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Cassam, Quassim. (2009) What is knowledge? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Vol.84 (64). pp. 101-120. ISSN 1358-2461

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1358246109000010

Abstract

What would a good answer to this question – call it (WK) – look like? What I’m going to call the standard analytic approach (SA) says that: (A) The way to answer WK is to analyse the concept of knowledge. (B) To analyse the concept of knowledge is to come up with noncircular necessary and sufficient conditions for someone to know that something is the case. Is the standard analytic approach to WK the right approach? If not, what would be a better way of doing things? These are the questions I’m going to tackle here. I want to look at some criticisms of SA and consider the prospects for a different, non-standard analytic approach (NA) to WK.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Knowledge, Theory of, Analysis (Philosophy), Information networks, Reductionism
Journal or Publication Title: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISSN: 1358-2461
Date: July 2009
Volume: Vol.84
Number: 64
Page Range: pp. 101-120
Identification Number: 10.1017/S1358246109000010
Status: Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
References: Austin, J. L. (1979) “Other Minds”, in Philosophical Papers, 3rd Edition. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Ayers, M. R. (1991) Locke. London, Routledge. Cassam, Q. (2007) “Ways of Knowing”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CVII. Goldman, A. (1992) “Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology”, in Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. Hampshire, S. (1979) “SomeDifficulties in Knowing”, in Philosophy As it Is. (eds.) T. Honderich and M. Burnyeat. Harmondsworth, Penguin. Kornblith, H. (2002) Knowledge and its Place in Nature. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. Snowdon, P. F. (1998) “Strawson on the Concept of Perception”, in The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson. (ed.) L. Hahn. Chicago and Lasalle, Open Court. Strawson, P. F. (1992) Analysis and Metaphysics: An Introduction to Philosophy. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Stroud, B. (2000) “Scepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge”, in Understanding Human Knowledge. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Unger, P. (1975) Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. Oxford, Clarendon Press. Williams, M. (2001) Problems ofKnowledge:ACritical Introduction to Epistemology. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Williamson, T. (2000) Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
URI: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/2530

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