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SUMMARY

Derrida's claim that there can be no concept of time that escapes from the sphere of the metaphysical presents us with three major questions: (1) Why does Derrida make this claim? What does he mean by it? (2) How, in the light of this claim ought we to read Husserl and Heidegger who aimed at just what Derrida rules out? (3) How can we square the claim with other things Derrida says about time and about metaphysics?

We undertake a critical reading of the two major works on time by Husserl and Heidegger respectively, arguing that while each of these two texts does indeed subscribe to such metaphysical values as fundamentality, certainty, unity, identity and wholeness, they nonetheless make a substantial contribution to our release from the domination of 'the ordinary concept of time'. Furthermore, we argue, Derrida's own writing is marked by the same (perhaps inevitable) 'metaphysical' shadow, albeit in an exemplary self-conscious manner.

To Derrida's claim about the impossibility of a non-metaphysical concept of time we reply (a) he elsewhere endorses a 'pluri-dimensional' temporality, and (b) when being careful, he admits that it is not concepts per se that are metaphysical, but their mode of textual articulation.

From these two concessions our double strategy develops.

I. His denial of an original, primitive time, coupled with his understanding of metaphysics in terms of textual articulation licences a programme for the description of temporal structures and representations of time, one abjuring any foundationalist pretensions, and resisting the temptation to spatializing interpretations.

II. We redescribe the 'moment' in a way that breaks utterly with any representational element whatever. This approximates in temporal terms the time-dissolving moves found both in the latter Heidegger, and also in Derrida.

No theoretical synthesis of these two strategies is attempted. 'Time as absolute openness to the other' and 'time as complex textuality' displace the value of 'presence' at two distinct levels - time as primitive event, and time as articulated structure. Their inner unity must remain, for the moment, a question.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Summary
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
Declaration
Foreword

1. INTRODUCTION

## PART ONE: HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF TIME

11. Chapter 1: The Intuitional Requirements of Husserl's Phenomenology and the Requirement of an Original (Pre-Objective) Temporality

33. Chapter 2: Husserl's Analysis of Time-Consciousness (with list of sections)

119. Chapter 3: Derrida's Reading of Husserl

## PART TWO: HEIDEGGER'S TREATMENT OF TIME AND TEMPORALITY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BEING AND TIME

157. Introduction

193. Chapter 1: The Existential Grounding

223. Chapter 2: Death, Resoluteness and Care

287. Chapter 3: Time and Temporality

330. Chapter 4: From the Earlier to the Later Heidegger (and Derrida)

## PART THREE: TIME BEYOND DECONSTRUCTION

353. Chapter 1: Derrida's Deconstruction of Time and its Limitations

369. Chapter 2: The Question of Strategy

426. Chapter 3: Time and Interpretation

451. Chapter 4: Some Temporal Structures of Language: Prolegomena to a Future Theory of Time

491. Chapter 5: The Philosophy of the Future

523. APPENDIX: Nietzsche's Transvaluation of Time

556. NOTES

600. BIBLIOGRAPHY of works cited
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Declaration of Previous Publication

The following chapters in Part III, *Time Beyond Deconstruction* have already appeared in print.

CHAPTER ONE: "Derrida's Deconstruction of Time and its Limitations" is a slightly revised version of "Time and the Sign", JBSP vol.15, No.2 May 1982

CHAPTER TWO (A): "Derrida and the Paradoxes of Reflection" is only subtly different from the paper with the same title in JBSP vol.11, No.3 Oct. 1980


the POSTSCRIPT to CHAPTER TWO: is an extract from "Differance and the Problem of Strategy" to appear in Derrida and Differance, Warwick: Parousia, 1985

CHAPTER THREE: "Time and Interpretation" was published in *Time and Metaphysics*, Warwick: Parousia, 1982

CHAPTER FOUR: The first half of this chapter appeared slightly changed as "Prolegomena to a New Theory of Time" in Research in Phenomenology, vol X, 1980

Some of the other parts of the book have been presented as papers but none has yet been published. The thesis is scheduled for publication in some form by Humanities Press in their Contemporary Studies in Philosophy and the Human Sciences.
Foreword

Had a systematic devotion to the reader's pleasure guided the writing throughout, a leaner, tighter text might have emerged, one that could scorn a preface, and one in which any departures from absolute transparency would unfailingly excite the reader's desire.

To the extent that this text can only recognize this ideal without fulfilling it, a few words of orientation may be helpful. It is divided into three main parts (with an important Appendix). Each of the first two parts centres on a substantial and detailed critical reading of a single text - the first by Husserl and the second by Heidegger - to which the surrounding chapters are satellites. The inclusion of these readings is largely responsible for the bulk of the typescript. We have tried to show in a detailed way a number of tensions at work within each of these texts - between the desire to illuminate time and temporality anew, and drawing ontological significance from this, between plurality and unity, dispersion and focussing, and so on. Their value stands or falls on the success with which these tensions have been displayed.

The third section consists of a set of largely self-contained papers linking up questions of time, textuality, metaphysics, deconstruction and style. Together they argue for, and with luck, demonstrate that there is time after deconstruction.
THE DECONSTRUCTION OF TIME

Introduction

It is perhaps a common a recurrent claim among philosophers and others who think about time that there is something wrong with 'our ordinary conception of time'. The fault may be diagnosed in different, even incompatible ways. There are those who think that the linear representation of time is responsible for its mistaken assimilation to space. There are those who argue that the metaphorical comparison of time with a river is responsible for the illusion that time 'flows'. There are those who think that our very possession of name-like words for 'past', 'present', 'future' erroneously leads us to suppose that these each in some sense still or already exist, like distant parts of space. More recently, there has been an attempt to rescue our understanding of time from 'metaphysics', a reading that treats most of the history of philosophy as the history of metaphysics. It is a reading announced in this radical form by Nietzsche, developed by Heidegger, and further radicalised by Derrida. Quite what is meant by 'metaphysics' and why it might be thought valuable or necessary (or possible, or impossible) to overcome it, is a matter we shall have to concern ourselves with in detail later. For the moment what is especially noteworthy is the suggestion made by Derrida that if we do succeed in overcoming our ordinary (=metaphysical) conception of time, it will involve the elimination of the concept of time altogether, that it is not possible to purify the concept of time of the metaphysical, for
there is an intimate connection between time, however we conceive of it, and metaphysics, such that time and metaphysics would stand or fall together. For someone for whom the history of philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato, his linking of truth to the eternal might seem to lend support to this view. But our argument here has a more general form.

The argument in its most general form is simple. It is that qua metaphysics, the history of philosophy is the history of the privileging of a certain temporal/evidential value, that of 'presence'. This value both supplies and is confirmed by an interpretation of time, one which privileges the present. It can already be found at work in Aristotle's treatment in the *Physics*, and thereafter, in various different forms in all subsequent treatments of time, until perhaps Nietzsche.

For reasons of influence as well as objective historical importance, we could not attempt to assess this claim without offering an account of the theories of time supplied by Husserl and, later, Heidegger. Each of them made a sustained and brilliant attempt to correct our ordinary understanding of time, each saw this understanding as historically sedimented in the history of philosophy, and each saw its correlation as requiring a radical change in general philosophical method and practice. Yet despite these self-conscious attempts at radical new departures it has been claimed that they do nothing but reproduce the very values that they are trying so hard to question. In particular it has been claimed that their revision of our understanding of time moves within the limits they take themselves to be transcending. For Derrida there is a very general reason for this failure: 'time in general belongs to metaphysical conceptuality'.

If one supposes that belonging to metaphysical conceptuality is in some way something from which one would like one's thinking to take a distance, then this is an enormously strong claim. There can be no adequate philosophical reflection on time that could successfully retain
the concept of time. The precise relation to metaphysics that we are being recommended to take up, by Nietzsche, by Heidegger, or by Derrida, is nothing as simple as 'rejection', or 'transcendence'. Indeed most if not all the critical terms one traditionally uses to describe the relation of one account to another account (even 'more or less adequate', even supposing them to be 'of the same thing') could be claimed to depend on assumptions which are themselves no less 'metaphysical'. The strategies possible in this area will have to be discussed in some depth. But there is no doubting the significance of an analysis that succeeds in showing that a supposedly radical account actually reproduces at one level or other the lineaments of the position it was attempting to distance itself from.

We have just referred to Derrida's insistence on the metaphysical status of the concept of time. Let us read it in full:

'The concept of time belongs entirely to metaphysics and it designates the domination of presence.
...if something connected with time but which is not itself time needs to be thought of outside the determination of Being as presence, we are no longer dealing with anything which could be called time.
...it is not possible to oppose to it [that is to the whole historically developed system of metaphysical concepts - DCW] a different conception of time, because time in general belongs to metaphysical conceptuality.' (our translation)

These remarks first appeared in 1968, in an essay by Derrida entitled "Ousia et Gramme": note sur une note de Sein und Zeit" as one of a collection of essays published in honour of Jean Beaufret, a respected French Heideggerean. What Derrida tries to do in this essay is to show that Heidegger's attempt to develop a new existential concept of time in opposition to the metaphysical one traceable to Aristotle, does not face up to the more radical possibility that there may be an essential connection between the concept of time (and any concept of time) and
that consolidated collection of Greek concepts that has determined the history of philosophy as the history of metaphysics. If this connection can be established, Heidegger's revisionary project in *Being and Time* would have to be rethought, and Derrida does exactly that, in this essay and in others.

This connection with Heidegger is only one of a number of features of Derrida's general philosophical position that makes his approach to the specific discussion of time for our purposes exemplary and critical. In a massive output that began with his book length introduction to the French translation of Husserl's short late essay "The Origin of Geometry" Derrida has addressed himself directly or indirectly not only to most of the important traditional philosophical discussions of time, but also to the possibility of understanding the history of philosophy as a single tradition marked by allegiance to certain determining values which historically speaking at least, define it and limit its scope. Derrida's name for the most dominant of these values is presence, understood as a fusing together of evidential, spatial, and above all temporal motifs. Derrida's position is for us exemplary because he poses in the most general and yet scholarly way the question as to the relationship between time and philosophical conceptualisation, a question which is not merely offering a (new) philosophy of time, but exploring the dependence of the philosophical tradition on our interpretations of time. These interpretations are claimed to exhibit a superficial plurality but an underlying unity: the commitment to the value of presence. His position is critical in the sense that it takes up and works with, and to some extent within a tradition that in our view has been the most original, productive, and far-reaching in its thinking in this area. It includes Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger and recent
structuralist thought. The judgement on our part as to the value of this tradition is no so much directly defended by the thesis as presupposed by it. But that there is such a tradition is something that even those who have not felt the urgency of its problems or tasted its delights should be able to agree on. In our discussion of the problems connecting time and metaphysics we shall remain largely constrained by the way these problems have been developed within this tradition, and for positive reasons.

Within this tradition, for example, there is a keen awareness of the difficulty of doing justice both to our intuitive sense of the intellectual transparency of time as experienced—we seem to directly witness its shape, its action every moment of our lives—and to a growing awareness that the concept of time can only be understood by reference to the role it plays in a range of different theories, and indeed that it only ever appears with some such tacit or explicit theoretical implication. This problem is at least a stage beyond the problem of producing a theory of time compatible with our intuitions.

Once we are convinced of the variety of the theoretical complicities of the concept of time we are confronted with the further question as to whether there is some order of priority among these theoretical dependencies (e.g., physical time more basic than literary time) such that we could arrive at the fundamental features of the concept of time by way of such a heirarchisation. Derrida's answer, as we shall see, works at three levels. First he credits a certain physical conception of time (derived from Aristotle) with having enjoyed a historical privilege in relation to other concepts such that they were typically modelled on it. Second, he questions the legitimacy of that privilege. Third, he claims that there are fundamental features of any concept of time by which it has a certain complicity with metaphysics. This last level will raise the
important question as to whether Derrida does not prematurely reunify our understanding of time, albeit at a formal level. (By 'formal' here I mean the level of our understanding of the general theoretical functioning of any concept of time.) This would leave undeveloped the insight into the plurality of our concepts of time. We will come to suggest that there is a conflict within Derrida's own account between the recognition of this multiplicity and the underlying reunification wrought by his critical method.

This tradition is also peculiarly sensitive to what we could call 'reflexive' problems (where the sense of reflexivity is neither purely logical nor psychological, but perhaps best understood as formal). And this is particularly important for the treatment of time. The history of the philosophical treatment of time (as of other key concepts—truth, language, the subject...) throws up from time to time problems in which the proposed account of such concepts seems in the very form or fact of its existence to presuppose, or at least to involve or suggest answers to the question at issue. For instance, does not any theory of truth necessarily give a privileged status to the truth of theoretical statements (such as it itself consists of) that would undermine any attempt to explain the truth of complex statements as a product of the truth of primitive or atomic propositions. For the theory would have no legislative value if it were merely a summary of a set of primitive truths. And any account of the concept of time would have to be such as to allow one to explain and endorse any temporal presuppositions built into the term 'concept'. That this is no empty possibility will be seen when we discuss Derrida's radically anti-conceptual 'theory of language'. Derrida and the tradition within which he can be located—particularly Nietzsche and Heidegger—are all acutely aware of such reflexive problems.

The key questions that supply the initial and in part the continu-
ing direction to the thesis are related directly to the quotations from Derrida with which we began: (1) Is there, as he suggests, a necessary link between time and metaphysics? (2) Is the account of metaphysics presupposed by this question acceptable? (3) Is Derrida's account of the consequences of such a complicity between time and metaphysics adequate? (4) Can Derrida's remarks about there being no other concept of time than a metaphysical one be reconciled with his suggestions that we think of time a multidimensional? (5) Does the level at which Derrida discusses the question of time (which is quite as abstract as any metaphysics could be) occlude the possibility of developing a more concrete account of the diverse modes and variety of temporal structure?

These questions have a clear analytical side to them. Is an alleged connection necessary? Is a certain account adequate or acceptable? Can two claims be held consistently? Does a theory inhibit the development of a certain line of thought? We do not however, hold the view that it is possible to ignore the historical development of the concepts and theories to which the analysis is to apply. Of course, it is possible to pretend of certain concepts that they have no important history, and one can treat certain theories (e.g. those with an immediate practical import in abstraction from their past. But one always runs the risk of intellectual naivety and in so subject is this more true than in philosophy. Philosophy does not so much have a tradition, it is a tradition. It does not follow from this that there is any guaranteed unity of problems throughout the ages. Tradition need not imply the continuous development of concepts or theories. There may be jumps, gaps, leaps, discontinuities, losses, as well as continuity, development, enrichening, preservation. What all this suggests is that our method
will have to be historical as well as analytical.

In this respect, Derrida's position can be used as something of an ordering device. If we suppose for the sake of argument that his account of the relation between time and metaphysics in some way takes in, or is responsive to all of his significant precursors, then we can order the historical part of our thesis by asking the question: What reading of the history of philosophy leads Derrida to make this claim about the time/metaphysics relationship? This will enable us both to reconstruct, indeed perhaps to construct for the first time in a comprehensive way, Derrida's own position on time, but also to traverse the territory we would have to pass through if we were to pursue the question about time and metaphysics 'on our own' (were that to make sense). And in traversing that territory with our critical questions in mind we will be in a position to give a historical depth to our answers.

It might turn out for example that the Nietzsche-Heidegger-Derrida account of metaphysics simply will not adequately cover the whole of the history of philosophy, which would radically affect the significance of any answer we might give to the relation between time and metaphysics.

Our historical approach both determines and is determined by the tradition we have chosen to concentrate on. First of all it suggests that whatever the universality of the well-springs of philosophical inquiry (wonder, astonishment, despair, joy, puzzlement) this inquiry is only ever seriously developed within a written tradition. And in such traditions concepts and theories will often be elaborated in ways not immediately translateable into other traditions. The assumption that all philosophical traditions are dealing in their own way with the same problems is easier to cast doubt on than it is to support. And this serves as a kind of justification for the self-imposed limitations
of this study. The particular tradition we have chosen also naturally suggests taking a historical approach to it, for all of its members were themselves keenly aware of and concerned with their own historicity, as an essential feature of their philosophizing. It would be either an enormous arrogance or naivety to try to understand those thinkers without taking seriously their own historical sense of their activity. We should perhaps add that they did all share a single understanding of what might be meant by that historicity. For Husserl, the lesson of history was the need for a radically new (and originally unhistorical) approach, and it was only later that he attempted anything like a serious treatment of the history of philosophical problems and outlooks. For Hegel and Heidegger on the other hand, it is only the history of thought that makes thought possible, even if, for Heidegger, it also sets limits to thought, limits that seem to require to be surmounted. This general concern with the history of philosophy is not only something to be mentioned once and then forgotten. For Derrida's method of reading philosophical texts to become clear, we will have to relate it to precisely those ways of thinking about and working through philosophy's past that his predecessors developed. So even one's method of reading history has a history which needs to be explained. For example, Derrida calls his own method deconstruction, which has clear filiations with Heidegger's very positive account of 'destruction' in Being and Time.

Some attempt is made to deal with these questions in the last chapter of this thesis — "The Philosophy of the Future" — see below.

Our general critical claim about Derrida's views on time is that unless one supposes that all concepts are metaphysical (in which case the claim about the concept of time in particular is much less interesting) his conclusion about time does not follow from his premises, unless
we endorse in his writing a level of analysis (which we shall call quasi-transcendental) that he himself supplies us with the tools for dismantling. Derrida does indeed liberate us once and for all from the quest for an 'original' time, from one which would contain within itself some foundational power and evidential primacy. But far from ruling out 'another concept of time' he actually opens the way for one.

Our reconstruction of 'the argument' — the series of analyses on which Derrida's general remark about time rests — will focus initially on two plausible candidates for a 'alternative concept of time' — the phenomenological version offered by Husserl, and the existential account(s) offered by Heidegger. These present themselves as pivotal paradigms because they each do so in the course of a general critical reading of the whole history of philosophy (as metaphysics), because there are clear and strong intellectual biographical links between Heidegger's account and Husserl's (Heidegger edited, perhaps somewhat perfunctorily, Husserl's lectures on time-consciousness from 1905 and 1905-1910, published eventually in 1928, as Vorlesungen zur Phenomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins), and because Derrida has devoted much of his writing to their général philosophical positions and to their specific claims about time. Indeed it would not be entirely misleading to treat Derrida's 'no non-metaphysical conception of time' claim as a conclusion drawn from, and certainly well-exemplified by, the difficulties encountered in and ny Husserl and Heidegger in trying to formulate one.

This thesis offers both a critical assessment of Derrida's general argument insofar as it draws conclusions about time, and a constructive attempt to supply, if only in outline, and developing certain suggestions Derrida himself makes, an alternative, yet non-metaphysical account of time and the temporal.
I. Husserl's Phenomenology of Time

CHAPTER ONE

The Intuitional Foundations of Husserl's Phenomenology and the Requirement of an Original (Pre-objective) Temporality

The powerful and enormously productive thrust of Husserl's phenomenology is the affirmation of a value that in his eyes all previous philosophy had lacked. Contact, immediacy, fullness, primordiality, intuition all cluster round this central value, which could be called 'presence'. Along with a number of other thinkers (such as Marx and Freud) whose thought in this respect shares the same structure, Husserl's affirmation of this value sustains a repeated opposition between a public, completed, 'objective', derived, inauthentic account of things, and the directly graspable, subjectively intuitable, original, authentic account of things. As Marx had elaborated an ideology-critique and Freud the practice of psychoanalysis, Husserl too developed a special method for prising apart the merely taken-for-granted from the intuitively graspable, and for describing delicately and in detail the region of intuitive transparency that this distinction opens up. This begins with a stage which is variously called an epoché, bracketing out, suspension and phenomenological reduction. The operation that takes place at this stage is crucial for the whole subsequent course of phenomenology. Husserl draws both on the distinction we have just made, between the lived experience transparently grasped as such, and the taken-for-granted or 'natural' attitude that we unphilosophically take up, but also on the distinction between Reality as such, and our grasp of it, however primordial or derived this latter might be. Husserl wants to set aside, bracket out,
both 'Reality as such' and our 'natural attitude' towards it.

'We are concerned with reality only insofar as it is intended, represented, intuited, or conceptually thought.' (Husserl PITC p. 28)

Our 'natural attitude' gets 'put aside' not because it is false (indeed he will not make that claim) but because part of what is involved in this 'attitude' is its lack of concern with the ground of its truth, its reflexive complacency. And 'reality as such' is 'put aside' because we can only know or say anything about it via an account of our own constitutive meaning-giving activity, not as it is 'in-itself'. What phenomenology seeks, then, is access to those meaning-giving acts on which our grasp of the real depends, and which will illuminate the knowledge we already possess by exposing its grounding in such intentional acts.

It might fairly be said, and Husserl was well aware of this, that the possibility of phenomenology rests on negotiating a delicate passage between psychologism on the one hand and some sort of linguistic philosophy on the other. Husserl's concern lest phenomenology be thought to be nothing other than a specialized branch of psychology dealing with mental activity was well founded. The logical principles with which he first concerned himself could not be the subject matter of an empirical science at the same time as being essentially presupposed by any science. Clearly there could be (for there is) some psychological interest in logical thinking - when it arises, how it develops through childhood, under what conditions it is abandoned and so on - but psychology could never tell us what logical principles were, or why they were valid. While logical principles can be embodied in or be the object of thought nothing guarantees that thinking will be logical, and if we are concerned with the common characteristics of all thought (such as predication) there is nothing essential that psychology - which deals, as does any science, with variations - can tell us about it.
Husserl's insight was to have realized that the most general cognitive framework of science (= any rigorous/disciplined thinking) could not itself be the subject matter of an empirical science let alone be justified by such an approach. His solution was not to abandon any attempt to ground thinking absolutely, nor to focus in a consequentialist manner on where different conceptual systems lead us, but to develop an analytic method for describing what he would call the _ideal_ structures of our conscious life. And this should not be taken as an exercise in the imagination that would idealize its subject matter with flattering artistry, but as a method that discerns the actually operative ideal in experience. Phenomenology, then, is an analytical method devoted to describing the qualitative constants of human experience. In so far as that experience has more or less primitive aspects to it, and is an _activity_, not merely a receptive surface, phenomenology is also concerned to bring out the constructive, or constitutive depth of experience.

It is through this concept of ideality (of 'essence') that both the method and subject matter of phenomenology can be kept distinct from that of any empirical science, including psychology. But it is equally important, if we are to retain Husserl's sense of his own enterprise, that we steer clear of another false alignment.

It would be easy to suppose that the ideality Husserl discerns in experience is none other than that of the ideality of language. Is it not through language that meanings get fixed, that ideality is born? But to follow this path would naturally lead to the abandonment of any interest in experience or conscious life as such, because there would always be a more direct route through some sort of philosophy of language. This is not the path Husserl followed. The reasons for this are historically momentous. If Frege's (1894) critical review of Husserl's
Philosophy of Arithmetic as a piece of psychologism had converted Husserl to his own views we would not have had the great divide in the twentieth century between linguistic philosophy and phenomenology. Quite how far Frege's review influenced the course of Husserl's thought is a matter of debate. What is less a matter of debate is that phenomenology claims to provide a distinct solution to the problem of psychologism, one that not only cannot lean on, or be reduced to, a covert philosophy of language, but would itself account for precisely that ideality which language exhibits.

For example, when discussing the difficulties that ordinary language - often ambiguous and vague - presents for the development of a scientific method, Husserl clearly gives to language the task of adequately representing what has already been intuitively clarified. He talks of

'the requirement that the same words and propositions shall be unambiguously correlated with certain essences that can be intuitively apprehended and constitute their completed "meaning".'

Ideas Ø66

And even when he describes the countervailing tendency to associative ambiguity and dispersal of meaning, the same dependency of language on intuition is maintained. He talks of "cancelling"

'other meanings which under certain circumstances thrust themselves forward through the force of habit.'

(ibid.)

For Husserl, 'essences' discovered by reflection on our conscious life precede language and make it possible. Ideality is a prelinguistic phenomena.

There are a number of ways one can criticize Husserl's phenomenological approach. The subsequent history of twentieth century philosophy is littered with positions that either explicitly take issue with it (Marxism, structuralism, existential phenomenology, to name but a few)
or offer alternatives based on premises that phenomenology would dispute (such as logical atomism, logical positivism, ordinary language philosophy, pragmatism). One could put in question its apparently foundational model of justification. One could doubt the very possibility of the pre-predicative description that seems to be entailed. Or one could dispute the adequacy, possibility, and viability of the particular kind of "foundation" Husserl constantly demands. We will discuss this later when we look at Derrida's critique of 'presence'.

But before taking up such external positions it is always worth drawing attention to a philosopher's own discussion of, or confrontation with, the limits of his thought. This we shall do for Husserl, drawing on a number of sections of Ideas 1. A word about underlying strategy might be helpful here.

We hold the value of philosophical criticism (and indeed the claim can be extended to other theoretical disciplines, including the natural sciences) to lie not so often in the refutation or confirmation of a philosophical position (or theory, or conceptual framework...) but in the demonstration or exploration of the limits of its scope of productive application. A philosophical position (etc.) formulated or held in the absence of any reflective grasp of the limits of its application could be said to be formulated or held metaphysically. From the point of view of intellectual productivity this can be, at different periods in the life of a position, a 'good' thing, or a 'bad' thing, 'necessary' or 'remediable' etc. Thus it may be important that a position be initially formulated in an exaggeratedly universalistic way to seem to be a plausible successor to a current position similarly formulated.

One danger with such talk of limits that we would hope to avoid is the ultimately complacent assumption that all successfully 'limited'
philosophical positions could be compatibly ranged or articulated in a single conceptual space. On this view, criticism would be analogous to the proceedings of an international boundary commission in that it would suppose that the nature of this 'space' was not itself a matter of philosophical debate. Furthermore, and to prevent any misunderstanding, we should also add that we do not at all deny that philosophical positions can be plain incoherent, inconsistent, based on false premisses etc. and that criticism can in these cases be healthily destructive. We are not proposing to establish a rest-home for lame ducks.

* 

We shall now turn to a discussion of the limits of Husserlian phenomenology, which will prepare the way for a critique of his attempt at a radically anti-metaphysical 'theory of time'.

One of the key areas in which Husserl gives expression to the limits of phenomenology (without himself conceiving these limits negatively) is in his discussion of phenomenological method. This is hardly surprising for two reasons: (1) it would seem quite generally true that one's philosophical method is something that is always already at work (or in play) as soon as one writes. If one subsequently returns to question it, that questioning would constitute a further elaboration of one's method. Does not that resultant complex strategy ultimately just stand or fall without further justification, and this constitute a 'limit' to any philosophical position? (2) Such a general argument seems to be especially important for phenomenology because its claims for philosophical renewal rest on adopting a radically new method.

I shall focus first on a remark Husserl makes in Ideas 03 entitled 'Essential Insight and Individual Intuition'. He writes
'At first "essence" indicated that which in the intimate self-being of an individual thing discloses to us "what" it is. But every such What can be "set out as Idea". Empirical or individual intuition can be transformed into essential insight (ideation) - a possibility which is itself not to be understood as empirical but as essential possibility. The object of such insight is then the corresponding pure essence, whether it be the highest category or one of its specializations, right down to the fully concrete.'

p.54 (our emphasis)

Husserl is explaining here how essences can be generated as objects of a distinctive kind of insight, by a certain transformation of our understanding of the essential nature of particular 'things'. We shift from thinking of a quality as instantiated in a thing to thinking of it in its own right. He will proceed shortly to some of the implications of this possibility, but before following him I would like to focus here on the apparent circularity of the words I drew attention to above - 'a possibility which is itself not to be understood as empirical but as essential possibility'. To see that this transformational possibility is 'an essential possibility' (and not merely a move that, as it happens, we can perform), we have to be able, presumably, to make it itself the object of essential intuition. This involves seeing that the 'essential' properties of individuals have a built-in independence of any particular individuals in which they happen to inhere ('Whatever belongs to the essence of the individual can also belong to another individual', §2), and that it is consequently possible to have a grasp of such properties independently of their concrete inherence. This grasp would involve 'essential insight'.

But if there is a circularity here it is not vicious. Essential intuition does not depend for its validity on being a transformation of individual intuition, and 'judgements of essence' do not depend for their truth on their being transformable from and into 'judgements of essential
generality'. There is rather a quite fundamental assumption as to the existence and importance of a distinctive kind of intuition which Husserl calls essential. What appears as a circularity is in fact just the recursive use of what is deemed a privileged mode of cognition. When he laments Külpe's critique of his 'theory of categorial intuition' (Ø3 n.1) he immediately goes on to refer to it as a 'simple and quite fundamental insight'. So the theory of categorial intuition is an insight, i.e. an intuition. And this confirms our suggestion that what we are dealing with in Husserl's work is a repeated appeal to a privileged source of a privileged kind of knowledge which precedes and sustains any subsequent 'theory'. That is, we will not (unless we insist on transforming this valuation of intuition into one) find a basic premise, or set of premises, underlying Husserlian phenomenology, but rather a certain (alleged) cognitive possibility.

Now it is of course open to us to question whether we do in fact possess the capacity for 'essential intuition' as he describes it, and whether it has the epistemological status he claims for it. (He claims it is the basis of a whole range of 'eidetic sciences'.) We might argue, for instance, that Husserl is not justified in supposing that just because an essential characteristic of a thing is independent of its instantiation in any particular individual item, it can be grasped independently of any instantiation at all. But Husserl's position here is quite subtle. He insists that 'no essential intuition is possible without the free possibility of directing one's glance to an individual counterpart and of shaping an illustration'. In fact, while there is a difference in principle between essential and individual intuition, each depends on being convertible into the other. Husserl is not advocating a complete separation of essential intuition from concrete instances. And interestingly such instances may
as well be imagined as real.

Our first tentative conclusion is that phenomenology rests on a primitive valuation of intuition, and this will constitute — not necessarily in a negative way — the first limit.

Our second focus will be on an important chapter in *Ideas* (section III, ch. 1) "Preliminary Considerations of Method", and certain immediately preceding remarks.

In Ø60, "The Suspending of the Material-Eidetic Disciplines", part of the previous chapter on the Phenomenological Reduction, Husserl is explaining the method of reduction by which phenomenology brackets out of consideration all that 'transcends consciousness', so that it can fulfill its own methodological standard, and claim

'nothing that we cannot make essentially transparent to ourselves by reference to Consciousness and on purely immanent lines.'

The question he poses at the start of Ø60 is whether there are any limits to this reductive procedure. He claims there are:

'As regards the eidetic fields of study on their material side, one of these is of such outstanding significance for us that the impossibility of disconnexion can be taken for granted: that is, the essential domain of the phenomenologically purified consciousness itself .... we could not dispense with the a priori consciousness. A science of fact cannot alienate the right of making use of the essential truths which relate to the individual objectivities of its own domain. Now it is our direct intention ... to establish phenomenology itself as an eidetic science, as the theory of the essential nature of transcendentally purified consciousness.' (p. 177).

Husserl is saying that there are some 'essences' which are instantiated in things that transcend consciousness, and others which are instantiated within the 'immanent formations of consciousness' itself. An essential grasp of the concepts involved in an abstract 'chronology' or 'topology' or 'mereology'... for example, could be bracketed out, but (I take him
to be saying) the distinctions (see section I ch. 1) between fact and essence or between transcendent and immanent, for example, could not. There is an obvious reason for this. The very value and possibility of undertaking these reductions is explicable only using these distinctions. If disconnexion, suspension, bracketting out, could be glossed as 'making no use of' certain concepts, then the limit reached would not merely be one beyond which the intelligibility or importance, or interest in the reductive procedure might be put in doubt, but a logical limit. One simply cannot, in principle, successfully employ a procedure which involves applying certain concepts so as to suspend the use of such concepts. If one were to 'succeed' one would retroactively annul the procedure by which that success had been brought about, and so annul the success itself. Briefly, reduction is an achievement dependent on the concomitant satisfaction of procedural norms.

But to say it is a logical limit is just not simply to confirm Husserl's claim about the 'right' of any science of fact to utilize its own essential truths; it turns one's attention towards the very methodological and conceptual framework within which such limits arise. In our previous discussion we concluded that phenomenology rested on a primitive valuation of 'intuition' (= the transparent grasp of the essence of some conscious formation, a close cousin of Descartes' 'clearness and distinctness'). And that would suggest that critical distance to Husserl could only be taken up by scrutinizing this notion, or the founding value he gives it. 12

Curiously, perhaps, in his chapter on Method, he gives a somewhat different solution to the problems of reflexivity, circularity and limits in phenomenology. In Ø65, "The Reference of Phenomenology Back to its own Self", he writes
'it might be a stumbling block to someone that whereas from the phenomenological standpoint we direct our mental glance towards this or that pure experience with a view to studying it, the experiences of this inquiry itself, of this adoption of a standpoint, and this direction of the mental glance, taken in their phenomenological purity, should belong to the domain of what is to be studied'

Husserl gives three different justifications of this reflexivity.

(1) He begins by claiming that it is not problematic, because it is no less true of psychology of logic ('the thinking of the psychologist is itself something psychological, the thinking of the logician something logical...'). But this is surely an unconvincing response, for

a. it is hard to accept a justification of phenomenological reflexivity which involves drawing parallels with empirical or purely formal disciplines from which Husserl has at all other times been at such pains to distinguish it;

b. while it is undoubtedly true that 'the thinking of the psychologist is itself psychological etc.' what is disturbing (at least potentially) about the self-reference of phenomenology is that unlike psychology or logic (at least according to phenomenology) phenomenology is concerned with its own ultimate grounding, as an ordinary factual or formal science need not be.

The question is, does this self-reference have any bearing on phenomenology's claim to have achieved, or to be able to achieve, this grounding?

Husserl seems to deny that it does:

'This back reference upon myself would be a matter of concern only if upon the phenomenological, psychological and logical knowledge of this momentary thinking of this momentary thinker depended the knowledge of all other matters in the relevant spheres of study, which is, as anyone can see, an absurd presupposition.'

(ibid. p. 190)

But this implausible exaggeration of the original problem is not a satisfactory response. That problem is: what effect does it have on the status of phenomenological scrutiny that this scrutiny (and all its accessory features) should itself belong to the field (presumably of immanent formations) which is itself to be studied phenomenologically?
If we were to pretend that such scrutiny, at whatever level it occurs, has as its object the awarding of 'epistemological value', this might seem an innocent enough fact. But the self-reference in question would precisely have the effect of confirming that the method of phenomenology did indeed conform to the standards it itself embodied, and thus give the appearance of an epistemological status that would block or at least deter subjecting these standards to an independent assessment. And such an assessment might be thought desirable.

Indeed, having begun by saying that the self-reference does not present a difficulty, Husserl goes on to admit that there is a sort of difficulty, one that phenomenology shares with other sciences, and this leads him into his second justification for reflexivity.

(2) Husserl in effect offers an account of the development of formal sciences (and of the formal structure of natural sciences) in which the self-reflexion of phenomenology is no mere logical possibility, or difficulty with which we must somehow come to terms, but the operation by which a procedure ('directing our mental glance towards a certain experience'), which is first carried out more or less innocently, is raised to a more 'scientific' (i.e. refined, precise, self-transparent) level, as reflection would do to any practice. In other words, the character of the second 'glance' is different from the first; it is specifically concerned to transform the 'unsophisticated form' of the procedure into something more rigorously formulated. This is not merely a useful means of clarification, it is an essential phase in the development of any science:

"Without preliminary and preparatory consideration both of matter and method, the sketch of a new science could never be outlined." 13

(ibid. p. 190)

So Husserl is claiming that the reflection involved is no mere logical
possibility but the means by which phenomenology develops itself as a science. Self-reflection is defended as a necessity, even a virtue, rather than as presenting any sort of difficulty.

(3) Husserl's third justification is that the intuitively compelling and yet modest method that phenomenology makes use of precludes the possibility of difficulties arising:

'If it figures as a science within the limits of mere immediate intuition, a pure 'description' science of essential Being, the general nature of its procedure is given in advance as something that needs no further explanation.'

(ibid. p. 190, last emphasis ours)

This modest self-limitation is, I take it, an attempt to play down the 'epistemological validation' side of phenomenology, by referring to its descriptive method and its restriction to intuitions. If it does not explain or justify and only says what is so clearly the case as to be indisputable, no problem could possibly arise. It is interesting to note, in the sentence we quoted, the phrase 'given in advance as', for, whether Husserl likes it or not, this raises yet again all the questions about how far phenomenology is pure description. It is quite true that 'immediate intuition' and 'description' suggest there is no need for further explanation. But this way of thinking might be wholly illusory. Something can be 'given' in a certain way, but not actually be that way. This is quite obvious when one thinks of the relation between spatial aspects and actual shape. But equally, Husserl's 'given in advance as' suggests the kind of rationally deducible future (insofar as it concerns the development of phenomenology) that might lead one to deduce the completeness of arithmetic from the possibility of providing it with formal axioms. And how many more opportunities are there for gaps to develop when one is dealing with such qualities as 'need for explanation'. Such needs can develop from unsuspected quarters even when not originally
apparent. And one obvious way in which such a need can appear is through a reflective grasp of phenomenology's limits, in which internal self-satisfaction (e.g., about the adequacy of an intuitive ground) is subjected to external critical appraisal.

* *

I would like now to suggest what conclusions we can draw about the limits of phenomenology from these probings of the points at which Husserl himself has appeared sensitive to the issue. I shall then suggest certain lines of criticism, and then show that Husserl's analysis of internal time-consciousness was intended as an answer to at least one of these lines.

The most conspicuously reiterated conclusion to be drawn is that intuitive transparency is a standard that is so fundamental to phenomenology that it not only characterizes the everyday products of phenomenological method, but also the results of phenomenological self-reflection, reflection on that very method. There is nothing necessarily corrupt about this. If another standard did arise at the level of reflection, it could undermine the operation of the original standard at the level of ordinary phenomenological description. No critique of phenomenology, then, could deny that phenomenology was self-critical. But what might still be scrutinized is the value accorded to this pervasive standard of 'intuitive transparency'.

I would like now to propose three different critical perspectives on phenomenology, from which, singly and collectively, the importance to Husserl of a theory of internal time consciousness will become evident:

1. The problem of reconciling the descriptive and legitimating aspects of intuition.

2. The problem of performing (and indeed of making sense of) that
detachment from the world on which phenomenological self-scrutiny depends.

3. The problem of giving public expression (in language) to private intuition without epistemological corruption.

1. The appeal of phenomenology (and perhaps any positive philosophical valuation of intuition) is that it (uneasily) combines (i) the idea of a purely descriptive method, that, after certain purifying procedures, is licensed to tell it how it is, and (ii) the idea that it is only through an intuitive apprehension that the concepts and the principles that organize our scientific knowledge can be legitimated.\(^{15}\) Now it is easy enough, perhaps too easy, to argue that one cannot derive legitimations from descriptions unless those descriptions covertly include valuations which would deprive them of their status as pure descriptions. As strict adherence to Hume's position can easily lead one to being unable to understand any valuations as anything other than irrational preferences, one might be excused for thinking that the matter was not so simple, and perhaps even that this uneasy combination of fact and value in 'intuition' might indeed secretly hold the solution to this problem. This does not seem likely, at least in the form that Husserl presents it. What it seems to preclude is the undermining of the status of an original intuition in the light of the consequences that can be drawn from it. One's moral intuitions, for example, are notoriously vulnerable to subversion by the deduction of unacceptable consequences from them, despite the utter clarity and transparency of the original insight. And yet it might be said that it is not the value itself which is undermined, but the scope of its application. It ceases to be thought of as absolute, it loses its metaphysical status.\(^{16}\) The recognition that there might be circumstances in which one would be prepared to kill does not refute a no killing principle, it just limits it, by demonstrating its potential conflict
with other values.

Nonetheless, the possibility of questioning the offerings of moral intuition raises the question of whether something parallel is equally possible in the formal and empirical sciences. And of course it is. Even the self-evidence of certain logical laws has been questioned. (Does the law of Excluded Middle apply to statements about the future, or to statements embodying false presuppositions? Have I or have I not sold my submarine?) And the danger for Husserl is that intuition would be reduced to being a source of candidates for logical primitiveness that would be judged by other standards (eg. hypothesis generating capacity, practical utility, compatibility with the conceptual frameworks of other theories, etc.)

**NOTE:** We do not mean to suggest that Husserl was not aware of many of these questions. He was well aware, for example, that intuition was not a foolproof basis for knowledge, or at least he became aware of this. In his "Phenomenology of the Reason" he brings these issues to the fore. One of the most important moves he makes, having pin-pointed self-evidence as the feature of intuitive apprehension that gives it its status, is to distinguish between adequate and inadequate self-evidence (§138) in which, as will be clear, 'self-evidence' is used in an 'extended sense'. Adequate self-evidence is that found in eg. simple arithmetical propositions (2+2=4). Its chief characteristics are that subsequent experience cannot strengthen or weaken it, and that it lacks 'the graded differences of a weight'. Yet, 'a thing in the real world ... can within the finite limits of appearance appear only "inadequately"' for all our intuitive grasp of worldly things is in principle subject to confirmation (harmonious "filling-out") or cancellation, fragmentation into a multitude of hypotheses etc.
A facade, for example, may lead us to posit a house which closer inspection will reveal not to be there.

Three points should be carried forward from this NOTE for consideration:

a. Husserl supposes that the various modes of confirmation, cancellation, fragmentation etc. of 'inadequate' self-evidence can be given a rational organization, conform to various standard types.

b. He takes for granted (i.e. presumably as 'adequately self-evident') the distinction between adequate and inadequate and its corresponding application to domains of objects distinguished as immanent and transcendent (as I understand it). This would seem to leave somewhat undecided the status of 'complex rational objects', if I might so label complicated proofs, difficult mathematical equations, theories and so on. Descartes faced just this problem and his solution\(^{18}\) - speed reviewing of the simple parts and their relations so as to bring them all within a single momentary gaze - shows exactly how the problem of time arises for Husserl.

c. For it is clear that the difference between adequate and inadequate self-evidence is nothing but a reflection of the distinction between what can or cannot be exhaustively grasped in a single moment, in the present. What is inadequately self-evident is in effect only a convincing pointer to a fulness that one at that moment merely posits. And yet the idea of anything at all taking place in an instant (an infinitely small temporal interval) is quite implausible. What is called for, and what, in effect Husserl supplies, is a phenomenology of the present.

Having concluded this long NOTE to our first critical perspective on Husserl, we turn now to the second.

2. The systematic use of intuition as the basis for organized scientific
knowledge requires, for phenomenology, the successful completion of an act of cognitive purification - a reduction of our conscious life to the life of consciousness, and then, as we have indicated, a focussing on the immanent structures of that consciousness. Husserl was quite aware of the possibility of scepticism about the possibility of such detachment and indeed attempts to deal with it (in Ø64, "The Self-Suspension of the Phenomenologist"). The fact that existentialists make such scepticism the backbone of their objection to Husserlian phenomenology suggests that this idea of detachment was not wholly convincing. In Heidegger's existential ontology, for example, knowing is just a mode of Being-in-the-world, which radically undercuts the status Husserl gives to the reductions. Merleau-Ponty thought of the reductions much more as a way of focussing on the structures of existence, an operation that can never be completed, and not as capable of bringing about any sort of ontological self-transformation. Obviously one question that will concern us is how far Husserl's account of time-consciousness is dependent on his belief in the possibility of existential detachment.

3. The last critical perspective one ought at least to adumbrate is one for which we have already laid the groundwork in discussing Husserl's charting his course between the Scylla of psychologism and the Charybdis of offering merely a disguised philosophy of language. In his Rules Descartes claims at one point that while intuition is unchallengeable, as soon as one proceeds to judgements about such intuitions, fallibility immediately appears. The problem is how one retains the virtues of pre-predicative insight at the level of linguistically articulated expression. For the relation of 'adequation' or 'fulfilment' or 'correspondence' between what it is one has grasped and the conditions of presentation that make its public appearance possible is extended to
the point of fracture. If phenomenology is not to be forever plagued by the problem of the linguistic form of its insights, it must hold one of two 'theories' of language: (i) that at some level, whether it be the level of the primitive elements of language, such as morphemes or words, or that of such articulated complexes as sentences, language must be capable of adequately capturing the intuitive contents of phenomenologically purified experience; or, (ii) that even if language in its normal, imprecise form cannot do this, that it can be sharpened up, used in careful accordance with definitions, rules etc., so as to achieve this result.

In its broadest form, the difficulty with either view is that even if there was some sense to be given to 'language capturing its objects', it is hard to see how the ideal of such a precise relationship could survive unscathed the material conditions of language use - the permanent sway of a pragmatic dimension (context, local conventions of use, range of particular intentions in play, etc.) If speaking/writing/understanding language is an interminable process (both, in principle, for each item, and because of the infinite number of such items) rather than the simple emitting and receiving of a message, then the prospect of phenomenology as an apodeictic science would be dim. This line of argument is not weakened by the actual existence of empirical sciences, for they do not claim the apodeictic qualities of certainty, necessity, clarity etc. that phenomenology makes its own. The proper comparison would be with formal sciences like geometry or mathematics. Surely they exist, and are successful? And yet Husserl claims that to grasp what geometry is about we have not merely to be able to do geometrical proofs, but to be able to reactivate the original insights that fundamentally sustain geometrical thinking. But
if at the level of mere symbolic manipulation, the internal coherence of (a particular) geometry may be quite unchallengeable, the introduction of another standard - that of the adequacy of one's inner understanding - puts in question all that purely terminological and operational precision. So, even if the ideal of an apodeictic science were a plausible one for phenomenology to aim at, even if comparison with geometry was appropriate, one would still be faced with the difficulty that the apodeicticity in question remains a property of basic insights, and does not extend to the relation between those insights and their linguistic form.

The question that persists, and in its more complex shape can usefully be divided into two parts, is this: (i) even if we allow 'within its own limits' the possibility of intuitions grounded in the transparent immediacy of present experience, does not the requirement to embody these intuitions in a public language - subject to all the vagaries of historical, social, scientific, even political pressures - explode the privileged interiority of intuition, and deprive the phenomenologist's public version of the value he aimed at? We could call this the problem of the clothing of intuition. (ii) More radically we may come to question the alleged independence of this intuitional layer from the structure of signification found in language. This move, which can be attributed to Derrida, has (for us) the important corollary that the whole ideal of a realm of (evidential) presence, and of an internal time-consciousness that would sustain it, is undermined. Derrida's denial of an alternative non-metaphysical temporality is clearly dependent on his view that the epistemological function served by Husserl's account of time-consciousness both determines the nature of that account in advance, and teaches us a wider lesson about the philosophical status of theories of time. Derrida's critique of Husserl is discussed at length below (ch. 3). Our immediate
task is to explain how Husserl's theory of internal time-consciousness reflects, depends on and is limited by the theoretical tasks for which it was invented.
I. Husserl's Phenomenology of Time

CHAPTER TWO

Husserl's Analysis of Time-Consciousness

\[ \text{p. 33} \] 1. Introduction

\[ \text{p. 34} \] 2. The Question of Scope

\[ \text{p. 43} \] 3. The Analysis of Time-Consciousness

\[ \text{p. 44} \] 4. The Focus and Scope of his Analysis

\[ \text{p. 47} \] 5. Husserl's Treatment of Brentano

\[ \text{p. 52} \] 6. Some doubts about Husserl's treatment of Brentano

\[ \text{p. 54} \] 7. Husserl's Two Main Questions

\[ \text{p. 56} \] 8. An analytical preview

\[ \text{p. 57} \] 9. The immanent temporal object

\[ \text{p. 60} \] 10. Husserl's Diagram of Time

\[ \text{p. 65} \] 11. Nietzschean doubts about Husserl's claims

\[ \text{p. 70} \] 12. Retention and reproductive consciousness

\[ \text{p. 71} \] 13. The dependence of recollection on retention

\[ \text{p. 76} \] 14. The difference between retention and representation

\[ \text{p. 76} \] 15. The simple story and its defects

\[ \text{p. 79} \] 16. Immanent description and analytical reflection: Husserlian ambiguities

\[ \text{p. 83} \] 17. The "Freedom" of reproduction

\[ \text{p. 85} \] 18. The preservation of order

\[ \text{p. 87} \] 19. The productive role of reproductive memory

\[ \text{p. 88} \] 20. The place of protention

\[ \text{p. 90} \] 21. Expectation as an inadequate paradigm for consciousness of the future

\[ \text{p. 92} \] 22. Husserl's epistemological focus

\[ \text{p. 93} \] 23. The scope of "perception"

\[ \text{p. 93} \] 24. Two levels of perception

\[ \text{p. 96} \] 25. 'There has bever been any "perception"' (Derrida)

\[ \text{p. 98} \] 26. Can "perception" be extended to any retentional continuum?

\[ \text{p. 100} \] 27. The positive contribution of recollection (to the constitution of time)

\[ \text{p. 102} \] 28. Recollection and the past

\[ \text{p. 105} \] 29. Recollection and the constitution of temporal objects

\[ \text{p. 106} \] 30. Recollection and the constitution of time

\[ \text{p. 107} \] 31. Time and Identity

\[ \text{p. 108} \] 32. The idealization of time

\[ \text{p. 109} \] 33. Idealization as distortion: a special principle

\[ \text{p. 111} \] 34. The path to absolute flux

\[ \text{p. 112} \] 35. 'For all this names are lacking'

\[ \text{p. 114} \] 36. Absolute flux and immanent time
I. Husserl's Phenomenology of Time

CHAPTER TWO

Husserl's Analysis of Time-Consciousness

'The conclusions we advance in regard to these matters, because of the difficulty and obscurity of Husserl's analyses, will involve a considerable degree of speculation and should be taken as tentative.'

John Brough

Introduction

In this chapter I shall try to show how Husserl's quest for an 'authentic time' leads him to a point at which the very idea of time is itself put in question. This startling conclusion sheds an entirely unexpected light (and hitherto unnoticed) on Derrida's insistence that time is an essentially metaphysical concept. I begin, however, by trying to answer certain fairly analytical questions:

1. How far is Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness a complete and successful philosophy of time?
2. If there is more to be said, does this mean an expanded phenomenology, or a going beyond phenomenology?
3. What scope does Husserl claim for it?
4. How far does his Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (hereafter PITC) rest on questionable/unexamined/optional assumptions? What schemas, conceptual frameworks does Husserl make use of?

Answering these (and allied) questions should help us to judge whether Husserl's phenomenology is indeed 'the highest point of the metaphysical tradition' (Derrida) and in particular what the nature of the relationship between Husserl and Derrida (so often misunderstood) might be. We shall argue in the next chapter that Derrida is perhaps even closer to Husserl than he knew. The position of the PITC is critical in this regard, as Husserl (albeit in his own terms) fully
understood. If one of the key characteristics of metaphysics is the privileging of presence, then a work that actually deals thematically both with the temporal and the evidential present, as PITC does, will not be a metaphysical work by any failure to reflect, or by its temporary commitment to certain themes or procedures, but carefully, deliberately and whole-heartedly. This is possible because of what Heidegger calls the 'unthought' in any thinking, which does not refer to shadowy parts of an otherwise illuminated field, questions one just happens not to think about, but to what is structurally hidden by one's very method of inquiry. (How, for example, could a questioning of reflection as a philosophical method that also made use of reflection as its mode of scrutiny do other than repeat and hence endorse at least at some level, that very reflection?)

Questions of Scope

It is a natural or at least common assumption that whether or not we accept Husserl's account of time-consciousness, that it is a candidate for our acceptance as a philosophy of time in general - indeed the correct one. That is to say, it is often supposed not merely that it offers an account of experiential time, but that such an account either says all there is to be said about time, or that anything else that could be said would rest on or be derivable from such an account, and that Husserl's own account of experiential time is the correct one (over and against those of Bergson, Brentano, James...) This assumption will be progressively questioned in the course of this chapter, but it will be instructive first to consider Husserl's own position on this matter.

In keeping with phenomenology's general procedure, Husserl begins PITC with a double move. He both distinguishes the phenomenological treatment of internal time-consciousness from other treatments of time
(Ø1, Ø2) and claims a privileged status for the phenomenological treatment. So he does not think that a phenomenology, of time-consciousness says all there is to say about time, but given that what he distinguishes it from are psychological and other scientific studies, the clear suggestion is that there is no other (satisfactory) philosophical treatment of time. Let us look at this double move in detail.

A phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness, in so far as it is phenomenological, involves (Ø1) 'a complete exclusion of every assumption, stipulation, or conviction concerning objective time'. The (perfectly natural) assumption that there is a single all embracing objective time would be set aside. More importantly, certain ways of studying time, based on naturalistic assumptions, such as the psychophysical correlation of objective and subjective measurement of time-intervals, are also excluded: 'Psychological apperception, which views lived experiences as psychical states of empirical persons ... is something wholly other than the phenomenological'. It is consistent with Husserl's view of the philosophical radicality of the phenomenological approach that he does not specifically mention other philosophical treatments of time, with the exception of a passing reference to Augustine, and then, at greater length, Brentano. The implication, I believe is that it is only by the phenomenological approach that philosophy (let alone eg. a particular empirical science of psychology) can avoid making naturalistic and hence psychologistic assumptions about our relationship to it. If the case of Brentano can be taken as exemplary, we see that finally succumbing to some form of psychologism is a risk that even the subtlest of philosophers can fall prey to. But again, if we take the study of psychophysical
temporal correlations to be exemplary, then it is clear that Husserl 
believes there can be other ways of studying time, but simply that 
they are not properly philosophical in the sense of dealing with the 
**essence** of time. When they do not pretend to be philosophical, they 
can simply be excluded; when they do they have to be criticized.

And yet at the same time as Husserl is distinguishing the 
phenomenological from the naturalistic/psychologistic approach he is 
also claiming a privilege for the former. What the latter approach 
takes for granted (objectivity, objective time) phenomenology offers 
an account of. It is this move which leads to '...the most extra-
ordinary difficulties, contradictions and entanglements' that 
motivates the strictness of the phenomenological method. In giving 
an account of what it distinguishes itself from, phenomenology 
establishes a priority. 'Phenomenologically speaking, objectivity 
is ... constituted ... through characters of apprehension and the 
regularities which pertain to the essence of these characters. It 
is precisely the business of the philosophy of cognition to grasp this 
fully and to make it completely intelligible.' So a phenomenology of 
time both distinguishes itself from any account which takes the 
objectivity of time (or indeed of anything) for granted, and goes on 
to give an account of how that is constituted. But while we can 
separate these two moves analytically, they are one and the same move 
in Husserl's writing. For the distinctiveness of the phenomenological 
approach in fact consists in its dealing with what precedes any 
objective formations, and such formations could have no other basis 
than these immanent acts that phenomenology uncovers.

However, if we ask what the relationship (of constitution) 
comes to, we have to conclude that it can itself only be understood 
phenomenologically. Immanent acts do not literally constitute objects
in the way that cakes or candles are constituted of what they are made of. The language of 'act' and 'constitution' cannot be understood in any ordinary sense. For example, we are not dealing with events that occur 'in time', nor indeed with any temporal features at all. A closer but not precise parallel would be with a logical or conceptual relationship. So if a phenomenology of time, whether or not the only possible philosophy of time, deals with the most primitive forms of time which any other philosophy of time would have to rest on, this privilege is one that it itself explains and justifies. This would seem to suggest that the final answer to the scope of a phenomenology of time remains undetermined, for all we have is a phenomenological answer, an answer, that is, that rests on the phenomenological concept of constitution. How far is this true? Might not phenomenology justifiably claim to be simply bearing the mantle of philosophy here? Do we not, in other words, accept the general approach that tries to deal with time in its fundamental features, rather than with each and every concrete chronological phenomenon? Does not the concept of constitution simply give a phenomenological name to the relationship between these fundamental features and derived forms? Is it not simply a consequence of it being a philosophical approach that phenomenology assesses its own scope, and no sort of vicious circularity? Again, this is precisely phenomenology's position (but need it be our's?).

Thus:

'From the point of view of theory of knowledge, the question of the possibility of experience (which at the same time is the question of the essence of experience) necessitates a return to the phenomenological data of which all that is experienced consists phenomenologically'

(Ø2, PITC p. 27)

and again

'The question of the origin is oriented towards the primitive forms of the consciousness of time in which the primitive differences of the temporal are constituted
intuitively and authentically as the original sources of all certainties relative to time'

Husserl is claiming that phenomenology is required by the theory of knowledge and his conviction that phenomenology is not just a more or less desirable philosophical option can be seen in his phrase 'phenomenological data', which, echoing his slogan 'to the things themselves', suggests that phenomenology is not just a good method, but is in some way an approach required by what it has to deal with. This same suggestion appears even more strongly when Husserl refers to 'the primitive forms of the consciousness of time ...' We are not, it seems, dealing with a hypothesis here, but with a fact (of sorts).

Now, it would be an immense task to try to adjudicate phenomenology's claim to be 'first philosophy', and one that would divert us unjustifiably from our own questions, but it is clear that it was not Husserl who invented the idea of a theory of knowledge and the quest for primitive elements and forms of experiences, the belief in the possibility of focussing in on 'lived experience' are common ground particularly for that philosophical tradition we call empiricism. Phenomenology retains sufficient of the goals and orientations of philosophy to be radically philosophical. And certainly, its abandonment of a largely passive and receptive model of experience is a great gain. So it would not be unreasonable for us to take seriously phenomenology's claim about the scope of the phenomenology of time. But one phrase in the last sentence quoted above gives us pause for thought '... as the originary sources of all certainties relative to time'. At the beginning of Ø7 (p. 42), Husserl asks two questions: (1) 'how the apprehension of transcendent temporal objects which extend over a duration is to be understood?' (2) 'how,
in addition to "temporal objects", both immanent and transcendent, is time itself, the duration and succession of Objects constituted?'

These two questions fall either side of another question about the relationship between the analysis of time and the theory of knowledge, one which our phrase takes one particular side of. The role of time or time-consciousness in making possible our grasp of temporally extended objects is one in which it is contributing to the theory of knowledge. And without an understanding of the role of retention, protention and memory in experience, no account of knowledge could be possible. On the other hand, Husserl is also concerned with time as an object of knowledge in its own right. He asks how time itself is constituted, and, as in the phrase just quoted, he is looking to account for our 'certainties relative to time', and, as we have said, a return to 'the primitive forms of the consciousness of time' is the direction he takes.

Does this link between epistemological issues and the analysis of time teach us anything about the scope of Husserl's project here? Both a weak and a strong interpretation are possible. On the weak interpretation, Husserl is quite right to point out the importance of a theory of time to our knowledge of objects. Without temporal extension there would be no objects and without an understanding of the possible modes of temporal extension our knowledge would be fundamentally deficient. (Consider the differences between, say, objects extended in time, objects temporally structured, and objects that structure their own time...) And the concern to get to the bottom of our commonsense understanding of time itself is nothing more than an attempt to bring relief to those who, like St. Augustine, find themselves at sea when they try to get a reflective grip on time. Husserl's answer to obscurity, difficulty, uncertainty is always and
understandably, to return to those most fundamental layers of experience in which primitive clarity has not yet been obscured.

The strong (and potentially critical) interpretation would be that this two-way involvement with epistemological considerations does constitute a real limitation to the scope of Husserl's inquiry. The simplest statement of how this limitation can arise would go something like this: there is no necessary connexion between truth and certainty of apprehension. Let us for the sake of argument suppose that there are indeed two kinds of knowledge that yield certainty - that which concerns mathematical and logical truths, and that which concerns what is immediately apprehensible. Many would deny the latter, and some the former. But even if we were to accept them, it requires an enormous act of faith to suppose that all truths can be grasped by reduction to one or other of these kinds of knowledge. Logical atomism, for example, elegantly orchestrated these two modes, treating complex propositions as logical constructions from simple ones that could be grasped with certainty. But it requires either faith or some sort of stipulative act to suppose that all knowledge can be dealt with in this way. And neither faith nor stipulation are consistent with the standards of certainty, clarity and groundedness that such programmes affirm.

Without taking on board all his accompanying intellectual baggage, we cannot but agree with Hegel when he wonders whether 'the fear of error (might not be)...the initial error'. And the way that Hegel and other philosophers like Dilthey developed this, by an appeal to 'understanding' rather than 'knowledge' still has some relevance today. For what traditional theory of knowledge takes for granted is that knowledge is a relationship between a clearly distinguished subject and object, and that every putative item of knowledge will appear, as
such, as an object of some cognitive act (such as 'apprehension'). Only under this kind of spotlight can there by anything like certainty, or that clarity and distinctness that Descartes demanded as a standard. Now whatever one thinks of the possibility in principle of isolating objects of knowledge from the subject grasping them as such, there would seem to be clear cases in which such a separation could be expected to prove difficult, if not impossible. For example, widely different theorists such as Foucault, Gadamer and Kuhn take this impossibility to lie behind the structural impossibility of historical reflexion on one's own present period, on the grounds that historical detachment cannot be purchased by greater reflective effort. One has to wait for the present to become past, for it to be capable of becoming an object. This is a negative example. Positively, the hermeneutic tradition does suppose that understanding may be possible where knowledge in the sense we have discussed above (a relationship between an independently identifiable subject and object) falters. Understanding (verstehen) proceeds by explication of what is being 'lived through'. It is appropriate for self-understanding, for existential reflection, for historical understanding (at one level), for exploring the wealth of our taken-for-granted world etc. But it does not set itself certainty as a standard. That is not to say that it treats accuracy and correctness with disdain, but rather that it recognizes the inapplicability of the subject/object schema to which certainty as a standard belongs.

Now the question as to the scope of Husserl's PITC can be posed anew if it is linked as it seems to be, to 'knowledge'. If, in other words, there are aspects, features, etc. of 'time' which are neither immediately available to phenomenological scrutiny, nor derivable from
those (i.e. the primitive features) which are available, then Husserl's PITC will for all its virtues not be able to claim to be a philosophy of time, but only of time-consciousness. We hope to be able to show that what Heidegger and Derrida each offer are different ways of limiting Husserl's phenomenological treatment, by developing accounts of what it cannot adequately deal with. The enormously problematic nature of each of these efforts can be seen in the fact that the later Heidegger abandons talk of 'time' proper, and 'substitutes' a more primitive 'time-space', while Derrida explicitly claims the metaphysical nature of any concept of time. If we were to treat these 'results' as the logical consequences of abandoning the link between time and epistemology it would cast a new light on Husserl's enterprise, although, as with all light, a new shadow will be cast too. For if we come to see Husserl as having taken to the limit the working out of the metaphysical concept of time, we might judge it either a finite project successfully completed, or, with a slight shift in one's angle of reading, as an enterprise doomed from the start by its metaphysical blinkers. In fact neither of these extreme judgements will quite fit.

One of the interesting features of Husserl's analysis, as we shall see, is that he cannot in fact confine time to the status of an object of knowledge precisely because of the second strand of his original double claim about its involvement in epistemology - that time enters into the constitution of objects of knowledge. It does so both at the level of the 'object' and at the level of the 'subject', and once this latter is established one can begin more easily to ask sceptical questions about the possibility of an epistemological delimitation of the subject, questions which lead in the direction of Heidegger's existential problematic in Being and Time. And if in Heidegger's work there proved to be something called existential time
which was not amenable to the kind of scrutiny that Husserl's phenomenology provides then it would constitute a positive limit to the scope of a phenomenology of internal time-consciousness. If there were a distinctive temporality of the unconscious, that too might escape the limits of a phenomenology of time. 4

The Analysis of Time-Consciousness 5

To demonstrate the pervasive, and yet variable penetration of Husserl's account of time-consciousness by epistemological concerns it is necessary to trace out in detail the path of Husserl's thinking.

Our remarks will be based on the lectures Husserl gave at Gottingen, especially in 1904-5, and from time to time up until 1910, lectures edited by Heidegger and published in 1928. 6

The focus and scope of his analysis

As we have indicated, Husserl begins with an exclusion and an apparent self-limitation, by which his phenomenological approach will gain its specificity and privilege. But the exclusion of 'Objective time' can be understood in two different ways, and as so much is often at stake in the early moves in a philosophical text we shall take the opportunity of elucidating this exclusion by trying to adjudicate between the two ways. We can suppose Husserl to be affirming the existence of 'world time, real time, the time of nature', simply saying that he is instead to deal with 'temporal experiences', because 'we deal with reality only insofar as it is meant, presented, looked at, or conceptually thought of', or we can suppose him to be leaving that question open, putting the external reality of time in question from the very beginning. Sokolowski supposes that Husserl is committed in these lectures to the first position, which affirms but ignores 'world time' etc. so that by the time of his Ideas (1913) there is a definite change. But this is not really convincing. It is not at
all difficult to read Husserl as writing in scare-quotes when he uses expressions like world time, real time, etc. and even in the sentence Sokolowski quotes as most convincing in which Husserl finds it 'eine interessante Untersuchung' to relate subjective time-consciousness to real objective time, we can quite easily read him as referring to the way psychophysicists conceived of their project. The crucial move by which the passage from a dualistic position to one that is neutral with respect to ontological commitment is achieved is to claim that terms like 'real' and 'objective', and indeed 'time' (in phrases like 'real time' and 'objective time') derive their sense from our constitutive acts. (Husserl's strong and notorious version of this, which is said to commit him to 'idealism' can be found in Ideas). And this, it is supposed, compromises the idea that such phrases could refer to anything that as such had an independent existence because without that constitutive activity there would be no 'as such'. Versions of this move are to be found in various places in Husserl's two introductory sections. For instance

(i) '... we make the attempt to account for time-consciousness, to put Objective time and subjective time-consciousness into the right relation and thus gain an understanding of how temporal Objectivity ... can be constituted in subjective time-consciousness...' (01 Pp. 21-2)

(ii) '... Objectivity belongs to "experience", that is to the unity of experience, to the lawfully experienced context of nature. Phenomenologically speaking, Objectivity is ... constituted through characters of apprehension and the regularities which pertain to the essence of these characters' (01 p. 27)

(iii)'that these lived experiences themselves are temporally determined in an objective sense... does not concern us... On the other hand, it does interest us that objective temporal data are intended in these lived experiences' (02 p.29)

The point of bringing into prominence these early remarks is to demonstrate that Husserl from the very beginning talks of Objectivity and Objective time as being constituted by our lived experiences. And this seems, to
us at least, to count against Sokolowski's attributing dualism to Husserl at this stage. On our reading, remarks that would lead one in that direction are better taken as remarks made in the course of a transition from everyday language to a phenomenologically displaced language, and should not be taken as suggesting a theoretical commitment to dualism on Husserl's part. So on our reading, there is much less need to accommodate Husserl's views here with those in *Ideas*. The exclusion is of 'what is called' reality, transcendent objects, word time, etc. Husserl is already ontologically non-committal while programmatically anticipating a relationship of constitution. Our assumption here is that the relationship of constitution cannot hold between independently existing things, and so the more he writes about constitution, the less plausible is Sokolowski's dualistic reading at this juncture.

Husserl's initial move, then, is one that distinguishes a subject-matter ('lived experiences of time'), that excludes, as preventing a solution to the problem, any consideration of temporal transcendencies, that claims to be able to answer the question of the 'essence' of time by a phenomenological analysis of such experiences, and that already outlines the kind of generative power (in the theory of acts and constitution) that such an analysis would have. As a forceful example of the latter, for instance, he suggests the possibility of explicating the a priori features of temporal order (infinite, two-dimensional, transitive etc.) by reference to time-consciousness. But what precisely is meant by time-consciousness? By 'lived-experiences'? The language of 'acts' and 'characters of apprehension' and 'constitution' correctly suggests that Husserl's positive contribution will not merely be to have championed subjective time over against objective time, but to have established a rather subtle relationship between them,
and to have done so with an account of 'subjectivity' distinct from that of St. Augustine, James, Bergson and Brentano, each of whom might superficially be thought to have championed subjective time in the same way. We can best grasp the particular position Husserl held by following his analysis and critique of Brentano's theory of time (§3). With this analysis we shift from his introductory remarks to an account of 'lived experience', albeit one needing correction. If we have explained the aim of this move, we ought also to make explicit Husserl's justification for it. We passed it over in §1, and it runs like this

'...time and duration ... are absolute data which it would be senseless to call into question. To be sure, we also assume an existing time: this, however, is not the time of the world of experience but the immanent time of the flow of consciousness'

and he goes on

'The evidence that consciousness of a tonal process, a melody, exhibits a succession even as I hear it is such as to make every doubt or denial appear senseless' (§1 p. 23)

Now these sentences constitute for a (broadly speaking) foundationalist epistemology a justification for focussing on immanent or inner time rather than world time. We are directly aware of it, and its principle feature, succession is indisputable. Even if we have the most unlikely dreams, the wildest hallucinations, the severest of illusions, the fact of temporal succession within and between these false images will not itself be in doubt. (However teleologically askew, succession is even found in those dreams in which, as Freud reminds us involve an inversion of the proper order of events.) But these sentences are much more than a justification for dealing with a specific subject matter (inner time). We can find in these sentences the precise form of the underlying question that guides Husserl's whole analysis: what must temporal succession be like in order for our
evidence for its occurrence to be beyond all possible doubt? And we can pose Husserl's difficulty in this way: Is not 'being beyond all possible doubt' a feature reserved for what is immediately grasped? And does not any grasp of succession involve grasping a relationship between what is immediately available (a current sensation) and what is now past (a previous sensation)? Yet how can a relationship between something immediately grasped and something no longer immediately grasped be itself immediately grasped? Is not 'succession' in fact a judgement we made about our experience which, however unlikely it might seem, could be mistaken, just like any other judgement? Husserl's view, quite plausibly, is, I think, that succession is not a relation built up out of parts and a relation between them, but something primitive, and moreover that it does not breach the conditions that 'certainty' demands.

We are now in a position to follow through Husserl's discussion of Brentano's account of time with this question in mind. In Æs3-5 Husserl outlines Brentano's theory, and in Æ6, which completes the first (the shortest) section of the book, he criticizes it.

**Husserl's treatment of Brentano**

Brentano clearly shared with Husserl the idea that the question as to the 'origin' of time (i.e. its fundamental 'essence') was to be answered by isolating its primitive element. Brentano's name for this was 'the primordial sensations'. These it was that would account for the ideas of duration and succession. The part of Brentano's theory (and here I am paraphrasing Husserl; we discuss the adequacy of this presentation below) that deals with these primordial associations can be summarized in the claimed 'genesis of the immediate presentations of memory which, according to a law that admits no exceptions, are
joined to particular presentations of perception without mediation'.
Consider what it is like to listen to a tune. What happens to each
note as we hear it? If it just disappears, we would never hear the
tune, but just a succession of isolated notes and we would never even
know it was a succession. If it stays around unchanged with nothing
to distinguish it temporally from notes that followed, we would just
have a simultaneous plurality of sound. The solution must lie in a
third position. Certainly what seems to happen is that notes etc.
after first being perceived, come to seem 'temporally shoved back',
without entirely disappearing without trace. How precisely does this
happen according to Brentano, asks Husserl? It must be the case

'...that that peculiar modification occurs, that every aural
sensation, after the stimulus which begets it has disappeared
awakes from within itself a similar presentation provided
with a temporal determination, and that this determination is
continually varied, can we have the presentation of a melody
in which the individual notes have their definite place and
their definite measure of time' (p. 30)

'It is a universal law, therefore, that to each presenta-
tion is naturally joined a continuous series of presentations
each of which reproduces the content of the preceding, but
in such a way that the moment of the past is always attached
to the new' (p. 30-31)

Crucial, then, to the third alternative, is the idea that instead of
remaining unchanged, or just disappearing, sensations do not themselves
linger on, or slowly fade, but generate 'a phantasie-idea like, or
nearly like, itself, with regard to content and enriched by a temporal
character'.

This idea will also generate a modification, and so on. The
point of this, it seems, is that the arrival of a new sensation, and
the phantasy modification of a previous sensation will occur at the
same time, giving rise to a 'primordial association'. One consequence
of this of course is that one does not actually perceive succession on
Brentano's view. It simply offers an account of how one seems to see it.

But if we have supplied the basis for understanding temporal succession, we need to go further to understand the idea of time as an infinite series. For this we need to consider the role of phantasy in creatively generating the idea of the future 'from the appearance of momentary recollections'. Husserl's account of Brentano's position is quite inadequate at this point. It is not good enough to compare the generation of the idea of the future from the past with transposing a melody into a different key. I can only suppose that a fuller account of how 'phantasy forms ideas of the future' 'on the basis of momentary recollections' would refer to an imaginary self-displacement, in which one comes to see that the possibility of these being recollections is based on those original past experiences being remembered at some future date, relative to their present, namely 'now'. If the past has one of its futures realised in the present, then phantasy can suppose that this present, when past, will too. This is the most plausible expansion of Husserl's account of Brentano that I can construct; it is odd that contrary to his usual habit, Husserl offers such a condensed account.

Finally, Husserl explains Brentano's insight that the temporal modes 'past' and 'future' modify rather than define the ideas they are attached to, as do predicates like 'possible', or 'imaginary', while 'current' or 'present' or 'occurring now' are defining characteristics. However difficult it may be to swallow, it follows 'that non-real temporal determinations (past, future) can belong in a continuous series with a unique, actual, real determinateness to which they are joined by infinitesimal differences'. So the succession of sensations or ideas
should be seen as a perpetual shifting from non-real to real temporal determinations.

Husserl's critique of Brentano's theory of time is an attempt to distinguish in that theory those elements which are genuinely phenomenological, and can be built on, and those in which naturalistic, psychologistic presuppositions linger on. These presuppositions are surely at work eg. in Brentano's talk of 'stimuli' and 'objects' 'producing' sensations in us etc. We can, however, focus instead on the properly epistemological (and hence phenomenological) aspects of this theory.

The crucial first point of scrutiny is Brentano's analysis of (the appearance of) succession. Is he correct to claim that a 'now' and a 'past' can be unified in a succession only by the 'past' appearing in phantasy? Husserl's doubts run like this: we can distinguish, as we have done, two levels of Brentano's analysis - the original intuition of time (which we perceive as temporal succession) and the secondary grasping of the idea of infinite time. These two are contrasted, Husserl claims, by the former being 'authentic' - ie. involving direct intuition, while the latter is not. Now there clearly is a distinction here, but for Brentano, both are the work of phantasy, and

'If the original intuition of time is indeed a creation of phantasy, what then distinguishes this phantasy of the temporal from that in which we are aware of a past temporal thing, a thing therefore that does not belong in the sphere of primordial association and that is not closed up together in one consciousness with perception of the momentary, but was once with a past perception?' 06 pp.36-7

Husserl's point is that the distinctiveness of Brentano's 'primordial association' is threatened by the role of phantasy in its explication, for it is just the same mode which is involved in the extension of the original intuition to that of infinite time. Brentano fails to grasp
that as a merely psychological connection, phantasy cannot serve to constitute an original intuition.

Husserl proceeds to demonstrate the further inadequacies of Brentano's position from the phenomenological point of view. The main difficulty arises from Brentano's ignoring of the 'act' - aspect of consciousness. Basically, Husserl claims that Brentano treats time, or temporality as a special feature of the contents of consciousness, while he himself wants to credit specific acts of consciousness with responsibility. But Husserl's claims here seem to waver into inconsistency. He begins by claiming that Brentano does not make the act/content distinction

'Brentano did not distinguish between act and content, or between act, content of apprehension, and the object apprehended. We ourselves must be clear, however, as to where to place the temporal element'. (p.37)

but later

'... even if (Brentano)... was the first to recognize the radical separation between primary content and character of acts, still his theory of time shows that he did not take into consideration the act-characters which are decisive for this theory'. (p.40)

So, on the one hand Brentano fails to make the act/content distinction, and on the other, he makes it, but fails to employ it at the right point. Let us look more closely at his criticisms to see if we can resolve this apparent shift of ground.

Husserl's question is how temporality can arise from a mere association of ideas, taking into account only the contents of those ideas. How can a temporal difference appear through a concatenation of ideas differing only in 'richness and intensity of content'? Husserl shows that for all the ingenuity of Brentano's account, the attempt to make a particular content of consciousness both be present (a product of phantasy) and also bear the quality 'past', or signify 'past' must
fail in the absence of any reference to conscious acts, i.e. without reference to the intentional dimension of time-consciousness. Husserl's critical position can be rendered consistent: he is saying that Brentano had elsewhere made the act/content distinction but had failed to apply it to his theory of time.

Some doubts about Husserl's treatment of Brentano

In the course of the discussion we have just outlined, Husserl makes a remark which, if we take it quite strictly, gives us pause for thought.

'It is most extraordinary that in his theory of the intuition of time, Brentano did not take into consideration the difference between the perception of time and the phantasy of time, for the difference, here obtrusive, is one that he could not possibly have overlooked'.

Husserl is making an even more pointed version of the kind of remark that we met earlier concerning Brentano's failure to apply to time the act/content distinction which he, Brentano, was the first to draw in this area. Now Husserl is claiming that he must have seen the difference between perception and phantasy but made nothing of it. Rather than supposing Brentano to be lacking in intellectual acumen, we must suppose that Husserl is accentuating the limitations of Brentano's putatively psychological framework, which allowed him to grasp at one level, the psychological level, what he could not make use of at another, the epistemological. But there is another way of responding to Husserl - that indeed Brentano could not, and hence did not overlook the distinction, and that consequently Husserl is misrepresenting him.

The interests of scholarly justice require us here to make brief reference to a rather critical, indeed at times polemical assessment of the way Husserl deals with Brentano. 9 Oscar Kraus, who published
his paper in 1930, two years after Husserl's lectures on the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness had belatedly been made public, vigorously defended Brentano against Husserl's criticisms. The main points he makes are these

(1) that either Husserl himself, or Heidegger as his editor, ought to have pointed out that Brentano had abandoned the theory of time Husserl critically attributes to him by 1895 i.e. not only before the 1928 publication, but a full ten years even before Husserl's original lectures. Husserl's critique of Brentano was based on notes he had taken at Brentano's lectures (I take it during Husserl's visit to Vienna in 1884-6). Certainly by 1911, with the publication of Brentano's *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene* (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot), a copy of which Brentano sent to Husserl, Husserl knew about Brentano's new position, and should have pointed this out to his editor. (Or was this perhaps one of those points on which it is said he was less than pleased with Heidegger's editing?)

(2) Husserl's criticisms of Brentano's attempt to found time-consciousness on temporal variations of the object were predated by Brentano's own auto-critique.

(3) Husserl's new position, which makes use of 'modes of consciousness' rather than differences in objects had already been anticipated by Brentano by March 1895. There Brentano writes of his new belief in a letter to Anton Marty

(a) 'that every sensation is bound up with an apprehension of that which is sensed' (Kraus, op.cit. p. 228)

(b) '... before ... we had a limited continual series of objects in the proteraesthesia, we now have a limited continual series of modes of apprehension of the same object'
and he goes on

'(Perhaps) ... now some things are conceivable that were inconceivable before ...' (pp. 228-9)

There is much else of great interest in Kraus' paper which it would be out of place to pursue here. With the exception of one or two small points, Kraus is largely putting the record straight, criticising Husserl's misrepresentation of his own originality. But on the whole the value and interest of his published lectures - whoever's views they originally were - is not contested. The real value of Kraus' piece today, half a century later, is that it shows us that the frame of reference within which internal time-consciousness appears as a problem was quite widely shared. Kraus' concern for accuracy here is I think justified, especially in the light of the importance of Brentano's reflections of time for the phenomenological movement, and indeed for Brentano himself.

Husserl's Two Main Questions

Husserl's analysis of time-consciousness involves him, as we have said, in answering two distinct questions, at least initially, the first concerning temporal objects, and the second, time itself. He claims (p. 43) a priority of the first question over the second

'a phenomenological analysis of time cannot explain the constitution of time without reference to the constitution of the temporal object' (p. 43)

(By 'temporal object' he means unified temporally extended object). This priority claim is a little complicated by the fact that he also claims that

'all these questions are closely interrelated so that one cannot be answered without the others' (p. 42)

But certainly the approach he makes to his central schema of time in section 11 is in contrast with two further deficient theories of our
understanding of temporal objects, each of which attempts to solve the same problem that Husserl has set himself. The comprehension of a temporal object requires an act of cognition in which the temporally separate parts are brought into some sort of unity or synthesis. The two views that Husserl criticizes differ at this point, over the temporality of that act itself. The Herbart-Lotze view (which influenced Brentano) is that this unifying act must itself take place at an instant in time. For the grasp of the whole involves transcending those temporal differences into which experience has dissolved it. If this consciousness of the whole were not momentary, but itself took time, then it would perhaps itself require a further act of unification. On the other view, that of the 'specious present' which Husserl attributes to Stern¹⁰ there are said to be (at least) some cases in which the apprehension of the unity of a temporally extended object develops alongside it, and is completed with it. Listening to a song would be a good example.

Husserl is not satisfied by either version, for they each fail (as Brentano had done) to make certain fundamental distinctions. In other words, their presuppositions about the nature of experience were, phenomenologically speaking, naive.

His two main objections seem to be these: that the question of how such temporally transcendent objects are constituted (eg. as enduring unaltered, as constantly changing) is left undiscussed and unexplained. And how, on the momentary apprehension view is it possible to understand the apprehension of time itself? (Surely a momentary apprehension of flux would have to distort it.) Against the Lotze-Herbart view, Husserl says it is perfectly obvious that the 'perception of duration itself presupposes the duration of perception'; perception does not
occur at an instant. Hearing a melody is a case of perception, for instance. But when we try to explain how this occurs, we so easily fall back into talking of a cognitive act that mixes current perception with memory and expectation. But even if we focus on the very shortest phases of individual tones we remain within the kind of framework Husserl criticised in Brentano.

In all his remarks so far, Husserl has merely been clearing the way for, demonstrating the need for, a phenomenological description of the most primitive temporal phenomena.

An Analytical Preview

We would like to distinguish Husserl's account of Internal Time-Consciousness into certain broad categories, which bear some rough correspondence to Husserl's own sub-sections.

The Originary Constitution of Temporal Objects

1. A description of the modes of appearance of immanent temporal objects.
2. A description of our consciousness of those appearances.

The Consciousness of Time given via Temporal Objects

3. An attempt to explicate the nature of the continuity of our experience of temporal objects through commentary on a diagram- 'the diagram of time'.

The Consciousness of Time More Generally

4. The transition to a more general account of the consciousness of temporality.
5. An elucidation of the nature of retention.
6. The distinct role of secondary remembrance.

Epistemological Reflections

7. The scope of 'perception' within this schema.
8. The contribution of recollection.

Time Beyond Language?

The Immanent Temporal Object

Husserl's persistent critical stance is that previous accounts of time-consciousness have focussed on the contents or objects of experience at the expense of the ways in which we experience them. His repeated criticisms are designed to show that any such account will inevitably leave vital questions unanswered, especially about the way temporal objects are constituted, and about the constitution of time itself. His phenomenological elucidation begins with two parallel descriptions of our experience of 'immanent temporal objects', first as they present themselves to us, and second, the possibility of using the results of the second description as the basis for a general account of our consciousness of time that is free from the difficulties Husserl previously found.

Husserl takes his example of an immanent temporal object from the sphere of sound. Initially, he considers using a melody as his focus. But the question of how different notes, or tones are unified into a cohesive whole already takes for granted the temporal unification of discrete tones, each of which endures. So he takes the single briefly enduring tone as his example of an immanent temporal object. A tone is chosen, one supposes, because it allows the basic structure of time-consciousness to emerge with minimum sensory content. Sounds, even treated as material (transcendent) phenomena are essentially evanescent, essentially temporal. Arguably persistent tones are to time what lines are to space, and it is, accordingly, no accident that Husserl resorts to a geometrical schema to illustrate the basic structure of time. And his concern to establish the nature of the temporal continuum completes the parallel.
understand time on the model of space that has prevented an adequate grasp of time heretofore, but the particular way that comparison has been drawn. At its simplest, if the usual mode makes out time to be a line with a direction, Husserl is adding a 'depth' to that line. But as we shall see shortly, the nature of that 'depth' is far from simple.

Let us turn, then to Husserl's pair of descriptions. First that of immanent temporal objects and their modes of appearance in a continuous flux.

The first description is of the various ways we are (temporally speaking) conscious of an immanent object "as" ... Thus 

'The sound is given: that is, I am conscious of it as now, and I am so conscious of it "as long as" I am conscious of any of its phases as now' (8, p. 44

Most of the ways the object present itself "as" are marked in the text by scare quotes: "Before", "during", "for a while", "expired". He describes quite uncontentiously the way we become aware of a sound as beginning, as ending, as coming to an end, as having just finished, and being past. He also introduces the key concept of 'retention' which will later play such an important role. He describes it as the way in which we still hold onto sounds that have ceased to be impressions and have 'sunk back' as he puts it.

'What we have described here', he says, 'is the manner in which the immanent temporal object "appears" in a continuous flux, ie. how it is given'. And he concludes by carefully drawing our attention to the fact (8, p 45) that his description of the manner of the object's appearance is not in fact a description of its temporal duration, for that duration is part of the immanent object (the same sound ...) itself, and is presupposed by the whole description. Through the
various modes of its appearance the same duration is lived, "expired" or remembered.

The second, parallel description (89) concerns 'the way in which we are "conscious of" all differences in the "appearing" of immanent sounds and their content of duration'. It is this shift that will inaugurate the discussion of the constitution of temporal objects through consciousness.

The key distinction he makes in this passage centres around the application of the term 'perception', a term which he will discuss thematically in 16, 17, which is the occasion of a great deal of careful footwork throughout. Here, Husserl wants to claim that while the sound is perceived, we can only say of the period of its duration that it is perceived moment by moment.

'We speak here with regard to the perception of the duration of the sound which extends into the actual now, and say that the sound, which endures, is perceived, and that of the interval of duration of the sound, only the point of duration characterized as now is veritably perceived' (our emphasis)

The significance of the term 'veritable' (eigentlich) will only appear during his later distinction of the two senses (restricted and extended) of perception in 17. For now, we need only point out that Husserl is setting up the problem of temporal constitution. For he is claiming that the sound as a whole, the enduring sound, the temporally extended sound is perceived, and yet the interval of its duration is only perceived at each now. Strangely making no reference to future-oriented constituting modes of consciousness (later called 'protentional') his first stab at an account of temporal constitution, at aligning the two levels of perception, at constituting a whole out of temporal parts, involves the deployment of the idea of retention, and that of degrees of clarity and distinctness in the
objects of 'retentional consciousness'. The retentional mode of consciousness operates at two different levels - both as functioning within the duration of (eg.) a sound, in which to every now there attaches a retention 'tail' - and with respect to 'the running-off of the entire duration'. And coupled with each of these levels is a graded loss of clarity and distinctness as the distance from the 'now' point increases, which again allows Husserl to draw the spatial analogy.

On the basis of these brief remarks, Husserl reiterates and clarifies the basic distinction he is making, one by which his difference from Brentano will be made explicit. The "object in the mode of running-off" is involved in constant change and as such is 'always something other'. (And yet 'we still say that the object and every part of its time and this time itself are one and the same'.) But, again making the analogy with a spatial appearance, this is not a form of consciousness, even if, as is just as clear, there must be for Husserl an analytical interdependence between 'the object-as' and the mode of consciousness.

We have to bear this distinction in mind to enable us to understand what precisely is going on in Husserl's 'diagram of time', which we must now discuss.

The Diagram of Time

Husserl entitles §10 "The Continuum of Running-Off Phenomena- the Diagram of Time", and for all his insistence on the distinction between 'the object in the mode of running-off' and the consciousness for which that occurs, there is very little if any need to refer to this latter at all, in understanding the diagram, which, whatever it is supposed to be, is actually a representation of the temporal
constitution of an immanent object. Modes of consciousness such as running-off are exhausted, from a diagrammatic point of view, by what they 'intend'. Perhaps we should put this another way: the structure of Husserl's analysis here, of the double continuity of the modes of running-off of the object seems to us compatible with various interpretations of the status of this Ablaufsphänomene, so it is not obvious to this reader at least that the particular status Husserl wishes to claim for them is demonstrated by this analysis or even specifically presupposed by it. 'Running-off phenomena' are, for Husserl, synonymous with 'modes of temporal orientation', which are modes of consciousness. And yet the particular concept of consciousness required by this analysis is at best a passive, registering one, rather than one involved in (say) some of the higher order complexities of constitution. There is eg. no reference to protention, no reference to the epistemological mechanism by which an object is identified as this or that x through time, and so on.

Husserl's real achievement is to have supplied an answer to the problem of continuity through time, although, as we have already suggested, it is in no way complete. For ease of reference we reproduce Husserl's diagrams and his explanations.
To these explanations we ought to add that P-P₁ is an arbitrarily chosen perception or experience or phase of the object somewhere between the beginning (0) and the end (E). The first diagram concerns the ongoing temporal constitution of an enduring temporal constitution of an enduring immanent object (e.g., a sound) and the second places such a completed object of consciousness in the framework of the past and undetermined future.

Two key terms Husserl uses call for comment:

1. (modes of) running-off (Ablaufsphänomene)
2. sinking down (Herabsinken)

When we hear an enduring tone, a sound that lasts, each analytically distinguished phase of each note begins with a 'now' and then reappears as something 'past'. These expressions name 'running-off characters'. Running-off itself, however, involves understanding these as reflecting 'modes of temporal orientation'. Presumably, then, this is meant to
illuminate the fact that, while at one moment we are aware of something happening, at the next, we are aware of it as having happened. Certain of Husserl's formulations suggest that each of these is in-itself, a kind of running-off, but I take it that the word 'mode' points to the essential unity of each of these phases, and that the 'running-off' itself is the flux from temporal mode to temporal mode.

'Sinking down' adds the idea that each impression is retained in sequence, in a kind of depth of sedimented layers that attaches itself to any later 'now'. So essentially the vertical axis just repeats the horizontal axis, but having converted something sequential into a sedimented depth, it is a repetition that transforms. The most important consequence of this transformation is that it generates a continuum and it is the purpose of this section to explain more carefully the nature of this continuum.

Husserl does not say so explicitly, but as I understand him, a temporal continuum is required for us to successfully 'intend' objective duration. That is, we know or suppose that the sound we hear is a 'single enduring sound'. But we may in fact not hear it in an unbroken sequence. Nonetheless, we are conscious of it as unbroken sequence. Nonetheless, we are conscious of it as unbroken, as a single sound. The continuity of our own experience of it forms the basis of this. We may then surmise that this continuity will equally play a role in allowing us to understand the unity of time itself. So how is this continuity explained?

His first explanation is something close to an assertion, coupled with an explanation of why it might not seem to be a continuum. He writes

'With regard to the running-off phenomena, we know that
it is a continuity of constant transformations which form an inseparable unit, not severable into parts which could be by themselves nor divisible into phases, points of the continuity which could be by themselves.'

In other words, he is claiming from the start that any talk of bits or parts of time (moments, instants...) as actually existing is a false abstraction from a natural flux. This is quite understandable, and indeed something of a commonplace among such theories. But it is quite another thing to explain the structure of this confusion. It is Husserl's striking claim that we have to do with a double continuum, or rather continuity operating at two distinct levels, to which the two diagrams correspond. His most concise account of the position is this

'...the continuity of running-off of an enduring object is a continuum whose phases are the continua of the modes of running-off of the different temporal points of the duration of the object.' Ø10, p. 50.

Or again

'Since a new now is always presenting itself, each now is changed into a past, and thus the entire continuity of the running-off of the parts of the preceding points moves uniformly 'downward' into the depths of the past' Ø10, p. 50.

What I take it he is claiming is this: that if each moment of experience is coupled to a continuum of past phases, any subsequent moment will have the previous moment with its attached continuum as one of its own phases. If we allow brackets to enclose attached continua of past phases, then we could represent this complex continuity thus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>abstracted point moment (starting with a as the original moment)</th>
<th>structure of continuum of phases</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>l</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>b(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>c(b(a))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>d(c(b(a)))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

etc.
We could already call this a 'double continuity' but I do not think this is what Husserl means. We call series 1 a continuum because of the merely abstract nature of the 'now'-points. Or, to put it better, what this series a, b, c, d, etc. abstracts from is a continuum. Series II is a continuum by virtue of its constant inclusions of itself. But perhaps Husserl has in mind a different conjunction, between series II (or the unity of series I & II above), and a continuity established among successive past phases of a completed sound. This, I take it, is what he means when he says (and here he is commenting on the second version of the diagram) that

'(a) series of modes of running-off begins which no longer contains a now (or duaration). The duration is no longer actual, but past, and constantly sinks deeper into the past'. Ø10, p.50

This conjunction of continuities would then be established between the constitutive continuity of our consciousness of duration of an immanent objects, as it unfolds, and the continuity among our retentions or recollections of it, once it has unfolded. And the initially constitutive continuum of temporal phases is enclosed as completed, within the continuity established by our memorial consciousness in its successive phases.

**Nietzschean doubts about Husserl's claims**

How ought we to assess these claims? Husserl's method we ought to recall, is purely descriptive. He is not offering us a model of how things might be (that we might verify or otherwise), or how things ought to be (whether they are or not), but of how things are, and how it is perfectly clear that they are when we reflect. Confronted with a concept of time as merely flat linear extension, it is certainly an achievement to have begun, at least, to shake that picture, to have offered an account of what the continuity of lived,
experienced time, could look like. But is it more than that? Or is Husserl, in effect, offering us a geometry of time that idealizes rather than describes our actual experience? To pursue this line of criticism, consider the claimed (double) continuity of our experience of an immanent temporal object. If the succession of sinkings-down (which he will soon call retentions) were a natural process, like that of the sedimentation of silt in rivers, then the order of succession would indeed be perfectly followed. But if, as he claims, retention is an intentional consciousness (or an aspect of such), are there not going to be other considerations, interests, motives, than the simple recording of the actual order of incoming impressions?

An example drawn from Nietzsche is apposite here

'The error of imaginary causes. - To start from the dream: on to a certain sensation, the result for example of a distant cannon-shot, a cause is subsequently foisted (often a whole little novel in which precisely the dreamer is the chief character). The sensation, meanwhile continues to persist, as a kind of resonance: it waits, as it were, until the cause-creating drive permits it to step into the foreground - now no longer as a chance occurrence but as meaning'.

What this example suggests is that if we think of consciousness as having a central 'meaning-bestowing' function, then not only is there no guarantee that this will ensure the faithful reproduction in experience, of the real order of events, but there is every reason to believe that this does not always happen. However we must not draw this conclusion quite so quickly. Two difficulties stand in the way of considering Nietzsche's example as an objection to Husserl. First, it could be said, he works within a clearly pre-phenomenological dualism, in which there are then problematic
alignments of objective and subjective times. Second, Nietzsche is arguably utilizing a notion of the 'Unconscious' which would be quite alien to Husserl.

Husserl explains to us early on why he is not interested in experimental comparisons of inner and outer time. But there is surely a difference between experiments demonstrating lengthening and fore-shortening of perceived time with respect of 'real time', on the one hand, and demonstrations that between the two there are changes of order, structural transformations. These would have an essential (and not merely qualitative) significance. If so, however, it would seem to cast doubt on the practice of suspending all consideration of 'objective time' (assuming it to be possible) as Husserl recommends. He takes for granted, I would suggest, that the structural transformations that occur between the two are limited to those that ultimately preserve the original order.

In fact, we can read Nietzsche's suggestion in two ways

(1) as suggesting a break between objective and subjective time
(2) as suggesting a break between the order of sensation and the order of experience.

If it is objected that the former considerations are inadmissible within Husserl's framework we are surely entitled to consider the latter, particularly given Husserl's own reference to sensations (hyle).

What is so interesting about Nietzsche's example is that like Husserl he makes use of a concept of retention ('the sensation, meanwhile, continues to persist, as a kind of resonance') and like Husserl, his 'retention', while being a phase of an intentional act is not one in itself (see below, p.71f ). And yet Nietzsche is not, I believe,
claiming that his retention is merely a physical or empirical psychological phenomenon. He is, I would say, claiming an unconscious retentionality — something which Husserl could not envisage. But for all that, Nietzsche's is an account of the necessary meaningfulness of consciousness. Here this necessity demands that the sound be experienced not merely as an external interruption of a dream sequence, but, suitably interpreted, as playing a significant part in it. The sound that actually was a cannon shot is incorporated into the dream (in, say, a dream involving a house) as the slamming of the front door...

The justification of taking such an example seriously within a Husserlian framework is this: (1) that if we consider the facts of sensation rather than those of 'real events', we move on terrain Husserl (rightly or wrongly, from his point of view) has already legitimated, (2) that even within Husserl's framework we could say that the hyletic level is an unconscious level, in that it does not, by itself, constitute consciousness.

But the gap between Nietzsche and Husserl remains. For Husserl, consciousness begins, as I understand it, with the transition from the impressional consciousness of a sensation of sound, to a retentional consciousness of the same. For Nietzsche, we remain at the level of sensation, even with retention added on, until the sound is taken up into consciousness by being given a meaning.

What, one wonders, would Husserl say about such an example? It clearly demands a response. (Freud quite independently discusses the way in which dreams utilize inversions of natural order to create their effects.) He could suggest that dreams are not the proper basis on which to construct an account of ordinary experience. And yet it
is Nietzsche's (and Freud's) belief that it is impossible to restrict the scope of these mechanisms (eg. of delay, of inversion) to specially contained regions of 'unconscious life'. The demand that our experience exhibit a certain sort of intelligible structure underlies our belief in the Self, our insistence on causal connections, belief in God, and so on. And, to maintain a parallel in conscious life with the specific dream example, if we DO come across an event of unknown provenance, we assume it has causal antecedents sufficient to explain it, and will usually assume it to be of this or that sort. And if Kuhnian accounts of experimentation in periods of 'normal' science are to be believed, it is much harder to even notice things happening for which we have no explanation. This would suggest that a similar sequence of delayed registration of sensation $\rightarrow$ successful scanning for interpretive schema $\rightarrow$ conscious registration of sensation, operates in ordinary experience. Differential delay in the second stage can cause inversions of the sort that Nietzsche has described. This would mean that the singularity of dreams would not stand up as an objection. Needless to say, even if one were to concede the idiosyncratic character of dreams, Husserl would still have to account for such experiences, and it would seem that his conceptual framework is far from ideally suited to handling them.

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So far, it is the concept of retention that has been our focus. In essence, all of Husserl's arguments are designed to show that it is a mode of access to the past that is "originary" not to be confused with any of the ordinary everyday empirical acts that it itself must play a part in constituting, in making possible. It is by this claim that Husserl distances himself from any kind of psychologism, which is
always presented as a confusion of levels. Retention is an ineliminable and irreducibly temporal phase of consciousness. Husserl's discussion, as we have so far presented it, has focussed on its role in constituting immanent temporal objects, objects whose identity is inseparable from their temporal extension and whose existence as such is inseparable from our experience of them. However successful we rate this account, it is a further step to explain how this helps us understand how immanent time itself is constituted. This is one of the tasks that now faces us. And beyond that we have to ask the question whether the immanent time grasped through our consideration of temporal objects is not perhaps a limited conception of time, and whether any more original temporality could be unearthed. This will take us on to consider Husserl's description of Absolute Flux. But first we have to realize that an account of immanent time cannot be developed without going beyond primary meaning, retention, to consider the positive role of reproductive, secondary memory. This is an enormously rich and valuable part of Husserl's work, for he is showing that even if retention is essential for the constitution of time, it is not sufficient.

Retention and Reproductive Consciousness

In discussing the relationship between retentional and reproductive consciousness, reflection on the expression 'retentional consciousness' itself will serve us well. The intimacy that holds between primal impression and retentional consciousness is founded on two conditions-(1) that between the contents of each there is a continual passing over from impression to retention, (2) that both impression and retention are modes of consciousness. Impressional conscious-
ness is (now) directed towards what is sensed, retentional consciousness is (now) directed towards what has just been sensed. Both are immediate, non-reproductive modes of consciousness.

The language of 'peeling off', 'passing over', 'running off', 'sinking down' is all carefully designed to suggest a mere change in 'temporal place' of the same content, with only a new angle being required for the intentional ray directed towards it. We need further to bear in mind two things: first, what we have called the succession of inclusion involved in retention, and second, that all these accounts in which reference is made to this or that particular retention must be understood in the light of the fact that individual retentions are only abstract moments of a continuous flux. Husserl's reference is to a 'continuous modification' (Ø11, p. 50) and, later, to retentions as mere phases of a flux (p. 54). The relation between a phase and that of which it is a phase is vital to Husserl's characterization of retentional consciousness. Phases are not independent parts of wholes. They are, as Husserl wants to claim for retention, logically connected to their fluxes, to the structure of any such flux — namely that it always begins with an impression, a now source. A retention is always a retention of. But the uniqueness of this relationship is that it is not a reproductive relationship, it does not involve images, or signs. Husserl's position stands or falls with the claim that it is an originary mode of consciousness. It is no more an imagistic, reproductive consciousness than it is a mere quasi-physical echo or reverberation.

The Dependence of Recollection on Retention

Here Husserl is not just making analytical distinctions, nor
'merely' describing phenomena as they present themselves to us; he is doing phenomenological epistemology. He has, in effect, an argument to the effect that symbolic, imagistic, representational relationships to the past must at some point as a matter of principle depend on our having an 'intuition of the past' (Ø11, p. 53), which, as we have said, he calls an 'originary consciousness'. It is only because we have a retentional grasp of the past that other (secondary) forms of memory can be understood to be 'of the past'. The supposition is that only what we can be acquainted with directly can we give sense to. Without retention, we would, I take it, be unable to distinguish - even in principle - memory from imagination. Of course we cannot in practice always do this, but the access to the past that retention (in a limited way) provides gives sense to the distinction that we may or may not on any particular occasion be able to make accurately.

Husserl here seems to be discounting the possibility that we might be able to make sense out of the various ways in which acquaintance, direct grasping, confronts its limits, which it cannot penetrate. To be specific, he presupposes that our grasp of the past has to be a positive rather than a negative one. But he would respond, I take it that to talk of 'the various ways in which acquaintance, direct grasping, confronts its limits,' begs the question, for it does not explain how these 'ways' are in fact distinct. Both memory and imagination deal with what is 'not actual'; the difference between them is that the former deals with what 'has been' the case, and the latter with what 'might be/have been' the case. The 'beyond' that memory deals with is distinguished from the 'beyond' of imagination (say) by the meaning of 'has been'. And our only source for that is
primary (retentional) memory.

Of course this reply we have provided for Husserl could itself be challenged. Surely we do have other ways of distinguishing memory from imagination, ways that rest on the fact that memory of states of affairs that still persist will give us knowledge we can check. I may 'imagine' that I have a tail, and 'remember' that I do not (and perhaps, qua human being, could not). The difference between these instances of memory and imagination, determining which is which, will be established by feeling for my tail. Of course such tests are not in themselves conclusive. Not all that one remembers is still the case, and some of what one imagines is actually true. That one can easily construct scenarios in which such tests would mislead is not the point. The very fact that one could broadly distinguish a class of experiences that mislead and another class that, making due allowances for the ways things can change, does not is what is significant. However, unless one at some point begs the question it is hard to see how such a distinction could do more than provide a way of guessing more or less accurately, assuming one had no other way of telling, which experiences were memories and which phantasy. But it would not quite so obviously provide us with the sense of these terms. They might be thought synonymous with more predictive/less predictive! Perhaps Husserl has a point. But what would he say to the further suggestion that precisely because retention is a mode of self-evidence, or direct awareness, that it cannot convey pastness to us, for the past is essentially what is no longer in any sense present? This question will be touched on again in a later section on Perception (see below $\S$23-6). The beginning of an answer might go like this: that the force of this objection is such as to focus one's attention on the
importance of supplementing retention by a consideration of reproductive memory. It might be, in other words, that while reproductive memory was dependent on retention, that the possibility of forming the basis for a reproduction was just as essential for retention to be the primitive form of our access to the past.

While we are considering alternatives to Husserl's use of retention to provide us with a grasp of the past, we might reflect that from the human point of view, the most striking feature of the past is not at all that it 'has been' but that it now must be, that it cannot now be changed. What is done, is done. There is no use crying over spilt milk.... It could be said however, that this could not serve as a defining feature of the past because the present cannot be changed either, and perhaps some aspects of the future are similarly immutable. As regards the future, however, it would only be a kind of folly (it would not be absurd) to try to prevent the sun rising tomorrow. Our inability to cut a cake into three halves is another form of determination quite different from the fixedness of the past. One can of course often restore affairs to their original state - retying a shoe-lace, rebuilding a wall, washing the dishes - but that does not repeal the past. One does not thereby wipe out the fact that the laces came undone, that the wall fell down, that the dishes were used, even if one wipes out all evidence of this fact. Again, it could be argued that the past, or at least the future past can indeed be changed by my current and future actions. I can, today or tomorrow, bring it about that I am (at some future date) remembered as a generous benefactor. Nonetheless I cannot bring it about that I did do something yesterday if I did not. It is the indeterminacy of the future that prevents symmetrical remarks being made about what
I will do from having the same force.

How about the claim that the present, at least, can no more be changed than the past, and so, again, immutability cannot serve as a distinguishing characteristic of the past? It is difficult to respond neatly to this. If we understand the present as the instant of sensate consciousness, then it is true that if I am sensing x at $t^1$, there is no changing that fact, except by moving on to $t^2$, to another present. With such a view of the present, one would have to add 'and not at this instant being sensed' as a rider to the unchangeability of the past. But if one thinks of 'the present' as having some duration (or indeed as being conscious duration) as we do in a loose colloquial way, then it is clearly a locus for a change, indeed perhaps the only one. If I look round to see what is making a purring sound at my ear, I change the focus of my attention. I can only act in the present, and in doing so, of course I take time, and so change the present! It would seem clear that the present as commonly understood cannot be thought of as unchangeable, for it is precisely the locus of change.

This however suggests a further objection — that the future cannot be changed not because it is fixed, but because it is not fixed. If it is not fixed, it cannot be changed, for there is nothing for it to be changed from. Perhaps we should say this — that the distinctiveness of a past consists in the fact that our current actions can have no effect on it, while they can affect what will be the case.

If this general contention can be sustained, does it not provide an alternative candidate for 'the meaning of the past' to that provided by retention? Clearly there are fundamental issues involved here, for we would be introducing a pragmatic, active, existential dimension
into a contemplative, epistemological framework, and somewhat vulgarly at that. But the possibility that it might be in just such a dimension that the past derives its 'meaning' cannot be ruled out.

There is, however, one final qualification I would like to make to the suggestion that the unchangeability of the past might be its defining feature. It would seem to confine our understanding of the past to a collection of events, the 'limits' of which are fixed at the time at which they occur. But there are two ways at least in which, if we abandon that presupposition, it would be possible to change the past. We can act in such a way as to change the meaning of a feature of the past. If I make many sacrifices towards the attaining of a supreme goal, and I am now at the point of being able to achieve it, I can act in such a way as to make sense of those sacrifices, or to make them in retrospect, futile. A more interesting example can be found in the act of forgiveness, as Levinas discusses it. The act forgiven cannot be undone, but forgiveness can effect a kind of moral wiping out of the past. We shall return to these sort of questions below.

The Difference between Retention and Reproduction

'we characterised primary remembrance or retention as a comet's tail which is joined to actual perception. Secondary remembrance or recollection is completely different'. (Ø14, p. 57.)

How is this difference described?

As usual Husserl offers us first a simple story, which he attributes to Brentano, one that seems plausible, but which does not survive critical scrutiny.

The simple story and its defects

'...actual perception is constituted on the basis of
In other words, on this account both retention and recollection are representational phantasies, the difference being that the former are not 'joined to perceptions'.

The flaw in this story, put very simply, is that it assimilates memory to phantasy, but more importantly, even if (as 019 suggests) we allow that assimilation, to treat retention, primary memory as rooted in phantasy, is to make it impossible to understand how secondary remembrance can reproduce what was once 'experienced', i.e. perceived. Reproductive memory must refer back to an original self-given, non-reproductive, grasp of an immanent object, and that cannot be provided by an essentially reproductive 'phantasy'.

It would be a misleading portrayal of Husserl's position, however, to focus too singularly on the non-representational nature of primary, retentive consciousness. This is a vital component of his account of time, but it might suggest that reproductive modes of consciousness are merely reproductive, with no special contribution to make to our understanding of time. And it is surely one of the great strengths and indeed virtues of his position that he recognizes the vital positive constitutive role(s) played by reproductive consciousness (see esp. 018, 032). The argument has the structure of what Derrida will call 'supplementarity' (see below, ch. 4). This we will pursue after a fuller discussion of the difference between retention and reproduction, primary and secondary memory.

Reproduction is not all of the same kind. Husserl makes a distinction between at least two different forms of reproductive
memory which we could call (a) simple recalling, (b) recapitulative memory. The first affords us largely unanalysed glimpses of the past, the second, a systematic reconstitution of the past experience. Husserl seems typically to focus on the latter.

He also mentions a spontaneous form of reflection on (say) some just completed phases of a melody, which is neither simply itself retention, nor a reproduction of the sequence. We simply have the ability to glance back at what we have just experienced. What is puzzling about this is the status it is meant to have. While Husserl does not say so, it could be argued that this capacity for spontaneous retro-glancing is quite vital for understanding our ability either to experience immanent temporal objects of any significant duration, or to recall them in their extended unity of duration. For even if we do not (as 'psychologists' have variously given for short-term memory) give any precise quantified limits to retention, it is hard to see how one could actually hold even a short story in one's retentive grasp, let alone a symphony, without some intermediary form of partial and successive retro-glancing, which would allow the process of constitution of an immanent temporal object to work at different levels. I read these brief remarks as Husserl's attempt to solve the problem of the limitation of the range of retention. But it is nonetheless theoretically problematic. It is not a 'mode of accomplishment of reproduction' because it is not reproductive. Nor is it simple retention. Husserl's words surely belie a certain unease ('Es scheint also, das wir sagen können: ...' Ø15) - as if we seem to be able to say it, but he does not quite know how. His justification is of course that of one who is faithfully describing what he sees, whether or not it is theoretically convenient. Its place in this section on the varieties
of reproduction rests on what it shares with reproductive modes of consciousness - that 'this givenness certainly refers back to another "primordial" ("ursprüngliche") one.' (Ø15, p. 60) But instead of immediately pursuing the consequences of trying to assimilate this rearward glancing in some theoretical way, I want to draw attention to a phrase Husserl employs at the end of the first paragraph of Ø15, for it opens up a more general question about how we should understand the phenomenological status of Husserl's claim in particular about reproduction. After briefly describing recapitulative memory (distinguishing it from what we have called simple recalling) he remarks 'However, everything (here) has the index of reproductive modification'. And we ask - what is it to have the index of reproductive modification? In particular, does this mean that reproduction bears (or bares) its status as reproduction on its phenomenological sleeve? Can one always or usually tell 'at the time' just by spontaneous reflection on the experience itself whether it is, say, primary or secondary memory or phantasy or 'living experience'? Or is he in fact saying that it is the analysis or description of reproductive memory that 'has the index of reproductive modification'?

Immanent description and analytical reflection: Husserlian ambiguities

The motivation of our question must be clear. A similar question could be asked by sceptics of various hues. But it is not our purpose here to cast doubt on the concept of recollection. We are interested, however, in marking the point at which Husserl moves from immanent description to what we could call reflective (analytical) description,
and for two reasons. Firstly, Husserl himself does not always pay attention to this shift, although from his own (phenomenological) point of view, it is quite crucial. And secondly, one would suspect that it is at the reflective, analytical level that we would find not only an intensification of theoretical insight, but also the quiet accumulation of dogma.

To appreciate the importance of this distinction between descriptive and analytical phenomenology, consider the following possibility: much of what Husserl wants to say about the distinctive features of 'recollection' cannot be said to fall under the heading of 'immanent description'. Indeed Husserl himself, having already devoted a number of sections to the distinctive features of recollection, goes so far as to point out (Ø19, p. 68), as if for the first time, that between 'representifying memory and primary remembrance' there exists 'a great phenomenological difference' which 'is revealed by a careful comparison of the lived experiences involved in both'. And what he means by a 'great phenomenological difference' is, it seems 'radical differences in content' (p. 69). The possibility we referred to above is this: that however much it may be crucial for Husserl's general programme, and indeed his particular analysis of time-consciousness, that he go beyond Brentano's interest (however shortlived) in the contents of consciousness, it is to just such differences in content that Husserl returns to bring out the 'great phenomenological difference' between retention and recollection. Even if it would be to unfairly exaggerate this remark to suppose that he was claiming the only difference was one of content, why does he use the word 'phenomenological' just at the point at which he wants
to talk about the contents of lived experience? (With one trivial exception, it is the first time he has used the word 'phenomenological' for 25 pages.) Might it be that differences at the level of acts are not phenomenologically accessible if one understands by phenomenology the immanent description of lived experience? Certainly many of the claims Husserl makes are simple deductions from certain basic principles he has established about experience (eg. the necessity for all experiences to be either self-given or related to one which is (or was) self-given). Whatever we ought to conclude here, we hope now to at least show that many of the differences between retention and reproduction owe more to reflection, to what must be the case, than to immanent description. And it makes the relationship between the two levels of description problematic in principle, as it certainly was in practice for Husserl himself.

Consider Ø 14 "Reproduction of Temporal Objects - Secondary Remembrance". Clearly taking reproductive memory as his model, one of his main points is that from the point of view of the experiencer 'the entire phenomenon of memory has, mutatis mutandis, exactly the same constitution as the perception of the melody' (Ø14, p. 57) (we pass over the details here). 'Everything thus resembles perception and primary remembrance and yet is not itself perception and primary resemblance'. What separates the two cases are facts about them (that we are not, in memory, actually hearing) and all that flows from these facts about the epistemological status of recollection ("presentified but not perceived"). Husserl will later (Ø19) attempt to distinguish phenomenologically (ie. in terms of content, as we have noted) these two, but his preparedness to follow through a very simple model of reproduction without much thought already calls for
comment.

By his 'very simple model' I mean the idea that reproduction is indeed just that - the re-living of the original experience just as one originally experienced it. It is important to remember that Husserl takes this to be the standard case, not an ideal, realised perhaps under special conditions. The implausibility of this model of perfect reproduction can be seen by reflecting on the following sentence, in which he is describing how in reproduction the operation of primary remembrance remains intact, the seal unbroken:

'with the apprehension of the sound appearing now, heard as if now, primary remembrance blends in the sounds heard as if just previously and the expectation (protention) of the sound to come' (Ø14, p. 58.)

It is extraordinary that we should have had to wait so long for a reference to protention, but here surely it is fatal for his account. For a recollection that ignored the question of whether or not the protentions in the original experience had or had not been fulfilled, a recollection that abjured the benefits of hindsight would surely be a very odd and unusual thing. If the memory is of our first listening to a piece of music, our knowledge of how it goes will interfere with the protentional structure of the original experience on recall. Where once we did not know what to expect, we now do .... To be fair, Husserl discusses some of these points in Ø24, but Ø14 exhibits no anticipatory awareness of the coming destruction of its model of recollection.

If Husserl has wanted a critical difference between primary and secondary remembrance, one which spans the space between what I have called analytical and immanent description, a discussion of the interference patterns produced by the shape of subsequent pro-
tentional fulfillment would surely have filled the bill. What does Husserl offer us in the way of a 'phenomenological difference'? His analysis of the 'hearing of two or three sounds' (019) is intended to provide the answer. Unfortunately, his discussion (019, pp. 68-70) is at best confusing and at worst itself confused. His attempt to demonstrate a phenomenological difference between the two (i.e. between primary and secondary remembrance) seems to involve both the identification of phantasy and presentification and yet importantly distinguish between the two, and it is altogether unclear what the final upshot is. When a clearer claim does emerge, it seems, as often happens, to be an analytical distinction posing as an immanent descriptive one. Husserl claims that there is a difference between the modification of consciousness involved in the transition from 'an originary now into one that is reproduced', on the one hand, and 'the modification which changes the now ... into the past'. But after having first suggested that the difference lies in the way the latter involves a 'continuous shading-off', he then states that 'reproduction ... requires exactly the same gradations although only reproductively modified'. And unless what is meant by 'reproductively modified' can be made phenomenologically clear (i.e. clear in immanent description) we are dealing again with another analytical distinction that does not make itself experientially apparent. 17

The Freedom of Reproduction

In his discussion of the "freedom" of reproduction we do however find a plausible candidate for an experientially distinguishing feature, even though there is a certain exaggeration involved. Husserl claims that there is a basic difference between the passive way in which we
can merely observe the sinking-down of original impressions into their retentional phases, and the free activity involved in reproducing (presentifying) the successive phases of a temporal interval.

'We can carry out the presentification "more quickly", or "more slowly", clearly and explicitly or in a confused manner, quick as lightning at a stroke, or in articulated steps, and so on.' (Ø20, p. 71).

This is surely an important claim. And it raises the most interesting questions in its own right. I shall consider three. The first two concern the status of the term 'can'.

In the section title, the word "freedom" is in scare quotes, as if Husserl was not sure it was quite appropriate. In fact Husserl is deeply committed to the idea of freedom, even if it does not play for him (as it does for, say, Sartre) a central role. For example, when endorsing (while modifying) Descartes' universal doubt (in Ideas Ø31) he writes 'the attempt to doubt everything has its place in the realm of our perfect freedom'. There too, the power of the 'can' devolves from our capacity as conscious beings to modify our mode of consciousness, to 'transform' our cognitive attitudes. There is an essential element of voluntarism operating here; the 'can' does not just refer to possibilities (as in, say, 'beetles can come in many shapes and sizes'). But it is a little difficult to know how eg. it is within our freedom to modify the level of clarity or confusion in our reproductions. It would seem to presuppose that the 'base' for this freedom in reproduction is perfectly clear access to the past, which we then deliberately may allow to become confused. It is hard to see how one could reconstitute clarity from confusion. But it is in fact just as difficult to see how we can introduce confusion into clarity, while at the same time (in some sense) having access to the (clear) version being confused. In fact the assumption
of perfectly clear access to the past is itself problematic for two reasons: (1) it would itself have to involve reproductive memory, and hence pose the same difficulty again, or be a kind of access not yet discovered, (2) while we may have such clarity on odd occasions, it is hardly something we can take for granted, and when we lack it, it does not seem to be remediable by an exercise of our freedom. The second point to be made about this 'can' is not a criticism, rather an observation: it itself involves a temporality that requires a complex use of Husserl's categories to be explained. One stab at an analysis of its specific temporality would be this: it is the reflective assertion (which transcends but includes 'expectation') of a generalised protentional possibility. If anything like this is true, it would at least call for a reassessment of any suggestion that the difference between retentional passivity and reproductive activity is one open to simple immanent observation, for the sense of '(I) can' must surely be seen either as a reflective addition to the bare activity of reproduction, or as introducing reflection into the very experience of reproduction.

The Preservation of Order

Finally, it is interesting to note the privilege accorded to the order of events or phases being reproduced, even though we are allowed to break the continuity into 'articulated steps' which would seem to set the scene for transformations of order too. But why not extend the exercise of our freedom to the order as well? The simple answer is that it couldn't be a reproduction of the original experience if the order of its parts was tampered with. Variations of speed or clarity, and a kind of phase-parsing seem to be acceptable but not
changes of order. The intuition behind this would seem to be that a change of order could only take the form of error, an intrinsic failure of reproduction, like adding an element that had never occurred. Clearly one can make mistakes about order. (Indeed this possibility is discussed in §22.) But not all transformations of order need be mistakes. If reproduction cannot avoid the destruction of the innocence of the protentional unfulfillments of its original experience, it might well be that the reproduction of an original experience could begin with a glimpse at the outcome or the end. (Think of trying to run over the construction of a plot in a novel one has just read, or the course of an important conversation, or a trial, or a joke.) There might be resistance to calling this reproduction, but (a) it is clearly not the same thing as error, for there need be no deception involved, no supposition that the end phase actually did come first, (b) nor is it a case of phantasy, because there is genuine reference to a past that actually occurred, (c) in the light of the effects wrought by knowledge of protentional fulfillments, one might conclude that there is nothing radically different in reproductive representations involving at some level, complex splicings of past and future, rather than the simple maintenance of the original 'order'.

Husserl would resist allowing transformations of order to be included in the freedom of reproduction. He could nonetheless allow that they exhibit a wider freedom. But the reason, I suspect, is paradoxically, that he readily acknowledges the complex temporal overlappings and interweavings on which we have predicated such transformations. But he wants to preserve a distinction between the order of what is experienced, and that of the intentional nexus that accompanies it in (eg.) reproduction. It is in the way he begins to explore this that
Ø24, "Protentions in Recollection", is so promising. What we have to take account of is that 'every act of memory contains intentions of expectation whose fulfillment leads to the present' (p. 76).

The Productive Role of Reproductive Memory

This gives us a hint of the productive role of reproductive memory. In reviewing the past in the light of outcomes one can learn from it and give it meaning. There is an interesting illusion possible here, however, which it is worth pointing out, just so that it becomes clear that it does not follow from a phenomenological analysis. It is that the only real meaning of past events is to be determined on the basis of the fulfillment or otherwise of their protentional horizons - how things worked out. Firstly, Husserl's concern at this point is with memory, but it would be a mistake to suppose that this frame of reference is definitive. Possibilities that were not realised, hopes that were dashed, dangers that did not materialise are in their own way every bit as 'real' as those that were 'fulfilled'. Indeed, retrospection need not merely serve to consolidate, or to draw the lessons of experience. It can just as well discover forgotten possibilities, find honour or courage in actions that resulted in failure, etc.

And although such judgements may often only arise retrospectively, the horizon they celebrate is not the past but the future. Courage attaches to an act whether successful or not because of the horizons of danger and uncertainty in which it is carried out. It is only an accident that the recognition of courage (with medals, for example) is so often a consolation for practical failure.

Husserl's discussion of protentions in memory makes it clear that one of the great virtues of a phenomenological analysis of time
is its ability to register and delicately disentangle the multiple strands of temporal intentionality. It does not necessarily mean that these strands are wholly susceptible to phenomenological separation; that remains to be seen. But it does mean that phenomenology offers a powerful way of broaching the question of the depth structure of time.

The Place of Protention

We have already mentioned the paucity of references to protention. Husserl's discussion in §24 is certainly some compensation. But is it not significant that it should first receive thematic treatment in the context of memory? What this seems to suggest - though we may be being unfair here - is that the fundamental importance of protention for Husserl is the way it anticipates possibilities of objectifying reflection. Protention is the name for the way the adventure of the future - its fundamental openness - is closed off by anticipation. The future is seen as a reservoir for generating an ever tidier past, insofar as it is (subjectively) filled with anticipations of completions of as yet only partial objectivities. The interesting question this raises is whether any truth there is in these remarks should be traced to the epistemological context of Husserl's writing, or whether it does not perhaps offer us a way of coming to understand the fundamental temporal project of epistemology itself.

Husserl, of course, also concerns himself with expectation as well as with protention (though some of his remarks would seem to refer to either, particularly §26, where he compares 'memory and expectation'. The possibility of clear sight of the future and
imperfect memory makes 'determinateness' an inadequate distinguishing feature. But there is an essential asymmetry, which is particularly interesting from our point of view, for it is of immediate phenomenological interest. Our expectations are fulfilled, or otherwise, perceptually, i.e. by a future experience, the occurrence of which will end the expectation. Whereas the only subjective basis for confirmation of memories is internal coherence, or, as Husserl puts it (p. 80) 'the establishment of nexuses of intuitive reproductions'.

I would like to make two comments on this, one that would add further complexity to the analysis, and the other, more important, which will draw us into a dimension that we will take up only much later.

The first is this: there is a strange inverse mirror relation between memory and expectation. In terms of fulfillment, as we have seen, expectation alone can appeal to perception. And yet in terms of intention, of course it is memory which has a special relationship to perception. We remember only what we have experienced and so what has actually happened. And memory posits such an occurrence. Expectation can posit what it likes but it may not happen. Memory has a special relationship to actual perception; expectation relates to possible perception. Husserl's asymmetry rests on the function of coherence in allowing us to test meanings, and perception those of expectation. But it ought to be pointed out that expectations too can be tested by considerations of coherence ('All this must ... dovetail into a context of similar intuitions up to the now'). But such considerations are, surely equally applicable to the expectations. Some expectations - for instance those inconsistent singly or severally - can be discounted in advance. That the moon will be found to be
made of green cheese, that my dead grandparents will turn up for dinner, that my book will write itself, and so on. In this respect, the contrast with memory is less marked than one might think.

**Expectation as an Inadequate Paradigm for Consciousness of the Future: an Alternative**

Our second comment may perhaps seem more tangential. Husserl is taking expectation as something of a paradigm for our relationship with the future. And yet does it not exhibit a strange unconcerned neutrality? Expectations treat the future as a matter of detached curiosity, unless we treat 'Expectation' as a mere analytical moment in some more interested or involved relation. It is surely somewhat rarely that we can relate to the future in a purely cognitive manner and for two reasons. Firstly, insofar as we are active beings (and not simply observers) the future is not something independent of our own actions. Secondly, even when we are not in a position to affect the future, we may be no less concerned about it. In the case of active involvement it may be said that it both presupposes an expectational nexus, involving all sorts of hypothetical assumptions about 'what would happen if....' and it results in certain expectations about what after one's intervention will happen. This is all quite true, but in each case, expectation has become (if ever it was anything different) an analytical component of a more complex relationship to the future. We shall suppose for the moment that a plausible name for a better paradigm of our relationship to the future is 'desire', and briefly suggest ways in which the analysis of desire would have to depart considerably from that of a mere analytical component — expectation.

Whether one adopts a Platonic or a neo-Nietzschean conception of desire — whether, that is, one thinks of desire as the expression
of ontological lack (Plato, Hegel, Lacan, Sartre), or whether one thinks of it as an expression of the way we each exceed and overflow ourselves into the future (Nietzsche, Deleuze), there is a sense in which desires may not be fulfilled as expectations ideally are. An expectation is a cognitive distance from a perception, and the perception (ideally) totally fulfills the expectation. The satiation of a desire, however, is different. For the satisfaction of desire only sustains more desiring. Indeed, it is the occasion for the discovery—certainly on the Platonic view—of the impossibility of satisfying what desire truly seeks—possession, completion, unity with the Other (or the other object), the end of striving, etc. In other words, desire has a metaphysical dimension to it that expectation per se lacks. If, however, expectation is always conjoined with some conative element, then we cannot exclude that, albeit by association, the same would be true of expectation. But only because there is no mere expectation. Expectation, pure as it may always be, is an index of our status as temporal beings. Particular expectations themselves occur, as we have said in a different context, within nexuses of other expectations, all drawing on previous experience, and as these new expectations are (or are not) fulfilled this body of experience will be itself enlarged, generating a new range of expectations.... But although the fulfillment of expectations could in this limited sense be said to generate new expectations, it would be more accurate to say that it modifies the framework of understanding within which new expectations are generated. The generation is indirect. But are matters so different with desire? A proper account of this question will have to await a fuller analysis of desire. Perhaps the clue to the fundamental difference is precisely in the apparent disin-
teretness of expectation, and the overwhelming interest involved in desire. The possibility of metaphysical illusion is not confined to the idea of disinterestedness (as the hollowness of at least some desires has suggested eg. to Epicurus, and to Buddhism.)

**Husserl's Epistemological Focus: a Limitation?**

Where does this take us in our discussion of Husserl? We do not claim yet to have proved anything by comparing expectation to desire, about the intrinsic limitations of phenomenology. But we do hope to have at least suggested that the move from thinking about expectation to thinking about desire is a move that brings the scope of Husserl's treatment of time-consciousness into a new perspective.

That is - it shows again the limited epistemological concerns on which Husserl's treatment is predicated. If this is a fair claim, we are confronted with a number of possibilities -

(i) that there may be a good reason for this limitation - that time is either itself an epistemological concept, or that epistemological and temporal concepts have some common root, or common field of operation. 18

(ii) that if this is not true of time, it is nonetheless true of time-consciousness, and this latter is fundamental.

(iii) that we need to expand our frames of reference to accommodate other concepts of time, leaving Husserl's intact, but as having finite scope, limited application.

(iv) that we need, in addition to (iii), to place epistemology itself within a wider context, within which Husserl's concept of time may or may not have its place.

These alternatives are not all incompatible. We can read (ii)
as a refinement of (i), and (iv) of (iii), drawing the main division between (i) and (ii) on the one hand and (iii) and (iv) on the other. The relationship between these two pairs is complex, indeed one of the key issues of this thesis will be whether moving the consciousness of time out of the framework offered by Husserl would mean its expansion, or its transcendence/displacement/destruction/deconstruction...

The Scope of Perception

The distinctiveness of Husserl's account of internal time-consciousness rests on the particular way he treats retention. Not only is it not understood as a change in the contents of consciousness (eg. by their acquiring a new quality - that of pastness) it is, positively speaking, treated as a non-dependent or 'originary' mode of consciousness. Retention in particular is not a reproductive, or representational mode of consciousness. He calls it a kind of 'perception', and allows that we perceive the past. And yet there seems to be a difference between our awareness of what we are immediately sensing now, and our retentive grasp of the 'immediate' past. Can we really call both 'perception' in the same sense? And if we talk about perceiving what is in one way or another immediately available to us, can we really talk of perceiving a melody which endures through time? Husserl does so because he wants to stress that the unity of the melody is constituted by intuitive acts, and not the result of mere associations. How can he reconcile these three senses (or types) of 'perception' especially considering the kind of epistemological privilege that such a term conveys?

Two Levels of Perception

What, in fact, we get from Husserl is an explanation of the different motives for the double application of 'perception'. We have said before that the idea of the present and of presence involves a
fusion of a temporal and an evidential sense, and this ambivalence plays an important part of Husserl's discussion of perception.

If we consider what it is to listen to a melody, the problem becomes apparent. On the one hand we want to distinguish between individual tones actually being perceived, and those that have gone by, which are no longer perceived. And on the other hand we want to say that we perceive the whole melody.

Husserl offers two ways of explaining the second usage. First we can say that the whole melody is perceived because each part of it is, one after the other, perceived. But this seems insufficient, because the unity of the whole melody as an immanent temporal object is not accounted for. A randomly organised sequence of the same tones would do quite as well. Husserl seems to admit this when he writes

'... appears as present so long as it still sounds, so long as the notes belonging to it, intended in the one nexus of apprehension, still sound' (016, p. 61) (author's emphasis)

This reference to 'belonging', to 'oneness', to the 'nexus of apprehension' brings out the second condition, that the individual tones be perceived as part of a whole. What he calls 'adequate perception of the temporal object' requires that

'the unity of retentional consciousness still 'holds' the expired tones themselves in consciousness and continuously establishes the unity of consciousness with regard to the homogeneous temporal object, ie. the melody'. (016, p. 60)

Husserl seems to say that the elasticity of the scope of 'perception' results from the variability of the intentional focus. We legitimately say we 'perceive' whatever is intended in experience and is therein constituted as such through time, as 'one', as a unity.

After this, Husserl follows up two seemingly inconsistent lines of thought, which can be explained in the following way: what counts
as perceived depends on whether we are making a distinction within the
domain of what is 'originally self-given', or whether we are distinguishing
that field itself from what is not self-given at all (but is only
presentified). The internal distinction gives rise to a distinction,
one that emphasises the temporal sense of 'presence', between perception
(of the now) and retention (of the just gone), while the external distinc-
tion emphasises the evidential sense of presence, and calls perception
whatever is self-given, whether or not it is so given in the immediate
temporal present. In brief he distinguishes perception v. retention
from perception v. presentification (eg. recollection).

His successive consideration of what we have called the internal
and external distinctions leads him to interestingly different
conclusions.

If we make the distinction internally, we would say that our
apprehension of an immanent temporal object was a product of mixing
perception and non-perception. At any time, we will have impressions
(perceived) and retentions (not-perceived). And yet when we remember
that we are only dealing with the phases of a 'continuum which is
constantly being modified', we have to realize that the restriction of
'perception' to the now is only an ideal limit, never actually realized.
He goes on to say that 'even this ideal now is not something toto caelo
different from the not-now, but continually accommodates itself thereto'.
This is a momentous remark. Husserl is first of all saying that once
we admit that the now is only a phase in a continuum, it only has an
ideal existence, and then he sees that it would be wrong to restrict
ideality to the function of making static abstractions from a continuum.
The true ideality of the now is itself a dynamic ideality, a continous
accommodation of the now to the not now.
What this surely implies is that the internal distinction between perception and non-perception breaks down, when we see that the distinction between the now and the no-longer-now itself breaks down, and not only 'in practice', but ideally too. What is actually perceived is not the now, but the now as it passes away into retention. And the now has no existence independent of its own becoming not-now.

The 'external' distinction - between perception and recollection involves treating the 'now-ness' of narrowly conceived perception as merely an instance of originary self-givenness. If we allow this latter to be the criterion for perception, then we can allow that retention is a mode of perception and as such is quite distinct from recollection, which is only presentification. The extraction of 'originary self-givenness' from the apprehension of the 'now' is in effect the extraction of evidential presence from a blend of temporal and evidential senses of presence, claiming that the evidential sense extends beyond the temporal, and is sufficient for 'perception' to occur. If we make this move we are saying that it is possible to 'perceive' the past.

'There has never been any 'perception'!' (Derrida)

What Husserl has to say about perception in Ø16 and 17 leads in a strange direction. The structure of his epistemological thinking is such as to treat our immediate awareness of the 'now' as the model of originary givenness, with which retention and recollection will later be compared. While retention does not give us the present, it is a mode of direct access to what is self-given, and if we consider this feature to be what is epistemologically central to our awareness of the now, then retention is thought of as a form of perception. But Husserl is quite aware that the distinction between impressional and retentional
consciousness is hewn from what is actually a continuum, and a dynamic continuum at that. And as a continuum, it is characterized by infinite divisibility, so that at any level one chooses, the sinking-down into retentional consciousness will already be apparent. And if, as he claims, the now is only an ideal limit, it is tempting to treat retention as the primal phenomenon, with impressional consciousness as extrapolated or derived from it, or perhaps as only one of its abstract phases. Husserl has, of course, earlier vigorously resisted anything like this.

'We teach the a priori necessity of the precedence of a perception or primal impression over the corresponding retention' (Ø13, p. 55)

And such a conclusion as we have suggested would make it somewhat difficult to credit retention with the epistemological status of 'now' - perception in the way that was done before, because, at the very least, they are inseparable. Put more strongly, however, there is no now-perception as such, and so nothing with which retention could be compared.

Is there not a parallel here with Hegel's discovery at the beginning of the Phenomenology of Mind of the difficulties involved in the idea of simple sense-certainty? I am not in fact convinced that the indexical terms 'this', 'that', 'now', or 'here' can be thought to bear the seeds of that universality that threatens the very possibility of simple sense-certainty. Nonetheless, it is arguable that 'this', 'here', 'now' not only have no meaning, they have no referential value either until they are filled out, or qualified in some way ('this phrase', 'here in Warwick', 'as I speak to you now' etc.). The argument then is that any attempt to specify the particularity or individuality of an item (eg. a sensation) automatically makes use of some sort of conceptuality, simply to delimit the item being indicated.
Husserl's willingness to extend the scope of 'perception' to immanent and enduring temporal objects could be seen to compromise the basis in an extended now-perception from which he proceeded. For it begins to seem that any now one might choose has its own inner retentionality. (The parallel with Hegel would only be complete if one were able to relate the role of concepts in Hegel to the primitive origins of constitution in Husserl - the structure of retention. We might suppose that this could be accomplished by seeing Kant's schemata as supplying the temporal underpinnings of Hegel's concepts, and Husserl's retentionality as supplying the basic unit from which schemata could be constructed.)

Husserl's repeated example of the melody (or a tone) may seem to simplify the question of temporal constitution, but at the same time it leaves open the way in which concepts actually do supply the unifying grounds for other immanent objects. Husserl's answer, of course, is his theory of constitution. But it is far from clear that the operations involved in constitution can all be derived from retention. And if the claimed epistemological privileges of 'perception' can be extended to retentional consciousness, and indeed to the experiencing of temporally extended objects, it is hard to see how it can extend to the products of extended constitution.

Can 'Perception' be extended to any retentional continuum?

Husserl has offered us, as we have mentioned before, a model of how this can happen, by progressive retentional inclusion:

'... in each of these retentions is included a continuity of retentional modifications ... each retention is in itself a continuous modification which ... bears in itself the heritage of the past in the form of a series of shadings'  (Ø11)
This is both a simple and a generatively powerful model and does indeed offer a superficially plausible way in which we might have some sort of direct access to the past via a kind of retentional backlog. But there are certain difficulties with it.

(i) Precisely because the principle of retentional inclusion can be recursively applied without limit, there should be no limit to what can be perceived. But it is perfectly clear that even if we accept this terminology, that such extended retentions shade into recollection (and indeed into forgetfulness, of which more later) without warning. And yet this whole analysis rests on there not being shades of self-givenness. Retentional inclusion is a neat but a priori solution, but it cannot explain why it ever comes to an end, or falters.

(ii) More important still, there seems to be no scope, on this model, for understanding the role of other schematic devices for organizing time. A very simple example will suffice. If I listen to four bars of a song, retentional inclusion has either to ignore the intentional structure of the song (i.e., minimally, that it is divided into four parts), or to take this into account. If it ignores it, it is blind; if it accommodates itself to it, it transcends the simplicity of its structure of progressive inclusion towards a recognition of the temporal structure of objects themselves, or of ways of representing their temporal structure that are inseparable from the ordinary ways of experiencing them, ways that could not be eliminated for being 'representational' (and hence secondary etc.) without eliminating the object itself.

Consider, for example, listening to a (regularly) repeated sensation, such as a heartbeat, a ticking clock, throbbing pain. In this experience the regularity, the equality of the intervals between
the 'beats', which is a fact about the series of sensations, is equally part of the experience itself. It could be replied that, of course, retention does not deal with representational elements in a temporal sequence. Our claim is that the kind of extended retentional constitutions to which Husserl alludes always require the scaffolding of types of temporal structuring that transcend retentional inclusion.

We are facing Husserl with an unpalatable choice:

a. either face the prospect of 'perception' being narrowed down to a very restricted band of experiences, or possibly even becoming an unrealizable ideal,
b. or abandon the epistemological status of 'perception' as, for example, offering certainty ("What I am retentionally aware of, we say, is absolutely certain"). (§22)

If we have doubts about how much we could be said to 'perceive' by retentional inclusion, it should not be thought that Husserl restricts our experience to this perceptual paradigm. Not at all. Recollection, even though it is not itself an original, self-given kind of experience makes a particular positive contribution to the constitution of time. This we must now explore.

The Positive Contribution of Recollection

Reproductive consciousness, secondary remembrance, representational memory... in each case the question is simple: what account can we give of the relationship to primary, original consciousness of the past (in retention) such that recollection can play a role in the constitution of 'time'? Why is this relationship problematic at all?
Unlike retention, reproduction can offer no guarantees of accuracy. The order of succession may be misrepresented. Elements may be added or lost. In fact Husserl allows the possibility of transmitting the certainty of retention through to reproduction only under very restrictive conditions, namely when we inwardly repeat what is till 'fresh' or 'vivid' in our memory (022). In this way, the 'reproductive flow' can coincide with 'a retentional one'. This would seem to apply to a rather narrow range of cases. It might properly describe the strategies by which one tries to keep in mind a telephone number until pen and paper are to hand, but does it really apply any more widely? According to Husserl it does. In section 14, it provides the basis for his account of the role of recollection in constituting the consciousness of duration and succession. We can summarize his argument as follows, focussing on his account of the constitution of succession.

Take the simple succession of two tones A and B.

(i) In addition to the experience of A and the experience of B (and their respective retentional trains) there is the experience of the succession A, B, which succession we perceive in an originary way (via Retention).

(ii) It is always possible ("I can") to repeat my consciousness of this succession, 'presentify' it; that is an a priori fact about my freedom.

(iii) I can do this indefinitely, generating a succession of consciousnesses of succession and I can even make any such sequence into one of the units of a similar sequence.

(iv) In this way (a) succession is constituted.

Husserl's presentation contains many subtleties not here
reproduced. But let us see if we can further clarify the central line of the argument, remembering that it is the role of recollection in the constitution of succession that is in question.

Husserl begins, as we have seen, by claiming that consciousness of the succession of two tones (A & B) is 'an original dator consciousness'. I take it that is achieved in retention, or is a kind of 'retentional consciousness'. His question, then, if I understand him, is how is 'succession as such' (and not this particular succession) constituted from this particular example, and his answer is that we have the capacity to reproduce the first constituted succession at will. I think his claim is that the series of memories of this particular succession (and memories of memories of succession) that this capacity generates gives us succession freed from its particular original content (A & B). Again interpreting his remarks, he seems to be claiming that reproductive consciousness, by generating a succession of successions allows us to focus on the form of succession itself, presented in the most appropriate way - successively.

Husserl's conclusion (pp. 67-8) is most important for understanding the fundamental status of succession in the constitution of an enduring object.

'In the succession of like objects (identical as to content) which we are given only in succession, and never as co-existing, we have a peculiar coincidence in the unity of one consciousness' (p. 67)

'we have an interrelatedness which is not constituted in a relational mode of observation, and which is prior to all "comparison" and all "thinking" as the necessary condition for all intuition of likeness and difference' (pp. 67-8)

Could we read this as saying that repetition precedes any consideration of identity or similarity?

Recollection and the Past
As far as the 'just past' is concerned, we have originary access to it by virtue of retention. But this does not suffice to account for the more remote past or the past in general. And it is here that recollection plays a vital constitutive role. The fact that recollection posits (as 'having been' in this way or that) the now it reproduces, serves to distinguish it from phantasy. Recollection also 'gives it a position with regard to the actual now and the sphere of the originary temporal field to which the recollection itself belongs' (023, p. 74).

Recollection can play a constitutive role in this regard because it itself takes the form of a flux of presentifications, which is 'a flux of phases of lived experiences constructed exactly like every other temporally constitutive flux'. In other words, the phases of primal retention and experience of the now occur just as freely with presentifications as their content. So this flux constitutes itself as a unity, but it also constitutes as its object - its intentional object - 'the unity of the remembered', the sphere of memory itself.

We have already discussed one of the most powerful ways in which this sphere of memory is constituted, via the reworking of the protentional horizons latent in what is recollected, in the light of what happened. This of course establishes nexuses within which particular past durations can be placed. And as these nexuses have as their ultimate context the whole of my conscious life, both past and still in flux, that sphere of memory is itself subject to modification. 'Everything new reacts on the old...' (025, p. 77).

This account is of the utmost importance. We should note in particular (1) that it is in the multi-phased flux of lived experience that constitution occurs; (2) that this can as easily take reproductive modifications as its 'content' as anything else; (3) this permits
all manner of non-originary modes of consciousness to play constitutive roles, and is the vital way in which the limitations of retentional consciousness superceded; (4) it is precisely the interaction between originary protentions as recollected, and the continual process of recollection that brings about the progressive knitting together of the unity of time-consciousness; (5) there is a fifth claim which while clearly important, is open to two somewhat different interpretations. Husserl's way of stressing the fact that the chain of reproduced objects is not a mere succession of associated intentions, is to talk of 'the past as reproduced bear(ing)... an indeterminate intention toward a certain state of affairs in regard to the now ... an intention which in itself is an intention toward the series of possible fulfillments' (p25, p.78).

Husserl is saying, I take it, that the past as actually reproduced at any one time is to be understood against a background of greater fulfillment, which is steadily realized. On this account his large scale intention would be the ideal fulfillment (or otherwise) of all the protentional gaps in our memory, and hence the maximizing of the internal intentional integration of our past.

But his subsequent remarks leave us less sure. He writes

'... this intention is a non-intuitive, an "empty" intention and its objectivity is the objective temporal series of events, this series being the dim surroundings of what is actually recollected' (p25, p. 78)

and shortly thereafter

'The component "unauthentic perception" which belongs to every transcendent perception as an essential element is a "complex" intention which can be fulfilled in nexuses of a definite kind, in nexuses of data (p25, p. 78).

We seem to have a rather different claim here - namely that what recollection actually intends is not just what I experienced, but
what happened. That serves as the background against which what I can actually recall stands out. We posit 'the past', which always in fact transcends what I will ever be able to recall or understand about it, but which could ideally be presented as 'data'.

If this is what Husserl is claiming here, we have an important instance of one of the transcendencies excluded in 01 reappearing as the object of an overarching intention.

**Recollection and the Constitution of Temporal Objects**

Our discussion of the positive constitutive contributions of recollection will be completed if we can explain how Husserl treats its involvement in the constitution of temporal objects and objective time. This is dealt with in 030-32, but with enormously greater precision and clarity in Appendix IV. We shall look first at the constitution of temporal objects.

Husserl's claim is lucidity itself:

'the identity of temporal objects is a constitutive product of unity of certain possible coincidences of identifications of recollection' (p. 144).

Recollection has a feature that merely perceiving—again lacks — the temporal object is quite identical on each occasion of recollection. Temporal objectivity can be established in subjective time-consciousness by virtue of the re-identification that recollection makes possible.

Recollection also has a feature that perception lacks — that while present time exhibits flux, and an always new now point, for recollection

'every point exhibits an Objective temporal point which can be objectified again and again, and the interval of time is formed from purely Objective points and is itself identifiable again and again' (p. 144).

Husserl seems to claim that while the unity of a temporal object rests on 'the series of primal impressions and continuous modifications'
through which it is generated - either as something unchanging, or as a unity involving change, its identity rests on the possibility of re-identification, in which the same 'enduring unity' simply changes in its 'mode of (temporal) givenness'.

Recollection and the Constitution of Time

But what is the relationship between the constitution of Objectivity in time, and the constitution of time itself? Husserl says they are not the same (p. 145) but that 'the possibility of identification belongs to the constitution of time' (p. 145), but what further contribution does recollection make to this constitution? Husserl is clearest on this point in Appendix IV. There he argues (roughly) this: that the possibility of freely returning, via recollection, to an identical portion of time, over and over again, which applies in principle to every part of my past experience, constitutes that experience as occurring within an objective temporal field. The analogy is drawn with the parallel feature of an objective spatial field - one can return to parts one has been to before. Recollection functions as the condition of accessibility of the temporal field, and hence constitutes it as a field.

For a grasp of how Objective time is constituted as such, how, that is, we come to be able to think and have experiences for which we know a place on a single temporal continuum will always be assured - recollection is not enough. The idea of Objective time is inseparable from this a priori assurance of the locatability of any particular temporal object or duration. And in this concluding section 33 of the second part of the book, Husserl spells out some of the further intuitive certainties that are involved, each of which is immediately comprehensible to us when we think about temporal position. This
section fulfills the promise of Ø2. He discusses, eg. simultaneity, transitivity, the homogeneity of absolute time etc.

But how should we assess this account of the constitution of Objective time? I would like to make two related observations.

**Time and Identity**

Subtly, and somewhat without announcement, Husserl has moved from discussing internal time-consciousness to explaining the constitution of what we think of, or experience as, objective time. The key role in this shift has been played by the apparently idealizing capacities of recollection, and the transitional, if lengthy emphasis on the constitution of temporal objects. These each sharpen a certain orientation towards the interpretation of time in the light of objects in time, (including essentially temporally extended objects), that is, discrete unities in time, subject to identity - establishing recollection. His discussion of time is in effect the discussion of the establishing and preservation of identity in and by time, by which the phenomenology of time contributes to the project (the term is Heidegger's) of 'fundamental ontology'. Recollection deals with completed durations; immanent temporal objects endure within distinct temporal limits, are nameable, reidentifiable, the bearers of predicates etc.¹⁹ Husserl does of course mention both protention and expectation but, as we have already suggested, his most important discussion of protention is in the context of recollection.

But is it really fair to suggest that Husserl's account is limited by its concern with identity? Surely it is simply a result of trying to deal with the most obvious and difficult question time poses - how can there be stable identities given the flux of time? It is not a theory which ignores the fact of flux, it is precisely
built on that fact. What we can say, however, is that there is little sense here of what we might call the negative side of time, the threat it poses to all constitution of identity, even as it sustains it. The concentration on the past is for its positive epistemological value. 'Wesen ist was gewesen ist' as Hegel put it. This seems to leave for another occasion a serious discussion of the future, and those attitudes, emotions, orientations and practices that require its openness.

The Idealization of Time

What are we to say about the idealization involved in Husserl's descriptions? At a certain point (p41) Husserl admits this. For the rest, he writes,

'...we operate with descriptions which already are in some respects idealizing fictions. It is a fiction, for example that a sound endures completely unaltered...' (p. 113)

There is of course a general justification for idealisation in any theoretical discipline, namely that it brings out what is essential. Where would Euclidean geometry be without the fiction of straight, infinitely thin lines? But this analogy, so helpful in some ways, also allows us to clarify our doubts. The dropping of the assumption that all lines are straight, for instance, allows the development of the geometry of curved surfaces, for example. What if the same sorts of restrictions are still operating with time? Husserl, for example, seems to treat as legitimate idealisation that everything we have perceived can be recalled at will, indefinitely, and without alteration. But this is not a description of experience, but the elucidation of a model of experience to which our actual experience ideally corresponds.

It should be possible to formulate a general rule to capture
those cases in which this difference matters and those in which it
do not. It would go something like this: idealisation is
permissible when those factors which are being excluded are of no
significance to the matter at hand. So a map of the British Isles
could, for most demographic purposes, square off the coast line quite
a bit without affecting its capacity to communicate accurate informa-
tion. But for an inshore yachting map it would be useless.

**Idealization as distortion: a special principle**

A very general description can be given of a type of case in
which idealization may be dangerous: whenever the phenomenon being
dealt with is itself the product of a certain (variable) failure or
success at idealization. An idealization which ignored this struggle,
compromise etc. would be critically misleading. Suppose I draw
this — 

1. "I have drawn a circle". This is an idealization of my achieve-
ment. In many circumstances it would not be misleading. But suppose
I had been trying to draw a more or less perfect circle. Then it would
be more accurate to say

2. "I have tried to draw a circle". An idealizing act must ensure
that it does not take as its subject-matter something which has an
intrinsic relationship to its own ideality, for it then risks covering
up the importance of the gap between actuality and ideality. Idealiza-
tion would make every attempt into a success.

How does this apply to time?

Husserl gives recollection a vital role to play in the constitution
of objective time. But it is an idealized recollection, one that does
not know the meaning of failure. Can it do more than constitute an ideal
time? It is particularly curious that the form this idealization takes ("I can" (always return)) actually presupposes the very ideal objective temporality it constitutes. Does not the "I can" pretend indefinite participation in the same future, connected to the past? Interestingly enough, though not noted by Husserl, this would make the past and indeed Objective time dependent on an idealization of the future. To be explicit, recollection presupposes a certain model of the temporal dimension which we could call transparency, accessibility, mobility and preservation. Nothing is lost, everything is still available. But if that were not so? If forgetting was quite as common, and identical recollections always involved some element of phantasy? Would we not at the very least have to consider the status of "objective time", or at least Husserl's account of its constitution? Might it not (just) be a projective idealization?

The power of Husserl's account is that it is in many ways intuitively persuasive. No doubt the objectivity of "Time" has something to do with our power to freely order, revert to, and reproduce past temporal points. But is it any more than an imaginary infinitizing of that power?

We have noted Husserl's orientation towards the 'completed', the way his road to "objective Time" takes him through temporal objects. But it would be misleading to leave it there. For Husserl is led to posit not just 'objective time' but an Absolute Flux, in which time, as a pre-objective, pre-constituted ground of any constitution, is discovered. We must briefly consider this idea, and where it leads Husserl to later on. It is the main concern of the third and last part of the book and of a number of Appendices (eg. VI, XIII).
The Path to Absolute Flux

The idea of the absolute flux of consciousness was not obvious to Husserl at the beginning of his lectures on time-consciousness. John Brough pinpoints its emergence in late 1906 or early 1907.\textsuperscript{20} Husserl's position is presented by means of a contrast that had not previously been put to much work, that between the constituted and the constituting. And although he proceeds in a descriptive manner it is clear that an argument does underlie the move. It is that the time-consciousness and 'Objective time' we have previously been discussing have been the constituted products of a more basic constitutive level, which we have not yet unearthed. He will call it 'the absolute, temporally constitutive flux of consciousness' (\textsuperscript{Ø32}). What is so interesting about it is that it differs so much from what we described as his previous orientation towards 'completeness', 'unity' and 'identity', for it is understood as the constitutive ground of all such 'products', and is not to be confused with them.

'... any object which is altered is lacking here, and inasmuch as in every process "something" proceeds, it is not a question here of a process. There is nothing here which is altered, and therefore it makes no sense to speak here of something that endures.' (\textsuperscript{Ø35}, p. 99)

So, neither the categories of object or process apply. As it is a flux, we want to talk about change, in some sense, but how?

'... we find necessarily and essentially a flux of continuous "alteration", and this alteration has the absurd property that it flows exactly as it flows and can flow neither "more swiftly" nor "more slowly".' (our emphasis)

What is absurd is that one wants both to talk of time as a flux or flow (\textsuperscript{Fluy}) and yet not talk about the rate of flow. But it would of course be even more absurd (if that is possible) if one were to talk of it flowing quickly or slowly.
'For all this, names are lacking'

Ø36, "The Temporally Constitutive Flux as Absolute Subjectivity", ends with the sentence 'For all this, names are lacking'. Husserl has drawn the ultimate (and obvious) consequence from the priority of this flux to any constituted objectivity (coupled with the thesis that language and meaning are also products of such constitutive acts) - that the description of this flux puts a fundamental strain on language itself. The word 'flux' itself must be treated as a metaphor. What we are dealing with is absolute subjectivity. He wants still to speak of 'the lived experience of actuality', 'primal source-point', a 'continuity of moments of reverberation', but language is clearly a struggle here.

'... temporally constitutive phenomena... are not individual objects... not individual processes, and terms which can be predicated of such processes cannot be meaningfully ascribed to them. Therefore, it can also make no sense to say of them (and with the same conceptual meaning) that they are in the now and have been previously, that they succeed one another temporally, or are simultaneous with respect to one another etc. (Ø36, p. 100)

In other words the language of temporal predicates belongs to the realm of the constituted, and cannot properly apply at all to the constitutive ground itself. He writes that 'we can only say that this flux is something which we name in conformity with what is constituted, but it is nothing temporally objective'. I take this as saying that we can attribute to this flux such 'properties' as are proper to it by virtue of its relation to what it constitutes, whatever they may turn out to be.

It is worth at this point explaining why he calls this flux 'absolute'. What he means (see eg. Appendix VI p. 153) is that the
shape of the flux - the constant sinking-down from impression to retention - is not something that any change in circumstances could affect; it is not contingent. It could not suddenly be the case that the flux got stuck in an impressional phase, for example. 'The variety of its phases can never cease and pass over into a self-continuing of ever-like phases' (p. 153).

But we have to ask what the relationship is between this absolute flux and the original discussion that centred on the diagram of time, of the various modes of temporal awareness. Have we here discovered something quite new, a new temporal depth hitherto obscured by the discussion of objective time? In fact Husserl's thematization of absolute flux is a taking up again of the discussion of primal impression and retention, the fundamental modes of temporal awareness, this time in the light of his attempt to delineate the constituted states of 'immanent' i.e. objective (see 039) time. With that behind him, the question of the temporality of the consciousness responsible for that constituting activity is posed again. To merely talk about different temporal phases is not enough. Two problems in particular arise:

(i) if temporal predicates properly apply to constituted (immanent, objective) time, what can we say about the temporality of the flux?

(ii) surely every flux must be constituted a unity - but how?

What Husserl tries to do is to derive features of the flux from a discussion of its relation to and difference from immanent time. This most explicitly begins in Ø 37 and Ø38.
Absolute Flux and Immanent Time

We know (or at least we suppose we know!) for instance that all objects and processes and events can be located within the framework of one immanent time. We know that within that time, we can give sense to 'simultaneity' for example. Does this concept, just to take an example, apply to the absolute flux?

Impressional consciousness is at any moment surely a plural affair. We are aware of many different sensory contents and this awareness is equally 'plural'. Husserl refuses to talk here of simultaneity but instead of Zusammen, Zugleich (all-together; all-at-once).

'the primal sensations themselves are not simultaneous, and we cannot call the phases of the fluxional before-all-at-once (Vorzugleich) simultaneous phases of consciousness any more than we can call the succession of consciousness a temporal succession'. (p38, p. 104)

Husserl is making a distinction between different levels of predication. Standard temporal predicates, to repeat, are being restricted to constituted time. And yet we do want to talk about the/this/any flux as possessing unity of some sort. How could such unity arise?

The illusion that would treat this flux as a temporal series like any other is an illusion born of adopting a retrospective viewpoint on it. It then appears constituted like any other object of reflection. But if that were the case, one would still be left with the problem of the temporality of the other level at which it was constituted, and so on ... unless, of course, some way could be found of avoiding this infinite regress. Husserl makes a formally traditional move, and claims, to Sartre's subsequent satisfaction, that the Absolute Flux is self-constituting.22
In §24, he had invoked the idea of double intentionality (somewhat by analogy with the axes of two-dimensional space) of recollection. Here he uses the same term in relation to retention. The retentional phase both serves to constitute immanent temporal objects (e.g. melodies) and thence objective time, via the "I can"; it is also self-constitutive in that these very retentive phases that make it up each refer 'back' to a previous mode of consciousness (ultimately impressional) and 'forward' to the next retentional one.

How should we describe this flux? He talks of

'the quasi-temporal disposition of the phases of the flux, which ever and necessarily has the following now-point, the phase of actuality and the series of pre-actual and post-actual (of the not yet actual) phases. This pre-phenomenal, pre-immanent temporality is constituted intentionally as the form of temporally constitutive consciousness and in the latter itself' (p. 109).

As far as one can tell, through the intricate forest of Husserl's descriptive subtleties, he is arguing that the modes of consciousness (impressional, retential, retentions of retentions etc.) in themselves and without considering the 'objects' they intend, possess a kind of longitudinal or inner transverse intentionality, by which they constitute themselves as a flux, indeed as an absolute flux, as they are not the work of any more fundamental agency. At a later point (Appendix VIII) Husserl writes of this unity as one of 'lived experience' given to us by a shaft or ray (Strahl) of attention. He adds

'that this identifying is possible, that here an object is constituted, lies in the structure of lived experience, namely that every phase of the stream changes into retention "of", this again, and so on' (p. 158)

and

'the flowing consists in the transition of every phase of the primordial field (therefore, of a linear continuum) through a retentional modification of the same, only just
past' (p. 158)

The remark I would like to focus on in these sections is one I have not yet quoted. In 038 (p. 104) he writes: 'we can no longer speak of a time of the final constitutive consciousness' and in Appendix VI (p. 150) he writes: 'Subjective time is constituted in an absolute timelessness'.

He does talk of quasi-time in one of his Appendices. He calls it 039 'a one-dimensional quasi-temporal order', and a 'pre-phenomenal, pre-immanent temporality'. Standard temporal predicates apply only at the risk of confusion of levels. The word Fluq itself is an acknowledged metaphor.

There is something very obvious and also very strange about this discussion of Absolute flux. That consciousness is a flux is both important and undeniable. What is special about Husserl's position is that he does not think of it, as many will, as a flux of contents (ideas and impressions running through one's head) but as a flux of modes of consciousness. He has drawn on the basic structure of intentionality: consciousness of \( I \) object I am conscious of and to the level of the temporal object there corresponds an immanent time, while to that of consciousness itself corresponds the absolute flux. So we are not just dealing with a flux theory of consciousness, but one that reflects a particular model of conscious life (and of human life itself). It is not easy to know how to deal with this claim but I shall venture the following comments:

Husserl claims, with respect of 'unconscious contents', that the idea is an absurdity - and yet is the idea of logic that such a notion of absurdity implies not itself one that operates at the level of the
constituted? Does not the operation of its standards here perhaps involve a confusion of levels? (Did he not himself endorse the 'absurdity' of 'the flux flowing as it flows'? ) If concepts like 'succession' and 'simultaneity' are inapplicable, is it not misleading even to talk of its unity? Is the claim that is is self-constituted simply a logical solution, or does it rest on phenomenological evidence?

Husserl's use of attentional rays as ways of revealing the longitudinal intentionality seem misguided. Surely what is essential to flux is its pre-logical (pre-unified) status, one that does not require a 'device' like self-constitution. (Is there any real difference between self-constituted and not constituted?)

The point of all this is that what the idea of Absolute Flux opens up is the possibility that the logical, the rational, that which conforms to the categories of what is objectively constituted (taking these to occupy a common field) might rest on something that exceeds these categories even more radically than Husserl allows. We may wonder whether Husserl has not peered over the edge of the brink and drawn back.

Husserl's discussion of Absolute Flux would suggest that if we pursue the concept of time to its 'origin', it ceases, in important ways to exhibit temporal properties. This conclusion is interesting enough in itself; what makes it all the more fascinating here is that we can find the same movement of thought, over a longer biographical period in Heidegger's work too, in the transition from his account of existential time (1927) to what he calls time-space (1962). Even more tantalizing is the way in which we can align Husserl's position here with that of Derrida, who in denying 'perception' is
claiming, as we said at the beginning, that time is an essentially metaphysical concept, and seems to distance himself so much from Husserl. We may wonder whether the distance between Husserl and Derrida is not in part mirage.
In 1967, under the title *La Voix et le Phenomène*, Derrida published a book that some years later, and after various more ambitious and eccentric writings, he could still refer to as the work of which he was, from a philosophical point of view, most proud. Husserl scholars have not reacted too favourably, but it has had an enormous impact on the wider perception of the limits and indeed very possibility of phenomenology. It was sub-titled 'Introduction to the Problem of Signs in Husserl's Phenomenology', and the 'problem of signs' is the other face of what we have discussed above as the problem of intuition in Husserl. The direction of Derrida's reading has already been anticipated by our own discussion in chapter II and we have alluded to it on a number of occasions in the previous chapter. It has a direct impact on our understanding both of the status of Husserl's theory of time, and on Derrida's later insistence on time's inherently metaphysical constitution, which we dispute. We shall spell out in greater detail Derrida's argument in this book and its implications for our inquiry as a whole.

There is a simple schematic way in which we can understand what is going on in the book. Derrida is claiming that the entire project of Husserlian phenomenology rests on the possibility of a realm of meaning which precedes public language and hence can provide it with a ground. It rests on the possibility of an evidential purity from which all exteriority, all inductive, indicative relations have been excluded. For Derrida such moves are illustrative of a much more general philosophical privileging of the value of 'presence', which
at times he suggests is a value inherent in philosophy itself. He shows, in detail, how Husserl attempts, and fails, to bring about this exclusion in two crucial ways. He is unable to complete the separation of expressive from indicative signs; if the former are always 'contaminated' with relations of indication, then it is the very possibility of a foundation of meaning that is excluded. Secondly, Derrida argues that Husserl's own theory of time-consciousness undermines the possibility of a 'present' as an intentional unity free from all temporal alterity. And without such a temporal present, the evidential sense of 'presence' collapses too. In each case, Derrida's strategy is to treat Husserl's texts as struggles (to exclude, to purify) which can be only temporarily suspended, and which the texts themselves allow one to resuscitate. Every such text contains the seeds of its own deconstruction.

The guiding question of this whole thesis is whether Derrida's claim that the concept of time is inherently metaphysical can be sustained. Towards that end we are considering in detail the most obviously relevant writings of Husserl and Heidegger, and Derrida's readings of these texts, to trace the course of his thinking. We have already suggested (at the end of our reading of Husserl) that we find in Husserl's own text something of a recognition that when pressed far enough the concept of Time (and even time-consciousness) dissolves. Derrida does not follow Husserl on this route, for it takes us to something yet more fundamental (Absolute Flux) which, whether or not it could actually perform any useful philosophical function, would perhaps have succeeded in detaching itself from the value of presence. We find instead, in *La Voix et le Phenomene*, Derrida substituting one temporal complicity for another. The
fractured bond between temporal and epistemological presence, between
the intentional unity of the temporal present and the subject's own
immediacy to itself, are replaced by another intimacy, one in which it
is the values of absence, difference and delay that inform. It is
entirely appropriate that the English translation - Speech and Phenomena
should include in the same volume, the essay Differance, for Derrida's
explication of that term shows clearly how, in its dual aspect (of
deferring and differing) it unites a temporal and a diacritical sense.
To those who find this fusing confusing, the reply must surely be that
it has to be seen as a response to the condensation-effect to be found
in presence itself. Derrida's subsequent denial of the possibility of
a non-metaphysical concept of time can then be seen to be a direct
consequence of the strategic significance of the term \textsuperscript{3} 'differance'.
It is not introduced as a concept, but as more of a device. To try to
deduce from it a new concept of time would be to attempt to reappro-
priate a transgressive discourse, which is to misunderstand it

However, not all of Derrida is transgression, and he can not
himself finally rule out the possibility of a new discourse of tempor-
ality, as we shall see. And even here, in his discussion of Husserl,
there is some sense in which he is making straightforwardly different
claims about language, and about the pervasiveness of certain of its
salient features (repetition, play, the trace, differentiation, delayed
effect etc.) which, at one level at least supplant Husserl's. Derrida
goes further than Heidegger, for example, when the latter claims that
he is not offering a new theory of language, only a new way of relating
to it, even if Derrida clearly inherits something of that evangelical
aim. \textsuperscript{4} It is open to question whether it is possible to successfully
displace any incumbent philosophical position without at least
implying certain positive propositions of one's own.\textsuperscript{5}

A final attempt to formulate the problem posed by this reading for our understanding of temporality might be this: on the one hand it could be said that Derrida accepts the dependence of signification on temporality, but disagrees with Husserl on the nature of that temporality, substituting a temporality of difference, of non-presence etc. Or it could be said that he sees the very idea of a distinct account of time or temporality as in itself a symptom of a metaphysical valuation of 'presence' which can be formulated atemporally - eg. the positing of what he calls a 'transcendental signified' - a source of meaning that lies outside of and escapes the 'play' of language. There is no doubt that there is a strong topological dimension to what one might playfully call Derrida's guiding intuitions and interpretive schemas. But the belief that a post-metaphysical account of temporality can rise again after Derrida must surely be encouraged by his inability to keep temporally loaded terms out of his analysis.

Let us now discuss in more detail the argument of \textit{La Voix et le Phenomene}, where the topology of inside/outside, of separation and exclusion, or more revealingly, perhaps, that of purity, immediately plays such an important part.\textsuperscript{6}

In his \textit{Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations)} \textsuperscript{01}, Husserl distinguishes two different sign relations or functions - Ausdruck (expression), and Anzeichen (indication). And by virtue of its relation to an ideal meaning, Husserl sought to privilege expression as the essence of language. However in all actual communicative use of signs expression and indication are entangled together, so Husserl turns to the case of pure expression to be found in 'solitary mental life', from which both the world and the other person are in
principle excluded.

For Derrida, the direction of this argument reveals Husserl's silent presuppositions and commitments in certain crucial ways. The privilege of expression is tied up both with the idea that what is expressed is an ideal meaning, and with the assumption that the natural medium for such expression is the voice. Husserl's acceptance that while expression and indication are always entangled they are still essentially distinct, presupposes, says Derrida, a distinction between de facto and de jure that is itself ultimately dependent on a certain understanding of language. In fact however, Derrida immediately shows precisely how Husserl escapes such a charge of circularity by the reference to solitary mental life. For if 'there is' such a thing as solitary mental life, then the 'ideal' separation of indication and expression will actually be achieved. The precise status of this dimension must therefore be investigated.

Knowing, as we do, Derrida's overall verdict on Husserl - that is phenomenology is the most vigilant example of metaphysics - it is something of a proof both of his candour and of his subtlety that he offers us not simply a 'critical' reading of the moves we have just outlined, but also a sympathetic one. Critically one might say that for all his insistence on presuppositionlessness, Husserl never raises the question of the sign to an ontological level. And it is by neglecting this that he can privilege that indicative function (Hinzeigen) that supports his primarily logical conception of language (of language as the bearer of ideal meanings). But equally, and against this, it could be said that by beginning not with the sign, but with an original fracturing of the unity of the sign (expression/indication) Husserl is showing exemplary vigilance. And are there
not very good reasons for avoiding the question 'What is a sign?' — for the premature attempt to subject the 'sign' to the regime of truth might well occlude the possibility that signification, without itself 'being true' might 'condition the movement and concept of truth' (p.26, ET p. 25). Derrida rightly sees that the interweaving of these two motifs makes the final judgement of phenomenology very difficult. Are these accounts of the production, the constitution of truth, on the one hand, and of phenomenology as a philosophy of presence reconcilable?

Derrida's comments here are enormously important. The very same ambiguity will be discerned again in his discussions of Heidegger when he identifies both a renewal of the value of presence in Heidegger's concept of Being and yet, insofar as Heidegger poses the question of Being (and, one might add, to bring out the parallel with Husserl more sharply, replaces 'presence' with 'presencing' in, for example, The Anaximander Fragment) it also points in the other direction. And the formulation that 'the activity of signification ... although it has no truth in itself (might) condition the movement and concept of truth' will have an important bearing on our understanding of terms like 'differance', 'trace' etc. of which it can be said that they make meaning possible without themselves having meaning. And most importantly, Derrida's denial of a primordial time will be based on the same kind of consideration — that when we unearth what makes truth (meaning, time) possible we must leave behind the language applicable to the constituted. We discuss below (see Part III, chapter 2) whether Derrida can avoid the accusation that he renews transcendental thinking.

Strangely the generosity of Derrida's double reading is then
suspended as he shows how Husserl attempts the reduction of 'indication'. This is achieved by linking the indication/expression relation to that between facts and essences, empirical/logical etc. Perhaps the most interesting suggestion Derrida makes is that in the distinction between indication and expression is rooted the whole problematic of the reduction.

In his chapter 'Meaning and Soliloquy', Derrida takes us through Husserl's argument for the claim that the possibility of expression without indication is demonstrated by solitary mental life. But if expression is to be thought of as an exteriorization (ex-pression), how can it survive the excision of the external world, of the world of communication? Derrida argues that Husserl's account of solitary mental life anticipates his later account of consciousness as a noetic/noematic structure, and that the inside/outside relation still preserved within solitary mental life is that between the act of expression and the ideal object it intends. The significance of the term 'expression' for Husserl lies in its association with the voice (which has to be a silent 'phenomenological' voice in solitary mental life) and with the idea of voluntary intention - a connection made much clearer in the French (in which Bedeutung becomes vouloir-dire, literally, "wanting-to-say").

But the importance of this account of solitary mental life lies in the way it embodies the value of self-presence, an achievement the ideality of which is the product of all the exclusions (of the other, of the body, of the 'sensible', of the context of communication...). In ordinary communication, the other has no immediate grasp of the meaning lying behind my words, and can at best perform acts of 'analogical appresentation'. My expressive acts must all be under-
stood as 'indications' of intentional states not directly available to the other. In solitary mental life, however, these problems are overcome. 'The meaning is therefore present to the self in the life of a present that has not yet gone forth from itself into the world'. In solitary mental life, mediation is replaced by immediacy.

Husserl quickly comes to see that what this requires is in fact the elimination of signs as such, and he comes to identify signs with indications as the nature of expression in solitary mental life becomes clearer. What role is there for words, then, in inner experience? The inner monologue that takes place in a living self-presence, makes no use of real words, to which indicative traces would attach, but instead of functions with imagined words, which are free from such implications.

The claimed necessary connection between communication and indication has the consequence that expression and meaning do not function in a communicative way at all in 'solitary discourse'. It is in his account of how Husserl explains the fact that we certainly seem to communicate to ourselves that Derrida inaugurates his first really subversive strategy.

The argument in this short chapter ('Meaning and Representation') has momentous consequences, but it is in our view defective, even if something of the same conclusion can be reached by other arguments (which we provide). We shall first offer a summary of what is already a very dense section, and then offer some extended critical comments.

Derrida's response to Husserl's distinction between actually communicating to ourselves (which, in pure expression, we do not do, in his view) and representing to ourselves that we do so, is to argue that the structure of repetition is constitutive for signs in general,
and hence for communication, and as it can be shown that 'presence' is inwardly and already constituted by representation, the distinction between actually and apparently communicating to ourselves breaks down. The corruption of presence by representation will have 'a whole chain of formidable consequences for phenomenology'. (p.63, ET pp. 56-7) Moreover, he claims that the basis for these moves is to be found in Husserl's own writing.

For Husserl recognizes that signs in general operate within a structure of repetition (a unique sign is no sign). And so this must hold of expressive signs just as well. (At this point, Derrida seems to ignore his earlier recognition that Husserl in a sense sees the trap and begins to suggest that expressive signs might not be signs at all, in his phrase 'signs, ie. indications'.) And yet repetition surely involves or implies or has as its basic element representation. The argument, in essence is contained in the following lines:

'(Something) ... can function as a sign, and in general as language, only if a formal identity enables it to be issued again and to be recognised. This identity is necessarily ideal. It thus necessarily implies representation: as Vorstellung, the locus of identity in general, as Vergegenwartigung, the possibility of reproductive repetition in general, and as Representation, insofar as each signifying event is a substitute (for the signified as well as for the ideal form of the signifier).'

Surely, then, representation is essential to language, and no accidental addition or intrusion.

'Since this representative structure is signification itself, I cannot enter into an "effective discourse" without being involved in unlimited representation' (ibid.)

And yet, when Husserl says that we only take ourselves to be or represent ourselves to be communicating to ourselves in solitary mental life, he is supposing that actually representation is excluded.
He interprets Husserl here as, in a very traditional way, trying to save presence and to reduce or derive (i.e. make derivative) the sign. (He is trying to ward off the consequence that the general repetitive structure of signification should apply to 'expression'.) For Derrida the position of the sign is paradoxical here. While the classical way of eliminating the sign (or reducing it, taming its dispersive power) is to make it derivative from a presence, if the sign then has that derived sense, we eliminate the sign if we make it primary. This latter move, I take it, is his own, and its consequences can be seen in such a term as 'trace' (which, he claims is not a trace of anything...).

Derrida is engaged here in a very general strategy of deconstruction, the first stage of which - that of reversal (making representation non-derivative) - we have already seen. The conclusion of this will be that 'The presence-of-the-present is derived from repetition and not vice-versa'. If Husserl never says this, Derrida claims it is consistent with both the Phenomenology of Time-Consciousness and the Fifth of his Cartesian Meditations. (Of course part of the point of such a claim by Derrida is that while it may be consistent, it would take Husserl (or our understanding of Husserl) in an entirely different direction from the one intended.)

Husserl does link ideality with the possibility of infinite repetition, and this is one of the points on which Derrida fastens. It is critical because of the three-fold ideality of the sign on Husserl's account (- that of the sensible word, the meaning, and (sometimes) the object referred to). The question we must discuss shortly is whether that 'linkage' can plausibly, let alone compellingly, be regarded as one in which repetition (or the possibility of repetition)
constitutes ideality. But the version of the reversal we have just quoted mentioned the presence-of-the present. How does the relation between ideality and repetition bear on the question of presence?

Ideality appears in presence in two forms, (1) the ideal object which stands before us, and (2) the ideal possibility of repetition afforded by a pure presence. Presence has the value and privilege it does because of the way it supplies the form for all experience, and because it too, as an ideal form is infinitely repeatable. Not only does this apply to my present, it applies to the present as such. In valuing presence I value an ideal ground of evidence, of transcendental life, in which not only is the existence of the world accidental, but in which my own death is no longer an issue. If, with Derrida, we see the value of presence to be tied up with the reduction of the sign, then we can see that the reduction of the sign involves a tacit recognition of the possibility of my death.

Derrida expands this, in a Heideggerean vein, to a general claim about the relationship between a subject and his/her own death. While for Heidegger, Dasein is essentially a Being-towards-death, Derrida's version is that if we understand my being as a subject to rest on this general relation to presence, and if this presence has a general sense, one which rises above the possibility of my personal disappearance or non-existence, then we can say 'I am = I am mortal'.

We cannot go into the subtle way in which Derrida makes much the same moves with respect to both imagination and fiction, as he has for representation, moves that again make use of Husserl's own phenomenological subtlety in dealing with these matters (see above, Ch. 2). ('... the general distinction between the fictitious and effective uses of the sign is threatened. The sign is originally weighted by
fiction.

The consequence of such further moves is to allow Derrida to extend, or perhaps just to put in other words, his undermining of the opposition Husserl needs to draw between mediated and unmediated self-knowledge, one's true experience of oneself from ways of imagining or fictionalizing oneself etc.

However, the immediately relevant conclusion of the chapter is that if representation lies at the heart of signs, then the idea of distinguishing true from merely represented (or imagined, or supposed) communication is suspect.

There are two obvious objections to this conclusion.
1. that the foundational role he gives to repetition is *arbitrary*.
2. that the relationship this has to Husserl's question — about communication — is misconceived.

The *arbitrariness* objection would go something like this: Derrida correctly gleans from Husserl a relation between the ideality of a sign and its repetition. But his attempt to go further than Husserl involves a certain casualness in his understanding of the modality of repetition. And it involves an unjustified weighting of the relationship of interdependence of ideality and repetition. To expand on these points: Derrida's position on the modality of repetition seems implausible when we compare it to the argument Wittgenstein used (in his *Philosophical Investigations*) against the possibility of a logically private language. For Wittgenstein, to use a sign intelligibly, it must be possible for that sign to be repeated at other times and by other people. That is a test for whether there is a rule governing its use, and with no rule, no meaning. For Derrida, the question of whether we are dealing with actual repetition or possible repetition is often unclear. He
certainly usually refers to 'repetition' without further qualification. But a relationship between ideality and this plain repetition is much harder to see. The reason for Derrida's vacillation here is surely obvious. The relationship between ideality and the possibility of repetition is hard to construe as constitutionally unidirectional. It is as easy to suppose that the possibility of repetition depends on ideality as vice versa. And yet clearly the interrelationship is very close. In the case of plain (ie. actual) repetition, the relationship to ideality is harder to grasp, while it is easier to see how that reversal would make a difference to whatever the relationship is.

There is a historical parallel to Derrida's position here, that of Saussure's principle of (semiological) difference (to which, inter alia, Derrida refers in his essay "Differance"). Saussure's revolutionary gesture was to have insisted that the identity of signs be understood as derivative from the differences between signs (phonic, graphic etc.); identity comes through difference. Language is a system of relations 'with no positive terms'. Clearly there are difficulties in conceptualizing this, because no point can be thought of as fixed independently of the others (of which, in each case, the same is true). And one of the critical features of this notion is, of course, that although thought of as synchronic, these differences need never be co-present. This in itself would facilitate the transition to spatio-temporality of Derrida's 'differance', but more modestly it gives one some insight into the virtuality underlying the idea of repetition. Repetition supplies the numerical difference on the basis of which ideal identity (= ideality) can be made to
appear. Derrida's reversal of the relationship between ideality and repetition might be said to have completed in a temporal dimension what Saussure had begun from a synchronic perspective.

Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that our worries about the modality of 'repetition' can be overcome. The question remains as to whether we do actually communicate to ourselves, and what bearing Derrida's argument, were it successful, would have on that question. Husserl says we only think we communicate to ourselves. For Derrida, the distinction is inapplicable to language because it is confused in language. The distinction between actually speaking to ourselves ("effective" communication) and imagining or representing to ourselves that we are so doing could only apply if actual speaking were free from the structure of representation.

But does the argument work? Can there not still be a difference between two things even if each presupposes the other? Would we not conclude on Derrida's argument that a husband and wife could not in fact act independently because the concept of husband already presupposes a constitutive relationship with that of 'wife'? Is not Derrida saying (wrongly) that we cannot distinguish between things that are constitutionally related? Suppose we agree that repeatability is essential to all signs, and that signs are the basis of communication. What that means is that other examples (tokens) of the same signs must equally be able to make sense. What it does not mean is that there is no difference between doing x and my supposing that I am doing x. The latter is compatible with my not doing x, the former is not. Surely Derrida confuses repetition and representation.

Is there perhaps a better explanation of Husserl's claim that we only think of ourselves as communicating? How about this: Husserl
claims that there is no point in communicating to myself because it would involve telling myself what I was thinking and to be able to do that I would already have to know what I was thinking, and so would not need telling. So I can only suppose that this is what I do. As I understand it, Husserl can only mean that we mis-describe inner speech if we think of it as communication. But he cannot mean that we perform an act of (false-) representation, because his very own argument would tell against such an act. It would be immediately obvious that we were doing no such thing if, as he believes, the evidence of non-communication were right there in front of us. I take it that Husserl means that we unthinkingly describe inner speech as communication just because we think it must be communicative as it involves words. If this is so Derrida has got §8 largely wrong. Does he not perhaps, for his own reasons, put too much weight on the literal sense of 'stellt...vor'?

We have said that Derrida would on this account be confusing repetition and representation. The fact that we think of ourselves/suppose ourselves/represent ourselves as communicating is not inconsistent with an inherent repetition involved in any sign (assuming we concede this in some sense). Representation etc. is an intentional act, repetition need not be. But there is an obvious Derridean response to this. Such a reference to an intentional act takes the very point in dispute for granted. We would be one of those Derrida describes as

'living in the effect - the assured consolidated, constituted effect of repetition and representation, of the difference which removes presence'. (p.57, ET p. 51)

Derrida's point is that the idea of intention rests on what in itself lacks meaning, namely (the possibility of) repetition.
But could one not still respond: yes, **repeatability** is indeed a condition of my intention being a **discrete** one (being this intention rather than **that**) and so it is a condition of my being able to suppose that I am communicating to myself that I am able to suppose so at other times too. But surely this does not invalidate the difference between communicating and merely **thinking that** one is communicating?

For the second relationship of representation or supposing is a 'that' relation, which is not the case for repetition. Firstly, the relationship involved in repetition is neutral with respect to whether the repetition actually occurs (the possibility will do), secondly there is consequently no constitutive, internal relationship between actual signs so repeated. Other actual signs would just be proof of repeatability and not in themselves required. Thirdly, even if we acknowledge the dependence of representation on repetition, that is not a relation of equivalence.

The proper thing to do with intentional acts is to apply the principle of identity through difference to them, to demonstrate their diacritical interdifferentiation. This surely does not mean that identity is undermined, but rather explicated.

What then are we to conclude about Derrida's position in this chapter? The relationship between repetition and the sign's identity or between representation and presence is not convincingly a constitutive one. The interposing of 'possibility of ...' makes that clear, allowing the relationship to be understood in quite the reverse way. It may be of course that there are other arguments for Derrida's conclusion about the presence/representation relation etc. that would dispell the thought that the meaning of any sign rests on its relation to self-presence. Derrida again claims that Husserl
himself provides them when one considers the question of self-presence from a temporal perspective, as we shall shortly see.

In the language of sameness and otherness, we have discussed Derrida's attempt to show that representation lies at the heart of the sign's presence. We have found the argument suggestive but not yet convincing. But Derrida offers another argument, to which we have already alluded in our initial summary, for an intrinsic relation to otherness in the sameness of the present. Derrida argues, as I understand him, that even if Husserl does not make much of the connection between ideality and repetition, his constant invocation of the value of presence itself rests on its infinite ideal repetition - ideal because the present as such 'concerns no determined being', is content-neutral. The present is, if you like, the ideal form of repetition. But again, we can ask, is such ideal repeatability built in to the meaning of the present, or is it just a consequence of its content-independence?

Derrida seems clearly enough to treat this ideal repeatability of the present as an idealization betraying a particular function it serves. He suggests that this ideal possibility of repetition is ultimately a 'dissimulation of one's relationship with death', a dissimulation in that it hides the fact that this ideality is bought at the price of denying my mortality, which will bring the series of such 'presences' to a close.

If so, then the ideality of 'presence' itself would betray a concern that transcended it, one's awareness of one's mortality, of a possibility other than the actuality of the living present. The remark is surely suggestive, but hard to judge the truth of. We might rather consider abandoning this ideal content-independent present, and moving to one which takes its structure and dimensions from its
content. Think of the difference in the 'present' when listening to a complex chord sequence and a single tapping rhythm. It it were admitted that some 'content', with contributions of its own to make to the shape and scope of the 'present' were always to be taken account of, then we would have an argument for the radical impurity of the present—whether one called this radical impurity 'representation' might depend on one's critical motives, but clearly for some 'content' to lend shape to the present, that content has to be grasped as such. And we might call that grasping 'representation'. For a tune to shape time it must be experienced as a tuneful sequence. This 'as' is surely the key to it being a case of representation. Would the same be true of the simplest beat, such as a heart-beat? Husserl as we saw in the last chapter, is not sure about this, but the answer is pretty clearly yes. While one can clearly retain one beat while listening to another, the protending of a third, while itself not an act of induction, surely rests on some recognition that one is confronted with a series of beats such that such protention is motivated. Representation then, in Derrida's language, would not precede presence, but be part of it. We repeat, and extend, here, the claim we made in Ch. III, §26.

To sum up our conclusions at this point:

(1) We are not convinced that Derrida can treat repetition and the possibility of repetition as interchangeable.

(2) We claim an 'opacity of implication'. Just because representation or repetition infects presence in itself, it does not mean that at another level one cannot distinguish between Øing and thinking one is Ø ing. The putative constitutional indebtedness of all intentional acts to pre-intentional conditions of repetition does not preclude à
further relationship between such acts, or between acts and states of affairs etc. Derrida wrongly treats repetitive constitution as a levelling procedure.

(3) But in the crucial question of the possibility of the evidential (and temporal) present, we can accept, via a somewhat different argument, Derrida's central conclusion, that the present is permeated by representation.

We shall argue (see below, III. 1,4) that the consequences of this permeation by representation is not, as Derrida would have it, the collapse of any concept of time other than a metaphysical one, but rather the collapse of time (as presence) as a pure intuitional foundation. What is opened up is a concept of time which theoretically embraces the necessary intrusion of representation.

In the chapter Signs and the Blink of an Eye, we find Derrida's more specific discussion of the temporal presuppositions of Husserl's theory of signification. Given the declared focus of the thesis it might be thought none too soon in coming, but it will have been clear we hope, how (it is vital to understand) the setting of the theory of signs in evaluating Derrida's discussion of Husserl on time.

At the end of the previous chapter, Derrida had written

'The self-presence of experience must be produced in the present taken as a now. And this is just what Husserl says: if "mental acts" are not announced to themselves through the intermediacy of a "Kundgabe", if they do not have to be informed about themselves through the intermediacy of indications, it is because they are "lived by us in the same instant" (im selben Augenblick). The present of self-presence would be as indivisible as the blink of an eye.' (p.66, ET. p. 59)

Derrida will argue that Husserl's argument is fundamentally threatened by an attack on the 'punctuality of the instant', and it
is this that he engages in, apparently with Husserl's own help!

Derrida himself divides this chapter into three parts, preceded by this warning of danger:

'If the punctuality of the instant is a myth, a spatial or mechanical metaphor, an inherited metaphysical concept, or all that at once, and if the present of self-presence is not simple, if it is constituted in a primordial and irreducible synthesis, then the whole of Husserl's argumentation is threatened in its very principle' (p.68, ET p. 61)

The three parts concern themselves respectively with

1. the importance to Husserl of the now point (and to philosophical thought in general).
2. (contrary to (1)). The important way in which Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness offers a more complex account of the present in which retention and protention are included.
3. The claim that however much weight Husserl gives to the distinction between primary retention and secondary recollection, i.e. representation, both of these, and indeed the ideality of presence itself, have as their common root 'the possibility of repetition in general', or what he calls the structure of the trace. This would undermine the pure self-identity of presence.

Let us now pursue the argument in more detail.

1. The fundamental point, at the risk of repeating ourselves, is of course that 'self-presence must be produced in the undivided unity of a temporal present so as to have nothing to reveal to itself by the agency of signs'. (p.67, ET p. 60) Temporality constitutes a threat to this unity if its movement cannot be excluded from presence. Once we get temporal differences, we lose the condition of immediacy and unity that would make signs unnecessary, and the possibility of a pre-linguistic immediacy seems to vanish.
But is Husserl committed to the idea of the present as a now? Surely the issues that Derrida is raising are precisely the ones which, as we have already shown at length, Husserl himself raises, and in the most sophisticated way. For Heidegger, too, hardly an easy thinker to please, Husserl's *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* was a radical break with the traditional Aristotelian view of time, determined in accordance with such ideas as 'now', 'point', 'limit', 'circle'. And does not Husserl enter into our study precisely as one who has attempted to distance himself from any such metaphysical conception of time?

2. Derrida's blend of appreciation and critique amounts to what can best be called a double reading, one which untangles two conflicting motifs and tendencies in Husserl's work. The focus of Derrida's interest is what he insists is the ambiguity of Husserl's expansion of the now by reference to the concepts of retention and protention, with which we have already concerned ourselves. The point instant may seem to have been breached, and yet each case of retention and protention is seen to share the evidential value of the original now point, and moreover, is fundamentally attached to it. Derrida can be seen to be arguing (a) that the point instant is still the reference point from which retention and protention are subtended, and (b) that the evidential value associated with it is retained, if we can use that word. Proof that Husserl is still committed to a view that lies comfortably within the tradition can be seen in the impossibility of Husserl accommodating say, Freud's concept of the delayed effect, becoming conscious of a content that was never conscious.

Not for the first time, we have a certain sympathy with Derrida's attitude here, and indeed his conclusions, but his argument is surely
wanting. Let us turn up the magnification and examine it more closely.

Derrida makes the critical point about Husserl's use of protention and retention in this way:

'the presence of the perceived present can appear as such only inasmuch as it is continuously compounded with a non-presence and non-perception, with ... retention and protention' (p.72, ET p. 64)

He admits, however, that Husserl says that actually retention is perception, 'if we call perception the act in which all "origination" lies'. In retention 'we see what is past'. Here 'perception' gives us a non-present. Derrida surmises that Husserl is at this point allowing himself to call retention 'perception' because for him (Husserl) the important distinction is between retention and reproduction. Derrida seems to try to discredit this assimilation by quoting Husserl's claim that there is 'no mention here of a continuous accommodation of perception to its opposite'. Now it is quite true that Husserl does (PITC ET p. 62) talk earlier of the continual passing over from perception to non-perception but the claim just quoted is taken by Derrida completely out of context. Husserl (PITC ET p. 64) is talking about recollection. It is in recollection that 'there is no mention of a continuous accommodation of perception to its opposite'. Husserl has not made some sort of slip in calling retention 'perception'.

The point is that Husserl is working with two different senses of perception, (1) as impression, (2) as an act of 'origination', which latter covers both retention and protention. Husserl usually uses 'perception' in the first sense - as in the phrase about 'passing over'. As it happens, Derrida's conclusion still goes through, for however we characterise retention, it will be continuous with the impressional now, and that, for Derrida, implies that no rigid distinction between 'now' and 'not-now' can be made. This takes us to the third point.
3. Assuming that Husserl is committed both to retention being continuous with the now, and also accessible only in a non-perceptual sense, Derrida then concludes that whatever their relative difference ('without reducing the abyss which may indeed separate retention from representation..') retention and representation have more in common than might first seem apparent. The distinction, he says 'is rather a difference between two modifications of non-perception'. There may be phenomenological differences between the two, but this 'only serves to separate two ways of relating to the irreducible nonpresence of another now'. If the relation between the impressional now and the retentional consciousness into which it passes over, is treated as a difference within presence, a relation to the Other within self-presence, we cannot just say that the sign has entered into the structure of presence, for the classical understanding of the sign involves a relation to a pure presence, which latter has now been discredited. It is here that he suggests the term 'trace' to capture that which cannot be called a sign, which lies at the heart of presence. If we can also see this relation to what is Other in the very ideal repeatability of the present, we can come to see how the present has a primordial nonself-identity.

Derrida clearly thinks, in one sense, that he is only redescribing what Husserl himself could admit. But where Husserl sees the impressional now and retention as primitively unified, Derrida sees in this relation a primitive difference. And this, it is claimed, equally affects how we think of time. For we cannot continue to give the name time to this primitive movement to otherness, for that concept has always 'designated a movement conceived in terms of the present and can mean nothing else'.
We have here, then, one of the places in which Derrida is arguing for the conclusion that we took as the starting point for this entire work. How plausible is it in this version? Surely not at all, for the argument is tendentious in the extreme. It supposes that the same/other opposition has some sort of automatic ascendancy over any other it happens to come across. Clearly, Husserl notes a difference between the now and retention, but Derrida simply refuses to allow him his own account of the meaning of that difference. And while acknowledging the radical difference between retention and representation, treats it as secondary to the same/other opposition. What Derrida should have discussed are the ways in which Husserl too describes the positive contribution of recollection (=representation) to consciousness (see above, ch. 111, especially §14, §30). Furthermore, Derrida's assertion that 'time' 'has always designated a movement conceived in terms of the present' is surely importantly imprecise. There is a considerable difference between, say, thinking of time as essentially recuperative of the present, or of some value associated with the present, and time seen as the inevitable loss of such a present or such a value. And yet both are covered by the phrase 'in terms of the present' ('a partir du present'). And the latter is surely represented not only in popular thinking (think of the picture of Father Time with his scythe) but also in the history of philosophy (think of Hume, for whom one can at least say the future offers no guarantees of continuing identity, be it for things or selves). Finally, we ought to repeat that one of the most puzzling things about Derrida's position here is knowing whether he is actually disagreeing with Husserl or just redescribing
that on which they would both agree. Husserl is clear that it is only because of the running-off of the now to retention that there is any consciousness at all. Presence is then for Husserl a primitive flux. Is not Derrida being obtuse in attributing to Husserl allegiance to the present as now-point? It is even more puzzling that Derrida should want to reuse the same sort of arguments (giving 'primordiality' a value, while applying it to 'difference') as Husserl had used. There may be a rescuable strategic value for (quasi-) transcendental arguments, but there is a real danger that in supposing one has achieved a reversal at some (fictional) transcendental level, one neglects to notice the consequence one's position has at other levels. As we have suggested before, the real question may well not be whether we call presence difference, but whether we can adequately articulate the actual overlaying of structures of representation onto any such primitive description of conscious life. Derrida still leaves himself the problem of coming down the ladder, negotiating the passage this time from the quasi-transcendental to the everyday. It may be that these remarks of ours will one day find their proper place in a positive revaluation of Derrida's relation to phenomenology. Further material for such a study is to be found in his account of the privilege of the voice for Husserl, where it seems Derrida is offering us a phenomenology of the voice.

We know that for Derrida the voice has a privilege in phenomenology, a privilege which, he claims leads Husserl to value the spoken word over the written word, a privilege which is said to have its roots in the special relationship between speech, the voice and presence.

In the chapter "The Voice That Keeps Silence" Derrida does not
offer us further evidence of Husserl's phonocentrism, but we are offered a description of speech which would make it plausible that a phenomenologist would privilege speech. The immediacy with which we hear what we say, and the way speech fades into immateriality as soon as spoken could easily lead one to consider speech as privileged. And if Husserl did not say it explicitly, there are many classical references to the privileged connection of the voice and the soul (eg. in Plato's Phaedrus). A lot more is at stake, however: the relation between the voice and consciousness, the idea of auto-affection, and the temporality of speech. We shall draw out only those relevant to our purposes.

Derrida has argued that for Husserl, absolute self-presence, phenomenological 'silence' requires not only the exclusion of indirection but even that of expression in so far as that is outside that of 'sense'. It also involves the exclusion of the relation to the other. What we are left with is an auto-affection, for which the key phenomenon is the 's'entendre parler', hearing oneself speak. It is through this experience that we come to associate ideality with sound.

'The signifier, animated by my breath and by the meaning-intention ... is in absolute proximity to me. The living act, the life-giving act, the Lebendigkeit, which animates the body of the signifier and transforms it into a meaningful expression. The soul of language seems not to separate itself from itself, from its own self-presence. It does not risk death in the body of a signifier that is given over to the world.... It can show the ideal object or ideal Bedeutung connected to it without venturing outside ideality, outside the interiority of self-present life.' (p.87, ET p. 78)

The auto-affection of hearing oneself speak is credited by Derrida with being the basis of a number of the metaphysical illusions of experience — especially those associated with its apparent ideality. And he says of it much the same as he said of the relation between
retention and the now point in the present, that it constitutes a pure difference dividing self-presence. And the difficulty we have noted before appears again with full vigour. This pure self-affection, with which he associates differance (with an a), is credited with a whole range of constitutive capacities, in particular it makes possible all those 'things' we thought it possible (and Husserl thought it necessary) to exclude from auto-affection — including space, the outside, the world, the body etc.' The ontological significance of this notion is to be found in its primacy in relation to all constituted identities, which has the double consequence that it itself cannot be grasped 'in its purity', and means that it does not belong to the subject of which it is true; rather it produces the subject. Support for the primitiveness of this temporal event, if we can call it that, is to be found, as Derrida notes, in Husserl's admission that properly speaking, 'names are lacking' for this primordial flux. The justification of his injection of the idea of 'trace' into the living present, with its peculiar 'logic' is that we are dealing with a 'movement' that precedes and conditions presence, and hence identity, the possibility of identifying and hence naming, and even the intelligibility that would go with this.

'The living present springs forth out of its non-identity with itself and from the possibility of a retentional trace. It is always already a trace. This trace cannot be thought out on the basis of a simple present whose life would be within itself; the self of the living present is primordially a trace.... Being-primordial must be thought on the basis of the trace, and not the reverse.' (p. 95, ET p. 85)

All this corresponds to a very traditional problematic. How can we attribute to those conditions which are supposed to be conditions of possibility for identity, sense, etc. those properties
themselves? And in the case of time, the 'movement' that would seem essential to any account of its primordial form undermines the possibility of primordiality and either identity or chronological priority being compatible. One either speaks metaphorically, and thus risks misunderstanding, or one invents terms which are logically 'indecidable'. Derrida sees the very word 'time' as what he calls 'ontic metaphor'.

The word 'time' itself, as it has always been understood in the history of metaphysics, is a metaphor which at the same time both indicates and dissimulates the 'movement' of this auto-affection. (p. 45, ET p. 85)

What is the difficulty with all this? Surely if we have discredited the transcendental mode of thought we have to abandon its language of constitution, production, primordiality etc. We shall argue later against the adequacy of the 'sous rature' strategy.

This idea of auto-affection has important consequences for time, and it is these that have guided us somewhat swiftly through the intricacies of this chapter. Now however Derrida will reassert his claims about the fundamentally metaphysical nature of time, and we shall have to consider these again.

In the last few pages of this chapter, Derrida brings to a focus the implications that his understanding of time as difference have for identity, ideality, presence, the subject etc. - in short for the language of ontology. What Derrida does is to draw out of Husserl, with renewed force and determination, the recognition that temporality fundamentally undermines and does not sustain the idea of presence, and the very possibility of the interiority by which subjectivity has been traditionally thought possible. For Derrida, this will not only open up the present primordially to what is not present, but also open up the 'inside' of subjectivity to the 'outside' of the world.
We have previously suggested that it is in the primitive movement from impressional to retentional consciousness that the idea of difference inserts itself in the heart of self-presence. Derrida here argues that auto-affection (which he links to, without identifying with, difference) is to be found in impressional consciousness itself. And the evidence for this is to be found in Husserl's description of the primal impression as a 'pure spontaneity', a pure production. The idea is that as such, it cannot be any sort of being, where 'beings' are thought of as constituted. And it is in this light that the strange logic of 'differance' and 'trace' must be understood.

We evaluate this move in more detail in III.2 below. For now it will suffice to put down a couple of markers. We shall want to know (a) Does not Derrida's problem arise from being initially seduced by the transcendental project? Might we not resist that move from the very beginning? Is there a way of avoiding it that equally avoids the naiveties of empiricism? Is there not another way back, should it prove inevitable? (b) Is not Derrida converting a tendency (that may well exist in our understanding of language) into a limit of language itself? Is he not, in effect working with a very restricted understanding of the capacity of language to convey ontological subtleties? To be specific, why could we not say 'time' and recognise quite clearly that it was not sort of thing? Does not the word 'temporality' already point in that direction?15

We said that the other consequence of time seen as differance is that it opens up the interiority of subjectivity to the 'outside'. This claim, if it can be plausibly maintained, would be an important response to those who accuse Derrida of a textual idealism (eg. for his
claim that there is no 'hors texte'). It is not clear whether Derrida offers a number of arguments for this, or just one in a number of different guises, but the suggestion that difference opens up subjectivity to the outside is not one that he convincingly sustains. He succeeds at most in showing that a certain spatiality can in a rather abstruse sense be located within subjectivity. And even then the language has a disturbingly Hegelian ring to it. Derrida writes

'Since the trace is the intimate relation of the living present with its outside, the openness upon exteriority in general, upon the sphere of what is not "one's own", etc. the temporalization of sense is, from the outset, a "spacing".'

He continues

'As soon as we admit spacing both as "interval" or as difference and as openness upon the outside, there can no longer be any absolute inside, for the "outside" has insinuated itself into the movement by which the inside of the nonspatial, which is called "time", appears, is constituted, is "presented".' (p. 96 ET p. 86)

At one level, Derrida is saying no more than he has already said about the structure or movement of difference lying at the heart of presence. At another, it seems to us that he is trying to repeat the criticisms of the transcendental reduction previously offered by existentialists. But all his references to the exterior or to exteriority, are in fact references to an exteriority within subjectivity. We need not conclude that there is an opening from subjectivity to the world, only within subjectivity itself.

It might perhaps be said that we are adopting a philosophically naive sense of 'space'. But Derrida's own notion of space, exteriority, externality seems itself to depend on it having undergone some sort of reduction. Suitably interiorized, it can then be wedded to temporality in a kind of primordial spatiotemporality. Derrida's indebtedness to
phenomenological themes returns to haunt his solutions. It is hard
to say whether he has undermined or simply refurbished transcendental
thinking at this point. When he writes

'As a relation between an inside and an outside in general
an existent and a nonexistent in general, ... temporalization
is at once the very power and limit of phenomenological
reduction....' (p. 96, ET p. 86)

one is tempted to respond that he is confusing structural analogy with
some sort of constitutional dependence. Temporalization does indeed
in some sense involve a relation between an existent and a nonexistent,
an inside and an outside but it can at best be said to symbolize the
inside/outside relation involved in phenomenological reduction.

Derrida, it is true, refers, perhaps in elaboration of the
above remarks, to hearing oneself speak, in a way that might be thought
to echo Merleau-Ponty:

'Hearing oneself speak is not the inwardness of an inside
that is closed in upon itself; it is the irreducible
openness in the inside; it is the eye and the world within
speech. Phenomenological reduction is a scene, a theatre
stage.' (p. 96, ET p. 86)

But the way out of interiority offered by such an experience is
surely not most obviously via 'the spacing in all temporalization' but
rather via the embodiment of the speaking voice, and the manifold
ways in which the purity of that listening to oneself might get
interrupted, distorted (from a sore throat, coughing, coping with
eating at the same time, to various paraphrases of speech, in which the
spoken word seems to have run forward, ahead of thought, or in which
the monitoring has broken down, or in which alien words, or associations,
have clearly crept in...).

For the sake of formal completeness and because Derrida's focus
here is still explicitly Husserl, and even though the issues will have
to be discussed again below, we conclude by a discussion of his logic of supplementarity, in his chapter seven. However, despite, or perhaps because of the wealth of its analyses, we shall select ruthlessly only those parts that directly contribute to Derrida's treatment of temporality. We shall put to one side Derrida's further discussion of Husserl's theory of language and concentrate on (1) the logic of supplementarity and its radically disruptive consequences for any understanding of time as 'succession'. (2) The relation between time, presence and the end of metaphysics.

What, then, is 'supplementarity'? The concept does not merely appear in this chapter. It plays an important analytical role in two chapters of *Of Grammatology*. It is both a complex and a powerful concept. It is powerful in that it captures a structure of dependence that relates a number of Derrida's key concerns - speech and writing, expression and indication - to name but two. And it serves to summarize and stabilize the relationship in each case. It is complex in that we have to jump the rails of our ordinary thinking to understand it. In particular, the kind of thinking we have to transcend is that which thinks of explanation as having the form of tracing back to a first point which unlike all the subsequent stages, will not be derivative, but will have some sort of fulness of presence. When Derrida talks of 'original supplementarity' or 'primordial supplementarity' what he is saying is that there is no such privileged first point. But there is something like a first operation of signification, a first movement - and that is supplementation.

As I understand it, Derrida derives the term from an innocent use made of it by Rousseau: 'Languages are made to be spoken, writing
serves only as a *supplement* to speech.\(^\text{18}\) In this remark we have of course, on the Derridean thesis, the traditional appreciation of writing as an unproductive replication of speech.\(^\text{19}\) We know that for Derrida the problematic of speech and writing is subservient to the question of the sign. And indeed, at the beginning of this chapter he explains supplementation, again, with the same duality as before, as the primitive structure of signification, both completing and displacing presence.

If we stick for the moment with the traditional concept of the sign, what Derrida believes is that signs do not merely reflect pre-existing objectivities or meanings. Re-presentation is not a simple standing-for a pre-existing presence. Signs give to whatever they signify whatever sense of presence they possess. Derrida even extends this idea of an addition that fulfils to the idea of 'the for-itself or self-presence' (or self-consciousness), and concludes 'by delayed reaction, a possibility produces that to which it is said to be added on'.\(^\text{20}\) In this respect we find an echo of earlier discussions of the 'I' and its relation to death, and the rejection of 'innocence'. Death does not befall a pre-existing 'I', rather a relation to death constitutes the 'I'. But if this *completion* aspect of supplementation is important, we must not forget *substitution*.

The written word replaced, substitutes for the spoken word, in Rousseau. In Husserl, *indication* substitutes for *expression* in communicative discourse.

Derrida describes supplementation as an original structure of signification. What does that mean? I take it he means that it is from this structure that the metaphysical picture is derived, by a
certain distorting transformation. We cannot, he claims, grasp the structure of supplementation 'on the basis of consciousness', or within a traditional temporal framework. I assume he means that when he talks of 'movements' he is not talking of conscious acts, and that this structure cannot be laid out as a succession of moves.

The link between supplementarity and differance is not hard to grasp. By differance, Derrida picks out the positive sense in which signs do not have their meaning by a relation to a presence, or, alternatively, that such a relation is an infinite deferral. And if supplementarity is seen to displace presence, it equally introduces into presence, a play of differences.

How does this account of supplementarity threaten time? The claim must be both that it involves a contortion of the order of succession that no amount of fiddling round with will straighten out into something resembling a simple sequence, and that this is important somehow. For the interrelations of a static structure might equally be said to resist a temporal interpretation, but unless it mattered to time we would think no more of it. The point here is surely that the logic of supplementation is such as to undermine any reference back to a primordial 'presence' that would be seen as the origin of a meaning, or indeed of time itself. Supplementary logic says that the 'first' is merely a shadow cast back by the second, so to speak, or that what 'comes first' is the movement from first to second, that the fulness was not there from the start, but is created by what seems to point elsewhere. The idea of the supplement could be said to capture the thought that the value of origin may be an effect of desire, generated perhaps from the sense that temporal representations cannot be all
there are, that time itself must have some underlying layer. 
Another name for this desire would be metaphysics.

At the end of this work, we can distinguish six motifs that have concerned him, (1) presence as the matrix of all the interdependent conceptions of phenomenology, (2) the interpretation of this system as a teleological structure, (3) the interpretation of the philosophy of presence as the attempt to eliminate differance, (4) the announcing of the closure of the history of being as presence, (5) the problem of how to carry on 'beyond' absolute knowledge, (6) the metaphor of the labyrinth 'which includes in itself its own exits'. The scope of this set of topics makes our attempt to clarify the particular status of time and temporality somewhat difficult. The most obvious remark to make is that Derrida makes it unnecessary to demonstrate that the question of time is more than one question among the catalogue of philosophy's questions. Derrida's discussion of Husserl's theory of signification has traced that theory, and with it traced philosophy itself, to a primitive assertion of the temporal and evidential primacy of presence. Equally convinced that theories of time have all traditionally privileged presence, the undermining of that value undermines time. When we talk about traditional theories of time, we mean, in fact, theories that, with the aid of 'presence', dissimulate differance, repetition, the fact that there is no origin, there are no absolute point-sources etc. The very concept of 'time' like all other concepts, is associated with moves that are essentially metaphysical. To try to change this involves changing all the rules of the game. The introduction of 'indecidables', the logic of supplementarity, perhaps also the strategy of 'sous rature' can all be seen as contributing to such a change in the rules.
But what we have to ask, repeatedly, is whether Derrida is not overreacting to the specific claims of Husserl here. For Husserl, the bond between the temporal and the evidential present is indeed tight. Husserl's goals were foundational, his method intuitive. But it would need more argument to show that philosophy in general had embraced these goals. Is there not a great danger that we come to see Derrida as having invented a new positive vocabulary when in fact he has best undermined another? Do we not need to leave behind all the talk of 'fundamental differance' at the very same time as we leave behind belief in 'presence'? Is not the way he explains his goal in Of Grammatology - to shake our complacency about presence - about right? Positive theory to replace it would be an error, at least at that level. Equally, it should not preclude, as it can seem to have done, the exploration of those overlayed temporal structures in which representation and the shadows of presencing it casts backwards co-habit, in which succession is one of many 'orders' of temporality, one interwoven with delayed effects, anticipations, teleologies etc. One enormous danger of trying to transcend naivety is that one transcends its wealth too.

Apart from the questions of strategy and method which we resume later, a final word ought to be offered about Derrida's arguments, and the fact that we have often argued in this chapter that they are inconclusive. In particular, his reversals have seemed to us at least twice to be arbitrary. Would it be sufficient to gloss their effectiveness as inconclusive in the following way: that in the face of a relationship taken naturally to operate in one direction, the plausible suggestion that it even might operate in the opposite direction, has
the effect of actually unsettling the naturalness of the original position? The suggestion that repetition might constitute presence, even if inconclusive, weakens the force of the originally assumed constitutive relation.
II. Heidegger's Treatment of Time and Temporality:

A Critical Analysis of Being and Time

INTRODUCTION

p. 160 Ø 1 "Intentionality"... a central problem

p. 162 Ø 2 Introductory survey of Heidegger's writing on Time

p. 163 (a) The Early Essay

p. 165 Ø 3 (b) Being and Time: the Original Plan

p. 165 Ø 4 Time and Presence in the History of Philosophy: Heidegger's View

p. 175 Ø 5 Beyond the Transcendental: a Speculation

p. 180 Ø 6 Heidegger's own Introduction to Being and Time

CHAPTER ONE: The Existential Grounding

p. 194 Ø 7 The Deferment of the Question of Time (Division 1)

p. 197 Ø 8 Phenomenology: from Husserl to Heidegger

p. 198 Ø 9 Opening Onto the World

p. 201 Ø10 The Topology of Selfhood

p. 204 Ø11 Seeds of Doubt about Authenticity

p. 205 Ø12 Care and Disclosedness: Intimations of Temporality

p. 212 Ø13 Wholeness and Method

p. 215 Ø14 The Hinge of Care

CHAPTER TWO: Death, Resoluteness and Care

p. 223 Ø15 The Temporal Reworking (Division 11)
CHAPTER THREE: Time and Temporality

p. 287 ø29 Temporality and Everydayness
p. 292 ø30 The Privilege of the Future
p. 293 ø31 Ambiguities of Authenticity
p. 296 ø32 Are there Dominant Ecstases?
p. 299 ø33 The Intrinsic Temporality of Language
p. 301 ø34 The Time of the World
p. 308 ø35 Critical Reflections
p. 309 ø36 The Temporality of Pleasure and Desire
p. 310  Ø37  The Ordinary Conception of Time
p. 316  Ø38  A Phenomenology of Measurement 1
p. 317  Ø39  Versions of "Present"
 p. 320  Ø40  A Phenomenology of Measurement 11
p. 322  Ø41  Aristotle and the Ordinary Concept of Time
p. 325  Ø42  From Temporality to Time: Some Critical Thoughts
II. Heidegger's Treatment of Time and Temporality:  
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INTRODUCTION

"Intentionality" ... a central problem

We begin our consideration of Heidegger's thoughts about time with a small bibliographical note. It was Heidegger who (somewhat perfunctorily, Husserl is said to have thought) edited the lectures of Husserl we discussed above. His editor's foreword tells us very little. It is idle but fascinating to imagine what he would have written had he offered a substantial introduction to the lectures. There is, however one remark that merits our attention. After pointing out the central role of the concept of intentionality, and the intentionality of time-consciousness in the lectures, Heidegger goes on, in words that Husserl could formally assent to

'Even today, this term "intentionality" is no all-explanatory word but one which designates a central problem.'

Husserl could agree to this. He called himself a perpetual beginner in philosophy. Nothing was to cease to be problematic. And in many of his references to intentionality, Husserl identifies it with 'a number of pervasive phenomenological structures' (to which a set of problems belong) (Ideas Ø84) 'the problem which in its scope covers phenomenology in its entirety' (Ø146). Its formula may be simple ('all consciousness is consciousness of something') but nothing could be less simple than working out its meaning and implications.

But the historian of phenomenology cannot fail to read into
Heidegger's words another suggestion - that 'intentionality' is not just the name for a legitimate and central problem, but is itself, as they say, part of the problem, rather than part of the solution. Heidegger dates his editor's foreword April 1928, two years to the month after concluding the writing of Being and Time if the date of its dedication to Husserl is anything to go by. But in that book there are only two mentions of the word 'intentional'. The first appears when he is paraphrasing Scheler, the second is a little more interesting - another case of marginalising in a footnote. This footnote is worth quoting:

'The thesis that all cognition has intuition as its goal, has the temporal meaning that all cognising is making present. Whether every science, or even philosophical cognition, aims at a making-present need not be decided here.

Husserl uses the expression 'make present' (Gegenwartigen) in characterising sense-perception .... This temporal way of describing this phenomenon must have been suggested by the analysis of perception and intuition in general in terms of the idea of intention. That the intentionality of 'consciousness' (sic) is rounded in the ecstatical temporality of Dasein, and how this is the case, will be shown in the following Division (in fact unpublished).'

(Being and Time p. 498 (H363) n. xxiii)

Here buried in a footnote Heidegger states the problem with intentionality. It is the pivot of epistemology, and the very project of epistemology is both grounded in, and, with all this tunneling, subverted, by Dasein's intrinsic ecstatic temporality, a temporality which cannot just be thought of as 'making present'. Heidegger's task in Being and Time is to spell out the nature and role of this ecstatic temporality, by providing, via an analytic of Dasein, an ontological dimension that will undercut the concern shared by phenomenology and neo-Kantian philosophy with questions of knowledge.
In its simplest terms, Heidegger has to rescue time from merely being the servant of epistemology. In doing so, he takes a fateful step out of the framework he had already begun to trouble in his early essay "The Concept of Time in the Science of History" (see our discussion below).

The relation to Husserl is important. Heidegger adopts, and I think is sincere in modifying the meaning of the term 'phenomenology', and his account of it occupies the longest section in his Introduction (§7). Of course he has his sights not just on epistemology, but equally on that whole tradition of philosophy (including its so-called ontological versions) which suffers in different ways from the same deficiency. This failure is more than a problem of method though it is reflected at that level. It is the failure to ask (and keep asking) the question of Being. That is a failure to pose one's questions in the light of the thought of Being. It is in this context that Heidegger's interest in time arises. Time, he believes, will provide him with a horizon (the horizon, he claims) within which we can both diagnose the various ways in which philosophers by privileging the present, or indeed presence, without grasping its deeper grounding in Dasein's ecstatic temporality, have fallen short, and at the same time will open up the possibility of thinking of Being itself. In principle the question of Time seems subservient to the question of Being. If there were another way of reawakening the question of Being, one might avoid a consideration of time. But it soon becomes clear that the two questions are inseparable.

Introductory survey of Heidegger's writing on Time

'Time' figures in the titles of many of Heidegger's writings
and as one of the key foci of certain others. While a full treatment of the question of Time in Heidegger would ultimately coincide with an exhaustive treatment of Heidegger himself, we shall be content with something less comprehensive. Nonetheless, it would be useful to take a brief look at some of the major places at which Heidegger has discussed time, or key aspects of time, following which we shall try to discern a relationship between the shifts in Heidegger's treatment of time, and his more general philosophical outlook.

(a) The Early Essay

In 1916 Heidegger published a short essay, one conforming in both its vocabulary and its focus of concern to a neo-Kantian framework, but which points forward to the problematic of time in Being and Time. It was entitled "The Concept of Time in The Science of History". The basic position Heidegger argues for in this essay, is that the concept of time required for the study of history is quite different from the one required for natural science; in particular physics. Physics has theoretical goals ('to trace all phenomena back to the laws of motion of a general dynamics') for which a concept of time that will make measurement possible is required. That concept of time is of time as 'a homogeneous ordered series of points, a scale, a parameter'. History, understood as a scientific, that is, methodical study, while not denying succession, has quite different goals -

'to represent the context of effect and development of objectifications of human life in its understandable peculiarity and uniqueness in so far as its relation to cultural values is concerned'. (op.cit. p.8)

And consequently, its concept of time is quite different. 'Historical time periods differ qualitatively' he writes, and time in history does not have the homogeneous character found in science.
Now, at one level, one could say that this essay remains at the epistemological level, concerned only with the conceptual requirements of different sciences, and different types of science. Is he doing more than repeat the distinction made by neo-Kantians, such as Rickert between nomothetic and ideographic sciences? There are however one or two clues to a breakdown of any simple epistemological framework. He begins with a quotation from Eckhart ("Time is what changes and evolves; eternity remains simple")—hardly suggesting epistemological confinement, unless the confinement we are considering should be that preceding birth. He goes on to discuss the limitations of the theory of knowledge in appreciating 'the full meaning of the ultimate question of philosophy' (without saying what that might be). Further, when discussing—in a very Nietzschean way—the importance of the interests of the present in interpreting the past, he makes a number of ontological moves. The past does not exist, he reminds us. It affects us in its 'qualitative otherness'. And it forces the historian into an overcoming of the gap between past and present. "Time must be overcome and one must live one's way through the temporal gap from the present to the past". The advocacy of a living-through that overcomes time suggests a clearly existential dimension to what might have seemed simply a question of scientific conceptuality. And he makes two important foundationalist moves. He argues that (though I am here construing a claim that is less clear in print) the possibility of understanding the past rests on the fact that its 'otherness' is such only in relation to the 'objectifications of human life'. As living, creating beings, we have access to a pre-objectified realm, from which alternative objectifications can be grasped. And finally, he makes a move that presages
a move he will make in *Being and Time* in suggesting that there is a dependency of computational time on historical time, one to be found at the beginning of any time series. Such series-beginnings are always invested with meaning and value. Calendars are obvious examples. We begin with the founding of Rome, the birth of Christ etc.

Fundamentally, in this essay, Heidegger injects a little Nietzsche into a neo-Kantian approach to the logical structure of the different sciences, and in doing so, the qualitative time of the study of history, and indeed the very business of reckoning time are suggested, albeit en passant, to require an existential grounding, and are certainly not reducible to any other sciences.

The general question of History will at this point be deferred. It would be more fruitful to discuss the question in the light of Husserl's *Origin of Geometry* (1939), Heidegger's later discussion in *Being and Time*, Derrida's reading of Husserl, and Nietzsche's early essay on the *Uses and Disadvantages of History For Life* (1874). But it is worth pointing out, following a schema of bifurcation that could be allowed to recur endlessly, that the question of history is not merely one among many for Heidegger, it is not just a topic of special interest. Many of the claims he has made in this short essay will find a place in his general understanding of the *History of Being*, which is the setting for much of the thought of *Being and Time*. *Being and Time* itself both discusses and enacts this overcoming of the past. It calls it 'destruction' at one point, and 'repetition' at another.... But in this preliminary sketch we cannot extend these considerations further.

(b) *Being and Time: The Original Plan*

Naturally, it is on *Being and Time* (1927) that our attention must
focus, but not only for the analyses of time that it contains, but also for the perspective it provides for the various other of Heidegger's writings on time that we shall consider. For these other writings can be seen, in various ways to be the working out of the complete structure of the two part treatise, never in fact officially completed. By 'these other writings' I refer to Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929), The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1975, but given as a lecture course in 1927) and Time and Being (1962). In the first part of the whole treatise the two published sections of which were titled Being and Time Heidegger offers us, in his own words,

'The interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality, and the explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being' (see the first page of the Table of Contents).

In fact we do not get in 1927 this explication of time as transcendental horizon for the question of Being. Indeed the subject is only broached in that work in the last paragraphs, and the last sentence of the book is a question 'Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being?' In the schematic outline of the whole treatise (08, H39-40), this missing third section had a shorter title - simply 'time and Being'. We can suppose in a preliminary way some sort of fulfillment of this section's promise in the lecture Time and Being given in 1962.

Part II of the treatise was to have looked like this:

'Part II

1. Kant's problem of schematism and time, as a preliminary stage in a problematic of temporality

2. the ontological foundation of Descartes' "cogito sum", and how the mediaeval ontology has been taken over into the problematic of the "res cogitans".

3. Aristotle's essay on time, as providing a way of discriminating the phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology.'
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, conceived\(^3\) if not written 1925-6, before *Being and Time*, if only published in 1929, could be thought of as the working out of the first section. One could treat part 1 of *The Basic Problem of Phenomenology*\(^4\) as a way of working out the second section, substituting Kant for Descartes, and part II as the working out of his relation to Aristotle's view of time, a question to which Heidegger could devote only a footnote (his longest) in *Being and Time*\(^5\). (We discuss below Derrida's long treatment of this footnote in 'Ousia and Gramme'.\(^6\))

There are other works by Heidegger in which Time is either discussed or plays an important role either as a subject in its own right or as presupposed by the questions being considered.\(^7\) The only other writings we shall consider in any detail will be Heidegger's *Nietzsche* volumes\(^8\) and *What is called Thinking?*\(^9\) for its further thoughts about Nietzsche, and in particular Nietzsche's understanding of time.

This merely schematic assimilation of various other of Heidegger's writings to the plan laid down in *Being and Time* has value only to the extent that it serves to focus our attention on the ways in which the project of *Being and Time* was not completed at the time of publication, and the various ways in which the problems encountered at that time are solved, or at least approached, in these other works. To say that they fulfill the promise of the original design is really mistaken, for in the end (eg. in *Time and Being*) they put that plan in question.

**Guiding Questions**

Our reading of Heidegger will be guided by the following kinds of questions:

1. How successfully does *Being and Time* overcome our
traditional metaphysical understanding of time?

2. In what ways do the various other writings on time successfully resolve deficiencies in that original account?

3. How does the shift in Heidegger's understanding of time correspond to his (and our) understandings of his more general 'reversal', 'change of emphasis', 'turn', etc. from *Being and Time* (1927) to *Time and Being* (1962)?

4. Is there any sense in which (a) there are other ways of proceeding beyond *Being and Time* (or even avoiding it) while endorsing the same goal (of rethinking metaphysics)? (b) there remains what is still a metaphysical motif in the very movement that Heidegger makes? (The work of Derrida is obviously what we have in mind here).

5. Suppose that the history of our understanding of time is the history of our inadequate ontological grasping of it (because ontology has always itself privileged the present), might it not yet be that time needs releasing from its rescuer, from its continually ontologico-transcendental framework of understanding? (Not only Derrida, but also Levinas and Nietzsche are relevant here.)

6. How unproblematic is the association of metaphysics with 'philosophy of presence'?

We cannot claim to have resolved all these issues, only to have considered some of them seriously.

**Time and Presence in the History of Philosophy: Heidegger's General View**

The question of time as we have seen is rarely absent from Heidegger's writing in some form of other. The term itself figures in one of the handiest symmetrical frames by which the bulk of his work can be organised—the path from *Being and Time* (1927) to *Time and Being* (1962). Heidegger
is one of a long line of philosophers for whom the question of time is not merely one of great philosophical interest as a topic for philosophical inquiry, but one which bears on the nature of that inquiry itself. This was in fact true for philosophers before Kant, but with Kant, and then Hegel, Nietzsche, and Husserl — to mention only the most obvious — this reflexive status of the question of time became thematic.

No philosopher who attempted to deal with the question of Time without confronting the way in which temporal valuations, ways of thinking of, and relating to time are woven into the very practice of philosophy, could any longer deserve to be taken seriously. If such a demand were posed as a test of philosophical seriousness, Heidegger would pass with flying colours. But an important question remains. Can we allow that the fate of our understanding of time should be linked so closely with its place in our understanding of philosophy? Is it not possible that the power of this insight might swamp and occlude certain possibilities of understanding time itself, even as it opens them up? But what about this 'time itself'? Does such a notion still make sense? Although it is somewhat difficult to recognise, Heidegger does not lose sight of the aim of restoring to time a sense free from metaphysical determination, and such accounts appear at each stage of his penetration into the question of Being. For with Heidegger, the engagement of time with philosophy itself appears in the form of the relation between time and Being, and in particular the question of Being.

For Heidegger, the importance of an investigation of time is derived from its role in our understanding of Being. The importance of the question of Being ("What is the meaning of Being?" is the shortest form of the question) is twofold. It plays a vital role in Heidegger's
reading of the history of philosophy, and it also serves as the basis for awakening awareness of certain existential possibilities. For Heidegger, the importance of the question is that while philosophers have always philosophised in its shadow, they have not posed this question to themselves adequately, if at all. The reason for this is that a way of answering the question has become historically so canonized as to obscure the fact that the question ever existed. Heidegger attempts to reopen it in essentially three ways: first by an existential analysis of that being for whom the question of Being, at least in a certain form, is still a live issue, second by a reading (a 'destruction', best read 'de-struction') of the history of philosophy, drawing out the points at which Being is silently interpreted without that fact being acknowledged, and thirdly, by meditation on the work of art, on the language of poetry, and on language itself. The consequence is not, in fact, a renewal of philosophy, not its revitalisation, but the marking out of its limits, the recognition that philosophy is not so much limited by its interpretation of Being, as constituted by that interpretation, and once one begins to think beyond or beneath that interpretation, one begins to leave philosophy (that is, metaphysics) behind, to its own devices.

How is it that Being has always already been interpreted? In broad outline, Heidegger's answer never varies. The history of philosophy is the history of the interpretation of Being as presence (Anwesenheit), that is in a particular limited and limiting temporal determination. Heidegger writes of

'the treatment of the meaning of Being as parousia or ousia, which signifies "presence" (Anwesenheit) in ontologico-temporal terms. A being is grasped in its being as "presence" (Anwesenheit) - this means that it is understood by reference to a determinate mode of time, the "present"' (Gegenwart). Being and Time, H25
But what of time itself? What Heidegger says of Augustine applies to the interpretation of time in general.

'The essential nature of time is here conceived in the light of Being and, let us note it well, of a totally specific interpretation of "Being" - Being as being present. This interpretation of Being has been current so long that we regard it as self-evident.'

And he goes on

'Since in all metaphysics from the beginning of Western thought, Being means being present, Being, if it is to be thought in the highest instance, must be thought as pure presence, that is, as the presence that persists, the abiding present, the steadily standing "now".'

What is Called Thinking? p. 102

These words, which date from the years 1951/2 complete the circle. Being is understood in terms of 'presence' guided by a valuation of the temporal 'present'. When time itself comes to be reflected on explicitly, it is understood in relation to Being already determined as 'presence'. These words bring out sharply a number of important themes. Heidegger does not and cannot, as Husserl was wont to, treat self-evidence as evidence of truth. The reason he offers here is simply that self-evidence may just be the mask of habit. But there is another more important reason. The standard of self-evidence is itself the perfect embodiment of the value of presence. What is self-evident shows itself to me as it is now. To ask self-evidence to pass judgement on presence is to ask it to evaluate itself. The suggestion is not merely that this would be improper, but that this accounts for the self-sustaining nature of the interpretation of Being as presence. But there are other explanations for the self-evidence attached to the interpretation of Being as presence. In particular, when Heidegger writes of time "conceived" in the light of (a specific interpretation of) Being, and when he says that throughout Metaphysics 'Being means being
present', he is in neither case describing a conscious choice among a set of possibilities. The concept of time was not made the object of a fundamental interrogation until the very end of Greek philosophy, and by then its association with the idea of 'something present' (ousia tis) had already been established via Greek physics.

Clearly if we want to talk of the question of Being as 'forgotten', no psychological sense of forgetting will do. Heidegger's project is a project of radical interpretation, uncovering not just what has been forgotten, but what has not been thought, or better, the unthought that lies in all thought. Collingwood's suggestion that we treat all philosophical propositions as answers to questions is helpful here. Heidegger's project is a revival of the question which unknown to itself, metaphysics has consistently been trying to answer.

Presence, and the present are each determinations of time. Heidegger's suggestion is that if we can gain access to the temporal horizon itself, within which such particular determinations of time, and thence of Being, occur, we will be able thereby to reopen the question of Being in a fresh way. In Being and Time, Heidegger projects two different, though because Dasein is itself 'historical', related ways of going about this. First, as he puts it

'...the interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality, and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being'. (§8)

This by and large, is what we are offered in Being and Time. The second way is what we have called the radical interpretation or destruction of the history of metaphysics, with, as he puts it 'the problematic of temporality as our clue'. With the exception of his brief treatments of Descartes and Hegel, this latter approach was not...
in fact carried out in the published version of Being and Time, but, as we have seen, accomplished instead in later lectures and published works (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Kant, Aristotle), Hegel's Concept of Experience, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth", his two volume work on Nietzsche etc.). Heidegger also shows that the question of Being can be raised in relation to the understanding of a work of art ("The Origin of the Work of Art") which, although unable to raise for itself the question of its own Being, as was true of Dasein, nonetheless works as a work of art, not by being a mere thing or being, but by 'opening up a world'. In his meditation on the language of poets and on poetic language, Heidegger tries yet a different way. In poetry, the referential confidence with which we ordinarily use language is broken. In poetry, language's openness to Being can be shown to be what is always at stake - certainly in the work of the great poets (Hölderlin, Trakl, Georg, Rilke). That poetry which is always on the verge of silence, is a witness to what Heidegger will later call the 'mystery'. All along, while he has moved away from the project of describing the temporal horizon through an existential analytic, Heidegger has nonetheless tried to find a way of talking about the relation between man and Being which avoids the trap of supposing that either can be adequately identified separately. For such a move, even without the use of such labels would lead back into the old opposition between subject and object, however subtly conceived. Being and Time had seemed to suggest that an authentic taking up of the temporality of human existence might be a task for each individual - a view inherited perhaps from Kierkegaard. The 'later' Heidegger, however, influenced undoubtedly, as Vail suggests, by his reading of Hölderlin, and by a continuing and
deepening confrontation with Nietzsche now attempts to name this relation in a way that, first, reverses the direction of activity (with the 'es gibt') and then moves away even from naming Being at all (with 'ereignis'), naming with this word, only the relationship between man and Being, seeing the terms as derivative from the relation itself.

In the course of Heidegger's thought, he moves away as we have suggested from the existential analytic of Dasein. It is often said that his attention moves from man to Being. And yet the advent of the 'es gibt' and 'ereignis' and the crossing-out of the word "Being" (The Question of Being p. 81) all point equally to his drifting away from Being. Or rather, perhaps we shall see that he drifts away from 'man' and 'Being' in the same way - that is, from the dangers of objectifying, conceptual, representational thought with which the very use of these words is fraught. Heidegger talks of man? Heidegger talks of Being? He has become a mystic as we were warned he might. These responses are understandable, if mistaken. From the point of view of our getting a grip on Heidegger's treatment or treatments of Time, these shifts are important. We will shortly look both at what Heidegger at various times has said publicly about the 'Kehre' in his work, and make our own comments. It remains true that if the later writings, and especially Time and Being are to be seen as offering us samples of what can properly be said about Time once one has thought through its previous metaphysical determination, then doubts about the value of Heidegger's path of thinking for our understanding of time do not need much encouragement. It becomes imperative to look carefully and closely at what is going on in Being and Time and to ask ourselves
whether the interests of understanding Time are best served by the path Heidegger took after writing it, or whether that path was in fact followed in pursuit of a different problem.

Beyond the transcendental: a speculation

In our discussion of Being and Time we shall be concerned with a number of issues. We shall be asking what positive contributions it makes to the project of rescuing time from its metaphysical determination, whether it supports the idea that the concept of time is intrinsically metaphysical, (which would mean that rescuing it from metaphysics would be like rescuing a fish from water), whether or not Heidegger's treatment of time in this work exhausts the possibilities of understanding time available in the 'everyday conception of time' or whether it in fact covers them over. And, as we have suggested, we shall consider the possibility of questioning the way in which Heidegger develops his insights about time after Being and Time.

Let us reflect again on the words with which Heidegger actually describes what for the most part he is engaged in in this book:

'The Interpretation of Dasein in terms of Temporality, and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being'. (Being and Time p. 7)

In fact the second half of even this characterisation of the published part 1 properly corresponds to the division he did not include (3. time and Being). The last sentences of the book put the completion of the task of the third division in some doubt:

'The existential-ontological constitution of Dasein's totality is grounded in temporality. Hence the ecstastical projection of Being must be made possible by some primordial way in which ecstastical temporality temporalizes. How is this mode of the temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way which leads from primordial time to the meaning of Being? Does time manifest itself as the horizon of Being? (H 437)
With these closing sentences a life's work is foreshadowed. If the book, the torso, has been successful, it will have offered a rather special account of man - namely of man as a being for whom his Being is in question - and will have shown that it is the temporality of his existence, in particular his way of taking up the fact of his finitude, that gives that Being its fundamental meaning. As we embark on an analysis of the book, we should pause to take note of the language Heidegger is using in those closing sentences. He talks of 'grounding', of 'constituting', of the 'primordial', of 'horizon', of making possible' and of the 'transcendental'. Much of the interest of Heidegger's writing lies in the way in which he transforms the sense of these terms from their often Husserlian origin. And yet the question must remain - do they not still represent a strongly neo-Kantian/Husserlian way of posing problems? Even if the method of analysis is different, is not Heidegger still wedded to a transcendental, foundational approach, one which ultimately derives its legitimacy from an idealism which he cannot accept? This difficulty will not escape him and much of the subsequent development of his thought after Being and Time will be an attempt to deal with it. We mention this fundamental matter now not in criticism, but simply to offer some focus to our reading. The question "Is there a more basic frame of reference or horizon or context within which something we think we already understand appears and derives its possibility of appearance and all its intelligibility" is an enormously productive one in the history of philosophy. But whether it fully understands itself is another matter. It often presents itself as a vertical principle. A certain surface makes more sense in relation to a deeper, hidden, layer. And where the vertical dimension is missing
one might say that the concept of horizon explicitly tries to avoid it
- the power of the analysis still seems to rest on an exclusive and uni-
directional ordering of the levels of description involved. An account
of the temporal horizon uniquely illuminates Dasein's existence. The
relation is assymetrical.

But what if, to use its own terminology, the possibility of such
transcendental grounding itself rested on a certain doubling-up, or
superimposition of language, in which something is thought in terms of
something else? It is not simply a question of translation, but of
transformation. The possibility of a transcendental grounding is
discursively dependent on an operation of mapping of one discourse onto
another, of the language of temporality onto that of existence. This
may be true, but what is gained by such a formulation? The gain is this:
there are no a priori restrictions on what mappings are possible, and no
guarantees whatsoever that certain incestuous superimpositions and wild
intermappings will not occur. This very intervention into the language
of grounding which treats relations of possibility, of ground, of
constitution, as special cases within a more general horizon of doubling
up, superimposition, mapping, transformation etc. demonstrates graphically
the disturbing power of such mappings. By offering a neutral way of
describing what is going on when one gives a transcendental grounding for
a phenomenon, it allows us to focus attention on the ways in which claims
about the privileged status of such a transformation are made. Here we
would return to the terms with which we began; ground, constitution etc.
We can treat them as attempts to order relations of mapping.

And yet if we ask for the justification of such ordering...? Will
we not end up doing theology? ('We have not abolished God if we still
believe in grammar' wrote Nietzsche). It may be suggested that the test of proper order is power to illuminate, the shedding of light. We ought to grasp this candle with both hands. For what is so interesting about illumination is that (a) it does not jealously proclaim its own uniqueness (it certainly need not) (b) it does not require that one establish vertical series of deeper and deeper levels of profundity. Sidelighting is often far more effective. Shadows often reveal quite as much as they obscure. The only objection to all this would come from someone who held there was only One source of light, whether or not that was to be found in the One proper discourse.

Prelude to our later discussion of Heidegger

We shall try to show, in our discussion of Being and Time the possibility of (and need for) a double reading, in which tendencies towards unity and dispersion are interwoven. The concept of authenticity will provide an examplary focus. In his later writing there is analogous tension. For on the one hand he reminds us frequently of the tentative nature of his writing, and yet what he consistently aims for is the 'proper word', the final story, to gather up the light into a single source. But if we treat accounts that offer transcendental groundings as essentially exercises in the transformation of one discourse into another, of the mapping of one onto another, then the 'vertical' flavour of a transcendental grounding would dissolve into a horizontal relation of transformability. What consequence would this have? There are two sorts of possible consequence. One could adopt a deliberately counter-transcendental attitude to language, an openness (one which involves danger, risk, etc.) to the phenomenon of superimposition, that is, of the undermining, or illumination of one or more of one's present discourses.
by another one. Corresponding to Heidegger's talk of 'where words break off'\textsuperscript{17} we would have the experience of using words (or not using them) which one knew to be vulnerable to engulfment by another discourse, and yet still.... Heidegger himself, after all, does not stop writing, but continues to take the risk of losing his previous insights (previous discourses) by developing ones which he can superimpose on them, and which threaten to conceal them. There is a second more direct consequence for reading the later Heidegger. We could try to interpret the apparent orientation to the unique word as the very principle which generates constant revision. For it is unachievable! One of the names of this principle would be 'desire.' To that extent one could justify belief in truth as a regulative ideal, not because we thereby get closer to it, but because it generates a multiplicity of texts, and in the succession of such texts, and the light generated by their constant displacement of one another is the only truth.

All this, as must be clear, is somewhat speculative and programmatic, but it does give a sense of how the mapping principle might function critically. And this principle has a more direct application to our present concern with Time. For at a certain point we shall want to explain how it might be possible to transcend 'ordinary temporality' without resorting to a more primordial level of primitive elements, and we anticipate that the mapping principle will play a significant role here. All this will of course have to be tied in with what Derrida calls deconstruction. Equally, we shall try to find room for the move from a valuation of 'grand recits' to what Lyotard\textsuperscript{18} calls 'petits récits', and his corollary principle of productivity. Heidegger writes, for example:
'If we penetrate to the "source" ontologically, we do not come to things which are ontically obvious for the common understanding; but the questionable character of everything obvious opens up.' (our emphasis) *Being and Time* (H 334)

What if we came to think of the true significance of fundamental ontology in a purely consequential way?

**Heidegger's own Introduction to Being and Time**

One of the most extraordinary features of this book is its structure. After an introduction which justifies our renewing the question of Being, provides a methodological perspective on the whole treatise (including the parts never published) and offers a radically new interpretation of phenomenology, the book divides into two parts. The first half, which offers a 'preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein', postpones at every turn the question of the temporal dimension of the phenomena it deals with, and yet interprets them in such a way that a temporal determination is what is most called for. This textual epoché of the time question is all the more fascinating because of the radical displacement of traditional (epistemological) accounts of our relation to the world that occurs in the first division. To accomplish such a displacement without reference to time or temporality given the fundamental role that these will be seen to have in Heidegger's thought, is quite extraordinary. He is operating, as it were, with one hand tied behind his back.

What does this 'preparatory fundamental analysis' achieve? At the beginning of Division Two, Heidegger sums it up, essentially, in four points:

1. Dasein is (a) Being-in-the-world whose 'essential structure centres in disclosedness'.
Taken structurally as a whole, Being-in-the-world revealed itself as care.

Dasein 'exists' in that it has 'an understanding potentiality-for-Being.'

Care has been seen to be concretely connected with Dasein's facticity and its falling.

Heidegger's account of care (Sorge), on which we shall focus our attention, is the structural hinge of the book. One and the same structure of involvement is revealed by Angst (in Division 1) and by the anticipation of death (in Division 2); that structure is care.

In his preface to the seventh edition, Heidegger writes of Being and Time that

'... the road it has taken remains even today a necessary one if our Dasein is to be stirred by the question of Being'.

Immediately after the page on which this sentence occurs is another, which begins by interrupting Plato's Sophist at the point at which the Stranger is talking. Heidegger's point is that the meaning of Being is for us doubly concealed, and that double concealment requires a philosophical strategy adapted to it. For not only do we not have an answer to the question of the meaning of Being, we do not even find the issue perplexing. We have to learn to ask the question before we can begin to answer it.

In the first part of the Introduction ("The Necessity, Structure, and Priority of the Question of Being") Heidegger begins by sketching out the historical scenario by which we can understand how the question might be both forgotten and important. It is a version of the view that the history of philosophy is the history of footnotes in Plato. While
Plato and Aristotle were in some sense aware of the questions, their successors are more interested in these philosophers' answers than in the space of questioning from which they arose. Heidegger dispels, or at least wards off the obvious objections to the question. But how are we to begin to ask it? It is by reflection on this question (How are we to ask the question of Being?) that Heidegger formally at least justifies the whole endeavour of Being and Time. He begins by claiming that it befits what is claimed to be a fundamental question that it be made transparent in itself (and not merely asked causally). That means we must (minimally) ask what a question is. His account is a structural one. A question has a topic (that which is asked about), an object (that which is interrogated) and a goal (that which is to be found out) and it is the behaviour of a questioner, and thus characterizes the Being of that being, in that questioning is not itself a 'thing' but the 'how' of a thing. So if we are to ask the question at all we must have some grasp of it. This he supposes we do have — albeit in the form of 'a vague average understanding of Being' — evinced by our apparently unproblematic use of the parts of the verb 'to be'. ('The water is rough'). This 'vague average understanding' is very far indeed from being determinate; for Heidegger its very unclarity is a sign that it is Being that we are dealing with. What he claims is clear is that the Being of things is not itself a thing, but may nonetheless only be accessible through things.

But how do we then choose which particular entities to interrogate? When we pose this question of choice, however, and begin to consider the problem of different kinds of access to Being etc., different modes of investigation, we are already discussing the Being of a particular entity
- namely we the questioners. So, Heidegger argues, if we are to make the question of Being structurally transparent, which looked like a mere methodological preliminary, we have 'first' to consider the Being of the questioner, of 'Dasein' ('... this entity which each of us is himself, and which includes inquiry as one of the possibilities of its Being...') H.7). Is this not circular? His response is basically that phenomenological exhibition of fundamentals is not concerned with such formalistic objections. 20

In the third section of his Introduction ('The Ontological Priority of the Question of Being') Heidegger asks what the point of this question might be. Initially his answer is very like Husserl's account 21 of regional ontologies. The discrete natural and human sciences in themselves are ontic disciplines which each require an ontological foundation - a fundamental clarification of their categories and concepts. 22

But this ontological enterprise itself (and here Heidegger is clearly and directly marking his distance from Husserl) rests on a priori conditions, which it is the more general task of the question of Being to consider. So talk of the 'ontological priority' of the question of Being is somewhat ambiguous, for at its deepest level, it has a priority in respect of being ontological.

It is in the final section on 'the ontical priority of the question of Being' (94) that we find the fullest and most convincing explanation of the place of the analytic of Dasein in the question of Being, one which, if it does not attribute 'reflexivity' to Dasein in the old metaphysical sense, certainly does make all sorts of reflexive moves in the analysis itself. The key to Dasein's ontical priority, that is, its priority as an entity among other entities is that it is doubly inscribed
by Being. What is distinctive about Dasein is that its very Being involves a relation to Being, 'its Being is an issue for it'. The passage is so critical we cannot avoid quoting it.

'... its Being is an issue for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive state of Dasein's Being, and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship toward that Being - a relationship which is itself one of Being. And this means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly. It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it. Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.' (H12)

The word 'disclosed' will turn out to be the important one. We are not dealing here with the kind of reflexive self-transparency in which a subject is aware of itself as a subject. Dasein is open to the possibilities of self-understanding which are existential rather than conceptual. 'Existence' is, as it was for Kierkegaard, the distinctive 'determining character of Dasein', and in the brief remarks Heidegger makes here, the later theme of authenticity is adumbrated.

'in each case it has its Being to be, and has it as its own'

'Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence - in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, or got itself into them, or grown up in them already'.

'Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or by neglecting.' (H 12)

What is clear from these remarks, which signal a significant intensification of language on Heidegger's part, is that when he says that for Dasein, its Being is an issue, he is talking not about a matter of mere curiosity or fascination for each of us, nor is he talking of choosing between a variety of possible life-styles. The level of possibility he indicates here concerns the stark alternatives between
grasping and not grasping the distinctiveness of having the relation to 
Being that each Dasein has, the truth of (one's own) Being. The radical 
possibility he offers is to be (become) 'what' we are, which means to 
gather ourselves up into our distinctiveness as beings that 'exist'.

Formally, we can say that the ontical priority of Dasein lies 
in its being ontological. But this 'ontological' status affects not 
only its existence but also its relation to other entities. Heidegger's 
argument is that we are not metaphysical subjects, but Beings-in-the-
world, and as such have some sort of grasp of the Being of entities we 
encounter in that world. This gives the existential analytic of Dasein 
the role of providing (in itself) that 'fundamental ontology from which 
all other ontologies can take their rise.' This he calls Dasein's 
ontico-ontological priority.

All this is to leave us in no doubt that if a choice has to be 
made about which entity to scrutinize in pursuing the question of Being, 
it will be Dasein. Heidegger, most interestingly concludes by a further 
linking of existence with philosophical inquiry itself. If for Dasein 
(its) Being is an issue, philosophical inquiry is only a radicalization 
of existence. And for philosophy to be successfully pursued it must 
be 'itself seized upon in an existentiell23 manner as a possibility of the 
Being of each existing Dasein'. Passive readers stop here!

The immediate importance of this Introduction is threefold:

(1) It offers a compelling route back into thinking about the 
forgotten question.

(2) It makes clear the role that the analysis of Dasein is to play 
in Being and Time - that is, one subsidiary to the general 
question of the meaning of Being.
It announces many of the major themes to be taken up in the first Division of Being and Time - Being-in-the-world, authenticity, and disclosure. But reflection on its movement reveals more. When John Sallis asks 'Where Does Being and Time Begin?' he actually begins at the literal beginning - Heidegger's quote from Plato - but ends by reflecting on the real place at which Heidegger begins, the place he begins from, and begins with, and returns to: 'the place of the disclosure of Being'.

In a later essay Heidegger will write that his aim is not to 'get anywhere, but for once to get to where we are already'. This is what I have called self-collection, or self-gathering, the thoughtful recovery of the ground of our Being. This thinking has of course its own temporality: it is the temporality of the circle, the circling back of the movement of recovery. With brief references to Parmenides, Aristotle and Aquinas, Heidegger gives this a historical dimension too. But temporality makes no thematic appearance in this introduction. And this is proof, if proof were needed, that Heidegger's central focus in this book is not time but Being. The horizontal functions of time and temporality are part of the solution, not the problem. Fundamentally they supply a way of describing the dimensionality of the 'horizon' of what for Dasein is its 'disclosure of Being'.

The two halves of Heidegger's Introduction anticipate, though not in any organised way, the division of the book itself. While the first half does not concern itself with temporal considerations, the second half bristles with them, at least in its first two sections which we shall provisionally distinguish as existential and historical in their focus. In particular we can distinguish four different levels
or regions (in §5):

(1) temporality as the dimension of Dasein's Being by which the move from the everyday to the 'authentically ontological' level of analysis is accomplished.

(2) time as 'the horizon for all understanding of Being', and in terms of the temporality of (1).

(3) the ordinary understanding of time, which also stems from the temporality of (1).

(4) the naive ontological function time traditionally plays - chiefly in distinguishing temporal and non-temporal or super-temporal entities.

The very title of §6 ("The Task of Destroying the History of Ontology") embodies at the level of particular project what Heidegger argues is the general structure of historicality. Initially one could say that Dasein is its past rather than that it merely has a past. But this 'is' needs articulating. For Heidegger, as for Nietzsche the past supplies the ways in which we understand ourselves, and it is in the light of these 'possibilities of Being' that we project the future. It is this necessary historicality that makes possible the thematic study of history.

These remarks, moreover, have direct reflexive application to the very project we are engaged in here. For the possibility of thinking about the meaning of existence, or of Being in general, and indeed of the historicality of our Being, is itself characterised by historicality. And in order that 'by positively making the past own own, we may bring ourselves into full possession of the ownmost possibilities of such inquiry'. We must concern ourselves explicitly (Historiologically)
with the history of the question of Being.

But 'tradition', certainly when merely part of our taken-for-granted world, and even when recovered explicitly, all too easily conceals both the originating power of the past it delivers to us, and an understanding of the 'most elementary conditions which would alone enable it to go back to the past in a positive manner and make it productively its own.'

'If the question of Being is to have its own history made transparent, then this hardened tradition must be loosened up, and the concealments which it has brought about must be dissolved. We understand this task as one in which by taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being - the ways which have guided us ever since.' (H 22)

But destruction is not negative

'we must on the contrary stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within its limits ... to bury the past in nullity is not the purpose of this destruction; its aim is positive; its negative function remains unexpressed and indirect'. (H22-23)

This introduction was designed as an introduction to Being and Time as projected in its entirety in ß8 (H39-40). Part Two was to consist of 'basic features of a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology with the problematic of temporality as our clue', and was to deal with Kant's doctrine of schematism and time, with the unthought ontological foundations of Descartes' 'cogito sum' and with Aristotle's seminal essay on time. In this section (ß6) Heidegger sketches out something of the line he will be taking (would have taken). Descartes (ß19-20), and Aristotle, in his longest footnote are returned to later in the book we now have, but further
discussion of Kant's schematism has to wait for Heidegger's 'thoughtful dialogue' with Kant in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. And Hegel, who is not discussed in this section does figure prominently later on.

Clearly his brief discussion of these three figures is meant as an example of the practice of destruction. But they are not randomly chosen. Heidegger will maintain on many occasions— even where it verges on the implausible— that all of Western thinking on time depends on Aristotle. And he makes this claim here too (H26). Moreover, the choice of Descartes is quite critical, and instructive. For despite the fact that Descartes clearly did reflect on the nature of the human subject, he did not, Heidegger claims, determine 'the meaning of the Being of the "sum"'. Heidegger's diagnosis is essentially that Descartes unquestioningly inherits a scholastic/theological notion of substance, which, when interpreted as 'needing no other being for its existence' obscures our Being-in-the-world. Descartes is the inheritor of the most ancient way of interpreting Being— as 'presence'. His valuation of certainty is the most obvious sign. Kant's importance lies in the fact that he more than glimpsed the significance of temporality. But he finally failed to raise the question of the Being of the subject in such a way as to successfully link time and the cogito. His chapter on the Schematism in which he (Kant) writes of the 'obscurities deep in the human soul' is treated as a monument to this (brilliant) failure.

These brief sketches of Heidegger's own (mere) indications are clearly of very limited value. They do, however, illustrate Heidegger's understanding of the history of philosophy. For Heidegger there are original and powerful formulations which as the congealed products of
thought influence every successive generation and prevent certain fundamental questions from being even considered let alone answered - particularly Aristotle's treatment of time. There are, correspondingly, blind receptions, failures to fully examine what one borrows from the tradition, and unconscious repetitions - Nietzsche writes of 'an invisible spell' - Descartes being a case in point, and there are revolutions that finally do not fully exploit their own insights - as was the case with Kant. Elsewhere Heidegger insists that every new disclosure is accompanied by a further concealment, and necessarily.

The midday sun that casts no shadow will always elude us. This suggests that philosophizing (and perhaps 'theoretical' writing in general) has a general structure of disclosure/concealment, so that the 'de-struction' of the history of ontology should indeed be thought of as exploring particular instances of this structure (or play) of disclosure/concealment in the light of the question of Being. This raises the question, to which we shall return later, of whether Heidegger's own enterprise should be thought to be included in, or to escape from this structure.

At the end of this section Heidegger makes some tantalizingly ambiguous remarks:

'In any investigation in this field, where 'the thing itself is deeply veiled' one must take pains not to overestimate the results. For in such an inquiry one is constantly compelled to face the possibility of disclosing an even more primordial and more universal horizon from which we may draw the answer to the question, "What is 'Being'". We can discuss such possibilities seriously and with positive results only if the question of Being has been reawakened and we have arrived at a field where we can come to terms with it in a way that can be controlled.' (our emphasis) (H26-27)

The ambiguity lies in the words we have underlined. Is it suggested that there is one or more primordial horizon that we are constantly on the verge of glimpsing, or that different, ever more primordial horizons
can keep opening up? On the first interpretation, the name of that one horizon is temporality (locally, for Dasein) or time (more generally, for Being). On the second interpretation, the possibility arises that horizon-seeking thinking could even go beyond temporality and find new horizons. The reference in the last sentence to 'coming to terms with the question of Being ... in a way that can be controlled' may perhaps serve as a clue, all the better for being unintended. The ideal - 'coming to terms with a question in a controlled way' - may itself constitute a limit of Heidegger's thought, beyond which Heidegger's later writing certainly suggests that the ideal of control might well have faded. But where Derrida can explicitly celebrate this loss of control without handing over control to another responsible agent, Heidegger seems to be prepared to release control only because of a faith that the ends it sought will be more surely realised by letting language speak. A responsible language. These questions will all be taken up later, and with specific reference to the problem of speaking (and writing) of time.

As we have said, these introductory sections (6-7) bristle with temporal considerations in a way absent from the earlier sections. Now that we have discussed the historicality of Dasein and the way it makes possible his destruction of the history of ontology, it is clear that no single separation of the concerns of 5 and 6 into 'existential' and 'historical', which we made provisionally, must now be discarded. Historicity is just the name for existential temporality in so far as that precedes and grounds historiology. The structure of a future-projective past that historicity consists in is a specification of general features of Dasein's temporal existence.
The term 'reflexivity' was used above in connection with the possibility that Heidegger's own writing might (and might necessarily) be characterised by its own 'unthought'. And this section brilliantly demonstrates the way considerations of method are self-applicable. Heidegger is perhaps right to think of this as a circle. And in connection with historicality, something like the same structure emerges. (The inquiry into historicality is itself historical....) If historicality is just (a dimension of) existential temporality, and if it is possible (by Heidegger's 'destruction' or by some other means) to recover a sense of the horizontal significance of temporality then what we must contemplate (and indeed do more than contemplate) with amazement, is a kind of layering of superimposed temporalities. What Heidegger will call (anticipatory) resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) will exhibit just this intensity of overlaying. But what, in such a set of layers is basic? What is the position of everyday time in all this? Are representations of time, reflections on the course of time, to be excluded, integrated, or what? To answer these and other questions, we must now turn to the body of the text. Our plan will be to comment first on those features of the first half that will figure most importantly in the temporalizing rerum of the second, developing in particular, the hinge of the book, the concept of care.
II. Heidegger's Treatment of Time and Temporality: 

A Critical Analysis of Being and Time

CHAPTER ONE

The Existential Grounding

At the beginning of Division II (045) Heidegger reviews the story so far and issues in broad outline a prospectus for the future course of the book. He has already provided us with a 'preparatory' account but 'our existential analysis of Dasein up till now cannot lay claim to primordiality.' (H233). In particular, he questions the primordiality of his earlier account of care. He had at one point called it 'the formally existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole' (H192), and more commonly Dasein's 'primordial structural totality'. But at the end of Division I he had asked '... has the structural manifoldness which lies in this phenomenon presented us with the most primordial totality of factical Dasein's Being?' (H230). Division II is based on the recognition that this 'structural totality' of care itself rests on another horizon.

'... The primordial ontological basis for Dasein's existentiality is temporality. In terms of temporality the articulated structural totality of Dasein's Being as care first becomes existentially intelligible. The Interpretation of the meaning of Dasein's Being cannot stop with this demonstration. The existential-temporal analysis of this entity needs to be confirmed concretely. We must go back and lay bare in their temporal meaning the ontological structures of Dasein which we have previously obtained. Everydayness reveals itself as a mode of temporality.' (H234)

And where Angst had disclosed the 'structural totality' of care, it will now be the anticipation of Death that provides care with a deeper, temporal dimension.
It is on his discussion in Division II that we must focus, but the enormous wealth of analysis in Division I (cf. H334), and the role that plays in the structure of the book, means that we must selectively bring forward some of this material, even where it may already be very familiar to the reader, and at the risk of being accused of omitting certain vital considerations. Our selections will be guided by our basic question - the possibility of a post-metaphysical understanding of time.

The Deferment of the Question of Time

The role of the existential analytic (Division I) can be explained like this: there 'is' no Being independently of man's understanding of Being (even if 'understanding' is never the whole story). But man's understanding of Being is shrouded both by the practical concerns of everyday life, and by traditional philosophical interpretations of both man and the world. The pursuit of Being has to proceed via an account of man's 'existence' that discerns both his essential relatedness to Being, and the various levels at which that relatedness itself can be lived and understood. In talking about 'Dasein' rather than 'man', Heidegger already marks out the essentially ontological orientation of his analysis. He is concerned with man, but only as Dasein, a particular kind of Being - Being-there - with a (problematic) relation to its own Being, with an openness to other Beings, and to the question of Being. Heidegger's method is hermeneutical, and phenomenological. It is phenomenological in the sense that it begins with what is most common and everyday - namely Dasein's everydayness. It tries first to show how this always has an existential dimension, and then how this existential dimension is to be interpreted as a relation to Being.
A number of tasks are being concurrently carried out in this first half. Heidegger is describing Dasein's everydayness via his various 'existentialia', he is transforming the framework of ordinary philosophical inquiry, and he is setting the scene for a temporal reinterpretation of this same material in the second half. The bracketting out of time from consideration in the first half has a number of explanations. Heidegger wants to be able to single out the temporal as a distinct necessary further horizon for the interpretation of Being. This is most effectively done by going as far as he can without it. (One is reminded of the way Paul Klee refused to use colour until he had exhausted the possibilities of black and white.) But it could also be said that Heidegger's first half already had quite enough to do without introducing the complications of temporality. Heidegger's first half is engaged in a transposition, a radical reworking of a whole tradition independent of the 'subject', 'the self', the world, knowledge, our relation with others, the possibilities of self-realization, the nature of language, and of truth. That this can be achieved, even in a preparatory way, without discussing temporality, when that is a perfectly obvious surface characteristic of human existence, quite apart from being the ultimate horizon of our Being, is quite extraordinary.

Our preliminary explanation of how this was possible is that in the first part, Heidegger is essentially manipulating the question of Dasein's 'limit', 'boundaries', 'spaces', inner and outer relations... ways in which Dasein's identity opens onto what might be thought to be other than it. 'Opening onto' is a radical undermining of self-subsistence. It is quite extraordinary how Heidegger manages to take positive account of the relational aspects of human being, while at
the same time enhancing, and not diminishing, the sense of individual human possibility. And this 'opening onto' is not just a fact about Dasein's Being, but the most luminous dimension of it (prior to any discussion of temporality). Another way of putting this would be to say that Dasein is a being for whom there are horizons - of significance, of potentiality for Being, of understanding, of disclosedness. When Heidegger talks of Dasein's 'existence', it is surely an ex-sistence, a standing outside of itself, that 'opens onto' such horizons. The reference to horizons, a term adopted from Husserl, converts the negative sense of opening onto 'what ... (is) other than it' into a positive feature. From the point of view of a Cartesian subject, for instance, the 'world' is other than it - and not even 'external' in any sense shared by the two relata - but ontologically alien. for Heidegger, man opens onto the world, Dasein is a Being-in-the-world. And a measure of the primordiality of this relatedness - that it does not leave its terms unmoved, can be found in his account of knowledge as a mode of Being-in-the-world, one founded on a more primitive involvement.

An Anglo-Saxon approach to such an account would be to talk of knowing-how as more primitive than knowing-that. Heidegger is talking about knowing-that. Knowing-how would be part of a more general orientation to equipment, things ready-to-hand. At the same time, Heidegger's account of the derivativeness of 'knowing' is aimed very generally at the epistemological centredness of most modern and much traditional philosophy, more specifically at Descartes, and indirectly at Husserl.
From Husserl To Heidegger

Whenever Heidegger discusses various possible ways of understanding 'phenomenology' he makes the same move: phenomenology is fundamentally ontology. And it is no accident that Heidegger has first (Ø10) reworked in his own terms the anti-psychologistic arguments Husserl offered both in his Logical Investigations, (1900), in Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, (1911), and elsewhere. And while we are discussing Heidegger's implicit references to Husserl, we should note that the whole of his discussion of Being-in-the-world must be seen as a response to Husserl's insistence on the need for phenomenology to begin with a reduction that bracketted out the world. For Heidegger we of course stand back from our practical involvement in the world but only so as to articulate and interpret its significance, not to put it 'in brackets' or 'out of play'.

We could also see Heidegger's whole discussion of Being-in-the-world (and of Being-in, Being-with, Being-there) as a radicalization of the principle of intentionality (that all consciousness is consciousness of something). The move from Husserl to Heidegger could be said to be the move from of to in (and as). With intentionality consciousness is opened onto its objects; with the analytic of existence consciousness itself is drawn back into its Being. This step back into a concern with Being, with the clearest but silent reference to Husserl, can be seen in Ø11 (H52)

"we shall not get a genuine knowledge of essences simply by the syncretistic activity of universal comparison and classification. Subjecting the manifold to tabulation does not ensure any actual understanding of what lies there before us as thus set in order. If an ordering principle is genuine, it has its own content as a thing (Sachgehalt), which is never to be found by means of such an ordering, but is already presupposed in it. So if one is to put various pictures of the world in
order, one must have an explicit idea of the world as such. And if the 'world' itself is something constitutive for Dasein one must have an insight into Dasein's basic structures in order to treat the world-phenomenon conceptually. (H52)

This is surely a critique of Ideas Chapter 1 (Fact and Essence).

The question of time is of course displaced. It could hardly be otherwise. And yet there is an interesting parallel in the place given to time in their respective thought. For Husserl, no less than for Heidegger, temporality is brought to bear on a scene that has already been described without reference to time (the realm of transcendental subjectivity, of epoche, of structures of intentionality). Husserl offers first a structural account of the space of intentionality, and then brings time in. And in each case it then becomes clear how inadequate the pre-temporal account really was. One might also try to show that the way the scene was first set in each case determined the way time entered into it. For Husserl, time-consciousness is (initially at least) a form of intentionality, and for Heidegger, temporality is a horizon, an 'opening-onto'.... And if that could be supported one might wonder whether we would not be paying a higher price than we realized for the methodological exclusion of the temporal from the first stage analysis, if it establishes the basic framework within which time can make its appearance.

Opening onto the World

Let us look in more detail at some of the moves Heidegger makes in Division I. We have said that Heidegger reworks Husserl's anti-psychologism. The form it takes in Heidegger is an emphasis on the error of taking the Being of things in the world (which he calls
Verhandenheit (present-at-hand) as the model for understanding Dasein. Man is not a thing. And yet the usual ways of showing this end up treating man as nonetheless possessing the same sort of being.

Heidegger brings out the status of Being-in-the-world with reference to two obvious truths about Dasein - that Dasein exists - that is, bears itself in relation to its Being, and that for Dasein, it is in each case (for itself) 'mine', and so grasped adequately or not (authentically or inauthentically). These are both, he claims, ways in which Dasein's being takes on a definite character, and as such, they must presuppose the domain in which such definite characters are possible - namely Being in the world. And the radical difference between this in-relation and that spatial inclusion relation found amidst ordinary things, 'present-at-hand', is brought out by a list of ways in which we are in-the-world:

'having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining...' (H56).

Heidegger says all these are characterized by concern (Besorgen). Perhaps the word in-volvement (literally, being rolled up in) would help to preserve the 'in'. Concern here is an existential - that is a fundamental dimension of Dasein's Being - one which does not come and go, but rather has positive and deficient modes. The chief point is that this involved relatedness to something other is an essential intrinsic feature (in-trinsic) of Dasein's Being. And it serves as an example of the way in which the metaphysical conceptualization of subjectivity and selfhood will be undermined. Being in the world is not something that an independently definable being does or has as an appendage, or an additional quality. Rather Dasein is exhausted by
such existentials, such ways in which it 'opens onto...'.

But what, then, is 'the world'? Heidegger like Wittgenstein\(^1\) draws a distinction between the world and any mere collection of things, including that collection by the name of nature. Again, it is Descartes' notion of 'res extensa' that is the most obvious point of differentiation. For the worldhood of the world is a phenomenon, albeit one it is easy enough to 'miss'. For we tend to focus on things in the world, and the world itself is not a thing in the world. (§16).

But this formal point does not itself reveal the phenomenon of worldhood, even if it encourages us to pursue it. Heidegger's key move is to distinguish between two modes of Being of things encountered in the world - presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) and readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit). It is through a consideration of the latter kind of Being that the worldhood of the world will emerge. The best examples of Zuhandenheit are tools, equipment, devices. And yet we do not group them in the fulness of their Being simply by an observational encounter. Our most direct contact with things ready-to-hand is to use them. And when we reflect on the use to which we put them, we realize that such uses, functions, instrumentalities are significant only within a whole network of such functions. This nexus of 'references and assignments', as he comes to call it, constitutes a background against which any particular function is set. When our tools break down - that referential context stands out. If I lock the keys inside the car, I cannot get into it, I cannot drive it, I cannot get to work on time, I cannot tell students what to read for next week etc. etc.

'The context of equipment is lit up, not as something never seen before, but as a totality constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection. With this totality, however, the world announces itself.' (§75)
The 'world' — and we are all the time here talking of the world in its primary everyday sense — is the world of our significant involvement, a world structured by such relations as 'towards-which', 'for the sake of which', 'in order to', and so on. It is in this sense of the world that Dasein is a Being-in-the-world. And it is such an understanding of the world that proceeds via the Being of things ready-to-hand, that allows our understanding of Dasein, at this everyday level, to escape reduction to the mere thinghood of the present-at-hand.

In the sections in which Heidegger compares his own account of the world with that of Descartes, he brings out the way Descartes inherits a scholastic and theological notion of Being as substance, one to be understood as linked to the idea of God the 'ens perfectissimum', which 'needs no other entity in order to be'. Such a notion of Being as autonomous substance is extended to characterize things in the world which, if not relative to God at least relative to one another, have this independence. It is just such an ontological autonomy and discreteness that Descartes relies on — but does not himself inquire into — in formulating the idea of a res extensa. And it is just such a notion that Heidegger characterizes as present-at-hand. Similarly, compared to Descartes' 'thinking substance', Heidegger's Dasein radically displaces the idea of subject as substance, as autonomous source that, leaving aside the vertical relation to God, Descartes held man to be. The worldliness of Dasein is the opening out of the Being of 'substance', a radical articulation of Being as ec-sistence.

The Topology of Selfhood

We have suggested that the key to Division I is Heidegger's unfolding of the 'limits' of Dasein, the bestowal on man of horizons
of disclosedness (and self-disclosedness) that explode the traditional space of its topological representation, that transfer the location, and indeed, locatability of the limits of Dasein's Being. Confirmation of this insight is found in Chapter IV ('Being in the world as Being-with and Being-one's-self. The "they".') A few short quotations will bring out something of the pattern of Heidegger's thought here. First - to connect up with our previous remarks:

'... others are encountered environmentally. This elemental worldly kind of encountering, which belongs to Dasein and is closest to it, goes so far that even one's own Dasein becomes something that it can itself proximally 'come across' only when it looks away from 'experience' and the 'centre of its action.' (H119)

Dasein in its oneness, is declared decentred

'Dasein finds 'itself' proximally in what it does, uses, expects, avoids - in those things environmentally ready - to-hand with which it is proximally concerned.' (119)

'It could be that the 'who' of everyday Dasein just is not the 'I myself'.

'Perhaps when Dasein addresses itself in the way which is closest to itself, it always says "I am this entity", and in the long run says this loudest when it is 'not' this entity.' (H115)

'By 'others' we do not mean everyone else but me - those over against whom the 'I' stands out. They are rather those from whom for the most part one does not distinguish oneself - those among whom one is too.' (H118)

One of Heidegger's moves here is to undermine the privilege of the 'near', and to argue, as he has often done, against the truth of the obvious, the 'self-evident'. Self-appropriation must make the detour of the worldly articulation of Dasein.2

The parallel with Hegel here should again not be missed. For Hegel, spirit has to make the 'detour' of historical articulation. And to the extent that the parallel holds, we can ask of Heidegger the
question that has often been put to Hegel: does not the need for the detour presuppose the validity of the destination? It is quite true that self-understanding, self-knowledge, and self-appropriation are not available to immediacy. But is there not a danger that the articulation of modes of mediation will only reinforce the value of the ideal, rather than put it in question. The scheme of Heidegger's thought is surely such as to warrant our questioning. It is because everydayness is only the necessary mediation of our authenticity that the danger of losing oneself in it arises. But what if the very value of selfhood and hence authenticity itself were ultimately bound up with a philosophy of identity that after Heidegger we have come to call metaphysical?

The other move is in a sense in the opposite direction. What we take to be other ('others') is in an important way not the other at all, but part of, or a level of my own existence. Again, the boundaries of Dasein are being transfigured. It is obvious that others are out there. What is less obvious is that at some level 'I' am 'out there' too....

We are here being confined to a quasi-spatial articulation. It is however interesting that the same point can be, and is made in temporal language in this same chapter.

"The others' already are there with us in Being-in-the-world." (H116).

'Not only is Being towards others an autonomous, irreducible relationship of Being: this relationship, as Being-with, is one which, with Dasein's Being, already is.' (H125)

What we have called Dasein's articulation is not something that happens at some point to a worldless Dasein: it is always already...
Seeds of Doubt about Authenticity

Heidegger's chapter on Being-with is the source of many important formulations. In particular, he develops the idea of the inauthentic 'they'-self which identifies itself with that dimension of Dasein which we have called 'Being-with' and treats this not as the basis for developing either an authentic selfhood, or an authentic relationship to others (see authentic solicitude) but rather treats it as a limit. Inauthentically, Dasein does what 'one' does. And yet Being-with in principle sets no such limits. To speak a public language is merely a necessary condition for poetry, not an obstacle to it. But it is a necessary condition. And it is vital to remind ourselves that authenticity cannot be simply opposed to everydayness, but only to that mode of Being that takes everydayness to be the standard. Close to the end of the chapter, Heidegger puts it like this:

'Authentic Being-one's-self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they'; it is rather an existential modification of the 'they' - of the 'they' as an essential existentiale.' (H130)

This general principle - that authenticity modifies everydayness, rather than breaking with it altogether - will be important for us later when we discuss what 'authentic temporality' could consist in. Clearly it will be a modification of everyday time, not a denial of it. We have already met the idea of authenticity in Heidegger's Introduction - where he says that Dasein can either choose itself or lose itself. It is fashionable among some sophisticated readers of Heidegger to pass over the concept of authenticity. Doesn't Heidegger himself largely drop the term after Being and Time? But this passing-over is a mistake. If there are difficulties with the term, they are difficulties that penetrate Heidegger's philosophy more generally. If Heidegger drops 'eigentlichheit' we should not miss the return of the 'eigen' in
To leave aside the concept of authenticity would be to fail to confront what can be seen as a central issue for a modern reading of Heidegger — whether his thought aims at a phenomenological restoration of such values as identity, totality, and 'presence', or, on the contrary, radically puts them in question. And there is a third position — which is that he makes this question in some way undecidable. We shall bear these questions in mind as we proceed, but the question of authenticity proper must await the temporal dimension of Division II. (See esp. our §16,29 below.) At the same time, however, we should realize that the question of how we judge Heidegger's treatment of time and temporality may well depend on just such a question about the 'fundamental tendency' of Heidegger's thought. Is existential time just a way of taming 'the time that destroys' by finding secular meaning in death...? (See below §23).

Care and Disclosedness: Intimations of Temporality

'Care' — what we have called the hinge of the book — is the subject of Chapter VI. The question of Dasein's 'wholeness' — a question that guides his discussion from the outset — is one to which we shall be giving close scrutiny. But an essential final step in articulating Dasein's Being-in is to be found in Heidegger's discussion of moods and of understanding — two distinct modes of the existential constitution of Dasein's 'there', that is of Dasein's manner of Being as disclosure. We are not engaged in summary, and we shall focus on particular features of these two analyses: (1) the way 'moods' can reveal Dasein 'as a whole' in a special way; (2) the proto-temporality of understanding.

'Moods', understood as ways of being attuned, and so not just good or bad moods as we usually think of them, are revealing both for
Dasein and for the philosopher. They are said to disclose to each of us, at the time, ourselves as-a-whole in the way that no attempt at a comprehensive self-knowledge could do. ('The mood has already disclosed Being-in-the-world as a whole...' (H137.) Through moods we do not learn facts about ourselves, rather Dasein learns 'that it is and has to be'. This is an existential disclosure of our thrownness. It achieves a kind of self-confrontation that knowledge cannot. Moreover the philosopher reflects on the fact that Dasein turns away from its moods so that time is an essential concealment in this disclosure. Heidegger's analysis of Befindlichkeit is denser and at points seems overdone, even acknowledging the genuine revolutionary insight on which it is based. If we can hold them apart, Heidegger adds to the disclosing of thrownness that states of mind also provide a 'current disclosing' of 'Being-in-the-world-as-a-whole' and opens up the possibility of circumspective concern, the awareness that things matter to us. As he will say about 'being in the truth', the possibility of going wrong here is not an objection to the analysis. What is at stake is, if you like, the possibility of a certain shape, modality, or character of disclosedness, not the accuracy or otherwise of its content.

If Befindlichkeit is one, understanding is the other existential structure in which the Being of the 'there' maintains itself. We might say - we must postpone further discussion until we consider the disclosive relation between Angst and Sorge - that Heidegger's account of Befindlichkeit offers a perfect example of the problem of judging whether the elaboration of an existential sense of being-a-whole allows him to escape the charge of taking the integrity of Dasein for granted, as a telos. The concept of de-severance (Entfernung) (discussed eg. in his Ø23) is another place at which this question can be raised. A
decision on that question - should it prove possible - could give a
firm direction to our interpretation of his general account of time.
Although that question is strictly speaking excluded from this Division,
in Heidegger's discussion of Understanding (and interpretation and
discourse) temporal structures are already pressing forward. What
is so interesting about this discussion of course is that the subject
of understanding has direct reflexive application to the method of
phenomenology itself and hence to the method being pursued in this
book (including this very section on Understanding). Something like
the model of understanding he will offer us was simply laid out for
acceptance right at the outset in his analysis of the structure of the
question (of Being). The ideas of disclosure, phenomenology as 'letting
show itself', and the hermeneutic circle benignly conspire to allow
this.

It has often been said that moral responsibility rests on one's
ability to have acted otherwise than one did. Without freedom no praise
or blame makes sense. We do not censure the hungry mosquito. Heidegger's
account of authenticity, while not a moral concept, shares a structurally
parallel relationship with the concepts of understanding and possibility,
or being able to be (Seinkonnen). It is only because we are beings
for whom both ordinary (ontic) possibilities and possibilities for Being
are intrinsic features, that understanding and authenticity are possible.

The notion of 'possibility' (being-able-to...) used here is quite
central to our grasp of the way Heidegger's account of Dasein transcends
that of any being merely present-at-hand, and begins to make it clear
how any idea of Dasein's other 'presence', or living in the present,
would have to be radically distinct from the presentness of, say, a stone,
or a machine, or an ant. To be sure a difference in man's way of
being-present has been clear to all philosophers who took memory,
expectation, imagination and self-consciousness seriously. The thought
that one's Being could be adequately tied down to a single-dimensional
bodily/perceptual being present at an instant is not one that withstands
a moment's scrutiny. But the difficulty remains that the attempts to
expound the way these 'faculties' expand our 'presence' have typically
taken for granted the categories devised for our understanding of
things. Heidegger's sustained effort in Being and Time is devoted to
the attempt to avoid this. His discussion of 'possibility' is a case
in point. Certain positive features of Heidegger's concept - that
possibility is intrinsic to Dasein, and that it precedes reflection
on what its possibilities are - demand its clear separation from (a)
empty logical possibilities, (b) mere factual possibility, and (c)
Aristotelian potentiality. Understanding, in Heidegger's sense, has
as its object 'Being-possible' - or a being for whom possibility is an
intrinsic feature. But we know that for Heidegger there are at least
two different ways of Being - authentic and inauthentic, as well as
(ontically) various degrees of lucidity about our involvements with the
world and relations with others. Understanding and possibility are
really to be thought of here not as 'achievement' or 'success' - words,
but as dimensions - existentials - that point to a manner in which
Dasein is to be elucidated. Heidegger speaks later of their
"transcendental 'generality'" (H199). This point can be made over
and over again in respect of Heidegger's existentials. The same must
be said, for example, of both disclosure and truth - each is a dimension
in which Dasein's Being is worked out, not the name for an achievement
in itself. Heidegger's account is ontological in that he determines
the dimensions within which subsequent ontic differentiations can be made.

He explains the relation between understanding and possibility in terms of 'projection' (Entwurf). It is not clear whether anything essentially new is added by this concept. It has a range of 'meanings' which deepen our grasp of the inherent towardness of Dasein's Being. As 'thrown toward' it links up with 'thrownness' in emphasizing that we are always already in this state, that it precedes any explicit forward planning. (In this combination of an already and a forward the (ultimately temporal) structure of care begins to be articulated.)

Macquarrie and Robinson suggest the geometrical sense (of which perhaps Mercator's projection of the surface of the globe is the most celebrated). 'Projection' in this sense means the way Dasein's Being is mapped onto its possibilities.

Understanding in general is understood in terms of projection. And the notion of 'projective understanding' is used by Heidegger as a way of rethinking the idea of 'sight', which he links, at the same time, to 'disclosure', and 'clearedness'. The force of this is to provide a way of deepening our understanding of the conditions on which any kind of seeing must rest. And this allows him, almost en passant, to mark out as sharply as he possibly could, the basic difference between existential and Husserlian phenomenology. As we saw in the last chapter, Husserl's understanding of time is limited in principle (and so for him not limited at all) to what pure intuition reveals. For Heidegger both pure intuition (Anschauen) and the 'intuition of essences' (Wesensschau) are deprived of their methodological priority by being 'grounded in existential understanding' (H147).

Understanding is not, however, itself devoid of possibilities,
which get developed in and by interpretation. What is tacit in understanding is made explicit in interpretation. But this is perhaps misleading. While Being and Time is itself a work of interpretation, it is not actually necessary for interpretation to take a linguistic form. For Heidegger the move from understanding to interpretation is one in which the 'as' structure appears. And while this is clearly accomplished in linguistically explicit forms of interpretation, it can equally be accomplished by the move from an understanding engaged in the world to the level of 'seeing-as'. 'The 'as' makes up the structure of the explicitness of something that is understood.' (H149).

It must be admitted, it is in the end difficult to precisely locate the point at which the 'as'-structure, for Heidegger, begins. He offers an account of the kind of presuppositionless seeing on which science is often supposed to depend, which argues (as he has argued earlier when discussing the 'present-at-hand') that such seeing is a very considerable achievement - being a privative derivation from seeing-as. And as such, of course, it does not have the primitive status it claims it needs. Many philosophers of science (eg. Popper, Hanson, Feyerabend) now agree that the foundationalism that inspires this appeal to a presuppositionless seeing is not only impossible, but undesirable and (for Feyerabend) positively dangerous. The fact that they do not however, typically, call for an existential analytic to replace it, does not mean that this is not called for.

The basis for this claim about the primacy of the 'as-structure' is of course Heidegger's claim about the primacy of our involvement in a world of things ready to hand. Even if not every item in the world is some-thing we use as a tool, everything is encountered in the light
of its significance to us - even in 'deficient modes'. Things that baffle us may be very important. Things we find very significant may be repressed etc.... 'An interpretation', Heidegger sums up, 'is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something present to us' (H150). But Heidegger is prepared to go further, and articulate the fore-structure of the 'as' of interpretation. His three levels have been translated as fore-having (Vorhabe), fore-sight (Vorsicht) and fore-conception (Vorgriff), which seems to indicate that the various different levels of explicitness all cumulatively contribute to the fore-structure of interpretation. We are not just dealing here with 'pre-supposition', but with an articulated array of levels of 'alreadyness'.

Heidegger goes on to defend the 'circularity' of interpretation, which seems to deliver only what it has already taken for granted. Understanding requires the circle. There can be no question of trying to avoid the circle, rather what matters is 'to come into it in the right way' (H153). For 'In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing.' (H153)

It is in this same pursuit of primordial existential grounding that Heidegger offers us readings of 'assertion' (as derived from interpretation and understanding) and of discourse - which latter, it turns out, is existentially on a par with state of mind and understanding. Discourse is understood as the significant articulation of the intelligibility of Being in the world. In the course of these accounts of assertion and discourse, the possibility of thinking of language as having a fundamental logical structure is ruled out by understanding logos itself as rooted in Dasein's existential analytic. What it suggests, and is meant to suggest, of course, is that all structures
and all representations are to be so understood, including the structures of time.

Chapter 5 concludes with an account of our everyday being there—in such forms as idle talk (Gerede), curiosity and ambiguity. These together point to an important aspect of Dasein's everyday Being—that Dasein is for the most part alongside and absorbed in its world. He calls this, quite neutrally, 'falling' (Verfallen)—and distinguishes, very interestingly, a whole range of ways in which we hide from ourselves, and flirt with the possibility of authenticity that fallen everydayness conceals (temptation, tranquilizing, alienation, and entanglement).

Wholeness and Method

So far in this Division, Heidegger has been spelling out in a reasonably ordered way the most general 'existentials' of Dasein's Being-in-the-world, filling these in with more specific characteristics. But the moment of analysis is counterbalanced by one of synthesis, and Heidegger begins his chapter on Care with the section heading ß35 The Question of the Primordial Totality of Dasein's Structural Whole. The first sentence says it all—"Being-in-the-world is a structure which is primordially and constantly whole." Why does Heidegger put so much weight on this wholeness? It is, after all, an issue that repeatedly recurs in the book. A preliminary answer would be this: that Heidegger has ventured a radicalizing articulation of man, of the self (as Dasein) which does away with any basis for unity there might previously have been, such as the permanence of a substance, or some cluster of features (grasped as present-at-hand). In opening man onto the world, Heidegger has risked loss of identity, because he has dissolved
the traditional limits (e.g., simple self-presence). Moreover, in the account he has given, he has continually stressed that Dasein can exist in two different ways—inauthentically and authentically, and he has argued for 'possibility' as an intrinsic feature of Dasein's being. At every turn, we might say, identity in any traditional sense is harder and harder to credit.

And yet as the wealth of his analyses piles up, it is easy to see how the demand for an understanding of Dasein as a whole can arise. Through his analysis of care, and then Being-towards-death, Heidegger will supply an answer to the question of 'the primordial totality of Dasein's structural whole'. What we have to ask ourselves, however, is on what ground this projection of wholeness is based.

Heidegger is right to suppose that if Dasein is to exhibit a 'structural wholeness' it must be of a somewhat original constitution. But that Dasein should have such wholeness, and what the source or point of that assumption might be is still unclear. Heidegger assumes that as a work of interpretation he is merely bringing out structures latent in Dasein's (understanding) existence. But might these not be exigencies of interpretation quite alien to the ground from which they arise? To put the question another way—might it not be that the demand for an account of Dasein in its wholeness, is the demand that a certain sort of account makes—a certain rather traditional account perhaps—rather than a demand that actually articulates the existence it interprets? Were that so, we would be at least as much interested in investigating the existential basis of this demand (inauthentic turning away from finitude?) as trying to satisfy it. Much of course will rest on our assessment of his account of death, but before that we have out-
lined a series of questions through which we can read his chapter on Care, which, with his famous disquisition on Truth (§44), brings Division I to its end.

A clue to the nature of this demand comes early on (§39), 'If the existential analytic of Dasein is to retain clarity in principle as to its function in fundamental ontology, then in order to master its provisional task of exhibiting Dasein's Being, it must seek for one of the most far-reaching and most primordial possibilities of disclosure— one that lies in Dasein itself. The way of disclosure in which Dasein brings itself before itself must be such that in it Dasein becomes accessible as simplified in a certain manner. With what is thus disclosed, the structural totality of the Being we seek must then come to light in an elemental way.'

So the requirement that Dasein's Being be able to be 'simplified' is one that stems from the role Heidegger has given to the existential analytic in approaching 'the question of the meaning of Being in general'. There is no a priori guarantee that this can be accomplished. ('Can we succeed in grasping this structural whole of Dasein's everydayness in its totality?' (H181)). But given the premise that 'an understanding of Being belongs to Dasein's ontological structure' it seems plausible to look for a privileged moment of such understanding. Heidegger's difficulty is that he has had to employ the scaffolding of the language of structure to organize the complex relationships between the various primordial features of Dasein's existence he has distinguished, and to prevent them from being a mere heap of insights. And yet he denies that this structural approach actually yields a totality in its own right. Why? '... the totality of the structural whole is not to
be reached by building it up out of elements. For this we would need an architect's plan." (H181)

This is ambiguous. It could mean that as Dasein is not the product of design, its 'totality' will not be able to be found by drawing up such a ground-plan — this would be to confuse a representation of totality with the totality itself. Or it could mean that without such a plan we would never be able to make sense of the complex relations between the parts. It is pretty clear as he continues that Heidegger is opting for a version of the first alternative. A representation of Dasein as a structural whole is not an exhibition of his-Being. What is needed is 'a single, primordially unitary phenomenon which is already in this whole in such a way that it provides the ontological foundation for each structural item in its structural possibility.'

The Hinge of Care

The simplification Heidegger seeks is found in care, which is revealed through Angst. Care, as will soon be apparent, has a triadic structure that waits only for the kiss of Division II for its temporal significance to be made explicit. The importance of this structural condensation of the existential analytic into the structure of Care via a fundamentally disclosive experience (Angst) is that it makes it possible for Heidegger already within the covers of Being and Time explicitly to move away from 'the special task of an existentially a priori anthropology' (H183). The structural condensation of Care, achieved via the primordial disclosure of Angst, prepares the way for the absorption of that structure into a dimension that precedes all structure and representation — namely temporality. Care itself is the hinge on which the thoughtful progress of the book turns.
Put very simply, the experience of Angst does not (as does fear) have an object in any ordinary sense; rather it 'discloses, primordially and directly, the world as world' (H187). The importance of Angst for Heidegger lies in his ontological interpretation of it. It puts in question our Being in the world, renders us 'unheimlich', forces us to face our potentiality-for-Being. If Angst reveals 'Nothing', it is as 'no-thing' - nothing in particular - that is, our Being in the world. And most important, Angst distinctively reveals to us our individual Being-in-the-world.

How does Angst play the role of revealing the structure of Care? Angst, we suppose, is a 'single' mood. But, in his account of it, Heidegger, not implausibly, had displayed its nature on three axes:

'Angst as a state of mind is a way of Being-in-the-world; that in the face of which we have anxiety is thrown Being-in-the-world, that which we have anxiety about is our potentiality for Being-in-the-world.' (H191)

This can be abbreviated further:

'The fundamental ontological characteristics of this entity are existentiality, factivity, and Being-fallen.' (H191)

Shortly afterwards, this gets re-expanded in a different formula

'The being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within the world). This Being fills in the signification of the term 'Care' (Sorge)' (H192).

Clearly any term which is to bear the weight carried by 'Care' will have difficulty in shaking off all the 'ontic' senses it brings to mind. In particular, despite the value he places on anxiety (Angst) he does not intend that 'Care' be understood in such a way. Care is understood, as he says 'in a purely ontologico-existential manner.' This does allow him to distinguish between our 'care' for the different
kinds of entities in the world — our 'concern' for the ready-to-hand, and our 'solicitude' for others. But it is hard to find any ontic paraphrase of the concept of care in Heidegger's discussion. As a way of emphasizing its ontological sense, this is clearly understandable, but it raises the question of why the word 'care' should be used in the first place. Is 'Care' just a convenient label for the structure (ahead/alongside/already...) already mentioned, or is that structure an analysis of the ontological concept of care?

It could be replied that the whole point of the discussion of Angst was to give us access to care itself as what Angst disclosively brings into focus. But Heidegger's interpretation of Angst is surely not conclusive. That it is possible to draw out the features he does draw out is clear. But whether they are the only features, or the ones that some other interest would have focussed upon — that remains far from clear. The move from the interpretation of Angst to the structure of Care seems somewhat preordained. And when it turns out that the structure of care can be given an all too easy temporal reading, we need not think of this as 'confirmation' of anything except Heidegger's own prescience.

The second difficulty that arises out of trying to understand the meaning of care while maintaining its ontological significance, and radically eschewing its ordinary ontic significance is that this is surely an impossible task. The word is chosen because of its everyday meaning (with the etymological connection between Sorge/Besorge helping). Does not this suggest a radical inverse dependence of the ontological on the ontical, one which Heidegger would find disturbing?

In Being and Time it seems that Heidegger is content to keep the
senses apart rather than to pursue the difficulties involved in articulating their inter-relationship. Elsewhere however (eg. in Letter on Humanism and his essay Language) he explicitly refuses to describe his use of certain apparently ontic terms as metaphorical (language is the house of Being, the flower of the mouth). The suggestion is that the relationship of one-way transference of meaning (from ontic to ontological) belies the fact that the ordinary ontic meaning of a word may well be open to a renewal, or revitalizing, one that an ontological transposition can provide. Heidegger suggests that understanding language as 'the house of Being' might deepen our sense of 'house', 'dwelling', etc. Another way of putting this would be to say that language has an ontological dimension even when being used ontically, even if that may often be unapparent, concealed. The difficulty with this position is that the possibility of a retroactive illumination of a literal sense by a metaphorical one can be accommodated without giving the relationship an ontic/ontological status. And this 'ordinary' retroactive illumination might well be enough to explain the effect Heidegger describes. 'House' could still be a metaphor.

What about the case of 'care'? Why does Heidegger choose such a word, rather than opt for some emptier, abstract term? It is no accident, I think, that the terms with which he compares 'care' - unfavourably for that term - are 'willing' and 'living' - which could respectively be traced back to Nietzsche/Schopenhauer and to Dilthey. 'Care' is a competitor in a field of other candidates for the title of 'legitimate successor to the epistemological paradigm', that is to 'knowing'. He has already argued for knowing as merely one mode of Being in the world, among others. Here (H194f) he argues that willing,
when we consider it ontologically, exhibits the structure of care.

'In willing, an entity which is understood - that is, one which has been projected upon its possibility - gets seized upon, either as something with which one may concern oneself, or as something which is to be brought into its Being through 'solicitude'.

He then articulates the structure of this a priori possibility in terms that allow him to conclude that 'In the phenomenon of willing, the underlying totality of care shows through.' And this same form of dependence is claimed for ordinary 'ontic' care too. ('The existential condition for the possibility of 'the cares of life' and 'devotedness', must be conceived as care, in a sense which is primordial, that is ontological."

We have alluded already to Heidegger's justifying references to the 'transcendental "generality"' of care, and to the (apparent) 'emptiness' and 'generality' of such descriptions. But even if one accepts as persuasive, illuminating, etc. his structural analysis here, there is a sense in which the abstractness is not just the price one has to pay for a priori virtue, but is a sign of incompleteness. There is a sense in which one needs a further story to be told about why there are just these three factors (existentiality, facticity, falling...), a story yet to be told.

In the face of this urgency, the discussions of reality and truth seem almost distractions. Heidegger's discussion of truth by its very brilliance, interrupts the course of the book, delays the moment of time. If it has a logical place here in the book, we can find it in the way the word 'disclosedness' keeps 'appearing' in the analysis of care. If we apply the idea of trying to 'preserve the force of the most elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself' to the Greek word
from which the traditional philosophical understanding of truth derives, we can trace back a series of steps (through uncoveredness, and uncovering) to Dasein's disclosedness as 'the most primordial phenomenon of truth'. (With this existential grounding of truth we can say that 'Dasein is in the truth'.) And Heidegger can then show (via disclosedness) the intimate relation between truth and care.

We have said that there is a certain delay here (in the last four sections of Division I). At the end of 041, Heidegger is already pointing forward, playing with the moment at which structure becomes time, a moment caught in the word 'articulated' (gegliedert) which deserves a special place in philosophy.

'In defining "care" as "Being-ahead-of-oneself-in-Being -already-in... - as Being-alongside..." we have made it plain that even this phenomenon is, in itself, still structurally articulated. But is this not a phenomenal symptom that we must pursue the ontological question even further until we can exhibit a still more primordial phenomenon which provides the ontological support for the unity and the totality of the structural manifoldness of care?' (H196)

For all the artifice involved in withholding the temporal, Heidegger has succeeded in giving an account of the fundamental structure of Dasein's Being which is both plausible and yet deficient, hugely so. Clearly the art has been to anticipate in structural form a triad susceptible of temporal transformation. But before we proceed to the gratification and fulfillment of Division II there is one question that ought at least be adumbrated here, even if it must return when we discuss Heidegger's own assessment of Being and Time - a single question even if it occupies a number of sentences. Do we really understand what is meant by an existential grounding? By treating Dasein's existence as capable of serving transcendental functions? Is it (and if not does it
matter?) really possible in principle to pin down the logical inter-
relationship between the multiple claims to primordiality (even being
'more primordial')? How satisfactory is the logic of deficient modes -
which has the consequence that phenomena which seem to have become
detached from their proper ground are actually (though negatively)
attached? (Might this not be an instance of an ill-advised conversion
of a powerful interpretive schema into an a priori assumption?) Is
there not a bad circularity involved here in that by assuming the
universal possibility of grounding one convinces oneself that apparent
exceptions are deficient modes and thus misses the possibility that
groundedness itself might be a limited phenomenon. We would recall
the suggestions in our introduction to Heidegger, that it is the very
impossibility of a primordial ground that incites a multiplicity of
cross-mappings, translations, etc. Vertical impossibility generates
horizontal diversity.

Our concern will be for our understanding of time. The question
we will try to put to Heidegger is this: is it not possible for the
existential grounding of our ordinary understanding of time to over-
estimate its own significance - to suppose that there is one ordinary
concept of time already seems contentious. And does it not run the
risk that all such transformations take - of being silently determined
by the shape of what it overcomes? Finally, and this is meant as a
hint of where our doubts about transcendental grounding lie, is it
really possible to exclude representation from our fundamental account
of existence? Heidegger is much more sensitive to the positive status
of the everyday than some of his critics suggest, but it remains true
that if an authentic modification of everydayness is possible, it would,
as I understand it involve an exclusion of representation. In
particular it would exclude representations of time from any role in our understanding of authentic temporality. Is this in fact or in principle possible?
II. Heidegger's Treatment of Time and Temporality:

A Critical Analysis of Being and Time

CHAPTER TWO

Death, Resoluteness and Care

The Temporal Reworking

Heidegger never misses the opportunity to make methodological remarks. The ease with which his contemporary readers drew merely 'anthropological' conclusions from his work fully justifies this practice. No less does the revolutionary nature of his project. At critical points he must remind us - the point of all this existential analytic is to answer the question of the meaning of Being. It is necessary to go through this existential stage, because

'to lay bare the horizon within which something like Being in general becomes intelligible, is tantamount to clarifying the possibility of having any understanding of Being at all - an understanding which itself belongs to the constitution of the entity called Dasein.' (H231).

In each of these methodological discourses, Heidegger channels our questioning in the right direction - towards the ontological, towards the primordial, and towards a conception of the question that progressively incorporates the insights already obtained. This last feature is one of the most impressive of the book, one which gives it unusual unity and penetration. It happens that we find in Ø46 a prime example of this textual roll-on.

We spoke of the over abstractness of the structure of Care, the felt need for another 'story' which would make sense of this structure (why three parts?). Heidegger begins his second Division by a
clarification of the ultimate question (the question of Being) and by a demonstration that our account of Dasein is so far inadequate. And he does so (1) by reminding us that the ontological interpretation in which he is engaged is a species of interpretation and as such subject to its fore-structure (fore-having, for-sight, and fore-conception) and hence to the demand that this be clarified as far as possible (2) by insisting that more needs to be done on this score.

Consider 'fore-sight'. In treating existence as potentiality-for-Being, we concentrated on its necessary but incomplete inauthentic form. And how can we claim 'fore-having' without an assurance that we have grasped Dasein in its wholeness? We may have supposed that 'Care' had provided us with an account of Dasein's Being as a whole, but surely when we consider Dasein from the everyday temporal point of view, we must question this. Indeed as Dasein is never complete until it ceases to be Dasein, as it almost seems to be defined by an incompleteness (potentiality for Being), one might wonder 'whether "having" the whole entity is attainable at all' and hence whether a primordial interpretation of Dasein is not rendered impossible by the very nature of its Being. Heidegger is using the standard of 'wholeness' as a vantage point from which to point to deficiencies in the story so far.

'If the Interpretation of Dasein's Being is to become primordial as a foundation for working out the basic question of ontology, then it must first have brought to light existentially the Being of Dasein in its possibility of authenticity and totality.' (H233).

It is at this point that Heidegger's concern with death is brought into focus. The argument goes like this: if Dasein is to be grasped as a whole then we have to come to some understanding of death such that the temporal incompleteness of a living Dasein does not prevent us from
grasping its Being-as-a-whole. The basic move is to argue that death is significant for Dasein only in his Being-towards-death, and far from sabotaging the possibility of wholeness, this serves, albeit peculiarly, to constitute it.

Heidegger's discussion of death, most particularly as it appears in the first chapter of Division II, is offered as an answer to the question of how we can understand Dasein 'as a whole', and that question is critical because it is, for Heidegger, a precondition of being able to move from the existential analytic (Division I) to the ontological account proper (Division II onwards) that we have such an understanding.

The explanation for this concern for Dasein's wholeness may be, as I have suggested, that Heidegger's approach to understanding man's Being has been from the beginning, in some sense, dispersive, so that what metaphysics could solve at the beginning (with eg. the idea of a self-identical substance) is continually postponed while its solution becomes more and more difficult to envisage. All our everyday models of wholeness have been taken away from us. (And yet Dasein cannot surely just be a fragmental dispersion, scudding clouds in the sky?) It might also be said that without something like a complete and full account of Dasein, there can be no adequate account of Being, given that Being only is through Dasein's understanding and our understanding of the rests on a complete understanding of Dasein. This argument seems less persuasive; perhaps it doesn't carry the same urgency as Heidegger's continued insistence would require. And perhaps too, it is possible to think of a complete account that did not rest on Dasein's wholeness.

One can have a complete archaeological inventory of the remains of an old building without that giving us an understanding of the building in
its 'wholeness'.

There is perhaps another explanation for Heidegger's repeated insistence on our getting a grip on Dasein-as-a-whole - which is that such a question does indeed force us to confront the very peculiarity of Dasein's Being, in comparison to other modes of Being. And it allows him to integrate a considerable number of themes (possibility, care, finitude, nothingness, anxiety...) in the question of death. It supplies the central thrust for Heidegger's discussion of death.

In order genuinely to invert the order of explanation, one would have to show that Heidegger for quite independent reasons wanted to give death (and our authentic response to it) a central role, and then prepared the ground for it by inventing or at least emphasizing the question of Dasein's 'wholeness'. It is hard to see how to do this for it is clear that the capacity of 'death' to focus many of the issues he needs to focus in Division II is quite genuine, and these issues are a logical progression from those of Division I. Nonetheless we can and must bear in mind that the question of wholeness might just be a residual question, one that has been left over from metaphysics, and which it is not the business of a fundamental ontology (let alone anything) 'after' that) to consider. Coupled with that is the key question that will guide our analysis of his account of death - is it a subtle form of the 'appropriation of death'? or is it, in fact, the site of the most far-reaching renunciation of the value of presence? In fact as we shall show, it is almost impossible to subject Heidegger to this either/or. We shall instead offer what might be called, after Derrida, a 'double reading'.

Heidegger's Chapter I Division II is entitled "Dasein's Possibility of Being-as-a-whole, and Being-towards-Death". It has been the source
of much misunderstanding of Heidegger's philosophy in general and of serious disagreements. Even now, with the benefit of these various discussions, it is possible to misunderstand what Heidegger is saying, and yet it is not, in essence, very difficult. Whether it is right or not is another matter.

The key to Heidegger's discussion of death lies in the initial move he makes to resolve the problems Dasein's Being in time and towards death seems to pose for the project of understanding Dasein's 'Being-as-a-whole'. The problem is simple. From the point of view of how much of our allotted time we have eaten up, Dasein is always either (a) incomplete (still living, not yet dead) or (b) dead (and no longer Dasein). How can Dasein be a whole when he is always, in fact, 'becoming'? The move Heidegger makes is to remind us that what this means is that for Dasein death affects us existentially - that is, it is in our Being-towards-death that differences will be found. The question then becomes - how can we find a basis for Dasein's wholeness in Being-towards-death?

Heidegger's central move here is to convert a temporal limit into an existential/ontological one. My death is at one level an event, and from an external point of view it can be dated, perhaps commemorated etc. When I say it 'is' an event, I mean that I can envisage it as happening, as about to happen, as having happened etc. This way of thinking about death is very important for Heidegger in that it (potentially) characterizes our everyday way of thinking of death. Opposed to it is the idea of death as 'possibility'. This may seem odd. Surely we can conjoin the ideas of 'possibility' and 'event'. Do not insurance companies deal precisely with 'possible
Is that not what lies behind many of the safety precautions we take—lifejackets on boats, seat belts in cars, helmets on motorcycles—just in case a certain possibility (an accident) should materialize, and to ward off another possibility (our accidental death)? Such a way of thinking of death as a possibility is however (severely) limited. It presents death as an event in a series of events of which it is the conclusion. Such a 'possibility' is always understood as a future actuality. It always and essentially gets (or could get) cashed out as something present, something actual. However, for Dasein, death as possibility has another meaning, and it is a meaning that is only in part oriented to the future. Death is primarily understood by Heidegger as the possibility of my non-Being—where 'possibility' is not contrasted with necessity or probability. To live with a grasp of one's mortality, to be a Being-towards-death—is to grasp in as full a way as possible that one's existentiality, one's potentiality-for-Being, is only fully disclosed in the light of the possibility of one having no (more) possibilities. To say that death is possible 'at any time' is not simply to say that one never knows when one will die, but that human life itself in its every instance derives its fullest significance from its contingency.

What is the status of the future here? For Heidegger, the future is the privileged ecstasis, and it is so because of the role that 'possibility' and 'potentiality-for-Being' play in the distinctive constitution of Dasein's Being. And if the inauthentic attitude to death (which he calls 'Erwarten' (expecting)) treats it as a future event, the authentic attitude cannot deny its futurity. But what is the future? Existentially, and that is the perspective from which
Heidegger takes his orientation, the future is significant as the dimension in which our potentiality-for-Being is exercised. And it looks very much as though Heidegger understands the future via the notion of possibility. The authentic orientation to death he calls anticipation, which does not treat it as an event, but rather is receptive (in anxiety) to what death means for my potentiality for Being.

It has been suggested in the quite proper cause of stressing the continuity of Heidegger's thought, that the central idea of his treatment of death already in Being and Time is a kind of Gelassenheit—a letting-be. Certainly many of Heidegger's sections here are devoted to releasing death from the grip of representative, thingly thinking. But surely one needs a word that captures the intensification that an authentic Being-towards-death is clearly meant to bring about. Moreover, death does not have any Being in its own right; it is irrevocably attached to Dasein (like Being itself, and Time).

It is worth noting, before we pass on to an assessment of these claims, how seriously Heidegger takes the need to distinguish negatively an existential understanding of death from any other. Heidegger explicitly separates off all these other disciplinary approaches that would treat death as an event. One cannot help wondering whether matters are quite that simple. Psychoanalysis certainly would not treat death primarily as an event. Thanatos, eg., is no event. And a biology that ignored the death already in life (eg. in aging) would be a poor biology. Heidegger also labours the point that the 'not-yet' of Dasein's death is quite unlike the various other kinds of incompleteness we can find in the world. Here Heidegger would almost qualify as an analytic philosopher. The many examples Heidegger uses are genuinely interesting in their own
Death and Representation

We shall start the process of evaluating this account by focussing on a fascinating theme he brings up early on in the chapter - that of Representation (Vertretbarkeit) for it offers both a way of further clarifying his position, and also a way of beginning to ask how satisfactory it is.

Heidegger associates the claim that Being-towards-death is (what he will come to call) my own-most possibility, with the idea that no-one else can die for me (see H240). There are, he rightly suggests, many ways in which one man can stand-in for another. Andy Warhol is said to have responded to the numerous requests for him to make a personal appearance by sending a look-alike, often without detection. But the relationship more commonly does not involve deception, but simply some form of taking the other's place - carrying out someone's instructions, as does a secretary (who may even sign my name). Or, further, one can represent one's fellow countrymen or one's school or firm at a conference or in some public affair like the Olympics. The varieties of this kind of representation are very wide - even steering clear of the sense of representation as idea (Vorstellen), as the translators remind us.

Heidegger's claim, positively speaking, is that this form of representation is not only common but in some sense constitutive of everyday Dasein. Here he draws on the idea that Dasein is, in particular 'das Man', a Being-with-others. Modern role theory would confirm this dramatically. And yet however many contexts there are in which someone else can represent me, there is one in which no-one can represent me.

'This possibility of representing breaks down completely
if the issue is one of representing that possibility-of-Being which makes up Dasein's coming to an end, and which, as such, gives to it its wholeness. No one can take the Other's dying away from him.'

'By its essence, death is in every case mine, in so far as it 'is' at all ... death signifies a peculiar possibility-of-Being in which the very Being of one's own Dasein is an issue. In dying, it is shown that mineness and existence are ontologically constitutive for death. (H240)

Strictly speaking, the words 'own-most possibility' do not occur here. We have to wait until a little later (H250), at which point the word 'non-relational' is added, which suggests something even stronger than 'incapable of being represented by another'.

This all sounds thoroughly plausible. We can agree, for example, that there are things for which it makes no difference who does them, that there are things which someone else can do as well as me, that there are things that someone else with my permission and at my instruction can do as well (or better than) me, and so on. And there seem to be things that even if someone else could in some sense do them, it would matter that it was not I who was doing them. But Heidegger seems to move very quickly over this question. One can only speculate as to why.

He claims or admits that someone else can 'go to his death for another', but adds 'that always means to sacrifice oneself for the other in some definite affair'. This remark sounds much more like the kind of position that might be taken by the early Sartre, concerned with the dilemmas facing members of the French resistance, or someone reflecting on war. But one most obvious reference of such words is surely to Christ's crucifixion. And is it not a quite extraordinarily mean interpretation of the idea that Christ died 'to save us' that this relates
to 'some definite affair'. Indeed, one may explain the circumstances of many a martyrdom without reducing what is at issue in such deaths to 'some definite affair'. (How 'definite' was what was at stake in Socrates' death?) And when, as has been documented, valiant souls substituted themselves for those in line to be liquidated in concentration camps, is it really possible to define the 'affair' in question? What if the affair was the question of life itself (its value, one's individuality, ... etc.)?

There are other directions in which Heidegger's move must be queried, and Sartre points the way. If one accepts that in some sense no one can die for me, is it not equally true that no-one can urinate, eat, feel joy, understand a philosophical argument, or ... fall in love for me? Surely anyone who replies that this objection misses the point must at least be pressed to explain how the privileged status of dying arises. At some point here it may be said that what we are dealing with here is an interpretation, (with the form of a hermeneutic circle), not a proof, so that to make (such) an 'objection' is a misunderstanding. However Heidegger does reach a very strange conclusion - that representation is excluded from Being-towards-death, and this is the conclusion of an argument which can, more or less, be reconstructed.

The argument is circumscribed by the general question of totality - the problem of 'getting a whole Dasein into our grasp' (see 047). The suggestion is initially made that we might be able to get around the problem of how to grasp our own totality (we always seem to be either alive (incomplete) or dead), by some analogical transfer from the death of others, which we do indeed experience. Heidegger's answer is that we only, at best experience the death of others as a loss - to us who
remain alive.

'In suffering this loss, however, we have no way of access to the loss-of-Being as such which the dying man 'suffers'. ' (H239)

And no psychological intimacy with the other would suffice:

'we are asking about the ontological meaning of the dying of the person who dies, as a possibility-of-Being which belongs to his Being.' (H239)

It is in the light of his demarcation of the failure of this enterprise that Heidegger focusses on the seemingly more plausible case that we dealt with before - that in which someone else dies for us, where the other is, if you like, no mere 'object' in the world, but in which the 'for me' is doubled up.

But is Heidegger really careful enough in his analysis of what the death of others can provide? One thing that does not seem to be adequately accommodated is that it is only from the fact that others have died that we 'know' of our own mortality, just as, should it come to pass, the technologically assisted super-longevity of others will convince us of our own (possible) immortality.  

Heidegger's reply, I take it, would be that if this is a 'condition' for our being able to have attitudes towards our own death it neither limits the scope nor determines the direction of our understanding of our own mortality. Let us allow him this. More serious, for his case, is the way in which he seems to be restricting the possible ways in which the dying of others can guide us, by focussing on the meaning, to us, of the event of the death of the other. This may be of limited importance. We have indeed become accustomed to and tranquillized about the death of others, especially as the range of our vulnerability to such information increases (newspapers, radio, famine relief appeals etc.).
But Heidegger wants to make his point, without explicitly saying so, about the fact or event of the death of those near to us. (The 'deceased' has been torn away from those who have 'remained behind' (H238) (our emphasis)). And yet he seems to do justice neither to the death of those near, nor to the death of those distant. Let us, briefly, consider two cases: the death of a loved one (my spouse, my child, my father, my mother...), on the one hand, and reading biography (including autobiography) on the other. For what Heidegger says to be convincing he has to persuade us that neither of these can offer (or constitute for) Dasein any kind of ontological illumination. This assumption appears as a rigidity in the distinction between ontic and ontological, to which the distinction between representation and existence is subsumed, and must surely be questioned.

Consider first the death of a loved one. We have pointed out that Heidegger seems to be concerned with the deaths of those close to us. Yet it is strange and perhaps symptomatic that he ends his discussion of the possibility of existential illumination through the death of others by supposing that what is at stake is whether just any randomly selected other will serve as a substitute for Dasein's own Being-towards-death. (see H239). Why this impersonalization? Might he perhaps be trying to avoid the question of love?

If love were an ontological event affecting my very experience of myself, might not the potential significance of the death of a loved one rest on the adequacy of one's analysis of 'mourning', 'loss', 'commemoration', etc. If such loss is merely an ontic event, perhaps susceptible to 'psychological' investigation, what kind of story would Heidegger give of the withering away of the bereaved? (We do not even
have to consider those cases in which the loved one dies at his or her own hand.) Surely the lofty response that these are of merely ontic concern to Dasein in its everydayness is quite insufficient. But why?

A number of possible responses suggest themselves. Is there not something quite as fundamental as one could ever want about being born from, creating with, and giving birth to, something that implicates those actual beings of whom it is true (or deemed true) in a way that quite transcends 'the body'. To be of one flesh: this 'flesh' is already 'outside itself'. Its exuberance already exceeds the way the body itself transcends simple self-presence (intermeshing rhythms, its scars and its passions, its sensory organs and its eroticism). It might be replied: this is all very fine and moving, but what more does it do than remind us of the primitiveness of being-with, and the temporal structure of relations between the generations? How does it approach the ontological concern with the meaning of one's own Being? The answer, surely, is that it does not so much approach that question as perform a certain molework on it.

When a father shields his child against the sword, and in so doing dies, it is perhaps neither courage nor 'instinct' but a sign of a fracture in the heart of 'own-ness'. It is not so much self-lessness, as a sign of the original rupture of the self, and one which, surely, is not reducible to the ultimately limiting 'being-with'. We do not pretend to any expertise, but it would not be unreasonable to read into these remarks a certain evocation of the spirit of Levinas.

It is in that respect interesting that to our knowledge, Levinas does not seriously (if at all) take account of Heidegger's analysis of authentic solicitude, which surely goes out of its way to liberate the
Other from objectification. However it does not liberate the Other from him/herself, but rather, charged with the weight of a renewed responsibility, returns it to him.

Is this all something of a side-track? Not if Heidegger would otherwise be allowed to return to the totally individuating nature of one's relation to one's death. We have tried to show that he cannot succeed in establishing this without a satisfactory account of love. We have not really even begun to offer this. The writings of Marcel, for example, would have to be mentioned. But we have, I believe, shown where Heidegger's ice is thin.

It is equally thin at the point at which he dismisses the value of the death of strangers (and hence, one would suppose, of biography and autobiography). As we have said, he accomplishes this by an implicit narrowing-down of the meaning of 'the dying of others' to the fact or event itself. Clearly it is then all too easy to contrast the Being-towards-death of my Dasein. But what then of (auto-)biography? Surely the ideal is precisely to reveal the existential choices and circumstances that shape a life, and many of the most interesting (auto-)biographies are of those whose life is conducted with an eye on their own temporal finitude, their own mortality. Biographies of martyrs, saints, zealots, great soldiers and adventurers, etc. provide only the most graphic examples. Now it is of course true that there need be nothing adventurous about reading the biography of an adventurer, and one gets no closer to the flames by reading about Joan of Arc. To read about the comportment of Others in the face of their own mortality does not eo ipso makes one's own attitude authentic. Indeed it can, quite the contrary, be a form of escapism, a deferment of self-confrontation. Heidegger's claim,
however, must be that it can have no ontological value, and that seems highly unlikely.

Perhaps we are being unfair to Heidegger. He might simply be saying that understanding what it means to be-towards-death, and acting and experiencing at that level are two different things. There is a radical difference between my reading about St. Augustine having his doubts about becoming Christian removed by reading Paul, and my doubts being so removed. But even if this were true, the general distinction between understanding and acting/experiencing will not do, because Heidegger is at this stage concerned precisely with understanding what it is for Dasein to be 'zum Tode'. And when one considers the extraordinary power eg. of the Gospels - of the accounts of the teachings and sufferings of Christ - to affect men's lives - one begins at least to consider how far possibilities-for-Being can be thought of entirely in isolation from prior example, from the choices others have made in different circumstances, from the historical stock of significant ways of Being. The reference to biography is only the most obvious way in which the horizon of such 'ways of Being' is radically expanded beyond what our local community may offer even as possibilities. The suggestion is not that we choose our own Being-towards-death as we would a commodity in a supermarket. We are claiming, rather, that to think of our Being-towards-death as something that inherently individuates us need not and perhaps cannot exclude some sort of grasp of the horizon of possible choices - which derives from tradition, in the widest sense. We are not convinced that it is possible to separate, in the way Heidegger would require, the level at which the understanding takes place, and the various thematized and unthematized possibilities that have perhaps always offered themselves to us.
What we are beginning to question, or perhaps only to grope towards questioning, is the way in which Heidegger's concept of authenticity, his references to authentic solicitude notwithstanding, essentially excludes the other, and not only the personal other, but also the other as Sign, as Representation. Might it not be that Heidegger's reference to death as Dasein's 'own-most non-relational possibility' here retained the goal of Husserl's reduction to a 'sphere of ownness' transforming it from an epistemological to an existential/ontological setting?

Finitude and Mortality

Clearly all these points must be redeemed (or otherwise) in a further discussion of the concept of authenticity, but before we move on to that topic, it is worth perhaps considering another of Sartre's major points of disagreement with Heidegger on the subject of death. Put bluntly, it is that Heidegger confuses, or at least conflates finitude and mortality. Surely we would still be finite beings even if we were, or believed ourselves with reason to be, immortal.

What is it to be finite? To be finite surely has its most distinctive manifestation not in our inescapable death, but in the 'death' involved in every instant as one has to choose (even by not choosing) to realize some possibilities and not others. Even immortal beings have to live somewhere at some time, have a particular body, sex, culture, etc. (and a particular order of their acquisition) and so on. Does this not show that finitude and being-mortal are different because we can imagine one without the other? The situation is a little more complex than this. (Even 'immortal' beings (as we have defined the term) may be vulnerable and are capable of dying so the possibility of
their death, even if never brought about, could still be a source of anxiety.) Would it not follow that even 'immortal beings', beings for whom death is not an inevitability would still be able to think of themselves as wholes only in relation to the possibility of their non-existence? That is to say - is that not what Heidegger would/could respond? And that would seem to suggest a difficulty in conceiving of a finite being that was not at the same time capable of an authentic Seinzumtode. It is even more difficult to think of a mortal being that would not be finite. So are the two concepts not, contra Sartre, after all intimately connected, and perhaps not even to be distinguished at all?

This certainly does not follow. Many of Heidegger's 'existentials' are equiprimordial, hard to think of as occurring in separation, and yet 'conceptually', if one can say so, quite distinct. Surely just this is true of finitude and mortality. But if it were so, what would hang on it? Our remarks here run the risk of being all too finite, but might it not be that Being-towards-death can function for Heidegger as the answer to how Dasein can 'be a whole' only if finitude can be absorbed into being mortal. And if it cannot, might it not be that Dasein's Being was inherently incomplete, or perhaps 'undecidable', for Being-towards-death would be no resolution of our everyday finitude.

One last dangling thread still needs to be taken up. Heidegger does not want to treat death as an event, but he does say that it cannot be circumvented. (Let us suppose that the sense of 'cannot' here is stronger than the confident assertion in the 1930s (I believe) that man could never see the other side of the moon. We shall not contest it here.) How important is it that death is inevitable? The whole tenor
of Heidegger's discussion of the existential dimension of death is to play down death as an actual future event, and to accentuate death as possibility in a different sense. As I understand it the force of this idea is that existence is most radically to be understood as a multi-levelled relationship with the possibility of not-existing. It is multi-leveled because the mere passage of time involves the closing off (the death) of 'openings-onto' (the future), while the fact that we need not exist (both in the sense that one's birth was not necessary and that nothing guarantees my persistence) gives further intensity to every such opening. It happens that for none of us can this possibility of non-existence be circumvented. But surely that is to go further than Heidegger really needs. Does not Angst for example actually reveal not our Being towards certain death, but rather that we can never rule out the possibility of death. Indeed so much are we tempted to rethink Angst as disclosive of contingency or finitude that we would not rule out the possibility of Beings certain of this immortality suffering from it, assuming, that is, that they had been born and had once not existed, and that their existence had never been 'necessary'. Their Angst could be in respect of the fact of their own finitude and 'groundlessness'.

What have we claimed in this section? We have given notice that Heidegger's account of Being-towards-death as Dasein's ownmost non-relational and uncircumventable possibility is open to doubt in each respect, and that those doubts provide the opening for a reading that treats Heidegger's discussion of death as an exclusion of the other - the other person and the other as 'sign'. However as we shall see, while these doubts will be developed further, they will in no way amount to a wholesale rejection of Heidegger's remarks on death and authenticity.
What is however brought to light in this double reading is an unresolved tension in Heidegger's thought between the necessity of grasping Dasein as a whole, and the recognition of time as the possibility of the other, beyond appropriation. If Heidegger is right in thinking that the move from an existential analytic to the ontological sphere, to the question of Being, rests on grasping Dasein as a whole, then we claim to have unsettled the very structure of the book.

**Authenticity**

There are a number of key features of authenticity, as Heidegger presents it. As they are often misunderstood, it would be as well to state them clearly, whether to correct these misunderstandings or to reveal our own. Authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) is centrally linked to the idea of intense individuation - ownmostness - even if it can be plausibly said to redefine rather than presuppose any sense of 'individuality'. Authenticity is utterly dependent on everydayness, of which it is nonetheless a distinctive modification. The 'choice' is not between everydayness and authenticity, but between *inauthenticity* and *authenticity*. Inauthenticity is perhaps best seen as the self-satisfaction of everydayness. One might indeed prefer authenticity to inauthenticity but it is not for all that an ethical concept, but an ontological one. As such, of course, it might well be essential for any ethics to take account of it. Authenticity makes no concrete prescriptions, nor is it (as Hegel said of Kant's ethics) merely a *formal* notion. Rather it is an *existential* notion, one to be understood as a certain *way* of Being, a certain ontological self-relatedness, in which one relates to oneself as the kind of Being one is. Although one rarely gets a hint of it
(Heidegger's discussion of poetic creativity at the end of The Origin of the Work of Art might be a case in point) a certain universality and anonymity is built into the whole discussion. To be oneself (rather than losing oneself) is to have achieved a rather difficult form of self-understanding, and to direct oneself in that light.

It would be easy to conclude, especially before having read him, that authenticity was for Heidegger what Absolute self-knowledge was for Hegel (and for Spirit). Negatively they agree that what is at issue is a non-object-like kind of 'wholeness', and that the resulting whole presupposes rather than 'destroys' the level(s) through which it must pass for its realization. (A discussion of the intermediation of Kierkegaard, though a risky move to control, might be thought to seal the matter.)

Does not Hegel insist that man must accept 'determinate Being' or have his light fade away without making any mark? Does not Hegel's account of the struggle to the death in the section in the Phenomenology of Spirit on "Lordship and Bondage" give the same or a similar status to death as Heidegger? (He who lives in the possibility of his own death (non-existence) wins?) Do they not both share an affection for Hölderlin's tender mortality? These are all interesting and important issues. And certainly Heidegger's words did not fall from heaven (any more than Hegel's). But we can at best use any prior understanding of Hegel's problem and solution as a handrail to reassure us that what is at issue is not entirely new. Moreover it is some help to consider the importance for Hegel of the appropriation of the Other, the reduction of the Other to the same. It is the point of the dialectic to offer a method and a justification for this. And it is for that reason that both Nietzsche and Heidegger have little good to say about dialectical
thinking. What we can ask, however, is whether this motif—of the appropriation of the Other (what is different) into a final whole is not still at work in Heidegger. And it is with this question in mind that we shall open up, in a more detailed textual manner, Heidegger's discussion of authenticity.

Before Heidegger can address the particularly temporal nature of Dasein's authentic Being-a-whole, there is a preliminary step in the exposition which we must first go through. The need for this step rests on a sense of the limited nature of what Heidegger has, up to now, managed to show. It is Heidegger's methodological scrupulousness, one might say, that reveals itself here, even if we shall have occasion to cast certain doubts on the precise moves he makes.

For what he claims he has shown so far, in discussing 'the ontological possibility of an existentiell Being-towards-death which is authentic', is 'the possibility of Dasein's having an authentic potentiality for Being-as-a-whole'. But, he adds, in a way that stresses this as a limitation, 'only as an ontological possibility'. (H266). In other words, we lack any assurance that it is a real 'existentiell' possibility for Dasein rather than 'a fantastical exaction'. Heidegger believes we need to uncover an experiential attestation of the possibilities of authenticity, and, interestingly, and without apparent justification, sees this as evidenced by Dasein's demanding authenticity for itself. What Heidegger has in mind is a treatment of conscience.

His treatment in II.2 might be thought somewhat marginal to our concern—the investigation of his understanding of time. But if, as we believe, that understanding is at least in part (eg. in his discussion of Being-towards-death) part of the project of trying to
answer the question of how we can have a grasp of Dasein as a whole, then it will be as well to take a serious if brief look at II.2, in which he takes one further step in attempting to attain this. As we have said, Heidegger's interest here is in a phenomenological attestation of the possibility of authenticity—in conscience. A mark of the limitation of his treatment in this chapter is apparent in the final paragraph (section 60) 37 pages later, where he writes that

'... as an authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, the authentic Being-toward-death which we have deduced existentially still remain a purely existential project for which Dasein's attestation is missing. Only when such attestation has been found will our investigation suffice to exhibit (as its problematic requires) an authentic 'potentiality' for Being-a-whole, existentially confirmed and clarified—a potentiality which belongs to Dasein.' (H301)

The discussion of conscience, and resoluteness contributes to the question of authenticity but not insofar as it relates to death. So in a sense, II.2 represents a pause in the temporalization of the problematic of Dasein that is the distinctive feature of Division II. Its appearance here confirms our suggestion that Heidegger's treatment of time must be understood as subservient to the wider problematic of grasping Dasein's wholeness (which itself is directed towards the 'question of Being'). All this is both to place our discussion of II.2, as well as to justify a certain brevity in our treatment of it.

Our central contention will be that this chapter does not resolve our question about whether Heidegger is ultimately committed to an appropriation of the Other. It makes it clear that he cannot be said to be committed to this in any simple way, but it leaves open the question of whether he can, at some deeper level. We shall focus on the question of 'what' conscience can be said to disclose, and in
particular, whether Heidegger successfully disposes of the suggestion that its function is (merely) ontical.

**The disclosure of conscience**

The importance of conscience for Heidegger can be explained very simply. Lost in the 'they' Dasein already possesses, but is not explicitly aware of, an authentic potentiality-for-Being-itself. Indeed as this 'lostness' prescribes a self (the 'they' self), criteria of significance, a level of discourse, etc., it is easy to suppose that there was 'no way out' of it. What is needed is an experience by which inauthentic Dasein can be drawn out of its complacency. And this is provided by the 'call of conscience'. This calls Dasein to 'its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self'.

Heidegger insists we take the greatest care over this phenomenon. In particular he wants to stress the difference between a disclosive experience and something merely present-at-hand. Conscience, as befits a fundamental experience of Dasein, is such a disclosive experience, and any attempt to understand it in the ordinary way distorts this.

At this point Heidegger's language gets rather strong

'The demand that an 'inductive empirical proof' should be given for the 'factuality' of conscience and for the legitimacy of its 'voice', rests upon an ontological perversion of the phenomenon. This perversion, however, is one that is shared by every 'superior' criticism in which conscience is taken as something just occurring from time to time rather than as a 'universally established and ascertainable fact'. Among such proofs and counter-proofs, the fact of conscience cannot present itself at all. This is no lack in it, but merely a sign by which we can recognize it as ontologically of a different kind from what is environmentally present at hand.' (H269)

The language is strong, but it betrays, we believe, an important weakness in Heidegger's position. And our discussion of this weakness will be
one of three critical moves we shall make in preparation for a more detailed probing of Heidegger's analysis of conscience.

Heidegger's argument here begins by making its case on the easiest ground (against the demand for an 'inductive empirical proof') and then generalizes the argument to 'every "superior" criticism'. There is not much of an argument offered here, but surely it is an argument, and a thoroughly weak one at that. It rests, at its most elementary, on the claim that no inductive procedures can demonstrate the 'legitimacy' of its 'voice'. Mere facts cannot determine 'essential' truths, and certainly not evaluative ones. But even if we accept this, nothing shows that all 'superior' criticism (which may attempt to understand 'conscience', from within, say, some theoretical framework), is equally inadequate. Heidegger's contrast between what is present-at-hand and what is 'ontologically of a different kind' is surely question-begging. And so too is his reference to the 'Fact' of conscience (our emphasis). These remarks aim at seducing us into supposing that there is one correct ontological understanding of conscience, by castigating in a broad-brush way attempts that fail to meet that standard. What it suggests is that there is no room for argument about the meaning of conscience, and that, surely, is unacceptable.

This same imperiousness had emerged, unfortunately, only on the previous page:

'That the very 'fact' of conscience has been disputed, that its function as a higher court for Dasein's existence has been variously assessed, and that 'what conscience says' has been interpreted in manifold ways, all this might only mislead us into dismissing this phenomenon if the very 'doubtfulness' of this Fact - or of the way in which it has been interpreted - did not prove that here a primordial phenomenon of Dasein lies before us.
This argument is a stronger version (in force, but not in validity) of the one he used to justify our continuing interest in the question of Being, despite the wrangling over whether it is a serious question. But does it really work? It is quite true, and important, that disagreements about the status of conscience are quite compatible with it being a primordial phenomenon (but equally one that only seems important from time to time for certain extrinsic reasons). And it is true that if one had established on independent grounds the primordiality of conscience, then one might well come to treat alternative accounts symptomatically (eg., as attempting to cover up what it was unacceptable to believe). But it is, surely, quite unjustified to suppose that disagreement about the status of something proves it is 'a primordial phenomenon'. It only shows that its status is contentious. And if, indeed, the issue at stake was whether it was or was not primordial, it would surely be a perversion of reason to conclude that it must therefore be primordial.

The third difficulty with Heidegger's account, one which becomes apparent in the very first section of this chapter (654), is this. Conscience is on the agenda because it offers a way out of the self-enclosure of Dasein's 'lostness in the "they"'; it is supposed to attest in an 'existentiell' way to the possibility of Dasein's 'authenticity'. But in Heidegger's analysis

'conscience will be taken as something which we have in advance theoretically, and it will be investigated in a purely existential manner, with fundamental ontology as our aim'. (H269)

This suggests that our understanding of conscience will not be confined to the individual. Dasein's experience of it, but will engage in an
analysis of the meaning of that experience. But this would not show how it was that conscience actually does succeed in letting lost Dasein rediscover itself. For everyday Dasein is familiar with the 'voice of conscience' and has its own everyday interpretation of it. Heidegger's account would be quite unsatisfactory if he had to say that whatever the everyday account of conscience was, the authentic story was different, because that would give conscience no radically disclosive power at the existentiell level, where it is needed.

From these difficulties we extract two questions for the critical guidance of our discussion of Heidegger's treatment of conscience:

(1) might we not allow the importance of a phenomenological treatment of conscience while arriving at conclusions different from Heidegger's?

(2) does Heidegger adequately clarify the way in which the voice of conscience can actually appeal to everyday Dasein? Let us follow through, selectively, some of Heidegger's presentation here.

Everyday Dasein is disclosed to itself 'understandingly' in terms of the world in which it is involved. This is a public world, dominated by the public interpretations of the 'they'. In being attuned to these, Dasein loses touch with itself. In listening to 'they', Dasein no longer hears itself. Into this situation, the call of conscience serves to break or interrupt this listening that listens-away (hinhören). Heidegger describes this call as one that not only redirects our hearing, restoring a lost possibility, but also one that does so 'unambiguously', leaving no foothold for curiosity', and with these qualities, it is radically distinct from ordinary world-directed 'listening'. This claim, as we shall shortly see, is soon repeated, and elaborated.

How, we might ask, can the call of conscience make an impact on
the they-self, which is essentially and by definition blind to such possibilities? Heidegger's answer is two-fold. First, that the disclosedness of Dasein's world is always accompanied by some sort of self-disclosedness. Dasein always has some self-understanding, even if it is 'the they-self of concernful Being-with-others'. Secondly, Heidegger claims, the call of conscience appeals not to this they-self, as a whole, but only to the Self itself.

'(The they-self) ... gets passed over in this appeal; this is something of which the call to the Self takes not the slightest cognizance. And because only the Self of the they-self gets appealed to and brought to bear, the 'they' collapses.' (H 273)

He further suggests that in being passed over, the 'they'(-self) is also affected (- almost as if snubbed?) - and 'the Self ... gets brought to itself by the call'.

Now it has to be said that this account is almost magical in its absence of any kind of explanatory model. The ease with which the self is detached, when appealed to in this way, from its public involvement, is startling. Heidegger is quick to remind us that we are not dealing here with any kind of world-less ego, but with a Self that is still essentially (though in a different way) Being-in-the-world. What the call in each case discloses is Dasein's 'ownmost possibilities'.

As we have already mentioned, Heidegger claims this happens without there being any ambiguity. This claim is expanded and underpinned by the distinction he draws between the content and the direction of the call. Thought of as having a content, the call might arouse a kind of inner dialogue, but the call essentially tells us nothing, it just points to (summons us to) a possibility of Dasein's Being. (Understanding the call is an ontological not an ontic affair.) Heidegger strongly
dismisses the possibility that the call of conscience might properly induce a reflexive self-scrutiny. (Such possibilities are discussed in fact in Ø37, on Ambiguity, and have a place only in everyday Dasein.) Can nothing go wrong with the call?

Heidegger does make two important claims at this point, though without giving them much emphasis.

(1) '... what the call discloses is unequivocal, even though it may undergo a different interpretation in the individual Dasein in accordance with its own possibilities of understanding.'

(2) 'When 'delusions' arise in the conscience they do so ... only because the call gets heard in such a way that instead of becoming authentic understanding, it gets drawn by the they-self into a soliloquy in which causes get pleaded, and it becomes perverted in its tendency to disclose.' (H274)

The first claim is I take it simple. The call discloses in each case an ownmost-potentiality-for-Being, but we each give that content in a different way. Allowing that disclosure and interpretation can be kept distinct, we can let this claim rest. But the second claim is surely not so easily dealt with. The call of conscience does not always succeed. The problem is that the case in which it does not succeed is precisely the one that one would suppose was standard and predictable. The 'they-self' interprets the call in its own terms — as it does everything else. This, for Heidegger, is a perversion of conscience's disclosive possibilities. But if we think back to what we called his magical account of a successful call of conscience, we find no explanation of why and how it succeeds on some occasions and fails on others. It is not that the call is inadequate, he claims. The explanation must lie in the way it is heard.

The Idealization of Conscience
Suppose we ask why the call succeeds here and fails there. Heidegger can say no more than he has said. But an explanation can be offered—that we are not in fact dealing with a disclosive event which may or may not succeed, but that we are dealing with, on the one hand, an 'ideal' possibility (which may nonetheless, or perhaps thereby, never be actualized) and on the other, the ordinary messier types of self-understanding to which the call of conscience can be assimilated. How then could we understand the authentic self-disclosure supposedly wrought by conscience? It would be the elimination, the expulsion of all that would sully the purity of a silent and wordless grasp of one's authentic Being-as-a-whole. When Heidegger was describing the interruption of Dasein's 'listening-away', he says that '(this) possibility ... lies in its being appealed to without mediation' (our emphasis). If we were right, Heidegger would be presenting as a real possibility what is in fact an ideal accomplishment of reflexive thought, one, to be sure, that responds to a genuine demand, as we shall see.

A brief parallel to Husserl is again justified. The innocent reader of, say, Husserl's Ideas comes away with the impression that bracketting-out, epoché, putting to one side one's everyday and theoretical views of the world, is an operation it is possible to carry out at a certain time, by taking extreme care. Three problems (at least) arise. First, it is far from clear what 'attitude' one is in (the natural attitude? the 'reduced' or 'transcendental' attitude?) when one performs this. Second, it is unclear how within the complacency of the natural attitude the motivation to transcend it can arise. And third, the time and thought needed to spell out what the reduction involves (not just its
consequences, which might indeed be complex, even supposing it were a simple act) makes it hard to see how the reduction could be any sort of simple operation. There is surely an instructive parallel to be drawn with Heidegger's account of the power of the call of conscience to effect an unambiguous, unmediated, separation of the 'they' from the 'Self'. Clearly the fact that the call of conscience is said to come from 'beyond' (though it turns out that this 'beyond' is none other than the authentic self as understood by the they-self) is meant to explain how the cosy complacency of everyday Dasein can be interrupted. And as we have said (though it falls short of an explanation) Heidegger will soon talk of the demand for a conscience, which supplies the motivation. But the parallel with the problematic status of the epoché for Husserl is the most instructive. Husserl came to see, I believe, what Merleau-Ponty made quite explicit (see his Preface to The Phenomenology of Perception) - that the reduction was not a one-off operation, but something to be repeated indefinitely. One is misled, perhaps, by a spatialized topology (eg. entering 'the sphere of the transcendental reduction') to suppose that one can, in these matters, actually be in one place rather than another. Is this not just as plausible in Heidegger's case? For it is clear, I would claim, that the various forms of self-understanding that Heidegger carefully distinguishes from what is disclosed by the call of conscience are quite as common, if not far more so. They, in their wealth of diversity, include various modes of self-objectification, self-interpretation, self-scrutiny, self-criticism; they are all, indeed, 'mediated', by models, by theories, by values, by language. If we suppose that what is so unsatisfactory about these modes of self-interpretation is precisely the
same as what is unsatisfactory about 'signs' — that we are led from one sign to another, without end — then we might come to think that what Heidegger has done for 'the call of conscience' is to have cleared a site for its appearance as a mode of self-interpretation that precedes all signs, and radically excludes them. On this reading, the name of this desire would be metaphysics, the metaphysics of presence. Clearly the possibility of such a reading was ruled out by the methodological remarks with which Heidegger begins this chapter, but as we showed, they did not in fact justify any particular determination of the experience of conscience. In any pursuit of this critical reading we would clearly have to offer some account of the experience other than the one Heidegger provides.

It may be that we have launched prematurely into a critical discourse. On the one hand the scope of our remarks is such as would disturb the whole of Heidegger's discussion of authenticity, and indeed the very 'question of Being' that illuminates this book. On the other hand, there are so many responses that Heidegger could make, or that we could make on his behalf, that we will seem perhaps to be doing him an injustice by not pursuing them at this very instant. There are, however, further important things to be said about his particular discussion of conscience.

Further Remarks on Conscience

We note only in passing that Heidegger's discussion of conscience as a call has in common with his later discussion of 'es gibt' \textsuperscript{11} that he operates a kind of transcendental abstraction from a transactional term. In particular, while the call seems to come from beyond, there is in fact no caller distinct from Dasein itself; nor is there any real
voice, nor are words actually used, nor is it a question of 'anything like a comment'. The parallel here to what Husserl calls 'solitary mental life' in the Logical Investigations is most striking. It turns out that the caller, like the called, is none other than Dasein itself - not any external power. (H278) Again the 'caller' is not to be understood or identified in everyday terms. Rather it is Dasein 'in its uncanniness'.

The 'call', as we have said, is stripped of its literal everyday linguistic significance. Now it is stripped of any suggestion that it requires a relation to another being. Heidegger is offering an interpretation of the call of 'conscience' that, at first glance, we might call 'internalized', but of course Dasein is not, for him, 'internal' at all. The question of whether Heidegger effects some sort of metaphysical closure of Dasein's Being will ultimately hinge on how we assess his alternative to a conversation in inwardness. His secret, of course, is that he can work a dialogue, or at least a relation between two aspects of Dasein's Being - as care, Dasein's existence (projective of possibilities) and Dasein's facticity (thrownness). This is what is going on in his otherwise somewhat odd discussion of Guilt and being Guilty, the significance of which is brought out in his discussion of what we might call Dasein's existential self-grounding. The call of conscience leads to the recognition of our 'Guilt', but this guilt is no ordinary matter that we could have avoided, or could make amends for. It is a primordial condition of Dasein that results, as I understand it, from Dasein's facticity - from his 'thrownness'. And the basic move that Heidegger makes here is that Dasein's Being has its basis in the fact that, as thrown, it has no ordinary basis, but rather exists in its projection of possibilities. Heidegger's position here can be seen, dialectically,
as a denial both of anything like an ego cogito, and of a theological location of the ground of my Being 'outside' me, in another power. Kierkegaard's discussion of Despair and the Self is on precisely these same lines, but concludes that man cannot be his own ground. 14

To talk about Dasein's primordial guilt, to say that it is this which the call of conscience finally reveals, is, as I understand it, to talk of the constitutive negativity or nullity of Dasein. It is as difficult as it is important to pin down a precise sense to this Being-guilty, but I would suggest the following senses, at least, should be included: (1) Dasein is characteristically 'lost' in the 'they'. In this sense it exists as a falling short of its true possibilities. This is one sense of negativity. (2) Dasein always has itself to be - it is as projected towards the future. This is nullity in a positive sense (eg. Dasein is not an already established substance, but this should not dismay us). (3) Dasein does not choose to be, nor that it one day will not be. (4) If Dasein always understands itself in terms of its possibilities, then every action - every actualization of itself - will rule out other possibilities, and that particular cases of this may result in remorse is based on this more primordial necessity to choose, and so to exclude.

It has to be said that Heidegger's discussion here presents the greatest difficulties of assessment, not just of comprehension. In particular, Heidegger clearly cannot be accused of offering an ontological fundament in the sense of some full and self-subsistent ground. Guilt is a primordial ineliminable negativity in Dasein, and, as with so many of the existential phenomena Heidegger deals with, would seem both to prevent any simplistic (eg. ontic) sense of Dasein's Being a whole, and to make even more radically difficult the construction of
another sense.

We suggested earlier that Heidegger's analyses of conscience might perhaps be understood as accounts of an ideal possibility, one that had eliminated all those features (such as ambiguity, sign ...) which would threaten its purity. Such a clarity of self-understanding would be thoroughly desirable, and it is surely no accident that Heidegger's account of what it is to understand the appeal should lead to the idea of 'wanting to have a conscience'. Not unexpectedly, Heidegger immediately tells us not to think of this wanting in any voluntaristic sense, but rather as a sort of 'preparedness for' or being 'ready for' the appeal. This is, of course, a very common theological notion. But it is not easy, in Heidegger's own terms, to pin it down. What would it be for the 'they-self' to be ready for the appeal? And what would it be for Dasein's authentic self to be so ready? Indeed, if the authentic self were dissatisfied with its lostness in the 'they', why would it need the call of conscience to effect a break? Is it not quite as plausible that the desire, the wanting, might be the metaphysical desire on the part of the philosopher for an idealization that would satisfy the requirements of not being subject to the doubts, ambiguities, and uncertainties of the sign? It is worth noting that this desire would, beyond all doubt, be distinct from anything psychological, and would have no less 'primordiality'.

Heidegger's response would surely be that, apart from anything else, this interpretation would surely have to conveniently ignore that the features of conscience that he has stressed are disclosed in experience. They are not an invention of the philosopher. There are two responses to this: (1) that disclosures are always subject to interpretation, which is not without its risks. Certainly Heidegger is
no friend of self-evidence. And we might take his question at the end of §58 as something more than a rhetorical one. ('Is, then, the phenomenon of conscience, as it 'actually' is, still recognizable at all in the Interpretation we have given?') (2) That the question of the status of our experience of conscience (and/or of Heidegger's interpretation of it) cannot be settled without an account of its temporality. It is strange that this question has been deferred, but it is clearly important. A single example will suffice. Conscience reveals Dasein's authentic Being-for-self 'unambiguously'. But if doubts subsequently arise, this unambiguousness becomes subject to scrutiny. For Heidegger, it might be said, the very thoroughness of the penetration of the conscience of 'authenticity' with Angst, uncanniness, wish, etc. allows him to relegate doubts, uncertainty, and even criticism to the inauthentic, as a kind of second rate anxiety. Critical questions about 'authenticity' itself are then symptomatic of a basic misunderstanding. But this would be sheer intellectual hubris.

The question of the temporality of conscience, of course, keeps us close to Heidegger's own line of questioning - the concept of resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) is an obvious advance here, and we shall turn to it shortly. But we shall first briefly discuss the alternative to Heidegger's account of conscience that we mentioned at the beginning - that of conscience as critique, and Heidegger's dismissal of this.

Conscience as critique

Heidegger's (§59) discussion of conscience as critique, to us the most plausible account, is set within a broader discussion of a distinction between the existential and the vulgar (everyday) understanding. The suggestion that conscience has a critical function is one of four
alternative possibilities he deals with, the one he mentions first but deals with last, and this itself may suggest he takes it most seriously. His general argument in this section is that these vulgar interpretations all have their place, but are all ultimately derivative from the more fundamental account he has given. We shall question this, focusing on 'conscience as critique'. Heidegger argues

(1) that understanding conscience as critique presupposes that the call is related in each case 'to some guilt-charged deed which has been factically willed' (H293).

(2) that this (perfectly genuine) experience (that conscience relates to particular deeds etc.) does not permit it (conscience) to 'proclaim' itself fully (293).

However, neither of these two claims is satisfactory. The first fails by overstatement, and the second simply begs the question of what it is for conscience to proclaim itself 'fully', and seems disinclined to assist such a process.

Let us expand on these points. Heidegger does not explain what he means by conscience as critique, so let us offer a brief characterization - to understand conscience as critique is to see it as a withdrawal, a standing-back, a detachment from some particular involvement, or some mode of one's involvement in the world, one in which one asks oneself whether one wants to continue with that involvement or act otherwise, and one in which what is at stake is whether one can fully avow that involvement. Let us now look at Heidegger's argument. (1) The 'critical' element is found in the combination of detachment with questioning. Now clearly we need not be concerned with a 'guilt-charged' deed, nor even a 'deed' at all, nor one that has been 'willed'. These are all possible, but one may equally be concerned
with 'where one is at' ('am I not wasting my life as a writer ...?'), without any prejudgement of guilt, without reference to a particular deed, and without a particular act of willing. (2) In the light of this we could argue that conceived of as narrowly as Heidegger does, this relationship of conscience to particular deeds, may not fully bring out the meaning of conscience. But it is, as I have suggested, open to us to conceive of it less narrowly.

The essential difference between our way of thinking of conscience as critique, and Heidegger's understanding of conscience as disclosing our authentic potentiality-for-Being, centres, as Heidegger seems to realize, around whether and in what sense conscience reveals anything 'positive', and/or whether its disclosive power must be thought of negatively. Heidegger admits the value (albeit limited) of the critical account when he says'... one can indeed point to nothing which the voice 'positively' recommends and imposes'. However, to rest content with this 'nothing' is not sufficient. For it is understood in relation to 'assured possibilities of 'taking action' which are available and calculable'. It may tell us nothing of that sort, but that is because it takes it out of 'things', and confronts us with our existence. This latter is not just a 'negative' affair.

Surely, however, this trivializes the critical interpretation of conscience. Even the 'everyday' experience of conscience is more than a mere not this, and not that. When it leads one to ask 'what should I do?' it is already more than negative criticism. But are we not just expanding the sense of critique until it becomes identical with Heidegger's account of the disclosive power of conscience? If Heidegger insists on the unambiguity, the direct, unmediated nature of the call of conscience, then this cannot be what we are doing. But suppose he were to say that
he has never denied the confusion that may result from the call, only that its direction is clear (the direction/content distinction again)? If we allow ourselves, as Heidegger does, to include within a phenomenon those features which appear when it is 'fully disclosed', then our response would be that the question 'what should I do?' is not a question that is asked by and addressed to an authentic self, but, precisely, leaves unresolved the question of whether there is such a self, whether/how it can be distinguished from the everyday self, and so on. Clearly the idea that I may have authentic possibilities, possibilities which are most my own, is one that, for all its radicality to a world-absorbed 'they-self', is also reassuring, for it precisely allows the possibility of a direction distinct from a content.

Further evidence of the divergence between Heidegger's position and our own - though not entirely unproblematic evidence - is to be found in his account of Dasein's authentic existence as resoluteness (Entschlossenheit), which while embracing 'anxiety' nonetheless seems to involve an overcoming of the ambiguity, the doubt etc. that we have earlier pointed to. Resoluteness is characterised in many ways. It is the name for one's authentic liberation from the 'they'. And yet it is essentially in-the-world, not some 'free-floating "I"'. It involves a kind of decisiveness about one's mode of Being. But it is essential that one understands this aright. Resoluteness not only makes choices, but resolves in the sense of focussing, the potentialities for Dasein's Being. Heidegger captures it as 'the disclosive projection of a determination of what is factically possible at the time'. Hegel has written that we truly exist only if we are prepared to be finite and not while away our time contemplating possibilities. And resoluteness surely captures this thought. Resoluteness is also meant to carry with it
that sense of finitude found in the idiom of 'guilt' and 'conscience' that we have already come across.

Clearly this is an important beginning to an answer to our question about the temporality of conscience. It will be taken up again very shortly in our discussion of authenticity proper. Before that, we must make just one small point, which will again probe the relation of ambiguity, indecision etc. to authenticity. Heidegger writes rather interestingly:

'\textit{To resoluteness, the indefiniteness characteristic of every potentiality for Being into which Dasein has been factically thrown, is something that necessarily belongs. Only in a resolution is resoluteness sure of itself. The existentiell indefiniteness of resolution never makes itself definite except in a resolution; yet it has, all the same its existential definiteness}' (H298)

As I understand this, Heidegger is saying that it is precisely our existentiell (pre-analytic) \textit{indefiniteness} that resoluteness \textit{resolves}. Does this not, again, suggest that resoluteness is brought in to satisfy a desire? Indefiniteness is \textit{unsatisfying}. Does it contribute to a temporal understanding of conscience? Surely not. The meaning of resoluteness is simply that what conscience disclosed must be made good, ultimately in relation to the future. But all the problems about the idealization of what 'conscience' discloses arise again for 'resoluteness'. What can it possibly mean to have one's own most possibility of Being (completely?) disclosed? Such doubts, Heidegger would say, are just the symptoms of the \textit{they}'s failure to understand (see eg. H296). But that is mere assertion.

\textbf{Anticipatory resoluteness and temporality}

We have suggested, without offering much proof, that the concept of resoluteness reinscribes, without itself \textit{resolving} the problems we
discerned in Heidegger's earlier description of what it is that conscience discloses. That points, (we suggested) in the direction of a vital task - the temporalization of our understanding of conscience. Our reasons for insisting on this temporalization are not however the same as Heidegger's, as we shall now see. For Heidegger, conscience points in an unambiguous direction - towards my authentic potentiality for Being. We see this formula as the expression of a desire that such a possibility be available, a desire which can be explained without any consideration of its possible satisfaction. And it is, one would suggest, characteristic of such desires that their character (of being a desire) is revealed in the course of time, when the exhilaration of the moment fades and the need to give body to such a vision reasserts itself. Resoluteness would bring to conscience a certain constancy (as we shall shortly see) and determination which would allow such a grasp of one's authenticity for Being to be retained. But it would be a mistake to think of this constancy as occurring within time. Rather it effects a certain transformed understanding of time itself.

Heidegger has already taken the first step towards such a transformed understanding in his discussion of Being-towards-death, where death was seen as something to be anticipated as the possibility of one's non-existence, rather than, as expected (Erwarten) as an event some time in the future. Clearly anticipation (Vorlaufen) is a mode of temporalization that builds in an understanding of Dasein's finitude - that one of its possibilities is not-to-be at all. So Heidegger suggests that we understand resoluteness more fully if we understand it as involving 'anticipation' in this sense, and that it is as 'anticipatory resoluteness' that 'temporality gets experienced in a phenomenally primordial way in Dasein's authentic Being-a-whole'. And here is announced the
pivot of the whole book, and of our interest in it.

'The primordial phenomenon of temporality will be held secure by demonstrating that if we have regard for the possible totality, unity, and development of these fundamental structures of Dasein which we have hitherto exhibited, these structures are all to be conceived as at bottom 'temporal' and as modes of the temporalization of temporality' (H304)

It is the pivot of the book not only because it explains the need for a temporal rewriting of the earlier more structural description, a rewriting on which the book turns, but also because it articulates the degree to which time as temporality does not merely penetrate Dasein's existence, but is also fatefully bound up with it. The question that will continue to guide our reading of Heidegger here is whether there is not room for disagreement with Heidegger about the interpretation of time and temporality even while accepting, indeed gratefully accepting, his demonstration of the need for illuminating it via an existential analytic.

Constancy

The existential account is all very well, but Heidegger insists, to ensure that anticipatory resoluteness not be construed as a mere abstract conjunction of ideas, that it be borne out existentially. Heidegger rightly stresses the methodological importance of this move. We have already suggested that he may not always be quite as successful in articulating the two levels as we would like.

We shall pursue this question at the point where Heidegger himself endeavours to explain its importance (062) and we shall focus on the issue of constancy. Heidegger has already helpfully explained how the concept of care transforms our understanding of the self. No longer can we think of it as a kind of self-subsisting substance that endures. It will be just this undermining of the idea of the self as a fixed
point, and time as a secondary modification that will be reflected in such formulations as 'temporality temporalizes' - for the subject 'is' itself temporal. We shall shortly pursue this in more detail.

What the self-as-substance did however achieve, was a sense of permanence and constancy, not surprisingly, because time was 'external' to it. With the concept of resoluteness, Heidegger attempts to re-establish the value at least of constancy. He must do so, it would seem, for the effect of 'the call of conscience' to be more than a 'pin-prick'.

This desire to maintain constantly a strong sense of that potentiality for Being disclosed by conscience is, we have said, a philosopher's desire. (We also suggested that Heidegger needs to but fails to retain a clear grasp of the distinction between the existentiell and the existential level of analysis of conscience.) Here we find proof that such retentive constancy concerns him as a philosopher.

'The Interpretation of the ontological meaning of care must be performed on the basis of envisaging phenomenologically in a full and constant manner Dasein's existential constitution as we have exhibited it up till now' (H303)

(and compare '... the unwavering discipline of the existential way of putting the question' (H323)) It is perhaps worth commenting (briefly on how he does this.

It can be said without criticism that Heidegger's style at times exhibits a very considerable density. This density is a rough and ready name for the way he tries to maintain a constant vision of 'Dasein's existential constitution'. There are of course many other aspects of his style, as we show later. But here we shall just mention those that contribute to this density: condensation, compounding, repetition and reworking. They are the consequence of adopting a method which
circles ever deeper, rather than proceeds through a series of easily stateable logical steps using a taken-for-granted language.

Condensation: without the handle of 'care' by which to refer to 'existentiality', 'facticity' and 'falling', the text would be largely unreadable.

Compounding: consider the work of preserving and displaying theoretical insight accomplished by all the articulated expressions (such as Indieweltsein/Being-in-the-world) and by such expressions as anticipatory resoluteness. These are vital ways of expanding the units of discourse, and so increasing what can be thought in one go.

Repetition and reworking: Being and Time is itself built on a reworking/rewriting principle in the movement from division I to division II. Heidegger's methodological scrupulousness means a great deal of repetition of material as similar points are made in different terms, or from slightly different perspectives. One of the key patterns of continuity, which is also a reworking, and which maintains the past is the very common move of offering one account as a mere filling out, clarification of, deepening of a previous one. Everything gets reworked, but more primordially. As we have said all this is mandated by and also required for his hermeneutic method of investigation.

How does Heidegger elucidate the existentiell dimension of anticipatory resoluteness which, he rightly says is essential methodologically, to avoid the charge that he is engaging in 'mere' theorizing. The existentiell dimension is necessary for the existential analytic, and it concerns all those modes of existence in which, while there is understanding, (self-)disclosure, etc. the philosophical implications of these are not, as such, being drawn out. But if the existential requires the existentiell, the existentiell, to appear as such, has to
be displayed, and section 061 involves a series of ways of displaying at an existentiell level, the various ways in which resoluteness involves in an intimate way anticipation, with death as the ultimate horizon.

The complexity of the relationship between existential/existentiell is enormous. Heidegger's method is one which gives the existential level a certain autonomy at the level of thought, but which insists on the need to ground any results of that thought on the existentiell level. Thus resoluteness is said to have to 'take over' Dasein's 'guilt' and this is only achieved when Being-guilty is seen not as some act-related state, but as a constant condition. This constancy itself has to be understood in relation to Dasein's potentiality for Being 'right-to-its-end'. This is as far as the existentiell account goes. But we know, existentielly, that this 'right-to-its-end' has to be understood as a towards relation, and ultimately as 'anticipation of death'.

This result of existential analysis must then be validated existentielly and that is what the section (061) is all about. And it is here that the question about constancy is raised. Heidegger wants to affirm the idea of constancy, but translate it from its connection with things present-at-hand, into a sense appropriate to Dasein.

And that sense is surely this: Dasein, understood in terms of its Being, is only in terms of its potentiality-for-Being, that is, its Being is to be able to be in various ways. And one of the vital dimensions on which we can assess its Being is that of the degree to which Dasein has taken on board, appropriated, these truths. The constancy that attaches to one's 'Being-guilty' is thus not the constancy of a state of an object, but of an existential condition of a Being whose Being is essentially bound up with its potentiality for Being.
Is it then still possible to ask the question (or has it already been answered) of the precise temporality of this Being-as-potentiality-for-Being?\textsuperscript{17}

It is sometimes easy to feel that Heidegger's basic move is a reversal. Kant's reversal was to say that if we are in time, time was first in us. Heidegger on the other hand thinks through, and deepens the metaphor of containment, and any reversal would have to be reformulated. Death, for example, is 'for-us', before it is anything 'in-itself'. But this 'for-us' is to be understood not as a reference to 'subjectivity' but to Dasein's Being. And Heidegger's discussion of resoluteness turns out to be a discussion of the modalities of our appropriation of our Being-towards-death. What is difficult to accept — and it is equally difficult to decide the status of that difficulty is that questions about the continuity, constancy and perpetuation of a certain potentiality-for-Being can be answered without resort to ordinary temporal categories. Resoluteness as 'anticipatory' emphasizes the sense of its Being-towards-death, towards the ultimate possibility. But ordinary questions about how to understand the temporal status of resoluteness (eg. as an act of resolution, as a momentary insight, as, once achieved, a permanent level of Being ...) surely remain. Heidegger's strategy seems to be (a) to defer these kinds of questions to a later discussion of the temporality of everydayness (b) to suggest a priority of potentiality-(for-Being) over actuality that would undermine any attempt to give weight to these 'ordinary questions'.

In this light, let us consider certain of Heidegger's formulations in this section. First, it is clear that 'resoluteness' cannot be thought of within the temporality of an act. He writes 'By "resoluteness" we mean "letting oneself be called forth to one's ownmost Being-guilty"'. This
'letting-be' signals the refusal of act-psychology. What is this Being-guilty? A 'potentiality-for-Being'? And how can it be constantly guilty?

It is

'... not just an abiding property of something constantly present-at-hand but the existentiell possibility of being authentically or inauthentically guilty. In every case, the 'guilty' is only in the current factical potentiality-for-Being.' (H304)

In so far as Dasein is understood as a potentiality-for-Being, it has no 'is' independently of this potentiality for Being. Authentic and inauthentic existence are modalities of the 'is' dependent on whether the full understanding of this potentiality-for-Being has been appropriated. (Anticipatory) resoluteness seems to be the name for that appropriation.

But again what of its own temporality? Heidegger writes

'The explicit appropriation of what has been disclosed or discovered is Being-certain'

'The primordial truth of existence demands an equi-primordial Being-certain, in which one maintains oneself free for the possibility of taking it back' (H305)

Heidegger is trying to describe a certain resoluteness with regard to a situation which maintains the possibility of determining the situation differently, without lapsing into an indeterminate or irresolute indecisiveness. His solution is a kind of redoubled resoluteness.

'... this holding-for-true, as a resolute holding-one-self-free for taking back, is authentic resoluteness which resolves to keep repeating itself'. (H308)

It is this resolution to repeat that seems to bear the weight of the notion of constancy. But can it possibly succeed? There would seem to be two immediate difficulties. The first is that any problems attached to resolving would apply equally to resolving to resolve. The second is that unless the idea of resolving builds in its own success, it is
surely open to all the vagaries of time - bad memory, the dimming of vision, falling back into inauthenticity etc. And the only way it could guarantee its own success would be by referring to an act of disclosure, which would be judged in terms of its luminosity, etc. rather than its being sustained through time. And surely no reference to potentiality-for-Being is going to improve matters. A concept like constancy involves an achievement in time, and cannot be reformulated in terms of anticipation, possibility, or potentiality for Being, without losing that sense. The desire for constancy can of course be so reformulated, but that is a different story.

These doubts are, perhaps, ill-conceived. Are we not falling-back to an understanding of anticipation etc. which treats them as psychological acts, albeit of a privileged sort? Surely anticipatory resoluteness is neither an act, nor a momentary state, but a certain mode of Being continually revealed in one's thoughts, behaviour, etc. or one revealed whenever it would be relevantly brought into play. That formulation, however, merely throws back to us the question of the basis of this continuity. It cannot be habit, for that would reduce Dasein to being the subject of properties like some sort of present-at-hand thing. It must surely be something like a power of ontological disclosure which can both open up the widest horizon (and deepest dimension) for the appreciation of and determination of the situations one finds oneself in, and can also see that this is directly applicable to all situations whether or not one does so apply it. This second clause is fundamentally only a weaker version of the redoubled resoluteness that we looked at above. It too leaves unanswered the question of how one moves - existentially or existentielly - from revealing experiences (beginning with and developing from the call
of conscience) to a life-permeating transformation. We claim that Heidegger can only multiply the levels and complexity of anticipation and desire. In the case of death, anticipation is not (from this point of view) problematic. For death, as the limit, as a positive negation, is a single thing. But the anticipatory transformation of the rest of my life, the projection of the decisiveness of anticipatory resoluteness onto the series of events which will trace my future, cannot be based on the supposition that the appropriation of death be distributed in dilute form, as it were, over every future event.

By making this contrast we have left intact the suggestion that the anticipation of death is both possible and legitimate and that it is a proper modalization of resoluteness. It is clearly vital to discuss this briefly for failure to understand these matters can lead to what Heidegger calls 'the grossest perversions'. Chief among these is the suggestion that anticipatory resoluteness is an attempt to escape death, to 'overcome' death.

The Appropriation of Death?

I take it the remark of Heidegger most vulnerable to such an interpretation is the one we quoted above and repeat here

"When in anticipation, resoluteness has caught up (eingehelt) the possibility of death into its potentiality-for-Being, Dasein's authentic existence can no longer be outstripped (Überholt) by anything" (H307)

The importance of the misreading that Heidegger sees as the grossest perversion is that it raises again the question of whether Heidegger is not (and if so whether he is right to) taking for granted the ideas of unity, identity and wholeness, of a life, and (merely) giving an existential underpinning (perhaps the only possible one) to that whole-
ness. We have already pointed out the importance of this for Heidegger. Without Dasein's Being-a-whole, he cannot make the move from an existential analysis of Dasein's Being to more general illumination of the question of Being. But a requirement of method cannot dictate what must be the case in any absolute sense. We say this not to begin to reject Heidegger's understanding of death, simply to say it is possible to deny it with no other immediate consequence than that Heidegger's own wider project would, in his own view be broken-backed. Heidegger's view seems to be based on the idea that a complete understanding of Dasein's Being requires an understanding of Dasein's Being-a-whole, attested in an existentiell manner. With such attestation there is no possibility that the 'wholeness' one obtained would be a mere theoretical picture. In this light, is Heidegger right to deny the charge of trying of 'overcome' death?

As we have suggested already, Heidegger seems to perform a certain inversion on death. When he first introduces the question he insists that death is 'not to be outstripped'. Now he says that with the anticipation of death, it is Dasein's authentic existence that 'can no longer be outstripped by anything'. It might seem as though authentic existence has displaced death in this way. But the sentence clearly suggests that it is by virtue of having incorporated death (as possibility) that authentic existence has this status, not by contrast with it. Is there not, nonetheless, a sense in which by anticipation the fear, even terror of death has been muted? And is not that an 'over-coming'? We must listen to the text more carefully.

(1) 'Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the 'overcoming' ("Überwinden") of death ....' (H310)

(2) '... it is rather that understanding which follows the call of conscience and which frees for death the
possibility of acquiring power over Dasein's existence, and of basically dispersing all fugitive self-concealments'. (H310)

(1) Heidegger somewhat loads the question. The words 'fabricated for' suggest he might think his intellectual honour was at stake. It could still be that some sort of escape was the functional consequence of the concept of anticipatory resoluteness even if there was no fugitive intention. It is quite correct to say that at the level of everydayness, anticipatory resoluteness offers no escape from death, in the way that, say, the elixir of youth might, if regularly imbibed. But in that quite literal sense, nor does the promise of life after death, where that life is spiritual rather than material. However Heidegger's point would be that this religious solution does deny that the event of physical death is a true end, and this finality Heidegger does accept.

The crucial issue in assessing Heidegger's position is whether there is not a sense in which grasping the possibility of anticipating death rather than merely expecting it as an event, is not to transform one's understanding, and perhaps dispel one's fear of death. For on Heidegger's reading the fact that death, from one point of view, may come at an inconvenient time - too soon, too late - peacefully or painfully, is unimportant when compared to the question of whether one's existence when alive is illuminated by the possibility of one's death. Clearly if by 'overcoming' ('überwinden') were meant either the denial of death or the lifting of its burden, then anticipatory resoluteness does not 'overcome' or escape death. But it is nonetheless the case that anticipatory resoluteness is an appropriation of death, such that its primary significance is no longer that of something absurd, something radically external, something which radically subverts the human endeavour - which is surely Sartre's position. Sartre takes Heidegger to task for
just this. The question however is how we understand the entity to which death has been appropriated - whether the appropriation of death completes a process of ontological closure, or whether it demonstrates as powerfully as anything could, the impossibility of such a closure.

(2) The second half of the sentence we quoted makes clear how it is meant to achieve the latter. For it portrays death not as something safely internalised within some enlarged concept of existence, but as itself holding sway over Dasein's existence (as the possibility of the 'impossibility' of that existence). If 'overcoming' death means a kind of cosy tranquilization then Heidegger surely does not do this. And when one reflects on the matter, the fact that Heidegger certainly does direct our attention from the mere event of our biological demise is both thoroughly justified, and in no way a lessening of our concern with death. Heidegger transforms our understanding of death, but the new shape it takes is no less powerful.

We said we would consider both the possibility and legitimacy of Heidegger's account of the 'anticipation' of death. We have extended Heidegger's own defence against the charge that this is a form of escape in a way which makes some contribution to the question of its legitimacy. (Though even so it only denies one basis for its legitimacy.) But of course the question of its possibility is not thereby decided. Something could be legitimate were it possible, but not in fact possible. We have already questioned the mode of achievability of anticipatory resoluteness and it would perhaps be worth extending this.

The comments that follow carry a risk of misunderstanding Heidegger to the extent of arguing what is his own position against him. The reader must judge.
Anticipatory resoluteness is a condensation of an account of how the recognition of one's finitude can effect an intensification of existence. That account is presented through a range of concepts - conscience, guilt, the call, anxiety, the 'they', for which Heidegger gives existentiell foundations and to which he applies existential clarification. Insofar as anticipatory resoluteness is a condensation of such an elaborate account it will possess all the strengths and weaknesses of the terms involved, and their articulation. The problem is surely that while one can give existentiell illustrations of these concepts, it is quite another matter to demonstrate their necessity or completeness. That is simply a formal point. More concretely, it might be suggested (a) that the English (or modern) reader's difficulties with the idea of Dasein's fundamental Being-guilty are not merely difficulties stemming from an inauthentic refusal of the thought, but from a deep suspicion of its (theological) roots in a particular tradition. (b) that even if in every case Heidegger will perform a shift of sense on the terms he employs (so that 'conscience' cannot be identified with the result of wrong-doing, for example, the 'the call' is neither audible, nor in words, nor from anyone else) it is surely still the case that what he discusses is a deeper sense of these particular everyday words in the German language. What else could he do? it might be retorted. The point however is not to suggest an alternative, but to feel one's way to discovering the limits of his thought. What if anticipatory resoluteness was unthinkable in some other natural language? (The philosophical privilege of the German language is hardly an acceptable position.) But quite apart from these gestures to radical cultural diversity there are surely other difficulties with anticipatory resoluteness, which centre on whether the disclosive orientation it captures is in any way
prescribed by our finitude, even when understood as our ultimate potentiality-for-Being. Heidegger, I would argue, follows Hegel in giving determinateness a privileged value for finite beings. In Entschlossenheit one focusses, one determines, one resolves. For Hegel, the alternative was to waste away in dreams and fantasies. For Heidegger, the alternative is being lost in 'the they'. It would of course be a separate project to compare the two thinkers on this matter, but they surely share a basic assumption, which is that the proper response to finitude is commitment — albeit retractable — rather than a mere wavering in indecisiveness. But finitude could equally teach a positive indecisiveness in which the failure to come to a decision would be no mere wavering, but eg. a deep suspicion of the frame of reference in which the demand for a decision is posed. It might be said that the very concept of Entschlossenheit rests on just this rejection of an everyday either/or. And yet it still echoes the ordinary sense of decisiveness, resoluteness, at the same time as it insists on the radical distinctness of the authentic and the everyday levels. In such a distinctness, ambiguity is necessarily, methodologically, denied. (Indeed, such ambiguity was earlier (§37) diagnosed as itself a form of everydayness.)

Consider what Heidegger says about wanting-to-have-a-conscience '...it brings one without illusions into the resoluteness of 'taking action'" (H310). Now Heidegger is at this point denying that anticipatory resoluteness is an unworldly attitude, so the reference to 'taking action' should be set into this context; action is not being stressed, it is simply the focus of his remark.

But what sort of actions are being recommended? Surely taking a stand, telling the truth, honouring one's commitments etc. are the
models here. And yet the suggestion that once one has cleared away the 'incidents' of one's everyday existence, freed oneself from illusions, these authentic possibilities of honest straightforwardness will remain, is surely itself illusory. Built into the whole idea of anticipatory resoluteness is a denial of ineliminable ambiguity, faith in a space of purity... Heidegger's position rests on a radical incompatibility between resoluteness and illusion. But what if illusion was in principle not separable from truth? Indeed why does not Heidegger stress, as he does elsewhere with other forms of disclosure, that it is accompanied by a necessary concealment?

The notion of anticipatory resoluteness may not have a moral connotation to it, but it is hard to deny a certain seriousness of tone. I will endeavour to bring this out by some comments on Heidegger's dismissive remarks about skiers. 22

Heidegger on Skiing

Heidegger here takes as his model the peasant who silently puffs on his pipe and is in tune with his world. He contrasts this humble, honest belonging to the shallow pleasure seeking of the skiers who drive up from the city. It will be left to Sartre, who almost certainly did not read this piece of Heidegger's, to give an existential interpretation of skiing; Heidegger's thought seems wholly negative. What is characteristic of the peasant's world? The regular beat of the changing seasons, the repetition of simple pleasures, a life in which little changes .... And the skier's? Our response to Heidegger would be this: First he knows what the peasant may not - that the peasant's world is not the only one. The visitor to the Provinces may, of course learn nothing about himself, but the peasant can not even begin the journey. And
what of the skiing itself? It is an elaborate act of pleasure, one which shows no return. For the peasant this would be wasteful. What use has the peasant for the brightly coloured ski costumes, the waxed fibreglass skis? And why do the skiers just go up and down? The peasant can see no point in this Sisyphean activity. And think of the skiers conception of time. For the peasant every day, in its season, is much like the rest, a sequence of reassurances. He is a creature of tradition, repeating what he has seen done by his elders. The skier is different. His element is speed, technique, control, risk, a play on the edge between gripping the snow and falling, perhaps suffering injury or even death. For Heidegger the skier makes the world of the peasant into a spectacle. But this reduction of the skier and his world is itself the consequence of reducing the skier to a spectacle.

How do these doubts of ours relate to anticipatory resoluteness? If we allow that skiing for pleasure has bound up with it risk, excitement, and a taking pleasure in playing at the very limit of control, we might suggest that this is an alternative way of appreciating finitude in the project of the intensification of the present. It is one in which the future is anticipated, but always in the form of danger, unlike the present, for whom the main danger is to become lost in the illusions of the city. For the skier the question of his Being-a-whole is not posed. What matters is whether he can cross a certain slope, execute a certain turn at a certain speed, gracefully, skillfully, in control. In an important sense, the whole problem of 'ownmostness' and authenticity dissolves, and not in passive pleasure, but in active boundary play.
We have taken seriously Heidegger's dismissal of the skiers because it can be seen as a symptomatic refusal to contemplate a radically different mode of Being-towards-death, a refusal which undercuts the necessity which Heidegger gives to his analysis. However, the idea of anticipatory resoluteness remains, and even if it represents a questionable ideal of authenticity, it does provide us with something enormously important, perhaps the answer to our complaint about the unresolved question of its temporality. For when Heidegger discusses its relation to care, and the temporal foundations of care, he provides us with something of a model for understanding, at least one important possibility of existential temporality - a complex articulation underlying the structure of care ("ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (a world) as Being-alongside entities encountered within-the-world") - and its role as the basis of 'projection'. And it is his development of the idea of 'temporality' from the structure of care that we shall now pursue.

Care and Temporality

One can see at a glance that 'care' has a tripartite structure to which past, present and future can easily be made to correspond. It is hard to imagine that this consequence did not influence Heidegger's original characterization of care! But the relationship between the three parts has to be shown to be other than a simple juxtaposition. And to this end, Heidegger links authentic care with anticipatory resoluteness and elaborates the multiple projective overlapping of modes of temporality that are involved in anticipatory resoluteness. In this multiple projectivity, temporality itself is disclosed.

As is true of the whole of chapter 3, the section 065 in which this is carried out bears repeated reading, and it is hard to do it
brief justice. We shall simply illustrate and comment on certain of Heidegger's formulations to show how anticipatory resoluteness is deemed capable of effecting this temporal condensation and intensification, and hence, how temporality itself appears.

We can set the scene by noting the primacy of the future for Heidegger. This devolves from the primacy of Being towards death, and from the kinds of existential moves required to give sense to Dasein having a relationship to its own wholeness. The future is conceived of not as a reservoir of new 'nows' but rather as what makes possible 'the coming in which Dasein in its ownmost potentiality for Being, comes towards itself'.

But how, then, do the other temporal ecstases come in? Heidegger argues (H325-7) first that Dasein's futurity and pastness are intimately connected, and that ultimately the future has priority. He does so beginning from his understanding of Dasein as Being-guilty, as 'being the thrown basis of nullity'. This sets a condition on any authentic anticipation (future oriented) that Dasein is first recognised as an 'I-as-having-been'. And at the same time, one's rootedness in the (absolute?) past of one's own nullity can only be existentially manifested in our relation to the future. ("Only so far as it is futural can Dasein be authentically as having-been").

Having a past is one thing, but for one's past to be part of one's being, one must first exist, projectively - that is towards the future. And yet anticipatory resoluteness situates itself, in situations, by 'making-present'. This 'present' he treats as what is released by the future as it becomes a future that 'has been'. And he uses these interlacings to define temporality.

'This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as "temporality" (Zeitlichkeit). ' (H326)
Heidegger will then proceed to spell out the temporal map underlying the structure of care in a way that is fairly obvious.

Let us now comment on temporality as Heidegger has just introduced it, for we are fast approaching crucial questions about the connection between time and Being. Heidegger rightly and at all costs wants to avoid any understanding of the articulated structure of time that would give to its discrete component some sort of independent status. But there are easier ways than the one Heidegger pursues to achieve this. We could (as Kant and Husserl did) simply talk about time as subjective. However Heidegger's critique of the 'subject' and 'subjectivity' precludes that option. For him, temporality emerges as an articulation of modes of Dasein's Being, itself thought in terms of the structure of care, and of the 'authentic' care he calls anticipatory resoluteness. So all the ontological delicacy which attaches to his discussion of Dasein's Being is equally applicable to his account of temporality.

When we apply temporal predicates to things, the question traditionally posed is whether to count the resulting 'objects' as real. Do future or past things possess Being? When they are applied to Dasein, they modify - in necessary and fundamental ways - its Being. They answer the question how. And the sign of this in Heidegger's formulations is the expressive 'as'. Dasein is an 'I-am-as-having-been', 'the future as coming towards', 'as-it-already-was', 'as authentically futural...' etc.

Heidegger has already discussed the 'as' structure explicitly; it appears as the structure of interpretation. In the as-structure interpretation lays out the meaning of its subject matter: 'the upon-which' of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible...
as something' (H151). This account suggests only one of the aspects of the 'as' which are important for understanding how Heidegger uses it in introducing temporality. Here the 'as' represents a dimension of explicit disclosure. But it does not merely function in interpretation. The as-structure is, as it were, part of the structure of Dasein's Being. Equally it locks temporality into the question of Being. Heidegger has attempted to displace the traditional problematic of the self as substance with the explication of the structure of care, with temporality as its fundamental structure. And problems that have always accompanied Heidegger's talking about Being and Nothing arise again for temporality. And Heidegger attempts the same formulation. 'Temporality' is so much not the name of an entity that it seems to Heidegger misleading even to allow it to function as the subject of a predicative 'is' let alone the 'is' of existence. He is happy only with the explicative verb form 'temporality temporizes (itself)' (Zeitlichkeit zeitigt) (H238) - to which 'das Nicht nichtet im selbst'²⁷ should be seen to correspond.

Heidegger's formulations here have important implications for our ultimate assessment of his success in having found, in temporality an adequate basis for his account of Dasein's Being, and equally, for our assessment of his account of temporality itself.

'Temporality', he writes, 'temporizes possible ways of itself. These make possible the multiplicity of Dasein's modes of Being and especially the basic possibility of authentic or inauthentic existence'. (H328). It is when he proceeds to a discussion of temporality as the 'ekstaticon' that the radicality of this really emerges.

Temporality as the 'ekstaticon'

In an important sense the whole of Heidegger's discussion so far
has been concerned to elaborate a non-metaphysical conception of temporality. But it is only too easy to say that by going existential one somehow transcends metaphysics. In the last few sections the precise way in which the investigation of Dasein will yield the required result has become clearer. His persistence in posing questions in terms of *Being* has more and more convincingly opened up the possibility of a thinking that does not centre itself on things, on substances, on the present-at-hand. With Heidegger's discussion of the *ecstases* of temporality, he accomplishes at one and the same time both a grounding of Dasein's *Being*, and a transformation of our understanding of time.

From our brief discussion of the 'as' of temporality, it would seem both to fill out, and yet in the end to constitute Dasein's *Being*. The relation of temporality to *Being* might be said to have something of the structure of *supplementarity* as Derrida describes it. Here, however, with Heidegger's discussion of the 'ecstases', the Derridean parallel is surely 'différance'. And Heidegger himself focusses on more of the little words: 'to', 'towards', 'alongside', 'being'... etc. with which the various modes of temporality are articulated. They each mark a primitive break in self-identity, for which Heidegger uses the Greek-derived word 'ecstasis'. In clearly Hegelian language, he describes temporality as 'the primordial 'outside-of-itself' and for itself'. And he continues: 'Temporality is not, prior to this, an entity which first emerges from itself; its essence is a process of temporalizing in the unity of the ecstases.'

In other words, primordial temporality is difference rather than identity. It is not something 'from which...' but the 'from which' itself. Heidegger calls it a process, and yet it is not one process among many. It is prior to all entities, and all entity-dependent
forms - such as 'events', and 'processes' ordinarily conceived. These 'ecstases' are fundamental modes of 'activity', and the need for such formulations as 'temporality temporalizes' becomes clearer. Temporality is only in its temporalizing. That is not just one of the things it does.

Heidegger's discussion of temporality, and its awkward and tautological syntax forms one of the strongest arguments for a continuity of project between Being and Time and his later writings, including Time and Being, where all these same difficulties re-emerge. (Ereignis is an 'event' but an extra-ordinary one; we cannot say simply that it 'is'.)30

One of the key consequences of this exposition of primordial time, is that it means that we can treat our ordinary understanding of time ('... a pure sequence of 'nows', without beginning and without end') as a 'levelling-off' of the ecstatical character of primordial temporality. And in particular it obscures (a) the primacy of the future 'ecstasy', and (b) the fact that primordial time is finite. These claims are interesting and important for different reasons - the first because it raises a rather interesting methodological problem. Heidegger later came to reject the primacy of the future.31 How is this possible?

When we referred to his claim that it is only as futural that Dasein can 'be authentically as having been', we were not in fact able to find any very convincing arguments for the dependence between the two being unidirectional. Dasein's finitude has a clear future flavour to it, but when thought of as the 'possibility of my impossibility' that flavour is somewhat dissipated. I am finite backwards too, after all. Dasein's projectivity, again, even if one thought to apply it primarily to the future, might equally well be said to depend crucially on my
thrownness, and on what in each case I bring to bear on the situation, out of the past.

But, more pointedly than these three ways of bringing a certain reasoned doubt into the 'primacy of the future' thesis, there is the methodological question – how could Heidegger have got it wrong? What scope is there for error in existential analysis? And if acknowledged here, where else might it reside unacknowledged? Paradoxical questions arise at this point: for Heidegger, interpretation rests on a fore-having, fore-conception etc. If we question their disclosive adequacy in this case we still seem to confirm the primacy of the future!

Disclosure-in-advance seems to be the condition on which the status of the future would be judged. If this circularity is not to be a defect, it must either be that this hermeneutic priority of the future is quite legitimately self-justifying, or that the priority of the future disclosed in advance is itself of a different order. And to explain how the priority of the future could be dropped, the same alternatives arise. It may be that the thought responsible for the fading of the future is that disclosure cannot be adequately thought on strictly temporal lines, and with the advent of time-space comes a falling away of the future. The horizontal features of spatiality displace the primacy of the future. If such speculation has any basis, it will run parallel to doubts about the possibility of a distinctly primordial time, and consideration of this topic must await our discussion of Time and Being.

The second claim – that primordial time is finite – is interesting for a different reason. On the one hand it undermines our confidence in the ordinary concept of time as infinite in both directions. (Heidegger argues that this infinite time is the product of a levelling-off of finite time). But on the other hand, there is an important sense
in which the two concepts of time are compossible, and have their own spheres of valid application. For Heidegger agrees that time goes on after my death. Infinite time and finite temporality are in a sense compossible because incomparable

'The question is not about everything that still can happen 'in a time that goes on', or about what kind of letting-come-towards-oneself we can encounter 'out of this time', but about how 'coming-towards-oneself' is, as such, to be primordially defined. Its finitude does not amount primarily to a stopping, but is characteristic of temporalization itself. The primordial and authentic future is the 'towards-oneself' (to oneself) ...' (H330)

In fact there is a tension between the claim that time and temporality are derived one from the other, and the claim that the two have their own legitimate domains. Heidegger is arguing uphill for the legitimacy of conceiving primordial time as finite, and in doing this he both wants to acknowledge that time appears endless, while insisting on a place for a temporality that is not. And a legitimate place for that temporality is ensured by arguing that infinite time requires it. His argument is basically that the ordinary understanding has not understood infinite time. And for this understanding we need to go to primordial temporality, for which the distinction between finite and infinite is significant. But, as the last but one sentence we quote above makes clear, finite and infinite are not really in opposition, because finite does not mean 'stopping'.

This both makes Heidegger's position easier to accept, and more difficult to understand. Consider the last sentence above, in which Heidegger jokingly alludes to Husserl's 'to the things themselves'. What this brings home to the reader is that the idea that for Heidegger existential time is just concerned with the humanly meaningful organization of time, is quite mistaken. This may be our loss. What he is committed
to, it seems, is a sense of time or temporality in which the guiding thread is the transformation into a temporal framework of the problem of selfhood — of self-gathering, returning to self, self-fulfillment...

The question this raises is whether there is room for, and whether Heidegger can himself provide room for, an understanding of human temporality which is neither harnessed to the question of self-hood, nor to the simplicities of 'the ordinary understanding of time'. If not, we may come to suspect that his guiding question, the question of Being, has functioned not only to illuminate, but also to limit. These questions must be pursued in relation to his discussion of Dasein's everydayness, historicality, and the phenomenon of within-timeliness. When Heidegger introduces these themes he sketches out the kinds of relationships he will establish between them. Both everydayness and the within-timeness of things will be seen to be dependent on primordial time and historicality will modify primordial temporality itself. Equally he points forward to yet another level of analysis 'in which the concept of Being is discussed in principle' that is not in fact provided, but only, again, suggested at the very end. (883).
II. Heidegger's Treatment of Time and Temporality: 
A Critical Analysis of Being and Time

CHAPTER THREE

Time and Temporality

Temporality and Everydayness

In a later chapter (see Part III, ch. 3) we discuss a variety of temporal structures, those that borrow their organization from the texture of language, some that mingle representation with experience, and others which may seem free of all representation. We argue that the understanding of time as structured in various explicit ways does not in itself reek of authenticity or inauthenticity. Heidegger does give everydayness both a derivative and yet a positive status. But will it supply the horizon of intelligibility for the outstanding issues to which we have alluded? or will it insist on reducing their pertinence to the problematic of everydayness? Our next task will be to assess the status Heidegger accords 'everydayness'. What is at issue is the precise way in which the sphere of everydayness is demarcated, and the insight it gives us, by contrast, into the values constitutive of authenticity.

We all have what might be called an everyday understanding of 'everydayness'. And to a large extent Heidegger relies on this, both in the sense that he himself does not make clear its precise meaning, and in the sense that it names a pre-philosophical or reflectively implicit mode of existence, but one which for all that can serve as a starting point.¹ His 'preparatory analysis of Dasein' relied on it, and so does much of what he wants to say about temporality. The chapter
he devotes to discussing its links with temporality (11.4) gives more content to it, but opens as many questions as it resolves about what it is. A number of claims can be made in a preliminary way. Everydayness is not the same thing as inauthenticity. The latter is something like the 'self-satisfaction' of the former, the belief in or assertion of its adequacy. Everydayness is a way of existing characterised by evasiveness, a reduction of existence to familiarity, the domination of a kind of shrunken horizon of complacency.

The very word 'everydayness' (Alltäglichkeit) suggests, correctly, a link with time (a link which would be lost if, for example, one thought to equate everydayness with common sense.) At the end of this chapter, and indeed the previous one, Heidegger anticipates his further discussion of this connection by pointing to the need to discuss Dasein's historicality, and his within-time-ness. But here the inner connection is best amplified by his account of daily life (071) as the breeding ground of existential complacency. Everydayness both has as its domain of application one's common, daily, repeated, unsurprising mode of existence and also derives from this repetition a certain limitation of vision. Dailiness constitutes a frame of reference by which possibilities are determined in advance, and in which the boredom and dullness this generates seek constant diversion. The concept of everydayness therefore already embodies an interpretation of time. In consequence the relation between everydayness and temporality with which Heidegger here deals is more intimate than one might imagine.²

Let us first chart the course of Heidegger's discussion of everydayness in this chapter. Everydayness is a mode of Dasein's Being-in-the-world, and as such exhibits a disclosedness distributed across the structural limbs of care. The temporality of everydayness can most economically be described by following the sequence they offer: understanding, state-of-
mind, falling, and discourse. With the exception of discourse, each will be claimed to exhibit the dominance of one particular ecstasy, in such a way that the tri-ecstatic structure of care and of temporality is confirmed.

Heidegger has also discussed our general Being-in-the-world in terms of our distinctive relation to things ready-to-hand and present-at-hand (Zuhanden, Vorhanden) and has argued for the derivativeness of the latter from the former. Insofar as these can be seen to exhibit a temporal dimension, he will try to show that any objectified or objectifying (eg, scientific, theoretical) understanding of things merely 'present' will be derivative from the time of our practical involvement in the world, that of 'circum-spective concern'. Here it becomes clear that everydayness, for all its deficiencies in relation to the possibility of authentic temporalizing that can develop out of it, is nonetheless the true, positive ground of our temporal being, and the presupposed basis of any representations of time. Heidegger's discussion of the temporality of the scientific neutral projection of beings as 'present' leads him to question yet further how that thematizing or objectifying is possible. His answer is that it rests on Dasein's transcendence. And this too has to be understood temporally. (The same claim (later withdrawn) will be made for Dasein's 'spatiality' too.) Dasein's transcendence, not distinct from that of the world, is accomplished by temporality in relation to the things we encounter. Temporality provides the ecstatic-horizonality of that encounter, articulating a dimension in much the same way as the syntactic articulation of language allows the transcendence of mere things ('present-at-hand') in the world. (Indeed intense and mood the temporal and linguistic modes of articulation co-incide).

Heidegger's discussion of the temporality of everydayness clearly demonstrates three things: (1) the immense resources of temporal signi-
ficance buried in the structure of our daily existence, (2) the possibility of understanding more theoretical and representational ways of thinking of time as founded on or derived from these resources, (3) a corollary to (1) the power of a temporal hermeneutic, by which we can come to understand the deeply layered significance of existence in temporal terms. This chapter alone is a strong argument for the claim that it is indeed structures of time that can give 'content' to the 'is' of human existence, that would otherwise have to be defined negatively (man is not a thing etc.). To say that man is a temporal Being does not immediately resolve the question of how to talk about his Being in a non-objectified way, but it does hold out the prospect of such an understanding. The problem of talking about Being and of talking about Time are the same problem, and the analysis of the temporal structures of Dasein's Being shows, in an exemplary and privileged way how this can be so.

Appreciation of the general aims and accomplishments of this chapter does not however absolve us of critical responsibility. And any departure from its precise conclusions will of course require that our appreciation be tempered by a critical appraisal. We begin by looking at his discussion of the temporality of disclosedness.

First, a brief word about disclosedness (Erschlossenheit), and its fundamental importance for Heidegger. It unites two vital features of Dasein's Being, as Heidegger presents it. On the one hand it captures the way Dasein is not a closed-off substance but is rather articulated in various dimensions of relatedness. We could call this disclosedness an essential articulation. At the same time, these dimensions of disclosure constitute the truth of Dasein, the modes of its openness, and are presupposed by any other sense of truth as propositional, representational etc. If disclosedness is fundamentally temporal, then this
essential outside-of-itself of Dasein will also have a fundamentally
temporal sense, and Heidegger will have accomplished, or taken vital
steps toward accomplishing, the task of substituting for any substantial
atemporal sense of self, a radically temporalised interpretation. The
systematic working-out of the temporality of disclosedness follows the
structure of care, as we have said, which will cover understanding, state-
of-mind, falling and discourse. We shall not attempt a survey, but try
(a) to draw out the analytical distinctions Heidegger makes; (b) to
comment on the interpretive achievement at a general level; (c) to
pose specific difficulties with particular analyses. These specific
difficulties will, we believe, add up to (and indeed are motivated by)
doubts about the drive to formal and systematic completeness that is
exemplified here, which is itself predicated on the persistence in this
work of foundationalist thought, undertaken in all seriousness. 3

Consider, first, that mode of disclosedness, that existentiale,
to which he gives the name understanding. This is not the name of a
cognitive achievement, as one might think, but a primitive condition
for a whole range of capacities. Abstractly and primitively, Heidegger
defines it as 'to be projecting towards a potentiality-for-Being for the
sake of which any Dasein exists!'. He goes on, 'In understanding, one's
own potentiality-for-Being is disclosed in such a way that one's Dasein
always knows understandingly what it is capable of' (H336). Those two
remarks point, respectively, to what might be called the temporal/structural
question and the ontological question. We shall deal with the former,
and in a way that should be seen, in part, as exemplary for the other
dimensions of care.
The Privilege of the Future

There are three main analytical claims: (1) that this projective understanding unifies, in its temporalizing, all three temporal ecstases. (2) That it nonetheless does this in such a way as to give the future a dominant role. (3) That each of these can occur in an authentic or inauthentic manner.

Suppose we use the expression 'ahead of itself' as a neutral term for Dasein's futurity. This can take the authentic form of anticipation, in which Dasein 'comes towards its ownmost potentiality for Being', or inauthentically, in which Dasein 'awaits this (potentiality for Being) concernfully in terms of that which yields or denies the object of its concern' (H337). Expectation of future events occurs within the horizon of awaiting. Again the crucial distinction between the authentic and inauthentic forms is that the inauthentic understands Dasein's potentiality for Being in terms of beings, and loses the distinctive sense of Dasein's Being.

We can portray the primacy of the future to understanding with reference to his discussion of the present. It too has an authentic and an inauthentic form. The inauthentic Present is called 'making present', a 'being-alongside the things with which one concerns oneself'. An example, one presumes, would be being engaged in an activity to which one was paying attention (listening to bird-song, writing carefully, neatly arranging the books ...). The authentic present, on the other hand, he describes as the 'moment of vision', and here the primacy of the future stands out more clearly. This 'moment of vision' actually occurs in the present, (and indeed what it discloses may not survive the passage of time) but more importantly it brings to light the possibilities latent in a situation, in a 'rapture which is held (ideally) in resoluteness.'
The moment of vision occurs in the present, but points to the future in its projection of possibilities.

Heidegger also distinguishes between forgetting and repetition of the past, but we shall pass over these for the moment.

The significance of the primacy of the future and this account of the authentic present should not be underestimated. For if Heidegger is right in supposing that the history of philosophy has been characterized by a metaphysical privileging of the present, and of presence, then we have here two different directions from which this privilege could be unseated. The primacy of the future suggests that no attempt to find some foundation, or ground, or privileged point in present experience, intuition, &c. will succeed, because the meaning and value of what that 'present' reveals will always be subject to a reference to the future. But secondly, Heidegger's distinction between an inauthentic and an authentic present is such as to correct any remaining interpretation of the present as a 'now'. For the now-present belongs to the specific mode of temporality known as within-time-ness (see below). And the moment of vision, both because it is an ecstatic rapture, and because it is subject to the future, '... in principle cannot be clarified in terms of the 'now'. ' (H338). The privilege of the present can never be the same again.

Ambiguities of Authenticity

In mentioning the authentic/inauthentic distinction we have already broached what we called the ontological question. Let us now spell it out. Heidegger distinguishes knowledge of facts from understanding one's potentiality-for-Being. He writes, as we have seen,

'In understanding, one's own potentiality-for-Being is disclosed in such a way that one's Dasein always knows
understandingly what it is capable of. It 'knows' this, however, not by having discovered some fact, but by maintaining itself in an existentiell possibility." (H336)

But this formulation is surely problematic. We have suggested above that Heidegger's account of the structure of existence is an attempt to give voice to, make sense of its distinctive 'is', (and thence to that of Being in general). There are two ways, however, in which this could be achieved. (1) The distinctiveness of the existential 'is' would be seen in each of the elements of the temporal structure so distinguished. (2) It would appear in the unity of that structure. Heidegger has made so much of the unified structure of care, and of the triadic unity of every mode of temporalizing that we might think he had opted for the second alternative. But surely the remarks above show that the problem of the 'is' is merely dispersed among the different existentials. The assertion that gives us trouble is this: 'Dasein always knows understandingly what it is capable of'. And our difficulties with this go deep into the heart of the idea of authenticity. Heidegger seems to us not just to be treading a very narrow line, but from time to time to be falling off it onto the wrong side. Authenticity is a way of being, and as such to give it content is both a temptation and a danger. The temptation is one that language keeps offering us - to say something about it. The danger is that what one says will be radically misleading. Does not Heidegger run this risk with this remark? What can it be to always know what one is capable of? Heidegger's gloss is that Dasein 'maintain(s) itself in an existentiell possibility'. But surely this language, and indeed the whole problematic of authenticity betrays its own phenomenological ground - which is that of the problem of (one's own) Being, of a sense of not being wholly identifiable with one's everydayness, of having to define one's Being without guidance, in the midst of anxiety etc. Authenticity, then, is surely closer to a not knowing, a self-questioning, a desire to know oneself for which
there is no guarantee of satisfaction. One tendency of Heidegger's thought is surely such as to convert this self-questioning into a prescription of a positive existential possibility. Such a conversion would suggest that the problematic of authenticity was, after all, in the service of a re-establishing of the self at a higher level, rather than the continual re-affirmation of its epistemological fragility.

These doubts could be summarised as the suggestion that Heidegger may have transformed a negative phenomenon into a positive one. But the same point could be formulated somewhat differently. Heidegger, it might be said has made a condition of possibility into a discrete phenomenon. Could this not be claimed for his general account of disclosedness, and perhaps even of his descriptions of the temporal ecstases? Take understanding, again, as an example. If we exclude from understanding, as we are meant to, any sense of projection that would involve either factual knowledge or prediction or planning, surely we have nothing left that could ever be entirely separated from newly conceived modes of worldly involvement? These may indeed be so conceived as to embody a certain self-understanding or to exclude another inadequate one, but the idea of a knowledge of one's 'potentiality-for-Being' that was not either a negative revulsion at a particularly anonymous or unchosen mode of involvement, or a new commitment with the new 'content' this would involve, is surely a fiction.

Heidegger's discussion of the temporality of disclosedness is not, of course, confined to understanding and we must indicate somewhat more succinctly, the kind of specific things he has to say about state-of-mind, falling and discourse. The question we ask is what does this temporalising re-run add to our understanding of these existentials?
Are There Dominant Ecstases?

In the case of the temporality of state-of-mind – mood – the most striking claim is not that temporal predicates are essentially (and illuminatingly) attached, but that there is again a dominant ecstasy, and that it is the past. Heidegger takes as exemplary the cases of fear and anxiety. Contrary to the common-sense view that fear is primarily oriented to the future, he argues that it rests on a clinging to what one has (or is) already, in the face of some disturbing possibility. After all, he says, we could be faced by something threatening without feeling fear. What one already is must, as such, be threatened. Now there is real merit in this demonstration that the future is not alone in determining the temporality of fear, but surely his argument for the priority of the past is unsatisfactory. For it could, symmetrically, be said that one’s sense of what one already is (such that it might be threatened) could actually emerge only at the point of being threatened. Might it not be fear that crystallizes the ‘already’? And certainly without the threatening future, one might just be complacently absorbed in the past and present. If the threatening future is so clearly what distinguishes fear from a sense of security, how could one fail to credit the future, yet again, with the privilege? A similar point could be made for anxiety. And Heidegger’s interpretive efforts on other moods seem to us to fare no better.

We would like to make two comments on this whole question of a privileged ecstasy.

(1) Even when less than totally plausible, the interpretive effort involved is not wholly unfruitful. It provokes a searching scrutiny of the less obvious temporal dimensions involved, for example. And it enables the claimed unity of temporalizing in each case to take an ordered
form. For instance, he claims that '... anxiety ... must ... come back as something future which comes towards (zukünftiges) (H343)'. The 'as' and the 'which' rest upon the determination of the 'come back' as the focus for modification. Might the need for diagnosing a dominant ecstasy in each case be a grammatical one?

(2) The particular case of 'mood' requires a comment similar in spirit to our doubts about the positive presentation of Dasein's 'potentiality for Being'. And again it is a doubt that would accentuate a particular side of our double reading of Heidegger. Moods are understood from the outset as 'bringing us back to something' (H340), and in explaining how hope, which seems primarily futural, really is not, he talks of it as 'hoping for something for oneself' (H345) (an 'already' self!). In each case, the philosophical value of moods is that, far from being mere emotional clouds on the clear sky of the intellect, they reveal us to ourselves in our thrownness. Now this thrownness, literally understood clearly involves a reference to the past, but more abstractly, if what it means is the 'that it is' of Dasein, then it is not specifically the past that is privileged. Moreover it can seem gratuitous to bring in one's self and one's 'having been' self in particular, (a) as if there were not moods in which the self is not entirely left behind, or marginalized, and (b) as if we could not eg. hope for others' happiness (which would mean that that one does not always 'hope for something for oneself'.

The claim we are making, broadly speaking, is that Heidegger's discussion of the temporality of mood, while correctly eschewing any reduction of mood to twinges and tweaks, or to mere emotional disturbances, seems nonetheless to understand them as disclosive of a possibility of authentic selfhood. This seems to us to rest on a dubious privileging of the past in this case, and a challengeable optimism about giving a
positive characterisation of what anxiety discloses. Even more succinctly, Heidegger is using temporality in the restoration of a sense of human self-identity, one which we would prefer to leave an open question.

It might be said in reply that it is anxiety above all else which puts in question all our worldly attachments, all our commitments, and any worldly sense of selfhood. Anxiety is just the opposite of complacency ... etc. This reading would make Heidegger into the hero of non-identity, of fragmentation. A double reading is required, however, because of the ease with which what anxiety discloses is named and pressed into service.

Heidegger's discussion of disclosedness makes a further contribution to a re-evaluation of the status of the present both in his discussion of the temporality of falling and of discourse. The temporal significance of falling (which can only have an inauthentic form) lies in the way it represents an entanglement, eg. in mere curiosity, in the affairs of the present. Discourse, however, is somewhat more interesting.

It has always been clear that 'discourse' was different in type from the trio we have just dealt with (understanding, state-of-mind, and falling). They by themselves disclose the 'there' of Dasein, and it is this that discourse then articulates. Linguistic articulation is only a possibility for discourse, and as such it does not have a primary ecstasis of temporalization. However, in its familiar form of spoken and written language, he claims, discourse is typically dominated by 'making-present', addressing itself to the significant world about us. Heidegger makes this claim very briefly largely because much has already been said about discourse in Division 1 (034). But in all its innocence it is actually a very important claim. For it takes a very clear position in debates about the respective privileges of reference, meaning, and play in language, one which would seem to give circumstantial application (here
and now reference) the privilege. And yet it is not difficult to argue that reference is only possible if language is constituted by a structure (or play) or differences, or differential functions which do not themselves carry any primitive referential power. It is only on such a position, it has been suggested, that it is possible to take account of that literature and those literary effects that break with referentiality. This is perhaps too large an issue to be explored here, but it is not without relevance to his next move.

The Intrinsic Temporality of Language

Anticipating the position we ourselves offer in a later chapter Heidegger offers a further very condensed discussion of the intrinsic temporality of language. He distinguishes (a) the fact that discourse can discuss time, temporal processes etc., (b) that it takes place in time, (c) that it is temporal 'in itself'. And it is of course this last which is the most revealing, and is itself revealed in the fact of 'tense' and 'aspect'. Tense and aspect in discourse themselves require a grounding 'in the ecstatical unity of temporality'. The time of language, in other words, is derivative from the time of existence.

Now this is a crucial claim. It means that the reason for the inadequacy of ordinary temporal concepts for understanding the time of language is much clearer. It further means that existential problems that take an explicitly linguistic form (eg. how to rescue the 'is' from the status of a mere copula) can be more appropriately dealt with. It is also crucial in that it might conceal a more complex relation between the temporality of disclosure and existence than it suggests. We discuss this in greater detail below.

We will take this opportunity simply to lay down some questions.
Would the dependence of the temporality of discourse on that of existence survive a radical interrogation of the foundationalist model implicit here? If we come to doubt that 'in any discourse one is talking about entities' \((H349)\) would we not have released discourse at least from being informed (and constrained) by a particular rhetorical mode? If the link between discourse and existence is retained, what would be the effect on our understanding of the temporality of existence if our understanding of the temporality of discourse were, on independent grounds, to change? The possibility of some of these questions bearing fruit should be assessed in the light of our persistently critical approach to a whole succession of Heidegger's formulations. The claim will be made that Derrida's writing supplies the theoretical justification for just such an attempt at a transvaluation of the relationship between discourse and existence. And most importantly, it does so without compromising Heidegger's claim that ordinary concepts of time are inadequate to comprehend either. As we indicated at the outset, Derrida will claim that the concept of time itself is circumscribed by metaphysical motifs, a claim we shall dispute.

We have made a number of critical claims in the course of our appreciative discussion of the temporality of disclosedness. We have voiced our doubts about the possibility of giving a positive significance to authenticity, and suggested, in the specific case of understanding, that it might better be understood negatively, or as a condition of possibility. We have expressed reservations about Heidegger's claim that each of these modes of disclosedness has a dominant ecstasy. And we have suggested that Heidegger's account of temporality for all its revolutionary impact is still subservient to the problematic of selfhood, and the project of restoring a sense to the self. But we also promised a general comment on this section.
Heidegger has been engaging in what we have called a hermeneutic of temporality. And notwithstanding all of our doubts, there is no doubting the success with which he has demonstrated that the most fundamental phenomena of human existence (or at least those he has chosen to focus on) are susceptible to, and are greatly illuminated by being rethought in temporal terms. Of course the possibility of doing this rests heavily on the way he has transformed our ability to articulate the temporal dimensions of existence in the form of iterable modifying phrases, thus supplying what we have elsewhere called a 'virtual temporality' for every apparently simple position, orientation, projection etc. And we do not mean to patronize when we say that it is Heidegger's example, quite as much as the particular results he arrives at, that is so enormously compelling. We criticized as unconvincing, for example, his account of fear, which as a state-of-mind is meant to be based on Dasein's having-been (rather than, as is popularly held, on the future). But whatever the truth of the matter, the temporal multidimensionality of fear is incontestable and Heidegger has made the search for such dimensions into an intellectual habit (in the best sense).

The Time of the World

It might however be argued that the temporality Heidegger has displayed is limited to Dasein in its self-understanding, or to a 'subjective perspective', or at least that the existential dimension is being considered very much from the point of view of Dasein, and with little reference to the world. And interesting as this might be, the place of time cannot be so limited. Surely Heidegger needs to offer some sort of account of what we think of as the time of the world? In Heidegger's view such an account is only now possible: the temporality of
'concern' (our involvement with the ready-to-hand) can only be understood on the basis of (in the language of) the more general temporality of disclosedness already developed. And if his earlier analysis is correct, that the present-at-hand is derivative from the ready-to-hand, it is only now that we can pose the question of the temporality of the present-at-hand, of the theoretical attitude, and of the transcendence of/by the world that makes it possible. In short, Heidegger believes he can follow through, in a logical sequence, the derivation structure of temporality - the theoretical being based on the practical, the practical on the disclosedness of the 'there' in general, and the theoretical also presupposing the possibility of transcendence, which possibility is itself to be understood temporally. In following this through we shall complete our discussion of Heidegger's account of the temporality of everydayness.

Central to Heidegger's being able to open up this new dimension of temporal reflection is his original conception of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. And for Heidegger, it is the ready-to-hand that is primitive here. His general argument for its fundamental temporality goes like this: we relate to things with which we are concerned not singly, but within a framework, which he calls 'the equipmental totality'. And that relation is one in which we projectively disclose (= understand) the involvement of one item of equipment (a typewriter) in an equipmental context. Heidegger uses the expression 'letting be (involved)' which will emerge later and more prominently in such essays as 'Gelassenheit'. Even here there is as much importance in the word 'be' as in the 'letting'. What is at issue is the constitution of the specifically ready-to-hand mode of Being.

Now if we are dealing with a case of understanding, we know from our previous analysis of the temporality of disclosedness that its
structure is fundamentally temporal. His way of showing this is to insist that the relation of involvement (which he dubs a 'towards-which') between an individual item and that context of use in which it is located, is one which, as an example of projective (i.e. pre-thematic) understanding, must itself be understood not as an 'analytic relationship but as a dynamic, or better, temporal one. And the two-way relationship (between part and whole) is characterised by the terms awaiting and retaining.

'The awaiting of what it is involved in, and ... the retaining of that which is thus involved, make possible in its ecstatical unity the specifically manipulative way in which equipment is made present' (H353)

and

'... (this) making-present ... makes possible the characteristic absorption of concern in its equipmental world' (H354)

In almost Husserlian language, Heidegger insists on the debt of the present to past and future projectivity.

At another level, one which necessarily compromises the authenticity of such a mode of involvement, the possibility of the kind of absorption and loss of reflection that goes with it requires 'a specific kind of forgetting'. And the interest of such a comment lies in the fact that it shows how - given the Heideggerean problematic of authenticity - the complexity of temporality is not confined to the possibilities of overlapping or modifying ecstatic projections, but that any one such complex can itself be the result of or made possible by, an essentially temporal move at another level - in this case, forgetting makes possible 'the unity of a retention which awaits' i.e. absorbed involvement.10

With this analysis of the temporality of involved concern, Heidegger can and does proceed to show how it allows him to make sense of those forms
of 'circumspective concern' with the ready-to-hand which arise when eg.
things break down, are damaged, go missing, surprise us, or in some
other way 'obtrude' from their inconspicuous context of use. Each of
these succumbs to, is illuminated by an analysis in terms of retaining/
awaiting. They take us an important step closer to the emergence of
the theoretical attitude (Ø69(b)). The important move Heidegger makes
here is to claim that the theoretical attitude is the result of 'change-
over' from that of practical manipulation. What is particularly in-
teresting is his denial that this 'changeover' is simply the result of
the suspension of the practical attitude. When that happens 'our concern
then diverts itself specifically into a 'just-looking-around'.

There is surely little doubt that it is Husserl and his account of
the suspension of the natural attitude that he has in mind here. Heidegger
argues in fact that the active circumspection (eg. checking equipment)
often born from our suspension of practical activity, is again, not theory.

However, it is his contention that the theoretical (scientific)
vision is derivative from the circumspection that can arise out of practical
involvement. Such circumspection, based on Dasein's basic care structure,
takes as its object the world of equipment, and although it involves a
break with unreflective involvement, also 'brings the ready-to-hand closer
to Dasein' by interpreting it within if-then frameworks of utility.

There follows an account of what Heidegger calls 'the genesis of
theoretical behaviour', one which is supposed to demonstrate the temporality
underlying this behaviour, and, if the title of the section is to be
believed, of the transition itself. Heidegger's line of thought seems
to involve the filling in of various steps, and the implications of these
steps, from practical involvement to theoretical detachment. Circumspection,
for example, is a making-present which brings to light the if-then structure
of Dasein's deliberation. But what is thereby linked together in if-then relations must already have been understood as this or that. And understanding something as something, in which the future and having-been are drawn into the present, provides circumspective understanding with a temporal foundation.

Now, although it is far from clear in his exposition, I take it that Heidegger is saying that 'understanding-as' is the closest we get, on the side of the ready-to-hand, to a radically new mode of relating to the world as present-at-hand, between which two there is a 'new way of seeing', one which marks the gap between the hammer being heavy and the hammer possessing weight as one of its properties.

This particular move, even in the elaborate version Heidegger gives us, is surely disappointing. We may in some sense have been prepared for it, but it seems to be more descriptive than explanatory, and, moreover, to little involve anything significantly temporal. It is important then to realize, as Heidegger insists, that even if it is possible to have the ready-to-hand as such, the 'object' of a science (eg. economics), the fully scientific approach involves a completely new projection of the Being of the present-at-hand. And it is here, I take it, that the temporal foundations of the theoretical, scientific attitude are truly found, for (taking physics as the paradigm):

'In this projection something constantly present-at-hand (matter) is uncovered beforehand, and the horizon is opened so that one may be guided by looking at those constitutive items in it which are quantitatively determinable (motion, force, location and time). (H362)'

Heidegger is saying that the physicalist model - in which space and time are mere qualitatively determined dimensions - has an existential ground. That this is fundamentally temporal might be thought clear from the reference to this as a projection (which takes us back to understanding,
the temporality of which has already been shown) and to its being 'a priori'. But for Heidegger, this peculiarly scientific kind of making-present, a unique form of disclosedness, grounded in Dasein's Being-in-the-world, has its temporal foundations best illuminated by an account of the temporality of the transcendence that its thematizing presuppose.

A superficial comparison of Being and Time with Time and Being might try to develop the idea that the latter abandons the possibility of a purely temporal perspective in favour of time-space. Heidegger's attempt (070) here to subordinate Dasein's spatiality to its temporality might be thought to support this view. Both readings would be mistaken, and it is Heidegger's account of the transcendence 'of' the world that makes this clear. The key word will be 'horizon', recycled from Husserl.

A brief word: the 'of' in 'transcendence of the world' is a subjective gentive. It refers to the 'world's' transcendence. Equally, it refers to Dasein's transcendence (qua Being-in-the-world). What is transcended? Both Dasein and the world, or, Dasein as being-in-the-world, are transcendent in relation to 'things', conceived of as just there, present. But how? Heidegger's answer, in a phrase, is Dasein's 'ecstatic-horizontality', and the claim is surely a brilliant one.

The world, understood as a unity of significance, involving such relationships as 'in order to', 'towards-which', and 'for-the-sake of' is essential to Dasein's being and vice-versa. And to each of the temporal ecstases we have already isolated corresponds a 'horizontal schema':

'The existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical unity, has something like a horizon'.
(H365, Heidegger's emphasis)

And the distinct horizontal schema (future ['for-the-sake-of-which']; having ['in-the-face-of-which']; present ['in-order-to']) constitute a
Two comments on this: (1) it can helpfully be contrasted with the Kantian treatment of time as the form of inner intuition. On such a view, time would be subjectively real, but in some sense an imposition on our experience. Heidegger, borrowing the word 'schemata' from Kant's 'Schematism of the Understanding', shows how it is possible (and sketches the possibility in principle), to see temporality not merely as a subjective condition but as constitutive of the world itself. This account of course both rests on and further consolidates the original insistence on understanding Dasein as primitively Being-in-the-world. (2) That these ecstases constitute dimensions of significance of the world is surely incontestable. But that they are the last word on what makes transcendence possible is less clear. The other obvious candidate is language, or discourse. At every level - the individual word, the assertion, the complex articulation of tenses - language exhibits a transcendence in relation to what it discloses. If it is thought of as constitutive (in whole or in part) of the world, then its candidacy is ensured. But the status of language, certainly in Being and Time, is limited. Propositional truth rests on a pre-predicative disclosedness, discourse articulates pre-theoretical understanding, tense reflects Dasein's primordially ecstatic conditions. Language seems derivative, and at best a 'supplement'. And yet (a) one cannot fail to notice that Heidegger later comes to credit language with a much more originary role. (b) Even in Being and Time, the argument is borne on the shoulders of tiny but vital words (in the face of, in order to, 'as', 'is' etc. [vor, um-zu, als, ist]). Minimally, one might suggest that his consideration of the temporality of transcendence at least raises the question of the role of discourse here, and of the inner relation
between language and time.

**Critical Reflections**

What is the status of Heidegger's discussion of the relation between everydayness and temporality, and what conclusions can we draw from it? Above all else, we have to recognize the tension in the notion of everydayness. For it names both the basic and normal condition of Dasein, one on which the possibility of there being a temporality at all depends ("Temporality is essentially falling" (H369)). It is, in other words, an inestimable source of temporal significance. (Indeed, he writes, '... at bottom, we mean by the term "everydayness" nothing else than temporality' (H371)). And it is also a way of being characterised by evasion, suffering, (self-)dispersion, and 'enigma after enigma'. If Heidegger equates everydayness and temporality, is it enough to say that authenticity is a modification of everydayness in order to make sense of the idea of 'authentic temporality'? The notion seems to be all too easily squeezed out. Heidegger's own remarks suggest considerable general uneasiness. He doubts whether 'the explication of temporality ... so far ... is sufficient to delimit the existential meaning of "everydayness"' (H370) - and his final chapters on historicality and within-time-ness will attempt to make this good. But he repeats a sentiment that has become increasingly frequent in this chapter - that the clarification of the meaning of Being in general is the ultimate aim of the book - one which as we shall see, remains unachieved at its conclusion.

Our own response to this vital chapter must now be formulated. We have already drawn together a number of our critical themes - our dissatisfaction with the role played by authenticity in its negative description of the phenomena of everydayness (eg. as a forgetting of one's own-
most potentiality-for-Being), with the attempt to exclude representation from his description of primordial temporality, and with the attempt at assigning dominant ecstases to the different modes of disclosedness. And we have taken a persistent interest in the relegation of the structures and functions of language to a secondary status in relation to time. What if they could not be separated? (Heidegger's discussion of the 'as' (H360) could serve as a point of departure). But there are one or two particular criticisms so far unvoiced, that it would be appropriate to now bring forward.

The Temporality of Pleasure and Desire

We could ask, first of all, whether Heidegger's whole existential frame of reference, for all its internal subtlety does not reflect a rather traditional and unexamined view of the nature of everyday life - which is essentially that of purposeful activity, means/ends relationships, etc. As a hermeneutic of the temporality of concern, it is surely unrivalled, but the place of such concern is surely not established beyond question. There would seem to be two 'existentials', ones perhaps of greater importance than he would allow, not covered by such an account, existentials which have their rightful place in 'everydayness' - those of pleasure and of desire. And what is important about them (and in this they are doubtless not unique) is that they may be thought to suggest modes of temporality somewhat disruptive to Heidegger's overall aim.

To convincingly demonstrate this, even supposing that these terms (pleasure, desire) could be innocently deployed without a glance at their philosophical (and wider cultural) history, would be an enormous task.
It might however still be of some value to stimulate a re-reading of Heidegger's account by suggesting certain limitations.

We could distinguish pleasures into those which are ontologically conservative (which reassure) and those which are ontologically subversive (by exhilaration, by rupture, by challenge etc.). Let us hold on to the second, and add to it a third pleasure, which we shall begin by calling ontologically innocent — say the taste of honey.

Let us further distinguish two types of desire — that desire which seeks to fill a lack, to remedy a deficiency, and that which proceeds from an original exuberance. Again, we shall hold on to the latter.

There is no doubting that in each case, the overlapping modifications of Heidegger's temporal language would be appropriate, often revealing. But we claim that in each case, Heidegger could only treat their unrelatedness to a self negatively. And yet their significance is in no way confined to that of a 'forgetting' of my potentiality for Being. They cannot be regarded as deficient modes of my coming-towards-myself. The 'taster of honey' may be tasting, enjoying, a liberation from the whole question of his real Being. And the man of jouissance, or of exuberant desire has found a mode of action which is not a mode of self-enactment. The clue to the break with Heidegger's account that these each involve is the positive disappearance of a projected horizon of the future. The future is allowed to be absolutely other.

The Ordinary Conception of Time

To the extent that Heidegger's account of existential temporality is successful it also poses a problem: how are we then to think about time? For there is a clear sense in which Heidegger, like Husserl has bracketed out the question of time to deal with temporality more effectively. By 'time' we mean something that was not immediately obviously
just a mode of Dasein's Being, but could capture the thought that events
take place 'in' time, that certain operations 'take' time, that times
can be shorter or longer than one another etc. In our ordinary way of
thinking about time, even if it is not a thing, it seems to have some
independence from our individual Dasein, it seems to serve as a dimension
in which things out there arise and decay. The book is titled Being and
Time, so what can we now say about it? If Heidegger is right, it is only
now that he can properly answer the question. For his answer will consist
of a complex derivation of our ordinary understanding of time from those
most primitive modes of our temporality. It is complex, because as we
shall see, it involves a number of stages, and because it involves a
certain reflexive redoubling of temporal structure. At a vital moment,
the full existential horizon of temporality is forgotten. And forgetting
is itself a mode of temporalization. The ordinary conception of time, as
a series of 'now' points, dominated by the levelled-off present, is an
inauthentic temporalization of (primordial) temporality. The import
of this analysis is two-fold. On the one hand, it serves to explain the
origin of the unreflective references to time that we make in countless
everyday expressions. On the other hand, it also enables Heidegger to
offer an explanation of the source of what in his view has become the
standard philosophical treatment of time, from Aristotle onwards. We
shall take the opportunity at a subsequent point to discuss the way
Heidegger amplifies his views of the traditional philosophical treatment,
in his Basic Problems of Phenomenology, and how this affects Derrida's
discussion of a seminal footnote on Aristotle in Being and Time in his
essay "Ousia and Gramme". The question will be the one with which we
began our treatise: whether and how far Heidegger still shows allegiance
to the traditional metaphysical understanding of time. Let us first
look at derivation of within-time-ness and of the ordinary conception of time.

In his discussion of circumspective concern he had argued that it was 'grounded in temporality ... in the mode of a making-present which retains and awaits'. His first move is to say that to each of these there corresponds what we could call a mode of temporal reference. These can be thought of as represented by the words 'then' 'once' (as in 'once upon a time'), and 'now' (dann, zuvor, jetzt). To each of these temporal references, there corresponds a horizon, for which, again, we have simple words: later on, today, and earlier. And implicit in our use of words like once, now, and then is a further elaboration, such as 'once, when' 'then when' etc. In other words they play their part in a relational structure of datability. And in such a use the primacy of the 'now' already becomes clear. For the references 'once' and 'then' refers to a past and future 'now' respectively. We can see, then in the primitive activity of temporal reference which he calls datability (no calendar dates need be involved) the emergence of the privilege of the now as 'making-present'.

This set of corresponding triads of words was obviously not intended by Heidegger as an explanation of the possibility of giving dates, because he immediately asks the question, implying that he has not yet answered it, of how this datability is grounded. The common sense answer supposes that there are points of time, and that these temporal references simply indicate them. But if we are seeking an explanation of such expressions as 'now that', 'once when' etc. this will not do, for such 'points' would have to have a significance which they are, as such, incapable of bearing. Datability, then, has to be grounded in something by which significance can be bestowed. Heidegger's answer is that expressions like 'once when', 'then when', 'now that' reflect not just an interpretation of what I am
concerned with, but also a self-interpretation. Dasein is expressing itself as 'Being-alongside the ready-to-hand'. Moreover, it does so in the form of a 'making-present'. This is quite obvious. We say now, then etc. (a) within a certain interpretive context, in which we are involved (eg. recounting one's life, reminding the other of a promise, remembering a scene etc.) and one does this from the point of view of and with reference to 'the present'. It might be asked why, if we always mean 'now that', 'then when' etc. we do not always spell out the tacit elaboration of significance. Heidegger's answer employs the reflexivity we noted above. We do not because although the ecstatic character of temporality is built in to each act of dating, it equally gets covered up in each 'making-present'. 'Making-present' hides its own ecstatic character in the 'now'.

In addition to these cases of what we have called temporal reference, that go to make up datability, Heidegger shows how Dasein understands itself not only in relation to temporal points, but also periods. He explicates phenomenologically Dasein's spannedness, stretched-out-ness, through such simple phrases as 'during', 'meanwhile', 'until-then'. And he could have talked of the continuous present tense. It is this spannedness that makes it possible for Dasein to 'take time (off)', to 'spend' time, to 'have' time to spare etc. and for every temporal reference to have its own span (some 'nows' are longer than others!).

But this spannedness, stretchedness, of Dasein cannot be understood in terms of a sequence of nows. It does not, for one thing, offer the guaranteed (if spurious) continuity of such a sequence. So what is its basis? Clearly a linguistic phenomenology is not enough, as we saw before. Heidegger's answer is that our ordinary stretching along, our ordinary ability to think of ourselves as living in spans of time, is an
inauthentic falling away from that projected stretching ahead of oneself opened-up in the 'moment of vision'.

'One's existence in the moment of vision temporalizes itself as something that has been stretched along in a way which is fatefully whole in the sense of the authentic historical constancy of the Self'. (H410)

The person who says he has no time for this or that has (inauthentically) lost himself in objects of immediate concern, and to someone for whom the moment of vision is no longer operative. In other words, Heidegger interprets the possibility of periods of time in terms of ecstatic temporality, transformed and covered over. But is this not confined, as we have formulated it, to each individual, one at a time? Where do we get the idea that we share the same time? Heidegger's answer is that the significance of expressions like 'now' and 'then' is one that rests on our public Being-in-the-world. We do not always mean precisely the same thing by 'now' even when we say it together, but the everyday disclosedness of Dasein is something all the more shared for being everyday. Indeed it is one of the distinguishing features of this public time that we think of it just as something 'thereis', in contrast to, say the authentic understanding of time in relation to one's ownmost-potentiality-for-Being.

But in a sense this only raises more problems. For one might well think that we had only been offered an explanation of how 'public time' arises rather than an account of what 'it is' that has so arisen. And Heidegger insists on the need to return to such a question. We might, for example, still wonder whether this 'public time' was something we imagine, project, impose on the real world, or whether it was really there. In his view, these sort of metaphysical questions only get confronted seriously by detailed phenomenological work.

The publicness of time cannot be dependent on the business of
applying numbers, the quantification of time, for there is a reckoning with time which is altogether more primitive, and which is quite sufficient to establish a public time. Moreover it is one in which the question of whether time is objective or subjective seems out-of-place. The difference between day and night, and the height of the sun in the sky, supply us all in a publicly available way, with a grid for the assigning of times, one that applies equally to the natural and the social world. This is the first clock, on which all subsequent clocks, or at least all subsequent use of clocks ultimately depend, Heidegger insists, however, that 'temporality is the reason for the clock'.

His sometimes complex formulations have as their goal (a) to demonstrate the dependence of any sense of time as an autonomous thing, on its being 'public', (b) to show that its being public is dependent on our utilzation - in a shared world - of natural and manufactured clocks for measurement and dating, (c) that such utilization has to be understood in existential terms, and (d) that these terms are ultimately temporal in their significance.

What is the relation between this public time and the 'world'? What can be made of the expression 'world-time'? Heidegger presses forward his demonstration that our use of simple temporal words has a built-in-worldly significance. Time references often have a built-in element of appropriateness or inappropriateness. We talk of 'time for ...' ('Time for tea') and again, a reference to the present betrays the structure of awaiting-retaining that extends its ultimate reference beyond the present. But this significance structure that we are drawn into is nothing other than the world itself. This public world-time is not something in the world, but part of it, belongs to it. Perhaps the relation could be summed up like this: concern structures the world
and is rooted in temporality, and the temporal way it structures the world appears as time.

Heidegger, as we have mentioned above, has claimed the peasant's world as his inspiration, but he does not want to restrict his discussion of public time to the way we can make appointments by measuring the length of our shadows, however significant such primitive time-reckoning might be. He is interested in the existential significance of the fact that we have moved on from there to the increasingly sophisticated use of clocks etc. and, as he might have added had he been writing a few decades later, to the regulation of clocks by the vibration of a caesium atom, even more reliable than the sun in its travels.

**A Phenomenology of Measurement I**

At this point, Heidegger attempts, in effect, a phenomenology of the measurement of time, a move which both confirms and yet in another way challenges the Derridean claim\(^\text{15}\) that Heidegger is still wedded to the traditional Aristotelian view which connects time with measurement. Heidegger's response must be, of course, that the connection is undoubtedly there and the question is whether phenomenology, and in particular this existential phenomenology can transform our understanding of that connection in a significant way. We discuss this question explicitly below.

There is more to telling the time than looking at a clock. We can see the hands, even their spatial position and the divisions on the face of the clock, but we do not see what time it is unless we already bring an understanding of time to bear on our looking.

> 'when we look at the clock and regulate ourselves according to the time, we are essentially saying 'now'' (H416)

and as he says, this 'now' has already been understood in terms of
'datability, spannedness, publicness, and worldhood'. Heidegger is surely right here, in supposing that our use of clocks already presupposes temporality. Think of what it is like to wake up after a doze and wonder after looking at one's watch, whether it was morning or evening. It would not make sense to say that one knew what time it was but one did not know whether it was morning or evening. And yet one might know that it was 7:30.

**Versions of 'Present'**

What is the ontological significance of our ability to tell the time? Heidegger's answer to this begins with a paragraph (H416-7) that deserves a certain unpacking. For anyone who relies at all on the English translation of the work, it becomes essential at this critical point for our understanding of the significance of a phenomenological reading to return to the German original. A number of translation choices that are justified independently come together to wreak confusion. Etymological connections are lost when they are important, and parallels appear which were never intended.

In the sentence that ends

>... an entity which is present-at-hand (vorhandenen) for everyone is every "Now" (Jetzt), is made present (Gegenwärtigen) in its own presence (Anwesenheit)" (H418)

the word 'present (-ce)' occurs three times, in various forms, in English, where three quite different words are employed in German. And the sentence beginning the paragraph to which we first referred makes it far less mysterious how Heidegger connects making-present with retentive-awaiting:

'Saying "now", however, is the discursive Articulation of a making present (Gegenwärtigen) which temporalizes itself in a unity with a retentive awaiting (behaltenden Gewärtigen)' (H416)

To these illustrations, we should also add the words 'the Present' (die
Gegenwart) (literally, the 'waiting-towards') and 'in the past' (gegenwärtig). The complexity of the interconnections between these words, (to which in all forms, the translators allude in their footnotes to H25), raises all manner of questions which we hardly know how to begin to answer. Is Heidegger's whole problematic, or parts of it, (eg. the etymological suggestion of futurity in the literal sense of 'Gegenwart') dependent on the peculiarities of the German language? (If we tried to do the same thing in the same way in English, might we not conclude that the present was a pre-esse, that 'is before', with roots in the past?) Still one might at least confirm the importance of the connection between time and Being by such etymologizing. And Heidegger might well argue that the ontologico-etymological parallels between parousia, an-wesen, and pre-sent (L. praesens, praesentum, prop. pres. ppl. of praesse, to be before, to be at hand; SOED p. 1573) were obvious enough. There is a remaining difficulty: if for Heidegger the historical 'translation' of Greek temporal terms into the Latin language represented a covering over of the temporality of time then the attempt to recapture Heidegger's claims in a term (present) with Latinate roots may be a further historical reversal. The same would, of course, be true of French. While one might occasionally find, if not solace, at least an explanation for the difficulty of understanding Heidegger in such a consideration, one's hope must be that even if such a problem did exist, it could be overcome (a) by awareness of it, (b) by having a multilingual basis of comprehension, and (c) by the use of subtle syntactic forms to compensate for the unwanted implications of the terms we must use (eg. the verbalizing tautology - 'das Nicht nichtet', 'the present presences'). Clearly Heidegger thinks one even needs them in German.
It will be appreciated that a presentation of Heidegger's phenomenology of measurement—which, as we have suggested comes to a head at H416-17f—is far from easy. Although we are writing in English, there is a sense in which it is an Anglo-German hybrid that is getting written in English. It might therefore be helpful to remind ourselves of one or two of Heidegger's fundamental claims about what history has done to our understanding of time, claims first made in his famous section "The Task of Destroying the History of Ontology" (Being and Time, 06) (see our Part II Introduction above).

Heidegger believes that it is only in ontology that the fundamental questions can be posed, that the possibilities of ontological thought were once open to ancient thought, but closed off by their particular formulations and need to be re-opened. The key to this de-struction is that it was always in relation to Time that Being was interpreted. For them,

'... the meaning of Being (was) ... παρουσία or οὐσία which signifies in ontologico-Temporal terms, 'presence' ("Anwesenheit"). Entities are grasped in their Being as 'presence': this means they are understood with regard to definite mode of time - the 'Present'. ' (H25)

There are two points here: (1) 'presence' is an ontological term; 'present' is a temporal term. The claim is that the temporal has determined the ontological. (2) A definite 'mode of time' has been so privileged, i.e. the present, rather than the past or the future. Heidegger's aim is to re-evaluate both of these connections. For the reader the fundamental interpretive question must be: does Heidegger accept the determination of Being by time as 'presence' (and simply want to give a new sense to 'presence') or does he want to challenge the relationship more fundamentally? Derrida, as we shall see, will claim the former, but it might be more accurate to say that with Heidegger the question becomes undecidable - which is not to say that we cannot
decide, but that in a sense the terms in which the question is posed have themselves been put in question.

Discussing the waning of the importance of 'dialectic' after Plato, Heidegger continues

'... Aristotle 'no longer has any understanding' of it, for he has put it on a more radical footing and raised it to a new level (aufhob). Αὐγαθήρατα itself - or rather οὐσία - that simple awareness of something present-at-hand in its sheer presence-at-hand, which Parmenides had already taken to guide him in his own interpretation of Being - has the temporal structure of a pure 'making-present' of something. Those entities which show themselves in this and for it, and which are understood as entities in the most authentic sense, thus get interpreted with regard to the Present; that is, they are conceived as presence (οὐσία) (H25-6)

Both our fundamental mode of awareness and the things of which we are aware, both poles of intentionality, to use Husserlian language, are indebted to an emphasis on a specific temporal mode - making-present (Gegenwärtigens). The possibility of a phenomenological investigation seems here to reside in a certain receptiveness to etymology.

A Phenomenology of Measurement II

Let us now turn to the task of elucidating Heidegger's phenomenology of measurement. We will first briefly explain what Heidegger is doing, and then comment in more detail.

What is Heidegger doing? He is giving a temporal interpretation to the apparent immediacy with which we 'tell the time' and understand and measure intervals in time. We have already cited the sentence in which he begins to explain this. When we say 'now' we are giving voice to a 'making-present' (Gegenwärtigens) which temporalizes itself in a unity with a retentive awaiting (behaltenden Gewärtigen)' (H416). In other words, the immediacy of the 'now' dissolves in an activity in which a bringing about of the present, making-present, presencing,
presentifying ... grasping/affirming something as present, is itself 'performed' only in conjunction with an orientation that points both forwards and backwards. What we relate to in this measuring activity is something Vorhanden, something just 'there' ("present-at-hand") as it seems. But our relating to it, involves more than just passive receptivity - a 'making-present'. There is a sense in which the measuring of an interval involves a double relatedness - to the 'standard' - by which I take it he means the 'unit of measurement' - say the way the clock is divided into minutes, hours etc., and to the actual extent of the interval. Each of these is confronted as something present-at-hand, and measuring consists of a making-present of what is thus Vorhanden. We may not think of ourselves as relating to Time as such when we measure it, but the fact that measuring thinks it is dealing in a public way with a present-at-hand multiplicity of 'nows' provides a basis for its subsequent theoretical interpretation.

It might be said (and many, including Bergson have said it), that the measurement of time involves a (misleading) spatialization, but Heidegger's response is that the 'space' supposed to be responsible for this is itself dependent on temporality, and so we are not dealing with a misplaced transformation of modes. Measuring is not a reductive spatialization but a specific making-present.

What does all this tell us about time's ontological status? Clearly 'time' is made public by the institution of measurement and things can have 'times') attached to them as soon as they are seen to be 'in' this public time. However, this time in which it is possible for things to be 'in time' is neither objective nor subjective (ie. in Heidegger's language it is not Vorhanden (present-at-hand) in any way.
We could call it 'objective' (though it is no 'object') insofar as it is the 'condition for the possibility of entities within-the-world'. It is certainly not just (with Kant) the form of inner intuition; it is encountered in the world just as immediately. Again we could call it subjective, but only as a condition of 'the Being of the factically existing Self' — not as some psychical faculty or component. What then is the status of this world-time, this time-within-which? We cannot now think of it, if we have followed Heidegger's argument, as a Dasein-independent framework. Rather it is a product of 'the temporalizing of temporality'. Keeping this in mind allows us to see through these false ways of construing time as either 'objective' or 'subjective'. Within-time-ness is both a legitimate and important phenomenon, but it also hides its own temporality in its immediacy. Through it, the everyday concept of time becomes intelligible.

Heidegger's moves here are surely commendable. He is giving a plausible account of how we can think of 'time' as fundamental without adopting the usual course of calling it either 'objective' or 'subjective' while yet managing to keep in the air at the same time the fact that its status is distinct from and makes possible particular things ('in time'), its publicness, its role as condition of factical selfhood, and its relation to the (significant) world.

Aristotle and the Ordinary Concept of Time

With this account of what it is to be 'in' time, of the time 'in' which things are to be found, he is now in a position to offer an explanation of how our 'ordinary conception of time' (as a series of "now"-points) has arisen. Heidegger explicitly and for the first time acknowledges (081, H421) that what he has been offering is

'... nothing else than an existential-ontological
interpretation of Aristotle's definition of 'time'

(which was '... that which is counted in the movement which we encounter within the horizon of the earlier and later'). It is not clear from this context whether he means that it just so happens to have this connection with Aristotle or whether it has been his underlying aim all along to provide such a phenomenological deepening. But it is fairly clear from the early remarks we have recently cited (H25) that he has seen a close connection between the ordinary conception of time and Aristotle's view. But the claim is not that the ordinary concept of time is somehow derivative from Aristotle's. Any appearance to this effect is explained by the fact that Aristotle and philosophers after him have interpreted time on the same basis as is shared by the ordinary (pre-philosophical) concept of time, namely our common-sense horizon (or lack of it).

There is clearly a considerable gap between what Heidegger has called 'world-time' which possesses 'significance' (eg. time we were finished, time to get up) and 'datability'. His explanation for this is in terms of 'covering over' and 'levelling-off'. In fact these terms seen to walk the line between description and explanation somewhat uneasily. For at one level they are purely descriptive of the difference between the 'now' to which significance relations are essentially related, and the cleaned up and isolated 'now' that stands in a series, without suggesting how the change has been effected. Heidegger's answer to this question is essentially that everyday concernful living in the world gets lost among the objects of its concern and fails to see the horizontal structure that makes this 'content' possible. So we treat each 'now' as something 'present-at-hand'. The ordinary conception of time as infinite
is then only symptomatic of such a view. For once all relations between 'now's have been reduced to those of sequentiaity there is nothing to put an 'end' to the series. Apart from the levelling brought about simply by the myopia of everyday concern, the ordinary conception of time as infinite also serves to underpin our flight from our own mortality,\(^1\) this levelled-off, infinite time belongs to everyone and no-one.

Heidegger's symptomatic reading is elaborated by two further claims: (1) that the expression 'time passes away' should be seen as a clue to our recognition that our own passing-away has not been entirely forgotten, and (2) that the irreversibility we attach to this ordinary concept of time should be seen as the legacy of primordial time poking its way through.

Have we then exposed an error? Heidegger claims that the ordinary concept of time has its place, its natural justification, as belonging to 'Dasein's average kind of Being'. Error arises, one might say, only when it 'errs' - when it strays beyond its horizons of legitimate application. Heidegger is offering diagnosis, interpretation, not critique. It is the relationships of derivation, dependence, grounding, between temporality, world-time, and the ordinary concept of time that are quite crucial.

'From temporality the full structure of world-time has been drawn; and only the interpretation of this structure gives us the clue for "seeing" at all that in the ordinary concept of time something has been covered-up, and for estimating how much the ecstatico-horizontal constitution of temporality has been levelled-off' (H426)

Starting from the ordinary concept of time (as of course Heidegger has not) so much is simply invisible and unthinkable - not only 'temporality' but the primacy of the future for 'ecstatico-horizontal temporality'. There is a radical difference between the temporal elements of ecstatic
temporality and those of the ordinary concept of time, even (and precisely) where they seem to map onto one another. What has 'the moment of vision' to do with a 'future-now'?

It is Heidegger's contention, of course, that it is the neglect of this 'ecstatic-horizontal temporality' that characterizes not just the ordinary concept of time at some preliminary commonsense level of reflection, but also the key philosophical accounts of time offered after Aristotle, for example, by Hegel and Kant (and, he would add, Nietzsche). Certain remarks to which we have drawn attention in passing suggest that Husserl too would be included in this list. And near the end of Being and Time (§82(b), H433f) Heidegger explicitly discusses the difference between his own views and those of Hegel, and in a long footnote (n.xxx, H432) discusses Hegel's indebtedness to Aristotle. This important question, raised again by Derrida\textsuperscript{20} in his essay "Ousia and Gramme" and by Heidegger's Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology\textsuperscript{21} is discussed separately below.\textsuperscript{22} It supplements in a more historical way our discussion of the possibility of a non-meta-physical concept of time.

**From Temporality to Time: Some Critical Thoughts**

We have presented Heidegger's discussion (in this last section) of the genesis of the ordinary conception of time, largely without criticism, so as not to detract from the course of the argument. But passive acquiescence is neither possible nor desirable.

We can accept broadly speaking his account of the dependence of theoretical concepts of time on one which is more tacit or primitive. Heidegger's main insight here is the double sense of everydayness - both as the source of significance and of its concealment. There is however, surely room for doubt about his explanation of the ordinary concept of time.
He makes no reference to the possibility that this abstract succession of 'nows' might have its basis elsewhere in the development of the number system, which exhibits the same unending seriality (in both directions, if we allow negative numbers). This is of course debatable. But the following arguments might be adduced in its favour:

(1) that the idea of an infinite series of dimensionless, meaning-less "now" points is one it would be rash to attribute a priori to primitive people (people lacking, inter alia, a number system of the sort to which we are accustomed). But the scope of Dasein is not restricted to modern Western man. Indeed one might have thought that, as Durkheim said of primitive people, they might display the essence (Being) of men all the more clearly.

(2) The move from the practice of measurement to the conception of time as an infinite series of nows is not that convincing, taken as an argument. Quite why the 'now' should come to be seen as present-at-hand, shorn of significance, is left unclear. This is not to deny the value of a phenomenology of measurement, but it might suggest an acknowledged role for 'structures' and 'representations'. Surely something ought to be made of the fact that when we measure temporal intervals, we mark the limits of these intervals and in themselves, these point instants have no meaning. If we think of time as something in which, then the dimensionless time of the 'limit' can have no meaning of the sort that requires the scope for an event to occur. However, if inner meaning has been eroded ('shorn' - Heidegger's word is 'beschnitten') we can still have outer relations - of serial order - and we have in the number series a model of just how that is possible.

This last remark, however, marks the point of difficulty without resolving it. Brouer, for instance, might argue that any idea of
succession we found in the number series would have to be derived from
our experience of real succession, (i.e. that of time). But if Heidegger
is right, our fundamental intuitions are not of empty intrinsically
meaningless points succeeding one another, even without bringing in the
poly-ecstatic nature of temporality. They rather consist of meaningful
periods, in which the 'units' of significance, if one can so call them,
would be existential. The time it takes to tie a shoe-lace would be
more primitive than 'the instant'. This primacy is not chronological,
nor logical, but hermeneutic - i.e. making reference to 'that in terms
of which something can alone be fully understood'.

But if it is central to the ordinary conception of time that its
elements be meaning-neutral, and their succession be endless, then we
are surely dealing with something from which representation cannot be
excluded. A structure of external relations is being brought to our
awareness of temporal succession and surely cannot just be derived from
it. The argument would be this: meaning-neutrality and infiniteness
(just to begin the list of formal attributes of such a series), could not
be thought to be discovered true of the series and its elements nor could
they plausibly be thought to be derived from each individual 'now'. But
whatever the source of this ordinary concept of time, its status is an
a priori one in relation to any part of the series we may be confronted
with. And in each case grasping its infinity is cashed out in a confi-
dence that one will always be able to continue counting, measuring, and
projecting time in any direction. Again, one might say, we are clearly
dealing with a concept and as such with something that has a representa-
tional content. Heidegger presents the ordinary concept of time as a
product of a certain covering-over, levelling out. But surely it has a
positive content - a content manifest in the clarity of its structure,
one which compensates to some extent for its apparently 'negative' origins. If one were to take a piece of paper and cut out of it a perfect circle, it could be said that one had just cut off certain bits, but the circular line one followed or the template one cut around gives positive guidance to the scissors. By analogy, one might suggest that the existence of the number system might supply a model from which could be drawn the ordinary concept of time. This is not a proof, rather a possible solution to a deficiency.

There is, however, a danger of opposing a facile objection to a more interesting error, and we should at least spell out the kind of response open to Heidegger. Suppose we insist that the idea of infinity should be understood as a rule - eg. to any series of 'nows' another 'now' can be added at either end. This we might claim is an a priori concept guided by an interest in formal properties, not derived by a negative process from a certain mode of existence. But Heidegger might reply - this recursive rule is fundamentally a temporal projection, one that applies equally to past and future. So even if we admit that we are dealing here with an a priori structure, we need only take one further step to realize that we have thereby confirmed its fundamentally temporal status. (Even the words 'a priori' give that away). That must be true. But it still seems that what we find here confirmed is an intimate fusion of the formal and the temporal, structure and time. One cannot specify the rule that gives infinity to the series without involving both senses.

If we were right and the ordinary concept of time were to be inhabited or informed by a structure imported from outside, then the possibility of a very different explanation of its origins could be opened up. One might wonder whether the philosophical theorizing about time had not so much taken for granted an historically invariant 'ordinary' concept of time as it has
privileged that mode of representation - the number system - associated with the birth of systematic measurement. Heidegger's account (particularly in 11.4 and 11.6) should then be seen as an attempt to incorporate one language of time into another. The other is that found in ordinary language, in tense, in certain indexical expressions, in numerous little words (and indeed in suffixes and prefixes). If the argument has a linguistic level, this however is itself treated as underpinned by the existential. Discourse merely discloses existential articulation. Were this view to be questioned, however, were one to come to believe that no concept of time could be kept free from the determinations of this or that language, model, schema, or mode of conceptualization then a third term - Language - would have to be added to Being and Time. And in effect, this is what Derrida, building on Heidegger's own later work, has done.
Our discussion in the last three chapters could be likened to a critical trawling along a path laid down in advance by the internal development of Being and Time. The key question determining the shape of the 'net' had to do with the way Heidegger's ultimate concern with the question of Being opened up the possibility of a radically new existential sense of temporality, and yet at the same time remained subordinated to values of wholeness, unity and closure. Heidegger's requirement that Dasein exhibit itself as a 'whole' stems not from the 'facts' of human existence, but from his wider project of making the existential analytic open the way to an illumination of the question of Being. To be specific, we take issue with his attempts to exclude 'representation' and 'otherness' in general from an account of the existential significance of death, we deny that Being-towards-death can serve as the foundation for Dasein's wholeness, we question Heidegger's claim that what conscience discloses it does so unambiguously and directly, and argue that it is its negative, critical role that is important. We trace in detail a double movement of opening up and closing off, one indeed which Heidegger's very account of disclosedness would have anticipated. We would like to think that just as something of the Hegelian dialectic can survive loss of confidence in the Absolute as telos, so much of the Heideggerean account of existential temporality still retains its plausibility, and in two different ways: 

(1) It is possible to repeatedly discount the positive content of his moves towards authenticity, wholeness, and resoluteness, and take them in their negative, critical aspect.

(2) One can read Being and Time as a witness to a 'metaphysical' desire
the elimination of which - either for Dasein, or for the reflective philosopher - still remains problematic.

In making these points we do not imply that Heidegger just stood still after *Being and Time*. He himself clearly found the transition from his existential analytic to an account of Being as such to present more than a temporary difficulty. In his writing after *Being and Time*, he moves in a direction that gives to our thesis its double trajectory. Our interest in developing an account of temporal structures, informed and guided by those of 'textuality', could be said to be grafted onto a version of existential analytic purged of the problematic of Being. And yet in our account of time as an opening onto radical otherness, drawing on Nietzsche, there is some convergence with the path Heidegger takes from *Being and Time* (1927) to *Time and Being* (1962). I shall now try to sketch this move.

In *Being and Time*, while the orientation of the book as a whole is ontological, directed towards the renewal of the question of Being, the actual content, as we have seen at length, deals more specifically with the existential structures of human being, of Dasein. In the second half of the book an adequate account of these structures is shown to be possible only by their interpretation within the horizon of temporality. Temporality is understood as a quite general existential condition, illuminating Care, Dasein's basic existential structure. It is through Care, for example that the different temporal ecstasies - being-as-having-been, being-as-making-present, and being-ahead-of-oneself - are united. The time we associate with the clock, time as measured, is not basic, but dependent on human temporalising. Time is not only existentially primordial, but also primordially existential. Time has long ceased to be a sequence of nows. It has become a basic existential condition.

As we hope to have demonstrated, there seem to be all sorts of virtues in this position, not least of which is that Heidegger has given us a
a phenomenological account of temporality which is not merely that of an internal time-consciousness. While Heidegger was undoubtedly indebted to Husserl, we are convinced that an adequate account of human temporality is not possible unless we can take on board the fact of existence as self-questioning, moodful, embodies, concerned and historical beings. And in these respects, Heidegger marks a certain advance on Husserl. But in Heidegger's view it would be a great mistake to think of this existential analysis as an end in itself. The existential analysis of Dasein, Being-there, was intended as a gateway to Being itself. Without this wider gloss, who we would risk confusing philosophy with anthropology. Husserl had previously levelled this charge against Heidegger had himself fought long against such dangers. But whatever doubts Heidegger was later to have about whether it was philosophy he was doing, he was certainly not just offering a general account of man, a new 'humanism'.

An existential account of temporality seems to us to be extremely fruitful, but Heidegger perhaps only scratched the surface of such an account in Being and Time. And yet in his later work he not only moves away from a phenomenology of Dasein, he moves away from an account of Time as related to Dasein at all.

For all the brilliance of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, in which he draws out the latent thematics of finitude in Kant's first Critique, there is very little mention of man as a being-in-the-world. If Kant's central aim, as he claims, was not epistemology (any more than his own, in Being and Time was anthropology) it is still true that Kant poses the problem of metaphysics within the framework of a theory of knowledge. And central though time is to this account, its role is cognitive, both in relation to the transcendental imagination and to the three modes of synthesis. Heidegger's account of temporality does not substantially change here. Rather the framework of Being and Time offers a way of reading the Kant
book, and as a result of that reading we can see *Being and Time* as an advance on Kant's first *Critique*.

Suggestions of a break or reversal in Heidegger have been exaggerated. But there is an implicit devaluation of *Being and Time* in the direction taken by his later work, one which affects his account of temporality. In our view, the account of time in *Being and Time* is not peripheral to his development. Its 'ecstatic temporality', when detached from any particular existential content, can be seen to serve as a kind of optics or framework, within which Being can be determined in various ways - as 'presence', for example. For time has ceased to be an objective succession in terms of which independently identifiable beings could be ordered. It has become an essential feature of the 'constitution' of such beings, to use a phenomenological expression.

Heidegger has always avoided the hint of subjective activity that the term *constitution* might be thought to imply. The concept of the subject as active origin becomes increasingly important for him to avoid. So time cannot be something we add to raw data to create temporally complex objects. Rather, through the opening, the time-space as he comes to call it, *Being gives itself*, or *it gives* (es gibt) or there is an event of appropriation (ereignis).

As we understand it, the central point of all his meditation on the *es gibt*, and on *ereignis* is the repudiation of the categories of activity and passivity, subject and object, in understanding Being, for the good reason that these categories always presuppose Being in some way or other. But no-one, we venture to say, will come away from *Time and Being* with any real sense of having grasped at last what Time is all about. Time is here not only assimilated into time-space, but even that general dimensionality has lost most of its content.

This seems to be inevitable given Heidegger's project. But it either casts doubt on the value of that project, or on the concern to elucidate the nature of time. Might it not be that 'time' is inextricably bound up
with metaphysics, as Derrida has suggested? So that we ought to expect
that increasing clarity about time would see it dissolve away as some sort
of metaphysical illusion.

The relationship of historical determination between Time and Being
goes in each direction. In the first direction, a modality of Being
determines our conception of time. This, we find in summary form, at the
end of Heidegger's *Introduction to Metaphysics*:

> 'in the beginning of Western philosophy the perspective governing
the disclosure of Being was time, though this perspective as such
remained hidden, and inevitably so. When ultimately ousia, meaning
permanent presence, became the basic concept of Being, what was the
unconcealed foundation of permanence and presence if not time? But
this 'time' remained essentially undeveloped and (on the basis and
in the perspective of 'physics') could not be developed. For as soon
as reflection on the essence of time began, at the end of Greek
philosophy with Aristotle, time itself had to be taken as something
somehow present, ousia tis. Consequently time was considered from the
standpoint of the 'now', the actual moment. The past is the 'no-longer-
now', the future is the 'not-yet-now'. Being in the sense of already-
thereness (presence) became the perspective for the determination of
time.'

The essential argument here is that while Being had since the pre-
Socratics been understood through time, this temporal condition was not
reflected on until 'time' had been taken over by physics. And this way of
conceiving of time made its earlier role in interpreting Being impossible
to formulate.

This fascinating argument opens up the possibility of rethinking the
original phenomenon of time, while at the same time making it clear how
difficult that would be. It is this project that Heidegger takes as his own.

In the reverse direction, Heidegger offers us an analysis of four ways
in which Being has been determined, in particular oppositions, by time.
Let us again briefly quote *Introduction to Metaphysics*, at a point at
which a long and detailed discussion is being summarized:

over against becoming being is permanence
over against appearance being is the enduring prototype, the
always identical
over against thought it is the underlying, the already-there
over against the ought it is the datum, the ought that is not yet
realised or already realised
Permanent, always identical, already there, given - all mean fundamentally the same: enduring presence, on as ousia. 5

So we can see that in Heidegger's view, it is a temporal modality - 'presence' - that each of these determinations of Being shares. And together these constitute much of the fabric of metaphysics. For while the fact that being can be determined in these ways presupposes a distinction between Being and beings, this distinction, which is absolutely necessary for Heidegger, is itself covered over and hidden. To raise again the question of Being is to render problematic the very meaning of Being and the possibility of such determinations. And this means to ask about 'presence', to ask about what we have called primordial temporality.

But will it help us in understanding Time, to follow Heidegger down this path? Are we not being lured by a phrase into a discussion with a quite different focus? Heidegger's concerns are with Being, with an original disclosure of Being, such as can give man a new historical orientation... 6 Surely anything he might say about time would be by the way.

And yet Heidegger is making a move which seems essential for any account of time that does not merely reflect our ordinary prejudices. He is trying to reawaken an experience not only of Being but also of Time, an experience which is both non-standard and fundamental. The odds are against such an enterprise:

' an age which regards as real only what goes fast and can be clutched with both hands looks on questioning as 'remote from reality' and as something that does not pay, whose benefits cannot be numbered.' 7

Nevertheless the prospect is held out of an understanding of time that is more basic than that of a succession of 'nows', and which can be developed in relative independence of the existential analytic of Dasein in Being and Time. And for this we have to concern ourselves with 'presence' again. (See "Versions of 'Presence'" above).

This is a particularly difficult and yet important question.
That it is difficult will soon become apparent. It is particularly important for us because of the weight attached to the concept of 'presence' by Derrida, and in the ambiguous distance from Heidegger this involves him in. Very crudely, Derrida regards an appeal to (a) presence of one sort or another as the hallmark of the logocentric or metaphysical tradition, and he is not sure that Heidegger, on whom he draws for this analysis, actually escapes from this tradition.

'to the extent that...logocentrism is not totally absent from Heidegger's thought, perhaps it still holds that thought in the epoch of onto-theology, within the philosophy of presence, that is to say, within philosophy itself' (Of Grammatology) 8

We shall return to this later. Meanwhile we can at least take our cue from it in looking at Heidegger's account of 'presence' ('Anwesenheit'). For it is true, Heidegger does not seem to claim that the interpretation of Being as presence is wrong but rather that we need to rethink the meaning of this 'presence'. We need to re-experience it.

An excellent account of what the author calls 'the presencing process' is offered by Werner Marx in his book Heidegger and the Tradition, 9 and I shall draw substantially on this in the remarks that follow now. Marx tries to capture Heidegger's account of the 'presenting process' or what we could call 'presencing', by focussing on three of the key Greek words that Heidegger rethinks or reworks: physis, aletheia, and logos.

As we have seen before, Heidegger had already talked about presence in the form of the Vorhanden, Being-present-at-hand, in Being and Time, a type of Being contrasted with the Ready-to-hand (Zuhanden) - also translated as 'tools' or 'equipment' - by its inert, static presence. 10 The most obvious example of this is Descartes' conception of a res extensa, a merely extended thing. This reading of presence would weight it on the side of the object. But in his later work, Heidegger came to understand
presence as characterising at the most general level, the relationship of man to the world, and to himself, or what Werner Marx calls the 'subject-object' relationship. Heidegger calls presence the constant abiding that approaches man, reaches him, is extended to him. It has taken a number of different historical forms:

'...presencing shows itself as the hen, the unifying unique One, as the logos, the gathering that preserves the All, as idea, ousia, energeia, substantia, actualitas, perceptio, monad, as objectivity, as the being posited of self-positing in the sense of the will of reason, of love, of the spirit, of power, as the will to will in the eternal recurrence of the same.'

But to see what presence really involves we cannot identify it with any of these historical embodiments. Heidegger's way of probing the meaning of presence is by way of what we could call a speculative etymological phenomenology. For Heidegger, certain words preserve fundamental experiences, and these experiences can be wrested from them sometimes only by violence. He often translates physis, when used by the pre-Socratics, as Anwesen, an active presencing, or making present. To physis as Anwesen he attaches a number of distinct phenomenal characteristics:

1. Creative occurrence. The emergence of something out of itself, illustrated in the overwhelming powers of nature, or the fruits of the earth.


3. Appearing. Showing itself, coming to light (even while pointing back to the darkness).

All these together, or each of them at different times, go some way towards capturing the early Greek sense of physis, a 'concept' which so interpreted is not really a concept at all but rather a pointer to a productive flux, governed by no restitutive necessities, or teleological principles. This is the first way in which presence can be unpacked.

Next we have aletheia. Marx relates it to physis in the following way:
'the basic traits of the presenting process thought as physis were manifested in its 'self-emerging-prevalence' which as a coming to be, an appearing, a coming to the fore, is a stepping forth into the light.' 13

We are offered, in other words, something like a primal scene as the underlying link between physis and aletheia. In the Essence of Truth it is understood as openness, in Letter on Humanism a clearing. So aletheia, usually translated simply as truth, is for Heidegger the 'openness characteristic of the occurrence of presence experienced by the early Greeks'. But Heidegger is not suggesting that in aletheia we have some absolute transparency, some perfect illumination, or unconcealment. That would lead us toward the idea of an unmediated presence, in which truth, for example, would just be a matter of contact or correspondence. For Heidegger, aletheia is light always struggling with the powers of darkness, lodged in a field of strife. Openness is always threatened and defined against what threatens it. Plato had already forgotten this.

In all too summary fashion, we must also mention logos. Through his interpretation of Heraclitus, Heidegger has developed a reading of logos that rounds out our understanding of 'presence'. Presence as logos is expressed in a number of ways:

1. a laying down, a laying out, laying forth
2. a depositing in unconcealment
3. a gathering of all that strives apart, out of its dispersion, a collecting together

But logos does not mean order, for as with aletheia, and indeed physis, there is no finality about this 'gathering', no necessity. There is no relief in this logos from struggle.

'On the contrary, presence must be kept in contention as a "conflict" a "primeval strife", if it is not to lose its creative power, if it is to remain an occurrence in the original sense.' 17

Aletheia, we said, was no final illumination. And logos is no privileged static order. The huge importance of this latter claim is that
logos itself has no ground, but is a 'groundless play' 'indifferent to our search for principles and foundations. So the logos for Heidegger can offer no absolute grounding, and this in his eyes is enough to dismantle the pretensions of ontology and theology.

Clearly there is a great deal more to be said about the logos, especially about its intertwinings with language. But already it is clear how Heidegger can be said to have returned from 'presence' understood on the basis of some pre-constituted concept of time, to a more original process of presencing. We shall shortly make explicit some of the elements of this analysis, elements that Derrida picks up in his continuation of the general thesis about the history of metaphysics as the history of Being as 'presence'.

But we must first at least attempt an assessment of this account of presence as an account of, or as suggesting an account of a primordial temporality. I would suggest two meanings of 'primordial temporality':

(1) A phenomenon which, although not itself temporal, is nonetheless specifically related to the temporal and makes it possible.

(2) A basic form of temporality on which other more developed and familiar forms depend.

The issue in either case would then be whether the phenomenon in question was itself temporal or not. But we cannot decide this unless and until we have some standard of what counts as the 'temporal'. And the trouble is that the assured constitution of the object of our inquiry cannot be presumed in this case. The question of what 'temporality' means is not independent of the question of whether presencing ( Anwesen ) can be treated as primordial temporality.

Within the Heideggerean framework we would not expect all that is true of Time, as commonly understood, to be true of primordial temporality. We would not for example expect primordial temporality to involve a sequence of nows. But are there not some characteristics it must have?
Primordial temporality - understood through presencing - has, we believe, the following important features:

(1) It is neither the temporality of a subject nor of a pre-constituted object (this theme reappears in the language of the *es gibt* and *ereignis* in *Time and Being*).

(2) In a corollary way, its description has to constantly resist nominal forms. Heidegger is far happier with verbal forms. His use of language here is often itself a kind of presencing. Presencing itself appears, emerges, is shown, drawn together, through verbal forms.

(3) This temporality is weighted on the side of the creative, the emergent, while not ignoring its relation to what lies hidden.

(4) Temporality is understood in oppositional terms. Its essential moment is that of struggle, conflict.

(5) This temporality is void of any supervening principles of order. It has no purpose, its form is not even linear, it has no dialectical powers of resolution.

(6) It is not a neutral base, but always has a 'colour'. It is always something that emerges, or is given, or is appropriated, or it always occurs in some way or other.

(7) The purity of temporality itself seems to recede in this account. With *aletheia* for example we have an opening, a clearing — more of a spatial concept. We might be forgiven for thinking of presence as a primitive spatiotemporality. And indeed in *Time and Being*, Heidegger talks of a primitive time-space, as if time by itself were a later abstraction.

If this characterization is at all fair, it begins to seem as though there is no clear answer to whether presencing so described is itself a form of temporality, or rather an 'event' or 'process' underlying temporality. On the one hand it would seem it could be equally construed as in part a primitive spatiality, and on the other hand, it
clearly does describe an event, presencing, that does not cease to be temporal. But it does not seem to be all there is to time. Might it not better be thought of as a theory of irruptions in time, not of time 'itself'? 

So it might be argued that we have overestimated Heidegger's account. Surely it is not an account of primordial temporality - but rather of a phenomenon - 'presence' - which is both more than a temporal one (involving something like a general man/world relationship), and also only handling directly one aspect of the temporal (what about the past and the future?). What this question raises more generally, is whether it is at all proper to try to understand Time on the basis of an analysis of a particularly important role that interpretations of time have played in the history of philosophy.

In so far as these interpretations seem to hold enormous sway over the ways we think of time, we might well conclude that these interpretations of time could at least be profitably drawn up into a more general theory of time. Surely time has all sorts of descriptive features independent of any value that has been accredited to different temporal modalities.

Two disconcerting replies can be made here. First, it might be said that if there are these descriptive properties, they would hardly be the concern of a philosophy of time, philosophy being concerned with theories, rules, principles but not mere description. The answer to this of course is that philosophy can indeed be descriptive and that phenomenology is a prime example of this possibility. The second reply is in many ways more worrying. Derrida has suggested that the concept of Time might be essentially linked to the metaphysical tradition, so that to try to think of time outside that tradition would be a vain undertaking. This position of course undermines the project of a philosophy of time from the outset, insofar as it undermines philosophy.
As a way into Derrida, this account of Heidegger's discussion of temporality and presence is not complete. Mention ought properly to be made of Heidegger's emphasis on the ontological difference between Being and beings, his essay on the "Onto-Theological Constitution of Metaphysics" of the *Question of Being*, of his Nietzsche books, of his essay on Anaximander, and of his *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. But what we would like to do now is to evaluate, in the light of Heidegger's account of presencing, the account Derrida gives of the role of time both in metaphysics and in particular in the theory of the sign. After this I will explain what I take to be the limitations of Derrida's approach to an understanding of Time.

Derrida shares with Heidegger the general analysis of the history of philosophy as the history of presence. In addition to Heidegger's own arguments, Derrida makes use in particular of Husserl's account of time-consciousness, and of Saussure's account of language as a system of differences, as providing ammunition for the deconstruction of the value of presence. The use of Husserl is ironic in that it appears in the course of an internal critique of Husserl's theory of ideality, of intuition, and of the sign. Husserl is committed to an account of ideality that refers to a particular type of consciousness, one which has an essence directly presented to it. Derrida as we have seen uses against Husserl his own theory of time-consciousness, in which the present is never simply distinguishable from the past and future but overlaid with pro- temptions and retentions. As such this present is never pure, says Derrida. And yet such purity is required for there to be a pure intuition. Husserl, he suggests, for all the superiority of phenomenology over previous philosophy, is still a metaphysician, in that he is committed to crediting presence with a value and status that it does not have and cannot sustain. Again, he argues against Husserl that there are no purely expressive signs, no signs that would or could simply convey a meaning expressed through
them. All signs function as part of a signifying system in which it is the play of differences between signs that gives each of them meaning. Derrida is committed to the view that all meaning, all signification functions like this, so the idea of coming face to face with an essence, or the meaning of a sign - a true presence - is an illusion, or better, a fantasy. Or rather, the possibility of an experience one might describe in such a way is dependent on relations outside that experience which destroy its sense of magical purity.

The belief in a fulness of expression, by the voice, of a meaning, which has given human speech a privileged value in the history of philosophy, is based on the idea that through the voice, the other is somehow directly given, or revealed. But if speech is equally a system of signs, then it too must be governed by the Saussurean principles of difference. And this time he operates an internal critique against Saussure.

For Saussure, inconsistently Derrida claims, reviles writing, as a mere external copy of speech, crediting speech with a privileged primacy, a thesis Derrida dubs phonocentrism. If we accept that the properties of detachability and arbitrariness that we find openly in writing are in fact typical of any systematic use of signs, it is not too far fetched to generalise the concept of writing and to consider every use of signs a writing. This is like the move that generalises the term 'language' to the language of art, of the body etc. Derrida instead, and with more persuasive intent, extends the term writing, and even to include speech. Whatever the problems this brings, it has, for him, the advantage that he seems to have cleared a site in which one might be able to think in a way free from the metaphysics that seems to appear whenever one talks about the subject, consciousness, meaning, experience....

Derrida is taking up the task that Heidegger laid at our feet - that of thinking if not beyond metaphysics, at least along different lines.
But there is surely another topic we could have added to the list—TIME. According to Derrida, as we have often remarked,

'\textit{the concept of Time belongs entirely to metaphysics and designates the domination of presence}'.\footnote{26}

And yet surely Derrida makes considerable use of temporal considerations in setting the stage for what he calls his grammatology.\footnote{27} After all it is the pervasiveness of the illusory temporality of presence that makes his project of deconstruction plausible.

One of the fullest accounts he gives of what we will provisionally call the primitive role of the temporal is to be found in his essay \textit{Differance} (with an a).\footnote{28} We do not propose to go through this point by point, but we would like to show what role the temporal plays in developing this vital 'term' because it is via difference that Derrida's consistent distance from philosophy can be measured.

After a few precious pages in which he makes it clear that difference is really a thoroughly undecidable term — neither a word nor a concept — he nonetheless tries to explain its manifold 'meaning' by a little semantic elaboration. The French verb \textit{differer} apparently does service for both the English verb to defer and to differ. Both of these senses are embraced at once. Signs are quite traditionally thought to defer their meaning, they stand in for something not immediately available. Derrida calls this temporizing.\footnote{29} And the sense of differer which means to differ neatly expresses the Saussurean sense of the differences, dissimilarities, between signs that allow them to mean anything. This would could call a spacing.

So far so good. But we must be careful. Firstly, the traditional understanding of the sign as deferring its meaning, treats the sign as secondary and provisional; in relation to some primary meaning. And this is a thoroughly retrograde view. Rather, the deferment, the temporizing aspect of difference involves an other which may never have been present,
and may never become present. In other words what is deferred is not to be thought of as a present just temporarily absent, but as outside the whole system of presence and absence.

The spatial aspect of difference - differing - also requires more thought. Briefly we must remember that the principle of difference applies not just to the signifier but also to what is signified, for example, meanings.

So what about differance? Can we say it produces differences? We can, but we have to be aware of the dangers of hypostatizing differance as some sort of real source or origin. If we can grasp such a productive play without attributing to differance the status of an originating presence, fine. If not, we have to think of some other way of putting it.

Derrida tries to handle this problem by the term 'trace', which, were it possible would be an effect without cause. The trace, if anything, is an element in the signifying process. Each trace relates to a past element, and to a future element; it is separated from other traces by an interval, and in such a fundamental way that this spacing can be said to be constitutive of its present. In summary, to use his own words:

'It is this constitution of the present as a 'primordial' and irreducibly non-simple and therefore in the strict sense non primordial synthesis of traces, retentions and protentions...that I propose to call protowriting, prototrace or differance. The latter (is) (both) spacing (and) temporizing.'

We are very close to being able to compare this account with Heidegger's account of presence. But let us search just a little further for an even more appropriate place to turn off.

'Presence...is no longer...the absolutely matrical form of being but...a 'determination' and an 'effect'. Presence is a determination and effect within a system which is no longer that of presence but that of differance; it no more allows the opposition between activity and passivity than between cause and effect...'

As we read him here, what Derrida is saying here is this: we can reconstruct the phenomenon of presence within a framework that makes no use of its basic terms and assumptions. If it did not risk a lapse
back into metaphysics, we could say that presence on this reading is merely a system effect, and not the ground, source, origin, foundation...of meaning or anything else.

Surely this is something of a writing experiment (along the lines of a thought experiment). The term differance is, as he puts it, an assemblage of the basic themes of a number of thinkers from Hegel to Bataille, and it seems to be possible to put it to work to construct an account of how presence could be produced non-metaphysically.

How, we might ask, does this square with the Heideggerean account of presence? We will briefly compare these two accounts with respect to two questions:

(1) Where do each of them leave time?

(2) Where do each of them stand with regard to metaphysics?

We take the second of these questions first.

Derrida is not at all sure where he stands in relation to Heidegger's account of the ontico-ontological difference, the difference between Being and beings, one obvious point of correlation with Derrida's differance. Certainly, he says, differance is in part 'the historical deployment of Being'. But equally, he would be happier if we could think of differance outside of all considerations of Being and/or its relation to beings. Certainly Heidegger himself came to be less interested in the ontological difference and more in Being as such. But Derrida seems to want to say that even then, metaphysics has not been thrown off. It is not enough, it seems, to awaken the question of Being, as Heidegger had done. We have in some way to actively forget it. Derrida suggests that the ontico-ontological differance might be a particular determination of his more original differance.

To return now to the first question, there are some fascinating parallels between Derrida and Heidegger as far as time is concerned. In particular:
a. In both cases, presence is underpinned by something not itself a presence. Whether we call it primordial temporality or whatever, it seems to have some quasi-temporal properties, and it certainly undermines the privilege of what it underpins, the ordinary metaphysical concept of time as a series of nows. 34

b. Both Derrida and Heidegger talk about this process as one of play, a movement in which principles of order, finality, origin, have fallen away.

c. Finally, both suggest in a way quite distinct from relativity physics, that fundamentally temporality and spatiality are not distinct. Derrida finds these linked in differance, and Heidegger in his time-space.

When all is said and done ought we to be convinced by this general thesis about the interplay between the history of philosophy as metaphysics, the interpretation of Being, and the value of presence?

As far as its consequences for philosophy are concerned, it can be immensely fruitful. One is thrust forcibly against a whole series of questions that lurk on the boundary between philosophy and non-philosophy. One is driven to asking questions of a basically Nietzschean sort about the theoretical investments involved in the tools of philosophical thinking—in particular those systematic and pervasive investments that seem to be self-concealing. And there is no doubt that a value—in part temporal—which has been called 'presence'—can be seen to unify, if loosely, a number of key philosophical concepts and values.

What are we to make of the suggestion that a new way of thinking, or a new writing is required? Has not a radical break in the history of philosophy often been advertised in these terms, 35 to the point that it is almost a genre?

Much of the problem lies in the temptation—to which we perhaps
succumb in the Appendix - to offer a description of a primal scene -
either of presencing or differance, in which certain ways of thinking
about space and time are legitimized. For even as description of this
scene recognises, say, the enormous wealth of language, or the variety
of ways of Being, it cannot help unifying this variety, comprehending
it, and anticipating its diversity. And the consequence is a novel sort
of reductionism. Moreover, the unifying drive that each of these
positions reflects, makes one wonder whether the understanding of time
has not been sacrificed in an ostensibly greater cause.

The conclusion we are to draw from Derrida is that in the only
place at which the question of time can properly be posed - within the
discussion of differance - it is welded to a spatiality and has no
genuinely independent status.

Both Derrida and Heidegger emphasise and draw our attention to the
fact that a philosophical study of time is systematically beset with
the problem of taking into account the role time has already played
in constituting the terms and standards within which the discussion
is to take place. I take it this is what Derrida meant when he said
that

'in a certain sense it is always too late to pose the question of
time since it has already appeared' 36

And it is not merely a question of discounting the work already done
by time in these terms and standards. If Heidegger and Derrida are
right there would be no philosophy left if we decided to put to one
side the interpretation of time as presence, for that has determined
the interpretation of Being since the pre-Socratics, and that has
shaped all or almost all of philosophy.

Surely one general thesis to be drawn from their work is that what-
ever the consequences for philosophy in general an investigation of the
role of Time in philosophy spells the end of the philosophy of Time.
And the residual nature of the temporality described in the primal scene would seem to confirm this.

However we regard the demise of the philosophy of Time as a sad prospect and an implausible one. We hope to show, by pursuing the project of the deconstruction of our ordinary concept of time one further stage, how this conclusion can be averted.
III. Time Beyond Deconstruction

PREFATORY NOTE

In Part III it will become apparent to the reader that surface linearity diminishes in importance as an organizing principle. We would like to think of this as bearing witness to the theoretical displacement of simple succession to which the deconstruction of time gives rise. The truth, however, has more to do with what lies outside the text—the force of circumstances. At the serious risk of laying false trails, we include here a few advance words about each chapter. The Appendix will be left to speak for itself.

Part III weaves discussions of time with discussions of textuality, style, and strategy. The rationale for this is to be found in the belief (a) that questions of time and signification cannot 'finally' be separated, and that the readier access we have to textual structures of signification affords us powerful insight into the complexities of temporal organization, (b) that in both strands of the double movement traced by this thesis—time as structure, time as event—the question of style and strategy, indeed of writing itself, has repeatedly become problematic. Indeed Derridean deconstruction necessarily problematizes writing, his own included.

The apparently untroubled innocence of our own style reflects in part our sense of the limits of alternative styles and strategies while fully appreciative of their value.

* In chapter 1 we argue that Derrida's concern to expose the metaphorical determination of our ordinary concept of time 'as presence' opens up the possibility of a 'positive' account of
the temporality of language. But by lodging his residual sense of the temporal in such a quasi-transcendental term as 'differance', this possibility is unfortunately closed off.

In chapter 2(A) we discuss style and strategy. Husserl admits that his word Flug, - for the Absolute Flux of time - is a metaphor. Perhaps the understanding of what is primitively temporal puts a strain on our ordinary linguistic resources. In this light we look at some of Derrida's innovative 'philosophical' styles and strategies of writing, and suggest some alternative.

In chapter 2(B), by comparing Heidegger's style with Derrida's 'strategy' we argue that the success of Derrida's philosophical writing depends on our illicitly (in his own view) privileging his strategic (meta-) intentions in the guidance of our reading.

In the Postscript to chapter 2, we further suggest, in relation to Derrida, (i) that 'differance' and 'presence' are not transcendentally but 'dialectically' related, (ii) that deconstruction is open to the charge of a certain formalism. Again we take serious issue with Derrida's use of the 'sous rature', and claim that he sails too close to the winds of metaphysics for his own good.

In chapter 3, we illustrate the consequences of restricting the scope of a range of philosophical views of time to regional applications, serving more modest hermeneutical goals. We consider cosmogonic, dialectical, phenomenological, existential time, and the 'time of the sign'. We suggest a limited privilege to the existential dimension outlined by Heidegger in Being and Time.

We suggest that something like the existential framework of Heidegger's Being and Time, with radical pluri-dimensionality replacing considerations of authenticity, might (if only for methodological reasons) have a privileged position here.
In chapter 4, we argue that an alternative model of time can be drawn from the structures of *temporal textuality*. We begin by looking at more or less structural features of discourse, defend the role of representation and diagrams of time against the charge of spatialization, and discuss the exemplary structure of narrative. Distancing ourselves somewhat from traditional 'structural analysis' we distinguish seven levels of temporality in the narrative (that of the reader, the narrator, the plot, the action, the characters, and of the narrative discourse itself) and argue that these sustain a strong analogy between text and experience.

In chapter 5, we distinguish two traditional grounds for giving the concept of 'the future' a special place in philosophical thinking: hermeneutical and ethical. Post-structuralism, it has been claimed, 'has no vision of the future'. We draw on Derrida's writing to show why this is so, and try to *interprete* it more positively. We suggest, reflexively, that philosophy be treated as a fundamental event.
CHAPTER ONE

Derrida's Deconstruction of Time, and its Limitations

In this chapter the discussion centres on the possibility of an adequate account of the temporality of language. We claim that Derrida's contribution here is essentially preparatory and that he does not (and perhaps cannot) himself offer such an account. The force of this demonstration for our argument as a whole rests of course on the generalizability of these claims about the temporality of language to 'time' itself. Our general line here (developed more explicitly in the next chapter) is that this expansion of scope is achieved when we see language (in its widest sense as the significant articulation of experience) as the very source of that wealth of temporal structures we only begin in this thesis to describe. We argue that Derrida's specific sterility here is a consequence of his one-sided development of a quite traditional philosophical opposition between identity and difference, and particularly, of his inability to shake free of what is for him a necessary strategic detour through transcendental argument.

The fact that my remarks will be fairly straightforwardly philosophical does however present in itself a kind of theoretical problem. For Derrida does not pretend to, or pretends not to seek the approval of philosophy. His aims lie elsewhere.

He writes:

* To make enigmatic what one thinks one understands by the words "proximity", "immediacy", "presence" (the proximate, the own, the

* This chapter is a very slightly revised version of Time and the Sign published in the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, vol. 13, No. 2, May 1982. It was presented in an earlier form to the International Association for Philosophy and Literature at the University of Maine at Orono in May 1980. I am indebted to Andrew Benjamin for his helpful criticisms of that version.
There may be a certain amount of irony in these words, but we need not dismiss them. Nor should we ignore their implications. Derrida is trying to produce an effect. His writing is governed by a strategy, not by, say, the ideal of truth. Indeed one reply to my claim that his position is onesided and undialectical, is that he is not actually taking up a position at all. A position implies a location within a space and Derrida is a frontiersman. To accuse him of theoretical overkill is to forget this strategic status of his writing.

But this strategy involves and invokes numerous philosophical arguments and numerous stands taken on other philosophical positions as well as on philosophy itself. Derrida's writing is armed to resist traditional philosophical reappropriation for as long as possible, and in trying to open him up, I have all the hesitation he has about trying to bite into Hegel. One can come to a sticky end. While I do not want to dismantle these defences in detail, I will just suggest a couple of ways of getting a foot in the door, ways of dealing with his most general defences against philosophy, so that a philosophical approach to Derrida will not seem futile from the outset.

The structure of this defence mechanism is classic. It could be called rebuttal by pre-emptive engulfment. Derrida knows what the essence of philosophy is, and he has taken its measure. Philosophy is the systematic deployment of concepts invested with a privilege which (after Heidegger) he calls presence, such as meaning, truth, experience, consciousness, the subject ... the list is very long. In each case we find the same value demanded, promised, preserved ... of a ground, a foundation, a beginning, a point of privileged encounter.
Is there not at least a danger - to put it no more strongly - that the whole vast bulk of writing we call philosophy, and much besides, might be thought to have been reduced to this one character? Are not all those enormous differences being treated as evidence of the Same? Surely this closure of philosophy, as Derrida calls it, is a gesture born and bred in the stables of philosophy itself? And yet on Derrida's own premises, premises independent of the thesis that philosophy is the development of presence, no writing, philosophical or otherwise, can have its meaning so summarily represented or extracted. Why does his circumscription of philosophy not commit him to an essentialism untenable on his own terms?

But pre-emptive engulfment is never a conclusive ploy, against philosophy especially. The second way I would demonstrate this, after which Derrida's writing should be sufficiently softened up to withstand a little philosophohical probing, is by offering a rather non-Derridean characterisation of his treatment of philosophy. In writing about the privilege of presence in philosophy, he uses terms like 'security', 'reduction of anxiety', etc. The value of presence is the value of a desire for such security, expressed in a variety of ways. Derrida's totalizing treatment of philosophy can be understood as a hermeneutic of Desire. More often even than philosophy invokes the value of a presence. Derrida interprets philosophy as the desire for such a first point or arche. This interpretation, albeit as a partial reading is generally accurate, but surely not legitimate for Derrida. As I read Derrida, the real meaning of philosophy is this Desire. But there are no real meanings for Derrida, and if there were, to privilege one, as he does here with such a Desire, would be an interference with play.²

With these two attempts to jam his basic defense against a
philosophical intrusion, I have simply tried to create a little space in which to think critically and yet philosophically about Derrida. These lines of argument may be thought both unnecessary and unjustified. Unnecessary because Derrida is the first to admit there is no real escape from philosophy. And unjustified because of the precautions with which he surrounds his writing. I cannot here take up the issue of the logic of precautionary gestures, but I can offer the conclusion I came to: that Derrida privileges his precautionary gestures—graphic and propositional—in a way he cannot justify, for there can be no such privileged writing.

I began with a claim about the absence of an adequate account of the temporality of language in Derrida, and how this defect is rooted in and undialectical promotion of difference at the expense of identity. I will first try to show how the specific temporality of language gets both partially uncovered and then covered over again. Fortunately the ground is still fresh.

The last section of Linguistics and Grammatology (LG) entitled The Hinge (La Brisure) will provide us with most of our material but the problem can be most sharply fronted by three brief quotations from the end of Derrida's long and difficult Ousia and Gramme.

1. 'The concept of time, in all its aspects, belongs to metaphysics, and it names the domination of presence.' (p. 63)

2. '... if something which bears a relation to time, but is not time — is to be thought beyond the determination of Being as presence, it cannot... still... be called time.' (p. 60)

3. 'an other concept of time cannot be opposed to it (the whole historical system of metaphysical concepts—DCW) since time in general belongs to metaphysical conceptuality.' (p. 63)

We are essentially in Heidegger country here. Heidegger's general thesis was that the history of philosophy could only be understood through the way it had interpreted Being. And for Heidegger, since the pre-Socratics, Being had always been determined, in some form or other, as
presence. But by the time this temporal determination of Being came to be reflected upon - by Plato and Aristotle - the understanding of Time had been taken over by physics. Time's ontological status receded from view.

It should be clear from this account that Heidegger leaves room for reappropriation of a more original time or temporality, a recovery of what was lost. And indeed he writes of authentic or primordial time in Being and Time (1927), and in Time and Being (1962) he refers to true time, to designate admittedly different readings of this original time.

For all his debts to Heidegger, Derrida not only thinks of the question of Being as a metaphysical residue, but explicitly questions this hankering after a lost primordial time. And here our quotations come to life. There is no alternative concept of time to the metaphysical one. To think outside metaphysics, or to try to, we must abandon the concept of time. The traditional way of understanding the concept of the sign, according to Derrida, is in part at least a secondary, instrumental and disposable representation of a meaning or referent which is not itself present, whose presence is absent and deferred. This concept of the sign invokes a value of presence which only the traditional conception of time can sustain. On Derrida's view, if we reject that concept of time, there is none other available to take its place. It is that or nothing. We may not be stuck for words, but they will not announce an alternative temporality.

We might think that some sort of compromise could be reached here. Could we not agree on a 'new' sense of time and temporality? One perhaps fundamentally different from the old one. The reason for his intransigence here is revealing. Derrida has a thesis (that slips in and out of erasure), which provides a transcendental ground for time (and indeed space).
Naturally this transcendental thesis is hedged by qualifications, for there could be nothing more metaphysical than such a claim. But in the first sentence of that section *The Hinge* it appears in all its birthday innocence

-Origin of the experience of space and time, this writing of difference, this fabric of the trace, permits the difference between space and time to be articulated, to appear as such, in the unity of an experience.* (Pp.65-6)

There are three problems with this. Is it a transcendental claim? If not what sort of claim is it? Do we not find a primordial temporality in *différance* or the trace?

These questions are only sharpened when we notice the extraordinary structural parallels between this description of the role of differance (let us say), the role Kant attributes (on Heidegger's reading) to the transcendental imagination in the first *Critique* and the role Heidegger gives to what he calls the *es gibt* in *Time and Being.* But whereas for Kant, transcendental imagination *is* (sometimes 'is rooted in') temporality of a primordial sort, and for Heidegger what is given is true time, Derrida has no such alternative temporality. At least he says no such is possible. This is not to say of course that what seem like temporal characteristics are not central to his characterization of the trace and differance. The stumbling block, as I see it, is that Derrida takes seriously the traditional link between time, the logic of identity and the law of non-contradiction. And it is not possible to characterise the trace or differance without violating these logical principles.

I will now try to show the vital role of time in the development of the terms trace and differance, and how they in turn then absorb that very same temporality.

The term trace can be understood as a transformation of the concept
of sign, a transformation in which the horizon of presence that governs the classic concept of the sign gives way to the 'horizon' of difféance. While a sign is classically understood as standing in for a meaning or referent which while not actually present, is potentially so, the trace on the other hand refers to a past that cannot fully be reactivated, even potentially, a 'past' that can no longer be thought of as a past present, now dormant. The term trace is the result of depriving the concept of sign of its signifier/signified structure. This deprivation rests on the claim that the idea of the signified here is a metaphysical legacy.

With this term trace arrives a problematic temporality, which may no longer be a temporality at all. We might think, for example, that what was needed was some sort of phenomenological enrichment of the traditional concept of time as a series of nows. Would it not help in understanding the peculiar mixture of dependence and independence of what is other than it to consider the phenomenological account of temporality elaborated by Husserl? Here the present is from the very beginning permeated with past and future, as retention and protention. But the past and future are here each grasped as presents, albeit potential presents. That is, they are experiences that we once were having, or may soon be having. In this expanded living present, the value of experiential evidence, of 'presence' remains and is indeed shored up. And it is this very value that the trace denies. There can be no phenomenology of the trace.

Now it is easy to see that an account of the temporality of language could not just make use of clock time, physical time. The words I am now writing or speaking, even understood from the point of view of simple succession have no single order to them. They can be ordered as individual word-units, or as parts of larger units of articulation, such as
sentences. We have elsewhere called this 'nested articulation'. And succession is by no means the key to the temporality of language. One might have thought that a theory of temporality that began by bracketing out objective, world time, as phenomenology does, would be exactly what was required. The force of Derrida's criticism here (LG p. 67) is to claim that it cannot account even for the most basic temporality of the trace, ultimately because its structure is anterior to even phenomenological temporality. Phenomenology was after all concerned with time-consciousness and Derrida's trace is an attempt to handle something like the 'unconscious' of language.

The trace is said to have a structure. Loosely speaking we could say that it involves a certain sort of relating. Derrida was prepared to use the word referring. If it breaks with the idea of time it is I believe in part because that relation neither requires nor establishes a dimensionality, any form of neutral extensiveness such as a concept of time always seems to require. To pursue this question, we will now turn to the related term differance (with an a). We draw on the versions found in LG and on the essay Differance.

In this latter essay, he puts the term through its hoops so that without defining it he can nonetheless show what use can be made of it, and explain the historical context of its appearance as what he calls an 'assemblage' (not a word or a concept). In LG he uses it to do the work for which a transcendental critique is traditionally reserved - to unsettle a naive objectivism - in this case that of Hjelmslev's linguisticism.

The term différence allows us another access route to Derrida's theory of writing, this time through Saussure. Derrida's relationship to Saussure has three key aspects. Derrida endorses in broad terms, the priority of language over the language user. To make sense we have
to make use of a pre-existing language. Secondly, he shows that Saussure's account of the sign is at odds with his privileging speech over writing, and Derrida himself argues that the rupture with presence, with the transcendental subject, that we find openly in ordinary writing is characteristic of all signification, including speech. Even speech one could say, is a kind of writing. Thirdly, he appropriates Saussure's diacritical theory of the sign, the idea that language is just a system of differences. Differance, indebted to Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud and others, is most directly drawn from Saussure. The sign has no meaning in itself, no semantic content. If we think of it as having a meaning, then it is not a 'presence', not a unity graspable in itself. For Saussure, both the signifier and signified have their identity only through the ways they differ from other signifiers or signifieds in the system. But how are we to think this relationship of difference? Derrida's development of the term 'differance' brings out what looks at first glance like an original spatiotemporality of differance, and does so using the semantic duality of the French verb differer. It stands for both the English verbs, 'to differ' and 'to defer'. In differing we have a kind of 'spacing' and in deferring a temporizing, that is a delaying. Differance is meant to capture both. This 'spacing' and this 'temporizing' are each offered as the fundamental conditions of any signification at all. They are two ways of unpacking the idea that a sign is constituted not by a re-presentative relation to another presence, but by a deferment to and a spacing from what is absolutely other. Identity is the product of difference; presence derivative from a fundamental absence.

So while Derrida makes important use of a temporal notion like delay, or temporizing in his account of differance (a good example is Freud's delayed effect) we are not to think of this as an operation that
takes place in time, nor as constitutive of another sort of time. Somehow, différence is a 'movement' that makes time possible. But is not itself temporal. Does it then offer us an account of the temporality of language? The answer to that, I think, is that if it succeeds at all, it does so by offering an account of the temporality of the sign, of its 'presence'. Derrida is, as it were, saving the appearances. The spacing and temporizing of différence makes possible the underwriting of the apparent simplicity of presence as a manufactured complexity.

'It is this constitution of the present, as an "originary" and irreducibly non-simple (and therefore stricto sensu nonoriginary) synthesis of marks, or traces of retentions, and protentions [terms used only provisionally - DCW] ... that I propose to call ... différence ... which (is)(simultaneously) spacing (and) temporization.'

So the argument is that différence precedes time understood through presence - that is for example, as made up of a series of now points, or as the living present - in that it is only on the basis of différence that presence is possible.

We quoted Derrida earlier as saying that no alternative temporality was available outside time as presence. One of the important consequences of this is that he will not allow us to have a kind of two-tier temporality, in which, say, an unconscious temporality, one governed by différence for example, was woven on to an underlying phenomenological time. That would leave phenomenological time in itself untouched by différence. And of course it precisely is affected if its presence is a mere "effect" of différence. We cannot use différence as a corrective; it transforms what it touches. And the implication certainly is that the very idea of an unconscious temporality is based on this idea of using différence in a merely corrective way, so it must be dropped. I think this is a mistake. An account of what we could call the unconscious temporality
of language can be provided and we can even begin to construct it out of
some of the material that Derrida himself has gathered.

To license my efforts in assembling a few hints towards a genuine
temporality of language I must first justify my misapprehensions about
différance, albeit too briefly to be absolutely satisfying. I begin with
a general reminder. Derrida's writing as we have said, is governed by
strategy and the historical situation in which he finds himself. Preceded
by and surrounded by a vast sea of philosophical writing, unaware as he
believes, of its naive and uncritical commitment to presence, Derrida's
response is to write a shadow text. By a shadow text I mean one which
precisely in its intransigent repudiation of presence as a founding value,
makes a difference that a more conciliatory text would not have made.
But this is just assertion, not an argument.

There is after all, an important objection to be made to giving a
transcendental status to the relationship between différance and presence,
a relationship which he characterises by all the forbidden words - priority,
production, origin... in and out of formal dress. He argues, I think
correctly that one has to go through transcendental types of argument,
rather than just bypass them. But he retains the value of privilege and
priority that only such arguments bestow. Remember his words "Différance
... is a constitution of the present as a synthesis of traces". Or "This
writing of différance ... (is the) ... origin of the experience of space
and time" (My underlining). In neither of these cases, and they are not
unusual, are precautions offered. It will be said that he knew what he
was doing.... But have we agreed on what that was? In making 'enigmatic'
the idea of presence, Derrida cannot be indifferent as to the legitimacy
of the means he employs. He is, I believe, engaged in high-grade mimicry
of transcendental arguments. But he does not and cannot show that différance
can be the origin of anything. Let us suppose that there are always scare-quotes or erasures implied in such terms. But then surely the consequence is that they do not have the required force. They cannot establish the priority they claim.

In my view undeconstructed presence, and various of the concepts associated with it, are ineliminable in principle. Derrida himself says something like this— that we cannot imagine abandoning the concepts of metaphysics when deconstructing it. I mean it in a rather different way. At the rarified level of argument we have just left, I concluded that Derrida could not claim a privileged position or priority for differance over presence without self-stultification. Is there room for the term differance without this privilege attached to it? I think there is and it is at precisely the same level as there is room for 'presences', 'unities' and 'identities' functioning without the metaphysical security that philosophy is apt to bestow upon them.

There is in Derrida's work a self-confessed danger of inducing sterility. The language of differance not only legitimates a school of criticism, but has terror potential in its exclusion of a whole range of important analytical concepts. More importantly for my purposes it discourages interest in the temporality of language.

The level I have referred to, at which presence and differance meet without privilege, I would call the level of human finitude. We are satisfied with partial answers to questions, incompletely fulfilled meanings, good enough cases of immediacy. We do have a tacit knowledge of contexts, we construe situations, we know what it is to see a piece of paper, to go for a walk, etc. Derrida would probably not dispute this. What I think he forgets is that it is from these everyday securities, and our tacit grasp, however vague and average that we necessarily start
with when considering, say, the contribution of difféance to their constitution. The always-already present is the condition for difféance being thinkable. Derrida's way of handling this problem involves the use of the concept of economy. The play of difféance is not infinite. Stabilities are the product of an economy of forces in a field. And that is importantly quite as true of the 'terms' difference and difféance. Difference and identity, or difféance and presence, are each linked pairs, and that we might do well to think of metaphysics as the result of a hypertrophic privileging of one of the terms in each pair.

We can now turn to consider the temporality of language more freely. We have said that, in spite of his rejection (in LG) of an alternative temporality, he nonetheless supplies some material and points the way. The best sources for this are to be found in his discussions of the linearity of the 'vulgar conception of time' and a similar account in *Grammatology as a Positive Science* (GPS). And there is a surprise in store for us. For he refers in passing, at the end of the second source, to our increasing 'access to pluri-dimensionality' and to a 'delinearised temporality'. This gives us hope that we are not on the wrong track.

It will help to be guided by a question: What is wrong with the picture of the temporality of speech or writing that represents it simply as a linear succession of elements? Saussure seemed to claim just this, at least about speech:

> Auditory signifiers have at their command only the dimension of time. Their elements are presented in succession. They form a chain. '13

Now there are two fundamental things wrong with it. (1) It is rarely if ever true, even superficially, of writing. So it is not generalizable to all signification. (2) It is only very superficially true of speech.14
For Derrida it reflects the historical domination of thelinearist conception of time, the 'vulgar concept of time' as Heidegger calls it, of time as a series of now points. Its hopelessness as a model of linguistic temporality should be obvious.

Derrida describes this linear model of time in a number of places. Its various attributes include consecutivity, irreversibility, unidimensionality, homogeneity, and 'dominated by the form of the now and the ideal of continuous movement, straight or circular'.

But if such a model of time has to be abandoned to account for, among other things, the temporality of language, Derrida's account of the 'trace' and of 'différance' does not offer us an adequate conceptualization of the alternative - and not just because they are not properly speaking 'concepts', but because their power to articulate the complex temporal structures of speech and writing is restricted in scope. Even if différance were basic to all the other temporal structures of language, it need not hold the key to their complexity and variety. There is no reason to suppose that an adequate account of the temporality of language can be generated from an account of the temporality of the sign (or the 'trace'). An adequate account, I suggest, would have to take note of four different levels at which language production is temporally involved: (1) ludic (2) intentional (3) structural (4) communicative.

The ludic level is that of the play of sounds and shapes that allow patterns of echo and repetition to be set up in discourse. The intentional level concerns itself with the way the construction and comprehension of discourse involves both protention and retention, and complex layerings of each. The structural level deals with the multiplicities of orders of unit (and thus levels of successivity) in a text, the different series to be found in the same text (constituting character, theme, plot, etc.),
the many continuities and discontinuities it enclosed, and so on. 15

Finally, seen as communication, speech or text production enters into the whole field of interaction, interpretation, understanding, interruption, response, correction, etc.

These gestures towards the different levels at which the temporality of language can be elucidated is designed only to suggest one thing: that a pluri-dimensional and delinearised temporality - one that escapes the most obvious forms of the metaphysical determination of time - can be developed by a careful elucidation of the complex weave of temporal structure found in discourse. A deconstructive practice that obscured these different levels would do us a great disservice. And what we are suggesting is if not strictly senso a new concept of time, at least a new model of temporal structuration.

The obvious response to this from one who insists that the notion of time itself is inescapably metaphysical - a thesis we attribute to Derrida - is to say that each of these different levels are identified under classically 'metaphysical' headings - how else can references to intention or to communication be understood? Do they not involve an appeal to presence in some form? And if so, does not the contribution each makes to what we have called the weave of textual temporality just re-establish the old concept of time on new ground?

I think we have to take seriously Derrida's own claim (quoted in note 10) that concepts are only metaphysical when inscribed in a particular way in a text. And I take it that the kind of textual inscription that counts here is one that gives a foundational value - the value of presence - to such concepts. But this is just what we have not done, by referring to a weave. Consider 'intention' first. If we want to understand the temporal structure of 'telling a joke', we have to refer to the
setting up of expectations, and the retroactive cancellation of these expectations in the punchline. This is not the whole story about the time of the joke, but it is an essential part of it, and it involves a reference to the intentional. Or again, consider 'communication'. We could think of communication as the establishing of some ideal co-presence in which minds, if only briefly, are unified. That would indeed be a metaphysical notion, as would the idea that it involves the transmission of some 'meaning' from one person to another. But we do not have to abandon the whole notion of communication, and the effort to understand its more subtle temporal structuring, just because it is open to a metaphysical appropriation.

To summarize: Derrida's deployment of 'différence' and 'trace' so as to strategically displace 'identity' and 'presence' in a deconstructive manoeuvre, would become an act of destruction if it were allowed to obscure the place at which 'identities' and 'differences' meet without privilege, without, that is, the relation between identity and difference being reduced to a foundational relation in either direction.

Derrida's claim that there can be no non-metaphysical concept of time is founded, we argue, on an illegitimate conversion of the status of the term 'différence' into one with (quasi-) transcendental significance. Only then can he argue that as différence is 'prior' to time (and its distinction from space) 'time' is only a fundamental concept within a framework that denies différence, i.e., within metaphysics. But if we refuse to allow différence to play this (quasi-) transcendental role, then the possibility of an alternative non-metaphysical temporality is opened up. To this end Derrida's work supplies much of the motivation and some of the tools but finally he obstructs the path.
III. Time Beyond Deconstruction

CHAPTER TWO

The Question of Strategy

A. Derrida and the Paradoxes of Reflection

Reading Derrida's work as philosophy, perhaps a foolhardy enterprise, one soon realises that something like a paradox courses through it. Derrida is proposing an account of writing which refuses even philosophy (or particularly philosophy) the status of 'purveyor of truth' in any linguistically naive way. For Derrida, linguistic naivety does not consist in forgetting, as Whorf might have said, that we are using a specific natural language when we make our universal pronouncements, and that these might not even be sayable in a language with different ontological commitments. It consists in supposing that philosophy could ever escape the condition of writing, which he thinks of as semantically ungrounded, as 'originating' with what he calls the 'trace' (which is not a trace of anything) rather than a meaning which can be grasped in itself. Writing is constituted by a play of differences, a constant deferring of the point at which its meaning could be cashed out. For those who would pin down a text to what it really means, Derrida's account of the determination of meaning is like that of catching an infinitely slippery eel.

The paradox lies in the status of what he writes, and the fact that he too is writing. If what Derrida writes is true, it would follow that we ought to read him and other philosophers in a new way. But if what he says is true in the ordinary philosophical sense of truth (which he
describes as metaphysical) then in fact it cannot be true, for there would then be at least one species of writing - namely Derrida's type of metaphilosophy - which has escaped the universal condition of writing of never just being able to deliver the truth for consumption. But if we drop the claim to truth, then how and why should we believe Derrida's claims about language as writing? Derrida has the problem of saying what he means without meaning what he says.

If Derrida were not aware of the form of this problem our task would be lighter and shorter, but he is very much aware of this paradox and his highly reflective and self-conscious texts can in part be seen as responses to it. He talks of his writing as strategic (though without an end according to which the strategy could be more or less successful), he insistently admits that metaphysics in some form or other is inescapable, but that does not make all texts equally metaphysical, and he varies his style. The difference between *Speech and Phenomena* and *Glas* for example, makes it clear that he is almost as concerned about his relation to his texts as was that master of authorial disguises Kierkegaard. It is finally worth pointing out, as further evidence of Derrida's concern with reflexivity, that when he deals with Hegel\(^2\) one of the places he makes for is Hegel's Preface to the *Phenomenology of Mind* in which Hegel expresses his distaste for prefices. It is after all inappropriate to offer the reader reflections on a work he has not yet read, and, more importantly, it is impossible to summarize a work that is inseparable from its actual detailed textual development. A philosophical preface is, as such, about the worst introduction to philosophical writing. Despite Hegel's attachment to the logocentric ideal of presence, in the shape of Absolute Knowledge, albeit with a long delayed delivery date, Hegel's concern that
we realise that philosophical work cannot be represented by summary forms, that one piece of writing cannot stand for another piece of writing, gives him a place in the fictional history of non-logocentric philosophy, philosophy not detachable from its written form, even if Hegel still hung on to a telos. 3 If I am right, the way Derrida latches on to Hegel's most important textual reflections is symptomatic of the importance of reflexivity for understanding Derrida's own work. I hope that pursuing this theme will help us to answer the question of the status of his writing.

By the question of its status I really mean its relationship to philosophy and possible future philosophical practice. I have already explained how this problem first arises. I have claimed that if we take his claims in a straightforward philosophical way, they can be reflexively applied to themselves to generate a puzzle about their own status. One way out of this problem is to abandon this naive reading. Derrida's own agreement with my suggestion about the inadequacy of a naive level of reading him is reflected in the apparatus of internal warnings, instructions, security systems, recommendations and the general level of guardedness with which he writes. Whereas the initial first level paradox I began with depended on making his conclusions reflect on themselves, I will now try to show that a second level of paradox can be discerned in the internal reflections within the text itself. I will argue that the use of these strategies of textual reflexivity which can be seen as a solution to the first order paradox, seems at least to realign Derrida firmly within the logocentric tradition he is criticizing, and moreover that it does this in ways that he did not anticipate, and cannot find acceptable.

But the problem about the status of his writing can be put another
Following Heidegger, he has a large scale view about the pervasiveness in the history of philosophy of a single underlying theme. For Heidegger this was the forgetfulness of Being — or forgetting the question of Being. It took the form of substituting some specific determination of Being (such as Plato's Ideas, or any other specific form of ontological commitment) for Being itself. Instead of a question we have a series of answers unaware that they are answers, because the questions have been forgotten and are now hidden. Derrida agrees with this analysis of the history of philosophy as a series of 'determinations of Being as presence' but does away with the reference to Being, adding that even Heidegger's 'Being' is just another product of the philosopher's desire for 'presence'. The concept of presence is Derrida's term for the principle that unifies all epistemological and ontological touchstones — intuition, self-consciousness, direct awareness of the other, the revelation of meaning, etc. Now if we deem metaphysical those philosophical texts which are organised by some appeal to the privileged value of presence, it raises the question as to whether there could be any non-metaphysical philosophy — a question which Derrida has himself also raised.

What Derrida opposes to the ideal structuring of a philosophical text by the appeal to the value of presence is the status of all texts (as well as speech, and even consciousness) as writing. And he uses the term writing to capture a view of language as a dispersion of signs with no centre, no point privileged by presence. The structure of presence could be regarded as the false-consciousness of the metaphysical text, and it is reflected in the refusal of such texts to recognise their own status as writing (by the kinds of timeless ideals they endorse, for example). If we suppose that such a blindness was a constitutive feature of all philosophy and yet that it is inconsistent with the ideals of
clarity, autonomy and self-justifiability that philosophy holds, then Derrida's account of writing puts in question the very possibility of philosophy not determined by metaphysical and thus ultimately contradictory values. There are a number of more general external considerations relevant to assessing Derrida which I shall simply list:

A. It seems to be a lesson drawn from his analysis of the work of Husserl and Heidegger that the principle that effort is rewarded does not apply to attempts to escape metaphysical determinations. I have already mentioned Heidegger's case. Derrida thinks of Husserl too as someone who despite the best intentions built into phenomenology the most basic metaphysical motifs – intuition as a guaranteed basis for knowledge. And Husserl had made the avoidance of metaphysics a thematic aim of phenomenology! It follows that Derrida's own efforts to (more modestly) limit the extent of his involvement with metaphysical aims need bear no relation to his success. History teaches us that the road back to metaphysics is paved with the very best intentions.

B. Metaphysics as Derrida understands it, is not simply to be found in the use of certain types of arguments, or the holding of certain sorts of propositions (those which cannot be verified, say). One is implicated in metaphysics as one might be implicated in an ontology even by the language one uses to escape it. The way Nietzsche describes truth applies in large part to the terminological armoury of metaphysics, and hence its insidiousness:

“What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms... illusions of which one has forgotten that they are illusions; worn out metaphors which have become powerless to affect the senses...“

Our language contains all the conceptual oppositions within which
the history of philosophy unconsciously plays itself out. And that language is not isolable from the one used in what Derrida calls the deconstruction of metaphysics.¹

C. Finally perhaps a rather provincial problem in assessing Derrida. On this side of the Channel, the thinkers who, in Derrida's view have been most successful, and in the light of whose writing Derrida is best understood, are as much the subject of philosophical suspicion as Derrida himself. And the success of Joyce, Mallarme or Artaud is no guide to judging Derrida who never seeks a wholly literary evaluation.

I have called these considerations 'external' because while they bear on Derrida's writing, they can be grasped without special reference to his work and allow some advance scene setting. I have mentioned the names of a number of philosophers with whose work Derrida's is intimately linked. I make some further connections and comparisons below, in assessing Derrida's textual reflexivity in a historical context, but before such comparisons, I shall spell out what I mean by his strategies of textual reflexivity.

What interests me here are the various ways in which Derrida explicitly focusses in his texts on the ways in which they break new ground, the remarks he makes about the complicity of any such critical writing with the metaphysical matrix that it is taking as its object, and his account of the strategic way in which, as a consequence he is using the terms he cannot avoid using. I shall argue that these strategies including Derrida's claim that all writing in this area is a matter of strategy and risk) are not the only possible responses to the theoretical situation as he sees it, and that, by the very reflective devices he uses he appeals to the most traditional metaphysical values, values he himself has analysed. While one might be prepared to accept the metaphysical
complicity of deconstructive theory on the strength of Derrida's explanations, if these explanations themselves are even clearer and more obvious examples of metaphysical thinking, we will surely have cause for a certain scepticism. I am saying that the general line of prudence with regard to metaphysics that Derrida takes is directly self-defeating.

The first level of reflexivity I would point to is that of Derrida's lexical innovations and appropriations. I am thinking of such examples as 'trace', 'differance', 'brisure', 'écriture', 'presence', 'grammatology', 'supplement', etc. These terms have the function of occupying a space created by the first stage of a deconstruction, that of reversing the dominance relationship between two opposed concepts, so that the value of presence is annulled. They are used as sticks can be used to hold open a crocodile's mouth. In each case we are not only treated to examples of the use of these terms, we are offered remarks about them which are designed to prevent us understanding them in traditional logocentric ways:

'differance' is neither a word nor a concept

a 'trace' is not a trace of anything

a 'supplement' is neither an increase, nor an addition

These are cases of what he calls undecidable terms, which do not obey ordinary logic and grammar. And yet it seems as though they can be given work to do in a text, and they are repeated in like contexts. One way of ensuring that we remember their special status is to write the words 'under erasure' - by first writing them and then crossing them out, and then leaving them in that state. Even when Derrida does not use this Heideggerian device, we are expected to remember the fact that these terms do not in any ordinary sense have a meaning. One might compare the way in which mathematical fictions such as the square root
of minus one can function in equations without themselves being rational numbers. The idea is an interesting one but we must look at just how they are used. If we were just to read them in a new attitude, we might be amused at this appearance of something like a phenomenological shift. But we are also supposed to accept accounts of the functions of such terms which sound suspiciously as though they are fitting into the very same patterns as the terms they have displaced. It is of interest that Derrida vigorously denies this but such denials constitute a different level of textual reflexion, to which I shall return.

Let me quote some remarks he makes about 'differance' in his essay of that 'name':

'What we note as differance will thus be the movement of play that "produces" (and not by something that is simply an activity) these differences, these effects of difference.'

'Differance is the nonfull, nonsimple "origin"; it is the structured and differing origin of differences.'

'Differance is what makes the movement of signification possible.'

'...we shall understand by the term differance the movement by which language, or any code, any system of reference in general becomes "historically" constituted as a fabric of differences.'

There is no doubt that he can seem to be offering us a new transcendental argument, with differance as the ultimate ground. But that would be a disaster if it were true because the term 'differance' is set up in direct opposition to just such an appeal to a first principle. Derrida not only employs an army of scare quotes to prevent us understanding his elucidatory terms in normal senses, he proceeds to point out that to take these accounts with their normal metaphysical weight would be quite mistaken. He insists that he is using these quoted terms only strategically. But surely we do have to understand the scare-quoted terms in order to be
able to grasp just how they situate a new sense for differance. And yet this we are not allowed to do. The tide however is pulling strongly and we are not encouraged to linger over these problems. Derrida already knows where he is going. He will refuse the identification of differance with Heidegger's Being, he will deny that there is any sense in which we can point to the essence of differance, and he will finally insist that differance is not a name at all. The reason for this is that what it would name, if it were a name, is

'the play that brings about the nominal effects, the relatively unitary or atomic structures we call names, or chains of substitutions for names' 13

The reason It cannot name this is presumably that the condition for the possibility of names cannot itself be named.

I have a number of worries about this theological argument. First, I cannot see why, if there was such a condition, it could not be named. After all it seems to be possible to describe it. My second worry is rather deeper. For it begins to seem as though Derrida's coyness about differance is based on his own mystical understanding of names. And I just do not see why we need to go all the way through Heidegger to discover that a term can be functional without being a name, and that its function can consist in both the substitutions it allows and those it engages in, i.e., its paradigmatic possibilities. Derrida is here following both Nietzsche and Heidegger in conceiving of language primarily at the lexical level, allowing no independent form to syntax. Are sentences just plays on words? 14 The whole problematic of language as representation seems to spring from such a limited conception. And I am not sure if one escapes it by meditations on the mystery of names, and the unnameable relation between names and things that Nietzsche called
both metaphor and a lie. My concern over the term 'differance' cannot be applied in quite the same way to Derrida's other terminological appropriations. Before making some general remarks about these, I would like to single out for comment one of his most powerful terms - 'presence'. When he explains the extension of this term he does so in a way that reminds me again of the very sort of thinking that 'the philosophy of presence' itself designates. Derrida lists a whole set of themes, which also appear as philosophical concerns and problems, which all exemplify the same privilege, albeit in different forms.

Does not the deconstruction of the history of philosophy of presence already posit as a history, as a series of expressions of the same theme? Does it not, in other words, at the very moment at which it discovers the pervasiveness of presence, thereby make 'presence' present, display it as a unity of the series of its appearance? Derrida's list goes on like this:

'...(presence of the thing to the sight as eidos, presence as substance/essence/existence (ousia), temporal presence as point (stigme) of the now or of the moment (nun), the self-presence of the cogito, consciousness, subjectivity, the co-presence of the other and of the self, intersubjectivity as the intentional phenomenon of the ego, and so forth (op. cit., supra)'

Derrida has had something like this point made to him before but he did not seem to understand it. The condition of the unity of the list is surely the way in which each of its elements exemplifies the essence of presence. And I think this is one of a number of cases in which it is simply not open to Derrida to refer us back to his claims that avoiding metaphysics is a difficult task, even an impossible one. Here for instance we are concerned with the very principle on which it is possible to identify what he has called metaphysics, i.e., the condition on which
even the sense of his doubts about total metaphysical hygiene rest.

I am saying that the very term metaphysics, as Derrida uses it, is

metaphysical, in that it rests on essentialism. The consequence of

these and other objections is to cast doubt on what Derrida thinks he

is doing, not necessarily on whether it is worth doing.

More generally, I would point to the extraordinary care and detailed

control that Derrida tries to exercise over all the terms he uses, the

exceptional self-consciousness of his texts. Where there is a chance of

misunderstanding, we usually find at that very point, or a little later,

a polite insistence that we understand him in the way he intends, that we

 bracket out the logocentric meanings of words. I point to this because

whatever he says about the merely strategic value of his writing, the

function of control, of internal reflexive interpretations, 'vigilance',

ultimately responsibility, seems to me to be a transference to the field

of writing of an ideal relationship between subject (writer) and object

(writing) which is nothing short of metaphysical. It is as if having

admitted the ineliminability of absence, alterity, otherness in writing,

that all the old values of directness, contact, and dare one say it,

presence (the presence of the author to his reader) can be reinstated

at another level. Is it a metaphor to call his writing constitutionally

self-conscious? And whence does such self-consciousness draw its value?

The second level of textual reflexivity covers a number of different

ways in which Derrida has spoken about the status of his own work, particu-

larly in relation to philosophy, literature and metaphysics. And I would

insist that we bear in mind when considering what he says that these

reflections, to be accurate, must accommodate the fact of their own

perpetual appearance within his writing, as well as from one text to

another (this most notably in the published interviews _Positions_ in which
he talks about his texts).

I have been unable to avoid trespassing on these themes already, but I shall try to make any repetitions clarificatory.

I have often tried to show that Derrida's writing is metaphysical, in his own sense of the term. I have also implied, and sometimes explicitly stated that despite his own claims about the unavoidability of this state of affairs, that such assurances were not adequate to the cases I mentioned. But I ought to give more flesh to his remarks about the stickiness of metaphysics.

In one of his papers on Lévi-Strauss\(^\text{17}\) he summarizes this complicity strikingly:

'There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to attack metaphysics. We have no language - no syntax and no lexicon - which is alien to this history; we cannot utter a single deconstructive proposition which has not already slipped into the form, the logic and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest.\(^\text{18}\)

And he cites the use of the concept of the sign to attack the metaphysics of presence (as in his critique of Husserl, for example) a concept which suffers from the same illness. Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger each in their own way tried to step outside the circle, and each were recaptured.

It is given this recognition of the trap set by the circle that the concept of risk appears. If hard work only digs one deeper in, perhaps what is needed is a different approach which may involve taking risks. And why not - it seems there cannot be anything to lose. After all, the risk is one that one could not help taking - the risk of having finally said nothing, or having repeated a movement that could have been foreseen. And I think the method of deconstruction is what he considers to be the best way of actually going about the task with some
limited chance of success.

What is this task? It seems to me that it is not simply the academic one of exposing for all to see the logocentric commitments of the great philosophers, but more importantly bringing about what Heidegger called a changed relationship to language. Indeed deconstruction can accomplish both these ends. The change is not easy to spell out but one might call it the recognition of the materiality and vulnerability of writing, and thus the impossibility of those forms of discourse predicated on writing having some higher status, like the expression of truth.

What interests me at this point are the norms that guide the particular way he has chosen to bring about this changed attitude, as I suspect that they are such as to make it impossible to put in question the sort of writing in which Derrida himself is engaged. They take it for granted, even affirm its neutrality with respect to metaphysics. Derrida believes in the classical values of theory, rigour, system, precision and control. He says that his texts 'belong neither to the philosophical nor to the literary register', but they do belong to the register of theory and they do not question it fundamentally. And my remarks about lexical control and proprietorship apply even more importantly at this level. Derrida at one point in Positions says that it makes a difference how rigorously and systematically one takes up one's distance to metaphysics. As I see it this involves a distinction between good and bad metaphysics. And it is a distinction which can be immediately deconstructed by refusing the value 'good' (or 'better') to that which is merely more rigorously controlled and self-conscious.

His writing is governed by rules, by norms, even I would say by a telos. (Such as: A changed relation to language) It is very unlike that Heraclitean play of differences to which he often refers. I will
not repeat my question about the logocentric nature of these very principles of textual ordering. What does strike me is the poverty of Derrida's middle range understanding of linguistic form. He is very interested in both the lexical and the systematic level but does not seem prepared to conceptualise the middle range forms of syntactic construction, except in the case of his general account of the strategy of deconstruction.

One of the reasons for my making these points about Derrida's residual choice of theory as a mode of writing is that it does seem to be a choice, it does not seem to be necessary; it is not so unavoidable for necessity to be an excuse. To show this I will make remarks about Nietzsche, by way of contrast.

One of Nietzsche's guiding threads was the finiteness of the circle of metaphysics, and the ease with which escapes can be just illusions. Heidegger takes over most of Nietzsche's history of metaphysics, but finally locates even Nietzsche's *Wille zum Willen* within that very same tradition - as, however concealed - a kind of 'presence'. And Nietzsche's account of language merely seems to be a radical sensationalist inversion of idealism. This is too fast a tour of a much more subtle diagnosis, but Heidegger is still too fast with Nietzsche. Nietzsche cannot be understood separately from his style. Many of Nietzsche's inversions, for example can be read as a sustained rhetorical device. And then it would cease to be true that Nietzsche was locked into a simple opposition. It is too large an issue to go into here but it seems that one can only decide on the degree to which Nietzsche (or anyone for that matter) has evaded the framework they have tried to escape from, after one has decided that they are serious in what they say. And we know perfectly well that while Nietzsche was serious in what he sought to convey, he did not restrict himself to serious forms of expressions. Nietzsche is amusing,
he exaggerates, he plays with his reader.

As we have already demonstrated. Nietzsche was well aware of what Derrida called the closure of metaphysics, its exhaustion, the fact that it had played itself out. And I think he chose style as his way out. He chose a way of writing by which he could be taken literally, referentially. I think Nietzsche continued to contribute to philosophy and did so by abandoning theory. However much Derrida may say he is not serious, many of the problems he sets himself arise from the ideal which may no longer be even intelligible in a strict sense, of being able to say what he means, in a theoretical form. Derrida's work is not marked by nostalgia, but a fixation on the importance of going through all sorts of traditional manoeuvres (one could almost say academic ones), many of which Nietzsche abandoned.

There may also be lessons to be learned from Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writings, which again use stylistic devices to effect a changed attitude to writing on the part of the reader.

At one point Derrida says that the passage beyond philosophy involves a new reading of philosophy, but unless that also includes an assessment of a philosopher's own understanding of the status of his writing, that new writing could be a form of blindness. It is not possible for Derrida to dismiss such considerations as too much concerned with what the writer intended, because he too is obsessed with having his intentions properly read.

Kierkegaard and Nietzsche developed real alternatives to scare-quotes. Quite how satisfactory they are as alternatives depends on how far one takes the activity of deconstruction to be a means to an end obtainable by other routes, and how far one takes it to be an end in itself. Derrida does not seem to me wholly clear on this point.
There is another philosopher whose strategies one cannot ignore in trying to come to terms with Derrida. Surprisingly enough I am referring to Husserl, the very object of Derrida’s most sustained ‘philosophical’ critique. Yet there are some strange and unexpected parallels between Husserl and Derrida.

Both philosophers share the view that metaphysics can only be escaped or its impact lessened by the strictest control over one’s writing. Husserl’s phenomenological reduction was in part the internalising of a rule that one should not read off ontological conclusions from one’s experiences. It was a refusal to be committed to the ontological seriousness of ordinary everyday experience and language. Husserl’s solution is to transform that experience so that it can support a new sort of seriousness, that which confines itself to essential structures rather than empirical matters of fact. Husserl is constantly reminding us that we must not understand what he is writing in a psychologistic way, however tempting it seems, for that is quite contrary to his intentions/meaning. Many of Derrida’s strategies seem very close to Husserl here. Like Husserl, Derrida knows he cannot avoid using ordinary language. All he can hope to do is to warn us against taking it seriously. While Husserl tries to organise a new permanent way of avoiding taking it seriously (= ontologically), Derrida, realising that Husserl only achieves this by giving to language a new phenomenological seriousness, offers us strategic uses of terms as an alternative short-life answer to the avoidance of seriousness.

But this appeal to strategy is only to a means. Finally Derrida wants to bring about a transformation of our ways of reading and understanding language quite as global and total as Husserl, and he would like, ideally, to arrive at a point at which it would be no longer necessary to
bracket out the logocentric meanings of words, to cross them out, to remind us that a certain expression is only a transitory evil.

Both Derrida and Husserl offer visions of 'philosophical' work to be done, discover or anticipate new sciences, logics, hold out promises to disciples. Husserl's dreams of the final scope of phenomenology are notorious. As far as judging the value of phenomenology was concerned, Husserl made constant references to the future work to be done. Doesn't Derrida repeat this? Grammatology, a logic of the supplement, even a parasitology are announced, but are they more than gestures in the direction of a new organisation of a theoretical space?

It has been said of Derrida\textsuperscript{22} that his main strength lies in the fact that 'he does not destroy anything or even refute - but simply offers a diagnosis'. There is a certain amount of truth in this. Derrida believes that the structures he discovers are actually there already in the texts, constituting them as the philosophical texts they are. Thus

\textit{A patient reading of the Investigations would show the germinal structure of the whole of Husserl's thought.} On each page the necessity - or the implicit practice of eidetic and phenomenological reductions is \underline{visible}.\textsuperscript{23}

While \textit{visible} would be strictly more accurate a translation than \textit{visible}, in the last line, the commitment to a realism with regard to the structures discerned is brought out well by the perceptual term. Derrida seems to me to be committed to a science of the structures of metaphysical writing in the same way in which Husserl was committed to phenomenology as a descriptive science of experience. The belief in the existence of structures of presence is a form of textual realism. On what other basis does he claim such a privilege for his readings? And yet such realism is utterly metaphysical!
Derrida cannot refute metaphysics for all the reasons that I (and he) have documented. And he began at least by merely exposing it. I suspect however that the attempt to draw a parallel with Husserl's neutrality would begin to fail if we followed the development of Derrida's thought. The use of terms which are 'indecidables' is the kind of active intervention in a field which Husserl never contemplated.

I have not the space to develop this point here, but I think it will one day be seen that Derrida's debts to Husserl, through his transformed appropriation of some of the strategies of phenomenology, are quite crucial in understanding why Derrida is not more like Nietzsche or Heidegger than he is. We must not forget Husserl's passion for theory.

One wonders whether, quite apart from its philosophical perversity, the preparatory and internally directing care with which Derrida releases his texts into the scattering winds of history will ever have the consequences for which he must hope. It was Husserl, again, who insisted on the difference between his phenomenology and any ordinary philosophy, that it was not just a branch of philosophy, but the only serious substitute for it. But for all his training of disciples, they ended up betraying him, and his writings were absorbed into the public domain of philosophy.

Derrida talks of himself as having set up camp at a distance from philosophy from which he can still communicate with it. But if that communication is the condition of his writing bearing on philosophy, it is also the source of the greatest risk - reabsorption, a condition we might describe as the mortality of the text, and a condition which Derrida's passion for acute textual control seems to be based on ignoring, or excluding.

Would he be entirely disappointed by such an absorption by the philosophy of the future? What would remain? If we consider for example,
1. Derrida's recognition that it is ultimately the strategies, articulations, and recourses of texts that are / are not metaphysical, not simply the concepts themselves. And that surely opens up an extraordinary range of possible textual ruses, from which it will become impossible to exclude questions of intention.

2. There is a sense in which the future of deconstruction depends on a steady supply of texts that at some not too deep level take themselves seriously, that continue to pursue a stateable truth in a reasonably straightforward way. But whether as a result of deconstruction or not there is no reason to think that philosophy will just stand still and offer itself for deconstruction. Not only could Derrida's defence of Nietzsche against Heidegger (using his 'style') be more generously extended to other philosophers who might similarly be thought to have sailed dangerously close to the edge of language and yet carried on writing, but deconstruction could spawn a range of texts that knowingly anticipated the inevitable possibility of their own deconstruction. (Derrida's own texts, he agrees, have just such a status.) The difference such anticipation would make is not one for which we yet have an adequate name.

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These considerations on the power and limits of the strategies of writing are not, however, meant as abstract conjectures, but are intended to license our own post-deconstructive temporal musings. For we claim that it is possible at least to imagine a post-metaphysical pluralism about time(s) in which the demand for primitive 'elements' would give way to proliferation without foundation. We claim to have taken a short step at least beyond mere imagination! On this view Derrida's 'trace' and Nietzsche's 'self-exceeding moment' are each cuckoo's eggs hatched in the nest of foundationalist thinking. There is no primitive unit, but if there were it would be like this........
CHAPTER TWO

The Question of Strategy

B. Style and Strategy at the Limits of Philosophy: Heidegger and Derrida

1. The Question of Style

The distinction between the form and content of language, between the how and the what, is not only traditional but formative for philosophy. It is formative in that it implies their genuine separability and so authorizes focussing on one side, on the what, relegating the question of how to such 'peripheral areas' as rhetoric, stylistics and pragmatics.¹

Despite the more recent interest of analytic philosophy (especially Austin and Searle) in speech acts, and of phenomenology in the noetic aspects of intentionality, this concern with the what, with the propositional content of language, has been the dominant tradition. The how of a philosophical text, what we will very broadly refer to as its philosophical style, has too long been seen functionally, as a means of conveying a content, or aesthetically as an end in itself. We have had exhortations to clarity on the one hand, and stylistics on the other. But might it not be that the "style" of philosophical writing is not treated with due philosophical seriousness when understood in either of these two ways, either as a means or as an end?

And in fact, whatever philosophy's dominant concern has been, its history does offer us examples of philosophers for whom style was more than a peripheral matter. Consider the examples of Plato, Hegel, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. Platonism is always represented as an otherworldly
the rhetorical exaggeration to be found in such phrases as 'the originary violence of writing' or 'there never was any "perception"', we soon come to realise that the exaggeration does have a function. A memorable phrase drags with it the special attitude needed for its comprehension. But the changes that one can envisage being brought about in philosophy cannot easily be determined in advance. In particular I can imagine two quite different 'ideal' effects: (1) the disappearance of certain forms of writing, and their 'replacement' by others (2) a change in attitude to the written word (such that writing was no longer understood as the articulation of meanings). I am not clear which Derrida would wish because the substitution of new forms of writing might well take place as the consequence of trying to maintain the seriousness of writing. While such changes would not be necessary if one ceased to treat writing with that reverence. The difference is between ceasing to use the word God because it has been shown it is not a name, and continuing to use it without using it as a name, without that seriousness. If Derrida takes the former path, it seems to me that he follows Husserl in this respect. If he takes the second path, it is quite possible for logocentric texts, even authoritarian texts to continue to be produced, with a kind of ironic sub-script, as a new rhetorical form. Indeed such texts could even reappear grounded by the self-conscious assertion of the ungroundability of their basic premises, as a new irrational voluntarism, asserted not justified, and logocentrically clean. Or, such texts could simply remain as rhetorical forms with the appeal to a ground appearing as an explicit textual structure, with a 'centring' as a formal device.

These various possibilities of learning from deconstruction without practicing it rest, fundamentally, we claim, on an exploitation of two factors:
philosophy; knowing has in each case an ideal form as its proper object. And yet Plato so often uses not just the figure of Socrates, but the form of his philosophizing, the dialogue. The Socratic maenetics is a dialectical art. This dialectic is a necessary preliminary to the earthly contemplation of the forms for those not trained in such vision from birth. So in our view, Plato's use of the dialogue form is no mere means of exposition nor a gilding of the truth.

Hegel's use of the speculative proposition, as he called it, allowed what he called the dialectic to appear at the level of syntax, as well as almost every other level of his work, including that of the individual word. It is the German language (the only truly philosophical language, said Hegel) that we have to thank for allowing the form of his philosophy to so intimately reflect his method.

Of Nietzsche more will be said shortly, but two aspects of his "style" are worth mentioning here. Firstly, he constantly changes his style in an attempt to avoid all appearance of building a system. System builders, Kierkegaard claimed, never occupy their castles, but live in huts next door. As Heidegger put it, "What is important is learning to live in the speaking of language." Secondly, his provocative style makes it impossible to treat his work as a picture of the truth. In requiring a reaction from the reader to supplement it, it loses that "imaginary" status.

Finally we ought to mention the style - questioning, bitty, "speculative" - of the Wittgenstein of the Investigations. This philosophical bricolage again demands a participation of the part of the reader that would have been redundant on the picture theory of language of the Tractatus.

Analogous remarks about the importance of style could have been
made about Hume, Spinoza, Whitehead and others. For many a philosopher, the problematic status of language is not confined to a localizable philosophical topic, but invades the expressive medium of philosophy itself. He may merely believe in the importance of clarity, or he may try to make his style consistent with his philosophical views, or finally he may try to use the way he writes to convey something that cannot, or cannot as effectively, be said.

If this story is plausible, those who make a habit of impatience with continental philosophy might begin to consider that very often a difficult style is not a gratuitous disfiguring of a more simply stateable truth, nor a veil covering the shame of confusion, but a careful, serious philosophical choice. We would like to take the cases of Heidegger and Derrida as object lessons for this general thesis. We shall argue that the motivation for their somewhat different difficult styles is an easily stateable philosophical problem.

Consider the problem posed by a universal solvent. The problem is how to store a liquid that could dissolve any container one put it in. By analogy, a philosopher who wields a method highly critical of the history of philosophy has to be very careful of his own philosophical production lest it be reflexively destroyed by its own critical method. Both Heidegger and Derrida wield such methods, both indebted to Nietzsche, and Derrida indebted to Heidegger.

Some will feel that the interest in such large scale enterprises should go no further. The original error can be seen in the use of such overgeneralizing critical methods, for they reduce the delights of philosophical variety to a grey nocturnal sameness. The short answer is that some games can be played for high stakes and philosophy is one
of them. Logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy were both based on the most general principles of method.

If we provisionally accept that this problem of an undermining critical self-reference is a real one, we can best illuminate what difficulties Heidegger and Derrida encounter by a brief reference to Hegel - another philosopher with an all-embracing critical method.

Hegel's dialectic, if we let it, would allow us to mark the limits of each previous philosophical position. If we thought of metaphysics as a kind of blindness to the finite and transitory nature of our conceptual schemes, the dialectic might seem to have a meta-metaphysical status. And yet closer scrutiny detects a teleological presupposition, which can itself be thematised and sublated.

In contrast, Heidegger and Derrida do not set out to rank the great philosophies of the past in some hierarchy of spiritual elevation - although they each have their heroes - rather they are concerned to reveal the metaphysical pre-structuring of the texts they analyse and to avoid reproducing these moves in their own thought. Heidegger uses the terms 'ontology', 'onto-theology', and Derrida the 'logocentric tradition' as roughly synonymous with metaphysics. For Heidegger, metaphysics is characterized by a forgetfulness of Being (what it is to be) and for Derrida it appears as the philosophy of presence. We shall expand on these phrases later; for now it is important to realise that both of these characterisations of metaphysics appear as structural features of philosophical texts. Heidegger's reference to "forgetting" is not to some mental process, but rather to something like the conditions of possibility of a metaphysics which manifests itself in the structure of philosophical texts at a number of different levels.
To complete our preliminary account of the philosophical importance of their style, we must make one further point. Both Heidegger and Derrida associate the metaphysical history of philosophy with mistaken attitudes to language and misdirected attempts to use it, and each has something approximating a theory of language that renders suspect a number of traditional philosophical moves (such as definition). This theory of language is as we have suggested heavily indebted to Nietzsche, and a brief account of that relation would not be out of place.

Once we accept that there is a problem concerning the relation between metaphysics and language, we still have to determine the scope of that problem. This makes an enormous difference. If we suppose that the problem is just a regional problem about the relationship between metaphysics and its language, and that its language could be isolated from the rest, we could at least in principle stand outside it, so to speak, and with a quite separate, clean and hygienic language, handle the local involvement of metaphysics with its language from a distance. But if this was how we were to read, say, Heidegger's *Introduction to Metaphysics*—treating as specially philosophical such oppositions as Being and Becoming, Existence and Essence, Appearance and Reality, Fact and Value... it soon becomes clear that such concepts, let alone all their synonyms and derivatives, cannot be thought of as specifically metaphysical, but are parts of ordinary discourse. That would mean we would have to expand the scope of our problem to that of the ordinary discourse of the West, and consider its relation to metaphysics, both informing it and informed by it.

Nietzsche points to both these levels and to a third: that of language itself. Language as such is, if not plain metaphysical at least a dangerous foundation on which to build anything, being a lie and a
deception. For it not only enables us to, but demands of us that we ignore differences between particulars to which we apply the same term. In summary, we can at this point distinguish three levels of concern with the metaphysical adequacy of language - that of the language of metaphysics, that of the permeation of ordinary language with metaphysical concepts and the problem of the original lie of language as such.

If we consider this last more deeply, we discover something apparently paradoxical. In *On Truth and Falsity in their Ultra-Moral Sense* Nietzsche gives us his answer to the perennial question as to how general terms can have multiple reference. His answer is that they are lies or metaphors. But surely to predicate 'lie' or 'metaphor' of a general term is to treat a word as a proposition or a figure of speech, that is as an entity of a higher order. And even if we side-stepped that one it is hard to see how such judgements could ever get off the ground. The very word 'lie' or 'metaphor' would be a lie or a metaphor etc. Clearly Nietzsche cannot here be taken literally. And this is particularly ironic because what he is nonliterally trying to get across is that we should not think of the literal relation of naming as paradigmatic for language. If we do, it should not be taken to be an external relation between a word and something just taken off the shelf. Rather we must think of naming and referring as textual, or even intentional phenomena, and in any case not a direct word-thing relation.

If we accept this analysis of Nietzsche's aim in using the terms 'lie' and 'metaphor', we realise that quite apart from the different levels at which language and metaphysics are interwoven, Nietzsche's text offers us a quite different direction to investigate - that of style.

Derrida is right in thinking that Heidegger was wrong in calling
Nietzsche the last metaphysician. Through his style, or rather the variety of his different styles, Nietzsche escapes this charge. All of Nietzsche's promotions of laughing, dancing, leaping and other ways of modulating a distance from a surface are metaphors for the advocacy of style as a field for philosophical innovation. Quite what it is capable of is one of the questions we have before us. But when we grow weary of trying to eliminate metaphysical terms from our philosophical and everyday discourse, might it not be a change of style that we need?

We are now at the point at which we can summarize the claim we hope to be able to make good:

Heidegger and Derrida both employ highly critical philosophical methods, the generality of which threatens to encompass their own philosophical work. In both cases, their diagnosis of the sources of metaphysics is linked to views about language and what it can and cannot do. Their respective "styles" are deliberate and careful attempts to direct their own writing so as not to retread too many of the paths of metaphysics and in this and other respects they are each following in the footsteps of Nietzsche. In support of this claim, we begin with Heidegger.

2. Heidegger and the Performance of Language

Our aims here are fairly limited. Firstly, we shall be talking about the later Heidegger rather than the Heidegger of Being and Time. Second, a comparison with Derrida will always be on the horizon. So there will be sins of omission, selection and simplification.

Heidegger's later philosophy can be interpreted as a rejection of the subject as origin, or ground of meaning. This perspective helps us grasp the transition from the early to the later Heidegger. What is
wrong with metaphysical subjectivity is that it has an inadequate understanding of its own activity. It takes itself to be a source, when in fact its very status as a being is grounded in a relation to Being. The forgetfulness of Being manifests itself as a forgetfulness of the conditions of one's own being. The consequence for one's (mis)understanding of language is that one takes one's possession of language for granted, and treats self-expression or communication as its essence. In doing so one forgets that language is a condition for one having anything to express, indeed for one being a subject at all. Language is not a means but rather constitutes the world of means and ends. More strongly than most philosophers, Heidegger conveys the autonomous power of language.

Heidegger distinguishes broadly speaking two modes of language. The first we could call technical/logical and the second, poetic/hermeneutical. These should be thought of both as actual ways people use language and as capable of being expanded into theories about the basic nature of language. In this very duality we will later find a point for a new departure.

In its technical/logical use, language operates primarily to communicate what has already been understood. Words function as mere counters; the linguistic appropriation of the world is a thing of the past; the language space is closed. Language is a transparent medium to be filtered clean should it ever cloud up. It is the language of (at least) normal science, of some philosophy and of much everyday conversation. In poetic language on the other hand we listen to what language itself already says, we work with rather than use language, we follow rather than force language, wait rather than lead. It is not a passive "use" of language - the poet is even creative - but it is a use
aware of the conditions of its own activity.

For Heidegger, the technical use of language is naive, covers over its own truth, and when he talks about language it is about that language that makes the poetic possible. Many of the remarks I have made above are captured in the following quotation on which we will focus some attention.

"Language is - language, speech. Language speaks. If we let ourselves fall into the abyss denoted by this sentence, we do not go tumbling into emptiness. We fall upward to a height. Its loftiness opens up a depth. The two span a realm in which we would like to become at home, so as to find a residence, a dwelling place for the life of man."

"To reflect on language means - to reach the speaking of language in such a way that this speaking takes place as that which grants an abode for the being of mortals."

Heidegger writes like this rather than in a more straight-forward way to avoid the circuit of metaphysical repetition. One cannot distance oneself from the history of metaphysics just by exercising care over the ordinary use of ordinary or theoretical words, or a robust confidence in the subject-predicate proposition. For these words and the privilege of certain sentence forms belong to that history. We are stuck at the level of the ontic with the unconscious products of long forgotten determinations of Being. We are stuck with beings, and Being never gets a word in.

When describing Heidegger's views of language, I was unable to say that he sees man either as active or passive in relation to language. This active/passive opposition already presupposes the independent describability of man and language which Heidegger is questioning. It is by a transformed style that he attempts to transcend such limitations. We are now in a position to return to our passage.

Heidegger began the essay with "man speaks." Now we find the words "language speaks." The substitution of 'language' for 'man' is part of
an exercise in undermining the status of man as a metaphysical subject, in deepening our sense of the dependence of the speaker on language. When someone speaks, is it not language we hear? When he continues: "if we let ourselves fall ...." Heidegger is suggesting a response to this sentence that is not merely one of understanding it, but allowing ourselves to be affected by it, or moved by it. He promises that the risk of falling or loss of self is illusory. Rather we will 'fall upward'. He is suggesting what he elsewhere calls a new experience with language. Or again,

'It is not a matter of stating a new view of language. What is important is learning to live in the speaking of language.'

This sentiment is repeated in the next two sentences. The space opened up by the height to which we in fact rise, and the depth to which we feared we would fall

spans a realm in which we would like to become at home, so as to find a residence, a dwelling place for the life of man.'

Here as elsewhere it is important to see Heidegger's exploitation of ontic language - the language of houses, dwellings, abysses etc. - to metaphorically capture the ontological. These particular metaphors capture the decentring of man that he is emphasizing. We are in language.

And again, in the last sentence, which begins "to reflect on language means - to reach the speaking of language." We see in a grammatical transformation Heidegger's insistence on the need for a new relationship to language rather than discovering some new truth about it.

The way in which a style can carry a "message" we could call exemplification. When we discussed earlier other philosophers (from Plato to Wittgenstein) for whom style was of more than peripheral importance, we left open the possibility of an exemplification that could not be put
in any other way. This we will call a necessary exemplification.

Heidegger's general style fits this description, but in an extraordinary way. For we must realize that Heidegger would reject the very term exemplification and its associated logic. For that presupposes a meaning that can be plugged into and detached from a language at one's convenience - precisely the view he rejects. Such an exemplification that rejects the logic of exemplification (i.e. detachability) we call performance. Heidegger's insistence that what is at stake is a new relation to language rather than a new view is entirely consistent with this account of his textual practice. The point of such performance is to speak so as to show what it is to speak.

An account of his style that cast its net over a broad selection of his writings would also remind us that (1) Heidegger introduces new words in an innovatory way, exploiting the German language to the full and even beyond, in his imaginative etymology. Oddly, enough, Heidegger always seems wholly serious about his etymology even when it seems to this reader like play. (In this respect, among others, he differs from Derrida.) (2) Heidegger yokes old words into new service, especially metaphorical. Those most favoured we call pre-reflective relational words. They fall into three main categories: (a) those modelled on the body and its space, such as Zuhand, Vorhand, standing, reaching, remaining ... (b) those that relate me to an outer space, so to speak - such as house, world, space, openness, dwelling ... (c) those that relate men and Being - disclosure, concealment, withdrawing, granting, clearing. What he calls thinking unlocks for philosophy a whole barrel of previously unemployed terms. This is roughly coincident with what Hofstadter calls Heidegger's primitivism.
(3) Heidegger promotes ontological language at the expense of the epistemological by what we call Germanic nominalisation. Sentences like

'The greater the concealment with which what is to come maintains its reserve in the foretelling saying, the purer is the arrival' 7

stick in one's mind.

(4) The provisionality of Heidegger's later philosophy - most of it is as "on the way" as On the Way to Language 8 - is registered in the many occasional formats he employs - such as the lecture, the address, the dialogue, the conversation.

(5) Heidegger's practice 9 of crossing out Being (Being) is an attempt to both name and not name Being, for if we thought we had succeeded in catching it in a name, it would be lost again.

(6) He uses what has been called philosophical tautology (care cares, temporality temporalises; nothing noths...). Schöfer sees this as an attempt to name without subjecting the thing named to the dispersion of normal syntax. He closes with a remark that gratifyingly confirms our approach. By this device of philosophical tautology, he says, "the performance of the thing and the performance of language coincide 'here':" 10

We have discussed six different elements of the style that Heidegger has forged for himself. Does it constitute a solution to the problem we began with - that of avoiding metaphysics? Within its own terms it is an extraordinary achievement. Metaphysics is characterized by forgetfulness of Being; that condition is finally only to be cured by a new relation to Being; that can only be explained with performative consistency by a new way of "using" language, a new way of writing. And that is the project he takes on. The achievement lies as much in the way
he follows his problems through as in any one of the means he adopts to solve them. As we accept the claim that there are things that can be done with words that cannot be said - though Heidegger does not rely, as Austin does, on pre-existing conventions for his performative language - we grant Heidegger some sort of success.

However his solution is not without its own problems

1. It is easy to misinterpret the later Heidegger and just as easy not to know if you have or not. That a difficult style is not uncommon among great philosophers does not give any of them immunity from misunderstanding, and wanting to be understood - if only, as in Nietzsche's case, by another age - is a communicative a priori.

2. As much as Heidegger is linguistically innovative, these innovations are only understood from the standpoint of an existing language to which they are bound, a language that they attempt to escape. And yet the figurative nature of Heidegger's language sets severe limitations - however necessary it is - to the privileged status it seeks. For it is continually necessary to pass through the world of images - of woods, homes, hearths, and clearings to get to his thought. And how can that not rub off on the ontological level he aims at?

3. Even if it is beyond all doubt philosophical, it is only doubtfully still philosophy. It is still highly relevant to philosophy because it is thoroughly determined by the whole history of philosophy, and represents both a drawing of the boundary round what remains philosophy and a questioning of the continuing possibility of that discipline.

4. Lastly, and most critically, Heidegger seems to be aiming at an ideal coincidence between what sceptics would still call the act and the content of language. And if we are right, it is in the performative use of language that, if anywhere, he achieves this. But this is an ideal, one
that the sheer materiality of language can never allow to be achieved. Heidegger is projecting onto his linguistic performance an imaginary unity, in a desire which is as old as philosophy.

There is some reason to suspect that Derrida might have tried to avoid some of these objections. He begins with much the same problem as guided Heidegger (distancing oneself from, if not overcoming metaphysics) and he shares some of our criticisms of Heidegger. So it is to Derrida that we now turn.

3. Derrida and the Language of Strategy

We will shortly see what Derrida's practical response is to the metaphysical predicament posed by the closedness of the conceptual and thematic repertoire of the history of metaphysics. It is first worth explaining his response to Heidegger, or at least to that style which is dominant in Heidegger, for he accepts that even in Heidegger's text there are "ruptures and changes in ground." Derrida's main reservation can be put simply: Heidegger has not been radical enough in his solution. Having diagnosed the privilege of presence - or the attempt to make Being present - as the hallmark of metaphysics, Heidegger seems content to give a kind of phenomenological filling out of presence, to rethink it rather than radically displace it. The very thematics of Being is of a "transcendental signified," a resource that escapes the play of language, that escapes difference. Heidegger in short reinstates the value of presence, and in doing so suffers the limitations of his strategy of immanent deconstruction.

For Heidegger, Being cannot be said, cannot say itself, except in *ontic metaphor*. But this gives a particular interpretation to the sense of Being. In thinking through presence, Heidegger 'only metaphorises,
by a profound necessity which cannot be escaped by a single decision, the language it deconstructs'. But the use of metaphor, for Heidegger, is entirely devoted to the project of bringing men nearer, closer into the presence of Being. This appears in Heidegger's exploitation of the language of light - brilliance, illumination, clearing, lighting etc. But more important still, it appears in the privilege accorded to language, and in particular spoken language - with talk of listening, hearing, the voice, speaking, speech.

Heidegger's metaphorical style - the poetic style of many of his later writings - draws its power from the ability of metaphor to make present. For Derrida language is not so easily bent to such ends. It should not be thought that all Derrida's judgements on Heidegger are negative. This is not even largely true. 12

The limitations of Heidegger's text lie in the area of what Derrida calls strategy. At a number of points, Derrida makes thematic what we could call the logic of reappropriation or system recuperation. The sheer interconnectedness and diffusion throughout language of metaphysically burdened concepts and themes make it very likely that attempted escape moves will have already been covered, will themselves be just moves in the game. One does not, for example, escape from the sphere of influence of a concept just by negating it. What is required is an analysis of the possible strategies for success.

On at least two occasions 13 Derrida offered two possible strategies by which to handle the problem of distancing oneself from metaphysics. Each time he contrasts

(a) an immanent deconstruction, an internal critique which would exploit the resources of metaphysical language against itself, demonstrating contradictions etc. with
(b) an abrupt change of ground, in which one would take a step outside philosophy. To begin taking such a step one would question 'systematically and rigorously the history of these concepts' — a kind of deconstructive genealogy.

He takes the first strategy — immanent deconstruction — to describe the approach of Levi-Strauss and of Heidegger. And the second approach, certainly when characterized as an abrupt change of ground, to capture the typical choice of current French philosophy.

As we have seen, Derrida believes that the first strategy risks merely confirming the prison one is trying to escape from. The second strategy runs a different risk — sterility — one ends up not being able to say anything interesting. But it is a risk he feels he has to take. He finally concludes that we need to somehow interweave these two different strategies producing complex and multiple texts.

It seemed at first that the way to contrast Heidegger and Derrida was to focus on Heidegger's style and Derrida's strategy. But in fact the difference is more subtle. It lies in the fact that Derrida's highly self-conscious styles are governed by considerations of strategy, whereas Heidegger simply does not have such a field of options "ready to hand." One way of answering those who complain about Derrida's tricksiness is to explain this puppetting.

Derrida's references to strategy should not just be thought of as opening gestures; they are to be found throughout his texts. In Differance, for example, an essay in which he introduces the title term as a kind of cipher in the text, he gives us a long lecture on its merely strategic use. What he is insisting on by reference to strategy is that he is not trying to introduce a new theological constant or metaphysical mooring. If we are right to focus on these references
to strategy, what we are being offered is a text that no longer has a straightforward surface, which constitutionally resists being read as a metaphysical text by virtue of the multiplicity of determinations and indeterminacies to which it has already been subjected. What we need to do now is to spell out some of the ground rules of Derridean writing to see just how such a text is constructed. We will draw from many different texts despite the danger of ignoring their proper boundaries.

Derrida owes much to Heidegger in his understanding of metaphysics. Metaphysics is a theoretical writing organized around a privileged point — a presence. He includes here

'presence of the thing to the sight as eidos, presence as substance/essence/existence (ousia), temporal presence as point (stigme) of the now, or of the moment (nun), the self-presence of the cogito, consciousness, subjectivity, the copresence of the other and of the self, intersubjectivity...'

Not much is left out. Derrida's basic criticism of this privilege goes something like this: presence, even in its literal temporal sense, is never simple, but structured by a relation to what is not present, what is other or absent. This is nothing other than the basic structure of the sign, which from the beginning, if we could put it like that, involves a reference to other signs. If all meaning has the structure of the sign, then all candidates for the privilege of presence are constitutionally in debt to something outside of, other than themselves. Derrida's elements, which exhibit in their own name this deferred, derived nature, are "traces." The trace structure, and its pervasiveness, is the lever by which the privilege of presence is deconstructed.

Derrida's earliest, best-known and perhaps most successful object
of scrutiny was the logocentric or phonocentric tradition, that which privileges the voice, or the inner voice, as having some special hotline to meaning. Derrida's deconstruction of this tradition – especially as it appears in Husserl and Saussure – is father to the term écriture (writing, and perhaps "scripture"). Writing serves to determine the entire field of signs or traces (including, one might add, speech), where this field is all the time understood as language loosened from any such privilege as a relation to meaning, or to the soul, or to the voice etc.

... Writing, in this persuasive definition, is characteristically understood as a play of differences (in a way that takes up and radicalizes the Saussurean diacritical account of meaning) or as free-play.

If the metaphysical text can be described as the centred text, Derrida's is pervasively decentred. The complexity of Derrida's texts results from the attempt both to keep one foot in philosophy and yet to systematically avoid creating in his texts those structures by which philosophical effects have traditionally been created. We have already referred to his overriding concern for the correct strategy. We will now try to explain in more detail what his textual tactics are. I distinguish them into five categories, for convenience: graphic, lexical, structural, methodological, and self-reflexive. It is by the parallel control of each of these levels that Derrida achieves his effects.

Under graphic tactics, I include all the standard devices of scare-quotes, brackets, italics which can be deployed singly or together to indicate many different degrees of using or mentioning of terms whose full implications one might not want to embrace. Derrida also appropriates the crossing-out device Heidegger employs in The Question of Being, although with Derrida there is not, as there is for Heidegger, the whiff of presence round the corner.
The **lexical** level is much richer. I would particularly point to appropriations and modifications of words that give rise to a characteristically Derridean army of terms, some of which one hesitates to call words, let alone concepts. In the term *déférance* (with an 'a') Derrida creates a hybrid of which Hegel would have been proud, except for the fact that Derrida is adamant in retaining a proprietary control over its lack of any full meaning. Terms like *supplément* and *trace* resist ordinary incorporation by being "indécidable" - not licensing the normal inferences. A trace is not a trace of anything, for example. Elsewhere - with *brisure*, *hymen*, *pharmakon*, what Derrida fastens on is the whole field of associations (sometimes contradictory) that they have. The point of all these innovations must not be missed. They are intended as a kind of fifth column undermining the tendencies towards theoretical centring and congealment.

The level I call **structural** covers the surface structuring of his texts. And I am thinking of those paginal arrangements that reach their creative peak in *Glæs* with insets into insets in parallel texts on the same page. In this multiple writing, the very linearity of writing is questioned, and the place of the author is made problematic. In the language of intentionality, it is as if the interrelationships between the parallel texts constitute an intentional nexus that severs the primacy of the author-text relationship.

The **methodological** level is perhaps a misnomer. There is much here that escapes the category of methodology - the many subtle and detailed ways he handles the texts he parasitizes. But if we were to pretend for a moment that Derrida had a method - a pretence he once himself made, even if he later regretted the simplifying lever it gave to others - that method would be deconstruction. And this involves
him in a particular textual practice, one that offers niches for the appearance of the lexical innovations we described above.

If we understand the metaphysical structure of a text to betray itself in a founding opposition, in which one of the terms of the opposition is weighted over the other (we might think of the speech/writing relationship in Saussure), then Derrida has a definite strategy for deconstructing this, in such a way as to try to prevent it from simply closing ranks after the first assault. He first of all inverts the opposition, crediting the lower term with the privilege previously accorded the first, and secondly, he injects a new term, or an old one reworked that will permanently disrupt the structure into which he has intervened. Thus writing in the broad sense is what comes to disrupt the opposition between speech and writing (in the narrow sense). Deconstruction, it will be seen, is not merely a case of "leaving everything as it is" although the early Derrida seems to have thought of it more like this. It is a procedure that aims to bring about a changed reading of a text.

Finally, self-reflection, or perhaps better, self-commentary. This includes all those remarks in which Derrida explicitly explains the problems of writing his kind of texts, the need for strategy, the risks of sterility, the debts he has to other thinkers etc. What is so important about them is that they seem to themselves occupy a privileged position in his texts, of being meant LITERALLY, SERIOUSLY, even URGENT, and yet they are a part of, and necessary parts of, texts that question the very possibility of such a privilege of the serious and the literal. It is as if by going up one level we could escape the limitations of the level beneath. But we have not escaped language, so that cannot be. We will expand on this criticism shortly.
Several avenues of criticism open up: the danger of sterility, his text-centredness, and the status of his textual reflexivity.

However much Derrida's writing has inspired literary criticism, he seems to many philosophers if not to be actually sterile, to have at least washed his hands of a whole range of classical philosophical problems. And while his own textual dissemination shows no sign of flagging, the risk of sterilizing the reader, too anxious of error to lift his frozen pen, is very real.

The criticism of text-centredness can be made at many different levels. Our basic objection is that Derrida treats the central extra-textual conditions on which textuality is alone possible, as mere extensions of textuality. And yet the human world of action and perception is not a text, but a context. Derrida cannot handle the idea of context.

Finally there is the problem of his textual reflexivity. While, for Derrida, the language of intention cannot be the site of a privilege, he has to privilege his own self-reflective remarks to ensure that we understand his texts properly. When trying to explain why, in Derrida's eyes, Nietzsche is innocent of Heidegger's "last metaphysician" charge, Spivak suggests, "Perhaps this entire argument hangs on who knew how much of what he was doing." And she refers to an exasperated Derrida replying to Houdebine in a Positions interview that he "knew what he was doing" at an important gap he appeared to have left in a text.

We said of Heidegger that he aimed at an ideal coincidence of "style" and "content" and that the ideality of that coincidence was of the same order as the metaphysical dream of presence, that pure performance was a desire doomed to unfulfillment. We are now in a position to
offered a parallel critique of Derrida. The very requirement to expand
on his stylistic repertoire in the interests of a strategy that in the
absence of an end found itself showered with means involved the
creation of a space of textual intentionality, which has to take itself
to be privileged in order to assure us of a correct focus on the rest of
the text. And yet by this very privilege the Derridean strategy under-
mines itself, the solvent begins to dissolve its bottle.

Derrida characterizes metaphysics as philosophy of presence. A
deconstruction of such a philosophy reveals a structure of textual
privilege licensing classical philosophical moves. In our view, while
Derrida is careful not to adopt any of his terms on a permanent basis -
his innovations for the most part come and go - the common space occupied
by these terms, and the deconstructive intentions they are designed to
serve do claim an analogous privileged status in relation to the texts in
which they are embedded. Derrida is not producing a separate meta-
language but he is producing a bifurcated text with an internal controlling
order established only by the appeal to authorial intentions. And in
this appeal there is a fundamental obstacle to the Derridean project.

On many occasions, Derrida points out the impossibility of doing
without metaphysical ploys to deconstruct metaphysics. In this respect
he differs from Heidegger in being prepared to get his hands dirty. The
inevitability of metaphysics is meant not to encourage it, but to focus
attention on textual strategy and economy rather than schemes for its
final elimination. In these respects, the Derridean project is impor-
tantly modest. But we do not think that this can serve as an escape
clause to justify Derrida's resurrection of the ultimate importance of his
own intentions at that vital hermeneutical centre - our strategically
informed understanding of his texts.

4. A Cautionary Tail

We have great admiration both for the effort and the results of Heidegger's transformation of his style, even when it takes him outside philosophy altogether. But it seems to us like an experiment in philosophical writing that should not be imitated, but further developed and explored. Heidegger breaks through not to a world of answers but to new problems and questions. The new paths opened up by appropriating one's style in an exemplifying manner are not paved with guarantees of success. In the conditions of its use, in its semantic and pragmatic presuppositions, in the arbitrariness of meaning of so many words, in the contingent historical circumstances that shape it, a language has what can best be described as a material aspect. From this materiality language derives both its depth and richness and its resistance to serving any higher end, such as philosophy. If a new style can mark a transformed articulation of Being, it does not protect language from its own materiality - indeed nothing could.

Heidegger's turn to style we find both productive and stimulating if unable to provide any ultimate solution. Much the same could be said of Derrida. But from the limitations of the Derridean project valuable insights can be drawn about the interpretation of philosophical texts.

Our critical treatment of Derrida (and Heidegger) mostly took the form of an immanent critique. In this respect our criticisms followed the same line as our expository premise - that both philosophers could be seen as turning to "style" as ways of avoiding being caught in their own metaphysical search lights. In both cases our critique took the form of claiming that they were so caught. To remain at the level of
such criticism is not however, satisfactory. One is not obliged to specify the weak spots in the position being criticized, nor to make a positive attempt to correct matters. We would finally like to indicate the direction this might take.

The weak point in Derrida's philosophical position lies in the fact that while it has certain rules for suspecting metaphysics — the list of structures of presence constitutes a kind of field guide — it has only ad hoc procedures for lifting this suspicion. Thus, despite the fact that the will-to-power seems to function as a centre, an ungrounded ground, Derrida finds in Nietzsche's style(s) reason to have him released from custody. For the most part we agree with Derrida here. But if we try to capture the grounds for this exemption of Nietzsche, in the form of a principle, we find ourselves wondering whether many others, already tried and convicted ought to be released. Nietzsche wears his style on his sleeve but might not the entire history of philosophy have been enacted by masked men?

The general question we have to ask of a philosopher is — what attitude does he take up to the signifier? The importance of analyzing the "rhetorical" aspect of philosophy, its "style", lies in the degree to which it betrays this attitude. But the example of Derrida's defence of Nietzsche shows us that what we have called the attitude to the signifier can manifest itself at a number of different levels of the text, and that there may even be, at least locally, a hierarchy of such levels.

For example, Nietzsche not only talks of the will-to-power, he psychologizes, he materializes, he even tries his hand at philosophical hit-man. There is no doubt that both at the lexical level and at the lower level of philosophical argument, he works the old language,
and deftly handles the old conceptual oppositions. How the "Real World" at last Became a Myth is a classic piece of anti-idealism.

But even at this stage Nietzsche must still be regarded as a meta-physician from Heidegger's viewpoint. He escapes because it soon becomes perfectly clear that Nietzsche's texts are elaborate constructions. He is not committed to the frames of reference he temporarily inhabits. The method is slash, burn and move on, a nomadology. He has no fixed address.

If Nietzsche's attitude to the signifier could be described as playful, we are talking of a feature which can be directly attributed to his texts without further evidence of a contextual or psychological nature. The way Derrida includes a theory of language within his own texts, his accounts of the strategies one needs to follow to avoid the errors of others, his warnings of the dangers of misinterpretation—all this self-documentation answers to the same demand, that a "successful" text should contain within it the principle of its own interpretation. Derrida is not easy to understand but he is much less easily misunderstood than Nietzsche was.

However, as a statement of a necessary condition for a "successful" text, this demand is a mistake, and one with unfortunate consequences. There is just no good reason apart from an idiosyncratic methodological hygiene, to suppose that a text can always be accurately judged on its appropriation of language, its attitude to the signifier, its metaphysical commitment, in the absence of an investigation of its conditions of production.

A revolutionary pamphlet may invoke a range of crude conceptual oppositions. It aims to incite. It may make all sorts of questionable assumptions. But they may be shared by its readers. Such indexical,
situated properties of a revolutionary pamphlet are shared by all occasional texts. While not all texts are written for particular occasions, they have some pragmatic, situated qualities. The importance of this dimension is that it is the condition for what is unsaid in the text, for what does not need to be said because it is self-evident, or taken for granted without ever being thematised by those to whom it is directed. If this is so we cannot read what is unsaid in a text unless we know what was taken for granted in its production.

On this view, the fact that texts have structures, centres, formal properties, is an internal reflection of the fact that texts are produced under specific conditions, they address certain problems, that they make certain assumptions, some of a factual nature, others about the very nature of facts. The finitude of the text - of which structures of presence are symptoms, is a reflection of the historical specificity and particularity of its Being. The formal analysis or dislocation or manipulation of a text brackets out concern with the context of its production and reception. And this unnecessarily restricts the value of the method.

In this limitation, the Derridean texts display their own finitude. They intervened at a time of blindness to the structures they revealed, and exploited to the full a new liberty of style. But it is no less a mistake to treat the limitations of a particular method as limits on what can and needs to be done. Much of what is thought of as metaphysical disappears as such when the context of its appearance is supplied, for what seems to be a formal property is then seen to be a reflection of a need, an interest, a desire......
POSTSCRIPT to

The Question of Strategy \(^1\)

'Tout dans le tracé de la différence est stratégique et adventureux' \(^2\)

In these last two chapters, we have persistently (and with luck consistently) put in question the legitimacy of Derrida's deconstructive strategy. We have argued that any positive formulations it offers are wedded to transcendental modes of thought, and that 'erasure' is no protection. Surprisingly, however, we say all this in an appreciative fashion, for we claim that whether 'legitimate' or not, it is successful in exposing, in its own terms, the metaphysical motifs in (philosophical) texts. What it cannot do, and there is some force in Rorty's position here \(^3\), is to offer anything like another positive account of anything, let alone the subject of our concern - time. But the fact that deconstruction cannot do it does not mean it cannot be done in a way responsive to its insights.

We are conscious, however, that this attempt to limit the scope of deconstruction can be opposed. We have of course already adduced various arguments for our position, and defended it against some of the obvious replies. But the reply that we are fundamentally misunderstanding Derrida's moves, and that our reading is naive could still be made. In this Postscript we shall try to make our own critical position that little bit clearer and stronger.

Let us first rehearse some of the doubts we have voiced:

1. That neither difference nor differance can be thought except in relation to identity and presence. The displacement of the foundational status of the latter by the former cannot be sustained. The hypertrophic development of either pair would be one-sided and even - if that were not such a contested term - undialectical. The everyday mutual interdependence
of these pairs is the unacknowledged point of departure for any thinking involving them.

2. Deconstruction is essentially a kind of **formalism** because it interprets as symptoms of a metaphysical syndrome (fissures in a text, structures of supplementarity, positing of a transcendental signified) what are actually the internal reflections of the outer historical conditions of a text's production (Foucault and Macherey).

3. 'Presence' cannot be made into the 'effect' of 'differance' because the only language in which this makes anything like sense is the language of transcendental causation. If one uses this language under erasure, its force is illusory. If one uses it straightforwardly, one is guilty of mere (intrametaphysical) inversion.

4. The success of Derrida's strategy seems bound up with our recognition of his authorial intentions, and his generous guidance in this respect. But this gives an extra-textual source (the author) the very kind of metaphysical privilege he is at pains to purge.

To each of these points Derridean replies can be made, and indeed have been, even if these replies do not settle matters. We would like to single out the first and last claims for further treatment, for it is they that are most directly concerned with the question of strategy. We shall take the last first.

Despite his warnings that we should not do this, Derrida must be interpreted as offering, at least formally speaking, transcendental arguments. We say 'formally' for although he does not posit transcendental entities, he is offering us 'conditions for the possibility of...' and not just logical conditions, but a 'productive activity' that brings about effects. But is this reading of ours not somewhat naive? Well, Derrida does not always caution us against understanding such claims in a traditional transcendental way. Great stretches of *Positions* go unprotected by such precautions. The reply to this, as Spivak says, is that there is always an 'invisible'
erasure'. Why? It is clear that on those occasions on which he does warn against a metaphysical reading, the force of his remarks is not restricted to those occasions, but is quite general. But if we are not to suppose that différence literally produces effects (because the language of production and cause/effect is appropriate only to relations to a generative ground, i.e. a 'presence') then his remarks do not have the force intended. When Saussure says of language that 'there are no positive terms, there are only differences' we have a sense of what he means that need not involve making difference into a principle with a power to bring about effects.

Derrida's general strategy is surely this: to infiltrate différence into the syntax of foundationalist and generative thinking, with a view to depriving it of its attraction. (One might compare the release of sterile male mosquitoes as an anti-malarial measure.) But once we realize this is the strategy, it is possible to ask whether this substitutive infiltration is acceptable. Derrida may say that of course it is not acceptable — that it is a transgression. But then we have to ask what is it to go along with Derrida?

Let us go round again, and this time with a closer focus on the paper 'Différence'.\textsuperscript{7} Derrida's texts, it may be said, always imply an 'invisible erasure' — he is using metaphysical concepts in a restricted way. That is, he would deny or refuse their full involvement in all the moves of a metaphysical discourse.\textsuperscript{8} (Now we could object here along the lines of our objection to the intentionalism of his insistent authorial control. We could say that it is an enormous claim to be able so to restrict the play of these terms that they do not start to do metaphysical work. Surely that would involve control over the reader's response? But we will leave this criticism undeveloped.) If, as we suspect, it is actually important to the ultimate shape of his thesis (what he wants to do with the term 'différence' for example) that he uses such terms out of erasure, we might be more careful in automatically being so charitable. There are
for example explicit contradictions between different texts on the subject of the status of differance. In *Positions* (1972) and elsewhere, he writes repeatedly of the concept of differance, while in *Differance* (1967) it is neither a word nor a concept. We mention this simply to show that we cannot assume consistency in Derrida's writing. Nor should we use 'invisible erasure as a portable barrier to criticism.

So, to repeat my claim — it is that Derrida either uses transcendental forms of arguments in explaining the term 'differance' in which case he undermines his whole project, or he does not, in which case the force of all he says about differance (and its intelligibility) evaporates.

Why should we not attribute to Derrida here a theory of transcendental textuality? Why is what he is doing not a translation from experience into writing of Husserl's account of constitution? Instead of supposing that there is this ulterior work going on in a text — of production and effacement — why not suppose that such absences and lacks and gaps are created by the act of transformative reflection on a text? Is not Derrida, in other words, projecting onto the texts he deconstructs a work of generation and repression that appears retrospectively only by contrast with the second deconstructive text? Surely it is there that all the work occurs, where all the action is?

To support this suggestion — an example. In his essay on Saussure ('Linguistique et Grammatologie') Derrida brilliantly exposes the almost hysterical expulsion of writing from the field of linguistics proper, and the language and tone that Saussure employs makes it clear that something like repression is going on. Writing threatens the natural life of language, and so is a monstrosity. But it is interesting that in this essay, in which Derrida is really very successful in exposing 'repression', he makes constant use of the language of psychology, and 'speech acts' — not of textual structure. He writes of Saussure's wishes, his 'irritations',
his tone, of him not wanting to 'give in', of not wanting to be 'too complacent'. It is Saussure (not his text) who analyzes, criticizes, confronts, 'says', defines, takes up etc. etc. Now we do not wish to drive a wedge between Saussure and his text, but we do claim that the plausibility of treating this as a work of repression rests very heavily on the language of authorial desires, acts and intentions (albeit unconscious) and not on an autonomous textual activity.

Elsewhere, we would claim, Derrida is making use of the language of transcendental causality, locating such work in texts, by an unjustifiable analogical extension. Perhaps deconstruction does not discover anything but transforms texts and then allows a comparison by contrast between old and new.

It might be thought that these references to the generativity or productivity of difference are inadequate to establish that it is playing a transcendental role — and not because of the 'invisible erasure' under which the terms are being operated (assuming for the moment (a) that the 'erasure' umbrella is always there, and (b) that the authorial control that such 'erasure' implies is not itself suspect) but simply because we are dealing with mere phrases and not with the detailed and subtle account Derrida gives of the structure of difference and its relation to the trace, the logic of supplementarity etc.

This is a perfectly reasonable point and we will try to meet the challenge it throws down.

In its analytically dual aspect — of difference and deferment — and in the various contributions made to its 'assemblage', difference is a condensation of a theory of the impossibility not of everyday presences in the empirical sense, but of a certain philosophical/metaphysical value of presence. Meaning is never completely fulfilled, in other words. One important consequence is that there can be no archê,
no first point, no foundation, no epistemological ground etc. For any putative origin has its fullness (and therefore its capacity to originate) constitutionally or essentially delayed. Once we accept that the possibility of philosophical discourse rests on the originating and grounding value of presence attributed to certain concepts, and to certain recourses and moves (e.g. to experience, to conscience, to truth etc.) then there is the possibility of a reading of a philosophical text that unmasks not just the difference and deferment involved in every 'presence' but the process of effacing or forgetting that difference. Thus

'the "matinal trace" of difference is lost in an irretrievable invisibility, and yet even its loss is covered, preserved, and retarded. This happens in a text, in the form of presence'.

We do have enormous doubts about this sort of claim. But would these doubts not be allayed if we allowed (for?) Derrida's strategy of writing? Are we not deliberately closing ourselves to what he says he is doing? We will return to this question, but first two replies:

(a) The fact that Derrida anticipates (and in Positions, scorns) the transcendental reading of his work, and tells us many times that this is wrong, is not a conclusive reason for avoiding it. We might indeed interpret these cautionary remarks as anxious premonitions of his just fate, or as themselves 'merely' strategic, designed to put us off the scent.

(b) Suppose we are refusing to play along. (Am I a bad reader?) Can there really be a strategy of writing that is not in principle compromised by the residual interpretive freedom of the reader?

We imagine Derrida could deploy here the distinction he draws at the end of Structure, Sign and Play... between 'an affirmation that plays without security' (of which he approves) and a 'sure play limited to the substitution of given and existing, present pieces'. The reader who
refuses to play along is the reader who plays safe, who will not take risks.

We are reminded here (and not only here in fact) of Heidegger's *What is Metaphysics?* and the point in that lectures at which he discovers reason's inability to deal with 'Nothing'. These pages make us uneasy; we seem to be cast adrift. Fortunately, with Heidegger, as the shores of Reason and Logic recede, the island of Experience becomes dimly visible on the horizon and our anxiety is over. Over, that is until we realize that it is the experience of anxiety, or Angst, that gives us independent access to Nothing which we should note is also said NOT to be a (formal) concept.

But while Heidegger ultimately redeems the danger and the risk by offering us access to Nothing through experience, Derrida's aim is loss of security. Heidegger's remarks about Nothing are usually questions, always tentative. Derrida's quasi-transcendental claims about differance are not at all tentative, and are meant to be believed in some sense or another. If not, what force can they have?

We are not suggesting that risk and danger are valuable only when ultimately rewarded. Certainly Nietzsche's advice to 'live dangerously' held out no such promise. But if Derrida were to reply to one who refused to play along that he/she was (just) playing safe, the obvious reply is that where ice is wafer thin, it is not dangerous to skate, it is folly. And it would seem equal folly to talk about differance 'producing effects' as a way of eliminating all talk of transcendental causation.

When we discussed earlier the claim that Derrida's method was 'one-sided and undialectical', we left the question prematurely unresolved, and we should like now to return to that question, and in particular to see what light it throws on the question of strategy. For, as he says 'in marking out differance everything is a matter of strategy and risk'.

Derrida claims in *Differance* that the term *differance* has profound affinities with Hegelian language, but nonetheless works a displacement with it - one both infinitesimal and radical. In *From Restricted to General Economy*,\(^{17}\) and in *Positions*\(^{18}\) it is clear that the radical aspect of the displacement is essentially Nietzschean (and Bataillean) in origin. Dialectics is understood as always a reappropriating method serving ultimately to restore identity. Difference, on the other hand, aims to break out of this system, to renounce identity and meaning.

Now if we accept that dialectic should be understood in this way - that one could not have a dialectic freed from its restitutive telos, one that charted the interminable struggle of opposites - then clearly *differance* cannot be faulted for being undialectical without missing the entire transgressive function it is designed to serve. And yet when Derrida is discussing Bataille's response to the master/slave dialectic - that of *laughter* - the response that 'alone exceeds dialectics',\(^{19}\) when he claims that 'differance would give us to think a writing... that absolutely upsets all dialectics...exceeding everything that the history of metaphysics has comprehended...\(^{20}\) and that *differance* holds us in relation with what exceeds...the alternative of presence and absence\(^{21}\) - we have somehow to give a sense to 'excède' which is not dialectical. In the sense of dialectical which means teleological/restorative of meaning, it is clear why. But in the sense of 'not derived from and essentially dependent on its derivation from the oppositions between presence and absence or identity and difference or, indeed, the Hegelian dialectic', it is not quite so clear.

Derrida talks of the 'displacement' of the Hegelian system - again a term which itself displaces any simpler filiation such as influence or development. But is it not quite as clear that this displacement is guided all along (and remains so guided) by that which it displaces?
Surely if we were to spell out all the subsidiary operations that Derrida engages in (reversal, insertion of undecidables, double reading, displacement etc.) we would find a method in which a teleological dialectics has itself been transformed dialectically. We do not get a progressive idealization, and we do not get a 'static' telos.

But what do we get? - 'an affirmative writing', 'joyous affirmation', 'the innocence of becoming', 'the adventure of the trace'. Not 'absolute knowledge', not 'spirit coming to know itself', not 'the realm of transcendental subjectivity', but surely something equally idealized, and something, interestingly enough, embodying values strikingly close to authenticity and freedom. To be sure, the concept of self, and what is proper to it have been put aside, but do we not have a repetition of key metaphysical motifs at the very end of Derrida's project?

We are not objecting to this in principle. What we are questioning is Derrida's self-understanding - his understanding of the possibility of a discourse other than that of 'metaphysics'. It may be said that Derrida has already admitted this. It is not a confession but an important methodological claim he makes when he writes that 'there is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics.' But for all our complicity with these concepts, this is a necessary means to an end - that of 'shaking metaphysics' and of exceeding it. In other words Derrida believes in making, at least with one foot, 'the step beyond' - beyond 'metaphysics', 'beyond man and humanism', beyond presence, beyond security, beyond the language of Being. The complexities all lie in the strategy for bringing it about. But there is no doubting, surely, the philosophical recuperability of the values informing his 'goal'. (And it surely is a goal; there is no reason to restrict 'goals' to static states of affairs) In brief, our admiration for his achievement does not depend on believing in his own assessment of its absolute radicality with regard to the circle of Western thought.
Derrida has transformed the way we think about, and read (or perhaps write) philosophy, he has transformed our understanding of the relationship between the inside and the outside of philosophy, but his strategic dependence on such metaphysical values as 'authorial intention' and on formally transcendental arguments essentially limit his achievement. There is no philosophical analogy to the chemical catalyst that facilitates the reading but remains unchanged, or the fictional number in mathematics that can be introduced and then later withdrawn from a proof.

But this limit is not a negative one. Rather, his lesson, or the lesson we draw from him, is not merely that, as he says, there is no sense in doing without metaphysical concepts in trying to overcome metaphysics, but there is no prospect whatever of eliminating metaphysical concepts and strategies. Rather the project of overcoming metaphysics (as Merleau-Ponty said of the phenomenological reduction) must be repeated indefinitely.

Derrida says of Heidegger that one of his real virtues lies in his intrametaphysical moves. We would like to say the same of Derrida. And we will finally explain what shape we think this takes, consciously aware of the way in which our own explanation takes for granted a particular metaphysical opposition. Again in Ousia & Gramme, Derrida, talking about Aristotle, says that what is truly metaphysical is not the particular question he evades (about the being of time) but the question evaded, the covering up, the passing on, the failure to reflect. Conversely, what exceeds metaphysics in Derrida is his writing as and insofar as it opens up the space of alternative theoretical possibilities and as it bears witness to the scope of its own transformative possibilities. And these occur even if the outcome may seem to be a new theory, another philosophy etc. Philosophy on the move is the only possible transgression of metaphysics. There is no Other Place to go.
We can only hope that the break with the theoretical sterility of deconstruction (when considered from the point of view of 'positive' description) adumbrated at the very least in the next chapter will fall within this description.
III. TIME BEYOND DECONSTRUCTION

CHAPTER THREE

TIME AND INTERPRETATION

The view that philosophy has a special subject matter is not a fashionable one today, unless perhaps one treats the many versions of 'the linguistic turn' as suggesting such a status for language. And even then a focus on language could not define philosophy, as linguistics, communication theory and semiology share the same focus. If language were to be treated as the subject matter of philosophy, we would have to specify in addition a particular approach to language in order to account for the specificity of philosophy. Such an approach is usually contrasted with instrumental, classificatory or objectifying alternatives. The force of such a self-understanding of philosophy can be gauged by the number of alternative and opposed philosophical approaches that share it (such as hermeneutics, structuralism, and analytical philosophy).

However, a case can be made out for bestowing on time the privilege currently accorded to language. This might be thought to be an obviously regressive move. Would not privileging time be an anachronistic revival of the spirit of the nineteenth century — of Kant and Hegel — or, worse, of more recent Bergsonian vitalism? Heidegger's work would seem to allay this fear. For even if he is clearly responsive to that tradition, that responsiveness takes the form of an appreciative re-thinking rather than a repackaging of those same ideas. Moreover, the development of Heidegger's thought, perhaps rather too tidily seen as stretching from Being and Time (1927) to Time and Being (1962) (for it should not be treated as any sort of simple inversion) suggests
a number of different dimensions in which the privileged position of time in philosophy can be articulated (ontic, existential, historical, ontological etc.). An account of the complexities of Heidegger's concern with time will, however, be reserved until later in the paper. Meanwhile we will be guided by what it opens up—the possibility of a hermeneutics of temporal structure, the scope of which will give support to the claimed privilege of time as the subject matter of philosophy. And in the metaphysical modesty of its descriptive and interpretive procedures there will be further confirmations of its distance from idealist and vitalist ambitions. Some of these broader issues are raised again at the end.

There is no doubting the importance of time, temporal structures and relations in understanding the identity conditions of different beings (events, things, processes etc.). The temporal dimension of such beings is crucial to their being the beings they are. This remark applies to cultural phenomena, experience, events, actions and so on. They can each be shown not merely to be 'in' time but to be temporally constituted in some essential respect. Music, for example, does not just passively take place in time; it involves the organization of time, in rhythm and melody. To the extent that the temporal organization of beings is what enables us to understand and relate to them as the beings that they are, an appreciation of the various types of temporal structure they can manifest will play a vital role in both the theory and the practice of such relating. This points to the hermeneutic importance of a theoretical grasp of the manifold structures of time.

As the art or science of interpretation, hermeneutics may take as its object literary, philosophical or other texts, or it may deal
with historical events or even the events of everyday existence. The aim of interpretation is basically to make sense of its object, or if you prefer, to understand it. (A deconstructive hermeneutics, if not a contradiction in terms, would aim at teasing out a multiplicity of strands of significance and indeed of modes of significance in a text.) To see philosophy as a hermeneutical discipline is to see argument as only one of its procedures and to see careful, reflective description and interpretation of phenomena as quite as important, and the kind of patience and care that this requires would be one of the hallmarks of philosophical responsibility.

One might suppose then that if we conceive of philosophy as a hermeneutical activity and direct our attention towards the temporal structure of the objects of our interpretation, that we ought to proceed without any particular expectations or intellectual baggage. We should, on this view, just prepare ourselves to receive those temporal structures that happen to spring up in our path. But it would not too grossly compromise the values underlying such an innocence if one were also to take along a few models of how time can be organized. We have offered elsewhere an analytical account of what such forms might look like. (Four types of temporal structure were distinguished: reflective, generative, participatory and active.) Here we shall attempt a rather different move - to show that we can obtain useful specific models of temporal organization and structure by a restriction of the scope of the most general accounts of time that philosophy has already thrown up. This move has a double thrust. We will show that such derived models have an interpretive potential by which they can supplement our stock of anticipated structures. And we make the further claim that it is the proper fate of such general accounts to
be restrictively transformed into accounts with a local application.

We can distinguish, for example, five general ways of thinking about time:

1. cosmic time
2. dialectical time
3. phenomenological time
4. existential time
5. the time of the sign

Each of these ways of thinking about time can be and at some point has been supposed to provide an account of Time as such and in general. Our transformative treatment of them clearly subverts the original philosophical role they were designed to play. We are making the point that incompatible general theories can be rendered compatible if their scope is restricted. To say that everything is made of water is one thing; to restrict the claim to the oceans and the clouds is another. On each occasion we pay special attention to extracting and disarming the explicit or tacit principle by which the generalization to Time as such is brought about.

1. Cosmic time

Cosmic time can be represented as a sequence of moments characterised by singularity, homogeneity, transitivity, universality, and directionality (or asymmetry). As a general theory of Time, its obvious difficulty is that it cannot accommodate the past/present/future structure of temporality. Its moments are all related to one another by earlier than/later than relations. If somehow one were to inject a viewpoint, a privileged point of orientation, into this account, its purely serial order would fall apart. It is incompatible with and cannot recognize intentionality.
Cosmic time fills out what McTaggart calls the 'B-series', but whereas he wants to claim that it is logically dependent on the 'A-series' (the past/present/future model intentionality needs, at least to start with), we are making the simpler claim that it cannot handle the relationships described by the 'A-series' but that it can be understood (and have value) as a representation (in itself harmless) of the ordering relations presupposed by certain everyday and theoretical practices. The structure of the calendar, for example, is a form of the 'B-series', albeit imperfect, and it is both a representation of and a determining condition of the practice of assigning dates to events. Clocks mechanically divide the basic unit of the calendar — the day. For computational economy, the calendar and the clock both make use of cycles and nesting of orders of unit but what they represent is a purely serial temporal order. Hence they play not just a practical role in everyday dating and structuring the synchronization of social life (time-tables, meal times, appointments), but also a theoretical role in those disciplines for which a sequential, intentionally-neutralized temporality is a prerequisite, like physics. If measurement of motion is the demand placed on a model of time by physics, it is not surprising that the resulting structure is that of 'a homogeneously ordered series of points, a scale, a parameter' as Heidegger put it in an early essay. Given that the success of physics is based on its mathematization of nature, and that the metrification of time is central to this project, it is hardly surprising that the structure of cosmic time, as we have called it, reflects the features of the series of natural numbers and indeed of any ordered series in the strict sense. There are in short a number of areas in which treating the
structure of time as simple seriality should be seen as reflecting real needs or functions. The complex temporal organization of daily life requires it. But it is a mistake to take the requirements of a certain sort of civilized life as proof of some deeper truth about Time itself. The prestige of physics may tempt us to suppose that what it requires of a concept of time transcends in significance the function that the concept serves in the theory. But if we succumb to this temptation, we have tacitly converted physics into metaphysics.

2. Dialectical time

For Hegel, world history is Spirit unveiled in an outer, temporal form. For Marx, that history is the history of class struggle. In both cases, the shape of that history can only be adequately expressed when seen as a dialectical development rather than a mere chronological series of events. Such simple chronology is concerned only with events and with external relations of succession between them. From the dialectical point of view however what the surface sequentiality of events reveals when interrogated is a deeper pattern of qualitative transformations, of development through conflict, the emergence and resolution of contradictions and so on. Essential to such an account of Time is the ability to identify and relate discrete underlying processes and forces whose interaction can be made intelligible in rational and teleological terms.

History has found many difficulties with dialectical thinking. The shape of dialectical progressions seems too formalistically represented by the thesis-antithesis-synthesis model, and yet in the absence of such a model it can too easily dissolve into woolly and unsystematizable references to struggle, the overcoming of oppositions etc.
More importantly, there has been considerable scepticism about the ontological assumptions underlying dialectical thinking. The move from Hegel to Marx, from an idealist to a materialist dialectic, is a move that in displacing Spirit in favour of social relation maintains the assumption that dialectical thought is guaranteed applicability by the nature of the subject matter in each case. Materialists claim that idealism can offer this guarantee only by inventing a subject-matter - self-conscious Spirit - of which it would be true. But its own claim - that the field of social relations is actually governed by those dialectical principles spuriously attributed to Spirit - is no less metaphysical a claim. This has led some to question the very idea of a materialist dialectic.

We can describe the relation between the idealist dialectic and the materialist dialectic in this way: the idealist dialectic offers a universality of scope and a more or less abstract form. The materialist dialectic on the other hand involves a fairly drastic restriction of scope (leaving aside such ventures as a dialectics of nature) while it is less able or willing to offer an abstract 'logic' for its method. Our interest here is in how the dialectical process can be seen as structuring time, and our aim is to show that while such a metaphysical ambition is misconceived something like dialectical time can still be employed as a hermeneutical model in a more restricted way. So it might be thought that the materialist version of the dialectic would happily fit with our programme. However, while not in any way denying the value of dialectical thinking in trying to understand (and indeed in influencing) the course of history we see no reason to restrict the scope of dialectics to the social/historical field. Dialectical thinking is legitimate wherever patterns of develop-
ment and transformation occur that can intelligibly be said to have some sort of 'logic', and which are the consequence of some human involvement. The reference to such involvement is a recognition of the need to set some limits to the scope of dialectics, but it does not, within those limits, offer any guarantee as to the applicability of dialectical thought.

We use the expression 'dialectical thought' deliberately. And something must be said about the status of such thinking. Firstly, it can be employed to give shape and intelligibility to a sequence of connected events that have already occurred. At one level this shape may be nothing more than an aesthetically pleasing articulation. But one may in addition wish to make the claim that a particular dialectical sequence is the product of some underlying generative principle (e.g. reflection, struggle, contradiction). Clearly the hermeneutic value of such thinking would vary with the kind of intelligibility claimed. Dialectical thinking can also be used predictively, but only in a hypothetical manner. If experience suggests that the situation we have encountered or find ourselves in will develop dialectically, that it is subject to particular local constraints, then we may be able to predict its subsequent development, or the range of possibilities open. Our prediction (as with all predictions) may not be confirmed by events. And even if it is, in fact, it is always possible that the success was adventitious, that the sequence actually had no 'inner logic', but only seemed to do so. What we call the 'logic' or the 'necessity' of a dialectical development is in fact a product of the events or thoughts or theories working themselves out within a 'closed system' and whether such a state of affairs obtains in a particular case is a matter of fact not of logic. There clearly are sequences of events
in the world which have a dialectical shape to them. In addition to world history, there are arguments, emotionally traumatic periods of one's life, local political swings and works of literature, to name a few. Whenever it helps to think of such sequences dialectically (at the very least using the language of opposition, conflict, struggle, contradiction, resolution, reflection, realization, development etc.) then we are giving sense to the idea of dialectical time, a time in which the principle is not quantitative succession but qualitative transformation.

3. Phenomenological time

The classic source of our understanding of phenomenological time is Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, a book rich in detailed analysis, and one to which we have already devoted considerable space (Part I, chapter II above). And it is to this book that we direct our discussion of the hermeneutical value (and metaphysical limitations) of phenomenological time.

Phenomenology does not see itself as just one approach among others, but as privileged in an important respect. It restricts itself to dealing with what we have a right to deal with - the 'things themselves' - namely, the data of consciousness. And whatever might be said in other cases, the initial reductive move - the exclusion of 'objective time' - is one that leaves us still with access to a genuinely temporal phenomenon, 'the immanent flux of the flow of consciousness'. (As Husserl puts it: 'The evidence that consciousness of a tonal process, a melody, exhibits a succession even as I hear it is such as to make every doubt or denial appear senseless.' p.23)

The first section ('The Exclusion of Objective Time') seems to
announce a modest scope for the study. Its exclusions of 'objective time' postpone any account of its relationship to time-consciousness.5 Between the time the main body of the book had been presented as lectures (1904-5) and their publication (1928), Husserl had shown an increasing willingness to bridge the gap between the analysis of the structure of consciousness and any possible account of the real, objective world. The theory of constitution offered in Ideas (1913) plays an important role. And this move seems already to have been begun in the lectures on time that we are considering. Section 31 deals with objective temporal points and section 32 with 'the constitution of the one objective time'. The exclusion of the question of the relation to 'objective time' has broken down, and for good reason. Phenomenology could never have had any interest for us unless its descriptions of the structures of consciousness had a value that went beyond their being an accurate account of subjective phenomena. That value lay in what was always assumed to be the epistemological and ultimately ontological signficance of consciousness. The reductions allow an initial freedom from the guidance of established unities, but what they are finally guided towards is an account of the contribution of consciousness to the constitution of such unities. One of the key moves is the recognition that terms like 'real', 'objective', 'transcendent', 'outside', 'world' etc. derive what meaning they possess from consciousness.

Our remarks here should be understood in the light of our general project, which is to demonstrate the metaphysical inadequacy, but hermeneutic utility of each of these 'models' of time. If we thought the exclusion of considerations of 'objective time' made this argument redundant, we can now see that it is not.
Husserl's main concerns in this book are quite well known. How, for instance, to explain that while our perceptual experience seems to occur always at a particular time, each time being part of a temporal flux, we can come to grasp the objects of our experience as temporal unities. How is unity across time possible (experiencing a melody, itself temporally extended)? The key to this question is his distinguishing and interrelating three different 'arms' of temporal intentionality: primal impression, protention and retention. Retention, for instance, is treated as an intentional modification of impressional consciousness, which gives the two an internal linkage not guaranteed, say, to conscious recollection. Husserl is also, however, interested in recollection and memory, as well as perception and imagination. In each case what the phenomenological account of temporality allows us to grasp is the intentional structure of a certain kind of consciousness. And it is only if time could be restricted to time-consciousness that a phenomenological account could ever successfully claim universality. There is no reason to doubt its value given its own methodological premises (which an existential approach would in fact challenge). But to anyone who would be tempted to think that phenomenology has a monopoly on the description of the temporal, we will mention just three modes of 'intrusion' into consciousness so conceived, which would undermine an account of Time that generalized from the time of time-consciousness.

A. The temporality of the body: the subjectivity of a temporally conscious being is an embodied subjectivity. One consequence of this fact is that even if there are clearly isolable sequences of experience such as phenomenological temporality describes, they are still the
experiences of a being already occupied by and with a multiplicity of somatic temporalities. For example, when listening to music, one may get distracted, or get tired and fall asleep, or even die. These fracturings of the isolable calm of a particular series of conscious acts are the predictable consequences of the periodicities that inhabit the embodied subject.

B. **The unconscious**: the unconscious can be thought of dynamically (as a set of hidden mechanisms that generate certain kinds of behaviour) or structurally (as a transverse structure that can be read through consciousness). Either way the possibility arises of, if not actually interference with consciousness, at least establishing different orders of interpretation. Under the heading of the unconscious, the phenomenon of repression could also be mentioned. Even if a theory of consciousness can be developed to account for forgetting surely repression is a harder nut to crack.

C. **Worldly time**: those concerned with internal time-consciousness cannot ignore that it has no monopoly on the forms of temporal organization. In the experience of surprise, for example, we have the recognition of the autonomous temporal orderings of worldly things. Time-consciousness has blind corners, failures and gaps in protention. There are, of course, surprises only for a protending consciousness, but success, let alone failure here already demonstrates a 'beyond' to time-consciousness that is itself temporal.

The generalization of phenomenological time proceeds, as we have suggested, by arguing for the dependence of all meaning on the constituting activity of the subject, insisting that any other temporal order would have to be meaningfully graspable and that such constituting
activity would only be made possible by a phenomenological temporality.

But this position tends towards an unacceptable idealism. The references to sleep, death, repression and surprise provide sufficient counter-examples to such a position. With a glance towards Levinas, we could add here: fecundity.

4. **Existential time**

An existential account of temporality is essentially participatory. It treats subjects both as embodied - and thus from the beginning 'in the world' - and as mortal. It is participatory in the sense that it claims that we are temporal in our very being and that the most basic temporal patterns which affect us are not those that organize the persisting objects around us, but those that involve our actions and our self-understanding as finite beings.

'Participatory' is perhaps to use too positive a term. 'Non-detached' might be more apt. It is not the temporality of a subject whose worldliness is in doubt, but of a person whose Being is in question, and for whom the temporal dimension of its Being is a key issue. On this account of time, the possibility of its generalization is assured by its association with the transcendental character of our Being. Man is transcendental because his Being is horizonal. And the horizon in question is one of ecstatic temporality: the triadic structure of anticipation, making present, and Being-as-having-been. Because we understand ourselves in terms of possibilities of Being, and the future is the fountain of possibility, it is the future that is emphasised in existential temporality.

One specific way in which existential temporality is given a privileged status vis-a-vis other forms of the temporal is by explaining those other forms in terms of it. For example, Heidegger says of
ordinary time that it consists

'precisely of the fact that it is a pure sequence of 'nows' without beginning and without end in which the ecstatical character of primordial temporality has been levelled off'

'... the 'time' which is accessible to Dasein's common sense is not primordial but arises rather from authentic temporality'

And in claiming, as he does elsewhere, that infinite time (= cosmic time) is derivative (by derestriction) from finite existential time, he further privileges the latter.

We seem at least at first to be able to separate the regional application of existential time from the transcendental arguments in which it gets involved. That there should be a kind of temporality specific to finite, ontologically self-conscious, embodied, worldly beings is not surprising, and it is enormously important in, say, interpreting human action. This is not of course to say that there are no problems for an existential temporality. Think of Barthes' sceptical remarks about biography or Sartre's discussion of the retrospective nature of adventures.

But if existential time can serve as the ground for cosmic time, why could it not be thought to ground all other times? This would seem to be Heidegger's position in Being and Time for example. If it were successful, the interpretation of temporal structure would have found a universal basis. Its success would require satisfactory solutions to two basic difficulties:

1. Existential temporality, even in its most direct application (human self-interpretation and projectivity) takes for granted as an ontological premise, the value of unity. The whole thrust of Heidegger's existential analysis of Dasein is to undermine metaphysical guarantees of personal
unity such as 'substance', the 'ego', the 'self' etc. His account of the theological sources of the idea of substance underpinning Descartes' dualism is masterly. And yet the conceptual apparatus by which Heidegger achieves this—and in particular, the pervasive distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic, and the idea of resoluteness—ultimately serve to redefine and re-establish notions like personal identity and responsibility, and the unity of a life through time. The authentic/inauthentic distinction rests on the possibility in principle of deciding what is 'my own' and what is not. If it does not suppose that personal wholeness and integrity is something given or guaranteed, it does suppose it to be achievable.

Opposed to such an assumption, I have in mind the vision of radically fragmented man offered to us by Barthes, both in the preface to Sade, Fourier, Loyola and his own substitute for an autobiography, Barthes on Barthes:

'What I get from Fourier's life is his liking for mirlitons (little Parisian spice cakes), his belated sympathy for lesbians, his death among the flowerpots .... How I would love it if my life, through the pains of some friendly and detached biographer, were to reduce itself to a few details, a few preferences, a few inflections.'

It would not be difficult to see in Barthes' position that of Hume, carried gracefully to its logical conclusion. Barthes' hedonism, if one can call it that, dissolves the distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic and seems to expose its ethico-ontological status. One might admit that something like systematic self-intelligibility is something people seek, without accepting either that they necessarily or actually achieve it, or that it is the only or supreme value. And yet existential temporality does make such a claim. One should not rule out the possibility of an existential temporality that embraced
without evaluation a multiplicity of 'selves' or tracks within a single person, but the concern in both Heidegger and Sartre with quasi-moral notions like authenticity, responsibility, resoluteness, and commitment, makes it hard for such pluridimensionality to get a grip.

Of course, one might still want to claim that difficulties in assessing the status of existential temporality in its direct application to the question of the unity of an individual life need not vitiate its role in providing a foundation for other kinds of temporality. We would still be able to think of cosmic time as a representation of the structure of the human practices of dating and measuring change, even if we had not got answers to whether such practices could or could not be existentially integrated. Even so we would be left with a second difficulty.

2. Existential time could only be extended to cover all other modes of time by supplying the ground or foundation for such times. Such an extension thus presupposes the legitimacy of the notion of such a ground or foundation. Significantly enough, Heidegger himself came to distance himself from just this transcendental form of thought.

In Being and Time, Heidegger's real aim was to reopen access to the question of Being, but the vehicle he used was an analytic of human being, insofar as the latter 'keeps itself ecstatically open to Being'. The existential analytic is the gateway to the question of Being itself. The history of philosophy has always treated Being as, in some form or other, presence. So the opening-up of the question of Being must take place within the transcendental horizon of time, in order to explore the status of that 'presence'. In Being and Time the existential focus of the question of Being means that human being (Dasein) is understood
within the horizon of its temporality. The development of existentialism is seen as a misunderstanding of the status of that existential analytic. And when Heidegger reasserts his real aim—thinking the question of Being—the link between time and the existential analytic gets severed, to such a point that in *Time and Being* (1962) the relation of his discussion to 'the human being of mortals is consciously excluded'.

At the same time as the specifically existential interpretation of temporality disappears, and in consequence the capacity of 'existential time' to render other kinds of time intelligible, Heidegger also seems to have assigned the concepts of foundation and ground to the very metaphysical tradition from which he is attempting to take up a certain distance. He comes to see the whole model of transcendental causality as mistaken in principle. What takes its place is a new approach to both Time and Being, in which we are offered instead of a ground, an account of that 'presence' by which Time gets involved in Being, in terms of presencing, opening, giving, bestowing... in which, if one were to speculate on the place of man in this scheme, something like 'active receptivity' might best describe it.

A full account of the treatment of time in the later Heidegger would take us too far afield, but it would not be unfair to draw the following conclusions from the discussion so far: (a) that we would have to defend *Being and Time* against his mature assessment if we were to pursue the project of treating existential temporality as a ground for other modes of time, (b) that it is not at all clear whether there emerges from Heidegger's writing an alternative understanding of Time that could stand alongside the various views we are discussing. But we have no reason to deny the importance of some form of existential temporality, in providing a framework for understanding human action.
and self-reflection. And there is no reason to rule out the possibility of a deeper understanding of the appearance of other types of time by reference to practices and attitudes the temporal structure of which can only be adequately understood existentially. In saying this, we are in effect endorsing the descriptive if not the ontological value of much of the detail of Being and Time.

5. The Time of the Sign

Derrida's critique of Saussure and Levi-Strauss is among other things directed against a purely synchronic, structural account of the sign. From the point of view of structuralist method, there is enormous value in its relative unconcern with the isolable meaning of signs, or with their referential aspects. Instead it focusses upon differential (especially oppositional) relations between signs. The representation of such relations in the form of grids or networks of opposition gives the impression - sometimes justified - that time is being altogether excluded from consideration, that difference is a static relation. On this view, time appears in language in the shape of tense, temporal terminology, the temporality of reading and writing, the internal development of a text (narrative, for example) and so on. But the elementary unit - the sign - would be free of temporal determinations.

Derrida's strategic introduction of the terms 'trace' and 'differance' (with an a) signals a departure from that view and although the whole idea of time proper is itself put in question the sense of deferral built into the term 'differance' introduces an essential temporality into the sign, and hence into the whole empire of signs and signification. Derrida is in effect treating both the sense and the reference of a sign as having the structure of desire. It is part of the classical conception of the sign that it stands in for, represents,
what is absent. Derrida is claiming that this 'absence' is necessary - not the absence of something that at some other time or place could be made present. Indeed Derrida offers a critique of the very possibility of such a presence. Meaning and reference always defer completeness. Textuality, in this light, can be seen as the movement of an impossible desire for plenitude, presence. Thinking of the sign as a 'trace' involves a similar relation to an imaginary time. The 'trace', he claims, is not a trace of anything (while the sign can be thought of as a representation (re-presentation) of what has been present). But while the trace is not a trace of anything (which is like saying that signs have an essential autonomy with respect to what they signify), there is, as it were, an imaginary relation to an origin that can alone make sense of using the term 'trace' at all. If the term 'imaginary' sounds awkwardly psychological, perhaps 'virtual' would do. Signification, and hence language, would then essentially involve an imaginary or virtual temporality.

But before we proceed to discuss this notion, a number of difficulties arising from our basing an account of the 'time of the sign' on Derrida's treatment ought to be mentioned. The reason for this approach is that it is from this point of entry that the possibility of the generalization of the 'time of the sign' can be contemplated. And yet in the course of this same generalizing move, paradoxically, the very idea of Time is threatened. The generalizing move rests on two premises: that signification knows no limits - that there is nothing to which we have access that is not caught up in it (including, for example, experience and perception); and that such terms as 'differance' and 'trace' capture the form of signification in general. But if this is how the generality of Derrida's position is produced, it is not obviously a generalization
of a form of time or temporality. Indeed he sees it, I think, as deconstructing the inherently metaphysical concept of time itself. (On this view presumably talk about imaginary or virtual time would only be permitted on the strict understanding that these were not kinds of time at all, but at bottom, mark the absence of the temporal.) But this would not endorse our aim of demonstrating the limitations of scope of each of our models because it fails to establish that it is a way of thinking about time at all. The terms 'differance' and 'trace' seem to be used as part of a negative transcendental argument to deny the possibility of any concept of time dependent upon the idea of the present — that is, any concept of time at all.

However, whatever status we do ultimately give to this argument, it is clear that Derrida cannot want it described in this way — as a (negative) transcendental argument. It would, for example, make 'differance' into a ground, and thus condemn it to the status of a new metaphysical concept. Indeed, having identified the concept of time as such with the metaphysical tradition, it is surprising, although gratifying, to see him referring to 'pluri-dimensionality' and 'delinearized temporality' in another paper. 17

It is precisely such notions of pluri-dimensional time that the field of signification — particularly textuality — opens up. A discussion of the temporality say, of a narrative text, would have to bring out not only the real chronology of events, but also the chronology of their presentation, the structures of internal repetition of words, situations, themes, the mapping onto the text of different types and modes of time (imaginary, symbolic, biographical, historical ...) and so on. There is an important sense in which the operational value
of Derrida's deconstruction of the concept of the sign lies in its liberation of *textuality* from the interpretive constraints imposed by traditional concepts of meaning and of time. Even if we continue to suppose that real, objective time was linear, Derrida's critique of the sign as representation would undermine any attempt to restrict textual temporality to a linear form. The text is a privileged site for the liberation of time. 18

This has particularly important consequences for interpretation. For the discovery of multiple strands of meaning within a text — part of what would be involved in a deconstructive hermeneutics — is heavily dependent on the discrimination of a variety of types of temporality. But strictly speaking, we have gained this status for a manifold of textual temporality by narrowing down rather than generalizing its scope. Can we really treat the world as a text? Has the age of hydrosemantics arrived? 19

Our original aim was to demonstrate how a number of different highly general ways of thinking of time can be successfully transformed into local hermeneutical 'models' by relinquishing their claim to a universal scope. This whole procedure is conceived of not as a salvage operation, not one that adopts the strategy Nietzsche attributes to the worm, 20 but more positively as a restoration of these models to the site of their more intuitive application. If we assume that the shape of such an enterprise has become clearer, we can now turn to consider some of the difficult questions it raises.

Have we not been operating under a mantle of innocence as to the real compatibility of each of these 'models'? Have we not, in effect, brought about reconciliation simply by silencing rival claims, and by
ignoring all the important questions? Have we not exchanged a healthy
dialogue between theories for a mere patchwork of their shrivelled
remains?

There is no denying the desire for some further account of what
if any the principle of unity of these various models might be. One
might reply that it is the desire for a ground, or a foundation, an
arche, and that such a desire rested on the mistaken belief in the
possibility of such a first point. It is just this impossibility that
the deconstruction of presence (discussed in the last section) demonstrates.
But it might seem that the result of accepting this diagnosis would be
equally unpalatable. Are we not left with a barren empiricism which
simply notes the variety of modes of temporalization and says 'How
interesting!' or a set of operational models, or descriptive techniques
which might be packaged ready for use by history, literary theory, the
phenomenology of music etc.? And is not the value of such a result
severely limited? Can the production of such models really be the aim
of philosophy?

Heidegger might have put the 'barren empiricism' charge in another
form. He might have said that we are concerned throughout with beings
and not with Being. He might cite in evidence the fact that we seem
to want to keep the analytical detail of Being and Time while leaving
aside the question of Being, the horizon within which that detail appears.
The fact that we retreat from any serious engagement with Time and Being,
in which the whole existential perspective is so clearly dropped, is
further proof.

Of course the objection is not merely that talk about Being is
absent from our account. The history of metaphysics is full of philosophers
who have talked about Being without understanding 'the ontological difference' (between Being and beings). And in principle it should be possible to respond to Being without naming it. (Indeed, as Heidegger discovers, naming it brings its own problems.) The objection would have to be that we are not responding to Being as such, but only to beings.

Our reply to this must be seen as tentative. Firstly we insist on the permanent, or better continuing, importance of detailed description of ontic structures. In an important sense there can be no discussion of Being without careful consideration of the realm of beings. It would be ironic if reawakening the question of Being were to start us yawning about beings. And yet just such a possibility of dissociation seems dangerously suggested at the end of Time and Being:

'The task of our thinking has been to trace Being to its own from Appropriation—by way of looking through true time without regard to the relation of Being to beings.

To think Being without beings means: to think Being without metaphysics.' (p. 24)

But doubts about Heidegger's formulation here do not constitute a reply to the objection that we ourselves are forgetting Being. We are drawn to make two apparently very different responses to this. The first response, put in a strong form, is that we have indeed abandoned Being, and rightly so. Nietzsche was right to think of it as 'the last cloudy streak of evaporating reality' or as 'an empty fiction'. And Derrida's own suspicion that it represents an unspent yearning for presence is fully justified. Do we not find confirmation in Heidegger himself of the impossibility of any coherent theoretical treatment of Being? Are we not always left with the question of Being, rather than answers? Put more positively, ought we not finally to realize that Being is nothing else but 'beings' grasped, understood, related to in a certain way?
And does not the recognition of the sparkling play of different types and orders or temporalization of beings offer just such a new horizon for relating to things? This horizon is not just wonder, but wonder informed by a sense of the variety of the forms of emergence, change, openness etc. which collectively constitute the horizon of temporality.

The second response would be this: if something remains in the later Heidegger of the recognition that the question of Being can only be reopened by the location of the dominant value of presence within the wider horizon of temporality, might it not be that the reopening of that horizon just is the reawakening of the question of Being, and the thought that there is some further task to be undertaken is an illusion. Our account here has demonstrated a polyhorizontality of time.

But are we not then committed to the perspective of Being and Time, one which we subjected to criticism above? And would that not involve just the sort of privileging of one temporal 'model' that we have been arguing against?

There is a sense in which the original definition of our problem makes this inevitable. We are concerned with interpretation, with hermeneutics, not with epistemology or metaphysics, and it is not giving hermeneutics a metaphysical grounding to recognise that it is a human activity, one that draws on existential 'categories' in pursuing its interpretive ends. Accepting this as an internal consequence of the way the problem of Time and Interpretation has been posed, it does not mean that we must forget our critical remarks about existential temporality as formulated in Being and Time. The most attractive corrective to that account would be one that attempted to blend our account of the multi-dimensionality of the text with a version of the account given in Being and Time from which the concept of authenticity has been dropped. The
claim would not be that life is a text, but that it is textured. And that man is a tissue of times.
Quite by chance, or so it seemed, two particular books recently lay side by side on my desk. One was Plato's Republic and the other, the multiply authored I Ching. I was enormously struck by this coincidence as they seemed to represent a disagreement of great import on which I had already taken sides. For Plato, time and change lead down the slippery slope to chaos, and intelligibility begins with the elimination of the temporal. While the I Ching, the book of changes, teaches us to recognise intelligible patterns of change, and that time is a condition for these patterns and not a threat to them.

The recognition that change can be intelligibly structured results, I would argue, from the absence of an enormous burden that Western philosophy has had to carry - the task of discovering necessary truths. To the extent that time is the source of changing circumstances it poses a threat to necessity. And it is no accident that in one of the most self-conscious and dedicated attempts to rescue time from the intellectual wilderness - I refer to the writing of Hegel - it can only return in the form of necessity. The more it is recognised that there is a middle ground of intelligibility between necessary truth and bare contingent facts about the world, the more plausible becomes the project of providing some sort of account of temporal structure and the less this phrase will provoke howls of mental anguish.

Our project has its limits. What is offered here is a frame-
work for a theory of intelligible temporal structure, and many
traditional problems about time will not be directly touched upon
at all. Let us begin with some points of orientation and clarification.
We take it that whatever is true of time is first true of the temporal,
that the adjective 'temporal' qualifies in particular relations, and
that complexes of relations may be called structures. What we require
is an analytical vocabulary by which such structures can be illuminat-
ingly discussed. We are not the first to suppose that language
itself (or at least reflection on language) can supply such a vocabu-
lar y.

What we claim is that the visible and reflectively discover-
able structures of language evidence a wide range of general temporal
structures; that in language, the structures of time are writ large.
Language we claim is an exemplary and a privileged temporally ordered
phenomenon. If our account here can sustain this claim, one welcome
consequence would be that we would not have to choose between the
alternatives: time OR language suggested above. We do not suppose,
as it might sometimes seem, that without structure there is no time.
No doubt time can appear in such primitive forms as simple duration,
as desire, as flux. What we object to is using these phenomena as
paradigms, for they are neither typical, nor perhaps fundamental.
We claim that language is an exemplary phenomenon. The temporally
informing features we will discuss are not restricted to language,
and a number of our examples will illustrate this.

The use of language as a site for excavation - and by language
here we mean speech, writing and interior discourse - has important
advantages over a study of the structures of time-consciousness:
(1) the structures of signification - intentional structures - that
language makes possible are infinitely more complex than would be available to a being without a language. The 'objectified intentionalities' of a natural language not only massively expand the possibilities of consciousness, but are more readily accessible for analysis. To the extent that temporal structure is intelligible it is ultimately and in the broadest sense, an intentional phenomenon. So a study of temporal structure that did not take into account the possibilities that language opens up would be importantly defective.

(2) Taking language as our object frees us to consider temporal structures without the doctrine of 'one man one time' hanging over us. If what we discover is useful for understanding experiential time, it has no a priori assumptions about unity, identity or continuity to hinder it, although these may of course creep in unnoticed. (3) The use of language as a mine of temporal structures gives us a breathing space of ontological neutrality, and a longer one than any analysis of consciousness can possibly hope to have.

Having established the site for excavation, we will now explain why we interest ourselves particularly in one sort of temporal structuring, the less favoured sort.

Language structures time in two ways which we will call explicit and implicit. The explicit way involves (a) (in languages with which I am familiar) such modifications of the verb as tense, aspect and mood, (b) use of temporal indices such as now, then and once, (c) the use of various languages of time and date - both everyday and specialist - from the calendar to the measuring systems of physics.

It is in these three areas that much of the work on the relationship between language and time is done. In our opinion
however, this explicit treatment of temporality by language is subject to certain a priori constraints which it is our intention to suspend, or bracket. These constraints are associated with the thesis of the a priori unidimensionality, unidirectionality, and continuity of time. We will call this, for short, the thesis of the a priori unity of time. This thesis has an application to the objective world — that (at least from a given position) all events can be uniquely ordered in a single temporal series; and it is applicable to subjective time in the view that for each person there is a single stream of consciousness, in which each experience can be uniquely ordered. Obviously there are various ways of handling the relationship between these two applications of the thesis, but these are not here our concern. We argue that the unity of time thesis is an unnecessary limitation of the investigation of temporal structures and particularly on those we call intentional. Accordingly we propose to put to one side the unity of time as a priori assumption. For this reason, and because much work has already been done in this area, our focus will not be on the ways in which language explicitly structures time insofar as these are linked to some form of the unity of time thesis.

But before we proceed to the body of the paper — the implicit temporalising of language — there are two important respects in which the explicit temporalising of language seems to already point beyond the unity of time thesis:

(1) If we consider a discourse in which tense or mood or aspect (or all three) are employed — the unity of time thesis will appear in the form of rules for assessing the consistency of these uses. In particular one thinks of tense logic. In our view, however, logic
is unsuited to legislate for temporal relations in general. It is itself dependent on further explanations of such key temporal notions as 'at the same time' (a point Geach makes in another context), and is only ever introduced and comprehended via our ordinary natural language. However, tense or mood (and aspect somewhat less) each allow the creative expansion of what we call ecstatic virtuality, or intentionality. They allow the subject to specify the most complex existential orientations, and indeed to conceive of them in the first place. And in doing so, one-dimensionality is implicitly expanded into a multi-dimensional texture, which opens up a crack in the 'unity of time' thesis.

(2) The other respect in which explicit temporalising can lead beyond this thesis is found in the possibility of multiple histories sharing the same dating system. Here we are thinking of Foucault's insistence that we consider history pluralistically — that there are histories of toy-soldier manufacturing, book-binding and soap as well as that of the kings and queens of England. So while dating systems in principle allow any event to be uniquely located in a single temporal series (the history of the world), there remains the possibility of establishing a number of more limited special series restricted by content and in which actual serial order is not always of overriding importance. Thus, in studying the lifework of a particular painter, it will only sometimes matter that one knows which painting he painted first — when there is a significant change of style, say.

These are two respects in which the explicit structuring of time by language can overcome the a priori constraints we have mentioned. Within these constraints much valuable work has already been done.
Our concern, however, is with the ways in which language structures time implicitly, and for the clues this offers for more general insight into temporal structure. We begin looking at the implicit structuring of time by considering temporal order.

Consider first of all seriality. Metrical time is merely a succession of instants, drawn out in a line, but language offers us more complex forms of seriality. We distinguish just four:

(i) repetition - in which the same element (a sound, or letter, or word...) is repeated over and over again.

(ii) simple progression - in which different words succeed one another without establishing any larger units.

(iii) syntactic connection - in which words that succeed one another DO form a new unity (eg. a phrase, a sentence) and in which the relations of succession may be much less important than say agreement, (in case, number, person etc.) with a more distant element. One way of looking at such connections is to treat their successivity as only the surface consequence of generation from a deeper structure by some rule.

(iv) finally we will speak of articulation of these syntactic units as defining another level - most important to complex temporality - which we will call textuality.

If we consider next the fact that language offers a number of different significant units, something like a nested structure of articulation becomes visible. Again if we take a lengthy text, we may find a plot, a collection of chapters, paragraphs, sentences, words and letters. At each level, a shift in attention occurs which changes the intentional focus and opens up a new horizon of meaning. And
at each level a distinct series is discovered. Ordinary empirical studies reveal what we could call different orders of magnification of temporal structure - from the vibration of crystals to history. The example of language suggests that at each of these different levels of magnification, distinct series can be found.

We have said that at each level of unit a new horizon of function appears. Words and sentences have distinct kinds of unity. The sorts of series we have just mentioned are combinatory or syntagmatic. But there is another axis of seriality - as it were - which opens up a virtual horizonality based on selectional or paradigmatic chains. Each time a particular word is used, a chain of the repetitions of its token equivalents is activated and extended. And this chain can have different sorts of significance. The etymological roots of the word may for example be unconsciously or explicitly alluded to. A word may take on a special local significance through textual repetition. (Think of Dasein or differance). So we can distinguish within the cosmic list of word's repetition both the regional series to which it belongs and the relationship between that series and the wider one.

What has this to do with time? The recurrence of the same is a primitive temporal structure. It too has its own horizonality. (The consequences of developing this insight can be momentous, as Nietzsche showed. We take up this question in our Appendix.)

Yet another advantage of taking linguistic productions as exemplary for understanding temporal structure arises from the plurality of texts, each of which to a greater or lesser degree allows distinct temporally ordered series to be identified, and 'times' within these
series. Thus we can talk about the early chapters of a book, the opening lines of a poem, or an argument. Where there is some ground for intertextual grouping, we can extend this intentional seriality to a whole opus, for example. Consider the early and later Heidegger, Kant's pre-critical writings and so on, even up to such large scale series as the phenomenological movement or the logocentric tradition.

In the world of texts and discursive sequences, there is no ONE time. Multidimensionality is the rule. This is not to say that by some magical process texts escape the possibility of being objectively dated. Rather the relationship between a text and physical time is likely to be less significant than between one text and another (or indeed between a text and the nature of its historical context). We would endorse here as we have said Foucault's emphasis on histories rather than history. But we would add that multidimensionality does not require the sacrifice of the intentional - of meaning, horizons etc. - rather its expansion.

Our use of the text as a model for temporal complexity has so far been to expand and pluralize time understood as serially ordered, linear time. Before we leave this valuable but limited perspective we must draw attention to another consequence of multidimensionality. The overall continuity of a multidimensional text permits discontinuities of particular strands, both in the sense that a particular series may begin or end, but also that it may be interrupted. The overall structure of a text allows such discontinuities to be located and identified. The pluralization of time has as its consequence that discontinuity becomes conceptually admissible. We discuss this more fully when we deal with narrative, below.
So the text can be used as a model for understanding a historical break. We do not however dismiss the idea of continuity or its importance. Rather we argue that consciousness, experience or epistemological history may be characterised by discontinuities. To admit discontinuity does not require us to abandon all interest in temporal order. It only suggests that we avoid a mistakenly a priori understanding of the structure of time which would find radical discontinuity hard to handle.

So far, with the concepts we have canvassed - multidimensionality, internal horizonality, nested articulation structure, and discontinuity, we have tried to illustrate the way in which linguistically structured temporality transcends simple seriality, drawing heavily on the structure of texts. But these particular concepts only disclose some of the most visible temporally constitutive intentional aspects of language. So as to try to anticipate in principle some of the diversity of other such structures, we will now look at three of the most important principles responsible, in our view, for their appearance, which, with certain reservations we will call determination, reflexivity, and 'presence'.

Let us begin with determination. Put most simply, a word a phrase or a sentence can be determined by a rule. But this opens up a number of different senses of 'determined' and of 'rule'. There are lexical selectional rules, and syntactic combinatorial rules. These could be called rules of construction. It is already clear that a single utterance can be determined by many different rules simultaneously. Moreover there are other ways in which utterances are determined which allows them to be multiply determined. In
particular, one thinks of all those conditions of appropriateness that a linguist would treat under pragmatics.

This talk of determination however, treats of a phenomenon from only one point of view. The rules involved would appear to function as limitations, constraints, conditions. They present themselves as demands that one must either meet or risk falling into babble or foolishness. But the other face of this same phenomenon is rather different. A single utterance can satisfy a multiplicity of conditions so as to be 'just the right thing to say', the 'not just'. And the very same rules, constraints and conditions can serve this creative role as well as the conforming role that the other model suggests. To understand and appropriate these conditions of sense and force, and to bring them to bear, consciously or otherwise on one's speech or writing has as its limit something we would call discursive saturation, the closest we can come to a redefinition of authentic discourse.

There are two important respects in which multiple determination or multiple satisfaction are temporally significant.

(1) If we allow that some of the rules governing the surface structure of utterances are rules that relate that surface order to a deep structure - a generative model - then we have given an important sense to the idea of surface order being derivative. It is not actually important for our present purposes that we agree on a generative model for syntax. For it clearly applies to linguistic production at other levels (such as writing a book from an outline) and to quite different fields, such as acting from a blueprint, as when one follows a recipe or a map or a flow diagram. In these cases the
temporal order of one's actions or decisions is derived from the order of another schema or blueprint. It may be wrong to treat world history or my monadic autobiography as the conscious or unconscious unrolling of some such deeper order, but the fact that a model can be misapplied does not invalidate it, it only reminds one of its limits. (2) The other respect in which multidetermination or satisfaction is temporally constitutive is more general. It exemplifies temporal focussing or condensation. An act in general and a linguistic act in particular, with a single physical description can be part of a number of different intentional series. Painting a fig leaf in the right place can satisfy the censors as well as improve the colour balance. A sentence can enflame and inform at the same time. Or consider the note at which two pianists moving along a piano in different directions cross over. That single note will have a different meaning depending on whether it is seen as part of an ascending or descending scale.

The point is this: language offers us examples of a very general phenomenon, which is the concretely multi-faceted nature of its instants, its moments.

After multiple determination or satisfaction the next specifically intentional feature of language we would single out for its temporal importance is reflexivity. The fact that language can be about itself, or that we can talk or write about other sentences, or even the very ones being uttered, means that the temporal structures constitutive of texts or discourses must be thought of as doubled back, or folded over on themselves. In such a reference back, the actual temporal gap - when there is one - is only there
to be ignored. Reflexivity establishes loops of immediacy amidst what remains of linearity. But it does more. We could restrict reflexivity to the clearest case in which S' refers to S either by name or in quotes. But the same principle of reflexivity is at work in anaphora, and in clause modification. It is no accident that Hegel associated the possibility of the dialectic with what he called the speculative proposition and as we have argued elsewhere⁴, the progress of the Spirit should be seen as at least modelled on, if not at times dependent on a reflexivity that belongs primarily to the Hegelian text itself rather than to some independent object to which it might refer. Dialectics, in short, would be in large part an exploitation of the phenomenon of textual reflexivity. For us this is not a reductionistic thesis. Rather, as we are claiming, complexly intentional time is best revealed by the structures of language, but need not be reduced to them.

The last particularly intentional feature of language is 'presence'. We have discussed this already in previous chapters, but it is worth repeating here. A certain confusion has proliferated around this term. According to Derrida, presence is a feature improperly attributed to terms or utterances because of the trace 'structure' of any sign. And if there is differance wherever there is signification, even the purity of that presence we call self-presence is threatened, to the extent that presence in its temporal aspect, is infected by its relationship to past and future. 'Presence' is an illusion of false-immediacy, as Hegel might have put it. Or in Derridean parlance, language is a play of differences and deferments. But need we choose between differance and presence? In our
view, the deconstruction of presence IS effective against taking presence - in one or other of its forms - as a metaphysical foundation. And if phenomenology is committed to the value of presence then (insofar as it is a metaphysics) its plausibility would be threatened. However it seems to us (a) that the development of phenomenology since Husserl has been consistently away from the metaphysical temptations to which he arguably fell victim, and (b) that phenomenology is not committed in principle to presence in some absolute sense. Phenomenology can survive without supposing, for example, that meanings can be perfectly fulfilled.

So we do not believe that a deconstruction of presence is an automatic deconstruction of phenomenology. Although it rightly breeds discontent with a narrowly intentional account of language, as Merleau-Ponty was beginning to see in his last work,\(^5\)

But in our view this critique of presence is quite compatible with presence being an essential phenomenon of language. It is quite true that words do belong to series, and do have meaning by virtue of unstable differences of oppositions to which they are related. But for all that, people use words to refer to actual and possible worlds. They take some words to be apt and others awkward, and they freight their discourse with meaning. A phenomenology of discourse cannot do without the concept of presence. Even if, as we have argued above,\(^6\) we cannot straightforwardly accept that differance is what makes presence possible, there is undoubtedly a complex relation of mutual interdependence, so presence cannot serve as a foundation. But equally it is no illusion.

Presence as we understand it is the primary phenomenon of
language. It is made possible by the relationship that the term or utterance in question has to the various differential series to which it always belongs and to the intentions and references it may bear. Presence is difference focussed by a linguistic subject's desire. The product of this focussing is that ideality that Nietzsche rightly attributed to language. Making present draws in pasts and futures. Presence in language is the phenomenon of which difference is a condition and ideality the abstraction.

So far we have dealt with what could be called structural features of language. Most if not all our claims could have been illustrated by a written text. We have explored textuality as complex temporality. We have argued that certain structural features of texts exhibit the general properties of this complex temporality. Three important problems arise out of this treatment and we would like to dispose of them before we go on to look at the most obvious standard form of textual temporality - that of narrative.

(1) We seem to have licensed references to intentionality without a subject. Texts have appeared in a kind of uncommitted limbo between being objects of analysis and being enlivened by reading or writing. References to speech, on the other hand, have not been sensitive to the specific temporality of the act of speaking.

(2) We have still not explained how it is that time can be thought of as structured without ignoring its essential spontaneity and creativity. Does not any talk of temporal structure inevitably spatialize time? Are we not mistakenly applying the static products of reflection to the pre-reflective level? Are we not confusing Being with its representation?
(3) What is the intended scope of our analysis? Are we talking only about subjective time, or existential time, or what?

We will first look at the problem of intentionality without a subject. There are two justifications for this:

(a) that the properties of texts and utterances we have discussed so far are neutral as to being written or read, being uttered or listened to. It is unnecessary to specify the position of the linguistic subject on each occasion, even if an adequate account of the ontological status of a text must acknowledge the need for its animation by linguistic subjects. But there is a more important reason for suspending the question of the status of the subject, and the precise sense of intentionality employed in the analysis of texts. Such a strategy allows the possibility to emerge that the concept of the subject, and of intentionality is considerably transformed when we take language as its field of operation rather than consciousness as traditionally understood. If we begin with the subject as the subject of consciousness not only would we be unable to understand a text except by problematically invoking an unconscious, but more importantly for our purposes we would still be rattling the chains of unidimensional temporality.

This struggle has an important historical dimension. In our view the only way of avoiding psychologism, in the battle against which phenomenology was born, without reaching for a transcendental phenomenology, is to recognize the determination of our lives and experiences by structures of signification, structures which are most complexly developed in language. While language most thoroughly exploits signification we do not claim that there is no signification
without language, rather that simpler forms, such as association by similarity or proximity, do not provide us with an adequate paradigm. This is why Hume's associationism won't do. Transcendental phenomenology we understand as a reflection of the inability of a unidimensional temporality - like Hume's - to handle on its own the complex structure of experience, and particularly to guarantee continuity and the identity of the subject. This flight into ideality loses its appeal if instead we rethink the temporal structure of our everyday experience and action along the lines we are suggesting.

The second problem is that we might be thought to be accessories to the age-old crime of killing time by spatialising it. Is that not what is implied by talking of structures? The importance of this charge is that it allows us to make historically overdue clarifications about the representation of time. Some philosophers seem to have believed that the attempt to represent time spatially was either in itself a fatal error, or led with some kind of necessity to making such an error. In whichever form we take it, the belief is not only mistaken, but, theoretically stultifying.

Our view, on the contrary, is this: that there has never been anything wrong with the spatial or other representation of time as such. The error can always be found in the interpretation of the representation or of time's representability. Put another way, the error has always been in failing to realize that a representation of any sort requires an interpretation. I take it that a version of our claim here is commonly accepted - that, for instance, even the most representational painting, the most descriptive statement, the
most realistic novel utilizes conventions, and that not all of the features of a representation can be assumed to be features of what is represented.

But if this has been generally agreed, the consequence for representations of time does not seem to have been drawn: that we can describe temporal structures - those that we have located in language for example - and we can even provide diagrams to display these structures more vividly - without killing time.

Let us illustrate this point: a spatial representation even of what appears to be a simple linear unidimensional temporal sequence can be used to capture at least four different types of temporal structure, which we will call reflective, generative, participatory and active (see attached sheet). These types of temporal structure differ in the sorts of relation that hold between successive elements. In the reflective case the principle by which the succession is unified, is one reflectively projected on the events after the fact - as one might look back on the outcome of a series of accidental occurrences. In the generative case, the serial ordering is understood to be a product of some underlying formative principle - such as a genetic code or a transformation of a deep structure. We have discussed this before. In the participatory case, the order is one that a subject is essentially involved in unrolling. We include as examples, listening to a joke, watching a play, reading a book. Each successive step is marked by anticipations confirmed, or denied, and others born. Finally, in the active type of seriality the sequence of events reflects a plan of action in which some order at least is already determined.
(1) **REFLECTIVE**

```
    \(\downarrow\) \(\downarrow\) \(\downarrow\)
A       B       C
```

the connections recognised between A, B and C are simply a product of a later reflective grasping of their serial ordering.

(2) **GENERATIVE**

```
    \(\uparrow\) \(\uparrow\)
A       B       C
```

the connections recognised between A, B and C are deemed a consequence of some underlying formative principle \(X\).

(3) **PARTICIPATORY**

\[
\text{Lists of words guessed at each stage:}
\begin{align*}
\text{IN} & \rightarrow \text{IND} & \rightarrow \text{INDI} & \rightarrow \\
\text{INNOCENT} & \rightarrow \text{INDECENT} & \rightarrow \text{INDIRECT} \\
\text{INNOVATE} & \rightarrow \text{INDUSTRY} & \rightarrow \text{INDIFFERENT} \\
\text{INWARD} & \rightarrow \text{INDIA} & \rightarrow \text{INDIA} \\
\text{INHALE} & \rightarrow \text{INDOLENT} & \rightarrow \text{INDICATIVE} \\
\text{ETC.} & \rightarrow \text{ETC.} & \rightarrow \text{ETC.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\rightarrow \text{INDIA} \rightarrow \text{INDIAN} \rightarrow \text{INDIANA} \rightarrow \text{INDIANA} \\
\text{INDIA} \rightarrow \text{INDIAN} \rightarrow \text{INDIANA} \rightarrow \text{INDIANA} \\
\text{INDIAN} \rightarrow \text{INDIANA} \rightarrow \text{INDIANAPOLIS} \\
\text{INDIANA} \rightarrow \text{INDIANAPOLIS}
\]

imagine watching a skywriter spelling out a word, and guessing it at each stage.

(4) **ACTIVE**

```
\(\downarrow\) \(\downarrow\) \(\downarrow\)
(Abc) \(\rightarrow\) (abc) \(\rightarrow\) (abc)
A       B       C
```

the chosen structure ABC guides the successive unrolling of three stages of action.
Although something like a diagrammatology is required to adequately construct and interpret them, each of these types can be spatially represented, and this involves neither their reduction to a simple type nor the loss of their authentic temporality.

Each of these, as it happens, are modulations of simple temporal seriality. We do not claim that they exhaust the field of temporal intentionality. Indeed they are consistent with the unity of time thesis, whose limits we reject. It is a confirmation of our orientation to language that each of these types of interpretation of temporal order has a clear linguistic embodiment. We have already directly discussed reflexivity, and the idea of a succession indebted to a rule that generates it was covered by the more complex principle of multiple determination.

The two remaining ways of interpreting representations of time - as participatory or active temporality - each have their place in language, indeed a place which constitutes one of the most fertile resources of temporal structure. They lead us back to those structures particularly characteristic of communicative interaction.

In the active production of contextually appropriate grammatical sentences, both speaker and listener will modulate the way they follow utterances with various kinds of anticipation and retention. What is retained and anticipated will reflect linguistic probabilities resting on both formal and contextual conditions. More importantly what is actually spoken, and thus whether a particular anticipation was correct, will reflect the very participatory temporal structure that utterances have. Thus, to take an extreme
but clear case, the punchline of a joke is both something actively waited for, and successful only if it is so anticipated. Part of the art of telling a joke (or writing a thriller) lies in the orchestration of clues to the existence and nature of the climactic structure of the discourse - both leading and misleading clues.

The importance of the joke, or, say, a Hitchcock film, for our project is that it exploits the active and participatory temporal structuring of language as this structuring gets elaborated by communicative interaction.

We cannot here explore in any depth the temporal complexities of communicative intersubjectivity, but we will mention some of the key factors involved. The central condition is the fact of another linguistic subject with his or her own temporally structured life. Communication requires some sort of interarticulation of these temporalities. Whether one is dealing with monologue or dialogue the intelligibility, and the effectiveness of discourse will in various ways depend on the speaker correctly judging the progressive structure of his audience's anticipations. This is equally and more vividly true of the writer/reader relationship, or the relationship between a director of a film and his projected audience. Communication, in short involves anticipations of anticipations, and ongoing modifications of one's discourse which accommodate these anticipations. The precise nature of these adjustments of co-temporality will vary with the type of communication involved. Making music together is often formally constrained by a score; the communicative aspects of climbing a mountain together will involve a mixture of verbal exchange, silent gesture and the interpretation of involuntary bodily movements. The feeling of co-presence, of shared exhilarated exhaustion on the summit is a product of all these previous exchanges.

It may be remembered that we raised three problems with our treatment of time structure, and we have so far only dealt with
two: intentionality without a subject and the alleged dangers of spatializing time. The third is the question of the status and scope of our investigation. We shall now try to answer this question.

So far we have been guided by two ideas:

(1) that structures of time are intentional structures, and that intentional structures are structures of signification. As language offers the most visible development of such structures, it is to language that we have brought the spade.

One consequence of the view that all structures of time are structures of signification is that our conclusions are not restricted in principle to time-consciousness or to existential time. Wherever change is patterned in ways that can be repeatedly recognised or accommodated to, or intelligibly grasped, a structure of signification is involved. We retain a certain sympathy for Heidegger's view that intelligibility and signification are rooted in our worldly involvement, even if discourse subsequently develops a certain autonomy. So the scope of our theory is intended to be quite general.

(2) Our second guiding idea has been this: if it is true, as Derrida claims, that our ordinary concept of time is metaphysical, we see this, perhaps with a certain deliberate naivety, as a condition to be changed. We find it quite unacceptable that temporal language should be squeezed out of philosophy just because of the temptations it puts before us.

Indeed, as Derrida knows, much of the evidence points in the opposite direction. Rather than supposing that time is a metaphysical concept it is more fruitful to consider the temporal determinations and commitments of metaphysics, such as the desire for the end of time. The same goes for a wide range of philosophical concepts, not least that of theory.
Something of this problem will beset us as we turn now to consider one of the classic ways in which texts exhibit temporality—that of narrative. The importance of narrative structures to literary studies goes without saying. But much broader claims have been made for its significance. For Ricoeur, it is the key to understanding existential time and for mediating between individual and historical existence. For Gallie, it is the defining feature of historical discourse. For Jameson, it is the central function or instance of the human mind around which we can restructure the problematics of ideology, of the unconscious and of desire, or representation, of history and of cultural productions. For Lyotard, it is the irreducible form of intelligibility in a sea of multiply differential discourses ('petits recits'). For Barthes, it completely surrounds and permeates us, it transcends genre, and it is international, transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply there, like life itself. The interest in narrative structure is as old as Aristotle and can plausibly be said to have taken a quantum leap in the modern era.

The question of narrative is very often and understandably, the focus of interest for the study of the very intersection between temporality and textuality that we have begun here. Our reasons for not taking this approach would be a story in itself. It would have been more difficult to resist the conveniences of an increasingly established frame of reference. But more importantly, many of the structures to which we have pointed function at a more primitive level than that of narrative. (Unless, of course, we extend the sense of narrative to include any and all linguistically mediated temporal intelligibility.)

In the face of such a wealth of narrative theory, we shall select on or two critical questions to which our approach makes a positive contribution.

The first question is one raised by Barthes in his seminal paper
Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative: 'Is there an atemporal logic lying behind the temporality of narrative?' His answer is that while Propp, 'whose analytical study of the folktale is totally committed to the idea of the irreducibility of the chronological order: he sees time as reality and... is convinced of the necessity of rooting the tale in temporality.' The modern consensus takes the opposite view:

...all contemporary researchers (Lévi-Strauss, Greimas, Bremond, Todorov),... could subscribe to Lévi-Strauss's proposition that 'the order of chronological succession is absorbed in an atemporal structure.' Analysis today tends to 'dechronologize' the narrative continuum and to 'relogicize' it... or rather... to give a structural description of the chronological illusion — it is for narrative logic to account for narrative time....temporality is only a structural category of narrative (discourse), just as in language (langue) temporality only exists in the form of a system; from the point of view of narrative, what we call time does not exist, or at least only...as an element of a semiotic system. Time belongs not to discourse strictly speaking but to the referent; both narrative and language know only a semiotic time,'true time' being only a'realist' referential illusion, as Propp's commentary shows. It is as such that structural analysis must deal with it.' (ibid.)

We shall focus our attention on two segments:

'...from the point of view of narrative, what we call time does not exist, or at least only exists functionally, as an element of a semiotic system.' and

'It is as such that structural analysis must deal with it.'

This account raises some most difficult issues, two of which we would like, albeit briefly, to discuss: (1) The question of a fundamental atemporal structure; (2) the general question of the dependence of temporality on narrative discourse.

(1) For Lévi-Strauss, as we see,' the order of chronological succession is absorbed in an atemporal matrix'. As a description of the method of structural analysis it is quite accurate. But does that tell us anything about narrative itself, or only about the limitations of structuralist method? This question can be hidden by the analytic success of a
structuralist illumination of, say, myth. But it should not be lost for ever. Consider the following:

A matrix structure, qua spatial representation is necessarily atemporal. At this level, so are representations even of the most obviously temporal phenomena - such as musical scores.

But this gives us two senses of 'atemporal matrix structure'. In the first sense, it is the representation itself which (qua spatial) is 'atemporal'; in the second, what is represented is represented as atemporal.

This latter, however, can again be divided. For what is represented may actually be atemporal (eg. a map of the London Underground, conceived of as a labyrinth of tunnels!) or it may, for whatever reason, just be represented as atemporal.

Clearly narratives are not atemporal. The mythical narratives Lévi-Strauss studies are recounted over and over again, and have orders of events, orders of actions which are essential to the intelligibility of that telling.

What Lévi-Strauss's myth-analysis claims (or presupposes) is that this order is not essential and that the binary oppositions at work are. But perhaps it is this atemporality that is the illusion.

What is true is that 'binary logic' does not involve time or temporality. But it does not follow that instantiations of binary oppositions are free from temporality. And this is the case at two different levels. Suppose we take Lévi-Strauss's analysis of the Oedipus myth. We find in his analytical matrix the opposition: born from the earth/ born from man. Clearly, (i) the individual components are as temporal as one could want, and (ii) for the myth to be a myth, these components have to be articulated in some narrative sequence, however complex.

Freud, (psychoanalysis was one of Lévi-Strauss acknowledged 'mistresses') can spawn a similar confusion when he declares that the unconscious
is atemporal. What is true is that it is no respecter of simple linear order. But that does not make it atemporal; it rather suggests a new complexity to temporal organization. If the unconscious were atemporal, then no significance could be attached to repetition. And the same point can be made against Lévi-Strauss. It may be possible to identify versions of 'the same myth' in which the structurally significant elements are distributed in a plurality of narrative orders. But that only shows that a particular narrative sequence is not important, not that narrative order is not, on each occasion, vital. And, as we have suggested, the residual and ineliminable temporality of the elements which are then organized in binary oppositions (birth, marriage, death...all figure in the Oedipus matrix) surely clinches the argument. Lévi-Strauss is talking of the atemporality of his representations of the structure of narratives/myths. But, as we have argued above, it tells us nothing about the temporality/atemporality of what is represented. Moreover we could ask: what is it to 'read', understand, grasp, one of Lévi-Strauss's matrices? If that were an essentially temporal process, what would that say for the claimed atemporality of these structures? Finally, we might point out the clear parallel Lévi-Strauss sees between the structure of myth and that of music. (His *Mythologiques* are organized in a 'musical' fashion.) This only intensifies the problem. Clearly music can be talked about structurally, spatially (Haydn's *Creation* has been called 'a cathedral of sound') and so on. But temporal articulation is quite simply indispensable for the appreciation of music (even for those who 'read' scores, and 'hear' the sound.) And that appreciation is never just the construction of an edifice complete only at the end, but an ongoing temporal experience, a play between structure, process and event.

There are enormous gains to be made by looking at the various 'logics' of narrative. Barthes discusses 16 (a) Bremond's attempt 'to
reconstitute the syntax of human behaviour utilized in narrative, to 
retrace the course of the 'choices' which inevitably face the individual 
character at every point in the story...an energetic logic', (b) (linguis-
tic ) Lévi-Strauss, Jakobson, and later Greimas, showing how 'paradigmatic 
oppositions...are 'extended' along the lines of the narrative.', and 
(c) (analysis of action) Todorov's attempts to 'determine the rules by 
which narrative combines, varies, and transforms a certain number of basic 
predicates.'

In each case, the atemporality is that of the representation alone, 
not what is represented. The time that is excluded perhaps, is that 
radical sense of time as the opening onto the radically other that we draw 
out of Nietzsche (see our Appendix). But this is excluded not by an 
atemporal logic, but by a temporally articulated narrative.

Consider Barthes' famous account of 'the structuralist activity'. It 
is a veritable self-subversion of any 'structuralist metaphysics'. Central 
to structuralism, he avers, is 'the notion of the synchronic...which 
accredits a certain immobilization of time'. What is meant by 
'a certain' ? Is this an expression of reservation or of ontological 
 limitation of such 'immobilization' ? Barthes seems to be distancing 
himself when he adds, in parentheses ' (although in Saussure, this is 
a preeminently operational concept ) '. Is it more than that for Barthes ? 
For him, the structuralist activity aims at producing an intelligible 
simulacrum of an object, by 'dissection and articulation'. This simul-
acrum is atemporal, and in this project, Barthes surely reaffirms the 
Platonic connection between the timeless and the intelligible. But without 
Platonic metaphysics. For he never loses sight of the fact that these 
simulacra are human creations, which suggests that for Barthes too, the 
synchronic perspective may be purely 'operational'. Indeed, the language 
of his account is shamelessly temporal, even teleological. Not only does
he insist on the structuralist activity, he describes it as 'the controlled succession of a certain number of mental operations', operations which have as their goal 'to reconstruct an "object"'.

Anyone who supposes that the detemporalization of narrative is anything more than a methodological ruse should reflect on this essay.

We have also insisted on the inherent temporality of those narratives ("myths") analysed by Lévi-Stauss. How can we deal with his description of myths as 'machines for the suppression of time'? 19 Our response would be this: it rests on the assumption that myths are reducible to a binary logic, that 'logic' is timeless, and that their purpose is to induce this timelessness. The first we have already cast doubt on, and the last is wholly unproven. We do have an explanation for Lévi-Strauss's remark, however. Lévi-Strauss suggests the possibility that his own 'Mythologiques' might itself be taken as a myth. 20 If we take this seriously, it might be that it is not the common myths of primitive people that are 'machines for the suppression of time', but rather the Lévi-Straussian structuralist 'myth' of a logic of myth that 'suppresses time' by its atemporal analysis of myths. Structuralism, after all does have that as its avowed aim; primitive people do not.

Let us now return to ask our second question of Barthes: precisely what relationship is being claimed between temporality and narrative? As we understand it, Barthes is claiming that extra-textual 'time' is a referential illusion - 'temporality' is a product of narrative, and not vice versa.

In relation to the first question, we have already argued that language in the ordinary sense is exemplary for revealing those temporal structures that transcend simple linearity. But the stronger claim, that temporality is essentially dependent on narrative textuality would depend on our being able to show that the temporality of 'consciousness' and of
'existence' was already organised in narrative fashion.

Our position is slightly different. We claim (a) that narrative, time-consciousness, and existential time each share certain primitive features - many of the features we analysed earlier in this chapter - but that this does not mean that full narrative intelligibility links eg. all the phases of my experience; (b) that Ricoeur is closer to the mark when he suggests in a most illuminating way, 'that narrative activity, in history and in fiction, provides a privileged access to the way we articulate our experience of time.' We do not here propose to give further justification of our theoretical preference, but we do share Ricoeur's genuine but limited appreciation for those authors engaged in the structural analysis of narrative for whom the aim is the reduction of narrative to atemporal structures. Referring to Barthes, and Greimas, he writes: 'the result is that the narrative component as such is identified with the level of manifestation, whereas only achronological codes would rule the level of manifestation'. Ricoeur suggests that this leads to the overlooking of 'the temporal complexity of the narrative matrix', and suggests we focus (again) on 'plot', not in any naive way, but seen as the rich 'matrix' of narrativity. Our appreciation of the structuralist approach is quite genuine - Barthes, Greimas, Genette, and many others, have made an enormously valuable conceptual contribution, but it is a mistake to confuse the analytical power of structuralism with philosophical completeness. What is required, one might suggest, is a structural hermeneutics. At the very least the limitations of a plain structuralist approach make it very difficult to pose our question: how are we to understand the relationship between narrativity and existence?

Let us try to approach this question through what might be thought to be the exemplary case of biographical narrative.

We may begin with two views of the relationship between existential
time and narrativity: (1) that narrative (e.g. biography, autobiography) involves an aesthetically motivated selectivity essentially distinct from life as lived. This difference can be understood positively (narrative articulates one's existence as an intelligible story) or negatively (narrative is a retrospective rationalizing distortion of life as actually lived). The ending of Sartre's *La Nausée* in which narrative intelligibility is offered as an aesthetic solution to the problem of the meaning of one's existence seems to leave this question open, undecided. Although earlier on in that same book, Sartre had taken a more critical attitude to the gap between a retrospective construal of a series of events as an 'adventure' and the actual experience of those events at the time. 'Adventure' is treated as a fictional distortion.

In Sartre's partial auto-biographical and his other 'biographies' (Flaubert, Genet) his position seems more positive. But one has to ask what basis there could be for a positive treatment.

In Hugh Silverman's "The Time of Autobiography", which, curiously enough begins by looking at Levi-Strauss's own autobiographical *Tristes Tropiques* (in which, surely, there is little evidence of an atemporal logic underlying the narrative), he makes a number of important distinctions between the different modes of temporality in 'autobiographical textuality' ((1) 'historical time', (2) 'chronological time', (3) 'the internal textual marking of autobiographical time', (4) 'autobiographical temporality, or the re-marking of lived time'.). But for the most part the paper operates with an unproblematic notion of 'lived time', as a pliant material on which one works when 'writing one's own life'. At one small point, however, he makes the suggestion that narrativity might appear at the level of existence itself. And surely it is important to consider the role this might play.

There is clearly a literal, literary sense of 'narrative' in
which applies specifically to written texts. But equally, in a great
diversity of ways, our everyday experience is full of partial, and
sometimes complete, 'narrative' reflections, projections, memories,
imaginings and so on. Lived experience cannot be purified of these
sequential constructions, understood both at the level of (unreflective)
protention (say) and more reflective and explicit projection and
planning. It may well be that there is some limited principle of
dependence here - that the explicit may often involve the articulation of
the inexplicit. But we need not suppose that things always work that
way. One's ongoing reflection may also work on actual or possible
past or future sequences never pre-reflectively strung together.

Of course, when we are thinking of (auto-) biographical narrative,
this ongoing reflection will itself include pieces of writing (in the
ordinary, pre-Derridean sense) - diaries, letters, poems, lists, perhaps
even articles and books. And they cannot be thought of just as 'partial
narratives' in comparison to a final summing up. For they actually affect
the way one continues to organize one's experience. Lived experience is
dialectically related to reflection on it, in it, whether written down, or
not.

But is it proper to talk of reflections on/in lived experience as
taking a narrative form? Do they always do so, or just sometimes, or
what? What is meant by 'narrative' here? I am going to assume that
the question of author and audience can be put to one side. If autobiography
is narrative, then, I shall assume, my mental musings about my last year
in Paris could also be, even if only I happen to be aware of them. But
what form must any such musings take to be considered to be a 'narrative'?

Let us be clear: our theoretical interest in 'narrative structure'
for its own sake is limited. The project of a general theory of narrative
must be deferred. Our question is whether 'narrative' can teach us
anything about the ways in which the standard model of time as a single
linear sequence of moments can be enriched, displaced, transformed... deconstructed etc. Our answer to the question of what intra-existential reflection must be like to count as 'narrative' will be content with the limited aim of showing that it can display some of the most commonly recognised features of narrative. And the claim will be that these features offer us a model by which both discontinuity, non-linearity, and pluridimensionality can be thought of as dimensions of both existential and textual temporality. The wealth of possible differences between existential and narrative time will not here concern us.

We distinguish the following levels of time in narrative:

1. The time of the reader (and the reading).
2. The time of the narrator.
3. The time of the plot.
4. The time of actions.
5. The time(s) of the characters.
6. The (real) time of events.
7. The time of the narrative discourse.

In making these distinctions we already give some of the game away. It would be hard to establish more than one of these and not find oneself with the possibility of pluri-dimensional time. And the fact that they do not evenly cross-correlate will allow discontinuity. The inter-relations between such times will allow such departures from simple linearity as circularity, splitting/rejoining, etc. We shall briefly comment on each of these categories before drawing some conclusions about their relevance for understanding existential time.

1. The Time of the Reader. Unread, the book is dead. (Without an ear there is no speech.) And yet the reader is no passive receiver of strings of words. Not only is the reader already lodged in a multiplicity
of time-tracks (writing a book, moving house, struggling to defeat an illness, digesting a meal, waiting for a phone-call, wondering about salvation, imagining unlikely possibilities, remembering his/her childhood...) but these can impinge on the practical business of getting through the book, on the understanding of what the book is about, of what the characters are doing, of its literary merits, of its construction and organisation etc. If there is no narrative except in relation to a reader, then the reader's range of temporal insertions is a vital element. All this is true even of the 'ideal reader'. Should he be a 1st Century Greek, should he be able to read the book at one sitting ...?

Reading is also an activity involving a very complex ongoing activity of retention, comprehension, protension, and imagination. The inner complexity of the book may set a certain threshold of synthetic power on the reader's part, bound up with his (or her) capacity to 'organize time'.

2. The time of the narrator. What we have just written could be repeated for the activity of writing. But in principle the product is independent of how continuous, how long, how interrupted the writing was, so we shall ignore this aspect. What cannot be ignored is the time of the 'implied author', the author as textually evident. Consider the difference between a retrospective narration, a 'stream of consciousness' narration, and a 'dream'. (Whether the text is written in the first or third person is in principle a logically distinct question.) We can ask: does the temporal position of the narrator remain fixed? For it can begin with 'memories' and work up to present description, or play with its own temporal position in more complex ways. The time of the narrator also allows for complex interplay with the other levels of narrative time, especially that of the plot and the characters. Barthes gives the wonderful example of a story by Agatha Christie (The Sittaford Mystery) in which the narrator, who is one of the characters, turns out to be the murderer that the story seeks to reveal. Here the
epistemological interaction (essentially bound up with time, and exceptionally so in a mystery or suspense story) between narrator and characters takes the form of the explosion of a conceit, at the moment of disclosure.

3. The Time of the Plot. This category is as old as Aristotle (see his Poetics) but substantially reworked by Ricoeur, as we have suggested. The need to rework it results partly from the way modern narrative has produced variations on the simple plot—multiple plots, ambiguous plots, plots without resolution, as well as the more obviously subordinated sub-plots. Unless we extend narrative 'downwards' to include a simple recitation of events, or 'upwards' to include any piece of prose, something like the notion of plot will remain essential. It does not require the structure of stage-setting, development, resolution of action. Nor does it require that the narrative be able to be reduced to a 'sentence' (see Barthes and Genette). But it does require some thread of developmental intelligibility to which the other orders of the narrative are more or less subordinate. (A postmodernist text could of course make a plot out of the refusal of one of these other elements to remain subordinated to the plot. What makes the Goon Show scripts merely modernist is that the continuous rebellions by the characters (vide Bluebottle's 'I don't like this game') and even, on occasion the narrator Greenslade, against the plot, are always quashed, or at least reappropriated. A postmodern reading might argue that the 'plot' was only a device on which to hang these acts of textual transgression.) If the plot cannot be summarized in a single sentence, it can in principle be briefly explained. Its narrative unrolling takes the form of a series of actions.

4. The Time of Action. By 'action' we mean stages of narrative description that contribute to the development of the plot. The agents of such actions
may be characters, but equally, natural forces (such as a 'flood');
and actions may be 'physical' or 'mental' etc. The critical thing of course
is that the order of actions can be quite different from the order of
events. A narrative may begin with the death of the hero, and set itself
the (retrospective) task of tracing how that happened.

5. The Time of Events. 'Event' here includes 'actions' and other events
that make no contribution (or no essential contribution) to the plot
(or to the plot-complex). The usual way of describing the order of
events is to talk of their 'real' chronological order. It is assumed that
however subtle the internal temporality of a text may be, it nonetheless
projects (and rests on) a 'real time' beyond itself. A flashback
requires a 'real past' to flashback to. Clearly, however, it
something of a literary convention, that all events can be located
in a single sequence. It is a convenient backdrop against which one can
construct a temporal play, but it is equally a convention that can itself
be played with. A flashback may be a memory, or a 'touched-up' memory,
or even a fantasy, and the question remain unresolved at the end. 33
Science fiction can operate with unco-ordinated time-frames, in which
questions of relative priority are again undecidable. Geographical,
institutional, and personal 'time-bubbles' can thwart the establishing
of a single sequence of events. However, the convention of 'real time',
'the actual sequence of events' is clearly very common, and, if only as
another fiction, essential even for these ways of playing with it to make
any sense, and in particular for the time of action to have any autonomy.

6. The Time(s) of the Characters. Whether or not the narrator is
actually a character in the narrative, characters have their own
temporal involvements and intentionalities. Everything we said initially
about the reader's multi-tracking, and memory and projection equally
applies to the characters. Of course we must also distinguish (a) what we
are told by the narrator, directly or indirectly (e.g., via other characters) about their own temporal insertion, (b) and what we can gather, (c) what we imagine or suppose without much evidence. At the bottom of all this the point is that the characters have their own individual time-horizons, some of which will be shared among themselves, some not, and which will differ from those of narrator and reader. Again, the most obvious differences are ones of knowledge and perspective; some characters will know more some less, than the 'implied' narrator, and the actual or ideal reader. In such differences lie the possibilities of irony, comedy, tragedy etc. One might add that, exceptionally, characters can of course have their own sophisticated views of time itself, which the text can enclose or refute.

7. The Time of the Narrative Discourse. What we mean by this is the temporality of the 'thick surface' of the narrative conceived of as a string of words. At the most superficial, it is a simple succession of words. But it will equally be broken into clauses, sentences, paragraphs, and chapters, and chapter headings... Slightly 'thicker' still we find various forms of repetition of words and names. (See our earlier account above.) And there are variations of tense, mood, direct and indirect speech etc. The thickness of the layer here described goes as far down as it is possible to go without touching 'meaning'. And wherever what is discovered exhibits a temporal organization (including paradigmatic oppositions 'extended along the line of the narrative' à la Jakobson) we will add it to our account of the temporality of narrative discourse. We are being radically unjust to this category, for a large proportion of the structural analyses of narrative would be contained within it. But our narrative has its own plot requirements.

If temporality is as all pervasive as it sometimes seems, these
seven levels of narrative temporality cannot claim completeness. But they are sufficient for present purposes.

We shall first demonstrate that they permit the divergencies from our ordinary account of time to which we have already referred. And second we shall show that they allow us to exhibit certain features of 'existential time' too.

In themselves, these seven different levels of narrative temporality make narrative time multi-dimensional. There is just no one answer to the question of what the temporal sequence of the narrative consists in. And, as we have suggested, these various times will not just run parallel, but will modulate their independence / interference with one another. One of the radical consequences of this is that the unity of narrative time can also be put in question. Or rather, we can propose a kind of unity not dependent on linear continuity. For the interweaving of seven different temporal dimensions can generate a kind of continuity without there being a 'single thread' running through it. We have in mind here the model of a piece of string composed of overlapping strands no one of which runs throughout the length. It might be said that it is precisely the role of the plot in establishing such a unity that distinguishes narrative from other forms of prose. Let us admit that. But we would repeat the two points made earlier: (a) that 'plot' can itself be the subject of a disconcerting play, generating for example, multiple plots and ambiguous and unresolved endings; (b) that one can produce a 'narrative' in which the plot is only an arbitrary device for bringing about a more complex literary effect.

Finally, this wealth of levels allows the possibility of temporal splitting (plots can split or rejoin (or not), of circular time, cycles of repetition, dispersal, irresolution etc. The key to all this is that one or more temporal dimensions can fragment or break, or disperse as long as the narrative line can be continued, for the moment,
along another dimension. (A Bacchanalian revel in which all (but one) are drunk!)

Yes, it may be said, such is the freedom of language (which even so runs the risk of unintelligibility). But surely that shows just how different it is from ordinary experience.

At this point we could return to the question of whether (auto-) biography necessarily 'distorts' life, and look at specific examples of this in the light of our current claims. We shall leave this for another occasion.

We have endorsed the Heideggerean understanding of the tri-ecstatic finitude of human temporality, and his disturbing of the linearity of time, but cast doubt on his residual commitment to temporal unity, as it is reinscribed in the gathering and focussing of anticipatory resoluteness. This resoluteness is fundamentally a demand that the multi-dimensionality be fused together, that the Babel of voices be silenced, that the different levels of our (temporal) worldly involvement be assigned a strict order of subordination. In plurality, Heidegger finds only 'turbulence', 'ambiguity', and confusion. And yet his account of everydayness is an acknowledgement of the fact of this multiplicity.

It would be too trite to compare the temporality of the narrator to that of 'conscience', of the characters to that of the multiplicity of our inner voices, of the plot(s)- complex to our 'fundamental project', and of the narrative discourse to the sequence of our lived thoughts and words. It could be done but we shall not do it here. Let us simply look at the difference between the temporality of events, and of actions, for this surely captures a key duality in the temporality of our lived experience. It is overwhelmingly clear, even on one particular time-track (saying writing a book) that the sequence of one's experiences need bear no relation to the sequence in which they can best (or at all) be rendered intelligible. One may only discover how it all fits together
at the end. (Compare picking up jigsaw puzzle pieces, compared with
successfully putting them down. Or listening to a long German sentence
with the verb right at the end.)

The multiplicity of only contingently coordinated time-tracks is
surely not restricted to avant garde literature, but a perfectly
common experience. We need only think of the way we weave together
a life of reverie, of dream, of different kinds of perceptual experience
( natural and artistically constructed; temporally highly structured
and not), a whole variety of activities, some nested within others,
many quite independent of one another, and the way the various more or
less sealed or communicating worlds we live in have their own inner
temporal development ( home, school, job, national politics....) And so
on. It may be that we do not need narrative, or the most general
structures of temporal textuality with which we began, to be able
to focus theoretically on this multi-dimensionality; the advantage
of considering textuality is that it is more easily objectified, and
that, in consequence, it is easier to develop a set of analytical
categories for understanding it. We claim, of course, that the
correspondence goes beyond mere analogy, and that 'lived' experience
is already impregnated with those very reflective structures elaborated
in textuality in general and narrative in particular.

We said we would not consider the differences between them. However
there is an obvious question which it would be hard to ignore: is there
not some parallel between human finitude and that of a text, of which
biography would represent a convergence? There is however a fundamental
difference, that between the ethical and the aesthetic. We are our
finitude; that of texts is a quite different matter.

* 

After all this, however, is there not a sense in which this whole
discussion of temporal intelligibility rests on a complacency about the values of unity, sense, self-understanding, which it endorses by the work of theoretical elaboration. To put it crudely, might not the narrative impulse (including perhaps the theory of narrative) be a flight not just from a contingent disorder, but from a fundamental obstacle to the kind of closure of meaning that it systematically induces. The 'fundamental' obstacle would be dispersion, death, madness, error, forgetfulness...as they appear within language itself, in the form of its irremediable fragility. If the philosophical ideal would render language 'transparent'—referentially and semantically—the same can be said for narrative—that its 'fictions' can only satisfy the desire for wholeness, unity, intelligibility—through the mirage of language. Narrative achieves aesthetically a unity that would wither outside the framework of linguistic representation.

We would like to make three responses to this argument, which have a more general application to the double strategy of the thesis as a whole.

(1) We can surely 'admit' something like the claim that madness lurks beneath the skin of order, and that narrative provides just such a 'skin', without supposing that this would in any way detract from the importance of narrative.

(2) If narrative is as universal as is claimed, we ought to investigate the wealth of its resources for generating sequential intelligibility.

(3) There is surely a sense in which 'the function of narrativity' performs a kind of reversal on attempts to restrict its scope. If we say that madness lurks beneath the fictions of order, are we not telling another story, and necessarily so? The moral of Derrida's demonstration that Foucault's project of writing a history of madness is dominated by the ideal of Reason is that at some level there is no alternative. It is not just that narrative intelligibility has an infinite power to subvert the discovery of what exceeds its bounds. Even
such a story of necessary subversion reinstates narrativity. This is surely a sobering thought. What it suggests is a necessary complicity between the excessive and the limits exceeded, madness and the law.
'So far the attempts at philosophical reform have differed more or less from the old philosophy only in form, but not in substance. The indispensable condition of a really new philosophy, that is, an independent philosophy corresponding to the needs of mankind and of the future, is however that it will differentiate itself in its essence from the old philosophy.'

Feuerbach continues

'The new philosophy makes man - with the inclusion of nature as the foundation of man - the unique, universal and highest object of philosophy.'

The candidates for inclusion under the heading of what has been called 'post-modern philosophy' are so varied that they probably do not illuminatingly share any common features, but I would have thought that they could be negatively unified by their distance from such a programme as this. Feuerbach knows what the needs of mankind are, what philosophy requires; he has no doubts about the concept of man, about man's roots in nature, or about the distinction between form and substance. (What would he have said to the suggestion that it is perhaps a change of style that we need?)

These remarks are taken from his Principles of the Philosophy of the Future (1843) and the title itself calls for comment. Feuerbach was confident about what 'the future' needed, that philosophy could supply it, and that the very idea of the future was unproblematic. We, who now exist in Feuerbach's future, are less sure. What is called post-structuralism seems to articulate a withering away, or perhaps better, a mutation in the concept of the future. But is it the future as such, or is it only a particular conception of the
future (teleological, utopian, etc.) that is put in question? If the very horizon of futurity is suspect, are practical and intellectual defeatism and inertia appropriate responses? Is the power to provide intellectual and practical ideals still a sound way of ranking competing discourses or should possessing such a feature be seen as the legacy of a metaphysical desire?

The first alternative, which gives a positive value to a vision of a future — was spelled out recently by Cornel West, an American critic of deconstruction, who wrote

"...post-modern American philosophers...have failed to project a new world view, a counter movement, a 'new gospel' of the future.'

He accuses them of offering no way past the nihilism they usher in. Instead, he goes on

"Their viewpoints leave American philosophy hanging in limbo as a philosophically critical, yet culturally lifeless rhetoric mirroring a culture (or civilization) permeated by the scientific ethos, regulated by racist, patriarchal, capitalist norms, and pervaded by the debris of decay."

Clearly West can have no serious dispute with rhetoric per se. But a gentler version of his views must surely be quite widespread. If they seem harsh it is worth remembering that we are living in Nietzsche's future too and that in his Preface to The Will to Power he claimed to be describing

"...the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, what can no longer come differently: the advent of nihilism."

How does Nietzsche know?

"...necessity itself is at work here. The future speaks even now in a hundred signs; this destiny announces itself everywhere."

West's argument is that Nietzsche offers the possibility of a stage beyond nihilism, a post-nihilism, but that post-modern American philosophy (and I confess not to knowing exactly who he means) is stuck at the stage of nihilism itself.

In the Winter of 1887, Nietzsche wrote of nihilism as a necessary stage
We must experience nihilism before we can find out what value these 'values' really have - we require sometime new values. It is a stage that he sees himself as only at that point having completed. Until then - which would cover most of his writing - he had been a thorough-going nihilist. He describes himself as 'the first perfect nihilist of Europe, who ... has now lived through the whole of nihilism, to the end, leaving it behind, outside himself.' Clearly the overcoming of nihilism is an operation vulnerable to mirage and illusion. But there is a beyond for Nietzsche - affirmation - or what he sometimes calls active or affirmative nihilism.

Accepting for a moment Nietzsche's characterisation of 'modernity'

'...overabundance of intermediary forms ...traditions break off, schools [appear] ...the willing of ends and means [is] weakened.' then arguably post-modern American philosophy has not even left modernity behind. Post-modernity, on this view, is a treat in store, is yet to come. It would not so much lack a future, or any projection of the future, as be in the future. And the present, in West's words would just be 'lifeless rhetoric' and the smell of decay. How fair is this judgement?

Clearly at this point it matters who one chooses to look at, but suppose we take the case of Derrida, who has had such an impact on the scene West describes. One can easily conclude that some justice lay in the verdict, not by a politically motivated analysis of Derrida's writing, but by reflecting on a remark he once made in (published) discussion.

'I don't see why I should renounce or why anyone should renounce the radicality of a critical work under the pretext that it risks the sterilization of science, humanity, progress, the origin of meaning, etc. I believe that the risk of sterility has always been the price of lucidity.' Can we conclude then that Derrida, for one, took the risk, and lost? These remarks need more careful attention. Contrary to what these sentences might suggest, Derrida is not actually wagering anything he values. The
values of 'humanity', 'progress', and 'the origin of meaning' are precisely the sort that, following Nietzsche, and with reservations Heidegger, he puts in question. To sterilize them, to render them no longer productive, would not be an unwanted by-product that deconstruction has to risk but is in fact, if we can say this, a central aim. It remains true, then, that for those subjects whose hopes and dreams are organised by reference to these values, sterility might indeed be the result of their being deconstructed. And then West's challenge to post-modern philosophy to produce Nietzsche's new values returns in force.

I have not yet made good nor made precise my claim that post-modernism allows the idea of the future to wither away. But to set the scene for my discussion of that theme, let me offer, perhaps prematurely, two opposing views of the philosophical status of the future, at a fairly general level.

Let me put the choice in what is perhaps an over-simple way. On the one hand there are those for whom some sort of projection of a future would be a condition for the intelligibility of the present. And ranged against them there are those who would treat such references to the future with a certain caution. We begin with a statement and discussion of the first option.

1. No theoretical account of any present (whether it be the present epoch or lived experience...) is complete, adequate, or even (perhaps) intelligible, without an account of the future. A n account of the future does not mean a prediction, but rather a projection. I would distinguish two different ways in which this positive account of the importance of the future can be articulated, which I shall call hermeneutic and ethical.

a. The hermeneutical importance of the future. This view can be traced back to Heidegger's concern with the role of the future as a horizon of intelligibility for action, for meaning, for truth and so on. Understanding is never a mere grasping of the present, or the presence of something, but always occurs within a triple ecstatic horizonality - of past, present and future.
For Heidegger, of course, this complex projectivity comes in different forms (authentic/inauthentic) but the underlying horizontal structure remains. This meant to be true at many different levels. The understanding of a sentence as it is spoken is an achievement in which a mobile synthesis of retention, current awareness and anticipation operates at fairly short range. But equally, one's understanding of the events in the morning paper is necessarily predicated on anticipating their consequences, how things might turn out. To multiply examples here would be otiose, for each aspect of everyday life—listening to music, watching a film, reading books, eating a meal, writing a letter, going for a walk—exhibits this same structure of horizontality. And even if Heidegger was later to drop the privileged position he had given to the future in *Being and Time*, there is no doubting the hermeneutic importance of the asymmetry between past and future; the future is the horizon of possibility in a strong sense. And it is a horizon that is essentially finite, limited for each individual by death. We take this up again later.

Although it stretches the word 'hermeneutic' it is worth adding here that on a dialectical view of history, an analogous general point can be made, in a rather different way. To understand any present, we have to grasp the contradictions at work within it, by which its capacity for (self-) transformation is marked. Understanding a state of affairs is to grasp its possibilities of change. Here, we might think, the future is only logically or abstractly required; but in another sense, of course, this transformed state is the future. If we were to allow ourselves to take Hegel's version of this view, an easy transition opens up from the general hermeneutic role of the future, to the specifically reflexive importance of the future to philosophy itself. Two different versions of this can easily be distinguished. The first envisages the future as fulfilling the ideals of philosophy in a way continuous with the past; the second announces the possibility (or necessity) of
a radical break either within philosophy or with philosophy itself. For convenience, we shall discuss the role of the future in philosophy's own fulfilment within the framework of the ethical importance of the future. The projection of the future required by the various forms of break, closure, fulfilment, or end of philosophy cannot be dealt with just yet. For such issues mark the point at which the whole question of the future becomes problematic. So let us turn to the ethical importance of the future.

b. The ethical importance of the future. We could state this thesis as follows: no account of an ideal state of human affairs, no account of basic human values, and indeed no prescriptions as to how things ought to be, or what ought to be done, are complete without a projection of the future as the condition of their realization. The practical move from the real to the ideal requires the positing of a future. Thomas McCarthy in words that echo Feuerbach, describes Critical Theory in just these terms, as

'a theory of the contemporary epoch that is guided by an interest in the future, that is, by an interest in the realisation of a truly rational society in which men make their own history with will and consciousness.'

And such projections are clearly not confined to Critical Theory. Phenomenology was from the very beginning inspired by the prospect of bringing about the realization of such ideals. For Husserl, for example, philosophy

'has claimed to be the science which satisfies the loftiest theoretical needs and renders possible from an ethico-religious standpoint a life regulated by pure rational norms.'

Philosophy undertakes to satisfy

'...humanity's imperishable demand for pure and absolute knowledge (and what is inseparably one with that, its demand for pure and absolute valuing and willing).'

Philosophy will

'...teach us how to carry on the eternal work of humanity'

His claim of course is that it has failed miserably, and that only
phenomenology can actually satisfy this demand. We shall modify this claim a little later.

One could multiply examples of this theme. Kant's essay on "Perpetual Peace" would be another obvious source. At one level, of course, there is nothing problematic about this at all. What is not yet finished needs more time to be completed. But what if 'the future' were nothing but the horizontal complement of a desire that in principle could not be fulfilled? The problematic referentiality of the future is notorious. Is it not extraordinary how easily we slip between indexical, substantive, and 'qualitative' senses of this term? Some such slippage might actually be part of the mechanism by which the future plays this ethical role. But before we turn to some of the caution about the future that just such considerations can engender, let us just rehearse in a positive form, this claim about the ethical value of the future. If we judge life as improveable, then our hopes and plans demand a dimension of futurity as a condition for their realization. If we think of philosophy as having a telos as yet unrealised then the future will be projected in such a fashion as to allow for this. If the improvement of life can come only through, or with the cooperation of philosophy, then these two futures fuse. And, on the whole, it is this strong version which we have been looking at.

I have little doubt that at whatever level of explicitness and intensity such views are widely held even today. They are, however, increasingly difficult to defend. That may only be symptomatic, but the proliferation of reasons for treating references to the future with caution is worth closer scrutiny.

2. There are a number of grounds for such caution.

a. The future as unpredictable. Firstly, and without being able to offer an adequate account of its philosophical significance, there is renewed vigour to plain old scepticism about our knowledge of the future. This has been brought about, paradoxically, by the massive expansion in human technological
control. I say paradoxically, because this would seem to suggest an increase in predictability. And yet the necessary incompleteness of this control has wildly unpredictable consequences, not least of which is the possibility of total self-destruction - at which point issues of technology and theology could be said to merge.

b. The future as ripe for ideological appropriation. The second ground for caution we can put succinctly. There is a clear ideological potential in normative references to the future. In the absence of a pre-destined path, interpretations of its proper course have a field day. The hand that charts the future rules the world.

However momentous, these first two grounds for caution do not seem conceptually problematic. There are others - we shall select three - which surely are, and each of which belongs to post-structuralism.

c. The future as myth of fulfilment. The most common theoretical role played by a reference to the future is as a supplement to the deficiencies of the actual present. The future then will bring a time, a future present which will not have these deficiencies. Heaven, utopia, the war to end all wars, absolute knowledge, 'a truly rational society' are all examples. The critique of the future, so understood, is continuous with the critique of the value of presence, of fullness of meaning, of freedom from 'differance', from a relation to the outside...

d. The future as unintelligible discontinuity. If we understand words like 'present' and 'future' to refer to something like current and future paradigms or general frameworks of discourse, rather than merely to events in chronological time, then any difficulty we might have of thinking outside our current framework of discourse will set an immediate limitation on our ability to project the future. Here 'the future' would be another way of referring to
what is (absolutely) other. That, I take it, is the sense of Derrida's claim that ' the future can be anticipated only in the form of absolute danger ' 15 What is the absolute danger? I take it that it is the breakdown of all intelligibility - madness: a radical discontinuity. 16

e. 'The future as a concept within a discredited logocentrism. If we accept that references to the future are inseparable from the general apparatus of historical discourse, and if it can be shown that the concepts involved in historical discourse ( development, progress, evolution, influence, cause and effect, context etc.) belong to metaphysics, to logocentrism, a consistent attempt to mark out a distance from logocentrism would require what I called a certain caution about the future. This argument would rest on the complicity of references to the future with traditional historical discourse. Somewhat differently, it could also be argued that a deconstruction of the future as telos, as end, as fulfilment, is possible by a straightforward transposition of the kinds of analysis Derrida gives of Husserl's discussion of the idea of 'origin', of the transmission of meaning, of reactivation, in his introduction to The Origin of Geometry.

Husserl had realized that it is only through writing that geometry is guaranteed historical continuity and hence the possibility of a reactivation of its origin. Yet this, at the same time, is the source of the very danger that threatens it. For writing is ruled by the absence of any absolute origin, an original absence. Might not the same paradox affect the future - that it is not so much what writing demands for its fulfilment ( such as the ideal cashing out of its meaning in experience) but it is the always withheld impossibility of that fulfilment. If the future were such an impossibility of achievement, if such distance were inherent in the philosophical functioning of the future ( consider the Spanish mañana ), then we might come to think of the future as the objective counterpart to the way Lacan understands
desire. And the link between writing, and indeed language in general, and the future, would be supplied by treating language as the primary site for the investment of that (metaphysical) desire.

Not only are appeals to the future necessarily expressed in language, but it is only so expressed that we can retain projective clarity and focus. Is it an accident that the response to a philosophical crisis is so often the proposal of a new method - in which one further layer of self-monitoring and control is established for writing? A successful transposition of the deconstruction of origin to that of the future as telos would argue that such projections are retained and refined only in writing. And if writing is thought of as involving a perpetual deferment of presence, then teleological fulfilment would rest on an impossibility of fulfilment, which cannot be a satisfactory state of affairs.

So, whether one thinks of the future as involved fairly generally in a traditional historical discourse viewed with logocentric suspicion, or as subject to a deconstruction symmetrical to that of an arche - either way it would come out as an essentially logocentric concept.

We have now outlined both the view that the future is an indispensable philosophical category - for reasons both hermeneutical and ethical (there are, no doubt, others) - and the view that such references to the future should be treated with great caution, both for traditional reasons - its unpredictability and vulnerability to ideological abuse - and for more powerful and complex reasons linked broadly speaking with post-structuralism. It is these last reasons that we now consider.

On this view, which will now occupy our attention in more detail, the typical philosophical role of the future is always or typically to project the value of presence on what is not present, to reduce the unknown to the known, the other to the same... 17. We turn now to Derrida.

His critical interest in the theoretical value of references to the future rest without doubt on his linking it with teleological and eschatol-
-ological views of history, with linear temporality, and with the metaphysics of presence. We shall try to: (i) outline the argument more precisely, (ii) draw out a crucial topological schema that reinforces the argument, (iii) ask whether there is any non-teleological, non-metaphysical way of thinking about the future that might emerge from the deconstruction of History, Time etc., and (iv) look at the way some of these themes are drawn together in one of Derrida's most interesting recent papers.

First, the argument.

(i) When I have mentioned the future in the context of post-structuralist caution I have often myself exercised a certain caution. I tried not to talk of the future per se, but of the theoretical value of references to the future. Perhaps I should have said textual rather than theoretical. This is important. For Derrida, it is not enough to know whether a text uses this or that term, but how it is being used. What is metaphysical about a term is the work it does, or its textual deployment. There is a difference between a mere prediction of a future course of events, and the use of such a prediction to legitimate a course of action. But there is a further level, and that is the use of the future to satisfy an ontological desire - the desire that history both past and future be seen to exhibit a continuous unity, which he calls the history of meaning - of its production and fulfilment. The models for such an account would for example be Hegel's philosophy of history, and Husserl's account of the Origin of Geometry. History is the unbroken transmission and development of meaning. Contingency, plurality, death, breaks, circles, regressions, are all to be appropriated within a wider continuity. Progress, truth, wisdom, freedom etc. are all names for what history is or can be made to generate. Derrida's general interpretive claim is that philosophy as we have hitherto known it always understands history in this way, and consequently always interpretes the future in this light. His explanation is that history so understood is the recuperation of differance, of what has always already exceeded and threatened presence, as
well as making it possible, under the value of presence. Origin and end are equally examples of this value of Presence. They always function as textual legitimations of one sort or another. Once we accept that history so understood exemplifies the structure of presence, Derrida then argues that the value of presence is not fundamental after all, but 'constituted' by the very differences it seeks to appropriate. The dependence of a sign's identity on its difference from other signs is given the strongest possible reading - a critique of any identity that might be deemed original. Where Hegel had criticised Schelling for the unmediated nature of his account of Absolute Self-Identity, for Derrida it is precisely this principle of mediation, by which time and history are reduced to serving the principle of identity, that is criticised.

Derrida's position has much in common here with Lyotard's critique of 'grand recits' which, in a historical context would take the shape of all-embracing narrative structures, drawing every event in history into a single story. Derrida's caution, then, is towards the subjection of the future to metaphysical ends. What is important is that he sees this subjection as almost universal. It is not just the mistake of isolated metaphysical excess or a lapse of judgement. Moreover, as we shall see, any attempt to break out of it is threatened by reappropriation. Before we come to that, however, I would like to fill in some of the complexities of Derrida's position.

I begin with the reflexive problem lodged within the idea of transgressing 'history' - that one does not know how to describe the move itself. In his "Exergue" to _Grammatology_ Derrida is writing about science's emerging unease with phonocentric writing. This has always been there

'But today something lets it appear as such, allows it a kind of
takeover without our being able to translate this novelty into clear-cut notions of mutation, explicitation, accumulation, revolution or tradition. These values belong no doubt to the system whose dislocation is today presented as such, they describe the styles of an historical movement which was meaningful—like the concept of history itself—only within a logocentric epoch.

This paradoxical position calls for what Derrida describes as a double strategy, which we shall shortly outline.

(ii) Derrida's second ground for caution about the future lies, I believe, in his fascination with invaginated topologies. Formally speaking what is important about such topologies is that their outside, or part of their outside, is also inside, or alternatively, that at certain points the distinction between outside and inside becomes problematic, undecidable. These structures have all sorts of physical and mathematical exemplars of varying complexity, from the rubber ball with a deep dimple pressed into it, to kline bottles. It is not perhaps insignificant that all the erogenous zones of the body (and certainly the typical points of fixation, according to Freud) are just such structures, points at which pleasure and discipline mingle. As models they allow Derrida to displace the metaphysical paradigms of circle and line, which maintain the strictness of separation of inside and outside, or unity of direction.

But how do such models get textually articulated in a way that bears on the future? Derrida writes that there is no possibility of doing without the concepts of metaphysics in the attempt to 'escape' from metaphysics. Theoretically speaking, these concepts, with all the dangers of recuperation, reappropriation, they bring with them, are the only tools we have. We have no choice but to use them. The way out, the way of going beyond metaphysics involves a strategy of displacement within the metaphysical text. The possibility of something other than metaphysics lies within, the outside inside, the future in a mutation of the present. Here, we should be clear, references to 'the future' should be read as
references to the textual work of disentangling itself from metaphysics that post-structuralism would involve. This topology of invagination that puts in question the distinction between inside and outside, what belongs and what does not, plays a more general critical role in the form of the structures of supplementarity, but we do not have time to go into that now.

It is important now to realize that this search for a beyond within, which we could call immanent deconstruction, is treated by Derrida as just part of the double strategy he recommends in a number of places. The second strand attempts to stand outside philosophy,

' to determine ' from a certain exterior that is unqualifiable or unnameable by philosophy — what this history has been able to dissimulate or forbid.'

He continues

' By means of this simultaneously faithful and violent circulation between the inside and the outside of philosophy — that is of the West — there is produced a certain textual work that gives great pleasure.'

But this second strand offers us no more assured grasp of, projection of the future than the first. To the first corresponds Derrida's reference to Nietzsche's suggestion that what we need is a change of style, and that 'if there is style, Nietzsche reminds us, it must be plural'. To the second corresponds Derrida's reference to

'what is proclaiming itself and which can do so, as is necessary whenever a birth is in the offing, only under the species of the non-species, in the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity.'

Either way, the idea of the future as something representable is radically undermined. The future can be approached through the interweaving of these two strategies, a new kind of 'writing'.

It is worth saying in passing that Derrida leans heavily on a post- or at least ateleological motivational structure, which again displaces the idea of the future as the projected dimension for the
achievement of one's goals.

Heidegger wrote about not wanting to 'get anywhere' but first of all and for once 'to get to where we are already', and Derrida, who perhaps could not quite swallow that formulation, writes of wanting to get to a point at which he does not know where he is going'. This implied deconstruction of the linearity of our ordinary motivational structures undoubtedly owes something to what we have elsewhere called the intensification wrought by Nietzsche's eternal recurrence, and it is again no accident that when Derrida actually does get round to naming the unnameable, or at least offering for its nominal effects the term 'differance' (which supplants the possibility of a future that would be a future present, by denying that possibility), he refers explicitly to Nietzsche. The term 'differance' implies that there will be no unique name, not even the name of Being. This

'must be conceived without nostalgia, that is, it must be conceived outside the myth of the purely paternal or maternal language belonging to the lost fatherland of thought. On the contrary we must affirm it in the sense that Nietzsche brings affirmation into play - with a certain laughter and a certain dance.'

Translated into our problematic of the future this means that we must not mourn the demise of the future as the horizon of intelligibility; rather we should celebrate it.

I have dealt so far with various motivations for caution about the future - the reflexive problem that when one is trying to go beyond the very categories of historical understanding it is hard to see what terms one should use, the use Derrida makes of an invaginated topology, which makes the reference to a 'beyond' undecidable, and his account of the need for a double strategy of interpretation and writing, which makes utterly obscure any sense of the possibility of representing the future.
(iii) Finally I would like to return to the question of whether Derrida has not 'merely' put a particular concept of time, history, the future etc. into question rather than these concepts 'themselves'. The two distinct answers he gives to this question seem inconsistent. The first one can be found in "Ousia and Gramme" in which he denies the possibility of a post-metaphysical concept of time.

'Time belongs in all its aspects to metaphysics, and it names the domination of presence... In attempting to produce (an) other concept, one rapidly would come to see that it is constructed out of other metaphysical or ontotheblogical predicates.'

But this is perhaps a little hasty in view of the claim we noted before, that there are no metaphysical concepts per se, only metaphysical moves or modes of textual articulation. It is perhaps this that, secondly, allows him to acknowledge in "Grammatology as a Positive Science" the possibility of a 'pluri-dimensional and delinearised temporality'. And this must be his considered view, because in Positions (the title interview) he is asked whether he can conceive of the possibility of a concept of history that would escape... [linearity]... as a stratified, contradictory series'. He makes precisely our point that it is the 'metaphysical concept of history that he is against'. What he endorses is the view he attributes to Althusser and to Sollers which criticizes the Hegelian concept of history, the 'notion of an expressive totality', and

'aims at showing that there is not one single history, a general history, but rather histories different in their type, rhythm, mode of inscription - intervallic, differentiated histories'.

The claim is now not that there is no alternative concept of history but that we must not underestimate the interconnectedness of the concept of history with the rest of the philosophical armoury, nor the difficulty of displacing it. He writes:
'The metaphysical character of the concept of history is not only linked to linearity, but to an entire system of implications (teleology, eschatology, elevating and interiorizing accumulation of meaning, a certain type of traditionality, a certain concept of truth etc...) That being said, the concept of history...cannot be subject to a simple and instantaneous mutation, the striking of a name from the vocabulary. We must elaborate a strategy of... textual work...' 33

His strategy involves constantly reinscribing the term 'history' in his own texts, with the aim of transforming it.

It might seem reassuring to be given back lots of little histories having been forced to give up History, and by analogy, lots of little futures in place of the Future, but we are still left with one or two further questions. First, how possible is it to shake off metaphysics, or even to try to do so, just by going plural? Second, is there not a sense in which Derrida is offering us two different levels of description, one which competes with grand teleological history at its own level, and the other which would have more obvious empirical applications? Third, how does this pluralism of histories affect our reading of Derrida's understanding of the future of post-structuralism?

1. First our doubts about pluralism, and we shall develop the argument here with reference to a plurality of histories. The basis of the worry, I take it, is that if each of these 'histories' one is left with is stamped with logocentrism, then we have merely multiplied the heads on the monster, we have not slain, or even tamed it. I think that is a misreading. Two points are worth making, (a) that these histories would not be, or would not need to be, histories of meaning, constituted by guiding ideas etc. They could be documentations of discursive formations in Foucault's manner, partial histories of particular institutions within a particular society, histories of particular scientific, cultural, agricultural etc. practices. Any regulative involvement of 'intentions',
ideas, or concepts would only have a nominal status, and be readily
dissolved back into the histories themselves, (b) that the very plurality
of these histories, histories that do not require, and would almost
certainly resist appropriation by History, is for that very reason a
threat to History. Indeed this would be so even if each microhistory
were cast in a teleological mould for there would be nothing to guarantee
their commensurability.

An acceptance that a radical plurality of futures was in itself
a sign of a post-metaphysical stance would allow one to forge links
with a rather different tradition. Consider the words of Bloch

'The concept of progress . . . . requires not unilinearity but a
broad, flexible and thoroughly dynamic "multiverse": the voices
of history joined in perpetual and often intricate counterpoint.
A unilinear model must be found obsolete if justice is to be done
to the considerable amount of non-European material. It is no
longer possible to work without curves in the series; without a
new and complex time-manifold...'

Of course the stress must be on the word 'radical'. The power of
pluralism to undermine logocentrism is shown by the considerable role
it plays in the work of philosophers such as Lyotard and Rorty, each of
whom in their different ways offers a new way forward. In both their
cases, the pluralism in question is radical in the sense that there is no
enveloping unity by which this multiplicity can be contained, and no
theoretical place for such a unity.

2. Second, the suggestion that Derrida is offering us two
different levels of description. What I mean by this is that he is
prepared to talk about the future, as if that singular term still made
some sense. It appears, as he says, as a monstrosity from the point of
view of logocentrism, when thought of in terms of radical otherness. The
passage beyond metaphysics is a certain sort of textual activity which, in
all its duality of strategy can be straightforwardly described, as we have
done. But the future as such cannot. It cannot be represented. And yet is not this talk of pluridimensional time and multiple histories giving us precisely that - representations, a promise of a complex cautious pluralism where once there was just the affirmation of the absence of meaning? If this is so, how should we order these two levels. I would suggest that we treat the first as opening up the possibility of the second. And if something of the subtlety of Derrida's cautions about premature exits can be maintained, this is a really promising suggestion. But perhaps we move too fast. There is still the third question.

3. Can we transfer all we have been saying about history to a consideration of the future? Are we not caught here in the ambiguity of the term 'history'? Does not the pluralism we have seen Derrida embrace really only make sense if we think of history as limited to the past? We could hardly have documentations of future discursive formations.

The answer to this question is surely that one simply admits, indeed encourages a plurality of incommensurable and even incompatible projections of the future. But then a second question arises: are we not just treating the future not perhaps as a future present, but as a future past by extending to it the idea of a plural history. Is one not, in effect, closing off the future by acknowledging the multiplicity of possible projections onto it? Is not the future potentially the source of the radically other, the unprojectable etc.? This it surely is, but it would seem perverse, at least at some level, to expect that an account of the future should 'take account' of that radical otherness, for it is precisely what cannot be taken account of. If anything, it is what the multiplicity of our projections are the vain attempt to anticipate. But even with this question tentatively resolved there must be a certain unease about reading Derrida as inviting a thousand flowers to bloom. What a naive
pluralism forgets is the caution to be attached not just to the idea of a single Universal history, but to its linearity. Plurality could leave linearity untouched. What is still required is an account of the complex subversions of linear order — of delayed effects, inversions of order, structures of repetition, substitution, supplementarity etc.

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For philosophy, surely, the problem of the future is a reflection of a crisis of method. We can outline the problem in the following general way: philosophy is a striving after truth, and a striving, as has often been noted, marked by constant failure. Philosophy is a history of disappointment, and disillusionment. Every 'success' is trampled on by what succeeds it. The future is bright only to the ignorant, and innocent, the children in philosophy, those who have not grasped the folly of its ways, those seduced by its promise. What is needed is a radically new way in which the ideals of philosophy can once and for all be realised. What is needed is a proper method.

With the idea that a proper method could achieve what the undisciplined wrangling, inspiration, and muddied thought of the past could not achieve, the future seemed brighter. With Descartes' Discourse on Method philosophy was to be systematically purged of what could not be clearly and distinctly perceived, and it became a slogan of modernity. Kant too turns his back on the mock-battles of metaphysics by directing philosophy along 'the secure path of a science'. And he claims to have found a way of guarding against all those errors which have hitherto beset reason', and that 'there is not a single metaphysical problem that has not been solved'. Hegel insists that philosophy cease merely being the love of knowledge and achieve knowledge itself. As he put it

' The systematic development of truth in scientific form can alone be the true shape in which truth exists. To help to bring philosophy nearer to the form of science— that goal where it can lay aside the name of love of knowledge , and be actual knowledge — that is what I have set before me '.
and Husserl, (who we should note would violently object to being
harnessed with Hegel in this way— he saw Hegel as 'weakening the impulse
toward philosophical science' in that it 'lacks a critique of reason'.
Strange Kantian words! given that he had only just lamented Kant's claim
that one could not learn philosophy, only to philosophize: 'What is that
but an admission of philosophy's unscientific character?') aims to
restore philosophy' to its historical purpose as the loftiest and most
rigorous of all sciences, representing...humanity's imperishable demand
for pure and absolute knowledge.' In each case it is (scientific)
method that supplies the horizon of the future for philosophy. For it is
only by a rigorous reaffirmation and redefinition of philosophical method
that metaphysical desire (for knowledge, understanding, truth, clarity...
and fundamentally, for presence) can be guided in a direction not
immediately guaranteed to disappoint. When Kant decries the mystagogues
it is surely because they usurp the role of proper philosophical method
in articulating the horizon of the future. Hegel's attack on Schelling
is similarly motivated. Philosophical method is a conceptual labour that
cannot be replaced by intuition. No royal roads. And if Husserl seems
to return to intuition, no-one can doubt the work of detailed description
this involves. It is not the speechless ecstatic revelation of a mystical
vision.

And reference to Husserl suggests a rather interesting possibility.
If we take the desire to avoid philosophy's traditional failure as the
driving concern of Husserl's philosophy, it suggests at least initially,
the subordination of the value of arche to that of telos. Secure foundations
are not ends in themselves; rather, they ensure that the building does not
collapse when completed. I say 'initially' because of course one can,
symmetrically, claim that the goal for Husserl is the re-establishing
of contact with the 'things themselves', intuitive fulfilment, the
reactivation of origin. In that case, the phase of subordination of arche to telos would be followed by an inversion of that relationship: ends and origins would cycle back into each other.

What this suggests is that the initial cyclic fracturing of linearity we claimed for Nietzsche could be found just as well in Husserl. And the case of phenomenology, and of Husserl in particular is surely paradigmatic for philosophy. It could be argued that while phenomenology may have limitations, it is still the healthiest embodiment of the ethico-rational ideal, one that has not yet failed for the simple reason that it can be seen to have eventually taken the choice recommended by Lessing - the infinite striving after truth. 42

If phenomenology cannot be completed, this could be affirmed in a positive way rather than lamented. Is not the ideal of perpetual activation and reactivation of the primal sources of intuition one we could embrace? It would both draw in the past, deepen the present, and give sense to the future. 'The greatest step our age has to make is to recognise that with philosophical intuition...a limitless field of work opens out...'.

This understanding of Husserl's phenomenology is persuasively presented by Merleau-Ponty. 43 'The most important lesson...the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction.' he suggests. And Husserl often refers to himself as a perpetual beginner, and his own constant inventiveness even in respect of major concepts would support this self-assessment. Philosophy is an 'infinite meditation' and when faithful to its intention, 'never knows where it is going'. 44

'The unfinished nature of philosophy and the inchoative atmosphere which surrounded it are not to be taken as a sign of failure. They were inevitable because phenomenology's task was to reveal the mystery of the world and of reason.' 45
We offered earlier a limited defence of a certain slippage between philosophical discussions of the future, and of the future of philosophy. So far we have listed a little on the side of the former. But the more reflexive questions about the future of philosophy — to which we briefly alluded when discussing Derrida's double strategy — can profitably engage our attention again. For while philosophers such as Rorty and Lyotard chart both the death of philosophy, and, via radical pluralism, its rebirth and reorientation, and while there is a real chastening of philosophy's commonly totalizing pretensions, radical pluralism leaves linearity untouched. However, with the kind of discussion of the end or closure of philosophy inaugurated by Nietzsche, and carried through by Heidegger and Derrida, this whole question of linearity is put to the test.46

Nietzsche offered us both synchronic and diachronic versions of the closure thesis: the synchronic in Beyond Good and Evil47 and the diachronic in Twilight of the Idols ("How the Real World at Last Became a Myth"). There is a mutation of linearity involved in both senses of circle involved in these accounts — the circle as a space of limitation or enclosure, and the circle as a movement of return. But the most radical break with linearity comes in his discussion of the eternal recurrence48 and the possibility of its affirmation. With this affirmation, it could be said that one 'opens oneself' to the future without reservation. And such opening is no longer captured in linear terms.49

A full discussion of the question of the end(s) of philosophy in Heidegger and Derrida is undoubtedly called for here, but the call will have to remain unanswered. Other thinkers have already applied themselves most satisfactorily to the job.50 Important distinctions have to be repeatedly emphasized, and further analytical clarification and distinction between different versions of this thesis would not be out of order. We would have to distinguish end as exhaustion of possibilities, as extreme
focussing of possibility, as termination of activity, as fulfilment, as goal... and so on.

What from our point of view it is worth extracting from this discussion is the double inscription of what we have called 'caution' about the future, one response among many to crisis. On the one hand the announcement of the closure of philosophy (as metaphysics, as logocentrism) declares a break within the history of thought through which no continuous thread may pass. What the future offers (a change of style, the step beyond, 'writing', 'thinking' etc.) lies beyond our current projective base, and it is quite the opposite of a fulfilment or completion of the present. But in addition - and here we have the doubling back - the place of the future is an issue fundamental to determining as distinct the content of what precedes and succeeds the rupture. For traditional philosophy, the future is an essential category (ethically and/or hermeneutically, as we have described above). For post-structuralism it may not be. The question is - is it merely not essential, is it excluded altogether, or does the future reappear in some mutation or other? What future has the future?

We have tried to develop the idea that the crisis in philosophy's future (and hence its very nature) has been seen, certainly by a string of the most important thinkers in modern philosophy, to be co-extensive with a crisis in method, for which a redefinition of its status as a 'science' is in each case required. We have suggested that while Husserl in one respect clearly belongs to this series, there is in his work a positive recognition of the impossibility of finality, of completing the task of philosophy. Where would this leave post-structuralism? And where, more particularly would it leave Derrida? Does this eminently reasonable restatement of the idea of philosophy as a perennial activity not deflate the very project of deconstructing the future?
Let us be clear that Derridean deconstruction is heavily committed to a transformation of our ways of thinking about the future. We have already quoted his remark that 'the future can only be anticipated in the form of absolute danger'—which is at the very least a radical discontinuity thesis. And while it always forms part of a double strategy, and so is coupled with immanent deconstruction, Derrida constantly refers to the need to take the step beyond—beyond 'metaphysics', 'beyond man'and humanism', beyond presence, beyond security, beyond the language of Being.

Such an alternative philosophical (?) practice can presumably claim to be radically different from everything we have hitherto known as philosophy. I have my doubts about this. But a question arises here which will help us clarify just what kind of transformation of our ordinary view of the future is being proposed. We might ask: leaving aside the radicality of the destination, surely the nature of the transition, and of the language in which it is announced is very far from being radical. Indeed it is very traditional. The name for it is apocalyptic discourse.

On the last day of the 1980 conference at Cérisy, Derrida presented a paper on Kant's 'lampoon' "Von einem neuerdings erhobenenVornehmen Ton in der Philosophie" (1796) ("On a Genteel Tone Recently Sounded in Philosophy"), in the title of which the word Apocalyptic replaces Genteel. Kant had taken to task those mystagogic pseudo-philosophers who by the tone they take and the air they give themselves when saying certain things, place philosophy in danger of death, and tell philosophy, or philosophers the imminence of their end.' Derrida is not only fascinated by the categories Kant uses to judge these philosophers, the fact that it is their tone that Kant is worried about, and the whole significance of Apocalypse as Revelation, he is clearly touched by the fact that Kant's essay can be seen to apply to him. This is not the place
for a detailed analysis of Derrida's paper, but here is a brief account of part of the argument.

For Kant, philosophy's basic commitment is to "Wissenschaftlichen Lebensweisheit" - the ethico-rational life. The mystagogues borrow the word 'philosophy', but not its significance. They claim 'an immediate and intuitive relation with the mystery', they are organised in tiny exclusive sects, use coded language, and set themselves apart as superior beings. They prefer intuition to concepts, 'gift' to work, and value genius above scholarship. Clearly they have a total disdain for Kant's commitment to rational inquiry, and indeed to its democratic implications.

Derrida begins by suggesting in analytic fashion that we treat apocalyptic discourse as essentially predictive eschatological discourse, discourse about the end or ends, or the limit (...of the world, of time, of philosophy). He then makes three moves. The first, specific one, is to argue that Kant himself produces just such a discourse in his 'marking a limit, indeed the end of a certain type of metaphysics'. His second move is one of generalization - to argue in various ways that eschatological discourse is unavoidable. It is clear that he means to encompass himself (and Heidegger) in these remarks.

'...whoever would come to refine, to tell...the end of the end, the end of ends, that the end has always already begun, that we must distinguish between closure and end, that person would, whether wanting to or not, participate in the concert.'

A few pages later Derrida repeats this argument, even to the point of allowing its force to override the ironic distanced tone which he believes is the most he has ever allowed himself when making his apocalyptic pronouncements. Here it seems neither mental reservations, nor a change of style will do.

The importance of this claim is that it confirms us in our view that Derrida is taking up a radical attitude to the future, and it rules out the response that his references to a beyond, to the future
as absolute danger should be taken with a pinch of French salt.

The argument, however, and perhaps also his tu quoque response to Kant, is surely a little misleading, for it would obscure the difference between the Revelation of John of Patmos, and the claim that philosophy, or a certain Western tradition of philosophy has exhausted its possibilities. Derrida, like Lacan, has little time for the distinction between use and mention, or between announcing the end, and charting its limits. Clearly both are concerned with marking limits, but to identify the two would conflate apocalyptic and eschatological discourse completely. And when talking of end as closure, the distinctively predictive element of apocalyptic discourse makes no sense, for 'closure' does not have chronological consequences in the ordinary sense at all.

But if that is so, surely we are wrong to try to use the 'end of philosophy' debate as the basis of a claim that these various thinkers (Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida) are transforming or deconstructing the future. The point, however, is that the substitution of considerations of exhaustion, possibility, repetition, closure etc. for those of philosophical progress, is in itself a displacement of philosophy's understanding of its own future. We could say that the ordinary temporal future ceases to dominate.

It might be replied that the ordinary temporal future never has dominated philosophy. Certainly teleological projection is far more than an extension of a series of now-points beyond the present. That is quite right. What is being claimed is that teleology nonetheless represents the preservation of the values of self-identity, of fulfilment, of.... 'presence'. After Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida, we can redescribe the projective scene at two different levels:
(1) Philosophy may well carry on as always, blind to its own limits, like a fly in a fly bottle, perhaps.

(2) A radically distinct possibility (of 'thinking', of 'writing') begins to emerge. This possibility, it may be said, surely gives us hope (indeed Derrida even goes so far as to endorse what he calls 'Heideggerean hope' on one occasion\(^{56}\)) and thus revives the 'ethical' importance of the future! This possibility will reappear at the end of the paper.

We will turn shortly to a considered interpretation of this stereoscopic, or bi-focal projection, but first let us consider the third move Derrida makes in the Apocalypse essay. It is a further generalization of the invaginated reversal by which apocalyptic discourse is no longer seen outside, to be excluded. He asks (in other words, he suggests)

"Wouldn't the apocalyptic be a transcendental condition for all discourse, of all experience itself, of every mark or trace?" \(^{57}\)

I have elsewhere had strong words to say about Derrida's reliance on such transcendental manoeuvres. If his general anti-foundationalism is accepted, it has no force at all: the 'sous rature' is no portmanteau protection. But this particular argument seems to me to commit a simple logical fallacy. The argument essentially is that apocalyptic discourse involves an indeterminacy of authorial voice, and of its audience, and that this indeterminacy, if only we were to realise it, is the condition for the possibility of any signification whatsoever. But even if one accepts that this generalised 'écriture' could be so characterised, it simply does not follow from the fact that the apocalyptic has these properties (among others) that it is the condition of possibility of discourse in general, which also has these properties. Structural correspondences have no transcendental consequences at all, and if by 'the apocalyptic'
Derrida means 'apocalyptic discourse' he would have to be claiming that a particular discourse was a transcendental condition for discourse in general, which seems a priori implausible. If all discourse did share this property (authorial/audience indeterminacy) then nothing would privilege the way in which apocalyptic discourses embodies it. And quite apart from this, it is hard to see how one discourse can have a transcendental relationship to other discourses, unless one has redefined the relationship as some sort of mapping, or translatability.

Derrida's difficulty here is that such displacements and reversals are often productively provocative, but that very success can breed routinization and even recklessness.

Having said that, there is still something of interest in this last move. I believe it is all to be found in the last pages of his paper, in which he offers us a 'meditation' on the word 'Viens', 'come'. With a commentary on this we shall draw our discussion to a close.

Allow me, for the sake of economy of orientation, to merely indicate some of the lines of thought condensed in this word. First, the apocalyptic gesture could be said to involve a general invitation to the reader, to the 'listener' to 'come', to follow, to open himself/herself to the light. Second, the word 'come' (Viens) in either English or French is immediately linked to the language of the future (avenir itself, and many phrases involving venir; in English, consider 'the time to come', 'coming events' and so on.) Third, Derrida is clearly using this word, much as Heidegger uses the word 'ereignis' and 'es gibt' to mark a site at which a new kind of thinking might begin to crystallize. And here, I claim, we find a clue at least to how the future might still have a role — indeed the central role — after philosophy's closure.

As I understand Derrida, the apocalyptic 'Viens', 'come' has the force of a primordial event in a Heideggerean sense, with a fundamen-
tal ethical flavour superimposed on it (in response perhaps to Levinas). We could see it as an attempt to bring about a confluence of Heidegger and Levinas. At this point, yet another paper could begin, but I will try to make brief sense of these obscure allusions.

How can an event be fundamental? Every event, as such, marks a rupture with the past, has its own temporal integrity. Some events we think of as historically (or biographically) momentous. They open a whole world of possibilities. Such an idea could be used to understand the activity of philosophy itself — as an opening onto, the opening up, of possibilities of thinking, indeed of living.

Philosophy so understood could be called the 'fundamental event'. But so defined, it has the most intimate bond imaginable with the future. The common trait of those views of the future (and of philosophy's future) that deconstruction sets its sights on is their embodiment of the value of presence, usually via some anticipatory representation of What is to Come. For fear of prejudging the issue we have not yet offered a positive alternative. But the account we have offered of the 'fundamental event' surely supplies one. The future 'is' fundamentally an event — the opening of possibility. As such, it is, literally speaking, a continuous Apocalypse, or revelation. The future opens onto what is other. 60

Something of the force of these remarks — if indeed they have any — comes from what we can call the impersonality of the idea of event being employed here. The same can be said, eg. of Heidegger's es gibt. We cannot ask who gives or what is given. Once again, the attempt is being made to demonstrate a space, an opening, and indeed to provide one. But Derrida's employment of Viens is not simply impersonal. In the apocalyptic texts in which the 'come' is uttered, there is to be sure a movement away from the personal. 61 But equally, the word 'come' has an essentially interpersonal significance that Heidegger does not
to my knowledge suggest for his focal words. There is little doubt that what Derrida is doing here is trying to bring Levinas into the picture for the latter's insistence that the ethical relation have primacy over the ontological. For Levinas, the relation to the Other (the other person) is the scene of the opening onto the infinite. And in the discontinuity, the otherness of the Other, we find the basis of the discontinuity of time. Moreover in the gift of pardon the Other has the power to heal the past....

What Derrida is trying to do is to capture a post-metaphysical sense of the future that does not entirely abandon the ethical dimension (that was so prominent at the beginning of our paper), but rejoins it at a deeper level.

We can suppose that this is simply a fascinating topic for philosophical discussion, but it is clearly more than this. It is meant, I believe, to offer us some sort of basic insight, if I can use that word, into how we might come to think of philosophy or of its successor. It suggests to my mind that it will rest ultimately on the invitation that we each extend to each other to open ourselves to the adventure (ad-venture) of thinking, without the prospect of completion, and without aiming at some prescribed destination.

Philosophy would be something of a double event: an invitation to the Other, a vulnerable opening of oneself to the Other, on the one hand, and a thinking about the open, and about opening itself, i.e. about the space and time within which philosophical thinking is at all possible.

An acknowledgement of the event character of philosophy so understood, is of fundamental importance. For it provides both a principle of selectivity in reading the history of philosophy – texts vary in their grasp of the space of possibility in which they work – and it would tend to protect those texts against reductive readings. (We should always ask what they are doing, not just what do they say.) It is this – at
least in principle - that prevents the history of philosophy from
being totalized prematurely. And interestingly, it suggests a way in
which a deconstructive history must be supplemented by a parallel history
of philosophical openings, of philosophy as an opening. Historical retro-
spection easily suffers from the illusions of objectification. We take
for granted the space/spaces that the texts we study were in fact in
part responsible for opening up, and focus on the possibilities they
foreclosed. This would be a rather different suggestion for a double
strategy of reading.

In conclusion, I would like to return to the point at which we
asked rhetorically, why Husserl's account of the future of philosophy
formulating it as we did as a ceaseless activity of exploration, of
reactivation of primordial experience, was not an adequate answer to
(post-) modern doubts about philosophy as a progressing or completeable
enterprise. Do not Husserl and Derrida's projects represent the same
mutation of that future-projecting metaphysical desire?

Derrida is certainly more the child of phenomenology than many
care to admit, and the extent of his debt to Husserl's spiritual
fecundity is easily underestimated. Perhaps I could conclude by
formulating the result of our discussion in the shape of a question:
is it possible that Husserl's logocentric concern with the primordial,
with origins, (and indeed Heidegger's increasingly precarious commit-
ment to the question of Being) could each be treated as strategies
subordinated to a conception of the activity of philosophy - as a
sustained opening (up) of the space of thinking - that Derrida (only)
reopens, albeit on new terrain? Where exactly is the difference?
And what would come of such a thought?

But these questions I must leave for another day,
another time.
APPENDIX

Nietzsche's Transvaluation of Time

The position of Nietzsche in this work is somewhat complex. He was undoubtedly influential in guiding Heidegger's formulation of the idea of the 'end' of metaphysics, and in setting up the whole problematic of its 'overcoming'. His radical scepticism about unity, identity, integrity ... has played a critical role at a number of points - in particular our readings of both Husserl and Heidegger's ways of reformulating the status of time and temporality. We have endorsed Derrida's general attack on the idea of a more authentic 'primordial' time that would underlie our everyday understanding of time as a succession of moments, and have argued that this opens the way for a more complex investigation of the variety of temporal phenomena, in which concepts, theories, representations 'of' time are embraced as forming part of the temporal itself.

In this context, our interpretation of Nietzsche's thought of eternal recurrence may seem somewhat anomalous. For it may seem like the strongest possible re-affirmation of the 'instant', in which it receives a new kind of purity, freedom from representation. Certainly Nietzsche might question the theoretical motivation of our pluralization of time and its structures which does not readily mesh with what we have called 'the intensity of the moment'. Nonetheless, we claim Nietzsche's account is instructive, and we offer here an interpretation of his self-avowedly 'highest thought', the eternal recurrence.

This presentation relates to the general argument of the thesis in the following ways:

(1) Nietzsche offers us a brilliant example of how to displace a frame of reference (in this case, the ordinary 'metaphysical' concept of time) from within.

(2) It retains the centrality of the instant only to explode the traditional
value of such a primitive concept. For Nietzsche, the instant opens out onto what is other.

(3) At the same time as the instant is a non-recuperative opening out, it is also an embodiment of all those identical moments it repeats. This 'repetition' could be said to be a most primitive kind of 'representation'.

(4) If so, Nietzsche's 'moment of intensity' builds in representation in its most primitive 'element' (which is primitively not self-contained).

(5) Broadly speaking we treat Nietzsche's account as a reflective intensification of our understanding of the 'present', one which successfully subverts our everyday 'recuperative' understanding. As such it belongs (in general) to the deconstructive phase of the rethinking of time, which, however interesting, cannot be the end of the story.

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Despite our doubts about Derrida's claim that there can be no non-metaphysical concept of time, it is quite true that it is often more productive to pursue the goal of rethinking time by focussing on other terms and concepts than that of Time itself. One is reminded of the way in which Austin sought to avoid the quagmire of questions about freedom and determinism by looking instead at what at first seem more marginal concerns, like the difference between excuses and justifications.\(^1\) Nietzsche does not say all that much about Time per se, and yet his most fundamental concept is an essentially temporal one: that of eternal recurrence.\(^2\) And as is true of both Husserl and Heidegger, the temporal here is linked with the ontological. However, we shall argue that Nietzsche does not, for all that, repeat the metaphysical motif of presence. He subverts it instead. His account of the moment is fundamentally at odds with any such value as presence.

We shall begin by showing how Nietzsche radically questions, subverts and displaces 'our ordinary concept of time', at a number of different levels. In terms of the Derridean formula, eternal recurrence is an undecidable term,
and I shall use this suggestion as a way of clarifying the various otherwise incompatible ways in which he explains it.

How we might ask is it in principle possible to avoid Derrida's strictures? We have already shown that Derrida has to admit that it is not concepts themselves which are or are not metaphysical, but rather their textual exploitation and functioning. This opens the way, we argue, to Nietzsche's use of such concepts. It may be, if we stick to some rather narrow sense of the term, that Nietzsche has not produced a new CONCEPT of time, but that he has replaced its status as a concept with something else. The impossibility of conceptualizing eternal recurrence may turn out to be a positive feature.

It is however worth asking ourselves to begin with whether we can properly talk about 'our ordinary concept of time'. This phrase can itself be understood in a common sense way as our taken for granted understanding of time, but as St. Augustine showed long ago, the attempt to transform this tacit understanding into something more conceptually rigorous is somewhat problematic. The other way of understanding the phrase would then rest on some such view (shared by Heidegger and Derrida) as that the one ordinary concept of time we all share is that derived from Aristotle. But are there not difficulties attached to the idea? Who are 'we'? Is it to be taken for granted that we all share a common concept of time? Might there not be a hidden complicity between the idea of a concept and some particular interpretation of time? We do we suppose there is but one concept of time?

Let us develop this last question.

Far more 'ordinary' than having a unitary concept of time is the fact that we distinguish between different kinds of time: subjective/objective, existential/cosmic, qualitative/quantitative, time as experienced/time as measured, and so on. But what if each of these oppositions merely distributed according to an unanalysed schema (such as inside/outside) the same fundamental value (such as presence). What if such a distribution functioned
to preserve that value? It could be argued, for example, that the distinction between subjective and objective time is a conceptual labour that assures under each heading the preservation of the unity of the temporal series, and that this is achieved precisely by making this distinction. All events can be located in one or other category by distinct rules of integration (such as narrativity for subjective time, seriality for objective time).

On such an argument, the fundamental unity of time would have been preserved precisely by multiplying the frames of reference within which it operates. Undoubtedly, one then needs a further story to integrate these multiple frames. The usual one, with only two frames, is a story of derivation. Objective time is shown to be dependent on, derivative from subjective temporality, or vice versa. The point of my remarks here is to suggest that talk about 'our ordinary concept of time' in the singular need not be undermined by the fact that everywhere we find a duality or plurality of such concepts. But it might perhaps make sense to allow that there are different ordinary concepts of time, and fall back on a more fundamental claim - that they each embody a common basic set of values, which we could call 'unity', 'integration', 'identity', or even more fundamentally, that of 'presence' as the condition of such values being realised. On Nietzsche's account these would be the values pertaining to Being. The traditional betrayal of time would consist of subjugating the values associated with Becoming to those of Being.

Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida share, in our view, (and they are not alone) the view that the ordinary concept(s) of time embodies values which are more ontological than temporal. But in each case the lesson this insight teaches is that questions about time and questions about Being collapse into one another and cannot be separated, as Plato long ago made so apparent.

Each of them is also engaged not merely in a critique of the ordinary concept of time, but in what we might call, borrowing from Nietzsche, a
transvaluation of time. And for Nietzsche especially, this is presented as
the key to a human transformation, indeed a transformation which would point
beyond 'man'. The focus of this transformative projection is the thought of
eternal recurrence, announced in the Gay Science, claimed (in Ecce Homo)
to be 'the fundamental conception' behind Thus Spake Zarathustra, and the
title of an incomplete book project bequeathed to us in his Nachlass. One
could avoid the analytical task of separating the various versions by saying
that the thought of eternal recurrence is not a single thought at all, but
a constellation or family of 'thoughts'. But this would only be a temporary,
because largely uniformative, way of legitimating the diverse and seemingly
contradictory accounts Nietzsche offers. Moreover there are other considerat-
ions.

(1) Nietzsche's mode of discourse and style of presentation varies from
from account to another, which makes a comparison of the abstract 'thesis' in
each case 'problematic. How, for example, should we compare the 'poetic'
versions (e.g. in later parts of Thus Spake Zarathustra) and the scientific
proofs in The Will to Power.

(2) The rhetorical strategy varies, and may indeed be the subject of crit-
ica! disagreement. Again, that there was a 'content' to be drawn out for
comparison would be made questionable in principle.

(3) The audience/level of exposition varies. Would we necessarily expect
esoteric and exoteric versions to be consistent?

One can make a virtue out of contradictions (vide Walt Whitman, for
whom contradiction was a sign of his spiritual abundance). Jaspers reading
of Nietzsche does just this. Or one can offer general arguments drawing on
the thesis of semantic indeterminacy or of the fictionality of truth and
hence of consistency (both of which Nietzsche held). But these are mere
slogans, signposts, the husks of thought; they are not in themselves arguments.
And to constructively sieve through Nietzsche's various presentations of eternal recurrence a discriminatory classification of the various accounts is essential. This will not be free from one's own theoretical interests, but where they coincide with Nietzsche's, the reading can be productive. Our theoretical interest, to make it explicit, is in understanding the role of eternal recurrence in Nietzsche's transvaluation of time. The value of such a guiding interest remains to be seen. It is also an open question whether it can be sustained as such, as a 'theoretical interest', or whether the cool analytical security that such a phrase suggests is not itself fundamentally at risk. Placing what Nietzsche called the 'greatest weight' on the scales is not an act free from danger. Nonetheless I shall begin by arguing
(1) that the various ways in which eternal recurrence is formulated reflect the different modes (levels, dimensions) at which time needs to be transvalued or 'deconstructed'.

(2) that the question of the status of eternal recurrence (whether it is a concept, a theory, a thought, an experience, a test...) will vary with the level in question above.

(3) that we ought to take seriously the suggestion that eternal recurrence is 'undecidable' in terms of the conceptual framework it subverts. (What that implies is that only one would eternal recurrence be a 'moral' test [try and affirm that!] but an intellectual test [try and think that through]).

To give some structure to this account, I propose, perhaps unoriginally to distinguish three levels or ways in which eternal recurrence is presented:
(a) cosmological, (b) psychological, and (c) ontological. It might be objected that this framework is not complete (what about the historical, for instance?) but I would not accept that it is 'naive'. Of course, Nietzsche might put these very distinctions in question (especially a/c, and b/c). But in my view the different presentations of eternal recurrence do work within such traditional categories, if only to dissolve them. And these categories also correspond to three different dimensions of time: (1) universal (including
historical) time, (ii) what I will call 'motivational' time, (iii) time as linked with identity (both of things and persons). If the ordinary schemata of time can be understood to rest on the value of unity—guaranteeing it, reappropriating it, making it possible, etc.—then the deconstruction or revaluation of time will invert and displace this value as it is specifically embodied in each mode, level or dimension.

Thus we find corresponding to the category of universal time the idea that time stretches infinitely in both directions, that it is one dimensional, and that every event has a uniquely determined place in it. Ordinary motivational time can be glossed as a structure of asymmetry between past and future, in which the past is complete and unaffected and the future the scene for the projection of one's freely chosen ends. Time understood ontologically, in relation to identity, is understood either as a neutral container in which things or persons endure as they are (substances), where their identity is independent of time, or as productive of identity by making possible the development of a being's identity to fulfillment or completion.

It is a sign of the polysemic depth of the idea of eternal recurrence that it can be transformed to transvalue each of these settings. Let us now look at some of Nietzsche's remarks that would bear out this reading. We shall turn first to the cosmological version of eternal recurrence.

The Cosmological Version

This is most explicitly formulated in The Will to Power and in various notes dating from 1885–8. Let me quote, as countless others have done, Nietzsche's 'most scientific' argument for eternal recurrence:

'If the world may be thought of as a certain definite quantity of force and as a certain definite number of centres of force—and every other representation remains indefinite and therefore useless—it follows that, in the great dice game of existence, it must pass through a calculable number of combinations. In infinite time, every possible combination would at some time or another be realised; more: it would be realised an infinite number of times. And since between every combination and its next recurrence all other possible combinations would have to take place, and each of these combinations conditions the entire sequence of combinations in the same series, a circular movement
of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated: the world as a circular movement that has already repeated itself infinitely often and plays its game in infinitum. "

We begin our discussion of this passage with two observations. First, it is not convincing, and second, it is not clear what difference it could possibly make if it were true, and consequently, it is not entirely clear what it would mean for it to be true.

There are a number of different claims to be distinguished in this passage, some more plausible than others, even allowing for his premises (a finite number of forces and infinite time). As it stands, we are not persuaded either that a finite number of elements could not generate an infinite number of qualitatively different states, thus making the necessary infinite repetition of each state a non sequitor. Nor, if everything were to be repeated infinitely, can we see why it must take the form of exact cycles of complete sequences of permutations. We are not the first to have had doubts about this proof. Others have found it more acceptable. Danto, for example believes that with the addition of various other plausible premises it can be made to work. We shall argue, however, that Nietzsche does not need the precise repetitions that this argument, if successful would prove. But first, we shall look at another problem with the idea of eternal recurrence as so conceived: what would it mean for it to be true?

We can pose our worry like this: what would it be to be in one cycle rather than another? The request for some distinguishing feature by which one cycle could be distinguished from another must always be refused, for ex hypothesi there can be none without violating the principle that what returns returns identically. There is no point outside such a series to mark one's place. The hypothesis could not, then, be confirmed or refuted by our ordinary experience. Yet unlike the hypothesis of a divine being, it does not posit a transcendence, a higher plane of existence, just a horizontal extension of this one. Eternal recurrence is minimally, it seems, an untestable hypothesis, consistent with ordinary experience, requiring no higher
being, and one the mere truth or falsity of which has no effect on our experience of the real world. This sounds like an empty, uninteresting idea which might at best occupy a marginal place in the dreams of an idle mind. And yet Nietzsche himself claims it to be his most powerful insight! Thus:

(1) He claims (The Will to Power, §55) it is 'the most scientific hypothesis'. We shall have something to say about this shortly.

(2) In the plan of the book on eternal recurrence outlined in The Will to Power § 1057, section 2 is entitled 'Proof of the doctrine'. He clearly takes the cosmological argument seriously.

(3) He clearly contends that belief in eternal recurrence does make an enormous difference. In a letter to Overbeck, he wrote

'If it is true - or rather if it is believed to be true - then everything changes and turns around and all previous values are devalued.'

What we propose is a strategy of reading Nietzsche's cosmological presentation of this doctrine which will both explain the importance with which he credits it, and resolve some of the difficulties we have with it. First, Nietzsche is not just offering this proof of eternal recurrence in an intellectual vacuum. He is opposing it both to the traditional conceptions of nineteenth century mechanism, and to the teleological conceptions of traditional theology. Let us take mechanism first. Nietzsche has a number of reservations about the idea of the world as a network of causes and effects. He is sceptical about the very concepts of 'cause' and 'effect' (as varieties of fiction). And if (as Kelvin argued) mechanism leads to a final state (entropy), it must, in infinite past time, have already reached it. As it clearly has not, mechanism must be false.

Coming from Nietzsche, and especially where they concern eternal recurrence, which was after all the subject of a vision (see below) these arguments raise certain questions of evaluation. Nietzsche is not parodying
scientific discourse; but nor is he committed to its concepts, its assumptions, its standards. Indeed, he elsewhere pours scorn on those conclusions that need proving. What he is doing, surely, is showing how eternal recurrence can be argued for even in terms that he did not himself endorse.

Some sort of confirmation of his willingness to adopt such a strategy can be found in the way he handles the other main view to which eternal recurrence is opposed—-theological teleology. In § 1062, for example we find the following argument:

'If the world had a goal, it must have been reached. If there were for it some unintended final state, this must also have been reached. If it were in any way capable of a pausing and becoming fixed, of "being", then all becoming would long since have come to an end, along with all thinking, all "spirit". The fact of "spirit" as a form of becoming proves that the world has no goal, no final state, and is incapable of being.'

The language here is surely that of theology. The argument can be constructed by substituting the opposition between Being and Becoming for that between Being and non-Being in Aquinas' Third Way. Where Aquinas argues that a necessary being must be posited to explain how, in infinite past time, we have not been swallowed up by a coincidence of non-Being, Nietzsche argues that the absence of a goal must be posited to explain how, in infinite past time, the universe did not cease all becoming. Aquinas did not think that such proofs were necessary, only convenient for some. No more did Nietzsche. That Nietzsche's attitude to the frame of reference in which such arguments are constructed is something short of total commitment can surely be seen in the next paragraph in which he continues

'The old habit ... of associating a goal with every event and a guiding, creative God with the world is so powerful that it requires an effort for a thinker not to fall into thinking of the very aimlessness of the world as intended.'

However: there is clearly a sense in which the cosmological version of eternal recurrence moves within this frame of reference. In our view
the cosmological argument for eternal recurrence can be seen as subversive of both teleology and mechanism in that it can be shown to be no less plausible in the very same terms. And that is the point of my saying that this proof is not offered in an intellectual vacuum. It may be quite as important that it challenge the existing contenders for our intellectual assent as that it finally convinces us in its own right.

The second consideration we would offer towards a more receptive reading of the proof of eternal recurrence is that it can be seen as an attempt to give a rigorous scientific justification for believing something which in a more general form we might find far more plausible. And Nietzsche himself at the beginning of the very passage from which this proof comes offers us just such an account of his 'new world conception' which depends not on any detailed argument, but on a model of a closed economy of forces. Does Nietzsche really need more than this? He writes

"The world exists; it is not something that becomes, not something that passes away. Or rather: it becomes, it passes away, but it has never begun to become and never ceased from passing away - it maintains itself in both. It lives on itself; its excrements are its food."

It might however seem that repetition is entirely missing from this picture, which would make it deficient in a vital respect. As we shall see later, the abandonment of exact cycles is a price, some think Nietzsche has to pay, to give eternal recurrence psychological force. But for this picture here to be sufficient we would have to find in the fact that becoming 'never ceases' a sufficient embodiment of becoming. We shall come back to this question.

We have cited Nietzsche's remark in a letter that if it is believed true, eternal recurrence turns everything round. It might be suggested that a comparison with heavenly salvation would be appropriate here. For that too, true or not, makes an enormous difference if one believes it possible. And it shares the feature of unverifiability.

Heavenly salvation is usually thought of as a reward, or at least as a consequence of having led a certain sort of life. The reward is to be led to
another life distinct from the first, on in which, one presumes, suffering is absent (or in the case of hell, in which suffering is eternal and hope is absent). In this case too, it is arguable that the truth or falsity of the existence of an afterlife has no direct bearing on the facts of this life, while belief in such a state can have an enormous 'effect'. Is eternal recurrence just a kind of inversion of salvation? A kind up upsidedown theology?

Surely on this first cosmological version, no. Because on this account it can be shown that the connection between one cycle and the next is neither causal nor moral, so nothing I do will have the slightest effect on the next round. This is true whether I believe eternal recurrence or not. And furthermore if one did suppose the relationship between one cycle and the next to be one of cause/effect in whatever loose form, one could not call it salvation (or damnation) for what one does merely to be repeated infinitely. Eternal recurrence does not offer a version of heaven or hell. It can offer in itself neither punishment nor reward. It is a horizontal move, not a vertical one. It is this feature - the horizontality of eternal recurrence - that, as we shall now explain, allows the cosmological version of eternal recurrence to play its special role in what we have called the transvaluation of our ordinary concept of time.

We seem to be able to think of eternal recurrence as a loopy arrow, as a single temporal series of a strange loopy shape. And yet without departing from seriality, Nietzsche has thereby generated a structure that threatens it. When we talk of a loopy shape, we think representationally of something like a coil, a spring shape. On such a model we would possess a way of distinguishing between the different cycles, even if there were no clear point at which one cycle begins and ends. But on the cosmological model, there is no external point of vision, and indeed we are not simply dealing with a model. There is no way of distinguishing between one cycle and the next etc. We are, or are inside, the coil, and to us the entire history of the universe as we
know it could just seem like a straight line, the arc of an immense circle. Why do we labour this literal interpretation of the eternal recurrence as a cosmological hypothesis? Should we not just feel its unfathomable power and not pause to analyse its reflective implications? We claim that this cosmological version is the first stage (or can be so construed) of Nietzsche's deconstruction of ordinary serial time. The key to this operation is that Nietzsche has managed to construct using ordinary serial time, a plausible account of the structure of time which provides the basis for the transvaluation of that 'ordinary time'. Eternal recurrence seems merely to be a very powerful modification, extension of seriality. But in fact it puts in question the assumed self-contained status of its units—nows—and their fundamental successivity. For as well as being located on a horizontal axis of succession, each 'unit' also appears to be a member of a vertical series of repetitions.

**Psychological Time.** It is hard to contain this version, as it appears in so many guises. Perhaps the key to it is the role of eternal recurrence in undermining and displacing the idea of purpose—be it personal or historical. As such, however, it is merely negative, and much more needs to be said about the idea of affirmation and the transformation of the will. We begin with an account of what we might call the 'intensity of the moment', which provides something of a template for self-affirmation.

**(a) The intensity of the moment**

The cosmological version of eternal recurrence functions in such a way as to extend serial succession (in 'loops') so that each individual moment acquires membership of an additional, vertical series. Consequently—and we take this up more fully in the next section—the identity of such units will also be divided along these two axes.

'Has time flown away? Have I not fallen...into the well of eternity?' 13

This second, vertical dimension to each moment, opens up
the possibility of depth and, experientially, intensity. Let us first look at some of the formulations Nietzsche has given of 'the intensity of the moment'. Writing of the aesthetic moment of 'rapture', Nietzsche says,

'...in this condition one enriches everything out of one's own abundance: what one sees, what one desires, one sees swollen, pressing, strong, overladen with energy...'

he goes on

'...the entire emotional system is alerted and intensified so that it discharges all its powers of representation, imitation, transfiguration, transmutation, every kind of mimicry and playing conjointly...'

And the first account Nietzsche gives of eternal recurrence is the occasion for another account of a 'privileged moment'; (we discuss this at length below, p. ). He imagines a demon suggesting that the 'eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again' and suggests two possible reactions - (a) utter despondency and misery, (b) exhilaration. The latter he puts like this:

'...or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: "You are a god..."?'

and elsewhere he tells of 'attaining' the Ubermensch for one moment and of the immortal 'moment...in which I produced return'.

The question I would like to put is this: how far are we confronted here with a new general account of the moment - and how far only of certain privileged moments? And if the latter in what way is Nietzsche offering a more general revaluation of time? One thing must be true - any 'general account of time' must allow the possibility of these self-expansive moments. But are they special cases or the general rule? Clearly at one level they must be special cases, or they could not exist distinctively, or in contrast eg. to the depressive moments of anguish at the possibility of eternal recurrence. And yet I think it is clear that for Nietzsche they are special in a special sense - they realize
the highest possibility of temporal experience - an intensity\textsuperscript{16a} of vision and/or self-mobilization and affirmation. But what of all the other moments that never achieve this status? Do we not have to accept that they too are part of time, and so we cannot say that Nietzsche's account of time in general is ecstatic and affirmative etc? Should we just say that he offers an ideal way of living (the moment) based on possibilities intermittently realized?

This would not be a dull view. By itself, it would require and justify some sort of existential temporality just to accommodate these peak experiences.

But we cannot rest with this picture, for a number of reasons:

(1) The cosmological version of eternal recurrence has already compromised the idea of time simply as a sequence of distinct moments. The addition of a depth to each moment redirects our attention away from relations of succession towards the possibilities of intensification. When Nietzsche writes of the 'eternity' of the moment, this is not just a reference to its infinite recurrence at other times. The picture we might have of life as a sequence of moments, some high, some low, still depends on giving seriality the last word. Given that model, leaping from peak to peak would correspond more closely to Nietzsche's picture. But Nietzsche does not retain that picture. The variable intensity of the eternally recurring moment constitutes an alternative. We return to this shortly.

(2) There is a second crucial reason why these peak moments are not just different, but privileged in relation to those of the plains or the valleys. Part of what makes for the experience of exhilaration is that they project their own ecstatic affirmative vision onto the rest of time. If we think of time from within the ecstasy of such moments, then those moments that do not actualise this peak possibility simply do not figure. This gives us a way of understanding the eternity of the moment.
('...joy wants the eternity of all things, wants deep, deep, deep
eternity') (in a way quite different from, say, Goethe, and in a way)
that seems to conflict with the supposition that in eternal recurrence,
everything returns, even the meanest. Here we approach Klossowski's
reading of the eternal return as a selective operation.

(3) It is possible to argue that it is not the privilege of peak experiences
that they project their own temporality onto the rest of time. Do not
such experiences as boredom, depression, and self-destructive feelings do
the same. But if they do so there is a major difference. Only this
affirmative rapture wills itself enough to will its own infinite repetition.
Only this total self-affirmation wants itself more and again.

Let us now turn to the role of eternal recurrence in undermining and
displacing the idea of purpose — the transformation of the will.

(b) The transformation of the will

If we consider that structure of action (and the temporality
that underlies it) in which goals are pursued, ideals aimed at ... it
is hard to see it as avoidable, let alone as being flawed in some way.
For Nietzsche, this simple structure — the pursuit of values — very
easily takes a pathological form, which he calls nihilism. For the posit-
ing of ideals — especially those that could never quite be realized —
is a tacit devaluation of this world. Plato, in this sense, is a
nihilist. Similarly, the belief in the perfectibility of man, utopian
thinking, the search for truth, can be seen as valuations of the future,
that, negatively, devalue the present. But the mere recognition of the
negative nature of ordinary human values merely leads to a second stage of
depressive nihilism, in which the world has no value, and there are no
values for it to have. As we shall see, the thought of the eternal
repetition is meant to be able to take this crushing idea to its limit, and in so doing setting a challenge to our attitude to the past. For the will finds in the past an obstacle that it finds impossible to overcome: the past, it seems, is over, is not subject to my will, cannot be changed.

However in the section "Redemption" in *Thus Spake Zarathustra* Nietzsche charts the course of the liberation of the will. In his *What is Called Thinking?* Heidegger devotes some five pages to a discussion of this section, in which, broadly speaking, he tries to show that the will's liberation consists in a triumphant victory over all obstacles by which victory it instates itself unchallenged in the seat of metaphysical subjectivity. 19

Zarathustra speaks to his disciples:

"Will - that is what the liberator and bringer of joy is called: thus I have taught you my friends. But now learn this as well: the will itself is still a prisoner."

Why is it still a prisoner?

"Powerless against that which has been done, the will is an angry spectator of all things past... it cannot break time and time's desire" 20

There follows an account of a sequence of moves the will makes in revenge, as Nietzsche puts it, for this obstacle to its power, concluding with the position we could attribute to Schopenhauer and to Buddhism - 'willing become not-willing'. Zarathustra's comment on this is

"I led you away from these fable-songs when I taught you: "The will is a creator"."

"All "It was" is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful chance - until the creative will says to it: "But I willed it thus"."

"The will that is the will to power must will something higher than any reconciliation - but how shall that happen? Who has taught it to will backwards too?" 21

The question is left unanswered. Zarathustra "looked like a man seized by extremest terror". It will turn out, of course that the Übermensch is the answer to the question.
Our own view is that this sentence: 'the will that is the will to power must will something higher than any reconciliation' - which Heidegger does not to my knowledge allude to (in What is Called Thinking?) poses a difficulty for his reading of Nietzsche's account as a metaphysics of will. What Nietzsche is insisting on is that the aim of this new creative willing is not merely reconciliation to the necessity of time's passing away, but an active affirmation of that fact. The question is whether this affirmative willing can importantly exceed the identity-seeking, reconciling, appropriating gestures characteristic of the rationalizations that had preceded it.22

Clearly this transformation of the will already subverts what I have called 'ordinary motivational time'. We are to will, not just accept, but will, what has been, and the fact that time will continue to pass over into the past. This is an idea it is almost impossible to think. One can accept that it might in theory satisfy the condition of going beyond mere reconciliation, but what can it mean? The idea sticks there, undecidable in terms of our ordinary understanding of willing, and will not go away.

I mentioned before the importance for Nietzsche of a transformation of nihilism - he saw himself as moving beyond nihilism only in his latest work (Ecce Homo). And in this move, we find the greatest challenge to our ordinary understanding of motivation. The thought of eternal recurrence has two faces: a face of terror and a face of exhilaration. The test that eternal recurrence poses is whether one can say yes to it, and transcend terror. 'Courage', Nietzsche writes 'destroys even death, for it says "Was that life? Well then, once more".'23 But the passage I have just been alluding to is Nietzsche's first real announcement of the eternal recurrence.

When one first grasps eternal recurrence all hope is extinguished. Everything incomplete, ill-formed, unwanted etc. will return. But there follows
an expansion 'a tremendous moment' in which one finds oneself strong enough to affirm all this. We learn something, I believe, from Nietzsche's precise words: 'If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are, or perhaps crush you', or 'What does not kill me makes me stronger' - as he wrote in *Twilight of the Idols*.

The idea of eternal recurrence is both a test of one's strength, and also, a source, an inspiration. The demon, on the second reading, is recognized as 'a god'. The idea can 'take possession'. At this most vital point, Nietzsche is taking as seriously as he could the idea that the consequences of believing something are more important than its truth (if indeed they can be distinguished from it). The eternal recurrence may be a trial; it is also a ladder.

But can it really make sense to believe it? In this form? And could it, after all really make any difference, except by a misunderstanding? We have already come across these questions- they are important in their own right, but also for judging whether Nietzsche has really succeeded in displacing the ordinary motivational time we usually take for granted.

There are at least two ways of articulating a critical attitude to the value or significance of eternal recurrence:

1. (as we saw above) that eternal recurrence cannot make any difference because we will never have any memory of past cycles, nor will our actions ever affect future cycles. Indeed it could be said that experientially it makes no difference whether I do this self-same thing once or an infinite number of times, if each time is independent of the other, and each occasion is identical;

2. that it makes an enormous difference, because if the doctrine is true then I have no real possibility of transforming, or transvaluing anything, unless, of course, I have already done so before. This view Nietzsche calls 'Turkish fatalism'.

When one reads commentaries on Nietzsche, and indeed Nietzsche himself, one is given the impression that these questions have sadly 'missed the point'. Two different general responses are offered, which are not, in my view, mutually consistent. The first, Nietzsche's own, which applies both to fatalism, and also to the indifferentism of the first objection, is basically a form of compatibilism.

'The truth is that every man himself is a piece of fate; when he thinks he is stirring against fate in the way described, fate is being realized here, too; the struggle is imaginary, but so is resignation to fate- all these imaginary ideas are included in fate'.

'You yourself, poor frightened man, are the invincible Moira reigning far above the gods...In you the whole future of the
human world is predetermined—it will not help you if you are terrified of yourself,'  *The Wanderer and his Shadow.* But the second explanation of why they are misplaced, involves a further step away from the idea of eternal recurrence as a scientific hypothesis about repetitive cycles. The eternal recurrence is neither a mechanical, nor 'logical!', nor mathematical 'repetition'. Rather it can exercise a *selective* power.

This selectivity can be understood in two different ways: one 'moral' and the other ontological. The first, 'moral' way is the more obvious. On this account, only what can affirm its infinite repetition deserves to return. Clearly such an idea can function as a principle by which one regulates one's words and deeds, a kind of supervilgant conscience. The ability to affirm eternal recurrence is a moral test. Nietzsche clearly offers us this version, but it has its difficulties. It seems to leave open the prospect of a *gap* between what ought to happen and what does. This is especially true if we take seriously the idea that actually *everything*, deserving or not, returns. And the problem is that for Nietzsche, such a gap *invites nihilism.* The second, less obvious way, we will call 'ontological'. On this account, willing eternal recurrence actually does operate as a selective procedure, such that certain events, objects, relations, moments will return and some will not. Clearly this is a significant modification of the original cosmological account of eternal recurrence. And there are clearly difficulties with it. For a start, it undercuts the heroism of the original affirmation that wills the return even of the lowliest and meanest thing. For that would no longer return at all.

There are two rather different ways of thinking through this second alternative. The first would concentrate on such Nietzschean remarks as that the thought of eternal recurrence licenses most men to self-erasure (crushed by 'the greatest weight'). There will be some people who continue who affirm themselves and the world, and some also who do not.
(I take it this can be understood either physically or existentially.)

But here 'continue' is relative to a particular life, and, on the standard version of eternal recurrence, those acts (or conditions) of self-erasure would themselves return eternally just as much as the acts of self-overcoming. And that would surely spoil the story. The second way of pursuing the ontological version of selectivity is not wholly distinct, but conceptually far more subtle.

Deleuze argues that if

(a) we take seriously the idea that eternal recurrence is 'the being of becoming' (as Nietzsche himself claims),

(b) distinguish (as Nietzsche does) between 'active' and 'reactive' (forces) and apply this distinction to kinds of 'becoming' then,

(c) we can say that only 'active becoming' 'has being' in the sense of embodying the principle of eternal recurrence. So

(d) only active becoming returns. Why?

'the eternal return would become contradictory if it were the return of reactive forces'.

The work here is obviously being done by the relation between being and becoming, and we must defer until the next section a proper assessment of this position. What we can say is that in Deleuze we find for the first time an account of how eternal recurrence would function as a selective principle that does not obviously presuppose the ordinary model of time as a succession of point instants. The question we will now pose is this: what understanding can we have of the moment that will allow the return of only those moments which affirm themselves, or perhaps better, in which we affirm ourselves. The clue must lie in a way of thinking of time that leaves seriality behind.
Ontological Time

We have suggested above that the clue to how we can understand 'The moment' in such a way as to allow the return only of those moments in which we affirm ourselves lies in a way of thinking about time that leaves seriality behind. But how is such a thought to be realized? Would we not be trapped in a perpetual present? Consider the following:

1. What is at issue, what is valuable, what is at stake in any experience is always the same - it is the intensity of self-affirmation that it contains. In this sense, other moments, moments that don't make the grade, just don't come into the reckoning.

2. If we ask of 'the moment' whether it is one or many, we find ourselves embroiled in the most difficult thoughts. It is not enough to distinguish qualitative and numerical senses; we are left with, and I think Nietzsche means to leave us with, a genuine 'undecidable'. I would like to spend a little time on this, focussing on a famous passage from Thus Spake Zarathustra ('Of the Vision and the Riddle') in which Nietzsche explains the eternal return in relation to the gateway called 'Moment', where the paths of the infinite past and the infinite future meet. The account proceeds in increasing tones of horror, and then turns to the vision of the shepherd choking on a snake, who bites off its head and is a transformed being... Let us look at the text:

'Then something occurred which lightened me: for the dwarf jumped from my shoulder, the inquisitive dwarf! And he squatted down upon a stone in front of me. But a gateway stood just where we had halted. "Behold this gateway, dwarf!" I went on: "It has two aspects. Two paths come together here: no one has ever reached their end."

"This long lane ahead of us - that is another eternity. They are in opposition to one another, these paths; they abut on one another: and it is here at this gateway that they come together. The name of the gateway is written above it: 'Moment',

"But if one were to follow them further and ever further and further: do you think, dwarf, that these paths would be in eternal opposition?"

"Everything straight lies," murmured the dwarf disdainfully. "All truth is crooked, time itself is a circle."

"Spirit of gravity!" I said angrily, "do not treat this too lightly!.."

"Behold this moment!" I went on.

"From this gateway Moment a long eternal lane runs back: an eternity
lies behing us."
"Must not all things that can run have already run along this lane? Must not all things that can happen have already happened, been done, run past?"
"And if all things have been here before; what do you think of this moment, dwarf? Must not this gateway, too, have been here - before?"
"And are not all things bound fast together in such a way that this moment draws after it all future things? Therefore draws itself too?"

I would like to select three sections of this passage for comment:

(1) 'They are in opposition to each other, these paths...and it is here at this gateway that they come together'.

(2) '...what do you think of this moment, dwarf, Must not this gateway too have been here before? And are not all things bound fast together in such a way that this moment draws after it all future things? Therefore draws itself too?'

(3) 'The name of the gateway is written above it: 'Moment'. '

We first note that the moment is the coming together of two paths (past and future) in opposition. And yet this coming together is not as such a reconciliation, but a tension. It is left to the possibility of eternal recurrence to alleviate their oppositional character. Second, the question of the gateway. When Zarathustra asks 'Must not this gateway, too, have been here before?' is he talking of this particular moment, or is he talking of the moment as the basis of a structure of repetition? What would it be to talk of this moment, to talk of this moment? Nietzsche has already given it metaphorical substantiality by calling it a gateway. And we can suppose that the vertical parts of the gateway will symbolize the vertical dimension of time. But there is a third point.

It is a commonplace of a structuralist view of language to suppose that it has to be understood as comprising two axes - syntagmatic/paradigmatic, metonymic/metaphoric etc. The serial articulations of a word are supplemented by paradigmatic relationships of substitutability - relationships in which substitutions of other words would retain some important feature, same meaning, same grammatical category, still forming
an intelligible sentence etc. Now it might be thought gratuitous to suggest a parallel between the double axis of language, and the double axis of time that eternal recurrence would generate. But consider the sentence

'The name of the gateway is written above it: "Moment".'

At this critical point, Nietzsche introduces not just 'language' but writing. What is the force of this appearance of writing? It is tempting to compare it to that point in the first chapter in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* at which he is demonstrating that the Universal is the truth of sense-certainty. He writes:

'It is as a universal... that we give utterance to sensuous fact. What we say is "this" i.e. the general this... we do not present before our mind in saying so the universal this, or being in general, but we utter what is minimal... language... as we see is the more truthful.'

For Hegel, the moment of language is the moment of universality. Can we say the same of Nietzsche? Is not Nietzsche suggesting that the structure of 'moment' is as independent of any particular experience as is writing of any particular intentional context? Might it not then be that it is precisely the moment that eternally returns the same? But what is the moment? When he writes 'this gateway' should we read it as one or as many? It is tempting to read him as saying there is just one moment, but then we have to add 'which gets repeated'. So there are many.

I would suggest first of all that the moment of writing in Nietzsche as in Hegel's reference to the 'utterance' of 'this' puts in question the presence of consciousness ('We do not present before our mind in saying so the universal this') but unlike Hegel, we are not led to another presence – that of the realm of universality (which will ultimately be subsumed under that general self-presence of Spirit). For Nietzsche, the moment of writing is the moment of undecidability, undecidability, that is, and as always, within the framework that insists on a clear answer to the question – one or many?
We can recall here Nietzsche's suggestion that eternal recurrence is 'the being of becoming', or 'the closest approximation of being in becoming'. Abstractly, it might suggest (and we might conclude) that eternal recurrence is the way the force of becoming is finally betrayed. Becoming, we might say, is the one thing that never changes, and hence embodies the value of permanence, which is the hallmark of Being.

But there is something very strange about such a formulation. 'Becoming is the one thing that never changes' seems like a perfectly intelligible sentence. What if becoming was the greatest threat to all thinking involving an 'is'? The 'approximation' of the becoming of eternal recurrence to being should be read neither as Nietzsche's confession of a new metaphysics, nor as a naive admission of that fact.

Rather the approximation of the becoming of eternal recurrence to being should be seen as a disruptive substitution of an undecidable term into metaphysical discourse. 'Becoming' in Nietzsche functions in the way in which, for example, 'writing' functions in Derrida.34 Becoming is no more in simple opposition to Being than writing (in Derrida's new sense) can be simply opposed to speech.35 The function of eternal recurrence is to allow the reinscription of becoming within the discourse of metaphysics in a way that undermines that discourse.

The point is that becoming demands a quite 'different' logic of identity to that of being.

It is now possible, I think, to distinguish more clearly three quite different functions of eternal recurrence. The first, as I have suggested, undermines the privilege of seriality by introducing, via exact cycles, a vertical depth. The second is to parody the values of a philosophy of being, by providing for every particular a kind of universality. But there is a third function, and that will require yet another thinking through of the meaning of eternal recurrence.36
We have already heard what Nietzsche has to say about the state of rapture as an affirmative projectivity. The Dionysian poet could be said to 'go out of himself', and when Nietzsche discusses the will to power, he says 'it must will something higher than any reconciliation'. In each case the basic structure is one of a self-exceeding which is not appropriated, but which, precisely, risks the self, and does not aim at a higher reconciliation. This, I would argue, is the fundamental structure of the moment for Nietzsche. And corresponding to this futural element of risk is the importance of forgetting; both are aspects of non-appropriative thought.

How is this idea of a self-exceeding that is not appropriated compatible with talk of the eternal recurrence of the same? Doesn't the reference to sameness imply, if not identity, at least a continuity? And is that not precisely what is put in question by an exceeding that does not 'return'?

There is a way of reading this reference to the eternal return of the 'same' that does make sense. We can treat it as a description not of repeated contents of experience, but of the dynamic structure of experience - the rhythm, the pulse of excitement and fatigue, of arousal and consummation, of exhilaration and passivity, of the rising and setting of the passions... It is this movement, the movement of becoming that is repeated eternally. Or, with Deleuze, we can say that it is the returning that returns. But what of our reference to a non-appropriating exceeding, a nonreconciliatory will? Surely the point is that sameness is not what is repeated, not what returns, but, again, is constituted by that return. The 'return to self' operates without a self, is the self. Sameness is this eternal recurrence. Eternal recurrence is the condition of and not merely the extension or prolongation of sameness.

I now want to return to the question with which I began - whether Nietzsche's thought is another kind of philosophy of presence or whether
he might be said to have exceeded the parameters of that framework.
Without wanting to claim to have mastered the complexities of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, it is worth reminding ourselves that Heidegger does claim that Nietzsche's philosophy is in this way metaphysical. The will that wills the past, that affirms all that has been and which is then able to will 'the eternal return of the same' is, he says

'The supreme triumph of the metaphysics of the will that eternally wills its own willing', 41
This will to power is interpreted as a form — the highest form — of subjectivity, of self-presence. But surely everything could turn on how we think of the moment?

If Nietzsche's account of the moment renders its relation to the question 'one or many' undecidable, and if the ecstatic moment can be treated not as an exception, but simply as the highest possibility of intensification of experience, and if the realization of that possibility is, as I believe it is for Nietzsche, the essence (ie. non-essence) of time, there surely is a case for saying that Nietzsche's thought here at least aims beyond presence and self-presence. Everything hangs on our being able to accept the idea that
(a) a general description can be given of the various accounts Nietzsche gives of the intensities of a moment, and
(b) that this description is that of a willing/thinking/affirming beyond, that does not aim at its own preservation, but risks itself perpetually, a going out that, even as it anticipates a return, puts in question what it is that will be returned to.

If this is not Nietzsche's thought, Nietzsche must be far less important than he is supposed. What I would accept — and this remark is not meant as a retreat — is that, as Derrida might say, deconstructive theses coexist in Nietzsche with those that remain inscribed within metaphysics.
Reading Heidegger reading Nietzsche: an interim report

Clearly a challenge is being posed here to Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, and we devote this last section to an elaboration of that challenge. We continue to draw on the work of Deleuze to that end. Unlike Heidegger, he sees the concepts of Will to Power and Eternal Recurrence as successfully deconstructing the matrix of metaphysical conceptuality. And it must be with Heidegger in mind that he writes

'We misinterpret the expression "eternal return" if we understand it as "return of the same".' 42

To readers of Derrida, his argument will be familiar, although the direction it gives to the thought of the eternal recurrence is new. He writes

'The synthetic relation of the moment to itself as present, past and future grounds its relation to other moments. The eternal return is thus an answer to the problem of passage.' (ibid)

We shall return to discuss this passage (together with "The Vision and the Riddle") shortly. He continues

'And in this sense it must not be interpreted as the return of something that is, that is "one", or the "same". We misinterpret the expression "eternal return" if we understand it as "return of the same".' (ibid)

We must prepare ourselves for an inversion:

'It is not being that returns but rather the returning itself that constitutes being insofar as it is affirmed of becoming, and of that which passes. It is not some one thing which returns but rather returning itself is the one thing which is affirmed of diversity or multiplicity. In other words, identity in eternal return does not describe the nature of that which returns but, on the contrary, the fact of returning for that which differs. This is why the eternal return must be thought of as a synthesis, a synthesis of time and its dimensions, a synthesis of diversity, and its reproduction...'(ibid) (our emphasis).

Derrida's position seems very similar here. He wrote

'And on the basis of this unfolding of the same as differance we see announced the sameness of differance and repetition in the eternal return.' 43

For both Deleuze and Derrida the key underlying idea is that identity is not a fixed point we need to presuppose for differences to be possible; matters are rather the other way round. And the possibility that a thing
can appear again and again at different times is what gives it an identity; it is not dependent on it having a prior atemporal identity. Time, then, is not only constitutive of identity, rather than a mere medium in which things unfold, but itself constituted by its role in supporting identities and differences. But even if we cannot in any simple way say 'what' it is that returns, independently of its returning, there are still questions that need answering. Perhaps I can put my disquiet like this: when Deleuze talks of 'the returning itself that constitutes being' is he talking here in fact of Being or beings? Is he referring to Time itself, or to things in time? I take it that Nietzsche fairly plainly talks about things in time, or if not things at least events, configurations of forces. And yet if we take seriously these remarks of Deleuze, eternal return is being interpreted as the ground of 'time itself'.

It may or may not be possible to square this with any account of the return of particular (especially non-human) beings, but it would certainly suggest that, yet again, eternal recurrence is functioning as a device for the deconstruction of time - here time seen as the locus of identity.

Here, Deleuze raises explicitly the question with which we began - that of presence. I suggested at the outset that Nietzsche might perhaps have offered an account of the present, and indeed of time based on the present, that was not subject to Heidegger's (or to Derrida's) criticisms. The vital question will undoubtedly be the status of becoming in Nietzsche. Let us now begin to open up this question.

Heidegger's verdict on Nietzsche is rather different from that of either Deleuze or Derrida:

(a) Heidegger quotes Nietzsche's remark that 'everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of Becoming to one of Being - peak of meditation' and comments

'with his doctrine of eternal return, Nietzsche in his way thinks nothing else than the thought that pervades the whole of western philosophy'.
Why? Because he thinks Being as Time without thinking it as the question of Being.

'Eternity, not as a static "now", nor as a sequence of "nows" rolling off into the infinite, but as the "now" that bends back into itself: what is that if not the concealed essence of Time? Thinking Being, Will to Power, as eternal return, thinking the most difficult thought of philosophy means thinking Being as Time'.

So, Nietzsche does not think of the question of Being (and Time). But might one not justly respond that the thought of eternal return is a continuous questioning, that to use such an idea as an explication of time as Becoming, is to lodge a question as deep as possible into the heart of time. It may be that when understood as 'the mere bending back of the "now"' the eternal return no longer had that disturbing undecidability that we have consistently noted, but perhaps that is a deficiency in Heidegger's reading. Might not Deleuze be right to query Heidegger's reading of eternal return as (always) eternal return of the same?

(b) Our second source is What is Called Thinking?

'...the answer Aristotle gave to the question of the essential nature of time still governs Nietzsche's idea of time'.

We have already alluded to his argument: that Nietzsche's use of a transvaluing will to affirm the past betrays a traditional valuation of Being (including the 'Being' of time) as present. Our response, we may recall, was to say that he took no account of Nietzsche's reference to a will that did not seek 'reconciliation' - that Heidegger was refusing the radicality of Nietzsche's affirmative willing.

Finally, I would like to suggest a way of reading Heidegger on Nietzsche, one that draws on some of the ambiguities in the notion of authenticity that we noted in our long discussion of Heidegger's Being and Time (vide supra). In our discussion of authenticity, we noted tendencies towards closure (for example, the idea that one's 'ownmost possibilities' could ever be anything more than a question) and tendencies
that would preclude such a closure, such as references to anxiety, the abyss, and throwness. I would like to show that this tension between these two motifs is not just found generally in Being and Time, but is found specifically connected with the question of that ongoing rupturing of selfhood that I have associated with the Nietzschean moment. Even more interestingly, Heidegger offers us, within the space of a few lines, though without posing it as a problem, the very question that is most pressing — how to understand this 'rupturing' in terms of Being. Finally, he does this at one of the very few places at which he invokes the name (in brackets!) of Nietzsche. These are the sentences in question:

1. 'Anticipation discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility lies in giving itself up, and thus it shatters all one's tenaciousness to whatever existence one has reached.'

What is this 'giving itself up' ('Selbstaufgabe')? Is it just death in the narrow sense, or is it not precisely the risking of all one is and has known? How does Heidegger continue? Doesn't he temper the radicality of the suggestion he has just made?

2. 'In anticipation, Dasein guards itself against falling back behind itself and behind the potentiality for Being which it has understood. It guards itself against "becoming too old for its victories". (Nietzsche). (ibid).

The important thing here is how we understand 'falling back behind oneself' and the 'potentiality for Being' (which it has understood).

These remarks can be given a direct Nietzschean interpretation — the 'understanding of Being' which it has understood is of course not a self to which one clings, but, I would suggest, a grasp of the sense and responsibility of the 'intensity' of experience. The problem about 'not falling back' is the same problem as that of selectivity'. Only what can will its own return can/should return.

The clear Nietzschean influence here suggests what will seem obvious when stated — that we would be wise not to divorce Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche from his continuing attempts at a self-interpretation.
We would like to have shown that if we suppose that the model of Dionysian excess provides a standard by which to measure the intensity of the moment, and if that excess is a non-recuperable rupture with all 'presence', then Nietzsche's 'moment', so far from being the reworking of the metaphysical value of presence, is the scene of its explosion. But is that what we should conclude about Nietzsche? Does he achieve the magical result of a non-metaphysical philosophy of the present? Perhaps matters are not quite so clear cut. What he does do, I believe, is to force us to make a distinction between two levels at which we can understand the meaning of 'presence' as a metaphysical value. The first we might in modern terms call foundationalist, and the second we could call appropriative. To each corresponds a different stratum of that mode of textual inscription that Derrida insists makes for metaphysics. By foundationalist, I mean a kind of thinking that reduces to or derives from one fundamental point the entire developed structure of some theoretical field. Arguably, Nietzsche does this at least in a formal, and perhaps only strategic way, if we are right in giving the moment the status we have. Nonetheless we could say, in Levinasian language, that for Nietzsche, time, in the shape of this 'moment' is an opening onto the other, onto otherness, onto what may never be appropriated, made identical, brought back. Here Nietzsche does break with the second characterisation we have given of the metaphysical value associated with presence. Nietzsche, on this reading would be a non-appropriative foundationalist.

This characterisation brings back the question we raised when discussing whether Nietzsche's was a special or a general theory. And for all the value of seeing the ecstatic moment as an ideal, it surely does not actually capture the general structure of time. It is precisely
because it does not that it can function as an ideal. And what that suggests is that we may learn more about the possibilities of exceeding metaphysics from the non-appropriative stratum of his thinking than from its foundationalism.
NOTES for Introduction


2. This view of metaphysics and its determination of the history of philosophy is shared in broad outline by Derrida and Heidegger, and will be discussed in a critical way below.

3. The presuppositions of unity and continuity in the idea of tradition will be discussed in the course of the thesis.

4. It is only for the sake of simplicity of presentation that we assume for the moment that there is only concept of time.

5. See our (unpublished) manuscript: "The Status of Textual Temporality".

6. The precise sense of 'critical' here will emerge later. It is closer to the Kantian sense of 'critique' than to any negative sense of criticism, but it cannot be identified with the Kantian sense.


9. Æ, "The Task of Destroying the History of Ontology".
1. This is mostly closely matched by Husserl's 'lebendige Gegenwart' (living present), and was illuminated as a value central to the history of metaphysics (i.e. Western philosophy) by Heidegger (variously as Praesenz, Anwesenheit, Gegenwart), and then again by Derrida. See later chapters.

2. The drying up of the well-springs of philosophical thought was itself only a symptom of a culture-wide crisis for which phenomenology was to be the cure. Husserl suggests this evangelical point of view at both ends of his career. See Philosophy As a Rigorous Science (1911) and his The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936).

3. Although Heidegger made this distinction (eigentlich/uneigentlich) central to his Being and Time, it was important to Husserl too: 'since authentic experience, i.e. the intuitive and ultimately adequate, provides the standard for the evaluation of experience, the phenomenology of "authentic" experience is especially required.' (Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (hereafter PITO), p. 28)

4. The stabilization of meaning through language is an important theme for Husserl (see eg. his Origin of Geometry 1966, and our discussion in the next chapter), but this is regulative rather than a creative or productive phenomenon as it would be for one such as Nietzsche.


6. A version of such a reduction can be found in a paper by Y Bar-Hillel.


8. For such a version of such a general anti-foundationalism see Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature Blackwell 1980.


10. This statement is meant to mark a position in what has become known as the 'end of metaphysics' debate that has arisen from the work of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida and was much discussed in the late 1960's. Are such interventions really of any avail? I would accept that they can be confusing. If we compare, for example, Kant's discussion (B21-23, First Critique) of how metaphysics as science is possible, we can find him castigating a use of reason that transcends the limits of its proper application as dogmatic metaphysics. We
are generalizing that ideal of adequacy, while jettisoning the ideal of philosophy (or metaphysics) as a science. Our suggestion that 'metaphysics' should be understood as a blindness to the question of limits rather than as having recourse to the value of 'presence' has the merit of releasing experience from the demand that it perform an impossible (foundational) task, all by itself. 'Presence' is indeed an illusion if seen as an absolute origin or foundation, but that experience can both at the time and on reflection seem to have this value, that 'presence' is phenomenally real, is not an illusion, but a fact. What we have to assess are the limits of its significance where none were once even suspected.

11. It might be thought that Husserl's emphasis on the descriptive aspect of phenomenology would make the reference to this theory of time inappropriate. My reply would be four-fold: (i) while he does write all the time of his 'analysis' of time-consciousness, when he discusses Brentano's account of time, he uses the terms 'analysis' and 'theory' interchangeably, (ii) he is quite happy writing of his 'theory' of noetic/noematic structures at a point at which phenomenological description is still to the fore (Ideas sect. Ill ch. 4), (iii) if we were to conclude that Husserl is not offering a theory of time, I think it could only be because the term 'theory' was inapplicable in principle to an account of time, not that Husserl had not gone that far. Certainly none of the other 'interesting' ways in which one might study time that he enumerates (PITC, §1 "The Exclusion of Objective Time" pp. 22-3) could more suitably wear the mantle 'theory of time', (iv) finally, there is an important and straightforward sense in which his 'analysis of time-consciousness' is, or is part of, a 'theory of time' in that he wants to argue that our grasp of the 'Objectivity of time' is predicated on internal time-consciousness.

12. Of course these alternatives might be quite distinct. One might, eg. come to credit 'intuition' with pride of place as a hypothesis - generating procedure, while giving it no value whatsoever as an epistemological foundation. Yet interestingly, Popper, to whom one might attribute such a view, does speak of the continuing need to 'clarify' the 'foundations' (of differential and integral calculus). See Conjectures and Refutations RKP, 4th (revised) edition, 1972 p. 70.

13. It is precisely here that Heidegger can be seen to have diverged from Husserl. For Heidegger this is no mere formal or even methodological circle, but one with a vital ontological dimension, in which the preliminary considerations are seen as both rooted in our existence, and fore-shadowing the later reflexive elaboration. See his Being and Time §68f and the discussion of phenomenological method in the Introduction, especially §7(C).

14. It would perhaps be stretching the point to describe Derrida as being to Husserl what Gödel was to Hilbert, and yet...

15. Thus in Philosophy as a Rigorous Science Husserl attributes the confusion in mathematics and physics in the early 20th century to a failure to adequately (= intuitively) ground their basic concepts.
What he was clearly not prepared to accept is that it was precisely the status of such intuitive foundations that was in crisis.

16. See note 10 above.

17. Ideas section IV ch. 2, §136f.

18. After analysis into simple truths, 'what I have to do is to run over them all repeatedly in my mind, until I pass so quickly from the first to the last that practically no step is left to the memory, and I seem to view the whole all at the same time'. Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule XI.

19. This involves transforming 'consciousness' from an adjectival form qualifying a particular type of worldly existence to being an independent field of investigation with only contingent worldly embodiment. Husserl's precise position on the authonomy of consciousness underwent certain shifts as his thought developed. The following three positions seem to stand out of an undoubtedly more complex picture:
   i. (Logical Investigations and first decade of 20th C.). The shift to studying the formations of consciousness could be described as purely methodological, without commitment to the existential autonomy of consciousness.
   ii. (Ideas and after) Husserl talks of the realm/sphere of transcendental subjectivity as logically prior to any positing of the existence of an 'objective' world. See eg. Ideas §46 (p. 145) "I myself or my experience in its actuality am absolute Reality, given through a positing that is unconditioned and simply indissoluble", and §49 (p. 151) "the Being of consciousness, of every stream of experience generally, though it would indeed be inevitably modified by a nullifying of the thing-world, would not be affected thereby in its own proper existence".
   iii. Crisis of European Sciences (1936) Husserl attempts to correct the worldlessness of the 'reduced' ego in Ideas, introducing the idea of the 'life-world' as the complex worldly involvement that all our philosophical activity takes for granted. See for example §44f.

20. 'no direct experience can ever deceive the understanding if it restricts its attention accurately to the object presented to it, just as it is given to it either at first-hand or by means of an image; and if it moreover refrains from judging ... for in ... judgements we are exposed to error'. Rules for the Direction of the Mind Rule XI (in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, vol. 1, trans. Haldane & Ross, Cambridge, 1911 p. 44.

21. A science of necessary truths, established with certainty and clarity. Kant had used the term before Husserl.

22. It might be thought that echoes, or at least parallels to Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of a logically private language are to be found here. But perhaps oddly, I think Husserl would not disagree with Wittgenstein. The intuitive adequacy my words ideally have to me is a private but not an idiosyncratic relationship. Such privacy is a condition of significance logically generalizable to all other language users.
Husserl's solution, much discussed by Derrida, is to separate two forms of such 'clothing' - indication and expression. In the latter, such problems of adequacy are supposed to disappear. Derrida claims indication is ineliminable. See discussion below (ch. 3).

2. Even though this is not the place for a discussion of the varieties of hermeneutic theory, it ought to be said that even within 'hermeneutics' there are considerable differences of opinion as to its scope and its basis. Broadly speaking, one may distinguish those for whom hermeneutics is a supplementary method of 'scientific' inquiry, specially adapted for the human sciences - a view derived from Dilthey, and continued by Betti and Hirsch, and those for whom it has an ontological significance, in which the main question to be answered is always man's relation to Being. This latter track we associate more with Heidegger and Gadamer. (See R. E. Palmer's Hermeneutics, ch. 4)

3. Even Husserl's own discussion of the Absolute Flux, developed especially in section III of PITC marks within the text itself a limit to the phenomenology of time because it suggests that time-consciousness is itself founded on a more fundamental flux to which temporal predicates are at best only analogically or imperfectly applicable. Does this mark the point at which the phenomenology of time deconstructs itself?

4. Freud of course claims (in his account of the Dreamwork) that the unconscious is oblivious to both logic and time, but might it not be a particular kind of time that it ignores? (After all in talking about dream-interpretation he tells us that we must be on the look out for temporal inversions, sequences, for example, which begin with their conclusion). Husserl's answer to this possibility can be deduced from Fink's brief Appendix VIII to The Crisis of European Sciences... "On the Problem of the Unconscious". He claims that for Husserl, the common (including the Freudian) understanding of the unconscious rests on a naive (i.e. pre-phenomenological) understanding of consciousness. The concept of the unconscious can only function adequately at all after the phenomenological clarification of 'consciousness'. This seems a reasonable claim, but is it compatible with the radical (Freudian) claim that phenomenological clarification of the unconscious helps us to see just why and how consciousness is merely a layer floating on top of it, like froth?

5. We gratefully acknowledge a general scholarly debt to two previous commentators in particular: John Brough (especially his "The Emergence of an absolute consciousness in Husserl's Early Writings on Time-Consciousness", Man and World, vol. 5 No. 3 Aug. 72) and Robert Sokolowski (in particular The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution (esp. Ch. 11) The Hague, Nijhoff 1964.

(1893-1917) Nijhof, The Hague 1966, published as vol. X of the Husserliana. It already contains quite as much as we need to grasp the character of his thinking about time—indeed there is already considerable repetition in the shorter version; it is also the manuscript with which, as editor, Heidegger was most familiar, the one that is commonly referred to in the literature, and the one to which Derrida in his Speech and Phenomena (see below, ch. III) refers to.

7. Sokolowski, op. cit. p. 75 n. 3.

8. He goes some way towards this in Ø33.


10. William James in his Principles of Psychology (1890) endorses this view of time, attributing the phrase to E.R. Clay. See vol. 1 p. 609.

11. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, Penguin, p. 50

12. 'If we now again take up the question of whether a retentional consciousness that is not the continuation of an impressional consciousness is thinkable, we must say that it is impossible, for every retention in itself refers back to an impression'. It is just such a logical impossibility that Derrida 'braves' (or perhaps 'flaunts') in his term 'trace', which is, in effect, a retention of what has never been present. See below p.

13. "in primary remembrance I see what is past" Ø13, p. 56.

14. By 'presentification' Husserl means a reproductive (i.e. non-originary, non-self-giving) mode of givenness.

15. "In mere phantasy there is no positing of the reproduced now and no coincidence of this now with one given in the past" Ø23, p. 74.

16. Within an experimental psychological setting, for all its alien conceptuality, it has been shown that ability to recall number sequences is considerably dependent on whether sub-groupings of numbers are made use of by the subject. These enormously expand one's power, and might well take the form of spontaneous glancings......

17. Our point in bringing out the dual way in which Husserl is operating here is ultimately to suggest that the foundationalist ambition of phenomenology— to provide for philosophy (and indeed for Western thought and culture, if Husserl's Philosophy as a Rigorous Science is to be believed) a new grounding, cannot be thought of as being totally reconstructive. Very many rational principles and procedures and schemas are taken for granted, and
it is not enough to say that they can, one by one, be scrutinized, because they are not independent of one another, as such a strategy would require. Husserl takes for granted not just the existence, but the value of concepts like 'unity', 'reliability', 'identity' 'genuineness', 'authenticity', 'certainty', the part/whole relationship, form/content etc., even at the very point at which he subjects such concepts to a phenomenological elucidation. What is then in question is not necessarily Husserl's procedure, but his claim as to its status. He believes it is possible to 'begin again', to put all previous philosophy in brackets, to immunize oneself against history. But it may turn out that a much more plausible view would present phenomenology as a procedure that always and only can work with and from what is already given, with strictly limited powers of radical recommencement.

18. Derrida's name for this field of operation is 'presence'.

19. Our language here is reminiscent of that of Strawson in his Individuals. There are strong affinities between Strawson's Kantian position and that of Husserl on both time and experience. The chief difference is that for Husserl the necessary independent temporal series is constituted subjectively.

20. Brough's "The Emergence of an Absolute Consciousness in Husserl's Early Writings on Time-Consciousness", from which our title page quotation is drawn, is a paper to which we referred at the beginning of this chapter. It supplies one of the best accounts of the moves that lead Husserl to posit an Absolute Flux. See Brough (1972).

21. Brough interestingly notes Husserl's shift from 'now-consciousness' to 'primal impression' at this point in his discussion. We may perhaps link this shift to what could be called Husserl's deconstruction of the 'now', as we discussed it above (circa 25).

22. This reader, at least, finds it curious that when this problem re-appears in Appendix VI (p. 154), "self-constitution" is not proposed as a way of avoiding infinite regress. He seems to be concerned that reflection inevitably objectifies absolute flux, and so makes it something temporal and in need of constitution. Abstaining from actual reflection leaves the possibility unaffected, and the possibility is sufficient to keep the regress problem alive. His concluding remarks suggest he has not solved the problem.

23. One important point to realize about 'retention' which allows it to play its part in Absolute Flux, is brought out very clearly in Appendix IX. In particular, retention is not an act; it does not objectify. It is an intentionality. It is not an act because that would be 'an immanent unity of duration constituted in a series of retentional phases' (and that would be a confusion of levels).

The act of apprehension qua objectifying consciousness is not the same as primal impression. For the act of apprehension is a unity of some sort.

Retention is a condition for becoming aware of the original
impressional consciousness, but that is itself a consciousness, not something requiring retention to bring it out. This all suggests the possibility of talking about an 'unconscious' and Husserl's important rejection of this idea we shall quote in full:

'It is certainly an absurdity to speak of a content of which we are "unconscious", one of which we are conscious only later. Consciousness is necessarily consciousness in each of its phases. Just as the retentional phase was conscious of the preceding one without making it an object, so also are we conscious of the primal datum - namely in the specific form of the "now" without its being objective ... were this consciousness not present, no retention would be thinkable, since retention of a content of which we are not conscious is impossible'. (p. 162)

These remarks, as we shall see, have had some notable readers. Sartre's account of pre-reflective (self-) consciousness would seem to be modelled on it, and Derrida, (who also quotes this passage, see Speech and Phenomena p. 63) brings it into critical focus.

It might, finally be worth quoting someone else, who most likely never read these words of Husserl, though he could be read as referring to them:

'To most people who have had a philosophical education the idea of anything mental which is not also conscious is so inconceivable that it seems to them absurd and refutable simply by logic .... They have never studied hypnosis or dreams' [Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id p. 10 Hogarth Press 1949].

24. These remarks might be compared with the following: 'the existence of what is transitory passes away in time, but not time itself. Time (is) itself non-transitory, and abiding ...'. Kant is here drawing parallels between time and substance, insofar as each are non-transitory. It is perhaps such a parallel that allows Husserl to generate an account of transcendental subjectivity that will displace the idea of an absolute self-constituting flux. Transcendental subjectivity gives a substantialist interpretation of the timelessness of the form of the flux. We could add that in Appendix VI, Husserl talks of the flux as 'abiding' (Verbleibendes) and adds that what is abiding above all is 'the formal structure of the flux, the form of the flux ... an abiding form (which) however, supports the consciousness of a continuous change'. from his Critique of Pure Reason ('Schematism' B 183).
NOTES for Part One, Chapter Three


2. It might be thought that the obvious word to use here would be 'critique'. But while Derrida's readings are clearly 'critical' in a number of senses, including 'historically momentous', 'discerning', and 'careful', he has taken pains to dissociate deconstruction from the negative (or indeed positive) implications of 'critique'.

3. See below, (Part III ch.2) for a discussion of the status of 'differance'.

4. See Part III, 2(B), "Style and Strategy at the Limits of Philosophy: Heidegger and Derrida".

5. R. Rorty, in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature suggests that the risk any 'edifying' philosopher runs is that of having one's work transformed into a 'systematic' form. This possibility is surely the counterpart to the possibility of a deconstructive self-unravelling latent in any theoretical text. Perhaps such 'systematization' should not so much be deplored as treated as a valuable index of decline in the 'edifying' power of the original text, and one that is rooted in possibilities necessarily contained in every text, however eccentrically transgressive.

6. Derrida's arguments in this book could be seen to reformulate the criticisms made by French existentialists of the Husserlian project of phenomenological reduction, which similarly attempts to exclude what cannot be excluded, namely 'the world'. Merleau-Ponty's version, somewhat different from Sartre's - that the reduction is a proper part of philosophical method, but can never be completed (see the Preface to his Phenomenologie de la Perception) converges with Husserl's own eventual position. The relationship between Sartre and Derrida is surely worth pursuing. (Derrida has only rarely mentioned Sartre and has seemed touchy about the subject ('Is this an interview about Sartre?') see 'Interview with Derrida' in Derrida and Differance ed. Wood and Bernasconi, Parousia Press, 1984). An excellent start can be found in Christina Howells' "Qui Perd Gagne: Sartre and Derrida", JESP vol. 13 No. 1, 1982.


9. This strategy has previously been announced in the shadows of a footnote, from which we here quote

In affirming that perception does not exist or that what is called perception is not primordial, that somehow every-
thing 'begins' by 're-presentation' (a proposition which can only be maintained by the elimination of these last two concepts: it means that there is no 'beginning' and that the 're-presentation' we were talking about is not the modification of a 're-' that has befallen a primordial presentation) and by reintroducing the difference involved in 'signs' at the core of what is 'primordial', we do not retreat from the level of transcendental phenomenology towards either an 'empiricism' or a 'Kantian' critique of the claim of having primordial intuition; we are here indicting the prime intention – and the ultimate scope – of the present essay.' (La Voix et le Phenomene p. 50, n. 1, ET p. 45 n. 4)

What these remarks leave open – perhaps deliberately, is whether there is any retreat at all from transcendental phenomenology. Derrida will continue to make many of its moves while denying certain of their vital implications.


12. The question of whether or not we ought 'in the last analysis' to treat these relationships (as inverted by Derrida) as 'constitutive' ones is, as we shall discuss later, quite crucial. We will argue that the philosophical strength of Derrida's arguments rests on their being transcendental arguments that contest the direction of constitution. To accept the 'sous rature', Derrida's denial of their being transcendental arguments, is to render their course uncompelling. Moreover we claim that the orientation to a transcendental level (albeit now formulated in terms of presence and absence) is such as to impede the development of a positive alternative understanding of time. Instead we are left with the emptiness of terms in which the varieties of representation (and hence of the invasion of presence by representation) are lost. See the end of this chapter, and below, Part III.

13. See especially Derrida's long footnote (p.94, ET p. 84, fn. 9).

14. See our discussion ch. 11 of above.

15. For a discussion of the broader issues involved here – the interconnection between philosophical strategy and the limits of language, with its consequences for our discussion of temporality, see below, Part III, ch.2(B) "Style and Strategy at the Limits of Philosophy: Heidegger and Derrida").

16. See, for example, David Krell's "Engorged Philosophy" in Derrida and Difference, ed. Wood and Bernasconi, Parousia Press, 1984, as well as a major forthcoming work on the subject (personal communication).

17. The two chapters are "... Ce dangereux supplement" and "Du supplement

19. Further investigation of Rousseau reveals that the issue is not so simple. Rousseau after all has taken up writing because of the way in which, in speech, in the immediacy of social interaction, he constantly misrepresents himself. He is forced into positions in which he says things he does not mean. Far better to write, when one can give considered thought to one's words. From this point of view, writing helps us to restore presence; culture comes to the aid of nature.

But equally, Rousseau sees writing as a threat. For it can easily be seen as a distortion of what is natural, a mere technique added to natural speech, which threatens to displace it. This theme of the two-fold sense of the supplement as completing an original presence, and as a substitute that threatens it, is apparently repeated over and over again in Rousseau, usually centring on the nature/culture opposition, and it underlies his account of education.

20. Compare, for instance, Nietzsche's account of reversals in the cause/effect relation, in his Götzen Dammerung (1889) (Twilight of the Idols) ("The Four Great Errors").
Notes to Introduction (Part II)

1. We here correct the Macquarrie and Robinson translation, which for some reason has 'unity' instead of 'temporality' for Zeitlichkeit.


5. See Being and Time part II ch.5 n.xxx (H432-3)

6. in Marques de la Philosophie; (Margins of Philosophy)


12. see Time and Being (1962)


15. Notethat at the very moment at which Being is crossed out, Heidegger stresses that man is far from being excluded from Being.

16. Heidegger makes a great deal of the word 'as' and has a long discussion of the 'as' in understanding, interpretation etc. (H150f)


20. This position is given a more more positive form in the idea of the hermeneutic circle. See esp. H314-5.

21. See his very difficult first chapter of Ideas (1913) "Fact and Essence".

22. 'This is a productive logic - in the sense that it leaps ahead, as it were, into some area of Being, discloses it for the first time in the constitution of its Being, and after thus arriving at the structures within it, makes these available to the positive sciences as transparent assignments for their enquiry.' (H10)

23. Heidegger distinguishes the term 'existentzal' (existential) and 'existentziell' (existentiell). We follow him in using this terminology, and yet will question his ability to keep these two separate. His most explicit account of the difference can be found in H12-13. The existentiell relates to an ongoing understanding of oneself in terms of one's possibilities of existence. The 'existential refers to an analytical or theoretical study of the structure of existence. The 'existential' presupposes the 'existentiell'

24. op. cit. n.19

25. See "Die Sprache" (1950) (trans. as "Language") in Unterwegs zur Sprache op. cit. supra n.17 (E.T.p.190)

26. 'Provisionally' because for Heidegger the historical is already existential, and vice versa (see esp. his II.ch.V 'Temporality and Historicity'.)

27. See Nietzsche's The Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life (1874) (see Bibliography).

28. Again, see Being and Time II.ch.V (seen n26 above).


30. See his Basic Problems of Phenomenology op. cit. supra (n.4)

31. II.ch.6 n.xxx (H432-433). This is the footnote alluded to in the sub-title of Derrida's "Ousia and Grammê" (see n.6 above).

32. op. cit. supra (see n.29)


NOTES to Part Two Chapter One

1. Wittgenstein begins his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922) with the now famous lines: 'Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist. Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht die Dinge'.

2. The parallel with Hegel here must not be missed. For Hegel, Spirit has to make the detour of historical articulation. And to the extent that the parallel holds, we can ask of Heidegger the question that has often been put to Hegel: does not the need for the detour presuppose the validity of the destination? It is quite true that self-understanding, self-knowledge or self-appropriation are not available to immediacy. But is there not a danger that the articulation of modes of mediation will only reinforce the value of the ideal, rather than put it in question. The scheme of Heidegger's thought is surely such as to warrant our questioning. It is because everydayness is only the necessary mediation of our authenticity that the danger of losing oneself in it arises. But what if the very value of selfhood and hence authenticity itself were ultimately bound up with a philosophy of identity that after Heidegger we have come to call metaphysical?

3. We refer of course to the English translators of *Being and Time*. They offer this geometrical analogy on p. 185 n. 1.

4. See our unpublished manuscript *Philosophy and Metaphor* in which these claims are discussed in more detail.

5. 'To any willing there belongs something willed, which has already made itself definite in terms of a "for-the-sake-of-which". If willing is to be possible ontologically, the following items are constitutive for it: (1) the prior disclosedness of the "for-the-sake-of-which" in general (Being-ahead-of-itself); (2) the disclosedness of something with which one can concern oneself (the world as the "wherein" of Being-already); (3) Dasein's projection of itself understandingly upon a potentiality-for-Being towards a possibility of the entity 'willed'. (H194)
Notes to Chapter Two

1. No general account of Derrida's reading of Heidegger could dispense with the idea of a double reading. He acknowledges Heidegger's enormous achievements at the boundary of philosophy and non-philosophy and yet will maintain that Heidegger's is perhaps the most powerful rearguard action in defense of 'presence'. (See Positions) Derrida's treatment of Heidegger in De la Grammatology is perhaps exemplary. Therea critical reading is progressively deepened by a series of defences of Heidegger against prematurely negative diagnoses.


3. This is also of course the title of an essay of Heidegger's (1959) trans. by J.M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund as "Memorial Address" in Discourse on Thinking New York: Harper and Row, 1966.

4. He seems to be arguing for what Ryle in his Concept of Mind (perhaps not uninfluenced by Heidegger) called a 'category mistake'—although Heidegger would say that what is at stake is not a distinction between one category and another, but rather between a category and an existentiale. An interesting general account of the Ryle/Heidegger relationship can be found in Michael Murray's "Heidegger and Ryle: Two Versions of Phenomenology" in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy ed. M. Murray, New Haven and London: Yale U.P. 1978.

5. See his L'Etre et le Néant Paris: Gallimard, 1943 (Being and Nothingness London: Methuen, 1957) See Part IV ch.1 section E. "My Death".

6. Many distinctions need to be made here—most notably between two senses of possibility. We can distinguish (1) the case in which it seems on the basis of others' longevity and their successful conquest of fatal disease and replacement of organs that no-one has to die. We may be immortal, but we cannot be sure—no-one has (or ever will) live 'for ever'. Inductive immortality; (2) We believe that death is no longer necessary, but it might nonetheless be hard to avoid some fatal accident. Immortality bar accident.

7. The OED gives us much food for thought here: 'exuberant' a.1503 (ad L. exuberantum, exuberare, f. ex+uberare to be fertile,f. uber adj. conn. w. uber udder) 1. Luxuriantly fertile or prolific; abundantly productive. Also fig.1645.2. Growing or produced in superabundance 1513 3. Overflowing, as a fountain etc.1678. Also fig.1503.'


9. See his Totality and Infinity, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 1969. eg. IV,F "(Patrality and Fraternity): 'The I breaks free from itself in paternity without thereby ceasing to be an I, for the I is its son' (p.278).


13. We might suggest a critical allusion here to Kierkegaard's discussion of a 'Power' in his Sickness Unto Death, New York: Anchor, 1954.

14. If man were to be his own ground, the second kind of despair he distinguishes—'despairingly willing to be oneself' would not be possible. Op. cit. supra n. 13. Kierkegaard seems to ignore the possibility that this despair might simply be unfounded, based on an error.

15. This may have other implications. It may for example be thought to provide some basic answer to the question with which other philosophers have wrestled: Why be good? or Why ought we do our duty?

16. Of course many others now make this point.

17. Death has been understood as 'the possibility of the impossibility of existence', and this transformation of the future into a 'toward-which' might seem to betray a certain denial of the reality of death rather than taking it seriously. Does he not say:

'When, in anticipation, resoluteness has caught up (Eingeholt) the possibility of death into its potentiality-for-Being, Dasein's authentic existence can no longer be outstripped (uberholt) by anything.' H 307


19. See n. 5 above.

20. A common cause of complaint by authors against reviewers. Derrida in particular laments such moves in his Positions.


22. Ibid.

23. Heidegger gives no value to speed; he laments the fact that people today value only what goes fast and can be grasped with one's hands. Clearly he would have little in common with those other Futurists...
24. We have suggested that 'ambiguity' might not be resolvable as Heidegger suggests. The brief essay we are considering here is a case in point. Heidegger castigates the sentimentalizing of peasant life, and yet one is tempted more than once to accuse him of it in this very passage. Indeed, it can seem hard to avoid. Is not much of the silence of the peasant the result of him (or her) having nothing to say, rather than being silent about what he (or she) could say? Is there not also the silence of dullness? Heidegger's extraordinary preference for the old woman who calls him Herr Professor, over those who read his books, suggests a quite incomprehensible status for his chosen life activity - writing - of which the woman has no comprehension.

25. This gets dropped later.

26. Ø32, 'Understanding and Interpretation'.

27. See "Was ist Metaphysik?" (1929) ("What is Metaphysics" (1949) in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, 1977 (op.cit.supra))

28. See De la Grammatologie / Of Grammatology Part II.2

29. See below Part III ch.2 ("The Question of Strategy")

30. See Part II ch.4 below.

31. He rejects other specific points too: (1) the temporality of spatiality, (2) the possibility of a fundamental ontology.
Notes to Chapter Three

1. 'At the very start...our analytic was oriented rather by the average way of existing, which has nothing conspicuous about it.' (H370)

2. Indeed Heidegger at one point (H372) even goes so far as to equate them: '...at bottom we mean by the term"everydayness" nothing else than temporality, while temporality is made possible by Dasein's Being...'.

3. As we have already suggested, its value may not lie in its possible accomplishment, but in the way it disturbs the seeds of complacency.

4. See for example, Derrida's essay "Differance".

5. See below, Part III, ch. 4 "Some Temporal Structures of Language: Prolegomena to a Future Theory of Time".

6. See Part III ch.1 "Derrida's Deconstruction of Time and its Limitations".

7. '...in laying hold of an item of equipment, we come back to it from whatever work-world has already been disclosed.' (H352)

8. op. cit. supra

9. Is not this whole level of discourse (projection, disclosedness) an expansion of Kant's reference to schemata?

10. What would our doubts about authenticity do to such a laminated temporality? We are predisposed (see our discussion below in Part III, ch.4, of "nesting") to encourage the awareness of multiple levels and recursivity in 'temporal structures'. (Words like 'nesting', 'levels' and 'structures' are all representations of multiple temporality.) The question is whether 'forgetting' would not itself have to be forgotten after a systematically sceptical treatment of authenticity. Arguably not. For if, as we shall suggest, we emphasize risk, danger, the possibility of fragmentation over the ultimately self-fulfilling sense of 'coming towards oneself', there is still a questioning 'relation to self' that a totally unselfconscious absorption in the world of things could be said to be 'forgetting'.

11. For example: '...when one is making present something ready-to-hand by awaiting, the possibility of one's getting surprised by something is based on one's not awaiting something else which stands in a possible context of involvement which is lost.' (H355). We might ask, however, how he would handle ontological surprise. This is surely not covered by his remarks at H264.

12. Such expressions as 'a priori' open up the most difficult question of the relation between the logical and the chronological. On the one hand logical priority clearly cannot be reduced to temporal priority, and yet seems to draw on the sense of irreversible linearity it provides, on the other, the necessity of one-way temporal order seems to approach the logical, and for someone like Freud could be thought to be the result of the imposition of a conscious demand for order.


15. In "Ousia and Gramme", op.cit.supra.


18. See eg. his Positions, Paris:Minuit,1972 p.75 (Positions trans. A.Bass London: Athlone,1981,p.55): 'I sometimes have the feeling that the Heideggerian problematic is the most "profound" and "powerful" defense of what I attempt to put in question under the rubric of the thought of presence.'

19. Derrida makes the same claim about the ideal repeatability of the present. See above Part I, ch.3.


21. op.cit.supra

22. See Part II, ch.4.

23. Brouer, for example, thought the relation was precisely the reverse: that arithmetical succession was based on temporal succession.

24. We are surely getting perilously close here to the sort of problems attached to Kant's idea of 'schematism' - by which he meant something like a temporalised concept.


26. It echoes in this respect and at one level, part of McTaggart's famous argument for the derivativeness of the 'B-series' from the 'A-series'.
NOTES to Chapter Four

* This is revised version of a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the British Society for Phenomenology, Oxford 1980.


4. ibid. (ET) p.172
5. ibid. p.169
6. ibid. pp.171-2
7. ibid. p.172


10. op. cit. ß15


12. ibid. p.7
13. W. Marx, op. cit. p.145


17. W. Marx, op. cit. p.155


23. See Part I, ch. 3 above


25. See Part I, ch. 3 above

26. "Ousia and Gramme" op. cit. supra p. 88

27. In Of Grammatology, op. cit.

28. op.cit. supra

29. Beware the first English translation here (included in Speech and Phenomena) in which this term gets thoroughly lost.

30. "Differance" in Speech and Phenomena op. cit. p. 142-3

31. ibid. p. 147

32. ibid.

33. Derrida's mixture of charity and critique towards Heidegger can be found well illustrated in "The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing" in Of Grammatology. The issue is whether Heidegger interest in the question of Being is sufficiently different from a pursuit of Being as such to enable him to escape the charge of reinscribing presence, in a metaphysical way, in Being.

34. Surely here there is a startling convergence with Husserl's most extreme conclusions (see our Part I, ch. 2, ch. 6 above) in which he talks of a 'one dimensional quasi-temporality', a 'pre-phenomenal, pre-imminent temporality'.

35. See Part III, ch. 6 "The Philosophy of the Future" below.

36. See Of Grammatology
NOTES to Part Three Chapter One

1. See "Linguistique et Grammatologie" (hereafter 'LG') p.103 ( ET p.103). This essay and "De la Grammatologie comme Science Positive" (hereafter GSP) are both to be found in De la Grammatologie (1967).

2. Am I myself not guilty of a psychologizing interpretation of Derrida? Sometimes this is just what his words invite. But whether references to Desire are ultimately psychological is an important question. The history of its metaphysical and ontological treatment (from Aristotle to Hegel to Lacan) would suggest otherwise.


6. 'Time is not. There is, it gives time. The giving that gives time is determined by denying and withholding reserve. It grants the openness of time-space, and preserves what remains denied in what-has-been, what is withheld in approach. We call the giving which gives true time an extending, which opens and conceals. An extending is itself a giving, the giving of a giving is concealed in true time.' "Time and Being" p.16 in On Time and Being trans. J. Stambaugh, New York: Harper and Row, 1973 (see Bibliography for original.).

7. If the parallels with Kant's transcendental imagination and Heidegger's "es gibt" hold up, and if Derrida is right in thinking that logical principles break down when describing the trace structure or differance, how did Kant and Heidegger avoid this consequence? In the case of Heidegger the answer is that he creatively distorts grammar, and exhorts his reader/listener 'not to listen to a series of propositions, but rather to follow the movement of showing' (ibid.p.3). Kant, as I read him, utilizes the fiction that the operation of the fundamental faculties of the mind can be described like the working of machinery.


10. It will be said that this is a notorious error. Ordinary language, Nietzsche has told us, is no less metaphysical than grand theory. It is just more complacent and naive. Does not this view inflate 'metaphysics' into a mere vapour, an empty term? Surely only a deployment of language can be metaphysical. Consider Derrida's important remark 'I have never believed that there were metaphysical concepts in and of themselves. No concept is by itself metaphysical, outside all the textual work in which it is inscribed'. Positions trans. A. Bass, Chicago, 1981, p.57 (from Positions Paris: Minuit, 1972).
11. LG p.105 (E.T. p.72)

12. GSP p.127f (E.T.p.85-7)

13. LG p.105 (E.T. p.72)

14. Speech can indeed be seen as a sequence of sounds. But on such a model, distinctions between semantic units may not be apparent, the temporality of meaningful speech production and comprehension will not be registered and there is no scope for acknowledging the different levels of temporal order in speech other than that of the succession of sounds.

NOTES to Chapter Two  ( A. Derrida and the Paradoxes of Reflexion)

1. While that phrase has obtained considerable general currency in English philosophy it is interesting to note that Husserl too - Derrida's first philosophical concern - gives a central place to redeeming meaning-claims, as one might take vouchers to a bank.


3. see "The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing" in Of Grammatology (op.cit.supra) eg. '...all that Hegel thought within this horizon [that of absolute knowledge ], all, that is, except eschatology, may be reread as a meditation on writing '.(p.26)

4. see below, n.13, n.14.

5. see Speech and Phenomena op.cit.supra

6. For a more systematically introductory account of Derrida's philosophy in which some of these issues are developed, see my "Introduction to Derrida", Radical Philosophy No.21 (Spring 1979); reprinted in Radical Philosophy Reader London: Verso,1985 (forthcoming).

7. It is worth pointing out that the extent to which one's language commits one to a particular ontology is the way this very same issue has been conceptualised in Anglo-American philosophy. I am thinking of the contributions of Whorf, Whitehead, Quine, Strawson and Davidson.


10. This procedure is explained at greater length in Positions,Paris: Minuit 1972,p.56.

11. "Differance" op.cit.supra.


13. "Differance" (p.159 in the Speech and Phenomena translation ).


15. See Of Grammatology p.12

16. See the title interview in Positions.

17. op.cit.n.9
18. ibid. p.280-1


21. Without endorsing the rest of his paper, Foucault does have a point when he accuses Derrida (in his "Mons corps, ce papier,ce feu") of failing to analyse 'the modes of implication of the subject in discourse'. I take this from Spivak's excellent introduction to her translation of *Of Grammatology* p.lxi. It lies behind Paul de Man's essay on Rousseau ("The Rhetoric of Blindness: Jacques Derrida's Reading of Rousseau") in his *Blindness and Insight*, Methuen, 1971. Derrida is blind to Rousseau's own self-deconstruction.

22. See Jean Marie Benoist,"The End of Structuralism", Twentieth Century Studies,1970,p.52

23. *Speech and Phenomena* (E.T.p.3) op.cit.,


25. *Speech and Phenomena* (E.T.p.103) op.cit.

26. The question of course is whether there would be such a thing as philosophy in the wake of these moves.

27. See "Structure, Sign and Play..." op.cit.supra. (E.T.p.278-9)

28. see n.19 above.

29. We have already made this point; see n.21 above.
NOTES to Chapter Two (B) "Style and Strategy at the Limits of Philosophy"

1. For a fuller account, see Newton Garver's preface to the translation of Derrida's *La Voix et le Phénomène*: (Speech and Phenomena, trans. David Allison; Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973, p.xi.)


3. We refer to both textuality and intentionality because each offers an account of how the relation between word and thing (when it occurs) is mediated. While we contrast them here, we would also hope to be able to relate these often opposed perspectives on some other occasion.


12. Consider this: "Heidegger's text is of extreme importance, and constitutes an unprecedented, irreversible advance and we are still very far from having exploited all its critical resources." (translated from Derrida's *Positions* [Paris, Minuit: 1972]).

13. (a) *The Ends of Man* (b) *Structure, Sign and Play in the Human Sciences* in Macksey & Donato (ed.) *The Structuralist Controversy* (Baltimore:

14. In part the thematics of strategy is only a recognition of the limited economy of such texts.

15. Included in *Speech and Phenomena*.


18. For Derrida's account of this procedure, see *Positions*.

19. A more detailed account would plot the development in Derrida's general strategy of deconstruction from (a) the display of the structure of a text (leaving everything as it is) (see e.g., *Speech and Phenomena*) through (b) disruptive intervention (e.g., parts of *Of Grammatology*) to (c) parasitical production (*Marges, Glas*).

20. See her introduction to *Of Grammatology*.

21. Derrida talks of it as a strategy without a telos.

NOTES to Postscript


4. This Postscript for example, gives centrestage to the term 'differance' in part because Derrida's paper by that name was the focus of the colloquium in which it was originally presented.


8. Derrida writes 'There is no such thing as a "metaphysical concept".... The"metaphysical" is a certain determination taken by a sequence or "chain". It cannot as such be opposed by a concept, but rather by a process of textual labour and a different sort of articulation'. "Hors livre" in La Dissemination, Paris: Seuil, 1972 p.12 (quoted here from "Outwork" in Dissemination trans. B. Johnson, Chicago, 1981, p.6).


10. To be fair, Derrida elsewhere in Positions distinguishes playing the role of a concept from producing conceptual effects. It is the latter that, more guardedly, "differance" can produce. (Fr., pp.54ff, E.T. 40ff.).

11. See De la Grammatologie (1968).

12. See "Differance" in Marges (1972) pp.25-6 (E.T. p.157). Derrida uses the word 'difference' (rather than differance) because he is working at this point with Heidegger's ontologico-ontological difference.


15. ibid. p.101f.


18. See the title interview in this book.

19. op. cit. p.376-7 (E.T.pp255-6)

20. "Ousia et Gramme" (1968) in Marges (p.78; E.T.p62)


22. op.cit. note 13 p.412 (E.T.p.280)

23. In his paper "Joining the Text: From Heidegger to Derrida" (in The Yale Critics: Deconstruction in America eds. Arac, Godzich & Martin Minneapolis: Minnesota, 1983) Rodolph Gasché reminds us of Derrida's claim that the thought of the trace can no more 'break with a transcendental phenomenology than be reduced to it', and argues, in a way intended as an explication of Derrida's position that the concept of 'text' allows something like an appropriative displacement of the value of transcendentality. Thus: 'the transcendental gesture in Derrida simultaneously seems to escape the danger of naive objectivism and the value of transcendentalism itself.' or again 'The notion of text, as already in the Heideggerian notion of Being, literally "occupies" the locus of the transcendental concept, which is to say that the former is not identical with the latter. Thus the notion of the text corresponds to a transformation of the transcendental concept and of the very locus it represents...the notion of text in Derrida can be understood only if one is aware of its function and effects with regard to the transcendental.' (Pp.160-1) Nothing Gasché writes can be ignored, and this in particular seems like a definitive reply to our attempt to circumscribe Derrida within a renewed transcendentalism. What it would require of us is that we abandon any attempt to attribute transcendental causality to particular operations, functions or activities (such as 'differance') and concentrate on the 'text', the field in which such 'operations' would 'take place'. The question then is how successfully one can explain a concept of text that is neither an empirical object, nor an ideal object, nor a dialectical concept etc. Gasché's solution proceeds via the idea of a displacement. The text 'occupies' the locus of the transcendental concept which is to say that the former is not identical with the latter. We would make three responses to this approach: (1) that the question remains of what kind of acquiescence or acceptance is required by the reader for the concept of text to have the force that derives from its occupying such a position without satisfying the condition (of being 'transcendental') that the 'position' requires; (2) Gasché says that the text 'literally' 'occupies' the locus.....'. What sort of schema is being deployed here? Is it not transcendental space? (3) Gasché denies that the text supplies 'a priori conditions of possibility...for meaning'. But how does he deal with those remarks of Derrida in which 'presence' is said to be the 'product' of 'differance'? And surely Gasché is committed to textuality as the condition (in some sense) of meaning?
23. (cont'd) Is the argument over 'a priori'? In our view, Gasché correctly relocates our question, (in brief, from 'differance' to 'textuality') but the problems we found do not go away.

24. "Ousia and Gramme" (1968) in Marges (p. 75, E.T. p. 65)

25. ibid. p. 52ff (E.T. p. 46ff)
Notes to Part III Chapter 3


2. I say imperfect because calendars always have a non-arbitrary zero point, which introduces a new asymmetry in the series, and because the linearity of calendars is enriched by the addition of various annual cycles (year, month) and is itself based on a unit which is a cycle - the day.


4. See for example Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, Allen and Unwin, 1919. He describes the features of an ordered series as 1. aliorelative (or asymmetrical 2. transitive 3. connected. (p. 33).

5. 'It may further be an interesting study to establish how time which is posited in a time-consciousness as Objective is related to real Objective time.' FTC p. 23.

6. Being and Time H 329


8. The mouthpiece for this discussion being Roquentin in Sartre's novel Nausea.

9. See Being and Time H 233 on the need for an account that treats 'Dasein... as a whole'.

10. Sade, Fourier, Loyola (see n.7 above) p. 9

11. This remark appears as part of the answer to a question in the Introduction to the collection of translations titled The End of Philosophy trans. Joan Stambaugh, Harper and Row, 1973 p. xii

12. For example: 'what characterizes metaphysical thinking which grounds the ground for beings is the fact that metaphysical thinking departs from what is present in its presence, and thus represents it in terms of its ground as something grounded' in The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking included in the translation of Time and Being, Harper and Row, 1972.


15. For example, Derrida remarks 'the concept of time belongs entirely to metaphysics and designates the domination of presence', in "Ousia and Gramme" [1968] in Marges, Paris: Minuit, 1972 (Margins, trans. A. Bass, Chicago, 1982). We have quoted this passage before - Pt. III. ch. 1.

16. See our discussion above, Pt. I, ch. III "Derrida's Critique of Husserl".

17. See his 'Grammatology as a Positive Science' in Of Grammatology (see above n. 13)

18. This point is made at length in my Prolegomena to a New Theory of Time, see the next chapter.

19. 'There will not be books in the running brooks until the advent of hydro-semantics.' J. L. Austin in 'Truth' p. 94 n. 2 in Philosophical Papers, 1961.

20. See his Twilight of the Idols 'Maxims and Arrows' Ø31 'When it is trodden on a worm will curl up. This is prudent. It thereby reduces the chance of being trodden on again. In the language of morals: humility.'

21. It is worth noting that Heidegger's increasing distance from the existential and the ontic is accompanied by the growth of a range of expressions (opening, clearing, dwelling, house, giving, granting) in which an existential content seems to be preserved metaphorically. (I offer a fuller account in 'Style and Strategy at the Limits of Philosophy: Heidegger and Derrida', The Monist vol. 63, No. 4) see above Pt. III, ch. 2 [A] where it is reprinted with minor changes.) But in a number of places Heidegger raises certain obstacles to a straightforward metaphorical reading. The best discussion of this is to be found in Jacques Derrida's The Retrait of Metaphor in Enclitic, vol. II, no. 2 Fall 1978.

22. In all fairness one must mention that Heidegger himself discusses these remarks of Nietzsche. In brief, he interpret them as accurate reports of the nihilistic state of Western culture. See his Introduction to Metaphysics, Anchor, 1961 p. 29f. Nietzsche's remarks are to be found in Twilight of the Idols.

23. The present form of this paper owes a great deal to the perceptive and helpful comments of Robert Bernasconi and Hugh J. Silverman.
NOTES to Chapter Four

1. See the beginning of III.3 "Time and Interpretation", above.


6. See above III.2 "The Question of Strategy" (especially the Postscript)


8. The following two papers are extremely similar: (a) Paul Ricoeur, "The Human Experience of Time and Narrative" in Research in Phenomenology vol. IX, 1979, (b) "Narrative Time" in On Narrative, ed. W.J.T. Mitchell, Chicago, 1981.

9. See W.


14. op.cit. p.12 (ET p.98-99)

15. op.cit. p.12-13 (ET p.99-100)


18. ibid. p.158

20. ibid.

21. op.cit. in 8(a) p.17

22. ibid. p.22

23. Both Barthes (op.cit.) and Genette (in his "Time and Narrative in A la recherche du temps perdu", in Aspects of Narrative, ed. J. Hillis Miller, New York: Columbia 1971) suggest that narratives are expansions of simple sentences (such as 'Marcel becomes a writer', 'I am walking'...) Barthes writes that 'a narrative is a long sentence'.


29. See William Golding's The Fall, Penguin, and the film Incident at Owl Creek.

30. op.cit. p.20 (ET p.113)

31. op.cit.

32. op.cit.

33. see the film Rashamon directed by Kurosawa.

34. A good example would be Shevek in Ursula Le Guin's novel The Dispossessed, Panther, 1974.

35. See Jakobson's "Linguistics and Poetics" (cited by Barthes, op.cit.) in Style and Language ed. T. A. Sebeok, New York, 1960


37. ibid.

38. An analogous claim is harboured in (a) Barthes' claim (contra Saussure) that semiology is enclosed within a more general linguistics (Elements of Semiology, Cape), (b) and Lacan's denial of the possibility of a meta-language. To the re-appropriating power of narrativity here corresponds a theoretical and practical necessity to explain, introduce and locate one's models, structures, and matrixes via 'ordinary language'. We claim this is no temporary requirement.
39. Derrida (op.cit.) writes 'There is no madness without the law: madness cannot be conceived before its relation to the law. Madness is law: the law is madness'. Cf. Pascal's 'Men are so necessarily mad that not to be mad would be another form of madness', cited by Foucault in his Histoire de la Folie, preface.
NOTES to Chapter Five


2. I 'adopt' this term for public expediency. I take it to include post-structuralism, certain of the writings of the 'Yale critics', Rorty, modern Nietzscheans etc. The term's currency has been enhanced by issues of Boundary 2 being devoted to its manifestations. I do not attempt to give it an analytical treatment.


5. Preface to The Will to Power, op.cit.

6. Ibid.

7. The Will to Power op.cit. 74


9. It could be suggested that Levinas supplies the obvious objection to this position. We do not agree. His use of the terms finite and infinite is distinctly idiosyncratic, and at some critical point my actual finitude is surely presupposed by the importance of fecundity.

10. See his Introduction to Habermas' Legitimation Crisis, London: Heinemann, 1976. In this quotation he is in fact referring specifically to Horkheimer.


12. Ibid. p.72.

13. Ibid. p.72-3.

14. An English translation of this (1795) essay can be found in Kant's Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, Cambridge U.P.1971.

15. See the end of the Exergue to Derrida's Of Grammatology, op.cit.

16. It does not mean death, but the structure of such a paradigm shift, or epistemological break would mirror Heidegger's reading of the existential bearing of death.

17. This is the guiding thematic of Vincent Descombes' Modern French Philosophy Cambridge, 1980, more revealingly titled in French Le Meme et l'Autre, Paris: Minuit, 1979.

18. See his La Condition Postmoderne, op.cit.

20. ibid. p.4 (E.T.)

21. "Structure, Sign and Play..." op.cit. (Writing and Difference,p.280)

22. Positions ( Fr. p.15; E.T. p.6-7 ) op.cit.

24. See Marges de la Philosophie, op.cit. ( "The Ends of Man", Margins of Philosophy, p.135 )

23.

25. "Structure, Sign and Play..." op.cit. (Writing and Difference,p.293 )


27. See the Discussion following "Structure, Sign and Play..." as printed in The Structuralist Contraversy ( see n. 8) p.267.

28. see our Appendix, below

29. See "Difference", in Speech and Phenomena, op.cit. p.159.

30. "Ousia and Gramme", in Margins of Philosophy p.63

31. In Of Grammatology, op.cit.

32. Positions op.cit. ( E.T.p.58)

33. ibid. p.57,59.


37. ibid.Axii,Axiii.


39. "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" op.cit.supra p.70

40. ibid.p.72

41. "Von einem neuerdings erhobenen Ton in der Philosophie" (1796) (" On a Genteel Tone Recently adopted in Philosophy").

42. I have Kierkegaard to thank for this reference. See his Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Princeton, 1941, Part I, ch.2,04.

43. See the Preface to his Phenomenology of Perception, London: RKP,1962 ( trans. from Phénoménologie de la Perception by Colin Smith )
44. The parallel with the remark from Derrida we quoted earlier (n.27) is worthy of mention.


46. It is only fair to point out that Hegel's 'circular' understanding of his thought and method already puts this into question.

47. Section 020

48. See our Appendix below.

49. It has to be admitted that Nietzsche cannot always be interpreted along these lines. Consider: 'A yes, a no, a straight line, a goal...Formula: of my happiness' (Twilight of the Idols, Maxims and Arrows 044)

50. For example, John Sallis, "End(s)", Research in Phenomenology, vol.XIII, 1983


52. ibid. p.80

53. ibid. p.81

54. ibid. p.90

55. This should be unpacked as a 'deconstruction' of the textual deployment of the term 'future' and its cognates.

56. See the last page of his "Differance" essay.

57. Semeia op.cit. p.87.

59. Derrida's focus on the word 'come' could be said to embody the very power he attributes to it. For further thoughts on the question of reflexive exemplification see my (unpublished manuscript) "Philosophy as Performance".

58. See Part III, ch.2 above: "The Question of Strategy".

60. Here we would lead in to our account of Nietzsche's Transvaluation of Time (see Appendix, below).

61. Derrida makes a great deal, as we have not, of what Kant disapprovingly called the 'tone' of apocalyptic discourse. And the apocalyptic 'come' is inseparable from a kind of tone. Tone for Derrida, could be said to relate to the performative,ethical aspects of 'come', in the way that 'style' relates to 'content'. In isolating the 'tone' of apocalyptic utterance, Kant, unsuspectingly, made quite a revolutionary move. For tone is unrepresentable, and yet of (arguably) enormous importance.

62. The 'es gibt' is 'only' metaphorically interpersonal, and Heidegger does not, to my knowledge, exploit this.

63. See Levinas, Totality and Infinity(4 (G) "The Infinity of Time") op.cit.supra.
NOTES for Appendix: "Nietzsche's Transvaluation of Time"

1. See J. L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses" in Philosophical Papers, Oxford U.P.

2. Nietzsche uses two different expressions - return (Wiederkunft) and recurrence (Wiederkehr). One could use these expressions to mark a strict distinction - between the recurrence of events and the return of people or things. But no such systematic usage is found in Nietzsche, and our various use of these two terms reflects the preferred terms of different commentators on Nietzsche at different times. Joan Stambaugh, whose book Nietzsche's Thought of Eternal Return is one of the best things written on the subject, further points out that (pp.29-31) in his critical passages, Nietzsche usually uses the expression Wiederkunft and that he hardly ever talks of Wiederholung (repetition), which, again, suggests that exact reruns were not part of his favoured version of eternal return.

3. See Part III, ch. 2 above.

4. See for example "The Intoxicated Song" ("Das trümmere Lied"), the penultimate section of the fourth and last part of Thus Spake Zarathustra. References will be to the Penguin edition translated by R. J. Hollingdale 1961.

5. A selection of Nietzsche unpublished writings - his Nachlass - was assembled under the title of Der Wille zur Macht (1901). We quote in this chapter from the Hollingdale and Kaufman translation of The Will to Power, New York: Vintage (Random House), 1968. The section containing the most important attempt at a scientific proof is §1066, see below.


7. The original title for this chapter was to have been "Nietzsche's Deconstruction of Time". I have been persuaded that this may be too loose a use of the term to justify the prominence that a place in the title would give it. But there are parallels with even the technical account Derrida gives of the general strategy of deconstruction (in Positions). I will suggest that Nietzsche reinscribes 'becoming' in a way parallel to the way Derrida reinscribes 'writing'. I claim, too, that the concept of eternal recurrence is undecidable in terms of the framework it puts in question.

8. Will to Power, §1066


10. The letter is dated March 8th, 1884, cited by Stambaugh, op. cit. supra.

11. It is quite true that Nietzsche was strongly and positively influenced by Lange's Geschichte des Materialismus . . . (1863) (see Hayman, Nietzsche: a Critical Life, Quartet, 1980, p. 82), but we prefer to treat such positivist and scientific streaks as there are in Nietzsche as weapons in an antimetaphysical struggle rather than as beliefs strongly held in their own right. Causal determinism eg. would be hard to square with his account of causation in "The Four Great Errors" in Twilight of the Idols. Where Nietzsche's rhetorical and scientific tendencies clash, we favour the former.
12. Will to Power

12a. And the significance of the horizontal axis - the serial order of time - is itself compromised by the addition of the second. A parallel to Nietzsche's construction of an account that is deconstructive in its effects, by a simple modification of seriality, can be found in the Moebius strip, beloved of Lacan, in which the absolute difference between the two sides of a ribbon is transformed into a continuity merely by a twist and a join.

13. "At Noontide" in Thus Spake Zarathustra, p. 288

14. See Twilight of the Idols, "Expeditions of an Untimely Man" p. 9. See also Heidegger's Nietzsche vol. 1 section 14 "Rapture as Aesthetic State".


16. The references here (Nachlass XIV:306; XII:371) are taken from Stambaugh (op. cit.) p. 23.

17. "the eternal is present with us in every moment; the transitoriness of time causes us no suffering", quoted by Karl Löwith in his From Hegel to Nietzsche trans. David Green, Garden City: Doubleday, 1967 p. 211.

16a. In this word 'intensity' we should hear the work of condensation (which latter word is itself a kind of intensification) - primarily of the ideas of tension and concentrated focus, a felt intensity - ideas that both inhabit and displace a psychological interpretation insofar as they suggest all sorts of difficulties with any traditionally substantive account of the 'subject'.


19. For Nietzsche, Heidegger writes, and clearly with Schelling in mind 'will is primal being. The highest product of primal being is eternity. The primal being of beings is the will, as the eternally recurrent willing of the eternal recurrence of the same. The eternal recurrence of the same is the supreme triumph of the metaphysics of the will that eternally wills its own willing'. What is Called Thinking ?, Lecture X, p. 104.


21. ibid.

22. This problem is plausibly represented by Vincent Descombes in his Le Meme et l'Autre (op. cit. supra) as the problem inherited by the 'desirants' - the French philosophers who took up Nietzsche's problems in the '70's - especially Deleuze, Lyotard and Klossowski.

23. "Of the Vision and the Riddle", Thus Spake Zarathustra, p. 178.

24. "Maxims and Arrows", 8

25. I am grateful, again, to J. Stambaugh Nietzsche's Thought of Eternal Return for this quotation.

26. Vincent Descombes (see n. 22 above) argues brilliantly that this problem haunts French Nietzscheans and that they do not escape its grip.
27. We could find here a parallel in Heidegger's account of authenticity and his contrast between finding oneself and forever losing oneself.


29. *Will to Power* Ø617


31. See n.23


34. See the early essays in Of Grammatology op.cit. especially "The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing", and "Linguistics and Grammatology".

35. The non-dialectical possibilities of Nietzsche's thought rest on such a relation.

36. see n.14

37. I allude here to a paper "Dionysus in Excess of Metaphysics" presented by John Sallis to *The New Nietzsche*, a workshop held at Warwick University, July 1984.

38. See Deleuze op.cit. E.T.p.48

39. ibid.

40. One could usefully compare Kierkegaard's position here, when he writes (Sickness Unto Death) that the Self is the relation that relates itself to itself.

41. *What is Called Thinking?* p.104

42. *Deleuze*, op.cit. E.T.p.48

43. "Differance" (Margins of Philosophy p.17).


45. ibid.

46. ibid.p.20


48. I have David Krell's remarks (in discussion) to thank for this point.

50. There are very many of these: The Fundamental Ground of Metaphysics", his "Letter on Humanism", "Time and Being" etc.
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