Swedish Integration Policy Documents

A Close Dialogic Reading

by

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Declaration
I declare that this thesis is the sole work of its author, that no parts of this text have been part of previously published texts and that it has not been submitted for a degree at another university.

Word Count
78,105
Abstract
Sweden as the great welfare state where everybody is equally welcomed and cared for has for long been the prevailing view. Although Swedish integration policy seems to confirm this view, this is far removed from many people's experienced reality. I argue that part of this disharmony lies in how West European languages contain and relate to an 'identity' construction, which perpetuates and is perpetuated through dichotomies that strengthen the social and political cogency of concepts such as 'race', ethnicity and culture. Based on this, I carry out a discourse analysis of Sweden's major integration policy documents from the mid 1970s up to today.

After an eclectic reading of discourses on migration and integration terminology, 'identity' and language, I assert the centrality of 'identity' construction to everything we do. With this in mind, taking the dialogism promoted by the Bakhtinian Circle as the dichotomy to monologism, I carry out a close dialogic reading in the tradition of Lynn Pearce (1994) and Peter Stallybrass and Allon White (1986).

Contextualizing the policy documents, I present the history of migration and integration from a Swedish perspective. Focusing on the last five decades, I divide the different historic tendencies into themes ranging from: emigration to labour migration, refugee migration and the European Union, and from immigrant policy to integration policy.

Believing that the conceptualisation and the handling of categorisation, segregation, culture, discrimination and racism are all central to a successful integration policy, I analyse the policy documents thematically accordingly. I show how the interdependence of the common 'identity' constructions and language sometimes obscures and frequently counteracts the intention of the author. As a result, I argue that the Bakhtinian Circle holds the key to a better understanding of the invincibility of stereotyping within racialized discourses, through applying absolute 'identity' constructions in monologic speech, and how this may be counteracted in order to strive for a dialogic approach to the world.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms and Abbreviations</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMS or Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen:</td>
<td>The Labour Market Board is the authority of the Swedish Labour Market Administration (AMV), which includes 20 county labour boards and 325 job centres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOT</td>
<td>This author's own translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DO or Ombudsmannen mot etnisk discrimination</td>
<td>The Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination. The government authority known as DO was set up in 1986 and the actual Ombudsman is appointed for a six year period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FL or Förvaltningslagen</td>
<td>The Public Administration Law, which deals with matters within the remit of the public authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrationsverket</td>
<td>The Swedish Integration Board or SIB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO or Landsorganisationen:</td>
<td>The Swedish Trade Union Confederation, which is the confederation for 16 affiliates which organize workers within both the private and the public sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metall</td>
<td>The metal workers union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrationsverket</td>
<td>The Swedish Migration Board or SMB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. or Proposition</td>
<td>Bill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regeringsformen</td>
<td>The Instrument of Government. Sweden's constitution consists of four fundamental laws plus the Riksdag Act, which sets out the role and work procedures of parliament. The four fundamental laws are the Instrument of Government, the Act of Succession, the Freedom of the Press Act and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riksdagen or Sveriges Riksdag</td>
<td>The parliament is made up of 349 members chosen every four years in general elections in 29 different constituencies with personal mandate according to a proportional representation. Sweden has a parliamentary system. In order to form a government, one or several parties together must enjoy the support of the parliament.</td>
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RRV or Riksrevisionsverket
The Swedish National Audit Office or SNAO, which was on 1 July 2003 succeeded by Riksrevisionen.

SAF or Svenska arbetsgivare-Föreningen
The Swedish Employers’ Confederation, which in 2001 changed name to Svenskt Näringsliv, Confederation of Swedish Enterprise.

SAP, Socialdemokratiska arbetarpartiet, or Socialdemokraterna
The Social Democratic Workers Party or the Social Democrats, founded in 1889 and split from its Communist wing in 1917.

SIV or Statens invandrarverk
The Swedish Immigrant Board was split into Migrationsverket, the Swedish Migration Board, and Integrationsverket, the Swedish Integration Board, in 1998.

SOU or Statens Offentliga Utredningar.
The State’s Public Investigations. This is the report that precedes a Government Bill

TCO or Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation
The [Swedish] Confederation of Professional Employees. It has 17 affiliated unions, with about 1.3 million members in total.
Chapter 1: Introduction

It is hard to avoid the ubiquity in the news media and popular press of debates on refugees, ‘bogus’ asylum seekers, ‘economic immigrants’, foreigners and ‘social tourism’. These terms and concepts, together with the social stereotypes of people (based on ethnicity, culture, ‘race’, religious beliefs, way of dressing or complexion), are central to the construction of the social, political, and economic identities that are used to distinguish the supposed real European from the rest. What is imagined as the identity of these Others who share our local world is an integral part of the stereotypes that describe individual ‘immigrants’, and in turn why these stereotyped features become a part of and the reason for ‘their’ assigned identities in society. Today this construction of identity and difference forms the common discourse on topics of migration within Europe.

For several decades, the meaning and importance of terms such as race, ethnicity, culture, immigrant(s) and foreigner(s) have been debated within academia. Depending on the context as well as the ideological positions adopted by researchers, these terms are described differently in the literature (for summaries see: Essed and Goldberg, 2000; Bulmer and Solomos, 1999; Hutchinson and Smith, 1996; Alcoff and Mendietta, 2003). This research has, in turn, had an important if variable impact on political debates in Europe about migration. In my MA thesis written prior to this dissertation, an attempt was made to untangle the interconnectedness and exchangeability between the terms and
concepts of ethnicity, culture and race within the popular debate on immigration in Swedish society (Persson, 2000).

Despite the fact that the term race is not present within the political or academic discourses on racism in Sweden, ideologically it is nonetheless expressed through the salience and cogency given to other terms within these discourses (see Ålund & Schierup, 1991; Ålund, 1999; Pred, 2000; Mulinari and Neergaard, 2004). In the constant redistribution of values that accompany the construction of the ‘multicultural’ society of Sweden, as well as Swedish multiculturalism as a policy conception, lines between the different sociological terms are blurred. As Phil Cohen writes, “[r]ace becomes ethnicised and ethnicity racialized…correspond[ing] to a complication of migration histories and provides for a more tactical, context-sensitive kind of identity work” (Cohen 1999b: 2).

The attempt to visualise how the terms race, ethnicity and culture are frequently used as a substitute for each other became the basis for the current thesis. The focus is, however, on the study of the successful or unsuccessful interaction of these concepts between social beings. In a fashion similar to Koselleck (1985), I will argue that a word or term does not necessarily carry the same lexicological meaning over time (its dictionary definition), and yet there is a quality to concepts such as these where they display an ability to survive and also a certain penetrability of social and linguistic practice that argues for some degree of durability. Despite the fact that the meaning given to these three terms, ‘race’, ethnicity, and culture has changed over time, their role or function in the erecting both of real and/or imagined borders between individuals and groups of
individuals has not displayed a similar degree of mutability.

This research proposes that West European languages, both contain and relate to a Saussure-ian identity construction, one that perpetuates and is perpetuated through dichotomies that strengthen the social and political cogency of concepts such as ‘race’, ethnicity and culture. This proposal is in part based on my own personal language knowledge, which is not exhaustive. In other words, it is important to acknowledge the values and ideas that come embedded in a society, a culture, and a socio-political horizon of practices. While exceptions may exist, my experience with language is no doubt typical, and thereby also applicable to other languages. Whilst it would have been possible to distinguish between languages such as German, Swedish or English and language as a mode of communication, such a differentiation would risk diminishing the individual connection between language as communication and individual languages. Instead, this thesis will assume that the reader, when necessary, will be able to distinguish between the two. The term Saussure-ian identity refers to a definition of identity that in popular discourses is specifically ascribed to his work in linguistics. This ‘common’ notion of identity is described as: ‘I am what I am, because I am not what he or she is’, or ‘we are the way we are, because we are not as they are’. The conceptualisation of identity will from here on also be referred to as ‘identity’ or ‘identity’ construction. (see Saussure, 1998; Culler, 1985).

This thesis consequently needed an alternative approach, to the language and identity approach represented by Saussure, to base its analytical framework. In trying to understand, organise and categorise the world around us, we seek information and
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interact with other social beings, i.e. we exchange and negotiate oral or printed information. The outcome is determined by the degree of success in this interaction between individuals or individuals and texts. The Bakhtinian Circle (Bakhtin, Vološinov and Medvedev) relates to the tension of needing the other in the creation of the self, while struggling with the risk of turning him or her into the Other, but also attempts to read, judge and construct texts as being involved in constant dialogues by avoiding, as long as possible, the "last word" (Bakhtin & Medvedev, 1991: 20). This thesis argues that this combination makes the dialogism or the dialogic reading as proposed by the Bakhtinian Circle effective in addressing the interconnectedness between language and 'identity' constructions (see also Bakhtin, 1990a; Vološinov, 2000).

As a result of the proposed inbuilt Saussure-ian identity construction, a text analysis was conducted and based on a discourse analysis with the philosophical reasoning of the Bakhtinian Circle at its core. To distinguish this combination, from other discourse analysis and dialogic reading, it is referred to as a Close Dialogic Reading. In an attempt to make this text analysis as open and transparent as possible, I had to choose texts that put the act of interaction in focus. One area where 'identity' not only is assumed to play a vital part, but also is central, is the migration process. In the course of immigration, the process of distinguishing the 'real' from the 'bogus' determines given or refused assistance. Successful or unsuccessful interaction between the new nation, its population and 'immigrants' may decide the level of inclusion or exclusion, just as the will to include or exclude will decide the level of assistance, who will be viewed as 'real' or 'bogus' and who therefore will enjoy a more or less successful interaction. The process or state of, and the discourses on integration potentially affect the entire migration
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process, emigration, immigration and the choice of staying and returning.

An integration policy document could be described as a set of guidelines for the process of removing obstacles standing in the way of the individual’s possibility to integrate. As such, it sets out future policies on the topic of integration, the state’s view on integration and which of many different measures are to be taken to reach the policy targets expressed in the individual document. The main integration documents that are analysed in this thesis are SOU 1974[69], Immigrants and Minorities; SOU 1996[55]/Prop. 1997/98 Sweden, the Future and Diversity, and; Skr. 2001/02[129] Integration Policy for the 21st Century (AOT)¹. These documents have been chosen based on their centrality to the Swedish integration policy history. Although there may be many documents that individually influence the overall integration agenda, it is far in between Swedish integration policy documents. The SOU 1974[69] report is seen as the prelude to Swedish integration policy, the mid 1990s documents as the adjustment and updating of 1970s policies, while the early 21st century documents are to set out the future of Swedish integration policies.

Whether reading the Integration Barometer 2002 (Integrationsverket, 2002b; AOT), one of the Integration Reports (Integrationsverket, 2001; 2002a; 2003; AOT) or Statistikrapport 2004 (Integrationsverket, 2005b), the conclusion is that integration is failing. This failure of integration is described both in objective figures and by subjective statements. Objectively this fact can be demonstrated by the differences in income between different ‘ethnic minority groups’ and the ‘ethnic majority’, or by considering the extent of housing segregation (Integrationsverket, 2001; 2002a; 2002b;
Subjectively this is demonstrated by individual statements by 'immigrants' of being an outsider and not being allowed in, whether in the context of the labour market, social institutions or contact with people who speak 'proper' Swedish. Experiences such as these are, for example, expressed in several articles published during the spring of 2002 by *Dagens Nyheter*, but also by the survey behind the *Integration Barometer* (*DN*, 26-April-2002; *DN*, 25-March-2002a; *DN*, 25-March-2002; *Integrationsverket*, 2002b; see also Mulinari and Neergaard, 2004). Both types of indicators tell stories that are interdependent. The objective side is met with specifically directed official measures towards the labour and/or housing markets, together with special laws introduced to combat discrimination, while the subjective story is, despite being connected with the objective, seen as less clear-cut and seldom publicly acknowledged, or at least downplayed.

In similar fashion to the work of the Bakhtinian Circle, this thesis holds that texts, oral and in print, stand in a relationship to earlier, contemporary and future texts. The integration policy documents are consequently analysed as self-contained documents, as texts related to other texts, and as documents explicitly answerable to implemented integration measures. The focus is on considering to what extent the actual text, its reasoning, supports or contradicts the conclusion and formulation of targets in the actual document and praxis.

If summarising, four elements are more central to this research than others. These are interaction, identity, language and policy documents. The question of successful versus unsuccessful interaction is central to all societies. In organising or categorising the world
around us, for example in the context of immigration, we assign 'identities' to people and things. Hence, how different notions of 'identity' potentially determine the possibility of successful interaction is the second element of this research. Because we all use some type of language when trying to understand and organise the world we face, and because there is a close link between 'identity' and language, language is central to both unsuccessful and successful interaction. The fourth element, the policy documents, was chosen because it allows for the encapsulation of the three former elements and provides for an analysis which tests the proposition of the relationship between language, 'identity' constructions and the conceptualization of immigration in society.

Research Question
The proposed relationship between language and 'identity' constructions will for explained reasons play an important part in how people interpret policy documents in general and integration policy documents in particular. The implications of potential interpretations are in focus and this thesis consequently poses the following research question: What are the potential consequences for the relationship between Swedish integration policy's language and the expressed policy aims and implementation?

Aim and Objectives
This thesis aims to critically scrutinise Swedish integration policy documents with the objective to (1) visualise and problematize the challenging interconnectedness between
language and ‘identity’ constructions, and (2) bring dialogism according to the Bakhtinian Circle closer to the subject field of IMER, International Migration and Ethnic Relations. This is done by carrying out a close dialogic reading, in which I anchor a discourse analysis in the philosophy of dialogism.

Time Frame and Layout
The time-frame for this research is both central and secondary to this study. While it is central to the context in which the individual texts were written, it is secondary when texts are analysed as a self-contained text. The time-frame for this research is set in relation to the history of Swedish immigration and integration. From having been an emigration country, Sweden turned into an immigration country at the beginning of the 1930s. Immigration to Sweden in greater numbers did, however, not start until the end of the Second World War. It therefore seems appropriate to set the time-frame for this research between the mid 1940s and the publication of the Communication 2001/02[129] Integration Policy for the 21st Century, which sets out the long term goals of future Swedish integration policy.

The thesis is arranged into nine chapters. Following this introduction, Chapters Two and Three, ‘Theoretical Issues’, parts one and two, provide a theoretical discussion of the terms and theoretical approaches central to discourses on integration and more specifically this thesis. In Chapter Four, ‘Method’, I position myself in relation to this thesis, both as a social being and as a researcher. This includes the practical process of
writing this thesis, problems encountered and lessons learned. I then discuss the texts and link the theoretical approach presented in the previous chapters with the analytical tool of the thesis. Values assigned to different texts and the connection between theory and analytical praxis are covered. Finally, the chapter provides a practical example of how to carry out an analysis in accordance with the analytical tool.

In Chapters Five, Six and Seven, I describe the history of Swedish migration and integration. With a brief pre-history to Sweden turning into an immigration country, they cover the course of events from the end of the Second World War up to the beginning of the 21st century with the intention of broadening the understanding of the context in which the Swedish integration policy documents were formulated. Chapter Five, 'From Emigration to Immigration', describes how Sweden as an emigration country turned into a country of immigration, first due to refugee immigration and later on due to shortages within the Swedish labour market. Chapter Six, 'Refugee Migration and the European Union' focuses on increasing refugee migration, asylum seekers and how the European Union plays an ever greater part in immigration policy making. Chapter Seven, 'From Immigrant Policy to Integration Policy', discusses the attempts to shift the focus away from the 'immigrant' onto society, the current state of Swedish integration and the future integration goals.

In Chapter Eight, I analyse the policy documents as individual self-contained texts, as texts related to other texts, and as texts related to integration praxis through their expressed targets and proposed implementations. Finally, in Chapter Nine, 'Dialogism and Integration', I outline the conclusions to be drawn from the analysis and the lessons
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to be learned, both in connection to future policy documents and to ‘Close Dialogic Reading’ as an analytical tool.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Issues (Part I)

It will be argued that the theoretical approach and analytical tools used in this thesis could be applied to any type of text. However, different texts exist within different contexts, which use, react and relate to distinct terms and conceptualisations. The focus of this thesis is integration policy documents and there is therefore a need to address terms, processes and/or phenomena related to conceptualisations of integration. The theoretical issues are divided into two different chapters. The first part focuses on a migration and integration terminology anchored in a discussion on 'race', ethnicity and culture, whilst the second part addresses questions on 'identity' and language central to the research question.

State Controlled Interaction

Human interaction is at the core of all types of migration through its triple effect. This triple effect is described by those events of migration that impact upon 1) the individual migrant, 2) his or her place of origin, and 3) the receiving community. Though these effects of migration are interdependent, the processes of each do not necessarily lead to mutual adaptation. While the 'place of origin' does not necessarily take an active role, it is affected by the decline in population that results from emigration; this is sometimes referred to as a 'brain drain' problem. The receiving place or country is greatly involved in the life of the migrant through its general immigration policy and its explicit decisions on whom to accept amongst the stream of individual 'immigrants'. While it is the individual who decides to migrate, it is the receiving country that decides if the
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'immigrant' is allowed to stay or not, and under what if any criteria. However, even if
the migrant becomes either a partial, temporary or full member in the receiving
community, the receiving community does not obtain a reciprocal membership in either
the migrant's society of origin, or in the 'ethnic minority' community in the receiving
country if this exists (Brochmann and Hammar, 1999).

A country's integration policy, independent of a stated aim to include in its purview all
residents of the society, commonly also refers to how the government aims to tackle the
inclusion of those who are newly arrived and those are perceived as already legally
established people with an immigration background. In other words, these types of
policies promote the state's view on either how it achieves or how to achieve what it
perceives as a functioning society with regard to the phenomenon of migration. In so
doing, it influences both the numbers and characteristics of the 'immigrants' attempting
to enter the society, but also potentially which 'immigrants' will decide to stay
(Brochmann, 1999b). An integration policy is closely related to an immigration policy.
Not only are the two different types of policies potentially directed toward the same
'immigrants', but both can also be seen as instruments of the same immigration control.
If large inflows, in relative terms, of 'immigrants', refugees and or asylum seekers are
perceived as a burden, either as the source for problems experienced in the labour
market or for the social welfare system, politicians may feel it necessary to react and to
restrict immigration (Hammar, 1990b). In addition, immigration is sometimes argued to
have a negative impact on the 'national identity' of a country through perceived changes
in the ethnic and religious composition of its population. This perception of a negative
impact may lead to the affirmation and/or change of the government's political position.
with regard to immigration and integration. As contemporary European history clearly demonstrates, with examples from Sweden, Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands, the former does not necessarily exclude the latter. There is always a close interdependence between a country’s external and internal control measures. Whilst the external measures, such as immigration and ‘immigrant’ control-policies, may relate to sovereignty and angst for a purported deterioration of a ‘national identity’ or social welfare system, the internal controls explicitly include policies on integration with access to citizenship, to political rights and duties (Peterson, 1997; Brochmann, 1999b).

**Integration Terminology**
It is important to differentiate integration from other related phenomena within the field of interaction between social-beings. There are several phenomena, terms and concepts closely related to integration. Since to communicate is to interact and interact is to communicate, one needs to understand the postulate of interaction. This “must account for the fact that being able to interact also implies some sharing. But we must not assume that sharing at all levels of either grammatical or social rules is necessary” (Gumperz, 1984: 29-30).

The implications of processes of inclusion and exclusion are often greater for people living at the peripheries of our societies and nation-states. These individuals are often dependent on the largesse of charitable institutional structures and the generosity of the society. Who is allowed to live in our societies and in which way this life is allowed to be expressed are central determinants of their living conditions. This may take the form of mentally ill patients either being locked up and away from the public eye, or being
left without assistance and thereby possibly homeless (without equating homelessness with poor mental health), or ‘immigrants’ experiencing insecure status, few social and political rights, or possibly even facing the risk of deportation. Though it can be argued that the infringement of someone’s private sphere is clearly of great symbolic importance, the current debate on religious symbols, not only reserved for France, is an example of how the same ban or action from the state may have different connotations and outcomes for people in the integration process. Being banned from or forced to wear a symbol, independent of beliefs or faith, has a different impact on individuals if they are already being or feeling excluded, living under forced segregated circumstances, and discriminated against, than if individuals do not associate these symbols with exclusion from societal norms.

In contrast to Gumperz (1984), the focus of the current research is not the question of what knowledge it is that ‘we’ may or may not share, despite the potential importance it may hold for a well functioning society, but the actual potential for successful interaction between people. The specific interaction in question is between people with an immigration background, or ‘new’ citizens, and people without any (recent) immigration background, or ‘established’ citizens. An ‘established’ citizen here refers to an individual with full citizenship including political rights. A ‘new’ citizen fulfils the same criteria as an ‘established’ citizen, but here the thesis makes a distinction between later arrivals to the society and includes in some cases the common category ‘second generation immigrants’. In their position as later arrivals, or ‘second generation immigrants’, ‘new’ citizens are often perceived as not fully part of the society. They do not have or do not perceive themselves to have access to labour and housing markets or
the educational system to a degree equal to that of the "established" citizens. These 'denizens' according to Hammar's definition are "grant[ed] permanent work and residence permits without time restriction or the need for prolongation, and conferring full social and legal rights, but usually not full political rights" (Hammar, 1990b: 21).

Despite or because it is equally common to use integration normatively as it is to use the term in a descriptive manner, that is, as either describing a process or an existing state of living in a society, it is difficult to provide a common definition of the term. The confusion between different definitions is, if anything, greater regarding the process of integration than with regard to the description of an existing population. Whether describing an everyday-life situation or a process of and toward interaction, the terms explicitly related to integration are that of acculturation, assimilation, integration, insertion, melting pot and cultural pluralism or multiculturalism. In different ways all of these describe aspects of the potential interaction between newly arrived and established individuals, the complexity and heterogeneity of everyday-life processes of interaction between individuals under circumstances that are often described as equal. Implicitly related terms such as 'race', ethnicity and culture describe social factors that have an impact on as well as are impacted upon by the integration terminology; these terms will also be addressed in what follows.

Acculturation is seen by Ben-Rafael and Bauböck (1996), for example, as the process through which the 'immigrant' learns and adapts to the norms and value systems of the new society. Socialisation could possibly be taken as a synonym, that is, the individual slowly learns from his or her surrounding society, close family and institutions the
norms and value systems so that he or she can function together with other social-beings in a common society (for example see Ben-Rafael, 1996; Bauböck, 1996).

Assimilation is commonly related to cultural behaviour or patterns. To pursue a politics of assimilation is to make the individual conform to existing standards and norms in society by divorcing themselves from 'their own culture'. As in other theoretical discussions, cultural and social behaviours just as often refer to the same as they do to separate phenomena (see Rex, 1996c). The term assimilation seems at the moment to have passed the peak of its popularity within academic research and in most political environments, and is usually replaced in policy formulation by the term integration. However, the term assimilation can also be used to describe economic conditions for immigrants. Ekberg and Gustafsson (1995) do this in their study of immigrants within the Swedish labour market where to be assimilated is to be fully included in the labour force.

Integration is, in comparison with assimilation, more often used to explain the social relations/interaction between immigrants and others in the host society. The aim of integration is to achieve, in relation to established citizens, equal treatment by different institutions, such as those of education, the law, labour and housing market, and the political arena. Integration may be seen as an equivalent to 'access', while integrated may be seen as an equivalent to 'established', both in relation to economic power and social (as in social capital according to Bourdieu, 1997) relations (see Bauböck, 1996, Rex, 1996b). To what degree social and cultural can be separated is of course of great importance for how these terms are interpreted and used. There will be reason to return
to this when discussing the concept of culture. Insertion, it sometimes seems, is used as synonymous to integration. Similar to the replacement of assimilation by integration within the political arena, it has been suggested that the sole reason for using insertion would be to replace integration, a term, which Bauböck (1996) argues, sometimes seen as politically tainted or suspect. The differences between the described terms are often nonexistent, but in contrast to integration, insertion refers to groups rather than individuals (Bauböck, 1996b, Faist, 1996).

Melting-pot has mainly been used in relation to immigration in the USA where different peoples/ethnicities/'races' were supposed to be melted down and reshaped into that of the American citizen. If used in contemporary literature, for any other reason than as a historic reference, it is most likely greatly altered from its original purpose, allowing the retention of the concepts of ethnicity and 'race' as a part of the description of American citizenship. The use of the term remains associated with the specific experience of immigration to the USA.

Cultural pluralism or multiculturalism derives its original definition from the Union in Diversity, the slogan of UNESCO's international conference of 1956 in Havana (Carmon, 1996b). These terms are either used normatively, as models of integration, or descriptively, as in describing a society as composed of several coexisting groups with different cultural, 'immigrant' and religious backgrounds. The definition of multiculturalism will be returned to at length later in this study.
Segregation

The need to address issues of integration in government policy arises when some state of, or fear of, segregation is present. Segregation does however not necessarily lead to a pursuit of integration. Segregation is most commonly used in reference to the housing market, but if looking it up in a dictionary, such as the Merriam Webster Dictionary (1995: 470), the term only means “to cut off from others” alternatively “to separate by races” (see also Encyclopædia Britannica, 2005). Segregation is then the state of being cut off from others, or being separated based on a concept of ‘races’, while a segregationist is “one who believes in or practices the segregation of races” (Merriam Webster Dictionary, 1995: 470). Hence, depending on ideology, one can advocate segregation; settle with the fact that many of our societies are, to different degrees, segregated; or, one can advocate some type of integration. By ideology I mean the mental framework, made up of language, concepts and categories, imagery of thoughts and systems of representation, which individuals, by themselves and in cooperation, “make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works”, but also apply with the intention to socially construct and engineer their surrounding environment, world (see Hall, 2003d: 26). I disagree with those who stress that Hall’s definition of ideology has a tendency to blur the line between culture and ideology (see Mulinari and Neergaard, 2004). I would argue that Hall’s conceptualisation of ideology should be viewed in conjunction with his view on Vološinov and Bakhtin (see White, 1993). As clarified later, such a view takes ideology to be consciousness expressed.
Race, Ethnicity, Culture

Some of the terms and concepts applied within ideologies, with the intention to socially construct and engineer our surrounding environment and world, are ‘race’, ethnicity and culture, but also terms and concepts such as sex, class, sexuality, disability and age figure frequently at the core. As these terms are constructed by social beings, which coexist and interact to differing degrees, they should, together with all other terms, be viewed as interrelated social constructions.

That there may not be any physical ‘races’ to distinguish does not make the term and concept of ‘race’ less real, or its potential consequences less felt. The ‘race’ ideology or racism is seen by some, for example Mosse (1999), to have its roots in the Enlightenment and the religious revival of the eighteenth century, while others, such as Essed would argue that ‘race’ ideology “is rooted in the nineteenth-century construction of biologists and anthropologists, of different ‘race’ categories” (Essed, 1996: 7). In both cases, we find its foundation to be a product of ideas of a rational universe, nature, and aesthetics (Mosse, 1999). The idea of white (European and Christian) superiority is however much older than this and can at least be traced back to a justification of colonialism, slavery, the appropriation of non-European land and ideas of the wholesale conversion of Muslims during the mid sixteenth century (Said, 1999).

Trying to refute the term ‘race’ has proven to be just as difficult as to define it. The latter would probably also prove itself a counterproductive pursuit. That is, while part of any term’s strength lies in its ability to cast its skin, to define it will most probably lead to a strengthening of its core (Koselleck 1985). The complexity of both refuting and
conceptualising is exemplified not only by Berghe (2001) who in trying to explain racism refutes biological ‘races’ whilst giving in to a biological underpinning of what he terms “social race”, but also by Williams (1999: 102) who discusses the complexity of emptying colours of their cultural and social values and by the Merriam Webster Dictionary’s (1995) explanations or conceptualisations of segregation. Wrenched from its context, the latter does in fact legitimize the existence of physical ‘races’. That is, to explain a segregationist as someone who believes in or practices the segregation of ‘races’, instead of someone who, based on his or her belief in ‘races’, believes in or practices the segregation of ‘races’ does presuppose the existence of physical ‘races’. The complexity of outright refusing to use the term or to define the same is also stressed by Bulmer and Solomos (1999) when they assert that even if you were to get rid of the term ‘race’, this would not automatically mean that you would get rid of racism, just as a society that does not commonly use the term race might still face problems with racism. Sweden would be an example of the latter category.

Though Omi and Winant (2002) provide a definition of ‘race’, this research stresses in accordance with the same authors that the most important starting point of any approach to racism “is the recognition that despite its uncertainties and contradictions, the concept of race continues to play a fundamental role in structuring and representing the social world” (Omi and Winant 2002: 124). Consequently, this research will stress that though no definition should be forced, any viable discussion of racism will need to pay attention to the term and concept of ‘race’. In hesitating to agree with a conceptualisation of the term ‘race’, the task is to problematize the situations where it is acted upon, whilst
avoid[ing] both the utopian framework which sees race as an illusion we can somehow 'get beyond,' and also the essentialist formulation which sees race as something objective and fixed, a biological datum. Thus we should think of race as an element of social structure rather than as an irregularity within it; we should see race as a dimension of human representation rather than an illusion.

Omi and Winant, 2002: 124; see also Winant, 1994

Consequently, racism is a case of 'Catch 22'. While not believing that actual 'races' exist, this thesis will not abandon the term due to its social and cultural relevance; the notion that 'races' exist and the effects felt when 'race' is acted upon results in discriminatory practises and treatments (see also Eriksen, 2002a; Eriksen, 2002b).

As a response to racism and as a politics of so-called anti-racism, new 'identities' have been constructed around the conceptualisation of ethnicity and culture (Hall, 2003c). However, despite the presumed intention to break with one dichotomy, other "ethnic categories and a strong sense of the insurmountable cultural and experiential division which, it is argued, are a feature of racial difference" are and have been constructed (Gilroy, 2002: 250). This is supported by Mulinari and Neergaard (2004) who stress that the political debate on migration and racism in Sweden today is not characterised by being organised from 'race', but from 'Swedes' as belonging to the nation in contrast to 'immigrants' as the ethnically deviating Other. In similar fashion, but from a different theoretical standpoint, Hutchinson and Smith stress that "non-ethnic 'us' and ethnic 'others' [...] continue to dog the concepts in the fields of ethnicity and nationalism" (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996: 4). Eriksen (2002a) and many with him stress that despite
ethnicity being a relatively new term, ethnic is not. Ethnic is derived from the Greek *ethnos* and *ethnikos*, which originally meant heathen or pagan. In similar fashion, ethnicity is often reserved for the Other. As such, ethnicity was a 'polite' way of referring to Jews, Italians, Irish and other people considered inferior to people of mainly British descent in (US) America around the time of the Second World War. Cohen (1999a) logically asks: new ethnicities, old racisms?

Conceptualisations of terms, whether of 'race', ethnicity or culture, are often divided into different categories, the reason being anything from honest attempts to simplify for university students to some form of 'standpointism' by the author(s) in an attempt to position him or herself. Hutchinson and Smith's (1996) collection of articles on ethnicity is no exception. However, neither these approaches nor lexicology are the focus for this thesis. To put the main focus on summaries of theoretical approaches or to give historical accounts would neither assist this thesis in its pursuit of answers to its research question nor would it add invaluable information for its potential reader. It is through such attempts that "the principle of ethnicity [but also culture] becomes absolute and essential" (Lindholm, 1993: 7, original italics).

Trying to avoid creating hermeneutic circles (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 1994), this thesis asserts that ethnicity refers to relationships between different 'groups' who perceive themselves as culturally distinctive and who potentially may be hierarchically ranked in similar fashion to classes, i.e. ethnicity refers to "something which is between and not inside" (Eriksen, 2002a: 12, original italics). However, and in contrast to how Miles (1993) divorces the concept of race from racism, Eriksen (2002a) stresses that while
social classes refer to systems of social ranking, to property and potentially to 'archived statuses', ethnicity refers to imputed cultural or racial differences. Ethnicity will therefore be viewed as a social construction, which expresses social tension related to other social constructions such as 'race', culture, gender and class. As a social construction it does not therefore, by its verbal existence alone, prove any descriptive value of relevance to anything 'naturally' existing, i.e. biologically existing (see Ålund and Karlsson, 1996).

Despite not arguing a case of primordial ethnicity or culture, as for what Melucci otherwise expresses in his article, he still stresses that

the meaning of ethnic and cultural action, which can vary from defence and resistance against modernization processes, to demands for political rights, to a challenge to the international system, which is in fact an interstate system: conflicts that mobilize ethnic and cultural identities make visible the crisis of the nation-state and bring to the fore the need for a new trans-national world system capable of recognizing and integrating differences.

Melucci, 1996: 422, original italics

Though differences exist between individuals, individuals' group associations and nations-states there is a risk of overplaying the difference of differences (Melucci, 1996), something which is a frequent contradiction within the critique of essentialism and mono-culturalism. This happens when what sometimes is referred to as the cultural politics of difference, such as anti-racism movements, "assert(s) the unfixed and 'overdetermined' character of identities [and] recognises both the interdependent and
The great problem of organising along the lines of an idea of antiracism, taking on the ‘overdetermined’ character of ‘cultural identities’, needs to be stressed, independent of it being an unfortunate outcome of what in hindsight then is an unsuccessful approach that only increases the already existing prejudiced views of fixed and insurmountable differences. Others, such as Cohen (1999), argue that the larger problem lies in the reductive representation of racism that was, Cohen argues, necessary in order to construct certain exemplary models of antiracist policy and practice. Gilroy goes as far as asserting that “[i]t is possible, then, that the idea of antiracism has been so discredited that it is no longer useful” (Gilroy, 2002: 251). As an example of the wider reaction from industrialised societies, or what commonly is referred to as the West, the ‘market’ has happily paid attention to the ‘overdetermined’ differences, neglecting the fact that the tastes and the needs of the individuals’ who constitute the market(s) is just as pluralistic as the Benetton models (hooks, 1992). This underscores the superficial interest shown not only by the market, but also by Western societies, making ‘overdetermined’ differences more permanent and unchangeable within the societies of the North and West.

As explained, there was a clear point in the attempt not to conceptualise ‘race’ and ethnicity; culture is however partly a different matter. According to this thesis culture is the way we relate and therefore function in relation to other people on an everyday basis. "’[C]ulture designates a cognitive system, that is, a set of ‘propositions,’ both descriptive
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[... and normative [...] about nature, man, and society” (Spiro, 1995: 323). While culture is not tradition, tradition distinguishes culture from the social. The way to function in everyday situations, how we relate to and interact with other individuals, is therefore taught and learned in similar fashion to how the captain of a boat learns about the bottom of the sea with the help of a lead. Like the signals sent out by the lead, traditional or taught knowledge is constantly tested and re-evaluated in the face of everyday situations and consequently between one generation and the next. Culture is, in this approach, burdened with tradition and therefore carries an essence, but is context sensitive and therefore never fixed. When cultural patterns are passed on, they are always, consciously or unconsciously, passed on in an updated version. Hence, this thesis views culture as an uncomplicated and unproblematic explanation of very complex phenomena involving social beings. This does not, however, mean that this thesis views all conceptualizations of culture as unproblematic.

That culture sometimes comes with the prefix ‘high’ and sometimes ‘low’ and sometimes ‘pop(ular)’ in relation to, for example, art, theatre and music is not per se problematic. It is the tendency of ethnocentric (de)evaluation of culture that is potentially problematic. This thesis would argue that Heller (1996) exemplifies this when she stresses that it:

becomes more important than ever to rely on traditional cultures that have grown indigenous high cultures (like the European, the Mediterranean and Asian ones): not because their every culture of difference is ‘worth more’ than the cultures of other people (we have no standard of comparison), but because there is a ‘plus’ in some which is absent in others – and this ‘plus’
belongs now to everyone and everyone can absorb it. This is what the 'universalism' of high culture means.

Heller, 1996: 30

Heller’s hierarchical multiculturalism, in contrast with what she stresses, exemplifies the immediate interest of culture in the context of this thesis (for further examples see Ekholm Friedman, 1994). The focus of this thesis on successful or unsuccessful interaction is brought to the fore when phenomena explained as culture, independent of prefix, is fixed and ‘essentialist’ (in the popular usage of the term) and/or ethnocentrically devalued.

There is no reason to dispute that social beings distinguish between people based on certain characteristics. The more pertinent question is, what are the specific conditions that make this form of distinction socially pertinent and historically active (Hall, 2002)? Neither is there any reason to dispute that ‘race’, ethnicity and culture are interlinked and occasionally interchangeable, something that is clear in the common usage of the term and concept multiculturalism. That some type of notion of ‘identity’ may underpin terms and concepts such as ‘race’, ethnicity and culture (in its ‘essentialist’ version) have above been indicated. To what extent, in what way and what the possible outcomes might be, will later become clearer. However, before entering in to a more detailed discussion on ‘identity’, there is a need to broaden the understanding of the term and concept multiculturalism.
Integration
Despite the fact that in the current state of EUrope it might have been more accurate to
discuss the relation between EUropean states and transcultural-ness, it is
multiculturalism that is central to the integration policy documents that are analysed.
There is, therefore, a further need to untangle the interconnections between integration
and multiculturalism.

Integration and Multiculturalism
Regardless of a noticeable confusion in regards to the meaning of integration, most
commonly it is used in conjunction with multiculturalism and as the antonym to
assimilation. Consequently, it is important to further articulate the difference between
assimilation and (multicultural) integration (Micheletti 1996; Kymlicka and Norman
2000b). Neither assimilation nor integration is all or nothing. Pieter Bevelander et al.
(1997) use integration as a yardstick for the labour market in a similar way to how
Ekberg and Gustafsson (1995) claim that different degrees of employment, skill- and
income-matching indicate different degrees of assimilation. Bauböck (2001) on the other
hand claims that “[i]ntegration should be understood as a demand for the inclusion of
newcomers but also as referring to the internal cohesion of societies and political
communities that are transformed by immigration” (Bauböck 2001: 1), while
Christiansen and Schmidt (2002), in an attempt to avoid cultural streamlining, focus on
ethnicity as an asset by primarily connecting integration with citizenship. The two latter
formulations, just as the former one, could potentially be made in respect to assimilation
which rather than clarifying our task underlines the confusion.
The intention of both multicultural integration and assimilation, according to Kymlicka and Norman (2000b), is to ‘integrate’ through constructions of new ‘transcendent (national) identities’ leading to a ‘citizenship-identity’, with the difference that multicultural integration does not expect elimination of cultural differences. While Ben-Rafael (1996) suggests that assimilation as an extension of acculturation does not only include adaptation to cultural patterns, norms and values of the dominant group, but also a change of ‘identity’, Kymlicka and Norman (2000b) argue that it is nothing but an elimination of differences (see also Ejrnæs, 2002). However, while assimilation as the elimination of differences can either be self-imposed or forced (Emerek, 2003), a lack of options could potentially also be read as non-verbalised forced assimilation. Despite the difficult of distinguishing between assimilation and integration, assimilation theories have in most cases, in academia and politics, not only become out of touch with the experienced world, but also, as Bauböck (1996) stresses, have almost become a dirty world implying a so-called politically incorrect coercive inclusion. To support philosophies of assimilation, as described by either Ben-Rafael or Kymlicka and Norman, is unviable if looking at the major cities in EUrope 2004, which are according to Castles and Davidson (2000) better described as highly transcultural, than monocultural, with new or foreign cultural elements.

In contrast with assimilation, both integration and multiculturalism or multicultural integration presupposes a degree of free will, while both accepting and recognising ‘ethnocultural identities’. Support from the state and its institutions, hopefully its citizens, is supposed to make residents/citizens from different backgrounds feel at home and therefore integrated (Kymlicka and Norman (2000b). As we will see later, this is the
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approach in the Swedish integration bill, Prop. 1997/98[16]. Three of the more central concepts in this 'support-of-free-will' multicultural integration are recognition, tolerance and acceptance (see Taylor, 1992; Rex, 1996b). While recognition, tolerance and acceptance are all closely intertwined, tolerance in multiculturalism or the multicultural democracy is primarily about tolerating new influences in what is perceived as an unique and homogenous state of being. That is, to tolerate is to recognise and accept other people’s approach to life as being just as important for them as the approach chosen by the one who is to tolerate. While it does not mean that you will have to adopt ‘their’ ways, to tolerate something you first need to recognise and accept it.

A tolerance of cultural diversity is according to Rex (1996b) based on three ideas. (1) Separate groups pursuing separate cultural values, which do not threaten other groups’ or the public political culture; (2) a combination of an intermediation between the market economy, groups and individuals; and (3) that members of ethnic groups are supposed to rely on solidarity from within the group as support in the pursue of equality (Rex 1996b). Despite the fact that there has to be, as Rex rightly points out, an acceptance of a common culture in every case of integration, he avoids problematizing both tolerance and common culture, and takes groups, or an individual’s group association as primordial.

Despite not being addressed, as in Taylor’s (1992) politics of recognition, the concepts of tolerance and acceptance are always implicit within discourses on recognition and equal respect. Taylor’s argument, or what can be seen as a popular version of his argument, is widely accepted and central to the Swedish integration policy. At the core
of Taylor's argument is, in spite of an inbuilt and unexplained value judgment, the need or demands by Others for recognition of 'their' cultures. If not, the state risks damaging or inflicting harm on the Others' self-esteem and 'identity'. Accordingly, but despite partly relying on a Bakhtinian dialogism, the recognition central to Taylor's multiculturalism is closely related to a notion of 'cultural identities'.

There are several problems with this argument. By reducing multiculturalism to recognition without problematizing tolerance and acceptance, Taylor almost completely avoids a theory of multiculturalism. In addition, as Hesse stresses (1999), neither is recognition, so central to his argument, clarified (see also Bhabha, 2000). In so doing, he is not only simplifying multiculturalism, but by avoiding problemizing recognition he is also running the risk of supporting popular discourses which claim that 'they' want and 'they' take while we are the ones to give. Furthermore, in both asserting that multiculturalism equals a politics of needs or demands for recognition and that this same need is "one of the forces behind nationalist movements in politics" (Taylor, 1992: 25), Taylor makes his approach, if not ethnocentric, at least somewhat one-sided. The implicit link of evidence created gives a disproportionate attention to nationalism in connection to multiculturalism. That Taylor's case is most likely based on Québec may erase some question marks, but far from all. Despite the fact that there might be a case of nationalism to be made in relation to claims and demands for self-rule by indigenous populations, not necessarily a negative one, there is hardly one to be made in relation to recent immigration, at least not an argument such as the one made by Taylor. To leave nationalism unproblematized is both unfortunate and potentially damaging. However, nationalistic politics or nationalism do not have to be contradictory to multiculturalism.
As we shall see, the Swedish national minority policy exemplifies this point (see discussion on page 243-246). Why Taylor's usage of Bakhtin's notion of the dialogic is highly problematic and contradictory will become clear when turning to the Bakhtinian Circle in relation to language and 'identity' (on Taylor's dialogic see also Bhabha, 2000).

Every situation of recognition demands a degree of acceptance, tolerance and respect. Recognition, acceptance, tolerance and respect cannot, however, be discussed outside the context of hierarchy. Hierarchy is unavoidably always put to its test in a nation composed of several communities having arrived at different times and with potentially different agendas. Who, for example, is supposed to tolerate whom and who is supposed to control the potential hierarchy? A common way of resolving these problems without actually addressing them is to add mutual as a prefix, as in mutual recognition, mutual acceptance, mutual tolerance and mutual respect.

Tolerance founded in respect encourages, according to Micheletti (1996), communication and awareness. Consequently, tolerant people are, according to this view, characterised by a curiosity for that which is different. Drawing on Weber, Micheletti (ibid.) furthermore suggests that it is the somewhat neglected concept of responsibility within social science, which holds a key to a functioning multicultural democracy. This responsibility demands a developed self-confidence and a clear objective in life of both individuals and 'groups', but never equals plights demanding a behaviour controlled by rules and regulations, nor should it be enjoined with threats and sanctions. Instead, there is a need for discernment and a readiness to engage with social
problems. Responsibility is accordingly developed out of social values and the actions that follow are consequently based on these same values. Just as Taylor’s interpretation of Bakhtin was to solve acts of recognition, so is communication and awareness central to Micheletti. An awareness demands that collective problems are handled in arenas where all ‘groups’ and interests are represented. Micheletti who writes on Sweden is primarily constructing a case for a multicultural democracy in a policy-driven state. Sweden, as a social democratically engineered Scandinavian welfare state, is often referred to as a ‘nanny state’, where too many interventions takes place through too many polices and laws. Despite the fact that SAP, Socialdemokratiska arbetarpartiet, or Socialdemokraterna (the Social Democratic Workers Party or the Social Democrats) has been in power during the greater part of the twentieth century, this should not be confused with a SAP-engineered Scandinavian welfare state. The transformation that took place during the twentieth century could not have happened without collaboration from other parliamentary parties and the rise of trade unions.

Steeped in the social democratic welfare state, and drawing on Taylor (1992), Roth (1997) formulates three questions in regard to a pluralistic or multicultural society and its integration: – (1) What positive values can be associated with a multicultural society? (2) Where are the lines or borders in regard to a desirable cultural plurality supposed to be drawn, and how is the state supposed to deal with ‘intercultural conflicts’? (3) How do feelings of social solidarity in a multicultural society take place (Roth 1997: 11; AOT)? These questions may not be at the core of this research, but they affect political decision-making in regard to immigration and integration and therefore both individuals and possible group associations. As such, the answers should, independent of ideology,
affect the multicultural state and its relation to integration. Depending on demarcations, one will end up with different definitions of multiculturalism. Drawing on Hesse (1999) and Micheletti (1996), this thesis will address five definitions of multiculturalism. These are the imperial, the liberal, the communitarian, the feminist and finally a Scandinavian social democratic model of multiculturalism.

Imperial multiculturalism is a European or Western phenomenon, which reluctantly deals with the multicultural as something which has come back to haunt ‘him’. Anchored in a masculine individualism and cultural hierarchy, conceiving the nation as being divided in terms of European and non-European, it is the modern archetype of European or (US) American nationalism. It is steeped in what could be perceived as a circumscribed liberal tradition. As such, the multicultural is not recognised and therefore not part of the state and the only option for ‘it’ is to assimilate. The latter is a constant and ambivalent struggle within imperial multiculturalism. Although ‘foreign’ cultures are only recognised as anomalies within the imperial multiculturalism, the potential success of its assimilation politics would eradicate the dichotomies so necessary for its nationalistic core. Despite the fact that imperial multiculturalism is a Western expression, a phenomenon of nationalism dependent on the Other, it can also be found in states as different to each other as Israel and Iran.

Liberal multiculturalism is best summarised as a politics of social justice, but also as a contradiction in terms. That is, one could also argue that the liberal state is the opposite of multiculturalism, multicultural integration and multicultural democracy (Roth and Runblom, 1996). The liberal state is, in theory, open to all people. Its focus is on
individual rights with freedom of opinion and freedom of religion, but without a multicultural recognition of specific groups and their rights. Consequently, in theory, there is a sharp divide between the public and the private within a liberal multiculturalism. As such, the question of faith is reserved for the private sphere. It only recognises different cultures by their access to social and educational opportunities, the bases for a 'good life', or goods. It consequently distinguishes majority cultures from minority ones by comparing different parts of the population, based on who is socially advantaged and who is disadvantaged.

In upholding a 'neutral' relationship between itself and individuals' group associations, the liberal state avoids recognising its own values. Cultural dimensions are complicated and not fixed facts. However, leaving cultural dimensions unaddressed is equivalent to making systems of cultural ranking, hierarchies and power centres invisible and consequently the individual 'immigrant's situation unexplainable. The avoidance of culture in public discourse runs the danger of not recognising t racialization through discrimination according to mentioned cultural ranking (Älund & Karlsson 1996). In line with Taylor's argument of recognition, Roth and Runblom (1996) argue that the lack of recognition of cultural (as opposed to social) rights that protect and support an individual's rights to associate with collective value systems will harm the individual's self-development. The consequence of the liberal state's neutral position in regards to its citizens and their group affiliations is that groups established within the unrecognised and neutral value base of the state will receive unrecognised support in getting their ideological messages across (Roth 1996).
Communitarian multiculturalism is in some respects the opposite pole to liberal multiculturalism with its view of the nation as consisting of “discrete, regenerated and recoverable communities and social groups in which citizenship as a common public good is particularly important” (Hesse, 1999: 219). It demands of its citizens and communities, as a civic virtue, to recognise other communities while participating in the development of the nation, its laws and policies. “It invests in the idea of discrete and accountable forms of representation and communal rights of self-determination, and disinvests in the idea of cultural assimilation” (Hesse, 1999: 219). Despite not being the prevailing model in practice, this research argues that the communitarian model of multiculturalism is the archetype of much of the multicultural discourses in Europe. This is certainly the case when it comes to Swedish policy documents on integration. Just as the social democratic or ‘nanny state (as it is sometimes called) is always controlled from the top, due to explicitly having its citizens’ best interest in mind and knowing what is best for its citizens, the communitarian model of multiculturalism has a need for a ‘policy-run-state’. This is because there is a need to ensure that its citizens live up to their civic virtue.

Feminist multiculturalism is shaped around the recognition of and the attention given to polyvocality and multiple dialogues, which form the basis for the state’s policy formation. It finds this basis in “an imaginary of the nation as divided into differential solidarities across communities and across nations. Its conception of the nation beyond the confines of parochial insularity and against the imperial hegemony of nationalism emphasises a transnational interdependence” (Hesse, 1999: 219-20). While it may not recognise difference in what the good life may contain, how to entertain it is left up to
the individual and/or group. The rights to liberty and the good life are held to be
multiplied as well as transformed through the interaction between and across
individuals, communities and gender. What Hesse (1999) calls feminist multiculturalism
could be argued to be similar to a common theoretical model of ‘identity’ politics in
cultural studies where individual and group differences are recognised, through
polyvocality and multiple dialogues, as the basis for a common struggle for the good or
fair life.

Scandinavian social democratic multiculturalism can be said to be at the core of
common Nordic social democratic values. While expressed as different parts of a society
living under different circumstances, through choice or lack of choice, integration is the
attempt by the state to form a unity. Central to its attempts is a belief in the
interdependency between grass root organisations and unions and the social democratic
state and how they developed and nourished each other. This could be said to reflect the
relationship between the state and its citizens in regards to tolerance, responsibility and
deliberation, as described by Micheletti (1996) and central to communitarian
multiculturalism. As already implied, one could in fact stress that if there ever was an
original model of a Scandinavian social democratic multiculturalism, it mirrored the
communitarian model. In contemporary Europe it is however a challenge to find a
purely liberal or a purely social democratic or communitarian state despite individual
governments’ statements. The Scandinavian social democratic model of multiculturalism
is not an exception to the rule. What one finds in abundance are different types of the not
always uncomplicated combinations of the five models described above.
There are several partly interlinked problems facing states struggling with their aspirations to be both communitarian and liberal. To be liberal is of course less seldom recognised if a Social Democratic party such as SAP is in power. Some of the more prevalent problems recognized by the states are: how the state is to enable and empower all of their individual residents/citizens and grass root organisations; what attention is the state to pay to continuation perspectives, i.e. life histories that sometimes have started outside the state's borders; and how, if desired, is the state to enable its individual citizens to identify with the arenas in need of transformation? These questions are both at the centre of every multicultural society and the complicated relationship between ideologies of social democracy and liberalism.

**Multiculturalism's essentialist nature**

Multiculturalism is often criticised for its essentialist nature (see Bhabha, 2000 on liberal multiculturalism). By accepting different cultures as just different, multiculturalism is supposedly assuming a fixed and distinct state of each one of the individual cultures in similar fashion to the antiracism movement. Trying to invalidate this critique, Modood argues that an acceptance of cultures does not equal an acceptance of a primordial existence. That one culture, one individual, or 'identity', is the same over time, does not exclude change, according to Modood, just as "change implies the continuation of something that has undergone change" (Modood 1997: 11). That we can refer to Swedish, Danish, French or English of today as the same languages through history despite several changes due the cross-influences between the different languages implies an acceptance of both essence and change, the opposite of a frozen language in time. This argument holds true for cultures in the same way as it holds true for languages,
According to Modood (1997), although providing a good reason for why we should not reject multiculturalism, Modood is according to this thesis missing or devaluating three central arguments surrounding multiculturalism. Firstly, just as Bhabha (2000) and Hall (2000b) stress the impossibility of criticising multiculturalism as if it was a homogenous phenomenon, it is just as impossible to defend a homogenous multiculturalism. Secondly, Modood does not give enough attention to external factors. That is, he underplays the impact of the host society on newly arrived cultures. To be able to understand any contemporary society and its potential problem, this thesis argues that there is a need to read culture in the context of cultivation of life and not circumscribed from the society in which the cultivation takes place. Thirdly, in his attempt to invalidate any argument that claims multiculturalism *per se* as essentialist, in exchanging essence for change Modood fails to recognise the essential flaw of such critique.

Despite the potential questions this may give rise to, in relation to the problem of who we are, how we are and why we are, prescribing certain characteristics as vital to a description is to give these characteristics essential value in relation to that description. This does not have to imply static characteristics or qualities (see Lange, 2001). However, while agreeing with Lange (2001) that there is a need to pay attention to everyday essentializing processes, processes of categorising, classifying and naming, in which all individuals take part, this thesis strongly disagrees with giving a carte blanche to academia in its processes of categorisation. In so doing, Lange disconnects academia from the reality with which it is engaged as a subject to understand and explain and as
such, the disconnection only manages to isolate the subject from the reality it shapes, it is shaped by and of which it is a part.

At the beginning of this chapter, it was stressed that different texts exist within different contexts, which use, react and relate to distinct terms and conceptualisations. We have now introduced terms, processes and phenomena relating to conceptualisations of integration. We have asserted that interaction is a social phenomenon which permeates society, presented segregation as the opposite to the state of integration and assimilation as the opposite to processes of (multicultural) integration. Having made ourselves familiar with the more common terminology in relation to the topic of integration it is now time to turn to Chapter Three and the conceptualisation of the two terms at the centre of the research question: ‘identity’ and language.
Identity and Language

As outlined at the start of Chapter Two, this thesis sees human interaction at the centre of all types of migration. Furthermore, it views unsuccessful interaction as the major hindrance against a successful integration process, independent of the definition of the latter. Part of the reason for unsuccessful interaction lies in fixed stereotypes, i.e. ‘identities’. That is, stereotypes and ‘identities’ here are in line with Bakhtin’s discussion on the need for open and honest dialogues viewed as one and the same (Bakhtin, 1990a, see also Leerssen, 1991b). This chapter proposes that the only way of understanding the potential problem of categorisation, whether in everyday policy or academic practice, is to understand the interdependent relationship between language and ‘identity’.

As proposed in the introduction, this chapter argues that West European languages contain and relate to a ‘Saussure-ian’ or an absolute ‘identity’ construction that lives and thrives of dichotomies that strengthen concepts such as ‘race’, ethnicity and culture. The ‘Saussure-ian’ ‘identity’ construction is compared here with stereotypes due to the preconceived notions upon which its construction rests. This ‘identity’ construction, which will also be referred to as a common notion of ‘identity’ can be summarised as: I am what I am, because I am not what s/he is, or they are what they are because they are not like us (Saussure 1998). Hence, in pursuing the interest of this research, we are here to problematize the role of and the relationship between language and ‘identity’. This is done in two steps; first, the more common approaches to ‘identity’ and language are
introduced; and secondly, an alternative approach to language, identity, the text and the research is presented.

Identity
“What then, is the need for a further debate about 'identity'? Who needs it?” (Hall 2000a: 1). Brennan’s (1988) stresses that ‘identity’ matters because “it is regularly associated with other things that matters.” He continues: “[s]uch a view is bound to shock those who believe that identity itself is something of fundamental importance, a feature of the world that underpins, for instance, our naming and referential practices” (Brennan, 1988: 5). In opposition to Brennan’s conclusion, this thesis would argue that it is precisely the underpinning nature of ‘identity’, its conceptualisation, which enables ‘identity’, whether addressed or not, to play a major role in relation to other things that do matter. That is, ‘identities’ or stereotypes are central to processes of building boundaries, segregation and discrimination.

Alcoff (2003) claims that the main reason behind the continuing and increasing debate of ‘social identities’, such as ethnic, sexual and national, has its roots in the political mobilization of United State’s cultural revolution of the 1960s and the many global conflicts related to ‘cultural identities’ (Alcoff 2003). Despite that this so-called cultural revolution of the 1960s (US) America might have worked as its turbo-charger, it is more likely, not a product of, but within a post-colonial recurrent reawakening that questions of ‘identity’ are raised and re-raised. Post-colonial does here not refer to a period post colonial times, but “marks the passage from one historical power-configuration or conjuncture to another” (Hall, 2000b: 213). However, not until we have established what
we refer to when we speak about ‘identity’ can we truly agree or disagree with Brennan’s conclusion (1988). In an attempt to illustrate different notion(s) and application(s) of ‘identity’, ‘identity’ will be divided into three separate notions. The names have been chosen in an attempt to explicate the differences, interconnectedness and interdependence between the different notions in a way as distinct as possible. The first one, though without any hierarchical order, will be referred to as a ‘private identity’, the second will be referred to as a ‘passport identity’ and the third will be referred to as a ‘public identity’.

Before turning to what this thesis views as three, partly, different ways of referring to and using ‘identity’, there is a need to briefly touch upon what one can call within philosophy a traditional meaning of ‘identity’. Despite that the whole field of philosophy may not agree on one general answer to any question there seems to be a predominant way of approaching the meaning of ‘identity’. Central to this traditional approach is to question the identity or similarity of things. Similarity can be described as; if $a$ is similar to $b$, then some property of $a$ should also be a property of $b$, while identity can be described as; if $a$ is identical with $b$ (that is, $a = b$), then every property of $a$ should also be the property of $b$ (Brennan, 1988). At the core of this discussion is the issue of survival. That is, for example, is person X of ten years identical or just similar to person X of 40? Despite that person X in everyday language would be referred to as the same, independent of age, it would here, due to physical changes, lived experiences and memory, probably be more accurate to state that he or she of 40 years is similar to and not identical to he or she of 10 years. Though it may not in everyday situations be common to reflect upon the issue of survival in regards to individuals’ ‘identities’, in
relation to assumingly specific ethnic cultures, we can assert that while a culture is not fixed over time, what survives is tradition (see the earlier discussion on page 30-32, 43 in this thesis).

Despite that people may not reflect upon the issue of survival, people do according to Glover (1991) ask questions about their own ‘identity’. “In asking these questions, they are using the word ‘identity’ in a way philosophers do not. They are not asking where they stop and the rest of the world begins, or which of several people they are. Rather, they are thinking about what they are like [and] about the characteristics that make them distinctive” (Glover, 1991: 109-10). This thesis sees no reasons to dispute that individuals, including this author, ask questions about themselves, and have thoughts about what they are like and about the characteristics that might make them distinctive. However, it is justifiable to ask if it is the individuals themselves or the researchers describing these phenomena, whom are using the term ‘identity’ when verbalising these questions.

We now return to the above mentioned division into three types of ‘identities’. The ‘private identity’ is constructed through the ‘private’ (in difference to the public) act of differentiating one self from the members within a ‘group’, which one claim membership to, as well as from other people that one need to relate to, despite not being acquainted with. This is commonly described as an ‘identity’ construction. However, this act of becoming an individual person, “an agent with a sense of yourself as an agent, a being which can thus make plans for your life, one who also holds values in virtue of which different such plans seem better or worse, and who is capable of choosing
between them” (Taylor, 1991: 257), is more helpfully referred to as the creation of the Self (Glover, 1991). Accordingly, and in combination with Taylor’s version of the multicultural democracy as a politics of recognition, Taylor argues that a notion of an individual includes both self-awareness and the making of value judgments supported by the individual’s memory (Taylor, 1991; 1992). Drawing on the discussion on identical, similar and survival, this thesis stresses that due to what it describes, the explanation can only gain by being referred as a creation of the Self, while being explained as an ‘identity’ creation, with or without the hinged prefix private, holds no contributing value.

The ‘passport identity’ is most probably most of the time seen as the most basic level of ‘identity’, which almost certainly also is the reason why it is seldom questioned. This is the act of proving your ‘identity’ on demand, by producing a birth certificate, an ID card or a passport. The complexity of what seems to be a simple act is exemplified when an arriving asylum seeker is forced to prove his or her ‘identity’, something that may turn out difficult after having fled a country where you possibly were persecuted by the state (Brochmann 1999a). An established ‘passport identity’ will to different degrees lay the foundation for how the individual in different contexts is referred to, such as in the interaction between the newcomer and the already established; and in a more explicit and permanent form in connection to official statistics and policies.

Categories and ‘public identities’ are created and kept alive through repetitions which confirms and reconirms its ‘valid’ representation, in what Bourdieu (1995) refers to as a ‘creation discourse’. In establishing a category, for example, through the ‘passport
identity' process, statistically referring to it and listing it together with other categories, the circular reasoning of the 'creation discourse' promotes what potentially might be popular categories into legal or 'public identities'. Exemplified, the 'creation discourse' is contradictory applied in integration discourses; while talking about inclusion it simultaneously differentiates by dividing people into different ethnic, cultural and religious groups.

The accounts of the 'personal identity', the 'passport identity' and the 'public identity' should only be seen as short theoretical exemplifications of different notions of 'identity'. Neither of these phenomena is at work in a society completely isolated from the others. There is in fact, according to this thesis, no use to refer to these phenomena by the term 'identity'. However, in an attempt to fully understand the complexity of the experiences central to interaction, the roles assigned to 'identities', one can neither afford to fully retire the term. The term 'identity' will consequently be used throughout this thesis, but within converted commas. Because 'identities' are constructed within discourses there is a need to comprehend them as produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices, by specific enunciative strategies. Moreover, they emerge within the play of specific modalities of power, and thus they are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the sign of an identical, naturally-constituted unity—an 'identity' in its traditional meaning (that is, an all-inclusive sameness, seamless, without internal differentiation).

Hall 2000a: 4
Why ‘identity’ matters, in opposition to Brennan’s claim (1988), is exemplified by Peter Erikson of the Green party in Sweden (AOT, DN 28-Aug-2002a), when engaging with immigration and integration discourses by addressing the lack of acknowledgement of discrimination or racism. Erikson stresses that:

It is obvious that they as quickly as possible should learn Swedish, so that they can interact in the Swedish society. However, we also need to put pressure on white middle-aged decision-makers, both within trade and industry and politics. It is discrimination of immigrants, within the labour market as well as within the school system and housing environments, which is the big problem.

DN 28-Aug-2002a

Erikson’s contribution to the debate personifies the way the ‘identity’ constructions works. Independent of if one agrees with the core of his argument, it is important to highlight that which is Erikson’s main achievement. While managing to put the blame on everyone from people in top positions within Swedish trade and industry and politics to the ‘immigrants’, Erikson manages to disassociate himself from being part of and having gained from everyday discrimination or racism, as well as a political system potentially institutionally racist. According to the Saussure-ian argument, Erikson is Erikson because he is not someone else. Because everyone else, or so it seems, are racist, Erikson is not. Since Erikson represents the Green party, the Green party cannot be racist, though potentially all other parties accordingly would be. Though one of course cannot “explain racism in abstraction from other social relations – even if, alternatively, one cannot explain it by reducing it to those relations” (Hall, 2002: 57),
this is what Eriksen does by avoiding everyday situations of discrimination and racism as well as implicitly removing the system from responsibility. In this way, Erikson manages to leave the option open for the average voter to remain racist-free. That is, the average voter can, in difference to everyone else, by voting for Erikson and the Green party, become part of the non-racist 'Green party identity'. In similar fashion "[i]t is particularly important for the argument that follows that the term 'identity' has become a significant element in contemporary conflicts over cultural, ethnic, religious, 'racial,' and national differences" (Gilroy, 2000: 106). In Erikson's 'identity construction' of both Self and group, he struggles with the alien, the 'immigrant' in similar fashion to how the imperial multiculturalism struggles with assimilating the 'immigrant' without losing its dichotomy.

In most discourses on migration topics, national culture and homogeneity are set up against multi-culture and heterogeneity, or so the discourses imply. To promote a national language or culture, which could be argued as part of assimilationist politics, is according to Heller (1996) in a natural way linked with strong traditions of language, text and history within European nationhood. To stress the importance of language in relation to the ability to participate in society, as done by both Erikson and Heller, is not per se problematic. However, to neither problematize the notion of 'good', for example Swedish, nor the sole relationship created between 'immigrant' and language, as by Erikson, or when Heller takes a historic description as the blue print for future politics without problemizing its affects is at least unfortunate (for discussions of the standardisation and economy of languages see Bourdieu, 1997; Crowley, 2001).
Just as Heller's (1996) unproblematised historic description does conflate great 
contradictions, so do historicised 'national identities'. Whilst the world as an economy 
or market is becoming increasingly more globalized, states are, in a desperate fashion, 
giving away power simultaneously as they are holding ever harder on to self-
maintenance and sovereignty by inventing and re-inventing historicised 'national 
identities' (Pettman 1996b; see also Pettman 1996a). An explicit example of this 
phenomenon is the complex relationship between the European Union and its member 
states. Odermatt (1991) calls attention to the play on symbols when building these 
political loyalties and 'identities' and how they are put to the test. While EU is working 
over-time on integrating its member-states and their citizens, each individual member-
state is, independent of ideology, struggling with the integration of its citizens and 
specifically so with those new citizens that have arrived from outside of Europe in a 
fashion similar to how Hesse (1999) describes imperial multiculturalism.

As stressed above, in contrast to Brennan (1988), this thesis believes that 'identity' 
underpins naming and referential practices. This, because there always is an ideology 
behind each attempt to sell a brand, just as each brand is there to materialise the 
ideology. Ideology is accordingly a formed view, conscious and deliberate thoughts, on 
how this world is supposed to be organised (Vološinov 1976). It is only when paying 
attention to the actual labels or 'identity' constructions that one is able to problematize 
that which is behind the branding, the ideology.

Leerssen points out that:
[n]ational stereotypes ... may be developed in many different ways: ironically or seriously, xenophobiaically or exotistically, appreciatively or denigratingly – but whatever the modality of their occurrence, national stereotypes always invoke the audience's prior knowledge, they always rely on a pre-given recognition value.

Leerssen 1991b: 174

As a result, despite that there need not be a link between categorization and social discrimination, as Otten and Mummendey carefully point out, "'person positivity bias' increases according to the similarity between the self and person to be evaluated" (Otten and Mummendey, 2000: 33; see also Scaillet and Leyens, 2000). This process of categorisation, identification or stereotyping is present on a multitude of levels in our societies and they go hand in hand with either ingroup favouritism, outgroup discrimination or any combination of the two (see Worchel et al. 2000; Waters 1990). In addition to the prominence of absolute 'identity' constructions in language and the connection made between 'identity' and Self as a result, Otten and Mummendey's theory on 'person positivity bias' underlines the need to investigate language and 'identity' in the context of society.

The categorisations central to the (national) 'identity' seldom discriminate within the same group-category between one individual and another, or between individual and their so-called group-category. Let us exemplify this by using the internationally much criticised Danish election debate of 2000 and how Swedish politicians through media, but also Swedish media itself, criticised the Danish election discourse and the subsequent outcome of the 2000 election (Nilsen 2004). This applies not only to the
mentioned Swedish critic of the Danish political discourse as xenophobic and the subsequent Danish defence, but also to Danish and Swedish migration debates in and by themselves where individuals come to represent or become represented by their respective or former nationalities and assumed ethnic group association. This research would argue that the national side of what was by the media termed the Verbal War (DN, 03-June-2002) was for both the Swedish and the Danish context significant and central to what this thesis views as the debate’s ‘hidden’ topic, the ‘national identity’. The way ‘identities’ were (un)intentionally constructed and put to use in the Swedish critique of the Danish election debate and the Danish responses will be referred to as split-level monologism. Split-level monologism is simultaneously working on two separate levels, something discussed by Stallybrass and White as explicit on one level and “with its own implicit principles of domination and subordination” on the other (Stallybrass and White 1986: 198).

According to the logic of the split-level monologism, the Danish population worked as the explicit opposite to Swedishness whilst the ‘Swedish immigrant’ was implicit but an absolute condition for the Swedish ‘national identity’. While the debate most likely just strengthened a Danish feeling of belonging amongst those included by a ‘Danish identity’ (see Nielsen, 2004), “[f]or those who find themselves excluded from the national identity amidst which they live, this exclusion is [already] a perilous one because homelessness is the constant threat, no matter how long they or their ancestors have been resident in a particular bit of geography” (Xenos 1996: 240). Because there is, Xenos argues, a necessity to feel rooted, not necessarily in just one place or with one thing, but the feeling, the nation-state’s response will always be contradictory. In trying
to supply an all-inclusive 'identity', it will always face opposition from a local rootedness. However, the struggle between the national and regional level is obviously a problem of luxury, compared to not being included at all. A second side of homelessness has less to do with space and more to do with being able to feel at home anywhere. It has less to do with homeland and more to do with home, a product and precondition of political life. This thesis would argue that the main problem for refugees of today is not that they so much are denied a new homeland, but that their possibilities to establish a home are delayed, circumscribed or completely denied as with permanent temporary resident permits (TP) (for similar arguments see Papastergiadis, 2000; Brochmann & Hammar, 1999). This is, Xenos argues, tied up with that “[t]he system of nation states systematically denies the possibility through its insistence upon the principle of sovereignty and the state’s hegemony over questions of identity”, which is in a state of opposition to “[t]he principles of human rights, [which], are meant to create that space” (Xenos, 1996: 243). It is here where the earlier described split-level monologism manifests itself through the ‘national identity’, permanent temporary resident permits and integration policy.

This split-level monologism is manifested in what Rutherford calls the hierarchical language of the West, in Hall’s marking of difference and exclusion and Pettman’s notions of otherness, racialized borders of difference and ‘identities’ of cultural and bodily difference. “In the hierarchical language of the West, what is alien represents otherness, the site of difference and the repository of our fears and anxieties” (Rutherford 1990b: 10). This, we see exemplified in The Implosion of Modernity (Friedman, 1996), in similar fashion to Taylor’s multiculturalism. From a position
somewhere in between popular discourse and ‘national identities’, Friedman stresses that “[i]mmigrants in the West are gaining in strength of identity at the same time as their hosts are becoming more ethnic themselves, leading to direct confrontations described as racism “ (Friedman, 1996: 247). That ‘identities’, ascribed to the ‘immigrant’, are gaining in strength while standing in opposition to an intensified ethnicity ascribed to the host, simultaneously as direct confrontations based on these ingredients are hesitantly described as racism, raises several question marks. That Friedman from this concludes that continued immigration only can lead to ruin and perhaps depravity is an ideological conclusion and something that this thesis strongly disagrees with (Friedman, 1996).

Language and Linguistic Approaches
Language is on an everyday basis taken for its face value; it is seen as ‘black on white’ and, though not necessarily discussed as such, something relatively stable. As a theoretical approach, there are several ways of theorising language, but most contemporary models seem to some degree, if not subscribing to, relating to, stemming from or reacting to structuralism (Nilsen et al., 1994).

The start of what later has become known as structuralism is most commonly associated with Ferdinand de Saussure (1998). Summarised, it can be said that Saussure’s linguistic studies focus on language as an abstract system from which one can make generalisations. Language is a system of signs, which do not primarily get their meaning from what they signify, but from their relation to other signs. That is, our formations of concepts are not expressions of given categorisations of the phenomena of the world, but the tendency of the human brain to categorise and in extension our language communities’ way of dividing the world (Saussure, 1998; Culler, 1985).
What was radical with this model of thinking was that the sign was divorced from the reality that it supposedly described. Semiology or semiotics deduced from this that social beings' perception of meaning have more to do with their mental pictures of reality than reality itself. This clear suspicion of the sign is also associated with psychoanalysis and Marxism, which are more interested in the deep structure than the actual symbols. Following this reasoning, social and cultural expressions are to be understood as symptoms rather than reflections, a difference that is parallel to Saussure's differentiation between langue (the system) and parole (what is expressed).

The deep structure behind that which is seen is consequently the main object of interest for the structuralist. Depending on approach, the deep structure is to be found on several levels and different approaches focus on different choices of words, mode of action and/or themes. The main aim is to find patterns between the different elements which will reveal the system of linguistic differences and similarities. On another level, its focus is on the structures of the text; systems of differences and similarities, but also in themes and the narrative form. The latter level elevates and broadens the interest to a level where it is no longer interested in the system of the text, but the system of language and the world of texts. By reducing the world of texts to one system and by widening the concept of text to include, for example, pictures, sounds, movements, architecture and fashion, structuralism has been accredited with, amongst other things, demystifying art forms (Nilsen et al., 1994).

This thesis has no intention to go into further details about structuralism. However, the
importance it has had for the influence of linguistic theories on the humanities and social sciences should be recognised. Amongst the theorists directly influenced by structuralism one finds names such as Lévi-Strauss and Foucault (for examples see Lévi-Strauss, 1983; Lévi-Strauss, 1994; Foucault 2000; Foucault, 1996). Furthermore, structuralism is sometimes seen as a reorientation within linguistics. As such, other theories are commonly seen as reactions to structuralism; a reaction against what is perceived as its rigid, static and reductionist features and/or the sharp boundaries around the text where neither author, reader nor society are considered as factors of influence.

Marxist, feminists, and psychoanalytical literary theories and deconstruction are some of the linguistic perspectives, approaches or theories closely tied up with humanities and/or social sciences, which structuralism has in one way or another given birth to (Nilsen et al., 1994). In their reaction to structuralism, they could all potentially be termed poststructuralists, though this term is more commonly associated with deconstruction. All of the theories above exist in different versions, to different extent, in combination with each other. One such combination of approaches is cultural studies which, as most other theories, studies and/or readings, come in several shapes and forms.

The Marxist reading(s) stems from Marx’s original theories with its foundation in the relation between the base and the superstructure, here represented by the text and the society (Marx, 1981). Amongst Marxist literary theorists one finds the full spectra from those who see the text as a relatively unproblematic reflection of the in society existing power relations, to those who see the text as in a position ‘independent’ of the existing materialistic relations of the base. One critique raised against the Marxist reading is that
it over-concentrates on the ‘substance’ of the text (Nilsen et al., 1994).

Feminist literary theories are, just as cultural theories or Marxism, a collective-term, which does not primarily describe a theory but the social purpose of the literature, independent of whether studying the society in the literature or the literature in society. In difference to Marxism that put class first, feminist theories focus not unsurprisingly on the power relations of the patriarchal society, sometimes in combination with class, sometimes with ‘race’ and sometimes with both. Accordingly, feminist theories are, in different ways, fusing with Marxist theories, Race critical studies/cultural studies, but also psychoanalytical theories.

Psychoanalytical literary theories, drawing from Freud, Lacan and Jung, view literature and art in similar fashion to how the classic Freudian theory focuses on the neurotic symptoms or dreams as expressions of needs that are in conflicts with norms or morals of the society (see for example Freud, 1984). The most common critique raised against Freud’s psychological theory is that it is phallus-centric. This critique has come both from within and from without the field of psychology. Lacan and Jung have been seen as more productive alternatives, either by themselves or in combination with Freud’s theory. Lacan’s main contribution is the understanding of the child’s psychological journey from being one with the mother via a painful divorce to the symbolic state (Lacan, 1996). From being one with the mother, and to some extent with everything else in the baby’s surrounding, the child’s divorce from his or her mother leads, first to the baby’s understanding of the symbolic representation of objects and secondly to the understanding of and the ability to use signs. This divorce between baby and mother will
occur in all ‘normal’ cases. However, under what circumstances this divorce takes place varies and these variations will affect the development of the individual’s usage of language. That is, our personal language is coloured by our personal history (Nilsen et al., 1994). One of Jung’s central contributions is the term and concept archetype (Jung, 1977). Archetype refers to a pattern of ideas or concepts that is predetermined. Jung’s way of stressing the universal nature of the archetypes made him construct them as predetermined and not learned and therefore ‘pre-placed’ in our psyches. They exist in a collective unconscious. Despite its clearly problematic untouchable-ness and the critique consequently raised, the term and concept archetype have been kept alive through alterations. However, there is a second aspect of Jung’s theories that brings us back to our simple summary of Freud. While Freud emphasises the causal aspect of the literature, Jung emphasises its final aspect. While Freud sees the text as a result of the author’s psyche, with traumas and neuroses as the results of ones childhood, Jung concentrates instead on the function of the text production, for both author and reader. While Jung’s unconsciousness is more than simply an appendage, Freud’s is not much more than “slop pail” (Nilsen et al., 1994: 38).

The last example, the most complex and the one hardest to pinpoint is deconstruction and Derrida. Derrida, in contrast to other poststructuralist, does not reject Saussure’s reasoning on the difference between the sign and the reality that it is signifying. Derrida is in fact rejecting all potential fixedness and stability of the sign. In Derrida’s view, the sign is always explained with the help of other signs, consequently resulting in a never ending interpretation, which means that the sign can never reach a point where it is finally determined (Nilsen et al., 1994; Derrida, 1984). Structuralism and Derrida have
been criticised for their view of language as a stable system that exist independent of its concrete expressions, which presupposes some kind of self-governing centre disconnected from its structure. Derrida, on the other hand, asserts that language does not have a stable centre and while stressing that everything is language he accuses Saussure’s followers for having a far too static view of language and that in their erg to find the System they forget or miss the constant play on meaning. The act of reading is text processing and the text is a manifestation of a text universe that exists without clear-cut boundaries between different texts. At the end, it is the meeting between reader and text that decides the status of the text in relation to reality, because “[t]here is nothing outside the text” (Derrida, 1984: 158). Nilsen et al. are not alone, when they in a somewhat sneering tone, stress that it lies near at hand to doubt every text’s relation to reality when language is divorced from reality, which is not only valid for literary fiction but also just as much for historic descriptions and news covers (Nilsen et al., 1994: 41).

Summarising, one can say that the history of linguistic theories, or theories of texts, has developed from a state of belief in the reliable text that means what it says, through a historic dimension that initiated suspicion, ending up with a more fundamental and constant doubt. This thesis will not subscribe to any of the above literary theories, but will by acknowledging their existence produce a reaction to them. In similar fashion to Hall (2003e) it will be argued that it is not possible to conceptualise language without any meaning. Neither is it possible to understand the web of social interactions taking place in the world without relating them to representations, significations and ideologies. Accordingly, we express our thought, explain and inform ourselves about the surrounding world through language. This we do with the help of our own language.
Independent of whether I use Swedish or English, I do so with a language coloured by my history and circumscribed by my knowledge of the language through which I am expressing myself (Devitt and Sterelny, 1999; Whorf, 1979a).

Central to any discussion of language as the bridge of interaction is the question of how meaning is communicated, sent, received and interpreted. On this issue Strawson stresses “that the meaning of a sentence in general depends, in some systematic way, on the meanings of the words that make it up and, secondly, that for a word to have a particular meaning is a matter of its making a particular systematic contribution to the meaning of the sentence in which it occurs /.../ in the context communication-intention” (Strawson, 1996: 104). That is, the utterer has an intention when he or she audience-direct an utterance on a specific occasion. An utterance, not necessarily vocal, is therefore that which by an utterer is expressed. The meaning of the utterance is carried by or contained within the intention behind the utterance, i.e. what the utterer wants to convey. However, Strawson stresses, it is not until the chosen audience recognizes the intention of the utterer that one truly can speak of a meaning (Strawson, 1996).

Described by Leerssen (1991b) as invoking the prior knowledge of an audience, Wilson and Sperber explain from the point of view of relevance theory as “utterances raise[es] expectations of relevance not because speakers are expected to obey a Co-operative Principle and maxims or some other specifically communicative convention, but because the search for relevance is a basic feature of human cognition, which communicators may exploit” (Wilson and Sperber, 2004: 2-3).
The focus on communication-intention is central to (new) rhetoric. That is, by looking at the text it approaches in an attempt to understand both author and audience, in similar fashion to Jung, they are looking at the effects on the audience. What does the text do (Guerin et al., 1999)? The four traditional concerns of rhetoric: audience, arranging, argument and style are also central to dialogism. These concerns try to answer questions such as: “What can we know of the speaker or narrator? To who is he or she allegedly speaking? What is the nature of that addressee, that audience? What setting is established or implied? How are we asked to respond to the situation created?” (Guerin et al., 1999: 321).

However and without necessarily contradicting previous statements, Ehrlich and King (1999), argues that “[g]iven that language is not a neutral vehicle in representation of reality and that it is necessarily laden with social values” (Ehrlich and King, 1999: 165), language needs to be read as highly centric, as in ethno-, Euro- or androcentric.

Nevertheless, “the introduction of neutral and/or non-sexist terms does not guarantee neutral and/or non sexist usage” (Ehrlich and King, 1999: 165). Whorf backs this up when he stresses that it is “[s]entences, not words, [which] are the essence of speech, just as equations and functions, and not bare numbers, are the real meat of mathematics. We are all mistaken in our common belief that any word has an ‘exact meaning’” (Whorf, 1979b: 258). Moreover, Vološinov takes the view of the word without ‘exact meaning’ one step further when he argues that every word needs to be viewed as an empty carrier ready to be filled with context dependent meaning (see Vološinov, 2000).

This thesis will take Koselleck’s (1985) and Vološinov’s (2000) views of the nature of the word as empty, though just to be filled, as the key to what makes words and terms
adaptable and what potentially strengthen their representations, significations and
ideologies, as the foundation stone for the alternative approach to language that we now
will turn to.

An Alternative
Strawson’s approach to meaning is in the view of this thesis certainly more productive
than the Saussure-ian, which with its relational but fixed meaning seems to have a
problem keeping up with a changing world. However, in theories that one first may
subscribe to, one may find things that after further scrutiny are more difficult to come to
terms with. For example, despite agreeing with Whorf when he stresses that the word
does not have an ‘exact meaning’, and though it is the meaning that is the ‘meat’ of
language, it is harder to agree with how he seems to downgrade the importance of the
word for the sentence and the language. Instead, this thesis stresses that the word is the
purest and only neutral sign and as such “the most sensitive medium of social
intercourse” (Vološinov, 2000: 14). Its importance lies in its neutral emptiness, in its
expectation for somebody to take control over it, i.e. for someone to load or reload it
with his or her meaning and ideology. Because of its position in the interaction between
people, its neutral emptiness to be filled with indicatory and representative power
through ideological negotiations and struggle, there is, according to Vološinov, no other
or better way of getting close to the core of ideologies than to study their words, or
terminology (Vološinov, 2000).
Language

At the core of this thesis interest in language is what it perceives as an interconnectedness between language and ‘identity’. There is, based on this, a need for an alternative approach to language, one that not only recognises this interconnectedness, but puts it on the centre stage. Following Vološinov, but also Strawson, Leerssen, Ehrlich and King, Wilson and Sperber, the term ‘identity’ is like all other terms, a social construction, a context dependent political construction, a historical, geographical, cultural and social product. Just as Hall (2000a) stresses that ‘identities’ are more the “product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the sign of an identical, naturally-constituted unity”, Pettman stresses that:

political identities are infused with notions of otherness, borders of difference that are often racialized. The clusters of identities and categories that are common currency in international relations – the West, the Free World, the Third World, Islam – frequently conflated spatial and relational identities with associations of cultural and bodily difference.

Pettman 1996b: 262

What Hall and Pettman stress as problematic with the concept of ‘identity’ also exemplifies the core problem in Taylor’s (1992) multiculturalism, i.e. the use of the common notion of ‘identity’. Common refers to “[c]ommon sense [that] is best seen as a mix of folk theories or, folk opinions” (Devitt and Sterelny, 1999: 10, original italics). In difference to Devitt and Sterelny, this thesis does not hold a preconceived paternalistic attitude to common sense or folk theories. Although Devitt and Sterelny may be right when they stress that most folk theories sooner or later are comprehensively rejected, one should not forget that the same has been true for many scientific theories. To
function in everyday situations people depend, to different extent, on folk theories or common sense. This does however not mean that all folk theories should remain unchallenged or that they could not be improved or changed. Applied, this common notion of ‘identity’, is a phenomenon expressed by Winant as “[t]he ‘twilight of white ethnicity’ in a racially defined, and increasingly polarized, environment means that white racial identity will grow in salience” (Winant, 1994: 65). In a reaction to the ‘identities’, in believing that language carry meaning while refuting the inherited meanings of words, this thesis will argue a case for dialogism or the dialogics of the Bakhtinian Circle.

As such, this thesis takes as its starting point, language as the smallest denominator between individual social beings and their environment and, as already asserted, the word as the smallest, the purest and the only neutral sign. However, the Bakhtinian Circle stresses that, even if language and therefore the word is almost everything in human life, language can never be solely the study of linguistics or for that matter understood purely through using linguistic methods. “The subject of linguistics is only the material, only the means of speech communication, and not speech communication itself, not utterances in their essence and not the relationships among them (dialogic), not the forms of speech communication, and not speech genres” (Bakhtin, 1999d: 118).

As social beings, we think and communicate about the world with the help of language. Written and oral, it is approached as a tool for organising the world in which we exist. Formed, this view or idea of how to organise the world is ideology. That is, behind every action, with a possible exception of a reaction, lies an idea. The idea is an internal self-
justification of action, taking place in the individual consciousness. Because self-
justification equals ideology, the individual consciousness can never be neutral
(Vološinov 2000). Hence, the individual consciousness is the ideology behind each
person's behaviour.

Externally verbalised, the individual ideology is exercised in discourses, i.e.
communication, discussions and debates over certain topics. This external verbalisation
or expression, "which, in some way taken shape and definition in the psyche of an
individual, [is here] outwardly objectified for others with the help of external signs of
some kind" (Vološinov 2000: 84). The discourse will therefore not be viewed as some
great untouchable, mostly evil, force that controls the relationships of this world. Just as
we find an unlimited amount of topics in this world, we potentially also find an
unlimited amount of discourses on each topic. Language, discourse and ideology do
therefore (per)form close relationships. Despite the clear interdependency and that
language seems to be the smallest denominator, neither of the three is reducible to any of
the other.

Though the individual consciousness equalled individual ideology, it is ideology and not
consciousness that the individual is expressing through communication, that is,
discourse formation. Discourse formation or communication does not take place in
vacuum, but depends on interaction. Even unexpressed ideologies are dependent on
interaction. For an ideology to be understood it needs to relate to experienced life, which
has been and which once more consciousness expresses in the formation of ideology. It
is in this recycling of signs, already expressed experiences, in formulating ideas,
expressed as ideologies, which we can talk about language as a tool for organising the world. This forms a support for common theories arguing that we perform political acts when commenting on society, which stands in sharp contrast to Raskolnikoff’s famous statement: “I talk and so I do nothing, though I might just as well say, I do nothing and so I talk (Raskolnikoff in Dostoyevsky, 1997: 1).

The whole idea with an expression is to have an addressee for that utterance. This addressee can never be thought of in abstract terms if the message put forward is to be understood. That is, if the reader, listener or responder is to fully understand the text or utterance, that addressee will have had to be present already during its construction. We are here talking about the contemplated and not the actual physical addressee. As implied, every expression is two-folded, consisting of that which is expressible, the inner (the individual consciousness), and that which is the objectified version of that inner (ideology), that which is for others to hear or read. However, the expression does not adjust itself according to our inner world, but rather the other way around, i.e. to be able to express itself, to be understood, our inner world adjusts itself according to the context.

Summarising what has been said so far, we can say that an idea is an inner self-justification that takes place in our consciousness. Ideas are expressible and when expressed they form ideologies. These ideologies are exercised in competition with each other in discourses and language is accordingly a tool with which we organise our surrounding environment. That is, it is in our consciousness, our inner and creative side, that we in response to specific contexts organise and manipulate the outer passive material, signs, to ideas that we express as ideologies exercised in discourses.
Interaction
Discourse formation or communication takes place through several types of interaction. Integration is one example. The speaker-interlocutor-relationship is central to the Bakhtinian model of the dialogic utterances. This model is best understood placed on a sliding scale between dialogic and monologic principles of communication or what we in everyday speech call dialogues and monologues. This also forms a central part of the method and methodology of this research. At one side of this sliding scale we find the monologic principle. A deduction and or semantic representation produced from the perspective of the monologic principle or ideology is not only part of an experienced reality, but also mirrors and refracts a reality, which it is not part of, and therefore “inevitably transforms the represented world into a voiceless object of that deduction” (M.M. Bakhtin 1999a: 83, original italics). This is the result of a common ‘identity’ construction. The opposite of transforming the represented world into a voiceless object is to engage in open and honest dialogues. Though this research will take the two opposites, monologic and dialogic principles of communication, as abstract prototypes at opposite ends of a sliding scale, it holds the dialogic model as something to aspire for while avoiding the monologic model in its tendency “to suppress and conceal the inherent dialogicality of spoken discourse” (Pearce 1994: 81, original italics).

Arguing along the lines of Bakhtin (1999a) and Pearce (1994) that the monologic principle, in contrast to open and honest dialogues, is expressing ideologies to a world made voiceless, this thesis will divide the monologic speech into three subcategories: autocratic, failed or mistaken, and response-less communication. The first, the autocratic
communication, is most clearly exemplified by a dictatorship, or a monarch or emperor of the past. That is, a dictator expresses the will, which the people are supposed to obey. A more contemporary example is the authoritative voice of a doctor. Today, in for example the UK, this is partly changing with more 'power' transferred from doctor to patient in an attempt to give the patient a greater freedom to choose. It is however not always clear what the patient is supposed to choose between or on what basis he or she will make the decision. Nevertheless, depending on context and power relations, this autocratic communication can take place between any two individuals taking part in a discourse. Power is here supposed to be understood both in its informal sense based on individual agreements and in the formal sense of hierarchical positions accompanying recognised titles.

The second type, failed or mistaken communication, is an unsuccessful transmission between a sender and a receiver. It is communication failing as a dialogue, due to either sender or receiver mistaking a monologue for a dialogue. Failed or mistaken communication will potentially lead to the third example, response-less communication. That is, if the individuals representing the parliamentary system communicate with the potential electorate through monologues they are transforming the citizens into voice-less objects. The effect is response-less communication, which is represented in default of communication by an uninvolved or a voice-less audience. The constantly declining number of voters in most EUropean countries represent one such uninvolved or voice-less audience which is part of a response-less communication. However, non-voting members of the public who express their distrust and dislike through manifestations such as demonstrations, handing out 'protest' fliers etcetera should however not be included
in the category of the uninvolved audience, but as attempting to engage in dialogues. A potential example of this would be the Anti-War demonstrations that took place leading up to the 'Iraqi-War'. The participants may have expressed distrust in the parliamentary parties and the type of democratic system they represent, but the manifestation expressed an attempt to participate in a dialogue with 'their' representatives.

The dialogic principle of communication is at the other end of what was described as a sliding scale. That is, as abstract prototypes the dialogic and monologic principles of communication are each other's antitheses. At the centre of the dialogic principle of communication we find 'successful interaction'. In contrast to the monologic principle, which 'failed' in its attempt to engage in dialogue and thereby created a voiceless object, the Other, the dialogic principle manages to engage in an open and honest dialogue with the other. An open and honest dialogue is resting on certain central ideas. The dialogic principle recognises the importance in emphasising the addressee, the other, who is supposed to hear or read. It recognises that the word is a two-sided act, an act determined by both sender and receiver. As such the word is interindividual, located outside of the individual consciousness of the speaker and does not belong to anyone. The word is based on and contains the relationship between the 'one' and the 'other'. That is, the word never entirely belongs to an individual speaker, except for the actual physical act. We can divide the rights, or the non-ownership, between at least three subjects: the speaker, the listener or responder and the former speaker(s). “Language acquires life and historically evolves precisely here, in concrete verbal communication, and not in the abstract linguistic system of language forms, nor in the individual psyche of speakers” (V.N. Vološinov 1976: 95). But
speech can exist in reality only in the form of concrete utterances of individual speaking people, speech subjects. Speech is always cast in the form of an utterance belonging to a particular speaking subject, and outside this form it cannot exist. Regardless of how varied utterances may be in terms of their length, their content, and their compositional structure, they have common structural features as units of speech communication and, above all, quite clear-cut boundaries

Bakhtin 1999c: 71

That is, utterances are always belonging to individual speaking subjects, speech subjects, and boundaries are controlled by the act of communicating, speaking and responding, between two or more subjects, all within specific contexts. In similar fashion, both the other and I need to be constructed through an open and honest dialogue, if not to become the other's Other (Bakhtin, 1990a).

**Dialogism, the Other and Identity**

This thesis views 'national identities' and 'identities' as constructions of a 'racial', ethnic or cultural nature, all potentially interlinked, and as such likely hinders for a successful interaction. This does not mean that this thesis diminishes the potential importance the act of identifying with ones faith, movements or people often holds for individuals and their possible group associations. As such, Mulinari and Neergaard (2004) stress that their informants do not talk about 'ethnic identities' but about an ethnic consciousness. Whether it is the informants or researchers that assert ethnic, in ethnic consciousness or awareness, will be left aside. As earlier indicated this thesis views such an anthropological ethnicity mainly as a replacement of 'race', biological or
cultural. Central to this view is to question the credibility of theoretical explanations, which rely on the term and concept of 'identity'. In this tradition, this research agrees with Gilroy when he stresses that 'identity' in relation to certain, or several, ideological views, earlier exemplified by Friedman (1996),

ceases to be an ongoing process of self-making and social interaction. It becomes instead a thing to be possessed and displayed. It is a silent sign that closes down the possibility of communication across the gulf between one heavily defended island of particularity and its equally well fortified neighbours, between one national encampment and others. When identity refers to an indelible mark or code somehow written into the bodies of its carriers, otherness can only be a threat.

Gilroy, 2000: 103-4

Consequently, if accepting 'identity' with its structures of oppositional relationships and "camp-thinking" as a model of explanation, then our societies, if not stopping all non-EUropean immigration, will head for a self-caused disaster (for the concept of camp-thinking see Gilroy, 2000). However, Gilroy's argument falls short in at least one aspect. It is not under certain circumstances that 'identity' ceases to be part of social interaction, but it is the term and concept 'identity' itself and its interdependent ideology, which are obstacles for successful interaction. This is the case when "gigantic processes of hybridization" are viewed as wishful thinking by short-lived global elites or academics (Friedman, 1996). It is in the 'identity' association and not in the association with a cause that the problem lays. 'Identities' are based on camp-thinking, on inclusion and exclusion, and if any, it is the elite whom can strive within the system due to its dichotomies, while it is minorities and refugees that will have to hope for a "gigantic
process of hybridization”, i.e., successful interaction and integration, because the opposite means to be locked outside without a home.

Despite that concepts of ‘identity’ (see Ekholm Friedman, 1994) can be and often are criticized for either being too fixed, or in post modernist way (see Best and Kellner, 1991) paying too little attention to the importance that processes of identification may play in individual’s lives, most theorists defend the need for a concept of ‘identity’, or simply resign themselves to the use of ‘identity’. Despite all critique, the ever growing importance of ‘identities’ can probably be derived from what Hall describes as the revolution of the subject, where the individual subject has been and is given more importance than the collective social subject which is becoming evermore segmented and pluralized (Hall, 2003a).

At the same time, our models of ‘the subject’ have altered. We can no longer conceive of ‘the individual’ in terms of a whole, centred, stable and completed Ego or autonomous, rational ‘self’. The ‘self’ is conceptualized as more fragmented and incomplete, composed of multiple ‘selves’ or identities in relation to the different social worlds we inhabit, something with a history, ‘produced’, in process. The ‘subject’ is differently placed positioned by different discourses and practices.

Hall 2003a: 226, original italics

In what Bakhtin calls the exact sciences there is only one subject and its opposition is the voiceless thing. In analysing ‘over the head’ of the object of research, even a social being will be transformed into a voiceless thing. This is only avoidable if allowing the subject or the social being to voice his or her opinion while the cognition of the subject
stays dialogic. The research needs to start with the researcher's recognition of his or her own position in regards to the research. However, it is only through the creator that an object can achieve determinateness and its face. Despite clear similarities, this is not the same as the ethno- or Eurocentric relationship between researcher and object of investigation that has been subscribed to by, for example, anthropology, among other Western schools of thoughts, something they have been heavily criticised for (for examples see: Friedman, 1996; Ekholm Friedman, 1994). Bakhtin attempts to avoid some of the common pitfalls by asserting that it is only through a sincere relationship, what he calls an open and honest dialogue, that one can become a whole being (Bakhtin, 1990a).

As an individual, one can never completely see the wholeness of oneself. Therefore, it is necessary for us to get the missing pieces of the puzzle from the other.

In order to see the true and integral countenance of someone close to us, someone we apparently know very well – think how many masking layers must first be removed from his [sic.] face, layers that were sedimented upon his [or her] face by our own fortuitous reactions and attitudes and by fortuitous life situation. The [creator’s] struggle to achieve a determinate and stable image of the [other] is to a considerable extent a struggle with himself [sic.].

Bakhtin, 1990c: 6

In the context of research, the importance of Bakhtin’s statement is two-folded. The individual researcher is never whole when commencing research and therefore in need of the other, the object of research, to fill in the missing pieces in an attempt to realise
his or her own position in relation to the object of research and the remaining society. The object of research is in the same way never whole before meeting the researcher, or somebody else acting as the other. In this never ending process of trying to create a wholeness, because of his or her outside position the author needs to try to experience the other through different value judgments than those which s/he values him- or herself and or his or her closest surrounding. It is only through the process of trying to step outside of oneself, trying to look in and at the context with the help of the other that the author can come close to completing the wholeness of him- or herself, and thereafter the wholeness of the other.

In Vološinov's words, "[i]n becoming aware of myself, I attempt to look at myself, as it were, through the eyes of another person" (Vološinov, 1976: 86), or in Bakhtin's words:

In order to vivify my own outward image and make it part of a concretely viewable whole, the entire architectonic of the world of my imagining must be radically restructured by introducing a totally new factor into it. This new factor that restructures the architectonic consists in my outward image being affirmed and founded in emotional and volitional terms out of the other and for the other human being.

Bakhtin, 1990b: 30

It is only in this process of trying to reach an open and honest dialogue, a successful interaction, which we get close to avoiding any misleading ethnocentrism. Even in architectonics, in the creation of the other, it is a struggle to avoid writing an obituary. That is, creation is an ongoing process that can never allow itself to come to an end, to
become essentialistic, fixed. This means that not even when inviting the other into the complete act of creation, attempting to portray a fair representation, is one safe from transforming the other into the Other. For as Bakhtin stresses: "I have to be, for myself, someone who is axiologically yet-to-be, someone who does not coincide with his already existing makeup" (Bakhtin, 1990c: 12). There can in other words never be a 'final word'.

To become aware of myself, as Vološinov (1976) stresses, is about constructing self-consciousness. Accordingly, from a Marxist perspective, the self-consciousness is what leads to class-consciousness and our 'objective roots'. Class-consciousness put aside, it is not until I as an individual am aware and self-critical of myself, my own position and my relation to the surrounding environment, that I truly can start to make just judgement about myself and the surrounding world. As Bakhtin stresses, "[o]nly in the form of a confessional self-utterance, [...] could the final word about a person be given, a word truly adequate to him [or her]" (Bakhtin, 1999a: 55-6). Consequently, it is about inviting the object of research into the process of creation, it is about "the discovery of a new integral view on the person – the discovery of 'personality' [...] or 'the man in man' [sic.] – possible only by approaching the person from a correspondingly new and integral authorial position" (Bakhtin, 1999a: 58, original italics).

This is central to the Bakhtinian Circle’s dialogism and to the view of this thesis in regards to interaction. Some things can only be reviled by the individual him- or herself. That is, there is always in all social beings something that cannot be covered through second hand information. Because, the truth about somebody coming from a third part,
i.e. the statement not being part of an honest and open dialogue, can never be anything but second-hand truth, a circumscribed truth or a lie and something that will limit or prevent the possibilities of the object of research to remain a subject.

When we contemplate our own exterior – as a living exterior participating in a living outward whole [one] introduces a certain spurious element that is absolutely alien to the ethical event of being. For, inasmuch as it lacks any independent value of its own, what is engendered is not something productive and enriching, but a hollow, fictitious product that clouds the optical purity of being.

Bakhtin, 1999b: 31-2

It is only when the creator and producer of utterances puts him- or herself in a direct dialogue and participatory position that s/he takes another person’s discourse seriously. It is only then that one can come in contact with somebody else’s discourse without fusing with it or letting one’s own discourse swallow it up, i.e. disabling the other’s possibilities to express meaning and value. The aim is to maintain distance in close contact. That is, not a physical distance, which would obstruct any constructive dialogue, but a distance that will enable us to better understand a difference in position.

This is dialogism, the dialogic speech and architectonics, all central to the attempt of avoiding monologism, the monologic speech and the creation of the Other. That is, “[a]ny object of knowledge (including man) can be perceived and cognized as a thing. But a subject as such cannot be perceived and studied as a thing, for as a subject it cannot, while remaining a subject, become voiceless, and consequently, cognition of it
can only be dialogic” (Bakhtin, 1999b: 161, original italics). This architectonic creation process of the Bakhtinian Circle is the opposite of creating an Other through putting an ‘identity’ on the other. Instead, it is about stepping outside of oneself; accepting help from the other in understanding oneself, as well as the other way around, enabling the cognition of the other. Despite that, the question of whether it is possible to walk in someone else’s shoes becomes apparent, the Bakhtinian Circle rejects any such attempt stressing that even if such a thing would be possible we would not gain anything by it. That is, if A is suffering B would at best only manage to duplicate A’s suffering, which is a passive and non productive act (Bakhtin, 1999b).

There are “[v]arious ways of being active in cognitive activity. The activity of the one who acknowledges a voiceless thing and the activity of the one who acknowledges another subject, that is, the dialogic activity of the acknowledger” (Bakhtin, 1999e: 161, original italics). What we cannot do without is interaction. Interaction is about dialogue, a dialogue that would be fruitless if the only way of understanding, or at least trying to understand, would be to merge with the other. The latter would, in fact, make the dialogue impossible. Instead, the Bakhtinian Circle chooses to talk about projecting oneself into the other, which according to BC is different to being one with the other. Projecting is here about interaction, of two individuals stepping outside of their own positions, trying to understand each other as well as themselves through the other before returning back into themselves once again. This is according to the Bakhtinian Circle the only way it is possible to experience the other from his or her position.
condition for a productive projection into the other and the cognition of the other, both ethically and aesthetically. Aesthetic activity proper actually begins at the point when we return into ourselves, when we return to our own place outside the ‘suffering’ person, and start to form and consummate the material we derived from projecting ourselves into the other and experiencing him [sic.] from within himself [sic.]

Bakhtin, 1990c: 26

It is from this position that one is able to consummate the other, according to the Bakhtinian Circle. That is, we would at this stage have completed our material, it would now become separated from the living, and it would die but get a life of its own. The author, researcher or fellow social being consequently needs to occupy a closely sustained position outside his or her object of research or fellow social being in respect of time, space, value and meaning for as long as possible. This ‘outside’ position of the author, researcher or fellow social being enables him or her to

collect and concentrate all of the [other], who, from within [him or herself], is diffused and dispersed in the projected world of cognition and in the open event of ethical action, [secondly] to collect the [other] and [his or her] life and to complete [it] to the point where [it] forms a whole by supplying all those moments which are inaccessible to the [other] from within [him or herself] (such as full outward image, an exterior, a background behind [his or her] back, [his or her] relation to the event of death and the absolute future, etc.) and [thirdly] to justify and to consummate the other independently of the meaning, the achievements, the outcome an success of the other’s own forward-directed life.

Bakhtin, 1999b: 14
This is the relationship between the author and his text and or object of research that makes them both whole but also, simultaneously, disconnects the text and or object of research from the lived world. That is, as soon as it is put on paper it stops reflecting the lived world. The subjects of the world continue to live while the produced material in a contradictory way dies while getting a life of its own. While having completed the wholeness one has also disabled the object of research, i.e. having lost its possibility of self-agency the research object ceases to live. The line between giving and taking away voice is therefore thin.

The creation process of oneself and the other, the problem of outsideness and wholeness, solved through interindivdual relationships, provides us with a possibility to look at the concept of relativity from a fresh perspective. It allows for the possibility of talking about relativism at the same time as a "unitary and universally valid world" because a thesis becomes "independent in every respect from that concrete and unique position which is occupied by this or that individual" (Bakhtin, 1999b: 23). This should make it possible to dispose the I and the Other and replace them with I and the other or some relative version of we. The never-ending interindividual process of creation correlates with a world view of individuals and their possible group-associations living under continuous change, which is the foundation stone of an alternative to the common 'identity' constructions or stereotypes. Such view, would allow us to defuse the 'identity' constructions, without neglecting, for example, Xenos (1996) discussion of the feeling of home in difference to homeless, which includes both physical and spiritual home. An alternative 'identity' would be read as the process of identifying, but without ever reaching or being able to formulate it into an 'identity'. The opposite removes the
connection with ongoing life; making the individual into a voiceless object, the Other. At best, this Other mirrors a historical description of the other, which is no different to clinging on to stereotypes.

The text
In the dialogism of the Bakhtinian Circle, there is no explicit difference between verbal and written utterances or between text and the other/Other within it. This means that texts are to be treated as attempts to start dialogues with their readers. "[D]ialogic relations are always present, even among profoundly monologic speech works" (M.M. Bakhtin 1999d: 125). A dialogic relation is however a concept much broader than the dialogic speech, in the narrow sense of the word. The main difference is that the dialogic speech or dialogue represents a conscious act, while the dialogic relation just is. That is, every text has a relation to previous texts. With or without the creator's awareness or intention every text is part of creating new attempts towards dialogues. There is a clear emphasis here on attempts, because there are obvious obstacles to start a dialogue with someone or a text that do not want to, or fails to engage in dialogue, i.e. a monologic text. However and as earlier stressed, for a text to be dialogic the imagined reader(s) needs to have been present in the process of production. In similar fashion and without any difference between researcher and layperson, the critical non-monologic reader needs to attempt to start a dialogue with the text to be read.

Reading a text one interprets and gives meaning to words, which become part of the "unity of the verbally constituted consciousness" (Vološinov, 2000: 15). That is, it is only in and through our consciousness that we can give meaning to things we see and
phenomena that we experience. This is the process of understanding. When we are making things understandable for ourselves, we use a base that partly already exists within us, which colour our understanding of that which might be new to us. However, to understand one must attempt to interact with the text through the open and honest dialogue, that is, one need to presume that one has something to learn from the text, that the text has something to tell us that we previously to non-prejudiced reading did not know. The opposite is to produce the text “within the bounds of that monologic world [where] someone else’s idea cannot be presented. It is either assimilated, or polemically repudiated, or ceases to be an idea” (Bakhtin, 1999a: 84-5).

Despite that, the text stems from an idea, the text and the idea are, in a similar way to the consciousness and ideology, not the same thing. While the idea neither can become the text as a whole nor theme, it is present within it as long as it is not finalized, and therefore it is the idea that gives birth to the text. The ideas of the original producer and the reader “take shape, to develop to find and to renew its verbal expression, to give birth to new ideas, only when it enters into genuine dialogic relationships with other ideas, with the ideas of the others” (Bakhtin, 1999a: 88, original italics). It is here in-between the two or more producers, in their joint production, “[a]t that point of contact between voice-consciousness [that] the idea is born and lives” and the producers’ personal unfinalizability lay (Bakhtin, 1999a: 88).

In similar fashion to the struggle to avoid writing an obituary over the object of research, a dialogic reading of a text never perceives the text as complete. While the author signs off his or her influence over the finished text and the author’s hero, object of research
and text cease to be a reflection of the living world, the text and its monologic reflection gets a life of their own. Through responding to or opening up a dialogue with the text the dialogic reader becomes both its co-producer and critic.

Is it, however, fair to judge a text in a different context to that in which it was produced? Yes, if being aware of the risk of ‘modernising’ and distorting the text, and if acknowledging the context from where the text was created. In fact, according to the Bakhtinian Circle, (Bakhtin, 1990a) a later reading will be able to scrutinise the material and evaluate parts of it that were not visible to its contemporaries. That is, as earlier asserted in relation to the common ‘identity’ construction, “[e]verything that belongs to the present dies along with the present” (Bakhtin, 1990c: 4). Produced texts had at the time of production a relationship with previous texts and hold after production a relationship with its own past as well as future texts through their relationship with texts of their future past. In the words of Bakhtin: “the aspect [is] of an essential link between the past and present, the aspect of the necessity of the past and the necessity of its place in line of continuous development, the aspect of the creative effectiveness of the past, and, finally, the aspect of the past and present being linked to a necessary future” (Bakhtin, 1990c: 36). Nevertheless, there is a need to be aware of the risk of being ‘time-centric’, that is, the ancient Greeks neither knew that they were ancient nor Greeks. Nevertheless, if one can critically acclaim an ‘old’ text, then one can critically disapprove another text.

Split-level Monologism and National Identity
Like a rhetorician, the Bakhtinian Circle sees the three “aspects – thematic content,
style, and compositional structure – [as] inseparably linked to the whole of the utterance and [as] equally determined by the specific nature of the particular sphere of communication” (Bakhtin, 1990c: 60). Even the most individual utterances belong to relatively stable types of utterances, what the Bakhtinian Circle calls speech genres. The amount of different speech genres is infinite and we organise them in generic forms in almost similar fashion to syntax. We form our speech accordingly, and when we listen, we are in search for a familiarity to enable us to predict the end. “If speech genres did not exist and we had not mastered them, if we therefore had to originate them during the speech process and construct each utterance at will for the first time, speech communication would be almost impossible” (Bakhtin, 1999c: 79; see also Wilson and Sperber, 2004

Bakhtin (1990c) differentiates between primary (simple) and secondary (complex) speech genres. These could be translated into base and superstructure of the Marxist model. The primary speech genre refers to everyday utterances, such as when costumer and vendor exchange context necessary phrases, while the secondary speech genre refers to higher complexity, such as, novels, drama, genres of commentary and scientific research. “The very interrelations between primary and secondary genres and the process of the historical formation of the latter shed light on the nature of the utterance (and above all on the complex problem of the interrelations among language, ideology and world view)” (Bakhtin, 1990c: 62).

Central to this thesis is what the Bakhtinian Circle calls double-voiced discourse, which is the dialogic relationship of discourses. “Relationships in and of themselves devoid of
any dialogic element [...] must clothe themselves in discourse, become utterances, become the positions of various subjects expressed in discourse, in order that dialogic relationships might arise among them” (Bakhtin, 1999a: 183). The double-voiced discourse of the Bakhtinian Circle has a twofold direction, that is, “it is directed toward the referential object of speech, as in ordinary discourse, and toward another’s discourse, toward someone else’s speech” (Bakhtin, 1999a: 185). It is a polemic discourse, externally and internally. The former attempts to make use of the other’s discourse, while the latter is “the word with a sideward glance at some else’s hostile word” (Bakhtin, 1999a: 196). The latter is represented in both the everyday speech made up of openly offensive and trapping utterances, but also a speech that is self-deprecatory over its own intended blow. Within discourses of racism the latter is most clearly exemplified in utterances such as – I am not a racist but..., i.e. utterances anticipating negative responses.

Earlier mentioned split-level monologism stems from this double-voiced discourse. Split-level monologism however allows us to deal more directly with the issue of ‘identity’. In addition to initiating and pursuing an explicit discourse, on one level, and at least one implicit discourse on another, it produces and consummates ‘identity’ constructions. Both the Swedish prime minister when he in the context of the ‘Verbal War’ describes the Danish election campaign as xenophobic, and the former Danish minister of social affairs when she stresses that there is a big difference between them (‘immigrants’) and us, and that they, because they are going to live in Denmark, therefore need to learn how to behave like Danes, express split-level monologism (TT-21-Nov; EUMC, 2002). If expounding the statement by the Swedish prime minister, this
thesis would argue, as already implied, that he both constructs and reinforces a Swedish 'national identity'. He does so through (1) accusing the Danish politicians and implicitly their voters, potentially the whole of Denmark, for pursuing xenophobic immigration and integration policies. (2) By putting Denmark in the spotlight, he indirectly uses Denmark as a dichotomy to the unaddressed Sweden, which becomes the good example, whilst the seriousness of potential problems with Swedish immigration and integration policies are avoided or at least downplayed. And (3), by default positioning 'Swedes' in a context of self-pride and 'immigrants' in a context of everlasting gratitude and therefore subordination. Through the monologic speech it constructs and reinforces on one level what it is to be Swedish, what Swedishness means, while on another level it upholds the dichotomised relationship between 'Swedes' and 'immigrants'. Both levels exemplify common 'identity' constructions at work (see also Stallybrass and White, 1986).

Conclusion
This chapter has problematized the role and relationship between language and 'identity'. It has introduced an alternative approach to the more common conceptualisations of these terms and phenomena. Together, chapter two and three have provided a summary of the different terms regarded as central to discourses on immigration and integration from a European and more specifically a Swedish context. Sometimes the definitions have been adopted from other theoretical writings on similar topics and at other times views and definitions have been adapted to accompanying the
views held by this thesis. I have argued that the terms 'race', ethnicity and culture, are all dependent on the common conceptualisation of 'identity', which produces, nourishes and sustains a camp thinking.

The core task of this thesis is to reveal 'obvious' barriers on the way to successful interaction, and if not being able to avoid them, to understand where it went wrong and learn how to improve. The Bakhtinian Circle's dialogism or the dialogic approach is presented as an alternative approach to the many other theoretical approaches that try to explain the construction of the other and how this relates to terms such as 'race', ethnicity, culture, class and gender. It would not be wrong to describe the Bakhtinian Circle's approach, as explained here, as a 'new' moral attitude towards critical issues. More importantly, it should be understood as a constant ambivalence towards differences, admitting their existence and individual importance without arguing for a primordial essence.

The act of projecting, so central to the Bakhtinian Circle, could be described as a metamorphosis, to borrow a Greek word, i.e. to change form or to overcome one's form, where researcher or layman aspire to avoid a creation of otherness (Melucci, 1996). That is, transcending our given 'identities', is the only way, according to the Bakhtinian Circle, to communicate or relate to differences without constructing monologic texts or Others out of others. Measuring the relationship between speaker and interlocutor on the sliding scale between dialogic and monologic speech appears to help us understand processes of interaction. If applied in combination with the core idea of the Bakhtinian Circle's linguistic reasoning, i.e. the word as an empty two-sided act that can only be
filled in collaboration, although sometimes in contestation, this should provide us with the tools to avoid, or postpone, making the other into a voice-less object, the Other. Taking this accumulated knowledge with the intention to transform it into an analytical tool to be applied in the analysis of the Swedish integration policy documents we will now turn to the Chapter Four, ‘Method'.
Chapter 4: Method

After having addressed different terms central to discourses on immigration and integration, it is time to turn to the analytical instruments and their practical application. However, before launching into a discussion of the analysis, it is necessary to anticipate a specific methodological problem relating to the subject of the researcher and his or her empirical material. This provides a necessary prelude and introduction to the presentation of the empirical material itself. This chapter therefore begins in a true dialogic fashion, by contextualising the researcher as a social being both generally, and within the research for this thesis.

In addition, this chapter provides a first introduction to the texts central to this thesis and discusses different issues on the topic of text evaluation. It presents one possible way of applying BC’s dialogism as a tool for text analysis as well as a practical example of the analytical approach. Excerpts from The Final Report from the Political Committee on Immigrants – Sweden, the Future and Diversity (SOU 1996 [55]; AOT) are discussed and function as examples of Swedish integration policy documents. The analysis carried out serves as an example of the analytical tool and exemplifies how one can gain insight into how to improve processes of future policy document production.

Position and Problems
As Melucci stresses (1999) we should
be aware of the fact that we are always situated speakers, writers, observers. We are always located somewhere in a social and cultural field and that we should be able to account for our specific location in this field and for the partiality of our point of view. But since we speak or write, we are also interested in some form of communication.

Melucci, 1999: 412

This holds true for the researcher, for all text producers and for produced texts, of which the different texts analysed herein are just one example. Consistent with this approach, it is necessary to acknowledge that I as the author of this work, though now having lived in England for four years, am of Swedish nationality. It was also primarily in Sweden that I as an individual first was raised, socialized and secondly as a student and researcher in the field of immigration research educated. The perspective to the topic of Swedish immigration research in this work is therefore simultaneously that of citizen and researcher. As an individual perceived and socially assigned a dialogic position as a Swede in Sweden, and even more so abroad, represented, however erroneously, as a ‘real Swede’, I cannot address the topic of immigration from within the position of being an immigrant in the textual politics that describe the field. To the extent that this form of positionality guides research, the dialogic approach attempts to mitigate the importance of any one role, position, or experience as indicative of the end of political possibility. A specific type of cognition of who we are allows us to be introduced within the field of narration, regardless of where we find ourselves, and in spite of how we might want to position ourselves. The contribution of a ‘Swede’ within the research on
immigration differs from that of an ‘immigrant’ in particularly important ways, but in regard to the current project, which is self-reflexive within a dialogue about policies, this need not be the primary factor guiding the research and its conclusions.

The Swedish citizen faces the challenge of possibly being ignorant of social and political problems inherent in the country of origin. This is principally due to the idealization of society that occurs in Sweden to support a coherent notion of citizen and nation (though still a Swedish citizen, I have lived for more than one year abroad, and is therefore no longer considered legally to be a Swedish resident of that country). Perhaps in this way the picture of Sweden can be thought to be too familiar. This same concern would motivate a parallel issue for me as a researcher, that the consequences of violating the norms of this idealization are fraught with professional and political risk; there are high stakes involved for Swedish society in continuing the socio-political narrative of advancing social progress and successful immigrant integration. However, it is to the benefit of the research field rather than personal advantage that this thesis is directed. By having a basic understanding, an insight into the system as a citizen and subject of Swedish society I know more readily where to obtain information, as well as how to sift out more easily the most relevant information within the dialogue that has occurred regarding policy documents and integration policies. This can in fact lead to an incisive, critical approach to Swedish integration policies.
From an educational standpoint, my background is both interdisciplinary and international. That is, I am located at the border of several scientific territories and more than one nation. This provides me with both advantages and disadvantages.

A border is simultaneously a frontier which separates, but also a line which sets the limits. Being at the border puts me sometimes in the uncomfortable position of not knowing exactly to which side I belong. But when you are at the border you can sometimes see things that are invisible within one territory, the shortcoming and the partiality of each language.

Melucci, 1996: 413

My educational background in Sweden was primarily located within the field of IMER, International Migration and Ethnic Relations. This area of research is approached from various subject fields, such as Sociology, Political Science, History, Economic History, Comparative Religion, Critical Race and Cultural Studies, Gender Studies, Human Rights, Ethnology, and Social Anthropology. My continued studies at CRER, Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, have been anchored in a similar, yet not identical tradition. As a researcher this has meant that I have approached the research topic wearing several academic glasses simultaneously.

In all probability no different from any other research project, this research has also encountered problems. Despite having had a constant focus on 'unsuccessful' interaction and the Bakhtinian Circle's philosophy of language for the duration of the research, the empirical material has changed. This may not be exceptional for research projects of this scope, but was at the time seen as a problem. The (US) American anthology *Race*
Traitor (Ignatiev & Garvey, 1996), which originally functioned as the material for a textual analysis of racial practices was not approved of by the external readers at the time of the first year review. The text was chosen solely because of its exclusive focus on how to live with the concept of 'race', but also rejected because of this exclusive focus. Whether the subject was disapproved of, or if the reason behind the choice of material was not made evident for the readers is today of less importance. After serious consideration, the material for the text analysis was changed to that of integration policy documents.

Following the Danish election of November 2001, the harsh debates on immigration and integration polices during the election campaign resulted in a trenchant critique from Swedish politicians, one that was followed up and assisted by the national news media. This election and the ensuing debate formed a pivotal conceptual role for me and my choice of texts to analyse. Populist ideas in Denmark, first and foremost promoted by the Danish People’s party (AOT), where ‘immigrants’ were put in opposition to Danes, fostered discourses focusing on criminal ‘immigrants’ and weighing immigration costs against those of child care provision, improvement in the care for the elderly and reduced taxes (SDS, 19-April-2001; JP, 17-Nov-2001; Politiken, 31-July-2002). The sitting Social Democratic-led coalition lost the 2001 election to a conservative and right-wing coalition led by Venstre (the leading conservative party, LCP). Already before the election day, the defeat was primarily attributed to promises of new and tougher rules on immigration and integration made by the conservative, liberal and right wing parties (JP, 14-Nov-2001). However, the defeat was also alternatively ascribed to the attempts by the Social Democrats to make political adjustments in an effort to retrieve what was in
the polls indicated as lost votes (DN, 28-May-2002).

Before the Danish election campaign had come to an end, voices of opposition from within the Swedish news media and parliament were raised with regards to the promised tougher approach by the Danes on immigration and integration policies (SDS, 19-April-2001; SDS, 5-Nov-2001; SDS, 10-Nov-2001). The outcome of the Danish election did not manage to end this critique, which by the media was termed the Verbal War (DN, 03-June-2002). In fact, the critique both spread and grew, and official critique from, not so much the EU as a body, but from individual Member States and especially from Sweden continued (Nielsen, 2004). The Swedish Prime Minister expressed that he thought it was frightening that the Danish People's party had been allowed to set the agenda, and heavily criticised the established parties for not disassociating themselves from the Danish People's party and its chairperson Pia Kjærgaard (TT, 21-Nov-2001). The new Danish minister of integration, Bertel Haarder, Venstre, defended the Danish People's party and indirectly its party chairperson Pia Kjærgaard. He asserted that the Danish People's party was a centre-ground-party and that the Swedish critique was out of place. Considering that integration was just as bad in Sweden as it was in Denmark, the only thing accomplished by this verbal mud slinging was to tarnish the Danish reputation in the area of immigration policy. Pia Kjærgaard, in response to the Swedish critique, stressed that it would be appropriate with a leaf on the bridge between Denmark and Sweden so that, while Sweden's big cities turn into Scandinavian Beiruts with clan wars, honour killings and gang rapes, Swedes could polish their halos and pretend that no problems existed (Politiken, 21-May-2002).
Language, culture, employment and economy were the central themes within the discourses of the 'Verbal War'. These themes are found in each country's internal public discourses on immigration and integration. Language and culture are commonly perceived and defined as obstacles between the 'immigrants' and 'their' integration, whether related to the labour market, education or social life. This can be exemplified with the Swedish People's party's (politically closer to Venstre than its Danish namesake, AOT) proposal of connecting the acquisition of citizenship with the attainment of specific language skills, as well as Venstre's suggestion to educate Imams working in Denmark in the Danish language and culture (SDS, 05-Aug-2002; JP, 14-July-2002). Other examples of the centrality of language, culture and economy to the immigration discourse can be seen in the way the former Danish Social Democratic minister of social affairs, Karen Jespersen, linked the numbers of refugees with 'third world' and 'cultural clashes', when she referred to the Swedish debate on so-called honour killings, and when the minister of integration, Bertel Haarder, close to one year after the election proudly asserted that their new immigration policies would save Denmark DRK300 million over a period of one year (JP, 01-Sept-2002; SVD, 16-March-2002; Politiken, 23-Aug-2002).

While Sweden was approaching its own election in 2002 (15th September) the aftermath of the 'Verbal War' was still highly present, and therefore provided the opportunity for Swedish political parties to make themselves heard on issues of migration and integration. Despite this, the 'public' Swedish election debate was rather moderate on issues of migration, and no parties mirroring the Danish People's party had any success at the national level (Politiken, 14-Sept-2002). The only noticeable exception was the
Swedish People's party. The party's upswing was credited with their support for the mentioned language test in relation to citizenship, despite its being an adaptation of a proposal previously made by Moderaterna (the LCP in Sweden; SVD, 12-Sept-2002). The earlier public in the 'public' Swedish election debate refers to an undercover television documentary on the election debate, which showed the discrepancies between the political parties' official lines and the unofficial views amongst each political party's local politicians. These so-called unofficial views were often, if not racist, at least anti-immigrant, anti-immigration and quite frequently anti-Muslim.

Whether blaming language, culture, or any other variable in discourses on integration 'they', the 'immigrants', the Others, are often seen as a burden and cost for both the Swedish and the Danish society wherein 'they' are supposed to be integrated. Either the nation wins or loses in economic terms, and either the cultural plurality has a positive value in itself, or the interaction between described cultures is seen as inherently dangerous to the social homogeneity desired in the society. This thesis does not hold Denmark or Sweden as representatives of something specific to the Scandinavian context, but of something commonly found in the rest of Western Europe. Such a view is supported by an analysis of the topics of the British election debate leading up to both the local and the European elections of 2004 and the national election of 2005. In fact, the debate on the desirability of 'immigrants' and the issues of culture and language is neither new, nor does it seem to contribute much by way of conceptual development from that found in the older, already existing debates on the value of immigration. Both Jensen (2000) and Mörkenstam (2002) have shown that similarities in the debates on immigration can be found as far back as the beginning of the twentieth century.
As has been stressed in the previous chapter, this thesis would argue that the Swedish critique of the Danish election debate and its central topic, which never was substantially developed during the Swedish election debate, symbolises a political discourse which asserts a static state of Swedish policies on integration. This narrative or discourse in the public (un)intentionally upholds and recreates a Swedish national 'identity'. Consequently, because the Swedish critique of the Danish election debate pre-empted and redirected any potential focus on Swedish immigration and integration policies away from the following Swedish election debate, I chose not to put the focus on Denmark, but on Sweden and the Swedish integration policies. Social interaction, the focus of this research, is at the centre of the integration process and the Swedish integration policy documents are setting out the ideas of how to reach the integration goals of the day, i.e. how the residents of Sweden are to interact in a better way. As such there are few other Swedish texts to which the dealing with interaction is more central.

Although painful at the time, the change of empirical material has allowed me to try out the dialogic approach on more than one type of text. This has strengthened the belief in the dialogic approach and the close dialogic reading as a productive avenue through which to study changing political forces in society.
Text Material

Different texts hold different values, depending on the researcher’s aim. “Since policy analysis is about people, a category in which I am forced to include myself, my experiences matter” (Wildavsky 1987: 1). Experience, however, matters in more than one way. As an individual and as a researcher I bring my own experience to the research. Previous experience, together with that which occurs during the research will ultimately influence both good and bad choices made during the research. The researcher is therefore unavoidably always part and parcel of the result.

The Swedish integration policy documents are analysed with the awareness that they were not written for the purpose of this research. However, as Melucci stresses, “[i]nformation does not exist independently of the human capacity to perceive it” (Melucci, 1996: 416). As information and guidance documents, policy documents are direction orientated, “for there is no such thing as a ‘general language,’ a language that is spoken by a general voice, that may be divorced from a specific saying, which is charged with particular overtones. Language, when it means, is somebody talking to somebody else, even when that someone else is one’s own inner addressee” (Holquist, 1982, original italics). Accordingly, Swedish policy documents on integration are intrinsically and extrinsically determined by and determine integration discourses, and they are therefore at least partly responsible for the current state of integration, and should as a result be understood particularly in the context of the Swedish integration project (Bakhtin and Medvedev, 1991; Florén and Ågren, 1998; Dahlgren and Florén, 1996; Holme and Solvang, 1997).
Texts can be viewed as primary and secondary, as well as intentional or unintentional sources for analysis. Because of the ‘linguistic’ approach of the analysis, the texts may be interpreted as unintentional. They were neither produced for the purpose of being empirical material for the research project, nor were they written with the intention of being subjected to any type of linguistic analysis (Bell, 1995; Halvorsen, 1992).

Although a text may present one historical account of an event, no texts are definite reflections of lived reality, and a policy document, a development or policy plan is certainly not an accurate reflection of real social and economic practices in society, but an attempt to set out future development. The information extracted from these documents can therefore not be expected to recreate a complete picture of a lived reality. What are reflected in every text are ideologies; its ideology and its refraction of other ideologies. However, “[f]orm and content in discourse is a social phenomenon—social throughout its entire range and in each and every of its factors, from the sound image to the furthest reaches of abstract meaning” (Bakhtin, 1982b: 259; see also Bakhtin and Medvedev, 1991; Florén and Ågren, 1998; Dahlgren and Florén, 1996; Holme and Solvang, 1997).

The main empirical material used in this project is based on the most recent Swedish Integration bill: Sweden, the Future and Diversity – from immigrant policy to integration policy (Prop. 1997/98[16]; AOT) and the Communication: Swedish Integration Policy for the 21st Century (Skr. 2001/02[129]; AOT). The Immigrants Report 3 – Immigrants and minorities (SOU 1974[69]) and The Final Report from the Political Committee on Immigrants – Sweden, the Future and Diversity (SOU 1996[55]; AOT) are discussed as well as analysed to provide further understanding of the evolution of Swedish
integration policy. As will become clear in the following chapters, the Swedish history of integration policy is a short history that is commonly seen to have its beginning in SOU 1974[69], whilst SOU 1997/98[16] and Skr. 2001/02 are the most recent policy documents that solely deal with Swedish integration policy. The selection of integration policy documents to be analysed has therefore neither been difficult nor can it be seen as a political choice where one policy is chosen instead of another.

**Dialogism, Monologism and Policy Documents**

Texts are not given shape and form by chance, but are adapted by author’s aim(s) and the readers’ role and purpose. A reader is quite familiar with most texts before having read them. The reader knows who has written or at least published the text; knows why it was published, i.e. information or novel; knows the topic of the text; and, knows what is supposed to be done with the text, i.e. read and learn or read and be entertained. From this point of view, the reader is more or less aware of the chain of communication; the sender, the means and the receiver (Melin and Lange, 2000).

However, a text analysis is to great extent based on an additional set of assumptions. The reader assumes that the shape and form of the text, choice of words and content are carefully thought through by an author thoroughly engaged with the topic and the end product. But these are only assumptions and the only thing the reader can take for granted is the end product, the shape and form of the text. To be on the safe side when carrying out a text analysis one can settle on issues of style, such as rhetoric or emotive.
If instead discussing the aim of the author and directive style or the text's affect on the reader, stress is placed on the issue of whether it is convincing or not, one is making an assumption about the content. There need not be anything wrong with making this assumption, but the need to make clear on what grounds these assumptions are made is greater than if restricting ourselves to the issue of style. Furthermore, if looking at the author's purpose, the text and the potential affect on the reader, it is of importance to try the outermost to distinguish the different parts of the analysis (Melin and Lange, 2000).

There is of course not only one correct way to conduct a text analysis.

For in the ideological horizon of any epoch and any social group there are not one, but several mutually contradictory truths, not one but several diverging ideological paths. /.../ The ideological horizon is constantly developing – as long as one does not get bogged down in some swamp. Such is the dialectic of real life.

Bakhtin and Medvedev, 1991: 19-20

There are consequently several ways of conducting a text analyses; their effectiveness depends on the purpose of the analysis. That is, each text analysis should be judged based on what it sets out to do.

It was as a student reading different texts on identity work and the interactions between social beings that I first stumbled upon references to the work of Bakhtin and Vološinov (Spivak, 1993; Kristeva, 1991; Brooks, 1997; Bhabha, 2000; Hall, 2003d). After having
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read the primary and secondary works of and on the Bakhtinian Circle, as well as having compared their theoretical approach to alternative descriptions of the theory of language use, I decided that the methodology of my thesis would be based within the ideas of dialogism first articulated there. This textual analysis should be viewed as a discourse analysis with the philosophical reasoning of the Bakhtinian Circle at its core. To distinguish this combination, from other discourse analysis and dialogic readings, it will be referred to as a Close Dialogic Reading.

In conducting this textual analysis, it is necessary to attempt to engage with the text, experience it, the thoughts and ways of expression it develops from within. As we have seen, according to a dialogic reading, this must occur without consummating, or totalizing, the text. The opposite of this approach would be to “[impose] a thesis on the [authors], a thesis in the sense of the ‘last word,’ and not as the generation of an idea” (Bakhtin & Medvedev, 1991: 20). Accordingly, in conducting a text analysis the text should be treated as the other, a subject, and the outmost should be done to avoid robbing it of its voice, turning it into something which it originally is not, the Other.

This thesis argues that a close dialogic reading is potentially one of the more productive ways of approaching a text, a research project or object of research. This view is based on an everyday reflection that one gets more out of a conversation with a fellow social being by treating him or her as such, as a subject, in difference to an object subjected to the gaze, disgust, desire or lust, in the form of the Other. This should be viewed as nothing more than common sense or knowledge, and therefore does contradict science (see discussion on page 70 of this thesis). The importance of the message of a text is not
whether something is based on technical formulas rooted in the history of science or common sense/knowledge, but in how the reader receives this message and how the reader will make use of it. The Bakhtinian Circle’s dialogism is accordingly based on a common sense of decency, which concurs with the above described approach to interaction. This is extended to literary works and texts in general, which means that no specific distinction is made between the subject as social being or as text. In striving for a constructive and not a destructive analysis, and in line with a view that sees policy documents as directives, this research will avoid imposing conclusions based on authoritative intentions, and treat the texts as sources that generate ideas that can be altered.

This thesis also argues a case for applying dialogism in the production of future policy documents, in difference to monologism, i.e., the more dialogic a policy document is, more likely it is that the text will live up to and assist its expressed aim(s). Dialogic and monologic texts, oral and written, are consequently seen as antonyms and not as incompatible opposites. This is not to say that the expressed aim(s) of a policy document in practice would be reached through dialogism, several other parameters besides the dialogicality of the text effects the outcome of policies. One of the more important parameters, though sometimes overlooked and independent of the explicit text, is the philosophy behind policy documents. Is it pro change, confirming already set out directions, or is it seeking to confirm the status quo? What can be said independent of the answer to these questions is that texts like all other ideological phenomena are both extrinsically and intrinsically determined. The use of the term intrinsic here implies treating a text within its specific textual sphere, where it is determined by other texts.
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Extrinsic describes where the text is determined by other spheres of social life. However, intrinsic and extrinsic influences can not be isolated from each other. The text that intrinsically determines has consequently also been determined from without, while extrinsic influence has been influenced by intrinsic phenomenon. Therefore, independent of the aim of the analysis of policy discourse, if dialogism is inherent in the construction of policy documents this methodological approach would suggest that the prospect for research influence on policy outcomes will increase to the degree the dialogical elements are continually facilitated (Bakhtin and Medvedev, 1991; Bakhtin, 1999b).

A Dialogic Reading
Dialogics or dialogism, as stressed by Pearce, has moved from being a feature of specifically novelistic discourse to a general reading strategy. It is possible to perform a dialogic reading on any chosen text in the same way that it is possible to perform a Marxist, feminist or psychoanalytical one; and the eclecticism of critical practice [...] means that the dialogic approach is frequently combined with various other [...] perspectives.

Pearce, 1994: 16; original italics

Just as there is often not one correct answer to a question (Salkie, 1997), there is also not one way of conducting a dialogic reading. A dialogic utterance refers to the relations within the text, between the text producer and the text, between the text and other texts, between the text and the social spheres surrounding it, and the text and its reader(s)
(Pearce, 1994). The choice of each selected passage for analysis is based on representing examples of the problem theorised in the thesis, i.e. unsuccessful interaction due to monologic speech. As Wildavsky (1987) stressed, choices determine which discrepancies to bring to light. To what extent they represent the entire text is in this case less of an issue. According to the dialogic approach to successful interaction, it would be of greater concern for the policy document as a text expressing certain aims if one were to find ten utterances, paragraphs or passages of monologic communication than if just one or two were to be found. Nevertheless, each example represents the potential for inhibiting or reducing the circumstances established within the integration policy document for achieving its stated aim.

An integration policy document is on one level a text like any other, but like *Race Traitor* (Ignatiev & Garvey, 1996) it represents a type of text that expresses specific solutions to problems, sometimes based on ideological reasoning connected to the phenomena of the conceptualisation of 'race' and ethnicity, which have lead to the unjust treatment of for example 'immigrants'. The integration document attempts to address issues that stand in-between its expressed aims and the actual achievement of these aims. The aim of the documents analysed in this research is to rectify a failing integration process. Therefore, to the extent that a part of the text is monologic in character should be brought to our attention as a possible impediment to successful integration. This does not need to be representative of the entire text but points to a certain problem that potentially may obstruct those measures intended to assist an expressed integration process, in contrast to a successful dialogic textual practice that would assist in supporting the same integration process.
What follows in the next section is a content analysis to familiarise the readers with the original policy documents. This will not only be useful for the reader unfamiliar with Swedish policy documents in general and Swedish integration policy documents in particular, but will also prepare the way for the later dialogic study. In performing the close dialogic reading, the text is addressed with four questions in mind. Three of the four questions address the text on a macro-level, while the fourth question represents the attempt of dialogic interaction, which can only take place at the micro-level. These questions are: What is the background, i.e., what and whom are involved in or by the text? What is the problem, i.e., what is the central theme of the text, what does it address and does it need to solve? What is claimed as the solution to the problem, i.e., how is the problem to be solved? In an attempt to establish a dialogic interaction with the text, the fourth overarching question asks: What is the value of the solution, i.e., potentially how successful is the posed solution in its current textual context? It is through the latter question that the thesis addresses the text's degree of dialogism, i.e. how it treats its intrinsic and extrinsic relationships (see Salkie, 1997; Pearce, 1994).

A Text Example

SOU 1996[55] is the report that preceded Prop. (Bill) 1997/98[16], but it will here function as a general example of the subjects covered by Swedish integration bills. The first two chapters of SOU 1996[55], The Summary and The Committee's task and work (AOT), will function as an example of this thesis' analytical approach to the policy
documents later to be analysed. These two introductory chapters should allow us to establish the internal and external context of the Report. The external context describes why the text was written, by whom and for whom. The internal context describes the different subjects that are covered by the Report. Independent of whether we are interested in an in-depth analysis of the complete Report or not, this contextualisation allows the researcher to create a picture of the Report’s agenda.

*The Committee’s task and work* introduces the reader to the task assigned to the Committee, but also the reasons for why this task was formulated. The Committee was essentially assigned to overhaul Swedish ‘immigrant’ policy. A large section of the Swedish population has an ‘immigrant’ background and therefore any change in integration policy has a large potential impact on society. Because of this, the Committee was to include in its purview an extensive set of political issues. The areas to be covered were: the contemporary immigration policy and its targets; ‘immigrants’ situation on the labour market; education in the Swedish language; the division of the responsibility between state and municipalities; the concentration of ‘immigrants’ to certain municipalities and housing areas; the whole-of-Sweden-strategy (regarding forced settlement of ‘immigrants’); ‘immigrant’ participation; the multicultural society; different roles and the responsibility of main operators; how work and activities of associations can contribute to integration; the need for measures to improve the prospects for ‘immigrants’ to live in accordance with their faiths; aspects of resettlement; the demarcation of ‘immigrant’ policies in relation to other political areas; current measures for the Finish-Swedish group (Due to Sweden’s ‘colonial’-historical ties with Finland together with a long history of Finnish immigration to Sweden, the
Finish-Swedish 'group', svenskfinska gruppen, has a specific position in Swedish policy making. This does not refer to the so-called native Finnish speaking population of Sweden; costs of immigration and the distribution of costs between the different public operators; changed state subsidy or new redistribution of economic resources between municipalities; the estimated costs in relation to future immigration; the support of 'immigrant' associations; the field of the Swedish Immigration Board; and the relevance of sector research for immigration policy and demarcation of the 'immigrant' group as a target group for particular policies (SOU 1996[55]: 17, AOT).

In addition, the Committee was to develop an action program with a focus on priorities for 'immigrants'. This points to the main task of the Committee: to evaluate current 'immigrant' policy, its targets, its scope, its aims and limits. As such, the Committee forms a discrete instrument in a set of government and parliamentary institutional structures designed to create new policies. These institutions have a limited set of functions including legislation, instructing the activities of other institutions, and the redistribution of budget resources. In addition, it should be remembered that measures by government also have the effect of forming public opinion and norms.

In the Summary of the report seven key phrases are extracted, highlighted and presented together with the Committee's proposals. These key phrases are:

- *Extensive immigration*, which over a short period has led to a change in the ethnic composition of the Swedish population. Despite that the change originally
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seemed conflict free, it has lately led to increasing social segregation with ethnic overtones;

- **Same rights and duties**, despite that the Committee has not positioned itself with regards to how a multicultural society ideally should develop, it did assert that 'immigrants' and their relatives/next of kin should have the same rights and duties as everyone else living in Sweden;

- **Immigrant policies are only for newly immigrated**, and the term ‘immigrant’ in Swedish rules and regulations and the new ‘immigrant’ policy should therefore be restricted to the first five years in Sweden;

- **The targets are self support and participation**, and in line with general policies priority will be given to self sufficiency, active participation and joint responsibility in social life, independent of ethnic cultural and social background;

- **Individual introduction plans**, based on the general assumption that all people are resources in a society, an individual introduction plan shall be prepared in co-operation between ‘immigrant’ and the receiving municipality, this shall constitute the right to introduction support;

- **A follow-up of the multicultural**, the society must in the long run function without discrimination and marginalization, and the Committee proposes several measures for preschools, schools, workplaces, the leisure sector and housing areas that will benefit long-term integration, there is however a constant need to follow up the progress; and

- **Marginalisation and dependence on social welfare cannot be accepted**, the structural transformation of the last few years has specifically affected people who have immigrated during the last decade, and as an exception to the main principle of general policies an action plan should be implemented with reference to the mentioned group.

SOU 1996[55]: 9-12, AOT

The Committee's proposals for new policy targets are divided into three domains. These areas are: the New 'Immigrant' Policy, the General Policy in the Multicultural Society,
and the Action Plan (SOU 1996[55]: 13, AOT). The new 'immigrant' policy includes measures such as: Increased introduction support, Taxed introduction support, Increased access to introduction for relatives/next of kin, Extension of introduction subjected to a means test, New 'immigrant' authority, Investment in preschools, Removal of economic support to the Law covering recipient of asylum-seekers, Increased teaching of Swedish in schools and preschools, Development centre for Sfi (Swedish for immigrants), Resettlement information, Customised education and 'Profession-testing' of 'immigrants' (SOU 1996[55]: 13, AOT). The general policy in the multicultural society includes measures such as: Measures compensating for linguistic handicaps, Supplementary education, Activity centres for unemployed academics, Transformation of the current appropriation to the Swedish Immigrant Board for organisation support, Basic-education for university students, Changes within home-language instruction and Follow-up institution of the diversity policy (SOU 1996[55]: 13, AOT). Finally, proposals for an action plan is to affect measures such as: Loans to entrepreneurs, Establishment-support to international consultancy companies, A program for employment of 'immigrants', Subsidised salaries by the State, Subsidised project by the State, Visiting activities for long-term unemployed, Basic education/training for adults and Municipality run action plan for housing areas (SOU 1996[55]: 13-4, AOT).

Re-reading SOU 1996[55]
The first impression will be shaped by what is said in the introduction and summary of the document. The importance in shaping public opinion and norms is also underlined by the Committee, though in the context of legislating. Independent of pre-knowledge, each reader should now have a fairly clear picture of which subjects discussed, not only
in SOU 1996[55] *The Final Report from the Political Committee on Immigrants – Sweden, the Future and Diversity* (AOT) but, in all of the Swedish integration policy documents to be re-read in the analysis. Re-read is here referring to the act of returning to a text with the aim of scrutinising content and language.

We start with answering the four questions central to a close dialogic reading. – What is the background, i.e., what and whom are involved in or by the text? – That the Report was composed by a Committee with parliamentary representation was known before engaging with the text, i.e., the sender is a parliamentary Committee, but who were its intended receivers and for whom was the policy intended? Approaching the text with a dialogic perspective, this question is of specific interest to us. Sentences such as: – The Committee has taken a clear standpoint in favour of the opinion that people who have immigrated, or their relatives, should have the same rights and duties as everybody else living in Sweden – (SOU 1996[55]: 10, AOT), indicates that the text is written for those who represent the recipient country, Sweden, i.e., the ‘Swedes’. Because, even if one takes into consideration that the new ‘immigrant’ policy only should count for the first five years in Sweden and irrespective of whether people included in this category potentially have more rights in Sweden compared with statistically similar groups in other countries, they do not and no suggestion was made in or prior to this document that they were to hold the same right and duties as Swedish citizens. The intention cannot be known, but one has to assume that the text only can have been written for a ‘Swedish’ audience about ‘immigrants’, former as well as recent, and their circumstances.
- What is the problem, what is the central theme of the text, what does it need to solve? and What is claimed to be the solution to the problem; how is the problem to be solved?

- The Swedish population has evidently changed over a short period without any major conflicts between different sections of the population. Lately an increasing social segregation with ethnic overtones has been noticed – (SOU 1996[55]: 9; AOT). This is presented as the basis for the main task assigned to the Committee and as such, it is the reason for carrying out an extensive overhaul of the current 'immigrant' policy, leading up to and including a proposal of new targets and guiding principles for a new 'immigrant' policy. The 'immigrants' weak contact with the labour market is presented as the main problem and the reason for the isolation and permanent dependence on social welfare amongst 'immigrants'. The seven key phrases and the policy targets mentioned above are all jointly to improve the state of Swedish integration.

- What is the value of the solution, i.e., potentially, how successful could the posed solution be? – It is not the aim of this research project to measure the actual success or failure of the current 'immigrant' or integration policy. There are several philosophical problems inherent in such an attempt. The primary reason is that a policy document is documented proposals and guidelines and not factual implementations. This would require therefore evaluation of the outcome of implementations and not the integration policy, though the two are linked. Even the outcome of implementations in the form of, for example, legislation would be hard to measure when there is no definite way of proving that possible changes are the direct outcome or result of the new legislation (Wildavsky, 1987). This SOU Report puts forward proposals for a potential future Bill and as such, after having been set in its proper context there is nothing but the text itself.
to study. In line with a close dialogic reading the text needs to be scrutinised based on its
dialogism, i.e., how the text treats its intrinsic and extrinsic relationships. This is the case
of any text and even more so of a report/integration policy document, relating both to
previous texts and the state of society, as well as future policy and steering documents
and on how to influence the future state of the society.

After having established the focus of the Report, the ‘immigrant(s)’, there is a need to
establish how s/he or they are contextualised. In re-reading the text, we can conclude
that despite the fact that the Committee was given the task of overhauling ‘immigrant’
policy; despite potential consultation rounds with individuals representing ‘immigrant
groups’, the ‘immigrant(s)’ is only talked about, never included except indirectly. To
minimise confusion, in line with the Report’s somewhat confusing usage of the term
‘immigrant’, this discussion refers to both groups, the group that has immigrated over a
period of the last five years and the population that has passed the five year limit, as
immigrants, though under constant erasure: ‘immigrant(s)’ (Hall, 2000a). The
construction or upholding of an already existing dichotomy between those who are
represented as the real Swedes and those who are represented as ‘immigrants’ is a
general feature throughout the Report. The Report is rich on examples such as: – the
employment gap between immigrants [they who have immigrated during the last
decade] and others is so big that it runs the risk of resulting in a permanent dependence
on social welfare for many – (SOU 1996[55]: 12, AOT) and: – Furthermore, the
Committee is to develop an action programme for immigrants, indicating priorities –
(SOU 1996[55]: 17, AOT).
When the investigation fails to explicitly include and present the object of the investigation in the creation of the text, a monologic tone is applied, limiting the possibilities of any successful interaction, and, to paraphrase the Committee, the long-term 'immigrant' integration. Both quotations above exemplify the problem with and how a common conceptualization of 'identity' is built into the monologic speech. The term 'immigrant(s)' is a textbook example of the absurdity in applying an absolute 'identity' construction. That is, when someone over any longer period is termed 'immigrant', he or she is separated out from the rest of society for something he or she once did, i.e. having crossed a border. He or she is in a permanent immigrating mode. This is no different to be termed student, because we once studied. This also identifies the basic problem with the Committee's task.

Once more, independent of who is referred to by the term 'immigrant', instead of being given the task to develop an action program in co-operation with 'immigrants', an action program is to be developed for 'immigrants'. Here the individuals, included in the category 'immigrant(s)', just as when ethnicity, culture and 'identity' are fused into an ethnic cultural background or 'ethnic and cultural identity', are transformed from the others into the Others through the monologic speech that upholds the 'identity' constructions. That is, being talked about (the object of investigation), but never addressed (as a subject), or listened to, the voice of the other is cut short or undone, hindering interaction and entrance into the society and any type of social being-ness. Thereby, the 'immigrant' person is transformed into a potentially permanent Other-ness. With an approach such as this, it is more likely that an 'immigrant' remains an
immigrant, than that they become one of many equal, and undifferentiated with regard to immigration status, social beings amongst others in the society.

Conclusion
I have in this chapter positioned myself in relation to this thesis and its topic, the area of Swedish immigration and integration policies, both as a social being and as a researcher. Secondly, I introduced the analytical approach, tied the previous chapters’ discussion of theories with the practical approach to texts given the dialogical character of the analysis. This was done by way of introducing the empirical material and positioning the thesis in relation to this empirical material.

The short example above provides an illustration of how this research seeks to apply a dialogic principle of communication to the textual analysis with a view towards invalidating the monologic approach to text production. Furthermore, in performing a close dialogic reading, this research seeks to reveal the role of ‘identity’ in language as both constructor and maintainer of conceptual social boundaries.

The texts that were presented under the heading of Text Material are contextualised in the following three chapters: From Emigration to Immigration; Refugee Migration and the European Union and From Immigrant Policy to Integration Policy. The description of the context of the history and political development of Swedish immigration and integration policies will allow the textual study initiated in this dissertation to more
clearly stand as an important contribution to developing our understanding of the present and future conditions for immigration and integration politics in Sweden. The connection between the textual study and the problem of integration is consequently made explicit.
Chapter 5: From Emigration to Immigration

We have now looked at the theoretical issues of this thesis and its analytical method, the close dialogic reading. Before turning to the text analysis of the Swedish integration policy documents, these policy documents need to be contextualized. Studying Swedish migration and integration patterns we will see that they follow more or less the patterns found in other West European countries and can roughly be divided into four periods; Pre-Second World War, Labour Migration, Refugee Migration and European Membership (see Castle & Miller, 1993; Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996, Westin & Dingu-Kyrklund, 1997).

To reduce the inevitable repetitiveness due to the overlapping nature of the subject, the history of Swedish migration and integration patterns is divide into: From Emigration to Immigration, Refugee Migration and the European Union and From Immigrant Policy to Integration Policy. This chapter, From Emigration to Immigration, talks about some of the early trend shifts in the history of Swedish migration. It gives account of the different immigrant groups, the large Swedish emigration to (US) America, early regulations, religion and tolerance, the World War II and the first refuges. It furthermore describes the Nordic labour market agreements, the years of free labour migration, the early institutionalisation of migration controls and the near total halt to specific types of immigration.
Historic Migration

Sweden did not turn into an immigration country until the 1930s. This section will give an overview of the Swedish migration history that led to the society becoming an immigration country. This will be done by describing pre 1930s emigration and immigration, giving an account of different ‘immigrant’ groups, followed by a description of early regulations and the progress towards the freedom of religion and its setbacks. It will conclude with the refugee immigration of the Second World War as a prelude to a wider influx of migration.

The first detailed description of immigration in Sweden dates back to the twelfth century and the Hanseatic League, when ‘German’ merchants and tradesmen arrived in Sweden. Despite not leading to surplus figures, from the sixteenth-century onwards Sweden has had a noticeable immigration. German ‘immigrants’ were during this early phase of immigration one of the more predominant ‘immigrant groups’, especially during the sixteenth-, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century. The ‘group’ of German ‘immigrants’ were made up of nobles, mercenaries, tradesmen and merchants but also poor people. Some of the names of well known Swedish individuals, such as Bellman, Taube and Wachtmeister, stem from this pool of German ‘immigrants’. Other foreign citizens that arrived and settled during the sixteenth century were farmers, craftsmen, and burn-beaters from Finland. Savolax (a geographical region) offered exemption from taxes and Finns were during the seventeenth century invited to settle in what today is called the Finnmark. Members of the Romany arrived, and Walloons to help develop the iron industry. Jews, of which many were silver craftsmen, and French artists, philosophers and intellectuals, arrived primarily during the eighteenth century. During the nineteenth
century, immigration was represented amongst others by ‘groups’ of Italian stucco workers and Scotsmen involved in the development of the Swedish brewery industry (Widgren, 1980; Adolfson, 11-2004; Rakar, 2005).

Other groups arriving between the sixteenth and nineteenth century, though in smaller numbers and not always settling in Sweden, were English industrialist and shipbuilders, merchants from the Netherlands, creditors from Turkey due to King Karl XII’s time in Turkey after having lost the battle of Poltava, and Russians during Sweden’s period as a great military power. Sweden did not have any voluntary immigration from the African continent before the 20th century. However, as an exception to the rule, through the short lived Swedish slave trade in the Swedish West Indian colony Saint Bahrthélemy and Corbo Corso on the African continent a small number of slaves did end up living in Sweden. In greater numbers were the involuntary ‘Swedish immigrants’ (1658/1660) from the former Danish territory in the southern parts of what today is Skåne, Sweden (Widgren, 1980; Adolfsson, 11-2004).

By far the largest migration movement in Swedish history is represented by Swedish citizens migrating to the USA between the years 1830-1930. This was mainly made up of small scale farmers and farm workers from rural areas, leaving to seek a better future in the so-called New World. More than 1.2 million Swedes migrated to the USA, the equivalent of a quarter of the population in 1900. A combination of the First World War and (US) American restrictions on immigration put an end to the large scale Swedish emigration to the USA and by the beginning of the 1930s immigration to Sweden exceeded for the first time the level of emigration (Widgren, 1980; Lundh & Ohlsson,
Early Regulations
Swedish immigration policy from 1860 to 1917 can be described as liberal. The guiding principle was free exchange of people with no passport restrictions, residence permits or work permits for settlers. Some restrictions did exist and vagrants, beggars, Gypsies or Romanies and criminals, all of which were more or less put into the same category, could be expelled. From the turn of the century, demands were made to further restrict undesirable or unwanted immigration regarding strike-breakers and criminals. More fundamental restrictions were not made at this time. The Swedish immigration policy did however turn more restrictive between 1917 and 1945, due to the Russian revolution and the First World War.

At the end of the First World War, Sweden started to deport foreigners who had been lacking passport, visa or residence permits on entry. The part of the Swedish population born abroad was at this time not exceeding 1.5 per cent of the total population. New passport restriction meant that foreigners needed to apply for residence permits after a three month stay in the country. In an attempt to protect domestic workers, work permits were now introduced for foreigners. The new rules regarding residence- and work permits, and the degree of restrictiveness was connected to the state of the labour market and part of the Aliens’ Acts of 1927 and 1937. The Aliens’ Act is the most important instrument in Swedish refugee policy, indicating the rights and duties of both the
individual refugee and the state (Lundh and Ohlsson, 1996; Essén, 2002; Integrationsverket, 2003).

Religion and Tolerance

Sweden did not have a stated minority policy before the mid 1970s. What Sweden, however, has had since 1951, often closely related to minority policy, is legislations addressing the importance of the freedom of religion, which at times has been a rare phenomenon in Europe.

Sweden changed the State church, from Catholicism to Protestantism or Lutheranism under the rule of King Gustaf I Wasa during the sixteenth century. This changeover did however little for freedom of religion. People living in Sweden with a different faith were forced to baptize their children in the Swedish Lutheran church. While the Swedish state exempted those of the Reformed Church, such as the Dutch and Walloons from the rule of baptism, the Lutheran church still argued that all children belonging to parents of the Reformed Church should be taken into custody so that they could be brought up according to the right Lutheran faith (Karlsson & Svanberg, 1997).

The first real steps towards freedom of religion were only taken in the royal proclamation of February 1718 by King Karl XII, in which the Muslims and Jews that had arrived in Karlskrona to exact the debts that the king had run into during his stay in the Ottoman Empire were guaranteed freedom to exercise their religions. In 1724, there
were also groups of Reformist ‘immigrants’ working in Alingsås who were granted freedom of religion. In 1741 this also came to include all Englishmen as well as all other Reformists. Nevertheless, Jews and Catholics were still denied freedom of religion. Some changes regarding Jews and Catholics were made in 1781 and 1782, which meant they now were allowed to settle in certain cities and to some extent practice their religion. As a result of a growing liberalism in society and the constitution of 1809, which stressed that the king should not hinder but protect people’s freedom to practice their religion, which came to apply to foreign religions from 1860, Jews and Catholics in 1870, with some exceptions, were finally granted full political rights. From 1873 members that wished to leave the Swedish church were also allowed to do so, as long as they left for another church recognised by the Swedish king (Widgren, 1980; Karlsson & Svanberg, 1997).

This formal liberalisation was tested as Nazism swept over continental Europe. The Swedish refugee policy was restrictive during the interwar period and while some political refugees were given asylum, many Jews from Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia were officially denied asylum on the grounds of not fulfilling the definition of political refugees. The reality of Swedish immigration policy during the Second World War was not as liberal as it is often described; the decision to deny asylum, taken by the Swedish Riksdag, (the Swedish Parliament³), was taken under great pressure from, amongst others, academics at Lund University. Sweden in fact hardly accepted any refugees during the major part of the Second World War and had by 1939 only accepted 5,000 refugees from the Nazi territory of Central Europe (Westin & Dingu-Kyrklund, 1997).
This standpoint was marked by Sweden's officially 'neutral' position during the Second World War. By granting Hitler a continuous flow of raw materials such as steel for the German arms industry and by allowing the German troops transit through Swedish territory, Sweden kept itself out of the war. The accommodationist policy turned however more generous in connection to Denmark's and Norway's involvement in the Second World War (Lundh and Ohlsson, 1996; Essén, 2002; Integrationsverket, 2003).

World War II and Refugees
As mentioned above, the Swedish refugee policy had been very restrictive during the interwar period and its policy did not change until Denmark and Norway became involved in the Second World War. The first large groups of immigrants arriving in Sweden were refugees arriving during the last years of the Second World War. At this time there were, without taking into account the former German guest workers and the German citizens that had to, or chose to, flee the advancing Soviet army, more than 40 million refugees and stateless people in Europe. In addition, there were another 13 million so-called ethnic Germans who had been expelled from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other East European countries.

It was by receiving 130,000 refugees from its neighbouring Scandinavian countries, who in distinction to Sweden were occupied during the Second World War, 30,000 refugees from the Baltic countries and 34,000 refugees from the continent, primarily through the
organised Bernadotte-action (the white Red Cross buses), that Sweden established itself as an immigration country; though no recognition of this fact was publicly made at the time. With an annual average of 30,000 ‘immigrants’ arriving during the second half of the 1940s, Swedish immigration policy entered a new and liberalising phase. However, despite striving to return to the principle of free exchange of people, the fundamental control measures such as passport, visa, residence- and work permits were never completely abolished (Widgren, 1980; Lundh and Ohlsson, 1996; Norström, 2004).

As part of a policy of receiving Nordic refugees during the Second World War, Sweden dropped all demands for work permits regarding Nordic citizens in 1943. This was followed by similar measures with regard to Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians in 1944. In 1945, Sweden continued to loosen its restrictions with regard to Nordic citizens. Norwegian, Danish and Icelandic citizens no longer needed visas to enter Sweden. Norwegians and Danes had however in practice been exempt from visa rules since 1943. The same year as Sweden officially dropped the visa rules with regard to these countries, it entered into an agreement about a common labour market with Denmark. Due to an increasing demand for foreign labour, visa demands also dropped for Finnish and Italian citizens in 1946 (Andersen, 1979; Widgren, 1980; Lundh and Ohlsson; Bager and Rezaei, 1998b).

During the second half of the 1940s, non-Nordic Europeans constituted 40 per cent of all ‘immigrants’ to Sweden. Amongst the non-Nordic European immigration, which has kept on increasing during the entire post war era, Eastern Europe was the first large contributor of ‘immigrants’. However, Southern Europe also contributed to the post war
immigration, with Italy as the main contributor. Individuals from Italy accounted for 80 per cent of the total immigration from Southern Europe during the 1940s and 50s. The most distinguishing characteristic of the long term immigration trend has otherwise been the increase in non-European immigration. An annual average of 2,100 non-European immigrants meant, however, that this immigration was still moderate during the 1940s.

The Period of Labour Migration
This section will give an overview of the Swedish labour migration history by describing the different migration trends between the mid 1940s to the mid 1970s. Between the end of the Second World War and the 1974 oil crises, Sweden experienced remarkable economic growth; mainly in its industrial sector. Sweden had during this time a growth rate of four per cent between 1950 and 1958, seven per cent during the record years between 1959 and 1965, and four per cent during the remaining years of the 1960s and was in reality unfamiliar with the concept of recession.

Whilst the size of the domestic population had been sufficient for the growth rate during the 1940s and part of the 1950s, already during the 1930s, Alva and Gunnar Myrdal in their book *Kris i befolkningsfrågan* (‘The crises in the population question’, AOT) brought attention to the declining birth rate amongst the native population, and that Sweden as a result was running the risk of stagnation (Myrdal & Myrdal, 1935). As a result, a commission proposed a family policy that was to stimulate the birth rate. Amongst the core propositions was a child allowance. However, the increasing lack in
numbers of employable individuals amongst the working population was also related to other reforms, such as the expansion of the educational system and an improved retirement pension scheme.

Ahlberg and Svennilson proposed in a 1946 research study of the labour market, commissioned by *Industrins Utredningsinstitut* (The Industrial Research Institute, AOT), that a well-balanced immigration should cover the lack of labour until the now increasing birth rate would show results. The size of a balanced immigration was estimated to be between 100,000 and 200,000 individuals during the coming decade, if the demands of industry were to be met (Ahlberg & Svennilson, 1946). Similar conclusions were made by the government long-term reports during the 1950s, and annual immigration was in 1955 specified to 10,000 people. This corresponded not only to the findings of Ahlberg’s and Svennilson’s investigation, but also to the actual net immigration during the 1950s (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

Sweden had a great demand for foreign labour until the beginning of the 1970s, and the possibilities for employment for ‘immigrants’ were good. Industrial growth was high until the mid 1970s, and the demand for foreign labour was therefore high amongst both skilled workers during the industrial transformation of the 1950s, and unqualified labour during the following expansion of the 1960s. As early as 1950, almost one out of five who worked within the hotel and restaurant trade had ‘immigrant’ backgrounds. The number of ‘immigrant’ women was particularly high within the textile industry. The textile industry during the 1950s was also the main employer of foreign labour. Whilst 12 per cent of the total number of textile workers at this time were ‘immigrants’, the
expansion within the metal and manufacturing industry, specifically during the 1960s, led to a similar intensifying employment of 'immigrants'. In 1970, 50 per cent of the sector's workforce were 'immigrants'. Consequently, this was a time when the industrial needs highly influenced both the political discourse on immigration and Sweden's immigration policy (Björk, 1997).

There are three main institutional transformations that led to increased labour immigration. First, there was the Nordic agreement of a common labour market in 1954, which confirmed that the Swedish labour market was now open for Nordic 'immigrants'. Second, there were continuing attempts to organise the collective transfer of non-Nordic labour to Sweden. Third, the liberalisation of the Aliens' Act of 1954 determined the practices for handling immigration cases; which opened up for free 'tourist immigration' from Europe, i.e. to arrive as a tourist and on site apply for work and thereafter apply for work permit (Prop. 1954[41]). Due to these institutional transformations, labour immigration was free in principle if not in practice.

Whilst many European countries have applied different types of guest worker policies, Sweden has never had a policy mirroring these so-called guest worker systems (Peterson, 1997). Sweden instead established bilateral agreements with countries about the collective transfer of labour. Arbetslöshetskommisionen (the Unemployment Commission, predecessor to Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, The Labour Market Board, established in 1948, AOT) was authorized by the government to enter into an alliance with Italy and Hungary for labour 'collective agreements'; in 1947 this was followed by similar agreements with further countries (Widgren, 1980). LO, the Swedish Trade
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Union Confederation, played a central role in advocating these collective agreements. This was done to counteract the risk of wage dumping, which LO saw as a central problem with the increasing number of labour ‘immigrants’ to Sweden.

The official course of action when seeking to acquire foreign labour was for companies to turn to AMS (the Labour Market Board) who after consultation with county labour boards and unions would grant the right to recruit. Despite the lack of a guest worker policy, the agreements do reveal that the general idea and belief was one of labour ‘immigrants’ returning after a couple of years to their respective countries, and that immigration therefore would not be part of a more permanent trend. In spite of the fact that these labour agreements could be terminated with one to three years notice and that in principal many labour ‘immigrants’ returned, the majority did stay and the ones that originally had not brought their families did so (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

Nordic Labour Market
In 1935, Sweden had negotiated with Norway, Finland and Denmark about a common labour market. Whilst Sweden managed to push through the agreement, the neighbouring countries were dragged into the Second World War before they had managed to do the same. The refugee immigration after 1942 from its neighbouring countries led Sweden in 1943 to make exceptions for Nordic citizens with regard to labour permits. The purpose was to make it possible for refugees to support themselves; a crucial source of labour was thereby made available for trade and industry, and the cost for the refugee sector was reduced.
The negotiations were immediately taken up again at the end of the war. At a meeting of ministers in Copenhagen in 1946, which now also included Iceland, a common proposal for a convention was prepared, by which Nordic citizens were to be excluded from the rule of the work permit. Despite that this convention was not enacted, the work permit rule regarding Nordic citizens was never reintroduced in Sweden. In 1945 the visa requirement was lifted for Danish, Norwegian and Icelandic citizens, whilst Finnish citizens had to wait four more years. In 1953, a new proposal of a Nordic labour market was composed. The creation of a passport/visa free union and the waiver of residence and work permits were at the core of the proposal, which laid the ground for the Common Nordic Labour Market that was introduced in 1954 (Widgren, 1980; Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

The 1954 agreement meant that the visa waiver already carried out by Sweden now also took force in the other Nordic countries. In spite of this, the principal net migration was represented by Finnish citizens migrating to Sweden, whilst the exchange of labour between the other countries contributed to a far lesser increase in population. The restrictions remained for non-Nordic citizens, though with a more generous practice with regard to residence and work permits. Foreigners were now able to enter as tourists and thereafter apply for work. For the successful applicants, permits were in general granted on a family basis.

Of the people that migrated from one Nordic country to another between 1954 and 1980, (approximately one million people), Finnish 'immigrants' in Sweden made up 40 per
cent, followed by the Finns who at one time or another lived in Sweden but decided to return to Finland. Though Finns returned in great numbers, Finns still make up 20 per cent of the population that have been born abroad now living in Sweden. Overall Nordic immigration amounted to sixty per cent of the total immigration during the 1950s and the 1960s, Nordic immigration has thereafter abated considerably (Andersen, 1979; Widgren, 1980; Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996; Bager & Rezaei, 1998b).

While the average annual level of Nordic immigration up to 1972 had been 20,000 people and corresponded to 50 per cent of the total immigration during the 1970s, it thereafter decreased to an approximate level of 30 per cent of the overall immigration during the 1980s. Pre 1974, the annual Nordic immigration amounted to a net immigration of 10,000 people, but has thereafter been around 1,200 per year. The latest figures from 2005 indicate a break in this trend, with Danes making up the largest non-Swedish ‘immigrant group’ during 2004 (Integrationsverket, 2005b).

**Migration from Other Countries**
The proportion of organised labour migration from out of the total numbers migrating was still limited during the 1950s. This was a consequence of the liberalisation of the immigration legislation and praxis, which opened up the possibility for foreign citizens on their own initiative to migrate to Sweden as ‘tourist immigrants’. The OEEC’s labour law of 1953 and the Swedish Aliens’ Act of 1954 constituted the foundation for this praxis (Prop. 1954[41]). The new Aliens’ Act was developed and informed by a positive
attitude to labour immigration. Earlier Swedish legislations had categorically established that foreigners were prohibited from accepting and/or occupying a position without a work permit. The new fundamental principles established the rights for foreigners to have full access to the Swedish labour market, unless the government called specifically for a work permit. This change should primarily be read as a change in attitude, because in reality most non-Nordic citizens still needed a work permit.

Nevertheless, apart from some ‘groups’, the labour and visa permits were gradually abandoned, that is, there was no need to apply for a visa and work permit before arrival. This was the start of what has been called ‘tourist immigration’. The work permit was still a way for the authorities to control not only the numbers of foreign labour in Sweden, but also a way of directing the labour to sectors and parts of the country where the demand was largest, by imposing time limits and only allowing work permits for certain professions. It was only cases of political refugees and related cases that deviated from the principle of labour market consideration.

For first-time applications, the authorities demanded a concrete offer of employment that lived up to prevalent work and wage-conditions as well as sufficient qualifications by the individual applicant. If Swedish or Nordic labour was available or was expected to become available in the near future, the application could be declined. In cases of extending a work permit, the process of examination was less extensive. Between 1961 and 1965, the authorities dealt with more than 90,000 first-time applications and 140,000 applications asking for extensions of, or changes in already valid permits. Only five percent amongst the first-time applications, and only two out of a thousand of the cases for
extensions and changes of already existing permits were declined (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

Whilst the unions always had their say with regards to first-time applications, respecting extensions and changes in contracts, they were only asked when the authorities felt that they were in need of advice. Commonly the authorities turned to the local unions, while metal, construction and manufacturing unions dealt with assessments on a central level. The organisations of employers, such as the Swedish Employers' Confederation, were only asked their opinions when the authorities found it necessary. This fact resulted in unions having a much greater influence in shaping the system of labour market assessment and immigration than the employers (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

As mentioned, people could more or less freely move to Sweden during the 1950s and the 1960s. Jobs were plentiful and labour immigrants could upon arrival almost instantly start to work. Though not all 'immigrants' were labour 'immigrants', the liberal Swedish migration policy had by 1950 resulted in 77,000 non-Nordic 'immigrants' living in Sweden. The annual average of 30,000 'immigrants' arriving in Sweden during the 1940s, though slightly decreasing during the 1950s, had by the 1960s reached an annual level of 40,000 immigrants. Whilst Nordic immigration during the 1950s and 1960s amounted to sixty per cent of the total immigration, the non-Nordic European contribution corresponded to thirty per cent, but did thereafter level off to an average of twenty-five per cent (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

By the 1950s, South European immigration had taken the dominant position amongst the
non-Nordic European immigration. Approximately 3,000 people from Southern Europe arrived annually between 1960 and 1974 with a peak in 1965/1966, when the annual numbers exceeded 5,000. Though immigration from Southern Europe levelled out to an annual average of 1,700 people, and the overall emigration from Sweden to Southern Europe overtook that of immigration after 1971, the numbers of people from Southern Europe living in Sweden has continued to increase (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

Migration from Italy dominated immigration from southern Europe between 1940 and the mid 1960s, resulting in 16,000 Italians having migrated to Sweden by 1990. Migration from Greece, which was predominant between the mid 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s had by the beginning of 1980 amounted to 15,000 people. Other countries from southern Europe contributing to Swedish immigration during the same period, though in smaller numbers, were Spain and Portugal (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

Migration from Spain resulted in 2,000 to 3,000 Spanish citizens working in Sweden during the 1960s. The migration trend from the 1970s has been the opposite, mainly due to elderly Swedish citizens migrating to Spain. In spite of this, the ‘Spanish’ population in Sweden has during the same period still increased. Portuguese labour immigration, starting at the beginning of the 1960s, was much smaller in numbers. In addition to the annual labour migration from Portugal, which only amounted to 100 people during the 1960s, another 600 Portuguese refugees arrived in connection with the Portuguese revolution at the beginning of the 1970s. The ‘Portuguese’ population has just as the other ‘immigrant groups’, though in smaller numbers, continued to increase (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).
Until 1966, an annual average of 5,800 West Europeans migrated to Sweden. The much lower Swedish emigration resulted in a West European immigration surplus. In total, the surplus amounted to 58,000 people or an annual immigration of 2,800. The largest contribution came from Germany and Austria. Swedish emigration has on the whole equalled immigration from West Europe after 1966 (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

The number of non-Nordic West European ‘immigrants’ had in 1970 reached 176,000. In absolute numbers, the annual non-Nordic European immigration to Sweden has been approximately 10,000 people. With the exception of the depression years of 1972/73, non-Nordic European immigration exceeded emigration during the 1970s, with an annual net immigration of approximately 5,000 people. The vast majority of West European ‘immigrants’ before 1970 came from what was then West Germany, but also a relatively large number of Austrians arrived during the same period. West Germany and Austria together stood for 75 per cent of the total West European immigration of the pre 1970 period and for more 90 per cent of the net immigration to Sweden. The number of people living in Sweden but born in West Germany and Austria was at its peak around 1970 when 50,000 people lived in Sweden. Britons have also contributed to the composition of the Swedish population and after 1970; approximately 1,200 people have annually migrated from the UK to Sweden (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996). For an overview of domiciled ‘immigrants’ by country of citizenship by 1973/74 see Table 1 on page 139.
Table 1. Domiciled Immigrants by Country of Citizenship 1973/74

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of citizenship</th>
<th>Number of immigrants</th>
<th>% of total number of immigrants</th>
<th>% up to this group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>188,150</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>40,166</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>28,237</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>26,575</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>71.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>18,402</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>16,918</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>80.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6,809</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>81.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>6,263</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>83.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>6,231</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>6,138</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5,601</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>87.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>4,616</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>89.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>4,343</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>90.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checkoslovakia</td>
<td>4,091</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>91.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3,637</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>92.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Netherlands</td>
<td>2,514</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>92.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2,207</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>93.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2,024</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1,909</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>94.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corea*</td>
<td>1,863</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>94.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>95.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Soviet Union</td>
<td>1,121</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>95.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* primarily adopted children

Source: SOU, 1974[69]

The demand for labour was, as mentioned, partly met through active recruitment processes abroad by companies and AMS (the National Labour Market Board), but even more common was that foreigners arrived in Sweden as tourists and on site applied for work. Regarding employment, these were, in comparison to more recent times, also good times for the majority of the refugees that arrived in Sweden. Whilst the incoming labour during the 1940s and the 1950s represented both skilled and unskilled labour, at the end of the 1950s it became increasingly difficult for the companies to obtain foreign
qualified labour. During the 1960s, the industry primarily employed unqualified labour in growing numbers. It was specifically within heavy industry that the number of ‘immigrants’ increased during the 1960s. In fact, in 1970, sixty per cent of the working ‘immigrant’ population were working within heavy industry.

Whilst refugees arrived from the Baltic States, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union after the Second World War and from Hungary between 1956 and 1960, labour immigration from Eastern Europe did not start until the beginning of the 1960s. The magnitude of the early refugee immigration corresponded to a fourth of the total immigration to Sweden, while the immigration from the mid 1960s up to the beginning of 1993 only corresponded to a tenth of total immigration numbers. Though Sweden at this time received Hungarian refugees from Hungary, and Austria, Germany and Czechoslovakian refugees due to the Soviet occupation, Poland and Yugoslavia were overall the two largest contributors to Swedish immigration from Eastern Europe. Both Polish and Yugoslavian immigration have continued. Whilst the Polish immigration has been of a refugee nature and originally greater in number, with the Yugoslavian changes in emigration policy in the 1960s, the Yugoslavian immigration turned into labour immigration with 34,000 Yugoslavians arriving in Sweden between 1965 and 1971.

The levels of employment were exceptionally high during these ‘early’ years of Swedish immigration. In fact, during the 1950s and 60s employment amongst the working population of 20 years of age was higher amongst ‘immigrants’ than the local Swedish population. This can be explained by a fortunate combination of facts: the overall majority of ‘immigrants’ who arrived in Sweden during this time arrived with the sole
intention to search for work, the high demand for labour within the different industries and the current immigration rules. That is, Sweden not only allowed, but in fact encouraged people to travel to Sweden and on location apply for work. The common view was that Sweden was in need of labour migrants.

Since the mid 1960s, the importance of the industrial sector has decreased with regard to both the numbers of employed individuals and its relative contribution to the Swedish GDP. The relatively deep recession of the 1970s in connection to the oil crises, and the oil price shock in 1973 deeply damaged industrial production in Sweden and led to a stagnating GDP. The growth thereafter, within both the industry and national economy, has been slower than during the 1950s and 60s. This has changed the terms of the labour market. Today the service sector has been responsible for the largest expansion in the economy, and within it above all the public sector (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

Early Institutionalisation of Integration Policy
This passage will introduce the reader to the first steps taken by the parliament towards a Swedish integration policy but also to how this development, in the Swedish case, seems to have gone hand in hand with the restriction of immigration. In the mid 1960s, a policy promoting immigration was advocated as the solution to the lack of labour. However, from the mid 1960s, opposition to this policy of free labour immigration grew amongst the unions. They questioned if there really was a need for labour immigration, and why industry did not make more use of the married women, older and disabled people amongst the domestic labour force. In addition, the unions, specifically LO, now
expressed the fear of ‘immigrants’ being exploited by some employers by being specifically recruited to low wage sectors, such as the hotel and restaurant sectors and the textile and clothing industry.

LO also cited the fact that ‘immigrants’ were experiencing disadvantages in the housing market. In connection to the increasing labour immigration during the 1960s, the press more than once reported that ‘immigrants’ were living in destitution in apartments that were too small. Other reasons given for the opposition were that the labour immigration threat risked calling a halt to the economic structural transformation advocated by LO as the main goal of its economic policy. In LO’s view labour immigration equalled cheap labour, which hampered the economic position of their members. LO argued that continued immigration was both conserving old-fashioned and ineffective conditions within certain sectors, and risked creating antagonism between ‘Swedes’ and ‘immigrants’. The fear, it was argued, was that ‘Swedes’ would increasingly perceive ‘immigrants’ as competitors in the labour market (Peterson, 1997; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2004).

When trying to explain the change at this time in the unions’ opinion of immigration policy it is important not to leave out the change in the characteristics of the 1960s immigration streams. The changes had a ‘visible’ impact on working life. In the 1940s, the Baltic and Polish ‘immigrants’ represented 30 to 40 per cent of the foreign labour force. Though later on being joined by Germans, Italians and Hungarians during the 1950s, these ‘groups’ gradually decreased in relative importance as immigration from the Nordic countries increased.
The Nordic labour force reached its representational peak in the beginning of the 1960s, when they represented more than 65 per cent of the total labour force. Amongst the Nordic labour force, Finnish ‘immigrants’ started to take an increasingly dominant position. While they only had represented 10 per cent in 1947, after the demand for visa permits was abolished, their share of the labour market increased rapidly, and by the mid 1960s it had passed 40 per cent. At the same time, whilst Nordic ‘immigrants’ between 1951 and 1960 represented 60 per cent of the total immigration, by the mid 1960s it had shrunk to less than 50 per cent. Simultaneously with the decrease in Nordic immigration, immigration from Southern Europe and the Balkans increased.

Concurrently with the increase in immigration from Southern Europe and the Balkans, Swedish labour immigration policy grew slowly more restrictive at the end of the 1960s', whilst a liberalisation regarding refugee immigration took place. Sweden demanded now that non-Nordic citizens should obtain both residence and work permits before entrance, which were to be based on a strict assessment of the labour market. The new restrictions together with the weaker economic development did lead to an increasingly difficult situation for potential labour ‘immigrants’ (Widgren, 1980).

Despite a clear intention to reduce net immigration, the liberalisation that simultaneously took place in connection to refugees, who were not implicated by the new restrictions, produced the opposite result. Refugees were not restricted by rules on residence- and work permits on entrance. In addition to refugees included by the Geneva Convention, Sweden also gave asylum to individuals and their next of kin based on refugee-like
conditions and humanitarian grounds. The latter category includes several factors and a distinction is made between so-called pure or absolute humanitarian grounds and political-humanitarian grounds. While the first includes physical and mental health, the second includes political circumstances in the refugee’s country of origin. The Iranian case is an example of the latter.

Besides now being more visible in character, i.e. the new ‘immigrants’ did not in looks and languages resemble the stereotypical notion of the Nordic population, the size of the refugee immigration streams played a large part in the unions’ perception on future immigration policy. Between 1960 and 1963, the average annual immigration reached 27,000 people, which represented a net immigration close to 12,000 people. Immigration continued to grow, during the following years reaching an annual level of 28,000 people, which was more than double the size of the initial years of the 1960s, and three times as much as the immigration estimates used in the government reports of the 1950s. Reaching 34,000 people in 1965, the union’s critique hardened (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

LO argued that the uncontrolled ‘tourist immigration’ led to ghettos of foreigners in many of the larger cities, and demanded that non-Nordic immigration should now be regulated. In the editorial of the Trade-union (AOT) in the summer of 1965, it was argued that to avoid chaos of the nature that the Yugoslavian invasion of Southern Sweden recently caused, there was now a need to reduce immigration. At the end of 1965 and the beginning of 1966, the situation had grown worse and close to 1,000 Yugoslavians were now, due to neither being able to find work nor housing, put in
refugee camps. The difficulty to obtain work due to the downward economic trend remained during the winter and spring of 1966, and AMS reported that 2,300 people were now being housed in the camps. At the end of the year, the numbers had increased to 3,000 unemployed foreigners, which corresponded to 15 per cent of the total unemployment number. The union press concluded that this meant that 'immigrants' were hit much harder than the 'Swedes' (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2004).

The 1966 rules, stipulated by the Home Office in line with AMS and LO, were meant to put a stop to 'tourist immigration' through the introduction of the requirement of a work permit. AMS was put in charge of organising the continued collective transfer of non-Nordic labour immigration. Despite the tightening up of the rules with regard to spontaneous non-Nordic labour immigration, it failed to accomplish a complete halt in immigration. In spite of the provisional arrangement during 1966, the government decided at the end of the year to further tighten up the regulation of non-Nordic immigration. The new rules came into force in March 1967, and a couple of months later an 'immigrant' commission presented its report. Based on this and in line with the changes of 1967, the government drew up directions for a new immigration policy, which was pushed through by the Swedish Riksdag in 1968.

The chief content of the new system regulating immigration meant that non-Nordic citizens who wanted to work in Sweden in principle needed to have arranged not only employment contracts, but also housing contracts before arrival. This was almost a complete return to the restrictions of the 1930s and 40s. The aim was to prevent
individual foreigners from travelling to Sweden and there seek employment without their applications having gone through a proper labour market assessment before arrival. An entry visa was now to be issued by the Swedish embassies and consulates after having been cleared by the Foreign Office. A visa entered into the passport of the foreigner counted therefore now also as work permit. However, there was no general return to visa requirements, the change only applied to those who were seeking employment, and therefore not to real tourists. Exceptions to these new rules were made with regard to, besides Nordic citizens, family members of foreign citizens that for some time had been working in Sweden, and political refugees with Swedish residence permits.

Simultaneously with the new immigration policy of 1967/68, which meant a more restrictive stand against spontaneous non-Nordic immigration, organised collective labour recruitment abroad was recommended under the guidance of AMS, in consultation with the labour market parties. Yugoslavia and Turkey signed recruitment agreements during the autumn of 1966 and the spring of 1967, with recruitment offices subsequently opening in these countries. Just as in individual cases, foreigners applying for work permits under the recruitment agreements had to have offers of employment and housing. The responsibility of housing contracts was in these cases put on the employer. Moreover, a labour market assessment meant that a thorough assessment had to be made with regards to existing labour demand, both Nordic citizens and 'Swedish groups' such as married women, older and disabled people had to be taken into account in the assessment. Further restrictions applied to the low wage sectors with a high unemployment risk, and to highly skilled foreign labour. In principle no permits were to
be granted in the low wage sector, while only in exceptional cases was recruitment of highly skilled foreign labour encouraged.

It was stressed in the Aliens' Act that the central immigration authority was now to be the highest instance of regulation, replacing the State's Foreign Commission (AOT) that had been in charge. 1969 was also the year when the government established Statens invandrarverk, SIV (the Swedish Immigrant Board), which consequently took over the responsibility (Prop. 1968[142]; Prop. 1968[158]; Prop. 1969[53]). However, except in cases of refugees and family members, the Swedish Immigrant Board came in effect to delegate decisions with regard to work permits to AMS, which followed already established praxis. In their decision making, AMS followed the advice of the unions.

The establishment of the Swedish Immigrant Board in 1969, can be read as consequence of the modern and administrative state. As such, the Swedish Immigrant Board was part of Swedish social engineering, where institutions were established with the aim to collectively address those areas of the society that are perceived as in the state's interest.

As earlier mentioned a guest worker system was in reality never introduced in Sweden (Peterson, 1997). Instead, the practice of granting residence permits to family members of non-Nordic labour 'immigrants' was established, based on proof of support and housing. A succession of agreements with other European countries during the 1950s had granted, with time-based qualifications, labour 'immigrants' family members the right to a succession of different social benefits, such as child allowance, study allowance and health insurance. In the discussions leading up to the regulation of non-Nordic immigration, LO argued that individual immigration without a labour market
assessment primarily should apply to family members of already present labour 'immigrants'. The government followed this position when they, after the provisions of 1965 and 1966, established the new rules.

When immigration increased in the mid 1960s and the numbers of Southern and Eastern Europeans rose, the trade-union movement no longer believed that their goal of equal living conditions for foreign citizens could be sustained. The union's demands for a restricted immigration can therefore also be read in this context, as a function of the demand for measures to ease the introduction and adaptation of 'immigrants' to the working and living conditions in Sweden. Such measures were also introduced in the mid 1960s. In contrast to immigration policy, where the political parties and different parties on the labour market stood for different opinions, the parties seemed to share the same views with relation to questions of adaptation, and agreed that the responsibility should be divided between society, employers and the unions.

Language difficulties, problems with conveying information, comfort and well being, together with cultural and religious differences were viewed as some of the more central problems for 'immigrants' that lived in Sweden. All of these problems were categorised as more or less language and culture specific, and concerned the 'immigrants' capability of communicating with 'Swedes' and living in Swedish society. This was a concern expressly related to the perceived difficulties believed to be inherent in the increasing immigration from non-Nordic countries. However, the largest group of 'immigrants' with perceived difficulties with the Swedish language was the large 'group' of Finnish 'immigrants'. These were Nordic immigrants. The Finnish 'group' amounted to 150,000
people in the 1960s.

In this context it is important to understand that though Danish, Norwegian and Swedish are different languages, each of the languages are commonly understood by the speakers of the other individual languages. The Finnish language, on the other hand, has different linguistic roots than its neighbouring Nordic languages, and is not commonly understood by the other countries’ populations, and vice versa. However, Finnish citizens are taught Swedish within the Finnish school system, as a legacy of the Swedish colonial rule of Finland. This colonial governance ended in 1809 when Finland was lost to Russia. Although Finland had its first President in 1919, the Finnish language, which had been oppressed during times of occupation, was not granted equal status with the Swedish language until 1863.

Despite this introduction of Swedish language training in childhood, research at the Volvo manufacturing plant (Skövdeverken; Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996) showed that 85 per cent of the Finnish ‘immigrants’ at the factory did not speak Swedish on arrival. Based on these language difficulties, the trade-union movement lobbied the government for the institutional support for language courses during working hours. Similar recommendations were made in a 1965 Labour Market Report, which advocated that language courses would ease the ‘immigrants’ adaptation to life in Sweden. Later that same year the government decided to introduce free courses in Swedish for ‘immigrants’, organised through educational associations. These courses were only held during traditional after work hours (Widgren, 1980; Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).
Another obstacle for 'immigrants' adaptation was said to be the lack of knowledge of how the Swedish society, working life and labour market functioned. The trade-union movement stressed that the 'immigrants' need for information was endless. In regards to the manufacturing industry, an 'immigrant' committee, consisting of the different labour market parties, drew up measures for company introduction and adaptation programmes. A similar programme was later also drawn up by LO, the Swedish Employers' Confederation and SIV. The unions also argued that it was important for 'immigrants' to become union organised labour, so that they could be reached by union information as well as get personal supervision by union representatives at branches and at work. Through negotiations between unions and employers, the employers agreed that they were to recommend union memberships to their 'immigrant' employees.

At the state as well as municipality level, the society started to invest in information activities. Information centres were established up and down the country, and SIV established special welfare services for 'immigrants', arranged courses for interpreters and financially supported 'immigrant' organisations and libraries. In 1967, came the first issue of a special 'immigrant' newspaper, published in Finnish, German, Italian, Greek and Serbo-Croatian. The introduction by the companies was viewed as a continuing process. Once employment of an individual was agreed upon, the immigrant was to get basic information with regard to the employment; such as, the nature of the job, the wage contract, working hours and work place regulations. In addition, the employer was to give information about the locality, village or city, about housing conditions, the need to be domiciled and routines with regard to residence permits. Finally, the employer was supposed to inform the employee about the union.
It was not until the realisation of the 1967/68 regulation of non-Nordic immigration, and the discussion of the introduction and adjustment of ‘immigrants’, that Sweden took its first steps towards a comprehensive ‘immigrant’ and minority policy. The category ‘immigrant’ had not existed previously in Swedish legislation; instead, the legal dividing line had been drawn between foreign and Swedish citizens; foreign citizens not being able to claim an unconditioned right to reside and work in Sweden.

When questions of adjustment and minorities were discussed in the mid 1960s, foreigners still had neither the right to carry out trade nor the right to hold a position as civil servant, though some exceptions did exist. Foreigners also lacked political rights. They neither had the right to vote nor to participate in the running of society. With these exceptions in mind, during the years of free labour immigration foreigners were equal to Swedish citizens with regard to rights and privileges. They held the rights of protection of person and property, and the right to express themselves before the court and other authorities. There was no difference between foreign citizens and their Swedish counterparts with regard to freedom of speech, freedom of religion and freedom of association and assembly. These rights and privileges came later also to be given the protection of international law (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

Citizenship did not play a role concerning compulsory school attendance, nor when it came to the right to study at upper secondary schools and vocational training schools. Foreign citizens were also given access to higher education. Some university courses did however give priority to Swedish citizens over foreigners or people with foreign
examinations. In relation to the rights to health and medical services, foreign citizens were on equal terms with Swedish citizens. The general child allowance, social benefits for students, health, occupational injury and unemployment insurance, ATP (national supplementary pension) and welfare benefits were payable to foreign citizens based on the same conditions as they were for Swedish citizens. Certain benefits such as state pension and jobseeker's allowance were based on a qualification time. Only exceptional social benefits, such as maintenance advance, were conditioned by Swedish citizenship. In principle, foreign citizens have also had the same obligations towards the society as Swedish citizens, with one major exception. Foreign citizens have never been obliged to carry out the compulsory military service. In this sense, foreign nationals have been what Hammar (1990a) calls denizens, rather than citizens.

Despite continuous and increasing changes in the composition of the Swedish population during modern times, Sweden still did not have any expressed minority policy. The policy regarding 'ethnic minorities' was disparate and the general goal was assimilation. Since the 'Same question' (the native population of Sweden, or Laplanders) was viewed as an agricultural policy about the breeding and keeping of reindeers, the term ethnic minority rarely occurred and a policy for positive protection of minorities did not exist. While domestic minorities (Same and Tornedal Finns) were small in numbers, the size of the group of 'immigrant' minorities sharply increased in the beginning of the 1960s. It was in the end this numerical increase that forced a pronounced and coherent minority policy. The minority complex of problems was obvious in 1967 when the Foreigner/Immigrant Report (AOT) was publicised. However, no prepared proposals of measures existed. A new 'Immigrant' Report was therefore commissioned in 1968,
and it was this Report that laid the ground for what in the mid 1970s was to result in Sweden’s first specific ‘immigrant’ and minority policy (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

**Restricting Immigration**

LO issued a circular to its local offices in 1972, in which they stressed that weaker groups, such as youth, women, disabled and older people had as a result of the recession in 1971/72 been excluded from the labour market, and now risked never being able to fight their way back in. Based on this conclusion, LO requested its local offices to apply a more restrictive policy with regard to issuing work permits to non-Nordic labour. As a result, from this time onwards, the unions became ever more restrictive in issuing work permits for foreign labour. Because AMS based the majority of their decisions on the recommendations of the unions, non-Nordic labour immigration came to a halt.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>Emigration</th>
<th>Net Immigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>35,415</td>
<td>12,523</td>
<td>22,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>61,147</td>
<td>14,874</td>
<td>46,273</td>
</tr>
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Source: based on Table 2.1 in SOU 1974[69]
H.T.R. Persson

Consequently, after the mid 1970s oil crises, the share of labour immigration decreased in relation to overall immigration to Sweden. Labour migration did not amount to more than several thousands people per year, or a tenth of the total number of non-Nordic immigrants during the second half of the 1970s. Labour migration decreased even further during the 1980s, and between 1984 and 1992, it annually did not amount to more than 200 people, which corresponded to approximately one per cent of the total non-Nordic immigration.

The Swedish trade union has unquestionably been an important instigator in the ‘immigrant’ political debate and exercised great influence on the policy that the government and the parliament established in the mid 1970s. Though the basic principles already had been elaborated at the end of the 1960s, the trade union movement originally did not have a coherent ‘immigrant’ or immigration policy. Instead, a policy was slowly chiselled out through the work by the local sections, through negotiations with employers. The question of the ‘immigrants’ position in the labour market, and the so-called adaptation problems were discussed during the LO-congresses of 1971 and 1976, but it was not until 1979 that the trade union movement’s attitudes were compiled into an ‘immigrant’ policy program.

As an example of the negotiation between unions and employers, LO and SAF (the Swedish Employers’ Confederation) recommended ‘immigrant’ introduction courses of 200 hours, of which the first 60 were to be paid by the employer. These courses could take place either during working hours or during free time. In the latter case a severance payment was to be paid out. There were however not always formal agreements and
Metall, the metal workers union, pursued a harder line than LO, and pushed for 240 hours, fully paid by the employers. Also pushing for an extension at the beginning of the 1970s was the Immigrant Board, which like the metal workers union argued that the course should take place during working hours. The Royal Commission on Immigration (Invandrarutredningen) took the same line as both Metall and SIV, and in 1972 a law passed that entitled newly employed 'immigrants' to the right to take paid time off when participating in Swedish courses (Ekberg & Gustafsson, 1995; Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996; Mulinari & Neergaard; 2004). After having described the different trends in the Swedish migration and integration history up to the transition period between labour migration and refugee migration it is now consequently time to turn to the era of refugee migration and the European Union.
Chapter 6: Refugee Migration and the European Union

This chapter covers the period of the Swedish migration and integration history that was, in difference to earlier trends of labour migration, primarily marked by the increasing refugee immigration. It discusses the shift towards migration streams almost solely comprised of refugees and asylum seekers. It provides an overview of the different nationalities that have made up and are making up the part of the Swedish population with an immigration background. It describes the shift from an immigration policy to an immigrant policy, from an immigration that was 'handled' by the labour market to one predominantly 'handled' by the social welfare system. It describes the end of the apolitical climate around immigration and integration policies in Sweden and introduces the European Union as an important factor for present and future immigration and integration policies. The chapter is then completed by an overview of the demographic result of 60 years immigration to Sweden.

The Period of Refugee Migration
In 1954, Sweden ratified the Geneva Convention of 1951. As a consequence, it came to apply a more generous refugee policy than before, one that included political refugees world wide. In its opening words, the document stressed that Sweden commits itself to not turn away political refugees in need of asylum, except in particular cases (Prop. 1954[134]). It was not until 1967, with the New York protocol, that the Refugee Convention was changed from its earlier refugee definition with regard to both time and geographical restrictions (Södergran, 2000).
The Swedish definition of a refugee in 1954, was however somewhat broader than the Geneva Convention, since it included persecution of several kinds such as for 'political crimes'. That Sweden bound itself not to turn away refugees in need of asylum, except in particular cases, meant that not only would refugees risking persecution not be returned to their country of origin, but also that refugees were granted the right to settle in Sweden. The asylum seeker could be refused asylum in Sweden in case s/he had already or could have been granted asylum in another country. The rule of first asylum country was a guiding principle connected to similar practices in other countries.

More than 98 per cent of the refugees arriving in Sweden during this time arrived from Eastern Europe, of which almost 90 per cent arrived from Hungary and Yugoslavia. Hungarian refugees arrived principally in connection to the Hungarian crisis of 1956, while refugees from Yugoslavia increased during the 1960s. Overall 17,000 quota refugees were transferred between 1950 and 1967, an annual average of 1,000 people. The immigration of refugees that arrived on their own initiative to Sweden was low during this period, not exceeding 7,000, which amounted to less than an annual average of 400 people (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

As an idea stemming from the 1967/68 immigration policy, with a regulated labour immigration that was to prioritise the collective transfer of non-Nordic citizens, the government felt it was desirous that refugee immigration in the future also took place through a similar collective transfer system. The result was something very different. As a consequence of military coups, civil wars and ethnic conflicts around the world,
together with a Swedish reputation as a democracy where human rights were respected, increasing numbers of refugees began arriving in Sweden at the end of the 1960s. While refugee immigration had represented less than a third of the total immigration between 1950 and 1967, between 1968 and 1992 it came to represent more than 80 per cent. Despite the clear intention to reduce immigration, the result was the opposite (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

**Main Immigrant Groups**

Up to the mid 1970s, the only category mentioned in the Swedish Aliens’ Act with regard to asylum was that of the political refugee. This meant more or less the same group that in the Geneva Convention was referred to as refugees. Though the law of 1980 applied the definition given in the convention, Sweden has since the 1960s also offered asylum to additional categories of foreign citizens. This despite the fact that they neither have fulfilled the conditions according to the Geneva Convention nor the Swedish Aliens’ Act. Conscientious objectors, de facto-refugees and refugees whose claims to asylum rest ‘on humanitarian grounds’ are all examples of these exceptions. Though the right to residence permits based on humanitarian grounds did not come into force until 1989, it had in practice been endorsed by the Aliens’ proclamations.

The composition of refugees that on their own initiative have arrived in Sweden from the 1960s onwards has, with some noticeable exceptions, been similar to the composition of quota refugees. As an example, whilst Vietnamese refugees, who on
their own initiative arrived in Sweden, were substantially fewer than the ones included by the quota category, refugees from the African continent are the opposite case.

During the 1960s, the majority of quota refugees arrived from Eastern Europe. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 led to 3,100 Czechoslovakians arriving in Sweden and as a result of anti-Semitic campaigns in Poland, Sweden received 2,700 Polish Jews. Whilst the share of Eastern European quota refugees decreased, its dominant position in the refugee flow was taken over in the 1970s by Latin American refugee migration, and later, during the 1980s, this was in turn replaced by Asian refugee migration. The transfer of quota refugees from the African continent has overall been of less considerable size. However, within this framework approximately 800 ‘Indians’ transferred from Uganda in 1972.

Eastern European refugee immigration, which previously had been included in the quota system, changed in character during the second half of the 1980s, when the number of refugees that on their own initiative arrived in Sweden increased. During the budget year of 1989/90, 2,400 Romanian, 600 Yugoslavian, 400 Bulgarian and Hungarians, 200 Polish and 100 Soviet citizens were granted asylum (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

Whilst refugees arrived from the Baltic States, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union after the Second World War and from Hungary between 1956 and 1960, the more long term immigration from Eastern Europe did not start until the beginning of the 1960s. Despite this, migration from Eastern Europe has primarily been of a refugee character. The magnitude of the early refugee immigration corresponded to a fourth of
the total immigration to Sweden, while the immigration from the mid 1960s up to the
beginning of 1993 only corresponded to a tenth.

Approximately 7,000 people arrived from Hungary followed by another 1,000
Hungarians from Austria and Germany, and the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia
led to more than 3,000 refugees arriving in Sweden. As mentioned, Poland and
Yugoslavia have been the two largest contributors to Swedish immigration from Eastern
Europe, and at the beginning of 1950 almost 8,000 Poles had arrived in Sweden. Whilst
immigration from Poland has continued with an annual average of 1,600 people,
Yugoslavian immigration has been more prominent, though of a slightly different
character than Polish immigration, which up to the Balkan War was greater in numbers.
The majority of the Yugoslavian immigration was up to the start of the War mainly of a
labour character. The Yugoslavian emigration did not start until the beginning of the
1960s, when the Yugoslavian authorities changed their emigration policy, resulting in
800,000 people migrating to West Germany. The Yugoslavian labour immigration to
Sweden started to increase in 1963 and culminated between 1965 and 1971 (Lundh &
Ohlsson, 1996).

The persecution of Jews in Poland in the beginning of the 1970s and the state of
emergency proclaimed by the Polish military regime in the beginning of the 1980s
resulted in a relatively large migration to Sweden. The immigration reached its peak
with approximately 3,000 to 4,000 Polish refugees arriving in the beginning of the
1980s. Because remigration to Poland has been low, the net immigration during the
1970s and the 1980s had by the beginning of the 1990s resulted in 35,000 people from
Poland living in Sweden.

Yugoslavian immigration from 1971 up to mid 1980s, a time of mainly family related immigration, was annually around 1,000 people. From the end of the 1980s, refugee immigration increased as a result of outbreaks of violence and increasing actions of war in Yugoslavia and the states that were formed when the federation was dissolved. The number of Romanian ‘immigrants’ increased during the entire 1980s and culminated at the end of the decade during the last years of the Ceausescu regime. The yearly Romanian immigration was between 1980 and 1990; 1,400 people. Immigration from Bulgaria also increased after 1988/89 as a result of Turk-Bulgarians being exposed to the harsh assimilation policy by the Bulgarian regime. Overall, more than 2,000 people emigrated from Bulgaria to Sweden. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union resulted in further immigration, mainly from its European region. Between 1989 and 1992 approximately 4,000 former Soviet Union citizens immigrated to Sweden (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

Before 1970 the non-European net immigration constituted an annual average of 1,000 people, which at the beginning of the 1970s corresponded to a tenth of the total Swedish immigration. The immigration from outside of Europe has thereafter gradually increased. Initially the increase was due to the decreasing number of the people migrating to North America. In fact, not more than 40,000 people who had been born outside of Europe lived in Sweden in 1970, which at the time only corresponded to seven per cent of the non-Swedish born population. From the mid 1970s up to the mid 1980s an annual average of 12,000 non-European individuals immigrated to Sweden,
thereafter this has increased to approximately 25,000. Non-European immigration from
the mid 1980s up to 1992 corresponded to approximately 50 per cent of the total
immigration. This amounted to 20,000 people, or two thirds of the total immigration to
Sweden.

During the 1970s and 80's, a large part of the Swedish refugee immigration was of Latin
American origin. The majority of the quota refugees from Latin America were Chileans
affected by the 1973 military coup. The coup led to large numbers of quota refugees
being transferred to Sweden, which between 1973 and 1977 corresponded to 7,000
people. During the second half of the 1980s, the number of Chilean quota refugees
decreased and the largest Latin American contribution instead came from El Salvador
(Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

Immigration from Latin America was overall negligible before the 1973 military coup.
The immigration had up to this point only corresponded to a couple of hundred people
annually, and the majority of these people where already Swedish citizens. In other
words, before the 1960s there were more Swedish people migrating to Latin America
then the other way around. While less than 3,500 people born in Latin America were
living in Sweden around 1970, from 1973 onwards more than 60,000 people immigrated
to Sweden, which corresponds to an annual average of 3,000 people.

The first 'wave' of political refugees from Chile consisted of the highly educated and
intellectuals with a political past. Because many Chilean refugees had to flee via other
Latin American countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, the Chilean migration to
Sweden was in fact larger than what the official 1970s' statistics indicate. During the second immigration 'wave', between 1987 and 1989, more than 5,000 people arrived annually from Chile. The majority had in comparison with the earlier immigration lower education levels and was from either a working-class background, and or part of family related immigration. Many of these 'immigrants' were affected by the temporary change in asylum practice in 1989 as part of an attempt to shorten the waiting time for asylum seekers (Lindqvist, 1991; Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

Though Sweden also has had important immigration streams, mainly of a refugee character, from other Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Peru and Uruguay during the 1970s and El Salvador and Peru during the 1980s, immigration from Chile has represented more than 50 per cent of Latin American immigration. The number of 'immigrants' has clearly been greater than the number of emigrants migrating to countries in Latin America. However, people have continued to migrate from Sweden to Latin America; in addition to Swedish citizens, many refugees have also returned home, of which some later have re-migrated to Sweden (Lindqvist, 1991; Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

During the 1980s the largest number of quota refugees came from the Asian continent. In 1981, 2,300 so-called boat people had arrived in Sweden. The number of Vietnamese refugees slightly increased until the end of the 1980s. However, the largest number of quota refugees from the Asian continent has been the result of the conditions in Iran and Iraq. An annual average of 500 Iranians have arrived in Sweden since the mid 1980s, while the numbers of Iraqi refugees have been considerably lower. The numbers of
Iraqis did however increase during the budget year 1991/92. Included in this refugee quota were also more than 1,100 Kurds.

Asian immigration increased during the 1960s. After having been relatively small during the 1950s, less than 300 people per year, it has thereafter been the most prominent contributor to Swedish immigration from outside of Europe. This Asian immigration represented 60 per cent of the so-called Third World immigration during the 1970s and the 1980s. In the beginning of the 1970s an annual average of 2,000 people immigrated, while it thereafter has increased in two stages. Immigration from Asia has primarily been of a refugee and family related character. Turkish immigration, originally of a labour character in the 1960s, thereafter gradually increased. Between 1976 and 1985, 6,000 people came annually from Turkey to Sweden. Refugee and family related immigration made up the greater part of the Turkish immigration to Sweden during the 1970s, while immigration during the 1980s mainly was made up of political and union activists, as well as Kurds. Turkish immigration has between 1985 and the beginning of the 1990s been annually averaging 1,500 people.

The largest increase however took place in connection with the conflicts in the Middle East. As a result, Iranians have made up the largest 'immigrant group'. When Shahen's regime was defeated in 1979, there were 2,200 Iranian citizens living in Sweden. Immigration then increased at the time of the war between Iran and Iraq. The Iranian immigration to Sweden was mainly made up of young Iranian conscientious objectors. This has been followed by an ever increasing share of family related immigration, but also by entire families seeking asylum. At its peak in 1987/88, Sweden had an annual
immigration from Iran of more than 7,000 people. The remaining immigration from the Middle East has primarily had its background in the civil war in Lebanon. This large immigration ‘wave’ was however preceded by immigration by Christian Assyrians/Syrians between 1972 and 1976. Immigration from Lebanon and Syria increased at the end of the 1980s, and whilst the Lebanese immigration culminated in 1990 when 9,000 people immigrated to Sweden, Syrian immigration kept on increasing. In addition, immigration from other East, Southeast and South Asian countries has also increased since the beginning of the 1970s. Since 1986 an annual average of 500 people from Thailand, 400 from China and 300 from Pakistan immigrated to Sweden.

Immigration from the African continent, which has been spread across a range of different countries, had up to the 1990s, been relatively small. The first larger group arriving in Sweden was people escaping ethnic persecution in Uganda, which resulted in 1,000 people arriving between 1971 and 1973. However, during the 1970s and the 1980s African immigration increased. The increase was primarily represented by people from Kenya and Morocco. African immigration then sharply increased between 1985 and 1991. The civil war in Ethiopia led to refugee immigration, primarily from Eritrea. This later ended simultaneously with the war.

When comparing the immigration patterns between men and women, ‘immigrant’ women make up 55 per cent of the overall immigration up to the mid 1950s. Two thirds of these women were unmarried, which is partly explained by the relatively large numbers of domestic personnel that arrived from Finland, Norway and Germany. Between 1946 and 1955 almost 60 per cent of the Finnish ‘immigrants’ and 70 per cent
of the Norwegian ‘immigrants’ were women, whilst the same was true for two thirds of
the West Germans ‘immigrants up to the beginning of the 1960s. From the mid 1950s
onwards the number of unmarried women immigrating to Sweden sharply decreased and
at its lowest level in the mid 1960s, women only represented 40 per cent of the total
immigration. As the number of unmarried women has decreased, the percentage of
married women has increased, and since the beginning of the 1970s more than 50 per
cent of the immigrating women have been married.

The main explanation behind the demographic change in immigration that took place
during the second half of the 1950s was due to the increasing demand for labour in the
expanding heavy industrial sector. This, together with refugee immigration, resulted in
an increasing number of families amongst the total number of ‘immigrants’. The
demographic change, from a high percentage of single women amongst the ‘immigrants’
during the 1940s, 50s and 60s, to an increasingly family orientated immigration,
primarily from the 1970s onwards, also matches the trend of increasing numbers of
children amongst the total number of ‘immigrants’. That is, whilst the ‘immigrants’ had
fewer children than the local population at the time of immigration during the 1950s and
60s, the tendency over time has been the opposite. ‘Immigrants’ tend now to have more
children, both at the time of arrival and after settling, than the local ‘Swedish
population’ (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

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Berliner Institut für Vergleichende Sozialforschung, 2004
statistik@emz-berlin.de
Immigration to Sweden during the 1970s and 1980s corresponded to an annual average of 40,000 people. For an overview of the numbers of foreign citizens by country of citizenship and year living in Sweden between 1973 and 1981 see table 3 on page 167. Immigration to Sweden during the major part of the post war period has exceeded emigration. While the annual average net immigration had reached 20,000 during the first half of the 1940s, 11,000 during the 1950s and 20,000 again during the 1960s, Swedish net immigration decreased during the 1970s and reached only a level of 15,000 people per year during the 1980s.

Around half of each immigration cohort has been made up of people between 20 and 35 years old. Since 1970 on average more than one third of all non-European ‘immigrants’ have been younger than 18 years old. Whilst one out of four of all ‘immigrants’ in 1990 was younger than 15, the corresponding number for the total population was less than a fifth. The share of women amongst the ‘immigrants’ who have arrived in Sweden has, as already mentioned, varied over different periods. This is mainly connected to the different types of immigration at certain times. Family related immigration has been high since the 1970s, overall around 50 per cent during the whole period, while the relative importance of refugee immigration has constantly increased. Refugee immigration and family related immigration have, during the period between 1984 to 1993, corresponded to 48 per cent and 46 per cent of the total numbers of non-Nordic immigration. Today, family related immigration, as mentioned above, makes up the largest number of new residence permits.

In addition to refugee immigration, but sometimes closely related to the origin of the
former, an annual average of 1,400 non-Nordic children have arrived in Sweden due to adoptions since the 1960s. Consequently, adoptions correspond to a noticeable part of the total immigration. A third of the adopted children have been of Asian origin, with adopted children corresponding to 80 per cent of the total Korean immigration, and a fourth of Latin American origin, with adopted children corresponding to 75 per cent of the total Columbian immigration to Sweden (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

**Immigration and Immigrant Policy**

In 1974, the Royal Commission on Immigration, which had declared itself highly influenced by Canadian minority legislation and different ethnic movements around the world, presented its final report; SOU,1974[69]. According to the report and subsequent government policy reforms Sweden was considered to be developing into a multicultural state, though at the time this was expressed as a vision of cultural diversity. Based on arguments from within this point of view, the state should neither force individuals to abandon their language nor their 'ethnic identity'. Future policies in all major areas such as housing, labour and social issues should, according to the report, emanate from this cultural diversity. It was argued that an assimilation policy would only increase the risk of cultural difference, and that instead a policy of cultural diversity with reciprocation between the 'majority' and the 'minority cultures' enriches the society as a whole.

Summarised, the Commission concluded that:

- Migration between countries can be expected to continue, and Sweden must therefore be prepared also in the future to receive and train newly
arrived immigrants, and to provide for the solution of their acute social problems.

- A large proportion of immigrants will probably settle permanently in Sweden, whose native linguistic minorities will consequently be joined by new population groups speaking other languages besides Swedish and having a partly different identity, which in many cases they will be anxious to retain. This need has already become manifest in a number of groups through the formation of separate associations and a desire for public support for the preservation of linguistic and cultural identity.

- Many of the immigrants coming to Sweden will eventually re-emigrate, which may involve new problems of adjustment and adaptation for themselves, but above all for their children. These problems can be alleviated by giving immigrants the opportunity of active contact with their own language, cultural heritage and native country while they are still in Sweden.

- A goal for future work on behalf of immigrants will be, as in the past, that they are treated on an equal basis with Swedish citizens. There will be an increasing demand for cultural exchanges between Sweden and the immigrants' countries of origin. Swedish society will continue to become more international in its ways.

SOU 1974[69]: 24-5

The key sentiment of the commissioned report was summarised as equality, freedom of choice and partnership. As Peterson (1997) has stressed, though no recognition is to be found in the report, the reference to the French Revolution and the slogan liberté, égalité, et fraternité is obvious. The goal of equality meant that ‘immigrant groups’ should be given equal living conditions to those of the rest of the population. Besides being provided with a material living standard corresponding to that of the ‘Swedes’, ‘immigrants’ were to be provided with the possibility to be integrated into the society.
This is where the courses in Swedish come in. However, it was also stressed as important that the 'immigrants' and their children be given a real chance to preserve their own language, to practice their cultural activities and to keep their connections with their country of origin, in the same way as it was argued the 'majority population' was able to preserve and develop their language and their cultural traditions.

The goal expressed as freedom of choice meant that individual members of different 'minority groups' should be given the choice to decide to what extent an individual wanted to keep his or her original language and 'cultural identity'. Partnership referred to an establishment of collaboration between the 'majority population' and the 'minorities', based on mutual tolerance and solidarity (SOU 1974[69]). As is apparent, the goal of equality was to a great extent the prerequisite for the fruitful partnership that the Commission hoped that the pluralistic 'minority policy' was to bring about. However, as Schierup (1988) has stressed, the ideas of cultural pluralism need to be read in the context of the power structures of society, determined by the economic and political positions of the different minorities, national and ethnic.

The Royal Commission proposed in 1974 that questions regarding 'the minorities' were to be discussed together with that of the adaptation of 'immigrants' into Swedish society. The government concurred, and from then on 'minority policy' was integrated with 'immigrant' policy; the general policy on 'immigrants' incorporation and adaptation into society. The government subscribed to the proposed goals by the Commission and the parliament supported the new slogan of equality, freedom of choice and partnership. Sweden, it has been argued, became with this report the first European
democracy to manifest an immigration and immigrant policy where the state took responsibility for creating a pluralistic ethnic society (Rakar, 2005)

In spite of the fact that freedom of religion had by law existed since the beginning of the 1950s, the Swedish constitution of 1974 was the first constitution to guarantee freedom of religion. Still this does not mean anything with regard to the Swedish calendar, which is still built around the recognition of Christian events. The Swedish school system has however been affected. Instead of solely teaching Christianity with elements such as morning assembly with prayer and hymn singing, it now teaches religion(s). The degree of study of the different religions is however up to the individual teacher and may therefore vary (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996; Karlsson & Svanberg, 1997).

In *regeringsformen*, the Instrument of Government and the Swedish constitution, of 1974, it was stated that ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities’ possibilities to retain and develop their own cultural associations and communions were to be encouraged. This cultural pluralistic ‘minority policy’ has in principle not been questioned since the mid 1970s, and in regards to the goal of equality since 1968. Whilst the policy was debated and clarified by the Swedish parliament in 1986, the goals of equality, freedom of choice and partnership have been viewed as permanent policy elements. For example, the criticism of immigration policy by the parliament’s auditors in 1992 was not in regards to the goals of the policy, but instead about the cost and the methods that were used to fulfil these goals.

The immigration and minority policy that has been pursued by Sweden since the 1970s
can be said to have had two aims. On one hand, it has wanted to facilitate the inclusion of 'immigrants' and their adaptation to the Swedish society, and on the other it has argued that it should be possible for different 'minority groups' to retain and develop their linguistic and cultural heritage.

Due to the new immigrant policy, it was for the first time possible for foreign citizens residing in Sweden to obtain positions within the public sector. Some exceptions to this have remained; the police, judiciary, the National Defence and Official Appointments were still supposed to be reserved for Swedish citizens. The most important change with regards to reducing the restrictions for 'immigrants' came in 1975, when foreign citizens above the age of 18, and who had been living in Sweden for not less than three years, were granted the right to vote in local elections. With this, foreign citizens now also became eligible as representatives in municipalities and county council districts.

These reforms were carried out after intensive parliamentary debates, which had started with a Social Democratic motion supporting the voting reform presented to the parliament already in 1968. The new reform increased the local electorate by three to four per cent, of which 50 per cent were of Finnish origin. Despite that the turnout was lower than the national average, it could still be viewed as a success for the new integration policy. 60 per cent of the electorate with foreign citizenship voted in 1976, participation has however thereafter decreased and in 1988 the number did not exceed 43 per cent.

'Immigrants' access to social benefits has also over time been improved, above all with
regard to pension benefits. Originally, only Swedish citizens and foreign citizens from countries that had come to an agreement with Sweden were entitled to pensions. In the mid 1970s, 90 per cent of the foreign citizens were granted this right. The waiting times had varied depending on agreements, but after a parliamentary resolution in 1979 all foreign citizens that had been living in Sweden for a period of five years before retirement and at least a total of 10 years of their adult life, were now granted the right to a state pension. Agreements were also made with several countries on allowing foreign citizens to bring with them their state pension if returning to their country of origin, a right that had already existed regarding the ATP (the National Supplementary Pension).

The most well known of the changes brought on by the policy, beside the voting reform, is probably the home language teaching reform of 1976. A couple of hours per week of home language teaching were carried out already in the beginning of the 1970s. However, with the 1976 reform, the municipalities became responsible for offering home language teaching to all children whose parents or custody holders called for it during kindergarten, the nine-year compulsory school years and during the upper secondary school level. The majority of the resources were however put into the nine-year compulsory school. Although home language teaching was compulsory for the schools, it was not compulsory for the individual pupil. Whilst only 3,800 pupils took part in home language teaching in 1971, the 1976 reform resulted in a sharp increase. The numbers of participants had by 1978 increased to 42,300, in the beginning of the 1980s to 50,000, and at the beginning of the 1990s, 65,000 pupils participated in home language teaching, which numbered more than 118 languages (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996)
Tomas Hammar has described this integration side of the Swedish 'immigrant' policy, developed between 1968 and 1975, as

a piece of social engineering, [w]hen general social welfare ideology was combined with an already old policy of permanent immigration, [i.e.] that the principle of equality was recognized as valid for all legal residents, citizens and denizens alike. Social and political participation became central objectives, and to this were added vague ideas about ethnic minority rights in a future multicultural Sweden.

Hammar, 1999: 178

Some researchers, such as Pred (2000) and Rakar (2005), argue that this still is the case.

In 1976, the Swedish Immigration Board started to separately account for residence permits that had been granted based on family connection, i.e. this is the first date from which one can estimate the extent of family related immigration. Sweden regularly grants residence permits based on family connection, i.e. to husbands, wives, partners and unmarried children under the age of 20. The same policy has been applied to single parents accompanied by their underage children. If they satisfy specific requirements, also parents to 'immigrants' are admitted, such as parents of the age of 60 or older on humanitarian grounds, and relatives, such as the 'immigrants’ last connection to the country of origin, have been granted residence permits. However, to make pro forma marriages or so-called 'fake marriages' more difficult, a probation time of six months was introduced before residence permits were granted. In 1977, this waiting time was extended to two years.
Up to the mid 1980s, 5 to 10,000 residence permits based on family connection were issued annually. Thereafter, the numbers of such issued residence permits increased and at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s they had reached a level of 20,000. Out of all residence permits issued during the 1980s, 40 per cent were based on family connection.

From Labour Market towards Social Welfare
As the quotation from Tomas Hammar on the previous page indicates, Sweden has had a long tradition of social engineering. The area of migration and integration is no exception. Between 1947 and 1984, the labour market authorities, the National Labour Market Board (AMS) had the main responsibility for asylum seekers during their initial arrival in the country. The responsibility for refugee reception was in 1985, in part due to the shift from labour to refugee immigration, transferred to SIV. By the end of the 1970s, the number of ‘immigrant’ service bureaus that were to serve as points of information and assistance for newly arrived ‘immigrants’ reached eighty. Their main tasks were to supply interpreting services and to assist the ‘immigrants’ in their contacts with authorities and society. In an attempt to live up to these goals 3,000 interpreters were employed by the end of the 1970s.

A common way of solving unemployment problems in Sweden from the mid 1970s onwards, not solely amongst ‘immigrants’, has been to establish a variety of education
courses. Though there may be a need for updating vocation knowledge, one should not forget that participants in these different courses are not included in the statistics of so-called open unemployment. During the budget year of 1982/83, 16,000 foreign citizens were enrolled in vocational training courses, which corresponded to 21 per cent of the total number of participants. There have also been attempts to strengthen the contribution by the jobcentres concerning the services provided to unemployed ‘immigrants’. Investments in staff training in connection with ‘immigrant’ specific questions, additional personnel and knowledge of an ‘immigrant’ language have been taken into consideration when recruiting. The National Agency for Education has also made attempts to translate the different foreign educations systems to Swedish standards to make it easier for employers and authorities to assess ‘foreign competence levels’.

Despite these attempts, a 1985/86 study of a ‘group of immigrants’ with post-upper secondary education from their countries of origin, showed that only one out four was employed within a sector of the labour market connected to their education five years after the municipality placement. As an indirect response to this report, other indicators of failing integration goals and evidence of problems in the market with regard to discrimination, the DO, the Office of the Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination, was established in 1986 (Björk, 1997; Peterson, 1997; Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

**End of the Cold War**

Concurrent with the increasing numbers of asylum applications during the end of the 1980s, pressure on the refugee camps increased. While in 1985, Sweden had nine
refugee camps, that approximately held 1,500 people, during the second half of the 1980s both the numbers of accommodated refugees and the refugee camps increased dramatically (Södergran, 2000). When SIV took over the responsibility of refugee reception from AMS in 1985, a new system was introduced, *Hela Sverige Modellen* (the Whole of Sweden Model). SIV was supposed to negotiate individual agreements with the individual municipalities with regard to refugee reception in exchange for financial support. As a result, 137 municipalities (there are 289 in total) received 14,000 refugees in 1985. In 1989, this meant that the average number of county inhabitants per refugees corresponded to 400 people (Södergran, 2000).

The system has, however, never functioned in the way that was originally planned. The waiting times for asylum seekers have often been longer than intended. This has primarily been explained in terms of increasing immigration levels, and by the absence of passports and travel documents on the part of new arrivals. While 50 per cent of the asylum seekers lacked travel documents in 1987, during 1988 and 1989 this had reached 70 per cent (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996). Despite the expansion of the refugee camp system, the time spent by the refugees at the camps increased. In 1986, the average time spent at a refugee camp was four months, but already the subsequent year this had increased to one year. In 1988/89, a third of those living at a refugee camp were those that had already been granted residence permits but had not yet successfully been placed in a municipality (Södergran, 2000; Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996). For an overview of foreign citizens by country of citizenship during the 1980s see table 4 page 179.
### Table 4. Sweden: Foreign citizens by country of citizenship and period, 1982-1989

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Berlin Institut für Vergleichende Sozialforschung, 2004

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Due to the obvious problems with the system, the handling of asylum applications has been investigated on several occasions by government auditors. In 1988, the Asylum Case Commission (AOT), after having investigated the process, proposed that the aim should be to deal with simple cases within two weeks, whilst the remaining cases should be completed within six months. The system was clearly overburdened and the implementation of these guidelines was judged to be next to impossible. In response to the proposed guidelines and in an attempt to shorten the ever increasing queue of asylum seekers, the government temporarily changed the practice in 1989, and in one sweep granted residence permits to 6,000 asylum seekers (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

Several attempts to reduce the number of asylum seekers have been made through applying more stringent immigration policies. One of the more prominent of these has been the attempt to circumscribe the possibility of travel to Sweden by introducing temporary visa requirements. The visa requirements have remained during times of so-called greater pressure and then been dropped when circumstances have changed. Furthermore, with the view that entry permits have been abused, selective measures have been applied to tighten up the practice. The visa arrangement with regard to family visits which was applied during the mid 1980s, resulted in large numbers of asylum applications from, amongst others, visiting Iranians. Approximately one fourth of the visiting relatives applied for asylum instead of returning to their country of origin. This led to the system of family visas for Iranians, together with other nationalities from the Middle East, being restricted in November 1987.
The predominantly apolitical climate surrounding the issues of immigration and integration policies came to an end during the late 1980s, when xenophobic arguments were introduced into the political debate (Björk, 1997; Peterson, 1997). Sjöbo's (a minor municipality in southern Sweden) decision to refuse participation in the national refugee settlement programme is commonly seen as the first of several major political events signalling the change in the national political debate on immigration reform.

Simultaneously with the Swedish election of 1988, a local referendum was held in Sjöbo. This referendum for the first time gave an indication of the public opinion towards refugee immigrants, at least in the Swedish countryside. Sixty-five per cent voted against the admission of refugees to the municipality.

The process of tightening up internal as well as external measures had been introduced already before the Sjöbo referendum. However, the Sjöbo referendum is often credited with the acceleration of this trend. From having had, after the Second World War, an immigration policy first led by the need for labour, then with a clear humanitarian and pluralistic tone that was gradually more politicised during the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, Sweden had now by the end of the 1980s developed an immigration policy far more restrictive and politicised than had been the case previously (Björk, 1997).

In 1989, the common view was that the Swedish immigration system once again faced a crisis. As a response, the government applied the rule of 'particular reasons' in what was termed the "Lucia decision". Based on what was viewed as a precarious political situation with 19,000 asylum seekers, the highest number since the Second World War,
the Social Democratic government pushed through new directives with regard to the refugee policy on the Lucia day (13 Dec.). The Lucia decision was supposedly warranted by the argument that a continued increasing queue of asylum seekers would put too heavy a burden on Swedish society, i.e. Sweden had reached a limit for what it was able to handle (Peterson, 1997).

The government stressed, if Sweden was to be able to grant asylum to those who will need it the most in the future, there was a need for the time being to restrict residence permits. However, two groups were exempted from the new and more restrictive refugee policy, people with humanitarian reasons and families of refugees with children. Because of the exemptions, it may be hard to evaluate the full result of the new and stricter rules, but the numbers of refused asylum applications did sharply increase, and in 1989 over 28 per cent of the asylum applications were refused. To shorten the waiting periods for asylum seekers, SIV has since 1989 appointed special public assistants to handle unclear asylum cases and referrals to first asylum countries (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

Implications of the Membership to the European Union
Whilst the European Union was established in 1991 through the Maastricht Treaty, i.e. the second and the third pillar (Prop. 1994/95[19]), Sweden joined the EEC in January of 1994 (SFS 1992[1317] and the European Union in January of 1995 (SFS 1994[1500]). This meant that Sweden could participate on the same terms as the rest of
the member states within the present collaboration on the abolition of border controls, coordination of visa rules, refugee and asylum policy and immigration rules. EU has since then agreed on several binding instruments within the area of migration and asylum; the Dublin Convention (Prop. 1996/97[87]) and the Schengen Convention, the Spanish protocol, directive on mass migration, asylum reception and the European refugee fund (Norström, 2004).

Though the receiving country’s migration policy seldom affects the reasons or cause for the numbers of refugees in the World, it does to different extent affect the number of refugee ‘immigrants’, asylum seekers and labour ‘immigrants’ that the individual country decides to receive. No country’s immigration policy exists in a vacuum. Each country is affected by the policy of its neighbouring countries. Furthermore, as a member of the European Union, each individual member state is affected by the policy of the European Union and therefore also by the policy of each individual member state. As a member of the European Union, this also applies to Sweden (Peterson, 1997).

The protocol on asylum for EU citizens, the Spanish protocol, included in the Amsterdam treaty, came into force in May 1999, but was passed in Sweden in 1998 (Prop. 1997/98[58]; SFS 1999[185]). Its main purpose is to grant EU citizens free movement within the union together with democratic rights for all member states’ citizens. Questions of asylum, migration and border control are to be moved from the third to the first of the three pillars. This means that the collaboration will be supranational and potentially binding for the individual member states. The Amsterdam treaty also presupposes a number of migration policy instruments that impact upon
refugees and asylum seekers. This includes visa rules, rules on 'illegal migration' and 'legal immigration' (Norström, 2004).

The Amsterdam treaty established that the member states shall decide on a common EU legislation on four areas within asylum and immigration policy. This includes which country is supposed to handle an asylum case from a citizen of a third country, minimum standards in receiving refugees, the minimum standard for when a citizen from a third country is to be perceived as a refugee and minimum standards for when a member state should be allowed to grant or revoke refugee status (Norström, 2004).

In 1999, the member states deepened their future collaboration on topics of refugee policy. The European Council agreed on four new milestones regarding refugee policy at the Tammerfors meeting. The first is an attempt to establish partnerships with originating and transit countries, with the intention to work with issues of human rights. The second milestone is a common European asylum system with absolute respect for the right to asylum. The third is the fair treatment of citizens of the third-countries. The fourth is the handling of migration, which includes combating human trafficking and the economic exploitation of 'immigrants' (Norström, 2004).

During the same period, Sweden reached record levels of asylum seekers when Sweden received 84,000 people, of which 70,000 came from former Yugoslavia, due to the Balkan War. Whilst asylum cases of Yugoslavian origin had at the end of 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s been on an annual level of two to three thousand, during the summer of 1992 a sharp increase took place when 45,000 asylum seekers arrived
between June and September. The Yugoslavian asylum seekers arrived from Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Vojvodina and Macedonia. However, the majority of these people were not considered to need asylum, and after deportations and the spreading of information in former Yugoslavia, the numbers of asylum seekers, primarily from Macedonia, at first decreased.

During the first half of the 1990s, between 53 and 65 per cent of the asylum cases were refused. Visa requirements for Yugoslavia were introduced in October of 1992, which in practice resulted in a complete end to asylum seekers from Kosovo. However, the visa requirements did result in an increase of asylum seekers from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Between June of 1992 and July of 1993, 35,000 Bosnians applied for asylum in Sweden.

In June of 1993, as a result of the sharp increase in immigration, 270 refugee camps and additional temporary accommodations housed ninety thousand people. Whilst a clear majority of these ninety thousand asylum seekers were having their cases tested, a large number of refugees who had already been granted residence permits were still living in the camps while waiting to be placed in a municipality. This situation was blamed on the unwillingness of the municipalities to receive larger amounts of refugees. Simultaneously as an increase in numbers of municipalities (290 in total) participating in the refugee reception scheme, from 137 in 1985 to 262 in 1993, the average number of refugees per municipality decreased from 100 to 50, with the exception of a peak of 400 in 1989.

During the autumn of 1992, 65,000 asylum seekers were waiting for their cases to be
decided. By June the following year when Sweden faced 1,600 new cases weekly, it had increased to 90,000, with daily costs for the state of SEK 21 million. This led the government to concede and in June/July of 1993 it granted a couple of Bosnian families permanent residence permits as de facto refugees and/or on humanitarian grounds. The decision formed a precedent and affected close to 40,000 asylum seeking Bosnians already residing in the country.

Throughout the remaining 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century, the annual Swedish immigration of foreign nationals has been on a level between 34,000 and 47,000 people. Sweden has however simultaneously had an emigration of 12,000 to 16,000 foreign nationals. Residence permits have been granted annually to between 37,000 and 59,000 people of which refugees have made up 14 to 20 per cent, quota refugees 1 to 3 per cent, family related immigration (including wives/husbands and children) 50 to 60 per cent, labour immigrants one per cent, adopted children two per cent and 15 per cent due to the EES-agreement (Skr 1999/2000[3]; Skr 2000/01[4]; Skr 2001/02[5]; Integrationsverket, 2005b)

Though numbers have varied greatly, 'immigrants' have arrived from all continents, with more than 50 per cent from non-European countries and approximately 30 per cent from non-Nordic European countries. Nordic citizens represented 17 per cent of the total immigration in 1998 and 45 per cent of those who emigrated, and in 2004 Denmark was the largest contributor to Swedish immigration (Skr 1999/2000[3]; Skr 2000/01[4]; Skr 2001/02[5])
After the major peak years of the 1990s, the number of asylum cases has once again increased from around 11-13,000 to an annual average of 30,000, out of which approximately 40 per cent are women. The number of accepted cases are however much lower. Out of the 44,000 individuals that in the beginning of the 21st century are annually granted residence permits, around fifty per cent are based on family connection, whilst less than 2,000 out of the approximately 7,500 people who are annually granted asylum are Convention refugees (Skr 2000/01[4]; Skr 2001/02[5]; Rakar, 2005).

**Results of the Refugee Policy**

By the 1990s, labour immigration had fallen to 10 to 15 per cent of the total immigration to Sweden, whilst 75 to 80 per cent was now made up of refugee and/or family related immigration. Between 1946 and 1993, Sweden’s net immigration had almost reached 780,000 people. Finland, Poland, Iran and Yugoslavia have been amongst the largest single contributors, whilst Asia as a whole between 1986 and 1993, stood for more than 50 per cent of the immigration surplus, followed by Eastern Europe with 29 per cent, and Latin America and Africa with 10 and 11 per cent respectively. By 2000, Sweden’s net immigration had increased to 904,701 people. The Swedish population with an immigrant background had by 2001, reached 1.7 million, or approximately 20 per cent of the total population. For an overview of foreign citizens by country of citizenship and period see table 5 bellow (Integrationsverket, 2001; Lundh et al., 2002; Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).
## Table 5. Sweden: Foreign citizens by country of citizenship and period, 1990-2002

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<td>3,278</td>
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<td>4,440</td>
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<td>1,124</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>877</td>
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</table>

Whilst Swedish immigration from the Nordic countries kept on decreasing during the 1990s, not exceeding 12 per cent of the overall immigration in 1993, it had once again in 2000 increased to close to 24 per cent. A large part of the immigration from its Nordic
neighbours came from Denmark. In fact Denmark was, as mentioned above, the largest contributor to Swedish immigration in 2004 (Integrationsverket, 2005b). The great majority of the Danish citizens who settles in Sweden do so in the Swedish part of Öresundsregionen (the Öresound region, which gets its name from the sound between Denmark and southern Sweden). This increase is most likely explained by the reduction in commuting time between Sweden and Denmark, together with much lower prices on houses and apartments in Sweden, and a good exchange rate for the Danish crown. After the completion of the Öresound bridge in 2000, the commuting time between Malmö and Copenhagen central stations does not exceed 25 minutes. This makes it lucrative for Danes to live in Malmö but still work in the greater Copenhagen area.

Amongst the non-Nordic European countries that have contributed to Swedish immigration, Poland has been one of the largest. In 1992, 38,000 out of 230,000 non-Nordic Europeans living in Sweden were of Polish origin. Whilst the non-Nordic European immigration decreased during the second half of the 1980s, and non-European immigration increased, in 1993 a non-Nordic European country once again was the largest contributor to Swedish immigration. This occurred simultaneously to Sweden experiencing its deepest economic recession since the 1920s, with unemployment rates escalating from practically zero to 10%, and interest rates from about 10 to 500%. As a last solution in an attempt to salvage the Swedish economy, Sweden made a u-turn in regards to its monetary policy when it ‘allowed’ the value of the Swedish Krona (SEK) to float. In reality, this led to a free fall.

Just as it was the case for many other European countries, Sweden was as has been
explained impacted by the war in former Yugoslavia, receiving large numbers of fleeing refugees who later were given asylum. An immigration of 25,000 ‘Yugoslavians’, of which 20,000 came from Bosnia, meant that almost one out of two ‘immigrants’ in 1993 came from Eastern Europe. The immigration from former Yugoslavia culminated in 1993, when the government granted asylum and settlement permits to a large ‘group’ of Bosnian refugees, close to 40,000 total. Over a short period by the end of 1993, 70,000 former Yugoslavians had immigrated to Sweden. However, because a large number of Bosnian asylum cases were never settled during 1993, the number of registered ‘Yugoslavian’ asylum cases was still large during 1994.

That the Yugoslavian contribution to Swedish immigration, except for the years around 1993, primarily has been one of labour immigration has meant that the Swedish and Yugoslavian migration exchange differed in relation to the general Eastern European migration patterns. That is, Swedish emigration to Yugoslavia has just as Yugoslavian emigration to Sweden been relatively large. We are however here primarily talking about former Swedish ‘immigrants’ from Yugoslavia that later decided to return to their country of origin.

The annual immigration surplus from non-European countries between 1987 and 1993 exceeded 20,000 people. This corresponded to two thirds of the total net immigration in the period. By 1992, this had led to 289,000 non-European individuals living in Sweden, which at the time corresponded to 35 per cent of the total population born abroad.

By 1992, there were 52,000 people from a variety of different Latin American countries
H.T.R. Persson

living in Sweden. The biggest individual contributor was Chile, whose emigration corresponded to 50 per cent of the 52,000. Other substantially smaller ‘groups of immigrants’ from Latin America have arrived from Peru, Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia and El Salvador; from 2,000 to 2,500 people from each country respectively. Swedish immigration from Latin America reached its peak during the 1970s and has since then decreased. Also living in Sweden in 1992 were approximately 13,800 (US) Americans, 1,800 Canadians, 1,600 Australians and 400 New Zealanders (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

Though not large in numbers, Sweden has had a steady influx of immigration from the African continent over the last decades. By 1992, there were 38,000 people of African descent living in Sweden. Immigration from Somalia increased during the 1990s and in 1991 Somali and Ethiopian emigration to Sweden corresponded to approximately 60 per cent of the total immigration from the African continent. At the beginning of 1993, there were 13,000 people from Ethiopia and 5,000 from Somalia living in Sweden. The third largest ‘group of immigrants’ from Africa were Moroccans, which amounted to 3,300, and the fourth the Tunisians with 2,300.

At the beginning of 1993, Swedish immigration from Asia resulted in 180,000 people with an Asian background living in Sweden, which corresponded to 22 per cent of the total number of people born abroad. As a comparison, this amounts to three times the number of West Europeans living in Sweden, seven times the number of people from South European countries, and two times the number of African and Latin American ‘immigrants’ together. Between 1979 and the beginning of the 1990s, Vietnamese immigration, which started around the time of the (US) American withdrawal in 1978,
and which mainly had been made up of Sino Vietnamese ‘boat people’ and family related immigration, resulted in 8,000 Vietnamese born people living in Sweden.

Between 1989 and 1992, an annual average of 5,000 people from Lebanon and Syria immigrated to Sweden, and as a result 20,500 people who were born in either Lebanon or in Syria lived in Sweden by the end of 1992. Syrian and Lebanese emigration to Sweden has continued, though in slightly smaller numbers, after 1994. Both internal and external Iranian conflicts have lead to extensive Iranian emigration to Sweden. As a result, 47,000 Iranian born individuals were living in Sweden by the end of 1992. With the end of the war between Iran and Iraq, Iranian migration to Sweden at the beginning of the 1990s decreased to an average annual level of 3,800 people. Iraqi immigration, which had been smaller than the Iranian immigration, had by 1992 resulted in 16,000 Iraqi born people living in Sweden. Whilst Iraqi immigration with the end of the war followed the same trend as the Iranian immigration, because of the two Gulf Wars the outcomes have been very different. Turkish immigration, which can be registered here both as Asian and as European, has also been of a noticeable size. At the beginning of 1993, there were 28,000 Turkish born people living in Sweden (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996). The continued fluctuation of the number of foreign nationals living in Sweden can be studied in Table 5 on page 188.

This chapter has described the period of Swedish immigration and integration history primarily marked by increasing numbers of refugee ‘immigrants’ and asylum seekers and how the European Union increasingly influence internal policy decisions. It has described how the Swedish state tried to anticipate, influence but also adapt to these new
trends. As a natural continuation we will now turn to a period marked by the change from 'immigrant' policy to integration policy.
Chapter 7: From Immigrant Policy to Integration Policy

This chapter describes the Swedish transformation from immigrant policy to integration policy. It looks at the current state of Swedish integration and current migration trends, and brings us to a close with a description of the most recent Swedish integration policies for the 21st century. This provides us with a natural transition to Chapter 8 and the textual analysis.

Policy Transformation

Three years after the Sjöbo referendum (discussed on p. 175), and most likely inspired by it and further exploiting the discontent with Sweden’s immigration and refugee policy, Ny demokrati (New Democracy), a populist right wing party was rapidly founded and ran for office in the election of 1991. Running their election campaign primarily based on the so-called ‘immigrant’ question, and their own campaign song published by one of the two party leaders' own record label, they gained eight per cent of the national vote and consequently a place in the Swedish parliament (the threshold is four per cent).

Though the new liberal-conservative coalition that came into power in 1991 managed to keep New Democracy out of the government, the major parties came to be dependent on New Democracy in Parliament. The coalition, which during the election campaign had promised to relax the strict asylum rules implemented by the previous Social Democratic government, set up a committee to review possible changes in what was considered an outdated immigration/immigrant policy. The initial intention of the government to allow
a more liberal reform to existing refugee policy was however quickly halted when Sweden, due to the Balkan wars, ended up being one of the largest net receivers of Balkan refugees. In addition to external factors, to counter the entry into the political arena of this new ‘anti-immigration party’, the traditional parties gradually changed strategies; further breaking down the last constraints regarding the apolitical tradition of Swedish immigration and refugee policy. Similar trends have, from the mid 1990s onwards, been seen in Norway, Denmark, France, Italy, and the Netherlands (Peterson, 1997).

Since 1991, the number and share of pupils taking home language, i.e. language spoken in the home between parents and children, has decreased due to the budget cuts that have been carried out. Such savings have partly been forced upon the service institutions by the critique directed towards the policy during times of recession. The critique was however not homogenous, and whilst the more conservative part of the parliament had criticised the cost of home language teaching, the RRV (Swedish National Audit Office) in their 1990 report criticised instead the ineffectiveness of the organisation. The RRV recommended, amongst other things, the implementation of a more flexible grant system, and that instruction only was to be carried out during regular school hours. The RRV did not recommend a reduction or cancellation of the home language teaching for children of ‘immigrants’.

When the SAP came back into power in 1994, cabinet minister Leif Blomberg was authorized to create a new Commission. Once again a Commission was given the task of giving Swedish ‘immigrant’ policy an overhaul. The largest part of Invandrarpolitiska...
kommittén's (the Immigrant Policy Committee, IPC, AOT) report was made up of an evaluating description of the policies adapted as a result of the 1974 report and following policy. The Commission concluded that what was seen as a discursive shift from assimilation to immigrant policy after 1974, should instead be viewed according to the economic and social changes that had taken place over the last twenty years. As such, the report, SOU 1996[55], can be read as an adjustment document, or more correctly, a document of proposed adjustments. This conclusion was criticised from within the Commission (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

The Commission declared that an annual average of 50,000 people had immigrated to Sweden during the last decade. With the exception of Yugoslavian immigration during 1993 and 1994, the majority of these 'immigrants' had arrived from countries outside of Europe. During the last decade 227,000 people had arrived. Overall 300,000 people were born in one of the neighbouring Nordic countries, 300,000 people were born in a non-Nordic European country, all together 300,000 people born in Asia, Africa or South America, 20,000 people born in North America, and another 700,000 people with at least one parent born abroad were according to the Committee living in Sweden in the mid 1990s. Based on this numerical data, together with more and more international influences reaching Sweden, the Committee concluded that the country was now an ethnically and culturally diverse society (SOU 1996[55]).

The Commission further concluded that many of the measures taken by the government to facilitate 'immigrants' integration had backfired. Attempts to increase the degree of equality had instead resulted in an increasing degree of segregation and discrimination.
The main reason for this was, according to both the Commission and the experts it committed, due to the political categorisation of ‘immigrants’. This categorisation had sent a message to the general public of ‘immigrants’ as a homogenous group, even as it simultaneously forced ‘immigrants’ to fulfil the roles assigned to this homogenous group in society. This categorization made their integration into the Swedish society harder, something that has been stressed before and after the publication of SOU 1996[55] (for examples see Ålund & Schierup, 1991; Peterson, 1997; Eryrumlu, 1997; Oweini & Holmgren, 1999; Mörkenstam, 2002).

Instead, the ethnic and cultural diversity was now recognized and affirmed as a natural part of Swedish society, and consequently became a natural starting point from where to form future policy. Special measures were no longer to be directed towards ‘immigrants’ based on a definition of ‘immigrant’ status. Special measures were instead to encompass all people with special needs, due to low education or unemployment, and housing conditions such as living in areas with large numbers of recipients of social benefits. Only under special circumstances, such as special economic support for people wanting to organize in associations, could the committee see a just cause in discriminating in favour of ethnic and linguistic groups. An exception was made with regard to ‘national minorities’, which were not taken into consideration in the Committee’s report (SOU 1996[55]).

Everyday multicultural life must, according to the Committee, in the long run do away with discrimination and marginalisation. Long term integration should be the responsibility of everybody in society, and as such public authorities are recommended...
to take the new diversity of Swedish society into consideration with regard to social policy. Amongst proposals for the new ‘immigrant’ policy, was an extension and strengthening of the teaching in Swedish, both in the compulsory schools and in adult education; a means tested extension of the introduction period; improved repatriation information; and tailored educational programs and skills testing were to be mandated.

The Committee suggested the need for measures to compensate for what it described as linguistic disadvantages; complementary education, activity centres for unemployed academics, preparatory education for university students, changes in home language teaching, and establishing an authority to assess the successful implementation of the diversity policy. In addition, the Committee presented an action plan that suggested granting loans to employers, support in the establishment of international consultancy firms, special programs, project and salary support in the employment of ‘immigrants’, and basic education and training for adults. It also described the need for municipality run action plans for housing estates (SOU 1996[55]).

The core of the new ‘immigrant’ policy was to make integration a part of a general policy where self-support and joint responsibility independent of ethnic, cultural and social background would be prioritised. The state would only discriminate in favour of the individual ‘immigrant’ during an introductory phase of five years. Furthermore the term ‘immigrant’, used in the rules and regulations of the state, would be restricted to ‘immigrants’ who have been living in Sweden for less than five years (SOU 1996[55]).

Based on the 1996 IPC report (SOU 1996[55]), the Social democratic government
presented in 1997 the Bill *Sweden, the future and the diversity* (Prop. 1997/98[16], AOT). The new Bill came to outline the new integration policy and replace the ‘immigrant’ policy from 1974 (SOU 1974[69]); and for the first time make a clean distinction between integration and immigration policy. Acknowledging the critique and views of the Immigrant Policy Committee, the government changed the name of the regulative agenda from immigrant policy to integration policy, with the expressed aim of shifting attention away from a focus solely on the ‘immigrant’ experience as exceptional towards goals that express their inherent inclusion, and that of their specific experiences, in the general society. That issues stemming from immigration are relevant to the whole of society and not just for the ‘immigrant’ part of the population was intended as more than merely a public statement by the government. The use of the term ‘immigrant’ was now to be replaced with ‘person with foreign background’, stressing the diversity of the people that had immigrated and will be immigrating to Sweden.

The government asserted that the ethnic and cultural diversity of the society should be seen as the starting point for general social policy and an all-pervading theme at all levels and in all areas of society. Specific policies directed towards ‘immigrants’ were now limited to those special measures presumed necessary during an individual’s initial introductory phase in Sweden. Policy issues regarding time spent in Sweden previous to the acquisition of a residence permit also changed its formal status from immigration to that of migration policy, and a new ministerial position was created: the Minister of Migration.

The Bill recognised that governments cannot set exact targets for integration, that the
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term can both describe processes in and goals of a society, and refers both to individual and societal levels of social inclusion. What governments can do is to set policy targets regarding sectors of society and policy areas, with the aim of supporting the individual in his or her attempts to realise his or her individual goals and life projects. Though the Bill asserts that integration on the individual level is about belonging to a greater entity, without being forced to lose an ethnic or cultural 'identity', it also underlines that a certain degree of adaptation to the rest of society is always necessary. The latter, it is stressed, should not be confused with the traditional goals of an assimilation policy. In contrast to the aims of an assimilation policy, integration, according to the Bill, requires all members of a society to adjust, not only the individual 'immigrant'. The conclusion is that a government can set policy targets for a society, but not for the individual (Prop. 1997/98[16]).

The Social Democratic government argued that the 'new' general policy would break with present trends of ethnic segregation, and would improve the living conditions of vulnerable 'groups', by way of a policy that was to make the most of the present composition of different backgrounds, competences, and experiences. Instead of a specific 'immigrant' policy, the lack of Swedish language skills and a Swedish education should be met with means based measures unrelated to the migration status of the individual in question.

The key targets of the new integration policy should be equal rights and possibilities for all, independent of ethnic and cultural background, a social solidarity based on the diversity of society, and a social development characterised by reciprocity, respect and
tolerance, which everyone shall be part of and responsible for. Furthermore, future integration work was to concentrate on providing the necessary requirements for the individuals’ self-support and participation in society, safeguard basic democratic values and promote women’s and men’s equal rights and opportunities, and prevent and counteract discrimination, xenophobia and racism (Prop. 1997/98[16]).

In addition to a historic overview and the change from an ‘immigrant’ policy to an integration policy, which we already have touched upon, the Bill covers seven main areas: Participation and Influence, Work and Provisions, Language and Education, Culture and Religion, Exposed Housing Estates, Special Measures for Newly Arrived Immigrants and Accountable Public Authorities. The sixth area, that which covers the special measures for newly arrived ‘immigrants’, entails the introduction, or the creation of introduction programmes, which are to include courses in the Swedish language, internships, work training, the validation of skills and education obtained outside of Sweden, knowledge of the Swedish society and institutions, social life and ways of living, contacts with Swedes through civil society organisations, the introduction for pre-school and school children in order to bring their educational background on par with Swedish standards, and with health checks initiate possible rehabilitation or medical treatment as early as possible to pre-empt higher economic and human costs at a later stage in their habitation in the society (Prop. 1997/98[16]).

With the exception of these admirable words about safeguarding equality, embracing diversity and preventing discrimination, segregation and racism, the establishment of a new public authority, the Swedish Integration Board, SIB, was the only actual result of
the integration policy document: *Sweden, the future and the diversity* (Prop. 1997/98[16]). The Swedish Integration Board (SIB) was established in June 1998. Close to half of its staff was moved over from the Swedish Immigrant Board’s (SIV) integration unit to the Swedish Integration Board. The establishment of the Swedish Integration Board and the removal of the integration unit from SIV led to the latter’s replacement by the Swedish Migration Board (SMB, name changed in 2000; Rakar 2005).

SIB is responsible for the implementation of Swedish integration policy, but is not supposed to accomplish the implementation of policy goals. That is, SIB has not been given any formal legal powers or other instruments by which to influence other key actors of government or the private sector. Instead, when influencing other key institutions as well as the public to take the necessary measures towards a better integration process in society it has to rely on an advisory or consultative role. The duties of this new public authority was summarised as:

1. to promote equal rights and opportunities for all, independent of ethnic or cultural background, and prevent and counteract discrimination, xenophobia, racism;
2. to work with the aim that attention should be paid to the newly arrived immigrants’ need for support;
3. to specifically follow up the municipal introduction for refugees and ‘immigrants’ for which the municipalities receive government funds;
4. to monitor and evaluate social progress from an integration policy perspective;
5. to work for, that the targets and outlook of the integration policy.
permeate the work of public authorities, municipalities and the remaining society;
6 when needed, assist newly arrived immigrants in their settlement in municipalities;
7 to administrate the state’s reimbursement funds for municipalities;
8 to support organisations;
9 to implement the Nordic language convention
10 to be responsible for ordering and co-ordinating the statistics within the public authority’s area of responsibility; and,
11 to participate in international cooperation and to develop international and other significant contacts in order to enlarge the knowledge within the area of the public authority.

Prop. 1997/98[16]: 101, AOT

Though the Swedish Integration Board is a political construction funded by the public treasury, it is supposed to act apolitically. The division of and distribution between the Integration and Migration Board could be seen as rooted in and developed from ‘immigrant’ policy conceptions connected to immigrant policy statements from the 1960s and 1970s. The creation of the Integration Board should therefore be put in the context of societal demands for a comprehensive review and regulation of individuals within the aims of migration policy; this includes refugees, asylum seekers, ‘immigrants’, immigration and returnees (Norström, 2004; Hammar, 1999).

All Swedish institutions, i.e. public authorities, are self-governed. They are to interpret and employ the law, whilst the activities of the public authority are primarily regulated by the Förvaltningslagen, FL (the Public Administration Law AOT). Though the individual authority is self-governed, case decisions are to be taken according to rules
elaborated and set by the parliament and government, in the spirit of how these rules were originally elaborated and decided on. In addition to responsibilities defined at its inception, from the 1st of January, 1999, the Migration Board was also made responsible for carrying out deportation orders (Norström, 2004).

**Sweden of Today**

Sweden has today 9 million inhabitants and, like most other countries in Europe, has been profoundly affected by extensive immigration during the post war period. At the beginning of the twenty-first century there is nothing indicating a shift in this trend. This is the ‘common’ way of talking about migration patterns from a European point of view. However, and this is not unique to Sweden, if all the descendants of Swedes that emigrated to the USA would return to Sweden this would exceed the 2,366,741 (Integrationsverket, 2003) that have immigrated to Sweden since 1945. Close to 45 million European habitants emigrated between the beginning of the seventeenth century and the Second World War. The countries of Europe would quite possibly struggle to integrate all of these European descendents if they chose to ‘return’ to Europe today, considering that they, already in the beginning of the 1990s, exceeded 150 million, just in USA and Canada. Another 20 million Europeans migrated to Central and South America, whose descendents today amount to more than 50 million people.

Nevertheless, the extent of post World War II immigration should not be underestimated. In this context the USA, commonly seen as an immigration country,
works well as a point of reference. During the peak emigration years, 1.2 million people, or 23 per cent of the total Swedish population in 1900, immigrated to the USA. Though the post war immigration to Sweden has not had similar proportions, it has been significant. As an example, Sweden received 83,000 'immigrants' during 1994. This corresponded to one per cent of the total population at that time.

When comparing the percentage of foreign born people living in today's Sweden with USA at the turn or the century (1800/1900) the differences are minor. In 1900, thirteen per cent of the USA population was born abroad. The corresponding figure for Sweden today is approximately 12 per cent, or one million out of the total nine million inhabitants. If the co-called second generation 'immigrants' are included, also termed in policy documents variously as people with foreign background, or people of foreign extraction, this group numbered 315,132 in 2003, the total number of immigrants in Sweden amounts to 1.5 million or more than 15 per cent of the total Swedish population ( Integrationsverket, 2005b; Ekberg & Gustafsson, 1995; Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996; Skr. 2001/02[129]; Lundh et al., 2002).

Though the raw numbers of ‘immigrants’ may differ from one report to another, the magnitude of the impact of immigration on Swedish society should be kept in mind when discussing immigration and integration today. A nation’s integration policy documents can only be understood if read with the national history and the contemporary migration and integration policy praxis as its backdrop.

If comparing Swedish gross and net immigration, it is evident that Sweden has had a
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considerable immigration during the post war period, but also that a less recognised but considerable amount of emigration has taken place. The extent to which immigration has influenced the composition of the Swedish population is potentially determined by the amount of emigration. If emigration is high then the potential influence on the composition of the population should be less noticeable. However, this fact is dependent on whether the people that emigrated are the same people that earlier had immigrated.

A selection sample of the individuals that immigrated between 1951 and 1955 revealed that 34 per cent had emigrated after five years. The majority of the returnees had emigrated during the first three years, whilst the inclination to return thereafter decreased. The same sample shows that emigration was more frequent amongst Danes and Germans than amongst Finns and other Europeans. For example, almost no Hungarians returned to their country of origin. Of those who immigrated between 1968 and 1985, 32 per cent returned to their country of origin after five years. The frequency of return has gradually decreased since 1968, which primarily can be explained by the change in composition of immigration countries and the share of refugees. The changing patterns are most likely explained neither by the individual's decision to stay nor the geographical location of the country of origin, but by the possibility of return, i.e., the actual situation in the country of origin (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996).

The tendency to change to Swedish citizenship can be viewed as a strong indicator of the individual 'immigrants' will to settle in Sweden for a longer period of time. Only 6 per cent of those who were naturalised between 1967 and 1989 had emigrated from Sweden in 1989 (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996). In 1989, only two thirds of the 593,000 foreign born
residents who were entitled to apply for Swedish citizenship had made use of this opportunity. Specifically low in numbers were the applications by Nordic citizens. Between 57 and 60 per cent of the Nordic non-Swedish citizens entitled to Swedish citizenship had by the mid 1980s chosen Swedish citizenship (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996). There are several ways of looking at the choice made by ‘immigrants’ when changing or declining citizenship. From the government point of view, it is often argued that citizenship and ‘national identity’ together is the glue that forms a nation, while from an individual’s point of view what determines citizenship choice may be an important personal link to one’s country of origin, one that enables the option of return.

**Current Migration Trends**
In 2004, 46,800 foreign nationals immigrated to Sweden, whilst 15,600 foreign nationals emigrated. In addition, 20,230 Swedish citizens left Sweden for other countries, whilst 14,237 returned (Migrationsverket, 03-2005). Sweden granted residence permits to 59,144 people, which represented a small increase from the previous year’s 57,616. The largest category continues to be family ties with 22,214 residence permits, followed by 14,959 residence permits within the framework of EES agreements (EES stands for European Economic Space and comprise EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein). The latter represented a 25 per cent increase from the previous year. Residence permits, some temporary and some permanent, were also granted due to labour market reasons, guest students and adoptions.
Table 6. Residence Permits by Category 2004

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</tbody>
</table>

A  EES Agreement  
B  Humanitarian reasons  
C  Quota Refugees, Convention Refugees, Protective Grounds, Temporary Residence Permits  
D  Guest Students  
E  Labour Market Reasons  
F  Adoptions  
G  Family Ties

Source: Migrationsverket, 03-2005

That the number of ‘immigrants’ continues to be newsworthy was confirmed in March 2005 when all major newspapers reported on the new, annual, migration statistics from SCB (Statistics Sweden). Though using slightly different figures, or interpreting them differently, than those produced by the Swedish Migration Board, the newspapers reported that immigration to Sweden was now decreasing (three per cent less than previous year) whilst emigration was increasing. Though contradictory in its use of the concept of ‘immigrant’, Svenska Dagbladet (the Swedish Daily Newspaper) reported that close to one out of five, or eighteen per cent of all ‘immigrants’ now were born in Sweden. Whilst four out of ten, or close to 25,000 people of the new ‘immigrants’
arrived from outside of Europe, 4,102 people arrived from EU new Member States.

More than fifty per cent of the latter category had arrived from Poland. The most noticeable break in trend, however, was that the second largest ‘group’, after Swedes, were now Danish ‘immigrants’, followed by Iraqi ‘immigrants’ (SVD, 15-March-2005).

Table 7. Immigrants Divided by Nordic, European and Non-European Citizenship, 2004

Source: Migrationsverket, 03-2005

Sweden does, and has historically, received high numbers of asylum seekers in relation to its population. Though 2004 was no exception, with 23,161 people applying for asylum, this represented a substantial decrease of 8,194 fewer people than in 2003. Out of these asylum seekers, 6,140 were granted residence permits as Convention refugees, 3,043 for humanitarian reasons and 1,822 as part of the refugee quota. In addition, 333 people were granted temporary residence permits (Migrationsverket, 03-2005).
The majority of all asylum seekers came from Serbia-Montenegro (4,022), Iraq (1,456), Russia (1,287), Azerbaijan (1,041), Somalia (905), Afghanistan (903), Bosnia-Herzegovina (705), Iran (660) and Bulgaria (567). In addition, 1,578 stateless arrived.

The number of asylum seekers clearly differs from one year to another and between different countries. When comparing IGC's (Inter-governmental Consultation on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies) 13 European Member States, without considering population size, Sweden was the fifth largest receiver of asylum seekers (see table 8 below).

### Table 8. A Comparison of Received Asylum Seekers, 13 European Countries, 2001-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>30,135</td>
<td>36,983</td>
<td>32,676</td>
<td>24,676</td>
<td>20,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>24,527</td>
<td>18,768</td>
<td>16,940</td>
<td>15,357</td>
<td>14,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>12,512</td>
<td>5,947</td>
<td>4,593</td>
<td>3,222</td>
<td>2,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1,650</td>
<td>3,443</td>
<td>3,221</td>
<td>3,861</td>
<td>3,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>47,260</td>
<td>51,004</td>
<td>61,993</td>
<td>65,614</td>
<td>54,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>88,287</td>
<td>71,127</td>
<td>50,563</td>
<td>35,607</td>
<td>25,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>90,244</td>
<td>109,548</td>
<td>61,051</td>
<td>40,202</td>
<td>23,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>10,325</td>
<td>11,634</td>
<td>7,900</td>
<td>4,766</td>
<td>3,921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Netherlands</td>
<td>32,579</td>
<td>18,667</td>
<td>13,402</td>
<td>9,782</td>
<td>11,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>14,782</td>
<td>17,480</td>
<td>15,613</td>
<td>7,945</td>
<td>4,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>9,219</td>
<td>6,179</td>
<td>5,918</td>
<td>5,398</td>
<td>4,701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>23,515</td>
<td>33,016</td>
<td>31,355</td>
<td>23,161</td>
<td>15,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>20,633</td>
<td>26,125</td>
<td>21,037</td>
<td>14,248</td>
<td>9,256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Figures until November 2005
2) Figures only until September 2005

Source: Migrationsverket, 03-2005

**Socio Economic Situation**

The Swedish government still has a long way to go before reaching its stated socio-economic goals regarding integration. Whilst the average employment intensity at the
1960 Census was higher amongst foreign citizens than the total population, this changed during the 1970s. At the time the employment intensity remained on a high level for foreign citizens, at least at the same level as that of the total population. Unemployment, however, became increasingly a bigger problem for the foreign citizens than for the average population.

The position of ‘immigrants’ in the labour market worsened during the 1970s and the 1980s resulting in what Eyrumlu (1997) has termed an ethnically hierarchical labour market. Though the unemployment level amongst ‘immigrants’ had been already for some time twice as high as amongst the rest of the ‘Swedes’, the economic recession of the early 1990s resulted in a sharp increase. Nevertheless, despite there being substantially higher unemployment amongst ‘immigrants’ than amongst the remaining population, there are today in real numbers more ‘immigrants’ employed, compared to the prosperous 1950s and 1960s.

The high unemployment level amongst foreign citizens, because of rigid welfare policies, leads to distress and social destitution amongst unemployed ‘immigrants’ and their families, and also results in increased costs for society. The cost of social benefits to refugees amounted to 28 per cent of the total social welfare costs between 1987 and 1992. However, whilst the new refugee ‘immigrants’ clearly have a harder time entering the labour market than earlier ‘immigrants’, long waiting times in refugees camps do not help this situation, and even prevent some refugees from applying for appropriate jobs.

At its worst levels, unemployment amongst foreign citizens has been three times as high
as amongst 'Swedes'. The bottom was reached in the mid 1990s, when the occupational level was 40 per cent lower amongst 'immigrants' than amongst the rest of the population. During the second half of the 1990s, the occupational level amongst foreign citizens started to recover, both in absolute numbers and in relation to people born in Sweden. Though unemployment decreased faster amongst 'immigrants' than amongst Swedes during the same period, labour immigration has continued to decrease and today only makes up a few per cent of total immigration (Lundh et al., 2002; Rakar, 2005).

There has also been an increase in the reliance on social welfare amongst 'immigrants'. In the beginning of the 1970s when 'immigrants' represented five per cent of the total population in Sweden, foreign households amounted to 12 per cent of the total number of households dependent on social welfare (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996). Despite that the total number of 'immigrants' has been on a relatively constant level since the beginning of the 1970s, the number of foreign households relying on social welfare assistance has constantly increased. At the end of the 1980s, 25 per cent of the total number of households on social welfare was made up of foreign citizens, whilst 40 per cent of the total cost of social welfare went to the same households (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1996). This increasing reliance on social welfare assistance is commonly explained by the transformation of the labour market and how this has made it increasingly difficult for 'immigrants' (Broome et al., 1996).

A common argument amongst experts within the area of immigration is that this situation is in turn due to changing immigration patterns, dominated by refugee and family related immigration, as well as changing economic conditions in Sweden during
this period. A slower economic growth rate since the recession in the mid 1970s, in combination with extensive structural transitions in the economy, have reduced the demand for the type of labour that was easily employed during the 1950s and 1960s (Ekberg & Gustafsson, 1995; Broomé et al., 1996). However, Oweini & Holmgren (1999) amongst others have stressed that these changes, as well as later economic fluctuations, do not provide an adequate explanation for why certain groups are affected much harder than others. As a consequence of the mentioned recession and structural transitions, certain ‘immigrant’ specific labour market policy measures were carried out in the mid 1970s to address the increasing difficulty of ‘immigrants’ to assert themselves on the labour market. Programs to educate immigrants in Swedish is but one of several of these measures. Another is government support for vocational training courses, where special rules make it possible to prioritise the education of ‘immigrants’. If taking a benevolent view, the ‘immigrant’ specific measures could be read as acknowledgements that there was more than the mentioned structural transition to the increasing unemployment figures amongst ‘immigrants’, such as discriminating attitudes to internal training courses.

The Swedish government’s employment goal is to gradually achieve an employment level of 80 per cent amongst ‘immigrants’. In 2003, this was not even accomplished amongst people born in Sweden, when the employment level was 76.7 per cent amongst men and 74.3 amongst women. For the government to achieve these goals amongst people who have been in Sweden between five and nine years, the employment level for this ‘group’ needs to increase by 20 per cent. For the level of employment amongst those people who have been in Sweden for a shorter period, zero to four years, to reach 65 per
cent there needs to be an increase of 14 per cent amongst men and 28 per cent amongst women (Integrationsverket, 2004). Based on this, Sweden has quite some distance to go before even reaching a level of relative integration of ‘immigrants’ in the labour market.

The acknowledgment of the existence of ethnic discrimination in Sweden is a late phenomenon. DO, the Office of the Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination, was not established until 1986, and not until the law against ethnic discrimination took force in 1994 was DO given the right to sue discriminating employers for damages. Although, the gap between the native and foreign born population described above has existed for several decades, the social and economic disparity has seldom been identified as due to practices of discrimination (Oweini & Holmgren, 1999). Instead, explanations based on the purported cultural, linguistic, experiential and competential differences between ‘immigrants’ and Swedes have established the gap as a consequence of natural, and thereby largely acceptable, market factors. Integration policies have time after time argued that though the gap is natural it is a temporary problem, which is to be solved through a combination of ever more education and training for the ‘immigrants’, together with information campaigns for the ‘Swedish majority’ (Ålund & Schierup 1991; de los Reyes & Wingborg, 2002).

According to this logic, children of ‘immigrant’ parents, who have been educated in the Swedish school system should have the same career opportunities as the remaining population born in Sweden, or at least greatly improved chances on the opportunities of their parents. That this lived experience is much more complex than existing integration policy would suggest is confirmed by the report, *Job? Please Wait!*, from the Welfare
Political Board (Lundh et al, 2002, OAT). This report shows that not only does the problem for ‘immigrants’ prevail, but it is inherited. That is, though some improvement takes place between so-called first and second generation ‘immigrants’, the difference in labour market connection between those with native born parents and those with foreign born parents is, in spite integration policy projects, still large.

Swedes with an ‘immigrant’ background are not only more frequently unemployed, but are also worse paid than other Swedes with equivalent education/training, according to the TCO, Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation (the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees) report: Last in line, Farida (AOT, SVD, 16-March-2005). The largest difference is to be found within civil engineers, where a Swedish born civil engineer earn SEK9,000 a month more than those who were born abroad and arrived as adults. The overall figure shows that Swedes with ‘immigrant’ background only earn eighty-eight per cent of those without an 'immigrant' background (SVD, 16-March-2005).

Whilst the first report in the series of TCO reports showed that Sweden is, in contradiction to common beliefs, gaining more competence through immigration than what it is losing through emigration, the second confirmed the common belief that highly educated ‘immigrants’ were regularly to be found as bus drivers or frying hamburgers in the larger cities. In addition to the report series, but closely related, TCO also carried out a series of questionnaires, which established not only the existence of ethnic segregation, but discrimination in the labour market. The third study, Last in line, Farida (Magnusson & Andréasson, 2005) focused on wage differences between the
native and foreign born population specifically; differences that are hard to explain by reasons other than discrimination. In addition the report studied, from a non ethnic-Swedish perspective, the risk of being employed in a profession in which one is academically over qualified and the likelihood of becoming manager or director. The report is based on 150,000 Swedish born citizens and 16,000 people born in countries outside of Scandinavia, EU15 and the richest OECD countries.

The TCO-report on questions regarding the labour market, ethnicity and higher education stresses that labour legislation is to blame when ‘immigrants’ lose out in the recruitment process. It concludes that people who have immigrated only have seventy per cent of the disposable income of that of people who were born in Sweden. As an example, for people born abroad and who have arrived in Sweden after the age of 25 the average wage difference is SEK/month 4,200. The overall difference in income between these groups is however, primarily explained by the considerably lower employment figures amongst ‘immigrants’.

On average, during 2002, only seventy per cent of the foreign born population received some kind of income, i.e. salary, sickness benefit or parents’ allowance, whilst the same figure for the remaining population was eighty per cent. If age, sex and education are not taken into consideration, the foreign population with employment has only 86 per cent of the salary of those born in Sweden. If taking age, sex and education into consideration the difference slightly decreases to 88 per cent (Magnusson & Andréasson, 2005). In addition to problems of obtaining employment, the differences in income levels are explained by the difficulty amongst the foreign born population to obtain employment
within a profession relevant to the education and or experience of the individual.

This explains half of the existing difference in income between those of the foreign and native born population with a higher education. Part of the difference is also explained by the considerable difficulty for the foreign born population to obtain a position as manager or director. Amongst those of the sample group with a degree in civil engineering, 17.5 per cent held a position as manager or director. Only 1.8 per cent of these managers/directors were born abroad. In summarising their findings, Magnusson and Andréasson stress that the overall result indicates that the difficulties in obtaining employment, to obtain employment according to education and to make a career are more decisive factors than actual wage discrimination (Magnusson & Andréasson, 2005).

Another area where a differentiation between people with 'immigrant' background and 'Swedes' is made is the juridical system. According to the author's of Likhet inför lagen (Equal before the Law, Diesen, 2005), a criminal who is a native woman and sentenced by a judge who is also woman has a fair chance of getting a mild sentence, whilst an 'immigrant' man who is sentenced by a judge who is also a man runs a greater risk of a tougher sentence. 'Immigrants' from outside of West Europe are the ones who suffer the most due to the discriminating practice (DN, 15-March-2005; SDS, 15-March-2005a; SDS, 15-March-2005b).

The findings seem to suggest that if Sweden does not already have, then Sweden is about to develop two legal systems, one for fair haired Swedes and one for those
stereotypically black haired. According to Diesen, it is a disadvantage to be an
‘immigrant’ when you are accused of a crime in Sweden, and even more so in
Gothenburg (Sweden’s third largest city). The jurist, Naite del Sante, who has
scrutinised all rape cases that reached the court in Uppsala between 1999 and 2002
concerns. In Uppsala, 42 per cent of the accused ‘immigrants’ were sentenced to jail,
whilst the figure for ‘Swedes’ was only 32 per cent. 32 per cent of the ‘Swedes’ got a
probational sentence, whereas the figure for people with ‘immigrant’ background was
only 19 (SDS, 15-March-2005b).

However, according to the report, it is not only in court that ‘immigrants’ are treated
differently than Swedes, but throughout the juridical system. Victims of crimes seem to
be less lenient or ready to come to an agreement with ‘immigrants’, courts are more
frequently sentencing ‘immigrants’, ‘immigrants’ receive harsher sentences, they are
more frequently sent to jail and receive less often conditional, probational sentences or
community service agreements. In addition, the law allows for negative discrimination
in regards to foreign citizens, for example, deportation. Furthermore, within the prison
establishment, ‘immigrants’ are treated worse than ‘Swedes’. It is harder for
‘immigrants’ to get parole, electronic tags and to be moved to an open institution. It
should, however, be acknowledged that the negative discrimination within the juridical
system extends to differences between men and women. Women are in general treated
better than men are and women judges impose lighter sentences than men do (SDS, 15-

The common belief or at least hope of the government is that integration policy is first of
all to improve, and gradually solve the above mentioned problems. As part of Swedish integration policies, Sweden’s introduction programme for ‘immigrants’ has since long been institutionalised. Though it has been through several adjustments and changes, its roots are to be found in the right to time off with full pay when participating in Swedish language education, a right established in the 1970s (Prop. 1972[100]; Prop. 1973[43], Bills).

As a result of high unemployment and increasing housing segregation, over the years much criticism has been directed towards the introduction program. Based on a 2004 survey of the participants’ opinions on content and quality, the Swedish Integration Board concludes that the majority of the participants today are very pleased with the introduction programme. At the core were questions of service and treatment, and to what degree the participants experienced their needs to be met for proficiency/knowledge and information about the society. The discontentment that was expressed was primarily directed towards the lack of possibilities of employment and network/contacts with the native born population (Integrationsverket, 2005a). Considering that the existing employment gap and housing segregation, and that the contact with the labour market through trainee jobs are supposed to be part of the introduction programme, the question of dissatisfaction is more important than the question of satisfaction. That previous reports, such as the Evaluation Report – Language Power (Persson & Blob, 2003, AOT), have reached the same or similar conclusions stresses the gravity of the problem with the present introduction programme. In spite of efforts to better the programme, little improvement can be detected and there is still much to achieve if Sweden is to reach the goals of the stated integration policy.
**Current Policy Situation**

Responding to the current situation, the development of Swedish integration policy and its future direction was laid out by the Government in its policy document *Integrationspolitik för 2000-talet* (Integration Policy for the 21st Century, Skr. 2001/02[129]). According to the report, more than one out of ten inhabitants in the society is now born abroad, while another 800,000 people have at least one parent who was born abroad. The majority of Sweden's 'immigrants' have been living in Sweden for at least ten years, and more than sixty per cent of those who have immigrated to Sweden today hold Swedish citizenship. The objectives of Swedish integration policy for the 21st century are expressed as equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for all, regardless of ethnic or cultural background; as a community based on diversity; and, as a society characterised by mutual respect and tolerance, in which every one can take an active and responsible part, irrespective of background.

The report is, besides giving an account of background and terminology, divided into eight key areas: Methods for how to carry out the integration policy, The Initial Time in Sweden, The Development within different areas of society, The activities of public authorities, Ethnic discrimination, xenophobia and racism, Equal rights and possibilities for women and men, International activities; and Future integration policy (Skr. 2001/02[129]).

Though the category 'immigrants' is still recognised to be a sensitive political subject, it
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is still used and the report differentiates between long term resident ‘immigrants’ and newly arrived ‘immigrants’. Whilst the needs of the former, like those of everyone else, should be included in general policies, and integration policy should focus on the conditions and mechanisms in play throughout society, the introduction process of the latter is more effective if based on the background and conditions of the individual ‘immigrant’. The term ‘immigrant’ is used to refer to those migrating to Sweden themselves, whilst the expression people of foreign extraction is used to refer to both those who have migrated to Sweden themselves, and those who were born in Sweden and have at least one parent who was born abroad.

Ethnic discrimination in the report is used to refer to unjust or abusive treatment based on ‘race’, skin colour, national or ethnic origin or religious belief. Previous laws against ethnic discrimination had been strengthened by the Act Concerning Measures to Counteract Ethnic Discrimination in Working Life from 1999, and the new law on the equal treatment of students in higher education from 2002. This was to be further strengthened in 2003, putting a greater responsibility on the employer (Skr. 2001/02[129]).

The main aim of the introduction that is provided to refugees and other newly arrived ‘immigrants’ should be to enable the individual as soon as possible to obtain housing, employment in which the individual is able to support him- or herself independently, a good knowledge of Swedish and the ability to take part in society. The municipalities are responsible for this, and receive funding from the government for this purpose. Together with the individual ‘immigrant’, the municipality is supposed to draw up an action plan.
fitting the individual’s requirements (Skr. 2001/02[129]).

The government aims furthermore to work systematically to ensure that integration policy permeates all policy areas. A method of mainstreaming is to put the ethnical and cultural composition of society central to all measures, at all levels, and in all sectors of society in their everyday operations. This is to be implemented by the Swedish Integration Board (SIB), through more stringent legislation against discrimination and racism, development programmes in the metropolitan regions, and more defined responsibility for the work of government agencies. To achieve the objective of equal rights, all sectors of society are to be accountable for the responsibilities and opportunities for everyone, as well as for combating ethnic discrimination, xenophobia and racism (Skr. 2001/02[129]).

The report asserts that organisations and public authorities now have achieved a greater awareness regarding equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities, compared to what was true at the time of the 1997/98 Integration Bill. This is partly explained by the ethnic diversity in Sweden, which has resulted in a greater openness to difference in society, that unemployment amongst persons of foreign extraction has shown a marked decline during the latter half of the 1990s, and that more new arrivals are able to support themselves, leading to reduced social welfare costs (Skr. 2001/02[129]).

However, despite extensive initiatives to provide everyone with the same opportunities, it was admitted that discrepancies between ‘immigrants’ and Swedish born citizens still exist. This applies to working life, education, housing and healthcare. To create a labour
market in which individual merit is valued and people of different backgrounds work, develop and meet each other is the stated main priority for the government. The disparities between 'immigrants' and Swedish born citizens are explained by the individuals' personal situation and structural causes, such as their knowledge of Swedish, education, lack of networks, discrimination and the length of time spent in Sweden (Skr. 2001/02[129]).

Future integration policy is to be continuously directed towards creating conditions that enable people to support themselves and fully take part in society, whilst safeguarding fundamental values and working towards equal rights between men and women. This is to be achieved by making the implementation of the integration policy's objectives more efficient and streamlined within the different social sectors and policy areas (Skr. 2001/02[129]).

In its attempt to combat exclusion and marginalisation, the government is reportedly creating better opportunities for people of foreign extraction to exert influence and participate in society. Within the framework of the government's urban policy, several long-term programmes are under way to break the negative trends in segregated housing within the metropolitan regions; the main focus being growth, employment and language development. Regional consultants are responsible for stimulating multicultural activities. An effort is to be made in the cultural sphere, so that everyone will have the opportunity to perform or experience a variety of multicultural expressions. In addition, the integration aspect is to be given a more prominent position in public health work (Skr. 2001/02[129]).
Conclusion
We have now followed the history of Swedish immigration and integration policy and praxis through the three major immigration themes of the post-war era; From Emigration to Immigration, Refugee Migration and the European Union and From Immigrant Policy to Integration Policy. We have seen how the Swedish state with varying success has tried to anticipate, influence but also adapt to new trends. In line with the expressed focus of this thesis and in an attempt to introduce the policy documents central to it, more time has been devoted here to the three major integration policy documents, than to equivalent immigration policy documents.

As asserted, many of the positive reflections on the state of Swedish integration that were made in the last integration policy document were, if not contradictory to the lived experience of a large part of the ‘immigrant’ population, at least overly optimistic in their projected goals. Similarly, though the wording may have changed over time, it is clear that several of the core themes, such as language training and equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for all, regardless of ethnic or cultural background, repeat themselves in all of the three integration policy documents. Whilst more language courses and education together with a popular recognition of the ethnic cultural diversity are to solve a continuously failing integration policy, little attention is spent reflecting over the policy itself and the possible failings of the language/education system and the activities of the major institutional authorities in the society.
The way we describe society reflects the way we see it. Accordingly, the language of the policy documents becomes central to the real plausibility of achieving the goals set out in these documents. Therefore, as an example, despite all conciliatory declarations, the common over focus on so-called foreign cultures continuous to cause more problems than actual misunderstandings between social beings themselves and social beings and institutions. As Ålund and Schierup (1991) have stressed, the over emphasis on different or difference(s), preconceives the ‘immigrant’ and ‘his or her culture’ as suspect from the outset, which creates rather than breaks down barriers. When now turning to the Analysis this thesis takes as its starting point the idea that the integration policy documents in themselves carry some of the responsibility for why the society as a whole is unable to achieve the goals set out in these same policy documents. Although this does not necessarily mean that the goals in themselves are flawed; it is important to reflect over the way society is explained to the people/authorities who are supposed to implement the policies.
Chapter 8: Analysis

It is now time to turn the focus on to the actual text of integration policy documents. The text analysis is carried out on material from what is commonly viewed as the three major Swedish 'immigrant' and integration policy documents: SOU 1974[69], Immigrants and Minorities; SOU 1996[55]/Prop. 1997/98[16] Sweden, the Future and Diversity, and; Skr. 2001/02[129] Integration Policy for the 21st Century (AOT). The overall content and direction set out by these policy documents, as well as that which could be said to be the outcome of these policies, the actual state of integration, has already been described and will therefore not be central to this chapter. A short introduction of the policy documents will nevertheless allow the reader to recapture reference points with regards to the context in which later text examples belong.

The actual text analysis will be divided into three main themes: the Dilemma of Categorisation; Segregation; and, Discrimination, Culture and Racism. Although they are not, of course, the only examples I could have chosen, they have not been chosen randomly. The themes where carefully selected to address the proposition, as outlined in chapter three, that a common 'identity' construction perpetuates and is perpetuated through dichotomies that strengthen the social and political cogency of categorisations and potentially obstruct successful integration processes. The first theme addresses the different ways the policy documents try to come to term with the Dilemma of Categorisation; the Segregation theme focuses on one of the expressions of a failed integration process, i.e. segregation; whilst Discrimination, Culture and Racism addresses what this thesis would argue to be the core problem: essentialist
conceptualisations leading to discrimination and racism. Within each of these themes, the analysis will be done in chronological order so that changes or the lack of changes in the language over time will become clearer. This overall approach will both allow for a closer reading and in a dialogic fashion invite the reader to open up a discussion of alternative readings that potentially have affected the outcome of the policies.

The Rhetoric of Immigrant Policy
Swedish ‘immigrant’ policy has, as already indicated, either been a rationalisation of already existing praxis or a change in official rhetoric, without any corresponding changes in praxis (see also Dahlström, 2004). In spite of this and despite that the political parties have been divided into two different camps on the issues of integration, as Hammar (1985b) amongst other migration researchers has rightly pointed out, Swedish ‘immigrant policy’ with some minor exemptions up to the end of the 1980s was never really politicised. That is, the different political parties represented in the parliament had up to this point joined ranks behind one ‘immigrant policy’ (Hammar, 1985b). While the Social Democrats (SAP) and the Green party over the years have been advocating assimilation, though without any official statements in support of assimilation after 1964, the remaining political parties have been advocating a policy of preservation of ‘group distinctive characters’ and the development of ‘ethnic identities’ (Dahlström, 2004).
Immigrants and Minorities
The 1974 report by the Royal Commission on Immigration (SOU 1974[69]) is commonly viewed as Sweden’s first attempt towards an integration policy. The report can in many respects be read as an ethnological/anthropological and partly comparative research on the current situation of immigration and ‘immigrants’ in Sweden leading up to 1974. Accordingly, the report gives a descriptive account of the impact of current immigration ‘flows’ in the major part of the western/northern world and not only in Sweden. As such, its aim is to give an accurate account of the impact, on both receiving and sending countries, on past, present and future trends, and how these effects are to be handled.

The report gives an account of the different ‘immigrant’ ‘groups’, under what circumstances they live, how they fare in the labour market, access to housing and living standards, and their access to the social welfare system in relation to health, social insurance, social benefits, education and correctional treatment. Other areas covered by the report are culture, information, the forming of public opinion, the sharing of responsibilities and co-ordination. The Commission’s conception of culture, central to most discussions of ‘identity’ and therefore at the core of this thesis, includes both the private and the public realm. Though these realms have a tendency to fuse, they include: sport; media; cultural associations; ‘staged culture’; literature; historic documentation; exchanges with countries of origin; the safeguarding of, the bringing to life and the development of ‘old’ cultures; and, exchanges between different linguistic groups. Language, both Swedish and home language/mother tongue, is presented as central to these cultural expressions and the formation of ‘group’ and individual ‘identities’.
Furthermore, and something that has become a central mantra in Swedish integration policy, the Commission underlined the importance of fully implementing the principle (adopted by the Parliament in 1968) of the division of responsibility between public authorities, namely that the authorities responsible for particular spheres in relation to Swedish citizens must be responsible for the same sphere in relation to 'immigrants'.

Whilst the 'immigrant' and minority policy from the 1970s, together with a general tolerance of refugees, asylum seekers, labour migration and aid to underdeveloped countries rarely have been politicized, the question of freedom of choice, the second part of the integration slogan from SOU 1974[69], has occasionally been up for debate. That is: How is freedom of choice to be interpreted? The official position of the state has been swinging between a universalistic and multicultural attitude towards 'immigrant' policy. Having had its point of departure in a universalistic policy where 'immigrants' were neither to assimilate nor integrate, but to adapt to the Swedish society, it swung towards a more multicultural standpoint in the face of the critique of freedom of choice by both Multiculturalists and Universalists. The latter questioned if 'immigrant groups' were to be allowed to opt out on certain values central to the Swedish society, such as equal opportunity between women and men, and whether the Swedish state in such a case should support the group in making this choice, whilst the Multiculturalists asked what good a policy would do if the only freedom of choice would exist within a set framework and if such a policy would in fact not lead to assimilation.

The Commission behind the SOU 1974[69] argued that both groups, but specifically the Universalists, had given culture too broad an interpretation. The Multicultural line
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gained more space in the public debate than the Universal, which led the government to change their official position. The Multicultural line that the government took in connection with the ‘immigrant’ Bill, Prop. 1975[26], was further questioned in the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. This is seen as the starting point for a swing back from multiculturalism towards universalism, which was completed by Prop. 1997/98[16]. Though it has had little if any effect on the praxis, it has in part changed the rhetoric of the government (Dahlström, 2004). Independent of this hovering between two extremes, the most significant debate with regard to ‘immigrant’ policy has focused on the term ‘immigrant’. Independent of the outcome of such a debate it will unavoidably influence the entire approach towards ‘immigrant’, and minority or integration policy.

The Future and Diversity
In 1994/95, the Social democratic government appointed a new Committee that was to overhaul existing Swedish ‘immigrant’ policy. Not surprisingly, considering the time that had past since the policy of the 1970s, the report was largely made up of a description and evaluation of policies adapted since the 1974 report and the 1975 Bill. The main conclusion of the Committee behind the 1996 report (SOU 1996[55]) was that the discursive shift from assimilation to ‘immigrant’ policy that had taken place after 1974 needed to be developed in light of the economic and social changes of the past two decades. The 1996 report should therefore primarily be read as an attempt to propose adjustments to the 1974/75 policy, rather than an attempt to outline a new policy. This
somewhat weak contribution to integration policy was criticised from within the Committee in a reservation attached to the report (SOU 1996[55]).

The different proposals thus mainly reinforced already existing policies, such as, that all residents in Sweden should be regarded as equals, and that the state should make no difference between 'immigrants' and the native population in supplying social services. That 'immigrants' initially might need introduction courses, containing language courses and information about the Swedish society, in order to kick-start their integration, represents the only real discrepancy from the general rule. In addition to this, the committee proposed for a unit to be set up within the Government Offices to monitor the development of the multi-cultural society. This was in order to safe-guard that equal opportunities prevailed and that the government structures did not in any way discriminate or make the process of integration harder in the long term (SOU 1996[55]).

The Committee stressed that, the reality of Sweden being a multi-cultural nation should be reflected in all future policymaking as well as government structures. Nevertheless, the committee refrained itself from formulating any long-term goals for a policy within the immigration area, as they felt these should be worked out through political processes contemporary to social developments. Whilst the Committee stressed the importance of equal rights regardless of origin and that future policy makers needed to acknowledge that in Sweden ethnic and cultural diversity was a fact of life, specific proposals did not make up more than a page of the report and were in fact only minor adjustments to the already existing policies (SOU 1996[55]).
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The majority of the improvements should, according to the Committee, be included in mainstream policy making and are therefore not read as projects directed towards ‘immigrants’. Only the first couple of years in Sweden and not more than five years should contain support specifically directed towards ‘immigrants’, such as, introduction courses and work skill evaluations. Because the Swedish welfare state is to care for all residents, the Committee reasoned that there was no need for any extra support for ‘immigrants’. Such extra support would according to the Committee only run the risk of giving extra attention to ‘immigrants’, which in its extension might stigmatise ‘immigrants’ and provoke xenophobia. The latter statement was at least in part a result of consultations between the Committee and other investigatory works. This had revealed that people who were ‘immigrants’ often were described as the cause of the problems affecting them (SOU 1996[55]).

That the integration Bill, 1997/98[16], was named Sweden, the Future and Diversity – from Immigrant Policy to Integration Policy was, if not an acceptance of the Committee’s proposed policy differentiation, a sign of the change in rhetoric. The change in the government’s rhetoric, as suggested by Dahlström (2004), was also indicated in the title, by the use of diversity, or in fact manifoldness⁴ (mångfald) instead of multiculturalism. The term diversity, in the discourse on immigration and ‘immigrants’, was assumed overburdened by the concept of ethnicity and therefore risked leaving out other types of diversity in society. Manifoldness was consequently to be read as more than just ethnic diversity. To read too much into the title of the integration Bill would however be to precede the actual text of the policy document.
In its summary, Sweden was described as a country which due to recent changes now is characterised by its cultural and ethnic manifoldness. Due to the intolerable situation for many with foreign background, the government asserted that it was time to depart from policies that single out ‘immigrants’. Instead, the cultural and ethnic manifoldness in society ought to be the starting point for overall policy making of the future, while policies specifically directed towards ‘immigrants’ should be restricted to the initial time spent in Sweden. That the same rights and possibilities were to apply to everyone, independent of ethnic and cultural background, a social fellowship with the manifoldness of society as its basis, a social progress marked by mutual respect and tolerance, something that everyone independent of background should both be part of and jointly responsible for, were expressed as the main goals of future integration policy. The integration policy should in praxis be aimed at providing 1) support to individual’s self-support and social participation, 2) secure basic democratic values, 3) promote equality of rights and opportunities between women and men, 4) and prevent discrimination, xenophobia and racism (Prop. 1997/98[16]).

In line with the proposal made by the Committee, the government determined that the creation of a new authority was necessary, one that would be responsible for the implementation of the aims and outlook of the integration policy on all the different levels and areas of society. It was suggested that this authority should both have responsibility for the implementation of equal rights and possibilities, independent of ethnic and cultural background, and for the prevention of discrimination, xenophobia and racism. The proposed authority should furthermore have the overall responsibility for the integration of the newly arrived ‘immigrants’, but also of the evaluation of social
progress with regard to society’s ethnic and cultural composition. As a result, the
Swedish Integration Board was launched in 1998 (Prop. 1997/98[16]).

Integration for the 21st Century
The most recent integration report came at the turn of the last century. Integration Policy for the 21st Century was to give an account of the current situation and development within different areas of society from the perspective of the integration policy of 1997/98. The main purpose was to provide the Parliament with a description of the results of the current integration policy in relation to its goals, while at the same time presenting the government’s intention with the future of integration policy.

The government stressed that though the realization of the current integration policy is in need of both improvement and development, the current policy direction should continue. Just as in 1997/98, the government asserts that the goals and approach of integration policy are to be incorporated in all areas of the society. – The needs of immigrants shall, just as the needs of others, be paid attention to within the framework of the overall policy. The integration policy shall focus on the state of things and mechanisms in the entire society and not as previously focus on immigrants and the attitudes of the society towards them – (Skr. 2001/02[129]: 7, AOT). The goals of existing integration policy were to be made clearer and questions regarding the common values and the conditions of childhood and adolescence of children and youth of foreign extraction were to be given increased attention in the integration process.
The government stressed that several Bills with an influence on integration policy had been produced since Prop. 1997/98[16]. The first of two Bills that were given a prominent position, 1997/98[165], referred to the goals and direction of metropolitan policy areas, such as breaking with current trends of social, ethnic and discriminating segregation, whilst the second Bill, 1998/99[143], referred to the ‘national minority’ policy with a focus on protection and support for the ‘national minorities’ and minority languages. That the government asserted that the policy on ‘national minorities’, in certain aspects, also is of importance in the context of the overall integration policy; that “[t]o the ethnic and cultural manifoldness contributes those people who belong to the country’s national minorities” can be described as a return to 1974’s inclusion (Skr. 2001/02[129]: 119]. Apart from cursory comments in the context of different ethnicities, the different ‘national minorities’ of Sweden had over the last decades on the overall been excluded from the larger integration debate. This is exemplified by statements in Bills and reports, stressing that Sweden through immigration had become a society with ethnic and cultural manifoldness.

The new inclusion originating in the Government Bill 1998/99[143] National Minorities in Sweden (AOT), adopted by the parliament in December 1999, represents the ratification of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ETS No. 157) and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ETS No 148). Defined as ‘national minorities’ in the context of Sweden are accordingly the Sami, the Swedish Finns, the Tornedalers, the Roma and the Jews and the minority languages are consequently Sami, Finnish, Meänkieli (Tornedal Finnish), Romany Chib and Yiddish. Originating in the EU, it is open for debate the degree to
which this change was brought upon Sweden by its EU membership. Though this question potentially also could be asked regarding the exclusion of 'national minorities' from SOU 1996[55] and Prop. 1997/98[16], the same thing is not true regarding the overall integration discourse.

With this in mind as the core of Swedish integration policy, it is time for a second and closer reading of the policy documents. This will be done by addressing the text's relation to the mentioned overall inclusion. Though, for example, race, ethnicity and culture are for already explained reasons central to any discussion of integration, it is the elaborate interconnectedness of language, 'identity' and ideology that steer the text and its message in the direction of monologism or dialogism.

**Themes**
The intention with this analysis is to give examples of how language potentially may obscure the meaning of even the most positive intention, in this case possibly obstruct or even put a complete halt to all potential progress towards expressed policy goals. This is not done believing that a perfect text exists, that it is possible to draft the perfect integration policy document resulting in the perfect integration process. Instead, the purpose is to show that the complex interrelations amongst language, ideology and world views play an important part in the outcome of each policy document. Hence, the way we formulate ourselves may either help or hinder the good intentions we originally might have held.
The Dilemma of Categorisation

When advocating, as the Swedish government does, the importance of implementing equality between all people in society, independent of background, it is of great importance to be able to register facts relating to discrimination, segregation, racism, sexism and ageism. The way this is measured will inevitably affect the outcome of the result, but also the way society is described. Though the 1974 report (SOU 1974[69]) contains an account of different terms and how they are employed, the explanations are in today’s context relatively uncritical. The term ‘immigrant(s)’ is commonly left undefined, except when stressed as: immigrant(s) during a specified period. A second term, ‘foreigners’, refers to people who have yet to obtain Swedish citizenship, i.e. individuals still registered as citizens in their countries of origin or stateless. An exception to the rule is: foreigners domiciled in Sweden, which refers to ‘foreigners’ who are parish registered.

Although it is easy to be critical with regard to the unreflective usage in the 1974 report of terms such as ‘immigrant(s)’ and foreigner(s), of more importance for the result is the report’s actual research approach. Though it is important to map out areas where different people may be in a disadvantaged position, the 1974 approach is at best lacking a self-critical assessment of its differentiation of persons. The overall focus is on individuals from the point of view of (assumed) ‘group association’ instead of potential problems. Consequently, the individual or the individual’s assumed ‘group association’,
s/he or they, indirectly become co-creators of 'their own' problem. Hence, the Commission paints a picture of existing and potential 'immigrant' problems, instead of problems that are either individual, caused by the state, or disproportionately affect individuals due to his or her (assumed) 'group association', e.g. former nationality, religion or the fact of having immigrated.

As a result and due to the central role social engineering has played in the construction of the Swedish welfare state, it is logical that the Commission asserts the need for the state to actively support all linguistic minorities in their lives, in both the private and public arena. This is exemplified by the idea of overall inclusion. All authorities must be responsible for 'immigrants' within their particular sphere, in the same way as they are for 'Swedes'. The personal assistance by the state, dependent on ideology, may be interpreted as a benevolent and welcoming hand to (what recently has been termed national) 'minorities', 'immigrants', and specifically so to 'new immigrants'. The concept of differentiation takes, however, precedence over the emphasis on actual support, which is to prevent or relieve potential problems.

By the time of SOU 1996[55] the term foreigner(s) had in principle been erased from the immigration and integration discourse and the term 'immigrant(s)', though still being used, was highly contested. Though the Committee addressed the potential problem with the term 'immigrant(s)', stressing the need to contest prejudiced conceptions of 'immigrants' situation as 'immigrant'-caused, the report contains no serious discussion addressing the causes of the actual problems with reifying people into a general
The example of the latter, the intent to break with previous ‘immigrant’ and minority policy, is exemplified by statements such as:

Special measures should apply to people with special needs, for example, low education or unemployment, or people living in geographically demarcated areas, such as sparsely-populated rural areas or housing areas with high numbers of recipients of social benefits. The hereditary characteristic of being born abroad or having at least one parent born abroad shall involve neither advantages nor disadvantages with regard to Swedish rules and regulations. The Committee is consequently of the opinion that the state shall not, except in exceptional cases, for example with regard to organisational support, discriminate in favour of ethnic and linguistic groups. The native minorities, which are not considered in this report, constitute a general exception.

SOU 1996[55]: 10, AOT

The expressed intent to break with previous ‘immigrant’ policies, which have made individuals categorised as ‘immigrants’ the cause of whatever vulnerable situation they have found themselves in, deserves recognition. The quote summarises this intention by being affirmatively general in its nature, stressing that origin or ethnic categories should amount to neither advantages nor disadvantages in regards to rules and regulations. As such, it represents a clear attempt to shift the focus from ‘immigrants’, towards social circumstances as the reason for special measures and support.

However, when re-reading and contextualising this quotation, several issues remain unresolved. People categorised as ‘immigrants’ are overrepresented amongst unemployed people and still today there are clear indications that this is related to their
‘immigrant status’ (de Los Reyes & Wingborg, 2002). An education from outside of Sweden and especially so one from outside of the northern and western hemisphere is less valued in the marketplace in comparison with one obtained within Sweden. This has resulted in proposals and the employment of ‘new’ special measures of how to translate these educations into Swedish standards, in an attempt to help employers make judgments. Consequently ‘immigrants’ are overrepresented in the second category: people who have low standards of education. ‘Immigrants’ may be less represented in sparsely-populated rural areas, but the opposite is true regarding housing areas with large amounts of people on social benefits. These areas have, according to Molina (1997), over time become increasingly racialized.

Just as so-called ethnic background should result neither in advantages nor disadvantages with regard to Swedish rules and regulations; neither should all ‘immigrants’ constitute a special category in any legislation – (SOU 1996[55]: 19, AOT). This position expresses a recognition of the importance of the debate regarding the term ‘immigrant(s)’.

There is no commonly recognised definition of who to regard as an immigrant. The term can be used – and is used – in several ways, often to cover a very heterogenic group of individuals. This report does not use one exclusive version. This would for several reasons be impossible, for one thing because, accounts of and analyses are restrained by the demarcations and definitions already used in the statistical material made used by the Committee. However, the Committee has as far as it is possible tried to define which category of immigrants that it refers to in the specific
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circumstances, even though this sometimes results in a linguistically dense text.

SOU 1996[55]: 50

Although, the Committee stresses that ‘immigrants’ do not make up a permanent distinct homogenous group, the need to define ‘immigrants’ does according to the Committee remain. Several definitions are also summarised in the report. The different definitions lead in different directions and should be read as a combination of already existing ways of describing and proposals for a coming Bill with new policies on how to tackle a population made up of people with different origins.

Regardless of how many times it may be stressed in the text, the approach is problematic and obscures the intent of the report. Proposals to describe ‘immigrants’ according to, for example, mother tongue or native language, is significant to the problem of categorisation and this text. The use of first language as a denominator in statistics describing the current state of discrimination may be both legitimate and serve as a good indicator. To use it to describe who counts as an ‘immigrant’ would primarily serve the purpose of describing who counts as a real Swede. Real Swedes are accordingly defined, not by speaking Swedish, but by not having one of the ‘immigrant’ languages as mother tongue or native language. Furthermore, real or proper Swedish is thereby defined in default of definition. Accordingly, and probably even more so than the term ‘immigrant’, due to providing home language support, a first language categorisation will of itself firmly describe a state of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’.
However and as already stressed, along the lines of a growing awareness of the inherent potential problems with the term 'immigrant', in part resulting in a change in rhetoric, the Committee proposed that 'immigrant' and minority policy from the 1970s was to be replaced by an integration policy. One policy should now respond to and affect the 'immigrants' first five years in the country, thereby tying a timeframe to the term, and 'one' policy should include the rest of society. Consequently, the former 'immigrant(s)' should after the first five years be included in and affected by all general policies.

Both new and old 'immigrants' are despite this, throughout the report put in the position of the Other, in fact, not only in relation to real Swedes but also to those explicitly not taken into account by the report, the 'national minorities'; a category at the time still to be filled but commonly referring to the Sami. Instead of talking about the hereditary characteristic of birth place, there is still a reference to the hereditary characteristic of being born abroad, in fact, in an almost identical passage to the one above on page 233-4 this is emphasized as: - being born in an Arab country or to have at least one parent born in Chile – (SOU 1996[55]: 19, AOT). Even when disregarding the birthplace of 'immigrants', refusing to acknowledge the continuing problem of retaining the social and political standard of using Swedish birth to determine real Swedes as normative standard with regard to successful integration implies that the 'immigrant' will still deviate from established values. This relates to the way incidences of discrimination in society are played down and how the concept of racism is exclusively reserved for the actions of extremist groups (see Cohen, 1999), but also the way the Committee admits disregarding consultative groups' and panels' advise that 'integration problems' often are related to being 'immigrants' or having been born elsewhere.
In the progress report from 2001 (Skr. 2001/02[129]), the government is still struggling with the issue of categorization. The core defence is mounted around the argument that to be able to find out if people born outside of Sweden are disadvantaged and or facing discrimination it may be a necessary tool to categorise people along the lines of national origin and citizenship. It is however simultaneously recognised that, the same categorisation in everyday speech may (un)intentionally have a disparaging and generalising signification, which may or may not be used to set borders between people and as such used in ways of reinforcing an 'us' vs. 'them' way of thinking (Skr. 2001/02[129]).

It should be clear that, this thesis is in no way trying to play down the difficulty of measuring who is unjustly disadvantaged in society. However, even more important, is the need to find out why certain people may be disadvantaged by society. When the solution becomes more about how to differentiate between different people, by making the net as fine-meshed as possible, leaving questions of 'national identity' and ethnicity unchallenged, why becomes secondary to who. The report's approach to the subject of segregation on the housing market and the new inclusion of 'national minorities' are part of the same (un)intended policies of differentiation.

In the summary of the Swedish Government's policy on 'national minorities' from 2004 (Faktablåd, Justitiedepartementet, Ju 04.15, November 2004, Fact Sheet, the Lord Chancellor's Department, AOT) 'national minorities' are defined as:
- Groups with a distinct affinity which, in terms of number and in relation to the rest of the population, do not have a dominant position in society.
- Groups with a religious, traditional and/or cultural affinity. Just one of these characteristics is sufficient. Self-identification. Both the individual and the group should have a desire and an aim to maintain their identity.
- The Group should have historical or long established ties with Sweden. The only minority groups that are considered to fulfill this last criterion are those that have been established in Sweden since before the turn of the last century (before 1900).

From having been included in the ‘immigrant’ and minority policy from the mid 1970s, and then defined by the 1990s exclusion, ‘national minorities’ are now once again included in the integration policy. That the new inclusion affects the overall integration policy is true for several reasons. How the inclusion represents a break from the policy approach of the mid 1990s and how the states relation to the ‘national minorities’ impacts on new and former ‘immigrants’ is however nowhere problematized.

Despite the intended definition, the central question; what does it take to become an official ‘national minority’?, remain unanswered. Although the question at first seems answered, it is not clear whether this choice is permanent, or if other groups in the future will be categorised as ‘national minorities’. Are, for example, Iranian ‘immigrants by 2075, who by then would represent 100 years of presence in Sweden and potentially could be part of an ‘ethnic minority group’ subscribing to the stipulated criteria, to be included as one of Sweden’s ‘national minorities’? Neither is it clear if one of the
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'groups' that today qualify as a 'national minority' in the future could disqualify itself by no longer subscribing to the stipulated criteria.

The answers are important due to the possibility of discriminating practices between 'national' and other numerical minorities subscribing to all or most of the stipulated criteria. Though the policy is to support all 'groups' that stand in a minority position in relation to real Swedes, i.e. providing support for spoken languages, such as home-language instruction; information about their history and culture within the school system; and opportunities to influence decisions affecting the community at large through consultative meetings; only legal 'national minorities' are granted these rights. Consequently, while 'national minority' languages associated with specific geographic location, such as Sami, Finnish and Meänkieli, are by law granted special regional measures with a view to keeping these languages alive, this does not apply to other groups, which primarily are represented in the greater metropolitan areas, such as Stockholm, Gothenburg, Norrköping and Malmö.

While the recognition of 'national minorities' on the one hand may be an important step in the right direction for a state advocating a form of inclusiveness, the same recognition asserts that the remaining minority/ies or 'immigrant' 'groups' are not fully recognised as a part of the Swedish nation. In addition to the differentiation made in Swedish law, the addition of the definition 'national' to certain 'minority groups' is of potential importance for the discourse on minorities. That is, central to this is the question of a potential hierarchy between 'national minorities' and 'immigrants' or 'ethnic minorities', and that between 'national minorities', 'immigrants', 'ethnic minorities' and
the 'native population', the 'real Swedes'. The use of the designation of national, as in
'national minorities' and 'national identity', creates an additional level in an
unaddressed hierarchy within the Swedish society. To what extent are or (when) will
people and their potential 'group' associations be included in and by the 'national
identity'?

As mentioned earlier, the creation and maintenance of the 'national identity' are part of
what Bakhtin (1999a) describes as a double-voiced discourse; what this thesis, anchored
in the tradition of Stallybrass and White (1986), terms a split-level monologism. As a
split-level monologism, the double-voiced discourse simultaneously works on different
levels with inherent principles of domination and subordination. Consequently, the
creation of 'national minorities' welcomes people that are associated with certain group
affiliations, but simultaneously restricts their inclusion by asserting their position as a
minority. While the designation as 'honorary Swedes' only gets its value in relation to
those who are not included, the creation does add value to that which is implicit, but not
addressed, with regard to the 'national identity'. In this lies the strength of every
absolute 'identity' construction, which is enhanced through split-level monologism. The
dominating position of those included in the real 'national identity' is created and upheld
by being in the position of choosing who is to be included, whilst those included in the
honorary position end up in a dominating position with regard to those not included,
while remaining in a subordinate position to those fully recognised as Swedish. These
relationships can also be read as the practice of what Hesse (1999) termed the imperial
multiculturalism; integration only so far as it does not threaten the 'national identity'
construction.
Segregation
That the Committee asserts that we should view "social segregation with ethnic overtones as a recent and increasing phenomenon" (SOU 1996[55]: 9) and the government similarly asserts that "segregation has increasingly got an ethnic dimension" (Prop. 1997/98[16]: 69) lays the foundation for the study of the forms of awareness and recognition that form the basis for Swedish integration policy. In opposition Westin and Dingu-Kyrklund, stress: "[t]here have always been Sami and Finnish speakers in the north, and historically an in-migration over the centuries of Germans, Balts, Dutch, Walloons, Scots…", all of whom have been living under more or less segregated circumstances (Westin and Dingu-Kyrklund, 1997: 9-10). Segregation has historically also been connected to the possibility to exercise religious rights, something that has primarily affected 'immigrants' (Karlsson & Svanberg, 1997). Furthermore, that this is a growing phenomenon implies and assumes that this is a condition that already has existed, and is therefore acceptable at specific levels by the government. Does the problem of social segregation referred to here imply those problems experienced by those who feel forced into or kept segregated from the majority population, or is it a question of how to reduce the impact of existing social segregation on the majority population?

That 161 different countries and 140 different languages are represented amongst the people living in the housing estate Rosengård in Malmö is evident from Report Integration 2001. It is consequently doubtful if it is
correct to talk about housing estates as ethnically segregated; it is rather a
question of less native born Swedes living there. // The turnover of tenants is
very high and in certain areas a quarter of the tenants move out during a
year. They who move in are often the most recently arrived refugees. They
who move out from these areas are noticeably often people who have moved
from unemployment to employment, who got improved economic
possibilities to influence their housing environment. Several studies show
that segregation primarily is about class.

Skr. 2001/02[129]: 75-6, AOT

Although we should recognise that this lengthy quotation is both a recognition of
diversity and attempts to play down the importance of background, the latter is
contradicting the reality facing many of the people living in the mentioned housing
estates. This thesis would like to stress that an honest and open dialogue cannot be
achieved until each situation is properly problematized and honestly described, i.e. until
as many people’s experiences as possible have been described and considered (Bakhtin,
1990a). To clarify, as part of miljonprogrammet (the Million Programme, AOT),
primarily located in the metropolitan areas of Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malmö and
Norrköping, approximately one million apartments were built between 1965 and 1975.
Over time, these areas have primarily become inhabited by people who have been socio-
economically worse off than the remaining population. From the mid 1980s, in
connection to increasing numbers of refugee immigration, mainly ‘immigrants’ and
refugees have moved in to the million-programme apartments, making foreign born
individuals in general, and newly arrived ‘immigrants’ and refugees in particular,
heavily overrepresented.
Without accounting for potential discrimination on the labour market, resulting in a dependence on social benefits, segregation is, except for a possible initial period, seldom self-chosen (Molina, 1997). This forced segregation to socio-economically worse off areas does minimise opportunities for employment due to the lack of social capital established on the labour market, something which in its extension commonly results in a dependence on social benefits (for a further discussion on the inclusiveness and exclusiveness as a result of the ‘possession’ or lack of social capital see Bourdieu 1997). That a higher share of unemployment and long-term recipients of social benefits are more common among these housing areas than in other areas of society and that ‘immigrants’, specifically newly arrived, are overrepresented amongst the part of the population that is unemployed and long-terms recipients of social benefits is a correlation in need of recognition by government.

Though the topic of segregation is still viewed as something to address in relation to integration policy, in the 2001 report, the government reads the situation very differently. Despite the recognition of several reports that stressed that the housing segregation from the 1980s onwards received a clearer ethnic dimension, the government questions the descriptions of housing areas such as Rosengård in Malmö as ethnically segregated. Instead, the government argues that they should be characterised by the declining number of Swedes that decide to live in these areas. Such an argument does not recognise that Swedish Finns, and Roma, ‘national minorities’, are also found in the million programme areas. That Danish, Norwegian, American and German ‘immigrants’, for example, are more rarely found amongst the 161 represented
nationalities or ethnicities, confirms the invisible hierarchy amongst ‘immigrants’ or ‘ethnic groups’.

The existing segregation is now explained as a class phenomenon, instead of ethnic segregation resulting in immigrant-ness or ethnic group-ness. This is based on the high turnover of tenants within the Million Programme areas and that those who move out, move from unemployment to employment. Supposedly supporting the class theory are the similarities between the self-chosen segregation of high-income earners and that of those people living in the million-programme areas. Though other explanations are recognised, such as that some people are discriminated against and that some people decide to live close to relatives and fellow nationals, the former appears secondary to the class theory and the latter is held in reserve to support the class explanation against future claims of ethnic discrimination (Skr. 2001/02[129]). Consequently, in spite of expressed rhetoric to the contrary, by indirectly disregarding, or playing down, potentially discriminatory praxis, those who are perceived as ‘immigrants’ and are unemployed in an area with high numbers of people on social benefits and/or with a low (unacknowledged) education will embody both a causal moment and a problem within government initiatives.

Though this segregation conserves an economic division, which could be termed accordingly a class hierarchy, it is ethnicity that acts as the main catalyst or conceptual mechanism for the segregation of individuals defined as ‘immigrants’ in the society. The class character of the segregation is merely a symptom of ethnic social categorisations and differentiation throughout Swedish society. That ethnic difference takes particular
material forms is dependent on the institutions in society that confirm specific elements as important in the distribution of resources. In other words, race and ethnicity take concrete form based in part on a society’s existing patterns of resource distribution (see Hall, 2002).

The rhetorical emphasis in Skr. 2001/02[129] on class politics seeks to confirm as well the Social Democratic party’s historical ‘identity’ as the party of the working class. With a history of a strong Social Democratic party (SAP), equally strong unions and a welfare system for everybody, the recent transformation towards more liberal/conservative policies has left SAP struggling with its ‘identity’ construction. In such a context class is a term and phenomenon comfortably familiar to its old core ideology in a similar way to how Miles (1993) rather avoids a continued debate around issues of race for a debate of racism as part of inequalities reproduced by and in contemporary capitalist social formations.

However, the largely un-interrogated definition of ethnicity used in the Skr. 2001/02[129] could just as well have explained the mentioned class divide. Though ethnicity is in other parts of the report described as a category applicable not only to ‘immigrants’ but also to real Swedes, here that argument is less clear. Just as Rex (1996d) definition of ethnicity seems to work better on societies free from transformations generated by new additions to already established (ethnic) ‘groups’, the Swedish government struggles with defining the Swedes escaping the often run down cement blocks that shield the cities from the ring roads and highways as one ‘ethnic group’ segregating themselves from more recent arrivals. The number of ‘immigrants’
from individual countries, validating the government’s explanation of non-ethnic segregation, draws attention to why the ‘immigrant’ marker has been given such a prominent position in Swedish immigration and ‘immigrant’ discourses. Though Sweden, with its small population of 9 million inhabitants, proportionally has received a large number of ‘immigrants’, with Finnish immigration as a possible exception, each ‘group’ has been proportionally smaller than equivalent immigration in countries such as Germany, France or the UK.

In spite of this and the recognition in SOU 1996[55], Prop. 1997/98[16] and Skr. 2001/02[129] of the ‘immigrant’ marker as problematic, no connection between the ethnic designation and that of the ‘immigrant’ is ever made. What in the report is observed as class segregation is also in part a manifestation of practices that perpetuate the social, economic, and therefore political distinction of ‘immigrants’ vs. ‘real Swedes’. Here the ‘immigrant’ designation not only includes de facto ‘immigrants’, as in those newly arrived, but people who might have immigrated to Sweden during previous decades, their children and even grand children. The lack of an extensive problematization of the relationship between ethnicity, ‘race’, ‘immigrant(s)’ and real Swedes leaves the description of Swedes as a ‘national identity’ unchallenged. Strengthened by its dichotomous relationship to the 161 different ethnicities and/or ‘immigrants’, the ‘national identity’ is confirmed as confusedly, intentionally, and definitively not non-Swedish (for a further discussion on how ethnicity or ‘race’ in the Swedish context is exchanged for ‘immigrant’ see Mulinari & Neergaard, 2004).
The different committees and the government do express a will to find solutions to the problems within the Swedish society, solutions that avoid putting the blame on the different 'immigrant' or 'ethnic groups'. This could potentially lead either to a more open ended definition of Swedishness or even to a dismantling of the importance of the idea of Swedishness. The result is, however, still the opposite of that which is intended. As long as a (imperial) multiculturalism which is based on dichotomies remains central to Swedish integration policy, the Swedish state will not be able to engage in open and honest dialogues on the ethnic hierarchy central to housing, employment, and education segregation. Consequently, whilst this ethnic hierarchy remains unaddressed and segregation is explained as a class phenomenon, this thesis argues that segregation will continue to correlate with unemployment and long term dependence on social benefits amongst the part of the population used to define the limits of Swedishness. Once again, without being explicitly mentioned in the document, Swedishness is confirmed.

Culture, Discrimination and Racism
The choice of research or descriptive approach, particular to the 1974 report, with an almost exclusive focus on 'immigrant(s)' and 'minorities' is probably best described as being anthropological. Just as the 'immigrant' becomes the creator or co-creator of his or her own problem, that which is perceived as 'immigrant' culture is created as not only different, but as something that deviates from the unspoken norm, the 'Swedish culture'. The view of the cultural deviation of the 'immigrant' is most clearly expressed by the reports heading: A Cultural Policy for Linguistic Minorities (1974[69]: 183, AOT).
Independent of if we are talking about staged culture, literature or living patterns, the heading indicates the need, not for a new Swedish cultural policy, but a specific culture policy for linguistic minorities, here referring both to 'immigrants' and those people recently termed 'national minorities'. The foreign contribution is here foreign to the extent that it can not be incorporated into a common policy for the entire Swedish society.

To convey the 'immigrants' cultural traditions can increase the understanding of these groups, whilst it can be a stimulating new addition to the Swedish cultural pattern // These partially foreign cultural patterns shall also be viewed as a valuable contribution to the Swedish society, which enrich and inspire our own cultural development

SOU 1974[69]: 185; and, Prop. 1974[28], quoted in SOU 1974[69]: 188, AOT

The above quotation and the previous heading confirm that according to the government there is something which is truly Swedish, as such it creates and recreates a notion of a Swedishness. Whilst we can read that we, Swedes, shall take as a well-meant advice these new cultural patterns as valuable contributions to the Swedish society, such a statement rests on the prerequisite of a cultural hierarchy with an undefined Swedish culture as dominant. Due to the conceptualisation of culture as something to be hierarchically ranked, people associated with this or these foreign cultural behaviours will deviate from the Swedish norm, which in its extension strengthens the idea of Swedishness. As a result, to be Swedish is not to be different to that which is foreign, but to not be different to the established norm. The examples are accordingly

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(un)intentional illustrations of split-level monologism. They are concurrently making their point on several separate but connected levels. While they are explicit on one level, they maintain the implicit principles of domination and subordination on other levels. As such, it upholds an absolute ‘identity’, which here signifies Swedishness (for further discussions on the conceptualisation of culture in the Swedish context, see Ålund & Karlsson, 1996). The domination and subordination is represented by the position of Sweden, Swedish, Swedes vs. ‘immigrant(s)’, foreign, and ‘ethnic group’/(former) nationality. By not questioning the norm, Sweden and Swedes are allowed to remain in the dominating position of deciding who and/or what is going to be allowed to enrich that which is Swedish, whilst those who are allowed to represent that which is foreign but high (enough) culture, to borrow Heller’s evaluation (1996), remain in a position of enforced, required subordination to constant gratitude at their inclusion as honorary Swedes (White, 1993).

Though SOU 1974[69] is commonly viewed as the first Swedish integration policy, in the document the term integration is hardly mentioned. In 1996 the term and phenomenon of integration was high on the agenda, although again seldom explicitly problematized. In setting out the goals and direction of future integration policy, the government asserts that integration refers to the opposite of assimilation, even as it states its ambition of equality. Hence, it can refer to something that is to be achieved, to a process or a combination of the two. When used in connection with the so-called ethnic and cultural manifoldness of society it should refer to processes on both individual and societal levels, described as the amalgamation of different parts. – Integration must therefore incorporate the possibilities to be part of a greater whole without violating ones
own cultural and ethnic identity — (Prop. 1997/98[16]:22-23, AOT). Considering an integration policy unavoidably will be read in the light of the conceptualisation of integration, the emphasis on ethnic and cultural ‘identity’ is according to this thesis unfortunate, but also contradictory to the expressed aim of an amalgamation of free will. Though the acknowledgment of differences does not per se contradict integration, when these cultural and ethnic differences are expressed as absolute ‘identities’, we are both establishing and fixing the same described differences, what Pettman (1996b) describes as political identities infused with notions of a racialized otherness and Eriksen (1996) refers to as imputed cultural or racial differences.

In similar fashion, in line with a traditional belief in social organisations’ ability to socially foster people into good members of society, the report makes a case for providing financial support to — associations founded by immigrants or on otherwise ethnic basis and whose activities are in line with the goals of the integration policy — (Prop. 1997/98[16]: 37, AOT). This represents an example of what Dahlström (2004), views as the swing back towards a more Universalist approach. This financial support is supposed to render assistance to the newly arrived individuals during the initial time it can take to orientate and readjust oneself to a new society, but also assist children and grandchildren to keep in touch with their roots.

Associations that acquire members with common ethnic and cultural background may however have a hard time to assert themselves in comparison with traditional Swedish associations and may therefore need special attention. This is motivated with that the ethnic and cultural manifoldness in society should be represented also in and by associations.
Such praxis needs to be put into proper context. Sweden has, when making a general comparison across similar societies, an exceptionally large amount of people involved in a variety of organisations and associations, from voluntarily participating in the activities of junior football teams and housing associations to active local party memberships. The numbers of both active and passive memberships have, however, markedly decreased over the last two decades. The fabrication of membership numbers in local political youth associations in attempts to increase financial support from the state, which has been reviled during the spring of 2005 and similar cases amongst football clubs during the 1980s and 90s, are just two examples of the problems associated with this trend. Why the work by associations, 'immigrant' and cross-cultural, should work to solve problems that the state machinery on its own seems less capable of doing, needs to be questioned in the context of the general downward trend in the popularity of organisations and associations.

Although a proportional representation in all different levels and areas of society may be something to strive for, i.e. the representation in organisations, associations and institutions should mirror the so-called ethnic and cultural manifoldness of society as a whole, that the same manifoldness should be represented by associations, organisations and institutions would be to reproduce the segregation present in the rest of society rather than result in integration. This is a problem for an initiative that seeks to use social organizations to improve immigrant equality issues in society. When attached to ethnic or cultural background/roots this economic support reaffirms the culturalisation, or
imputed cultural and racial differences of that which was the hallmark of the earlier 1974 report.

This is not to say that the Report by the Committee, or any of its individual members, intentionally has been given a monologic tone to avoid interaction and potential, long- or short-termed, integration, or had as its explicit purpose to exclude 'immigrants' from the Swedish social life. On the contrary, the Committee stresses on several occasions that it opposes discrimination and recognises diversity. In fact, it asserts that the latter should be a natural part of everyday life in Sweden. However, in spite of this, the Committee does often call the 'immigrant' into question. When asserting that all people are to be seen as independent and responsible individuals, as resources in society and therefore to be treated with respect, whilst simultaneously stressing that the individual introduction plan prepared in co-operation between municipality representatives and individual 'immigrants' is the basis for financial introduction support, the 'immigrants' participation is inescapably questioned, if not discredited.

When the Committee stresses that these measures, their financial incentives, are supposed to strengthen the chances for the individual 'immigrant' to live and to support him- or herself in Sweden, it simultaneously questions the 'immigrants' will to participate. By deduction, to question the will to participate with the system and to do ones share, is to assume some degree of exploitation of the system. Although, there is no reason to question that exploitation of the system exists, just as of any other system, there is per se no reason to doubt the participation of future 'immigrant(s)'. The latter would be to attach a static cultural trait of exploiting systems to 'immigrants'.
Contradicting the examples from *Sweden, the Future and Diversity*, the 2001/02 report asserts 1) that cultures and cultural heritage are not static but subjected to constant change and reinterpretation, and 2) that this is one of the starting points for the integration policy of 1997/98[16]. The ethnic and cultural manifoldness should be mirrored in the national cultural amenities, and financial support is therefore to be directed towards cultural institutions, such as theatres, museums, libraries, music studios, cinemas, sport, recreational/leisure activities and media (Skr. 2001/02[129]).

Large amounts of money have clearly been spent and great efforts made in an attempt to diversify cultural amenities. However and in spite of the expressed starting point within culture, within theatre the primary focus is on static culture and not on a contemporary avant-garde theatre scene mirroring culture in transformation.

The Swedish National Touring Theatre’s programme of activities at Södra Teatern [the Southern Theatre] shall to a substantial part focus on dramatic art from the entire world, specifically from countries and settings, which cultures normally are not accessible for the Swedish audience through established commercial or institutional channels. During 2000, the Southern Theatre has focused on the phenomenon of identity from the perspective of sex, class, religion and ethnicity.

Skr. 2001/02[129]: 82, AOT

The intended focus on a representation of here, now, and everybody is by this wording shifted away towards a there, then and they, which in turn constructs, confirms and
sustains a relation of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’. If accepting the concept of ethnicity, when focusing on cultures normally not accessible for the Swedish audience we will connect ‘their ethnicity’ with a culture not present in Sweden. Instead of, in line with Spiros (1995), accepting culture as system which designates a cognitive scheme about the environment we live in, they and their culture are admitted on the stage, but divorced from public life. Consequently, in similar fashion to the 1974 report, the 2001/02 report portrays culture as a series of fixed or dead anthropological museum pieces; artefacts.

The way we conceptualise a term, such as culture, potentially affects our conceptualisation of other phenomena. The state’s official view of culture, discrimination, xenophobia and racism does not only potentially colour the views and praxis of national institutions and the people who work for these institutions, but also whether people feel accepted as part of society or not. The centrality of preventing and counteracting ethnic discrimination, xenophobia and racism to the integration policy was first stressed in Prop. 1997/98[16]. The introduction since then of a national action plan against discrimination, xenophobia, racism and homophobia; a law against ethnic discrimination on the labour market; an Ombudsman against ethnic discrimination (DO); and, a law against discrimination of students within higher education, based on sex, ethnicity, sexual preference and disabilities are all presented as examples of the ongoing attention the government reserves for the prevention and counteraction of discrimination, xenophobia and racism (Skr. 2000/2001[59]; Laws: 1999[130]; 1999[131]; 20001[1286], in Skr. 2001/02[129]).
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Though this work should be given full recognition, the best laws in the world will not help when the legal system discriminates on the basis of ethnicity and/or sex (see discussion on unequal treatment before the law under Socio Economic Situation).

Independent of good intentions and procedural legal instruments, much of this confusion might originate in statements such as:

Ethnic discrimination means a factual special treatment based on ethnic belonging, which does not need to be based on xenophobic or racist views or ideologies. The measures needed to fight ethnic discrimination differ to a large extent from measures against xenophobia and racism and are therefore accounted for separately in this chapter.

Skr. 2001/02[129]: 94, AOT

Such standpoints are at best unfortunate for the work against discrimination and racism, but are at any rate examples of the complex problem of the interrelationship between language, ideology and world view (see Bakhtin, 1990c). In countries within the EU, governments compete and brag about the state of their own school systems. With a seemingly infinite amount of information available through media such as newspapers, radio, TV and internet, in national institutions such as libraries, and with people travelling the globe, there is no excuse for so-called xenophobic behaviour being accepted as an excuse for racism (Eriksen, 1996; Cohen, 1999).

The proposal is that behind every action lies a conscious or unconscious idea, and that this idea of how to organise the world equals our ideology. Such a view takes ideology to be consciousness, expressed. This thesis conceptualises ideology, in similar fashion to
Vološinov (1976; 2000), White (1993) and Hall (2003d), as the mental framework, made up of language, containing concepts and categories, the imagery of thoughts and systems of representation, with which we as individuals use to make sense of, define, decipher and make the ways of society intelligible. To differentiate between ethnic and gender discrimination or discrimination based on sexual preference and racist actions is accordingly only an internal self-justification of our actions, or if paraphrasing Otten and Mummendey (2000), our own person positivity bias. Consequently, to choose someone you know instead of the unknown, might be understandable, but cannot be taken as legitimation for a differentiation between ethnic or gender discrimination and racist ideologies. Ethnic segregation or discrimination, racism and gender discrimination might be differently expressed but part of the same system and as such they cannot be separated. For the government to come to terms with these phenomena, this thesis would argue that it needs to realize the great difference between – [e]thnic discrimination means a factual special treatment based on ethnic belonging – (Skr. 2001/02[129]: 94, AOT) and, ethnic discrimination means a factual special treatment based on a belief in ethnic belonging. While the latter holds the key for a better understanding of differential treatment the former accepts the treatment as a naturally existing and primordial phenomenon (see Eriksen, 2002a).

The number of reports on ethnic discrimination to Ombudsmannen mot etnisk diskriminering or DO (The Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination) rapidly increased with the introduction of the new laws and the number of reports has kept increasing. Since 1997, the number of report on ethnic discrimination quintupled and between 2000 and 2001 the reports increased more than 70 per cent (Skr. 2001/02[129]:
Simultaneously, during 2000, 825 reports on incitement to racial hatred were made, which corresponded to an 85 per cent increase from the previous year. In fact, the number of reports on incitement of racial hatred constantly increased during the entire 1990s (Skr. 2001/02[129]: 100).

A central factor of explanation is, according to SÄPO [the Security Police], the attention given to the fact that racist crimes have increased during the entire 1990s and that this in combination with a number of verdicts have probably influenced institutions of administration of justice to make greater extensive use of the crime incitement to racial hatred in the fight against different forms of racist manifestation. The fight against crimes with racial, xenophobic or homophobic motives and unlawful discrimination is since several years a highly prioritised area within police and judicial system. This will continue to be the case.

The laws themselves and the awareness of the laws and the procedures about how to invoke these laws doubtless play a part with regards to the number of reports made. To present the same findings as the reason behind the increase with regards to the number of crimes committed indicates a degree of scepticism in the relation between reports made and crimes committed. Considering that reports on discrimination on the labour market and in the courts indicate failure rather than success, the reason behind the increase needs to be sought elsewhere (Magnusson & Andréasson, 2005).

What potential role does discrimination or racism play in relation to what has been discussed up to this point? This thesis argues that discrimination and racism, partly by
being divorced from each other, are downplayed in the different policy documents. This allows for continued ignorance of the interrelationship between ethnicity, culture, ‘race’ and knowledge/language, the sometimes exchangeability between ethnicity, culture and ‘race’ and how these concepts and phenomena work as differentiators between people living in Sweden. Such a view is supported by Mulinari’s and Neergaard’s (2004) study of FAI (Trade Union Active Immigrants; AOT). Their study, which shows patterns of behaviour within LO (the Swedish Trade Union Confederation) similar to the ideology expressed by the policy documents, supports the argument of a downplay of discrimination. They stress the tendency to connect racism with extremist groups, often the activity of youths, as still being the prevailing attitude within the Swedish society.

Instead of focusing on the problem of discrimination and racism on the part of the ‘majority’ population, ‘immigrants’ are described as needing more education in Swedish to resolve a perceived problem of ethnicity as underlying the inability of ‘immigrants’ to successfully integrate into the society (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2004).

The teaching of Swedish for immigrants (sfi) shall provide adult immigrants with fundamental knowledge in the Swedish language and about the Swedish society. The language instruction and the information about society within sfi constitute in other words a central element in the introduction. // ...it is evident that older students with shorter schooling background manage sfi worse than others and that men finish their studies with sfi-marks to a lower extent than women. The linguistic background plays a smaller part in relation to the result than age and educational background. // ...[larger numbers] discontinued their studies than those who finished their studies with a leaving certificate.

Skr. 2001/02[129]: 22-3

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While this thesis concurs with Mulinari’s and Neegaard’s assertion that the government’s argument that language and education are the main solutions to most problems of integration is over played, the refusal by the government to establish what would define an acceptable Swedish language ability for social interaction is not given enough attention by the authors. The common use of accent and ways of speaking as justifications for discrimination continually reaffirms difference in society. That language is central in making yourself understood and therefore a tool to function in a society is self-evident, but without problematizing what perfect, good or sufficient Swedish represents amongst the real Swedish population, the ‘immigrant’ will never be able to erase a perceived social difference based on the linguistic assignment of origin and ‘identity’ as an ‘immigrant’. Knowledge is, as stressed by Melucci, not so much the knowledge of content as it is the ability to codify and to decode messages. “Control over the production, accumulation and circulation of information depends upon control over codes. However, this control is not equally distributed, and access to knowledge therefore becomes the terrain where new forms of power, discrimination and conflict come into being” (Melucci, 1996: 417). There is therefore, and will always be, a need for the ‘equal’ distribution and negotiation of language in society, i.e. if the successful integration with new populations is to occur. That is, whenever and in whatever context the language of a country, in this case Swedish, is being used as a yardstick, it needs to be scrutinised for aim and outcome in relation to the entire population. The Swedish Board of Integration would be the perfect institution to carry out such an investigation.
As an example, if high rates of illiteracy amongst ‘immigrants’ from specific geographical areas is a fact, tying language with origin, this needs to be addressed in ways that neither ignore the effect of how Swedish is taught nor how the use of Swedish, by these groups, can become a way to socially stigmatize individuals. Blob’s (2002) evaluation of combining native language teaching with teaching Swedish to a group of illiterate Pashto women is an indication of how addressing the issue of conditions in both Sweden and the country of origin can open up new possibilities for, not only Swedish language development, but also the individuals’ integration within the new society. Language can otherwise erroneously become the basis for the assignment of perceived social difference and stigmatisation in the form of ‘immigrant-ness’ (for a similar discussion see Blob and Persson, 2003).

It is argued by this thesis that conflicts or unsuccessful interaction arises in these areas of systems in charge of producing information and allowing access to communication resources. These same areas are under constant pressure for integration by ‘immigrants’, to satisfy crucial dimensions of daily life, access to welfare systems and access to self shaping of personal and social identification.

The conflicts [referred] to, do not chiefly express themselves through action designed to achieve outcomes in the political system. Rather, they organize information. The ceaseless flow of messages only acquires meaning through the codes that order flux and allows its meanings to be read. The forms of power now emerging in contemporary societies are grounded in an ability to ‘inform’ (give form).

Melucci, 1996: 420
The lack of the critical self awareness, as expressed by Bakhtin (1990b), and an acknowledgment of the norm of Swedishness that pervades the Committee's work and its subsequent proposal becomes a contradiction to expressed aims. It undermines the potentially progressive proposals for new policy that are contained in the document. This can be explained by the lack of dialogue with the Committee's object of research so central to the dialogism of BC (Bakhtin, 1999a). When both the readers and the object of research are not allowed presence in the creation process the text remains monologic. As earlier stressed, neither creator nor object of research can complete itself without the other. When missing an opportunity for dialogism, as in the Report, the other is transformed into the Other. An absolute 'identity' construction is thereby upheld/created.

Though the unavoidable end to every creation/research process needs to be acknowledged, the attempt should always be to postpone this end, the last or final word (see the discussion on co-creation p. 80-95). The Report's lack of critical self awareness results in the creation of the hegemonic norm being innocent of a downplayed and under-examined racism in Swedish society. By locating racism as a product solely of right-wing extremist, neo-Nazis and possibly uneducated youths one is avoiding the recognition of racism and the problem of defining the Other as an increasingly integral part of everyday Swedish life (Mulinari and Neergaard, 2004). By attempting to solve existing problems by treating the symptom instead of the decease, the proposals put forward by the Report lack a strong foundation in the problems that exist in Swedish
society. Despite the lack of real change that occurs as a result of the ‘new’ direction in integration policy, those belonging to the majority are by definition without blame.

Conclusion
The objective behind this analysis has been to show how language potentially may obscure the meaning of even the most positive intention, in this case how it potentially obstructs or even puts a complete halt to all likely progress towards expressed policy goals. As already asserted, this has not been done with the belief that a perfect text exists, that it is possible to draft the perfect integration policy document, resulting in the perfect integration process. Instead, the purpose has been to show that the complex interrelations amongst language, ideology and world view play an important part in the outcome of each policy document. Hence, the way we formulate ourselves may either help or hinder the good intentions we originally might have held.

Despite that three decades have passed since Sweden’s first official integration policy was formulated and despite that much has changed, both in praxis and rhetorically, the formulations remain of a predominantly monologic nature. The examples chosen from the different integration policy documents may not represent the entire texts, but they are representatives of the texts and as such, they are indications of the authors’ overall attitude towards the subject of the texts and how they position themselves in relation to the same. By scrutinising the texts, focusing on their potential problems with the belief
that they in the future can be avoided or at least minimised, the intention by this thesis has throughout been to engage in and extend the existing dialogue.

The comparative approach of the 1974 report mainly concentrated on the 'immigrants' situation and how the state was to face this new challenge. This approach made the difference between 'them' and 'us', more important than both problem and cause, and consequently closed down all avenues to open and honest dialogues. This thereby (in)directly upheld a two-tier system, a form of camp-thinking (Gilroy, 2000; Pearce, 1994). As described in the more recent reports, processes of integration are mutual processes of adaptation. The way absolute 'identities' are applied throughout the reports makes it, however, at least in part more difficult to read integration as the inclusive amalgamation it is set out to be. Although, this does not equal the purpose of the Swedish integration policy to uphold or increase the state of segregation amongst its population, to read the recent policy documents as the advocates of integration they set themselves out to be, to attempt to engage in dialogue instead of closing the text down, demands both imagination and great effort by the critical reader. Despite the acknowledgement that previous year's 'immigrant' focus has constructed 'immigrant' specific problems, in which the 'immigrants' appear as sole creators of the problems they face, the over-concentration on their difference remains.

Independent of the degree of consultation with the subject, the 'immigrant(s)' situation, language ability and culture only appear as anthropological objects, artefacts for the museum. What comes across as a lack of what the Bakhtinian Circle described as an honest and open dialogue, the lack of the subjects or object's co-creation subsequently
also bypasses the process of self-creation, i.e. the absolute ‘identity’ construction of Swedishness. As a consequence Swedish culture is left unchallenged (Bakhtin, 1999a; 1999b; Vološinov, 1976). This does not per se reduce well-intentioned ideas behind the texts, of how the Swedish state and society are to function in a more diversified Sweden, but the focus on differences minimises the potential for honest and open dialogues between ‘immigrants’ and ‘Swedes’ (Bakhtin, 1999a). As such, the chosen texts are examples of why this thesis argues that integration policy often runs the risk of reinforcing an already vicious circle of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’.

When people feel forced to organise along the lines of ethnic, linguistic or ‘immigrant’ background, but also gender or sexual preference, in response to stereotyped expectations, or in an attempt to bring attention to problems that disproportionately affect the same ‘group’, the same background has a tendency to be viewed as both cause and effect. As a result, when an individual is facing the specific problem associated with his or her supposed ‘group association’, s/he will potentially be judged as a representative of the ‘group’ and ‘their’ problem, and not as the individual he or she is. Though a categorisation as such does not represent something negative, when the emphasis is on differences and not the cause of the perception of difference, the individual consequently embodies both the category, which s/he is associated with, and the potential problem. The latter case is the negative result of an absolute ‘identity’ construction and forces us to question the created polarisation of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, which clearly stands in opposition to the definition of integration provided by the more recent Integration Bills.
The division of a policy, one for the individual's first five years in the country and one for the remaining population, does represent one of several changes in how the integration process has been redefined in recent years. This can be read as a step away from a monologic approach towards a more dialogic approach. As such, this change potentially opens up opportunities to engage in open and honest dialogues, i.e. an approach towards dialogism which potentially could result in joint co-creations. The indications of possible rapprochements towards a more dialogic ideology are however contradicted within the same texts. Consequently, the attempts to rhetorically change the conceptualisation of integration is not yet representative of the ideology behind the entire texts, and the split-level monologism with absolute 'identity' constructions leaves the reader with a disjuncture between the attempt to differentiate and the overall world view expressed in and by the policy documents.
Chapter 9: Dialogism and Integration

This thesis set out to look at the relationship between the language of Swedish integration policy documents, its expressed aims and the potential consequences this relationship may have for policy implementation. The Swedish integration policy documents were scrutinised to visualise and problematize the challenging interconnectedness between language and 'identity' constructions. Through carrying out a close dialogic reading of the integration policy documents this thesis has introduced the Bakhtinian Circle's dialogism to the academic field of IMER.

The theoretical exposition of the terminology associated with the topic of integration has allowed the reader to become familiar with some of the relevant research material already published on this subject. The more common conceptualisations of the terminology surrounding public migration and integration discourses, such as assimilation, integration and multiculturalism, but also terms such as 'race', ethnicity and culture have been presented. It was, however, neither the task nor would it have been possible to give a fair picture here of the entire field and of all the different theories accompanying the different terms. The meaning and importance of the terms 'race', ethnicity and culture have been debated intensively over several decades and there is little indication that these debates will diminish in importance within a foreseeable future. Instead, I have presented an overview with the intention to assist in furthering the aims and objectives of this thesis.
Furthermore, the exposition of integration terminology has functioned as a starting point from which the theoretical discussion on communication and 'identity' constructions has been addressed. Although one finds interaction to be at the centre of most of the critical theories on 'race', ethnicity and culture, few of these discourses seem to deal in an overt way with the dilemma of 'identity' constructions. I view integration to be about interaction in a similar fashion to how the Bakhtinian Circle discusses 'identity' constructions in interaction. Consequently, I see the problem of identifying with our surrounding environment, i.e. to assign 'identities' to the world we live in, with the help of our language, to be at the core of integration policy making. Through use of academic texts and of politicians' views expressed via the media, I show how the use of common or absolute 'identity' whose origin I ascribe to Saussure's theory of language, builds further barriers between people and consequently obstructs successful interaction.

As a working hypothesis I proposed that the Bakhtinian Circle's philosophy of language holds the key to a better understanding of how a term such as 'race', despite not carrying the same lexicological meaning over time, displays durability in erecting both real and/or imagined borders between individuals and groups of individuals. In short, the Bakhtinian Circle stresses that in an attempt to verbalise our surroundings for others and ourselves we categorise, or assign 'identities' to the world in a Saussure-ian tradition. What we express is our ideology, how we would like to see the world, and how we do. Outwardly objectified, when engaging in discourses we express these ideologies for others with the help of signs. Because language is the tool we use when we engage with others to form the world, language can never be neutral.
From this it follows that all terms are social constructions and that it is neither possible to isolate conceptualisations of 'race', ethnicity and culture from each other nor separate our conceptions from the other ideologies trying to shape the surrounding world. On a sliding scale between two extremes, one pole is described by monologism, a monologic speech or as a monologic approach to the world. In contrast to this the Bakhtinian Circle proposes that for a better understanding of interactions we need to strive for the opposite social conception, that of dialogism, dialogic speech or a dialogic approach to the world.

I have consequently presented dialogism as interpreted by the Bakhtinian Circle as an alternative approach, one that asserts the need to see language as an ideological battle ground where tension exists between the objective and subjective aims of the research, and where an effort must be made to avoid the rigidities of conceptualisations that derive from the tradition of linguistics developed by Saussure.

As an analytical method, I merged the dialogism or dialogic approach of the Bakhtinian Circle with a more traditional discourse analysis. This combination results in what I term a close dialogic reading, something traditionally close to Lynn Pearce, Peter Stallybrass and Allon White. The close dialogic reading differs from the more traditional discourse analysis in its approach to the text. Every text is seen here as an open dialogue with which we need to engage, with honesty regarding our intentions. It therefore takes its own position in relation to surrounding people and texts (i.e. the personal recognition and the public account of its own position) to become of great importance for the outcome of the analysis. The close dialogic reading tries to stay aware of that, and of how the spoken or written text relates to itself, to the subject and to individuals, but also
of whether or not it is engaged in an open and honest dialogue with previous, contemporary, future texts and people, or whether it takes on a monologic tone. Finally in line with the dialogic idea of avoiding the final word, the close dialogic reading always strives to keep the open(ed) dialogue alive for future texts.

Swedish integration policy documents were used to test the different propositions of the thesis. Each text clearly aims at avoiding expressing prejudice, stereotyping and the use of terms such as ‘race’, ethnicity and culture or, if necessary, only doing so in a ‘correct manner’. To critically analyse Swedish integration policy documents instead of their British counterparts, means that this thesis has on this basis alone added new elements to the collective knowledge of integration policy analysis in the UK. However, such a task demands that the dissertation provides the non-Swedish reader with a sufficient historical description of the Swedish context. The historical approach developed here, as the backdrop for the analysis of the integration policy documents, was therefore more extensive than it otherwise might have been. Although primarily interested in current Swedish integration policy, for the uninitiated reader this approach has allowed for an informative overview of the Swedish history of migration and integration policy and how these two relate to one another in the Swedish context.

In the general tradition of Swedish integration policy analysis, I took the 1974 report (SOU 1974[69]) as the starting point of Swedish public integration policy, although the lack of a single definitive document may also be interpreted as deliberate policy. That the modern Swedish state was to respond with integration measures to the new influx of ‘immigrants’ was viewed by many at the time as revolutionary and a radical departure
from government praxis in Sweden. However, I view the introduction of an integration policy to be in line with the prevailing Swedish welfare system. I regard the actual policy document as mimicking an anthropological approach to its subject, turning it/them into mere objects, of the type one usually finds on the shelves of museums; artefacts of politics that serve several different social imperatives in that society. As we saw, this condition is partly revealed in the title of the document, *Immigrants and Minorities* which asserts that it is a policy, a description, of how ‘we’ are to deal with the Other.

The second report (SOU 1996[55]) and the bill (Prop. 1997/98[16]) from the mid 1990s were primarily responses to the critiques raised from within academia and the few ‘immigrants’ with legitimised voices within the public arena. Criticism had arisen regarding the direction of 1970s policy. The critique focused on how the policy solutions presented the social problems as ‘immigrant’ problems and that the ‘immigrants’ thereby were facing two-fold victimisation. The culture of blaming the victim made it impossible to resolve the dilemmas that ‘immigrants’ actually faced when living in Sweden; they could not be solely responsible for their own plight. Although, this research would argue that the report and the bill, *Sweden, the Future and Diversity* partly worked as a useful barometers for determining the extent of the current situation, and while the bill in part changed the rhetoric of policy debates, few real alterations to the already existing policy were initiated therein.

That the new policy approach was now to differentiate between an ‘immigrant’ policy and an integration policy represents one of the few changes. Where the former dealt with
special measures directed towards 'immigrants' during their first years in the country, the latter was to be directed towards and include everyone in the society. Although this change is asserted in the subtitle of the Bill; from immigrant policy to integration policy, the text still stresses differences between 'immigrants' and 'real Swedes' rather than the actual problems or the anticipated future of politics. In 2001/2, the government once more asserted and marked out the direction of the policy from the mid 1990s in its report Integration Policy for the 21st Century (Skr. 2001/02[129]).

This thesis has, however, established that the approach to the subject of Swedish integration policy clearly has changed over the last 30 years. Not only is the aim of the latest policy to be more inclusive than that of the 1970s, the overall rhetorical distance between the policy makers, here represented by these texts, and its subject(s), has decreased. We can therefore conclude that if the text that expresses the aims of the policy makers is to be judged by its language then Swedish integration policy has improved a great deal. The documents are no longer just talking about the 'immigrants' and integration is no longer just about how we are to deal with the 'immigrants' or how the 'immigrants' are to adjust to life in the Swedish society. The rhetorical transformation of Swedish integration policy of the last 30 years indicates a trend towards a more inclusive society, where actual problems will overtake differences with regard to integration measures. There is need for caution amidst this optimistic finding, however. The report, Integration for the 21st Century, shows that the trend towards addressing the problems with a focus on us versus them is still in its preliminary phase, one that is accompanied by a constant desire to return to the language that describes an Other instead of a convergent community of people.
Independent of a decreasing difference between expressed aims and the rhetoric of documentation, the overall emphasis is still on differences rather than on actual problems, resulting in the latter being perceived as more important than the former in policy construction. Even a transformation such as that from 'immigrant'-specific special measures to special measures focusing on the individual's needs, which this thesis views as a progressive change, is explained with reference to differences. In addition, little or no acknowledgement is given to the over-representation of 'immigrants' amongst individuals with the same specific needs. The lack of attempts to find explanations for the actual inequalities between individuals, whether people with an 'immigrant' background and 'real Swedes' or women and men, will by default leave 'their' difference as the most likely explanation to 'their' overrepresentation. Ethnicity, culture, language or the lack of recognised (Swedish) education serve as determinants in a racialized integration debate, where the ethnic group with 'its' culture becomes the norm for difference, the unquestionable explanation of inequality, the natural state of things, making discrimination/racism or sexism into anomalies.

This thesis holds the Saussure-ian 'identity' construction to be part of western languages and the main obstruction for every attempt towards an interaction consisting of open dialogues. This common or absolute 'identity' construction represents monologism and is the backbone of the racialized integration debate. By not showing self-awareness of his or her position with regards to the subject/other, by not taking the other’s point of view, that of the author nor the other’s autobiography into consideration, the text represents a monologic approach to the world. Whilst a Swedish self-image might be
best represented by what I term Scandinavian social democratic multiculturalism, this thesis would argue that the reality of the Swedish integration policy resembles what Hesse (1999) terms 'imperial multiculturalism'. As such, the 'immigrants' are welcomed to stay but never fully included in their position as difference personified and are instead, in the integration discourse, fixed in a permanent state of gratitude to the Swedish state and its people. This occurs at the same moment as the Swedish self-image is confirmed as one of the 'do-gooder' and Swedishness by default is defined by not being different; the Same in contrast to the Other. Swedish integration policy is, in the words of the Bakhtinian Circle, applying a double-voiced discourse. As a consequence Swedishness, country and culture, is confirmed through what I term a split-level monologism within the current integration policy.

At the heart of this thesis is the strong belief that it is the unaddressed 'identity' construction that runs as the main thread through all of the areas discussed with regard to integration, independent of definition. While 'identity' seems to have little to do with anything natural, the conceptualisation of 'identity' plays a major role in relation to other things that matter. Constructed within specific discourses fuelled by ideologies, world views and specific intentions, it affects and is affected by the power relations where it is constructed and as a result functions more as a marker of difference and exclusion. Hence, the problem of integration is that of defining the Other, 'the immigrant', by the majority population, and not the inability of 'immigrant' individuals to try and negotiate the social resources they have in society.
The result of the analysis is clearly multi-layered, which is something to be expected from a close dialogic reading. I believe I have managed to establish that the language, to a greater extent than the aims of the policy document, will effect how we interpret the policy document, independent of the good will of its authors; that is, how the new policy will be received. I believe that this has great implications for all policy making and its implementation, but specifically so for an integration policy where the individual and his or her potential group affiliation are at the centre.

The position of the author on the sliding scale between monologism and dialogism will affect the readers’ interpretation of the text; this is how we interpret the author’s relation to us, to the subject of the text as well as to other written sources. While it is important therefore, on the one hand, to minimise the options for interpretations with regards to the position of the author in relation to his or her subject(s), it is crucial, on the other hand, that the author strives towards developing a dialogic approach to the world, in order to give a reasonably accurate portrayal of it.

I have demonstrated that the Bakhtinian Circle holds the key to a better understanding of the invincibility of the stereotyping within the racialized discourses, through applying absolute ‘identity’ constructions in monologic speech, but also in relation to how one may attempt to counteract this by striving towards a dialogic approach to the world. I therefore do not believe the elimination of a certain terminology to be the first step towards a more successful integration process. Instead, any such attempt needs to be preceded by a realisation of the amplitude of racism and discrimination, whether based on race/ethnicity or sex.
If the idea behind Swedish integration policy is to include all individuals residing in Sweden through a general policy anchored in the ethnic and cultural diversity of its society, the primary need is not for more integration policy documents. As expressed in SOU 1996[55], Prop. 1997/98[16] and repeated in Skr. 2001/02[129], this thesis does not believe that special measures directed towards ‘immigrants’ represent the perfect integration policy unless it is during the initial settlement period in the new country, e.g. language courses combined with information about the country, study visits and practical work experience in the labour market. Whilst one can hope that initial measures together with rules and regulations will minimise exclusion from the labour market which, in some cases, may lead to greater social inclusion, artificial inclusion of their culture will most likely lead to nothing more than anthropological exoticism. Instead, just as the policy documents have stressed from the mid-1990s, this thesis supports general policies backed by strict rules and regulations regarding discrimination and racism. However, it is not the number of laws that is of importance, but that the existing rules and regulation are applied to their full extent. A Swedish Integration Board has already been established and one of its tasks is to produce integration reports, describing the current state of integration. Given greater authority, although not by writing new integration policy documents, the Swedish Integration Board could fulfil a more important role in the integration process.
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