Resource allocation games of various social objectives
Chen, Bo, Dr. and Gürel, Sinan (2009) Resource allocation games of various social objectives. Journal of Scheduling . ISSN 1094-6136
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In this paper, we study resource allocation games of two different cost components for individual game players and various social costs. The total cost of each individual player consists of the congestion cost, which is the same for all players sharing the same resource, and resource activation cost, which is proportional to the individual usage of the resource. The social costs we consider are, respectively, the total of costs of all players and the maximum congestion cost plus total resource activation cost.
Using the social costs we assess the quality of Nash equilibria in terms of the price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS). For each problem, we identify one or two problem parameters and provide parametric bounds on the PoA and PoS. We show that they are unbounded in general if the parameter involved are not restricted.
|Item Type:||Submitted Journal Article|
|Subjects:||Q Science > QA Mathematics
H Social Sciences > HM Sociology
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Resource allocation -- Mathematical models, Nash manifolds, Equilibrium (Economics), Game theory|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Journal of Scheduling|
|Publisher:||Springer New York LLC|
|Official Date:||10 July 2009|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
 S. Aland, D. Dumrauf, M. Gairing, B. Monien, and F. Schoppmann. Exact price of anarchy for polynomial congestion games. In Proceedings of the 23rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, LNCS
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