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Do elections always motivate incumbents? : learning vs. re-election concerns
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Le Borgne, Eric and Lockwood, Ben (2004) Do elections always motivate incumbents? : learning vs. re-election concerns. Discussion Paper. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research. Discussion paper (Centre for Economic Policy Research) (No.4664).
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Abstract
This paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between office-holder and an electorate, where everyone is initially uninformed about the office-holder’s ability. If office-holder effort and ability interact in the determination of performance in office, then an office-holder has an incentive to learn, i.e., raise effort so that performance becomes a more accurate signal of her ability. Elections reduce the learning effect, and the reduction in this effect may more than offset the positive “re-election concerns” effect of elections on effort, implying higher effort with appointment. When this occurs, appointment of officials may welfare-dominate elections.
Item Type: | Working or Discussion Paper (Discussion Paper) | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Political behavior , Elections | ||||
Series Name: | Discussion paper (Centre for Economic Policy Research) | ||||
Publisher: | Centre for Economic Policy Research | ||||
Place of Publication: | London | ||||
Official Date: | October 2004 | ||||
Dates: |
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Number: | No.4664 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 24 | ||||
Institution: | University of Warwick | ||||
Status: | Not Peer Reviewed | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Open Access (Creative Commons) |
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