Miller, Marcus, 1941- and Thomas, Dania (2006) Sovereign debt restructuring : the judge, the vultures and creditor rights. Discussion Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. (Warwick economic research papers.

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Abstract

What role did the US courts play in the Argentine debt swap of 2005? What implications does this have for the future of creditor rights in sovereign bond markets? The judge in the Argentine case has, it appears, deftly exploited creditor heterogeneity – between holdouts seeking capital gains and institutional investors wanting a settlement – to promote a swap with a supermajority of creditors. Our analysis of Argentine debt litigation reveals a ‘judge-mediated’ sovereign debt restructuring, which resolves the key issues of Transition and Aggregation - two of the tasks envisaged for the IMF’s still-born Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism. For the future, we discuss how judge-mediated sovereign debt restructuring (together with creditor committees) could complement the alternative promoted by the US Treasury, namely collective action clauses in sovereign bond contracts.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Discussion Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance J Political Science > JX International law
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Debts, External -- Argentina, Debts, Public -- Argentina, Debt relief -- Argentina, Argentina -- Economic conditions -- 1983-
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	August 2006
Number:	No.757
Number of Pages:	27
Institution:	University of Warwick
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC), University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR)
Grant number:	RES-051-27-0125 (ESRC)
Adapted As:	Marcus Miller, Dania Thomas. (2007). Sovereign debt restructuring: the judge, the vultures and creditor rights. The World Economy 30(10), 1491–1509
Related URLs:	Other
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/26

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