philosophical
tradition, starts from the assumption that there are distinct beings and,
although in vastly more sophisticated terms than was ever done before,
gives an account of, ultimately, the principle of sufficient reason
('nothing is without ground'). But this critically reinscribed ontology is
still, as we have seen, utterly dependent upon the representation of
empirical time as linear (even as it implicitly admits the status of this
representation as somewhat of a necessary fiction) and of transcendental
time as permanent and unchangeable. According to these assumptions a thing
comes to be, exists for a time and passes away, while time and matter
persist and do not change. Thus the commonsensical view of time finds its
rational articulation in which the originary status of being is preserved.
But there is no immediately obvious reason why existence should be viewed
from the point of view of the preservation of distinct entities rather than
from the point of view of the perpetual transformations of matter. To
prefer the former is, on one level, nothing but a habit and a prejudice of
a metaphysically biased reason:

""Dinge, die eine Beschaffenheit an sich haben" - eine dogmatische
Vorstellung, mit der man absolut brechen muß".
""Things that have a constitution in themselves" - a dogmatic idea with
which one has to break absolutely". (KSA 13,11 [134], WM/ WP no. 559)

As opposed to such a dogmatic view the experiment of a philosophical
physiology promises the possibility of viewing time and matter as
indivisible and as such equally unfettered by idealist impositions.

In this physiological thought corruption - a term which is deeply
symptomatic of Platonistic orientations because of the manner in which it
fuses a moral and a physiological register - is no longer posited in
opposition to and in dependence of generation because this thought does not seek to divide essentially continuous, primary, physiological processes into oppositional schemas whose sole purpose is to impose morality upon nature. Instead, in physiology there is celebrated the self-overcoming nature of matter (beyond the narrow conceptual confines of oppositionally related terms), its revelling in self-expenditure for which corruption now merely signifies the generation of self-overcoming in which 'distinct entities' flare up and explode again with the speed of lightning.

Kant himself had an intimation that this would be the - for him catastrophic - effect of the abolition of a non-transitory substratum when he remarked that "...in mere succession [without the substrate of time as permanent substance] existence is always vanishing and commencing and never has the least magnitude [extension in time]" (KrV/CPR A183, B226, t.m., my insertions).
II. The Transcendental Idea of Substantiality

In the previous section we saw how, in the domain of knowledge (briefly, in the actus of subsumption of the manifold of intuition under categories), Kant demonstrates the universality and necessity of the concept of substance and how it leads to the assumption of time as permanent substance when the pure concept of the understanding is activated in the pure form of inner sense. Thus the transcendentality of the concept of substance is, for Kant, a proven fact of the understanding, that is to say of that faculty which (in its application to sensibility) is central to the formation of judgements of knowledge.

When the separation of becoming from itself was on the one hand described as the imposition of a subject (of change) upon a 'pure' process of becoming (above, sec. I), this thought was in fact formally derived from the first Critique itself, namely from Kant's characterisation of the dual nature of reason. For without claiming to circumscribe the entire domain of reason, it can at least preliminarily be said that 'reason' designates two impulses within such a faculty which are in mutual conflict to such an extent that they would effectively cancel each other out if they were to dominate that faculty at one and the same time.

Reason, which is variously described as the faculty of principles (KrV/CPR A299, B356), contains in such a principle a "...subjective law for the orderly economising with the provisions of our understanding, that by comparison of its concepts it may reduce them to the smallest possible number;" (KrV/CPR A306, B362, t.m.). This 'economising' takes place by means of the syllogisms, knowledge of the operations of which is peculiar to reason. And whilst "...all pure concepts in general [here those of the understanding] are concerned with the synthetic unity of representations...", only "...concepts of pure reason (transcendental..."
ideas) are concerned with the unconditioned synthetic unity of all conditions in general." (KrV/CPR A334, B391, my italics and insertion in square brackets). And since in the case of the ideas of reason, as much as in the case of the concepts of the pure understanding, they are investigated in their transcendental, and not merely in their logical employment, the apriority of either group of concepts is to be proven.

The Transcendental Analytic set itself this task as regards the categories. The possibility of synthetic a priori judgements could in principle be shown by demonstrating that a universal and necessary synthetic judgement can never be derived from concepts alone but that it needs recourse to the (equally a priori) forms of intuition in order to go beyond the mere concept of the object and to associate with it, in the formation of experience, predicates which are not merely contained in that concept of the object. An analogous question is posed as regards reason, namely, does it "...contain a priori synthetic principles... and in what may these principles consist?" (KrV/CPR A306, B363).

Now the dual nature of reason resides in the fact that (like the understanding) it believes itself to be in possession of such principles (equally, with respect to experience!) but - and this is what the Transcendental Dialectic must show - that this belief is erroneous. The understanding can legitimately claim transcendental status for its pure concepts because it is directed to objects of experience or appearances. But the transcendentality of the concepts of pure reason, or transcendental ideas, is illusory because there cannot be anything in experience which corresponds to them or, to put it yet another way, they do not contribute anything to and are not constitutive of knowledge but should only organise the judgements of knowledge derived from the understanding and act regulatively upon them.
The three concepts of reason are derived from the three categories of relation, which in turn are deduced by Kant from the table of judgements. He explains how he sees reason arriving at its ideas:

"So viel Arten des Verhältnisses es nun gibt, die der Verstand vermittelst der Kategorien sich vorstellt, so vielerlei reine Vernunftbegriffe wird es auch geben, und es wird also erstlich ein Unbedingtes der kategorischen Synthesis in einem Subjekt, zweitens der hypothetischen Synthesis der Glieder einer Reihe, drittens der disjunktiven Synthesis der Teile in einem System zu suchen sein."

"As many kinds of relation there are which the understanding represents to itself by means of the categories, so many pure concepts of reason there will also be and hence, firstly there will have to be sought an unconditioned of the categorical synthesis in a subject, secondly of the hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series, thirdly of the disjunctive synthesis of the parts in a system." (KrV/CPR A323, B379, t. m.)

The initial contribution of reason towards the syllogism lies in its formation of the inference or conclusion from the relation between the major premise, given through the understanding, and the minor premise, brought about through the operation of subsumption in the faculty of judgement (Urteilskraft) (KrV/CPR A304, B360f). But, Kant claims, it is in the nature of reason to attempt to unify and reduce in number the judgements of the understanding by inquiring whether the condition (of the syllogism), represented in the rule which constitutes the major premise, is itself conditioned, that is to say whether it is itself the conclusion of a prior syllogism (prosyllogism).

Thus, and this constitutes one of the two impulses of reason mentioned above, reason searches and surges 'upwards' through the syllogism(s) towards the unconditioned of the entire series (cf. for example KrV/CPR A336, B394). In this respect we may say of reason that it indulges and enjoys its own prowess without finally considering the demands of critique.
that knowledge be strictly applicable only to objects of experience; for the unconditioned cannot constitute an object of experience in Kant's definition of such an object precisely as constituted and conditioned by sensibility and understanding. But a corollary of this 'upsurge' of reason is the eventual imposition of an actual unconditioned (an idea of reason) upon this self-assertive process and this imposition constitutes the other, contradictory impulse inherent in reason. Their mutually cancelling effect is obvious because the imposition of an idea upon the process of the search/surge for it brings that movement to an end and, conversely, as long as the search/surge carries on no actual idea can have been found. Thus, if this dual nature be admitted, the implication is that reason must always turn against itself in order to act in accordance with its own nature or, to put it another way, because it is impossible to fulfill two mutually contradictory demands at the same time, it is in the nature of reason to be entrapped in a schizophrenic scenario.

Kant makes this point explicitly but plays down its psychotic character considerably when he writes:

"Es gibt also eine natürliche und unvermeidliche Dialektik der reinen Vernunft, nicht eine, in die sich etwa ein Stümper, durch Mangel an Kenntnissen, selbst verwickelt, oder die irgend ein Sophist, um vernünftige Leute zu verwirren, künstlich ersonnen hat, sondern die der menschlichen Vernunft unhintertreiblich anhängt, und selbst, nachdem wir ihr Blendwerk aufgedeckt haben, dennoch nicht aufhören wird, ihr vorzugaukeln, und sie unablässig in augenblickliche Verirrungen zu stoßen, die jederzeit gehoben zu werden bedürfen."

"There exists thus a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason, not one in which for instance a bungler entangles himself through lack of knowledge, or which some sophist has artificially conceived to confuse reasonable people, but one which adheres to human reason unalterably and even after we have exposed its deception it still will not cease to mislead reason and to throw it incessantly into momentary errors which need to be lifted at all times." (KrV/CPR A298, B354f, t. m.)
This observation concerning the nature of reason must, for the time being, stand alone and as if out of context. But it is taken up below and integrated into this ongoing reading of Kant's treatment of the concept of substance throughout the first Critique.

But returning to our overarching question of Nietzsche's materialism and the role of physiology in it, we must now turn to the 'Paralogisms of Pure Reason' and ask what significance the critique of the concept of substance in the domain of reason, carried out in that chapter of the first Critique, has for the current project of delineating Nietzsche's philosophical physiology.

Here we must remind ourselves that the question which exercises the first Critique is that of the possibility, in principle, of knowledge. And as we know, Kant systematically investigates the constituents, as he sees them, of the processes whereby knowledge becomes possible. Just as reason in its finite employment, namely as the understanding acting in conjunction with intuition, positively contributes to the enquiry into the conditions of possibility of knowledge, so reason in its aspirations towards the infinite, namely unfettered by the essentially finite forms of intuition, contributes, as it were, negatively (cf. for instance Kant's remark, KrV/CPR A382) to this enquiry and forms the subject proper of critique, 'critique' here taken in the narrow sense of setting the circumference within which reason operates legitimately, given that the goal is to establish knowability in general.

In the sections on the 'Paralogisms of Pure Reason', Kant seeks to demonstrate in detail which unfounded syllogistic figures ensue when reason, in its historical manifestation as metaphysics, that is as yet unchecked by critique, falsely attributes various forms of knowability to
pure concepts which are not founded in intuition:

"Wir haben... gezeigt: daß reine Kategorien... an sich selbst gar keine objektive Bedeutung haben, wo ihnen nicht eine Anschauung unterlegt ist." "...we have shown that pure categories... in themselves have no objective meaning where no intuition supports them." (KrV/CPR A348f, t. m., my omissions).

In particular, paralogisms of pure reason are the unavoidable corollary of applying the pure concept of substance in this 'illegitimate' manner to the proposition 'I think'. The branch of traditional metaphysics which necessarily falls into this trap Kant designates as rational psychology. Its sole text, he maintains (KrV/CPR A343, B401), is the 'I think' which appears in the first Critique only as the transcendental unity of apperception.

Whilst it seems to be universally accepted that the section on the paralogisms is chiefly a response to Descartes (who is of course mentioned, for instance at A355) and the cogito ergo sum, it is much more important for our purposes here to draw out the ways in which this part of Kant's text is in, at least implicit, dialogue with Platonism such as it manifests itself most clearly in the Phaedo, the dialogue charting the death of Socrates and celebrating the eternal life of the soul.

This issue arises for instance in the following remark from the 'Critique of the First Paralogism of Pure Psychology':

"Was soll ich aber nun von diesem Begriffe einer Substanz vor einen Gebrauch machen. Daß ich, als ein denkend Wesen, vor mich selbst fortdaure, natürlicher Weise weder entstehe noch vergehe, das kann ich daraus keineswegs schließen und dazu allein kann mir doch der Begriff der Substantialität meines denkenden Subjekts nutzen..."

"But what use am I to make of this concept of a substance? That I, as a
thinking being, persist for myself, and do not in any natural manner either come to be or pass away, I can by no means deduce from it and yet that is the only use to which I can put the concept of the substantiality of my thinking subject." (KrV/CPR A349, t. m.)

It is precisely the 'use' mentioned here to which the concept of substance is put in the Phaedo, namely to found the belief that it is the substantiality of the soul which is the guarantor of its purity and its adequacy to the realm of the forms, and ultimately of course of its immortality.

Equally, in the 'Critique of the Second Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology' in which the metaphysical inference from the 'I think' to the simple or incomposite nature of the soul is shown as not in fact contributing to the knowledge of my thinking being, Kant again very plainly states the 'use' of this metaphysical inference:

"Jedermann muß gestehen: daß die Behauptung von der einfachen Natur der Seele nur so fern von einigem Werte sei, als ich dadurch dieses Subjekt von aller Materie unterscheiden und sie folglich von der Hinfälligkeit ausnehmen kann, der diese jederzeit unterworfen ist... obiger Satz... daher er auch ... so ausgedrückt wird: die Seele ist nicht körperlich."

"Everyone must admit that the assertion of the simple nature of the soul is of any value only insofar as thereby I can distinguish this subject from all matter and consequently can exempt it from the dissolution to which the latter is always subjected... the above proposition is frequently expressed as: the soul is not corporeal." (KrV/CPR A356, t. m., my omissions).

In other words, this aspect of 'the sole text of rational psychology' too has no other (implicit) purpose than to establish the immortality of the soul.
This same purpose is entirely apparent and even openly declared in the *Phaedo* and it is this open declaration of intent which makes this dialogue such a suitable focal point for our discussion here.

The significance of death as the starting point for this Platonic text cannot possibly be overemphasised. The narrative itself is set in motion by the imminent execution of Socrates; the discussions which make up the central parts are set during the last day of his life. But death is also the motor for this dialogue in another sense, insofar as Socrates claims that "...a man who has really devoted his life to philosophy should be cheerful in the face of death" (63e) and "...those who really apply themselves in the right way to philosophy are directly and of their own accord preparing themselves for dying and death." (64a). The Socratic project, the triumph of the dialectic, finds its consummation in death. This could be taken in a number of ways and it is absolutely crucial to draw out the predominant one here.

To say that the sense of philosophy lies in its preparation for death could, first of all, be a reminder of the finitude of human existence, both as mortality of the individual and as limitation of its faculties or capabilities - much in the way that the first Critique displays the reiteration of human finitude as one of its most predominant strands, most notably in emphasising throughout the crucial significance of the *finite* nature of sensibility. In this sense philosophy could be considered the art which gives a conceptual space to this fundamental truth. But this can clearly not be the case since the *Phaedo* is so centrally concerned with 'proving' the *immortality* of the soul, which means that it constitutes precisely a concerted disavowal of human finitude.

A second, and much more glorious, possibility for reading the claims which Socrates makes for philosophy would be to take them as a celebration of the - ardently anticipated - dissolution of individuated existence, a
celebration of the ('self'→expenditure in which matter likes to indulge. But Socrates, on the contrary, seeks to disprove this trait of matter by seeking to demonstrate the immortality of the soul.

The significance of philosophy as preparation for death centres on the description or definition of death as the separation of body from soul. All parties to the argument are united in the unquestioned belief in this duality although each one, Socrates, Simmias and Cebes, defines the relation between body and soul differently.

It is this division which centrally organises this dialogue and which is the Western metaphysical schema to have dominated philosophy for over two thousand years. The absolute separation and subsequent binary opposition of body and soul spawns the two series (throughout the Phaedo, throughout philosophy), the 'two worlds' which have become synonymous with Platonism: matter, mortality, impurity, illusion, unreason, secondary status/copy, becoming, difference, compositeness; as opposed to ideality, immortality, purity, truth, reason, originary status, being, identity, incompositeness/simplicity. Needless to say, philosophy in Socrates' projection inhabits—or at least seeks to inhabit—the second series only and the burden of proof which falls to Plato, in this case concerning the immortality of the soul⁴, is to found the second series as originary and, conversely, to show the dependence of the former series, which, needless to say, is taken to encompass all that is low, abject and reprehensible, on the latter one.

From a less metaphysically biased standpoint it is clear that this constitutes one of the most gigantic perversities ever to have been committed and that only an insanely arrogant life form could claim for itself the right and the voice to sit in judgement over life itself and to find it wanting. For that is obviously the implication, namely that life itself in one of its aspects (such as were outlined in the former series,
above) is deficient, that the body is of a far lesser status than the mind which is, for Plato, the only rightful place from which to aspire to truth and knowledge. This mania is very accurately portrayed in the following passage from Nietzsche:

"Über das Leben haben zu allen Zeiten die Weisesten gleich geurteilt: es taut nichts... Immer und überall hat man aus ihrem Munde denselben Klang gehört, - einen Klang voll Zweifel, voll Schwermut, voll Müdigkeit am Leben, voll Widerstand gegen das Leben. Selbst Sokrates sagte, als er starb: "leben - das heißt lange krank sein."

"On life the wisest have judged identically at all times: it is useless. Always and everywhere one has heard from their mouth the same tone - a tone full of doubt, full of melancholy, full of weariness with life, full of resistance against life. Even Socrates said as he died: "to live - that means to be sick for a long time..." (KSA 6, GD/TI, II, 1, t.m.)

In a symptomatic reading of this central Platonic text, the *Phaedo*, what emerges most distinctly is that the chief characteristic of Platonism is its foundation on an ontology of lack and absence for in it the realm in which the human animal moves is identified by insufficiency and whatever plenitude there can be resides in another realm, in that of the forms, access to which is always mediated (by philosophy). All of a sudden, the earth has become a barren place in which each thing and every being is so utterly devoid of any intrinsic meaning (which is reserved for the world of the forms), so suspended in the overwhelming experience of its own inadequacy, all it finally does is to anticipate its consummation in death - hence Socrates' ghoulish cheerfulness throughout the *Phaedo*.

To sum up this point, the sense of designating philosophy as preparation for death lies in projecting this type of philosophy as complementary to an image of life as fundamentally deficient and we also saw how the opposition of body to soul acted as the vehicle of this denigrating view of life.
Having established the most significant implications of the division of body and soul, which is itself of course the precondition of any proof for the immortality of the latter, we must return to the Paralogisms and expose their Janus-headed position, on the one side casting slyly longing glances towards these Platonic structures while the abyssal ruminations of Nietzsche loom on the other side.

Kant clearly states the three dialectical (that is to say, illusory, cf. for instance KrV/CPR A339, B397) questions which exercise rational psychology, and does so in a manner which precisely mirrors the structure of 'proof' in the Phaedo (69a-84b). In the section which concludes the Paralogisms in A, entitled 'Observation on the Sum of Pure Psychology, in Consequence of these Paralogisms' ('Betrachtung über die Summe der reinen Seelenlehre, zu Folge diesen Paralogismen', KrV/CPR A381ff, t. m.), he names firstly the question concerning the commerce between body and soul, secondly the question concerning the existence of soul before birth, and thirdly that concerning the continued existence of soul after death.

But of course the task which the chapter on the Paralogisms sets itself is to curb the speculative employment of reason when it attempts to extend knowledge concerning the 'I think' from concepts of reason alone, however innate this attempt to thus extend its knowledge is to reason, and thereby to prove these questions of rational psychology as unfounded, to exile them from the domain of objectively constitutive transcendental philosophy.

Insofar as these questions of rational psychology are predicated on a rigorously adhered to Platonistic two-world theory, one might at this point be tempted to infer that Kant's banishment of them has the effect of breaking up the mind-body dualism, of liberating matter into the divinity which only spirituality is accorded within Platonism. But, predictably enough, the chapter on paralogisms does not finally liberate the space of transcendental philosophy from the Platonistic legacy which tends to
accompany any enquiry into the nature of the thinking self, be it under the name of 'soul' or under that of 'transcendental unity of apperception', however much Kant seeks to distance his critical method from mere dogmatic assertions (KrV/CPR A388-A395).
III. The Transcendental Deduction (I)

We saw that the proclaimed task of the chapter on the paralogisms in the first Critique was to strip speculative metaphysics of any claims to knowledge concerning the nature of the thinking self. The most obvious side effect of this curbing of reason beyond its legitimate sphere of influence is to anchor all the more firmly the only notion approximating to the traditional concept of soul that remains valid within the first Critique, namely the transcendental unity of apperception. Kant claims that, having applied a critique of reason to one of its most central tenets (the founding nature of the 'I think'), this concept or proposition may reclaim its central space in its now reconstituted form, namely under the condition that no positive knowledge may be derived from it alone.

What, then, is the role of the transcendental unity of apperception in the first Critique? Kant, in proposing the Copernican turn, redirects the question of knowability to the knowing subject, to the one who says 'I think...such and such'. But in doing so he forecloses the question of who or what it is that says 'I think', and he does so not just as concerns the parameters of traditional metaphysics but, more importantly, for critical philosophy itself. And yet critique, the method invented by Kant against the inflated claims of speculative - fundamentally Christian - metaphysics, does not finally admit of any immovable fundaments like the (in the last instance) absolute nature of the 'I think' which has more of the functional structure of an old-style Christian belief than the invincibly moving force that critique displays at its best.

It certainly is a very clever move to rule out all inferences from the 'I think', especially when they are presented as taking their cue solely from the unrealisable project of rational psychology (unrealisable because it seeks to provide synthetic a priori judgements of knowledge from concepts
alone). But although Kant claims not to know anything about the unity of apperception, and claims that it can never aid in expanding knowledge of my thinking self, neither can he allow any space to the question of the whence of the 'I think', a very un-critical restriction. In other words, the very incisive question of use, which Kant addresses to the ideas of reason that emanate from the paralogisms (cf. p. 21 above), must not, according to him, be carried over to the transcendental unity of apperception, lest we disturb the sleep of reason which hovers about it.

But we know that the human animal has not yet been fixated ("Der Mensch ist das noch nicht festgestellte Tier" KSA 5, JGB/BGE, III, 62), and must raise the question of the implications of assuming an 'I think' necessarily able to accompany all 'my' representations ("Das: Ich denke, muß alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können" KrV/CPR B131, Kant's own emphasis).

In the 'Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding', Kant seeks to demonstrate the objective validity of the pure a priori concepts he listed in the Table of Categories. In order to show how such concepts can relate to intuitions, thereby producing knowledge (experience), he imagines both of these elements (categories and intuitions), as well as the result of their combination (experience), to be constituted in a synthesis. Firstly, empirical intuition is produced in a 'synthesis of apprehension in intuition' (KrV/CPR A98 - A100); secondly, the function mediating between intuition and concept resides in imagination ('synthesis of reproduction in imagination' KrV/CPR A100 - A102); thirdly, the provision of the concept to an otherwise pre-intellectual process occurs in the 'synthesis of recognition in a concept' (KrV/CPR A103 - A104).

The momentous thought which occurs here for the first time with any degree of explicitness is that all the elements which, when operating in concert, are constitutive of knowledge, are themselves produced by a series
of pure synthetic processes. Of course Kant immediately seeks to counterbalance this immensely radical thought by attributing these syntheses to a number of 'fountains of knowledge' (Erkenntnisquellen), namely sense, imagination and apperception respectively (KrV/CPR A115) and thereby seeks to, as it were, anchor inherently unfounded, sheer processes within quasi-stable domains, namely the faculties. But with this conception of 'pure' production he unwittingly unleashes the thought of a production without producer and thereby, for the first time in millenia, even if only within the space of transcendental philosophy, liberates nature from the impositions of theistic or anthropomorphic delusion.

A concomitant effect of this thought of synthesis concerns critical method. As Kant explains by way of contrast with dogmatic assertions:

"Der dogmatische Einwurf ist, der wider einen Satz, der kritische, der wider den Beweis eines Satzes gerichtet ist. Der erstere bedarf einer Einsicht in die Beschaffenheit der Natur des Gegenstandes, um das Gegenteil von demjenigen behaupten zu können, was der Satz von diesem Gegenstande vorgibt, er ist daher selbst dogmatisch und gibt vor, die Beschaffenheit, von der die Rede ist, besser zu kennen, als der Gegenteil. Der kritische Einwurf, weil er den Satz in seinem Werte oder Unwerte unangetastet läßt, und nur den Beweis anficht, bedarf gar nicht, den Gegenstand besser zu kennen...; er zeigt nur, daß die Behauptung grundlos, nicht, daß sie unrichtig sei."

"A dogmatic objection is directed against a proposition, a critical objection against the proof of a proposition. The former requires an insight into the constitution of the nature of the object so that the opposite of what the proposition supposed about this object can be claimed, thus it is itself dogmatic and supposes to know the constitution concerned better than the opposite. A critical objection, since it leaves the proposition in its validity or invalidity untouched and only assails the proof, does not need to know the object any better...; it only shows the claim to be unfounded and not to be wrong." (KrV/CPR A388, t.m., my omissions)
It is clear from this, as well as from our first brush with the\nTranscendental Deduction above, that both as concerns its object\n(knowledge) and, even more importantly, its method, critique concentrates\non their status as productions, on their nature as produced.

But Kant ("a cunning Christian to the last" KSA 6, GD/TI, IV, 6) throttles\na series of otherwise uninhibited syntheses he had discovered by a number\nof devices.

Foremost among these is the transcendental unity of apperception. It is\nof course possible to be extremely generous to Kant and to say that\nwhenever he says 'unity of apperception' he implies the constituted,\nunified nature of apperception. But if this were the case, he could easily\nhave used a whole range of German words which even in their nominal form\retain a strong verbal sense, such as, above all, Vereinigung or even\nEinigkeit, thereby indicating unity as the effect of unification rather\nthan as pre-given. But throughout the Transcendental Deduction the word he\nuses is Einheit.

A further, obvious point which needs to be made about the transcendental\napperception concerns the imputation of unity to it, which is of course the\nfirst category in the group headed 'quantity' in the Table of Categories\n(KrV/CPR A80, B106). As we saw in the discussion of the chapter on the\nparalogisms, the chief fallacy within rational psychology is derived from\nattributing to the 'I think' certain characteristics derived from pure a\npriori concepts alone. But Kant himself incessantly attributes the category\nof unity to the 'I think', thereby applying a category to that which\nelsewhere he simply calls "the vehicle of all...transcendental concepts"\nwhich is, furthermore, "always included in the conceiving of these\n[concepts]" and which "serves only to perform [auftühen] all our thought,\nas belonging to consciousness" (KrV/CPR A341, B399f, t. m., my omissions and
insertions). Kant can of course say that there is consciousness but, as he himself goes on to show in the Paralogisms, no categorically derived statements concerning the nature of that purely formal consciousness, or transcendental apperception, may be made.

A third point concerns not so much the result of Kant's inadmissible inferences about transcendental apperception but the manner in which he arrives at them. He writes:

"All necessity is at all times grounded in a transcendental condition. There must therefore be a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, and consequently also of the concepts of objects in general, and so of all objects of experience, a ground without which it would be impossible to think any object for our intuitions..." (KrV/CPR A106, t. m.)

In keeping with his method throughout the first Critique, the only transcendentality Kant could legitimately attribute to consciousness is the transcendentality of the conditions of its production, namely the synthesis in imagination or pure, transcendental imagination, as indeed he does when he writes:

"Diese synthetische Einheit [der reinen Apperzeption] setzt aber eine Synthesis voraus, oder schließt sie ein...und soll jene a priori notwendig sein, so muß letztere auch eine Synthesis a priori sein. Also bezieht sich die transzendentale Einheit der Apperzeption auf die reine Synthesis der Einbildungskraft, als eine Bedingung a priori der Möglichkeit aller Zusammensetzung des Mannigfaltigen in einer
Erkenntnis."

"This synthetic unity (of pure apperception) presupposes or includes a synthesis, and if the former is to be a priori necessary, the synthesis must also be a priori. The transcendental unity of apperception thus relates to the pure synthesis of imagination, as an a priori condition of the possibility of all combination of the manifold in one knowledge." (KrV/CPR A118, my insertion and italics).

It is in accordance with his own critical thought for Kant to say that a synthetically produced unity presupposes an a priori synthesis - in fact this could almost serve as a definition of the critical project insofar as it enquires into the possibility of unified experience through synthetic a priori judgements. But cutting across this coherent and definitionally correct inferential operation is the imposition of unity when there is simply no place for this pure concept of the understanding in this key critical operation, the Transcendental Deduction.

The tensions which the Kantian text suffers at this point are marked by italics in the above quote. In order not to fragment itself beyond all recognition it has to say what it does about the necessary movement of the deduction but it so yearns for a stable ground to the unpredictable maelstrom of pure synthetic activity that it loses itself in the feeble ambiguities I have indicated in the above passage.

So, to sum up these points, to speak of the transcendental unity of apperception betrays the effects of a wrongful syllogism just as much as does the paralogistic imputation of substantiality to transcendental apperception. Kant wishes for a transcendental subjectivity whose chief characteristic is self-identity. But this reactive desire of his is left behind by the inevitable flux of his own thought.
A further – Nietzsche derived and by now rather clichéd – point which needs to be made about transcendental apperception concerns the relation of grammar and thought. Only because the conjunction of grammatical subject and predicate in a proposition is identified as the form of a coherent judgement, there is no reason to attribute any truth beyond that of grammatical validity to it. And yet that is precisely what Kant does when he claims that the 'I think' is the vehicle of all concepts (KrV/CPR A341, B399) or even that "the abiding and unchanging 'I' (pure apperception) forms the correlate of all our representations in so far as it is to be at all possible that we should become conscious of them" (KrV/CPR A123). What is initially claimed here is merely that knowledge must always be articulated in accordance with the rules of grammar. But beyond that it hypostatises what is merely an event of thinking into an entirely indefensible unity of subjectivity, thereby betraying what is no more than an unfounded prejudice, namely that knowledge should always be on the side of such allegedly unified consciousness.

A key to the understanding of this wholly irrational move on Kant's part is provided by the following passage from the notebooks of Nietzsche, who clearly smelt the pungent odour of repression in Kant's first Critique:

"Die logisch-metaphysischen Postulate, der Glaube an Substanz, Accidens, Attribut usw. hat seine Überzeugungskraft in der Gewohnheit, all unser Thun als Folge unseres Willens zu betrachten: - so daß das Ich, als Substanz, nicht eingeht in die Vielheit der Veränderung."

"The logico-metaphysical postulates, the belief in substance, accidents, attribute etc, has its convincing force in the habit of viewing all our actions as consequences of our will: - so that the I, as substance, does not enter into the multiplicity of change." (KSA 12,9 [98], WM/WP no.488, my italics)
That is to say that the clandestine, essentially idealist and fundamentally Platonistic hidden agenda in Kant's assumption of the transcendental unity of apperception is to assure the stability of subjectivity, to have at least one 'safe' point exempted from the multiple becomings which he elsewhere thematises under the heading of 'synthesis'. Kant even states this explicitly when he recapitulates the first Analogy's findings prior to, and in the section on, the proof of the second Analogy, where he writes that:

"Das Entstehen oder Vergehen der Substanz selbst [findet] nicht statt."
"The coming to be or passing away of substance itself does not take place" (KrV/CPR B233, t. m.)

Kant thematises becoming under the names of coming to be and passing away but whatever is thought as substance is exempted from these changes. However much Kant would on the one hand like to distance himself from dogmatic metaphysics, he cannot, on the other hand, accept the perilous unpredictability of thought or thinking without a subject. Inasmuch as he attempts to prove the need for a unified transcendental subjectivity within the critical system, Kant remains in the vicinity of Plato when he feels the need to 'prove' the immortality of the soul.
IV. Physiology Inchoate

We are now in a position to show the connection between two points made earlier in artificial isolation. At the beginning of section two above, the inherently schizophrenic nature of reason was briefly mentioned. In the context of the first Critique it is - to a very limited extent - in Kant's interest to discredit the speculative use of reason which - in an infinite employment - claims to contribute to knowledge. Theoretical reason which goes beyond the subsumption of intuitions and concepts under each other exceeds the bounds of the operation which for Kant is productive of finite human knowledge. But as I hope to have already shown at the end of the penultimate section and again just now, Kant to varying degrees makes claims for the understanding which entangle it in similarly incompatible demands within the critical context.

Of reason Kant says without too much hesitation that it is perpetually and unavoidably involved in a dialectic concerning its own nature (KrV/CPR A298, B354, quoted and discussed above). This I take to mean that Kant admits that reason has to impose an absolute (the idea), on its own, otherwise uninhibited, surging process.

But in section I, entitled 'The Principle of Substance', I hope to have shown that this is comparable to the effect of imposing an, as it were, (de-)temporalised substance (permanence) on otherwise unceasing processes of becoming which are, furthermore, reduced to linear temporality in this metaphysical constriction of them.

Or again, as we saw in the discussion of transcendental apperception (the very guarantor of the imposition of conceptual order upon the chaos of perception), Kant's unfounded attribution of the concept of unity to it is finally incompatible with the critical sweep which arises virtually in the same gesture in the Transcendental Deduction.
It is therefore possible to say that whenever Kant militates against his own (better) insights, these reactive rebellions are formally extremely similar. Whether in the infinite employment of reason or (under the name of 'understanding') in its finite employment, reason makes itself impossible by imposing critically untenable identities (of the idea, of time, of consciousness) upon synthetic time-flows which are prior to them.

The significance of these identities within the critical system is that Kant wants them to act as guarantors of knowledge - prejudicially defined as unified experience. But, and this is what I hope to have shown, a properly critical project would have to abandon such metaphysically and dogmatically infused barriers to sheer synthesis in order to truly abandon itself to the search for the synthetic a priori elements of experience.

A more radical, that is to say a more truly critical meaning can be given to the notion of the transcendentality of experience if these 'logico-metaphysical postulates' are supplanted by a more appropriate embodiment - and methodological starting point - of perpetual production, as Nietzsche does when he writes:

"Gibt es eine gefährlichere Verirrung, als die Verachtung des Leibes? Als ob nicht mit ihr die ganze Geistigkeit verurteilt wäre krankhaft zu werden, zu den vapeurs des 'Idealismus'. Es hat Alles nicht Hand und Fuß, was von Christen und Idealisten ausgedacht worden ist: wir sind radikaler."

"Is there a more dangerous aberration than contempt for the body? As if it did not condemn all spirituality to become sickly - to the vapeurs of 'idealism'. There is nothing solid to whatever was made up by Christians and idealists: we are more radical." (KSA 13,14 [37], WM/WP no. 1016, t.m.)

And for the following reasons he suggests that the body and physiology provide this radical impetus:
"Alles, was als 'Einheit' ins Bewußtsein tritt, ist bereits ungeheuer kompliziert: wir haben immer nur einen Anschein von Einheit. Das Phänomen des Leibes ist das reichere, deutlichere, faßbarere Phänomen: methodisch vorzustellen, ohne etwas auszumachen über seine letzte Bedeutung."

"Everything which enters consciousness as 'unity' is already tremendously complicated: we always only have a semblance of unity. The phenomenon of the body is the richer, clearer, more graspable phenomenon: methodologically to be placed first without deciding anything about its ultimate significance." (KSA 12,5 1561, WM/ WP no. 489, t. m.)

So the body is to be made the methodological starting point without hypostatising it into a new 'ground' or a final explanatory principle and it will have to be thought in a non-substantial manner so as, minimally, not to repeat the metaphysical investments carried by the Kantian guarantor of knowledge, the transcendental unity of apperception. There are three closely related and equally important reasons why the substitution of body for 'soul' (transcendental subjectivity) is a crucial strategic move for Nietzsche.

Firstly, this obviously constitutes a forceful antidote to the anti-materialist agency which is projected (or rather 'invented') in the Platonic dialogues and which is constitutive of Platonistic philosophies, or simply Western metaphysics.

More subtle minds might object that this means nothing but a simple reversal of terms which leaves the fundamental oppositional structure of Platonism and its insidious effects intact. But this would only be a valid point if the body of Nietzschean physiology were an exact complement to the Platonic notion of soul. It remains for the following chapters to show that this is not the case.

Secondly, it is obvious that a very different type of knowledge must ensue from this central shift of method. For if it is no longer a self-
identical, quasi-idealistic subject to which an equally unified object must correspond with absolute necessity, if this version of the correspondence theory of truth - and with it any naive notions of truth itself - is overcome, knowledge gives way to what Nietzsche calls 'unknowing' (Nichtwissen or Unwissenheit), a knowing beyond the confines of representational thought. At the same time the unsustainable fiction of a self-coincident, self-possessed mind as the appropriate site of this (un-)knowing gives way to the 'richer', excessive productions of the body. As Nietzsche explains:


"The body and physiology starting point: why? - We gain the right idea of the nature of our subject-unity, namely as regents at the head of a community, not as 'souls'...as well as of the dependence of these regents on the ruled and of the conditions of order of rank and division of labour as making possible the individual and the whole at the same time. In the same way as living unities continually come to be and die and as eternity does not belong to the 'subject'...The certain ignorance about the individual tasks...of the community in which the regent is kept also belongs to the conditions under which it is possible to rule. In short, we gain an estimation for unknowing too, for rough and ready viewing, for simplifying and falsifying, for the perspectival. But most
important is that we understand the ruler and his subjects to be of the same nature, all feeling, willing, thinking." (KSA 11,40 [21], WM/WP no. 492, t.m., my omissions)

One of the predicted effects of this shift of attention from soul to body as the corollary of a different type of knowing is the restructuring of the relation between the two and, most remarkably given the hostility of metaphysics towards the body, the abolition of their oppositionality well beyond the anaemic idealist conception of both as 'thing', res cogitans and res extensa.

Thirdly, the time of the body is an entirely different time from that of consciousness. We saw Kant expounding the latter time as permanent and unilinear in its transcendental and empirical constitution, respectively. In doing so (chiefly in the first Analogy) we saw him translating the law of contradiction into temporal relations. But, given the transcendentally ideal nature of time and the cohesive demands of the Transcendental Deduction, the identity of consciousness and the identity of time (of that same consciousness) posited by Kant are not in any significant respect distinguishable. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the supercession of the former by a multiplicity of processes will entail a comparable dispersion of the latter. Nietzsche exposes the connection between the conception of time and the notion of truth when he contrasts the values with which Platonic thought and his own thought infuses their relation:

"Wert der Vergänglichkeit: etwas, das keine Dauer hat, das sich widerspricht, hat wenig Werth. Aber die Dinge, an welche wir glauben als dauerhaft, sind als solche reine Fiktionen. Wenn Alles fließt, so ist die Vergänglichkeit eine Qualität (die 'Wahrheit') und die Dauer und Unvergänglichkeit bloß ein Schein."

"Value of transitoriness: something that has no permanence, that contradicts itself, has little value. But the things in which we believe as permanent are pure fictions as such. If everything flows..."
transitoriness is a quality (the 'truth') and permanence and intransitoriness merely an appearance." (KSA 13, 11 [98], m.t.)

The significance of this development will be brought out in chapter four, below.

Having thus demonstrated the critical necessity for a physiological method, and the untenability of the concept of substance as a way of thinking physiology, it becomes necessary to pursue the implications of this strategic shift further by asking whether causality, as the traditionally dominant explanatory concept of the productions of nature, is appropriate for thinking the will to power as physiology.
"...wir suchen nach einem Täter zu jedem Geschehen...was haben wir gemacht? Wir haben ein Gefühl von Kraft, Anspannung, Widerstand ein Muskelgefühl, das schon der Beginn der Handlung ist, als Ursache mißverstanden - oder den Willen, das und das zu tun, weil auf ihn die Aktion folgt, als Ursache verstanden."
"...we seek a doer for every occurrence...What have we done? we have misunderstood a feeling of force, tension, resistance, a muscular feeling, which is already the beginning of the act, as the cause - or we have taken the will to do such and such for a cause, because upon it the action follows." (KSA 13,14 [98], WM/WP no. 551, t.m.)"
I. The Principle of Causality

The part of the Principles which is occupied by the second Analogy is entitled 'Principle of Succession in Time, in accordance with the Law of Causality' in the second edition, although in the first edition it is formulated more succinctly as 'Principle of Production' and it is to some extent from this latter title that the present chapter will take its cue. We must briefly remind ourselves that the general section on the Analogies of Experience states that 'Experience is only possible through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions' (KrV/CPR A176, B218) and that the central point here is that this connection is always only a connection of appearances in terms of time. So that in this, as much as in the other two Analogies, the burden of proof which falls to Kant concerns the necessary and universal, that is, the a priori nature of the particular temporal relation which the Analogy has to demonstrate. And although causality is of course one of the categories, and its rightful claim to feature in the Table of Categories needs to be established in detail here, it must be emphasised that the hypothetical judgement which spreads this concept over a statement (and from which judgement Kant claims the category to be derived) is the product of relations (between appearances) in time being organised in accordance with the pure concept of causality.

The second Analogy, though, derives its particular importance in the text from its place in the genesis of the whole critical project. For it was the question of the apriority of the concept of causality, as raised by Hume, which first provoked Kant to re-examine the entire issue of the claims of reason to any a priori concepts at all or, as Kant himself so famously puts it:
"Die Erinnerung des David Hume war eben dasjenige, was mir vor vielen Jahren zuerst den dogmatischen Schlummer unterbrach und meinen Untersuchungen im Felde der spekulativen Philosophie eine ganz andere Richtung gab."

"The recollection of David Hume was that which many years ago for the first time interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a wholly different direction."

(Krol/P 260, t.m.)².

Kant outlines the process which took him from the reappraisal of Hume's objections concerning the claims of reason that it possessed such a priori concepts as causality, to the 'discovery' of all a priori concepts of the understanding and the possiblity of their deduction (Prol/P 260). And he even implies that the first Critique, considered in extremis, does nothing but to work out the problem as posed by Hume:

"...Ausführung des Humeschen Problems in seiner möglich größten Erweiterung (nämlich der Kritik der reinen Vernunft)"

"...execution of the Humean problem in its greatest possible extension (namely the Critique of Pure Reason)" (Prol/P 261, t.m.)

Given the fact that Kant here apparently claims nothing less than the inception of the first Critique from the solution to the problem of the doubtful apriority of causality, it seems justified to expect its treatment in his text to be the most astonishingly coherent, minutely worked out and generally flawless account imaginable. Instead of which the second Analogy is full of false starts, inconclusive trains of thought and a 'solution' to the problems it poses which is clouded in obscurity. For instance, the proposition which is to form the major premise in Kant's intended syllogistic proof of the apriority of causality, namely that "...the apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive" (KrV/CPR A189, B234), appears in only slightly modified formulations no less than
three more times throughout the chapter as: (in perception) "appearances follow one another" (KrV/CPR B233); "In the synthesis of appearances the manifold of representations is always successive" (KrV/CPR A198, B243); "To all empirical knowledge there belongs the synthesis of the manifold by imagination which [synthesis] is always successive" (KrV/CPR A201, B246, t.m., my insertion). In none of these cases does he, to my mind at least, satisfactorily carry out the intended proof. And although this is not the place to carry out the thorough and detailed reading which this strange chapter deserves, some of the more obvious hiatuses in the overall argument need to be discussed. All the more so since they point the way for a reconsideration of these issues in light of Nietzsche's thoughts on the topic of production.

Kant's own claims for the significance of the material which is covered by the chapter on the second Analogy aside, the issue of causality would naturally dominate his metaphysics of experience since the law of causality has traditionally been considered the very paradigm of the condition of possibility of regulated experience and that has historically meant, of knowledge as science. If, as Hume found it to be the case, causality was not an a priori concept and thus not the guarantor of the predictability of natural processes occurring with any degree of regularity, science would be entirely reduced to empirical procedures and philosophy would do nothing but summarise its findings after the event. So in order to demonstrate that science is more than the organisation into coherent discourses of details of knowledge derived from experience and thus, by extension, to prove the role of philosophy as the sole discipline which can in principle explain this possibility of science, Kant needs to return to causality the right to claim apriority for itself. Of course he needs to do this for all the pure concepts of the understanding, but no other category can quite claim the
position of cornerstone to the foundation of a rational science in the way that causality can.

And it is, in short, for this reason that the 'success' of the entire critical project can be gauged by the success of the proof of the apriority of causality which Kant undertakes in the second Analogy. This outlines the task of the second Analogy in general. We can now turn to the first of the more detailed technical problems encountered in that chapter.

The beginning of the section, entitled 'proof', in the first edition states with characteristic concision that "the apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive." (KrV/CPR A189, B234). In other words, "the representations of the parts [of an appearance] follow upon one another" (ibid., my insertion). These two statements taken together represent no more than a reiteration or a reminder of the material of the 'Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition' which appears in the first version of the Transcendental Deduction (KrV/CPR A98f) and in rather more explicit terms in the second edition (KrV/CPR B162). This is naturally the case since each of the Principles repeats - in terms of the particular category or group of categories which determines each individual Principle - the structure of the three interrelated syntheses given only in purely formal terms in the Transcendental Deduction (in A). In that chapter the process in general is outlined without any one of the determinate concepts, the imposition of which on the synthetic processes creates the need for the Principles in the first place. In the Transcendental Deduction (in B) Kant states explicitly that "...the synthesis in apprehension...is empirical" (KrV/CPR B162) and in the previous chapter we saw that empirical time is always linear or successive for Kant. The quote from the second Analogy given above could thus be slightly reformulated to say that the apprehension of the manifold, insofar as it is always the product of an
empirical synthesis, is always successive. But this necessary initial ordering of representations in time into the succession which is said to correspond to the alleged nature of the pure form of inner sense, does not yet provide any knowledge of the temporal organisation of the object of representation 'itself', or of the temporal relations between these objects of representation. Consequently, what Kant needs to do here is to establish the difference between the necessary and universal but, insofar as its apriority derives only from that of the pure form of inner sense, merely subjective succession in apprehension (post hoc) and the necessary and universal succession in the object (propter hoc) which designates the causal nexus proper. And in order to establish this difference he needs to, as it were, drive a wedge between merely subjective representations which lack objective necessity and the objectively valid representations (of an object) in accordance with temporal orderings of a necessary succession. As he puts it:

"...so soll ich anzeigen, was dem Mannigfaltigen an den Erscheinungen selbst für eine Verbindung in der Zeit zukomme, indessen, daß die Vorstellung desselben in der Apprehension jederzeit sukzessiv ist."

"...I have to show what sort of connection in time belongs to the manifold of appearances themselves inspite of the fact that the representation of it in apprehension is at all times successive."

(KrV/CPR A190, B235, t. m., my emphasis)

Needless to say, in the final instance the form which the argument takes is well known and thoroughly predictable. The question 'how do we know that causality is an a priori concept?' (that is to say, an objectively valid term whose status as preceding and formative of experience can be demonstrated without relying solely on experience for this proof) Kant answers in typically circular manner by saying 'because we have an a priori faculty which provides this concept'.
But that is not to say very much, for he could have answered his overarching question of 'how are synthetic a priori judgements possible?' by merely saying 'because we have faculties which interact in such a manner as to make them possible' instead of writing the first Critique which gives substance to that thought. And although that, in the final analysis, is indeed the answer which the first Critique gives to its organising question, it cannot stand in lieu of the individual arguments for the transcendental organisation of the faculties of knowledge Kant needs to produce throughout. And so in the context of the argument for the apriority of causality, too, the general answer to the problem must be put aside for the moment and the minutiae must be examined.

Picking up again the thread which the structure of the three combined syntheses provides for the reading of the second Analogy, and with reference to the second synthesis in the Transcendental Deduction ('Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination', KrV/CPR A100 - 102), Kant, after having reminded his readers that a causal connection means that "...I am...connecting two perceptions in time" goes on to say that "...connection is... the product of a synthetic faculty of imagination which determines inner sense in respect of the time relation". But, and this is of enormous significance, in the same place Kant writes:

"Diese [die Einbildungskraft] kann aber gedachte zwei Zustände auf zweierlei Art verbinden, so, daß der eine oder der andere in der Zeit vorausgehe...Ich bin mir also nur bewußt, daß meine Imagination eines vorher, das andere nachher setze, nicht daß im Objekte der eine Zustand vor dem anderen vorhergehe..."

"But imagination can connect these two conceived states in two different ways, so that the one or the other precedes in time...Thus I am only conscious that my imagination places one before, the other after, not
that the one state precedes the other in the object..." (KrV/CPR B233, t.m., my omissions)

The synthesis of the manifold in apprehension derives its peculiar temporal structuring from the nature of empirical time as linear (or, more accurately, as representable only in terms of linearity). The synthesis in imagination - which is not only an empirical synthesis - is that actus which in principle enables the combination of intuitions and concepts, in other words it is that which provides the 'ground' or possibility for the temporalisation of concepts or, conversely, for the temporal determination, according to categories, of the manifold of intuition. Imagination is that faculty (reservoir of connective capabilities) which primarily allows synthesis to occur. It does not itself, however latently, contain a necessary temporal relation or, more specifically succession, which it could impose on the material which it synthesises. The imagination makes connections, it does not determine what these connections are. The imagination only synthesises, but linear time is not itself the product of this pure synthesis. Hence the imagination 'connects two perceptions' and this connection is always 'connection in time' (cf. previous page). But whether, of two states a and b, it is a which precedes b or vice versa, it is not for the imagination to decide.

That which does determine their relation in time is the concept which enters the synthesising processes in the third synthesis ('Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept') at which point the understanding, in other words consciousness, comes into these otherwise pre-conscious processes. Thus far Kant merely fills in the formal structures sketched in the Transcendental Deduction (in A). What is required at this point is that the difference between "..subjective succession of apprehension [and]..objective succession of appearances" (KrV/CPR A193, B238) be
generated, which Kant proposes to do, after restating the problem (cited p.45f, above, in a quote from A190, B235) in the following manner:

"...was verstehe ich also unter der Frage: wie das Mannigfaltige in der Erscheinung selbst...verbunden sein möge? Hier wird das, was in der sukzessiven Apprehension liegt, als Vorstellung, die Erscheinung aber, die mir [durch diese Vorstellungen] gegeben ist, ohnerachtet sie nichts weiter als ein Inbegriff dieser Vorstellungen ist, als der Gegenstand derselben betrachtet, mit welchem mein Begriff, den ich aus den Vorstellungen der Apprehension ziehe, zusammenstimmen soll."

"...what then am I to understand by the question: how the manifold in the appearance itself...may be connected? Here that which lies in the successive apprehension is viewed as representation but the appearance, which is given me [by these representations], notwithstanding that it is nothing more than the epitome of these representations, is viewed as their object to which my concept, which I derive from the representations of the apprehension, has to correspond." (KrV/CPR A191, B236, t.m., my omissions and insertion)

Kant obviously wants to locate the difference between subjective and objective succession in the fissure he opens up between 'the appearance itself' and the representations which make up this appearance. Furthermore, he introduces a distinction between appearances and objects, the former of which merely 'designate' (bezeichnen) the latter (KrV/CPR A189f, B234f). But both distinctions seem rather forced and unconvincing.

As concerns the first, no point (in consciousness) is imaginable from which the difference between representations and appearances could actually be realised. To do so would require absolute control over the entire process of perception and, since this process is characterised by receptivity and passivity, and hence is a completely involuntary process (e.g. KrV/CPR A19f, B33f), it is not at all clear how this distinction could become operative in practice. As concerns the second differentiation, it is, if anything, even more spurious. For if the knowable world is to be
the correlate of the transcendental subjectivity which formally produces it, if the world is to be in that sense intrasubjective - and this is what the Copernican turn, without which philosophy slides back into what Kant calls empirical idealism, demands - then the only admissible difference between appearances and objects must be a heuristic one, not one which could substantially affect any argument.

The real reason why Kant overloads his terminology here and asks it to do much more than it can do, given the parameters he lays out for it everywhere else in the first Critique, seems to me to reside in the fact that the only way in which he could ultimately thematise the difference between subjective and objective temporal orders would be precisely to admit that such rivalling temporal orders exist. But it is of course the case that he cannot entertain the idea of a fragmentation of (what is for him a monolithic) time anymore than he can envisage a fragmented subjectivity, its inevitable corollary.

Given the centrality of time in the first Critique and the way in which the whole project in fact hinges on the rethinking of the concept of time (namely as empirically real and transcendentally ideal, cf. for example KrV/CPR, §§ 6 - 8 of the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' or A369 - 377 of the 'Paralogisms'), the realisation, repeatedly provoked by reading the first Critique, that Kant does not finally think temporality with any degree of conceptual specificity, comes as more than a surprise. By this I mean to say that the critical system gives, as it were, a place to time which ultimately remains vacant; or, to put it another way, it sets up the centrality of time without explicitly rethinking it as the entirely altered concept demanded by the more advanced implications of critique itself, and specifically by the thought of synthesis.
This contention is in fact amply borne out by the examples with which Kant seeks to clarify the difference between succession in apprehension and succession in appearance. His example for the succession in apprehension, which is a merely subjective (albeit equally necessary) succession, he locates in the appearance of a house, of which he claims quite confidently that the appearance 'itself' is not successive:

"So ist...die Apprehension des Mannigfaltigen in der Erscheinung eines Hauses, das vor mir steht, sukzessiv. Nun ist die Frage: ob das Mannigfaltige dieses Hauses selbst auch in sich sukzessiv sei, welches freilich niemand zugeben wird."

"So...the apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a house which stands before me is successive. Now the question is: whether the manifold of this house itself is also in itself successive which of course no one will grant." (KrV/CPR A190, B236, t. m., my omissions and emphasis)

On the other hand, the apparently indisputable exemplar of an appearance which does 'itself' contain a necessary succession is that of a ship drifting down a stream ("Ich sehe z. B. ein Schiff den Strom hinab treiben.") of which he states equally unequivocally:

"Meine Wahrnehmung, seiner Stelle unterhalb, folgt auf die Wahrnehmung der Stelle desselben oberhalb dem Laufe des Flusses, und es ist unmöglich, daß in der Apprehension dieser Erscheinung das Schiff zuerst unterhalb, nachher aber oberhalb des Stromes wahrgenommen werden sollte."

"My perception of its position downstream follows upon the perception of its position upstream in the course of the river and it is impossible that in the apprehension of this appearance the ship should be perceived first downstream but later upstream." (KrV/CPR A192, B237, t. m., my emphasis)

There are three closely related but distinct aspects of these examples which show them to be rather inappropriate. They are also, it must be
stressed, especially symptomatic of the central dilemma of Kant's text, namely the simultaneous centrality and unthinkability of synthetic a priori temporality within the parameters of the critical system, and it is obviously for this reason, rather than because they are 'badly chosen', that they require close attention here.

Firstly, as concerns the - according to Kant - indisputably non-successive manifold of the appearance of a house, it has to be said that the house, and with it the manifold of its appearance, does of course extend in time.

We saw above that the empirical constitution of time is identified with succession by Kant, so that succession and extension in time can be taken as synonymous as far as appearances are concerned. Conversely, though, extension in time is definitional to appearances. If it is further realised that appearances cannot be apprehended in isolation from their manifold, it becomes obvious that, contrary to what Kant wants to claim for it, the manifold of the house is indeed successive.

But the steady procession through time (in its parts as much as the whole) which the house must undergo in order to become an appearance for perception at all, is not matched by any obvious large-scale movement in space. And it is obviously the fact that the house remains relatively constant or settled in space which seduces Kant into thinking that its movement through time is similarly curbed. This is no doubt another instance in which Kant's tendency to think time in purely spatial terms (cf. chapter one above) finally prevents him from thinking the specificity of time at all, even in order to establish the apriority of certain concepts (as, in this case, causality) with regard to temporality.

Similarly, the only real difference between the house and the ship in Kant's formulation of these examples is that the latter drifts visibly
through space as well as through time. But it is not only his task here to prove the possibility of an object's progression through space. Instead, Kant set out to thematise the condition of possibility of recognising (erkennen) change in nature, of it forming part of experience. (He must found the science of metaphysics which can show how the science of nature, here qua physics, is in principle possible - because both are based on rational precepts (cf. for example KrV/CPR, Preface in B and Introduction parts V.- VII.).) But the change in nature which physics theorises is not equivalent and reducible to movement in space. The latter is obviously part of the former but the theoretical possibilities of the former are not exhausted by describing the mechanics of the latter.

Equally puzzling, though, is the case of a ship drifting down a stream as an example of a necessary objective succession. There is a rather sly twist to Kant's manipulation of his material in this example, for the following reason. Although this is rarely quoted correctly or commented on, Kant does in fact speak of a ship drifting down a stream ("Ich sehe z.B. ein Schiff den Strom hinabtreiben."). What is peculiar about this is that a ship would only drift if it was out of control or even unmanned; it would then be subject to natural forces (the normal activity of ships - in German - is fahren or segeln). If the ship was drifting down a stream it would be in, yet as object separate from, the movement of the stream, rather like an object is in consciousness, according to Kant; (as such this scenario might have commended itself to Kant as an analogy, rather than as an example, of the type of succession he seeks to demonstrate). In the more usual case of a ship going down a stream, the controlled nature of this movement would be due to the manipulation of a navigator or a similarly skilled person. Hence both examples discuss objects which depend on their movement (or perceived lack thereof) on the skills of craftspeople or technicians. And although
the difference between natural and made objects (objects of *physis* as opposed to objects of *techne*) is of no further relevance for a physics which constructs its objects merely in terms of mechanical causality, it is nevertheless interesting that Kant exclusively focuses on the latter type of object in a discussion which seeks to found what is perhaps the central concept of physics — a science which at least began by being the study of natural objects. The reason being that Kant might find it more comforting to imagine himself moving in a world of made objects, rather than in a world of natural objects which remain fundamentally alien, even when subsumable to the conceptuality of physics. But by speaking of a ship drifting down a stream he has seemingly struck a compromise between the forces of nature (which would cause the drifting) and human engineering (which produces the ship).

In all conceivable ways the example of the ship fails to demonstrate anything about the necessary temporal succession in the object. It merely repeats, on an explicitly spatialised plane, the thought of the necessary succession in apprehension (the alleged one-dimensionality of inner sense) which all our representations 'drift down'. In this example, too, Kant's pre-critical instincts to spatialise all essentially temporal relations are given free rein.

But it is not only in the inappropriate demonstration of the two types of (subjective and objective) succession that the second Analogy displays some obvious problems.

At one of the points in the chapter where Kant starts up the syllogistic proof of the apriority of the category of causality he begins, as already mentioned above, with the reiteration of the one certainty, namely that the apprehension of the manifold in appearance is always successive. Or, according to the formulation which he gives his major premise here:
"In der Synthesis der Erscheinungen folgt das Mannigfaltige der Vorstellungen jederzeit nacheinander."

"In the synthesis of appearances the manifold of representations is at all times successive" (KrV/CPR A198, B243, t. m.)

He proceeds - not to the minor premise but to a blatantly incorrect statement, and one which is delivered in an uncharacteristically dogmatic tone:

"Hierdurch wird nun gar kein Objekt vorgestellt [sic]; weil durch diese Folge, die allen Apprehensionen gemein ist, nichts vom andern unterschieden wird."

"Now no object is being represented hereby [sic]; since by this succession which is common to all apprehensions nothing is being distinguished from anything else." (KrV/CPR ibid., t. m.)

Contrary to what Kant claims here, it must of course be the case that an object is being represented by the synthesis of apprehension. If this were not so then the house, the representation of which comes about as a result precisely of that synthesis, would not become an object of perception at all (in the example cited and discussed above). The sentence reproduced in this last quote from the second Analogy provokes the lingering impression that it stands in lieu of, rather than as, the necessary argumentative progression from the major premise to the conclusion.

But it is really this 'conclusion', on which falls the onus to show convincingly the necessary and universal status of causality, that contains the most conspicuous hiatus which, incidentally, runs through the entire chapter. Kant writes:

"So bald ich aber wahrnehme, oder [besser gesagt] voraus annahme, daß in dieser Folge eine Beziehung auf den vorhergehenden Zustand sei, aus welchem die Vorstellung nach einer Regel folgt: so stelle ich etwas vor
als Begebenheit..., d. i. ich erkenne einen Gegenstand, den ich in der
Zeit auf eine gewisse bestimmte Stelle setzen muß, die ihm, nach dem
vorhergehenden Zustande, nicht anders erteilt werden kann."

"But as soon as I perceive or [rather] assume beforehand that in this
succession there is a relation to the preceding state from which the
representation follows according to a rule: so I represent something as
an event...that is, I come to know an object which I have to put at a
certain determinate place in time which, after the preceding state,
cannot be allotted to it differently." (KrV/CPR ibid., t.m. my insertion
and omissions)

Whilst this is unproblematic as a description of how the concept of
causality is applied to appearances (of the mechanics of that operation),
it nonetheless begs the question, here averted and unanswered, why it is
that I perceive (wahrnehme) or assume beforehand (voraus annehme) that this
type of relation should be applied to these appearances in the first place
- when a detailed account of the grounds for applying each pure concept of
the understanding in turn to intuitions is precisely what the Principles
must provide. Thus the chapter on the second Analogy should be able to
explain the reasons why, in any given case, representations should be
connected according to the concept of causality. And although Kant,
throughout this chapter, obviously operates with the differentiation
between subjective and objective succession, nowhere in this chapter does
he actually convincingly establish the ground for their differentiation, or
say which are the criteria by means of which it can be realised that this
succession is merely subjective whereas that succession does take place in
the object's.

Instead of countenancing these questions, Kant paints what is for him the
nightmare scenario of a world without regularity and that means first and
foremost a world devoid of causality, without which the possibility of
knowledge disappears altogether for him:

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"Man setze, es gehe vor einer Begebenheit nichts vorher, worauf dieselbe nach einer Regel folgen müßte, so wäre alle Folge der Wahrnehmung nur lediglich in der Apprehension, d. i. bloß subjektiv...Wir würden auf solche Weise nur ein Spiel der Vorstellungen haben, das sich auf gar kein Objekt bezöge...mithin gar nicht vor Erkenntnis irgend eines Gegenstandes...gelten kann." "Let us suppose nothing preceded an event upon which it had to follow according to a rule, so all succession of perception would only be in apprehension, that is, merely subjective...In this way we would only have a play of representations which would not relate to any object...and thus cannot count for the knowledge of any object." (KrV/CPR A194f, B239f, t. m., my omissions and italics)

And as if the thought of being at the mercy of such an unpredictable farrago as a mere 'play of representations' was not enough to shock all lovers of knowledge into the realisation that causality must be primordial, Kant reiterates the point more sternly when he writes:

"Widrigenfalls, wenn ich das Vorhergehende setze, und die Begebenheit folgte nicht darauf notwendig, so würde ich sie nur für ein subjektives Spiel meiner Einbildungen halten müssen, und stellte ich mir darunter doch etwas Objektives vor, sie einen bloßen Traum nennen." "Otherwise, if I posit the preceding and the event would not necessarily follow upon it, I would merely have to regard it as a subjective play of my imaginings and if I yet represented it as something objective to myself, I would have to call it a mere dream." (KrV/CPR A201f B247, t. m., my italics)

Unless the objective validity of the pure concept of causality as an a priori concept is admitted, we condemn ourselves to a merely subjective play of imagination or illusion and to a dream. So objectivity, here of course understood as the prevalence of the understanding and its continuous formation of a world which corresponds to the structures of consciousness,
is the only guarantor of the possibility of transcending the unpredictable, irregular and incommunicable realm of the 'merely subjective', of sensibility and imagination. The fact that Kant here equates transcendence and objectivity becomes quite clear when he restates the question which runs through the second Analogy in the following formulation:

"...wie geht diese Vorstellung wiederum aus sich selbst heraus, und bekommt objektive Bedeutung...?"
"...how does this representation in turn go out beyond itself and acquire objective meaning...?" (KrV/CPR A197, B242, t. m.)

The conjunction here appears to have the function of 'that is to say', thereby implying that Kant here wants to locate transcendence in objectivity. We have already seen how this reductive representational schema, for instance in its tendency to deny the non-spatial specificity of a temporality in need of re-thinking according to the demands of critique, produces seemingly insurmountable problems for the critical system. The limitations imposed on Kant by his absolute insistence on the primacy of the understanding (and the allegedly rational structures according to which it is said to organise experience) surface again with great clarity in his discussion of causality. The chief obstacle, as I hope to have indicated, once more lies in the essential unrepresentability of time 'itself' which leads Kant to claim that, in the last instance, an object which does not move in space is not in time at all (his example of the house, cf. my discussion above) and that an object which drifts down a unilinear trajectory has causal necessity due to this movement.

In these examples it is essentially the understanding's incapacity to realise the specific properties of non-linear, non-rational, pre-conscious time (the temporality which can be associated with the imagination,
according to Kant's own characterisation of it in this Analogy as well as in the Transcendental Deduction) which leads to the breakdown of the argument, insofar as Kant cannot finally theorise the ruptures between that type of temporality and a merely subjective progression due to the nature of empirical time and the apprehension of the object it necessitates, nor those between that subjective progression and an objective progression, due to a causal nexus in or affecting the object. The reason for this crucial inability would again appear to be related to the irresolvable tensions between Kant's explicit project - namely to found the claims to knowledge of the rational sciences by delimiting the domain of synthetic a priori judgements - and his unstoppable slide into a (very much implicit) theory of unconscious production which emerges at precisely that point where the possibilities of his avowed project exhaust themselves.
II. The Containment of Matter

Throughout the Analogies, as throughout the Analytic, Kant's aim is of course to deal with temporal relations or relations in the realm of appearances only. Thus the question need never arise whether things in themselves, in theoretical isolation from our modes of perception and conceptualisation, are organised and connected in terms of causality. Obviously, the only question which Kant needs to address is whether causality is one of the a priori concepts according to which experience is always necessarily structured, not whether things in themselves undergo change or whether events in themselves ('event' being Kant's name for causal succession in the object) occur due to causality. Thus in reading the second Analogy, a repetition of the error of which Kant accuses Hume's detractors is to be avoided, namely to misunderstand the claims being made for causality:

"Man kann es, ohne eine gewisse Pein zu empfinden, nicht ansehen, wie so ganz und gar seine Gegner... den Punkt seiner Aufgabe verfehlten und... immer das als zugestanden annahmen, was er eben bezweifelte, dagegen aber mit Heftigkeit... dasjenige bewiesen, was ihm niemals zu bezweifeln in den Sinn gekommen war..."

"One cannot observe, without feeling a certain pain, how entirely his opponents... missed the point of his task and... always assumed that as given which he doubted and conversely proved with vigour that which he would never have dreamt of doubting." (Prol/P 258, t.m., my omissions)

It is clear that Kant's theory of the production of knowledge for and by the natural sciences, insofar as it claims that this knowledge is produced according to causality, is adequate. The issue, though, which remains entirely unquestioned in this is what type of knowledge (Wissen) or science (Wissenschaft) ensue when causality is the fundamental organising principle
and whether this is the most desirable way of thinking the productions of nature. In short, Kant's adherence to causality as the chief Principle (here in the technical sense of that word) of production needs to be considered from the point of view of value.

First of all the, perhaps rather obvious, point needs to be reiterated that critique, which is based on the central proviso that no knowledge concerning the nature of things in themselves is possible but that the investigation is confined to a theory of how appearances are produced, carries with it no less hidden assumptions and prejudices concerning the nature of the (now exclusively phenomenal) world than any other ontology. That is to say that Kant's critically reinscribed ontology is imbued with unrealised values which it is the task of the 'physician', in the mode of Nietzsche, to diagnose and thereby to determine what kind of physiology asserts itself in these writings, what type of will to power dominates in them.

Before attempting such a diagnosis, some preliminary comments concerning Nietzsche's thinking on the matter of value need to be made. Its most significant aspect undoubtedly lies in its revaluation of the proprietary relation which exists between values and human being.

From Protagoras to Kant, the principle of homo mensura, whether explicitly formulated or cloaked in the language of a man-made theology, runs through philosophy as one of its chief truths. With regard to values this belief quite naturally leads to the assumption of human being as the originator of values, whereby the representational framework of a (for this type of thinking) fundamentally unproblematic subject-object relation within which epistemological issues are raised, remains entirely undisturbed. As opposed to both this and a positivistic scientism which
throws up the fact-value distinction, Nietzsche’s re-thinking of the relation between values and human being reverses the order of origin, so that it is no longer human being which deliberately 'uses' or regrettably 'has' values in its dealings with the 'external', factual world.

By the time Nietzsche’s understanding of their relation emerges, any voluntaristic notions, according to which values could be manipulated by a self-possessed human subject, have been jettisoned. Instead, and in keeping with the primacy of will to power as productive 'principle', will to power itself produces values. So much so that it is even entirely misleading - although inevitable due to the rules of grammar structured around subject-object relations - to distinguish between will to power and the production of values, for that is what will to power does exclusively. That human being features as one of the instruments through which values are played out should not give rise to the misunderstanding of human being as originary of them (although this misapprehension has of course traditionally been predominant). And - since to do otherwise would be to underwrite the divisions, classifications and categorisations imposed upon the flows of nature by humanistic self-interest - Nietzsche never loses sight of the fact that the will to power as articulation of values - which is what is meant by 'interpretation' - is not even confined to (organic) life ("Leben ist bloß ein Einzelfall des Willens zur Macht"; "Life is only a special case of the will to power" KSA 13,14 [121]; WM/WP no.692), nor does it solely operate by means of human being but is equally at work in all other organisms:

"Der Wille zur Macht interpretiert: bei der Bildung eines Organs handelt es sich um eine Interpretation; er grenzt ab, bestimmt Grade, Machtverschiedenheiten. Bloße Machtverschiedenheiten könnten sich noch nicht als solche empfinden: es muß ein wachsen-wollendes Etwas da sein, das jedes andere wachsen-wollende Etwas auf seinen Wert hin
interpretiert. Darin gleich - In Wahrheit ist Interpretation ein Mittel selbst, um Herr über etwas zu werden. (Der organische Prozeß setzt fortwährendes Interpretieren voraus)."

"The will to power interprets: the formation of an organ is a question of interpretation; it delimits, determines degrees, differentials of power. Mere differentials of power could not yet sense themselves as such: a something that wills-to-grow must be there, that interprets every other something that wills-to-grow according to its value. Therein equal - In truth interpretation is itself a means of becoming master over something. (The organic process presupposes continual interpreting)."

(KSA 12,2 [148], WM/WP no.643, t. m.)

It should be clear that the mastery ("Herr über etwas werden") mentioned in this note does not refer to any human individual becoming master over something or someone. It is, if anything, rather human being which is mastered by the interpretation, that is to say by the will to power positing values. Two instances or levels of values, therefore, have to be distinguished: those of primary, originary status which Nietzsche discusses (for instance in the passage cited above), which determine each particular physiology they shape and inhabit in a very immediate sense and which may therefore be called physiological values; as opposed to the anthropomorphic values of any traditional - philosophical, ethical, scientific etc. - system of which human being flatters itself to be the source and according to which it in turn interprets its environment. The relation between the two classes of values is made particularly clear in this passage from Götzen-Dämmerung:

"Wenn wir von Werten reden, reden wir unter der Inspiration, unter der Optik des Lebens: das Leben selbst zwingt uns Werte anzusetzen, das Leben selbst wertet durch uns, wenn wir Werte ansetzen."

"When we speak of values we speak under the inspiration, under the perspective of life: life itself forces us to posit values, life itself values through us when we posit values." (KSA 6, GD/TI, V, 6,5, t.m.)
It is well known that the Nietzschean diagnosis seeks to discover whether the life form, phenomenon, occurrence, or whatever else the pulse on which it puts its finger belongs to, is discharging itself in an uninhibited way or whether its capacity for (self-)expenditure is in any way interrupted—typically by the idealist impositions of speculative reason (whether as Platonism or Christianity):

"Welche Vorteile bot die christliche Moral-Hypothese? Sie verlieh dem Menschen einen absoluten Wert, im Gegensatz zu seiner Kleinheit und Zufälligkeit im Strom des Werdens und Vergehens."

"Which advantages did the Christian moral hypothesis offer? It lent human being an absolute value, as opposed to its smallness and contingency in the stream of becoming and passing away" (KSA 12,5 [71], WM/WP no. 4, t. m.)

This state of affairs, this incapacity for expenditure, is indicative of the exhaustion which Nietzsche terms decadence. Thus for instance the following passage provides a vade mecum for the practitioner of such diagnoses:

"Es gibt einen Begriff, der anscheinend keine Verwechslung, keine Zweideutigkeit zulässt: das ist der der Erschöpfung. Diese kann erworben sein; sie kann vererbt sein — in jedem Falle verändert sie den Aspekt der Dinge, den Wert der Dinge...Im Gegensatz zu dem, der, aus der Fülle, welche er darstellt und fühlt, unfreiwillig abgibt an die Dinge, sie voller, mächtiger, zukunftsreicher sieht — der jedenfalls schenken kann, verkleinert und verhunzt der Erschöpfte alles was er sieht, — er verarmt den Wert: er ist schädlich...Der Arme an Leben der Schwache verarmt noch das Leben: der Reiche an Leben der Starke bereichert es...Der Erste ist dessen Parasit; der Zweite ein Hinzuschenkender..."

"There is a concept which apparently admits of no confusion, no ambiguity: that of exhaustion. This can be acquired, it can be inherited— in each case it changes the aspect of things, the value of
things... In contrast to him who, from out of the fullness which he represents and feels, involuntarily gives to things, sees them more fully, more powerfully, with a more promising future - who is at any rate able to give, the exhausted diminishes and ruins all he sees, - he impoverishes the value: he is harmful... The poor of life the weak yet impoverishes life: the rich of life the strong enriches it... The first is its parasite; the second adds gifts..." (KSA 13, 14 [68], WM/WP no. 48, t.m.)

So in either case, unconscious physiological values play themselves out via the wholly involuntary comportment of human being. In one case depleted, weakened values repeat themselves through human being in such a manner that they in turn deplete and weaken the luxurious plenitude of life, whereas in another, equally involuntary case, human being expends its own physiological wealth into a world which is thereby enriched. In the passage above, as throughout his ruminations on these issues, Nietzsche barely touches upon the question of why one orientation rather than the other prevails: '...it can be acquired, it can be inherited...'. But he repeatedly warns against assuming causes for a state of affairs which is itself nothing but the symptom of a necessary physiological distribution. Thus for instance Platonism is not itself the cause of the philosophical impoverishment which is referred to as the two-world theory. It is of course only the name which describes such a life-negating mechanism. That Platonistic two-world thinking could come to the fore at a certain time and dominate whole cultures, civilisations and continents for several millenia is indicative of an exhausted physiology which must be ready to function as host to this parasitic thought because otherwise this thought could not have gained such ascendancy.

With the acceptance of the primacy of physiological values it becomes necessary to re-examine phenomena under the aspect of these types of values
which have shaped and continue to shape them. The question in each case is transformed from the previous 'what is it?' which enquires into, and is predicated on the assumption of, the identity of that to which it is addressed, to 'which values are productive in this case?' and thereby turns into a question concerning the processes constitutive of its physiology ("Die Frage der Werte ist fundamentaler als die Frage der Gewißheit"; "The question of values is more fundamental than the question of certainty" KSA 12,7 [49], WM/WP no.588). It is clear in this that the latter question belongs to a radically different philosophical project than the former. Because truth and, more importantly, the will to truth, are no longer the ultimate measure but have instead become the foremost obstacles for a physiologically oriented philosophy, the hitherto central question of the possibility of knowledge and the invariably ensuing theory of knowledge have lost their allure. Instead of concerning itself with questions of knowability, thinking in the wake of Nietzsche's physiological method must continue to determine the value of knowledge. As always when it comes to doing this, Nietzsche is completely unambiguous. His remarks on the topic are innumerable but the following quote sums up the issue succinctly enough:

"Es ist unwahrscheinlich, daß unser 'Erkennen' weiter reichen sollte, als es knapp zur Erhaltung des Lebens ausreicht."

"It is improbable that our 'knowing' should extend further than is scarcely sufficient for the preservation of life." (KSA 11,36 [19], WM/WP no.494, t.m.)

What we call knowledge, knowledge in its present form, is precisely such an impoverished way of relating to the world; it is interested in the preservation (Erhaltung) of life, it does not promote excess and the dissemination of energy. And even in its preservation it is miserly, it

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only scarcely (knapp) allows or admits whatever is sufficient (ausreicht) for its preservation. It is improbable, although not known to those who question the value of knowledge, that (the current form of) knowledge be any more than an instance of this meagre self-preservation. It is not known but can be estimated to be the case, judging from its failure to add to the (self-)disseminative dimensions of life.

On the issue of values, too, it is clear that Nietzsche's thinking is structured in terms of an economy which is radically different from that inherent in any Platonistic philosophy. As was shown in chapter one above, Platonism — and thus the two-world logic of Christianity and of Kantian philosophy in its rationalistic aspects — is predicated on a violently anti-materialist and, more specifically anti-physiological, reversal based on lack. 'This' world (matter, body) is deficient, it is the lesser with regard to the other, 'real' world (God, noumenon) of which it is at best a copy, a pale imitation (a simulacrum). But this belief is only tenable as long as the whence of this form of thinking remains unasked. And this is of course precisely the question which Nietzsche addresses to Platonism and to any of its later varieties, namely which types of values are productive of them, which kinds of physiology sustain them. Because it is only these questions which firmly relocate any alleged other-worldly points of origin in an unequivocally intra-phenomenal realm.

To recapitulate, physiological values are not produced by any form of human activity, they are — albeit in a difficult sense which stands in need of elaboration — natural. That is to say they precede, and are themselves constitutive of, human being and the anthropomorphic values it carries before it. It follows from this that the examination of, for instance, Platonistic structures according to this 'theory' of values will have to retrace the conscious, manifest or anthropomorphic values inherent in
Platonism to the unconscious, latent or physiological values of which they are a necessary elaboration. In the process of this it should become apparent which type of physiology is the site of this elaboration.

Insofar as Platonism is predicated on such an ontology of lack and deficiency, it becomes imperative, if this impoverished, parasitic thought is to be undone, to declare war on all forms of thinking, all forms of life, which sustain it and to overcome them from within with the strategic thought of an originary plenitude which is of 'this' world, which is this world, to the exclusion of all others.

Because nothing is exempt from the diagnostic procedure according to this new theory of values, no aspirations to a neutral, 'factual' sphere of objectivity, such as Kant continues to dream of, can be sustained any longer. In fact the task of this diagnostic is most urgent whenever any 'eternal truths' or anything purportedly unproduced - and that means outside the sphere of the will to power and its value-productions - is invoked.

Thus especially anything which lays claims to the status of scientificity, thereby seeking shelter in that alleged bastion of objectivity, needs to be exposed to the anti-humanist blasts of the will to power:

"Es gibt eine tiefe und vollkommen unbewusste Wirkung der decadence selbst auf die Ideale der Wissenschaft"

"There is a deep and completely unconscious effect of decadence even on the ideals of science" (KSA 13, 14 [40]; WM/WP no. 53, t. m.)

This forced innocence can only be countered by a 'theory' of values and of originary interpretation by the will to power:

"Gegen den Positivismus, welcher bei dem Phänomen stehnbleibt 'es gibt nur Tatsachen', würde ich sagen: nein, gerade Tatsachen gibt es nicht,
nur Interpretationen. Wir können kein Faktum 'an sich' feststellen: vielleicht ist es ein Unsinn, so etwas zu wollen."

"Against positivism which halts at the phenomenon 'there are only facts', I would say: no, there are especially no facts, only interpretations. We can determine no fact 'in itself': perhaps it is a nonsense to want something like that." (KSA 12, 7 [60], WM/WP no. 481, t. m.)

And so the question as to which values inform them must be taken to the sciences and, in the case of the first Critique, to a philosophy which is willing to act as the apologist of these ideals. If these discourses display the signs of an exhausted physiology, if they support ideals of decadence, they will betray themselves by the aspiration to an implicit model of preservation - of themselves as of their respective objects. That is to say that their objects will be conceived or projected in terms of being (preservation) rather than becoming (expenditure). In the latter case it does not of course finally make sense to speak of an 'object' anymore. If a science of becoming could be envisaged it would turn its attention to, and become submerged in, a multiple becoming, a series of processes. It is only by believing in a world of being that the formation of an 'object' as such can proceed:

"Eine werdende Welt könnte im strengen Sinne nicht 'begriffen', nicht 'erkannt' werden: nur insofern der 'begreifende' und 'erkennende' Intellekt eine schon geschaffene grobe Welt vorfindet, gezimmert aus lauter Scheinbarkeiten, aber fest geworden, insofern diese Art Schein das Leben erhalten hat - nur insofern gibt es etwas wie 'Erkenntnis'..." "A world in becoming could not, in the strict sense, be 'comprehended', be 'known': only insofar as the 'comprehending' and 'knowing' intellect finds an already created crude world, constructed from mere semblances, but become fixed, insofar as this kind of appearance has preserved life - only insofar is there something like 'knowledge'..." (KSA 11, 36 [23], WM/WP no. 520, t. m.)
"Erkenntnis an sich im Werden unmöglich; wie ist also Erkenntnis möglich? Als Irrtum über sich selbst, als Wille zur Macht, als Wille zur Täuschung."

"Knowledge in itself impossible in becoming; how then is knowledge possible? As error about itself, as will to power, as will to deception." (KSA 12,7 [54], WM/WP no. 617, t.m.)

Thus, for example in the case of a metaphysically invested biology, Nietzsche warns:

"Die Physiologen sollten sich besinnen, den Erhaltungstrieb als kardinalen Trieb eines organischen Wesens anzusetzen. Vor allem will etwas Lebendiges seine Kraft auslassen: die 'Erhaltung' ist nur eine der Konsequenzen davon."

"Physiologists should think again about positing the drive for preservation as the cardinal drive of an organic being. Above all else something that is alive wants to expend its force: 'preservation' is only one of the consequences of this." (KSA 12,2 [63], WM/WP no. 650, t.m.)

Thus far this most fundamental distinction of Nietzsche's physiological thinking, namely that between preservation and expenditure, has only been established in outline. But before returning to the discussion of Kant's treatment of causality in the first Critique, a brief but important digression becomes necessary by which to expand and complicate the account given of this Nietzschean economic thought of plenitude and preservation so far. The impression which must be prevented from arising concerns the interaction which these two types of forces enter into; in short, they must not be perceived to be in an oppositional relation:

"'Wahrheit': das bezeichnet innerhalb meiner Denkweise nicht notwendig einen Gegensatz zum Irrtum, sondern in den grundsätzlichsten Fällen nur eine Stellung verschiedener Irrtümer zueinander..."
"'Truth': within my way of thinking that does not necessarily signify a contrast to error, rather, in the most fundamental cases, only a position of different errors to each other..." (KSA 11,38 [4], WM/WP no. 535, t.m.)

Furthermore, any simplistic equation of truth as preservation as exhaustion and of its apparent mirror image, error as expenditure as plenitude, is completely inappropriate for thinking the intensely complex relationships between these terms. As is clear from the quote from WM/WP no. 520 (penultimate page), to assume that all is in flux (when knowledge as conceived by the metaphysical tradition can only arise in approximation to a fixed and unchanging realm of truth) inevitably means that (such a metaphysically defined) truth is an error in this world at last thought of as perpetual becoming:

"Wahrheit ist die Art von Irrtum, ohne welche eine bestimmte Art von lebendigen Wesen nicht leben könnte." "Truth is the kind of error without which a certain kind of living beings could not live." (KSA 11,34 [253], WM/WP no. 493, t.m.)

The error which is truth is indispensable for the preservation of a particular life form, namely human being. Human being has a need for truth insofar as this life form is orientated towards preservation. Truth arises out of need, truth is the symptom of a fundamental impoverishment. But this account, plausible though it is, is still insufficient for thinking in its entirety the relation of life's plenitude and truth.

Nietzsche's transvaluative thinking is the type of thinking which embodies primordial multiple becomings most readily. The truth of being and of preservation is an error in a world of plenitudinous becoming, it is directed against 'this' world. But this error does not arise out of a lack of knowledge or a miscomprehension of the truth, in which case it would
merely remain an error secondary and supplementary to this metaphysical truth. The error which is truth, even this most depleted of phantasms, still grows out of the infinite, inexhaustible exuberance of life or will to power, as Nietzsche calls it to emphasise the play and economy of forces continually raging through life. Even the erroneous truth, this most blatant mark of decadence, is only possible on the basis of the originary extravagance life luxuriates in. This is to say that preservation and expenditure are not simply and neutrally opposed to one another; any economy in which they interact is itself only possible because life must first of all expend itself in an economy of multiple becomings, or will to power.

But there is a further twist to the transvaluation of this economy, for it must be asked which is the site of the error which is truth when the dismantling of this ancient idol means that truth is no longer thought of as existing 'out there', as pre-given (be it as ideal, eternal form or, after the Copernican turn, as a priori form of objectivity). The site which Nietzsche names as the battleground for life's active forces of expenditure and life's reactive, life-negating forces of preservation is that of human physiology. There the ruinous adventure of life in combat with itself takes place, there it is being determined whether the affirmation of life in dissemination or the negation of it in preservation is to become dominant. This ongoing process may lead to the devastation of the human body, as has been the case with the incorporation of the truths of Platonism, as Zarathustra deplores:

"...ich wandle unter den Menschen wie unter den Bruchstücken und Gliedmaßen von Menschen...ich [finde] den Menschen zertrümmert und zerstreuet wie über ein Schlacht- und Schlächterfeld hin."

"...I tread amongst humans as amongst fragments and limbs of humans..."
I find human being smashed and scattered as over a field of battle and butchery." (KSA 4, ASZ/TSZ, Bk II, t.m., my omissions);

or it may bring about the dissipation of the human body in a joyous exchange with other flows of matter. Through these processes life can, in the latter case, replenish its productive powers or, as in the former case, become temporarily impaired in its disseminative capabilities. Thus when, in the following note, Nietzsche speaks of life-threatening physiological errors, the threat which the error that is truth poses does not only concern life in its physiological instantiation (where the error is sustained like a cancerous growth) but concerns even life 'itself':

"Der Irrtum ist der kostspieligste Luxus, den sich der Mensch gestatten kann; und wenn der Irrtum gar ein physiologischer Irrtum ist, dann wird er lebensgefährlich. Wofür hat folglich die Menschheit bisher am meisten gezahlt, am schlimmsten gebüßt? Für ihre 'Wahrheiten': denn dieselben waren allesamt Irrtümer in physiologicis..."

"Error is the most costly luxury which human being can permit itself; and if the error is even a physiological error it becomes life-threatening. For what has humanity consequently payed the most, atoned the worst? For its 'truths': for these were all errors in physiologicis..." (KSA 13,16 [54], WM/WP no. 454, t.m.)

This point, namely that the economy of forces within the will to power is only possible on the basis of the originary plenitude of life, should be borne in mind when this economic thought (in its more elementary form) is taken up and developed below.

We are now in a position to return to the discussion of the implications which a rationalistic philosophy's attachment to the notion of causality carries with it. If we briefly recall Kant's vision of a world no longer attached to the concept of causality, and the terror this provokes in him
because this concept represents for him the chief guarantor of the possibility of knowledge, it comes as no surprise that the very same scenario is viewed by Nietzsche, who is without naivety as concerns any quest for knowledge, with no more than mildly mocking detachment:

"Die bestgeglaubten a priorischen 'Wahrheiten' sind für mich - Annahmen bis auf weiteres, z.B. das Gesetz der Kausalität, sehr gut eingebügte Gewöhungen des Glaubens, so einverleibt, daß nicht daran glauben das Geschlecht zugrunde richten würde. Aber sind es deswegen Wahrheiten? Welcher Schluß! Als ob die Wahrheit damit bewiesen würde, daß der Mensch bestehen bleibt!"

"The most believed in a priori 'truths' are for me - assumptions until further notice, for example the law of causality, very well rehearsed habits of belief, so incorporated that not to believe in them would ruin the race. But are they therefore truths? What conclusion! As if truth were proven by the fact that human being endures." (KSA 11,26 [12], WM/WP no. 497, t. m.)

Here we must briefly recall Kant's definition of anything a priori as universal and necessary. That is to say that apriority (as unconditioned) by definition lies outside the realm of the properly temporal and of appearances (the conditioned) which, although constituted by or in terms of the a priori forms of sensibility and understanding, do not as appearances have the status of apriority. But since only appearances are subject to change it follows that for Kant 'a priori' and 'eternal' ('universal', unchangeable) are effectively synonymous. Thus when Nietzsche speaks of 'a priori truths', 'a priori' being most immediately associated with Kantian terminology, he means eternal truths, the 'truths' of the metaphysical tradition from which Kant himself at other times so eagerly wishes to dissociate his own philosophy.

Nietzsche paints causality as one of the eternal truths behind which a dogmatically inclined reason likes to hide from the perpetual onslaught of
nature (or simply matter) which is profoundly indifferent to the parochial interests of self-preservation which occupy human being. What is called 'truth' by that tradition is in fact no more than one of the tenets by means of which a particular life-form knows to preserve itself. This 'truth', the law of causality, is thus the prime example of an anthropomorphic value, a belief which helps to structure the world into a regularity based on the primacy of being for the purposes of anthropos and which at the same time determines the human being which enters into commerce with the world on the basis of this reductive concept.

Only now can the question be posed why Nietzsche views causality as such a reductive concept, and it can be asked which physiological values inform it. Throughout Nietzsche's writings there are innumerable notes in which he carries out dissections of the mechanisms by which the concept of causality imposes itself upon multiple processes of becoming. It was mentioned above that Kant refers to an objective succession (succession in the object) as an event. That is to say that for him an event marks the successful imposition of the conceptuality of the causal nexus upon an occurrence (in the natural world, the processes of which are to be brought under the sway of scientific knowledge). I would translate the German word Geschehen, as for instance used by Nietzsche at 12,2 (84), WM/WP no. 531, quoted below, by 'occurrence', thereby distinguishing it from Kant's use of the word Begebenheit (e.g. KrV/CPR A192, B237; A194, B239; A201, B247) which is best translated as 'event'. The difference is that in the Kantian understanding of this term, the parameters of what happens are always already determined by the structures he elaborates in the Analytic of the first Critique, whereas Nietzsche's use of the term Geschehen is concerned with rethinking change in non-representational ways, that is to say before the imposition of subject and object or doer and deed upon a multifarious becoming.
And again, the demands of grammar rather than any investment in knowledge force the separation of an occurrence into doer and deed, the first of which is conceived in terms of being and substance, and as causing the second to take place as its effect:

"Die Trennung des 'Tuns' vom 'Tuenden', des Geschehens von einem Etwas, das geschehen macht, des Prozesses von einem Etwas, das nicht Prozeß, sondern dauernd, Substanz, Ding, Körper, Seele usw. ist, - der Versuch das Geschehen zu begreifen als eine Art Verschiebung und Stellungs-Wechsel von 'Seiendem', von Bleibendem: diese alte Mythologie hat den Glauben an 'Ursache und Wirkung' festgestellt, nachdem er in den sprachlich-grammatischen Funktionen eine feste Form gefunden hatte. - "

"The division of 'doing' from the 'doer', of the occurrence from a something that produces the occurrence, of the process from a something that is not process but rather endures, that is substance, thing, body, soul etc., - the attempt to comprehend an occurrence as a kind of shifting and change of position of 'beings', of the permanent: this old mythology has fixated the belief in 'cause and effect' after it had found a fixed form in the linguistico-grammatical functions. - "(KSA 12,2 [139], WM/WP no. 631, t.m.)

Only through such an act of carving up the multiplicity of interacting forces into two and (in a fundamentally arbitrary, not to say capricious move) assigning to one, as cause, the status of being, to the other that of act, effect and change, can an event in the properly Kantian metaphysical sense be conceived:

"Wenn ich sage 'der Blitz leuchtet', so habe ich das Leuchten einmal als Tätigkeit und das andere Mal als Subjekt gesetzt: also zum Geschehen ein Sein supponiert, welches mit dem Geschehen nicht eins ist, vielmehr bleibt, ist, und nicht 'wird'. - Das Geschehen als Wirken anzusetzen und die Wirkung als Sein: das ist der doppelte Irrtum, oder Interpretation, deren wir uns schuldig machen." 

"If I say 'lightning flashes' I have posited the flashing once as activity and another time as subject: so that in addition to an
occurrence I have presupposed a being which is not at one with the occurrence, which is rather permanent and does not 'become'. - To posit an occurrence as something that effects; and the effect as being: that is the double error, or interpretation, of which we become guilty." (KSA 12,2 [84], WM/WP no. 531, t. m.)

In the same note Nietzsche sums up the problem with this regressive causality:

"...wir haben die Wirkung als Wirkendes angesetzt und das Wirkende als Seiendes. Aber auch noch in dieser Formulierung ist der Begriff 'Wirkung' willkürlich..."

"...we have posited the effect as something that effects and the something that effects as being. But even in this formulation the concept 'effect' is still arbitrary..." (ibid)

That is to say that, although, as is recognised, the term 'effect' is still an arbitrary (willkürlich) imposition of anthropomorphic categories upon impersonal occurrences, this last quote provides a dissection of the detailed mechanisms of the processes through which becoming is habitually reduced to being (here as mere change). A multiple becoming is first of all cut down to the size of an effect (Wirkung) which is in turn posited as 'something that effects' ([ein] Wirkendes). In the next step the 'something that effects' is then posited as being, as subject or substance or whatever else can be construed to be exempt from becoming and its insatiable temporality.

Nietzsche here describes the processes of increasing hypostatisation and ossification by means of which a traditionally metaphysical conceptuality, perversely and without regard for the true nature of things, turns an essentially irreducible becoming (Geschehen) into a profoundly a-temporal being which thereby becomes comprehensible in mechanistic terms (as already quoted above: "...der Versuch das Geschehen zu begreifen als eine Art..."
Verschiebung und Stellungs-Wechsel von 'Seiendem', von Bleibendem."
(KSA 12, 2 [139], WM no. 631)). But Nietzsche's excavatory work is able to restore
the primordiality of a becoming, which has been given a reactive direction
by the impositions of human being.

The advantage which human being gains by imposing such categories of
(essentially temporal) identity - substance and causality - upon
fundamentally non-identical processes of becoming lies in the construal of
fixed points which can be made to correspond to the illusory fixity from
which the 'I' is in each case enunciated, thereby underwriting the
comforting humanist delusion that a self-identical subject and a self-
identical object correspond to one another as if in a form of pre-given
harmony. But the properly philosophical activity of thinking, unlike for
instance a traditional metaphysics steeped in theological concerns, need
not be comforting°, need not reassure its audience of their security in
certainty:

"Wir stellen ein Wort hin, wo unsere Unwissenheit anhebt - wo wir nicht
mehr weiter seh'n können, z.B. das Wort 'ich', das Wort 'tun', das Wort
'leiden': - das sind vielleicht Horizontlinien unserer Erkenntnis, aber
keine 'Wahrheiten'."

"We put a word where our ignorance commences - where we cannot see any
farther, for instance the word 'I', the word 'do', the word 'suffer': -
those are perhaps the horizons of our knowledge but no 'truths'."(KSA 12,
5 [3], WM/WP no. 482, t. m.)

It may be inferred that to speak of causality is such an instance where a
word merely masks the fact that we are confronted with a multiplicity which
does not correspond to any of the traditional forms of understanding, which
is irreducible to anthropomorphic values and which masks the boundary
between the world as we have construed it, as we know and recognise it and
the - far larger - domain beyond the horizon which remains profoundly obscure to human knowledge.

This obscurity does not arise because it so happens that the sciences have not yet reached that far but will in time conquer that territory, too. The obscurity to which the only appropriate response is the acknowledgement of unknowing (*Unwissenheit*) persists because of the necessarily limited nature of consciousness and of reason and of any instrument of human knowledge. The infinite, impenetrable darkness which surrounds the tiny speck of light under which the human animal labours outstrips the sphere of the knowable not because there lies a 'not yet' or a 'no more' hidden in the folds of that knowledge, awaiting its discovery by busy humans - it exceeds human knowability unknowably and utterly unreasonably and it will not be tamed by representational conceptuality, however subtle or refined. The human animal can no more catch up with the great obscurity which surpasses its knowledge than it can ever reach and move beyond the horizon which marks its earthbound trail, however swiftly it learns to move. The great release from instrumental rationality's impossible aspirations to total domination of its world and from the nightmare which ensues can only come about with the recognition of the primacy of will to power which interprets, creates and organises long before and well beyond the meagre calculations of which anthropos believes itself to be the origin:

"Es ist nicht genug, daß du einsiehst, in welcher Unwissenheit Mensch und Tier lebt; du mußt auch noch den Willen zur Unwissenheit haben und hinzulernen. Es ist dir nötig, zu begreifen, daß ohne diese Art Unwissenheit das Leben selber unmöglich wäre, daß sie eine Bedingung ist, unter welcher das Lebendige allein sich erhält und gedeiht: eine große, feste Glocke von Unwissenheit muß um dich stehn."

"It is not enough that you recognise in which ignorance humans and animals live; you must also have and learn the will to ignorance. It is necessary for you to comprehend that without this kind of ignorance life
itself would be impossible, that it is a condition under which alone the living can preserve themselves and flourish: a large, firm dome of ignorance has to encompass you." (KSA 11,26 [294], WM/WP no. 609, t. m.)

But to a life-form which has entered the stage of decadence and which feels itself in desperate need to cling on to whatever fixed points it can grasp in its rapid descent, to such a life-form the colossal darkness surrounding it holds nothing but terrors and anything which can be retrieved from the brink of the abyss provides a comforting illusion of stability. Thus to assume 'causes' and 'effects' and to rest assured in the knowledge of laws which organise and order everything that occurs into tidy regularities is particularly pleasing to the beleaguered human animal, whether this account it gives itself of the world is ultimately true or not. Nietzsche describes these desperate 'safety measures' in the following terms:

"Etwas Unbekanntes auf etwas Bekanntes zurückführen, erleichtert, beruhigt, befriedigt, gibt außerdem ein Gefühl von Macht. Mit dem Unbekannten ist die Gefahr, die Unruhe, die Sorge gegeben, - der erste Instinkt geht dahin, diese peinlichen Zustände wegzuschaffen. Erster Grundsatz: Irgend eine Erklärung ist besser als keine. Weil es sich im Grunde nur um ein Loswerdenwollen drückender Vorstellungen handelt, nimmt man es nicht gerade streng mit den Mitteln, sie loszuwerden: die erste Vorstellung, mit der sich das Unbekannte als bekannt erklärt, tut so wohl, daß man sie 'für wahr hält'."

"To trace something unknown back to something known relieves, soothes, satisfies and in addition provides a feeling of power. With the unknown danger, disquiet, anxiety is given, - the first instinct goes towards eliminating these awkward states. First principle: any old explanation is better than none. Because at bottom it is only a question of wanting to get rid of oppressive ideas one is not exactly strict about the means to get rid of them: the first idea with which the unknown declares itself as known is so agreeable that one 'holds it for true'." (KSA 6, GD/TI, V, 5, t. m)
The task of the second part of this chapter has been to demonstrate the unsuitability of the concept of causality for thinking Nietzschean physiology. The move beyond the technicalities of Kant's discussion of causality as an a priori concept of the understanding in the second Analogy was made possible by two things: firstly, by a symptomatic reading of the examples he offers in that chapter and secondly, by introducing the question of value to the discussion of an a priori causality. As concerns the former point of attack, it is clear that Kant is guided by an enormous fear of the unknown in his choice of examples. The advantage of a mechanistic metaphysics of experience is that it fixates the vagaries of matter into manageable units. But Kant cannot countenance matter in any way whatsoever and has to pretend that the productions of physis are subsumable to the productions of techne (as will become even clearer in the next chapter). A further stratagem by which he is able to put some distance between himself and material forces is to presume the subject exempt from the processes of nature, to stand by as if merely an unaffected observer whose own materiality and physicality could be neutralised at will. Lastly, Kant's examples try to give the impression that everything which takes place in nature only does so in relation to the human observer, he assumes an absolutely anthropocentric point of view from which the orderly parade of effect upon cause upon effect etc. may be inspected.

It is the notion of value, in its Nietzschean sense of the interpretations of the will to power, which disrupts Kant's seemingly unproblematic anthropocentrism by showing how, far from in any sense marking a valid originary perspective, it too is an outcrop of the will to power. The question of value further derives its significance from the fact that when it is addressed to the most typical instantiation of an anthropomorphic value, namely causality, it emerges quite clearly that reactive ideals of preservation overwhelmingly occupy this 'pure concept of
the understanding' which is the same as to say that all the important
questions about the primacy of being or becoming have already been decided
in favour of the former by the time this type of conceptuality gets
underway. Whilst it does not perhaps come as a great surprise that Kantian
critique should be so entirely predicated on the primacy of being, it is
also undoubtedly true that Nietzsche's experimental thinking celebrates an
originary becoming under the name of will to power or physiology. In this
it finds itself at war with a Kantian philosophy whose ultimate, if
inexplicit, objective is the careful and elaborate containment of matter.
III. An Antinomy against Nature

As I hope to have already shown in the first chapter, at certain decisive points in his text Kant falls conspicuously short of realising his own best insights. For instance, having 'discovered' the paralogistic implications of one of the key concepts of dogmatic rationalism (namely the substantiality and immortality of the soul or subject), he fails to radicalise his own project into the overcoming of any quasi-substantial, and that finally and most importantly means extra-temporal, subjectivity, which he retains under the name of transcendental unity of apperception. Equally, as concerns the antinomic structures of the dialectic of reason, the problem as exposed by Kant must be taken back to his own text as a way of radicalising critique immanently. The technical aspects of the problem can initially be stated in simple terms: it must be asked which are the factors that determine the shift between, on the one hand, the solutions to the first and second Antinomies, in both of which both thesis and antithesis can be shown to be based on erroneous assumptions and, on the other hand, the third and - for our purposes here far less significant - fourth Antinomies, for both of which Kant wishes to show both thesis and antithesis to be based on correct statements which, whilst still, like those of the earlier two Antinomies, contradictory are nevertheless reconcilable given the appropriate critical context. In order to clarify why this is such a crucial question and to show the implications a particular response to it might entail, the argument must be taken through a number of stages which at times may appear to digress far from the immediate point.

To recap briefly the salient points of the Antinomies, these are the dialectical conflicts into which reason plunges of itself when faced with the task of forming the empirical representations given to it (solely by
the understanding, as pre-critical reason believes) into a coherent whole or world or cosmos. The cosmological ideas formed by reason fall into two groups, the first of which Kant identifies with dogmatism (dogmatic rationalism) and thematises as the thesis in each respective dialectic, the second of which he summarises as the position of (dogmatic) empiricism (which he also refers to as scepticism at other times) which he arranges in the antitheses (KrV/CPR A465f, B493f). He summarises the four theses of dogmatic rationalism in the following, terse manner:

"Daß die Welt einen Anfang habe, daß mein denkendes Selbst einfacher und daher unverweslicher Natur, daß dieses zugleich in seinen willkürlichen Handlungen frei und über den Naturzwang erhoben sei, und daß endlich die ganze Ordnung der Dinge, welche die Welt ausmachen, von einem Urwesen abstamme, von welchem alles seine Einheit und zweckmäßige Verknüpfung entlehnt..."

"That the world has a beginning, that my thinking self is of simple and therefore imperishable nature, that it is at the same time free in its voluntary actions and elevated above the compulsion of nature and that finally the entire order of things which make up the world descends from an originary being from which all derives its unity and purposive connection..." (KrV/CPR A466, B494, t.m.)

At the same point in the text he even states quite explicitly, and somewhat guilelessly, that the stuff of the theses has traditionally provided the "foundation stones of morality and religion", whereas the tenets of dogmatic empiricism which deny the assertions of the theses and hold the very opposite to be true, seem to deprive morality and religion "of all power and influence" (KrV/CPR A468, B496).

The erroneous syllogism (major and minor premise of which are stated at KrV/CPR A497, B525) which seduces reason into these seemingly irresolvable antinomic structures takes the following form:
major premise: if the conditioned is given, the entire series of all its conditions is also given;
minor premise: the objects of the senses are given us as conditioned;
conclusion: the entire series of all the conditions of the objects of the senses are given.

As was mentioned in chapter one, above, reason's twofold character firstly initiates the surge or ascent through the syllogism towards, secondly, the condition of the entire series of logically dependent propositions which it posits as final or absolute condition and hence of course as unconditioned. Thus one aspect of reason (the aspect which is amenable to critique) provides the impetus for the construction of syllogisms and the organisation of judgements, derived from the interplay of the other three faculties of - importantly - sensibility, understanding and (the faculty of) judgement (Urteilskraft), into these syllogisms. In this respect it is precisely the integrative capacity of reason which allows for judgements of knowledge to be formed into a cosmological whole. But reason's simultaneous and insurmountable dogmatic impulse to posit the condition of the entire series as given and, insofar as it is assumed to be itself unconditioned, as the absolute point of origin (for the series of syllogisms) towards which - in its less absolutist guise - it merely aspires, instantaneously closes off its own cosmos in the making. Dogmatic reason thereby curtails the integration of further synthetic a priori judgements into the whole it forms (as critical reason) and at the same time (as dogmatic reason) forecloses. Reason's twofold potential thus encompasses the possibilities of it being the motor of coherent knowledge and the death of it, which latter possibility has, according to Kant, traditionally been the position of dogmatic rationalism and of a theistically inclined idealism.
The difference between an activating and an arresting reason Kant here locates in the subtle shift of meaning between the words *aufgegeben* and *gegeben* (KrV/CPR A497f, B526). An active reason understands the series of conditions to any given conditioned as *aufgegeben*, as set, like a task to be accomplished, like a course to be followed, whereas reason's absolutist aspect takes that same series as *gegeben*, as given and that means closed off and, ultimately, *given precisely by* a prime mover as first point of origin to a series which consequently must be taken to be complete from the start. About this aspect of reason Kant remarks, at the end of the thetic 'Observation on the Third Antinomy':

"Die... Bedürfnis der Vernunft, in der Reihe der Naturursachen sich auf einen ersten Anfang... zu berufen, leuchtet daran sehr klar in die Augen: daß... alle Philosophen des Altertums sich gedrungen sahen, zur Erklärung der Weltbewegungen einen ersten Beweger anzunehmen, d.i eine freihandelnde Ursache, welche diese Reihe von Zuständen zuerst und von selbst anfing."

"The... necessity of reason to appeal to a first beginning in the series of natural causes... becomes very clear by the fact that all philosophers of antiquity felt themselves urged to assume a *prime mover* for the explanation of cosmic movements, that is, a freely acting cause which first and of itself began this series of states." (KrV/CPR A451, B479, t.m., my omissions)

Since the self-proclaimed task of Kant's critical solution to the antinomic problem is to delimit the claims to exclusivity of both the thetic and antithetic positions, that is, of both rationalist and empiricist dogmatism, it seems fair to assume that part of the solution will lie in the overcoming of the theist assertion that is particularly inherent in the former position. This point will be taken up below.
But apart from the split nature of reason, part of which lures it into untenable and ultimately theistic assertions, there lies another flawed impulse at the very heart of its syllogising, cosmogenic capacity.

The understanding needs to work in concert with the pure forms of intuition in order for synthetic a priori judgements, and here that means judgements of knowledge, to become possible. If the understanding neglects this necessary union with sensibility, its propositions remain empty (KrV/CPR A51, B75) and it descends into mere (general) logic (KrV/CPR A52, B76), forsaking the possibility of contributing towards expansive judgements about the world. But reason, in its traditional manifestation as dogmatic rationalism, does not accept that sensibility (qua transcendental space and time, the pure forms of intuition, in Kant's treatment of the problem) is indispensable for the formation of judgements of knowledge. Due to this error it believes that judgements based on pure concepts of the understanding by themselves can be constitutive of knowledge and can be constituted or integrated into coherent cosmological systems.

But - and this is the most important point of transcendental idealism which Kant never tires of reiterating - the objects of knowledge are not things in themselves but are appearances and that chiefly means that they are subject to the conditions of a priori temporality and a priori spatiality. In order to remind reason of this indispensable condition of knowledge - and this is one of the central elements of the critique or delimitation of reason's self-understanding - Kant allocates a merely regulative function to reason. That is to say that reason cannot by itself be constitutive of judgements of knowledge, it merely regulates, organises and integrates them into a syllogistic structure''.

Thus, as concerns the syllogism at the basis of the Antinomies, dogmatic reason fails to appreciate that, unlike that of the major premise, the proposition which forms the minor premise (of the syllogism quoted above)
refers to appearances ('objects of the senses' KrV/CPR A497, B525), that is, to objects in part constituted by the a priori forms of intuition. By failing to comprehend 'objects of the senses' as subject to the delimitations of space and time which are only transcendently, and not empirically ideal and which conversely are only empirically, and not transcendently real, dogmatic reason fails to appreciate the true scope of experience and the extent to which propositions concerning the nature of the cosmos can be extended. Reason is, in short, over-ambitious and only its critique can curtail the overzealous application of its sufficient principle.

It is of course perfectly possible, as witnessed by the vast majority of commentaries on the first Critique, to perceive the problems critique develops in its encounter with dogmatic reason solely in the terms laid out by Kant. But if at the same time one of the central tasks of critique is to destabilise the territorial claims of dogmatic (and that simply means pre-critical) rationalism (as well as its obverse, empiricism) then to probe more deeply into Kant's text with the objective of uprooting all hidden remnants of the old priesthood is to do the greatest service to Kant's avowed project. In this spirit the third Antinomy has to be approached. In the context of a chapter which seeks to trace Kant's treatment of the category of causality through both Analytic and Dialectic of the first Critique, this is obviously the only Antinomy which requires closer attention.

As a strategy for resolving the respective claims of contradictory and mutually exclusive metaphysical positions, the solution offered to the problem of the third Antinomy is of course hugely inventive. To cut the Gordian knot (Kant's own metaphor, KrV/CPR A529, B557) which had bound
determinism and free will into seemingly irresolvable conflicting claims by declaring that conflict to be based on a miscomprehension of the field of application of those respective claims was nothing short of revolutionary. But whilst it is necessary to acknowledge the enormity of this achievement it would nonetheless constitute nothing but an utter abnegation of philosophy's historicality - even in its crudest form - to simply revert to the Kantian perception of this nexus of problems and to end the discussion once it has been decided whether the solution to the third Antinomy successfully separates noumenal and phenomenal causality.

The most salient symptom of Kant's desire flows in this respect occurs in the formulation of the thesis to the third Antinomy. The structure of the Antinomies is centrally dictated by the fact that in each case the two metaphysical positions in conflict with each other are genuinely opposed, that they claim the same ground on the basis of wholly contradictory propositions. This structural requirement is fulfilled in the formulations of all the Antinomies except the third. Here the thesis reads:

"Die Kausalität nach Gesetzen der Natur ist nicht die einzige, aus welcher die Erscheinungen der Welt insgesamt abgeleitet werden können. Es ist noch eine Kausalität durch Freiheit zu Erklärung derselben anzunehmen notwendig."

"Causality according to laws of nature is not the only one from which the appearances of the world as a whole can be derived. It is also necessary to assume a causality according to freedom for their explanation (KrV/CPR A444, B472, t. m.)

Thus the thesis here not only claims its own ground but, implicitly, that of the antithesis as well; it admits the material of the antithesis into its own domain, "not only causality according to nature but also causality according to freedom". The thesis proclaims the antithesis as necessary but..."
not sufficient. This formulation of the thesis obviously opens up a huge dissymmetry between the rival claims, given that the antithesis nonetheless insists on its own position as the only viable one. As a consequence of this disequilibrium, when Kant maintains that the solution to this Antinomy requires the acceptance of both thesis and antithesis, he is utterly disingenuous as concerns his own procedure. In fact, he has already formulated the thesis in such a way that to admit causality both according to nature and according to freedom simply confirms the contention of the thesis - in declaring only the thesis to be correct he could still assign different fields of application to the two types of causality, thereby salvaging transcendental idealism as the invention which provides the solution to all Antinomies of reason.

The reason the thesis is formulated as it is, thereby disturbing the requisite symmetry of the Antinomy, is simple: were it to be formulated in direct contradiction to the antithesis it would declare that 'everything in the world takes place solely according to the causality of freedom'. Whilst this would be the symmetrical opposite to the antithesis and thus formally the most appropriate, it would also obviously be wrong to claim that the world in its entirety is due to acts of the (noumenal) human will.

The Copernican turn affords the possibility of locating an originary, formally productive capability in the faculties coordinated by transcendental subjectivity, thereby apparently allowing that subjectivity to supersede the God of the metaphysical tradition as the source and guarantor of a coherent, comprehensible and calculable nature, or experience. But, as was mentioned before, the simple replacement of one point of origin for another in the context of an otherwise unchanged formal structure of restricted, unilinear production, does not detract from the fact that a fundamentally theistic model remains in place. Kant's human
god, transcendental subjectivity, here in its manifestation as noumenal freedom, no less suppresses the originary productivity of nature than does, for instance, the Platonic εἰδή or the Christian God. As was briefly mentioned above, Kant acknowledges that prior to the humanisation of the ἀποτελεῖν τοῦ νόημα by transcendental idealism, it had been deemed necessary by the metaphysical tradition to inscribe a deistic prime mover into the causal series to get it underway. He implicitly aligns the formal features of his statement of the Antinomy's thesis with a characteristic of the very tradition against which it is ostensibly directed. And since (contrary to what Kant wishes his readers to believe) his solution to the free will - determinism debate is more immediately parasitic on that Antinomy's thesis, rather than offering genuine arbitration between both sides of its dialectic, it must be concluded that he can ultimately only resolve the problem by unreasonably and illegitimately privileging a stance (namely that of dogmatic rationalism) to which theistic prejudices are by his own admission generic.

Kant's treatment of the problem of the third Antinomy displays a further weakness in the formulation of its thesis when it asserts that it is 'necessary to assume' a causality according to freedom. For it must simply be asked what the basis of this necessity might be. So far in the first Critique, necessity had only been attributed to two things. Firstly, to the status of transcendentality, insofar as its apriority is defined in terms of necessity (as well as in terms of universality), and, secondly, to the status of phenomena in their relation to subjectivity, which is thematised under the fourth group of categories named modality. That is to say that for theoretically oriented reason necessity only applies to appearances, either in the aspect of their (transcendental) constitution or their (phenomenal) constitutedness. Thus when Kant urges that it is 'necessary to
assume' a noumenal causality — something utterly unthinkable in the terrain of theoretical reason — he obviously appeals to other than theoretical demands. In the third Antinomy the pearly gates leading to the realm of practical reason open up, from here Kant can construct the rational ethics which for him (as we have come to suspect) form the pinnacle of his critical achievement.

The question is whether the critique of theoretical, cosmogenic reason is the most appropriate place from which to launch the defence of a free (noumenal) will. The demand to assume the practical truth of such an anthropocentric will is perhaps, not least of all, reminiscent of Nietzsche's wry observation (quoted at greater length above):

"... die erste Vorstellung, mit der sich das Unbekannte als bekannt erklärt, tut so wohl, daß man sie 'für wahr hält'."  
"...the first idea with which the unknown declares itself as known is so agreeable that one 'holds it for true'." (KSA 6, GD/TI, VI, 5, t.m.)

This is obviously not the place to begin a discussion of Kant's practical philosophy and the unconscious forces to which it is subject. But at the point (in the solution to the third Antinomy) where the concerns of critical theoretical reason are channelled into those of critical practical reason, a marked change of tone becomes noticeable. A certain undercurrent of regret seems perceptible when Kant is forced to admit:

"Das Sollen drückt eine Art von Notwendigkeit und Verknüpfung mit Gründen aus, die in der ganzen Natur sonst nicht vorkommt... ja das Sollen, wenn man bloß den Lauf der Natur vor Augen hat, hat ganz und gar keine Bedeutung."  
"The ought expresses a kind of necessity and connection with grounds which is not found anywhere else in the whole of nature...indeed the ought, if one merely has the course of nature before one's eyes, has no meaning whatsoever." (KrV/CPR A547, B575, t.m., my omissions)
And only a little later he becomes surprisingly explicit about his aspiration (which he knows to be hopeless) to dominate nature entirely by reason, even to rewrite its inevitable course in accordance with an implicitly superior reason:

"...da [in der Naturordnung] sollte vielleicht alles das nicht geschehen sein, was doch nach dem Naturlaufe geschehen ist, und nach seinen empirischen Gründen unauflieblieh geschehen müßte."

"...there [in the natural order] perhaps all that ought not to have occurred which did occur according to the course of nature and which had to occur unavoidably according to its empirical grounds." (KrV/CPR A550, B578, t.m., my insertions)

This theme of a superior human faculty which, especially in its noumenal employment, remains entirely untainted by the impure materiality Kant calls the manifold, which enters experience through sensibility, emerges with particular violence in a paragraph which aims to cloak its virulently anti-materialistic stance by an ornately Latinate, and hence purportedly objective, terminology (since Kant italicises heavily throughout this passage, I emphasise by means of bold type):

"Die Freiheit im praktischen Verstande ist die Unabhängigkeit der Willkür von der Nötigung durch Antriebe der Sinnlichkeit. Denn eine Willkür ist sinnlich, so fern sie pathologisch (durch Bewegursachen der Sinnlichkeit) affiziert ist; sie heißt tierisch (arbitrium brutum), wenn sie pathologisch nezessitiert werden kann. Die menschliche Willkür ist zwar ein arbitrium sensitivum, aber nicht brutum, sondern liberum, weil Sinnlichkeit ihre Handlung nicht notwendig macht, sondern dem Menschen ein Vermögen beiwohnt, sich, unabhängig von der Nötigung durch sinnliche Antriebe, von selbst zu bestimmen."

"Freedom in the practical sense is the independence of the will from coercion by the impulses of sensuality. For a will is sensuous in so far as it is pathologically affected (by motives of sensuality); it is called
bestial (arbitrium brutum) if it can be pathologically necessitated. Although the human will is an arbitrium sensitivum, it is not brutum but liberum because sensuality does not necessitate its action but a faculty inhabits the human being to determine itself by itself independently of the coercion by sensuous impulses. (KrV/CPR A533f, B561f, t. m.)

Nature, even in its critically controlled form as experience shaped by the a priori forms, is still an imposition on an otherwise independent practical reason. In fact, it is much more than an imposition, it is an unwanted, coercive, bestial tormentor which is alien and hostile to reason and which affects reason like a disease. The noumenal will is here clearly identified with the highest purity, a holy virgin for a rational age, whereas nature qua the sensuality through which the subject is affected is base and vile and in need of the most violent suppression.

This distribution of values between sensibility and reason, between nature and morality is clearly reminiscent of Socrates' agitating on the same point in the Phaedrus and Phaedo (quoted in chapter one, above). Kant here continues the long line of dogmatic anti-materialists that stretches all but unbroken from Plato to the eighteenth century. He relapses into the most aggressive dogmatism about the preciousness of the free noumenal will at the very point where critique could provide the formal means for the most effective assault on all previous dogmas.

Kant seems to relish the spectacle of the noumenal will turning against nature when he celebrates practical freedom for 'producing something entirely of itself', and especially against the 'force and influence' of natural causes (KrV/CPR A534, B562). Here there is revealed, to adapt a well-known phrase of Nietzsche, reason as anti-nature.

But Kant's hanging judge's mentality with regard to the inexcusable impurity of (causality according to) nature entirely overwhelms the text when his otherwise rigorously transcendental philosophy descends into the
murky depths of an empirical example, concerning the hypothetical 'case' of a 'free agent' spreading 'malicious lies' (KrV/CPR A554-556, B582-584). His whole legalistic register instantly betrays the fact that to apportion responsibility and hence guilt, to single out the culprit, comprises the hidden agenda in which the aims of transcendental idealism and of judicial process happily coincide. And of course this register also aligns Kant's project with that of Christianity which rests heavily on the assumption that we are all guilty before God, just as for Kant we are all guilty, because responsible, before the court of reason. Again it is clear that the substitution of an anthropocentric for a theocentric position in Kant's text constitutes no real advance as long as the fundamental structures and impulses governing the system remain in the end unchallenged and unchanged.

But to return to our original question of the third Antinomy's disturbed symmetry, it is clear that the thesis is stated the way it is to make it acceptable to common sense as well as to the rationalistic ontology of the natural sciences (or, in short, Enlightenment philosophy). But this is effectively done at the cost of destroying the Antinomy proper since, as mentioned before, the contention of the antithesis is already contained in the thesis so that, finally, no proper Antinomy exists between these two positions. And that ultimately means that Kant can either sustain the antinomic structure or the contention of the causality of a free noumenal will - but not both! Typically, then, at the very point where the pressure of his rationalistic prejudices comes to bear down most forcefully on his otherwise critical argumentation, he cannot sustain the grand design, cannot abide by his own best insights.

Finally, the question concerning the shift from the first two to the second two Antinomies needs to be taken up again. Why can it not be said
that in the third Antinomy, too, both thesis and antithesis are inappropriate as explanatory principles for a critical cosmology? Unless the baroque architectonic of the 'Schlussanmerkung' (cf. footnote 12, above) is to be believed, there is no reason why in this (pseudo-)Antinomy, too, thesis and antithesis should not be considered equally untenable. But obviously the abyssal thought of a world without any kind of causal certitude is far too terrifying to entertain for the Kantian perspective. His repressive desires need and want both the noumenal and the phenomenal realm to be closely policed by causality, the concept that incarcerates becoming.

Nietzsche goes straight to the heart of the matter and draws out the real significance of Kant's pseudo-antinomic causalism when he notes:

"Dies ist die Antinomie: sofern wir an die Moral glauben, verurteilen wir das Dasein."

"This is the antinomy: insofar as we believe in morals, we condemn existence." (KSA 12,10 [192], WM/ WP no.6)

Needless to say, in the conception of the world as will to power, this repression is unsustainable. Consequently, when it comes to the elaboration of will to power as physiology in positive terms (in chapter four, below), it will obviously not be a matter of conceiving a body in terms of the a-temporal, unitary nexus of causality. From the paucity of a production based in human being physiology will entice thought back into the delirium of multiple material becomings.
"Der Abfall, Verfall, Ausschuß ist nichts, was an sich zu verurteilen wäre: es ist eine notwendige Konsequenz des Lebens, des Wachstums an Leben."

"Waste, decay, elimination is not itself anything which would have to be condemned: it is a necessary consequence of life, of the growth in life."

(KSA 13,14 [75], WM/WP no. 40, t.m.)
I. The Idealisations of Reason

Following the discussions, in the previous two chapters, of the categories of substance and causality and the related ideas of reason which they give rise to (as thematised in the Paralogisms and the Antinomies, respectively), it might be expected that this third chapter would trace the category of reciprocity through its Analogy and its idea of reason in analogous manner. But whilst a comparatively cursory glance at the appropriate parts of the first Critique, namely the third Analogy and the Ideal of Pure Reason, will be necessary, the majority of the present chapter will concern itself with quite another text. Before considering the reasons for branching out at this point it will be best to clarify why the third Analogy at least is dealt with in such relatively summary fashion here.

But first of all it is necessary to recall that the readings carried out in the preceding two chapters of the present text did not chiefly have the aim of enhancing our understanding of Kant's treatment of the Principles insofar as they ensue from the categories of relation, but that they were attempts at symptomatic interpretations of his implicit, one might say latent or unconscious, thinking of temporality. Because, as was mentioned before, the 'relations' systematically discussed in the three Analogies concern the "time-relations of appearances", insofar as the categories of relation give the rule to each of them in turn (KrV/CPR A177, B219). So an extended discussion of the third Analogy would only be justified here if it yielded an additional perspective on Kant's metaphysics of time.

The third Analogy, with its 'Principle of Simultaneity, according to the Law of Reciprocity or Community' (to give it its full and rather cumbersome title) is not without significance for Kant, for he says of it that "...simultaneity...is...the condition of possibility of things themselves
as objects of experience." (KrV/CPR B258). And of course the entire first Critique is in one sense an account of the formation of experience. As we know, by experience Kant means the regulated, thoroughgoing connection of representations or, as he puts it in the formulation of the general Principle of the Analogies of Experience, "Experience is only possible through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions." (KrV/CPR B218).

The particular significance of the Principle of Simultaneity can be unfolded if it is taken into consideration that the 'community' (Gemeinschaft) which organises this Principle is a dynamic community or commercium, "without which even the local one (communio spatii) could never be known empirically" (KrV/CPR A213, B260). This I take to mean that the space within which objects appear for sensibility (as discussed in the first part of the first Critique, the Transcendental Aesthetic) 'gives' the perceptions from which representations can be formed but that it is not sufficient for the conceptualisation of spatiality or of the coexistence of objects in time and space. In other words, the Principle of Simultaneity thematises the reciprocally causal relation of objects in space just as the Principle of Causality thematises the unidirectionally causal relation of objects in time, simply called causality.

But it is in each case not merely a category which structures a Principle but, importantly, a temporalised category or schema. Kant reminds his readers of this when he writes:

"Wir werden also durch diese Grundsätze die Erscheinungen nur nach einer Analogie, mit der logischen und allgemeinen Einheit der Begriffe, zusammensetzen berechtigt werden, und daher uns in dem Grundsätze selbst zwar der Kategorie bedienen, in der Ausführung aber (der Anwendung auf Erscheinungen) das Schema derselben, als den Schlüssel ihres Gebrauchs, an dessen Stelle, oder jener vielmehr, als restringierende Bedingung, unter dem Namen einer Formel des ersteren, zur Seite setzen."
"We will then, by means of these principles, be justified in combining appearances only according to an analogy with the logical and general unity of concepts and thus we will make use of the category in the principle itself, but in the elaboration (the application to appearances) we will put the schema of it, as the key to its employment, in its place or rather, we will set it alongside the category as a restrictive condition under the name of its formula." (KrV/CPR A181, B224, t. m.).

Hence it seems reasonable to infer that whatever holds for the internal connection which structures a class of categories also holds for that which structures the corresponding group of Principles. On this point Kant remarks that "the third category in each class always arises from the combination of the second category with the first." (KrV/CPR B110). Thus, for instance, community can be defined as "the causality of a substance in determination of another reciprocally" (KrV/CPR B111, t. m.). And although Kant admonishes his readers most solemnly not to think that therefore the third category is in each case merely a derivation of the first two, one might assume that the operation ("a special actus of the understanding", ibid) by which the third category or, in our case, the third Analogy is arrived at, does not in fact differ widely from that of the earlier two. The only implication of this which is of importance to us is that the implicit dogmatic metaphysical values which were shown to inform the first two Analogies can be expected not to have been jettisoned or even just to have been significantly transformed in the construction of the third Analogy.

For these reasons I propose to, as it were, circumnavigate the chapter dealing with it and to proceed straightaway to a consideration of the Ideal of Pure Reason.
In the chapter on the third idea (the Ideal of Pure Reason), as in the preceding chapters of the Dialectic, Kant seeks to demonstrate the errant ways of a speculative reason which believes itself capable of producing theoretical knowledge of an object even though it does not take into account in any way the conditions of possibility of all objective knowledge other than pure concepts, namely the pure forms of intuition (Kant formulates this as:

"Wir heben von dem Gegenstande der Idee die Bedingungen auf, welche unseren Verstandesbegriff einschränken, die aber es auch allein möglich machen, daß wir von irgend einem Dinge einen bestimmten Begriff haben können."

"We remove from the object of the idea the conditions which limit the concept of the understanding but which also solely make it possible that we have a determinate concept of any thing." (KrV A674, B702, t. m.)

In this respect the chapter on the Ideal conforms to Kant's method throughout the Dialectic but two of its characteristics are of particular significance for the present project in which a radicalised critique of Kant's transcendental idealism is attempted.

The first point arises out of Kant's presentation of the problematic of the Ideal of Pure Reason (KrV/CPR A567f, B595f). As Kant reminds his readers, by means of pure concepts of the understanding alone no objects can be represented because without the conditions of sensibility the conditions of objective reality themselves are lacking. That is to say that by means of the categories alone objects can be thought and can be judged as formally possible according to the laws of logic but nothing may be said as to the status of such objects in reality if they are not locatable in space and time. Categories do however become concrete when 'applied to' appearances (that is to say if they can be seen to be formative of appearances) because pure forms of intuition furnish them (the categories)
with the material (Stoff) which turns them into concepts of experience (Erfahrungsbegriffe), that is, concepts which are formative of experience and not just of logically correct manoeuvres. In other words, the conditions of sensibility (space and time), must interact with the categories to form experience and the concrete material of experience enters into this operation through the forms of intuition. Otherwise empty concepts become concrete, objective reality (and thus correspond to a given object) when impregnated with the material of the senses and that finally means by inchoate, perceptual matter. The astonishing implication of this train of thought is that Kant here, in a rare moment of unprejudiced lucidity, elevates pre-conceptual matter to yardstick and final measure of objective reality². He underscores this tendency further by the manner in which he subsequently extends this line of argument to the introduction of ideas and, a little later, of the ideal of reason:

"Ideen aber sind noch weiter von der objektiven Realität entfernt, als Kategorien;... Aber noch weiter, als die Idee, scheint dasjenige von der objektiven Realität entfernt zu sein, was ich das Ideal nenne..."

"But ideas are yet further removed from objective reality than categories;... But even further removed from objective reality than the idea seems to be that which I call the ideal..." (KrV/CPR A568f, B595f, t. m.)

In this scheme of things, matter, the raw material of the senses, is designated the site of greatest objective reality and both the concepts of the understanding and those of reason appear as if arranged on a sliding scale on which they lose their degree of (potential) objective reality the further they deviate from 'the absolute' of matter given in intuition³.

This passage of Kant's text is remarkable for the simple fact that it marks one of the few instances where the strenuous anti-materialism he
manages to sustain almost everywhere else is, however slightly, punctured by an assertion which is yet in keeping with the formal demands of his own project of circumscribing the legitimate and appropriate domain of theoretical reason. This observation would already be significant if for no other reason than that it undermines Kant's implicit rationalistic claims for authorial sovereignty and for the univocity of his text. But it is also interesting for another reason, which brings us to the second point mentioned above.

As with all the ideas of reason, so too with the Ideal, Kant needs to show that an unavoidable and 'natural' illusion of reason leads it to assume them as given and hence as constitutive of knowledge when at best the only task they are fit to perform (concerning theoretical reason) is to keep in check, to act regulatively upon, the syllogistic material with which the understanding (and the faculty of judgement) provide it:

"Diese Ideale, ob man ihnen gleich nicht objektive Realität (Existenz) zugestehen möchte, sind doch um deswollen nicht für Hirngespinstes anzusehen, sondern geben ein unentbehrliches Richtmaß der Vernunft ab, die des Begriffs von dem, was in seiner Art ganz vollständig ist, bedarf, um darnach den Grad und die Mängel des Unvollständigen zu schätzen und abzumessen."

"These ideals, although one does not wish to attribute objective reality (existence) to them, are nonetheless therefore not to be regarded as figments of the brain but they provide an indispensable standard measure of reason which is in need of a concept of that which in its kind is entirely complete in order to evaluate and to measure the degree and the defects of the incomplete in accordance with it." (KrV/CPR A569f, B597f, t.m., my italics)

Just as for the understanding there exists - in the form of the material of intuition - a measure against which its operations can be evaluated and the degree to which they attain to this measure can be assessed, so too for
reason there exists such an absolute point of reference in the form of the ideal. And for both of them the issue of reality is the decisive factor. Kant exposes the unavoidable tendencies of speculative reason, firstly, to assume the ideal (as characterised in the above quote) as given and, secondly, in the guise of rational theology, to name this ideal 'god'.

It seems inapposite here to enter into the details of the arguments by means of which Kant demonstrates the impossibility of all speculative-theoretical proofs of the existence of god, be these proofs ontological, cosmological or physico-theological, especially since they formally repeat his argumentation in the Paralogisms to some extent. Instead I propose to concentrate on Kant's general description of the transcendental ideal (mainly in the second section of the third chapter of the Transcendental Dialectic, A571ff, B599ff) and in particular on certain key terms with which he characterises that which speculative reason (mis-)takes for the highest reality, namely the ideal.

In the transcendental ideal Kant claims to have discovered the principle under which each thing in general and according to its possibility stands, namely the principle of 'thoroughgoing determination' (durchgängige Bestimmung). This is not merely a formal organising principle like the law of contradiction but one that affects the content of a thing in general, insofar as this principle strives to determine which of all possible predicates apply to the thing. This principle itself is in turn structured by the ideal proper, the concept of the epitome (Inbegriff) of all possibility, according to which each thing can be determined or, as Kant sometimes calls it, by the originary concept or archetype (Urbegriff) which contains within it all possible predicates to the highest degree and most originary form (thus not admitting any derivates or hybrids). The determination itself proceeds as follows:
"...es werden durch diesen Satz nicht bloß Prädikate unter einander logisch, sondern das Ding selbst, mit dem Inbegriffe aller möglichen Prädikate, transzendental verglichen."

"...by means of this proposition predicates are not merely compared logically with each other but the thing itself is being compared transcendentally with the epitome of all possible predicates." (KrV/CPR A573, B601, t.m.)

This means that reason, like the understanding in its own way, operates with such an absolute standard, against which all its objects are compared, assessed and measured as to their status vis-à-vis this highest reality. But there is of course one enormous difference between the measure of reality as posited by the understanding and as posited by reason, insofar as the former (at least in its critical manifestation) acknowledges something outside itself, namely the material of sensibility, without which it remains unproductive of knowledge and of reality; whereas reason merely insists on the ideal as its highest instantiation of reality, without acknowledging that it is in danger of drifting off into transcendance, in danger of utterly divorcing itself from reality without the material of the senses:

"Das Ideal...in der Erscheinung realisieren wollen...ist untunlich."

"To want to realise the ideal... in an appearance... is impracticable."

(KrV/CPR A570, B598, t.m., my omissions).

Thus it may be said that the site of the highest reality is posited at opposite ends of the spectrum by the understanding (as matter) and by reason (as god).

We are now in a position to examine in which way Kant characterises the transcendental ideal whose only proper function is to regulate the theoretical propositions of the understanding but in which reason
unavoidably overreaches itself and presumes that it can be constitutive of knowledge by itself. In elaborating the nature of the ideal, as imagined by speculative reason, Kant observes:

"Wenn also der durchgängigen Bestimmung in unserer Vernunft ein transzendentales Substratum zum Grunde gelegt wird, welches gleichsam den ganzen Vorrat des Stoffes, daher all mögliche Prädikate der Dinge genommen werden können, enthält, so ist dieses Substratum nichts anderes, als die Idee von einem All der Realität (omnitudo realitatis)."

"If thus a transcendental substrate which contains, as it were, the entire stock of material whence all possible predicates of things can be taken, is put at the basis of the thoroughgoing determination of our reason, then this substrate is nothing other than the idea of an all of reality (omnitudo realitatis)." (KrV/CPR A575f, B604f, t.m., my italics)

This is to attribute to the ideal (to 'god') the greatest originary plenitude possible as well as the highest potential, potentia, power and capability. It is to say that all that can be lies contained in the ideal but, much more importantly, conversely it implies that plenitude, richness, highest power and highest capacity are locatable elsewhere, in a world beyond, and not here, where there are only things themselves. Since they are not themselves originary or, for that matter plenitudinous, they are mere copies of the original, they are mere imperfect ectypa (mangelhafte Kopeien (sic)) of the original archetype. The immediate effect of such an operation of idealisation, as performed by an as yet metaphysical reason, is to allocate both plenitude and power solely to a beyond unattainable for mere appearances or for the shadowy figures who move in such a deplorably deficient realm.

As has already been mentioned, Kant calls the ideal Urbegriff, the originary concept or archetype. This means that the copies are derived from it but it does not derive from anything or anywhere else (or so dialectical
reason wishes to believe). The ideal is wholly original, first in a series of formations (which is why Kant also refers to it as 'prototype'), highest in a hierarchy of formative ideas and not itself determined from elsewhere. The ectypa or imperfect copies, on the other hand, are wholly secondary, wholly derived:

"Das Ideal ist... also das Urbild (prototypon) aller Dinge, welche insgesamt, als mangelhafte Kopien (sic) (ectypa), den Stoff zu ihrer Möglichkeit daher nehmen..."

"The ideal is....thus the archetype (prototypon) of all things, which one and all, as imperfect copies (ectypa), derive the material for their possibility from it..." (KrV/CPR A578, B606, t. m.)

They are devoid of any power to generate their own material for themselves but have to import it from the higher, richer power of the ideal\(^4\). Secondly, then, the metaphysical distribution of values results in the things of this world being entirely conditioned, being mere derivatives, only second-bests, whereas the ideal itself is distinguished by not being in any way conditioned or derived.

In introducing the principle of thoroughgoing determination, Kant remarks:

"...er [der Grundsatz] betrachtet... jedes Ding noch im Verhältnis auf die gesamte Möglichkeit, als den Inbegriff aller Prädikate der Dinge Überhaupt."

"...it [the principle] also views... each thing in relation to the entire possibility, as the epitome of all predicates of things in general." (KrV/CPR A572, B600, t. m., my insertions and omissions)

That store of all possibilities is the epitome, the most complete, most perfect place of all predicates, a treasure trove from which things can be furnished. But this of course carries the implication that the copies
themselves are far from perfect. This is made abundantly clear in the continuation of the penultimate quote:

"...indem sie [die Kopeien] demselben [dem Urbild] mehr oder weniger nahe kommen, dennoch jederzeit unendlich weit daran fehlen, es zu erreichen."
"...while they [the copies] get more or less close to it [the archetype], yet they fall at all times infinitely short of reaching it." (KrV/CPR A578, B606, t. m.)

Thirdly, these points can be summed up by saying that the ideal on the one side and things or copies on the other side, are for all time infinitely far removed from each other, and perfection resides entirely and exclusively on the side of the former.

What must of course be remembered is that Kant characterises the ideal as _plenitudinous_ and _powerful_, as _original_ and _not conditioned or derived_ and as _perfect_ without thereby in any way endorsing the image that emerges. In fact the entire sweep of the Dialectic is to demystify the processes by which speculative, metaphysical reason cuts itself off from the exigencies of objective reality. In the course of this demystification (or critique), Kant painstakingly even enumerates the precise steps (realisation, hypostatisation and, finally, personification) by means of which reason identifies its ideal in a movement which begins innocently enough with the search for the greatest reality and ends up with the person of an anthropomorphised god:

"Dieses Ideal des allerrealesten Wesens wird also, ob es zwar eine bloße Vorstellung ist, zuerst _realisiert_, d. i. zum Objekt gemacht, darauf _hypostasiert_, endlich, durch einen natürlichen Fortschritt der Vernunft zur Vollendung der Einheit, so gar _personifiziert_..."
"Thus this ideal of the most real being, although it is indeed a mere representation, is first _realised_, that is, made into an object, then..."
hypostatised, and finally, by a natural progress of reason towards the
completion of unity, even personified..." (KrV/CPR A583, B611, t. m.)

But even in the midst of this highly ethereal and entirely erroneous
procedure, Kant credits pre-critical reason with enough sense (even when
devoid of all sensibility) not to imagine such a being to exist
objectively:

"Es versteht sich von selbst, daß die Vernunft...nicht die Existenz eines
solchen Wesens, das dem Ideale gemäß ist, sondern nur die Idee desselben
voraussetze..."

"It is self-evident that reason...does not presuppose the existence of
such a being that corresponds to the ideal, but only the idea of it."
(KrV/CPR A577f, B605f, t. m., my italics and omissions)

And he sums up the ontological argument in which such an idea, which is
merely intended as a regulative concept of reason, is converted into an
objectively given, real thing when he calls it 'a mere fiction' (eine bloße
Erdichtung, KrV/CPR A580, B608). It is in such an act of fictionalising that
the ideal, which initially is but another merely regulative idea of reason,
is elevated to the untenable status of constitutive ground of all reality
in the person of 'god'. The source of this transformation Kant names
transcendental, which is to say pre-critical, theology (for instance
KrV/CPR A580, B608).

It appears that all these remarks by Kant can again be summarised and
organised in the form of an ascending scale, depending on where the various
types of thought locate themselves in relation to the two extreme
interpretations of what constitutes the highest reality, god or matter.
Needless to say, it is a critical vantage point from which this order of
things emerges.
At the lowest point of this imaginary scale Kant finds theology; it identifies the ideal with 'god' whom it takes to be objectively real, whom it believes, simply, to exist. Thus for (this type of) theology the highest reality is a being for whose objective reality, as Kant goes on to demonstrate conclusively, no proofs (nor indeed disproofs) can be found. Theology's ideal is entirely devoid of any real substance or matter. Technically speaking this can be attributed to the fact that the necessary conditions of objective knowledge, in the form of (transcendental) time and space through which the material of the senses is given, has not yet been realised as being constitutive of experience. But within a diagnostic register the very same characteristics of theology merely attest to the illegitimate elevation of an imaginary agency to the ens realissimum.

A median position is taken up by dialectical or pre-critical reason which, although still compelled to identify the ideal with 'god', at least moderates its zeal to the point of acknowledging that this ideal cannot in fact be found to exist in reality, independently of the unavoidable, illusory tendencies of reason. Thus dogmatic reason at least realises that the ideal only exists insofar as reason thinks it. Reason has now entered a more modest phase in which it begins to orientate itself towards the exigencies of this world. But although it no longer adheres to the grotesque inventions of traditional theology, it does not yet fully embrace the implications of a world of appearances.

Only at the pinnacle of the scale, in the development of critical reason, do even the last echoes of Christianity become wholly inaudible. This can finally happen for the very simple reason that, at least within the project of founding theoretical knowledge, the senses, their material and the equal share this has in the formation of knowledge, are given their proper due. It is, in short, no longer 'god' (be it directly or in the form of a prestabilised harmony) that guarantees the correspondence of human
knowledge to the objects of the world; instead the harmonious interaction of the faculties (of knowledge) ensures that the objects of knowledge can correspond to our means of knowing them, ensures in other words, that they can become objectively valid or real. This is obviously what turns the, seemingly merely technical, reversals of critique into a revolutionary thought.

But whilst it is important to draw out the special position which critique occupies in the history of philosophy and the concurrent demise of the (Christian) ideal, we should not be lulled into thinking that Kant unequivocally eradicates all traces of a quasi-theological thought from all parts and aspects of his text, we should not even imagine that he would be free to do so. But at least the scale, elaborated above, the construction of which Kant greatly facilitates (even if he does not explicitly present it) by the way in which he introduces his material, allows us to gauge the distance from its two poles (matter and ideal) at which Kant's project can be situated. As before (chapter one, section three of this text), a particularly rich source of material for such an evaluation can be found in the Transcendental Deduction. In the same way in which Kant questions pre-critical reason's blind belief in the ideal and exposes its metaphysical implications, it is possible, and indeed necessary, to question the Transcendental Deduction's equally untenable, equally pre-critical belief in a transcendental unity of apperception.
II. The Transcendental Deduction (II)

We have already seen in which, extremely loaded, terms the ideal is constructed (as plenitudinous, etc.). Interestingly enough, transcendental apperception is occasionally described in not altogether dissimilar terms, as for instance when Kant refers to it as 'this pure, originary, immutable consciousness' ("dieses reine, ursprüngliche, unwandelbare Bewußtsein", KrV/CPR A107) and as 'this originary condition' ("diese ursprüngliche Bedingung", KrV/CPR A106). Is this consciousness, then, which at other times seems to have no other function than to provide the material of the three syntheses with formal unity (e.g. KrV/CPR A105), imbued with the same unconscious values which inform the old ideal?

It is then first of all a matter of attention to the tone or register in which Kant describes transcendental apperception, if its Platonic basis is to be uncovered. Although it is true that the epithet 'pure', technically speaking, refers to the a priori conditions of possibility of knowledge, it is impossible to dissociate it entirely from a more sinister register of purity which stands in opposition to an allegedly sullied, compromised, corrupt and altogether impure order which traditionally marks matter, the body, physicality, etc. (these conflicting series have already been anatomised, cf. above, chapter one, sections one and two). In being characterised as 'originary', transcendental apperception in part seems to share the ideal's status as epitome (Urbegriff) and by being called the 'originary condition' it is reminiscent of the attribution of precisely the same status to the ideal; furthermore, insofar as the former is 'immutable' it seems to carry the same capacity as the ideal to found knowledge even, or especially, when devoid of matter which is in the highest degree subject to mutation and so finally resistant to a complete encapsulation by transcendental thought.

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On the level of the argument, too, some unsustainable claims about transcendental apperception are being inserted into the Transcendental Deduction, a chapter whose chief function is after all nothing more than to demonstrate that the pure concepts of the understanding can in principle provide the rule according to which it is possible for the manifold of intuition to cohere.

In terms of Kant's project it is something of a truism to say that necessity can only be grounded in transcendental conditions ("Aller Notwendigkeit liegt jederzeit eine transzendentale Bedingung zum Grunde" KrV/CPR A106). Even if it is accepted that an empirical unified consciousness is necessary, within which disparate intuitions can be held together under convergent categories, and given the fact that this necessary consciousness as such requires transcendental conditions which make it necessary, this does not strictly speaking allow any immediate inferences as to the nature of these transcendental conditions.

It would seem that less prejudiced inferences only lead from a synthetic, formally unified consciousness to a transcendental, formally unifying synthesis, or from an empirical synthesis to a transcendental source of it, namely to transcendental imagination, the faculty of synthesis. This should especially be the case since a concept (of the understanding, that is to say, a category) is that by means of which the manifold is unified (synthesised) into one representation (KrV/CPR A103) and, conversely, a representation or an object (ein Gegenstand) is that, the concept of which expresses the necessity of such a synthesis (KrV/CPR A106). Why should it be the case that this kind of circular logic (whereby whatever appears synthesised can only be traced back to a synthesis) is applicable on the local level of a concept but not as far as the faculty of concepts, the understanding, and its chief vehicle, transcendental apperception, are concerned? It is a peculiar, albeit apparently unavoidable, feature of
Kant's text that it should be so enormously insightful regarding the operations of a (pre-critical) reason but that it seems blind to its own (pre-critical) prejudices.

There appears a very telling paragraph in Kant's discussion of speculative reason in which he details its typical procedure not without a slightly condescending tone. He writes:

"So ist also der natürliche Gang der menschlichen Vernunft beschaffen. Zuerst überzeugt sie sich vom Dasein irgendeines notwendigen Wesens. In diesem erkennet sie eine unbedingte Existenz. Nun sucht sie den Begriff des Unabhängigen von aller Bedingung, und findet ihn in dem, was selbst die zureichende Bedingung zu allem andern ist... Das... ist absolute Einheit, und führt den Begriff eines einigen, nämlich des höchsten Wesens bei sich..."

"Such then is the natural course of human reason. First it persuades itself of the existence of any necessary being. In this it recognises an unconditioned existence. Now it seeks the concept of that which is independent of all condition and finds it in that which is itself the sufficient condition of all else... That... is absolute unity, and carries with it the concept of a singular, namely the supreme being..." (KrV/CPR A587, B615, t.m., my omissions)

Kant is of course writing about the fabrication of 'god' (or at least an image thereof) within rational theology or 'natural' reason but it is very tempting, as well as very revealing, to read this passage as if it described the fabrication of human being (or an image thereof, by means of transcendental apperception) within a transcendental idealism which has simply not quite yet managed to rid itself of the old dogma of a supreme being — be it divine or merely human, a being which in any case is presumed to stand at the zenith of, and apart from, nature conceived as creation. Kant himself inadvertently hints at such a parallel when he writes:
"Dieses Ideal des allerrealesten Wesens wird also, ob es zwar eine bloße Vorstellung ist, zuerst realisiert, d. i. zum Objekt gemacht, darauf hypostasiert, endlich, durch einen natürlichen Fortschritt der Vernunft zur Vollendung der Einheit, so gar personifiziert...; weil die regulative Einheit der Erfahrung nicht auf den Erscheinungen selbst (der Sinnlichkeit allein), sondern auf der Verknüpfung ihres Mannigfaltigen durch den Verstand (in einer Apperzeption) beruht, mithin die Einheit der höchsten Realität und die durchgängige Bestimmbarkeit (Möglichkeit) aller Dinge in einem höchsten Verstände, mithin in einer Intelligenz zu liegen scheint."

"Thus this ideal of the most real being, although it is indeed a mere representation, is first realised, that is, made into an object, then hypostatised, and finally, by a natural progress of reason towards the completion of unity, even personified...; because the regulative unity of experience does not rest upon appearances themselves (sensibility alone), but on the combination of its manifold by the understanding (in one apperception), consequently the unity of the highest reality and the thoroughgoing determinability (possibility) of all things seems to lie in a supreme understanding, and consequently in an intelligence." (KrV/CPR A583, B611, t. m., my omissions)

It seems not altogether impossible to read this very procedure (reason’s construction of its ideal) back into the Transcendental Deduction, Kant’s ostensible account of how (and what with) the pure concepts of the understanding combine to produce experience. For does not Kant allow transcendental apperception to be hypostatised, does he not allow something that merely has to be able to be the concomitant of all conscious representations, the understanding, to become the under-standing, the ὑποστάσις, the foundation of what is at heart simply a process of groundless thinking, of free synthesis? And does he not (as already discussed in chapter one, section three, above) confuse the unified nature of this formal consciousness with a – much more essentialist – unity which he wishes to stamp on this consciousness? And finally, above all, does he not
channel the multiple, pre- or extra-human impulses of nature, which he
himself thematised under the name of synthesis, into the paltry 'vessel' he
refers to as 'my identical self' ("mein identisches Selbst", KrV/CPR A129)?

Throughout the Transcendental Deduction (in A) there runs an enormous
tension between the rival claims to priority of the transcendental (unity
of) apperception, and the productive synthesis in imagination. Kant likes
to seek refuge from uncertainty about this conflict in the wonderfully
ambiguous words 'relate' or 'relation' (beziehen, Beziehung), as for
instance when he writes:

"Also beziehet sich die transz. (sic) Einheit der Apperzeption auf die
reine Synthesis der Einbildungskraft, als eine Bedingung a priori der
Möglichkeit aller Zusammensetzung des Mannigfaltigen in einer
Erkenntnis."

"Thus the transcendental unity of apperception relates to the pure
synthesis of the imagination, as an a priori condition of the possibility
of all combination of the manifold in a cognition." (KrV/CPR A118, t.m., my
italics)

The sentence does not even make entirely clear which of the two is meant
by 'a priori condition', which is here more originary, transcendental
apperception or transcendental imagination, the (hypo-)stasis of the
understanding or the multiple becomings of synthesis. Similarly, the
problem arises in the following formulation:

"...die Einheit dieser Synthesis [des Mannigfaltigen in der
Einbildungskraft] heißt transzendental, wenn sie in Beziehung auf die
ursprüngliche Einheit der Apperzeption, als a priori notwendig
vorgestellt wird."

"...the unity of this synthesis [of the manifold in imagination] is
called transcendental when it is represented as a priori necessary in
relation to the originary unity of apperception." (KrV/CPR A118, t. m., my italics and insertions)

What is this relation, is it one of subordination or of coordination and, again, which of the two 'relata' is more primordial? There are a large number of examples which could be cited just from the third section of the Transcendental Deduction (in A), the section where this ambiguity is most prevalent. Then again, Kant seems to settle the dispute once and for all by stating quite clearly:

"Also ist das Principium der notwendigen Einheit der reinen (produktiven) Synthesis der Einbildungskraft vor der Apperzeption der Grund der Möglichkeit aller Erkenntnis, besonders der Erfahrung." "Thus the principle of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination prior to apperception is the ground of the possibility of all cognition, especially experience." (KrV/CPR A118, t. m., my italics)

But far from solving the problem conclusively, this definitive statement seems to be utterly contradicted just a few pages later, when Kant declares:

"Die Einheit der Apperzeption aber ist der transzendentale Grund der notwendigen Gesetzmäßigkeit aller Erscheinungen in einer Erfahrung." "But the unity of apperception is the transcendental ground of the necessary lawfulness of all appearances in an experience." (KrV/CPR A127, t. m)

Although we are not quite yet in a position to draw out the more important implications of the decision which to privilege, primordial synthesis or originary apperception, we can offer some suggestions concerning Kant's seeming inability (or unwillingness) to resolve this very
important question. And here we are at last able to return to the
discussion above, in which it was proposed that the success of the critical
project could to some extent be gauged by the standard it itself sets in
its delineation of the failures and unavoidable errors committed by
rational theology. In this regard I have attempted to highlight some of the
more obvious similarities between the prototypon transcendentale, viz. the
ideal of pure reason, and that other first foundation in another quest for
the certainty of knowledge, namely transcendental apperception. Insofar as
Kant can be shown to inadvertently repeat some of the lacunae of pre-
critical reason, the intellectual distance which separates him from the
consummation of critique can be staked out quite clearly. On the other
side, that very examination drew us into yet another preliminary discussion
of Kant's enormously significant discovery of synthesis as a possible
primary force of nature (whereby 'nature' must of course retain the sense
it takes on after the Copernican turn, namely as a construct of, and as
only knowable by the faculties of knowledge). And it is this momentous
discovery, however latent and unrealised it lodges in the interstices of
his text, which indicates the huge advances of the critique of reason, as
it gradually begins to question the claims of the Christian god over all
beings - this reason, no longer safe in the knowledge of the divine ideal
and not yet liberated into the divinity of matter.
III. The Marasmic Ideal

At this point it becomes necessary to substantiate the earlier claim (made at the beginning of section one of this chapter) that in the present context it no longer suffices to consider some implications of the principles and ideas based on the categories of relation, as discussed in the first Critique. In this, as usual, we are simply following Kant's own procedure very closely.

On one level, it was the self-appointed task of the first Critique to found a theoretical approach to the objects of nature qua experience, to found, in other words, a theory of nature and the possibility of natural science qua physics. It did this by taking up the question - central to philosophy since Plato - of how it is in principle possible that our representations (our knowledge) of objects correspond to these objects and, as is well known, reversing the question to allow it to inquire into the possibility of objects corresponding to our means of knowing them. By thus relocating the problematic in the realm of the faculties it became possible for Kant to bring centuries of unresolved argumentation to a solution with one stroke. More precisely, it is in the formulation of the 'highest principle of all synthetic judgements', viz. that "the conditions of possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of possibility of objects of experience" (KrV/CPR A158, B197, t.m.*) that Kant solved this age-old problem.

What distinguishes Kant's answer most radically from those of his predecessors is of course the fact that for him the objects of our knowledge are not given as such prior to our modes of knowing them, that they are, in other words, precisely objects of our knowledge, of our means of knowing them. This is not to say that we produce objects as things in the world - materially they are indeed given, pre-exist and precede our
faculties. But as separate, individual objects (that is to say, formally) they are the products of our faculties. Nor does Kant's Copernican revolution state that the processes of this formal production are individual and 'subjective' (in which case they would give rise to all manner of unsolvable 'epistemological' problems). For, according to Kant, the processes by which theoretical knowledge is produced are universal and necessary, they do not change in different (for instance, historical) circumstances nor are they determined by psychological factors (cf. e.g. KrV/CPR A53, B77) and they are certainly not open to volition; they are entirely spontaneous (ibid A50, B74) or, one might say, automatic.

By revolutionising the thinking around the issue of truth (traditionally comprehended as the correspondence of knowledge and object) in this manner, Kant takes on the burden of analysing and explicating, albeit predominantly on the level of their transcendental derivation, the processes which he alleges to be productive of this new critical truth (a perhaps not altogether unbearable 'burden' for Kant, given his penchant for slow, methodical work).

Among the cornerstones in this great excavatory work are of course the categories which provide a kind of guiding thread through the Analytic and Dialectic of the first Critique and thereby fulfill the role of drawing together what would otherwise be vast swathes of seemingly unrelated material. However contentious their alleged Aristotelian origin or their ultimate justification within the larger project of a critical philosophy, they undoubtedly provide the means for Kant's exploration of how the objects of knowledge are constituted (cf. the more extensive discussion of these points in the Introduction, above).

According to Kant it must be possible to articulate knowledge of the objects of the world in terms of synthetic a priori judgements. The apriority of the latter rests in the universal and necessary constitution
of the faculties which are productive of them (cf. above, previous page); but that they are synthetic is entirely due to the fact that there are disparate, although obviously not altogether unrelated, faculties in the first place. Only because there is an understanding as distinct from intuition, can the synthesis of their respective materials (and Kant's analysis of their procedures, whether separate or combined) occur.

Without in the least diminishing the enormous significance of the magnificent intellectual sweep in which Kant revolutionises philosophy and delimits the legitimate scope of theoretical reason, it is nonetheless finally impossible to ignore the intrinsic limitations of the theory of knowledge established in the first Critique. Kant himself was the first to realise this. For, although the grandeur of the project of thus philosophically founding theoretical knowledge is undisputed, the limitations of this type of knowledge (even in Kant's own terms) immediately come into view when it is realised what is known through it and how it is known, in short, when the scope of this type of knowledge is realised.

For any object to become cognisable for the human faculties, its manifold must be apprehended by the senses and via the categories a concept of it must be formed. The faculty of judgement effects the subsumption of the particular under the universal and since this operation is determined by the understanding in its pure concepts (the universal is given for which it must be possible to find the particular), the faculty of judgement is here acting determinatively. In terms of the pure forms involved, the apprehension in intuition and the recognition in a concept must be mediated by a synthesis in imagination (KrV/CPR Transcendental Deduction in A); only then can an object be known.

But the object which is thus produced as object is an object in general
(überhaupt) which is to say that it is only known as object. This means that it must have empirical attributes but what its particular empirical characteristics are cannot be known in advance as a result of the productive processes described in the first Critique. All that is implicitly known of it is that it must be knowable in terms of quantity, quality, relation and modality because these general determinations are analytically contained in the concept 'object'. But which quantity or quality it has, and in which type of causal relation it stands, and whether it is actual, possible or necessary - this it is not within the scope of the first Critique to determine. Which is to say that the first Critique provides an account of how objects in general are formed and become knowable but not how they are known in particular and as particular.

This problem simply repeats itself on the level of the system. Although not explicitly formulated as a problem, it is already implicitly contained in the following quote from Kant:

"Unter Natur...verstehen wir den Zusammenhang der Erscheinungen...nach notwendigen Regeln, d.i. nach Gesetzen. Es sind also gewisse Gesetze, und zwar a priori, welche allererst eine Natur möglich machen; die empirischen können nur vermittelst der Erfahrung, und zwar zufolge jener ursprünglichen Gesetze, nach welchen selbst Erfahrungs allererst möglich wird, stattfinden, und gefunden werden."

"By nature...we understand the connection of appearances...according to necessary rules, that is, according to laws. There are thus certain laws which first make a nature possible, and these laws are a priori. Empirical laws can exist and be discovered only through experience, and indeed in consequence of those original laws through which experience itself first becomes possible." (KrV/CPR A216, B263, t.m., my omissions)

The thoroughgoing connectedness of appearances, as produced by the interplay of the faculties, is what Kant understands by nature in the first Critique. The cohesiveness of experience according to necessary and
universal laws is the sense in which nature is discussed there. Nature is
that of which we are capable of forming a coherent picture if and when the
faculties in their a priori constitution interact appropriately. But, as
Kant himself points out in the above quote, in this way only nature in
general is given, 'a nature', as he calls it, a coherence in general, the
possibility of coherence. As the a priori faculties function properly, a
coherent picture comes into view but it is only an outline or a sketch. No
theory of the formation of empirical laws of nature exists as yet. After
the first Critique we know that we can know nature formally, but we do not
yet know how we could know nature, how it becomes possible as empirical
system. The material of empirical laws is derived from experience which is
to say that this material does not have a priori status. But if these
empirical laws are to be universally and necessarily valid they must
somehow be comprehensible in a priori terms. This is why Kant needs to show
that, whilst the material of empirical laws cannot be comprehended in a
priori terms, it must indeed be possible to comprehend the method of their
derivation as laws thus.

As concerns the particular type of interrelatedness we have been
concentrating on so far, namely the temporal connection of appearances as
thematised under the categories of relation, an entirely new hiatus opens
up around them. For although Kant does not explicitly state this in the
first Critique, the only type of causality he deals with there is that of
efficient causes, which can only comprehend mechanical forces working upon
one another. This is not a problem as long as it only seeks to account for
synthetic a priori judgements in the context of how a science of nature qua
physics is possible, as is of course the case in the first Critique (cf. the
But although such an account is absolutely necessary for the cognition of
nature, it is not sufficient, since not all objects of our cognition are comprehensible by reference to mechanical laws alone. Some of the objects which appear as a result of the work of the understanding, that is to say, some of the objects given in experience (although, crucially, not solely derived from it) blatantly exceed any such theorisation according to merely mechanical laws.

Such objects are organisms or products of nature and we must now turn to the chief critical text in which Kant seeks to provide a theory of knowledge of these types of objects, namely the Critique of the Faculty of Teleological Judgement ('Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft').

The comparison in terms of which many eighteenth century writers liked to formulate the problem of inorganic as opposed to organic things was that between a clockwork and an organism (cf. for example KtU/CTJ A288, B292). The comparison is apt to the extent that both contain multiple parts which interact in such a way that the whole functions in accordance with a concept, specifically the concept of a purpose, we might have of it. The question is whether a clockwork and an organism are exactly alike or, if not, wherein their differences lie. This is how Kant describes the interrelatedness of the parts peculiar to a clockwork:

"In einer Uhr ist ein Teil das Werkzeug der Bewegung der anderen, aber nicht ein Rad die wirkende Ursache der Hervorbringung des anderen; ein Teil ist zwar um des anderen Willen, aber nicht für denselben da."

"In a clock, one part is the instrument of the movement of the others but one wheel is not the efficient cause of the bringing-forth of another; one part is there for the sake of the other but not due to it." (KtU/CTJ A288, B292, t.m.)

The parts in a complex object of this kind at best cause one another's movements (which are comprehensible according to the laws of physics) but they do not cause each other materially; the purpose of one part is to
cause another to perform its function (which is here only a certain movement) correctly, but its purpose can never be to produce another part materially, nor can one clock produce another or mend itself when a defect arises. It is of course the horologist with whom the concept of the purpose of the whole rests and who produces this whole in accordance with the concept of its purpose. Here the purpose of the object logically and temporally precedes its production but the concept of the purpose is external to the object and the site, as it were, of this concept is of an entirely different order to that of the object itself.

But the causality internal to the object thus produced is clearly only a mechanical causality, which is to say that the effects which the parts of the clockwork have upon each other can be comprehended exhaustively by reference to the type of causality which we know from the categories of relation. In other words, the understanding can form a complete picture of the object as such and of its inner workings by means of the type of causality inherent in the understanding, here its categories are sufficient.

But not all objects conform exclusively to the understanding in this manner. Some objects (although nevertheless as such derived from the understanding) are given through experience and are such that they exceed the capabilities of our faculties of knowledge to cognise them as long as these faculties are determined by the understanding. It is impossible to account ultimately for the whence of this peculiar experience, but at some stage the faculties of cognition encounter phenomena which they experience as excessive to their own capacity. This is to say that the scope of the understanding could be exhausted and yet these peculiar objects would still not be entirely theorised. At that point, as always when the understanding reaches the limits of its application, pure reason steps in to supply a
concept not contained in the understanding. If this concept, or idea, of reason expects to act determinatively upon the objects of nature, reason involves itself in an unavoidable dialectic (hence the chapters on this in the Dialectic of the first Critique, as discussed in our previous two chapters and in section one of this chapter). The proper application of reason as concerns natural objects is to act regulatively upon the concepts of the understanding. In the context of the faculty of teleological judgement this means that when the understanding's concepts of (mechanical) causality, with which it aspires to determine all objects, no longer suffice to account for the causality of organisms, reason steps in to provide the regulative concept of purposiveness which, and this could stand as a definition of it, the faculty of teleological judgement utilises as an internal, material, objective purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit) with a purpose (Zweck). Kant marks the difference between purpose and purposiveness in the following manner


"...the concept of an object, insofar as it contains at the same time the ground of the actuality of this object, is called a purpose, and the correspondence of a thing with that constitution of things that is only possible according to purposes, is called purposiveness." (KU/CJ A XXVI, B XXVIII, t. m.)

A purpose is of course originally a concept of pure practical, not pure theoretical reason. It could not be otherwise since the ideas of the latter are themselves only invalid mutations of the pure concepts of the understanding and are by definition illegitimate in the formation of theoretical knowledge whereas a purpose is a legitimate concept of pure
practical reason.

The purpose is internal, rather than external or relative which means that the object itself is judged to exist in conformity with the concept of a purpose which is internal to this object rather than external to it and therefore lying in another being or object for the sake of which the externally purposive object would exist. Simply put, the object is an end in itself and not just a means to an end external to it.

Nor is the purposiveness, in accordance with which the object is thought to exist, merely formal and therefore only concerned with the object's structure. The purposiveness which is imputed to the object precisely concerns the manifold of intuition of this object, its matter, which is given and which the understanding experiences as untheorisable and unpredictable according to its laws and hence as utterly contingent. The understanding would never be at a loss to find a concept for the formal properties of an object for this is exactly the function of the understanding. But it is this fact of the understanding's inability to find anything lawful in the empirical, material aspects of organisms which leads the faculty of cognition (Erkenntnisvermögen) to supplement this deficiency of the understanding with a concept derived from pure practical reason, a concept with which it can found an a priori principle even in the hazardous, apparently lawless jungle of the wholly empirical, a concept through which even organic matter can become subject to a priori laws.

In the first part of the third Critique, the Critique of the Faculty of Aesthetic Judgement, the purposiveness which can be attributed to certain aesthetic forms is said to be only subjective. By this Kant means to say that the purposiveness of aesthetic objects is produced by, and ultimately only locatable in, the interplay of the faculties, thereby provoking pleasure; no actual purpose is even thought to adhere to the object which is thus judged. There Kant speaks of a purposiveness without purpose, which
is equivalent to a goal-oriented activity which never reaches its goal, a
directionality without direction or simply an act of judging without the
judgement being determined by a concept.

But the purposiveness of organic objects is not just the effect of the
unrestrained, pleasurable interplay of the faculties. The purposiveness of
natural objects must be thought to be attributable to them via a concept
(that of purpose) since it is to account for their objective (albeit
material) existence and for the necessity which binds them to their (final)
cause. Thus the purposiveness of organic objects hinges on the concept of
purpose and must be applied to such natural objects as if it were an
objectively valid concept - which it can never be since only the categories
of the understanding attain that status. Another way of putting this is to
say that organisms lend objective reality to the (otherwise ideal) concept
of a purpose (KtU/CTJ A291, B295). This as if, with which the faculty of
judgement pretends to itself to know much more than it ever could - namely
the necessary material constitution of empirical, organic objects - Kant
denotes by the term 'reflective'. The faculty of judgement must act as if
it were in possession of such objectively valid concepts as are in fact
only found in the understanding if it is to contain a principle for the
investigation of nature (cf. sec. II of the first Introduction to the third
Critique). But of course it does not possess any such determinatively
functioning a priori (or necessary) concepts. So when it posits the concept
of a purpose as the internal 'ground' of an organism, this concept is
objective not in the sense of applying constitutively, but only
reflectively, to an object, thereby expressing a necessity of the faculty
of judgement for its own a priori principle. This restriction of the
concept of an objective purposiveness is emphasised by the fact that Kant
in this case speaks of the faculty of judgement in its reflective
employment. An important implication of this is that the faculty of
judgement, although it needs to presuppose the purposiveness of natural forms for its own sake, never claims to know if objects are in fact purposive or not. Only the understanding can determine judgements concerning the actual, but only formal, constitution of natural objects since it is itself formally constitutive of them. The faculty of judgement can never aspire to such knowledge.

It is of course the case that Kant, in elaborating these distinctions between different types of objects, does not seek to explain the inexplicable, namely why natural objects themselves come to be, or grow, or decay. No theory, whether essentially scientific or philosophical, could account for this. The former mode of enquiry might describe the processes of natural development as far as this is within its means, but it could not ultimately answer the question of why this occurs, nor does Kant have any ambition to stray into such transcendent, speculative realms.

He is still engaged in the project of critique and this means that 'only' the transcendental constitution of our knowledge of natural objects is being investigated, not the objects of nature themselves but only our means of knowing them. In short, he is still only concerned with the interaction of the faculties which has to occur for knowledge of the natural world to arise.

One of the chief reasons why Kant elaborates these issues so meticulously is that the concept of the purposiveness of organisms, which is regulatively applied to them by the faculty of teleological judgement in its reflective employment, would appear to accomplish the impossible since it apparently is an eirenicon between the - hitherto irreconcilable - faculties of the understanding, which only effects the realm of nature, and that of reason, which only has effects in the realm of freedom, since this
purposiveness is a concept which is derived from reason but applied to nature'.

If these points seem rather complex, this is surely so because the position which the faculty of teleological judgement occupies vis-à-vis organisms is rather difficult to locate with precision in relation to the many formal requirements internal to the critical system. And yet it is only by thus locating the faculty of teleological judgement that the specific (and specifically temporal) differences between efficient and final causes, as drawn out by the Critique of the Faculty of Teleological Judgement, can be appreciated.

The only conceptualisation of causality of which the understanding is capable involves a unilinear progression from cause to effect (nexus effectivus), in keeping with its unilinear conception of transcendental temporality. Even the category of reciprocity does not violate this one-directional principle since it essentially only juxtaposes or, as it were, doubles two instances of this type of causality and its concomitant type of temporality. And although the purposiveness of natural forms also involves this subsidiary kind of causality, namely reciprocity, insofar as all the parts of an organism are considered mutually cause and effect of each other, this can only be thought to be the case on the basis of another and more complex form of causality, namely that of final causes (nexus finalis) because only a purpose is that concept of the whole which can be thought to organise and guide the mutual productions of the parts.

In this type of causality the effect (B) of a cause (A) must at the same time in some sense be considered the cause (B) of the thing (A) which was its cause and which thing (A) is thus in turn considered an effect of (B). Thus an oak tree, for instance, can in one sense be thought the effect of an acorn (namely insofar as the acorn precedes the oak tree in time and the
latter comes to be as a result of, grows out of the former) but an oak tree can also be thought as that for the sake of which the acorn exists. In that sense the oak tree is the fruition of the acorn and must be thought to, as it were, lie contained in potentia in the acorn. Kant puts this very succinctly when he writes of the nexus finitum:

"...[es] kann... eine Kausalverbindung... gedacht werden,... in der das Ding, welches einmal als Wirkung bezeichnet ist, dennoch... den Namen einer Ursache desjenigen Dinges verdient, wovon es die Wirkung ist." 
"...a causal connection can be thought... in which a thing which is once called an effect, nevertheless deserves the name of cause of that thing, of which it is the effect." (KtU/CTJ A285f, B289, t. m., my omissions)

It is immediately obvious what distinguishes the two kinds of causality most of all. Although both the concept of an efficient cause and that of a final cause are means by which a subjectivity seeks to explain the processes of nature to itself, the former concept can easily be supported by empirical evidence (the acorn, for instance, can be observed to develop into an oak tree), whereas no amount of empirical observation can underwrite the concept of a final cause:

"...da wir die Zwecke in der Natur... eigentlich nicht beobachten, sondern nur, in der Reflexion über ihre Produkte, diesen Begriff als einen Leitfaden der Urteilskraft hinzu denken..."
"...since we do not actually observe purposes in nature...but only add this concept in thought, in the reflection on its products, as a guiding thread of the faculty of judgement..." (KtU/CTJ A332, B336, t. m., my omissions)

And since 'there can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience' (KrV/CPR B1), if the experience (from which alone a (theoretical) a priori concept can be deduced) does not exist, then that
knowledge cannot exist. We can think natural objects to be organised in accordance with final causes but we can only know them according to efficient causes. Again, Kant sums this up:

"Man könnte die erstere vielleicht schicklicher die Verknüpfung der realen, die zweite der idealen Ursachen nennen..."
"One could perhaps more appropriately call the former the combination of real causes, but the latter that of ideal causes..." (KtU/CTJ A286, B289, t.m.)

This implies that the concept of a final cause is entirely beyond the scope of (a critically circumscribed) nature itself and is merely an ideal concept with which we supplement the conceptual shortfall of the understanding in its encounter with organic beings. This is to say that, like all theoretical objects, the empirical objects of nature must first of all appear as (real) objects through the work of the understanding, for this is how they achieve their status as objects in the first place. But in addition, some objects demand the application (which can only happen retrogressively, that is to say, after their formation as objects of our cognition) of a further a priori concept, namely that of purpose, which is derived from reason and which, since reason cannot be formative of theoretical objects as such, must be considered an ideal cause.

But although the concept of a final cause must properly be thought of as a merely ideal cause, it affords a glimpse of organisms in which they escape the narrow projection of temporality as necessarily only linear. In other respects, too, the Critique of the Faculty of Teleological Judgement yields some rather surprising insights. More particularly, there are three points to Kant's characterisation of the way in which organic beings are theorised where it, as it were, brushes against a much later conception of nature, namely that which can be found in the thought of the will to power.

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Firstly, from a critical standpoint it is clear that we can never know natural purposes as such; rather, it is a 'necessary fiction' of the faculty of judgement to say that these objects are produced in accordance with a purpose, that they are the products of a technique of nature.

Here it is not so much the content of the thought but its status that is significant, since Kant effectively says that the empirical objects of nature can only be 'known', that propositions concerning their empirical properties can only be integrated into larger, although still empirical, laws if the project of knowing them is in some respects relinquished. The critical version of the correspondence theory of truth still requires that the objects of knowledge correspond to our means of knowing them and thus allows them to be judged as objectively valid (true) if they harmonise with the interacting faculties. But this only concerns the formal properties of objects. But since our faculties are not productive of objects materially, it is implicitly the case that objects could never materially correspond to the formally productive capacities of the faculties. Thus, when a purpose is posited to underlie the material constitution of a natural object, it must be said that we know nothing of this object in this regard. And yet far from shunning the attempt to critically found the empirical study of nature, Kant carries on the critical project regardless but allows the status of knowledge to be altered radically and ultimately to be undermined in the process.

Secondly, although it should not perhaps be overemphasised at this point, Kant acknowledges that what is peculiar to organic beings cannot entirely be comprehended by reference to linear temporality alone, as was briefly mentioned above. There is, rather, a certain circular temporality involved which allows the transformations that typically occur in an organism to be more adequately understood. And although Kant reduces this elusive
temporality to the traditional Aristotelian conception of final causes (and is then forced to admit that this is only an ideal and not a real concept), he is surely only able to do so because he realises the insufficiency of linear temporality in accounting for complex organic developments. 

Thirdly, what distinguishes an organism from any other type of natural object is the fact that it is self-regulating and self-perpetuating, that it is not simply an aggregate of disparate parts but a system in which the parts interact in such a way that the system is internally self-sustaining. More precisely, the productions of nature can be considered as aggregates in some respects but as technical in others:

"Die Natur verfährt in Ansehung ihrer Produkte als Aggregat mechanisch, ...aber in Ansehung derselben als Systeme...technisch..."  
"Nature proceeds mechanically with regard to its products as aggregates, ...but in respect of them as systems...technically..." (KU/CJ, First Introduction, section VI)

An organism does not require a reference to a singular producer outside itself in order to explain how it comes to be or maintains itself. One of the ways in which Kant describes this unique quality is found in the following passage:

"In einem...Produkte der Natur wird ein jeder Teil, so, wie er nur durch alle Übrige da ist, auch als um der andern und des Ganzen willen existierend, d. i. als Werkzeug (Organ) gedacht...; als ein die andern Teile (folglich jeder den andern wechselseitig) hervorbringendes Organ, dergleichen kein Werkzeug der Kunst, sondern nur der allen Stoff zu Werkzeugen (selbst denen der Kunst) liefernden Natur sein kann:...nur dann und darum wird ein solches Produkt, als organisierter und sich selbst organisierendes Wesen, ein Naturzweck genannt werden können."  
"In...a product of nature every part is thought in such a way as it is due only to all the rest, existing for the sake of the others and of the whole, that is, as instrument (organ)...; as an organ which brings forth the other parts (consequently each brings forth the other reciprocally),..."
which can be no instrument of art but only of nature which provides all material for instruments (even those of art):...only then and for that reason can such a product, as organised and self-organising being, be called a natural purpose." (KtU/CTJ A288, B291f, my omissions)

Instead of a singular, in principle identifiable producer external to the object itself (as is the case with clockworks and suchlike artefacts), the 'cause' of these objects is that generalised self-producing capability we refer to as nature. Here the 'cause', namely an auto-productive capacity, is itself internal to the object. Nature is not external to the object in the way in which the clock-maker is external to the clock, that is to say temporally and logically precedent to it; in the case of nature we merely abstract or extrapolate such a self-causing capability in order to comprehend what is unique to such objects but there is no nature outside, over and above the products of nature in the way in which it could be said that the clock-maker exists apart from the clock.

We merely think of a natural object as a purpose of nature, that is, as caused by a technique of nature in order to, one might almost say, compensate for the fact that we cannot name a cause of it other than 'nature' and because, for the type of philosophy for which nothing is without ground it must be possible to name the ground or cause of each thing if it is to be cognisable. And the most peculiar characteristic of a natural object, thought of as a product or purpose of nature (in contraposition to the mechanical object as product of a purposefully acting producer), is that the parts do indeed cause each other to develop materially and reciprocally; these types of causation we refer to as generation and growth (KtU/CTJ A283f, B286-288). Since Aristotle the two types of bringing-forth have been distinguished into physis, for that mode of production which is self-sufficient and produces itself from out of itself, and techne, which relies on a producer outside itself in order for
it to come into being\textsuperscript{14}.

These three peculiar issues which surround Kant's critical teleology, the abandonment of the project of knowledge (of organisms), the non-linear temporality on the basis of which organisms must be thought and their self-producing nature, can only be pointed out for the moment but they are incorporated into the discussion below.

Until now this section has mainly confined itself to a relatively straightforward exegetical approach to some of the central issues concerning the faculty of teleological judgement. As in previous chapters, it now becomes necessary to examine whether critique realises its project of a post-metaphysical methodology or whether it is still partially implicated in the very dogmatic assumptions and prejudices, for the overcoming of which critique was developed in the first place.

Since there are only two types of causality (as Kant tells us (KtU/CTJ A286, B290)) namely mechanism and teleology, and since in the previous chapter we saw that mechanical causality is fundamentally flawed, that is to say, metaphysically loaded, as a way of thinking natural objects, we now have to ask whether thinking nature according to teleological principles, as advocated by Kant, is any less compromised as a procedure.

As is always the case with critique, it must stipulate the objects to which the branch of philosophy it circumscribes, should be directed. Thus the first Critique delimits the legitimate scope of a theory of nature, and its objects, in general. Equally, the (second part of the) third Critique should simply provide a methodology for the empirical sciences of organic nature, state what they could reasonably expect to cognise of their given object and what they should be able to say about it. At no point is it required that the Critique of the Faculty of Teleological Judgement itself
(which only needs to show the a priori principle of this faculty in reflective mode) provide empirical, teleological propositions, the so-called maxims of the faculty of judgement (e.g. KU/CJ A XXVII, B XXX). And yet this is precisely what happens at certain points throughout the text, although in a very veiled and clandestine manner. The point here is that Kant should not import substantial teleological principles into the inquiry into the (conditions of) possibility of such principles.

One such principle, and the foremost as concerns the metaphysical baggage it carries (cf. the extensive discussion of this in the previous chapter), is that which presupposes a self-preservative tendency to direct the processes internal to organisms (this is explicitly mentioned, although in no way critically illuminated, for instance at KtU/CTJ A289, B293 and A366, B371). By imputing such a motive to organisms, it seems that Kant implicitly claims knowledge of something we can never know and which elsewhere he calls 'the inner ground of nature which is unknown to us' ("der uns unbekannte innere Grund der Natur" KtU/CTJ A312, B316). A less prejudiced form of inquiry might ask why self-preservation should be considered as a more originary modus operandi of organisms than (self-) expenditure. Predictably, the third Critique contains no obvious answers to this question, but a diagnostic approach to this text unearths a persistent and implicit tendency which threatens to overwhelm the more radical aspects of the project of critique and which Nietzsche writes against when he says:

"Die Physiologen sollten sich besinnen, den Erhaltungstrieb als kardinalen Trieb eines organischen Wesens anzusetzen. Vor allem will etwas Lebendiges seine Kraft auslassen: die 'Erhaltung' ist nur eine der Konsequenzen davon. - Vorsicht vor Überflüssigen teleologischen Prinzipien! Und dahin gehört der ganze Begriff 'Erhaltungstrieb'."

"Physiologists ought to think again of positing the drive for preservation as the cardinal drive of an organic being: above all something living wants to expend its force: 'preservation' is only one of
the consequences of that. - Beware of superfluous teleological principles! And that is where the entire concept 'drive for preservation' belongs." (KSA 12,2 [63], WM/WP no. 650, t.m.)

Although Nietzsche addresses this admonition to physiologists, it surely applies no less to critical philosophers. The question of why the third Critique should wish to elevate self-preservation to an importance well above its station can be elaborated by reference to two quite distinct levels of the discourse; the first concerns one of the rare examples, given in the Dialectic of the text under consideration, whereas the second deals with a technical move which repeatedly occurs throughout the same text.

The conspicuous dearth of examples from the realm of nature, given the enormous wealth of potential material for them, has the effect of throwing into greater relief the ones that are given. For instance, it seems to me that Kant's rather casual tone (implying that it is business as usual) is not to be believed when, in the discussion of the antinomy between the application of mechanical and teleological principles to the same organisms, he suddenly says:

"Wenn ich z.B. von einer Made annehme, sie sei als Produkt des bloßen Mechanismus der Materie (der neuen Bildung, die sie für sich selbst bewerkstelligt, wenn ihre Elemente durch Fäulnis in Freiheit gesetzt werden) anzusehen: so kann ich nun nicht von eben derselben Materie, als einer Kausalität, nach Zwecken zu handeln, eben dasselbe Produkt ableiten."

"If, for example, I assume of a maggot that it is to be regarded as a product of the mere mechanism of matter (of the new formation that it achieves for itself when its elements are set free by putrefaction), I cannot then derive from the selfsame matter, as a causality that acts according to purposes, the selfsame product." (KtU/CTJ A353, B357, t.m.)
And vice versa, the passage continues, once this product of nature is regarded as a natural purpose, it can no longer be explained by reference to mechanical productions - but that is not the point. Here it does not primarily seem to be a question of the technical points Kant makes about the antinomy. Much more fascinating is the sudden eruption into the text of a dark fear which remains well-concealed for most of the time, a eruption which has more revelatory force than any amount of careful exegesis. What reveals itself here in such stunning fashion is a, quite literally unspeakable, fear of decay and disintegration, to which physiological processes of putrescence organic beings are of course most immediately prone. Why else would this decaying matter only be glimpsed in one brief example, comparatively late on in the text, especially given the fact that Kant studiously avoids any reference to it when he mentions all the other developmental processes organisms undergo (KtU/CTJ A283f, B286-288)? And if it was not for the fact that what distinguishes organic matter from all other types of objects most decisively is this inherent tendency towards dissipation, a tendency that is bound to be utterly unsettling to the chief exponent of an integrated critical reason, why would Kant even want to erect the baroque sepulchre that is the third Critique in the first place? All that is finally decisively established by the third Critique is that transcendental idealism cannot in any way tolerate organic, base matter although what it of course attempts to 'prove' is precisely that the excessive productions of physis are, by analogy, entirely subsumable under the much more comprehensible, and much more safe, productions of a rational being according to techne.

But whilst this extravagant example points in the direction of a profound fear, this fear can be probed and exposed even more successfully by reference to a structural feature which runs throughout the third Critique,
as for instance when Kant mentions a 'raw chaotic aggregate' ("ein rohes chaotisches Aggregat") and, even more so, when he speaks of 'that disturbing boundless heterogeneity of empirical laws and heterogeneity of natural forms' ("jene besorgliche grenzenlose Ungleichartigkeit empirischer Gesetze und Heterogenität der Naturformen", KU/CJ sec. IV of the first Introduction) - this is clearly what needs to be controlled and conquered by the conceptuality of the third Critique.

We have already seen in another context (section three of chapter one, above) that Kant displays an irrational tendency towards unity, which he tends to presuppose dogmatically, rather than to strive for critically, in a manner not entirely dissimilar to reason's own stance towards its dialectical ideas, according to Kant's account of it. The most glaring example of this tendency occurs in section V of the second Introduction to the third Critique, where he compares the determinative and the reflective faculty of judgement under the aspect of their respective unificatory capacities. To begin with, harking back to the first Critique, he says of the determining faculty of judgement:

"...die transzendentale [bestimmende] Urteilskraft...hat nichts weiter zu tun, als die Bedingung der Subsumtion unter dem vorgelegten Verstandesbegriff a priori anzugeben..."

"...the transcendental [determining] faculty of judgement has nothing further to do than to state the condition for the subsumption under the given a priori concept of the understanding..." (KU/CJ A XXX, B XXXII, t. m.)

This is to say that when faced with the heterogeneity that is the manifold of intuition, namely the pre-conceptual matter of perception, the entire machinery of the understanding and the faculty of judgement working in concert can be activated to organise this heterogeneity into the manageable units Kant refers to as determining judgements. As far as unity
is concerned, it is of course the transcendental unity of apperception which guarantees the unity of the object in general and hence that of experience in general, thus keeping at bay the excessive, heterogeneous materiality of the pre-conceptual manifold.

A comparable problem arises as concerns the empirical diversity, in the individual products as well as in the empirical laws, of natural productions. This is how Kant states the problem and proposes to overcome it:

"... wir müssen in der Natur, in Ansehung ihrer bloß empirischen Gesetze, eine Möglichkeit unendlich mannigfaltiger empirischer Gesetze denken, die für unsere Einsicht dennoch zufällig sind (a priori nicht erkannt werden können); und in deren Ansehung beurteilen wir die Natureinheit nach empirischen Gesetzen, und die Möglichkeit der Einheit der Erfahrung (als Systems nach empirischen Gesetzen), als zufällig. Weil aber doch eine solche Einheit notwendig vorausgesetzt und angenommen werden muß, da sonst kein durchgängiger Zusammenhang empirischer Erkenntnisse zu einem Ganzen der Erfahrung Statt finden würde...: so muß die [reflektierende] Urteilskraft für ihren eigenen Gebrauch es als Prinzip a priori annehmen, daß das für die menschliche Einsicht Zufällige in den besonderen (empirischen) Naturgesetzen dennoch eine, für uns zwar nicht zu ergründende, aber doch denkbare, gesetzliche Einheit, in der Verbindung ihres Mannigfaltigen zu einer an sich möglichen Erfahrung, enthalte."

"... we must think in nature, as regards its merely empirical laws, the possibility of infinitely manifold empirical laws which are nonetheless contingent for our insight (cannot be cognised a priori); and in this regard we judge the unity of nature according to empirical laws, and the possibility of the unity of experience (as a system of empirical laws) as contingent. But since such a unity necessarily has to be presupposed and assumed, since otherwise no thoroughgoing connection of empirical cognition into the whole of experience could take place... the [reflective] faculty of judgement has to assume for its own use the a priori principle that what is contingent for human insight in the particular (empirical) laws of nature nevertheless contains a, although unfathomable for us, yet thinkable, lawful unity in the combination of
Thus on the level of the 'infinitely manifold' empirical laws of nature the problem of the manifold of intuition repeats itself and in both cases it sparks the search for an underlying a priori unity which this heterogeneity can be referred or, more simply, reduced to. Where the first Critique posited the unity of apperception as that which guarantees the unity of experience in its a priori principles, so in the third Critique the reflective faculty of judgement heautonomously posits, which is to say, gives to itself (cf. KU/CJ, the penultimate paragraph of sec. VIII of the First Introduction), the lawful unity that is assumed in the concept of a purposiveness of nature in order to be able to find unity of experience on the level of the empirical principles of nature, too. But whilst in the case of the former, the whole project of a critique of our cognitive faculties stands and falls with the possibility of a unified experience, there seem to be no ultimate grounds for assuming a unity of the empirical constitution of nature. Kant gives vent to the prejudicial nature of this thinking very clearly when he writes:

"...die entdeckte Vereinbarkeit...mehrerer empirischen heterogenen Naturgesetze unter einem sie...befassenden Prinzip [ist] der Grund einer sehr merklichen Lust, oft sogar einer Bewunderung...Dagegen würde uns eine Vorstellung der Natur durchaus mißfallen, durch welche man uns voraus sagte, daß, bei der mindesten Nachforschung...wir auf eine Heterogeneität ihrer Gesetze stoßen würden, welcher die Vereinigung ihrer besonderen Gesetze unter allgemeinen empirischen für unseren Verstand unmöglich machte."

"...to discover that...several heterogeneous empirical laws of nature can be unified under a principle that comprises...them [is] the ground of a very considerable pleasure, often even of admiration...By contrast, we would thoroughly dislike a representation of nature by which one told us in advance that, in the slightest investigation...we would meet a
heterogeneity of its laws which would, for our understanding, render impossible the unification of its particular laws under universal empirical ones." (KU/CJ A XXXVIIIf, B XLf, t.m., my omissions)

Put like this it would seem that the preference for a particular constitution of nature as expressed here by Kant could easily be supplanted by another, although perhaps equally prejudicial, view. What is important here is that Kant openly admits that, given the historical, and perhaps even to some extent personal, circumstances that surround this text, one view of nature is preferable to another - not more veracious or accurate but simply more desirable, more convenient. After this it hardly seems to matter which particular prejudice is indulged; the effect is to render nature, the empirical, heterogeneous, manifold materiality of production, as cast off from the hitherto safe anchor of transcendental philosophy.

Nietzsche remarks on this development:

"...wie tief das Wertschätzen in die Dinge geht, ist bisher übersehen: wie wir in einer selbstgeschaffenen Welt stecken - Beschränktheit des Gesichtskreises des Kantischen Idealismus (...was geht uns die Wahrheit an, wenn es sich um unsere höchsten Wertschätzungen handelt - 'man muß dann dies und jenes glauben' meinte Kant)."

"...how deeply all evaluating enters into things has up to now been overlooked: how we are stuck in a self-created world - limitedness of the field of vision of Kantian idealism (...what does truth concern us when it is a matter of our highest evaluations - 'then one has to believe this and that' Kant thought)." (KSA 11,26 [75], m.t.)

Kant expresses this need to construct a nature convenient for the human animal on a more localised level and in seemingly more technical terms when he says that 'a teleological judgement compares the concept of a natural product with what it should be', namely according to a rational concept ("ein teleologisches Urteil vergleicht den Begriff eines Naturprodukts nach..."
dem, was es ist, mit dem was es sein soll" KU/CJ First Introduction, sec.X). Similarly, although Kant admits that from a theoretical point of view this cannot in fact be the case, he says (KU/CJ A XIX,B XIX) that the supersensible realm of freedom should have influence over the sensible realm of nature which is to say that the 'immense gulf' (ibid) which separates the two realms cannot be bridged from the side of nature (it cannot forge a transition to the supersensible realm) but the reverse is possible and must in fact be possible, the supersensible must be able to build a bridge to the sensible realm. Nature's laws cannot be extended to the laws of freedom but it must be possible to extend the demands of practical reason to the realm of nature.

To impose this 'ought' on nature indicates very clearly that for Kant, nature cannot be left as it is because it is imperfect (too heterogeneous) and hence morally deficient. This impulse to 'improve' nature is commented on by Nietzsche in the following passage:

"Feststellen, was ist, wie es ist, scheint etwas unsäglich Höheres, Ernsteres als jedes 'So sollte es sein', weil letzteres, als menschliche Kritik und Anmaßung, von vornherein zur Lächerlichkeit verurteilt erscheint. Es drückt sich darin ein Bedürfnis aus, welches verlangt, daß unserm menschlichen Wohlbefinden die Einrichtung der Welt entspricht;" "To ascertain what is, how it is, seems something unspeakably higher, more serious than every 'thus it ought to be' because the latter, as human critique and presumption, seems to be doomed to ridiculousness from the start. A need expresses itself therein which demands that to our human well-being the arrangement of the world should correspond;"

(KSA 12,7 [15], WM/ WP no. 333, t. m.)

The profound irony of this is that the very strategies with which it was attempted to extend and strengthen the hold of transcendental idealism, and to keep (organic) nature's dissipatory tendencies at bay, contain the germ for the eventual overcoming of this project.
But before this radicalised critique can be realised more fully, several further strands which the third Critique displays in this regard, need to be exposed. The first of these touches directly on the unsustainable dream of a common ground which unites the faculties of cognition in their transcendental constitution on the one side with empirical nature on the other side. And although the following quotes from the third Critique must obviously be read as properly critical remarks, in the sense that they concern the necessary characteristics of (one of) the faculties and not any claims concerning actual nature or nature in itself, they nevertheless express an obviously deeply felt need to anthropomorphise nature, to prune it down to a human size the more it threatens to utterly exceed it"', about which impulse Nietzsche had the following remarks to make:

"Abseits von einer religiösen Sanktion und Verbürgung unserer Sinne und Vernünftigkeit - woher sollten wir ein Recht auf Vertrauen gegen das Dasein haben! Daß das Denken gar ein Maß des Wirklichen sei, - daß was nicht gedacht werden kann, nicht ist, - ist ein plumpes non plus ultra einer moralistischen Vertrauens-seligkeit (auf ein essentielles Wahrheits-Prinzip im Grund der Dinge), an sich eine tolle Behauptung, der unsre Erfahrung in jedem Augenblicke widerspricht. Wir können gerade gar nichts denken, in wiefern es ist..."

"Apart from the religious sanction and guarantee of our senses and rationality - whence should we derive the right to trust in existence! That thinking be a measure of the real, - that what cannot be thought is not, - is a crude non plus ultra of a moralistic trustfulness (in an essential principle of truth in the ground of things), in itself a mad assumption which experience contradicts at every moment. We can precisely not think anything as it is." (KSA 12, 2 [93], WM/WP no. 436, t. m.)

The register of terms around which Kant builds this phantasm is that of 'measure' (Maß) and related words. The term Zweckmäßigkeit is of course the first instance of this since it already contains the notion of, in this case, the products of nature agreeing with, or being adequate to an a
priori concept of the faculty of judgement. But Kant expands this register well beyond this immediate, central term of the third Critique, as for instance when he defines purposiveness:

"...die Zweckmäßigkeit oder Angemessenheit der Nature...zu unserem Vermögen der Urteilskraft."  
"...purposiveness or the adequacy of nature...to our faculty of judgement." (KU/CJ sec.II, first Introduction).

This is of course entirely commensurate with one of the earliest definitions of the Copernican turn, namely that the objects of our cognition should correspond to our means of knowing them and not vice versa (KrV/CPR B XVI). But even to say that we must assume this to be the case, rather than actually attributing this quality to nature, again merely expresses a certain wishful thinking and exposes the boundless ambition of transcendental idealism to colonise all of existence with its conceptuality - nothing must escape reason. This 'imperialism' of reason vis-à-vis the empirical is brought out quite clearly in the following passage:

"...es ist ein Geheiß unserer Urteilskraft, nach dem Prinzip der Angemessenheit der Natur zu unserem Erkenntnisvermögen zu verfahren, ohne ...auszumachen, ob es irgendwo seine Grenze habe, weil wir zwar in Ansehung des rationalen Gebrauchs unserer Erkenntnisvermögen Grenzen bestimmen können, im empirischen Felde aber keine Grenzbestimmung möglich ist."

"...it is a behest of our faculty of judgement to proceed according to the principle of nature's adequacy to our faculty of cognition,...without deciding whether it has its limits anywhere, since although we can determine limits as regards the rational employment of our faculties of cognition, no delimitation is possible in the field of the empirical." (KU/CJ A XXXIXf, B XLIf, t.m., my omissions)
Further instances of this desire to find a measure binding the human faculties and nature together occur in sec. V of the first Introduction, where Kant speaks of 'a certain parsimony of nature, adequate to our faculty of judgement' ("eine gewisse unserer Urteilskraft angemessene Sparsamkeit") and in the second Introduction, where Kant explains this concept of nature's adequacy further:

"Wenn man also sagt: die Natur spezifiziert ihre allgemeinen Gesetze nach dem Prinzip der Zweckmäßigkeit für unser Erkenntnisvermögen, d. i. zur Angemessenheit mit dem menschlichen Verstande... so schreibt man dadurch weder der Natur ein Gesetz vor, noch lernt man eines von ihr durch Beobachtung... man will nur, daß man... durchaus nach jenem Prinzip und den sich darauf gründenden Maximen ihren empirischen Gesetzen nachspüren müsse, weil wir, nur so weit als jenes Statt findet, mit dem Gebrauch unseres Verstandes in der Erfahrung fortkommen und Erkenntnis erwerben können."

"When we say that nature specifies its universal laws according to the principle of purposiveness for our faculty of cognition, that is, for the adequacy with the human understanding... one does not thereby prescribe a law to nature, nor does one learn one from it by observation... one only wants that we have to track down its empirical laws according to that principle and the maxims based on it because only as far as this takes place do we progress with the use of our understanding in experience and can we acquire knowledge." (KU/CJ A XXXVf, B XXXVII, t. m., my omissions)

Whilst this projection of nature is largely in keeping with the overall critical project, as cannot be emphasised too strongly, at the same time it needs to be realised that this view of a (critically reinscribed) nature utterly precludes any encounter with nature qua material production which has not already implicitly conquered that materiality. Especially as concerns this register of a measure mediating between rational (human) production and natural production, the third Critique comes to resemble a critical reworking of the Leibnizian 'pre-stabilised harmony', and as
surely as that earlier version it requires, or in fact implies, the idea of a divine mediator to sustain this precarious balance. It will therefore not come as a great surprise to find that Kantian teleology, too, prepares the ground for, and inexorably moves into theology. To see this happening will constitute the next stage of our examination of the third Critique.

Although Kant is extremely anxious to avoid the importation into the natural sciences of the claim that 'god' is the cause of (the products of) nature or that the whole of nature can finally be explained as a purpose of 'god', and instead emphasises that in the natural sciences one must speak of a purpose of nature only, this is merely to ensure that the business of the natural sciences does not get swamped with illicit concepts which can have no counterpart in objective reality (cf. KtU/CTJ A301f, B305f). But although natural science itself must not speculate about the ultimate cause of nature as a whole and must not seek to apply teleological principles to it, critique encompasses a consideration of teleology which places it in the context of the other sciences (cf. KtU/CTJ A361, B366). The question is, where does teleology belong, to the theoretical or to the practical part of the (philosophical) sciences, and if, as is the case, it belongs to the former, does it have greater affinity to natural science (which examines what can be an object of experience) or to theology ('which deals with the original ground of the world as the epitome of all objects of experience', cf. KtU/CTJ A359f, B365, t. m.). Kant initially remarks that 'teleology does not constitute a distinct part of theoretical natural science but is attached to theology as propaedeutic or transition' (KtU/CTJ A305, B309) but does not substantiate this observation for another seven paragraphs. Only then (§75) does he begin to shed light on the (according to Kant!) unavoidable tendency of the human mind to enquire into the cause of nature
as a whole (first mentioned in 868, KtU/CTJ A302, B306).

Here Kant first of all reminds us that to conceive an object as a purpose of nature implies that the same object is contingent as concerns the a priori laws of nature, as found in the understanding. Taken together, these objects of nature constitute the 'foremost proof for the contingency of the cosmos' ("den vornehmsten Beweis für die Zufälligkeit des Weltganzen", KtU/CTJ A331, B335, t. m.).

But such a completely contingent empirical cosmos obviously militates against the principle of sufficient reason and (as far as Kant is concerned) simply cannot be left to stand in its seeming arbitrariness. In order to remedy this abyssal state of affairs, Kant proposes that human reason must assume that as contingent the cosmos is dependent upon a supreme being which exists apart from it (loc. cit.).

Such a being's relationship with its product (the cosmos) must, secondly, be thought by analogy with a rational (human) producer who produces objects according to intentions (rational causes). In fact, this analogy with a rational human producer must be assumed on three hierarchically ordered levels which are progressively integrated throughout the third Critique: firstly, the individual object of nature must be viewed as if it were the product of a rational causality; secondly, nature, as productivity, is thought to operate like such a rational cause, this is called the technique of nature; thirdly, the world as a whole, the cosmos, must be thought of as if it were the product of such a rational being. This necessity - which is of course only a necessity of the human faculty of cognition and not objectively attributable to the cosmos - leads Kant to finally state that 'teleology finds no completion of the solution to its investigations other than in a theology' ("die Teleologie (findet) keine Vollendung des Aufschlusses für ihre Nachforschungen, als in einer Theologie", KtU/CTJ A331, B335, t. m.).
Needless to say, Kant is at pains (especially throughout §75, where he introduces this thought) to identify this 'completion' of teleology as a mere exigency of the human faculties, and not as a dogmatic claim concerning objective reality. This is how he formulates this important distinction:

"Es bleibt also schlechterdings ein nur auf subjektiven Bedingungen, nämlich der unseren Erkenntnisvermögen angemessenen reflektierenden Urteilskraft, beruhender Satz, der, wenn man ihn als objektiv-dogmatisch geltend ausdrückte, heißen würde: Es ist ein Gott; nun aber, für uns Menschen, nur die eingeschränkte Formel erlaubt: Wir können uns die Zweckmäßigkeit, die selbst unserer Erkenntnis der inneren Möglichkeit vieler Naturdinge zum Grunde gelegt werden muß, gar nicht anders denken und begreiflich machen, als indem wir sie und überhaupt die Welt uns als ein Produkt einer verständigen Ursache (eines Gottes) vorstellen."

"Hence it remains a proposition which rests entirely on subjective conditions, namely those of the reflective faculty of judgement adequate to our faculties of cognition, which proposition, if it was expressed as objectively-dogmatically valid, would be: There is a god; but now, for us human beings, only permits the limited formulation: We cannot think or comprehend purposiveness, which has to be presupposed in the cognition of the inner possibility of many natural things, in any other way other than by representing it and the world in general as the product of an intelligent cause (of a god)" (KtU/CTJ A333, B336f, t.m.)

Here it would seem that the true meaning of teleology, insofar as it must culminate in a theology, reveals itself. Whilst this obviously constitutes a hugely important qualification of a typically dogmatic stance vis-à-vis the relationship between natural science and theology (so much so that this 'qualification' can in some sense be identified with the entire project of critique), it must finally be asked whether the critical reformulation of the thought of 'the world's dependency upon, and origin in, an intelligent
being which exists apart from it' (KtU/CTJ A331, B335) is ultimately any
less nihilistic than its dogmatic Christian predecessors'.

That this projection of the world as dependent upon, and originating in,
an extramundane supreme being is utterly nihilistic, Nietzsche never fails
to remind us, because what is implicit in it is that this world is not only
not self-sufficient or self-sustaining, but that it is so fundamentally
deficient that it needs an (in this case rational) ground outside itself to
sustain it (if only as rational conception). When critique - in this case
the Critique of the Faculty of Teleological Judgement - underwrites a
conception of nature whereby this nature can only become comprehensible if
thought to exist due to an act of, and that means, as an intentional
purpose of 'god', it denigrates nature and consequently only expresses the
dark terror which the uncontrollable transmutations of matter provoke in
it. Nietzsche points out the chief implication of this domination of what
should be over what is, the domination of the ideal (which he renames
'desirability' (Wünschbarkeit)) over the real:

"Die Wenigsten machen sich klar, was der Standpunkt der Wünschbarkeit,
jedes 'so sollte es sein, aber es ist nicht'...in sich schließt: eine
Verurteilung des gesamten Gangs der Dinge."
"Very few clarify to themselves what the standpoint of desirability,
every 'thus it ought to be but is not'...comprises: a condemnation of
the entire course of things."
(KSA 12, 7 [62], WM/WP no. 331, t. m., my
omissions)

And the notion of science (as the domination and suppression of nature's
excessiveness) which issues from this is certainly deeply nihilistic and
only concerned with containment and preservation rather than with
enhancement and expenditure. Nietzsche defines such a reactive science as:
"Wissenschaft - Umwandlung der Natur in Begriffe zum Zweck der Beherrschung der Natur..."

"Science - transformation of nature into concepts for the purpose of the domination of nature..." (KSA 11, 26 [170], WM/WP no. 610)'

That the critique of reason results in such nihilistic ideas was already apparent in the earlier reading of the first Critique. At the very end of the Dialectic of the first Critique, in its Appendix, Kant feels compelled to show that the ideas, like the categories earlier, can be the objects of a deduction. In this deduction of the ideas of pure reason Kant seeks to show that the ideas have objective validity, although they can only be employed regulatively upon the material given them, not directly through intuition, but by (constitutive judgements of) the understanding. So they can never be applied to objects (as formed by the understanding) but can only serve to integrate propositions concerning objects (of the understanding) into greater systematic unity. Of the three ideas of reason, the psychological, the cosmological and the theological (discussed in the Paralogisms, the Antinomies and the Ideal, respectively), it is undoubtedly the last which has the greatest integrative capacity; Kant says of it that it induces us to view all possible experience in the following manner:

"...als ob der Inbegriff aller Erscheinungen (die Sinnenwelt selbst) einen einzigen obersten und allgenugsamen Grund außer ihrem Umfange habe, nämlich eine gleichsam selbständige, ursprüngliche und schöpferische Vernunft, in Beziehung auf welche wir allen empirischen Gebrauch unserer Vernunft in seiner größten Erweiterung so richten, als ob die Gegenstände selbst aus jenem Urbilde aller Vernunft entsprungen wären..."

"...as if the epitome of all appearances (the sensible world itself) had a single supreme and all-sufficient ground outside of its circumference, namely an, as it were, independent, original, creative reason, in relation to which we direct all empirical use of our reason in its greatest extension as if the objects themselves had sprung from that archetype of all reason..." (KrV/CPR A672, B700, t. m.)
In this regard the transcendental principle of the faculty of judgement (as it is presented in the third Critique), according to which a purposiveness of nature is assumed, and the third of the ideas of reason (as discussed in the first Critique) have much in common. Both can only be employed regulatively upon material furnished by the understanding; both have the function of providing philosophical or scientific investigations with a supersensible substrate which guarantees the systematic unity of the empirical manifold; lastly, and most importantly, both demonstrate clearly that the Platonic schema of this world as fallen, deficient, dependent, secondary etc. remains firmly in place, albeit under the provision of the as if, when it is attempted to systematise any knowledge of it.

It is obvious that any attempt to de-humanise and to de-moralise nature, any attempt to extricate this critical god, this pale ideal of reason from nature must obliterate such a system of nature. Nature cannot come into its own until it is free of this marasmic ideal which forces its productions into the straitjacket of a unified system.

A glimpse of an alternative perspective is afforded in the following passage:

"Tiefe Abneigung, in irgend einer Gesamtbetrachtung der Welt ein für alle mal auszuruhn; Zauber der entgegengesetzten Denkweise; sich den Anreiz des änigmatischen Charakters nicht nehmen lassen."

"Profound aversion to reposing once and for all in any one overall view of the world; enchantment of the opposing way of thinking; not to be deprived of the attraction of the enigmatic character." (KSA 12,2 [155], WM/WP no. 470, t. m.)

It is in the Nietzschean thought of the will to power that we will have to look for a way of thinking nature as utterly heterogeneous, as entirely different from and unsubsumable under any rationalistic project to suppress it.
In the previous chapter we asked whether the notion of mechanical causality, in its Kantian formulation, could provide the model for a truly post-metaphysical thinking of nature. And there, as concerns the a priori constitution of nature, it became apparent that, as much as Kant seeks to overcome the dogmatic, which is to say ultimately Christian, conception of nature and its science, causality, whether as pure concept of the understanding, as its principle or as idea of reason, is implicated in reactive ideals of preservation and thus merely perpetuates a prejudicial and not yet fully critical thinking of nature.

Similarly, in the third part of the present chapter it became necessary to enquire whether the empirical constitution of nature (qua organic matter) and the conceptuality Kant develops to deal with it under the name of teleology, could provide a richer, more productive, or a less emaciated means for thinking nature. But, as I hope has become clear, since Kant thinks of naturally productive processes by analogy with rational productions, organisms are still assimilated under an idealist structure. And precisely what is most characteristic of their organic nature, namely their intrinsic tendency towards more or less rapid dissipation, their capacity for putrefaction, their material excessiveness and unassimilability (resistance to being made equal or homogeneous), is still repressed and cannot be represented by the idealist conceptuality at Kant's disposal.

Since both the first and the third Critique failed to provide any satisfactory solutions to the quest for a thought of nature which is not deeply imbued with anti-materialist tendencies, it now becomes necessary to ask whether Nietzsche rehearses a thinking which, whilst still in an important and difficult sense critical, approximates to the characteristics of matter on its own terms, as mentioned above; whether his thinking
reproduces these organic processes any more successfully than does Kant's; whether, in short, Nietzsche's is a truly physiological thinking - not the imposition of logos (qua rationality) on physis, as is the case with Kant, but the re-enactment of physis in logos, in a thought which celebrates that it must 'self'-destruct.
"Die 'wahre Welt', wie immer auch man sie bisher konzipiert hat, - sie war immer die scheinbare Welt noch einmal." "The 'real world', however one has hitherto conceived it, - it has always been the apparent world once more." (KSA 13, 11 [50], WM/WP no. 566, t. m.)
I. The Repetition of Critique

So far this text has implicitly raised a number of questions and posed a number of problems and although it is not the task of philosophy to answer questions, it should be very explicit about the problems it raises. Hence this final chapter will not attempt to answer any questions but will attempt to intensify them, to take them to the edge of thinkability — and hopefully beyond.

In the previous three chapters the relation between Kant and Nietzsche was examined by focusing on the relevant sections from Kant's critical texts, albeit from a strongly Nietzschian perspective (of which there are obviously more than one). In contrast to that procedure, the current chapter will concentrate on Nietzsche's writings, albeit against the background of (our earlier readings of) Kant's critical philosophy. More specifically, it needs to be shown in what sense Nietzsche's philosophical physiology constitutes the moment at which Kantian critique is completed and its reactive moments overcome. The intensification, completion and overcoming of Kantian critique will therefore be seen to be central to Nietzschian physiology.

Kant's significance as a philosopher undoubtedly rests on the 'invention' of immanent critique, that is to say on the critique of reason by reason in order to establish the legitimate domain of reason. But the self-examination which reason undergoes is still predicated on a number of assumptions which remain unquestioned. Another way of putting this would be to say that although Kant seeks to examine the conditions of possibility of Judgements of reason, the conditions of possibility of this examination itself, namely the values which structure it (cf. ch. 2, II, above), remain
outside the scope of Kantian critique. The method which Nietzsche develops in order to demonstrate such inevitable, intrinsic limitations is genealogy. But more specifically, and more pertinent for the present project, Nietzsche intensifies the movement of critique to encompass reason itself and he does so, crucially, on the basis of a physiological thinking.

Although there are a great many facets to Nietzsche's physiological thinking as the radicalisation of critique, three central moments can be isolated which demonstrate that Nietzsche utilises the movement of critique while yet forcing it to mutate in some important respects. The three central aspects of Nietzsche's critique of Kantian critique are, firstly, the saturation of the latter by a will to truth; secondly, the anthropocentric fabrications of reason and, thirdly, reason's investment in the primacy of being, all of which bind Kantian critique to Platonism. In the following each of these constraints of Kantian critique will be discussed in turn and their common ground explored.

As concerns the first point, the will to truth inherent in Kant's critique of reason, the Kantian method of critique can be described in the following terms. It questions the legitimacy of claims (to knowledge, in the case of the first Critique) based on dogmatic assumptions. In the Dialectic of the first Critique these assumptions are named as those of rational psychology, cosmology and theology, each of which believes itself in possession of substantive knowledge even though it is without a doctrine of the faculties which prepares the ground for an understanding of how knowledge is in principle possible. According to Kant, the claims to knowledge of these three dogmatic disciplines exhaust the field of pure pre-critical philosophy. The philosophical method of critique establishes itself by first of all demonstrating that the claims of its predecessors in the field are unfounded and beyond their legitimate scope, that they are,
in short, transcendent. As such, critique is the most effective de-
stabilising force as regards Platonic-Christian metaphysics. It degrades
an assumed transcendent 'I', as much as such a world or such a 'god'. The
claims of Christian, dogmatic metaphysics are shown to be unfounded and
with it the belief in 'god' as guarantor of knowledge is dispelled
(although not of course faith in other aspects of divine providence). In
this respect, critique marks the moment at which philosophy overcomes its
deference to theology. With critique, philosophy abandons god - or so it
seems.

Kant had discovered the movement of thought with which it is possible to
question assumptions and the claims to legitimacy which they cloak. But his
critique of reason itself is not without equally dogmatic, that is to say
pre-critical assumptions. First and foremost of these is the fact that the
value of truth remains unquestioned in his critical system. In the whole
magnificent edifice which is the first Critique, the ground on which it
stands is never subjected to a critique (contrary to what Kant claims, e.g.
KrV/CPR AXXI'). Kant demonstrates that the objects of knowledge, as
appearances, are in each case produced as such. This distinguishes his from
earlier philosophies which took their object simply as given. But whilst
the entire first critique is an investigation into the conditions of
possibility of judgements of knowledge, and that ultimately means into the
modes of production of such judgements, the production of the production
itself remains outside the scope of this investigation. And yet the entire
force of the arguments of the first Critique rests on the fact that
whatever remains outside the scope of critique must be assumed to be a
remnant of the old dogmatism.

Kant forces the god of Christian dogmatism to abdicate, to relinquish its
claims to found any system of knowledge. But the commanding position of
authority itself, from which the entire field of knowledge is organised,
does not in fact fall vacant, nor is it finally abolished in the sweep of critique. For as long as the adherence to the absolute, unquestioned value of truth is maintained, the old god lives on, albeit in a less conspicuous guise. For from within the movement of critique itself it must be asked what is the meaning of 'god' in the realm of knowledge. Its function in any dogmatic doctrine is to suppress the realisation of the producedness of (the objects of) knowledge. But an exactly analogous role is played by the unannounced assumption of the value of truth within Kant's critical philosophy itself. Again, a realisation of the producedness, in this case of the production (of the objects) of knowledge is suppressed because as long as a will to truth centrally organises this production, it fulfils the role of a given, it resists the de-stabilising force of critique².

Nietzsche, on the other hand, continues critical philosophy but widens its scope to include this implicit will to truth which is one of the central dogmatisms within critique itself as, for instance when he writes:

"Es ist immer noch ein metaphysischer Glaube, auf dem unser Glaube an die Wissenschaft ruht, - auch wir Erkennenden von Heute, wir Gottlosen und Antimetaphysiker, auch wir nehmen unser Feuer noch von jenem Brande, den ein Jahrtausende alter Glaube entzündet hat, jener Christen-Glaube, der auch der Glaube Platos war, daß Gott die Wahrheit ist, daß die Wahrheit göttlich ist..."

"It is still a metaphysical belief, on which rests our belief in science, - we knowers of today, too, we godless ones and antimetaphysicians, we too take our fire from that blaze which was started by a thousand year old belief, that belief of Christians, which was also the belief of Plato, that god is the truth, that the truth is divine..." (KSA 3, FW/OS V, 344, also KSA 5, GdM/GoM III, 24, t.m.)

But the perspective from which it becomes possible for Nietzsche to question the dogmatic implications within Kantian critique is that which is opened up by the thought of the will to power. It is only by understanding
the will to truth as a type of will to power that the absolute nature of truth is finally undermined and, obversely, that the primacy of production is affirmed. Because if truth (the old idol) is transvalued as the will to truth and the will to truth as an instance of the will to power, truth is seen as produced and thus the former stasis of truth, its divine, ideal, unproduced status, is utterly dissolved. But it must be asked why the primary production that is the will to power would be channelled into a will to truth if the truth that is its product suppresses the very primacy of the production which produces this truth in the first place. Nietzsche offers the following interpretation of this problem of a truth opposed to life, of a life that turns against itself in this notion of truth:

"...das asketische Ideal entspringt dem Schutz- und Heilinstinkte eines degenerierenden Lebens, es deutet auf eine partielle physiologische Hemmung und Ermüdung hin, gegen welche die tiefsten, intakt gebliebenen Instinkte des Lebens unausgesetzt mit neuen Mitteln...ankämpfen. Das asketische Ideal ist ein solches Mittel..."

"...the ascetic ideal springs from the instinct of protection and healing of a degenerating life; it points to a partial physiological inhibition and fatigue against which the deepest instincts of life which have remained intact incessantly fight with new means...The ascetic ideal is such a means..." (KSA 5, GdM/GoM III, 13, t. m.)

This is to say that the ascetic ideal, here in the form of a truth that is posited as absolute, is a symptom of life in conflict with itself. The starting point in this excerpt is a degenerating life. But it must be remembered that weakening, or degeneration, is already present if the will to more, the will to growth is somehow impeded. For the will to power is first and foremost a will to grow and to expand: 'will to power in the organic process: the imperative growing' ("Wille zur Macht im organischen Prozess...: der Imperativ wachsend" KSA 12, 7 [9], WM/WP no. 644). At other
times the will to power is simply called 'a something that wills to grow' ("ein wachsen-wollendes Etwas" KSA 12,2 [148], WM/WP no. 643).

The completely circular logic which Nietzsche unfolds here means that even as the will to power weakens in a life form, it still protects this particular organism against its imminent dissolution by erecting another barrier against expenditure without reserve (that is to say, against death). It assures its own continued existence, it preserves itself, by inventing and establishing another source of power apart from that which is already intrinsic to it. It compensates for the loss of its 'own' force by projecting the will to power it is in another realm. But these are not voluntary actions or acts of consciousness. It is solely the will to power which doubles into the will to truth. When the will to power has weakened to a certain extent, it has to duplicate itself, has to reproduce itself extrinsically in order to sustain the particular life form in which this weakness occurs. According to Nietzsche, this phenomenon can be observed on all levels of organic life, for instance 'the division of a protoplasm into two takes place when the power to master the possessions which have been appropriated is no longer sufficient' ("Die Teilung eines Protoplasmas in zwei tritt ein, wenn die Macht nicht mehr ausreicht, den angeeigneten Besitz zu bewältigen" KSA 11,36 [21], WM/WP no. 655). One such reproduction of the will to power is the will to truth and a life form whose demise is thus temporarily halted is a humanity in the throes of Platonism.

Critique furnishes the method by means of which the modes of production of phenomena can be drawn out. But Kant's critique stops short of a full critique because it does not understand itself as produced, and in particular as produced by a will to truth. That is to say it does not realise that the will to truth is the type of ideal which is imposed as a point of stability in what would otherwise be a continuous stream of productive transformations. In this sense, the Nietzschean diagnosis of an
ascetic ideal (a will to truth) at the heart of Kantian critique formally repeats the analysis of the transcendent (unfounded and unsustainable) ideal which, according to Kant, centrally organises dogmatic theology.

Nietzschean critique can go further for the simple reason that it does not operate with any conceptions, such as a metaphysical truth, which are opposed to life. It simply does not need to pose sources of power outside those intrinsic to it. In Nietzschean critique the will to power thinks. It has strengthened to such a degree that it no longer needs to posit a realm other than that of its own productions. In Nietzschean critique, thought convalesces from the long but temporary disease that is Platonism. It calls ascetic ideals into question, it submits them to a physiological critique but it does not operate on the basis of such ideals. The 'basis' of Nietzschean critique is precisely that everything is produced - in the mode of the physiological.

The second aspect of Nietzsche's radicalisation of Kantian critique concerns an implication of the Copernican turn with which Kant abandons the attempt to know things as they are 'in themselves' and instead concentrates on their phenomenal status (that is to say, as materially 'given' in space and time but knowable as objects, as phenomena, due to the interaction of the faculties). The Copernican turn which is the starting point for Kant's critical philosophy has been discussed several times in the previous chapters of this dissertation. But its initially merely technical aspects, namely the reformulation of the relation between the object and knowledge of it, and the re-thinking of the object as appearance, carry two important implications. The first, put simply, is that by redirecting the attention of philosophy towards the conditions of possibility of the object of knowledge, Kant demonstrates the status of the object as produced and no longer as simply given. For this reason alone it would be philosophically
regressive to go back to a conception of objects prior to that of the Copernican turn. It is necessary to sustain this first implication of the Copernican turn for without it thought can only relapse into assuming objects as such to be given, the position of every, as it were, vulgar idealism prior to Kant's reconsideration of its conditions of possibility as transcendental.

But alongside this properly critical strand there runs another which immediately recuperates this loss of metaphysical ground. Whilst Kant realises the produced nature of all phenomena, he locates the origin of these productions firmly in the realm of the faculties. And although the subjectivity which is interjected as the source of the productions of objects can be understood merely to mark the point of convergence of these transcendental founts and, in short, as a transcendental (universal) subjectivity, it nevertheless means that a human agency is placed at the centre of the productions which make up the universe. The effect of this is formally very similar to that of Kant's continued uncritical belief in truth. Here, too, a theocentric conception is overcome but since it is, in this case, replaced by an anthropocentric perspective, the most fundamental features of the old system are only seemingly altered. For it is immaterial to the distribution of values whether the site and source of the highest values is called god or man (transcendental subjectivity). In either case an agency is posed as exempt from nature and that means, for Kant as much as for Nietzsche, of nature as production, as produced. As was shown before (ch.1.III; ch.3.II), Kant only allows transcendental apperception to accompany the three syntheses of the understanding but apperception itself is not, according to him, formed in a synthesis. It is clear that this is formally very similar to saying that 'god' is the source of creation but not itself created or natural. And in either case the fundamentally Platonistic structure, in which a supersensible realm is opposed to the
sensible, or nature, remains in place. Nature is only ever construed as derived and secondary in such Platonistic conceptions of it. It is not itself sufficiently plenitudinous to extend throughout the entire field of creation or production. According to this Platonistic logic, its intrinsic deficiency must be supplemented from elsewhere. Hence a supersensible realm is invented: 'god' and the ιδεα, in the case of Plato, transcendental subjectivity and noumena, in that of Kant.

Nietzsche's thinking is able to strike a fatal blow to this conception of the world and of human being in it by a transvaluation of the entire Platonistic structure on the basis of a primary physiology. If his thought simply opposed another conception to that of Platonism, it would only reduplicate the oppositional structure which is coterminous with Platonism. The same goes of course for Nietzsche's stance towards Kantian critique. As with all the idealised conceptions of earlier philosophy, rather than opposing them, they can be overcome if the ground on which they are articulated is transvalued on the basis of a primary physiology. Critique certainly has the potential to be adapted in the service of a physiological thinking, but this adaptation only becomes possible when critique is cleared of the idealist impositions which hold it back from realising its potential for destabilising traditional metaphysics.

In the same way that the oppositional stance that is Platonism cannot be overcome by an oppositional thinking (which would merely duplicate it), so, too, any variation on its fundamental anti-materialist theme would not move beyond its central assumptions. But Nietzsche's physiological thinking does neither. It does not deny the reality of the Platonistic (or of Kant's idealist) projections. It merely inquires into the value of these conceptions and asks what their function is in the overall economy of life. Thus consciousness which, qua the self-consciousness of the 'I think', Kant takes to be originary must be rethought as a mere epiphenomenon of a more
complex and more fundamental productivity. In the physiological rethinking of consciousness it no longer stands outside the incessant synthesising of the will to power. It is, in short, no longer a being-conscious (Bewußtsein) but has been transformed in the productive process of becoming-conscious (Bewußtwerden). This becoming-conscious is as much a function of an organism as any other of its physiological functions such as ingestion or digestion. Becoming-conscious occurs in the service of the organism, and is not intrinsically functionally superior to any other of its involuntary processes. Nietzsche writes:

"In Hinsicht auf das Ungeheure und Vielfache des Für- und Gegeneinander-arbeitens, wie es das Gesamtleben jedes Organism darstellt, ist dessen bewußte Welt...ein kleiner Ausschnitt. Dies Stück Bewußtsein als Zweck... für jenes Gesamtphänomen von Leben anzusetzen, fehlt uns alles Recht: ersichtlich ist das Bewußtwerden nur ein Mittel mehr in der Entfaltung und Machterweiterung des Lebens. Deshalb ist es eine Naivität,...irgend eine Einzelheit der Sphäre des Bewußtseins als höchsten Wert anzusetzen: und vielleicht gar 'die Welt' aus ihnen zu rechtfertigen."

"As regards the immensity and multiplicity of working for and against, such as the entirety of life in every organism shows, its conscious world...is only a small segment. To posit this piece of consciousness as purpose for the entire phenomenon of life, we have no right at all: becoming-conscious is obviously only one more means in the unfolding and expansion of power of life. Therefore it is a naivety...to posit any singularity in the sphere of consciousness as the highest value: and perhaps even to justify 'the world' from out of them." (KSA 12,10 [137], WM/WP no. 707, t.m., my omissions)

This passage diagnoses a paralogistic thinking as regards the value accorded to consciousness in an idealist philosophy. Rather than being understood as the product of the will to power's synthesising activity, idealism construes consciousness as the originary source of the world; the world itself springs from it, and it is of little consequence whether this
consciousness is that of god or of man. Nietzsche's thinking overcomes this paralogism by re-incorporating consciousness into all the other perpetual becoming of an organism - just as Kant is able to leave behind dogmatic rationalism by showing that the paralogisms of reason are only possible on the basis of the synthetic productions of the other faculties.

Within the thinking of the will to power, any traditional notions which oppose body to spirit (irrespective of which terms this opposition is formulated in) are no longer valid. This is not to say that their 'dialectic' has been 'sublated' in a higher synthesis³. It is, rather, the case that the perspective opened up by the will to power shows that 'spirit' had only ever been possible as yet another production of the will to power as physiology. One implication of this is that the body which is the object of so much fear and hatred within Platonism, is again comprehended as the basis on which even Platonism itself first becomes possible. Secondly, the absolute opposition between human consciousness on the one side and the otherness of nature's materiality on the other side, simply falls away if both are conceived as forms of the will to power and if a physiology is named as the site of their perpetual exchanges. In other words, this aspect of Nietzsche's transvaluation of critique has the effect of liberating matter from the idealist imposition according to which it too only arises as an effect of an originary consciousness. That is to say, Nietzsche is able to de-humanise nature, to recommence a thinking which understands itself to be possible on the basis of the productions which Nietzsche thematises under the name will to power, and not vice versa.

Here, too, Nietzsche utilises the insights offered by (the Dialectic of the first) critique whilst yet turning them against critique to overcome the remnants of an obsolete idealism. In particular, by extending the scope of what is comprehended as the result of a paralogistic operation, Nietzsche is able to devalue the centrality of 'man' in nature, to destabilise the
anthropocentrism intrinsic to Kantian critique. This reinterpretation of
the paralogism is the second aspect of the transvaluation of critique.

Both Kant's continued adherence to a metaphysical conception of truth and
his substitution of a theocentric by an anthropocentric originary
consciousness are finally nothing more than symptoms of his unquestioned
acceptance of being as primordial. And this brings us to the third aspect
of Nietzsche's transvaluation of critique which can only be touched upon
relatively briefly here because its final fruition requires another context
(sec. IV, below) for its discussion. Here attention can only be drawn to a
few salient points.

Despite the fact that it is driven by the motor of critique, Kant's
entire ontology is predicated on the belief (which of course remains
unquestioned by Kant) in the primacy of being as presence. There is first
of all the obvious point that Kant posits a noumenal realm which, although
unknowable, functions as a point of absolute fixity. The productions of
human consciousness only concern the phenomenal aspect of a thing but 'in
itself', prior to, outside of its constitution as phenomenal object, it
retains a pristine, unaltered state. But this obviously presupposes the
existence of objects which can be theoretically divided into their
phenomenal and noumenal sides. Nietzsche called this Kantian conception of
the two aspects of a thing 'the sore spot of Kantian critique' ("der faule
Fleck des Kantischen Kritizismus") and had this to say about it:

"Kant hatte kein Recht mehr zu seiner Unterscheidung 'Erscheinung' und
'Ding an sich'... insofern er den Schluß von der Erscheinung auf eine
Ursache der Erscheinung als unerlaubt ablehnte - gemäß seiner Fassung
des Kausalitätsbegriffs und dessen rein-intraphänomenaler Gültigkeit:
welche Fassung anderseits jene Unterscheidung schon vorwegnimmt, wie als
ob das 'Ding an sich' nicht nur erschlossen, sondern gegeben sei."

"Kant no longer had a right to his distinction 'appearance' and 'thing
in itself'...insofar as he rejected as impermissible the inference from an appearance to the cause of an appearance - in accordance with his version of the concept of causality and its purely intra-phenomenal validity: which version on the other hand already anticipates that distinction, as if the 'thing in itself' was not merely inferred but given." (KSA 12,5 [4], WM/WP no.553, t.m., my omissions)

The irresolvable dilemma at the centre of Kant's critical philosophy is that it only becomes possible for him to concentrate on the transcendental conditions of possibility of phenomena by first of all instituting the division of things into their phenomenal and noumenal aspects. But at the same time to posit noumena at all is a deeply un-critical move in that by definition they lie outside the realm of the productions of the understanding and in that sense are transcendental. This is to say that the status of noumena in Kant's theory of the production of knowledge is deeply problematic. The question is how they can be arrived at without having been inferred from phenomena when at the same time inferences from phenomena to another realm, other than that of their transcendental constitution, is utterly illegitimate, given Kant's redefinition of causality as solely applicable to the phenomenal realm. In this sense noumena fall outside the compass of the transcendental whilst at the same acting as guarantor of the phenomenal function of objects. This puts them on a par with the ideas of reason which take up a similar position vis-à-vis the objects Kant discovers to be synthetically produced. Hence noumena, too, are exempt from the movement of becoming.

But even in the realm of phenomena, which are by definition temporalised and which can be material (both of which surely sully what could otherwise be an immaculate objective status), the concept of substance provides a theoretical point at which an object is not open to transformation. Its accidentia may undergo change but qua substance it does not (cf. the
detailed discussion of this in ch. 1.1, above). Even though the application of the concept of substance to a manifold of intuition is a synthetic act, as a consequence of this act the object is then conceived in extra-temporal terms and as unchanging with regard to the aspect of it which is theorised as substance.

But even the change, which Kant admits may affect the accidentia of an object, is really little more than a change of position within a cosmos of fixed things which persist. We have already seen (ch. 2. II, above) how Nietzsche ironises 'this old mythology' ("diese alte Mythologie"), the suppression of the primary processes of becoming, as 'the attempt to comprehend an occurrence as a kind of shifting and change of position of 'beings', of the permanent...' (KSA 12, 2 [139], WM/WP no. 631, t. m.).

It has to be emphasised, though, that all the objections to Kant's ontology which have been mentioned so far operate on the technical level and are locatable as internal to his system. Over and above these technicalities it has, however, to be realised that his ontology is entirely predicated on the unquestioned assumptions that there are objects, that they exist. Although the first Critique is obviously on one level an attempt to theorise how things, qua objects, are produced by a transcendental subjectivity and hence become knowable, the entire work is nonetheless based on, and unthinkable without, the presupposition that things (although at that point as yet unknowable to that subjectivity) exist prior to their formation as objects by subjectivity (Kant's idealism is, after all, not that of Berkeley with his esse est percipi). Kant need not formulate this underlying assumption anywhere in his text because it is so entirely beyond the scope of the inquiry for him, so unquestionably self-evident. But objectivity is itself one of the fabrications of anthropos with which it assures its continued existence, which consequence does not mean that the fabrication is true.
Nietzsche's thought, in contradistinction to that of Kant, does not start from the supposition that being (as presence, substantia etc.) is primary. Instead it grows out of a conception of the world as perpetual becoming. On the basis of this Nietzsche rehearses a thinking in which the status of all entities is radically transformed. They are no longer objective positivities which are factual and simply given but are now thought of as useful fictions, precisely as fabrications. In this vein, Nietzsche writes:

"Die fortwährenden Übergänge erlauben nicht, von 'Individuum' zu reden ... Wir würden nicht von Zeit reden und nichts von Bewegung wissen, wenn wir nicht, in grober Weise, 'Ruhendes' neben Bewegtem zu sehen glaubten... Der Satz von der Identität hat als Hintergrund den 'Augenschein', daß es gleiche Dinge gibt. Eine werdende Welt könnte im strengen Sinne nicht 'begriffen', nicht 'erkannt' werden: nur insofern der 'begreifende'... Intellekt eine schon geschaffene grobe Welt vorfindet, gezimmert aus lauter Scheinbarkeiten, aber fest geworden, insofern diese Art Schein das Leben erhalten hat - nur insofern gibt es etwas wie 'Erkenntnis'..."

"Continual transitions make it impermissible to speak of an 'individual' ... We would not speak of time and would not know anything of motion if we did not believe to see, in a crude way, 'what is at rest' beside what is in motion... The background to the law of identity is the 'apparent fact' that there are identical things. A world in becoming could not, in the strict sense, be 'comprehended', be 'known': only insofar as the 'comprehending'... intellect finds an already created, crude world, constructed from mere semblances, but become fixed, insofar as this kind of appearance has preserved life - only insofar is there something like 'knowledge'..."

(KSA 11,36 [23], WM/WP no. 520, t.m., my omissions and emphases).

As concerns the dichotomy of conceptions of the world according to being or becoming, Nietzsche resolves this in a manner formally reminiscent of Kant's solution to the (third) antinomy. As was discussed before (ch.2, III), Kant overcomes the rivalry of claims of determinism and free will by
assigning each to a different realm, namely to the phenomenal and noumenal, respectively. Although many of the constituents of Nietzsche's thinking are obviously very different from those of Kant, formally he repeats many of his predecessor's moves. In this case, as concerns the rival claims of being and becoming, Nietzsche, too, assigns them different functional domains. In brief, a world of being has to be construed for the purposes of knowledge (cf. above quote) and that means for the purposes of self-preservation of anthropos. A world of becoming cannot be cognised for in it there are no fixities, such as an immutable concept of truth. Nor are there fixed, or indeed any, objects in it (after Kant, the concept of an object implies that something has been fixated). And knowledge in any traditional sense of the word can obviously not come about if there are no fixed objects to be known and if the project of knowledge has been completely bankrupted by the absence of any belief in the fixity of truth.

Just as in Kant's solution to the antinomy one side is privileged from the start (as demonstrated in ch.2.III, above), so too, in Nietzsche's reconsideration of the problem, no neutral symmetry can be expected. But where Kant (by the manner in which he formulates the antinomy) implicitly privileges the noumenal side (the side of being, crudely speaking), Nietzsche's thinking presupposes that perpetual becoming is that which makes the impositions of being possible in the first place. Kant ultimately wishes to claim that reason is the immutable, unchanging basis on which the productions of nature can be understood whereas Nietzsche's reactivation of the primacy of becoming entails that all phenomena of stability are themselves conceived as produced, as secondary and as less fundamental than the constituents of the production, that is to say of the economy of the will to power.
So far in this chapter I have attempted to show that Nietzsche formally repeats some of the key moments of critique, whilst yet adapting these moves to submit the reactive aspects of Kantian critique themselves to a critique. In particular, this meant, firstly, that the ideal of dogmatic theology could still be seen to be operative in Kant's text, albeit in a more subtle form, in the will to truth which organises it from above, so to speak. Secondly, we saw that the conception of the paralogisms of rational psychology was broadened to encompass Kant's anthropocentrism. Thirdly it was shown that the terms of the antinomy of rational cosmology could be intensified in order to encompass the rival claims to primacy of being and becoming.

It has been possible to keep the discussions of these transvaluative moves relatively brief because all the substantial work had already been done in the previous three chapters. Thus the first and second chapters focused (in part, if not exclusively) on the paralogism and on the antinomy, respectively, as discussed in the first Critique. The third chapter offered a reading of the ideal, as discussed in the first Critique, but also extended to the second part of the third Critique.

The next, final step will obviously have to be an exposition of the physiological 'fundament' which makes this rethinking, this transvaluation, possible in the first place.
In the previous three chapters, different aspects of Kant's theorisation of the causal nexus were examined. In the course of this I hope to have shown that substance, causality and teleology are all equally bankrupt, if for subtly different reasons, as means of thinking the productions of bodies. Here it is necessary to remind ourselves why it is of any importance how a body is thought. In chapter one (sec.II, above) the two-world theory which is synonymous with Platonism was outlined. As has often been pointed out, in order for Platonism to be operative, this oppositional structure needs to be sustained. But apart from this structural requirement, the effectiveness of Platonism is utterly parasitic on a profound hatred of the body, is utterly dependent on the thorough suppression of physiology (my aim was to draw attention to this central feature of Platonism from the start, hence the quote from 'Phaedrus' with which the first chapter opens). A great deal has been written on how to move beyond Platonism by moving beyond the oppositional thinking which is constitutive of Platonism without repeating the very oppositional structures this non-Platonic thought was sought to supercede. Far rarer is the attempt to overcome Platonism by reinstating physiology in the primary position of which Platonic thought robs it, and yet Nietzsche's incessant onslaught on Platonism is as much concerned with the suppression of physiology which occurs in it, as with its oppositional structures. In what follows I shall therefore attempt to draw out the sense and the manner in which Nietzsche's writing constitutes an affirmation of the body or, as Nietzsche himself likes to put it (for instance in the preface to the second edition of the 'Gay Science'), the sense in which it marks the convalescence of the body in philosophy.

It is a peculiarity of Kantian philosophy that although it is a critique
of reason qua dogmatic, and that ultimately means qua Platonic-Christian, metaphysics, it does not intensify critique into an affirmation of the body. As concerns this point, the twofold task will be to show what precisely prevents this intensification in Kant's philosophy and, conversely, what facilitates this intensification in the thought of Nietzsche.

Before we proceed any further in this line of enquiry, it might be advisable to clarify in general one crucial point as concerns this Nietzschean physiology, namely the difference between it and the empirical science which is classed as a branch of biology. The latter type of physiology examines the functional relations of (and to some extent between) organisms. As such, its presuppositions and clandestine assumptions about the nature of organic beings are just as limited as those of any other rationalist science, even if its object is signally capable of being thought in such a manner as to destabilise these very presuppositions and assumptions. The philosophical physiology which Nietzsche advocates and practices is as far removed from this empirical (rationalist) science as from any other. Nietzsche's attraction to physiology seems to me to stem from the fact that its register can so easily and conveniently be appropriated by a thinking which seeks to affirm the materiality of the body but, very importantly, without setting it in opposition to mind, spirit, god or other idealist impositions.

A second advantage of physiology is that its object (the functions of organisms) provides a foil for rethinking any number of productions in any of the traditional spheres (such as art, science, politics, nature, philosophy, etc.) without simultaneously having to reiterate the traditional anthropocentrisms which structure them.

Thirdly, it might be asked why a specifically physiological register
should be preferable to a generally biological one for the re-thinking of
non-anthropomorphic productions. One obvious reason, and one which the
classical philologist Nietzsche was surely aware of, arises from the
respective etymologies of βιόω and φυεῖν. Because whereas the former can mean
simply 'to live' but in the sense of 'to maintain one's life, to preserve
life', the latter translates as 'to produce, beget, bring forth, make to
grow'. Especially in this last respect phuein is obviously more
appropriate for thinking the productions of the will to power for which
growth is more primordial than preservation, for which preservation is only
ever a secondary effect of the much more basic will to grow that is the
will to power (cf. ch. 4, I, above).

Furthermore, Nietzsche's philosophical physiology seeks to describe the
functional processes by which life expends (and only secondarily sustains)
its self in and through a human body. In this respect the descriptive scope
of a physiological register is more readily adaptable to this task than
that of biology in general.

Having drawn out some important distinctions between an empirical and
Nietzsche's philosophical physiology, in what follows reference is
exclusively made to the latter type.

Although Nietzsche does of course attack Platonism on many different
fronts and develops a whole host of strategies to destabilise its ways of
thinking, it seems to me that his physiological thinking is the most
effective weapon in his armoury. Put schematically, in Platonism a 'higher'
realm, that of the forms, is posed whence issue value, meaning, sense and
signification which structure, sustain and give form to the 'lower' realm,
that of matter and the body. It is of secondary importance precisely with
which terms the high and the low are inscribed - in Christianity, for
instance, they become 'god' as against the flesh of mortals, in Kant, the
transcendental as opposed to the empirical. The crucial point is that a complete and thoroughgoing denigration of 'this', the 'low' world is thus carried out and 'this' world always ultimately means the materiality of the human body because it is that, according to the Platonic schema, which most of all stands in the way of the thinker attaining to the purity of the realm of the forms. The 'ground' of (the things of) 'this' world is, ironically, located in that unattainable higher realm which is by definition remote from the realm of the materiality of humans, that is to say, physiology. In this regard the Platonic two-world schema is a very forceful expression of an all-pervasive hatred of the physiological and thus the expression of a degeneration of life.

\[ \text{high} \]  
\[ \downarrow \]  
\[ \text{low.} \]

One of the obvious implications of this schema is that whatever is designated as low is itself intrinsically valueless, worthless and that means first and foremost that it is not invested with any productive power. In order to dislodge this devaluing conception of matter, Nietzsche develops a physiological thinking. In it, but only as a first step, the body is accorded a formally similar status to that which previously attached to the Platonic forms. It is now thought as the site whence signification and value derive and hence it is now accorded primary status. In this sense Nietzsche can speak of 'idealisation', that is, of the processes whereby primary physiological values transform themselves into secondary values of consciousness and its cultural edifices (cf, ch. 2, II).
This initial step has been exhaustively theorised as Nietzsche's overturning of Platonism by means of a thinking which 'twists free' because by reversing the order of priority between the two 'realms', it is not just the status of an originary productivity which has somehow, miraculously, passed from the one to the other. Instead, the entire schema, the two-world theory itself, is thereby compromised beyond redemption:

"Die wahre Welt haben wir abgeschafft: welche Welt blieb übrig? die scheinbare vielleicht?...Aber nein! mit der wahren Welt haben wir auch die scheinbare abgeschafft!"

"The true world we abolished: which world was left? the apparent one perhaps?...But no! along with the true world we have also abolished the apparent one!" (KSA 6, GD/TI IV).

This undoubtedly constitutes a moment in the Nietzschean overcoming of Platonism. But it is necessary to show that Nietzsche's drilling into the 'ground' of physiology reaches further than this rather tidy, rather clean model envisages. Because it is an important aspect of the dissolution of the Platonic schema to unsettle the association of the realm of the forms qua source of values with purity and its adjoining conceptuality of clean and unsullied productions (of values). But equally, any other models of production in which vestiges of this immaculate conception remain, in this respect obviously retain the character of the Platonic projection.

There are in actual fact three central aspects to Nietzsche's descent into the physiological which make it such a powerful antidote to the Platonic affliction. The first of these (which was briefly discussed just
now) is the destabilisation of the two-world structure which organises Platonism. It is true to say that to base thinking on physiology obviously undermines any Platonistic project insofar as Platonism is always, by definition, implicated in an oppositional structure whereas a body knows nothing about oppositions: the perpetual exchanges of matter which characterise a body have nothing to do with, and cannot be comprehended in terms of, oppositionality. An oppositional structure is the type of structure which denies what is most fundamental about a body: the fluidity of 'its' matter and of the transformations of matter.

But however important, as a moment in the Nietzschean down-going, the undermining of the structure of Platonism is, it also unfortunately offers a way of avoiding the grittier, less purely structural components of Nietzsche's physiological thinking. For, as I hope to have shown in the previous three chapters, one crucial aspect of Kant's continuation of the trajectory of Platonism is his inability to confront the perpetual transformations of the human body, the exchanges of matter which proceed through it and which utterly compromise its status as a closed-off object. The history of Platonism is, in other words, coextensive with the history of the suppression of the materiality of bodies. In order to interrupt this trajectory, a more or less violent, more or less abrupt eruption of what can only be described as bodily slime into the sanitised discourses of the philosophers needs to occur. Because this is precisely what a Platonistic deprecation of the body is directed against: its putrefactory fluidity, the fact that it is essentially unsubsumable to the rigid, formal and ideal conceptualuality of a type of thinking which has its origin in fear and horror of an excessive, disintegrating fluidity and which needs to fixate this perpetual flux (of matter) in order to justify existence to itself. It is in this sense that Platonism's hatred of time and of matter, of the body and of becoming are all united in one grand sweeping movement which is
specifically directed against anything which intrinsically resists subsumption.

The point at which Nietzschean physiology not only casts off the structure of the Platonic two-world theory qua anti-sensuous oppositionality but also overcomes this structure as the first model of an anti-material rigidity imposed on the uncontrollable flows of the body comes, strangely enough, at the point when Nietzsche attempts to think of a possible place for 'god' in this new or renewed, convalescing physiology. In Platonism (as in Kant) 'god' does of course mean something that is the highest, and that is to say, the most remote from the vagaries of the body. In Platonism, 'god' is the highest ideal, the greatest source of value for all that is lower down in the hierarchy. In Platonism, everything else may change, may be in or subject to time, but 'god' is immutable and extra-temporal. When Nietzsche comes to rethink the possibility of something like 'god' on the basis of his physiological thinking, it will of course have mutated into something entirely different from this anaemic, extra-temporal spectre which has terrorised the human body for two millenia, down to the last little crevice and corpuscle.

It must in principle be possible for the Nietzschean physiological thinking to reconsider even the most ideal, even the most anti-physical aspects of Platonism in terms of their physiological production because physiology is precisely the method with which the producedness of all phenomena can be demonstrated, by means of which they can be traced to a will to power which inhabits a body in a specific way. In this sense physiology is the motor of Nietzsche's transvaluation of all values. On this basis Nietzsche is able to rethink 'god' as something like a point or instant of greatest intensity which is intermittently reached by the will to power in its pulsating play of contraction and expansion. In this
perpetual ebb and flow, the will to power is periodically concentrated as in the crest of a wave before breaking, receding and regathering momentum.

Here the 'high' points in this incessant ebbing and flowing might also be thought of as 'god' points into which the will to power is periodically concentrated but which are, firstly, not distinct from the entire process of becoming in a temporal sense and which, secondly, do not have any absolute value which would elevate them above and separate them from, the rest of the ongoing process. Nietzsche describes this sequence in the following way:

"'Gott' als Kulminations-Moment: das Dasein eine ewige Vergöttung und Entgöttung. Aber darin kein Wert-Höhepunkt, sondern nur Macht-Höhepunkte. ...Der Rückgang vom Höhepunkt im Werden...als Folge dieser höchsten Kraft ...welche, gegen sich sich wendend, nachdem sie nichts mehr zu organisieren hat, ihre Kraft verwendet, zu deorganisieren..."

"'God' as moment of culmination: existence an eternal deification and de-deification. But therein no high point of value but high points of power. ...The receding from the high point in becoming...as consequence of this highest force...which, turning against itself, after it has nothing more to organise, utilises its force to de-organise..." (KSA 12,9 [8], WM/WP no. 712, t.m., my omissions)

In the same note Nietzsche demands the 'absolute exclusion of mechanism and of matter' ("Absoluter Ausschluß des Mechanismus und des Stoffes") as types of conceptuality which are utterly inappropriate for the thinking of the will to power. This I understand to mean that mechanical causality (as well as, by implication, teleological causality, its conceptual complement) does not do justice to the complexities of the topology and economy of
becoming and that it must therefore be left behind when a physiological thinking is attempted. Similarly, it is necessary to disregard any schema which opposes matter to form, to spirit, or to any other kind of idealist conceptuality which starts from the pre-supposition that the latter, for instance as consciousness, is qualitatively different from (and superior to!) the former, just as 'god' (in that scheme of things) is different in kind from all natural processes.

As opposed to this, Nietzschean physiology implies that the processes of a body may at times naturally intensify to such a degree that the culmination of forces at that moment can be understood to reach a state of deification. What is quite clearly not meant by this is any kind of alignment of increased consciousness, greater spirituality, higher anti-material purity etc., with such moments of deification. For whilst the will to power as physiology does at times produce consciousness as an epiphenomenon of all the other transformative processes matter can undergo (the becoming-conscious of matter, c.f. sec.I of the present chapter), this does not mean that Nietzsche thinks of such becoming-conscious as a deification of matter. Instead it is necessary to distinguish two types of transformative process, two series, which might accidentally overlap but which are not intrinsically or necessarily related, and which are certainly not identical.

One of these series involves the host of transformations of matter which can be thought of as a body. Among these processes, although from the perspective of the will to power there is no particular reason to privilege this, there occurs the becoming-conscious for which a body has a certain capacity. Here the important point is to draw out the continuity between wholly unconscious physiological processes and the gradual flowing of these into ever more conscious, but still fundamentally physiological activities. It is perhaps not too fanciful to suggest that even the word...
physiology itself embodies such a gradual transformation of physis into logos, of body into thought, while never becoming anything fundamentally other than body. Nietzsche writes:

"Die Glaubwürdigkeit des Leibes ist erst die Basis, nach der der Wert alles Denkens abgeschätzt werden kann. Gesetzt, wir hätten lauter Dinge erdacht, die es nicht gibt...Der Leib erweist sich immer weniger als Schein! Wer hat bis jetzt Gründe gehabt, den Leib als Schein zu denken? Der vollendete Brahman-Verehrer."

"Only the credibility of the body is the basis according to which the value of all thinking may be judged. Assuming we had thought up all manner of things which do not exist...The body proves less and less of a semblance! Who, up until now, had reasons to think the body as semblance? The complete Brahman-admirer." (KSA 11,39 [18], m.t., my omissions)

This first series, then, marks physiology as a topology beyond both idealism and a vulgar materialism.

Another series concerns the economic fluctuations of the will to power insofar as it expands and expends itself, grows and becomes more organisationally complex but then, once it has saturated the entire field of its possible structuration, it decreases and diminishes in force and recedes (to regroup and regather). This second series emphasises the plasticity of the will to power as physiology, including the multidimensionality of its contractions and expansions and the way in which these delirial fluctuations precede a conceptualising whose successes depend on the extent to which it can impose disjunctions upon prior and more fundamental continuous flows.

It is clear from this that any confluence of these two series could never be a necessary consequence of the processes described in each. And it cannot be overemphasised what a complete deathblow to Platonism it is if.
firstly, that which Platonism construes as ideal, and as 'given', is traced
back to its physiological origins and re-thought in terms of the
idealisations of the body; if, secondly, there is nothing remote or
absolute about the highest ideal ('god') anymore because it is so entirely
re- incorporates into all the other perpetual transformations of the body;
and if, thirdly, the concept of 'highest consciousness' is extracted and
separated from the concept 'god' and the two sequences, one of which
thematises the becoming-conscious of a body and the other thematising the
possibility of becoming-god, are thought as separate and as only
coincidentally overlapping.

This is to say that by means of physiology Nietzsche can overcome an
ideality that is posited as given by the tradition of Platonism, regardless
of whether that ideality is construed as originary supersensuous productive
consciousness ('god') or simply in terms of human consciousness
(transcendental subjectivity, in Kant's terminology) 16. In either case,
Nietzsche is able to tempt philosophy away from the (libidinal) investment
it has had in these anaemic forms of conceptuality. That with which he
tempts it is a new thought of the body, well beyond the oppositional
schemas of Platonism. To think about this other body, this becoming-body to
which the tradition has largely been deaf in its perceived obligation to
keep thinking in terms of a two-world theory, will be a much greater
challenge to philosophers than anything which has gone before. This is how
Nietzsche paints this enticing vision:

"Gesetzt, daß 'die Seele' ein anziehender und geheimnisvoller Gedanke
war, von dem sich die Philosophen mit Recht nur widerstrebend getrennt
haben - vielleicht ist das, was sie nunmehr dagegen einzutauchen lernen,
noch anziehender, noch geheimnisvoller. Der menschliche Leib, an dem die
ganz fernste und nächste Vergangenheit alles organischen Werdens wieder
lebendig und leibhaft wird, durch den hindurch, über den hinweg und
hinaus ein ungeheurer unhörbarer Strom zu fließen scheint: der Leib ist
ein erstaunlicherer Gedanke als die alte 'Seele'."

"Assuming that 'the soul' was an attractive and mysterious thought from which philosophers have rightly taken leave only reluctantly - perhaps that which they are now learning to substitute for it is even more attractive, even more mysterious. The human body, upon which the entire furthest and nearest past of all organic becoming becomes alive and corporeal again, through which, over and out of which a tremendous inaudible stream appears to flow: the body is a more astonishing thought than the old 'soul'." (KSA 11,36 [35], WM/WP no. 659, t.m.).

This note is entitled "Am Leitfaden des Leibes" ('Along the leading thread of the body') and it will have to be asked where this thread leads if it is followed. It is possible to enter into this question obliquely by becoming aware of the thought that is rehearsed here, as Nietzsche draws attention to the body as conduit for the 'tremendous inaudible stream of all organic becoming'. The immeasurable significance of this thought is precisely that everything is now rethought on the basis of the primacy of becoming, everything is rethought as becoming, and for Nietzsche that means becoming as perpetual material transformations. After Nietzsche it is no longer legitimate to set thinking in opposition to material forces.

Nietzsche ridicules such an oppositional mode when he writes:

"Niemand kam je auf den Einfall, seinen Magen als einen fremden, etwa einen göttlichen Magen zu verstehen: aber seine Gedanken als 'eingeggeben', seine Wertschätzungen als 'von einem Gott eingeblasen', seine Instinkte als Tätigkeit im Dämmern zu fassen..."

"It has never occurred to anyone to understand his stomach as a strange, even a divine stomach: but to conceive of his thoughts as 'inspired', his evaluations as 'blown in by a god', his instincts as activity in the twilight..." (KSA 11,36 [36], WM/WP no. 659, t.m.)

Conversely, this means that a Nietzschean physiological thinking must assert its non-Platonic character by immersing itself in the 'tremendous
inaudible stream', even at the risk of being washed away by it. This immersion, with its attendant danger of submerging, of drowning (in which the Zarathustrian 'down-going' might become a 'going under'\textsuperscript{17}) is akin to being led into a labyrinth without any certainty that the re-emergence from it is guaranteed. Nietzsche plays on this theme at the end of another note (KSA 11,37 [4]) which, to my mind, is one of the central texts of his physiological project. Without entering into the enormous complexity displayed by the finale of this note, and in particular by its obscure reference to Ariadne, it suffices to remember that in the myth of Ariadne and Theseus, she leads him out of the labyrinth by means of a leading thread (Leitfaden). In this way he escapes the danger of the Minotaur, a wild, untameable beast which threatens to devour him, much as 'untamed' unconscious desires threaten to consume a body not given over to the rule of reason, according to a Platonistic thinking\textsuperscript{e}.

A later account of the emergence of man from darkness and confusion can of course be found in what is possibly the central text of Platonism, the parable of the cave in book VII of Politeia. In either case, those exposed to darkness, ignorance, confusion and danger are led into the light of knowledge, safety and security by a benign guide, or so myth and fable would have it. But in actual fact there is nothing innocently benign or helpful about this ascensional trajectory. Instead, this emergence into the light is always only possible on the back of a mangled and broken body. Plato no doubt understood the poor inmates of his dungeon to be the prisoners of their bodily needs and desires. But how much more are they debarred from any freedom of movement by their aspirations to 'light', 'knowledge', 'truth' and 'god', all of which lie beyond the cave?

As against these ascensional aspirations which are those of any project of enlightenment in the broadest sense, Nietzsche seeks to tempt thinking into the labyrinth, which is an aggravated cave, away from light and
certainty and truth, into the maelstrom of becoming, the site of which he
takes the body. How a Platonistic thinking indulges its prejudices against
a greater obscurity, Nietzsche indicates in the following notes:

"Hauptirrtum der Psychologen: sie nehmen die undeutliche Vorstellung als
eine niedere Art der Vorstellung gegen die helle gerechnet: aber was aus
unserem Bewußtsein sich entfernt und deshalb dunkel wird, kann deshalb
an sich vollkommen klar sein. Das Dunkelwerden ist Sache der Bewußtseins-
perspektive."  
"Principal error of the psychologists: they take the indistinct
representation to be a lower kind of representation calculated as against
the distinct: but what removes itself from our consciousness and
therefore becomes obscure, can therefore itself be perfectly clear.
Becoming-obscure is a matter of the perspective of consciousness."  
(KSA 12,5 [55], WM/WP no.528, t.m.)

"Die Physiologen, wie die Philosophen glauben, das Bewußtsein, im Maße es
an Helligkeit zunimmt, wachse im Werte: das hellste Bewußtsein, das
logischste kälteste Denken sei ersten Ranges. Indessen - wonach ist
dieser Wert bestimmt? Das oberflächlichste, vereinfachte Denken ist
in Hinsicht auf Auslösung des Willens das am meisten nützliche..."  
"Physiologists, like philosophers, believe consciousness, to the degree
it increases in lucidity, to grow in value: the most lucid consciousness,
the most logical, coldest thinking is of the first rank. However -
according to what is this value determined? The most superficial, most
simplified thinking is the most useful as regards the release of the
will..."  
(KSA 12,5 [68], WM/WP no.527, t.m., my omission').
III. Critique as μεταβολή

I hope to have shown that the body of Nietzschean physiology is neither the living sepulchre in which the Platonic idealist's soul lies temporarily buried, nor the instrument or material substrate of a self-possessed agent, nor again a 'body-thing' \(^\text{20}\) as passive object of scientific probing, which is conveniently organised according to mechanical causality and adjacent rationalist conceptuality.

A body - to give the unthinkable constriction of a unitary coherence to this most dispersed of multiplicities - is never one. Nor does it make sense to speak of the point where that imaginary unity may come to rest. They do not exist, these stable coordinates which would faithfully promise to remain intact while the search for that phantom, 'a body' would take place. Of course, a body is never at rest, never simply is. A body is continually in becoming, it simply escapes the attentions of a stationary observation, such as Kant dreams of in his thematisation of the Analogies of Experience. What is captured between the pages of biology textbooks or in the reams of sour Platonistic mumblings are mere glimpses, mere shreds and caricatures of the rich physiological multitude swarming across the surface of the earth\(^\text{21}\).

Again, it is worth emphasising that these ongoing processes take place completely spontaneously, not merely prior to or outside the intentional control of any particular agency but, more fundamentally, the very concept of intentionality is entirely inappropriate in the sphere of physiology. A living organism is thus continually involved in systems of exchange (of matter and energy) that cut across the inside-outside division. It is always already engaged in economies with 'the outside' and is continually undergoing transformation\(^\text{22}\). Its stability is thus only of a relative nature. It must be stressed that an organism is a form of becoming without
anything substantial, stable or pre-given that becomes, it is variously a becoming-matter, becoming-energy, becoming-life.

Flows of matter breaking down, assimilating other flows, releasing energy, combining into larger formations, interlacing streams, reshaping everything in their path, leaving waste matter, sprouting new growths, a body is never at rest but perpetually grows, expands, contracts, channels liquids, exchanges gases, decomposes into a wholly different body. A body is at best the unconscious circuitry for myriad flows of matter, energy, desire or thought, holding out the range for their interlacings without coincidence. The unconscious nature of these assured interactions is of the greatest importance because it alone guarantees their smooth working. Consciousness is too impoverished, too limited and too unsure of itself, in short, too base to incept, sustain and regulate the infinitely complicated interactive processes that distinguish a body which is first and foremost metabole.

As was hinted in the previous section, a physiological register is a particularly rich source for a Nietzschean thinking of material becoming because physiology is not concerned with what a body is (as substantial entity) but with what it can do (its potency), not with its structure but with its functioning. Foremost among the functional capabilities of an organism are the metabolic processes by means of which it is continually and spontaneously undergoing decomposition, or dissimilation. The technical term for this is 'catabolism', during which processes of decomposition complex molecules, the smallest constituents of the organism, are broken down into simple ones, an annihilation in miniature and a concomitant release of energy occur. This is to say that an enhancement of vital processes (due to a release of energy) results from a physiological breakdown or expenditure. This is clearly in marked contrast to the
Platonic-Christian fear and hatred of the processes of decomposition with its alignment of physical and moral corruption which fear, moreover, still dominates Kant's critical philosophy.

'Metabolism' comes from the Greek 'metabolē', meaning 'change' or, more literally and accurately, 'overthrow'. It stems from a combination of the prefix 'meta', denoting 'over' or 'beyond', and the verb 'ballein' - 'to throw'. The sum total of the chemical processes that occur in living organisms and that result in growth, production of energy, elimination of waste material etc., in short, the living processes themselves are nothing other than a perpetual overthrowing of the organism. Thus, it must also be pointed out that from this physiological mode of thinking there issues an understanding of Nietzsche's notion of (self-)overcoming and the overman simply as those physiological types that enter into their own perpetual transformation, dissimulation, decomposition or, more bluntly, death, with the greatest enthusiasm, and without even knowing it.

One of the most important features of a physiological register is, then, that from it there ensues a firm focus on the metabolic as the chief mode of every particular organism. This is to say that whatever phenomenon, occurrence, process etc. is examined according to this physiological method will always come into view in terms of the overcoming (metabolism) intrinsic to it. This (self-)overcoming simultaneously refers to the ongoing dis-establishment of its interiority and 'self'-identity and, more profoundly, to the mode of becoming specific to it.

What Nietzsche therefore achieves in this physiological thinking is to revive the (potentially tremendously powerful) method of immanent critique (critique of x by x), yet without also having to maintain the idealist conceptuality which accompanied Kant's version of it. This means that for a Nietzschean physiology the oppositions which structure the Platonistic
thinking still rehearsed by Kant, such as those between inside and outside, spirit and matter, substantial and accidental characteristics etc., are rendered inactive and simply no longer have any productive power:


"We can think Nothing other than as material. Thoughts and abstractions, too, receive from us a much subtlised materiality which we perhaps deny: nonetheless they have such a materiality. We have become used to overlooking this subtle materiality and to speak of the 'immaterial'. Just like we have divided dead and alive, logical and illogical etc. To unlearn our oppositions - is the task." (KSA 10,1 13[m.t.])

By thus breaking up the spirit-matter dualism, matter can be liberated into the divinity only accorded to spirit within Platonism. This means that whatever is thought in this physiological mode is thereby released into the 'immanent critique' according to which everything exists, insofar as 'immanent critique' here comes to mean the mode of overcoming intrinsic to it. It could therefore also be said that just as much as the metabolic (as the central feature of physiology) marks a revival of the notion and method of immanent critique, so immanent critique can be seen to function as a prototype of Nietzsches's physiological thinking.

The crucial difference obviously lies in the fact that for Kant the 'x' in the trope 'critique of x by x' can always only be equated with reason because the rational is for him the 'founding mode' of all phenomena. All phenomena are as such (for Kant) insofar as they are constituted by (the faculties of) reason. This is in keeping with the Copernican turn and the
consequences it has for the conception of all phenomena as produced by that
part of reason which Kant designates as the understanding. But reason
cannot question itself fully and thus become critique without reserve
because it cannot question the will to truth which is definitional to it.

In contrast to this, Nietzsche diagnoses the loss of ground of reason. In
charting the self-devaluation of the highest values hitherto, 'the highest
values devalue themselves' ('die obersten Werte entwerten sich' KSA 12,9
[35], WM/WP no.2), Nietzsche emphasises that reason, together with all the
other Platonistic investments, progressively weakens as chief explanatory
force for all phenomena, that it is no longer capable of 'grounding' them.
But it is important to emphasise that in Nietzsche's understanding of this
process, reason is not overcome by anything extrinsic to it, such as
feeling or experience. Rather, it is intrinsic to reason, precisely
insofar as it ever had any significant explanatory force, that it overcomes
itself, that it devalues itself in the very process of trying to sustain
its value. This is how the will to power as rationalisation plays itself
out. In this regard, Nietzsche follows Kant's procedure very closely when
the latter conceives of the overcoming of reason by reason as immanent
critique.

But not only does Nietzsche show that reason overcomes (and thereby
devalues) itself (in this respect he simply repeats Kant's model of
critique), but he develops a thinking in which the trope 'critique/
overcoming of x by x' completely dominates over whichever 'x' is inscribed
in it, whereas for Kant the 'x' always had to be some form of 'reason'. In
this sense it could be said that a physiological thinking is that wherein
the nature of this trope ('critique/overcoming of x by x') as trope is
privileged and the 'x' in it becomes, if not coincidental, at least of
secondary importance. This entire movement of thought turns full circle
when we remember that the term 'trope' derives from the Greek προτεινω, to
turn, and τρόπος, turn, manner, mode of life. Nietzsche is exceedingly explicit about this when he writes:

"Alle grossen Dinge gehen durch sich selbst zu Grunde, durch einen Akt der Selbstaufhebung: so will es das Gesetz des Lebens, das Gesetz der notwendigen 'Selbstüberwindung' im Wesen des Lebens."

"All great things go to ground, perish through themselves, through an act of self-overcoming: thus the law of life wills it, the law of the necessary self-overcoming in the nature of life." (KSA 5, GdM/GoM III, 27, t.m.)

Immanent critique, or self-overcoming, is the fundamental mode of life through which great things overcome themselves. Great things are great precisely to the degree to which they participate in this essential mode of life. Critique itself overcomes itself insofar as it relinquishes its idealist investments (chief among them reason's claim to foundational status) and is reborn as a physiological thinking in which self-overcoming in the mode of any ordinary organism has complete precedence over anything thought to be stable, even when and as it overcomes itself.

Hence Nietzsche's physiological thinking, unlike that of Platonism, is in no way opposed to life and its natural processes. It does not set up any superior instance, agency or vantage point (such as 'truth' or 'god', the 'ideal' or reason) from which and in terms of which life may be judged and measured. This is how Nietzsche describes the utterly 'immanent' nature of physiological thinking:

"Wir gehören zum Charakter der Welt, das ist kein Zweifel! Wir haben keinen Zugang zu ihr als durch uns: es muß alles Hohe und Niedrige an uns notwendig ihrem Wesen zugehörig verstanden werden!"

"We belong to the character of the world, there is no doubt! We have no access to it other than through us: all that is high and low in us must
necessarily be understood as belonging to its nature!" (KSA 12, 1 [89], m.t.)

This is to say that 'we', that 'our' bodies, belong to the world and its perpetual movement and not vice versa. It is clear from this that a physiological thinking aspires to the very movement Nietzsche finds in life itself, namely a perpetual metabolising, a fundamental, material overcoming of itself. Hence the move from metaphysics to metabolism is in the highest degree indicative of the transformations thinking undergoes as it turns away from Platonism. Because metaphysics is that type of thinking which posits something (ideal) over and above the physical and which is, moreover, thought to be inherently superior to a merely material nature. The metabolic, on the other hand, which is the leading thread of a physiological thinking, in the fullest sense of the word incorporates what can be thought of as excessive to material nature back into material nature and has the effect of rendering matter 'itself' intrinsically excessive, intrinsically beyond itself. A body is always already so entirely beyond itself, insofar as it is involved in the perpetual overcoming that is its metabolism, it does not even need anything 'above' or 'beyond' it which would structure it, and give it meaning and sense extrinsically.

In this sense a body embodies life perfectly: it refuses to stand still and to submit to being, as does life; the becoming which is called a body is never interrupted, halted or brought to a stop, and nor is life; a body can never catch up with itself and is always irretrievably beyond itself, as is life. It is for these reasons that a thinking which emulates the body and which begins to listen to the 'tremendous inaudible stream of all organic becoming' is the only thinking which does not set itself in opposition to life which is always a way of denigrating life. Life itself is strengthened in a physiological thinking because the self-overcoming of
The great release of thought occurs when it is realised that the most profound mode of life is the cataclysmic or the catastrophic. Life 'itself' has nothing to preserve, not even 'itself'. It is clear that the demand is always to waste what appears safe and enclosed. The safer something appears, the more radically it may be wasted. The imaginary interiority of the human animal appears as the greatest certainty to a godless age and for that reason alone it must be sacrificed in a splendid and entirely useless gesture. Death is the most extreme expenditure of the spectre of interiority. And so it is absolutely necessary to perish, as cells, as rational agents, as organisms and as a race. To celebrate this headlong rush into expenditure without reserve, into catastrophe and to embrace its necessity joyously - that is the meaning of physiology.
IV. The Time of Physiology

One of the most important starting points for Kant's rethinking of the issues concerning the production of knowledge in the first Critique is to say that there are two separate and qualitatively different founts of knowledge, namely intuition and understanding. But having so radically separated these two, it becomes necessary for him to show that and how they can be combined to produce the kind of advanced, integrated experience Kant calls knowledge. The details of the progressive integration of their respective material are given in the Analytic of Principles which thematises the subsumption of the manifold of intuition under each of the categories in turn. But the demonstration that this combination is in principle possible, that these two deeply heterogeneous sources of knowledge can be fused at all, is the subject of the Transcendental Deduction. In that chapter, then, Kant needs to demonstrate that knowledge of an object is the result of the formation of the object as a synthesised manifold of intuition unified in a concept of the understanding. This is to say that, according to Kant, a subject can claim to know an object on the basis of a complex, bipartite synthesis in which the object as distinct entity is produced in the first place. Synthesis is that which brings together what are otherwise merely 'empty thoughts' and 'blind intuitions' (KrV/CPR A51, B75) and hence it is that which actually brings about the emergence of objects through the fusion of these elements, it is that which makes possible expansive judgements beyond merely analytical (tautological) 'truths'.

But in the shift of perspective which occurs from Kant to Nietzsche and the fundamentally different understanding of a philosophical project which accompanies this shift, this outline of how objects arise will naturally undergo some radical transformations. Among these there are two in
particular which are of special interest to the present attempt to chart
the emergence of Nietzsche's physiological thinking from the Kantian
formulation of critique.

The first of these two points describes the supercession of the impotent
belief in knowledge by the vigorous creation of a culture within which the
perpetual productions of the will to power are recognised for what they
are, a task Nietzsche describes most succinctly as:

"Der Glaube 'so und so ist es' zu verwandeln in den Willen 'so und so
soll es werden' ."

"The belief 'such and such it is' to be transformed into the will 'such
and such it shall become'." (KSA 12, 1 [125], m.t.)

For Kant it is of course still a matter of a subject relating to an
object according to a specific model of knowledge, namely that which he
envisages in the Copernican turn. In this particular type of relation both
subject and object are conceived as distinct entities and the faculties of
knowledge in their interplay can be named as the site where subjects and
objects are produced in their phenomenal constitution. This means that,
having abandoned 'god' as the highest ground, Kant puts the human subject
in its place: knowledge of the human phenomenal subject and knowledge of
phenomena for the human subject are the two aspects of his central concern.

But this model is only sustainable as long as the blind faith in reason
which lies at the heart of it remains unquestioned. In this sense the
Kantian investment in the possibility of knowledge is no more than a
symptom of what Nietzsche calls incomplete nihilism. In it, the old ideal
or idol ('god', truth) is still worshipped, albeit in a thoroughly
modernised, secularised form which, moreover, is entirely devoid of any of
the ecstatic dimensions inherent in any truly religious, sacrificial
practice. The Platonic structures remain firmly in place as long as
critique does not also encompass reason and its claims to knowledge.

But we know that Nietzsche does much more than simply to question reason: he attacks, ridicules and demolishes reason as long as it claims to be the ground of all things, of the world and of the human beings in it. The entire project of knowledge as the 'founding mode', of the sciences as the highest forms of relating to the world, and of philosophy as that discourse which gives the metaphysical underpinning to these forms of relation, is shown up in Nietzsche's writings as the pathetic, impoverished fantasy of an enfeebled life-form that it is. The question 'what can I know?' has simply lost all meaning for Nietzsche because the 'I' that is required to pose this question has been 'decentred' to the point of insignificance. It is merely another instance of an imaginary stability, a quasi-identity which only serves to hold at bay a great, all-pervasive exuberance, only another makeshift levee against the flood:

"...we have renounced the belief in the knowability of things as much as the belief in knowledge. The 'thing' is merely a fiction, the 'thing in itself' even full of contradictions, an impermissible fiction: but absolute and consequently also relative knowing, too, is equally only a fiction! With it there falls away the compulsion to posit a something which 'knows', a subject of knowing, any pure 'intelligence', an 'absolute spirit': this mythology, not even entirely given up by Kant,
which Plato prepared for Europe in fateful manner, and which threatened
deval, by means of the basic Christian dogma 'god is a spirit', to all
science of the body and hence also to the further development of the
body, - this mythology has now had its time." (KSA 11,38 [15], m.t.)

What distinguishes Nietzsche's thinking most radically from that of Kant
is its readiness to hurl itself into the flood and to drift off in it so
that nothing is saved, nothing is preserved and it is futile to ask of the
outcome. Via Nietzsche's writings, thinking becomes again what it always
was below the flimsy surface of an ostensible quest for knowledge, a de-
personalised, de-humanised, automatic, self-sustaining voyage without
departure or arrival, most readily comparable to the insensible but hugely
effective coursing of blood through the veins of a body, a deep,
unconscious roar which carries with it all that it touches and which
'cares' as much for the survival of the organism it pervades as the ocean
'cares' for the seafarers embarked on it.

Finally, the most momentous implication of this shift of perspective
concerns the respective understanding of temporality that accompanies Kant
and Nietzsche's philosophical project: to theorise the production of
knowledge of an object by a subject in the case of the former and to
celebrate the exuberance of physiology or the will to power in the case of
the latter, to put it somewhat schematically.

As has been discussed before (ch.1, I, above), Kant realises that the
transcendental aspect of time is strictly unrepresentable. The conception
of time derived from experience, on the other hand, invariably implies that
time is unilinear, unidirectional and irreversible. And hence Kant
compromises with this reductive conception when he says that "we represent
the time-sequence by a line progressing into infinity" (KrV/CPR A33, B50).

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But by his own admission, time as transcendental cannot be represented to consciousness in the forms in which it articulates the world to itself, namely in terms of the categories of the understanding and the schemata to which they contribute. Although Kant explicitly states that this is so, his absolute commitment to the project of knowledge and a blind investment in the all-pervasive force of reason lead him to quickly pass over what is potentially an enormous stumbling block for his theory of the formation of knowledge through the interplay of the distinct faculties.

Early on in the first version of the Transcendental Deduction Kant makes this hugely important observation about time or, as he habitually refers to it, inner sense:

"Unsere Vorstellungen...gehören...zum innern Sinn, und als solche sind alle unsere Erkenntnisse zuletzt doch der formalen Bedingung des innern Sinnes, nämlich der Zeit unterworfen, als in welcher sie insgesamt...in Verhältnisse gebracht werden müssen."

"Our representations...belong...to inner sense, and as such are finally subject to the formal condition of inner sense, namely time, as in which they must all be... brought into relations." (KrV/CPR A98f, t.m.)

Here Kant clearly says that all our representations are in time, that it is time which 'gives' representations (which are eventually to become knowledge) although the specifics of their relation can only be determined by categorial input.

Furthermore, Kant says that synthesis, as the spontaneous actus which unifies a pre-conceptual heterogeneity and as such can justifiably be thought of as the productive capacity per se, is the expression of, or simply belongs to, the faculty of imagination (cf. also KrV/CPR A118, A120, A123, B130, B152f), as for instance when he states that:
"Verknüpfung [ist]...das Produkt eines synthetischen Vermögens der Einbildungskraft, die den inneren Sinn in Ansehung des Zeitverhältnisses bestimmt."

"Connection is...the product of a synthetic faculty of imagination which determines inner sense as regards the relation of time." (KrV/CPR B233, t.m.)

But Kant equally, albeit very much implicitly, allows for synthesis to be essentially an unconscious activity, although capable of becoming conscious, when he remarks in passing "...all connection, we may become conscious of it or not..." ("...alle Verbindung, wir mögen uns ihrer bewußt werden oder nicht..." KrV/CPR, B130, t.m., my emphasis). If we further take into consideration that Kant conceives of an object as the product of a synthetic process, "an object is that in whose concept the manifold of a given intuition is unified." ("Objekt ist das, in dessen Begriff das Mannigfaltige einer gegebenen Anschauung vereinigt ist." KrV/CPR B137, t.m., Kant's own emphasis), it gradually emerges that in the Transcendental Deductions Kant thematises what can only be termed the (conditions of possibility of) the becoming-object of the manifold. Of the synthesis at the heart of this productive process Kant writes:

"...eine objektive Bedingung aller Erkenntnis, nicht deren ich bloß selbst bedarf, um ein Objekt zu erkennen, sondern unter der jede Anschauung stehen muß, um für mich Objekt zu werden, weil auf andere Art, und ohne diese Synthesis, das Mannigfaltige sich nicht in einem Bewußtsein vereinigen würde."

"...an objective condition of all knowledge, not just one which I myself require in order to know an object, but under which every intuition must stand in order to become an object for me because otherwise, and without this synthesis, the manifold would not unify itself in a consciousness." (KrV/CPR B138, t.m., Kant's own emphasis)
This shows that although Kant feels compelled to locate, or to anchor, synthesis in the faculty of imagination, nonetheless in the Transcendental Deductions he operates with the notion of an unconscious or pre-conscious temporality which spontaneously synthesises the pre-conceptual heterogeneity which perpetually and indiscriminately assaults the senses and which is progressively integrated into the distinct, unified entities Kant calls objects.

It seems to me that one of the ways in which Nietzsche's thought of the eternal recurrence of the same can be approached is to say that it remains formally very close to these Kantian characterisations of the relation between time and 'objects' - although the status of the latter is obviously drastically undermined in the conception of the world as will to power ("This world is will to power - and nothing besides", WP no. 1067). Since Nietzsche has shown the project of knowledge to be deeply infused with an incomplete nihilism, his reconsideration of temporality is no longer subservient to the Kantian project of founding a rational metaphysics. It is obvious that he agrees with Kant when the latter says that time is intrinsically unknowable. But this is not because, as for Kant, the medium (inner sense) in which a pre-conceptual heterogeneity becomes available for the formations of consciousness (in short, concepts) cannot be represented as such other than in terms of these concepts which are imposed on it. This is itself merely a conceptual problem. Instead, Nietzsche's thinking passes beyond any ambition to 'know' time as transcendental. As for Kant, for Nietzsche time 'itself' is unknowable but, unlike Kant, Nietzsche finds that time is thinkable and for him it has become so within the parameters of the non-Platonistic, post-metaphysical conception of the world as will to power. In this way it becomes possible to be submerged in the unconscious flows that bear along the matter of the universe, to ride the
wave of becoming. It becomes possible to envisage how the universe must move, how it must perpetually transform itself. Hence what Nietzsche says about temporality is the necessary and inevitable outcome of multiple strands of thought which include the following components.

First of all it must be observed that for Nietzsche time has to be infinite. Only by conceiving of it in this way can the absolute primacy of becoming be affirmed. A time which would have begun would have had to be created and thus requires the assumption of a creative force outside or prior to time in whose power it would lie to make time commence. This would obviously again be nothing other than yet another Platonic-Christian falsification and suppression of becoming. But just as much as time must be thought as without commencement, so it must also be thought as without end, whether as simple cessation or as telos. If becoming was capable of ceasing it would already have done so (although it is perhaps more accurate to say that if it was capable of ceasing it would never have done otherwise and hence would never even have begun to become, a thought which is in turn paradoxical since, as we saw just now, time cannot have begun). The fact that the world exists and continues to exist is itself the most material proof of the infinity of time.

This further implies that being is in principle impossible. Becoming would have to be suspended, would have to cease, for being ultimately to become possible, insofar as being is thought of as in absolute opposition to becoming, namely as eternal or permanent, as immutable and finally as immaterial. For this is what is meant by being, the permanent cessation (for it cannot be otherwise, being and permanence are utterly coterminous) of becoming. But such a state is merely an empty fiction, there can be nothing which does not perpetually become. Nietzsche writes:
"Hätte die Welt ein Ziel, so müßte es erreicht sein. Gäbe es für sie einen unbeabsichtigten Endzustand, so müßte er ebenfalls erreicht sein. Wäre sie überhaupt eines Verharrens und Starrwerdens, eines 'Seins' fähig, hätte sie nur Einen Augenblick in allem ihrem Werden diese Fähigkeit des 'Seins', so wäre es wiederum mit allem Werden längst zu Ende, also auch mit allem Denken, mit allem 'Geiste'. Die Tatsache des 'Geistes' als eines Werdens beweist, daß die Welt kein Ziel, keinen Endzustand hat und des Seins unfähig ist."

"If the world had a goal, it must have been reached. If there was for it an unintended final state, it also must have been reached. If it were at all capable of a pausing and becoming-fixed, of 'being', if for only one moment in all its becoming it had this capability of 'being', then all becoming would long since have come to an end, along with all thinking, with all 'spirit'. The fact of 'spirit' as a becoming proves that the world has no goal, no final state, and is incapable of being." (KSA 11,36 (15), WM/WP no. 1062, t.m.)

So far we have seen that Nietzsche thinks of time as infinite, as does Kant (cf. for instance KrV/CPR A32, B47f). But unlike Kant, Nietzsche understands the infinity of time as the great affirmation of becoming. But perhaps the most significant of all differences between the Kantian and the Nietzschean conception of time lies in the fact that the former is utterly committed to time (representable) as linear whereas for Nietzsche this carries at least one wholly unacceptable implication. If time is infinite and yet linear, and that first and foremost means without repetitions, if the formations which occur in time are never repeated, if time itself never repeats itself, it must be asked: whence derives this capability for the eternally new? This, in turn, could only be explained by recourse to the thought of an infinite force which is capable of an eternity, an infinity of new creations. And again there is only one model which maps perfectly on this conception of an infinitely creative force, namely that of the Platonic-Christian god. Because this is the philosophical construct which
alone could explain the miraculous aspect of such a conception of the world:

"...die Wunder-Fähigkeit zur unendlichen Neugestaltung ihrer Formen und Lagen. Die Welt, wenn auch kein Gott mehr, soll doch der göttlichen Schöpfkraft, der unendlichen Verwandlungs-Kraft fähig sein... Das ist immer noch die alte religiöse Denk- und Wunschweise, eine Art Sehnsucht zu glauben, daß irgendwann doch die Welt dem alten geliebten, unendlichen, unbegrenzt-schöpferischen Gott gleich sei..."  
"...the miracle capability for an infinite new structuring of its forms and arrangements. The world, if no longer a god, is to be capable of the divine creative force, of the infinite force of transformation... That is still the old religious manner of thinking and wishing, a kind of longing to believe that in something the world is like the old loved, infinite, boundlessly creative god..." (KSA 11,36 [15], WM/WP no.1062, t.m., my omissions)

But if, conversely, an infinite time and a finite force, as is the will to power, are thought as the compass for the post-Platonistic conception of the world (and this alone prevents the illegitimate assumption of a divine agency as the ground of the world, a known symptom of incomplete nihilism), the thought of a circular temporality becomes utterly unavoidable. This is to say that the three chief components of the eternal recurrence of the same mutually necessitate each other. Their mutual interdependence can be expressed in at least three different ways. Firstly, if the world is thought as self-productive and hence no longer dependent on a notion of 'god' to sustain it, time becomes infinite and force becomes finite; secondly, the will to power as the economy of a finite and intrinsic (non-metaphysical) force demands for its articulation the infinite repetitions of eternal recurrence, as a consequence of which 'god', as Platonic-Christian construct, is rendered redundant; thirdly, an infinite time, if this thought is not to relapse into the Platonic-Christian model of an
extra-mundane ground, demands a finite force. However, their relations are formulated, in each of these three articulations the combination of these elements of thought entails the conception of temporality as circular and demands that time be thought as repeating itself - even if this thought is perhaps as yet (or even intrinsically) incomprehensible, given that for two thousand years this conception of time has been suppressed in favour of the one which remains essentially intact up to its formulation in the first Critique. But god is dead and it is, if nothing else, an anachronism, in the fullest sense of the word, to cling on to a notion of temporality which is so completely parasitic on the old idol as is that of a simple linearity of time.".

It might perhaps be asked in what sense Nietzsche can on the one hand speak of the eternal recurrence of the same and yet denounce the eternal as a characteristic of other things, as for instance when he writes "we do not believe in any eternal concepts, eternal values, eternal forms, eternal souls" ("wir glauben an keine ewigen Begriffe, ewigen Werte, ewigen Formen, ewigen Seelen" KSA 11, 38 [14], m.t.). This seeming contradiction can easily be resolved when it is realised that an infinity of time (eternity) can, and indeed must, attach to the recurring formations in time, but that as soon as eternity is thought as an attribute of something which is thereby thought as exempt from the ceaseless becoming that is time, recurring 'itself' (and hence its related components, discussed above) is again suppressed. This is to say that in the eternal recurrence of the same it is the recurring which takes place in an infinity of time and it may even be said that recurring is that which recurs infinitely. As Kant had already demonstrated in his theorisation of the emergence of objects (in the Transcendental Deduction), the same, as that which appears to be identical with itself, is only produced as such in a synthetic temporality. This is
exactly what Nietzsche says of the same - with the not unimportant
difference that he does not seek anything behind objects as appearances in
the way Kant does when he assumes what is effectively a noumenal substrate.
Another way of drawing out the difference between an eternal recurring and
an assumption of eternal forms would be to say that in the former it is the
(self-)differing of time which is expressed and hence the perpetuation of
difference in time, whereas in any Platonistic conception of eternity the
very opposite is the case insofar as it equates 'eternal' and 'self-
identical' and hence represses difference. In addition, it is important to
emphasise that Nietzsche frequently speaks of 'making-equal' (Gleichmachen)
or 'equalisation' (Ausgleichung), thereby drawing attention to the fact
that for him (as for Kant) the same is the effect of a spontaneous,
unconscious activity:

"Alles Denken,Urteilen, Wahrnehmen als Vergleichen hat als Voraussetzung
ein 'Gleichsetzen', noch früher ein 'Gleichmachen'. Das Gleichmachen ist
dasselbe, was die Einverleibung der angeeigneten Materie in die Amöbe
ist."

"All thinking, judging, perceiving as comparing has as prerequisite an
'equating', even earlier a 'making-equal'. Making-equal is the same as
the incorporation of appropriated matter into an amoeba." (KSA 12,5 [65],
m.t.)

Again, the difference lies in Kant's distinction between the process of
the production and the product (an object), whereas in Nietzsche's
conception it is unnecessary to distinguish between the process
(equalisation) and the 'product' (the same). It is useful to think of the
eternal recurrence of the same as the eternal recurrence of equalisation,
or even just the eternal recurrence of recurrence, which emphasises that
the accent has shifted from that which recurs to the process of recurrence,
which Kant had glimpsed as synthesis.
To recapitulate what this section attempted to establish, Kant discovers the unconscious, spontaneous, temporal actus of an originary synthesis through which objects (identities) emerge as such. But at the same time as he discovers this sheer perpetual, productive process, he stultifies it, first of all, by anchoring it in the faculty of imagination but secondly, and with much more devastating consequences, he grounds this potentially de-personalised productivity in the reductive, anthropocentric agency which he envisages in the (to us, imaginary) unity of transcendental apperception. I hope to have indicated that Nietzsche takes up the thought of an unconscious, temporal synthesising process but that he is able to release synthesis from the constrictions of an anthropocentric project of the foundation of knowledge into the cosmic delirium of the eternal recurrence of the same.

As has already been discussed (sec.III, above), Nietzsche can be seen to adapt the central trope of critique (critique of x by x) to the demonstration of a perpetual self-overcoming as the chief mode of the will to power or life (overcoming of x by x). Similarly, when it comes to weaving the temporal aspects of the will to power, namely the eternal recurrence, into the discussion there is one trope which perfectly encapsulates the thought that becoming ('time') exceeds itself in a repetition or a doubling of itself in which the same formations occur over and over again. Whenever Nietzsche speaks of noch einmal, there appears a trace of this new conception of temporality, this excessive self-differing wherein becoming repeats itself. Unfortunately this is usually rendered as 'once again', the German equivalent of which would be wieder einmal. And although 'recurrence' (or 'return') translates Wiederkunft (or Wiederkehr), I would suggest that noch einmal, the trope of eternal recurrence, more directly corresponds to 'once more' which retains the thought that an occurrence repeats itself but which has the added advantage of capturing
that in any such occurrence time expends itself, that it dispenses its boundless, eternal excess, that which is 'more' (noch), unceasing and eternally undepleted. This seemingly minor problem of translation becomes particularly acute in a note such as the following one:

"Die 'wahre Welt', wie immer auch man sie bisher konzipiert hat, - sie war immer die scheinbare Welt noch einmal."  
"The 'real world', however one has hitherto conceived it, - it has always been the apparent world once more." (KSA 13, 11 [50], WM/ WP no. 566, t. m.)

The two-world theory as conceived by Platonism implies that the 'real world' is that of the forms and of the ideal, that the 'real world' is in fact the 'ideal world' because that which is ideal harbours the highest truth, the greatest purity etc. As opposed to this Platonism conceives of 'this world', as a mere fallen, lesser copy of the immutable ideal/real world and as such 'this world' is not real but merely apparent because it is in time, is subject to becoming and changes, because it is the world of matter, of physical disintegration and of all the perpetual transformations which matter undergoes and which the ideal/real world, as that which has being, does not have to suffer.

One of the most important ways in which Nietzsche demolishes this dangerous fiction is to say that, on the contrary, 'this world' is the only world which boasts any productive capability and that it is precisely the excessive temporality of 'this world' which alone can repeat itself in such a way as to even produce the idealist fictions of Platonism. Only becoming can produce being, whereas being is incapable of founding becoming, because it is devoid of the metabolic motor of time which drives on the perpetual transformations of this world, the only world. In this move, in this hugely condensed note, the rift between time and matter as the two aspects of becoming, torn open by the oppositional thinking inherent to Platonism, is
healed once more. After philosophy had denied the body of the thinker for several millenia, Nietzschean thinking releases the tide of physiology. In the physiological thinking rehearsed by Nietzsche, the economic aspect of material becoming which he terms the will to power, and the temporal aspect of a perpetually mutating materiality, namely the eternal recurrence of the same, are fused once more in the nearest, richest phenomenon, in which thinking is liberated again into that which it always has been, this world's becoming-body.
Introduction

1. Nearly thirty more references can be found in the 'Sämtliche Briefe'. Olivier Reboul in his book Nietzsche critique de Kant makes the following remark about Nietzsche's response to Kant:

"Kant est le philosophe dont Nietzsche s'est le plus occupé... avec un sérieux qui prouve qu'il avait rencontré dans l'auteur des trois Critiques un vis-à-vis de taille, un penseur en face duquel, contre lequel il lui fallait sans cesse se définir et se redéfinir, un philosophe sans qui il n'eût pas été lui-même tout à fait philosophe." "Kant is the philosopher with whom Nietzsche occupied himself the most... with a seriousness which proves that he had met in the author of the three Critiques an opponent of stature, a thinker in the face of whom, against whom, it was necessary to define and to redefine oneself ceaselessly, a philosopher without whom he could not himself have been the philosopher he was." (p. 7, m.t.)

2. Heidegger's remarks in (section 15 of) Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst, entitled 'Kants Lehre vom Schönen. Ihre Mißdeutung durch Schopenhauer und Nietzsche', in which he alleges that Nietzsche (like Schopenhauer) utterly misunderstands Kant's notion of the 'without interest' of aesthetic judgements, have not exactly furthered Nietzsche's reputation as a reader of Kant.

3. In this context I would also like to mention a recent article by Keith Ansell-Pearson, entitled 'Nietzsche's Overcoming of Kant and Metaphysics: From Nihilism to Tragedy' (cf. bibliography), in which he writes:

"...in terms of the history of modern European philosophy, Nietzsche's fundamental, philosophical project - regarding both principle and task (will to power and the revaluation of all values) - is to be examined against the backdrop of Kant's critique of metaphysics - a critique that has determined the parameters and nature of modern Western philosophy up to this day. Gilles Deleuze... is the only thinker to have explored the relation between Kant and Nietzsche - specifically on the nature and aims of 'critique' - in any detail and with some degree of sophistication. Once, however, it is accepted and acknowledged that the relation between Kant and Nietzsche is a crucial one for contemporary thinking in philosophy... the relation between Nietzsche and the 'Chinaman of Königsberg' will be the focus of much greater attention amongst scholars and commentators of Nietzsche's philosophy than has hitherto been the case." (p. 337)

As concerns Ansell-Pearson's assessment of the relationship between these two thinkers, I am in complete agreement.

5. Cf. chapter 3, footnote 10, in which I explain my reasons for translating the title of the second part of the third Critique in this way.

6. Innumerable references to 'physiology' can be found throughout Nietzsche's oeuvre, especially in the Nachlaß, volumes 7-13 of KSA but also, for instance, in GD/TI, KSA vol. 6. These increase in frequency towards the end of Nietzsche's writing life. A subject index, if it is ever done, should confirm this.

7. It is in the Heideggerian tradition of Nietzsche interpretation that this is the case. Typical examples include, firstly, Heidegger's own statement of the issue in his Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst, Nietzsche I cf. bibliography, and also Michel Haar's article "Heidegger and the Nietzschean 'Physiology of Art'" in Exceedingly Nietzsche, cf. bibliography. Cf also note 8 in chapter four.

8. In a recent Canadian collection of papers entitled Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism (cf. bibliography), one can find an article which purportedly deals with the issue of Nietzschean physiology (Richard Brown, "Nihilism: 'Thus Speaks Physiology'"). One of the most astonishing aspects of that piece of writing is that it never states what it understands by 'physiology', as if this was perfectly self-evident.

9. Although this is on one level merely a question of the weight lent to these different aspects of Platonism, the consequences for a philosophy are nevertheless profound. Thus, for instance, Heidegger's response to Platonism can be understood as concentrating on the third of these points, namely the suppression of temporality as an effect of a Platonistic thinking, and to approach all other aspects of it on the basis of this emphasis. I am grateful to Jim Urpeth for pointing out to me this connection with Heidegger.

Although this study is not the place to carry out such a comparison, it would be possible to read the differences between Nietzsche's 'materialist' thinking and the marked distaste Heidegger displays for any materialist thought, to issue from this initial shift of emphasis in their respective responses to Platonism.

10. Contrary to the scandalously unfounded claims about the position of the will to power in the history of Western metaphysics Heidegger makes in Der Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis, Nietzsche II, cf. bibliography.
11. As Pierre Klossowski puts it in *Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux* (cf. bibliography):

"Le corps est le résultat du fortuit: il n'est rien que le lieu de rencontre d'un ensemble d'impulsions individuées pour cet intervalle que forme une vie humaine, lesquelles n'aspirent qu'à se désindividuer."

"The body is the result of chance: it is nothing but the site for the encounter of a group of impulses, individuated for this interval which forms a human life, which don't aspire to anything but to de-individuate themselves." (p. 52f, m.t.)

12. This notion of repetition is of course hugely prominent in the work of Heidegger (*Sein und Zeit*), and in that of Deleuze (*Repetition et Difference, Nietzsche and Philosophie*), cf. bibliography.

13. As witnessed in the famous programmatic formulation with which Kant answered the question 'What is Enlightenment?', 'Enlightenment is the emergence of Man from his self-induced immaturity' ("Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit", vol. XI of the *Werkausgabe*, p. 53, t.m.).

14. It might perhaps be asked why this dissertation is still concerned with Kant's categorial framework if Nietzsche has succeeded in devaluing all philosophical system-building. The answer would have to be that it is useful and revealing to read Kant in the terms laid down by his system but that it is perfectly possible to do so without subscribing to the absolute belief in the primacy of reason which informs his texts.

15. Perhaps this is what lies behind Heidegger's somewhat cryptic comment about Nietzsche in *Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst, Nietzsche I* (p. 17):

"Was Nietzsche zeit seines Schaffens selbst veröffentlicht hat, ist immer Vordergrund...Die eigentliche Philosophie bleibt als 'Nachlaß' zurück." "What Nietzsche himself published during his creative life was always foreground...His philosophy proper was left behind as posthumous, unpublished work."

**CHAPTER ONE**

1. For clarification of how to read the proof of this Analogy in terms of the syllogism as rendered here, cf. Heidegger *Die Frage nach dem Ding* p. 181, cf. bibliography.

2. *Note*—incidentally, made by Bergson in quite a different context.
the heart of the imputation of the a priori concept of substance to objects is here translated into an empirical concept, thereby losing some of the momentum of the argument. By definition, though, this loss is inevitable if clarificatory examples are to be given at all.

4. It is not necessary here to enter into the structures of 'proof' by which the Phaedo seeks to demonstrate the immortality of the soul, at least not in terms of their aspirations to the status of proof — to do so would mean nothing other than to revive a branch of theology long since desiccated beyond recognition. Only a reading of certain moments within the Phaedo in purely symptomatic terms is required to prepare the ground for the subsequent reconsideration of the Paralogisms.

5. It is of course the case that in other writings, be they philosophical, scientific or literary, a conception of nature which is not (in this restrictive sense) theological, can be found; de Sade's writings would be a case in point. But within the tradition of metaphysics, that is to say in those texts which constitute the history of Western philosophy, Kant's is an original move.

6. As does Heidegger throughout Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, especially in the section entitled 'Das dritte Stadium der Grundlegung. Die innere Möglichkeit der Wesenseinheit der ontologischen Synthesis', pp. 65-84, cf. reference in the bibliography, below

7. Despite what Kant says in the Deduction in B:

"Diese Einheit, die a priori vor allen Begriffen der Verbindung vorhergeht, ist nicht etwa jene Kategorie der Einheit... denn alle Kategorien gründen sich auf logische Funktionen in Urteilen, in diesen aber ist schon Verbindung, mithin Einheit gegebener Begriffe gedacht. Die Kategorie setzt also schon Verbindung voraus. Also müssen Wir diese Einheit [ich denke]...noch höher suchen, nämlich in demjenigen, was selbst den Grund der Einheit...enthält."

"This unity which precedes a priori all concepts of connection, is not at all that category of unity...for all categories are grounded in logical functions in judgements, but in these connection, and thus unity of given concepts, is already thought. Thus the category already presupposes connection. Thus we have to seek this unity [I think]...even higher, namely in that which itself contains the ground of unity...." (KrV/CPR B131, t. m., my omissions and insertion)

Far from threatening my argument here, I believe that the latter part of his contention that "all categories are grounded in logical functions in judgements, but in these connection, and thus unity of given concepts, is "...thought" is so utterly unfounded, it inadvertently underwrites the
point that to attribute unity to transcendental apperception is illegitimate.

CHAPTER TWO

1. 'Tumultuous' - riotous or turbulent; L < tumere - to swell up.

2. In fact, perhaps prompted by the realisation of the magnitude of his own philosophical project, he praises Hume in rather hyperbolic terms when he writes:

"...seit dem Entstehen der Metaphysik...hat sich keine Begebenheit zugetragen, die in Ansehung des Schicksals dieser Wissenschaft hätte entscheidender werden können, als der Angriff, den David Hume auf dieselbe machte." 
"...since the emergence of metaphysics...no event has taken place which could have been more decisive in regard to the fate of this science than the attack which David Hume made on it." (Prol/P 257, t. m.)

For without Hume's work, the implication is, critique would not have had this indispensable point of departure.

3. Nietzsche repeatedly ridicules this type of argument because it short-circuits the very process of thinking rather than to contribute to it, for instance when he says:

"...der alte Kant..., welcher einmal sich die Frage stellte: 'wie sind synthetische Urteile a priori möglich?' Er antwortete endlich, mit wunderbarem deutschem Tiefsinn: 'durch ein Vermögen dazu'..." 
"...old Kant...who once posed the question to himself: 'how are synthetic a priori judgements possible?' He answered finally, with wonderful German profundity: 'through a faculty for them'..." (KSA 11,30 [10], m.t., my omissions).

4. As concerns the second distinction, namely that between object and appearance, Richard E. Aquila in his book on the Transcendental Deduction (chapter I.IV. "Objects and Appearances", p.26, cf. bibliography), makes the following remarks:

"...the apprehension of objective reality involves the apprehension of appearances...as objective realities"

and:

"...from having been actually identified as objectively real, need not be supposed to possess any being of their own..."
5. For instance, this object grows from the size of a blade of grass to that of a full-grown oak tree in minutes because of the speed with which I approach it, whereas that object undergoes the same change in years.

6. Heidegger, in "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'" in Holzwege (cf. bibliography), asks what Nietzsche understands by 'value' (pp.222-228 of Holzwege deal with this point). He arrives at the conclusion that it is the will to power which posits values, a reading I entirely agree with. But by this time, Heidegger's own account of the 'history of metaphysics' so entirely depends on according to Nietzsche's writings the position in which metaphysics completes itself that in the course of his interpretation of these writings, Heidegger has to perform a number of moves which seem to be at best disingenuous and which at worst utterly misrepresent Nietzsche's thinking. An example from the latter end of the scale seems to me to occur when Heidegger writes of Nietzsche's understanding of becoming:

"'Werden' meint den Übergang von etwas zu etwas, jene Bewegung und Bewegtheit, die Leibniz in der Monadologie (§11) die changements naturels nennt, die das ens qua ens, d.h. das ens percipiens et appetens durchwaltet."
"'Becoming' means the transition from something to something, that movement and turbulence which Leibniz calls changements naturels in the Monadology (§11), which range through the ens qua ens, i.e. the ens percipiens et appetens." (Holzwege op.cit.p.226, m.t.)

As a comment on Nietzsche this seems rather crass for two reasons. Firstly, the transformations of the will to power are most emphatically not "from something to something". Nietzsche incessantly reiterates that in the world thought as will to power there is no 'something' and to align becoming (will to power) with a 'something' (and that means with beings) without thoroughly problematising this proximity is downright misleading:

"...man darf nichts Seiendes überhaupt zulassen, - weil dann das Werden seinen Wert verliert und geradezu als sinnlos und überflüssig erscheint."
"...one must not admit any being at all, - because then becoming loses its value and appears downright meaningless and superfluous."(KSA 13.11 [72], WM/WP no. 708, t.m.)

Equally misleading, secondly, is to mention Leibniz in this context, as if it was the Monadology which inspired Nietzsche's conception of becoming. The following is taken from the very note with which Heidegger focuses his essay:

"Eine dauerhaften letzten Einheiten, ...keine Monaden: auch hier 'ende' erst von uns hineingeleget."

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"There are no durable ultimate unities,...no monads: here too 'a being' is first imported by us." (KSA 13,11 [73], WM/WP no. 715, t. m.)

This entire essay is riddled with such, and worse, falsifications. By 1943, the year of this essay, 'Heidegger's Nietzsche' had mysteriously turned from a nuanced thinker into the intellectual equivalent of a fascist thug.

7. Heidegger was the first to point out this economy in Nietzsche's writings, c. f. Nietzsche I. As is well known, he focused on the terms 'preservation' for phenomena of exhaustion and 'enhancement' for those of expenditure.

8. Deleuze elaborates these points with great subtlety in "Plato and the Simulacrum", cf. bibliography.

9. This must be done without lapsing into some puerile, quasi-Rousseauian dream of a benign and innocent nature which would heal all the evils brought on by a corrupt society if it were only possible to return to it and its benevolent reign. Where he deems this necessary, Nietzsche never fails to demarcate his own thought from that of Rousseau, cf. for instance the following selection of remarks:

"Die Art Mensch, deren Mundstück ich bin:...wir leiden nicht an der 'Verderbnis', wir sind sehr verschieden von Rousseau und sehnen uns nicht nach dem 'guten Naturmenschen'-"

"The kind of human being whose mouthpiece I am:...we do not suffer from 'depravity', we are very different from Rousseau and do not long for the 'good human being of nature'--" (KSA 12,7 [46], m. t.)

"Rousseau, dieser typische 'moderne Mensch', Idealist und Canaille in Einer Person, und das Erste um des Zweiten willen, ein Wesen, das die 'moralische Würde' und deren Attitüde nötig hatte, um sich selber auszuhalten, krank zugleich vor zügelloser Eitelkeit und zügelloser Selbstverachtung: diese Mißgeburt, welche sich an die Schwelle unserer neuen Zeit gelagert hat, hat die 'Rückkehr zur Natur' gepredigt - wohin wollte er eigentlich zurück? Auch ich rede von 'Rückkehr zur Natur'..."

"Rousseau, this typical 'modern human being', idealist and canaille in one person, and the first for the sake of the second, a being that had need of 'moral dignity' and its gesture to stand itself, sick with unbridled vanity and at the same time unbridled self-contempt: this homunculus, which has settled at the threshold of our new time, preached the 'return to nature'...where did he really want to return to? I too talk of 'return to nature'..." (KSA 12,9 [116], m. t.)

"Rückkehr zur Natur' immer entschiedener im umgekehrten Sinne verstanden als es Rousseau verstand. Weg vom Idyll und der Oper!"

"Return to nature' ever more decisively understood in the opposite sense from which Rousseau understood it. Away from idyl and opera!" (KSA 12,9 WP no. 117, t. m.)
"Mein Kampf gegen das 18. Jahrhundert Rousseaus, gegen seine 'Natur', seinen 'guten Menschen', seinen Glauben an die Herrschaft des Gefühls - gegen die Verweichlichung, Schwächung, Vermoralisierung des Menschen: ein Ideal, das aus dem Haß gegen die aristokratische Cultur geboren ist und in praxi die Herrschaft der zügellosen Ressentiments-Gefühle ist..."

"My struggle against the eighteenth century of Rousseau, against his 'nature', his 'good human being', his belief in the dominance of feeling - against softening, weakening, moralisation of human being: an ideal that is born of hatred against aristocratic culture and that is in praxi the dominance of unbridled ressentiment-feelings..." (KSA 12,10 121, WM/WP no. 1021, t. m.)

These quotes clearly demonstrate that Nietzsche, whilst in a sense involved in a re-thinking of the 'natural', brooks no comparison with Rousseau because the values which inform the latter are still those of lack and need (cf. for instance the first italicised part of the second quote above). Rousseau is for him the eighteenth century's décadent par excellence.

For an in-depth discussion of the relation between Nietzsche and Rousseau, but one which is focused on the problem of history and modernity in the thought of each of these, and the politics which ensue from their respective position, cf. Keith Ansell-Pearson's Nietzsche Contra Rousseau (cf. bibliography). Ansell-Pearson considers these comments of Nietzsche, and other ones by him in a similar vein, as too simplistic a characterisation of Rousseau. As concerns the hermeneutic surface of these comments, so to speak, this is undoubtedly the case. Nevertheless I think that there is a philosophical 'truth' to these comments beyond the domain of historico-textual accuracy, such as Ansell-Pearson investigates.

10. On this issue Nietzsche remarks:

"Eine Lehre,... eine Umwertung der Werte... braucht durchaus keine Glückslehre zu sein: indem sie Kraft auslöst,... bringt sie Glück."

"A doctrine,... a transvaluation of values... need not at all be a eudaemonism: in that it releases force,... it brings happiness." (KSA 13,11 [38], WM/WP no. 1022, t. m., my omissions).

11. The sense in which reason is regulative does of course differ considerably from the sense in which the dynamic groups of categories, relation and modality, are regulative in the context of their deployment in the understanding. There what is meant by 'regulative' is that these dynamic categories are not by themselves sufficient to produce the representation of an object, they are not constitutive of the object, they ate the relation of other, already present objects to it or,
under the name of modality, its relation to the subject's consciousness, the status of the modification of the subject's mind.

12. Not even the abstrusely worded second part of the bridging section between the two sets of Antinomies, entitled 'Schlussanmerkung zur Auflösung der mathematisch-transzendentalen [sic], und Vorerrinnerung zur Auflösung der dynamisch-transzendentalen Ideen' KrV/CPR A528, B556, entirely manages to rationalise this slip of the pen.

13. The German Sinnlichkeit can of course be rendered as 'sensibility', 'sensuousness' or 'sensuality', but the implications and associations are in each case very different. The problem lies with the English which does not have an abstract nominal equivalent of the adjective 'sensory'. The latter has the advantage of being merely descriptive of that which appertains to the senses, and hence much more neutral. In this respect it corresponds much more closely to Sinnlichkeit than any of the nouns available in English. For the most part I follow the (nonetheless unsatisfactory) convention of translating Sinnlichkeit by 'sensibility' but in this instance the whole sweep of this quote from Kant's text would, in my opinion, be lost if this were to be done. I am, however, aware that to opt for 'sensuality' in this translation produces its own problems. It is obviously a case of accepting the lesser evil.

CHAPTER THREE

1. 'Putrescent' - becoming putrid; rotting. Putrid - 1. (of organic matter) in a state of decomposition, usually giving off a foul smell. 2. morally corrupt or worthless. 3. sickening; foul. 4. deficient in quality or value.

2. I am aware that this is a problematic issue, but I think that the tensions in Kant's text which this reading exposes should not simply be ignored. 'Pre-conceptual matter' does not of course equal 'phenomena', and yet at this point in the text Kant seems to accord it objective reality. A more in-depth discussion of this textual hiatus is unfortunately beyond the scope of this dissertation.

3. This scalar logic can be seen explicitly in the work of Schopenhauer and, in a much more difficult sense, in that of Nietzsche but it comes as a surprise to find traces of it, however remote, in a text of the idealist Kant. For an excellent discussion of the scalar logics of Schopenhauer and Kant, cf. Land, The Thirst for Annihilation (cf. bibliography).
4. Again, Deleuze, in "Plato and the Simulacrum", Logic of Sense op. cit., explores these points.

5. As Heidegger does, for instance in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, op. cit.

6. "The conditions of possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of possibility of objects of experience" (KrV/CPR A158, B197, t. m. This is discussed by Heidegger in the second part of Die Frage nach dem Ding, cf. bibliography.

7. It should be remembered how unflagging Kant's vehemence is in stressing the entirely different constitution of the human faculties of cognition as opposed to an - imaginary - intellectual intuition (e. g. KrV/CPR B72, B159, B307f, A286, B342), a fact some of his successors conveniently ignored.

8. Urteilskraft is regularly translated as merely 'judgement'. For the following reasons I consider this inappropriate: judgement (Urteil) or judging (urteilen or beurteilen, the difference does not register in English) refer to an actus in its nominal or verbal form respectively. As we know from the first Critique, this is coterminous with the formation of every proposition, insofar as judging implies the subsumption of intuitions under concepts. Every proposition therefore implies an act of judging. But the question which animates the third Critique (cf. my comment at the end of this note) is whether Urteilskraft deserves its own Critique, whether it is a separate faculty, containing its own a priori rules etc. Although I am conscious of disagreeing in this with one of the most conscientious and expert translators of Kant, namely Werner Pluhar (cf. list of primary texts), I think it makes a nonsense of the entire project which motivates the third Critique if Urteilskraft is translated merely as 'Judgement'. The French translation, too, takes account of this and renders 'Kritik der Urteilskraft' as 'Critique de la faculté de juger'.

The further question of why Kant does not for the most part employ his usual term when referring to the a priori sources of (theoretical or practical) knowledge, namely the word Vermögen which must be translated as 'faculty', can, I think, be answered by pointing out that Kant wants to keep Urteilskraft slightly apart from the other two faculties of understanding and reason. This quote from the Preface to the third Critique clarifies the reason for this, where he says of Urteilskraft that:

"...ihre Prinzipien in einem System der reinen Philosophie keinen besonderen Teil zwischen der theoretischen und praktischen ausmachen dürfen, sondern im Notfalle jedem von beiden gelegentlich angeschlossen werden können."
"...in a system of pure philosophy its principles may not constitute a special part between theoretical and practical philosophy but in an emergency can occasionally be annexed to either of them." (KU/CJ AVI, BVI, t.m.)

But in the sentence immediately preceding this one in the Preface he gives ample grounds for thinking of Urteilskraft nonetheless as a faculty in its own right:

"Eine Kritik der reinen Vernunft, d. i. unseres Vermögens, nach Prinzipien a priori zu urteilen, würde unvollständig sein, wenn die Urteilskraft, welche für sich als Erkenntnisvermögen darauf auch Anspruch macht, nicht als ein besonderer Teil derselben abgehandelt würde."

"A critique of pure reason, i.e. of our faculty to judge according to a priori principles, would be incomplete if the faculty of judgement which also claims this for itself as a faculty of cognition were not treated as a special part thereof [of the critique of pure reason]" (KU/CJ ibid.)

Although philosophy as a system only consists of two parts, namely theoretical and practical philosophy, the critique of (the legitimate employment of) our faculties consists of three parts, namely those of the pure understanding, pure reason and the pure faculty of judgement (KU/CJ A XXIII, B XXV). If any more grounds for considering Urteilskraft a faculty in its own right were needed, one would have to look no further than the end of the first paragraph of section V of the first Introduction to the third Critique. There Kant establishes the notion of a reflective Urteilskraft of which he states:

"Die reflektierende Urteilskraft ist diejenige, welche man auch das Beurteilungsvermögen (facultas diiudicandi) nennt." (KU/CJ first Introduction, section V, my italics).

For obvious reasons I do not attempt a translation here. Since I shall not at all deal with the first part of the third Critique, namely the Critique of the Aesthetic Faculty of Judgement, unless the text explicitly states otherwise, all references to the 'third Critique' are to the second part of the third Critique or to the Preface or either of the Introductions.

9. For instance Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, part II where Philo insists on the irreducible difference between a mechanical contrivance, such as a watch, and the unique properties of organic beings. This marks a radical departure from the earlier, Cartesian view, expressed repeatedly throughout Descartes' œuvre, that the human body, as an example
of a complex natural object, can be thought of in terms of a machine; cf. for instance the Sixth Meditation in the Meditations on First Philosophy, where he writes:

"...I may consider the human body as a machine fitted together and made up of bones, sinews, muscles, veins, blood, and skin in such a way that, even if there were no mind in it, it would still carry out all the operations that...do not depend on the command of the will, nor, therefore, on the mind."

Although this Cartesian thought contains the important observation that physiological processes do not depend on voluntaristic or any other mental interventions, it falls short of giving any specificity to the peculiar properties of the organic matter of which a body is composed. Although it is true that the processes of the body are self-sustaining, it must be remembered that Descartes is only thinking of mechanical processes, or simply movements, and not of the more complicated physiological, chemical and biological transformations a body continually undergoes. Thus the materiality of the body is still completely suppressed, it is still only res extensa.

10. For example, KU/CJ, the first few paragraphs of section II of the first Introduction where Kant mentions this word several times in such a way as to denote a generalised cognitive capacity, not exactly just the understanding or the faculty of judgement or reason, but the faculties' capacity for interaction.

11. Since this dissertation only deals with critical philosophy insofar as it concerns a theory of nature, Kant's practical philosophy (as well as, incidentally, his Critique of the Aesthetic Faculty of Judgement) cannot be considered here, which also means that a discussion of the faculty of judgement's mediating role in the critical system is not possible. But since many excellent studies on this topic exist already, there is no immediate need for such a discussion here.

12. A brief but very attractively formulated passage from Cassirer's chapter on the third Critique in 'Kant's Leben und Lehre' (ch.6, p.358f) puts the issue in a nutshell (sic!):

bleibt und daß in beiden schon die Tendenz zur künftigen Gestaltung wirksam und kenntlich ist. Diese Art des Zusammenhanges ist es, die wir herkömmlich mit dem Begriff des Organismus bezeichnen."

"Where true development is present, a whole is not formed out of parts, but it is contained in them, as a guiding principle. Instead of the uniform march of the before and after of time, in which every previous moment is swallowed by the present one and loses its existence to it, in the phenomenon of life we think a reciprocal interlocking of the individual moments: such that what is past is preserved in what is present and that in both the tendency towards future formation is effective and knowable. This is the kind of complex which we usually signify by the concept of an organism" (t.m.)

13. It would be impossible to introduce these issues in more technical terms at this point, by mentioning the trace of another temporality, for instance, without unduly anticipating a discussion which properly belongs in the next chapter.

14. Heidegger elaborates on this point, for instance in Die Frage nach der Technik, cf. bibliography.

15. We would have to consider this rather abrupt outburst after Freud as an instance of 'the return of the repressed', as mentioned for instance in The Language of Psycho-Analysis, by Laplanche and Pontalis, cf. bibliography.

16. This recalls Kant's discussion of the sublime in the Critique of the Aesthetic Faculty of Judgement. The question might be asked whether the sublime marks a point at which Kant's need to anthropomorphise nature momentarily subsides. Although this would be a fascinating question, in particular by way of comparison between the two parts of the third Critique and their respective conceptions of nature, such a discussion clearly falls outside the scope of the present project.

17. Cf. also sec.V of the first Introduction, where Angemessenheit is mentioned several times.

18. If this dissertation had the space to bring Kant's practical philosophy - and its nihilistic tendencies - into the discussion, this would now necessitate a reading of the transition from physical to moral teleology which takes place from 887 onwards. But as this latest twist to Kant's teleology makes very little sense without an overall consideration of his practical philosophy, and since such a consideration is entirely beyond the scope of this study, I can only refer the interested reader to this part of the third Critique.

19. WM has "... im Begriffe" which, whilst not impossible, sounds rather too stilted and Hegelian for such an elegant writer as Nietzsche.

20. Although Kant very briefly provides this 'deduction', it is nowhere
near as rigorous (or as significant) as that of the categories; cf. KrV/CPR A669f, B697f.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. Kant confidently proclaims:

"...Kritik, die zuvörderst die Quellen und Bedingungen ihrer Möglichkeit darlegen mußte, und einen ganz verwachsenen Boden zu reinigen und zu ebennen nötig hatte."

"...Critique which first of all had to expose the sources and conditions of its possibility and needed to clear and to level an entirely overgrown ground." (KrV/CPR AXXI, t.m.).

2. In terms of the terminology developed by Deleuze and Guattari concerning these same issues, it could be said that critique marks the movement of deterritorialisation whereas the impetus of the will to truth is that of reterritorialisation.

3. It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this dissertation to show in how far Nietzsche's strategy for overcoming the dichotomy between mind and matter is entirely different from that developed by Hegel. Suffice it to say here that not only the Hegelian notions of the dialectic and of the sublation into which it enters are utterly foreign to Nietzsche's thinking but, more importantly, the notion of synthesis which is operative in his texts has nothing whatsoever to do with the Hegelian notion of the same name. As Deleuze demonstrates (Nietzsche and Philosophy, ch. 5, op.cit.), Nietzsche's relation to Hegel is almost as fascinating as his relation to Kant. I would consider it facile to substitute the in-depth study this relation deserves by a few casual comments.

4. The inspiration for reading Nietzsche in these terms is obviously derived from Deleuze's reading of the three essays of the GdM/GoM (cf. 3.7 of Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 87f). Whilst there are potential problems with this, namely insofar as it might appear to overly systematise Nietzsche's thought, I understand Deleuze's reading as an attempt to bring out the subterranean connections between Kant and Nietzsche, connections that have gone virtually unnoticed in this century's philosophy. My own attempts at situating Nietzsche vis-à-vis Kant are very much undertaken in this spirit of excavation. I don't claim that this reading of Nietzsche is correct, only that it is useful for bringing out the connections between.
his and Kant's thought.

5. In particular, I would say that much of the work of Heidegger and Derrida, and the tradition which their work has spawned, is based on this reading of Platonism.

6. Cf. the previous note.

7. Bataille, for instance, does this without being in overt dialogue with the tradition.

8. In this regard the persistent attention to Nietzsche's physiology of art, which all too often offers nothing but anaemic, idealising readings of the potentially much richer Nietzschean notion of physiology, seems to be the symptom of a resistance to this thought, rather than a true realisation of it. Cf. also note 7 to the Introduction of this thesis.

9. As defined in Langenscheidt Greek Dictionary.

10. In German wertlos encompasses both meanings.

11. Heidegger writes:

"With the abolition of Platonism the way first opens for the affirmation of the sensuous... What is needed is neither abolition of the sensuous nor abolition of the nonsensuous. On the contrary, what must be cast aside is the misinterpretation, the deprecation, of the sensuous, as well as the extravagant elevation of the supersensuous. A path must be cleared for a new interpretation of the sensuous on the basis of a new hierarchy of the sensuous and nonsensuous. The new hierarchy does not simply wish to reverse matters within the old structural order, now reverencing the sensuous and scorning the nonsensuous. It does not wish to put what was at the very bottom on the very top. A new hierarchy and new valuation mean that the ordering structure must be changed." (Nietzsche I, p. 209, op. cit.)

Although this thesis is manifestly not concerned with the intricacies of 'Heidegger's Nietzsche', it is interesting to note that at this crucial point in his text, Heidegger sidesteps the full impact of a reversal and overturning of Platonism on the basis of a physiological thinking and instead privileges Nietzsche's 'physiological aesthetics' (for instance, p. 211). By doing so Heidegger can circumvent the messiness of sexual or drug-induced Rausch and sustain the neo-scholastic register of purity in which he chooses to speak.

12. See the article by D.F. Krell, entitled "Descensional Reflection", cf. bibliography.

13. In contrast to Deleuze, who wants to say that Kant's critical method is a way of de-temporalising thinking, and that this tends to be a feature of all philosophical method (Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 103f), I think it is
legitimate to understand Nietzsche's physiologico-critical method in very different terms, namely as a way of temporalising thinking by showing that thought is never anything but a function of an energised matter, or simply will to power. Nietzsche remarks that

"Die wertvollsten Einsichten werden am spätesten gefunden: aber die wertvollsten Einsichten sind die Methoden."
"The most valuable insights are found last: but the most valuable insights are the methods." (WM/WP no. 469, t.m.)

14. Deleuze and Guattari have shown, and have done so in terms which happily go far beyond the rather simplistic reading I offer here, that it is perfectly plausible to theorise Capitalist economies in terms of the will to power, in their most Nietzschean of ouvres, Anti-Oedipus, cf. bibliography.

15. Nietzsche equates these terms when he writes:

"Geist (oder die 'Seele' oder das Subjekt, wie die Schulsprache jetzt statt Seele sagt)."
"Spirit (or 'soul' or subject, as the language of the Schools now has it instead of soul)." (KSA 11,36 [36], WM/WP no. 659, t.m.).

16. Leitfaden is literally a 'leading thread' but more commonly translated as 'theme' because it denotes something that draws together the various parts, for instance of a text.
17. Is this what happened to Nietzsche in the end?
19. The Colli-Montinari edition has 'Auszülsung des Willens' ('release of the will'), whereas it seems to me that 'Auszösung des Willens' ('dissolution of the will') is not only perfectly possible here but does in fact make a great deal more sense, given what Nietzsche says about it, namely that it accompanies this most superficial, lucid consciousness.
20. As Heidegger calls the body conceived as res corporea, following Descartes, cf., Sein und Zeit, 921 for instance.
21. "Organisms are transient systems in which energy transformations are continually taking place, they have virtually no fixed or permanent constituents" M. S. Gordon et al (ed. s) Animal Physiology, p. 25.
22. "Organisms are delicate but highly adaptable dynamic systems that exist in a state of continuous exchange of energy and materials with the
environment that surrounds them." ibid. p. 28.

23. The converse of 'catabolism' is 'anabolism', a kind of reconstitution or assimilation, in which simple molecules are synthesised into complex ones and a storage of energy is effected.

24. "...the interacting dynamic systems that constitute the organism can be maintained only by the continuous expenditure of energy." Animal Physiology op. cit., p. 34.

25. Deleuze makes this point in Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 91.

26. In a short but surprisingly philosophical article under the title 'Shifting Sand' which appeared in the 'Independent' of the 24th of July, 1993, the following observations, which seem strangely pertinent to our discussion, were made:

"While American forces have blasted Baghdad with rockets and Mogadishu with missiles, back home in the Midwest they have been discovering anew that when Nature is the adversary, they must fight her in the trenches. The battle against the Great Flood of 1993 is hand-to-hand combat: the most useful weapon, human muscles... damage to property in the state of Iowa estimated at more than $1 billion, damage to crops of more than $750 million, two million acres under water. Some 30 people have died across the affected states and total damage is estimated at more than 15 billion... Still the work goes on, filling the bags, chucking them one by one into helicopters, chucking them one by one out of helicopters and down on to the ruptured levees; a Band-Aid in a case of multiple fractures. The size of the task is dramatically apparent in satellite pictures. Before: the Illinois and Missouri and Mississippi rivers, narrow, clearly defined arteries winding neatly through the plains. Afterwards: all three rivers have become preposterously swollen, spilling promiscuously wherever they break through... But where the land has not yet been inundated, it gleams bright emerald green from all the rainfall. It is the paradox of the flood: this quintessentially destructive event is also the bringer of new life, the regenerator of lands from which the farmers have squeezed so much. It's a fact modern man, with his levees and flood walls, has spent 200 years trying to deny. Perhaps, in the long run, America will benefit from being reminded that she is not, after all, the only remaining superpower."

In this context ch. 7 of The Thirst for Annihilation, entitled "Fanged Noumenon (Passion of the Cyclone)", also has some interesting things to say, for instance when Land asks:

"Is not transcendental philosophy a fear of the sea? Something like a dike or a sea-wall? Alonging for the open ocean gnaws at us, as the land is gnawed by the sea. A dark fluidity at the roots of our nature rebels against the security of terra firma, provoking a wave of anxiety in which we are submerged, until we feel ourselves drowning, with representation draining away." (p. 107)
27. Of these two stems of knowledge, the understanding and sensibility, Kant says that neither is to be privileged over the other ("Keine...ist der andern vorzuziehen." KrV/CPR A51, B75).

28. If this discussion of the eternal recurrence of the same is rather brief, this is so because our focus is after all Nietzsche's physiological thinking and eternal recurrence only warrants a discussion to the extent to which it contributes to the understanding of it. It is understood that this is in no way an exhaustive account of the thought of eternal recurrence, even if that were possible.
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