Inquiry in Question

In Four Volumes

II

Martin Joughin

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PART ONE: SECOND HALF

I Am

From Initial Question to Third Century
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Alexandria

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  to the Close of the Fifth
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PART ONE: SECOND HALF

I AM

What is this transitional Question?

For my part, I suggest that a radical expression of the question may be found in the 'potentiality' of the poetic frame of the story, the 'action', simply as such. Thus I frame the transitional situation in terms of a configuration of 'actor' and situation, in this asserting my part in the transition, and find that an 'actuality' of the situation responds to this 'framing' of the situation, 'agrees' to it, 'confirms the tentative assertion of Drama.

- The figure 'works' somehow. - The 'figure' of framing the transition, responding to its 'question', and this corresponds to a 'new' actuality 'in' the World, in the configuration of the beginning of our Era - or, say, Augustus' integration of a 'World' - a 'World' in which this 'part' is open to the man Octavian, who in asserting himself in the part open to him - as 'actor' - becomes in that 'World' a 'god', partakes in that 'divine' or 'heavenly' figure of self-activity.

'In' the 'transitional' configuration the question of radical choice - 'choosing to choose', to frame one's activity - becomes, as it were, systematically open, an actuality of Choice in the World as new Frame of activity. The actuality of a figure - a figure, indeed, of Actuality - in which is inscribed for the first time the relation of internal 'logical' order and external 'physical' order: the meeting
of this 'inside' and 'outside' in a 'poetic' actuality that now begins to distinguish itself in the dramatic articulation of these two orders, and this through our part in this articulation— and first of all, in our simple assertion of this part, of our part as 'actors'.

Up to the point of transition, as we have seen, the 'poetic' or dramatic frame of articulation of the two 'sides' of activity, 'inward' and 'outward', was only 'comprehended' in abstraction. - The logical circuit of Theory — the determination of the relations of text and context 'in' the text, did not 'incorporate' the economy of the actual interface of text and context — to which 'economy' theoretical assertion was thus more or less blindly subordinate in fact.

The 'point of transition' marks, in the form or figure of Question, a minimal coincidence of logical, physical and poetic orders. - This appears in the logical order as the inscription or appearance of the 'economy', the poetic articulation in activity, of text and context, as a question.

As I suggested some way above, it seems to me that the most radical or focal expression of such a 'theoretical' question may be found in the writing of the alexandrian Jew Philo. I have already suggested that the 'question' is 'outwardly' expressed in the framing of activity in a World integrated by Augustus — as the possibility of knowing the radical actuality of Choice in choosing to assert oneself as 'actor'.

Within this configuration of Reflection and World, the primary 'dramatic' or poetic expression, 'focussing' as it were the figure of dramatic actuality in its minimal expression, amounts to a dramatic 'possibility' exemplified in various stories which were integrated in parallel narratives of the arrival of the Jewish 'messiah', Χριστός, 'anointed', around the beginning of the century. (Indeed, it was upon these accounts, correlated with other texts in a common context of Augustus' World, that this incarnation or 'arrival' was taken, around 527, as the beginning of our Era, the focus of transfiguration of Time and the History it frames).
Now, what is 'dramatically' fundamental is not one of these sometimes conflicting 'stories' of the transition into our 'Era', into a new frame of accounting, of History, but rather the dramatic possibility of action they exemplify, which 'in itself' amounts only to the actuality of a Question. - A Question to which these varying accounts are the responses, after the fall of Jerusalem in the seventieth 'year of the Lord'. Behind the accounts, as it were at a 'focus' behind them, lies a common question: what are we to make of all this? And these accounts, these versions of a 'message' from Heaven, what some people made of it towards the end of the first century, themselves participate in the configuration of the transition into our 'Era' as a question.

This 'second half' of the first Part of the Story, this Story, amounts to a progressive integration of this Question or Mystery within an Economy of Kosmos - from the bare appearance of the Question, which marks the beginning of our Era, to the integration of an aristotelian Economy of Inscription with a dual Mystery, in the thirteenth century. The frame of this development may be taken to be the 'dramatic' interaction of logical, poetic, and physical orders of 'framing' activity over these thirteen centuries, from the initial configuration represented by Philo, 'the Christ', and Augustus, to the integration of these figures in the 'Church' of the thirteenth century.

The development of the 'logical' order over this period may be articulated within the question posed by the two sides of Λόγος, Reason, 'Word': this is simply the primary or most radical 'logical' expression of the transitional 'Question'. These two sides, the Economy and Mystery of Framing, eventually meet in the figure of Aristotle's Active Reason, in the thirteenth-century Schools (and, primarily, the leading School, Paris). The elaboration of questions, within this general frame, which culminates in the 'scholastic' articulation of Inquiry, with its formal economy of disputation, is paralleled over the same period by the integration of heavenly Mystery and earthly Economy (framed in Law), culminating in the dual articulation of Empire and Papacy as primary frame of activity. From this thirteenth-century mirroring, then, of Reflection and its Context, arises a new question, and a new framing of individual activity, within whose subsequent development the 'middle Part' of the Story may in turn be articulated. An analogous transition out of this middle period will then, finally, lead us towards the configuration of this our writing and reading.
This second half of the first part naturally falls into three sections:

I: From the initial Question to the third century.
Over this period is developed the 'logical' articulation of the mystery of the transitional Question, to the point (with Origen) where it is logically 'symmetric' as between the 'christian' subordination of theory to story or narrative, and the 'pagan' incorporation of the dramatic figure of Mystery into the logical circuit of Theory. Paralleling this logical development are the articulation of the christian groups or assemblies, concluding in the 'World' Assembly or 'catholic' Church, with its unitary frame and administrative hierarchy; and the progressive breakdown of the political and economic order organised by Augustus.

II: From the third century to about 500
Around the end of the fifth century (in Proclus and Damascius, notably) the 'pagan' attempt to incorporate the figure of Mystery within the logical circuit of abstraction (in terms of the logical determination of the relations of logical and physical orders of text and context) closes in a configuration which presents the 'Question' of the poetic frame in an extreme or limiting form. At this point independent pagan reflection effectively closes, being assimilated - through the inscription of this last configuration within the missing poetic figure of the christian Mystery, in 'christian' 'mystical theology'. By this time the governments of East and West are almost independent, the latter having passed effectively into the hands of the Church hierarchy, which preserves the forms of roman institutions, interacting, in this new embodiment, with the customary Law of the 'barbarians'.

III: From the sixth to the thirteenth century
This phase may in turn be divided into three subordinate periods:
A: c. 500 - c. 750 - The emergence of two new frames, represented by the ascendancy of the Franks in the West, and of Islam in the East
B: c. 750 - c. 1000 - Emergence of feudal order in the west; cathedral and monastic schools. Caliphate of Baghdad: symmetries of arithmetic, astrology, alchemy abstracted from greek logic of representation (a converse, as it were, of 'pagan' abstraction from theological History).
C: c.1000 - c.1250 - Decline of Baghdad, rise of Cordova, and interaction with West. Systematic integration of 'Christendom' under Emperor and Pope; transition from cathedral schools to 'University', and incorporation of Islamic and Western Christian traditions in a scholastic synthesis.

I will not treat these developments in the same way that I treated the transition from the Pythagoreans to the beginning of this 'second half'. The principles of articulation of detail would be much the same, and the point of this Story is not primarily to construct a uniformly detailed History.

Rather will I now begin to apply the 'dramatic' figure of articulation of two 'sides' of the poetic frame of activity - the correlation of simple or elementary 'figures' of Reflection and Context - within the primary figure of Drama, which I will begin by trying to exemplify in my 'definition' or rather, identification, of this figure in the transition from first to second half of this 'first Part'.
I: From the initial Question to the third century

I have tried to mark a 'dramatic' transition into 'our' Era, our Time, as a 'question': the question posed by the 'poetic' frame simply as such.

'Question': or perhaps 'possibility' - something Open: a figure of open-ness of which the 'logical' figure of the question, determined within a logical order of 'in' and 'out' abstracted from the actuality of Choice, is one 'side', one aspect.

'Question', then, in the widest sense, of what is 'dramatically' open to action. And my part in this configuration of Question, it seems, is simply to mark the question as such, by exemplifying it in this very figure of marking.

For this 'question' of transition into a dramatic frame of Reflection expresses itself as what is 'open' to my framing of 'it' as question. - An actuality which 'responds' or corresponds to my 'I' which asserts itself in framing the transition, just as - as one 'side' of this actuality - the stoic Λογος 'responds' to Zeno's rational inscription of that inscription in Reason, Λογος. - Just as Epicurus' Φύσις, Movement of Matter, 'responds' to his inscription of that inscription in 'physical' terms.

-In the simple figure of framing, assertion (then), of the transition as Question - of Question as the most radical actuality of the Frame of which Reason and Matter are two 'sides', aspects - this actuality of the Frame expresses itself. The question is there, simply in virtue of my assertion, since questioning of this 'framing' of the transition itself embodies the very figure in question. And within this figure of Question as radical frame of Drama, an actuality of historical assertion of self, of 'I', recognising its actuality in 'choosing' the very frame of self-assertion, begins to inscribe itself.
Choosing', determining: for the frame of the story, of our framing of activity (ours or another's), is itself inscribed in the radical psychical figure of 'I', asserting itself in the claim of its 'logical' determination of the relations of the two 'sides' of an action (logical and 'physical', inside and out), and this first of all in the minimal actuality of asserting this very actuality, identifying itself as the figure of identifying, framing, as what is at work in this very act or actuality of (self)identification, choosing, deciding.

But rather than taking place within a logical frame of figure, of one figure 'in' another (and this figure of 'I' 'in' itself — as in the case of earlier reflection), this identification now begins to inscribe itself in the poetic frame of Action, Drama. The 'I' coincides, as it were, with the previously 'formal' abstraction of the 'logical' order from the more radical actuality of this move of abstraction itself.

That is: this self-assertion or self-recognition of 'I' inscribing itself within 'I', involves at the same time the self-expression of the possibility of this identification as a complementary actuality, an actual 'open-ness' to this actuality of 'I' in the actual situation 'in' which it takes place (and time). In the limiting case this open-ness is just the fact, the ontical actuality of the question, as inscription of the relations of logical and physical orders of action in the 'outward' configuration 'in' which we choose to assert ourselves in one logical figure of self-assertion, rather than another — appropriating', as it were, one frame from the actuality of an open range, from the actuality of a question, 'a choice' in the 'ontical' sense. 'A choice' outside us, in that it is not reducible to the inscription of the physical order of 'in' and 'out' (physical difference) to the logical recurrence of 'I', to our 'choice', in the 'psychical' sense.

The radical question, then, for 'us', the range of 'I' in which we can each assert our specific or individual 'actuality', is simply that of our 'part' in the dramatic articulation of these two components of Actuality at work in the particular situation in which
we 'find' ourselves. We participate, simply as individuals, as a materially embodied range of possible assertion of 'I', in the interface of the 'psychical' and 'ontical' orders. We are the locus of their articulation, participating in both the figure of assertion and (through this) in the configuration of what is open to my, or your, or his, or her subsequent assertion or choice, action.

And the most radical question which confronts us is (then) that of our part in this interaction of assertion and possibility, of psychical and ontical. - And this question first appears in its most radical form in the outward configuration of the 'transition' into a new Era, a new framing of action, of activity in Time, in which it is open to each of us as 'I' to find our part in framing our part.

- And this, in turn, amounts to the recognition of this possibility in the figure of the Question 'appearing', opening-up, in our Space and Time: the framing of our part in terms of the appearance in Time and Space - in Matter - of this question, the embodiment of this most personal question in the frame of our activity, through the articulation in our Past of a response to that question. - Of responses which in turn elaborate further the Question, unfold and embody it in the frame of our activity, as an actuality of 'I' open to us, if we choose.

Again: in the configuration of the transition into our Era, which marks in our situation the question or choice of our 'framing' of our activity, in terms of an actuality of 'I' embodied in our situation (both individually and collectively), we are confronted with the figure of 'I' open to us, to be this, to be me. Neither side, Reason or Matter, is actually reducible to the other: such an 'imaginary' scheme of reduction or definitive inscription amounts to the logical circuit of an abstraction from our actual situation, a blindness to our part in actually framing such an abstraction, choosing it, and so, like Zeno or Epicurus, 'framing' our part in a 'one-sided' way.
Rather are we actually—and this is our most radical actuality—'in-between' these two sides, the locus of Choice itself. And in the Question posed in our situation as the 'beginning of our Era', we have open to us the possibility of choosing this Choice as the most radical actuality of our 'part'.—Choosing not to refuse the choice, and its figure of 'responsability', by blindly assenting to a figure or framing of our situation in which such a Choice is not open to us.

—but why should we choose to choose, rather than not? Are we not here back to some ciceronian circular morality, a 'part' which requires of us—as our 'duty'—that we should assent to the part?

There is here, however, an utterly or irreducibly radical difference: contrary to the ciceronian case, here we are the part, for the part is simply choice, and we cannot choose not to choose. There is no 'I' or 'me' which can stand outside this radical configuration of embodiment and 'responsability', as 'I' stands outside the circular obligation of Cicero's part, an 'I' that might just as well be slave or millionaire, an 'I' that has not chosen the part (which ciceronian 'part' rather chooses itself in abstraction from radical Choice—the part of Pilate). The part here is rather that of myself, which I cannot refuse and still remain myself. In such a refusal I cease in part to be, I become less of an actuality and more of a mere 'image' of myself, a nothing from which I come into further being through choice.—Through choosing to choose, and so mysteriously distinguishing myself from indifferent Nothing.
The first step

Choice cannot choose but be choice. 'We' is or are in the middle, between choices open to us, the possibility of Choice, and its Actuality in a choice. 'We' know or knows 'ourselves' most radically in recognising, choosing, our part in this distinction of 'I' as self-assertion of assertion, from the mere possibility of this distinction (marked by the word, mark, 'I'): in choosing the part of choice.

In 'playing' this part of choice we frame, as 'open' to us, further choice; we participate in the wider frame of 'I' as Being, distinguishing itself from the open possibility of being, from open Nothing. And we find ourselves already in a configuration or situation framed, in part, by 'past' activity. We frame our part - that, precisely, of 'framing' - in a Drama of choice and actualisation: the ontical order of what is open is, on the one hand, already articulated, in part, by 'past' Choice; Choice is, in turn, constrained by this embedding in our situation, in things. The dramatic transition marked by Choice as a question, by the embedding or inscription of this question - its marking - in the roman World of that transition, is the 'historical' opening-up in our past of the radical choice or possibility of direct active participation in Kosmos as Drama. 'Direct': simply 'in terms' of the question of the 'part' of the pure self-assertion of Choice, in the framing of our choice - which is at the same time the question of our part in framing that part of Choice in our situation. A question marked on this our Earth, in this our Space, in this our Time. A question marked in our Past, and in this marking a transition into, or opening-up of, a 'new' Time, a new Heaven and a new Earth, a new World.

The 'first step' in this 'opening-up' of direct participation in Kosmos as Drama of cosmic 'history', corresponds to the embedding in this our Earth of a minimal figure, a 'germ', of dramatic Actuality: a germ of Actuality, a 'focal' part in the cosmic Drama, the part of first framing activity, of framing one's part, in the
figure of that Drama. The figure of marking the possibility of access to the new frame of activity as a question, a question marked by the posing of the question as (perhaps) the first step into, the first activity in, the new frame opening up as question - as what is open to us in the suggestion that the part of Choice in our situation, and our part of framing that part, poses the same question: presents a new coordination of 'heavenly' Choice and 'earthly' choices as opening up. Opening up through this simple question, 'through' this question as something open, as the minimal 'germ' of what opens up in the 'transition' into a new World, the 'transfiguration' of the roman World 'through' this question.

The 'first step' in the transition then, might be taken to be the very marking or posing of the Question in the roman World, which is at once the first arising of the question, and the first response: the very posing of the question is a recognition of what is open, and that recognition is itself a response.

But then any account or 'story' of the transition must itself be a response to the Question which is here taken to mark a radical 'transition' or access to a new World. Any 'story' of what opens up 'our era', any story of what becomes open, must recognise itself as a response to what it frames as open, as opening up. Any story of that Question must be as 'circular' in its self-assertion, as the Question is circular in its open-ness. Indeed we may at once frame, and respond to, the Question, by finding it radically embodied in just this circular complementarity of circular open-ness and closed circuit of primary response as 'description' of the Question.

We must, then, try and find the Question in the configuration of our attempt to give a story or account of the Question. The question of what story to give provides a radical access to the Question. What story, then?

Cicero, a hundred years before the posing of the question, had 'stepped into' the part of Lawyer, representative of the (roman) Law. The full complexity of 'circumstances' of that step, that assumption of the 'part' of Lawyer, is of course incalculable, unthinkable
indeed. One might, for example, imagine an unlimited variety of different developments from the configuration of Cicero's birth in 106, any of which would exclude such a step. One might proceed to imagine a wider range of circumstances associated with that birth itself. In terms of a configuration of individually (relatively) independent determinations of Fact, of relevant facts, we cannot even find any fixed point, however remote (unless it be some supposed first point of the physical World) at which to begin a 'full' account of that step. And yet the configuration of the part of Lawyer itself, a correlation of coordinate figures, beginning with, working out from (a correlation 'in') the figure of Lawyer, presents different questions (the question, in particular, of where to stop, rather than that of where to begin), and is, relative to the 'full' complexity of a 'complete' account, simple and straightforward. Thus we begin to unfold, from the figure of Lawyer, in the 'poetic' symmetry and coordination of an account or story, a correlation of, say, its components or dimensions of greek reflection and roman institutions, in the wider 'historical' configuration of the early first century: the convergence in this figure, say, of several primary components of greek reflection since the third century, as they interact with institutions that are slowly being integrated within systematic roman Law as general frame of a roman World. A similar configuration of the correlation of reflection and institutions might in turn be applied (as in the first half of this first part) to various prominent 'parts' in this situation of Cicero's part itself, giving an elementary 'story', a schematic dramatisation, a simple account, of Cicero's part or place in the general development of reflection in Antiquity, and in the transmission of greek reflection to Rome which may be taken as a central strand in a general history.

We may then unfold the poetic symmetry of 'story', by working 'out' from the figure of 'Lawyer', correlating or coordinating various figures 'around' that 'part' of Cicero. Such a correlation or analysis may be unfolded as far as our account requires - without our ever reaching, for example, any determination of why some particular man (or bundle of elements or epicurean atoms or whatever), called 'Marcus Tul-lius Cicero', actually existed, lived, rather than not - without ever reaching the limiting physical order of the fact that Cicero played the part he did.
...But an imaginary 'definitive' explanation which leaves no questions unanswered, which unfolds the 'part' of Cicero into its complete embedding in a global History - say, embeds Cicero in some deterministic coordination of atoms or elements or whatever within a unitary physical Universe - that is no essential part of an 'account' or story of Cicero's step into the roman Law. The point of the account, determining which questions are pursued and which left aside as the account unfolds, lies rather in the poetic configuration, the poetic symmetries and coordinates, of the step itself, considered in 'poetic' abstraction from the unlimited range of possible questions, possible details (such as the facts, say, that he was reading (Euripides' Medea) just before being killed, that he had two wives, the question, say, of his whereabouts on the Ides of March in 44...). The point or organising direction of the account given here is rather to outline, to discern, a certain fairly simple configuration, correlation of dimensions (and implicitly a correlation of corresponding unanswered further questions), in the context of this very account of Cicero's part, itself: in the common context of Cicero's 'part' and of this text of of an account of that part.

This text is internally articulated as a mirror of its own configuration, determination, framing, in a 'historical' context organised as 'history' insofar as it reflects the poetic articulation of this text. The account in the text of Cicero, is coordinate with the meeting, in the figure of the roman lawyer, of various configurations of this book's context. The direction, 'point', end, of the account corresponds to the guiding axis, through the question of the relation of Cicero's part in the text, and in its context, constituted by the radical question posed by asking in the text about the relations of text and context - text and context of this very questioning itself. The configuration of this questioning, the stage in the inquiry, marked by Cicero leads, as it is brought into question, to a new configuration of context, and a new relation of text and context as an attempt is made to give an account of that configuration.

It is just this characterisation of our inquiry into our inquiry itself which must now determine what might constitute a 'next step' on from Cicero's step into Law, as next configuration of context. The question attaching to the ciceronian component in text, context, and in their relations, itself provides the figure for the next con-
and in their relations, itself provides the figure for the next configuration of context, the next configuration of text...and the next configuration of this inquiry, in the mirroring of these 'external' and 'internal' dimensions.

What account, then, of the 'part', in Judaea, around the thirtieth year of our Era, of the marking of the 'Question' which is here taken to constitute a transition into this Era? What of the 'Christ', the 'Anointed', the 'Messiah' of the Jews, what of the man from Nazareth in the border-area of Galilee, between Syria and Judaea, who, according to various accounts, played this part?

Our account must itself be drawn from those various later accounts of the 'first step' into our Era, which themselves in their turn amount to further steps in a configuration opened up by the 'first step' of which they are accounts. Thus the 'first step' itself at once partakes in the Question it is here taken to mark. Otherwise, indeed, it could not mark that Question. Yet we may find a simple configuration or figure of a first step as, precisely, a question - as a possibility, something open, to which the texts of the central 'second step' (around the middle of the century), taken by the graeco-syrian pharisee Paul of Tarsus in Cilicia, may be taken as a response. - This 'second step' is expressed in letters of instruction from Paul to 'assemblies' (most of which he had personally set up) among the 'gentiles' (those of 'nations' outside the closed circuit of Jewish culture), and in a later account of this work of 'assembly', this 'mission'. The later account, the 'Acts of the Apostles', belongs to a third step or phase, in which the letters of Paul are given a context. The latter setting of text in context is part of the wider coordination of various accounts or stories exemplifying the 'first step' of the Christ - various responses to his 'question', his 'call' - in the unitary context of a continuous narrative of the 'first step'. One doctor-friend, Luke, of Paul's, seems to be responsible for one such narrative (one of three extant 'synoptic gospels'), as well as the extant narration of the various parallel 'second steps' of the 'apostles' in the 'Acts'. This third phase, the integration of texts and contexts in the unity of a narrative abstracted from the particular situations of the various
'responses' to the Christ it coordinates, begins around the time of the fall of Jerusalem (until then the chief 'assembly') to the Roman army, concluding an attempt by fanatical Jews to reassert Jewish independence from Rome (in the years 66-70). The narratives of the doctor Luke are intermediate, in this third phase, between the initial narrative exposition of Mark (probably an associate of the Peter who figures prominently in the narrative itself), together with a collection of the Master's λόγως texts, sayings, by a Matthew (who himself figures in the various narratives as a 'scribe') on the one hand, and some 'John's systematic dramatisation of the narrative, as embodiment of the figure of λόγος in the activity of a Man, on the other. The relation of the writer of this final 'version' of the 'good news' to the figure, in his narrative of 'the disciple whom Jesus loved' does not seem very clear. The composition, 'dramatically' integrating the 'poetic' figure of the earlier fragmentary stories with the parallel Graeco-Judaic reflection of the Alexandrian Philo, may perhaps be assigned to around the end of the first century.

What, then, is the question 'behind' these various accounts of it, which are also so many phases in the articulation of response to it? How can we move 'back' through this configuration of texts to an initial posing or 'marking' in the Roman 'World', of the Question of participation in dramatic Actuality? What initial figure, what initial missing point, will allow us to coordinate these responses, and accounts of responses, as so many versions of the missing point, and so many versions of the context in which the initial point, and these various versions, are all set?

...But the very circularity of a 'version' of the initial question or invitation, which itself frames the context of both 'call' and version, is itself reflected in the earliest extant account of the 'invitation'; the question hiding 'behind' the various versions of it as responses to it, is just the question posed by the part of framing our situation, in the dramatic dynamics of that situation: the invitation to respond to what is open in that circular figure by echoing the initial response which is 'just 'the Christ's' marking of what is now open:
Have faith in God: I tell you it's really true that if someone says to this mountain 'Be moved away and thrown into the sea', and doesn't waver in his heart, but believes that what he says comes to pass, then it will come to pass. By this I'm telling you that whatever you ask or choose, believe it granted to you, and it will be. And whenever you stand asking like this, set aside anything you've got against anybody, so that your father in the skies sets aside your shortcomings too.

The later narratives, in particular the more 'greek' Luke, do not frame this asking or 'prayer' in this figure of 'moving mountains', or impose such a burden of belief, 'faith', as Mark. Yet this simple figure of faith - making something true by believing it in the heart of one's being, recognising one's part in 'framing' what is the case, creating one's world - lies 'behind', at the root of, each narrative. The unthinkable possibility of moving mountains provides a simple figure 'by which', in which, to frame more modest scenes - there is here no suggestion of any practical situation in which the immense physical forces of earthquakes, say, might be brought 'into play'. Moving mountains is a more or less limiting figure of what is open to the figure of 'I', to me, in visible Matter; a limiting figure 'in' or 'by' which the particular figures of less 'dramatic' situations may be inscribed. A figure of 'prayer', of the framing in the 'heart' (as in Aristotle, and generally in Antiquity, the seat of conception and imagination) of an action in which we have the part of framing.

1: Mark XI. 23-5
Open to 'I': open to 'I AM', Yahweh, Jehovah, 'God', to that pure self-assertion of assertion, 'I am who am', complementing Matter as the pure possibility open to such assertion. 'Prayer', me asking that pure 'I' of which I am an image in matter, an earthly 'son'; 'in faith': my participation in that radical circularity of pure self-confirming assertion, as I frame my choice from what is open in the world around me and, unwavering, make this choice come to pass, make it 'true', by believing it, acting according to it. Just as my 'I', my assertion, is a particular image or reflection of pure self-assertion in the local and temporary detail of my spatio-temporal embodiment, incarnation, so in the figure of 'prayer' I can participate in the magical or mysterious dynamic of 'I's' self-confirming Choice from what is open in Matter simply as such. Prayer will work if what I ask is framed in the simple correlation of 'divine' I, and my particular 'I', as 'faith in God', faith in my 'heavenly father' or exemplar. Prayer is our 'part' in the pure self-assertion of assertion, as we respond to the invitation to frame our incarnate activity, the details of our lives in Matter, on Earth, in Space and Time, in terms of our own circular self-assertion as locus of framing, choosing, of our world. The simplest figure of such participation in a formal principle reflected in matter - of our 'part' in the general Frame of the World, in Creation as its framing, is reflected on Earth in the figure of an earthly father. So that through 'faith' we can, simply by a sort of unthinkable circular choice, become 'sons of God', just as we have already become, without choosing, 'sons of Man' by our earthly fathers' inscription of the male principle he embodies (if we follow the scheme of Aristotle) in female matter.

What is the special part in this scheme of 'the first-born son of God'? Simply, perhaps, to choose to mark the possibility, for all men, 'to become sons of God': to mark, and so open up, the dramatic possibility of framing our activity as participation, on Earth, in 'I AM', as this figure is constantly, systematically, open in every possible situation in which 'I' find myself involved. Once what thus becomes open to 'sons of Men' is marked in their world, the world presents them with the choice of 'becoming sons of God', and the very act of marking what is open is itself simply the first
response to what becomes open — in this unthinkable temporality of being a response to a question first posed by the response as marking of the question somehow strangely intermediate between the 'heavenly' circularity of pure self-assertion, and the earthly response to a question that has been marked through this intermediary figure, by this 'first-born son of God'. The seed or germ of the question or possibility as presented by this odd man, and transmitted through responses to him of further men — and women — partakes of a radically paradoxical figure of 'I AM' itself ('him' self) choosing to become incarnate — or rather, of a radical confusion in this initial marking of the question as first response to the question, of a heavenly and earthly 'I'. Is God asserting himself in determining this initial figure of 'faith', in choosing the earthly locus of its marking as a new possibility open to men... or does some man, 'Jesus', just find himself in a position of marking a question to which the marking is itself a response, 'by chance'? Is the initial self-assertion his, or God's?

Let us consider the frame of this odd step in more detail. First of all, as it embodies a sort of point of coincidence or integration of two converging traditions of Law as frame of the World.

Jewish Law: the relations or related 'parts' of 'Heaven' (that circle of circles 'framing' activity in Time, in which we participate as we frame our world and our part in it) and 'Earth' (that, this, 'natural' Economy or play of possibilities in which such framing is 'open') had been framed in a developing Jewish tradition in the figure of 'Law', as it were intermediate between the Chaldean frame of a general open Economy of Heaven and Earth, and the Egyptian tradition of a unilateral downward Hierarchy and Government of the Whole (with the earthly economy organised 'below' as image or reflection of the rule of the Sun in Heaven).

'Intermediate', rather as the history or story of the Jews is framed in the interface and interaction of these two great 'empires' of Babylon and Egypt. In the Books of the Law (which frame the texts of the Jewish laws strictly speaking in their legendary context) the
initial figure of 'Law', and the culture or activity it frames, is provided by a sort of 'contract' between 'his' god and Abraham (Ab Raham, taken by the later narrator to mean 'father of many'). The figure of a 'personal god' of Abraham echoes a figure prevalent in 'chaldean' or mesopotamian culture towards the end of the third millenium. Chaldeans (as is attested by their cuneiform 'deeds') would make and break contracts with heavenly forces, with 'actualities' governing the working of particular frames of action, just as they made business contracts with earthly colleagues, within a general Economy of Heaven and Earth (in which temples were also the main financial centres, coordinating that trade in and between chaldean cities which organised mesopotamian 'culture'). His 'personal god' leads Abraham out of Chaldea, down into Egypt, and then into the intermediate coastal strip of Palestine. What is radically new in the figure of Abraham's relation to his god, is their agreeing to the figure of Contract (this itself a recasting of the earlier less binding contract) as primary frame of all their action, a sort of indissoluble marriage, and a contract binding on all of Abraham's heirs. An irrevocable choice of this Contract as primary frame, rather than just one component or consideration in a wider, radically open, Economy - but also a free choice by both parties of such an irrevocable contract, rather than some egyptian passive recognition of one's subordinate part in a unitary scheme of cosmic government. This 'legendary' figure of Abraham instituting the 'jewish' culture of his heirs presents a later 'jewish' version of a cultural configuration in the interface of babylonian and egyptian worlds, that is echoed or reflected in extant babylonian and egyptian documents from around the beginning of the second millenium (in particular, Abraham's god's warning to leave 'Ur of the Chaldees' before impending destruction is echoed in the violent end of the city known by archeologists as 'Ur III' - until then the organising centre of southern mesopotamian culture - in 2003.

The simple figure of the inaugural Contract or Covenant, the choice of or assent to a 'legal' framing of activity, through an initial act of choosing a fixed frame in which subsequent acts are thereby contracted to be framed, corresponds, it will be seen,
to the figure of Law in Cicero's late philosophical writing - as indeed to a figure current in the pharisaic schools in the first century before our Era: a primary 'moral' actuality or 'working' of Law.

The figure is 'opened' to Abraham, 'proposed' by his 'god', in Palestine. And this place in which the possibility of a new frame of activity is opened up to Abraham, this land of Palestine, is itself a primary component or term of the proposed contract, defining in the opposition of 'inside' and 'outside' of its boundary the spatial dimension of the frame of action into which Abraham agrees to enter. The possession of this land of Palestine, the control of the spatial frame, the land 'open' to one's disposition of it, is guaranteed by the initial framing of the contract, by Abraham's choice of this contract as frame of his and his heirs' activity. The heirs thus become the primary 'actors' in a drama whose space or scene is defined in terms of the 'inside' and 'outside' of this land, this land thus 'promised' to them, in the contract transmitted by being marked or inscribed a week after birth on that male 'organ' of procreation by which life itself is transmitted. Here then are the scene, and the principal actors, the 'culture' embodied in a whole people thus chosen, as specified or defined in the initial contract. The story or history of this 'chosen people', framed by their contract, made in their name by their father Abraham, now begins to unfold.

The contract is ratified, reasserted, by Abraham's immediate heirs who, at the end of the first book of the 'Law', are settled within the borders of Egypt; but several centuries later (a phase corresponding in a more general 'history' to the thirteenth century before our Era), at the opening of the second book, the heirs of those immediate descendants are in disarray, reduced to slavery in Egypt, 'outside' the framing of activity within the initial contract, out of control of their lives and destiny, just as they are outside the Land of the Covenant. In this configuration there opens up a figure of reaffirmation of the forgotten contract, framing a return to the Land which to be 'in' is guaranteed by being, acting, in, within, the Law, the Contract: framing the Return, the Exodus from Egypt, in the simple relation of 'within' and 'outside' the Law, to 'within' and 'outside' the Land.
In this configuration 'the god of Abraham and Isaac and Jacob' appears to 'Moses' (Egyptian: 'son', interpreted as Hebrew 'drawn-out') in the figure of 'I': I AM 'I AM'. In the context of the transition or return from Egypt to Palestine, related in those four books which together with the first, 'Creation', constitute 'the Law', the contract is renewed in this new figure, I AM governing the articulation of what is 'within' and 'outside' the Law, as Moses inscribes the activity of enunciating the Law within the primary figure of 'I' asserting itself in the articulation of the Return. Thus, for example, the relations of 'inside' and 'outside' the inscription of activity within this figure of 'I' asserting itself in the situations of choice, assertion, are themselves inscribed within this figure of 'I's' self-assertion: At one extreme the Law governs the relations of the community of those ('Israel' - the progeny of Jacob or Israel) subject to the Law, and 'the Nations', 'gentiles', outside the Law; at another extreme it governs the symbolic articulation of 'ritual', activity which reflects the contract in the articulation of the step into a 'figure' of the self-assertion of 'I' in that step. Between these extremes the Law articulates the activity by which, having found oneself or another 'outside' the Law, one may bring oneself or the transgressor back within the Law.

Within the frame then, of this 'Law', Jewish history subsequent to the Return is articulated as a story of 'I's' self-assertion in the reflection, in Israel's internal and external relations, of the adherence (or otherwise) of individuals and community to the Law. The principal dynamic is simple enough: each individual, in the configuration in which he finds himself, can frame his action inside or outside the Law. This in turn contributes to his, and to others', subsequent situations, in which the choice or figure of Choice again recurs, and so on. Finally, in the sixth century, through the development of this figure, I AM finds the People, taken as a whole, as no longer within the Law: the point comes where the Law is reasserted in a new Exile. The truth of the Law is re-established by the reflection of the departure of Israelite activity (in its general frame) from the Law, in the transportation to Babylon in 586 (after the destruction of Jerusalem) of the whole governing class - of all those with any 'responsibility' in the direction of the community, the people.

The return from this Exile of the priestly class, in several phases (in the last third of the sixth century and first third of the fifth)
marks a transition to a new phase of the Law and Tradition, of the framing of the Jewish story or history. A transition outwardly reflected in the rebuilding of the Temple at Jerusalem, the House of God, and the parallel organisation (centred on this rebuilt temple) of a unitary and systematic frame of activity, of life.

Just as the first phase of the tradition was framed in the arrival of 'Abraham' in the Land of the Contract, and the second by the return of 'Moses' to this Land (as re-assertion of the Contract), so now a third phase is framed in a return to the Land from Babylon. - Framed, around the end of the sixth century and beginning of the fifth (the time of Pythagoras and Heraclitus) by a new figure of the Law and the Tradition.

- The Law as unitary and comprehensive frame of a systematic story or History of the interaction, the dialogue, of I AM and HIS People. The traditions relating to 'Abraham' and 'Moses' are collected by the priesthood, and integrated for the first time in a single written account.

- A History is constructed or framed, embodying the articulation of earlier choices and actions in the frame of a Law - a Law whose enunciation and institution this History, in its turn, frames. The Law thus 'framed' articulates the Action, the Drama, of which its framing is itself one component. 'Inside' and 'outside' the Law are again and again inscribed in the figure of Law, as the Law is broken, 'transgressed', again and again - giving rise, opening-up, again and again, situations in which individuals and groups are faced with the possibility of choosing again the Law, reasserting the Law as frame of action, and as frame (in particular) of this its reassertion.

This History, then, as self-expression of 'I' in the World, is punctuated by critical points at which one man finds himself in the position of presenting the People with the choice of reaffirming the Law as frame of their activity. A man finds himself in a situation in which it is 'open' to him to embody the figure and actuality of 'I', to present the Law as a question, and to frame this choice in that Future which is itself articulated in the primary choice of Law as choice of a frame of Action. That is: the books of the Law are succeeded by books of History subsequent to the Return from Egypt, which in their turn frame the books of the Prophets.

Prophets: men to whom the figure of 'I', its assertion, is open, opened, revealed. Men who may choose or assent to the self-expression of this figure of 'I' in their speech or action, men 'inspired', stepping into the fig-
ure of I AM, and so punctuating the articulation of a History with a choice presented to the People as a whole — just as the History is articulated, in general, through the choices of individuals and groups themselves leading to further situations of choice.

The Law directs the People to ask a prophet for a 'sign': his part in the configuration of Action, corresponding to the limiting frame of the choice of Law as frame of future choice, includes that of 'seeing', of fore-knowledge and fore-telling, corresponding to his participation in the figure of the I AM that frames Time in the figure of Law. It includes also other figures of participation in the framing of things which are not 'open' save through a participation in 'I' as the primary instance of framing what is 'outside' what we as simple men can naturally frame (with, for example, our hands, visibly).

Around the beginning of the Captivity in Babylon the prophet Ezekiel embodied the assertion of I AM in the framing of expulsion from Jerusalem as consequence of departure from the Law. The figure of Return is focussed, towards the end of the sixth century, in the prophecies constituting the latter parts of the book of Isaiah: 'I' in these poems, addressing 'you', Israel, frames a figure of transition. The return marks a turning-point in a universal History, in the Time of an Everlasting Contract, when the Law will be seen to govern the relation of 'inside' and 'outside' Israel, just as Israel has been 'redeemed', renewed, through recognising the reflection of departure from the Law in departure from the Land of the Contract. The Law will become universal, its integration of 'within' and 'without', as two sides of a single frame of History, turning on the figure of Israel's Return. Like Israel, who mark this transition, Men within and without the Law will see that this opposition is itself in the Law, and thus seeing their place in the everlasting frame of their activity, will act in accordance with the Law — will accord with the Law, where before they wandered in darkness, confused by their inability to see the Law as the frame of their action (whether they chose or not). Now all action will be framed in the same Law and so accord — where before actions framed according to limited vision conflicted, though this conflict was itself (as was then unseen) framed in the universal articulation of Law. In this 'vision', the frame of activity in Time, on Earth, is seen to be the self-expression of 'I'; our earthly nature leads us out of the Law, only to enter into a wider Law embracing both sides. Finally we see the Earth itself as a passing frame within the universal frame
of assertion of I AM, of which Heaven and Earth are two (passing) sides.

That is: the figure 'opened up' in the complex configuration of the Return from Babylon corresponds to a cosmic frame of History, a 'cosmic' framing of a universal Story in the figure of Law, Law as primary principle of articulation of the 'elements' of the Story. - Within the universal frame of which Heaven (the place of I AM) and Earth are two complementary 'sides', a Contract is instituted on Earth - a primary correlation of being-within the Law and being-in the Land of the Contract. The general figure of choices leading to situations in which further choices are made, is now framed in a primary figure of a choice of recognising the correlation at Babylon (or in the Exile) of being-outside the Land and being-outside the Law. In this simple figure of correlation, defining the primary 'scene' of History, the Law may now be re-asserted in a universal form, in terms of the inscription of all activity within the primary 'space' of inside and outside the Land of the Contract, and the time or sequence of successive choices. This wider or universal Law frames not only activity within the Land, but through the figure of correlation of transgression and exile opens up the possibility of an integration of all activity, within and without the Land, within and without the Law, within a universal frame. The transgression which led outside the Law and the Land itself fits into a wider scheme, by opening up the possibility of a wider assertion of Law in the wider frame of a World, of which the 'inside' and 'outside' of the Land are two complementary or correlative 'sides'.

That is: the assertion by exiled Israel (the collective agent or actor - 'servant' in Isaiah) of the correlation in the Law of this exile and a prior transgression amounts to a turning-point in World-History, the beginning of the integration of all earthly activity within one unitary frame - the self-expression of I AM in the primary spatial frame of Heaven and Earth as a whole, and the primary temporal sequence of a universal Story, each choice or action leading into the configuration of a subsequent choice and action.

- A turning-point: In the Beginning, a primary distinction of Heaven and Earth in the self-assertion of I AM, distinguishing itself and Heaven (as its Place) from Matter, Earth; next a correlation of these two sides in human choice - earthly nature leading us out of direct participation in the figure of I AM on Earth: and now, in the recognition of
of Earth as the spatial frame of interaction of I AM and earthly nature — in the recognition of this primary configuration of Heaven and Earth in the correlation on Earth of transgression and exile, a new framing of activity (and with it a universal self-expression of I AM) is opened up.

The figure of an integration of all earthly activity within a universal recognition of this simple frame, presented to all the World as a question by Israel's 'redemption', by their inscription of the relations of 'inside' and 'outside' their Land within universal Law as frame of their activity.

This figure of the Return, and of a cosmic Law which mirrors the relations of Heaven and Earth in two 'sides' of an earthly boundary, and of the special part of 'Israel' in effecting the integration of all earthly activity within the unitary frame of this mirroring, marks (then) the opening-up of a new phase of the framing of Jewish activity. — Opens up a more radical figure of our part, of the part of our choice and action, in the universal frame of things, now articulated as a universal Story. A Story beginning with an initial figure of separation of Heaven and Earth, an initial radical self-assertion of I AM, turning about the recognition on Earth of this radical framing of all activity, and thus passing into a universal institution of Law as interface of I AM and Nature, as the whole World recognises, in the activity of Israel, the question of their parts in this Frame and this Story.

— A new phase, in which this figure is itself developed — incorporating the arrival of Alexander, submission to Egypt under the first Ptolemies, syrian conquest, maccabean reassertion of independence, and eventual incorporation within the roman Law.

Over this period, the figure of the institution or recognition throughout the Earth of a universal Law comes to be focused in the figure of an 'anointed' of I AM — of some one man who will be in a position (to whom it will be open) to effect the transition foreseen by 'Isaiah'. 'Anointed' — in hebrew, Messiah; in greek, Christ, ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ. — Anointed: chosen, consecrated, by I AM as his agent, like the priests and kings before the babylonian exile. — For the 'turning-point' of History must be focussed for the whole World in the activity of one man, just as the turning points in the internal History of the jews had been focussed in the Prophets who presented the People as a whole with a choice of returning within, or exclusion from the initial Contract.
By the time of Antiochus Epiphanes and the maccabean revolt, the 'apocalyptic' or revealed scenario of this 'turning-point' of World-History - the 'Day of the Lord', 'Time of the End', 'Judgement of the Nations' appears in the form of a narrative which is set at the time of the Exile, and which situates the conflict with Antiochus and the syrians as the last step in an interaction of earthly and heavenly forces beginning in the prophesy of 'Daniel' at Babylon. The conflict is 'dramatised' or framed as a sort of invocation of 'Michael', the 'Prince of the Jews', the 'angelic' or heavenly force corresponding to the People as a whole: by focusing the framing of resistance in this imminent self-assertion of the archangel Michael against the 'anti-christ' Antiochus, the Revelation or Scheme of 'Daniel' actually works to introduce this figure of 'Michael', the chief intermediary between I AM and the Jews, into the conflict, precisely as the 'force' whose 'part' in the conflict the story or symbolic configuration frames. - The story itself tends to effect the framing of its immediate context according to the story, to realise the 'angelic' intervention it narrates.

Over the following century-and-a-half, this figure of a story framing its own enunciation converges with the parallel developments of Reflection already traced, towards a sort of formal coincidence of those two 'circular' assertions - 'poetic' and 'logical' - in the figure of a Question which I take as constituting a transition into our 'Era'. Thus at Alexandria over this period there develops a 'wisdom literature' (embodied in the greek text of the Jewish 'writings' - in the Septuagint - but not in the hebrew texts) in which the framing of the 'dramatic' circularity of apocalypse as Memra, divine 'Word' is incorporated in the unfolding of the stoic conception of Λόγος. This alexandrian development parallels Posidonius' incorporation in the Stoic scheme of the syrian astrology and angelology which constitutes one side of Jewish apocalyptic after the Exile. At the same time, stoic schemes are incorporated in the apocalyptic framing of the integration of the World within a universal Law.

More generally, one may see a formal parallel and convergence of the 'logical' development of Reflection, within the primary figure of Ἰωύα introduced towards the end of the sixth century, and the 'poetic' or dramatic development of the 'framing' of Jewish activity within the primary figure of the part in universal History of the framing of this
limiting Story in the figure of law. That is: these two radical 'circles' in which the development of 'theory' and the framing of Jewish activity run parallel over five centuries may be seen to pass through successive phases of integration in the common context of successive phases of integration of the 'World' over this period - concluding with the unitary scheme of Augustus' Roman law. The 'logical' and 'poetic' analogues develop from the simple initial schemes of Pythagoras and 'Isaiah' towards their coincidence in the figure of a question - the question of the framing of action, and in particular, of the framing of this very framing itself.

As 'question' this coincidence of 'logical' and 'poetic' circles of Reflection and Dramatisation does not, of course, appear in any definite form to mark the 'beginning' of an Era. It rather corresponds simply to a possibility of framing a 'transition' into our 'Era' in a unitary scheme, to something radically 'open' in the transition: its 'framing'. The framing of the transition simply as 'question', as a systematic open-ness to different constructions, as 'open', itself marks the closing of an 'Era' opened up by this figure of question, open-ness. In the recognition of the possibility of framing this transition simply as what is open to different 'framings', this figure of 'open-ness' comes, as it were, 'full-circle'. In such a 'full circle' parallel framings of the Question of framing may themselves be inscribed, whereas the intermediate dynamics of these parallel and apparently opposed framings (which frame their opposition, one to another) systematically exclude any symmetric or unitary framing of the different historical accounts of the Question. Indeed, it is only in the systematic configuration or articulation of this 'full-circle' from the formal coincidence of 'logical' and 'poetic' circularity in the Question, that the Question may itself be identified as such.

- In particular, the figure of the transition as 'question' may be first discovered in an initial divergence of two primary 'framings' of the Question posed by the convergence of Reflection and Action in what was subsequently framed as a 'beginning of an Era', a turning-point of Time, a passage from one figure of Time to another, into its 'transfiguration'. - Two 'primary' framings, resolutions, of the figure of Question, of what is 'open' in the configuration of the transition, in the con-
vergence or coincidence of poetic and logical orders of questioning in the unitary World of Augustus: framings of this transition within the poetic circularity of a framing of action which (in this) frames itself as a critical act, and within the logical circularity which inscribes 'theory' or reflection within the frame of an initial 'psychical' actuality of the logical distinction of logical and physical orders.

These two parallel steps, parallel and complementary 'markings' or framing of the transition, are taken - in their initial or minimal or most radical configuration - by Jesus of Nazareth (in the judeo-syrian borderland of Galilee) and Philo the Jew, of Alexandria - and this around the same time: parallel 'first steps' over about the first third of our first century of years - a 'first century' later defined in terms of the 'dramatic' part of Jesus 'the Christ', since this 'dramatic' resolution of the question is more 'central' in the poetic frame of a universal History than the 'one-sided' logical step of Philo.

In terms of the figure of the framing of action as question, at which the first half of this First Part arrived (and in which it concluded or closed), the second half of this Part may be minimally characterised as a successive inscription within the 'logical' figure of Philo's reflection of the poetic figure of 'the Christ'. As I indicated at the close of the first half, this inscription naturally falls into three major phases, each defined by the 'coming full-circle' of some simple subordinate figure of integration of 'poetic' or 'dramatic' in the logical circuit of Theory or Reflection. The first of the three phases, then, closes (in the 'third century') with the theoretical question of the logical symmetry of the 'poetic' and 'logical' framing of the Question - and this paralleled by the unitary framing of 'christian' activity in the roman World: by the figure of a κοινοτέτοιοι εὐαγγελισμοί, a single Assembly in which the previously independent 'christian' groups were then integrated.

As I also noted at the close of the first half, the three 'phases' of the second half will here be inscribed within the figure of the simple 'dramatic' scheme framed in the radical figure of the question of framing action.
Thus here in the second half, as before in the first half, the questioning of my identification of figures 'at work' in text and context will be paralleled or mirrored in the identification of successful figures as questioning of earlier such 'figures'. So that the questioning of any particular such identification will itself be framed in the radical or primary question which frames this account as a whole - the question, precisely, of its 'frame' or framing.

To begin accounting for this 'second half', then:

What is the minimal figure of the 'poetic' or 'dramatic' framing of the transitional Question - of the identification of what is 'open' in that transition (or in 'this' transition, since its identification here as Question is itself an essential element of the 'transition' here identified)?

Is it not simply the question of the part of 'the Christ', the 'anointed' of I AM, of 'I', in the transition? Of the part, indeed, in this figure of 'the Christ' of the choice of that part, of the framing of a man's action as 'Christ' in an 'apocalyptic' scenario or scheme whose very enunciation belongs to that 'part'? A focussing of the 'abstract' schemes of 'Isaiah' and 'Daniel' (and the latter's successors in the field or figure of Jewish apocalypse) in a scheme which directly incorporates the enunciation of the scheme as focal element - as the presentation of the 'messianic' question of transition into a universal Law?

- A scheme of a universal or radical Drama in which the 'part' of the Messiah or Christ becomes 'open' as the choice of that part - a choice framed or opened-up in the augustan integration of the 'World', and focussed in Judea?

- For what is the minimal figure of the 'poetic' framing of what is open in the framing of action taken simply as such? Simply the story that if you 'believe' a story 'with all your heart', it becomes true.
- Simply the framing of our part in framing action and our part in it: our part in 'actuali	'y', and the implicit application of this figure of actuality (of our part in the 'working' of the Frame of things) to its own enunciation. Simply that figure of 'Faith' we found (above) in 'Mark's' account of the Christ - the figure of framing activity within the actuality of I AM, within the figure of 'I' as it is most radically 'open' in the configuration or situation of our choice.

'If you believe a story it becomes true' - and this, most particularly, in the case of just that story of truth or actuality itself. So that if one doesn't believe such an actuality possible then (according to the story) that is because one sees one's activity framed in some way in which (indeed) it isn't possible (for this conception one has of oneself). That is: one hasn't assented to the basic or radical figure open to each of us simply by our being (participating in the figure of) 'I', of framing the part of our framing of an action. ... And the figure of the 'Christ', in whom Isaiah's 'turning-point of History' is focused as critical points in the internal history of the Jews prior to the exile had been focussed in the framing of a choice for Israel by the Prophets corresponds (then) to the part of marking this choice, open to each of us inasmuch as 'we' each participate in the figure of an 'I' or 'I AM' which expresses the framing of the framing of activity in its minimal form of simple self-assertion, 'my' assumption of the part of framing my self-assertion as 'mine'.

The Christ, that is, is the part of assuming the part of Christ, the part of first expressing the possibility of framing one's part so as to include in it the figure of this framing. - The Christ as minimal instance of this figure of the 'part' in the universal Drama of Creation: as simple participation in the figure of 'I', 'God' in 'us'. - In the figure of this participation as the activity of 'I' simply as such - of 'God' - in incarnate humanity. - In Man, whose most radical choice, then, is framed in the symmetry of 'logical' and 'physical' orders of his identity, of this 'I', this Name, Word. - The choice between a Matter in which we act simply in accordance with a part in some frame whose choice does not figure in that 'part', and a 'Spirit' - our entry, in the self-assertion of I AM and our assent to it, into a part framed as itself framing its part in the universal Drama. - The choice between 'The World', Earth, and the 'Kingdom', 'Rule', 'Government', of Heaven (the 'Place' of 'I' simply as such). - A choice
which is itself framed for us by the 'Christ's' first step into this common figure of 'I'. 'I' distinguishing itself, in the cosmic frame of Law, from the mechanical inscription of a formal figure of assertion in an earthly Economy of figure-inscribed-within-figure - an actuality of I AM distinguishing itself from its formal inscription in the passive play of figure, from the passive economy of World, from that very figure - 'World' - of 'my' passive assent to the mechanical part of 'I' which excludes my choice of this part, which excludes the 'heavenly' actuality of 'I' of which this mechanical part, and its material embodiment, is a mere Image.

How does the choice of the part of presenting this question of our choice - of our recognition of our 'responsibility' for the framing of our part in a universal Drama - amount to the part of the 'Christ', in whom Isaiah's figure of the integration of all earthly activity in the frame of Law has come to be focussed?

'Isaiah' (the latter parts of the Book of Isaiah) had presented the Jews with the assertion of the Law - or rather its reassertion - in the correlation of exile and transgression, as transition into an integration of 'inside' and 'outside' the Land of the Contract within a universal recognition (in this Jewish act of inscription of Space and Time within the primary dramatic frame of Law) of Law as primary articulation of all activity, all assertion, in a cosmic Drama. But although this assertion of Drama was itself 'inscribed' 'outside' the Land, in a correlation of transgression and exile, and a correlation of the affirmation of that correlation with Return, this configuration of cosmic Drama framed in Law and marked (at the critical point of the Drama) as a universal question, 'what is your part in all this (O Nations) since the Scene of the Drama includes all the World, 'inside' and 'outside' of the focal Land?', the self-expression of the figure of I AM through universal recognition by all men of their part in the Drama and Law was not actually effected in the Return. Over the subsequent centuries of conflict and foreign domination - of 'external' framing of the part of Israel in World-History - the effecting of the transition from Law as the internal frame of Jewish activity to Law recognised as the universal articulation of World-History came to be focussed in the figure of the Christ.
At the beginning of 'our Era', augustan Law framed activity throughout a roman 'World', - embodying the figure of 'World' as unitary economy of 'inscription' of figure-within-figure, action-within-action, within the working of the whole. - A whole in which, as we have seen, the very part of Augustus (and his immediate successors) as primary locus of Decision, Choice, was itself framed in the Law. - As, indeed, was the part of the Jewish Law as a subordinate frame.

Within the 'mechanical' economy of such a 'World' - such a unitary frame of inscription of activity within wider activity (in which this figure of 'inscription' is itself one component) - arises, or opens up, the simple question of 'my' part in such activity. For the 'World' determines 'my' part only insofar as I identify my part in the situation in which I find myself. The stoic, for example, as 'stoic', has the part (precisely) of 'duty', officium, subordinating an 'I' which somehow stands outside the specificity, the limited figure, of any 'part', to a part. To a part as determined by this stoic figure of 'I's' primary actuality. ... But why, though, should I understand this 'I' as a stoic? How can I choose the part of the stoic in the first place? - The argument of the stoic is circular: the choice of the 'part' of stoic is itself presented within a stoic figure of choice: this is the limiting circle and impasse we found in Cicero's framing of his activity as Lawyer: it was the Lawyer 'in' Cicero (precisely) who (or perhaps 'which') chose the part of Lawyer, and presented a judicious deliberation upon the primacy of deliberation in the framing of activity.

... But the figure of 'I' which asserts simply its assertion, its framing of this act of assertion as its 'own', stands outside this circular principle of 'identification' of a part in terms of that part as already somehow assumed, but not 'chosen', not inscribed within the radical figure of simple assertion or choice, of 'I' which cannot choose but choose, which cannot be within 'its action within the figure of choice'.

'I', which distinguishes its radical actuality from any such unquestioned or circular 'identification' of 'my' part; which presents a radical choice between assenting to the mechanics of 'choice' attaching to the part of Stoic or Lawyer or Priest or 'Job' ('I'm only doing my job') and seeing that there is indeed a choice between this unquestioning assent to some 'part' in which one seems to find oneself (without choosing it), and the part of radical choice itself, - Between acting out a part which one has not chosen and does not question (except in the terms available to
such a part as, for example, the stoic might 'choose' in terms of stoic 'choice' (or 'assent') to be a stoic), and assuming the part of radical choice, which is simply the distinguishing-itself from the abdication of choice in some mechanical image of oneself. Choice chooses to be choice, rather than not to choose, rather than excluding the question 'what is my part' by identifying oneself with some image in which that question is not open, in which there is no question of the part one must play, the 'choices' one must make.

This radical figure of the part of choice, of the distinction of my actuality from some part, some image 'I' has not (have not) chosen, corresponds exactly to the primary figure of athenian Tragedy, of Action or Drama, the mystery of Dionysos which was taken as a poetic analogue of the pythagorean self-assertion of 'I' in around the beginning of the fifth century. 'Tragedy' turns precisely upon the transgression of ἔφεσις, of a circular identification of oneself with some 'part'. Thus (to take Aristotle's example) Oedipus assumes the part of Reason, only to find the root of this 'part' in Confusion, in the figure of an Identification, an irrational and unquestioned identity, which reflects in the imaginary space and time of the Drama the 'identification' of Aristotle's rational spectator with the actor, with Oedipus. Actor and spectator participate (then) through this 'ritual' action or activity, in a moral actuality of Choice which, in the configuration of the ritual drama or action, distinguishes itself from the spectator's identification with Oedipus' illusory identity; from the image of self or identity in the 'play' of figure, the free play of figures of inscription of one figure in another - the free play of figures of 'this' side and 'that' side of the action, of 'inner' self or identity, and 'outer' thing, 'reality'.

We saw above how this initially poetic figure of athenian ritual drama was successively incorporated within the logical circuit of ὧν ὑπέγραφε, within the figure of Reflection itself taken as (in the last instance) unquestioned. Thus Aristotle as it were 'purged' his initial distinction of two unquestioned 'sides' of ὁ ἐστι, position, of the confusion attaching to this initial identification, by inscribing just this figure of 'confusion' within a rational figure of the distinction of this distinction from the 'poetic' figure of irrational identification.
Stoics and epicureans, in their turn, recognised the part, in this configuration, of Choice — brought into question the initial distinction of two 'sides' of position, and the dynamic of the self-distinction of Reason from the confused play of figure, of the Image. But they framed this Choice in complementary 'one-sided' ways, understanding the initial resolution of the 'two sides' of positing from one side or the other, and unable to question or frame what decides between these complementary 'versions', except in terms of one version, one side, or the other. Academics, in their turn, brought such one-sidedness into question, but couldn't resolve the more radical question of whether to act or to question the basis of choice and action (this questioning itself being an action).

Towards the beginning of our Era, as we saw, with the convergence of stoic and academic 'parts' or positions, the various determinations of choice, 'logical' (with the stoics), 'physical' (epicureans) and 'poetic' (academics) tend towards a formal coincidence in the question of the frame of action, considered simply as such, recognised as radically 'open' to different accounts, different framings. At the same time, I have suggested, the jewish figure of Law as framing all activity in a unitary cosmic Story or History, tends towards the question of the part of this very framing of History in that History itself. — Tends towards the figure of a transition into a New Age, as this question is focussed in the figure of a Christ, a Messiah. — In the maccabean revolt (for example) in the middle of the second century (when Rome first achieved a mediterranean dominance that was to be integrated in Augustus' 'Empire'), the 'framing' of the rebellion (beginning with 'Daniel') actually enters (through a kind of fictional displacement of the locus of assertion or framing) into the configuration of activity which it frames.

Might the 'part' of 'the Christ', then, as primary or first poetic figure of the part of framing History in History, mark an elementary incorporation of the 'logical' figure of the Question of the Frame of Action, within the poetic figure of that question as practical, as actually 'open' in the unitary integration of a 'World' under roman Law?
 Might this part (then) amount to a minimal 'poetic' figure, a minimal 'dramatic' configuration, of the Question of the Frame or framing of Action?

- To a marking of the question of the part of Choice in a Kosmos framed as simply Story, Action, Drama? - To an inscription in a radical and universal form, in the figure of World - as simple correlate of that figure in which we are all involved - of the question, for each of 'us' (as each being 'I', each a locus of radical Choice), of our part in the Story...

- A marking of that question at a point of coincidence or convergence of a roman Law as unitary frame of the relations of different 'parts' (with their associated 'duties'), and Jewish Law as articulating the question of the part of 'I' in our choice and activity. As we saw, the figure of 'I' and its radical actuality of Choice is systematically 'open' in the figure of a unitary articulation of one activity within another, within 'the World' as comprehensive Activity, as mechanical frame of inscription of one figure within another. With the formal inscription or integration of Jewish Law within the unitary frame of a roman World, the question of each man or woman's 'part' in Kosmos and World is framed in the simple symmetry of a roman inscription of the instance of 'I' in a mechanical Economy of Law, and the 'messianic' distinction of an actuality of I AM from this its inscription in a worldly or earthly economy. - That is to say, the simple symmetry of the 'mechanical' inscription of the Jewish 'Law' as one department of the roman Law (governing a range of subordinate, 'Jewish', activity) within the wider Activity of the roman World or Empire as a whole, and the 'dramatic' inscription of this roman Law (and its formal inclusion of the Jewish Law as one department) within the figure of I AM distinguishing itself from any image, any of the 'parts' correlated in the articulation of roman Law.

' The Christ', then, amounts to the part of inscribing, marking, this question in the 'mechanical' or earthly frame of 'World', marking it in this figure of a dynamic of inscription of 'figure' within 'figure', as the question 'Who am I?'. In this question is focussed the question attaching to each of us, simply as each 'I': 'Who am I? - What is my part in the symmetry of these two 'versions' of the 'World'... for in the 'Christ' version it is my part to choose between these two versions; in the 'worldly'...
version such a 'choice' makes no sense - the World is simply the World, and itself frames my part in it. Seeing my 'I' in this figure of a World, I have no choice but to be just what I find myself to be, just this 'me'. I don't even know what this 'me' is exactly, but it's just a fact, somehow, independent of my choice.

In the scenario, the story, enunciated by this 'Christ', then, his part is just to present us with a question - Who, what, is he? And there is a suggestion that if we consider that he might be the Jewish Messiah, then this question will in turn begin to make sense. - And in discovering how our part in framing his part 'works' in that story, we discover the operation of 'I' or 'I AM' 'in the World', as articulating this World so that an inscription of our choice in this actuality of 'I' is always open, and this inscription of choice and action in this figure of pure self-assertion itself leads into a wider configuration in which it is more extensively 'open'. - For example, the injunction to consider our 'transgressions', our abdication of this choice of 'I' in the past, when we 'pray' or (as it were) 'step into' this figure of Choice, repeats the figure of 'redemption' familiar from Isaiah - the reintegration of our actuality in the figure of 'I', through the correlation of abdication of this 'I' and the situation in which I find(s) myself - a correlation of 'transgression' and 'exile' - of assenting to an image of identity rather than a working or actuality of self-assertion, and then finding myself somehow only an image of myself, divorced from being.

... And this question, 'who is this man?', then fits into the scenario or story, the 'apocalypse', he presents: for if, in presenting the question of his part, he induces me to assume 'my' part in his story, this in turn induces others to ask 'what's happening?', what is the story of this situation which they too are 'in' (insofar as their wondering what it means, what to make of it, is itself part of the story of which they're trying to make something)? Thus the question becomes as it were more and more widely diffused, and this in turn tends towards effecting the transition presented in the story.

What, more exactly (then) is this story?

- It is in a way a simple repetition or re-assertion of the figure of a transition into a universal recognition of the basic 'working'
of Kosmos as self-expression of I AM, differentiating itself from the mere possibility of this self-assertion—a reassertion of the figure expressed in terms of 'I' and 'you' in the latter parts of the Book of Isaiah. The transition will be effected through people wondering about the story told by this man Jesus, in which this very telling of the story is the turning-point. Their part in the story (according to the story) amounts to deciding, choosing, what to make of this very story. If they (this is how it goes) see how this choice is open to them, and interpret it according to the story, then they will enter into the coordination of activity in the World, in the figure of self-assertion of I or I AM. At a certain point, then, corresponding to the Jewish 'Day of I AM', this 'coordination' or divine government, the 'Kingdom of God', will simply distinguish itself openly as Actuality, and those who have abdicated their part in the Kingdom (those who have refused to recognize the part of their interpretation of the story in the story, those who have assented to an image of identity rather than an actuality or 'working' of their identity in the scheme) will somehow find themselves excluded from the New World (this bit seems to be somewhat ambiguous).

Now according to the subsequent accounts—the subsequent 'interpretations' of this story or apocalypse, revelation, the focal element in this story is the distinction of the true identity of the Christ from the activity of an ordinary man within the material economy of bodies. That is, the recognition in this figure of Jesus as Christ of a radical actuality which distinguishes itself from 'normal' activity within the familiar worldly economy of 'embodiment', that latter being simply one component of the more radical actuality. — The more radical actuality of a figure of personality of which the visible and tangible embodiment is but an image, an element, a subordinate part. That is: the general figure of the question of a distinction between the 'I' and the 'part'—between, for example, 'I' and a Lawyer who some 'I' might be (Cicero, for example), here appears in its most radical form as a distinction between 'I' and its primary image, a body (with its familiar part in the 'mechanical' economy of World or Earth).

What, then, is the figure or configuration of this distinction, in the 'story'?

The man Jesus, it appears, was condemned under Jewish Law for
sacrilege: he marked the question, already alluded to, posed by the meeting of roman and jewish Law - the distinction between the inscription of the jewish Law within a roman Economy of the World, and the inscription of such 'material' Economy as a whole within the figure of participation in the self-assertion of I AM, systematically 'open' in the material economy of our embodiment.

... Then the 'part' of jewish Law as framed within roman Law - its 'response' to this radical question posed by the coincidence of these two 'Laws', is itself a basic or primary element in the question itself. The question is determined by this 'mechanical' version of the jewish Law - by the jewish Priests and Lawyers of the Council who play these parts of Priest and Lawyer in abstraction from the radical part of 'I', of Choice - as 'outside' this Law, this 'part' of the jewish Law within a roman Economy of 'World'. The Image excludes the question of its actuality, just as the part of Lawyer excludes the radical question of the choice of that part, the framing of one's actions as those of the Lawyer, the inscription of one's choice and deliberation within that limited figure.

... And this worldly 'image' of the jewish Law determines a correlation of this question 'outside' the Image, and the 'exclusion' of the man responsible for this question from the World.

... And it precisely in this correlation that the question of the relation between the part of 'embodying' this correlation (as Israel in Exile 'embodied' the correlation of exile and transgression in the part of Isaiah's 'suffering servant' and sacrificial lamb) and the part of 'the Christ' is itself 'embodied'. The jewish authorities, in their application to the roman authorities for a sentence of death upon the man Jesus of Nazareth (for this matter of 'exclusion' from the World had to be referred from jewish Law to its part in roman Law as ultimate judicial instance) made this question the fundamental charge, the fundamental sacrilege which called for the sentence of death, exile from the World: 'He said he was the Christ'. ... Yet according to the 'christian' version of the story, he only presented the relation between the jewish 'Christ' and his part as a question... A question that, in the 'christian' account corresponds - precisely - to the part of 'the Christ'. -The jewish Council, then, inscribing its Law within a roman Economy of 'World', excludes this radical question by attaching it to the 'part' of playing the Christ, a
'part' which has, indeed, no place in the figure of 'World', and the inscription of the articulation of choice in the Jewish Law within a 'worldly' economy in which each choice is in turn inscribed within the unquestioned assent to some 'part' of Priest or Lawyer or whatever else.

... And here, in this primary figure of correlation of the 'part' of the Christ with exclusion from the World and its Economy of the unquestioned part, is posed the most radical question, the most radical configuration in which the self-assertion of 'I' is open to our participation. - A question 'prefigured', as it were, by the analogous figure in Isaiah. For in this image of exclusion of the question of the part from the Economy of the Image, is opened up a configuration of a radical reassertion of 'I', in relation to the material Economy of World or Image simply as such. - And, according to the story which presents this 'opening' as inscribed in the very Economy of the World as that story, we understand our part in this self-expression of 'I' (as an Actuality distinguishing itself from any inscription in the Economy of Matter and Image) by participating in an actuality of 'the Christ' which (if we choose) distinguishes itself from the limiting figure of the mere 'part' (from the inscription of its actuality in the figure of some man, some human embodiment) in the configuration of a reassertion of 'I' in the correlation of the question of 'I' and its exclusion from the 'World'. - That is, in the figure of a reassertion of 'the Christ' in the configuration of his death, his 'exclusion' from the World, according to the worldly image of such 'exclusion' (bodily exclusion, material exclusion). - A 'reappearance' of this same actuality of 'the Christ', 'after' death, through the very figure of his choosing this 'death' as correlation of the Image of Actuality, and the image of exclusion from Actuality of the question of the relation of Image and Actuality. - A 'resurrection' of 'the Christ', as 'first-born of the dead'.

- Then (again: according to the story) a transitional image of this 'spiritual' actuality of 'the Christ' (whatever exactly one is to make of that paradoxical image) leads into a more radical participation in the actuality of this figure of 'the risen Christ', as simply a figure (or perhaps force, or actuality) 'at work' in the limiting frame of the Story - in the primary configuration of I or I AM distinguishing itself from the mere possibility of its self-assertion, marked by the familiar 'economy' of the figure of 'I' in the World (the way, for example, that children naturally come to recognise themselves as the 'I' that as-
serts that it is asserting itself in this 'word', 'I', this sound, when they 'make' it).

An 'image' of the risen Christ leads into a more radical participation in the actuality of that figure of 'Christ': in the story, the bodily risen Jesus soon leaves 'the World', and his invisible 'Spirit' appears to the 'apostles' or 'messengers' which he had earlier framed as the prime exponents of the story (this choice, again, being one element in the story they were chosen to expound).

What are we, after two millenia, to make of all this, of this 'story' (insofar as we can actually regard it as a unitary frame somehow 'behind' its various versions)?

- The story, for a start, includes this very question of what we are to make of it. Are we, with our more developed 'mechanical' understanding of all activity to simply inscribe the whole business within some mechanical delirium or 'madness'? ... But then that move is itself already inscribed within the story as one possible response - as one way of simply refusing the radical question posed (in the story) by the story.

- But what else can we 'rationally' make of it?

Can we not, quite 'rationally' - within the figure of an aristotelian initial separation of two 'sides' of mechanical reality (inner imagination and outer thing) - at least recognise, in the inscription in the story of our interpretation of the story, the figure of a question?

- 'I', then, (me), writing this, can inscribe the part of this my writing in the story, as simply the presentation of the story (and thus this my part in it) as a radical expression of the figure of Question.

- Radical, in that the figure attaches (quite rationally) to what we make of it in a systematic way: it incorporates as one element the move of our abdication of any part in the question, which is one possible response; it attaches directly to the figure of what is open to each 'I', insofar as each such 'I' recognises its formal implication in the frame of the
story, the Drama of 'History'. - Its place or part, in the very situation in which the question arises, of choosing between 'I' and some part, some abdication of the radical Choice implicit in the figure of 'I' - in that figure which, insofar as 'I' respond to the question posed by the story, I am personally implicated.

- Thus, for example, I, writing all this down, at once find myself framing this 'christian' story within the question posed at the outset by this 'book', this frame of writing - this story - and find that, in thus framing that story, I am inscribing this very framing of the story in the figure or frame of that story itself. The story is at once inscribed in the figure of 'question' found at the outset in the framing of these words as words, and at the same time includes this framing of the story as question, and the appearance (at the outset) of this writing as questionable, in the cosmic Drama it presents. - In that Drama, the implication of (my) 'I' in the 'economy' of questioning, of Reflection, as one element in the wider Economy of an earthly World, itself simply constitutes a part of what is ('ontically') open. I find myself, through pursuing my initially unquestioned 'part' in a worldly economy of Reflection, faced with the (involved in the) figure of what is 'open' to me as a limiting question, in which all the prior figures of my questioning may be inscribed. - I find this radical 'open-ness', in which, for example, I have the incomprehensible possibility of asserting my difference from 'I' otherwise embodied (you, for example, in the singular and plural) - this, and the complementary 'closure' which somehow restricts this open-ness so that something (rather than uniform Everything) is open (I who write, for example, embodied 'here' and 'now' have different possibilities of assertion from you who read what I have written). - An open-ness most radical in that it actually incorporates the framing of what is open, the resolution of this my situation into what is 'open' in it and what is not. An 'open' in which is inscribed or incorporated the symmetry of what is open and closed in any situation in which 'I' find myself.

- In which 'I' find myself - or perhaps, 'I' finds myself, finds 'me' somehow open to me as a possibility of self-assertion. - As a child might find in a sound, 'I' (or 'me', more probably), a radical possibility of self-assertion, of first being himself or herself (or perhaps, 'itself', before the possibility of 'him' and 'her' has opened up).

... Now this 'story' of the Christ, which I find inscribed in
the very fabric of my situation (as a figure in which so many activities, through 'institutions' - through their very 'institution' - or directly, are inscribed) presents me with the possibility of framing this most radical 'open-ness' of my situation (the way that it is open to me to frame what is open to me) in the 'poetic' figure of a story in which my choice of this story as frame is one element. - In the situation in which I find myself, this is one possibility, one thing 'open' to me. - And from the very correlation of this figure and the figure of your reading this, it is equally open to 'you', too: you find it in these words, which are part of your situation (insofar as you are reading them), just as I found the question attaching to my part in the economy of Reflection (in which, without knowing quite why, I found myself engaged).

Again, then, what are we to make of this situation?

Well, as I have already tried to explain, I find I must make of it a question, framed in the radical question of this writing and reading, as itself framing that (rather, 'this') question... and I must of course leave you to make of it whatever you choose (that being your choice whether I or you like it or not).

- I must make of it a question (in which that very 'must' is of course a basic component). I must leave it 'open': but that does not exclude my making it fairly specific. For example, I may ('without prejudice') recognise in this question the primary 'poetic' figure, in this our common earthly situation, of what is perhaps a more radical Question posed by the coincidence of 'logical' and 'poetic' figures of what is 'open' (what is in question) which I have taken as a figure of 'transition' into this our Era.

- 'Perhaps' more radical: certainly this 'Question' is 'logically' prior to its inscription in the 'poetic' frame of the 'christian' story or question. - And, indeed, as I have already remarked, this transitional coincidence of logical and poetic orders (presented in the poetic frame of the christian story as the configuration of Incarnation of the Christ) has a 'logical' presentation in Antiquity which parallels (in the reflection of the alexandrian Philo) its 'poetic' presentation in the figure of the Christ.
Furthermore, the complementary inscriptions of these two orders of the transitional Question, one in another, through successive phases of the Tradition, constitutes (as, again, I have already remarked) a primary figure of development, in which the second half of what I have taken as a 'First Part' of the Tradition may be inscribed in a unitary and systematic manner. That is to say, one may 'frame' this second half of the First Part as a series of parallel steps, in each of which the prior inscription of logical within poetic orders of the Question is reinscribed in a reassertion of the logical order, and the prior inscription of poetic in logical orders is reinscribed within the poetic order (to eventually become Christian 'orthodoxy', as a unitary version of the Christian 'story' becomes one element in the unitary articulation of the Christian community as a 'catholic church').
What, then, of Philo? What of his 'part' in this scheme, his part in this book and its relations to a context in which we write or read it?

We know, from his own account of an embassy to Caligula, that he was over fifty at the time of that visit to Rome. Caligula, succeeding Augustus' successor Tiberius in 37, decreed in the following year that he be worshipped as a god throughout his Empire. Many Jews, who would admit (in accordance with their Law) of no other 'god' but I AM, were put to death - this, most particularly, in Alexandria - and Philo was chosen by the Jewish community of that city to petition the emperor for the reassertion of the place of Jewish Law within the Roman constitution of the imperial province of Egypt. The unsuccessful embassy shortly preceded the emperor's assassination in 41, which Philo was taken to have prophesied, upon the failure of his mission.

Thus Philo's intellectual 'flourishing' (according to the conceptions of Antiquity) was roughly contemporary with the death of 'the Christ' around 30. Furthermore, each figure, each 'part', is framed in the configuration of Jewish Law in a Roman World, and the question of the part of divinity in that configuration. Caligula had taken it upon himself to assert his part of himself framing this part in the framing of 'the World', in the figure of 'god' - whereas the 'divine Augustus' had only assented to a widespread and more or less spontaneous attribution to him of this figure throughout the Empire.

...But in Philo's case, the part in the convergence and confrontation of the two Laws is itself subordinate - it may be 'inscribed' as one component or element - to the meeting of Jewish Law and that predominantly 'Greek' Reflection that amounts, as we saw, to one 'side' of the Roman 'World', one 'side' of the closed circuit of a Mediterranean 'Culture' which itself incorporates as one component the relations of 'inside' and 'outside' of its circuit, of itself. The dominance, in Philo's 'part' of the figure of 'Greek' Reflection, and its relations to the general 'Economy' of a Roman World in which Alexandria was the central Market, and the central intellectual 'Forum', is perhaps suggested by Philo's 'position' in the Alexandrian community: the Jewish historian
Josephus (in his rather 'greek' reconstruction of Jewish history down to the revolt of 66-70 in which he himself played a prominent part) tells us that Philo's father had been prominent in Palestine before moving to Alexandria, where his family was the noblest among the Jewish aristocracy. Philo's elder brother Alexander was in charge of Taxes at Alexandria, the richest man in the city (and thus perhaps in the world of which it was the economic focus), and an old friend of Claudius, who succeeded Caligula as Emperor. Philo himself was to occupy an equally prominent place in the 'intellectual forum', where the Romans had continued to fund the Ptolemies' Museum and Library as departments of the Egyptian state.

Just as the 'poetic' framing of that meeting of reflection and world in what I have called a 'transitional question' is 'focused' in Judea, so the 'logical' framing of the same radical figure seems to be focused at Alexandria. Thus I traced in (barest) outline the 'poetic' or 'dramatic' figure of the framing of action or activity, down from the Greek city-state at the beginning of the fifth century, through its incorporation within a Macedonian 'empire', and the subordination of this Macedonian rule to the power of Rome, to the unitary framing of Mediterranean activity in the Roman 'world' articulated, around the beginning of 'our Era', about the 'imperium' of Augustus, who frames his own part of framing law as primary frame of activity, within this frame or figure of law itself. Within the figure of a Roman law as frame of a Roman world, in which one activity is inscribed within another (one 'figure' of activity within another), in the limiting figure of law itself - within the limiting figure of this very 'inscription'. In that limit the question arises of the frame of a Kosmos, a cosmic law, in which this unitary 'world' of inscription and its economy might itself be inscribed and 'justified'. And in that question Roman law meets a Jewish law whose articulation of the two 'sides' of Heaven and Earth (or world) has itself been widened to the point where the question arises of the part in cosmic history of the inscription of the frame of this history or Drama in the figure of Earth or world.

In a parallel development, the part of the figure of reflection, of the 'logical' circle (in which logical distinction distinguishes itself from the physical difference by which this very distinction is marked), in a Kosmos which it reflects within the intermediate circuit of culture (as 'poetic' frame of activity), is itself again and again reinscribed within
this very figure of Reflection itself. I traced this dynamic or economy of Reflection (in outline) from an initial point (in the Pythagorean figure of \( \theta \)) down through the recognition (around the middle of the fourth century) of the figure of Reflection itself inscribed within Reflection, and through Carneades' recognition in this figure of the 'self-activity' of the 'I' which frames itself as framing action, down to the recognition of Reflection itself as one activity among others, which to determine simply in terms of an unquestioned activity of reflection seemed somehow arbitrary. - That is, the figure of Reflection (like the figure of Law) was widened (through the dynamic of reinscription of relations of text and context within the figure of text) down to the point where it discovered or confronted the question posed by the symmetry of 'logical' and 'poetic' orders of the 'frame'—a question which cannot, in principle, be resolved within the figure of a Reflection 'abstracted' from the actual situation of abstraction, from the initial 'move' into the figure of Reflection.

It will, I hope, be immediately evident that this radical Question: why think rather than act, to resolve this symmetry of Reflection and Action? is itself simply the question of 'framing' posed logically—and is thus simply the 'logical' figure of access to an 'open-ness' in which even this matter of how the question is to be posed, is itself 'in question'. - That is, the two complementary figures of Law as frame of Activity, and of Reflection, go through parallel 'economies' of development (from an initial correlation in the Pythagorean 'mystery'), until they eventually converge and coincide in the figure of a Question, which incorporates the question as to how this question is itself to be framed.

At Alexandria the 'dramatic' frame of this radical Question is reflected in the resurgence of 'Pythagorean' schemes or figures of the place of Reflection in a Kosmos which it directly and exactly 'mirrors'. Such 'Neopythagoreanism', with its inscription of the interplay of all figures within a primary frame of Symmetry disrupted by a radical actuality of 'framing' Kosmos (in which this framing of the radical actuality itself participates), marks a formal convergence of the 'Athenian' and 'Alexandrian' traditions, after their initial divergence in the third century. In the symmetry of the Neopythagorean scheme is mirrored the symmetry of the Question: What is involved in the very actuality of this figure of Question? - Well, the Stoic figure of the rational inscription of such rational inscription in Reason; the symmetric Epicurean
inscription of that initial inscription in a physical order (in which alone such a rational act is 'open' to us); the academic question of the poetic symmetry of these complementary actualities of the mark ... and the actuality of the resolution of this last symmetry, which actuality is itself indirectly 'marked' by our recognition of the mark as mark, with its complementary logical and physical orders - the peripatetic order of the 'working' of the whole configuration, of the 'working' of the marking of this 'actuality' as 'outside' the poetic order of the mark.

The relations of these various orders, the 'play' of their inscription, one in the other, is thus formally 'framed' in the familiar pythagorean symmetries of point or unit as marking the figure of 'mark' simply as such - in its minimal expression. The various 'logical', 'physical', 'psychical', 'ontical', 'theological' aspects of the mathematical poetics of the point and unit are developed in an (in principle) unlimited play of reinscription of a primary symmetry of these elementary orders, within the various elements of that primary symmetry corresponding to the various orders. In particular, an initial theological actuality reflected in the initial mark or unit, reappears in the 'quaternary' correlation of two sides of the mark (theological and 'poetic') with the poetic symmetry of logical and physical 'sides' of the mark; this quaternary configuration in which the initial One is supplemented by a Trinity, in turn unfolds into a ten-fold symmetry in which the four basic orders are further correlated, and so on.

Yet this 'neopythagorean' inscription of the interplay of stoic, epicurean, platonian and aristotelian figures within an arithmetical order of symmetry, itself only frames the question of our part in this play or interplay - just as the roman World with its unitary Economy of inscription of activity within activity only frames the question 'Who am I?.. Who should I be, in order to choose who or what to be?.. How choose how to choose?'. For the neopythagorean scheme only incorporates the self-distinction of Actuality from its mathematical poetics as itself one element of that symmetric poetics.

- It is within this analogue, then, of the 'part' of the Christ in the symmetric inscriptions of roman and jewish Law(s), one within the other, that we find the 'part' of Philo, framing Actuality within a primary figure of Choice, in which he inscribes his very choice of this frame or figure as primary.
Choice

In the choice of Choice as primary Frame, primary framing of Actuality, the 'transitional Question' as focus or turning-point of this First Part (of our narrative) finds its initial 'logical' framing - just as it found an initial 'poetic' framing in the identification of the 'part' of I AM opened up in the configuration of that Question, with the part of 'the Christ', the Anointed One. In each case a choice of Choice is framed in the Jewish figure of Law as dramatic order of Kosmos. A primary actuality or working of framing is found in the configuration of a step into the figure of I AM: a configuration articulated by Jewish Law in the free play of figure, be this in the poetic economy of Action, or the logical economy of Reflection.

Philo begins at the Beginning (as this 'Genesis' is framed by Moses at the point which it in turn frames as focal: the point at which the Law is marked in the cosmic frame, in the cosmic story or history, which it governs). In the Parmenides the question of Actuality (Actuality as question, mystery) had been posed, in effect, by the free play of figure, form: by the discovery in that play of inscription of one form or figure within another, an articulation or configuration that somehow 'works', a closed circuit so to say in the open play, in which that play of inscription (in and from which this framing of Actuality distinguishes itself) is itself inscribed as one term or element. This primary circuit or 'frame' of a configuration of orders of inscription that 'works' (to borrow Aristotle's term) appears in the Timaeus as...
primary Act framing Creation (1). Within this primary Frame, Order, coordination, 'Kosmos' indeed, the figure of the 'play' of figures is itself determined, identified, as the open Economy of 'Matter': as a Chaos (Χαος: 'open-ness') which, 'before' the Act of Creation, is Nothing, no 'thing', nothing fixed: it has no 'identity' or 'being', not even (properly speaking) the temporal definition of a 'before', since the play of figure is not so much 'in' (the figure of) Time, as Time one figure in the chaotic 'play'. Philo finds this primary or primordial configuration of Act, Actuality itself, reflected in the cosmic framing of Moses' enunciation of the Law as marking in that cosmic Frame (with whose framing 'Moses' opens the books of the Law) the cosmic 'Law' in which it is inscribed as the marking. The opening or Beginning of the Drama, the Story, the identification (by 'Moses') of whose Frame as Law marks the central turning-point (the Return) in the Drama, 'Moses' frames, identifies, thus:

In the beginning God made Heaven and Earth. And Earth was undefined, without configuration, and Darkness was on the upper side of this bottomlessness, and the Breath of God was moving on the upper side of Water. And God uttered 'Let there be Light', and there was Light. And God saw that Light was good: and God parted one half of Light and one half of Darkness. And God invoked Light as Day, and invoked Darkness as Night. And there was dusk and dawn: One Day.

Here the initial configuration of Actuality, the configuration of a primordial Act or Action, opening the cosmic Drama, is marked or expressed, so to speak, 'within' the 'play of figure' - in a story, in a 'mystery', by which the figure of the distinction of Actuality from the...
open play of figure, from Chaos, is itself inscribed in the play of figure directly - rather than within the figure of systematic Greek Reflection which is, as it were, properly subordinate to this primary Actuality, this primary figure or Frame of identity.

Indeed, according to Philo, this 'mystery' revealed to Moses is itself, in its successive developments, the source of Greek philosophy; only in Philo's time has that philosophy in turn unfolded to the point where it discovers the figure of its inscription in a more radical mystery.

At the same time, this radical mystery of Actuality may now first be fully understood 'philosophically', though the inscription in Reflection of the place of that Reflection within the cosmic Drama. This through the coincidence of the 'poetic' actuality of allegory or mystery, and the 'logical' actuality of definition, in the figure of Law as primary frame of Kosmos.

Philo's reflection is not presented, then, as a systematic 'theory', but rather as framed by his commentaries, his readings, of the first book of the Law - the book 'Beginning', Γάζων. Since the primary self-expression of Actuality lies in the inscription in the play of figure of the figure of distinction of Actuality from this empty play - and this in the figure of a book, as that figure of book itself enters into the play of figure at a certain time, in a certain historical configuration - then the 'part' of Philo is to reflect on the inscription of his reflection in this radical Actuality - in the 'poetic' interface of text and context of 'Moses' book.

... And we know, from the account given in that book of the writing of the book (or rather of the five books of Moses - the 'Law' or 'written Law'), that in the figure of the Word in which it is framed, Elohim (grammatically a sort of empty form of substantive - 'The One', perhaps - though indeed it is strictly a plural form) expresses 'him' self even more radically as I AM. - That is to say, the opening configuration of the First Book of Moses should in its turn be framed in the figure of Word, Λόγος, in which the book and words themselves (as it were silently) partake, before even the account of Creation begins.

Indeed we then see that the primary Act or Actuality of Kosmos, the act of pure self-expression as Light, is simply the primary actuality
of this figure of Word:

Elohim said: Let there be Light — and there was Light.

- and this primary actuality is simply the Good of the Timaeus, corresponding to Plato's primary configuration of Actuality in that book as movement towards an Image of itself.

The next act or actuality is then the definition of the play of figure or Chaos, Matter, from which Actuality first distinguishes itself, as a formal opposite, an absence of Actuality, of self-expression of 'hidden primaeval Light' — a 'Light', as it were, 'behind' the visible light which reflects the invisible actuality of the play of figure, 'in' which alone this visible play has any being. Properly there is no 'name' for Actuality simply as such — in principle it cannot be inscribed or comprehended in the poetic economy of the mark, the visible — it can only be indirectly indicated as 'outside' this frame of inscription. This Actuality of I AM, ΘΕΟΣ, is ἡμετέρα ὁμοτάξιος, ἀγάπησ, ἀνεφύλακτος, unnameable, unspeakable, incomprehensible. Like Actuality in Aristotle's scheme, it cannot be defined because it is ἱγνώστητος, the frame of all definition, which cannot be distinguished from anything else in any 'wider' or more general and comprehensive frame.

The Word, ΛÓΩÇ, then, is the first self-expression of Actuality, distinguishing itself from the 'empty' play of figure (in which the formal symmetry of Actuality and this 'Nothing' as two 'sides', theological and poetic, is itself one element). The play of figure, Chaos, is, as in the Timaeus, identified, inscribed in the actuality of a distinction of Actuality from this 'nothing', as 'physical' Matter. The actuality of ΛÓΩÇ expresses itself in the familiar figure of distinguishing itself from the material order of the mark (of this play) in which that very distinction is made: the ΛÓΩÇ is 'the Place of the intelligible world', of which physical Space is an empty reflection: the actuality of physical Space lies properly in the articulation of its 'logical' distinction from an 'inner' Space which is the articulation of ΛÓΩÇ.

This figure of Word or ΛÓΩÇ is, then, the very Frame, the very framing, indeed, of Actuality. It is the 'Image of God', 'second God',
'first-begotten Son of God'. Kosmos is articulated within this primary figure of Λόγος, as the inscription of subordinate figures, λόγος, within this first figure - the inscription of subordinate figures, one within the other, within this primary Actuality.

As (again) in the scheme of the Timaeus, the 'initial' frame of Kosmos comes full-circle in the actuality of individual human identity and choice, in which 'logical' and 'physical' coincide. For we are the locus in which the choice between the 'logical' inscription of the figure of 'I' in the material economy of the visible, the empty play of figure, and the 'psychical' inscription of that image of choice in the radical actuality of an I AM which distinguishes itself from its inscription in the mere play of figure, reappears in the mechanical economy of figure, in that figure of World, Earth.

Thus the polarity of Λόγος amounts, in Philo's scheme, to an intermediate figure between a pure Actuality of I AM 'beyond' the opposition of Actuality and Nothing, and Man, in whom these 'opposites' are two symmetric sides. That is, Λόγος - and λόγος - have two sides: the Word is 'Man-God', the mirror in which Man is made 'in the image of God'. The λόγος or aspects of this Man-God appear 'on one side' - in the play of figures in which the Law as Word of God is inscribed by 'Moses' - as those 'sons of God' or 'angels' of Jewish History. Their other side, though, brought out by Philo in his allegorical reading of the History, is the eternal actuality of a form or platonic idea, inscribed within the primary form of Λόγος itself, in the actuality of distinction of Actuality from its 'earthly' image.

Such a central duality of 'heavenly' Actuality and 'earthly' Image is of course a constant element in the framing of Kosmos from Parmenides on. In Parmenides' poem, for example, we saw how What Is distinguishes itself from the inscription in the 'fictional' play of forms or figures of a 'fictional' opposition of Actuality and Fiction - from the inscription 'in' Fiction of a fictional opposition of 'inside' and 'outside' of Fiction - from an inscription in the poetic order of the Text of the opposition of Text and Context. What is radical in Philo's commentaries on the Law is his 'inscription' of that elementary 'critical' figure of the Commentary - of standing 'outside' the text of the Law,
and framing the relations of Law (Text) and cosmic Context in a wider Text — within 'Law' as the primary expression in the domain of the Image, of the self-distinction of Actuality from Image.

In this radical step of framing his critical distance from the written Text of the Law, within the scheme which such commentary reveals — within the cosmic frame of Law of which the 'literal' Text is thus revealed as primary Image (or reflection in the domain of the Image) — Philo thus 'knows' the Actuality of I AM as Choice, by direct participation of his choice of the part of Commentator in this very Actuality of Choice.

Actuality is known, then, through participation in the 'working' of this very Knowledge, \[\text{I AM} \] : known primarily or most radically in the recognition of our part — as each 'I', knowing ourselves as and in knowing — in Actuality, knowing ourselves at work in Kosmos — in a Kosmos that focusses the formal correlations of its various basic orders in a choice open to us: to know ourselves as the interface of Being and Nothing, 'Spirit' or psychical actuality and 'Matter' or the part of mechanical inscription of figure within figure in a wider frame 'outside' all mechanism.

- Through an actual participation in the resolution of the 'philosophical' question posed by the formal symmetry of the Nothing of this symmetry, and an Actuality of the symmetry in which the formal symmetry or opposition may be actually presented as a question, and seen to be, 'in itself', Nothing.

In this 'act' of participation in the resolution of that radical symmetry then (of the formal articulation of Kosmos, and its actual articulation — its possibility and its actuality), which knows itself as first of all self-recognition in the act of recognition, the actuality of 'I', of I AM, is known as an Actuality of Choice, a 'deciding' of the symmetry of symmetry and decision (of Matter and Spirit), which is outside any systematic and symmetric articulation of figure-within-figure, however extensive. I AM is knowable, but incomprehensible.

And in the act of choosing Choice, Decision, rather than an endless elucidation of the structure of distinction of Choice and Mechanism, we know this Choice as incomprehensibly free, 'outside' any definitive inscription in a formal or mechanical economy of inscription of action within action — outside (in particular) 'Matter' as/mechanical framing of
earthly action. That is: we know Actuality as radically 'dramatic', in which the framing of our activity as 'mechanical' is simply one possibility, complemented by the formally symmetric possibility of framing our action 'spiritually' - or rather, framing it in the question of that complementarity, that most radical choice. - And so seeing that the possibility of framing our activity or actions 'mechanically', 'materially', is not properly a 'choice', symmetric with a 'spiritual' framing of activity at all: it is the abdication of choice in the aquiescence in an image of choice, rather than a participation in the actuality of which this 'material' activity is only an image. - An image which, within the temporal frame of an earthly life-time, does indeed (as a figure) comprehend all activity, except the paradoxical self-consciousness of different instances of 'I' as each somehow 'me' rather than 'you' - except the actual distinction of this mechanical figure of human Being from its very actuality in each individual instance.

Within (then) this 'dramatic' Kosmos - a Drama which turns about the recognition by each 'I' of his or her 'part' in the Drama - about the recognition of Actuality as dramatic, as Drama - each 'I', by discovering himself or herself simply as taking part in the radical actuality of I AM, directly knows the self-distinction of I AM from the formal inscription of 'I' as figure of framing action within the 'mechanical' or 'material' economy of figure. Each 'I' knows this participation or taking-part as itself 'inscribed' within an Actuality of Choice which, formally, logically, might not have been. The actuality of our choice of Choice rather than mechanical Necessity, of Spirit rather than Matter, Actuality rather than Image, must itself have some root in a 'prior' actuality of a situation in which such an individual choice is 'open'. And by knowing our choice as free, we know the radical differentiation of Actuality from mere possibility as equally Free - indeed as the very Freedom in which our individual choice participates. That is, we know the Act of Creation, the limiting distinction of Actuality from Nothing (or a coordinate 'Matter') as itself incomprehensibly free, and the very possibility of our framing the question of that distinction as a radical self-expression of the 'I' that distinguishes itself from Matter in that primary Act, as this 'I' or I AM speaking to us, in that figure of self-expression which we recognise in another human 'I' freely choosing to address us, and anticipating some response to his or her question.
Within this cosmic framing of dramatic Actuality as Dialogue, then, the Drama of cosmic History (in which we play a crucial part in recognizing History as primarily Drama, and seeing our actuality as primarily that of 'part', 'actor') is articulated as the interaction in Man (in whom Actuality and Nothing symmetrically meet in the earthly inscription of 'I' in the open play of figure or form) of free Spirit and mechanical Matter, of 'divine' and 'natural', 'heavenly' and 'earthly'. Freedom, Divinity, is 'outside' Natural Law and its mechanical Economy of inscription of figure within figure. Yet this Freedom, which is (first of all) Self-Expression, expresses itself precisely in a formal recognition that the very Actuality of Natural Law is itself 'outside' that Law. In the very Fact of Nature, what we must naturally call 'what is outside Nature' speaks 'in' Nature.

- Here again is the figure of Beginning, of the Act of Creation: the 'hidden Light' shines or speaks in the distinction of Light and Dark, in the Actuality which distinguishes itself from a merely formal opposition of two symmetric 'marks' or 'names':

Elohim called Light 'Day', and Darkness 'Night'.

More particularly, within this limiting cosmic Frame of the Actuality of Distinction, the divine Spirit freely intervenes through 'providential' suspension of the Law of Nature - that is, through the inscription in the natural Economy of Matter of figures of the distinction of what is 'natural' and what 'outside Nature', 'supernatural'. Indeed the very Act of Creation may be seen as a limiting instance of this figure. We, in turn, may participate in this figure of Spirit, by assenting to the actuality of I AM in us - in 'prophetic' inspiration. Most notably, with the figure of the mosaic authorship of the Law, is revealed a general figure or frame of participation in this interaction of I AM and World, of Spirit and 'matter.

This Law of Moses is for Philo the primary embodiment or Actuality of the figure of 'mystery', and he describes its elementary 'working' in the language of the 'mysteries'. The written Law is the inscription in the earthly play of figure (itself 'framed' by the figure of 'law' as principle of inscription of one figure within another) of the distinction of Actuality from this very Image in which it is inscribed. This figure of the Jewish Law as primary Mystery comes full-circle in framing the very configuration of its 'inscription' in the earthly Economy of natural
activity: the allegory of Genesis, Beginning, comes down to Moses' re-
assertion of Law in the figure of Return to the Land, Exodus from Egypt,
In which the allegory finally defines the part in Kosmos of the inscrip-
tion of the allegory in the figure of Writing. The allegory defines the
part of allegory as framing within the written Text of the Law its cos-
mic Context, this figure being the very Image of the framing of the play
of images (including the image of a difference between Actuality and Image)
in actuality - the very Image of the actuality of the Image. Thus the
'mosaic' Text frames allegorically the literal texts of particular laws.
In particular laws - in the Jewish framing of activity within a literal
Law - Jewish activity is articulated so as to frame, in its unitary inscrip-
tion in the figure of a Law in which literal and allegorical coincide,
a question for all nations, and all individuals, which is systematically
answered in the recognition of Moses' cosmic framing of the literal Law
as itself allegory. And one enters into this Answer to the question of
'I', by finding in the figure of Law (at the very beginning of the first
Book) the self-expression of a distinction of Actuality and Nature in the
frame of a Word, Λογος, of which this Law is the direct reflection in one
of its 'sides' - in its 'natural' or earthly side.

That is: the question posed by the inscription of this Law in
the material Economy of the World, as frame of Jewish activity, and amount-
ing to: 'What is my part in this distinction of 'within' and 'without' the
Jewish Law?' is answered by the step into the frame of Law, by the step of
identifying this very step with its part in the Law, knowing this choice
as a participation in that Choice which, as the first Act or Reality of
Kosmos, frames the Law as reflection in an earthly Economy of a heavenly
distinction of Heaven and Earth. Jews, says Philo, are born into this
primary Mystery; outsiders, 'the Nations' ('Gentiles'), can only find this
last step of the choice of Choice at the limit of a laborious philosophical
Reflection, which ultimately leads to the question of the difference of
Actuality from Nothing, and (perhaps) the recognition of the Answer to this
limiting Question in the Mystery of the Jewish Law.

The opening-up of this step to Gentile Reflection has come
through a long unfolding or development of this 'Greek' figure of Reflection
or Philosophy. In that 'natural' access to the Mystery of Law - in
the last step in which the 'Gentile' in some sense becomes spiritually
a 'Jew', he knows the self-assertion of I AM in the radical Choice of
Creation as 'outside' the symmetric 'natural' articulation of figure
within figure, form within form. In particular, he knows this Choice as 'outside' that Time which frames the material Economy of Nature or Natural Law. This Choice 'outside' Time, though, articulates figures 'in' Time, insofar as it frames the very figure of Time in which those figures are in turn inscribed. - It appears or expresses itself in Time as articulating Time 'towards' an 'End' chosen 'outside' Time: and this Actuality of Choice 'in' Time is simply the reflection in the Figure of Time of the inscription of that figure within a primary Actuality of Choice.

Thus, stepping 'outside' Time, the gentile philosopher who has at last reached the radical Question, Choice, at the limit of his reflection, can see his concluding step into the Mystery of Law as itself partaking in the articulation of Time in Choice. - As his part in the cosmic scheme 'chosen' in the very Act of Creation (itself timeless). - In a 'scheme' or frame of Time which is a direct correlate of the radical Actuality of Choice itself. - Kosmos as Frame in which the instance of framing frames itself simply as I AM.

What, then, is the simplest figure of such a scheme of Kosmos?

We saw how the initial Actuality of a distinction of this Actuality from the play of figure in which it is formally inscribed as 'outside' the symmetrical play unfolds to the point where this distinction is itself reflected in the play of figure (the latter being inscribed in Actuality as 'Matter', 'Nature', 'Image'. We have now seen how this Mystery of the Jewish Law eventually becomes accessible at the limit of gentile Reflection - this constituting a primary figure of the integration of 'inside' and 'outside' of this Law within an Actuality first presented in the domain of the Image only to those born within the Law. The 'end' or finality of the whole Scheme then consists in the complete integration of the domain of the Image within this inscription in Actuality. This amounts, it will be seen, to the integration of Image and Actuality in the figure of Man, in whom these two sides are mirrored. All men will enter into the primary Mystery of the Law, and all human activity and choice will be inscribed in the Actuality of Choice. The 'End of Time' amounts to reaching, in the activity of integration of choices within Choice, the initial figure of a cosmic distinction of Actuality and Image: this last step in the reintegration of Actuality and Image is focussed in the figure of Man, who,
in this last step, this last Day, knows himself in the unity of I AM. The Act of Creation is as it were completed in the last step of integration of Actuality and Image, concluding a cycle of unfolding and integration prefigured in the initial cycle of the First Day:

    Elohim called Light 'Day', and Darkness 'Light'. And there was Evening and there was Morning: One Day.

The unfolding of Nature is as it were mirrored, in the eternal framing of Time in the radical Actuality of Choice, by the involution or convergence of Time towards its inscription within the Actuality of Distinction (of which it is initially the barest image): the End of Time is its transfiguration through the interaction of Spirit and Matter in the figure of Man.

Thus for Philo the figure of the Messiah, the Christ, has two 'sides': allegorically it presents the transfiguration of the individual man in the participation in I AM; literally it represents or prefigures the integration of all human activity, each agent knowing his part within the coordination of all choices within a unitary Law. The stoics - Aratus, Polybius and Posidonius - had framed World-History down to the first century before our Era as the inscription of cycles of activity within wider and wider cycles, ending in the limiting cycle of recurrent cosmic conflagration. Philo took this scheme, but made the end of the cosmic cycle of Creation (in which Time as limiting figure is inscribed in the primary actuality of Choice) not a repetition of the beginning, but rather the transfiguration of the beginning - the transfiguration of the figure of Beginning, Genesis. Each participation of our choice in the Actuality of Choice further articulates this Actuality 'in' Time, until the scheme concludes in the complete articulation of the distinction of Eternity and Time 'in' Time, the full inscription (that is) of Time in Eternity - the complete integration of earthly activity within heavenly harmony.

    Thus the elementary figure of our part as men and women in Creation is articulated in the inscription of choice within Choice, of our activity within the figure and actuality of Actuality. Our part lies primarily in the distinction of our divine actuality as each 'I' - as each, indeed I AM, God - from the bodily image of this actuality, lost in the play of images, in Sense, in the 'World', 'earthly' imagination. The highest activity of man is that Prayer which is a direct part-
icipation in I AM — in Divinity, Actuality. The chief virtues are those we have already seen (in Mark's account of the Christ's instruction in Prayer) articulated in this figure: πίστις, the 'faith' which is the framing of action within the primary scheme of I AM distinguishing itself from Matter and Image; the mercy or forgiveness of faults which sees these not as the faults of any 'I', but rather as the results of some 'I' being lost in an image of himself or herself — and the μετάνοια, repentance, which is the recognition of this figure of fault in ourselves, through which the actuality of 'I' in us distinguishes itself from its empty image, through that divine Mercy or Grace in which our exercise of mercy towards others itself participates. As action is first of all choice, and choice the inscription of action within the primary figure of Actuality — Choice — so these primary elements of such inscription are for Philo the primary ἄξιος virtues — just as Plato had found the primary virtues of justice, wisdom, courage and balance corresponding to his framing of action in the Philebus and the Laws, and the stoics had found the primary virtue of 'playing one's part' in detachment from Sense.

The primary 'end', the result or 'reward' for the practice of these philonic virtues is simply the actuality 'outside' Time discovered in this practice. When the bodily image of this actuality dissolves in death, the actuality is left or somehow remains — knows itself then in a more radical distinction from its material or bodily image, than is possible while still 'in' the body. Knows itself as participating in the eternal actuality of I AM — Actuality which is the primary End or Good, of which all earthly goods are sensible images.

I suggested at the beginning of this 'second half' of the First Part of this History or Story, that one might find in the 'parts' of the Christ and of Philo analogous or parallel 'versions' of that coincidence of 'poetic' and 'logical' orders in a radical figure of Question that frames a transition into 'our Era' (a transition later determined as Conception of the Christ). Indeed this figure of 'Question' finds a primary expression precisely as a sort of imaginary point of convergence of Reflection and Action from which 'christian' and philonic versions are taken as parallel
initial steps – as a notional coincidence of parallel 'steps' back from these analogous 'versions', and notional steps forwards from the analogous positions of, say, Cicero, Posidonius and Antiochus, towards the middle of the first century 'before Christ', before our 'Era'.

- Of course such an imaginary 'point', 'in Time', merely marks the figure of Question – the figure in which the transition from Cicero to Philo and Christ may be framed in a unitary way. 'The Question' does not (of course) appear as such at any point in-between Cicero and Philo: what I frame in this figure of Question is simply what, in the configuration of Reflection and Activity, World, is 'open' to such framing. To frame what is thus 'open' to being framed as Conception of Christ, or Access of Reflection to the Mystery of the Law, or simply as the Question of how to frame the possibility of different 'framings' opened up in the configuration of these various different framings... is simply to mark this 'opening-up' in various ways. To mark it simply as 'Question' – as the question of how to mark it – amounts, then, to marking a distinction from this marking of 'what' is thus marked. It was just this actuality of what is 'open' in the transition, distinguishing itself from its 'marking', inscription, in the logical frame of this present text, that amounted to the marking, at the close of the Introduction, cf an ontical 'out-side' of this text.

Philo, then, frames this radical question of the Frame, of 'framing', 'logically': the limiting question of Greek Reflection, posed by the inscription in the symmetries of the Neopythagorean scheme of the distinction between such a scheme and its actuality, is resolved by inscribing this very resolution in the primary 'outward' working of such a distinction as primary actuality of Kosmos. This 'participation' of the framing of actuality in the actuality it marks as primary cosmic Frame, frames itself in the intermediate 'poetic' figure of Jewish Law as primary reflection in the play of figure of the distinction of actuality from its Image in that play. That is: the 'logical' figure of the primary actuality of Kosmos as a psychical distinction of this distinction from the ontical difference by which it is marked (as the 'psychical' self-distinction of I AM) is mirrored in the configuration of the Law by Philo's assertion of his part of reflection on the Law as participation in this actuality.

This move presents a 'logical' parallel or analogue of the 'part'
of 'the Christ': the part of presenting to each 'I' the question of his or her part in the transition marked by this question, in the Last Days. The part of framing the Law as a simple question: Image or Actuality.

- And within this 'part', itself framed as a whole in the death of the Christ - in the question, Body or Soul.. Matter or Spirit? - this question framed in the allegorical figures presenting an image of the distinction of Image and Actuality in particular situations - in παραβάλεις or parallels. - Or in those wonders, 'miracles', in which the same figure of an image of the distinction of image and actuality in some particular situation finds (if we are to believe the stories) 'physical' expression. - Or in those simple cosmic schemes or figures of Heaven and Earth, expressed literally, rather than transposed into parables and miracles.

- Again this 'part' is framed in the figure of Jewish Law as primary image of the self-distinction of Actuality from Image. - But whereas in Philo's part the basic question which frames all the others is that of the framing of the initial Distinction which itself frames the Kosmos in which (in turn) it appears as a question for Reflection, here the basic question is: How frame the activity of this man?

- An activity which presents itself as question, and presents our part in it as 'framing' it one way rather than another. - And this question focussed - framed indeed - in the question: Is this the Christ of the Jews? .. And this focussing of the question of our part in framing our part in Kosmos, in the question of the 'part' of this man Jesus of Nazareth (rather Yeshua or Yehoshua: 'I AM (is) salvation') amounts precisely to the figure of 'Christ', if we so choose. - In this recognition, in choosing that story, and our part in it as that choosing, we recognise the actuality of I AM as Choice presenting itself as a universal choice focussed in the question 'Who is this man?', 'What does he think he's doing?', 'How am I to take this insistence that it's up to me to decide..?'. - And this focussing of the question of Choice in a 'universal' form - attaching to all men and women simply as each finding their part marked as the question of how to frame - this in the 'story' to be framed - corresponds to the figure of 'Messiah', 'Anointed' or Chosen of I AM as it appears in the Return from babylonia Exile towards the close of the sixth century. (Just as Philo's 'mystery' of the Law repeats the pythagorean figure of marking what distinguishes itself - in the configuration of the mark - from the mark).
Now whereas Philo's reflection is 'logically' framed as text (albeit 'commentary', inscribed in the interface of the Text of the Law, and Kosmos as Context), this 'question' of the Christ is framed primarily as activity - as Action, Drama. - As a drama in which subsequent written accounts, subsequent attempts to frame the action as text, themselves correspond to the 'parts' of 'christians' (or, later, the parallel 'parts' of their critics) in the dramatic configuration they themselves frame as text, as a unitary story.

That is (then) Jesus' framing his activity as Christ, and in this presenting as open in the context of this activity the part of framing one's activity, one's situation and one's part in it, amounts formally to a 'poetic' or dramatic framing of what is 'open' in the configuration subsequently framed as the beginning of an Era (as a new Beginning, indeed, a mirroring of Philo's initial configuration of Genesis in one side - the 'Darkness' - of that first Beginning).

The successive framings, then, within this 'dramatic' scheme or configuration, of this scheme, eventually arrive at a 'logical' - a 'philosophical' - account of the inscription of such an account in such a scheme, during the third century - notably in Origen's 'apology' for Christianity (written about 248) in his defence against the criticisms made by Celsus about a century before - criticisms attaching primarily, it seems, to the 'unphilosophical' circularity of a 'poetic' framing of one's framing of activity as one element of the activity so framed. (From the point of view of the Critic, standing 'outside' such a short-circuit of the free 'play' of figures and frames, the circularity corresponds to figures of dogmatism and superstition - which, indeed, a 'mechanical' circularity of a story which incorporates as one element the difference between story and context, precisely is. . . ).
'Apostle to the Gentiles'

The first step in the framing of the 'christian' drama within that drama, as text - and the earliest 'christian' texts - are found in the letters of the graeco-syrian pharisee Paul of Tarsus in Cilicia to the 'churches', κοινωνίας, 'assemblies' (most of which he had set up) among the 'gentiles' - outside the Land of the 'Old Contract', asserting a New Contract as universal frame of activity for every 'I', jew or gentile.

Paul had begun by finding his part in christian activity as the reinscription of the new 'version' of the Law within the old Law as a transgression of that old Law - by attempting to reinscribe this new distinction, of Choice from its image in the formal articulation of all activity under the old Law, in the articulation of that Image. The question of his part, then, in the christian drama, focusses this question of the 'part', of the choice of Choice distinguishing itself from its Image. In his attempt to reassert the Law in Syria, Paul - or rather Saul the pharisee - somehow finds himself in a new part: the figure of the Christ asserts itself to distinguish the distinction of Actuality and Image from the image of this distinction as inscribed within the formal articulation of literal Law. Saul becomes Paul: his 'I' shifts from the bodily image, the Flesh, Saul the pharisee, to the Actuality of the Christ in which Paul finds the actuality of his new 'I':

\[ \text{I live, but not I, but Christ, lives in me.} \]

And the part of this new 'I' in the frame in which it thus first finds itself, 'newborn in Christ', is simply to assert this part of Christ asserting through him the distinction of Actuality and Image, of Spirit and Flesh, Grace and Law, Faith and Works, Paul and Saul.

This assertion, then, and the activity, the 'miss.on' it organises, is framed first of all simply by Paul's physical or bodily position 'outside' the Land: in this simple physical image the true 'home' of the believer distinguishes itself from its historical image in that Land. The true Exile is exile from participation in the figure of Spirit, of the actuality of the figure of the Christ distinguishing itself from its bodily image, from this actuality as framing our activity through assent to our part in that figure, and the story it frames - Exile from 'Grace', from the 'free gift' of actuality as participation in the free
Choice that appears in Philo's commentaries as the Act of Creation, and as divine Mercy.

- The outward, 'physical', correlation of Exile and Transgression in the history of the Jews is thus an image, a prefiguration, opening up now the possibility of direct participation in the more radical figure of Mercy and Grace.

Paul's part, as he frames it in his letters, is to present or represent this new 'frame' or figure, 'outside' the Land of the Old Contract, the old frame of Law. His part thus 'frames' access to the New Contract from 'outside' the Land and Law, as this 'part' of figure of 'Ancestor to the Gentiles' is in turn 'framed' in the figure and actuality of the Christ. That is: his inscription of his part, his 'I', his assertion and activity, within the activity framed by the question of the Christ, in its turn frames the activity of those, those 'I's', those further 'parts' in the drama, that enter into this figure of the Christ 'through' him, Paul.

His letters to Christian groups in Asia Minor and Greece, that he has thus 'framed' - of which he has 'laid the foundation' - in which he is 'present in the Spirit' - with which he is 'in labour-pains' - groups of which he is the 'father' - these letters amount then (as he sees it) to his part in framing activity within these groups, consequent to his initial part of framing those groups 'in Christ' through his 'good news', his \[\text{εν ἀγαθῷ λογῷ τοῦ Χριστοῦ}, \] his version of the story.

In these letters, then, Paul presents his part, his 'apostolic' authority, as itself inscribed within the primary figure of the framing of Christian activity as a whole 'in Christ', in that primary figure of distinction of Law and Grace, Flesh and Spirit, Works and Faith, Image and Actuality. - A figure which, in turn, frames the authority by which he himself asserts the primacy of this figure. The articulation of these distinctions in the primary distinction of Spirit and Body, focussed in the bodily death of the Christ, and Paul's framing of his assertion of this primary frame of Christian activity in that frame, amount to his framing of his part in deciding questions which arose in Christian groups 'outside' the Land of the Old Contract.

A first letter, then, dating from around the middle of the cen-
tury, to the group he had instituted in the macedonian capital, Thes-
sal·nica, exhorts them - in the face of local Jewish persecution which
had driven Paul from the city to faith, activity which reflects his own
part in first framing the group. - This in the simple scheme of an im-
ment transition from earthly to heavenly life, prefigured by the trans-
ition from the earthly body of Christ to his heavenly Spirit in his death.
The current framing of the relations of heaven and earth on Earth in earth-
ly terms will soon be 'transfigured' dramatically into a 'heavenly' king-
dom in which those relations are framed in Heaven, in Spirit.

A long letter, a few years later, to the independent group at
Rome (which he had not instituted ) presents Paul's part in the drama, as
he himself frames this drama, and, in it, this part of presenting it to
the 'Gentiles', the 'Nations'. The letter announces the part in this scheme
of an intended visit to the capital of the World, after an impending vis-
it to the capital of the Jews - to Jerusalem, where he had already come
to an agreement over his part 'outside' the Jewish land, with the 'apost-
les to the Jews' (1).

- But the Jews of Jerusalem brought him (like the Christ before
him) before the Roman authorities, as seeking to incorporate the Jewish
Law in the new Way - just as he had earlier tried to reinscribe this
Way within that Law, as a Jewish transgression of the Law. After a couple
of years under Roman house-arrest, Paul appealed (under Roman Law) to the
emperor in Rome to resolve his case. While under house-arrest in Rome
(61-63) awaiting the outcome of this appeal, Paul heard of a new 'version'
of the cosmic drama, that was being asserted in the church of Colossae,
(near Ephesus) whose institution he had delegated to the colos-sian Epaphras.
Paul's last three letters are to the group at Ephesus (which he had per-
sonally founded) to that at Colossae, and a short personal letter to one
of the prominent members (who he had himself 'converted') of the latter
group. The letter to Colossae contains an injunction that it be trans-
mitted to the phrygian capital Laodicea, and that the letter to
be read at Colossae - the letter to Laodicea may well be the same as that
'to Ephesus' - an open letter to the various groups in 'Asia' (western
Asia Minor). In these two open letters, Paul frames the authority of
his assertion of the part of the figure of Christ, in the scheme of Kosmos

1: Letter to Galatia, ch 2
which he opposes to the reinscription of the christian Drama within an abstract greek scheme:

See that no-one makes a prey of you through Philosophy and empty deception, according to human tradition, according to the elemental spirits of the Kosmos, and not according to Christ. For in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily, and you are fulfilled in him, who is the head of all rule and authority.

...stripping all rules and authorities [principalities and powers] he freely presented them for what they were, triumphing over them in himself. So let no-one pass judgement on you in questions of food or of drink, of festivals or new moons or sabbaths: these are a shadow of things to come, but the Christ is the very body. Let no-one disqualify you, insisting on self-abasement and worshipping of angels, taking his stand on visions, puffed up without reason by his sensuous mind.

'Philosophy': the 'godless and silly myths' of the pseudo-pauline letter to Timothy:

1: Letter to the Colossians, II,8-10 2: ibid, II,15-18
.. ταύς δὲ βεβαιώντας καὶ γνώσεις μόνης καταστάτω.. (1)

..keep away from profane and silly myths..

Oh Timothy, guard what has been entrusted to you. Stay away from the profane empty talk and contradiction of 'Knowledge' as it is falsely called, for in professing it some have missed the mark as regards the faith.

'In him the whole fulness of deity dwells bodily': 'Fulness', πλήρες—Actuality, Being, 'in itself', distinguishing itself from its inscription in the physical order of Matter, Image, as 'outside' that worldly order... a 'logical' actuality of Knowledge, Γνώση, distinguishing itself from the 'outward' physical difference of 'inside' and 'outside' by which the distinction (from that outwardness) is marked. 'Fulness' then a pure 'inside' which is outside the physical difference of inside and outside; such is the 'God' of 'Philosophy', of that 'profane myth'. A myth framing physical Creation as Fiction: a formal or merely apparent, 'outward' distinction of Actuality, πραγμα, from something 'outside'—which latter has no actuality... a 'fiction' turning in the formal marking of something 'outside' Being, a fiction turning in and upon itself, like Parmenides' inaugural distinction of Being and Non-Being, which distinction itself is the very nothing nominally identified as one of its 'terms', the inaugural abstraction of the circuit of Fiction from true Being.

A Fiction or Creation in which we are trapped, imprisoned, by the very circuit of fictions, the circular return of Fiction upon itself.

1: First Letter to Timothy, IV, 7
2: ibid, ad fin.
A Fiction or Creation 'framed' by the formal 'I' of the Jewish god, with our own actuality or part in Actuality, trapped as a bodily image within frames-within-frames, fiction-within-fiction — within the circuits of astral (planetary) forces, one within the other, framing this last circuit of earthly matter in which we are trapped in the image of ourselves, reflecting within the initial fiction of a distinction of this fiction from Actuality, the very configuration of that distinction.

The only way to return to the ἸΑΜ, then, is to find our way back, from frame to frame, until we reach the ultimate frame of Fiction as such, and see it for what it is: until we frame the final distinction between Actuality and the fictional distinction of Actuality and Fiction. We learn that way back, that Return, through the Knowledge, Γνώσις, which frames our hearing of that knowledge in fiction-within-fiction, until the whole series of frames are finally inscribed within the primary distinction through which Actuality distinguishes itself from Image or Fiction, through which the 'fulness' of the 'inside' distinguishes itself from the 'outward' distinction of a symmetric 'inside' and 'outside', from the formal difference of Being and Nothing.

Now, just as the whole Fiction or Creation is framed in the Jewish Law, in the first circuit of 'I AM', in that initial recurrence of the logical order in a symmetrical opposition of logical and physical, so the successive astral or planetary circuits within this primary circuit correspond to the 'angels' of the Jewish Law — the 'powers', ἐξουσίες, that Philo identifies with λόγος, under the primary 'powers' or 'principalities' of the Book of Daniel — Michael, for example as the angel who frames the activity of the Jewish Nation or Principality.

So much for the 'godless and silly myths', in outline... just what version or versions were appearing in the churches of Asia after the mid-century we do not know — except that they must have prefigured the complex 'gnostic' systems of the succeeding century. Presumably the earliest ἹΑΜ embodied the simple figure just sketched, common to the subsequently divergent developments. The very simplest figure is simply the inscription of the 'noetic' figure of the Christian 'mystery' of Paul, in a more 'radical' logical figure: Out of an initial simple 'inside' or ἸΑΜ, there comes, in a first step, a distinction of 'inside' and 'outside', which is somehow mistaken (the various versions of this initial mistake diverge) for something 'outside' the logical articulation of
The Christian 'mystery', then, is taken as the 'poetic' or dramatic presentation, within the 'outside', in Creation as primary Fiction, of the initial Mistake. Various later gnostic schemes, for example, make of Jesus' embodiment a sort of phantasm or collective hallucination in which the Actuality of the \( \pi \cdot \lambda \cdot \zeta \cdot \nu \cdot \zeta \) expresses itself at the 'centre' of Creation, by distinguishing itself from the sensible Image, this distinction focussed (as it were) in the actuality of the Christ, distinguishing itself from that bodily image to which we are all so firmly attached. The Christian story is inscribed within the logical or cosmological frame of \( \gamma \cdot \zeta \cdot \sigma \cdot \gamma \) as allegory - within the 'logical' determination of this figure of allegory as image of the distinction of actuality and image. The 'Christian' chooses his part, in the Christian story, of choosing that story, and acts out that part, framing his activity in \( \pi \cdot \sigma \cdot \gamma \) , 'faith'. The 'gnostic' frames this 'faith' as an 'image' of the truth, that works to effect a rising of the soul through various degrees of illusory figures, but which does not overcome the last figure of Fiction, Creation, Image, itself - the step out of which, out of the illusory opposition of logical and physical orders, into the participation in the logical determination of this distinction (into the logical distinction of logical and physical, and the final abstraction of this logical order of distinction from the outward difference by which it is marked) is participation in the 'psychical' actuality of \( \gamma \cdot \zeta \cdot \sigma \cdot \gamma \). The Christian story, then, leads to the last question, the last figure, in which Actuality expresses itself by distinguishing itself from the 'outward' or fictional distinction of 'inside' and 'outside' - leads to the interface of \( \pi \cdot \lambda \cdot \zeta \cdot \nu \cdot \zeta \) or 'fulness of deity' and visible Creation.

Cosmic history, then, is presented as an initial descent of Actuality, 'Light', into Darkness, Ignorance, and a subsequent process of Return to the simple Inside or Actuality of the \( \kappa \cdot \lambda \cdot \iota \cdot \zeta \cdot \upsilon \cdot \zeta \). Actuality expresses itself in the Darkness of Creation, Matter, in figures, images, of the distinction of actuality and image, as these find expression in different historical myths and religions, which are all thus framed in a unitary way as more or less radical allegories, amounting to the intervention in Creation of more or less powerful forces of Light, mirrored in the astral forces of Creation, since the logical or psychical articulation of the \( \pi \cdot \lambda \cdot \zeta \cdot \nu \cdot \zeta \) is mirrored in the physical articulation of visible Creation.

Man, in this scheme, amounts to the very reflection of the Actuality of the \( \pi \cdot \lambda \cdot \zeta \cdot \nu \cdot \zeta \)-in the Nothing or Matter of its 'outside', and thus
the 'christian' figure or image of the distinction in Man of Actuality and Image, Light and Dark, constitutes a sort of limiting frame in which all religions and mythologies may be inscribed, the last step in a process of Actuality expressing itself in the illusive play of figures which is visible Creation. In some gnostic systems the Jewish Law was the penultimate step in this progressive revelation — in others the God of the Old Contract was the chief of the forces of Darkness, an I AM that doesn't know that it or He is the interface of Visible and Invisible, knowing nothing of the Actuality 'above' him, of the πρότερον, but seeing himself as prose-ing the whole of Creation, the Image which he takes for the Whole, when properly it is Nothing. — An illusory 'I' that is the very framing of Darkness, imprisoning Man in the systematic image of choice and its actuality, in His Jewish Law.

By certain kinds of 'exercise', ἀρπαγμον, one could learn to distinguish the actuality of one's part in the 'fulness of deity' — one's part in Actuality — from the image in which one was 'imprisoned', and begin to rise through the various stages of the Prison, the Frame of Creation. Thus Paul refers to abstention from certain kinds of food and drink: by detaching oneself from certain 'natural' figures of appetite, one could distinguish one's 'spirit' (or rather Spirit could distinguish itself) from certain 'images' in which it was naturally trapped. Thus an appetite for a certain food or drink corresponds to a 'figure' of mechanical bodily existence: in one's imagination there is a 'me' and a certain food, say; the working of the image is such that the 'me' eats the food. I as it were unthinkingly play my part in the little scene, which then leaves me in another situation where I play my part in another little scene, and so on and on in a mechanical circle. "Αρπαγμον breaks these circles and allows the actuality of a choice, which has distinguished itself from the unthinking mechanism of the little scenes or frames of action, to better know itself in distinction from the image of choice according to which, for example, appetite seems to induce me to 'choose' to eat certain food.

Certain ritual acts, certain figures of action, will allow certain 'angelic' forces of Light to express themselves (through these figures, images of their distinction from the Image) through me — which is to say: will allow my access to these figures, these forces, and the
'breaking' of a complementary or antithetical force of 'Darkness'. In particular, rituals associated with the astral cycles of Time, 'festival or new moon or sabbath', will allow me to break through the mechanisms of cycle-within-cycle in which, otherwise, my earthly activity is trapped - in some self-perpetuating circle or other.

Further, by 'thinking', framing my situation, in the scheme of ωζ/ζ, in this cosmic scheme of Descent through nested frames of the Image and Return back through them to πα/ζεμα, I can enter configurations in which I play a part, participate in, 'heavenly' figures of Actuality: when it, where it, is no longer this embodied 'me' that is thinking, but some 'higher' actuality that was 'lost in' that bodily image. An earthly configuration of imagination and activity gives way to 'visions', and the interaction with angelic forces they frame.

In short, the 'gnostic' inscribes his activity in this 'logical' frame, inscribing in that logical scheme the Christian frame of πτζς as one component: as a limiting allegory in which all other allegories can in turn be inscribed as subordinate figures, subordinate actualities within that radical image of the distinction of Actuality from Image. The Christian 'mystery' prefigures the final mystery of Ζςζ, which organises the activity of the 'illuminated' gnostic as systematic abstraction from Matter, from the Prison of the Image.

Confronting this incipient inscription of the dramatic frame of the Christian mystery within what purports to be a deeper or higher Mystery (of which the Christian mystery is the last prefiguration, just as the Jewish Law 'prefigured' Christianity), Paul insists upon the more radical character of the figure of the Christ, the very frame of coordination of πα/ζεμα and Image in the Drama of Creation:
He is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of all Creation: for in him all things were created, in the Heavens and on Earth, Visible and Invisible, whether Thrones or Dominions or Principalities or Authorities - all things were created through him and with him as their end: he is before all things, and all things are coordinated in him. And he is the Head of the Body, of the Church: he is its principle, first-born of the dead, that he might be first in all things. For in him the whole Fulness pleased to dwell, and through him to reconcile all things to him, making peace through the blood of his cross, through him, whether things on Earth or things in the Heavens.

He has abounded to us, making known to us in all wisdom and prudence the mystery of his will, according to his purpose which he set out in him as an economy of the fulness of time, bringing all things to a head in the Christ, the things in the Heavens and the things on Earth.

The purportedly 'deeper' knowledge of the gnostic has 'indeed an appearance of wisdom', but this appearance is just that: 'only a shadow', belonging to the World (3)...to the World, the Flesh, which it appears to oppose... the appearance of opposing Appearance.

1: Colossians I, 15-20   2: Ephesians I, 9-10   3: Colossians II
The figure of the Christ, which (rather, who) frames the step into the Christian 'Drama' - the step into the working or actuality of that figure, distinguishing Actuality from Image in the very configuration in which we find ourselves (unlike the gnostic 'myth' which is centred in an imaginary 'fulness', an Inside 'outside' the outward two-sidedness of Heaven and Earth), frames all activity. Frames, as the limiting figuration of its Actuality, Kosmos itself, of which Heaven(s) and Earth are two sides (rather than together some 'outside' of some more radical Inside: 'In him the whole fulness of deity dwells bodily'). In this cosmic frame of activity, this scenario of the cosmic Drama in which our part is to find our part, to find ourselves as 'part', we can see that the formal inscription of this Drama in which we are involved, and know ourselves 'alive in the Christ', within some abstract figure (in which the whole Drama is marked as Mistake, as Nothing) that this imaginary inscription itself belongs to the formal play of 'World' - of images, figures - from which we are 'freed' by stepping into the dramatic actuality of the Christ in our actual situation and relations:

1 If with Christ you died to the elemental spirits of the Kosmos ['World'], why do you submit to rules as though still living in the World? 'Do not handle, Do not taste, Do not touch' (those all being things which perish as they are used), according to the precepts and doctrines of men: they do indeed have the form of wisdom in their rigour of devotion and self-abasement and severity to the body, but these are of value to no-one, serving only to indulge the flesh [?: various constructions of the last clauses possible].

The formal inscription of the dramatic scheme of Christian framing of activity - and the actuality of framing one's part as thus framing activity

1: Colossians, II, 20-23
in some abstract figure of Kosmos, is thus inscribed as itself only an image - a deceptive image - of some formal opposite of the Image. As belonging to that domain of Image which is, indeed, only one 'side' of Creation, but whose 'other' side distinguishes itself from this Image in the domain of the Image. The 'invisible God', as in Philo, is the Actuality which distinguishes itself from any Image; the two sides of God and World, I AM as the actuality which frames the World, and that 'Matter' which is 'open' to this 'framing', meet in the figure of Christ, 'the image of the invisible God'. At the midpoint of Time (as it were), the turning-point of the scheme of Creation, this actuality of the Christ, the Frame of distinction of Actuality from Image, appears 'in' the Image, in the World, as Man, as a man, and in this figure, through this figure, we can discover our part in the plan, and so participate in the integration of the 'two sides' in the figure of the Christ.

Following the destruction of Jerusalem by a Roman army in 70, and the dispersion of the first Christian group which had been an initial focus of Christian activity, 'Mark' made a collection of the stories handed down about the Christ's earthly life, and 'Matthew' a collection of 'sayings'. Between that time and the end of the century, Paul's associate Luke (a physician) arranged these, and a few similar elements in the form of a narrative. Around the turn of the century 'John' framed a parallel narrative within Paul's figure of the Actuality of the Christ as Frame of Creation, beginning his 'version' of the story with a recasting of the 'framing', in its philonic configuration, in this figure. Around the same time this writer, 'John', published a warning against gnostic 'versions' of the story. Those who are 'in Christ' and frame their activity in Christ, have 'knowledge', and directly experience, participate in, the working of truth: they directly know that abstract gnostic schemes, most particularly the 'abstraction' of the Christ from an incarnation in which 'Word became Flesh', are false. In a short letter -probably to one of the churches of Asia Minor - 'the Elder' instructs a sister church to exclude gnostic versions (2 John). In another short letter he warns a trusted member of some group or church that he intends to come and assert his authority, where a certain Diotrephes has been excluding members from John's church, and further excluding those in his group that disagree with that measure.
The Elder thus frames a correlation between framing activity 'in' the figure of Christ as primary, and participation in the christian group that is, as it were, an image of this framing, in which members participate by playing their parts in the christian 'version' of the Drama. Reflection must be integrated as simply one 'part' among others in this framing of activity 'in Christ'. To frame 'activity in Christ' within the logical order as primary, as subordinate to the logical frame of γνώσις, is to be 'outside' of Christ as primary frame: and thus gnostics should be excluded from the physical body or frame of the individual christian group, as 'John' suggests in his second letter.

- Reflection, then, is simply one variety of activity, to be itself framed within activity-in-Christ as more radical, as primary. Over the course of the second century, various 'gnostic' elements (framing activity within a 'logical' frame of distinction of logical (or psychical) and physical (material) as primary), thus 'excluded' from the initial christian groups (or perhaps, like the Diotrephes of the third letter, excluding the 'poetic' framing of activity from a 'christian' group dominated by gnostic elements) became organised as dramatic frames, as related groups, parallel to 'orthodox' christian groups. Around the middle of the century such frames of 'gnosis' became instituted in the various systems of Valentinus, Basilides, Marcion and others - notably in Syria and Egypt, where the dominant 'versions' of Gnosis reflected the dominant cultural and mythical configurations of those two old traditions.

In a parallel development, the 'christian' framing of activity had, over the same period, to decide the question of the relations between playing one's part in the frame opened up by the Christ, and playing one's part in the roman frame of the World. Paul had urged early 'christians' to regard earthly Law as one side, one element, in the Drama, complemented by an Invisible Order which distinguished itself from such earthly Order in that order. But around the middle of the second century, Montanus, in Phrygia, instituted a move to separate altogether the organisation of the christian groups, from that of the various other groups in which, as men and women, the members of these groups were involved - most particularly, from the roman institutions of civil society. Over the following century those who participated in this move, experiencing the framing of this distinction of heavenly and earthly orders as a new actuality of Spirit, were, like the 'gnostics', gradually excluded from the 'orthodox' groups, which were in turn being integrated within the unitary frame of a 'catholic' Group of
all christian groups, integrated in one Body, a unitary frame of activity, which was taken as the earthly image of the integration of christian activity in the figure of the Christ. One might take as reflecting this integration the systematic persecution of 'the Church' by roman emperors, that began with the emperor Decius in 250 (when, for example, Origen was imprisoned and tortured) and extended to the severe measures of Diocletian in 303-4. Over the course of this third century, the roman Army eventually became predominantly christian. Since the Army had become by this time the primary organising force in the roman World, the formal integration of the 'christian' frame of activity and roman Law by Constantine in the early years of the fourth century (following Diocletian's failure to overcome 'the Church') was simply the part falling to the 'emperor' in the World in which he found himself.

The conflict of the early christian groups with 'gnosticism' and 'montanism' around the middle of the second century is reflected at Alexandria (as the institutional focus of reflection in the roman World) by the establishment of the 'Catechetical School' as a christian institution parallelling the Museum and Library.

I have already noted that the convergence of the various Schools of Reflection was framed at Alexandria, around the beginning of our Era in the symmetric frame of 'neopythagoreanism'. I took as the primary response to the Question posed by the formal difference of the symmetric neopythagorean incorporation of the various convergent elements and the Actuality of a Kosmos in which this formal scheme is found, Philo's framing of Kosmos through the assertion of his part and participation in an actuality of Choice which (as I AM) distinguishes itself from its formal inscription in the symmetric scheme as 'deciding' the difference between Actuality and its mere formal possibility.

By the middle of the third century the various complementary elements had been integrated at Alexandria in a neopythagorean frame in which the simple philonic figure of Choice was replaced by a more or less systematic scheme of Actuality distinguishing itself from its inscription in a
formal symmetry of Actuality and Nothing, in platonic figures inscribed within the primary distinction of One and Many (in the *Parmenides*) as primary Actuality. This 'neoulatonism' of Plotinus constitutes a convergence of the parallel developments of 'neopythagorean' figures inside and outside the Museum. Outside the Museum the 'gnostic' figure of practical participation in the drama or mystery of psychical Actuality distinguishing itself from Matter (through a logical distinction of that logical distinction from the physical difference by which it is marked) appears as 'alexandrian hermeticism', incorporating earlier schemes of egyptian religion in the familiar figure of allegory - along with jewish, christian and 'pagan' schemes in various combinations.

Activity within the Museum over this period is represented by the mathematical and medical traditions dating from the third century before our Era. Ptolemy, who flourished around the middle of the second century, articulated the spatiotemporal frame of Kosmos, figure within figure (according to Hipparchus' trigonometrical principles) within a primary Sphere of Heaven, at whose centre was the sphere of Earth (this in the *Great Syntaxis* - arabic: Almagest - and the *Geography*). Positions on either sphere are given by two angles - 'horizontal' and 'vertical'; the position of planets by orthogonal (rectangular) projections onto three orthogonal planes - horizontal, (prime) vertical, and meridian - and the position of stars on the sphere of fixed stars by 'stereographic' projection onto the horizontal from the opposite pole:

![Diagram of Ptolemy's model of the universe](image-url)
This systematic articulation of the physical frame of Kosmos in terms of its elementary components (in particular the resolution of planetary movements into circles-within-circles - epicycles within epicycles within ecliptics, within the unitary Sphere of Kosmos as a whole) - or rather, intervening between the outer Sphere and the sphere of Earth) is doubled by the 'invisible' articulation of Actuality set out in the Four Books of the Ἀριστοτέλους. That is, Ptolemy systematically presents, in the mirroring in the physical frame of Kosmos, of 'astrological' actuality, one 'side' of the Actuality which is inscribed in the systematic symmetries of the neopythagorean frame in terms of a primary distinction of this Actuality from this its inscription.

The parallel development of medical studies at the Museum are best represented by the writings of Galen, who was completing his studies at Alexandria (again) around the middle of the second century.

Galen integrated the various medical traditions within a primary figure of the psychical actuality of the living human body distinguishing itself from the physical Matter of its context, through the 'transfiguration' or transformation of outward Matter, corresponding to Aristotle's figure of Life as the recurrence of a certain form in the distinction of 'inside' and 'outside' that form. That is, the various figures of physiology and pathology deriving from the various previous schools, are inscribed, one within the other, within a primary figure of psychical actuality (πνεύμα ἐν ζωὴ) distinguishing itself from its physical inscription in the physical difference of 'inside' and 'outside' a living body. 'Inside' the body, the primary figure of this 'psychical' actuality is the platonic one of Heart mirroring Brain in Liver: the liver effects the primary incorporation into the 'system' of the 'physical' interface of digestion, physical assimilation, in which 'natural spirit' distinguishes or differentiates itself from the physical matter of the food. This πνεύμα ζωῆς passes to the heart, another interface (of left and right sides of the heart) where 'vital spirit' differentiates itself. These then, πνεύμα ζωῆς, pass to the interface of inside and outside of the brain (a sort of reflection 'inside' the body of the body as interface of physical 'inside' and 'outside') where finally πνεύμα ἐν ἑαυτῷ distinguishes itself as psychical actuality.

This elementary figure of three orders 'in' the body reflects (as a προκοσμός) a mirror 'macrocosmic' order 'outside' the body - of
which Ptolemy, indeed, gives the limiting frame. Medical practice operates in each of the three orders (or a combination of them): physical treatment with drugs, operating in the nutritional interface and its analogues; 'vital' treatment by the regulation of activity - and, most effective of all, 'psychical' treatment through the basic figure, now familiar, of images of the distinction of psychical actuality and physical image - 'charms' for example, worn about the neck; prayers and 'magical' operations; 'astrological' figures, and so on.

About the middle of the second century, then - about the time that Ptolemy was completing his scheme of Kosmos, and Galen was introducing his complementary scheme of the 'microcosm', Man - a christian 'school', paralleling the pagan Museum, was instituted under the direction of Pantaenus. 'Logically', such an institution embodies the figure of a 'logical' determination of the place of the logical order of Reflection in christian activity; practically, dramatically, it embodies a further incorporation of the 'logical' figure of Reflection within the 'poetic' frame of that christian activity. This latter aspect is reflected in the part of the successive heads of the school (Pantaenus, Clement, Origen..) in the formal frame or organisation of the alexandrian church, which, by mid-century, was moving towards that figure of a 'catholic' framing of christian activity, group within wider group, and one member at each 'level' of framing responsible for 'framing' activity at that level. Thus Clement and Origen were, as head of the School, 'elders', παντανέαμος (corresponding to one of the three groups - along with priests and lawyers - in the Jewish Council or Sanhedrin), under the authority of the 'overseer', ἐπίσκοπος (bishop) of the alexandrian church as a whole, as a unitary group. Origen, indeed, was excluded from the alexandrian church ('excommunicated') and removed from headship of the School in 230, in a conflict with the Bishop of Alexandria with involved both the question of an 'irregular' ordination as 'elder' by the Bishop of Jerusalem (without the application for the Bishop of Alexandria's approval), and a doctrinal difference between Origen and the alexandrian authorities, elicited by Origen's intercourse with valentinian gnosticism. The decision of the alexandrian council or 'synod' (συνόδος ) of egpytian bishops was in turn rejected by the councils of Palestine, Phoenicia, Arabia and Achaea, and Origen instituted a new school at Caesarea, the roman capital of Palestine. The episode prefigures the conflicts of different sections of the 'universal' church in those universal or 'ecumenical' (οἰκουμενικά ) Councils which followed
Constantine's integration of Church and Empire (and which were summoned by the Emperor who presided) - such as those of the fourth and fifth centuries which excluded various doctrines of Origen - this implying civil penalties for any who maintained them.

But to return to that earlier phase of the Church as frame of Christian activity, and the place of Reflection in this frame, as instituted at Alexandria (bearing in mind that this institution is contemporary with the first 'synods' or councils: those of Asia Minor which excluded montanism).

The primary object of the 'catechitical schools' of Alexandria and other cities was the 'induction' of Christian 'converts' - those who had as it were discovered or identified themselves with their 'part' in the Christian Drama - who were 'converted', like Saul into Paul - into the central 'mystery' of 'communion'. That is, an induction into the ritual 'meal' around which the activity of the churches were becoming organised, through the ritual dis-solution or washing-away of sin in 'baptism': an induction to the primary frame of Christian activity as participation in the figure of Christ through these two symbolic activities which (in the accounts transmitted from the previous century) marked the beginning and end of his teaching. Baptism: the invocation of Spirit, distinguishing itself from Matter or Flesh in the 'washing-away of sin' - in that 'repentance' which is a recognition of the correlation of the Flesh, the bodily image of 'I', with a dynamic of choice (will, desire) that always leads 'outside' the inscription of choice in Choice, of my self-assertion in the self-assertion of I AM. Washing: an image of the separation, at the interface of 'psychical' inside and physical 'outside', of psychical actuality from physical image. - An image, then, in terms of 'inside' and 'outside' of a bodily interface, of that of which this very image is itself the 'outside', the visible exterior. - The image of the distinction of the psychical actuality of Spirit from the physical image of this distinction... For the baptised an invocation of Spirit, for the baptiser, making himself an instrument of the Actuality of Spirit, an act of induction of the catechumen or postulant into this Actuality just as the baptiser has himself been inducted into a higher level of this same Actuality through a 'laying-on-of-hands' of those to whom the initial laying of the Christ's hands on his immediate disciples has been (so it was supposed) similarly transmitted.

With baptism, then, a change of name, corresponding to a 'converted' identity, transposed from Matter to Spirit. - And through baptism
a participation in the ritual meal of Bread and Wine — in the ritual in which the baptised members of a particular group enter together into an identity of Spirit, into the figure of Christ. — This, again, through the figure of the transformation of physical matter — bread and wine — into the psychical actuality of Spirit — a transmutation (transubstantiation) in which Spirit distinguishes itself from the image of this distinction in the transformation of physical bread and wine into our physical flesh and blood, through our eating and drinking (this parallels Galen's primary figure of the psychical actuality of Spirit distinguishing itself from the image of this distinction in the transformation or assimilation of 'outside' food into 'inside' body).

— 'Communion', because in the sharing of a common bread and wine in the ritual the 'communicants' discover themselves to be simply 'aspects' of a common Spirit, a common 'I', that distinguishes itself from the physical Matter of the bread and wine in the frame of the group. — Of the group as a sort of mirror: physically many bodies, many 'I's' or 'me's', but in the Actuality that distinguishes itself in the ritual from body and image, simply aspects of one 'I', that, in the ritual, knows itself or experiences itself as such.

— 'Mass', missa, because before the ritual meal the unbaptised catechumens or postulants were excluded, dismissed, from the group.

Within the frame of this direct participation, then, in the figure of Christ as spiritual actuality of the group, distinguishing itself, 'himself', from the plurality of 'his' bodily image in the men and women of the group, christian activity had begun to be articulated by the middle of the second century. Communal meals, ἱματία ἁγία, love(-feasts), had indeed been a central aspect of activity within the earlier groups, but the formal articulation of the activity of the various groups within this common figure or 'mystery' did not arise until the physical re-appearance of the Christ (expected so soon by Paul, and by the John who saw \( \text{the antichrist} \) as the 'antichrist' that heralded the Last Days, as by the other John (his contemporary) whose Revelation presents a scenario of the Last Days, in terms of the activity, around the end of the first century, of the 'seven churches of Asia') seemed no longer imminent, and so no longer provided the primary frame of activity.

The principal business, then, of the catechetical school —
(oral) instruction - is to show the 'convert', who has found that the Christian story somehow 'works' (in the circular figure by which he recognises himself in the story precisely as playing this part of recognition or identification) the place or part of this 'working' or actuality in the unitary frame of Christian activity, of the Drama embodied in that 'story', as a whole. The initial figure by which the convert has gained access to the working of the story or Drama, the initial identification with the 'part' of identification, is inscribed, figure within figure, within the primary figure of the mystery of the Christ in which the activity of the Church is coming to be framed in a unitary way. And the primary end of the instruction is to 'induct' the catechumen into this 'framing' of activity, through the 'mysteries' (Latin: sacramenta) of baptism and 'communion', eucharist, εὐχαριστία.

Pantaenus' pupil (indeed, catechumen) and successor Clement, towards the end of the second century, expresses this catechetical induction into the 'mystery' of Christ as primary frame of Christian activity in a general form (so as the general frame of catechism) by expressing that mystery as the limit and completion of Greek Philosophy, of Reflection. This is simply to repeat the figure of Philo's presentation of the Law (as resolving the last symmetry of potentiality and actuality in which all the particular figures of Greek Reflection might then be inscribed, one within another) - but in relation, now, to the elaboration of that radical symmetry (notably in 'platonie' figures) over the intervening period.

The particular figures by which the new convert enters into the Christian Drama of Cosmos have a 'working' or actuality which itself belongs to the figure of τρισεβίσμος, faith. The end of catechism, when this figure of faith has been extended to the limit, to the primary figure of the Christ, he calls γνώσις.

The Father, I AM, is, as in Philo, the invisible Actuality that distinguishes itself from every image - the Creator 'outside' the visible frame of Cosmos insofar as nothing 'in' Cosmos can decide whether or not there will actually be this Cosmos it is 'in' - but invisibly 'in' this Cosmos, reflected in everything which is rather than not, since it decides that this Cosmos which frames everything itself is, rather than not. This Father or Progenitor
of all things, then, distinguishes itself or Himself (as I AM) from the mere potentiality of Kosmos as formal frame, in the primary figure of distinction of Actuality from Image: the 'logical' figure of distinction of this figure of distinction from the physical difference by which it is marked. The psychical actuality of this figure of distinction distinguishing itself - 'I AM' - from its image in physical difference, thus 'frames' Actuality, the actuality of Kosmos: this figure of \( \Lambda \gamma \varsigma \) is the figure in which 'the' (this) Kosmos is 'framed', 'created'. Access to this figure, by the inscription of this very access in the primary Figure amounts to \( \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \), of which faith, \( \pi \pi \pi \) is the image, the prefiguration. And the primary figure of this faith is presented by the image of (the) \( \Lambda \gamma \varsigma \) in Matter, in one of its sides, the side of the Visible, the Image:

Christ Jesus who, though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men. And being found in human form he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even death on a cross. (1)

The radical distinction between 'gnosticism' and the christian gnosis of Clement (and Origen) is that Clement, inscribing his reflection within the dramatic scheme of Paul and 'John' (the writer of the fourth 'version' of the Story) makes Visible and Invisible two sides within a unitary Kosmos framed in the actuality of \( \Lambda \gamma \varsigma \). Actuality distinguishes itself from the Image in the Image. The Father is the One of the Parmenides that distinguishes itself (as its very principle of actuality, what 'decides' that it is rather than not) from the Visible in the Visible. The Son is the very image of the Father. Between his Baptism and his Last Supper he presents in bodily form, embodies, the question of the distinction, in the frame of word and action, of the psychical actuality of this distinction, from its outward image in 'physical' activity. This question is focussed in the configuration of his physical 'death' - and the question posed by the symmetry of the two sides of this life, visible and invisible, reflects the question posed by the symmetry of two sides, physical and psychological, in each of us, for each of us. The question of our part in framing the 'story' of the Christ 'outwardly' embodies an access to the question of our part in framing the distinction between 'psychical' and 'physical' sides of our being: in as it
were stumbling across the 'working' of faith in the part of our framing the story of the Christ in the story, we accede to our part in the actuality of I AM. The actuality, the part, open to us in the 'story', 'outwardly' reflects the part open to us in Kosmos - the incomprehensible 'grace' or free gift of being, the 'invitation', as it were, to 'take part' in Actuality.

That is: the visible articulation of Kosmos about the question of the Christ, the inscription of this question within figure after figure within the limiting figure of Visible Kosmos as a whole, is a sort of exact inverse or converse of the invisible inscription of figure within figure within the actuality of λόγος. Visible and Invisible are two exactly complementary 'sides' ('inward' and 'outward') of this radical actuality of the Word which distinguishes itself from the 'physical' side of the Image in the Image. Our part in the 'outward' question of the Christ is a direct access to our part in the 'inward' λόγος. The 'catechism' then, effects the transition from 'outward' to 'inward', the induction into the Mystery of mysteries, into the figure of Mystery itself.

The question posed in the Visible Kosmos by (or in) the figure of the Christ is then an exact and direct 'reflection' in Kosmos of the question of the Actuality of Kosmos as a whole - the Son is the perfect image of the Father, in which the Father distinguishes himself from the image.

One might perhaps say that the figure of the Son corresponds to the question posed by the two 'sides' of λόγος (Philo's 'inward' and 'outward' λόγος), and that the Father as Choice, I AM, corresponds to the actual resolution of that question. That is, the Son embodies the symmetry or mirroring of the converse psychical and physical orders of 'inside' and 'outside', appearing 'in' the outward or visible physical order as the figure of the Christ within figure upon figure - 'in' a certain place and time, 'in' various relations to other things and other people, and so on - and yet also, 'inwardly', being the figure of the distinction of 'inward' and 'outward', 'in' which the whole 'outward' physical order is in turn inscribed. The incarnation of the Word, then, presents the very image of the distinction of actuality and image, of 'inward' and 'outward' (outwardly): it amounts to the transposition of the primary figure of distinction of 'inward' and 'outward' into the 'outward' physical or visible order of the Image, of Matter, Sense.
Then the 'question' appears 'outwardly' as: what account, story to give of this inscription of the distinction of inward and outward in the outward order in which we sensibly, visibly, tangibly, find ourselves? How frame that inscription? - And this is just to find ourselves, as it were, paradoxically involved in the very configuration of the question. - And to find the figure of the Father in the very resolution in us of the question, which corresponds to our actuality(s) as 'Son(s)', sons of God. We are involved, since there is no 'objective', formal, resolution of the question posed by the inscription of the figure of distinction of 'inward' and 'outward' in the 'outward' physical order: the very part of our choice in framing this inscription is itself irreducibly inscribed within the figure we must somehow frame, for which we must choose some account - if it be only 'this question is of no account'. Again, then, catechism leads from the initial step of 'faith' in which we find ourselves somehow involved in the 'working' of this figure of the Word or Christ, to the inscription of this initial mystery of faith as one component in the Working which is Actuality - which to know is to know the part, the working, of this figure of knowledge, in the dramatic Working which is Actuality. - To know our part in the Drama as participation in this Actuality of I AM. - And to pass, through the figure of Baptism, into the framing of our part in the Drama in the Actuality which distinguishes itself in the figure of the Christ: this through framing our activity in a group whose unitary actuality is mirrored in assimilation of the same Matter of Bread and Wine. - The part of this ritual 'in' the outward activity of the group mirrors the part of the communicants 'in' the activity or actuality which frames their actions - and this duality of 'inward' and 'outward' framing of group activity inscribes the group in the limiting expression of this duality: the mirroring, in the inscription of the figure of Christ 'in' the material World, of the inscription of this World in the figure of Christ (as one side).

Clement left Alexandria for Palestine in 203, during the persecution of Christians under Severus, and was succeeded as head of the School in the following year by his pupil Origen, whose own father had died in the Alexandrian persecution (there is a story that Origen wished to die with his father, but that, his mother hiding his clothes, he was unable to join him).
Some time before the conflict with the Bishop of Alexandria (turning, it has been noted, upon his consecration by the Bishop of Jerusalem, who had been a fellow-pupil under Clement) Origen articulated the dominant themes of clementine gnosticism in the systematic frame of a book of Principles, Περὶ Ἀκρωτίων - On First Things.

Origen transposes the primary figures of 'gnosticism' into a unitary Kosmos, rather than framing them in a primary abstraction of from the formal opposition of an 'inside' and 'outside' Kosmos. Significantly, the doctrinal component in the conflict with Bishop Demetrius of Alexandria turns upon just this relation to unorthodox gnosticism. Against the valentinians Origen maintained, in 230, that if the Prince of Darkness had 'fallen' into the physical order through will - in the primary choice of an image of choice, rather than the authority of Choice itself, of I AM then even he could return into the primary actuality of heavenly Choice through the figure or actuality of Repentance (already discussed in relation to Prayer, in Philo and Paul, above). Neither the valentinians nor the alexandrian bishop, with their complementary dualisms of Light and Dark (whether the opposition be of 'inside' and 'outside' the Kosmos, or 'within' it) could countenance such an assertion.

In the book on Principles, this 'fall' of Satan into the Image, into Darkness (the darkness, precisely, of the visible order - of the physical Light that hides inward or spiritual Light) is the very axis of Creation, of the cosmic Drama. Different souls, 'I's', fall to different degrees into, as it were, an image of themselves, into the Image, and the whole Drama amounts to the interaction of this principle of the Fall with the converse principle of Return - illumination and redemption. The Drama turns upon the Incarnation of the Word, through which the Actuality of I AM reasserts itself in the Image, through the figure of a christian Mystery already discussed in relation to Clement.

Psychical (or rather, for Origen, 'spiritual', κυριεύω) and physical ('material', λήγω) 'sides' of the Word, then, frame the Drama, as interaction of Actuality and Image. These two sides meet in that intermediate 'vital' (ζωή) order in which Actuality distinguishes itself from Image in the domain of the Image. This 'vital' order is focussed in the Incarnation of the Word, of the Son, the image of the Father. As we saw,
the 'external' relations of the figure of the Christ 'in' the visible order of Space and Time exactly mirror the 'internal' relations according to which the actuality of the various figures of the 'external' order are inscribed one within the other in the 'spiritual' side of the Word, of the Christ. The orders of 'spiritual' inscription of figures, Λόγος, in the invisible frame of Λόγος correspond, as in Philo, to 'angelic' orders; the converse 'material' figures, 'powers of Darkness', correspond to 'demonic' orders, framed in the primary Power of Darkness or 'Satan' (in effect, the Egyptian figure of Seth, as dual and adversary of the Hidden Sun, Amun Ra).

In particular, the 'external' relations of the figure of the Christ as expressed by his part in in the text of the Book, which the figure of the Book is focussed, as the figure of Man is focussed in the Christ) constitute a perfect mirror of the inscription of corresponding figures within the actuality of Christ, the invisible Christ. Indeed the two sides of the Λόγος meet in the figure of this Book, which is thus, as it were, the very System of Creation: in a sense it is the very Frame of Kosmos, intermediate between the systematic involution of all figures within the Invisible Word, and the 'evolution' of this inward Word focussed in its Incarnation in Matter.

Thus Origen attributes to every component of the 'Bible' or Book per eminentia three aspects (corresponding to the three aspects of the Word which 'meet' in the Text of the Book): a material (or literal, 'historical') aspect, a 'vital' (νευρικός) aspect, and a 'spiritual' (ψυχικός) one.

In particular each character, like each man in the context of the Book, has three aspects - material, vital, and spiritual; and these three aspects correspond to activity on three levels (depending which of these 'I's is 'framing' the action) - material activity (in which the body, and the outward word 'I', are involved in the mechanical economy of outward figure), activity framed in faith, and activity framed in νευρικός.

The 'lowest' or literal sense of passages in the Book, then, corresponds simply to the implication of actions in the material economy in which the ('my') assertion in the figure of 'I' is simply a mechanical concomitant of 'my' embodiment. - 'I' as it were passively experience a semblance of activity, of actuality: this is the 'image' of actuality which hides the reality. - But on this level paradoxes arise - for example, con-
traditions in the text — or, most notably, the paradox in which our part in the story of the Christ is to frame that story. Here we discover our implication in the Text, and that circular figure of 'faith', πίστις, in which we discover ourselves framing our part as that of framing our part. This actuality of faith corresponds to the second level of the Text, the Word. In it we discover ourselves involved in 'allegorical' figures in which, in a certain episode or other element of the text, an actuality expresses itself through an image of the distinction of that actuality from that image. Through this second level we eventually rise to the third level, where these figures, independent on the level of simple faith, are systematically inscribed within the figure of the Word as actuality of the Text itself. This 'spiritual' level of the Word and of 'reading', in which our part in the scheme as reading is discovered in the final Truth of the scheme itself, amounts to 

Having formulated this scheme of Book and Kosmos before his move to Palestine, and institution of a new School in 232, Origen went on to establish a systematic text of the Book — his Εικόνα — a collation of the Hebrew text of the 'Old Contract' (and its greek transliteration) with the original greek version of the Seventy, and three other versions. This he completed in Palestine, where he nearly completed also a systematic commentary on the whole of the Book, Old Contract and New, which Commentary he saw as his part in the scheme which this part revealed, and in which it was itself known. This palestinian period opens with a treatise on Prayer — on the elementary articulation of the three 'levels', physical, ethical or vital, and spiritual in the I AM that distinguishes itself from the image of 'I' in this 'my' material body. In prayer I discover my actuality as freedom, in the figure (given in Mark's account) of framing my activity as framing — framing my 'part' as primarily framing my part in some configuration, some scheme. Thus through prayer as primary frame of faith, I can frame actuality in ways which are not 'materially', 'physically', open to 'me' — and this rises into the highest form of prayer: that 'contemplation' or 'adoration' or simple actuality of Love, which is a direct participation in the figure of I AM, rather than simply in that radical actuality as it enters into the framing of particular activities in faith.

The palestinian period closes with Origen's apology for the Christian Faith Against Celsus, already noted above. Celsus, a contemporary of Galen,
had written in the second half of the previous century the first systematic pagan attack on Christianity. The original of his Άνως Άληθής is lost — but from Origen's reply in the form of commentary, one sees that Celsus' criticism amounts to a 'standing outside' the circularity of Christian faith — outside the circularity of that story which includes the part of the hearer or reader as one element, which makes the relation of text and context one component of the text. Celsus refuses the part, refuses (of course) to play the part, in the story of Refusal, and becomes Critic and Satirist (for the detachment of the spectator from the circular frame of the actor's identity is the very figure of Comedy). Celsus is, like Galen, more or less a Platonist. His criticism repeats the academic criticism of the Stoa: of the circularity of an 'assent' to the criterion which must itself justify or decide that assent. For how can we really choose such a circular determination of choice?

Λόγος Άληθής: 'The Real Logos' ('What the Logos actually is'), and also 'The True Account' which itself partakes of this reality, rather than the circular fantasy of 'Word becoming Flesh' and all the circular reasoning of superstition attaching to the 'Christian's' identification with a part in this fantasy. Paul of Tarsus goes so far as to inscribe the rational criticism of this circular identification of a 'part' within the story as the mistake of inscribing action within reflection. Reflection on the fundamental act of identification, of framing one's part of framing activity, while thinking it is the criterion of Knowledge and Truth and Wisdom, does not even know itself as one activity among others:

"Ο λόγος γὰρ ὁ τῶν σκισμῶν τῶν μὴν ἀποκαλλυπτόμενος μονῆς ἔστιν, ταῖς δὲ συνορεύσεσιν ἡμῖν συνάρχει Θεὸς ἢ τιν. γεγραμμένος γὰρ:

Ἀπλώθε τὴν σοφίαν τῶν σοφῶν,
καὶ τὴν σύνεσιν τῶν συνετῶν ἔφεσιν;"

παρ σοφῶν; τοῦ ἀρχηγοῦ, τοῦ σωφρονιστῆς τοῦ κόσμου τοῦ τοῦ, συνειρρίγον ο Θεὸς της σοφίας των σοφῶν των καιρῶν; ταλαγὴ γὰρ ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ τοῦ Θεοῦ αἰνεῖ, ἢ πορεύσει συν τῆς σοφίας τῶν Θεῶν, εὐφημισθεὶς ο Θεὸς συν τῆς σοφίας των "

*cf LXX, Isaiah XXIX, 14; XXXIII, 18
For talk of the cross is madness to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God; for it is written:

I demolish the wisdom of the wise, and the cleverness of the clever I will make useless.

Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Hasn't God made the wisdom of the world into madness? For since, in the wisdom of God, the world did not know God through wisdom, it seemed right to God, through the madness of the message, to save those who believe it. Since Jews ask for signs, and Greeks seek wisdom, our message is Christ crucified, a scandal to Jews, and madness to Gentiles, but to those called, Jews and Greeks, Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God. For God's madness is wiser than men, and God's weakness is stronger than men...

...My talk and my message were not framed in the convincing arguments of wisdom, but in the evidence of spirit and power, so that your faith wouldn't be in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God...

...Let no-one deceive himself: If anybody among you seems wise

1: Paul, First Letter to the Corinthians I.18-25 2: ibid II.4-5 3: ibid III.18-19
in this age, let him become mad, in order to become wise; for to God the wisdom of this world is madness.

If we try and decide 'logically' what part to choose, we will regard the step into the circular identification of a part in the christian Story or Drama as superstition, fantasy, madness... But then that is just (in the christian account) the very part of 'standing outside', the part of a reflection which does not recognise the question of its part: it is simply the failure to recognise that the 'rational' or 'logical' determination of choice, even a logical choice of a way of choosing, of the 'true' version of Choice, is itself only one option, one 'choice' - the choice that as (really) only the image of Choice, hides from me that it is I myself who must choose... or I will simply be caught in the formal and unthinking identification with that 'I' which is only a word, the formal 'part' of Reflection, which asserts itself in me, unless I choose, and discover myself as an actuality of choosing, framing - discover 'in' myself the actuality of 'spirit' and 'power'.

That is, the 'true discourse' which is an inscription of as dramatic circularity in the figure of Reflection, subordinating judgement to the formal 'I' which 'stands outside' the circularity of the christian Word or Story, is itself only the image of the 'true', the 'actual', Word: and it is only the image of the way that this actuality of the Word distinguishes itself from it, that this 'imaginary' criticism inscribes in its formal frame as folly, 'madness'.

Origen's apologia for christianity, then, follows the same pattern as his introduction to Prayer; his commentary on Celsus follows the same pattern as his commentary on the Book: beginning with the image, finding in the image an image of distinction of actuality from image, and passing to the inscription of the initial image in the actuality which distinguishes itself from this image, in this image.

Thus he begins with Celsus' complaint that christian activity is framed in a way which conflicts with roman Law as frame of the World. Indeed it does, sometimes, but that only distinguishes Justice from its image
in earthly Law. He passes to Celsus' criticism of the irrationality of
the christian identification with a part in some Story or Drama - or rat-
her to the images of this in the component circular figures in which in-
dividual christian activities are framed, and to the frequent conflict of
different 'stories', the contradictory character of christian activities
(so often) when considered all together. Yet, insists Origen, there is a
'Spirit and Power' at work - actualities distinguishing themselves from im-
ages, while still subject to confusion with the image of this distinction.
(This then, corresponds to the 'vital' level in the frame of christian act-
ivity, the 'practical' level of its 'working').

Further, through this figure, or by integrating instances of
this figure of Actuality (that is, component 'powers' or actualities) in
the figure of Actuality distinguishing itself from an image of the distinct-
ion of Actuality and Image, we discover a psychical actuality of Spirit, of
which the logical order of Reflection is simply the image - and in this we
resolve or answer the limiting question of that Reflection or Philosophy for
which (while caught in the image, the formal 'I' of unquestioned thinking)
that Reflection cannot itself account: the question of the distinction of
Actuality from its inscription in the Image in terms of a formal op,osition
of Actuality and Image. - We discover, that is, the actuality of Creation,
of Creator as I AM, in which primary Actuality we participate (and which
we thus know) through recognising our part in the question presented in the
World by the Story of the Christ.

Thus Origen has passed (having first elaborated the primary
scheme of the principal figure of K.smos in the figure and actuality of Word) from the elementary application of
his triple scheme to the individual - in the figure of Prayer - through
a systematic commentary on the Book, to the general application of that
scheme to the frame of christian activity as a whole in the World. - Not-
ably to an incorporation in the dramatic frame of the christian Story, of
the figure of Criticism (the inscription of the christian Drama in the log-
ical order), as the inscription of the worldly image of the christian
Frame within an image of Reason, / . Just as the part of the Christ
in the World, the Visible Order, the Image, is a systematic inversion of
the 'actual' part of the Image in Christ, so this inscription of the christ-
ian Frame of activity (as it appears in the World) in what appears to be
a more radical figure of Reflection, in the 'logical' order of criticism, reflects (indeed anticipates) the part of the 'psychical' (or 'spiritual') order - of that actuality of 'I' of which the logical order of assertion is the 'image' - as one side (the 'invisible' side) of that Frame.

This scheme was completed in 248. The following year the roman general Decius was sent by the emperor Philip to reassert imperial authority over the rebellious army of the Balkans (Moesia). This army proclaimed Decius himself emperor - against his will - and forced him to lead them against Philip, who was defeated and killed. Such was the common pattern of implication of political direction in the military balance of the third century - the balance of military force within-and-without the Empire as a whole, and the balance among the various sections of the imperial Army within the Empire. Decius was mainly occupied, in his new part of Emperor, in the defence of the Empire as a whole against gothic 'outsiders', 'barbarians', and he died in battle against them in 251. Within the Empire, though, he was the first Emperor to establish a systematic persecution of Christianity (the previous waves of persecution having been essentially local and sporadic). This mid-century attempt to constrict the christian 'frame' of activity - what was becoming a unitary or 'catholic' Church or Group - within the legal frame of the roman World complements, in a way, Origen's inscription of the figure of greek Reflection (one 'side' of that World) in the christian Frame: it amounts, one might say, to the attempt to incorporate the 'outward' frame of christian activity (with which Celsus had begun his criticism) within the 'outward' roman World...to subordinate it to the Economy of the Image. Origen himself was arrested in 250 in Tyre (in Syria) and tortured (as prescribed in Decius' decree) to try and make him change (as it were) his Story. He died in Tyre a couple of years later. With the mid-century close of Origen's reflection, and in it of the first closed system of christian Reflection, there closes a first phase of development opening with the radical configuration of the roman World 'in Question'. And with the opening of systematic persecution of a Church whose Story and whose institutional Frame were now themselves becoming systematic, there opens a new phase of that development.
From the Middle of the Third Century to the Close of the Fifth

With Decius' death, and a lull in the Persecution, the question arose whether those who renounced the Faith under threat of torture should or could be readmitted to the Church. The Bishop of Rome, and many other bishops, thought they should; but another party, prominent at Rome and particularly strong at Carthage, feeling that the apostates had in their choice of apostasy rather than torture and death irredeemably left the unitary spiritual Body of the Church, elected a certain Novatian as 'true' Bishop of Rome and head of their party - along with their alternative bishops in those sees where the incumbent had approved readmission.

Thus in 251 the unity of the Catholic Church (under the Bishop of Rome) first became a practical question - although the novatian party ('cathari, 'the Pure') soon became merely a parallel group of minor significance, which could not be incorporated in the Universal Church as summoned by Constantine to the first General Council in 325.

Around the same time - and like the question of the Unity of the Church reflecting Origen's incorporation of the 'logical' order into the framing of the Christian Drama - the various gnostic sects or groups, whose development had paralleled the rise of a universal Group or 'catholic' Church, lose any independent importance, and begin to be absorbed into the Story or Mystery announced around the mid-century in Persia by Mani, who had identified his part in the cosmic Drama as the πρότερος, the Helper, that the Christ had (in John's version) promised to men:

εὐφρένεις ὑπὸ ἐμοῦ ἰσομερέστατος. Ἐνὶ γὰρ μὴ ἀκέλθη, ὅ
παρελήμφον οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες ὑπὸ μέρους. Ἐνὶ γὰρ ἂν ἴσος, πέρον
μὴ ἐχὲς ὑπὸ μέρους καὶ ἄρα ἢ ἐχὲς ἢ ἄσχημον ἢ μὴ ἔχες
πέρα ἔργης, καὶ τεῖχος συναισθήματος καὶ τέλη κόρους.
It is to your profit that I go away. For if I do not go away the Helper will not come to you: but if I go, I will send him to you - and in his coming he will convince the World of Sin and Righteousness and Judgement.

I have still many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now: when he comes, the Spirit of Truth, he will guide you into all the Truth, for he will not speak for himself, but will speak rather what he hears, and will announce to you the things to come. He will glorify me, for he will take from what is mine and announce it to you.

The identification by Mani with this 'part' in the Drama - Helper, Counsellor - amounts to a sort of limiting case of syrian gnosticism (which was absorbed into 'manichaeism'). The 'orthodox' reading of John's account takes it as announcing the Spirit of Christ, which distinguishes itself from the Body, its image, when that image has gone (and yet the divine actuality of the figure 'embodied' for a while in the human Christ remains at work in the interplay of Heaven and Earth). The christian story is framed, inscribed, in Mani's story, through the inscription of its ('mythological') image and imagery, its 'outward' side, in a symmetrical economy of logical and physical orders: of Light identified as $\Delta\nu\psi\omicron\alpha\varsigma$ and Dark identified as Ignorance (and converse equivalence of those 'logical' or psychological figures with the physical order of Light and Dark).

- A symmetrical economy: hellenistic $\gamma\nu\omicron\omega\rho\omicron\varsigma$ had always involved a final subordination of 'physical' to 'logical', but in this limiting persian scheme such a finality is itself only one side, the 'force' of Light, balanced symmetrically in us by the forces of Darkness. That is: the logical determination of the relations of logical and physical orders, which frames hellenistic gnosis, is now symmetrically doubled or mirrored in a converse inscription of this logical figure.

1: John XVI, 7-8;12-14
in an equally radical physical order of Darkness, Matter. There is no way to 'logically' resolve this symmetry from one 'side' in some primary logical frame of Light and Dark. That resolution is not somehow 'outside' the symmetry of Light and Dark, framing their relations - rather, this 'framing' itself simply one element in the poetic frame of symmetry of Light and Dark. This 'rational' principle of resolution of the two sides is itself one of those sides - this figure of recurrence defining simply a direction, a force, which cannot definitively determine its relations with the complementary forces of Darkness.

This symmetry, then, is focused in us, in our activity, our choice. But there is no 'identity' outside the symmetric forces of Light and Dark in 'us' which could frame their relation in some detached way - within some more radical unity. Rather does the framing of their relations itself amount to the operation of the force of Light in us - partakes directly in the inscription of the relations of the two sides in that side, which thus, like Light in Darkness, distinguishes itself within the primary 'poetic' or dramatic frame of their symmetry. The 'logical' frame of gnosticism discovers its part as one side of a more radical 'poetic' frame. And in framing this Drama, Mani discovers his part in it, as embodying the force of Light that - in his playing of this part - first distinguishes itself.

- There is no 'neutral' framing of activity: what is most radical is the irresoluble symmetry of Light and Dark. - To frame this symmetry is not to stand outside it, but is already to take one side - that of Light rather than the other. In recognising the symmetry, we recognise that we are already involved in the conflict of Light and Dark, and that this recognition is the activity in us of the most radical form of Light, the primal Ray penetrating into the primal Darkness of Matter itself. And yet, in this recognition, we also recognise the Forces of Darkness, as a sort of palpable tendency towards hiding the Rays of Light in Matter, the tendency to as it were recuperate the forces of Light by incorporating their self-distinguishing in some mechanical image which leads us back into confusion and blindness. - So that in relation to any activity we wonder if this is the Light asserting itself in me, of a deceptive image leading back into Darkness? - And is this very question, then, Light revealing the deception of Darkness, or Darkness trying to hide the Force of Light which seeks to assert itself in this activity. - And is the 'me' that is framing the situation the Light in me, or the Darkness... and how can I even decide how to decide, since I will not know whether it is the Light or the Dark which is framing the decision so as to reveal itself...?
Thus in this initial questioning, introduced by the primary figure of symmetry of Light and Dark, I now see that these Forces are already at work in 'me' - while realising already that it is just this 'me' which is now radically in question. And the fact that the question has arisen (where before I just imagined I was simply myself) is itself a first obscure perception of the Light.

So that if I, Mani, first recognise the question, that means that I am the agent of Light now first revealing itself in Darkness - not in the figurative form of the Christ whose message has been substituted a dark image in the form of an earthly Church. And for me, Mani, to frame the question in the primary figure of Light and Dark, their radical symmetry, is to reveal what was darkly hinted at by the Christ, through John.

The Persian priests, then, the Magi, playing their parts in what is an exact image of this primal conflict - in its inscription in the physical order of Earth and Stars - are the prime embodiments of the forces of Darkness, hiding the Truth behind a precise Image. And for Mani's followers, his crucifixion and flaying at the hands of these priests (in 276), prefigured by the similar death of Jesus, presents the very figure of Darkness apparently overcoming the Light. So that in the recognition of this figure, Light asserts itself in distinguishing itself from the primary Darkness that is the Visible Image. Light appears in its primal Force in our recognition in Mani's life of the very figure of Darkness seeming to overcome the Light - the figure for whose recognition and expression Mani, as he saw was necessary, died.

The story of Mani, then, amounts to a direct parallel of Origen's inscription of the logical order of Reflection in the dramatic order of Christian activity. But whereas Origen's framing of this inscription is itself framed as partaking in a radical actuality of Creation which distinguishes itself in the poetic frame of Symmetry from its symmetrical inscription in that frame as formal opposite of Symmetry, as the radical Asymmetry of the Choice that frames this actual Kosmos (rather than not), Mani's embodiment of the cosmic principle of Light knows itself as light, as a force of Light, by finding its part in the Symmetry of a poetic frame of (this) identification which is itself taken for granted. There is no question of the difference between the formal symmetry of 'Light' and 'Dark' as announced by Mani, and the working or actuality of the distinction in his situation - no question
of a Creation, of the (actual) distinction of an actual Kosmos and the formally symmetric logical and physical orders within it, from the formal distinction of 'actual' and 'possible' which, to have any actuality at all, must itself somehow be marked in an actual Kosmos. - In an actual Kosmos which, in the very configuration of this marking, distinguishes itself from its image or reflection in the formal relations of those marks, their 'poetic' order. This radical asymmetry or distinction of Actuality from its nominal inscription in the poetic order of the Image as 'outside' that order thus constitutes a primary distinction in which the actual distinction of 'logical' and 'physical' orders may be inscribed. Mani's identification of himself with the 'Spirit of Truth' of John's account of the Christ frames an abstraction from the primary participation in Spirit as Actuality distinguishing itself from Image in the Image, to an image of this participation, in a poetic or dramatic 'economy' of symmetric logical and physical orders of an unquestioned Actuality. - An abstraction from the primary Mystery of Creation or Actuality to a sort of 'split' identity or identification in the play of conflicting actualities, symmetrically distinguishing themselves in the primary symmetry of logical and physical orders in the poetic order (in and from which Actuality as such distinguishes itself). - This through an identification with an image (the 'Helper') of the distinction between Actuality and Image.

The importance of the manichaean 'myth' ('myth', since it is an image of Mystery, abstracted from the last step of recognising the distinction of Mystery from its image) - of that simple and symmetric economy of distinction of two orders (with the recurrent question of which order any figure of inscription of one order in the other itself belongs to) - in this Story or History, lies as will shortly be seen in the way that it 'frames' Augustine's 'conversion' to his part in the Christian Story a century later. - This through the absorption into the manichaean story of those syrian elements common to the gnostic sects of the syrian coastland (Phoenicia) and the old phoenician/colony of Carthage. - Carthage which, rebuilt by Augustus, had by the third century become a leading city of the West, and, with Rome, the most prominent church of the Latin part of the Empire.
The configuration of the 'logical' order of Reflection and the 'poetic' order of framing activity at the middle of the third century — of which Origen's apologetics, the decian persecution, and Marcion's transposition of the configuration into the frame of his Story are so many aspects — has, of course, many other aspects, other faces... other versions. — Other 'versions', each of them in turn components in that configuration, and each in a way a 'framing' of the configuration of which it is itself a part. — Each a 'framing' which itself enters into the configuration as a common Frame (whatever, more than a certain Place and Time, is indeed common to all versions, rather than simply to some range or group of those).

The middle of the third century stands out, like the 'beginning of our Era', or the beginning of the fifth century before our Era before both of these, simply because the simple figures in which I am 'framing' this account — most importantly those of Reflection and Context — meet at these points in particularly simple ways, in particularly simple configurations. The 'beginning of our Era', for example, is here framed simply in the figure of Question: the configuration of Reflection around that point exhibits simple correlations between the particular forms in which this Question is posed or experienced, and the situations — the relations — of these various forms. In particular this correlation appears in a radical way simply in terms of the part of Reflection — as one approach to the 'Question' — in the roman World of the time as primary frame of activity, in which the Question appears in a 'practical' form. By taking the figure of Question as Frame, the (or some) relations of particular elements in that Frame (for example, Reflection and World) may be framed so that the 'internal' differences or relations between different elements directly reflect their 'external' relations. Thus the 'logical' relations of the figures of Reflection and World (the correlation of these figures in Reflection) reflect the 'physical' configuration of human Reflection on Earth within the 'dramatic' correlation of Reflection and World as 'frames of activity'. In particular, the different 'situations' of Philo of Alexandria and Jesus of Nazareth 'reflect' their complementary framing of Reflection and Action. And Philo's reflection is framed in the question of the relation of Reflection and Actuality, Jesus' activity within the question of the relation of 'framing' and Actuality.

By the middle of the third century (with Origen's 'part') the simple logical circularity or recurrence (the logical distinction of the
logical order of distinction from the physical order of difference by which this distinction is itself marked) corresponding to the figure of 'Reflection' is incorporated in the practical or dramatic frame of 'Christian' activity, so that one can no longer 'logically' decide to act outside that frame rather than within it. - The 'logical' and 'poetic' frames have become logically symmetric, so that the 'natural' place of Reflection is no longer critical detachment from the 'poetic' circularity of the Christian Story, and from identification with a 'part' in it. The step that then defines the frame of Reflection for the next two-and-a-half centuries, and which begins with Plotinus' lectures in Rome around 250 (and his earliest written meditations), amounts to the reinscription of this complementarity of 'poetic' and 'logical' orders in the logical frame of Reflection. Parallel to the development of a 'neoplatonic' philosophy within this simple frame (up to the point where the question of the inscription of this logical order within the poetic or dramatic order of activity recurs in a more radical form, around 500) runs the incorporation of the opposition of 'Christian' and 'Roman' frames of activity within the Christian frame, culminating in the collapse of the Latin or Western Empire over the fifth and sixth centuries. The end of the fifth century marks, then, another 'focal' point in this account, in many ways analogous to the middle of the third. The complex interrelations of various figures - their complex working or 'dynamic' - in an intervening play of figures, converge at such nodes in relatively simple figures of inscription of whole orders of figures, one within another, within an elementary configuration of Reflection and Context or Frame.

These 'nodes' - 500 'BC', the Beginning of our Era, 250, 500, 1250, and so on, will eventually in their turn be framed or correlated within the primary figure of this account or story as a whole - which, it will be remembered, was 'framed' simply in terms of the complementary 'logical' and 'physical' orders of a transition from the Pythagorean figure of Kosmos to a corresponding figure that arose in the Introduction to this 'story'. Such a frame includes (of course) a complexity of detail which is in principle irreducible to the configuration of this (or any) text. - It is obvious that 'the History of Reflection' cannot be reduced in principle to the configuration of some text, in which is formally inscribed some logical difference or distance from the irreducible multiplicity of past Reflection? It is precisely with such a circular figure that...
Writing proposes a break. I do not, for example, wish to suggest that the correlation of simple 'poetic' and 'logical' figures around the middle of the third century by itself determines, decides, the Reflection and Activity of that period - indeed the part of the figure of choice in that very configuration itself belies any such 'determinism'. I wish, rather, to try and find how these various figures - 'logical' and 'poetic' orders ('orders', indeed); 'choice'... even 'working', 'figure', and their 'play' ... are somehow 'at work' at such a time. - To find in Reflection and its Context at a more or less definite time the figure of an 'economy' in the correlations or 'play' of figures in Text and Context (and 'between' them). The question of the significance of such a 'play' - of an 'actuality' to which it might somehow correspond - reflects (continuing the familiar scheme already noticed at several previous 'points') the very schemes of 'actuality' which are 'in play' around this time, the middle of the third century. As in the analogous cases already treated, of the reflection in the schemes discussed of the scheme of 'reading' or 'framing' them, the common question of the significance of such a 'mirroring' of texts and readings must be left until the Conclusion of this whole account.

To briefly recapitulate (then) the 'scheme' of reading so far:
The initial figure of 'Reflection' (the 'circular' logical determination of the relations between 'inner' logical order and 'outer' physical order of a text or account) was found in a minimal form in the configuration (around 500 years before our Era) of a Pythagorean 'mystery'. - That is, the simple correlation of the various primary 'orders' of Reflection within that primary figure or circle of the mystery itself 'mirrored' the corresponding 'physical' articulation of the context of the mystery, in the 'poetic' or 'dramatic' frame of activity in the Greek city-state.

An 'economy' of corresponding 'inscriptions' of these various orders one within another, in successive steps, led down to the appearance, in the 'logical' order of Reflection (as the 'beginning of an Era'), of the 'poetic' or 'dramatic' figure of the frame of activity. At the same time (as it were the 'other side' of this 'logical' question) the logical figure of the question appeared in the unitary poetic frame of a Roman World, opening up a new possibility of 'framing' activity.

Now in this 'epochal' configuration of a 'Question' as interface
of logical, physical and poetic orders, amounting to the 'beginning of an Era' (of a new circuit or cycle or phase of development of these figures or orders), it was seen that the initial 'pythagorean' articulation of various elementary orders of reflection (or questioning) 'recurred' in the articulation of the Question. - They recur in a sort of transposition from the initial interface of Reflection and Context in the mystery of Croton into the analogous interface now inscribed within the 'logical' order of Reflection as a radical Question. - And this by a sort of convergence or formal coincidence in this figure of the Question of the various 'orders' of Reflection that had earlier diverged from the initial figure of Reflection - ἔργον - as one component order was subordinated to another, in various parallel developments, eventually taking the form of various rival Schools. This five-hundred-year circuit or phase of Reflection was traced through (or over) various subordinate phases, corresponding to subordinate 'circuits' of development (analogous to the simple figure of the whole phase or circuit) of primary subordinate 'figures'. Thus various 'nodes' were marked: the beginning of the pelopponesian war, the configuration at the death of Plato around the middle of the fourth century, the organisation of the various alexandrian and athenian Schools over the third century, the initial roman dominance of the mediterranean around the middle of the second century among them.

The transition from the simple figure of the 'Question' that is taken to mark the beginning of 'this' Era (of ours) to the logical presentation (by Origen) of the logical symmetry of the 'logical' and 'poetic' 'versions' of this initial Question, constitutes a further phase, inscribed within a simple figure, in which two parallel processes or economies of inscription of one of these 'versions' of the Question in the other, coincide in a new question, a new configuration, of which Origen's apology is simply one element - the inscription of the logical figure of Reflection within the 'poetic' frame of the christian Mystery, as recognising (as it were) the formal symmetry of this its inscription in that poetic order, and the converse figure of inscription of that poetic order in a logical order taken as 'primary' (as in Celasus' earlier attack). - And the further transition from Origen's apology (or rather the configuration of Reflection of which it is a prominent component) to the close of classical Antiquity around the beginning of the sixth century constitutes another 'phase' of Reflection, closely analogous to the transition from the beginning of the Era to the middle of the third century. In order to discover some
simple analogies or correlations of these two 'halves' of the wider transition from the commencement of our Era to the end of its fifth century, we must first try and express the configuration of the third century simply in terms of the correlation of 'logical' and 'poetic' orders, of which Origen's 'version' is only one aspect.

The question posed at the beginning of the Era is marked, as has been noted, by the recurrence (framed now in the figure of the question, rather than the initial figure of Assertion) of simple pythagorean schemes, expressing the 'symmetries' or systematic complementarity of the various 'orders' of Reflection corresponding to the various 'Schools'—platonists, aristotelians, stoics and epicureans. The emergence of these schemes at Alexandria around the beginning of our Era may be called 'neopythagoreanism', but this may be somewhat misleading, since the recurrence of pythagorean schemes amounts rather to a new element in the general 'economy' of Reflection (in its interaction with its various contexts), than to another 'school' paralleling the older schools (which had themselves ceased to function as definite traditions, and become more like complementary elements in a more or less open range of schemes of themes, from which individuals might construct a position loosely (perhaps) allied to one of the old schools).

I will not attempt any sketch of the various 'eclectic' positions of the first few centuries, in which these various elements or schemes of the old schools enter into complex interaction. I have already noted that, within the general question posed by the difference between the formal distinction of Actuality and its formal scheme, and their actual distinction (the question, roughly of 'Creation'), this radical distinction came to be articulated in 'platonic' figures. — 'Platonic' figures progressively articulated within the primary distinction between the formal Economy of a pythagorean Kosmos and its Actuality. The distinction (then) between platonism and pythagoreanism over the first few centuries is rather an artificial one, since these appear as two complementary 'sides' of a single configuration. One might better, perhaps, speak of the dominance of one side or the other—of 'platonic' or 'pythagorean' tendencies within a common play or interaction of schemes derived from both. One may equally well speak of 'stoic', 'epicurean' tendencies: there is for example a definite
epicurean tendency in Celsus' second-century 'platonism'. Only aristotelian 'tendencies' seem rather rare - since (perhaps) the simpler schemes of the aristotelian Economy of Kosmos constitute a common element in the various different tendencies.

Over the course of the third century stoicism and epicureanism disappear as independent positions - their interplay in the first and second centuries with an emerging platonic scheme is finally incorporated within the systematic articulation of that scheme itself. The cilician Diogenes Laertius may, for example, be taken to mark the close of the epicurean tradition in Antiquity. His history of Reflection down to Epicurus is framed in a simple scheme of the meeting of two convergent Schools, the Ionian and the Italian (beginning with the ionian 'physicista' and the pythagoreans, respectively) in the inclusive figure of epicurean atomism. The configuration of his Conclusion, in which the close of the history is made to correspond to the closed circle of Epicurus' logic, in which the prior figures of Philosophy are to be considered systematically inscribed, has already been noted in connection with Epicurus' system itself (which, along with so many of the schemes thus inscribed rather awkwardly within it, Diogenes alone has preserved for us).

Roughly contemporary with this 'story' of Diogenes (whose inscription of Reflection in an 'external' History corresponds to Epicurus' primary figure of inscription of that inscription in outward Nature), around the middle of the third century, and also expressing a 'limiting' figure of Reflection that constitutes one component of the configuration, the 'node', now under consideration is the 'empiric' Sextus of Alexandria (and Athens). It will be remembered that the 'Empirics' of Alexandria five centuries before had opposed the dogmatism of the rival 'Dogmatic' schools of Erasistratus and Herophilus (parallelling in this the emergence of the Middle Academy of Arcesilaus at Athens). Sextus inscribed his 'pyrrhonism' in the sceptical tradition of Pyrrho and Arcesilaus. His attack Against the Mathematicians (that is, against the neopythagorean elements at Alexandria) is a final systematic expression of a 'critical' position outside the primary 'logical circle' in which the pythagorean economy of Kosmos was inscribed, before 'the formal relations of 'inside' and 'outside' this circular Reflection are themselves integrated in the 'neoplatonic' recognition (in such a figure, eventually) of an Actuality which distinguishes itself from its formal inscription in a pythagorean economy of Kosmos as 'outside' that economy, as the formal complement of the symmetrical economy (in which it is thus inscribed) as a whole.
Around the same time, stoicism was finally being altogether assimilated into the complementary (and soon rival) christian and 'pagan' versions of 'neoplatonism', and 'neopythagorean' schemes ceased to be distinguishable from 'neoplatonic' ones (although here one cannot properly speak of 'incorporation': the 'neoplatonists' after Plotinus tended to call themselves both 'platonists' and 'pythagoreans', the latter character becoming predominant - Iamblichus and Proclus make not only Plato himself, but also Aristotle, 'pythagoreans').

I noted some way above that with the recurrence of pythagorean schemes around the beginning of our Era, the 'geometrical' mathematics of Euclid, Archimedes and Apollonius began to be supplanted by an arithmetic (not to say 'numerology') in which the analysis of figure in terms of a reduction in principle to the 'geometric' elements of point and line was replaced by an 'arithmetical' play or economy of figure - of forms of numbers and of their composition, abstracted from the euclidean coincidence of logical and physical orders in the geometrical point. -Forms within forms, reducible in principle to the elementary unit - and an economy of such forms, which reflects the forms or figures within which that economy of figure is itself, in turn, inscribed within the unitary frame of Kosmos.

Thus Nicomachus of Gerasa, a 'pythagorean', early in the first century composed an Introduction to Arithmetic, beginning with the unit and the various figures of combination of units, and passing through correlations of these various figures (without any proofs, in the euclidean sense, but only examples to illustrate the various principles of composition and correlation), to an elaborate theory of proportion - that is to say, of the elaboration of a whole frame of Figure out of the interplay and recurrence of certain elementary figures, such as those of the arithmetic, geometric and harmonic proportions which articulate the cosmic frame of the Timaeus. Nicomachus setting out of such a 'play' or 'economy' of figure remained the dominant mathematical frame for the rest of classical antiquity, and, through the latin adaptation of Boethius early in the sixth century, remained dominant in the West until the introduction of arabian mathematics in the thirteenth century.

More characteristically, perhaps, Theon of Smyrna, another 'pythagorean' towards the middle of the second century (a contemporary of Ptolemy, who uses some of his astronomical observations), wrote a guide to the mathematics of Plato's dialogues - integrating the mathematical elements of these in an 'arithmetic' frame similar to that of Nicomachus. He also wrote an
elaborate treatise On the Tetractys, in which the mathematical articulation of the 'first Tetractys' is the model for the elaboration of nine further Tetractyes, altogether comprising a whole scheme of Kosmos, in which the place of the mathematical articulation of the first Tetractys in the series of ten, is reflected by the place of the Unit as first term of the first (mathematical) Tetractys. The place of the second term is reflected in the Kosmos of the ten Tetractyes, in the second Tetractys, giving the articulation of physical Space, and so on.

Thus the 'neopythagorean' mathematics of the first centuries are seen to substitute for the euclidean reduction to the point (and corresponding articulation of progressive 'proof'), a coordination of figures intermediate between euclidean point and euclidean Space, which reflects the 'platonic' figures by which this 'mathematical' figure is itself inscribed within the articulation of Kosmos, as primary image of that articulation. In Ptolemy's work, for example, the question arises: Why does space have three dimensions, not more or less? This question makes no sense in euclidean geometry, but itself frames the fundamental Space of that geometry, complementing the elementary point. The only way to approach this radical question is (as in Ptolemy's rather circular answer) to mirror in the three-dimensional articulation of mathematical figure, the place or part of that figure (as its formal frame) within a complementary actuality of Kosmos. ... It will be seen how such a 'pythagorean' tendency in the second century approaches the question of the distinction of Actuality from Image by articulating this distinction itself within the 'mathematical' frame that is, as it were, the formal image of Kosmos.

The limit of this 'pythagorean' tendency, corresponding to its coincidence with a previously complementary 'platonic' tendency around the middle of the third century, is reflected in the abstraction by Diophantus of Alexandria (around this time) of arithmetical analysis from spatial representation, in principle. He develops the analysis of arithmetic 'forms' (in his Arithmetic), originally derived from the geometric composition of figures in terms of a given unit 'length', to the point where he operates with relations of figures that have no geometric interpretation. Thus he takes for consideration some 'unknown' quantity whose relations with certain other quantities, and other relations between quantities, are known. By combining these various 'forms' he reaches an identity between two 'forms' - that is, he reaches two different 'expressions' of the same 'quantity' - in one or both of which the 'unknown' may occur in several
'forms'. These forms are now manipulated according to rules derived from the principles of addition and composition-in-square ('multiplication') of geometric 'quantities': any quantity (of any 'form') may be added simultaneously to both 'sides' of the identity or 'equation' ('equals added to equals give equals' and 'equals compounded with equals are equal' are basic principles of euclidean arithmetic); and the inverse operations of subtraction and division may be likewise performed. Eventually Diophantus transforms the equation into one between the unknown on one 'side' and some combination of 'knowns' - which is to say, some multiple or submultiple of the unit - on the other. But in his manipulations 'square' quantities (for example) may be compounded with squares (corresponding to a figure of four dimensions' with no spatial representation), 'lines' may be added to 'squares', and so on. The euclidean analysis of figures is, from this point of view (though Diophantus could hardly have regarded it thus) simply one particular case of the general articulation of arithmetical figures or 'forms', rather than the arithmetic relations being simply abstract presentations of geometric relations, ultimately analysable into euclidean point and line in a process which is the simple converse of 'synthesis', geometric proof based on an initial coincidence of logical and physical orders in the simple euclidean 'point'.

Diophantus' Arithmetic constitutes a formal limit to the mathematics of classical Antiquity - a sort of question posed by the relations between geometrical space and arithmetical 'figure' (like Ptolemy's question of the triple dimensionality of Space, or of the principle involved in Euclid's 'Parallel Postulate'). Its sequel lies in arabian 'algebra' rather than in any further development of ancient mathematics. A similar limit is marked by the systematic exposition by his contemporary (and fellow-alexandrian) Pappus of the results of alexandrian geometry over five centuries. The only subsequent work in classical Antiquity is the neoplatonic commentary (in, for example, Iamblichus and Proclus) which systematically articulates the mirroring between the forms of earlier mathematical theory, and the place of this mathematical figure in a platonic-pythagorean Kosmos. The limit marked by Diophantus, then, reflects (whatever may have been Diophantus' philosophical views... the exposition of the six extant books of the Arithmetic has the character of an intellectual game - 'play' of or with (arithmetical) figures) that limit of inscription of the difference of actuality and play of figure in the play of figure, which marks the transition from the parallel development of pythagorean and platonic schemes to their conjunction in 'neoplatonism'. 
It remains now to note two analogues of the development of 'neo-pythagorean' arithmetic over this same period. An 'egyptian' art and a 'chaldean' or 'magian' art, which each embody the form of a 'mystery', corresponding, in this, to the initial embodiment of the 'greek' art of mathematics in the pythagorean group or 'mystery'.

First, the 'egyptian art'. As part of his political, legal and economic restructuring of the roman World around the end of the third century (which included, as already noted, the final systematic attempt to suppress the christian Church or Community), Diocletian is said to have decreed the burning of all books on the 'egyptian art' - χητιχ - of transforming 'baser' matter into silver and gold. An 'art' or activity which, like the failing roman economy it was thought to be attacking by increasing the amount of precious metal in circulation (and inflating prices), was centered in Alexandria. Alexandria in Khmi - Egypt (in the native language).

This 'egyptian art', χητιχ, was also (perhaps somewhat later) known as χητιχ, fusion of infusion. This as the 'chemical' transformation of baser matter into 'noble' silver or gold was expressed (in those texts which survive) as the interaction of 'noble' Fire and 'base' Earth in the chemist's vessel, as the fire of his furnace was applied to the matter in his 'bowl'. Thus Zosimus, a contemporary of Diocletian's, and the earliest writer on the 'art' who can be dated with any reliability, describes the 'chemical' process of transformation in an allegory which focusses on the bowl or crucible as 'altar' at which the 'work' takes place. 'Work': a 'mystery', and also a 'sacrifice' and 'punishment', whose articulation directly mirrors the gnostic scheme of descent and ascent of the soul into and back from Matter, from and back to Light:

And again I saw the same divine and sacred bowl-shaped altar, and I saw the priest clothed in white celebrating those fearful mysteries, and I said 'Who is this?'. And, answering, he said to me 'This is the priest of the Sanctuary. He wishes to put blood into the bodies, to make clear the eyes, and to raise up the dead' (1)

The process in the crucibulum, the 'little cross' of the sacrifice, is an image of the cosmic scheme of Spirit and Matter, Invisible and Visible, Above and Below. The transmutation of the matter in the crucible is to be effected by recognising the place of the 'work' in this scheme, as an image
of the cosmic scheme of Actuality distinguishing itself from Image in the Image. The 'bowl' is not only the chemist's vessel, but also the bowl of the Earth, and the 'fire' is also the Sun. The adept focusses the interaction of Heaven and Earth (primary image of the distinction of Actuality, Spirit, from Image, Matter), responsible for the formation of metals 'below' in the Earth, in his bowl and furnace. He is, as it were, the intermediary between the cosmic interaction of Heaven and Earth, and the image of that interaction in his laboratory: he is Zosimus' 'priest... celebrating these fearful mysteries'. - Mysteries 'framed' allegorically in terms of this intermediate order between crucible and Kosmos - in terms of a human drama of sacrifice, death, resurrection in a new body.

The cosmic scheme of Actuality distinguishing itself from Image which is 'one side' of this 'mystery' derives primarily from the allegorical articulation of the neopythagorean scheme (often following Philo) in terms of hellenised egyptian religion - an articulation which may be regarded as a limiting egyptian form of 'gnosticism'. That scheme is set out in the 'hermetic books', compiled in Alexandria in the first few centuries of our Era. 'The Father' is identified with the 'One', the 'Son' with 'Two' or Dyad, 'Spirit' with Three; or the Mother may be associated with the Dyad, the Son, Hermes Trismegistus, 'thrice-greatest' with the Triad. The two schemes are not so much conflicting, as complementary, figures: in the first the Mother or Female Principle (corresponding to graeco-egyptian Isis, the Great Mother whose cult was the dominant 'mystery' in the roman World in the first few centuries - at least outside the army, where the persian-babylonian cult of the Son, Mithras was dominant, until supplanted by that of Christ, the Son) is as it were assumed as a sort of 'indefinite dyad' or multiplicity, in union with which the One produces the Two, the first definite dyad, called in the hermetic books the Word, \( \Lambda \) \\

From this first three-in-one proceed the seven planetary spheres (giving a familiar ten-fold ladder of cycle-within-cycle). The Son in the first triad is the 'Image of the Father'; the Sun in the visible heavens is also the 'Image of the Father'; the Moon is the Image of the Mother. But since the structure of Actuality and Image mirror one the other, the 'working' of the Father is also the working of the Sun. Multiple 'versions' of the same scheme are juxtaposed, and Image is identified with actuality - one image with various actualities, one actuality with various images: for the 'hermetic' tradition or scheme is framed at the outset as allegory, as
mystery. The allegorical substitution in the discourses of 'Hermes' or 'Asclepius' of image for actuality on the level of 'content' directly reflects the substitution of 'outward' words (as components of the discourse) for (to speak with Philo) the 'inward' \( \alpha \omega \), 'powers', they reflect. That is to say: the free substitution of image for identity, the play of analogy or 'figure', itself as it were silently points to the initial natural or unthinking substitution by the uninitiated reader of an imaginary play of mere forms of 'Father', 'Sun', 'Moon', 'Above', 'Below', and so on, for the unitary Actuality which, in these various figures or images, distinguishes itself from the domain of the Image, from the mechanical play of the 'ordinary' reader's imagination. In a way, the reader is himself 'Asclepius', the Son (of Hermes), insofar as he finds in the 'images' and allegories of the texts that of the Father distinguishing himself from the Son as Image, and so 'speaking' to him (the reader) as the very 'son' in which this distinction is actually taking place (through the participation of the reader in the distinction of Actuality (Father) from Image (Son), which distinction appears in the text in the image of Father speaking to Son).

This figure of 'entrance' into the 'hermetic' mystery, by participation in the Actuality which distinguishes itself from its formal expression in words through the figure (in the play of those words) of Father (Hermes) speaking to Son (Asclepius-Tat (ie Imhotep)), leads the reader into the perception of his place between Heaven above and Earth below. - And the image 'below', in Earth, of the self-expression of Actuality, 'Power', distinguishing itself from its image, lies in the steps of transformation of 'gross' or earthy matter into fiery gold, the purest and most changeless matter. These steps 'below' correspond to steps upwards through the heavenly actualities of Spirit, imaged in the successive planetary spheres (each associated with, indeed identified with, one of the 'seven metals', and denoted by the same symbol: \( \bigodot \) for Sun and Gold, \( \mathbf{C} \) for Moon and Silver, and so on. Just as, in understanding the hermetic texts, the reader discovered himself as an interface between text and Actuality, through which Actuality expressed itself (or 'himself'), distinguishing itself from its image in the text, the 'outward' words, so now the chemist becomes, through partaking of the more general figure to which the text is an induction or introduction, an intermediary between the heavenly Actuality:above and gross Matter below, an intermediary through whom that
Actuality can express itself by differentiating higher Gold from lower Silver...or Copper, or Lead.

The configuration may best be understood in a medical analogy: the interaction of the three orders of Above (Spirit), Intermediary (Man) and Below (Matter) is reflected in the intermediary order by the three levels of the human organism and their interaction (as presented, for example, in Galen's systematic figure). The liver and its 'natural spirits' correspond to Earth below, the heart and its 'vital spirits' to the intermediary or mediating activity of Man, and the brain to the heavenly actualities whose material images are the stars.

...Or it may be understood in terms of Ptolemy's parallel scheme of 'astrological' interaction of Heaven and its cycles Above with Earth and its linear movements Below.

More generally, these two analogues, medical and astrological, may be regarded as two sides - microcosmic and macrocosmic - of the chemical 'Work' or working of Actuality. Later arabian 'alchemy' (al kimia = χιμεία) begins with the systematic integration of what one might call the 'horizontal' triple order of medical 'inside', active passive interface, and astrological or macrocosmic 'outside', with the triple 'vertical' order of Heaven, Man, and Earth, common to all three 'horizontal' orders.

Finally, as an example of the inter-relations of the various figures - 'hermetic' symbolism, the part of the 'chemist' between Spirit and Matter, and so on, I give a version of the central 'hermetic' text whose greek original (probably of the third century) is lost, but which remains in various arabic versions. It was to exercise a great influence - to play a central part - in the european 'hermeticism' of the thirteenth to the seventeenth century (that is, over the first 'half' of the Second Part of this Story or History):
The Words of the Secret Things of Hermes Trismegistus:
True, without deceit - certain and most true.
What is Below is as what is Above, and what is Above is as what is Below, for the performing of the Wonders of the One.
And as All were from One, by the intermediary of One, so were All born of this One, by adaptation.
Its Father is the Sun, its Mother the Moon; Spirit carried it in its Womb, and its Nurse is the Earth.
This is the Father of all Perfection in the whole Kosmos.
Its' Power is integrative, if it be turned into Earth.
You must separate the Earth form the Fire, the Subtle from the Gross, smoothly, with great cleverness.
It ascends from the Earth into Heaven, and again descends into the Earth and receives the Power of Superiors and Inferiors. Thus will you have the Glory of the whole Kosmos, and thus will all Darkness flee from you.
This is the powerful Power of all power - because it will overcome every subtle thing, and penetrate every solid.
Thus was the Earth created.
Hence will there be wonderful adaptations, of which this is the means.
And so am I called Hermes Trismegistus, having three parts of the Philosophy of the whole Kosmos.
What I have said concerning the work of the Sun is complete.

Parallel with this hermetic 'mystery', whose relation to the hermetic books of the first few centuries reflects that of the christian mystery of the 'eucharist' with its transformation of material Bread and Wine into the Body and Blood of Christ to the early 'theology' of the Word, there runs the 'chaldean' or 'magian', 'magical art', μαγιστρία, whose elaboration in the terms of graeco-syrian philosophised mythology (or 'Gnosis) is a direct analogue of the graeco-egyptian thematic of alexandrian 'alchemy': μαγιστρία and γνώσις, the chaldean and egyptian 'arts', par excellence.
The 'cosmic' Frame of this 'magic' is directly coordinate with that of contemporary alexandrian alchemy - as may be seen from the fragments of the 'Chaldean Oracles' (Ἀδύμια Χαλδαῖα) preserved in neoplatonic commentaries from Porphyry's down to Proclus and on to Psellus, of the lost poem (dating from some time in the century before Porphyry's commentary) generally ascribed to 'Julian the Chaldean' or to his son 'Julian the Theurgist'. Here again appear Father-One, Son or Mother as Dyad, Spirit or Son as Triad. Again the 'mystery' is framed as a reflection in the symbolism of the text, of the primary figure of distinction of spiritual actuality, working, from literal or material image - the distinction of 'inward Word' or words, from the outward configuration of the text from (and in) which they distinguish themselves.

A primary or characteristic difference between the 'Mysteries of the Chaldeans and of the Egyptians' (to take the title of what presents itself as the reply of the egyptian priest Anebo to Porphyry's questions, and is traditionally attributed to Porphyry's most prominent follower Iamblichus, founder of the 'syrian' school of 'Neoplatonism', itself dominant until Proclus' athenian integration of alexandrian and syrian elements) reflects that primary complementarity of egyptian and 'chaldean' cultures and mythologies already noted. Whereas the egyptian mystery or art is framed in a primary figure of the Work of the Sun in the transmutation of base Matter into solar Gold - in that limiting figure of distinction of Above and Below, of Actuality and Image, in an image - the chaldean art of 'magic' is framed within the figure of an Economy, in which that 'alchemy' appears simply as one figure of transfiguration among others. An Economy which attaches primarily to the 'intermediate situation of the adept or initiate, rather than to the extreme terms of unitary 'solar' Actuality and blind earthly Matter, in which intermediate figurations might be suposed hierarchically ordered.

That is, the chaldean magic, as reflected in the 'theurgical' texts or rituals that parallel the alexandrian alchemical texts of the first few centuries, is organised in the duality of Spirit and Matter in the particular configurations in which theurgist or magician finds himself as 'intermediary' between these two orders. The primacy of this
'symbolic' framing of such intermediate activity or working (rather than the Egyptian adept's self-inscription in the limiting figure of distinction of the two orders, of subordination of Below to Above) is reflected in the central interplay of magical text ('incantation'), ritual activity or drama, and symbolic objects involved in the activity. In the limit the Manichaean dramatisation of the conflict of Light and Dark embodied in the very enunciation or invocation of this conflict, might be seen as an extension of this 'Chaldean' or Syrian figure (to include, like the Antiochid administration, Babylonia in Syria), to the cosmic Drama as a whole...for from the sixth century before our Era, Persian 'dualism' interacts, as a sort of limiting figure, with the Babylonian cultural Economy.

How does a scheme of 'magical art' apply 'in practice'? Roughly, in the configuration of a particular situation certain component 'figures' will correspond to figures by which certain 'actualities' - workings, 'powers', forces - express themselves, according to the elementary figure of Actuality, Power, distinguishing itself from Image: the simple figure of magical Action, Activity, Working, as such, the simple 'frame' of the mystery. Then, just as the text of the Oracles or λόγος frames the part in such Activity of the Word of Power - the way in which the text effects the entry into the 'magical' configuration in general (as it were the 'script' for the Drama which identifies itself as one element in the Drama or Working) - so a particular λόγος, formula, incantation, text, frames the invocation or actualisation of a 'power' corresponding to some particular aspect (something open in its cosmic configuration) of the particular situation 'in question'. This, then, through those 'words of power' of which, Origen tells us in the first book Against Celsus, the Tetragrammaton, the unspeakable NAME of the God of the Jews and Christians, was recognised as the most powerful by the 'magicians' of his time: I AM - the actuality of the Father of Syrians, Jews and Egyptians alike, the Father of the Chaldean Oracles and the Hermetic Books.

1: Des Places Fr. 150 (Psellus, Commentary on the Oracles, Pat.Gr.1132c)
never change foreign names...for there are among each people names, god-given, having mysterious power in rituals.

- a power 'mysterious', ἀγάμος, which cannot be 'translated' into the 'open' play of everyday prose; which is rooted in a closed configuration of particular figures essentially embodied in the particular figuration of an 'actual' language and culture. ἀγάμος: at once undescrivable in open speech, and not to be so 'opened', divulged, in everyday intercourse 'outside' the closed configuration of the ritual, the 'mystery'.

Δύναμις: the 'force' of the word cannot be translated, its import in the closed figuration of ritual. In the configuration framed by the 'circuit' of inscription of text, of its logical order, in the coordination of various orders it frames - whether this be the general configuration of 'magic' framed by the text of the Oracles as a whole, or the particular configuration of a certain ritual. In the primary magical frame of 'ascending through the spheres', magically transfiguring the Matter in which as participant in the ritual or mystery one is embodied, the 'words of power' invoke corresponding workings, actualities, 'gods'...induce their self-expression in the outward order of the Image - in and from which they 'distinguish' themselves:

1: Fr. 144 2: Fr. 142
For in contemplation and mystery that which makes the way upward both sure and unstumbling for us, is proceeding in order — and indeed the Oracle affirms:

Nothing else so turns God from man, and with living power sends him upon empty paths — as when, without order or concordance, we make our ascent towards the most divine contemplations and workings, as it is said with uninitiated tongue or unwashed feet.

The frame of 'vision' and action, 'working' — ἡγομ. and ἡγεῖ, opens (is revealed) and closes (comes 'full-circle') in the entrance, 'initiation', through words, into the working of figures, of images, in which divine Actuality distinguishes itself in and from the image of this self-distinction or self-expression. The Oracles are the words, the Word, the λόγος, which frame the widest circuit of 'magical' mystery of 'sounding light', the 'Works of Deathless Fire', in an outward silence.

.. urging yourself to the centre of sounding light..

Towards the Light and the Father's rays you must hasten, whence Life is sent forth to you, clothed in multiple mind.

For mortal, approaching the Fire, will have Light
But when you see most holy Fire beyond form, springing shining through the depths of all Kosmos, listen to the Voice of Fire.

If you invoke me many times, you will see all things grow dark. For then is seen no curved dome of Heaven, stars do not shine, the Moon's light is hidden, Earth is not solid: everything is aflame with Lightning.

...and Proclus preserves a specific invocation, the configuration of a particular scene in this dramatic mystery of Word and Light:

Having uttered these invocations you will see either fire spread springing like a boy on the waves of air, or indeed: fire without form, from which comes forth a voice, or a wealth of Light all around the field, rushing, whirling...

Proclus further notes, in his commentary on the Cratylus, that the particular ritual forms framed by the general coordination of Word and Light are prefaces- that is, they 'open'...and indeed are (en)closed - by the admonition:

...keep silence, you admitted to the mystery

1: Fr. 148 2: Fr. 147 3: Fr. 146 (from comm. on Republic) 4: Fr. 132
Lydus relates the inscription in the general frame of the Oracles' identification of their order of Words as a primary component of the Kosmos these words frame, of the pythagorean figure of Pentalpha - Pentangle or Pentad: the geometric image of a fivefold working in which that image, that geometrical order, is one component (this circularity then associated, as we earlier saw, with the Pentalpha as 'symbol' of access to, and closure of, the pythagorean mystery):

![Pentalpha diagram]

The Oracle declares that souls, when restored to their former nature by means of this Pentad, transcend Fate:

For theurgists are not counted in the herd subject to Fate

Presumably this Five, like the quaternary or Tetrad, is to be understood in relation to the self-differentiation of the One Alone into a Triad (One 'of whose terms' being, so to speak, its 'primary' Image):

1: De Mensura, XXIII, 6 (=Fr. 153) 2: Fr. 3 3: Proclus, Comm. on the Parmenides, 1091 (Fr. 22 interpolates: οὐκέταν οὐκέταν οὐκέταν ὑπαρχόντα τί ἐστιν καταγράφοντα
The Father 'withdrew': *ἐκδιώκειν* - to steal away, but also to 'grasp' with the Mind: and this radical withdrawing or abstraction as it were to one side of an inaugural distinction or Two is (as in Zeno of Citium's figure of *καταλαμβάνει*) itself the very figure or configuration of 'mental' 'inside' framing its part in an initial order of assertion; of self-assertion, of Will, indeed. 'Withdrew' as the logical assertion of the distinction of the logical distinction of physical and logical from the physical distinction by which this is marked (the physical 'image', then) 'abstracts' in its primal order of 'grasping itself'. Radical Unity, then, of Mind as one 'side' of a triple order of mirroring of that Actuality and its mere Image, reflection, in the Nothing of the Mark: a fivefold Pentad of the triple mirror and its two 'sides'. From the 'invisible' side, then - from a threefold Invisible Fire - proceed, as in the Hermetic Books, the seven heavens of Visible Fire. The Sun, middle term in this tenfold scheme between Father and Earth, corresponds (as in pythagorean accounts noted at the beginning of this First Part) to Five. But as I noted in relation to the 'multivalent' symbolism or play of figuration in the Hermetic Books, the 'actuality' of the Five might more properly be found at work in *all* the configurations in which the figure (its symmetry of 'five-fold') occurs - distinguishing itself, then, from all these its images - rather than being identified with one image of the configuration of distinction (the Sun, for example). And 'the' One itself is here 'at work' as the very figure of that 'abstraction' of 'the' Five: the figure of distinction from the image of this distinction (from the image). Distinction, in particular, of Unity from the unity 'of' Five...of Two, Three, Four...and of One 'among' others.

One, the Father, at work 'governing all', then, through the coordination of these images: Triad as Father-Son/Word-Spirit, and Spirit in turn mirroring Father and Word in Matter and Nature in its threefold mirror...or Son as Dyad mirroring Spirit in Nature. Even at the elementary level of the configuration of initial abstraction and coordinate Image, Fire, there is already a 'play' of figures, a play of different figures of inscription of the first three terms one in another, or in a configuration of other terms - a play of 'perspectives' in the initial symmetry. A play which is itself what is open in the symmetry or figure of Three, in which the actuality or working of the Three distinguishes itself from its various 'versions', images.
The way that the three of Triad is itself framed as 'primary' cosmic symmetry (whether it be, for example, within the 'egyptian' figure of hierarchy, or the 'chaldean' figure of cosmic economy) is in turn reflected in the account of triple division thus 'externally' framed in some cultural figure or configuration rather than another. To take a radical instance: Origen's 'dramatic' framing of a primary Trinity of Father, Son and Spirit is strictly analogous, if taken simply as a formal configuration, to Plotinus' primary Triad or Trinity of One, Mind, and Life, framed within a primary 'logical' figure of Reflection. Each of these, in turn, might be said to be 'male' versions of the primary Trinity: egyptian and chaldean 'mythologies' alike complement the figure of the Father distinguishing 'him' self from the Image, with the figure of the Mother (Isis-Ishtar) in which (or whom) this distinction itself is 'open' - I have already noted the dual treatment in the Oracles of Dyad as Son or Mother. Such duality is fairly common in 'gnostic' schemes, where the primary mirror of Actuality (Σοφία) and Image is usually female Wisdom, Σοφία, rather than male Word, λόγος.

Leaving gnostic schemes aside, one might remember the dominance, in the first few centuries, of the mysteries of Isis throughout the roman World, as a unifying frame of Mystery as such. - Isis as the Female Principle of Life, Above and Below, of whom all goddesses were taken as so many aspects, integrated within the frame of the primary image of the Moon, in which (or whom) Above is mirrored in Below. - The sun of Heaven (for example) in the Gold of Earth.

- This unifying frame was in its turn assimilated, along with most of its (her?) symbolism, into the christian church, over the two-and-a-half centuries which are the subject of this section. The third General Council was called to Ephesus in 431 to discuss the denial by the syrian Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople, of the title 'Mother of God' to Mary the mother of Jesus, Nestorius insisting that Mary was mother of the human Jesus, but not the divine Word, the Second Person of the Trinity. The Bishop of Rome and the Patriarch of Alexandria pronounced this view of Nestorius' λόγος, to be 'excluded' from the Church, claiming that it involved a distinction of two persons (rather than simply the orthodox two 'natures', divine and human) in Christ. The Council supporting this view, and Nestorius refusing to retract it, he was deposed and banished. His supporters were in turn excluded from the Empire (considered co-extensive with the Church) and, growing in numbers on its eastern borders, eventually became the primary means of transmission of greek learning to the califate of Baghdad in the eigth century, and so, ultimately, a major component in the transmission of that learning to thirteenth-century Europe.
To return, though, to the 'male' Trinities of Origen and Plotinus: One may reasonably enough associate what is common in these two 'versions', 'dramatic' and 'logical', of the Three-in-One with the shadowy figure of their common teacher at Alexandria, Ammonius Saccas ('Sack-carrier') who himself wrote nothing, and died in 243, whereupon Plotinus left Alexandria to join the expedition of the emperor Gordianus against the Persians (who had invaded Syria) with a view, it is said, to studying the religion of Chaldea and Persia. Upon the death at the Euphrates of Gordianus' father-in-law, the prefect of his personal Guard, and the murder of the emperor at the instigation of the new prefect (this following a common pattern of the third century, already noted), Plotinus passed to Rome where, as I wrote above, he began to write and lecture around the middle of the century.

Ammonius' parents were Christian, but it is not sure quite what, apart from strongly eclectic, we may make of the religion of the son: Plotinus says he ceased to be a Christian in later life; Christian authorities deny this. This confusion itself might be taken to reflect that convergence of 'logical' and 'poetic' orders towards the mid-century which is reflected in the writing of Origen and which, after the mid-century, begins to find 'logical' expression in the 'neoplatonism' of Plotinus' Roman essays, later collected and edited by his Phoenician pupil Porphyry (who also first published the Chaldean Oracles—whatever may have been their prehistory). The backward deduction from the analogies between the triadic schemes of Origen and Plotinus, and the correspondences between those analogies and the schemes of Hellenised 'chaldean' and 'egyptian' religion already described, in which Ammonius would appear to have been keenly interested, are further strengthened by the consideration that Ammonius' third eminent pupil, Longinus (who was Porphyry's teacher at Athens, before the latter went on to Rome and Plotinus) seems to be the writer of a 'poetics'—On the Sublime (literally, 'On the Above')—which presents a third 'version' of the convergence of 'logical' and 'poetic' orders (a reflection on that figure of heavenly actuality distinguishing itself in an image). It is as though the 'mystery' of Ammonius' teaching (in both the esoteric and exoteric senses of that word) moved in some symbolic play of the various schemes elaborated in turn by Origen, Longinus, and Plotinus, and that this 'play' and its primary triadic frame was eventually focussed towards the end of the century by Porphyry (who had associated with, if not actually studied under, Origen in Palestine, before passing on, in turn, to Longinus at Athens and Plotinus at Rome).

With this configuration of the transition from a triadic frame of
alexandrian syncretic symbolism to the 'logical' articulation of this frame as 'neoplatonism', in Porphyry's assembly of Plotinus' essays into a unitary scheme, we may pause for a moment to set out schematically an initial correlation or coordination of the various 'orders' of Reflection and their contexts, before illustrating how this elementary coordination is at work in the transition from the third century to the close of classical antiquity. Indeed, in terms of this simple scheme, it will be possible to show, in simple outline, how that 'close' corresponds in a way to a limiting expression of this same scheme - a limit to its 'logical' framing in Antiquity. - A limit that appears in 'neoplatonic' form (in Proclus' successors) as the question of the 'logical' or formal symmetry of the three orders of 'hypothesis' or actuality, of which this same 'logical' order of symmetry is itself one (of the three) components.
The discussion of the relations of Reflection and 'World' in the first few centuries of this 'Era' has been dominated by a simple 'figure' - that of the distinction of 'Actuality' from its 'inscription' in the 'play' of the 'Image' - and this in that play itself. - A figure which had earlier been found to 'frame' the concluding dialogues of Plato around the middle of the fourth century before this Era, this Time. ... To 'frame': that is to say the 'working' of the various schemes or figures of those last dialogues - the 'logical' Parmenides, the 'physical' Timaeus, the 'poetic' (in the widest sense of ποιημα, current at that time) Laws - might be 'inscribed' one within another, within this simple figure of distinction. - A figure framed 'logically' in terms of one 'class' in another, in the Parmenides, and framed 'physically' according to a strictly complementary or inverted order of 'spatial' and 'temporal' inscription of one figure or scheme within another 'in' a primary frame of cosmic Sphere and circular or cyclic Time.

We saw how this duality of logical and physical 'in', inscription, in turn framed (in the same sense) Aristotle's systematic 'Economy' of inscription, in which the logical order of inclusion was itself 'psychologically' inscribed 'in' the physical order of 'inside' and 'outside', and this physical order, in its turn, 'ontologically' inscribed within the simple logical figure of τόπος, position or positing - within the logical determination of the distinction of logical and physical orders. - A distinction itself abstracted, in this very same figure, from the 'physical' difference of 'inside' and 'outside' by which it is 'marked'.

We further saw how this 'logical circle', defining the minimal element and mark of simple 'position', and reflected in the maximal figure of cosmic Sphere and First Mover (as self-position) was itself 'inscribed' in this systematic Economy or Frame of inscription, as the figure of a Reflection, distinguishing itself from the 'dramatic' play of figure inscribed within the overall scheme in the figure of Drama. - And then how this 'identification' of the part of Reflection within the scheme which it itself 'framed' in the logical figure of position, was itself recognised as partaking in the same figure of 'imaginary' identification which, in the aristoc-
It appeared to stand 'outside' of the poetic economy of figure, and the imaginary 'dramatic' identification central to that economy or 'play' was itself seen to be one (most deceptive) element in that very 'play' of figure: seen as the very figure of Oedipus' 'blindness' to his part in the 'act' he thinks to stand outside and frame or represent.

We saw, then, the development of two complementary 'versions' of this figure of 'identification', 'stoic' and 'epicurean', over the following centuries, and the parallel development, in the platonic tradition, of the question presented by the symmetry of these complementary 'logical' and 'physical' versions of identification. The question was posed in terms of the figure of Choice: these conflicting 'identifications' of the stoic and epicurean 'part' in action or actuality were themselves the primary or minimal figures in which stoic and epicurean activity was 'framed', the primary choice of the figure of Choice in which particular 'choices' were then to be 'inscribed', framed. But how, then, choose between these two versions?

More radically: how choose between choosing one of these two contending versions of Choice, and not choosing? That was Cicero's question, which he resolved by playing the part, not of stoic or epicurean, nor even 'greek' academic, but rather that of roman Lawyer.

... But then, what of the circularity of framing this choice of the part of Lawyer in Cicero's 'judicious' manner?...

... So, at last, to the question of Choice, and the 'framing' of action, simply as such... but this question was seen to be just that - a question... a question in which was in turn inscribed, in practice as in theory, that of how to frame this very question itself. - A question that lies silently 'behind' the various 'versions' that soon begin to appear - a question of the symmetry or complementarity (again) of those various versions, and, first of all, of the symmetry of a 'logical' (or theoretical) and a 'poetic' (or practical) version.

Each of these 'versions' - the 'logical' framing the Reflection of Alexandria over the first few centuries, the 'poetic' framing christian activity - are framed in the radical figure of a choice, an initial identification, in which the 'I' which chooses Choice rather than some unchosen
'part' (with its image of identification and choice), knows itself, experiences itself, as in this actuality of Choice, actually 'I'. - Knows its particular actuality and working in some body - as 'somebody' - as a participation, a 'part', of the working of the figure of 'I' simply as such - as 'God'. - Knows this personal participation in Actuality or Divinity, as a participation in the primary actuality of Kosmos, distinguishing itself from its Image in 'Matter' (as simply the mechanical 'play of figure' - the 'formal' inscription of one figure within another, in which the figure of Actuality as 'outside' this play is itself one element). - Knows his or her 'I' or actuality as the analogue, in a certain 'body', of the figure of 'I' simply as such distinguishing itself from 'Body', 'Matter', simply as such.

This simple figure, then, is common to the 'logical' and 'poetic' versions of 'framings' of the 'question'. The primary difference, within this common figure, is that the 'logical' version amounts to an inscription of the participation in the fundamental figure of Actuality directly in that 'logical' figure of its inception, of 'psychical' actuality in 'abstraction' from the 'image' of distinction, the figure, in which it is remarked or marks, expresses itself whereas the 'poetic' version involves the inscription of this distinction within the 'poetic' symmetry of this 'logical' figure, and the 'physical' inscription of this figure in 'Matter', in the Image. The period at which we have now arrived may be taken to begin, around the middle of the third century, with the inscription in the 'logical' figure of distinction of Actuality and Image, of that 'poetic' symmetry of Above and Below. And, of course, paralleling this is the inscription of the simple 'logical' figures of Actuality - in terms of 'Trinity' and 'Incarnation' - in the poetic frame of Christian activity. In particular, over this next period, orthodox figures of Trinity and Incarnation were inscribed in the Church as the 'Christian' frame of Reflection at successive 'General Councils', and conflicting heterodox or 'heretical' versions were excluded, along with their proponents, from the frame of Christian activity. With the integration of the 'invisible' frame of that activity with the Empire as visible frame of bodily activity, the exclusion of heresy became a major function of the civil Law, and a major factor in imperial policy.

How express the actual interplay of these various simple 'orders' in a correspondingly simple way? Evidently - to begin with- the 'outward'
physical framing of the 'logical' order of Reflection in the third century mirrors, in a way, the 'internal' logical determination of the 'logical' relations of primary Actuality and the 'outward' Image in and from which it distinguishes itself. Further, the 'logical' symmetry of logical and poetic frames of choice presented by Origen's last work opens up a choice between resolving this symmetry within the 'poetic' framing of Reflection as one element among others in unitary Christian activity, and inscribing the resolution of this radical symmetry within the logical or psychical distinction of Actuality and Image as primary frame of distinction or resolution.

We have, then, at the outset, a configuration of three 'orders', 'logical', 'poetic' and 'physical', interacting through the play of inscription of this triple configuration in each of the three orders. - And, in particular, this complex interplay is, in the physical space and time of the Roman World of the third century, itself reflected in the articulation of the 'logical' order of Reflection within a primary figure which directly reflects the 'triple' order of which it is itself one term. We find, for example, that this triadic frame of the logical order of the third century finds expression in all sorts of analogous 'versions', each of which reflects the place of that particular 'version' within the poetic framing of that version within some configuration of activity. Thus the frame of 'Chaldean' or Syrian culture is reflected in a 'magical' framing of Kosmos within the figure of symbolic text as 'mystery', while 'Egyptian' culture is reflected, in that same figure, as 'alchemy'. - Of course one cannot simply identify the circular figure of a 'culture' (where the figure of inside' and 'outside' that 'cultural' frame is itself one component of that frame), 'Egyptian' or 'Chaldean', with some 'physical' frame, some particular country or place - or rather, such an identification is itself one component in the interaction of 'poetic' and 'physical' frames of activity. The 'Chaldean Oracles', for example, were probably compiled at Alexandria. On the other hand, to identify the 'magical' figures of those 'Oracles' simply with some abstract circuit of 'Chaldean' culture, while failing to perceive that in them such a figure of Chaldean 'economy' is inseparably combined with Egyptian elements, would be to make a mistake analogous to that of identifying that figure of a 'culture' with some fixed spatial extent.

...Yet we are not faced with undifferentiated Chaos, with a 'play' of such various figures (an irreducible logical dimension or figure 'in play' in the 'abstraction' of discrete 'figures' from the 'play' that
is itself irreducible to the mere figure of 'play') in which it is impossible even to begin. For we can actually mark in simple terms what is 'outside' the 'logical' correlation of these various figures - and we can recognise in this simple configuration of 'inside' and 'outside' what we can call (not thereby defining it or 'constituting' it logically) an 'ontical' actuality; the 'working', in relative independence of ('outside') the text, and 'on' the text, of an 'actual' historical Past which as it were 'responds' to our work, the working, of abstraction. For with each new presentation of, say, 'the roman World of the third century', new questions open up out of this inexhaustible 'Past'. 'Work' or working of abstraction here: as this text asserts and questions, and its 'material' asserts itself and questions, the latter reflecting the embedding of the abstracting text in its wider context. A working already 'found' in Aristotle's texts, as they mirrored the working of this inquiry into Aristotle and his predecessors and successors.

Ontical actuality of our Past, differentiating itself from the formal configuration of these words, in and through them: an order complementing or responding to this text as it confronts Aristotle's text, in whose relations to its context, the same ontical actuality of the common context from which Aristotle, I, and the intervening writers of the third century, all abstract our texts. And it is the 'dramatic' symmetry of logical, poetic and physical, together with psychical, mystical and ontical, reflecting the question of our approach to the third century text and context in the aristotelian 'poetics' of abstraction, which is now posed as axis of this inquiry. We must find something in the third-century configuration which 'asserts itself' in response to our abstract coordinates of logical and other orders inside and outside this, and those, books; we must seek an echo of the 'working' of a process of abstraction which slowly articulates this inquiry, in the way that third-century schemes are embedded in the third-century context they frame, according to a poetics of abstraction from the 'play' of symmetrical logical, physical and poetic orders, that we first found in Aristotle's discussion of tragedy.

Formally, we may begin by positing or postulating the same triple order - logical 'abstraction', outward physical context of that
abstraction, and the poetic interplay of various component figures of the first two orders and component figures of this order of interplay, - both in the relation of this text to the third-century complex of texts and contexts of abstraction (as its 'material'), and in the relation of those texts to their 'material'.

Here then is an elementary 'logic' of text and context, as this and those texts are articulated in a common figure first defined as that of the relation of this text to those texts. Now in turn we may see the same figure in those various 'parallel', symmetric, texts of the third century, their immediate third-century context the opening up of various orders of question, theoretical and practical, in the radical symmetry of the various orders of text and context that has unfolded out of the initial Question which opens our Era.

We have already found a minimal form of the 'logical' figure and its implicit order, in the process of 'abstraction' of a logical 'inside' of marks from a (logically opposed or complementary) physical 'outside': we recognise 'in' the marks a formal distinction between their 'inside' of logical distinction (and its dynamic of deduction), and the 'extrinsic' physical difference of two sides of something ('in' and 'out') 'by', 'through', 'in' which this logical distinction of logical and physical is 'marked', in which it is 'made'.

This simple figure should now be familiar: it has already occurred again and again in our reflections upon the relations of Reflection and Context. It defined, for example, aristotelian 'form', and appeared 'at work' in the aristotelian Economy of Kosmos as Life: the form or figure of 'inscription' in the figure of its 'two sides', formal 'inside' and material 'outside' or context. The figure, indeed, appears in two complementary forms in the two limits, formal and material, of Aristotle's Kosmos: in both the primary movement or actuality of Heat (the principle of dissociation of the primary opposites of Heat and Cold in otherwise undifferentiated prime matter), the 'elementary' 'principle' of Life, and in the limiting Thought thinking itself, which is simply the actuality of Form as the distinguishing of Form and Matter.
This radical figure of the 'logical' itself presents, as I have several times insisted, a 'logical circle'; the very circle, or recurrence of a figure in itself that closes an order upon itself, and institutes a separation of 'inside' and 'outside'. An 'in-side' defined 'in terms of' the inscription of some configuration 'in' that 'logical' figure of 'inside' and 'outside', according to an order of inclusion ('logical inclusion') that is itself structured by this inscription.

How can one then hope to decide, logically, between that logical order of 'in', and its physical complement or mirror, in the 'initial' articulation of the two-sided configuration in which these two senses of 'in' are to be distinguished, and assigned their exclusive spheres? Even the order supposed by this 'initial' becomes ambiguous, indeed confused. If we are to make this radical distinction of logical distinction (logical inclusion and exclusion) from physical distinction or difference (physical inclusion and exclusion), then we mustn't suppose it already available for this its making.

This question - or rather this difficulty or paradox, for there appears not even to be the stability of any frame available to constitute it as a 'question' - arose in connection with the relations between the aristotelian determination of the 'poetic' frame of symmetry of 'logical' and 'physical' orders (in the 'dramatic' working of a difference or distinction of the two orders which could be inscribed in neither - an 'action' or drama somehow intermediate between inner imagination and outer reality), and the complementary 'poetics' of the aristotelian logic of drama. - Arose, that is, with the question of the circularity, in Aristotle's Poetics, of an 'abstraction' of the logic by which drama was analysed, from the dramatic dynamic of the spectator's abstraction of his 'I' and its rational, logical 'in-side' of thought, from the poetic confusion or symmetry of 'inside' and 'outside', as this dynamic was itself presented 'logically'. With the question of the complementarity of the logic of Aristotle's Poetics, and the implicit 'poetics' of Aristotle's logic - with the coming-into-question of Aristotle's initial 'abstraction', his unquestioned identification with an 'I' which is only a formal or nominal centre, and limit, of the 'logical' order.
The next step, then, was to logically inscribe the figure of its logical framing in the noetic order of this symmetry of logical and physical 'sides'. The primary figure of this actual choice of the logical order, inscribing itself in the poetic order it thus frames 'logically', is simply the figure of choice, of action framed 'in' or by 'I'. - Or rather, by 'me', since this assertion distinguishes itself from a mere formal 'possibility' of assertion - the logical 'I' - being 'outside' this order, and distinguishing itself in the order as such - the actuality of the distinction being inscribed logically as the 'I' that is - 'by definition' - 'outside'.

- The formal working of this 'second' recurrence of the logical order within itself appears, as we saw, with the stoic choice of logical choice, and the 'working' of the corresponding identification, in the act of deciding between logical and physical orders, with a 'part' in the logical order of resolution of decision.

- The 'actual' working corresponds rather to Carneades' 'self-activity' of the 'I' that, in some situation in which this is open, 'frames' its part in that situation as the instance of choice which 'chooses' to frame the situation as this its self-assertion in framing it.

Now, the formal configuration of this actual identification of the 'logical' order - first the simple distinction, then the distinction of this distinction from the physical difference by which it is marked, then the assertion of the actuality of choice, distinguishing itself from the symmetric recurrence of logical and physical distinctions of logical and physical, 'inward' and 'outward', orders - corresponding to the actual working of logical distinction, in distinguishing itself from 'physical' and 'poetic' analogues (each with their two 'sides'), involves the actual distinction of two 'sides' of the triple configuration of logical, poetic and physical two-sidedness. That is, the actual 'working' of logical distinction, involves not just the aristotelian 'abstraction' from symmetric logical and physical difference, but an inscription of this recurrence, in its turn, in the poetic symmetry of the two sides, which Aristotle leaves unquestioned, in the initial 'logical' framing of the discussion.

Formally, then, this 'dramatic' working of the logical order in what one may call a 'free play' of the figure of difference or distinction -
of 'in' side and 'out' side, with nothing further fixed – without presupposing that one may treat these sides from one 'side' rather than another before first introducing a distinction of one side from the other – must involve analogous 'workings' of physical and poetic two-sidedness, and the 'interplay' of the three analogous orders, 'in actuality'.

Thus, for example, the physical order of the 'working' or actuality of the logical order at which we have arrived by a double recurrence of logical distinction (a double recurrence implicit in distinguishing that distinction as 'logical') must (logically) 'outwardly' or physically frame that 'logical' recurrence in a configuration that is reflected in the part of 'physical' difference in the logical configuration in which the logical order identifies itself.

For this 'physical' order was found to 'mirror' the initial logical 'recurrence' or 'circle' of logically distinguishing between physical difference, and the logical distinction 'marked' by that difference – in this case, the very distinction of these two 'orders'.

Furthermore, we know that 'logically' (again, from the primary 'logical' configuration of identification of that configuration as 'logical') this 'mirroring' must itself amount to the primary articulation of the 'poetic' order, reflected in the way that it enters into the identification of the logical order.

Let us then complete the configuration by a sort of induction, which will itself come full-circle (as it were) with the inscription in the 'working' of the three orders, of the working of this our actual identification of that 'working'.

First of all, then, the 'physical' side. How does this work? We must, to begin with, consider the 'ontical' actuality corresponding to the 'fact' that logical distinction does indeed 'work' (we can actually identify it – we can work with the distinction of 'logical' and 'physical'). There 'actually' is such a difference open to being distinguished by us. What in our situation presents us with the possibility of marking the dif-
ference? What is the minimal configuration in which this marking is actually open to us?

The question corresponds to the transition from the 'logical' frame of the Parmenides to the 'physical' frame of the Timaeus, and thence from the 'dramatic' frames of human community (with which the Timaeus ends, and the Critias and Laws begin), back to the 'dialectical' or logical frame of the Parmenides, but now, as it were, from 'outside', from its place in human community and a physical Kosmos (into whose consideration it had initially led). - Or to the transition from Aristotle's 'logical' treatment of the 'working' of logical distinction (in the 'Organon'), into the 'outward' Kosmos of the Physics, thence into the consideration of Life, whence into that of human community, and the place in it of Reflection, into which the Organon is the introduction.

We begin, then, simply with a 'physical' or 'outward' order of 'inside' and 'outside'. In this we find an initial 'physical' difference of 'two sides' which amounts to the primary inscription of the difference of 'physical' and 'logical' orders in the physical order.

- We are by now very familiar with these 'two sides' of the physical Kosmos: In the Timaeus they appear as the ordered inscription of one actuality within another within the primary actuality of Kosmos as a whole (the 'logical' side of the physical order), and the chaotic play of figure (the 'material' side, or the 'physical' side in that restricted sense). Life, as the interface of these two sides, their mirroring, has as its primary locus the interface of 'inside' and 'outside' of the heavenly 'spheres' - this reflecting the primary actuality of 'God' as the interface (as it were) of the logical order of the Parmenides, and the physical Sphere of Kosmos as a whole.

- In Aristotle's scheme we find an analogous configuration of this initial distinction (of 'form' and 'matter'), again reflected in the mirroring of the 'physical' sphere of the whole in the primary interface of spheres within that sphere. And the primary interface of the subordination of 'fifth element' to the logical order of heavenly cycle-within-cycle, and the otherwise chaotic interplay of linear movement of the other elements, is the sphere of Earth.
Now, to embody the mirroring of logical and physical orders in a 'recurrence' in this initial division of the physical order, of the same principle of 'physical' division, we must find (here) 'below' an image of the initial distinction of Heaven and Earth, above and below.

It is this recurrence, of course, which defines the transition from the scheme of the Timaeus to that of the Critias and Laws, or from Aristotle's 'natural' philosophy of Heaven, Earth and their vital interface, to his 'moral' philosophy of community (to borrow Cicero's latinised terms).

The familiar scheme of this 'second' recurrence in the physical order of the image of the distinction of that order from its 'logical' converse, is of course that of a division of the surface of Earth into two 'sides'. Nature 'outside' and Culture 'inside'. In the simplest case of mere 'enclosure' (the persian pardies, our 'paradisecomclosed-around), this 'culture' amounts exactly to the 'agri-culture' of the ager - 'acre' or field. The 'logical' order of heavenly cycle-within-cycle is reflected directly in the elementary 'culture' which articulates the activity of an agrarian community within the heavenly cycles of the 'seasons'. Through the heavenly cycles, one within another within the unity of the Sphere of Kosmos as a Whole, that unitary actuality distinguishes itself from the chaotic 'play' of figure - this through the figure of physical 'in', inclusion and subordination. Similarly the articulation of human activity within the circuits of a 'culture', framed within the primary activity of planting and harvest, amounts to a subordination of the 'economy' of free Nature to an elementary 'logical' actuality of choice, inscribing the activities of the Group within the primary activity of maintaining the earthly subsistence of the group.

The primary 'physical' determination, then, of the 'poetic' order of mirroring of logical and physical orders, is simply that of a two-sided 'Land', 'within' which the distinction of the two sides - 'Nature' and 'Culture' - is itself inscribed as the primary 'logical' frame of Culture. This does indeed correspond to the earlier discovery of the logical order as an order of choice, and here the poetic frame of the 'land' or 'boundary' (the mirroring of a 'close', and a Nature 'beyond the pale') does indeed define an elementary articulation of 'choice', distinguishing itself from the natural economy of possible 'choices', courses of action. Yet this inscription of the 'poetic' order within the physical order, like its earlier inscription within the formal articulation of the logical order within the figure of choice (in which the 'psychical' order distinguished itself from, and so
defined, the logical order) is only one side of the poetic order of mirroring of physical and logical. To complete the scheme, we must somehow find how the primary 'physical' determination of the poetic order as physical frame of choice, and the primary 'logical' determination of the poetic order as simple formal mirroring of physical and logical, in turn mirror one the other in the poetic order.

The scheme of this mirroring is already familiar in various guises. We know, for example, of the correlation of choice and Land in the figure of the Jewish Law. We know the mirroring in Law, as the primary frame of the Greek city-state, as of the Roman World of Augustus, of the 'logical' articulation of Policy (the inscription of action within action in relation to some end), and the 'material' or physical Economy in which this Policy is articulated.

We know, further, Aristotle's scheme of the 'poetic' order of action ('drama', 'fiction', 'acting' and so on), within the organisation of the City - as the frame of distinguishing the logical or rational order of one's identity from the free play of figure in the economy of 'imagination'.

Now this 'rational' inscriptions of the poetic order in the logical articulation of community does indeed mirror, within Law as frame of civic activity, the 'physical' inscriptions of that order as 'boundary'. The figure of this mirroring is already implicit in our discussion of the framing of Jewish activity (as 'cosmic drama') in their Law. Aristotle's configuration of the poetic order within the logical order of his reflection, is an analogue of the logical order of the text (a mirroring of this logical order in the physical order of context - a mirroring in principle reducible to the 'logical' side of the text, just as the logical order of reason is in principle to be abstracted from the physical economy of sense, through the poetic mirroring of these orders). This inscription of the poetic order within the logical, through the figure of text, the order of sign, language (taken by Aristotle as 'logically' determined from one side, in terms of a logical distinction of logical and physical 'sides' of language and  blowjob) mirrors the converse 'physical' determination of the 'poetic' frame of action, within a poetic frame of which these are two complementary 'versions'. Thus within the poetic frame of mirroring of which these are two converse images, the 'double recurrence' by which these converse images are defined 'physically'
and 'logically', in turn define a 'double recurrence' of this poetic order of mirroring. - So that, for example, the logical order of distinction in which the distinction of logical and physical orders is inscribed, as a 'first' recurrence within itself of this logical order of distinction, mirrors the converse inscription of the logical order of distinction in the physical order. That is: in this configuration or mirroring, the logical order as a whole mirrors the physical order as a whole, the inscription of the logical order in the physical mirrors the converse inscription of the physical in the logical, and the recurrence of this figure of inscription in one case, mirrors the complementary recurrence of the converse figure in the other.

... But this only gives us a formal configuration of the various orders. The third instance of 'logical' distinction, in which that order was actually identified, is essentially 'dramatic', distinguishing itself, as in Aristotle's figure of the spectator of a drama, from the mirroring of logical and physical orders in the 'play' of figure.

'Gives us': this is where we come in. For the point at which we have now arrived in the formal 'unfolding' of the three orders corresponds to the actual difference between 'formal' identification of their correlation, and their actual correlation and identification, through the reflection, in the configuration of this writing and reading of ours, of the configuration of 'identification' which it formally, 'logically', presents.

That is: the formal distinction between the poetic symmetry of logical and physical 'identification', and its actual 'working', its actuality (of which the distinction between actual identification of the logical order, and the formal inscription of this distinction in the logical order is one 'side') is actually embodied in this discussion of the distinction. The 'working' of the various orders is to be found 'at work' in the very actuality of this discussion of the working - and this through the articulation of the orders about the actual distinction of this discussion from its formal inscription in the discussion in terms of the radical poetic 'actuality' in which 'psychical' choice and its 'ontical' force are instance in this case.

That is (again): the final 'recurrence' of the logical order of distinction, in which the actuality of the logical order is found 'at work', is primarily (here) embodied in the distinction between the actuality of
this distinction of the 'logical order' (of this logical order in which this distinction participates, is 'at work'), and the formal distinction 'in' this discussion of formal distinction and 'actual' instance. Similarly, the ontical actuality of this discussion, of this writing and reading, distinguishes itself as this actual earthly configuration of identification, rather than some mere 'image' of the physical articulation of the actual context of writing and reading. And the 'working' of the mirroring of psychical and ontical actualities in this case, distinguishes itself from the merely formal figure of such a 'this', as its distinction from the poetic order of mirroring is inscribed in that order.

'This' must all seem rather convoluted... but it amounts simply to the part of this identification of the dramatic frame of identification, in that frame. Formally, we might simply say that our final configuration of 'mirroring' of a 'physical' image of the poetic order, in the physical boundary of a culture, and a 'logical' image, in the mirroring of physical and logical orders in that 'play' of figure from which the rational order of identification (as in Aristotle's scheme of drama) distinguishes itself, is to be distinguished (and is itself the frame of distinction) from the actual instances of that 'mirroring' — and this, most radically, through this instance in which that distinction is actually made. One side of this 'actuality' of framing the poetic order of framing (and so finding it 'at work') is that assumption of the part of self-assertion, of the 'I' that distinguishes itself from its formal inscription in the 'logical' play of distinctions, and in which the actuality of logical distinctions must ultimately be 'inscribed' — this self-differentiation of some 'I' (say, me or you) being as it were the primary logical figure of Distinction in which (in the logical sense of 'in') subordinate distinctions must find their 'working', one within another. This 'assumption' of a part — in the limiting case, that of 'I' or assertion — must (as we earlier saw) involve correlative 'mystical' and 'ontical' actualities, reflected in the formal correlation of physical and poetic orders with the 'logical' order of this actual assertion. Now we find the simple configuration of those orders of such radical 'assertion', and we find that this actuality of assertion is itself simply one side (a sort of limiting case) of a 'poetic' order (of 'mystical' actuality, distinguishing itself from its formal inscription in the poetic order as 'outside' it). — A 'side' that is actually mirrored, always, in an ontical actuality of the situation of assertion.

That is to say, the 'poetic' mirroring of the 'physical' and 'logical' images of the poetic order of action, is always 'actually' at work — is
only, indeed, 'actual', in particular instances. And the radical figure of this distinction of formal mirroring and actual instance is simply that of the formal figure of the 'group' in which the 'logical' and 'physical' versions of the central interface of logical and physical orders mirror one another, as actually distinguished from the persons, the actual 'personality' of me or you, of which all actual groups are made up.

That is (yet again): the actual mirroring of logical and physical orders, of 'psychical' and 'ontical' actualities, is focussed in actual personality, as the primary 'locus' of interaction of 'psychical' self-assertion and what one might (in virtue of the 'mirroring') call ontical 'self-assertion'. In particular, 'my' personality, in any actual case, is radically bound up with the question of the difference between this 'formal' configuration of personality, and my 'own' actuality, in which I participate in the poetic order of distinction of 'inside' and 'outside' the formal 'frame' precisely in recognising the distinction reflected by the mere 'figure' of personality, from that figure.

Realising, then, how intimately 'we' are ourselves involved in this 'discussion', let us proceed to work outwards from this 'focus' of personality, back to the question of the interplay of three orders in the third century.

First of all, we find ourselves as 'actors', actual persons, in which the logical figure of our distinction from the 'imaginary' poetic interplay of 'logical' and 'physical' sides of aristotelian 'drama' is mirrored in our 'physical' situation in an earthly 'economy' of Life. Within the poetic frame of a group, the 'logical' order of rational assertion is mirrored in the 'physical' order of our embodiment. The poetic frame of Law reflects the 'logical' order of text and language in the 'physical' order of an earthly Economy, where the group first distinguishes itself as 'inside' the boundary of some Land. This 'physical' determination of the poetic order of mirroring physical and logical orders in the group may itself be regarded as a 'limiting case' of that mirroring, embodying the same 'poetic' principle as the converse 'logical' case of the mirroring of the two 'sides' of a text. In the general case these converse 'sides' of the poetic frame of action interact. The logical assertion or choice which distinguishes itself from the
interplay of the figures of 'choice' and 'fact', thus defining the poetic mirroring of such 'possible' choices and corresponding situations as 'imaginary' (this is the figure of Aristotle's definition of 'drama'), is 'mirrored' in particular actions by the 'ontical' self-assertion of a reality or fact which distinguishes itself from its logical determination as simply the 'other side' of a thought or choice or name or text (with the relations of these two 'sides' logically determined - the frame of 'Reflection' or Thought 'abstracted' from the poetic mirror of Action).

Two sides: the 'logical' configuration of choice as an actuality of distinction defines the 'poetic' mirroring of 'logical' and 'physical' orders in terms of Aristotle's figure of the drama, or 'representation', μίμησις, imitation, analogy. - The actuality of choice distinguishes itself from the 'imaginary' mirroring of logical distinction and physical difference in that order of 'fiction' of which drama (being the mirroring of action by action) is the primary expression. In this it defines the 'poetic' order of that mirroring as the merely formal order of symmetry of the 'two sides', logical and physical, of text and component word or sign. In the general case, this logical or psychical order of assertion distinguishes itself from the play of possible assertions, in the mirroring of the figure of 'my' assertion in various figures of 'my' outward situation, by choosing one of these instances of 'my' (possible) assertion: identifying with that instance of 'I', in action - of which the simple self-assertion 'I', distinguishing itself from a mere 'image', is a limiting case. The 'physical' side of this configuration corresponds to what is (in fact) 'open', in the play of 'choices', to 'my' choice. This is restricted by the necessity of acting 'within' the physical order. What I 'choose' must (if this choice is not to turn out to have been itself 'imaginary' or illusory) find its place in the 'ontical' inscription of action within action within the physical or ontical frame of this 'Kosmos'. In particular, my choice must be inscribed in the 'physical' figure of its part or 'place' in the physical order of Kosmos - notably in that figure of inscription of action within action within a 'cultural' order of unity that finds its 'finality' reflected in a primary physical difference of two 'sides' of some physical circuit, a 'geo-graphical' or regional unity as a closed system of activity, whose two sides directly reflect their logical analogues in the two 'sides' of a 'mark', a 'sign' (ὅρις: a definition, and also a boundary-marker, like the god Hermes), of 'language'. - Of a language which defines, for example 'greek' culture, in which the distinction of two sides is marked in the language as
that of speakers of the language, and 'babblers', 'outside'.

- This just as a Law defines the two 'sides' of Jews and 'the Nations', and this in the primary correlation of being-within the Law and being-within the boundaries of the Promised Land of the Contract with I AM.

Between these two limiting cases, then, of assertion and its place of context (of thinking, we might say, and being), we find the three orders of two-sidedness (logical, poetic and physical) at work, interacting. - This primarily in the configuration of the group, with on one side its structure of multiple assertion, and on the other the complex structure of its situation. It is just this radical symmetry of the 'two sides' of the group that is abstracted from its actual situation in the closed frame of the 'drama' discussed by Aristotle, the 'poetic' frame of a 'fiction', a 'representation', a simple 'image' of assertion from which rational assertion (Aristotle supposes) rationally asserts its distinction. Such drama is itself framed as 'acting' precisely within the figure of that distinction of player and part. Yet that very distinction must itself, ultimately, be regarded as simply one figure of activity, of 'acting' among others. - And in the 'general' case, this particular figure of 'drama' is seen simply as a limiting case of the interplay of choice distinguishing itself from its inscription in the free 'play' of figure, and the mechanical play of that very 'figure' of choice distinguishing itself from its 'image' in some particular 'scenario' of action. The 'rational' choice which articulates the unitary Policy of a group (for example) thus distinguishes itself from the open 'play' of possible figures of action that constitutes the 'Economy' of choice in that group. - An Economy in which this figure of Policy is itself one component. An Economy rooted in the primary inscription of cultural finality in natural 'efficiency', a Policy whose imaginary abstraction from such an Economy would provide that figure of the integration of the activity of a community within the logical order of Reflection that defines the platonic ideal of a Philosopher-King.

What, then, is the place of Reflection in the actual communities with which we are dealing? As embodied in the 'poetic' frame of a definite discourse or text it may amount either to a mere contradictory image of abstraction from the analogous closed frame of the 'drama' to its 'logical side', or to the expression in such a figure of 'abstraction', of a 'psychical' order or actuality which in the text distinguishes itself from
its illusory 'logical' image. The latter, for example, is the case with
the 'text' of Parmenides' poem, which in the order of narrat on distinguishes
from the illusory 'play' of figure. The former 'mechanical' logic is often
fairly marked in Aristotle's texts, and is reflected, notably, in his 'pro-
saic' account of Athenian tragedy. Yet there are of course 'mechanical' ele-
ments in Parmenides' poem, and 'mystical' elements in Aristotle's account of
sφραδ. In general the illusory 'mechanism' of Reflection, of the 'logical'
text, and the distinction in such a mechanical frame of a 'working' or actuali-
ization which it is an image, interact as two 'sides' of the text. The case is of
course strictly analogous to the interaction of 'mystical' and mechanical or
'representational' sides in tragedy. Aeschylus was prosecuted for revealing
part of the Eleusinian mysteries in one of his plays; whereas in Euripides' Bacchae
the mirroring and confusion of 'inner' and 'outer', of logical and
physical orders appears rather as pathological madness than as a reflection
in the visible order of the mirroring of Visible and Invisible. Sophocles' King Oedipus,
intermediate between these 'mystical' and 'representational'
tendencies, seems almost to balance the two sides, making the drama itself
into a sort of question.

The poetic order of the 'boundary' of Culture and Nature - the
poetic order, that is, as inscribed within the physical order of 'macrocosm'-
thus reflects this physical Kosmos as a whole in the closure of the 'logical'
text: the articulation of the poetic order of this 'boundary' within the unity
of physical Kosmos as a whole exactly reflects the articulation of the Text
within the converse order of Culture.

On the other hand, if we take the poetic order logically determined
as the closed frame of an 'action' or drama, then the 'physical' inscription
of Culture in terms of a simple enclosure or boundary, is reflected in the
simple logical order (as one of six correlative orders of the 'text', or of
'theory') of logical 'inside' and 'outside'.

Last of all, if we consider the poetic symmetry of these two 'ver-
sions' of the poetic order of Action, and of the Interaction of symmetric
logical and physical orders, we find that, in the mirror of the Group, and
the actuality of personality, the simple logical order of 'inside' and 'outside'
abstracted from the various symmetric 'theories' which it articulates in Ref-
lection (and so constituting a reflection on Reflection itself), directly
mirrors the 'physical' order of inside and outside, as expressed in the lim-
iting figure of Kosmos as primary physical 'inside'. 
This 'actual' mirroring of the working of 'physical' and 'logical' in-side and out-side is thus (if we consider the details of this configuration of the various orders) itself reflected, in the logical order of the text, as a formal symmetry of 'logical' and 'physical' theory — this, given the familiar articulation of the six primary orders of 'theory' or reflection within the textual order of Reflection as a whole (of which 'logical' theory — as for example the aristotelian Organon — presents only one department — the theory of articulation of reflection or theory simply as such, in abstraction from its application).

The limiting logical articulation of Reflection simply as such, then, involves a logical determination of the formal articulation of reflection in six orders of 'inside' and 'outside'. This is the primary logical articulation of Reflection, constituting the formal frame of the mirroring of Reflection in itself. The first structure to be considered in the logical abstraction from the particular 'theories' or departments or orders of Reflection to their common formal articulation, is simply the structure of this abstraction itself, which defines, as the primary frame of logical theory, the abstract form of abstraction to that theory itself. This structure must then, in its turn, define the formal frame of the various theories from whose 'external' or extrinsic correlation in Reflection it is abstracted. Thus each order systematically 'mirrors' in its 'internal' articulation, its 'external' relations with the other symmetric or correlative orders or theories. To put it more succinctly: the application of Reflection to itself exactly reflects the application of Reflection to its other primary objects.

In particular, the inscription of the relations of these primary objects or orders of Reflection in the logical order (as one of these primary orders) directly reflects the inscription of the logical order among the other orders, and, inverting the principle of this reflection, directly reflects the place of the logical articulation of Reflection as a whole within the primary orders of a Kosmos in which the logical articulation of Reflection is itself one component.

This... reflection...amounts, of course, to no more than an abstract consideration of the formal symmetry in which the question of the logical identification of the 'logical' order was actually articulated. But now we can see how this formal symmetry implicit in this 'recurrence' of the logical order within ('applied to') itself reflects a formally identical structure of the 'physical space' of Kosmos, within the (again formally sym-
metric) 'mirror' of the poetic order.

Thus the 'recurrence' of physical difference which eventually led us to the two 'sides' of Nature and Culture, may itself be inscribed within a formally symmetric 'space' which directly mirrors the 'logical' space in which the recurrence of the logical order within itself is theoretically inscribed. A 'space', indeed, in which the first distinction corresponds to a closed 'surface' of Earth, and the second to a closed 'line' or boundary (to use Euclid's language) on or 'in' that surface, in that space or Space.

A 'Space' then, of three 'dimensions' reflecting the formal space of Reflection in which Reflection itself is identified. And reflecting, within the 'logical' theory which is one 'dimension' of that formal space, just that form of logical 'identification' by which this logical order is itself identified.

A Space, then (to continue the reflection on the elementary mirroring of logical and physical orders, whose actual configuration we have already considered), constituted by three symmetric 'dimensions' of physical identification of physical 'objects', the 'terms' or identities of the physical order, or at least the primary frame of such identification.

But what then of the mirroring of these three dimensions in another three, corresponding (like the psychical, ontical and mystical orders of reflection) to a 'working' of the order, inscribed in the 'space' of distinctions as an order of distinction from that space in that space?

This symmetry of 'two sides' of our Space, with each 'dimension' of our initial triple order or space its 'image' is of course just the temporal order of 'mirroring' in that space. - The 'time' that is the order of physical 'working' - of action and actuality.

In the Time of Kosmos as a whole, then, we find a 'working' of physical difference, a primary Actuality of Kosmos which corresponds to the 'psychical' actuality reflected in the 'double recurrence' of the logical order. Indeed this primary recurrence or 'closure' of the physical order corresponds directly, as in Aristotle's figure of the First Mover at the limit of the Sphere of Kosmos, to the 'mystical' actuality of the mirroring
psychical and ontical orders of Recurrence (this mirroring reflected in 
the poetic order of the unitary cosmic Action - its Working or Actuality - 
as mirror of logical and physical 'space').

- Time as the primary 'mirror' of logical and physical 'space': 
again the figure is familiar from the systematic articulation of Aristotle's 
Economy of Kosmos. The 'closure' of the poetic order (whether in the mini-
mal instance of a 'drama', or in the maximal figure of Kosmos as a whole) 
of action amounts to a mirroring of the 'physical' order of 'efficient' 
causality in the 'logical' order of 'finality' - a mirroring of which the 
mirroring of Culture and Nature has already provided us with an example - 
when we saw how the finality of integration of actions within the frame of 
a community reflected the 'heavenly' integration of the actuality of Kosmos 
as a whole within the cycles-within-cycles of the 'spheres' or their analog-
ues.

Thus the 'Space' of the physical Kosmos as a whole is 'abstracted' 
in its Actuality, from the mirroring of two 'sides', corresponding (to use 
a spatial image) to two converse 'directions' of Time, the 'physical' order 
of efficiency and the 'logical' order of finality. As we earlier saw, the 
primary image in that physical order of Kosmos of this abstraction) is to be 
found in the two 'sides' of material body - physical 'inside' and 'outside' - 
and in the two 'sides' of the body we call Earth, in particular: 'above' and 
'below'. In Aristotle's Kosmos, for example, we saw how the recurrence or 
closed circuits of the heavenly spheres (images of the Form of forms: the 
form of distinction of Form and Matter) 'above' was reflected in the recur-
rence of elementary Heat distinguishing Heat and Cold, and so tending 'away' 
from the Cold that unites Heat and Cold at what is thus the primary stasis 
or 'centre' of Kosmos, at which earth 'fell' or aggregated, constituting 'be-
low', from which fire 'rises' (as far as it can) 'above'. The 'efficient' 
causality of this latter scheme of 'sublunary' movement (which itself already 
participates in a minimal finality, unlike the mere potentiality, the free 
play of all figures, which is the economy of prime matter) is mirrored in 
a converse finality, or rather a converse order of finality, forms within 
forms, and thus partakes in a poetic order of actions-within-actions, with-
in a primary Actuality of Kosmos as a unity, as a whole.
A 'second recurrence' of this primary figure of 'physical' two-sidedness, leads, as we have already seen, to an 'ontical' working or actuality of the physical order, corresponding to the 'identity' of the 'physical object', its term. This of course mirrors that elementary logical reflection of identity or 'term' in 'order' or frame, first exemplified in the simple form of logical identification (or 'distinction') of the logical order. It is this figure of 'ontical' identity or actuality which enters into the actual poetic or 'mystical' mirroring of logical and physical (reflecting psychical and ontical) orders in action. Yet the formal frame of physical identity constituted by the 'physical theory' whose articulation mirrors the self-application of Reflection in 'logical theory' belongs simply to the order of the Text, abstracted from the particular context or situation of its construction or composition. How is such a formal 'theory' actually applied to the physical objects whose particular configuration in the actual context of the 'theory' is 'outside' the logical order of the 'theoretical' text?

'Logically', one may derive an 'applied' theory - for example, an 'alchemy' which applies the formal frame of physical identity to the actual physical configuration of a situation in which the 'alchemist' actually finds himself - by considering the part of the 'logical' order of the theory or theoretical text in the logical configuration of the 'poetic' order of action. This will of course constitute only a 'theory' of application - actual application of the initial formal theory, as indeed of this further 'theory' of application (or 'applied theory') belongs not simply to the logical determination of the poetic order of 'action', but to the actual mirroring in action of this determination of the poetic order, and its converse 'physical' determination.

It will be remembered how this figure of the 'text' appears in logical theory of the poetic order as one 'side' of an action, 'abstracted' from the mirroring in a 'drama' of logical and physical sides, and from which abstraction this 'drama' may be reconstituted by 'actors', producing that element of 'spectacle' which Aristotle regards as a secondary image of the text, which may just as well be read as 'acted', 'presented'.

We saw how this was a 'one-sided' view of the poetic order of
the text—a 'prosaic' view, indeed, inscribed in the logical order of that 'forward-moving' style, rather than in the poetic symmetry of balanced 'verse' (prosa or proverea oratio, rather than the versus spoken by the tragic 'actor'). 'One side', corresponding to the inscription as one component of the text (defining its primary dimension, indeed, its 'logical time') of the distinction of text and context. We saw how this figure was itself a sort of illusory 'image' of the abstraction from the symmetry of sense, the mere play of figure from which reason distinguishes itself.

The very image, in fact, upon which the tragedy of Oedipus, central to Aristotle's discussion, itself 'turns'. For what is that tragedy, but an image of the poetic articulation of the mistake of identifying oneself with the critical assertion of an 'I' formally outside the action. An 'I' which, in Oedipus' case, finds itself at the very centre of the action which it thinks to stand outside.

And are not the tragedies of Aeschylus which remain to us prefigurations of this same sophoclean principle? Nemesis mirrors the substitution, for the moral choice which participates in the psychical actuality of the gods, of some image of that choice, some 'part', some 'mask' or persona, mirrors such a substitution which abstracts from the poetic symmetry of actor and situation, in a situation in which the agent is trapped in the image, the part.

And in this poetic symmetry, then, of ζηρες and Nemesis—of the 'logical' short-circuit of the psychical order of assertion, and the physical situation into which this mistake leads the agent or actor who has substituted an image for his self—the 'spectator', Θιον, 'sees' in his detachment from this image, the mystical actuality of the 'God', Ὄτος, who articulates the poetic symmetry of the Action. The 'divine' actuality which distinguishes itself, in that 'image' of imaginary action or drama, from the image, of which the substitution by the protagonist of image or part for actuality, is one side.

So much for the 'spectacle' of the ξαρα, the place of vision, which mirrors in the (initially circular) interface of actor and spectator, Action and Audience, in the ring of the Χρο, the chorus, the interface of Culture and Nature in which that circuit of represent-
ation is inscribed, as one component of Culture among others. - One component, and that the very image of Culture, transposed into the City (in the time of Pythagoras and Heraclitus) from the original χριστός, circuit, of the Mystery of Dionysos, celebrated in the midst of 'Nature'. What, then, of the 'art of the text', reflected in this 'poetic' configuration?

We saw, at the beginning of this First Part how the 'applied logic' of pythagorean 'mathematics' - that 'instruction', μνήμη της μνήμης, that 'mystery' - was organised in an analogue of the 'poetic' figure of drama as mystery, just described. The 'logical' order of abstraction arrives, by a 'double recurrence' of the primary principle of limit (logical 'in' side and 'out' side), at unity or identity (limit-unlimited; odd-even; one-many). The logical order of this identification is then as it were reiterated within this figure of the 'unit', and this reiteration mirrored in the converse 'physical' space, through the symmetry of number and space in the poetic order of a configuration of points.

'Logical' and 'physical' orders are thus mirrored in a 'poetic' configuration of the point: the Tetractys, in which the actual identification of the point, as actual mirroring of logical and physical orders, is reflected in the poetic order of configuration of points. The 'point' is as it were the limiting 'image', limiting symmetry of logical and physical orders. The configuration of distinction of actuality from image is reflected in the poetic order of the image as a configuration of points. Thus the logical order of 'limit' or distinction and identification is reflected in the poetic order of action through the 'mystery' of the Tetractys as principle of access to that poetic order of the pythagorean 'mystery', which for some time determined the Policy of Croton.

How does this relate to the principle of the poetic order of 'drama' as just elaborated?

- Each of the six 'primary' orders of theory partake equally in the same simple figure of 'abstraction' from the poetic symmetry of Action. In each case this 'abstraction', like the 'short circuit' of
tragic ἀρχαῖς, is complemented by the converse articulation of a complementary or converse order, in the poetic symmetry of Action. The 'application' of the particular order of abstraction (or reflection, or theory) in each case, amounts to a participation of the 'actor' (distinguishing himself from the 'formal' part of 'I' as abstract pole of reflection or abstraction in 'one-sided' theory) in an 'actuality' which, in the actual mirroring of the complementary orders of Reflection in the Action or 'application', distinguishes itself from the poetic order of the image, in the actual articulation of that order.

Thus, for example, we saw how the operation of the alexandrian 'alchemist' was to be effected through the 'poetic' or dramatic frame of a symmetry of 'Above' and 'Below', of the psychical actuality of Heaven and the physical potentiality of Earth or Matter. The alchemist as 'priest' participates in the 'mystery' or sacrifice reflected in the symbolic texts of Zosimus or 'Hermes'. Similarly the symbolic texts of that 'magical' art or mystery I called 'applied ontology' or 'phenomenology' mark the part of the operator of the 'work of fire' in the expression in the visible order of symmetry of ontical and logical of those mysterious forces that distinguish themselves, in that order, from that order, and which may thus be brought into operation in the more general frame of our action, distinguishing itself in the figure of actual choice, from the poetic economy of possible or 'imaginary' actions (of which the 'action' of the drama is a limiting case).

Each of these 'arts' or applied sciences, then - mathematics, the magical art, alchemy, medicine, astrology and 'music' (or 'applied poetics' - of which drama is a prime example) - corresponds to a certain frame of 'action', reflecting one of the primary orders of 'reflection'. Each amounts, indeed, to the inscription in the logical figure of the poetic order of some 'theory', as instance of the place of the logical order of Reflection in that 'poetic' order whose configuration it determines. Such 'applied sciences' are of course themselves more or less 'imaginary' unitary abstractions from the actual 'application' of theory. They correspond to one side of the way theory enters into practice or activity - 'theories' of this application, which themselves must find practical application. Indeed these 'arts' may be regarded as a sort of 'interface' between theory and action, in which theoretical and practical 'figures' interact. They amount to a logical determination of the 'poetic' interface of logical and physical orders, and as such are them-
selves involved in the mirroring of this 'version' in the 'natural' economy of the interface of earthly Nature, and the particular culture in which some 'art' finds expression.

What, then of the application of Reflection in general? Aristotle had said that the 'part' of Reflection in a City (indeed, within the wider frame of Kosmos, too) was to effect the identification of the learner with his part. This amounts, of course, to an analogue of the rational distinction of the reflecting subject from the symmetrical 'play' of Sense, in the civic institution of Theatre. The exercise of Reason is to distinguish this activity of Reason from the confusion of figures of reflection and of situation in the undisciplined economy of Imagination and Sense, from the unthinking working of the 'lower' principles of appetite and emotion. This should lead eventually to the rational articulation of choice in the citizen, and the rational articulation of Policy in the City.

... But as in Aristotle's 'rational' discussion of Drama, this is only one side of the matter. The work of logical 'distinction' from the play of figure amounts, in each case, to one figure among others in a dramatic economy of identification and corresponding action, to one element in the play.

In the general case of 'earthly' action in a group of embodied 'actors' or agents we (being ourselves such 'actors') find ourselves involved in a radical symmetry and confusion of the 'imaginary' order of a 'play' or economy of 'figures', and an actuality which, in the figuration of this play distinguishes itself from mere imaginary 'play'. Thus we 'choose' and actually identify with some part in the 'imaginary' economy of 'possible' actions — and the various converse 'ontical' elements of the 'scenario' or configuration of action in which we thus assert ourselves as 'I', 'we', in turn assert themselves, distinguishing themselves from their inscription in the figure of our assertion — our 'choice', identification, and corresponding action or 'playing a part' in the situation in which we find ourselves. The 'passive' part of mere spectator of some 'action', and the rational self-assertion of an 'I' distinguishing itself from identification with some 'actor' in the spectacle, the 'play' of figures of 'I' and 'it', 'subject' and 'object' (in a later scheme), is merely a limiting case of this 'dramatic' figure — the 'poetic' configuration in which the symmetry of 'logical' and 'physical' sides of Action is in-
self 'actually' identified, itself actually enters 'into play'. This limiting figure of actuality and ('imaginary') drama, corresponding to the inscription of the figure of poetic symmetry of 'logical' and 'physical figures within a logical distinction of those two 'sides' of 'two-sidedness', is itself only one element in the distinction of 'actual' from 'image' in the 'play' of figures, images, 'possible' configurations or frames of action. It amounts to a working, a 'force', of Reflection, itself - 'like Oedipus - both 'in' and 'out' side the 'play': 'at work' in the interplay of various elements, deriving its actuality from a 'participation' in the 'mystical' figure of Actuality distinguishing itself from (and in) the 'imaginary' symmetry of 'poetic' and 'mystical' orders. The logical 'figure' of Reflection enters into this 'dramatic' configuration of Actuality, both as 'framing' the psychical actuality which distinguishes itself from the 'imaginary' inscription of the logical order of distinction in the 'play' of logical, poetic, and physical orders and, in the very logical figure of this distinction, inscribing itself in that 'play'.

At the same time, the 'ontical' figure of an 'outward' actuality of 'things' which distinguishes itself from its logical determination (or 'ontological' determination) as a mere formal mirror of our assertion, itself enters into the 'play' of actual and 'possible', real and imaginary, in a symmetric way. Again, the aristotelian figure of 'drama' provides a limiting case of this distinction: the ontical order of our 'actual' situation reasserts itself when the 'play' is finished, mirroring our 'psychical' reassertion of our actual identity, distinguishing itself from a passing identification with the 'part' of some 'actor'. But in the general case, the distinction between our selves and a part, and the complementary distinction between what our situation is and what we take or imagine it to be, must actually be drawn in us and in things. Our situation is closer to that of the tragic actor than the spectator. The distinction between actuality and image is not simply 'there' at the outset, like the distinction of actor and audience in the theatre. To draw the line between actual and imaginary or 'possible' is itself, already, an 'action', itself ambiguous in its very form between the two 'sides' which it appears to distinguish.

What relation does this rather abstract discussion bear to the
(actual) configuration of Reflection and 'earthly' Context in the 'third century'?

Well (and this is after all 'my' assertion, itself an inextricable element in what it asserts), this almost desperate interplay of various 'sides' seems to correspond in a fairly simple way to the interplay of the various factors 'at work' in the third century, which I have already attempted to 'frame' or outline. What seems 'fixed' in that configuration, 'framing' in a rather abstract way all the complex interplay of 'facts' and 'theories', is the framing of interacting theories in a common pattern, corresponding to the symmetrical interplay of three primary orders. The pattern of such a radical triplicity or trinity is, of course, nowhere presented in the abstract form in which I have just attempted to present it. Rather do these different 'theories' or 'versions' of analogous 'triple' orders (with Plotinus' three 'hypostases', and the various accounts of a Christian 'trinity' as the dominant examples) themselves correspond to the actual working of the figure of Theory or Reflection in that symmetric scheme of Kosmos I endeavoured to sketch. That symmetrical working-out of a first scheme of symmetry and interaction of three primary 'figures' or orders of Reflection (itself embodying one of the three orders as its primary frame) amounts to a symmetrical correlation of the various figurations discovered in various different orders of theory and context, through a more detailed specific analysis. What seems characteristic of the third century is what appears to me to be a fairly simple correlation, within that abstract scheme, of the 'positions' in the scheme of the various third-century points of assertion of different 'theories', and the corresponding 'framings' or versions of the triple order through which (or in which) this 'position' is itself defined. Thus Plotinus' 'logical' framing of the correlation of his three orders of identification or hypostasis, is reflected in the part of this 'assertion' of the force of Reflection in the political frame of a Roman 'World', shortly before the assimilation of that 'figure' or configuration of World within the 'Christian' framing of Action in the 'mystical' symmetry of poetic and 'theological' orders. The simple abstract symmetry of the three orders will allow us, through such a simple principle of correlation of 'perspective' or position of theoretical assertion in that scheme with what is thus asserted, to trace in a simple way some of the configurations 'dramatically' at work in the subsequent interplay of these various perspectives. Thus we will see, for example, how the 'logical' scheme of Plotinus gradually incorporates the poetic figure of 'mystery' (notably
in the form of syrian 'magic') until it finally faces the logical sym-
metry of logical and poetic orders around the end of the fifth century,
when the close of the plotinian tradition is reflected in the material
suppression of its transmission.

One, two, three: the barest 'application' of logical theory,
reflecting the simple pythagorean image of the abstraction of an Identity
from a double difference, two two's. Reflecting the poetic symmetry of
logical and physical 'two-sidedness', as 'two sides' of the 'poetic' ord-
er - its very two-sidedness, a difference of differences, the primary frame
of identification.

Two two's make three and one: the poetic order of symmetry of
logical and physical orders itself reflects a unitary (and yet triple)
actuality of identification 'outside' this triple symmetry of the three
orders of 'figure'. 'Figure'? - Simply a figure of the symmetry of these
three orders, a simple figure of a difference of 'in'side and 'out'side,
itsel ambiguous between logical and physical 'in' and 'out', and, indeed,
between these and the common 'figure' of two-sidedness each, differently,
embodies. Figure, then: itself, like the εἴσος of Plato and Aristotle,
embracing the interplay of the various orders of identification. 'Fig-
ure', what is 'framed', fictio, also a 'fiction' and 'figment', the very
figure of the 'play' of imagination, that 'inner' drama that is one side
of Aristotle's tragedy, mirrored in some 'physical' action outside.
Fictio: what is made or done - thus also factum, and the actio and
σκηνις that lies between: πρεière, making.

... A 'play' of such figure, then: ludum, a mimic contest,
a mimicked contest, of actors, parts, actualities.. and of illusions
and delusions, confusions of actuality and fiction, image; of actor and
'part'.

- A play whose identification requires an interplay of these
orders, whose own very actuality is the interplay of these orders. Each
order asserting itself in framing the relations of these primary orders;
the same figure of a double difference, a double recurrence of difference or distinction, in each order. A mirroring of the relations of the various orders in each of the related orders: this the primary articulation of the actual distinction (this actual distinction, made in these very words now) of Actuality and Image, in this 'play' in which we find ourselves, along with the philosophers and bishops and emperors of the 'third century'. A mirroring of three-in-one in three-in-one, whose minimal image we found in the pythagorean Tetractys, and will find again at the close of this whole account.

We found, we will find: at the focus of this elementary configuration of Actuality, of this 'play' of figures of difference, the play of inscription of the whole configuration in each order, and of that inscription, in turn, in another order or configuration of orders, we find the figure of a distinction of that figure and our selves: the very figure of our self, of ourselves, an image in the mirror of this elementary configuration of identity or Actuality. A figure of 'personality', of the actual actor in this group of 'we', a figure of distinction of this figure and ourselves, of a 'nominal' identity and the actuality which asserts itself, ourselves, in a name.

Here we are, then. Working out now from this simple focus, and discovering the actualities corresponding to the various configurations of this 'mirror' of our actuality, our actualities, we find these primary articulations of ontical, psychical and mystical actuality, which correspond to the analogues of the primary distinction of Actuality and Image in each of the three orders of figure. Working out from the central dramatic mirroring of our ontical and psychical actuality in the earthly activity of a 'group', a frame of interaction of these actualities, whose primary actuality is reflected in the limiting form of distinction of audience and actors in theatrical 'drama' - that primary 'mystery' of Action, we find those triple physical and logical orders of Kosmos and Reflection whose simple symmetrical relations I have just discussed. The figure of distinction of actual from possible, of actuality from the play of figures (in which this figure is itself involved, inextricably) recurs in the inscription of this primary order of action
in the 'physical' order of distinction of Culture from the 'natural' economy or play of simple Life on Earth - this in the 'mirror' or 'poetic' frame of the 'physical' or material 'frame' of activity of a 'cultural' group, a 'culture' or closed circuit of activity. This framing of action in the 'mirror' of Culture and Nature - the integration of action within action distinguishing itself from the free play of a natural economy of bodily subsistence - is itself in turn framed in the two sides of 'passive' material 'economy', or play of Matter, and its integration within a 'heavenly' unity of Kosmos, an image of the 'logical' integration of a culture presented by the cycles-within cycles of the heavenly 'bodies', which thus provide the 'mythological' frame of early culture, notably that of Egypt and Chaldea.

Working, as it were, in the other direction, we find this recurrent 'physical' and 'ontical' inscription of our action in a unitary Actuality mirrored in a 'logical' or 'psychical' order. Action is inscribed in the figure of a 'representation' corresponding to an identification of the poetic order of symmetry of logical and physical orders as two 'sides' of a word, a sign, a text - such as the text of a dramatic 'play', for example - this mirroring, in the 'poetic' order of our interaction, the 'external' framing of that interaction in earthly Nature. Indeed the 'physical' interface of Culture and Nature reflects the logical interface of Text and Context, in the poetic frame of 'representation' from which the psychical order of our self-assertion, and the corresponding order of the 'ontical' things among which we assert ourselves distinguish themselves, mirroring one the other - this, notably, in our own embodiment here on Earth.

This figuration and correlation extends, then, as we saw, to the logical integration of the various orders of the text within a 'logical' space and time that mirrors physical Space and Time. The 'psychical' actuality which distinguishes itself in and from this logical order then corresponds to the 'ontical' order of integration of the physical Kosmos within a unitary Actuality, just as the logical articulation of the terms or identities of this textual order reflect the poetic economy of Matter and its elementary configurations, from which the Actuality of Kosmos distinguishes itself, these two poles of physical Kosmos and physical Matter mirroring one another in our intermediate activity. And between our intermediate activity and these two poles of, for example, Aristotle's God (prime mover and self-thinking thinking) and prime Matter, the psychical actuality of that 'God' in which
or whom we, in our way, participate, is identified with the ontical order of 'Heaven' as heavenly Mind or minds embodied in the courses of the stars - Aristotle's 'intelligences'.

This three-fold mirroring of ontical and psychical orders of Action or Actuality, amounts, then, to a triple poetic order of integration of actuality, in which the configuration of our earthly action is reflected, in the interface of Heaven and Earth, in the configuration of Kosmos as a whole. Thus, for example, the textual articulation of a tragedy reflects, in the action it frames, a 'heavenly' configuration of 'gods', articulating the action.

'Gods'? Is there any place for them in our action, though? Already Euripides had begun to wonder...

Rather let us move from our actual situation of reading and writing these considerations, first out to the formal frame of correlation of these various orders (whatever we are to call them), to Kosmos, and then from this formal frame of Kosmos back down through configurations of God or gods to the activities of the third century of this our Time or Era.
On our way back down from the simple frame of Kosmos to the third century, what do we find but Plotinus coming up towards us...

The framework of Plotinus' roman essays (about 250-270, paralleling his lectures, where his audience was drawn from the 'cultured' classes, including court circles) is schematic enough. The Kosmos is essentially that of the Timaeus, the 'physical' (or rather, ontical) correlate of the logical 'in' of form-within-form. The primary Actuality is called simply the 'One'. Outside the One is Nothing... not even Nothing: that opposition (to speak with Parmenides) is itself Nothing — One is not even opposed to anything, since everything that is what it is is thereby 'one', and there isn't anything which isn't what it is. In such a merely nominal opposition, then, the 'play' begins. Unity, Actuality, expresses itself first of all in the 'logical' figure of distinction of Actuality and merely formal identity, hardly even Nothing, less than Nothing... 'Nothing' as it were marks a 'tragic' mistake of merely formal reference, the 'fall' of Actuality into an image which hides it. The cosmic drama lies in detachment from the Nothing which is the poetic symmetry and imaginary identity of Sense. We must get rid of nothing, says Plotinus, but Nothing is the hardest thing to lose.

Within this primary mirroring, then, of One and not-even-Nothing, of One and Fiction (again, the figure derives ultimately from Parmenides), One and mere Image, Actuality expresses itself through the logical articulation of this formal distinction of Actuality from its inscription in a formal distinction. This actuality of distinction, in which the One Actuality can distinguish itself at work, Plotinus calls Νος, Reason.

Within this logical (or rather, psychical) order of Νος, distinction is inscribed logically within the primary figure of a logical distinction of logical distinction and the difference by which it is marked, a primary psychical actuality distinguishing itself from Nothing, identifying and knowing itself as 'alone' actual. This, then, through a sort of circuit through Nothing, a sort of series of hypothetical steps into Nothing, to find itself in the return from... Nothing, a false hypothesis.
'Hypothesis', and return from this position 'outside' - which is to say 'below' - itself: for in the articulation of the Image, the image of such hypothesis or 'hypostasis' is a 'fall', eventually concreted into the apparently 'solid' mechanical image of earth. - And the image of Return, when Unity redisCOVERs itself 'outside' itself ('at work' in distinguishing itself from that outside), is a 'rising' above the circular confusion of the Image, into converse circuits of NoS - stepping out of those circular illusions, 'plays' of the image, and into the complementary circuits of the One, 'proceeding' from itself in order to return to itself. And the very image of this stepping-out of the circuits of illusion, into the circles of Reason of which they are the inversion or mirror, is a 'conversion' of our reflection from the confused play of earthly things to the cycles-within-cycles of the Heavens, of which the earthly play is itself (in turn) the inversion, the involution, the involvement, in Matter, 'Matter': that merely formal or nominal pole of 'outside' the One - the imaginary centre about which the play of illusion turns.

Two 'poles', then, the unitary actuality of the One, and the merely nominal reflection of that Actuality 'outside', in a play of apparent reference to some fixed 'Matter', 'underneath' appearances, some material 'hypostasis'. - But there is nothing thus 'underneath' Appearance, Image, no 'substantial' centre about which it turns. Rather is substance, hypostasis 'behind' the Image, in some sense - hidden 'under' it. The only actuality of the Image, its 'working' in the scheme, is that of a point of Return, where it is inscribed in Actuality as the actual working of illusion. Not a point of return from anything - but only from a 'fiction', the return of the spectator 'to himself', from his imaginary identification with an actor. The One is the only Spectator, and the whole Drama 'out there' (out here) of Creation, Fiction, turns upon 'his' recognition that this is the whole point of the Drama - the One playing hide-and-seek with itself.

Kosmos as Drama: here again we find that simple aristotelian figure of the poetic order, inscribed within the logical frame of an initial logical distinction of logical and physical orders. And the part of Reflection in this drama is as it were the part of Reflection in the Athenian theatre (according to Aristotle) mirrored in the part of Reflect-
ion in the City (as that 'Education' through which our rational part identifies itself): that reflective self-identification of the part of Reflection, extrapolated to Kosmos as unitary Stage of all 'representation'.

A cosmic 'stage': framed in that limiting circuit of Time, the limiting Sphere of Kosmos, as interface and mirror of the logical inscription of figure-within-figure within the primary logical figure of a logical distinction of 'inside' and 'outside' the logical order of Νος.

Time, then: the primary interface of Actuality and Image, mirroring the One Actuality (which to be 'in' is simply to be) in the nominal role of Matter, the very centre of that illusory physical 'being-in' the visible order of Kosmos, about which all that physical order of being-in turns - that physical order of 'in' which is the bare formal inversion or involution of the logical and psychical order of Actuality - form within form within the primary figure of Νος.

Time, the mirror of the 'inward' and 'outward' Αφαγος of Philo and Origen. And the actuality of this mirroring, Plotinus writes, is the third υψωτατος, Ψυχα, Life.

In this mirroring, then, the interface of Νος, the rational Spectator, and visible Creation as the Stage of the great Fiction (the very figure of Fiction, indeed, in which all activity 'in' time is inscribed), the One Actuality expresses itself, not within the 'psychical' (or perhaps I should say, 'noetic') figure of a radical logical distinction of logical and physical orders, but rather in some 'local' and 'temporal' (or 'temporary') image, analogue, of that 'logical' figure.

- An 'analogue', whose part in the visible physical order of Creation mirrors the part of some 'psychical' figure of logical distinction: the part of the physical 'image', 'in' the physical order of Kosmos, mirrors the part of its psychical correlate 'in' the logical order of .

- And this 'mirroring' is just the systematic inversion or conversion of logical 'in' from logical 'inside' to 'outside' (from logical 'in' to physical 'in'). - A mirroring which, in that other student of Ammonius Saccas - in Origen - is framed as the mirroring of 'inward Αφαγος', the divine Reason, in the outward order of visible Creation, with all the
'figures' of that Creation turning about the incarnation of the inward Word, one within the other, in a sort of conversion of the order in which those same figures or 'ideas' are inscribed one within the other in the figure of the invisible Word.

- And so, in Plotinus' scheme, the figure of Reason, Δοξα, is 'embodied' in time and place by just such a conversion. Man finds himself (or herself) in-between the mirror of Time (and the unitary Life inscribed in the symmetry of that "mirror") and the nominal or illusory role of Matter: in the order of a Δοξα, a Nature, that mirrors 'above'. A Nature that is not a 'fourth hypostasis' (any more than Matter is a fifth), in that there is nothing fixed in this Nature, no fixed figure or identity in which the various figures of 'its' appearances, images, could be definitively inscribed. Any such identity, any such fixity of one figure (say, this my physical 'identity' as embodied in a place and a time) is only a passing moment in a wider play, in that great Play, indeed, in and from which unitary and fixed Actuality distinguishes itself, just like Aristotle's spectator of some lesser drama.

Here we are, then. And Plotinus as it were for a while at Rome, the centre of the Stage, trying to persuade the chief actors - the emperor Gallienus among them - that they are just that - actors - who have confused themselves with some image, some part - and who will find themselves caught by Nemesis in all sorts of circles unless, like Oedipus at Colonnus, they come, through reflection on the dramatic configuration of their lives, to distinguish themselves from that 'part', that image of themselves. Until they come, indeed, to recognise in their very 'selves' images of Δοξα, mirrored in Time.

... A strange entertainment, indeed, for imperial romans. Nero had, it is true, regarded himself as first of all a dramatic poet and actor, the Emperor being merely one part among others. But now the lyre and chorus have vanished, the choral interface of Spectator and Action being transposed to the heavenly Music of the Spheres, and the Theatre of earlier days recognised as simply one passing image of the Poetics of Kosmos.
... A strange irony, this. Plotinus wanders about among the leading actors, playing his odd part: Look, there, out there, can you not see that that is who you really are, and that this body with which you have identified yourself is only a mechanical and passing reflection of the Spectator, your entranced Self... and your forgetfulness of this only a reflection of the Spectator forgetting himself, itself, yourself, myself, and so identifying with this your forgetfulness? - No wonder you get into trouble, and the World is in trouble, since you are acting as though you were somebody other than your true self, playing out some phantasy, which of course comes up again and again against an educational Reality, which in your strange phantasy you judge, according to the illusions of your 'part', as somehow wrong—when it is all the while trying to teach you that it is you who are wrong.

- A strange irony: for who, then is Plotinus - or, rather, what, then, is Plotinus, as he engages in extended conversations with the 'emperor' Gallienus? - Gallienus who had become regent in Italy in 253, and was technically Augustus, 'emperor' from 260. Outside Italy the various armies raised their commanders to the office of Caesar, and carried on a constant factional contest, until eventually the Illyrian army proclaimed their leader as a new emperor. Gallienus was murdered by his own soldiers when he finally confronted his rival at Milaan, in the third century 'emperor' had indeed become one 'part' among others, in the interplay or contest of forces in a fragmented Roman World. Plotinus survived his patron by only a couple of years, having seen his own project of building a Platonic Republic near Rome, with imperial funds (to which Gallienus had agreed), come to Nothing.

An irony, for Plotinus' figure of the One Spectator, the psychological actuality of contemplation, with which or whom he could identify in the Mirror of Creation, working back through the orders of \( \psi \) and \( \psi \), mirrors in a way his failure to find his part in the World in which he found himself, in conversation with the Emperor. Instead of finding the part of Reflection in the City of Rome as he found it, Plotinus (and with him Gallienus) rather began with the figure of Reflection, and then tried to frame the part of Reflection in the 'Real World' (with all its ontological force), by first framing the civic frame of that part within the figure of Reflection, as 'Platonopolis' in Campania.
There is something tragical, and indeed something comical, in this irony, that Plotinus' conception of his part should reflect the tragic illusion in which it is itself framed – the figure, again, of Oedipus inquiring, as spectator, into the action of which he is at the centre, of Aristotle logically framing tragedy, without seeing the comical 'part' of the Philosopher in this, blind to its own mistaken identity. And the initial framing of the cosmic Drama in a logical figure of two 'sides', spectator and actor, which does not 'comprehend' the illusory circularity of its own part in that Drama, as an unthinking identification with the part of spectator, opens up, as it were, the tragicomic destiny of 'neoplatonism' over the next two-and-a-half centuries, until the final impasse.

What, then, is the dramatic scheme of this destiny?

Plotinus plays his part, with essays, lectures, conversations. Always in relation to some particular situation. He doesn't see how the figure of detachment from the poetic symmetry of the two 'sides' of the Image, of Sense, of the worldly 'play' of figures and fictions is itself one component in the fragmentation of the Roman World – of it Policy, its Economy, its Army and Law – in which he 'bodily' plays this part. He doesn't see, for example, how the hellenising court circle, playing the part of Reflection, in this mirrors the abstraction of the court, and the organs of imperial Policy, from the economic and military chaos 'below'. Leading citizens as it were mistake the figure and part of political direction for its 'logical' analogue, and, divesting themselves of 'material' goods, identify themselves with Reason distinguishing itself from Image and Body, in their (or is it Reason's?) contemplation and εγκατάστασις.

Plotinus plays his part, One at the centre of the ascetic Reason of his roman circle, the very axis of transition of the material 'side' of its various dramatic configurations into the 'spiritual' or noetic, psychical side 'above'. – Embodying in these changing configurations of the circle below the psychical actuality which distinguishes itself in each 'scene' from the inscription of that scene
in the physical order of the Image. Plotinus, the very Life and Soul of the party, the focal interface of its psychic and physical sides, in which the various component figurations of the mirroring might be inscribed.

Into such a group, around 263, came Porphyry, born to the purple (if this be the interpretation of his royal name Malchus, and that familiar designation) about thirty years before on the phoenician coast of Syria. He had earlier (as I have noted above) associated with Origen, and studied under Longinus at Athens.

When Plotinus died in 270, it was to Porphyry that it fell to edit his occasional essays. This the disciple did by arranging the material as systematically as he could into six divisions of nine books each, the 'Enneaes' or Enneads: six parts, each triply triple. He composed also a Life of his master, integrating that drama of which the writings amount to one side, into a parallel unity. Shortly after Plotinus' death, it seems, Porphyry retired to Sicily to compose the first systematic neoplatonist attack against the Christians. Thence, it seems, he returned to teach at Rome until his death around the beginning of the fourth century, and to work out in systematic detail the scheme bequeathed by Plotinus.

In particular, Porphyry, in extensive commentaries on their work, embedded in this system - as two complementary sides, as it were - the schemes of Plato and Aristotle. In the Introduction to the first book of the rhodien canon of Aristotle's writings - to the Categories - and so as the introduction to the systematic economy of Kosmos, Porphyry poses a radical question which, in the Latin version (with its commentary) of Boethius, was to frame the second rise of western Reflection between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. Are 'universal' forms, ἐννεάες, properly, primarily 'in' the mind or 'outside'? If outside, are things properly 'in' them, or they rather 'in' things?

This, it will at once be seen, is just that question of the figure of 'figure', raised a moment ago - the 'play' of different senses of 'in', in relation to the figure of 'in' itself - the 'play' that frames the Parmenides of Plato. Porphyry, like Plato's Parmenides, gives no
answer: in each case it is the very 'play' of this figure, the poetic symmetry of logical and physical 'in', and its Economy, which frames the primary distinction of Actuality and Image. Such a 'play' is indeed in a way the minimal interface of platonian and aristotelian schemes - the platonian 'mystery' and a complementary aristotelian Economy, of Kosmos. And it is just this mirroring of platonian Mystery and aristotelian Economy which allows Porphyry to introduce the plotinian mirror of Life, the third hypostasis, as frame of his 'neoplatonic' systematisation.

The primary configurations of this Mirror, this interplay of figuration in \( \text{Nay} \) and \( \text{Dag} \), Porphyry finds in the 'pythagoreans'. The pythagorean principles of figures embodying an image of the distinction of some actuality from that image are already familiar. The plotinian triad becomes itself the primary instance of such figurative actuality, rather than an independent abstract order of distinction in which the 'figurative' mirroring of Life is inscribed as a secondary (or rather, tertiary) configuration. The subsequent progress of the alexandrian and syrian schools deriving from Porphyry involves a gradual assimilation of Plotinus' initial logical frame to this Mirror of Figure or figuration, until with Proclus' successors around the beginning of the sixth century, the logical distinction that had always at some point been assumed in the framing of the figuration, itself becomes lost in the 'play'. The key is as it were thrown away, and the School of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Porphyry and Proclus wanders about after its last head Damascius, circling in the sands of Syria and Persia.

Porphyry himself becomes involved in the play of pythagorean figures. The Life of Plotinus is followed by a Life of Pythagoras, and a discussion of the principles of pythagorean abstinence. Porphyry publishes the Chaldean Oracles, and begins that inscription of mythical figuration in the 'neoplatonic' scheme that was to be carried so far by his successors.

This 'figurative' direction becomes more pronounced in Porphyry's most eminent disciple and fellow-syrian Iamblichus, in the first third of the fourth century: Iamblichus the organiser of the 'syrian school' which came in the fourth century to dominate non-christian philosophy - which is as much as to say, with the christians, 'Philosophy' - and, in the person of the emperor Julian ('the Apostate') framed the two-year struggle to re-
assert 'philosophic' paganism as the spiritual frame of the Empire.

Iamblichus 'the pythagorean' - Iamblichus the magician, the numerologist, the astrologer...there is even an alchemical text attributed to him. The biographer (another) of Pythagoras, the commentator on Nicomachus' Introduction to Arithmetic, on the Oracles, on the mythical stories that dramatise divine actualities, perhaps On the Mysteries of the Chaldeans and Egyptians, attributed (again) to him. Iamblichus the Philosopher who wrote, like his master, Against the Christians - against that story taken as the fixed (in principle) poetic or dramatic frame of Kosmos.

Julian, who had studied under Iamblichus' disciple Maximus at Ephesus around the middle of the fourth century. The sole remaining claimant to the Empire through Constantine's half-brother (the others had all been murdered by Constantine's sons; the youngest, he owed to his own exile the leisure of study), he was appointed western Caesar or military leader in 355, and found himself proclaimed Augustus by his army at Paris in 360. His cousin's death the following year left him Emperor, and he set about re-shaping the World in a neoplatonic image. The following two years, until his death in a campaign against the Persians, present a tragic figure played out by the last actor-emperor of pagan antiquity. A tragedy in which a visionary subordination of the earthly Economy of the World to a spiritual Policy found itself hopelessly enmeshed as simply one more component of that mindless Economy or 'play' - this reaching the point at which, over a year spent in luxurious Antioch, the syrian capital, Julian became a comic figure to the citizens. At the same time his attempt to contradict the christian 'story' by rebuilding the Temple at Jerusalem was thwarted by balls of fire from Heaven - a figure contradicting him in his very own terms, universally taken at the time as a reply from the Invisible Side of things.

This brief tragicomedy might well be taken as an epochal point in the development of neoplatonism, or rather in the reversal of the parts of paganism and christianity (Empire and Church, indeed) a century before, in the time of Decius. When at Rome Julian had, for example replaced in the Senate the statue of Victory removed by
Constantine's son Constantius. When it was once more removed by the emperor Gratian - and this act was quickly followed by that emperor's death and by famine at Rome, the old roman patrician class petitioned the new emperor for restoration of the statue, and the centralised pagan ritual which paralleled the now almost purely nominal activity of their Senate. This appeal was the occasion (384) of the first intervention of Ambrose (bishop of the new western administrative capital, Milan) in the framing of imperial (that is, civic) policy: this as representative of a higher 'spiritual' Authority from which, he claimed, the temporal authority of the emperor over outward things (such as Ambrose's body and material goods) was derived. In a subsequent intervention, to stop the emperor Theodosius rebuilding a jewish synagogue burnt down by a christian mob at the instigation of their bishop, Ambrose framed his interdict in the parallel between Theodosius' situation, and Julian's attempt to rebuild the Temple at Jerusalem.

The part of Ambrose (and, as we will shortly see, of his 'convert' Augustine) in the latin West is paralleled by the part of Cyril of Alexandria in the East. I have already noted this patriarch's deposition (in concert with the bishop of Rome) of Nestorius, the patriarch of Constantinople who refused to accept the title Ἐμμανουήλ, Mother of God: Mary was mother only of the human nature, not of the divine nature, of the Christ. In fact the Council of Ephesus which deposed Nestorius was irregular, its decision being made before the arrival of the fourth patriarch, John of Antioch, and his syrian bishops (who largely supported Nestorius). John accordingly deposed Cyril (with the emperor's assent), but the egyptian church refused to recognise the decree. The following year Cyril published his dogmatic statement of his position, in the form of a defence of christianity against the emperor Julian's Against the Christians. This had been preceded by definitions of the primary elements of the christian mystery as invisible frame of activity, of which the visible church was but the image: the heavenly 'Trinity', the mirroring of inward and outward Word in 'Incarnation' (and so the mirroring of heavenly Trinity through 'Spirit' or two-sided Life, in the 'visible' order), and the inscription of activity in this frame through a ritual frame of distinction of Image and Truth. It will be seen how such a frame of the 'christian urama' closely parallels the 'neoplatonic' scheme: of this more in a moment.
between Empire and Church as complementary 'frames' of activity over this period (about 250-500). The interest of Cyril here (in the discussion of the fate of 'neoplatonism') relates rather to his initial activity as bishop of Alexandria, where he succeeded his uncle in 412 — returning from a period of anchoritic seclusion in the neighbouring 'desert' — a period 'outside' the world (as ἀφ' ξυλουτρίσμου of which also, more in a moment).

Among Cyril's first acts were the closure of the parallel 'novatian' churches (already discussed above, in connection with Novatian the 'anti-bishop' of Rome, following the Decian persecution of 250-1), the expulsion of the Jews from Alexandria, and connivance at the torture and murder, by a Christian mob led by his fellow 'monks' or 'anchorites', of the leading Alexandrian pagan — the neoplatonic mathematician and philosopher Hypatia (415).

Cyril's precise role in the murder of the most eminent female philosopher and mathematician of the whole Tradition is unclear; but his bitter enmity and his complicity are clear enough. To Cyril and the monks the daughter of Theon must have seemed almost Eve herself, the very antithesis of that 'Mother of God' in whose name their persecution of Nestorius soon began. Even the murder is almost an exact inversion of the Christian mystery: returning from a lecture (the temple of Serapis- Osiris which, originally a department of the Library, had replaced 'museum and Library under Aurelian (270-5), was sacked by a Christian mob incited by Cyril's uncle and predecessor Theophilus in 391, following Theodosius' assent, already alluded to, to the destruction of all non-Christian places of worship; it is not clear whether lectures were resumed there some time after the sack, or carried on elsewhere) she was dragged from her chariot to the Caesarium, now converted to a church, stripped naked before the altar, the flesh torn from her with oyster-shells, and the rent pieces of flesh and dismembered limbs carried to the civic rubbish-dump and burned.

Eve: embodying that radical symmetry of Male and Female Body, of Male Form, the rational principle, and Female Matter — of logical and physical orders of our earthly embodiment — that is the very antithesis of Male Reason, Word, distinguishing itself from the autonomous play of this symmetry in Female Nature. — That 'play' which is the very principle
of our embodiment in Matter, in the Image: of our 'fall'. - So that the
inscription of this principle as Virginal Mother of God, in that figure
of egyptian Isis, allows the limiting distinction, in the figure of Ἁγία,
Word, of heavenly actuality from earthly image, of those two sides, Male
and Female, of dual Life.

Eve: for not only was Hypatia a woman, but offering the Fruit
of the Tree of Knowledge, of a γυναῖκα which had already appeared, in
the first three centuries, to inscribe the christian story, in the figure
of Allegory, in a more radical logical distinction of logical and physical
orders, of which the poetic figures of story and allegory were to be seen
as that secondary or tertiary interface, the 'figurative' mirror of logi-
cal and physical in Life and Faith (whether it be in the gnostics of the
second century, or Plotinus in the third).

This γυναῖκα, then, inscribing the figure of christian πίστις in
an apparently more radical mirror of logical and physical orders, was it-
self simply a complementary component (along with the analogous symmetry
of the 'sexual' image of logical and physical orders of the Image) in the
abstraction of the Image from its inscription in the christian Drama -
the very focus of the 'devil', Satan's (egyptian Seth's) Work of Darkness.

Paul had warned the greeks against 'the Deep things of Satan' -
the mystery of Knowledge as taught by a female member of the group at Cor-
thin. This warning was soon to be found in the order of the Mass on the
day of martyrdom of Catharine, the heavenly patroness of learning, whose
(fictitious) story is simply a (rather scandalous) transposition of the
'martyrdom' of Hypatia into the frame of the christian Drama - this con-
version of the story reflecting the conversion of the symbolic 'sacrifice'
of the Mass itself, into the real sacrifice of Hypatia's body and blood.

About this time Augustine, near Carthage, was encouraging the
magistrate Dulcitius to carry out the decree of the western emperor Hon-
orius against unrepentant deviation from the theological frame of christ-
ian activity - against 'heresy', haeresia, ἁρέσις, (independent) 'choice':

It is much better that some should perish by their own fires, than
that the whole body should burn in the everlasting flames of Gehenna
through the desert of their impious dissension (1).

- Better to purge the soul by earthly fire, rather than allow
it to be consumed by eternal fire after natural death.

Cyril and Augustine were simply playing there parts in the
fixed frame of the 'Christian' Story and Drama in which they thought
to find themselves. The symbolic or figurative 'logic' of the murder
of the pagan philosopher Hypatia, or of those whose different 'versions'
of the Christian Story seem to involve their further 'fall' into the
Fire below the surface of the Earth, unless they be transformed by fire
here at the surface, follows directly from Cyril's and Augustine's fram-
ing of their 'parts' in the Story as they frame it, as thus framing it.
This figure of 'dogma', this 'circularity' of a poetic order or frame
which includes the critical position 'outside' that frame as one com-
ponent of the frame, is in effect the focus of 'logical' criticism of
Christianity from Celsus, through Porphyry and Iamblichus, to Julian,
Proclus, and beyond. Yet, as we have seen, the 'logical' framing of
criticism itself partakes in a strictly analogous and complementary
circularity. And the interaction of these positions from the early pag-
an persecutions of Christians, down to the Christian persecutions which
progressed, from the murder of Hypatia to the closure of all 'pagan' or
'heathen' schools a century later, should perhaps be seen rather as an
almost mechanical working out of a tragic fate, than as the passing
cruel aberrations of emperors and bishops.

Thus Hypatia does indeed embody the very antithesis of the
part of an intercessory 'Mother of God' in Cyril's kosmos. Her impor-
tance (moreover) in the development of 'neoplatonism' - as the leading
figure of the Alexandrian school - itself belongs directly to the work-
ing of an analogous figure in the Neoplatonic scheme or Kosmos. The
correlation of femininity and philosophy which must have amounted al-
most to the part of Eve (or the rabbinic Lilith, even) in Cyril's drama
of Creation and Redemption, corresponds to Hypatia's theoretical mir-
roring, in a systematic mathematical frame, of an Aristotelian economy
of Form and Matter and a Neoplatonic mystery of self-distinction of
Form from Matter. The 'sexual' imagery of the primary symmetry of
logical and physical orders (the symmetry of these orders as primary axis of neoplatonic 'Nature') had already been worked out in Porphyry's elaborate allegorical interpretation of the Cave of the Nymphs that frames one episode of the Odyssey. The Cave is Plato's visible World, and the Nymphs those principles of poetic symmetry and identification which hold us fascinated in the illusory play of this World, lost in a substitution of Image for Actuality, Body for Soul - lost in the 'play' of these figures, this Nature. This allegorical figure then amounts to a primary figuration of the Mirror of Life (Plotinus' third hypostasis), corresponding to the formal configuration of that question which Porphyry raises in his Introduction to Aristotle's Categories.

From what we know of Hypatia's own work, the correlation of edenic sexuality and knowledge corresponding to that configuration, and to her own position in Christian Alexandria, was reflected in her work simply as a sort of 'biographical' configuration from which her mathematical articulation of Aristotle's mechanical Economy, reflecting a platonic Mystery, was itself 'abstracted'. Abstracted - in that familiar principle underlying the mathematical and medical work of the Museum, already analysed in relation to its origins six or seven centuries before - in that correlation of Porphyry's question about 'ideas', and plotinian actuality, which reflects the 'euclidean' articulation of mathematics.

Hypatia's father Theon had produced (possibly in conjunction with his more eminent daughter) an extensively annotated edition of Ptolemy's Syntaxis or 'Almagest'. Hypatia followed this, and her father's edition of Euclid's Elements, with her own commentaries on the first six books of Apollonius' Conics, and perhaps on earlier works on mechanics (Archimedes?).

Her teaching attracted students from far afield (some record is preserved in the many letters to her from her student Synesius of Cyrene, who after studying at Alexandria and Athens, and composing several 'neoplatonic' treatises, including collections of 'hymns', became a Christian bishop of Ptolemais in the Libyan pentapolis: this unwillingly, not through any 'conversion' to the rival faith, but simply because, as the leading figure in the troubled city, he was eventually persuaded to accept the chief position, that of bishop). With her murder the school was largely dispersed, many of the students retiring to Athens, where a new 'Academy' was instituted.
Proclus, who was born at Constantinople about 411, studied at Alexandria (whose intellectual tradition was only fully restored by Proclus' student Ammonius (and his monophysite student John Philoponus) briefly at the end of the fifth, and beginning of the sixth centuries). He soon passed on to the new Academy at Athens, now under a certain Plutarch, whose daughter Asclepiageneia, a priestess of Eleusis, instructed him in the 'mysteries'. Plutarch and Asclepiageneia at Athens, at this time, seem to parallel Theon and his daughter Hypatia at Alexandria, shortly before. Plutarch's 'successor' Syrianus (as the name suggests) represented the syrian tradition of Iamblichus' school, which now met the more 'abstract' alexandrian neoplatonism at Athens. Proclus, Syrianus' successor as head of the 'Academy', represents the integration of these two currents, syrian and alexandrian. An integration reflected in his identification of himself with (a reincarnation of the soul of) Nicomachus of Gerasa. In him the systematic 'figuration' of the mirroring of 'platoonic' and aristotelian schemes incorporates both the syrian 'dramatisation' of Iamblichus' school, and the systematic mathematical articulation of the alexandrian school, as two complementary sides.

Iamblichus had indeed introduced 'mathematical' figuration into the scheme of Plotinus and Porphyry, but this (as reflected in his commentary on Nicomachus' Arithmetic, and the Theologoumena Arithmetica, his system of numerology) was dominated by that 'arithmic' play of figurate numbers that had replaced the euclidean analysis of geometrical figure as the main 'mathematical' concern, around the beginning of our Era. Theon and Ilypatia, on the other hand, had placed the emphasis on the euclidean frame of the Elements, Apollonius' Conics, and Ptolemy's Syntaxis. As I have just suggested above, this return to the geometric analysis of mathematical figure, in terms of a reduction to the geometrical point as primary or initial determination of the symmetry of logical and physical order of 'position' theos, reflects a limiting application of Porphyry's principles of integration of platoonic and aristotelian schemes (in terms of the elementary symmetry and interplay of 'logical' and 'physical' sides of the 'poetic' order of symmetry and identification). Proclus' major work in mathematics is an exhaustive commentary on Euclid's Elements of Geometry, in which the thirteen books are interpreted as a reflection of the unfolding of the One whose primary image is the Point, up to the point (...) where the unfolding arrives (at the end of the last book) at the 'cosmic' (or 'platoonic', or 'pythagorean') solids, the material 'elements' of the platoonic Kosmos of
In the course of the development, as elsewhere in Proclus' extensive writings, we find the mathematical figuration of the place or part of mathematics (the 'mathematical order') in this Kosmos. And it can hardly come as a surprise that the primary figure of this mathematical figure of the place of that figure in Kosmos, is that of One-in-Three. For that the systematic frame of Proclus' integration of Plato and Aristotle (and Pythagoras) is the unfolding of an initial One-in-Three until it comes 'full-circle' in the determination of the place in the scheme of this recognition of the scheme. Nor that the primary figure of this 'process' of unfolding of Eternity into Time, where it discovers itself thus unfolding, should be that 'circle' of hypothesis or hypostasis earlier found at work in Plotinus' essays. At each point in the Great Circle through which the One leaves itself to return to itself ('falling', it will be remembered, into an 'image' or analogue, and there recognising its distinction from the Image), there appears the same figure of stasis or remaining (μντη), 'procession' or 'proceeding' (προφητεύειν) and return (ἐπιστρέψεως).

In going 'outside' itself, in appearance, the One yet remains, actually, 'in itself' - it 'only' appears to be 'outside' itself; or rather... it goes outside itself to appear.... For this outside simply is Image; Appearance. There is really no outside: 'outside' the actuality of Unity is 'outside' precisely in the sense that, really, it isn't anything. This is what it means to be 'outside' the One, as 'Nothing' is 'outside' Being. This 'outside' the One is thus outside the One, and in this formal recurrence of the figure of 'outside', this radical circle of Illusion, which is only the illusion of 'position' or reference in the symmetrical 'play' of logical 'inside' and 'physical' outside, turns upon itself until unitary Actuality distinguishes itself from it. Or, rather, not 'it', for 'it' isn't even 'Nothing'. - Actually, 'it' doesn't even bear talking about. Doesn't even bear thinking about. 'Talking', 'Thinking'? ... But they are nothing too. We find ourselves, first of all, making the basic mistake of reference, identification. We first find ourselves in the figure of distinction from an unthinking identification in the poetic order of symmetry of thinking and being. And this initial discovery of Actuality distinguishing itself from Image, in some particular case, leads to a 'return' through wider and wider frames of this distinction - from each of which, in turn, we again distinguish Actuality as from yet another, more radical, mistaken identity, yet another 'reference', position 'out-
side' itself - and move on. - Move on, back and further back, again and again in this same recurrent figure of 'return', of distinction of Actuality from Image, stepping into ever more radical figurations of 'inside' and 'outside', until we come at last to this figure of 'inside' and 'outside' the One itself, to the pythagorean figure of Limit, two-sidedness.

At each point in this Return, we recognise the 'working' of a Mirror of Procession (which is simply Forgetting, and identification in a 'lower' order of symmetry and play of orders) and Return: we recognise and return to an Actuality which is this working, and remains just what it is through our forgetting and rediscovery: for it is just the pattern of this two-fold 'procession' and 'return'.

And every point in the 'process' is simply an 'image' of the only actual point in the whole scheme, the One. Every procession and return to any point an image of the Actuality of Procession and Return which, all the time, remains simply the Actuality of the One. The whole of Actuality, then, is simply a wondrously complex system of image-within-image of image-within-image, with its unitary actuality or dynamic of a sort of distributed distinction, through all this 'play' of figure-within-figure, of Actuality from this Drama or Play.

What, then, is the first configuration, 'in' which all the others can be inscribed, by a sort of self-application of this primary pattern of 'inside' and 'outside' Actuality?

'Inside' and 'outside': but we have just seen that this 'outside' is simply a fiction, an 'appearance' (of the One). We can't symmetrical-ly 'oppose' the One to any 'not-One', as if we thereby defined, identified, referred to something.

The 'play' of the various 'sides' of this radical opposition (of 'inside' and 'outside', Limit and Unlimited), in which the One distinguishes itself from a merely nominal 'other' side, is 'dramatised' by Proclus in the 'poetic' frame of a text - the Elements of Theology, whose
logical articulation is modelled on those Elements of Geometry which Proclus 'inscribes' in the Scheme of the Whole as another component 'order' (of 'procession' and 'return'). Dramatisation: a 'play' - for the One distinguishes itself from its merely nominal opposite, through the play or interplay of 'aspects' of that opposition, which have no underlying, 'hypostatic', substantial unity or reference 'behind' them. The One distinguishes itself in the play of a dynamic of Aspect or Image, in which there is no 'neutral' or independent account of the nominal opposite of the One, about which the 'play' turns: each of the essentially multiple accounts of this 'other pole' are themselves simply perspectives on the play as a whole from some particular point 'in' the play. The other pole, we may say, is simply Fiction 'itself', whose only identity lies in the step out of its illusory frame - as when the spectator 'returns to himself' at the close of a tragedy, of that limited 'play' within the Play or Interplay of the Whole, of 'all' the aspects whose unitary integration lies, not in something 'underneath' as the 'matter' of a stone might be thought to somehow 'underlie' its various aspects or appearances, but rather in the converse direction of 'return' from the 'fictional' frame of which such 'Matter' is a sort of limiting term - the organising force of the nominal opposition of One and 'Another'.

What is the primary frame of this 'play' of aspects of our initial insubstantial opposition, our initial 'hypothesis' of an 'outside' of the One?

- It is, of course, just the interplay of the familiar 'two sides' of 'two-sidedness', and the distinction of the One from that difference of differences, that 'two two's', that 'indefinite Dyad' or irreducibly double duplicity. Proclus calls the formal opposition of 'two sides', 'Limit' and 'Unlimited', returning to the pythagorean scheme of double-difference (in which, it will be remembered, unity distinguishes itself through a triple duality: Limit-Unlimited/Odd-Even/One-Many).

One 'side' of the initial opposition (which, again, is 'in itself' nothing but the fiction of reference of the mark or sign of opposition), which Proclus calls that of 'knowing', ἡ νοησία, corresponds formally to what I have called the 'logical order' of difference (or distinction). The 'other' side of this 'aspect' is (of course) logically determined as 'the known', ἡ νοημα - though it distinguishes itself 'ontically' from such a 'logical' determination: Proclus calls the actuality of the 'logical' side
Now the actuality of each of these, then, involves its self-distinction from the symmetry of these three order of distinction or difference. Which is simply to say that each order amounts (in a now familiar figure) to the analogous inscription of the relations of the three orders in (terms of) that order. And each of these self-distinctions are then seen as reflecting (in each of the three oriers of actuality) a common figure of Actualiry distinguishing itself from this its symmetric triple expression as Νος, Ω, Ζ. Each order (that is) embodies - in one of these symmetric aspects, the figure of self-distinction of the One from these three symmetric 'images' or aspects of radical Actualiry or self-distinction (or, equivalently, self-identification, self-expression, in this primary figure of 'procession' of One into Multiplicity, into the Image, and self-recognition in its 'return', distinction from, this 'play' of the Image).

... Self-recognition - as both what knows (Νος) itself as thus knowing-and-known (νομίζω, νοέω), and knows this self-distinction and return to itself as its very 'Life' or Actualiry.

The formal symmetry of this primary configuration or frame of Actualiry, of the One's self-distinction, may thus be seen to be a distinction of that self-distinction from its three primary (and correlative) images of Νος, Ω, Ζ, where each of these subordinate 'actualities' of 'hyrostases' are themselves reflections of that distinction: each of the three orders 'internally' reflects the configuration of the One's self-distinction from that order. Schematically, one might present the terms of the primary configuration thus:
- That is, formally, as the One distinguishing itself from the three vertices of a triangle or triad of which it is the centre, and where each of those vertices is in turn the centre of an 'image' of this first triad or triangle.

Now, before we (or 'one') distinguish(es) the various orders of difference by (necessarily) entering 'into' one of them, these four 'triads' of vertices are quite equivalent or 'symmetric'. Thus we might say that this configuration of 'vertices', each an image of the One, quite symmetric until we (as it were) decide 'where we are' in the configuration, and articulate (as it were) the remaining vertices from that particular aspect or 'perspective' - that this 'symmetry' of twelve 'absolute unities', \( \vartriangle \), is itself a sort of 'mirror' in which the One distinguishes itself from its identification with each of the vertices, each of those actualities of 'aspect' on a common symmetric configuration.

In this way, then, we may see how the primary distinction of three orders of Actuality - Knowing, Being, Life - itself corresponds to the configuration of the 'breaking' of the unitary symmetry of the absolute unities or 'henads'. This configuration of distinction from the three orders of distinction of Actuality itself, may itself be expressed in the 'image' of that triad articulation. - For in the mirror of the twelve absolute henads, the operation or working of the One is analogous to the working of \( \text{No3} \) distinguishing itself, in the 'mirror' of Life, from Being. Further, we may see in this primary circuit of the One through the Image, the 'inscription' of this whole primary articulation of the distinction of the One from the three primary orders in - as indeed - the primary self-expression of \( \text{No3} \) actually knowing itself in this configuration. So that, now, the whole primary configuration is inscribed within \( \text{No3} \) and this in turn amounts to the self-distinction of \( \text{No3} \) from a corresponding wider configuration, according to the figure of correlation of \( \text{No3} \), Life, and Being in this order of \( \text{No3} \). And it is this configuration, at last, which allows us to frame Kosmos in the familiar sototian figure of 'two sides', Visible and Invisible, of Time.

In this wider frame, then, of which the 'logical' articulation of the three primary orders (this itself being the order of \( \text{No3} \)) is simply one 'side', the mathematical symmetry of the twelve 'supernal' henads (together constituting the single 'supernal Number') are reflected in the
corresponding 'geometric' symmetry of 'physical' Space. For our four triads correspond, when referred to some 'thing' of which they are correlative aspects, of the simple 'tetrahedral' symmetry of Space, 'seen' from each of its four symmetric corners. And within this 'ontical' analogue of the 'noetic' or psychical 'space' of logical distinction, with its 'arithmetic' order, that figure of tetrahedron recurs as the 'atom' of Fire, the primary 'physical' element (as in the Timaeus). Thus the 'ontical' order of geometric space (itself mirroring the arithmetic order of 'logical' space) distinguishes itself from its primary image, 'material' or 'outward' Fire, as the 'Light' which illuminates that distinction.

Thus (now) we can distinguish the primary 'images' of psychical and ontical orders as 'inside' and 'outside' the Space of Kosmos, with the primary image of the mirroring order of life, as the interface of these two 'sides' in Time. Yet in the correlative distinctions of the actualities of each order from these primary images, each order is seen to be equally 'in' the others. Thus the mirroring 'in' the logical order of $N_0$ of One and the three primary orders - this in the arithmetic symmetry of the twelve hexads - itself 'belongs' not only to the logical order of $N_0$, but also to the order of mirroring of logical and physical (or here, psychical and ontical) orders, Life. And this radical twelvefold 'Life', the working of the symmetry of One and primary orders in which all actuality may be inscribed - the primary figuration of the One's procession from itself and corresponding return to itself - this may be recognised as what is called Divinity.

Thus the 'logical' analysis of the Actuality of self-distinction of the One, which 'begins' with the formal distinction of two 'sides' of One, properly amounts to the Elements of Theology, being simply a limiting case of the mirroring of logical and physical (psychical and ontical) order in the 'noetic' or 'mystical' order of Life. This logical analysis is itself articulated within a primary distinction of One and not-One which belongs, irreducibly, to the order of the Image - albeit a very abstracted domain of this order. As Proclus insists in his introduction to his exhaustive Commentary on the Elements of Geometry (he is then commenting on Eudemus' lost History of Mathematics), the abstract mathematical order was derived from the practical concerns of egyptian surveyors and chaldean astrologers: for we must begin our return to the One from where we find ourselves, in the actuality of self-distinction of some image of the One in
some particular situation. Any such actuality is essentially 'circular', partaking in the radical figure of 'proces-sion' to the Image, and return from it, recognising in this very symmetry the actuality to which the recognition is a return. Thus the configuration of the Elements of Theology is a direct reflection of the formal choice of starting-point, the framing of the exposition itself in the 'logical' order. But we must, in order to understand this 'logical circle' of that text, first arrive somehow at its starting-point. Thus these Elements cannot stand alone, but must find their place in some systematic framework of Reflection in which we can 'find' that starting-point, and, most importantly, this scheme of Reflection, inscribed in the logical order of exposition, must in turn be 'inscribed' in some practical relations with the situation in which we find ourselves embodied 'here and now'.

The wider theoretical context in which this 'Theology' is inscribed (as limiting 'logical' figure) is reflected in those Elements as the mathematical frame of symmetry of logical and physical orders - the mirroring of the 'arithmetic' mirror of One and primary triads in the 'geometric' mirror of Space and Matter. The various specialised treatises that deal with various component domains of 'theory' are all, as it were, extended essays on various aspects of the monumental Commentary on the Timaeus, which Proclus presents as the very frame of his vast production. Thus, the 'points' at which he begins an Elements of Physics or an Abstract of Ptolemy's Syntaxis, or a commentary on the Parmenides, may as it were be found, as in a general map of Cosmos (where the specialised treatise is a restricted map on a different 'scale'), in the frame of the commentary on the Timaeus, and we will know where we are.

Well... almost: for this systematic map or frame is itself framed in a Reflection that amounts to only one side of the still more radical dramatic frame that is reflected in the formal mathematical frame of the Timaeus as Life. The frame of the Timaeus is itself a limiting case, as indeed Timaeus himself observes, of the figure of the Story.

In the logical frame of the Elements of Theology we can see the 'logical' symmetry of the logical order of Nos and the poetic order of Life, within the arithmetic frame of the Supernal Number, the twelve Henads. But that logical order cannot determine how the symmetry is
actually broken, so that we find ourselves engaging in a logical execution, rather than say some structurally analogous or symmetric 'mythology' of the twelve primary 'gods'. To explain how we got to the 'position' outside the One where we can compose a logical treatise, we have to tell a story. The most radical frame in which the 'narrative' order of the Timaeus, and so the 'logical' order of the Elements of Theology can be inscribed is just the dramatic frame of which the 'poetic' mirroring in Divinity of the poetic mirroring of $\Theta\alpha\sigma\gamma$ and $\Pi\alpha\nu\gamma$, of their 'logical' and 'physical' orders, is a limiting case: the limiting case corresponding to the reflection in the narrative frame of the Timaeus of the dramatic self-expression of Actuality in the utterly radical order of Mystery - of which the Timaeus itself, the Mystery of Reflection, constitutes one side.

The narrative frame of the Timaeus is thus inscribed as a limiting case, abstracted from any particular situation, of the more general figure in which we actually find ourselves at the interface of Actuality and Fiction, involved in the particular configuration of some identification in some particular 'situation', in which we also identify particular 'outward' things, including other instances of this actuality of identifying (other 'people'), and so on.

-The more general figure in which the 'poetic' symmetry of the 'logical' and 'physical' orders of some situation in which we find ourselves, is itself an image of the mirroring of Actuality and Image.

-That is to say: the 'poetic' order of difference of logical and physical 'versions' or 'aspects' of the difference of these three orders of distinction itself frames the difference of the 'actuality' of the situation from the 'possibilities' corresponding to its 'psychical' and 'ontical' aspects.

We 'find ourselves' at the interface of Actuality and the 'poetic' symmetry of 'fiction' in which our situation is framed - find ourselves in stepping out of that configuration, as an actor might suddenly remember that he is - say- not Orestes, but somebody 'playing the part' of Orestes, that he is not before the Areopagus, but before the judges of the dramatic contest, and so on. And we can see, precisely through considering the dramatic frame of Cosmos as a whole, and then the place of the dramatic recognition of a distinction of Actuality
and Image in that general frame, that the primary articulation of this distinction is rooted in the mirroring of Actuality and Image or Fiction in the particular case. That the 'general' case, presented as a mathematical frame of Cosmos abstracted from the particular case (which it in turn eventually determines as primary) itself appears, in the general frame which it defines, as only one side, one component, of the particular situations in which we will 'find ourselves'.

To put it another way: we find the part, in the general frame, of the presentation of that general frame, as itself only one side of the general case: for the general case is essentially specific or particular. The general case is framed in the primary dramatic figures of distinction of the poetic configuration in which 'we find ourselves unthinkingly 'playing a part', And the range of cases, of activity (Reflection), in which this distinction is framed in the logical order - although in those cases we see the general frame of all cases - itself amounts to one range of cases within the more general 'poetic' figure. The 'mathematical' figuration of the general interface of Actuality and Fiction or Image, developed by the alexandrian school, is seen as simply a limiting case of the 'dramatic' or 'theurgic' figuration developed by the syrian school. - A figuration which, although it logically frames the 'dramatic' figuration of Iamblichus' school, itself amounts to one component in the primary drama of Return. - Of return from the situation in which we find ourselves, not from some abstract 'position' outside the One which may amount to one component of the configuration in which we find ourselves. We must first find our way to that abstract point - and we must somehow decide whether that abstract point lies on the most direct path to the One, the most direct path of Return from our particular situation.

What then is the primary 'poetic' or 'dramatic' figuration of the interface of Actuality and Image, in which we first actually discover ourselves to be (at) such an 'interface'?

- Simply 'the mysteries' which, in the form of a sacred drama, embody an image of the distinction of the 'divine' actuality (which thus distinguishes itself) from that image. Thus the mysteries of Eleusis, of which Proclus' early instructress Asclepigenia was a priestess or cele-
brent—literally, indeed, an actress—turned about a natural image (the 'death', 'sleep under-ground', and 'rebirth' of the ears of corn—that first figure of agri-culture, revealed in the myth by Demeter to Triptolemus) of the distinction of natural and spiritual, Visible and Invisible.

— Or the mysteries of the chaldean and egyptian divinities, in the latter of which's rigorous fasting, it seems, Proclus nearly left behind his earthly body altogether—nearly died.

— Or those mysteries which involve as one element the 'text' of the mystery, which symbolically inscribes itself in the configuration of the drama: the Chaldean Cracles, the Hermetic Books, the Orphic Poems.

— Or, more generally, the 'mythology' of the whole world, which consists, for Proclus, of a systematic mirroring, in the various different times and cultures—of the various different situations—of the various stories, of an Actuality of the One, mediated through the complex orders of Divinity, which distinguishes itself, in those particular situations, through the frames, the poetic configurations, of these different but systematically related stories or 'myths' or 'mysteries'.

And what in all this, then, is the part of the Philosopher? Proclus, as I have noted, identified his part in this scheme as a reappearance of the 'life' or soul which had once animated the body of Nicomachus the neopythagorean. He saw his part in a Great Drama as focusing, like Nicomachus or Pythagoras or 'Hermes' or 'Orpheus' before him, the frame of distinction of Visible and Invisible, Actuality and Fiction. —Framing the activity of Return of his fellows embodied there with him, who had forgotten where they had come from, what they were, and why they were there.

His life was several times threatened by the athenian christians: 'My body does not matter, it is the spirit that I shall take with me when I die' he told students who offered to defend him. He was eventually banished from the city for trying to get christians to return.
with him towards the One. When he was again allowed back, it was to a situation in which his instruction was confined to a restricted number of close associates in nocturnal groups reminiscent of the platoic Council of the Laws.

Proclus died in 485. Justinian, Emperor of the East, closed all 'heathen schools' — forbade the teaching of pagan neoplatonism, with its twelve 'hegemonic gods' (the absolute unities) and complex configurations of divinity — in 529. Damascius, who had succeeded to the direction of the restored Academy in the early years of the century, and six of his associates, transposed their studies to the Persian court, but soon found it was not the place for neoplatonic reflection and gave up the enterprise.

I have at several points suggested that the outward 'closure' of the Academy by Justinian in a way reflects the impasse encountered by Damascius in Reflection — the material closing of the school marking the close of a 'circuit' of Reflection that begins, shall we say, with Pythagoras arrival in Croton, about 528 years before the beginning of this our Era. More exactly, the transition from Proclus to Damascius brings full-circle, in a way, the logical dynamic of 'pagan' Reflection which begins with the transition from Pythagoras to Parmenides, which I have generally called the period of the 'first pythagoreans', the contemporaries of Heraclitus, and of the first athenian dramas (and much else besides).

Proclus had 'logically' determined the primacy of the 'dramatic' order of Mystery, of which the logical component was only one side. In that figure, as we have just seen, the 'poetic' symmetry of 'logical' and 'physical' orders of distinction is an image of the symmetry of that triple order of the Image or Fiction, and the Actuality which, in that Image, distinguishes itself from that image of distinction. The logical articulation of this elementary configuration of orders of difference — the 'Elements of Theology' — is defined relative to the formal starting-point of the theoretical text in a merely nominal distinction (of One and not-One). But what, then, does that 'starting-point' amount to, except
an imaginary mark? And what does the logical order of the text amount to, other than one particularly delusive fiction among so many others? Indeed, how can we start anywhere at all, since that would be to assume the fixity of some 'point', 'outside' the One. Any starting-point is already itself simply another element in the 'play' of figures. And how can we even begin to give any account of such a 'starting-point' - where can we begin? We certainly cannot properly begin with the One; that is rather the end of our process of Return - if we begin formally with 'the One', in the logical order of some text, we are simply beginning with some mark, some name, some fiction of reference or position - the mere empty form, indeed, of illusive position.

Damascius' chief text he calls Τίτταν Ἀρχάγγελος: On Beginnings - or rather 'About Beginnings', 'Around Beginnings', even.

Proclus had assumed a formal starting-point, in the One: a name for what distinguishes itself from any name. But where is this starting-point to be found in the cosmic Scheme evolved in that play of distinction of Actuality and Mark? With the removal of such a formal point of reference 'outside' the scheme, we find that everything begins, as it were, to spin about us. We find ourselves in a play of distinctions, in which the distinction of 'inside' and 'outside' that play is simply one figure among others. Can we replace Proclus' formal framing of the primacy of a figurative order, of which this logical order of formality was simply one side, abstracted from that more radical order, by a more radical beginning in this figurative order, which we know (logically) to be primary? Can we take one last step out of that logical circle, and find it within the play of figure, rather than inscribing the play of figure in it as logically what the logical order itself is 'in'? Can we not see in the primary logical figure of a return from a nominal 'point' outside to the One, an image of the departure involved in the nominal beginning of that logical order of exposition?

Damascius' text is framed in the interplay of those 'mythological' figures which Proclus had framed, logically, as expressing the primary Drama of Actuality from which the logical order of Reflection is abstracted. An interplay both itself framed in, and framing, the 'logical' figuration of the theoretical text.
What, then, is the locus of Damascius' assertion in the 'logical' figure of Reflection. How can the logical 'circuit' which frames the text be identified with this same 'logical' figure as it appears in the 'poetic' figuration of the text? Is Damascius' 'part' or 'place' inside or outside the poetic or dramatic order from which the text is 'logically' abstracted, but which this very text defines as its primary locus? - For the correspondence of the logical frame of the text, and the place or part of that figure or frame in the poetic order of Kosmos in which the text 'logically' inscribes itself, has until this impasse corresponded 'dramatically' to the place of that circuit of Reflection in the 'poetic' order of the Group or Society in which the text is written. There is simply no place in the 'poetic' order of Damascius' activity of writing and teaching, for the 'logical' circuit of Abstraction: and the primacy of the 'dramatic' order reflected in Damascius' logical abdication of an 'autonomous' logical framing of Reflection is itself reflected by the mirroring of this 'logical' impasse in the physical 'closure' of the School, the 'outward' dramatic frame of his assertion. There is no place, in the Empire of 529, for Abstraction. And the last attempt to find a place by moving into the formal 'outside' of that World in which there is 'no place'—as if (then) the place is 'outside' that order of no-place—in Persia—completes this closing scene of pagan Reflection. - For that last desperate attempt to correlate the logical 'outside' of the dramatic frame of the Empire, with a 'physical' outside, outside its boundary, amounts to the last illusion, in which the Philosopher must finally recognise his distinction from that 'I' which is the logical instance of his assertion.

This amounts to the last scene in the 'drama' of neoplatonism—a sort of radical 'crisis of identity' of the logical instance of self-assertion, which frames its part in the dramatic frame of activity by recognising the locus of its logical articulation or framing in that dramatic frame—this a sort of identification of the part of Philosopher in a 'mirroring' of the logical framing of the order of activity in that order, as thus framed. But now, with Damascius, there is no longer any 'place' in the dramatic order of activity, corresponding to a formal 'starting-point' outside that order. There is no longer any 'place' in the earthly play of figures, for an identification with a point 'outside' that play, of which one's actual part in the play—the part of identifying with that point 'outside'—might be seen (in that identification) as a mere 'reflection'.
... But thus far, we have only followed the fate of this abstract point 'outside' the play of figure from 'outside' the earthly locus of identification with (or of) that 'point'. We simply find ourselves, with Damascius and his associates, 'lost'. We had identified with that 'part', 'outside' the earthly order of a Christian Empire, and now see the 'part' finally dissolve into nothing — find that we have 'no place' in that foreign World, no figure, any more, in that World, corresponding to a point of assertion 'outside'. The last players of that neoplatonic 'part' of identification with the logical locus of assertion, wander, banished from the frame of their tragic researches, like blind Oedipus banished from Thebes, when he discovers that he, who thought himself the detached Inquirer, finds that he is the very object of his inquiry, and that this illusion of detachment is precisely at the root of the disorder he thought to resolve.

Looking, now, to the actual frame of this impasse of Thought, we find that the text that marks Damascius' impasse — in which there is no longer for Reflection, any possibility of identification of the logical order which 'outside' frames the text, and that order as it appears 'in' the logical determination of the poetic frame of Kosmos presented in the text — we find that this text, marking the point where Reflection finally loses itself in the poetic order of activity, is itself strangely reflected — or strangely reflects — another text: the 'Book' or Codex, 'Code' of Law, published by Justinian in 528-9, the first fruit of his systematic reorganisation of imperial Law, begun immediately upon his succession to the throne of his uncle, in 527.

A 'code', a text, which systematically determines its part in the 'poetic' frame of a Law it itself frames or defines: a sort of 'poetic' inversion or conversion of Damascius' impasse.

— And as a prelude to this unitary Law, we may note Justinian's repeal of the former law which forbade a member of the Senate (and so, a fortiori, forbade the Emperor) to marry an actress. The eastern seat of Empire, instituted two centuries earlier by Diocletian, had been much subject to the influence of the women of the court circle — this, in particu—
uler, through their attachment to contending Church parties. The law forbidding marriage to an actress might be said to have instituted, in the integrated frame of the Christian Empire, that dramatic figure of abstraction from the 'poetic' symmetry of sexuality, already noted in the relations between Hypatia and Cyril of Alexandria, and his particular devotion to the Virgin Mother of God. To the contemporary courtier Procopius we owe two accounts of the part of Justinian's actress-consort Theodora - an 'official' history which relates her leading part in the wise government of the Empire reorganised under her joint rule with Justinian, together with a 'Secret History' published only in the seventeenth century, which works out a sort of parallel inversion of the official picture, turning upon the very figure of the play of the actress' sexuality and deception, and making the official picture itself simply illusion. Which of the two sides is fiction, and which actuality, or which has more of fiction, which more of reality, it seems difficult to discover.

In either case, the common figures of the two accounts, whose different versions were to prefigure two 'sides' of the byzantine Court and government in the following centuries, serve to illustrate the frame in which pagan Reflection closes and is closed. The union of the male proponent of the systematic legal frame of the Empire, with the feminine instance of the 'play' of poetic symmetry from which and in which the unitary integration of 'activity' in Law distinguishes itself, itself frames, in Justinian's 'symbolic' repeal of the Law against marriage between nobility and actresses, that new figure of the Text or Codex which is, as it were, the 'other side' of Damascius' text. That 'other side' which itself frames, in 529, the imperial decree 'closing' the institutes of abstract Reflection - of Reflection abstracted from the 'theological' instance in whose dogmatic order Reflection must now inscribe itself - the law enacting this inscription itself partaking of the logical order of the Text as one side of the dramatic configuration in which divine actuality and Authority expresses itself in the Christian drama or mystery.

It will be seen that the unitary frame of activity instituted in principle by Justinian's first Codex - the systematic integration of earlier imperial decrees into a single text - corresponds to a direct analogy of the 'dramatic' scheme of Neoplatonism: As the One expresses itself by distinguishing itself, in the logical order of distinction, from the interlay of that order with symmetrical 'poetic' and 'physical' orders, so the unitary Authority of the Emperor expresses itself through
a Text or Codex, in whose logical order of inscription of action-within-action, the integration of activity within Law distinguishes itself from the 'economy' of interplay of orders of legal text, particular action, and situation. The 'logical' order of the text here inscribes itself in the poetic frame of action it determines, so as to articulate a systematic drama of identification of 'parts' in the civic order thus framed by Law. In particular, the 'part' of the Emperor is thus framed as that of 'logically' framing the poetic order of activity in which it thus defines or frames its part. This closed circle in which activity in the Byzantine Empire is thus 'framed' by the Emperor, itself 'excludes' the 'part' of Philosopher, of identification with a 'critical' position 'outside' the frame of the civic order instituted in systematic Law.

This 'step' of Justinian's is paralleled in the 'West' — in the 'Latin' West whose last 'Emperor' had abdicated in 476 — by the institution of the Authority of the Bishop of Rome in the systematic 'Canon Law' of the Roman abbot Dionysius Exiguus (the Small). The last Emperor of the West had abdicated; there was no meaningful place for that old office in the interplay of 'Roman' Church and barbarian (chiefly Gothic) military power. Justinian's army briefly controlled Italy towards the middle of the sixth century, but with Justinian's death and new barbarian incursions (Lombards, now) the Byzantine administration there was fragmented, and the Church's contact to the West was severed. Dionysius' systematic collection of 'canons' — decrees of councils and of the Roman bishops, relating to the organisation of the Church — are a western analogue, in many ways, of Justinian's codification of imperial Law. Characteristically, the part of 'canon law' in the East is determined by Justinian's definition of the part of a smaller (and contemporary) Eastern collection of conciliar decrees, in the systematic frame of his imperial Law as a whole. The integration of Church and State in the East is paralleled by a division and dual organisation of these two complementary frames of activity in the West. I will now quickly outline the development of these relations of Church and Empire in the progressive division of Latin West and Greek East, from the middle of the third century where I left Decius and Gallienus, to the accession of
Justinian in the East, and the determination, that same year, by Dionysius Exiguus in the West, of a new Era, to be dated from the Annunciation of her part in the cosmic Drama to the Virgin Mother of God, at the spring equinox (25 March) which Dionysius calculated to precede his determination by 527 years (in this making a mistake of between three and five years, if we are to match the accounts of Matthew and Luke with Josephus' dating of the death of Herod the Great to '4 BC'). I will treat as one component of this configuration the 'Christian' Reflection which, over this period, considers (as it were) its place within the frame of Christian activity as a unitary whole.
Church and Empire, East and West

We left the 'roman World' of the third century in some disarray. I noted the first systematic confrontation of roman Law and christian Mystery in the decian persecution of 250-1, in which Origen was imprisoned and tortured, and after which the question of the place in the Church of those who had renounced their faith in the persecution, first presented for consideration the unity of the Church as a 'catholic' or universal Frame of the Mystery.

I noted the way that, over the third century, the 'Emperor' had become simply one 'figure' in the contests of the various armies for military - and so political and economic - dominance. - The figure of 'political' direction, itself only one element or component in a more or less open economy of interaction of the three primary 'orders' of the Empire: integration of action-within-action in the 'logical' articulation of Policy; interplay of possible actions, of the various 'figures' of action in the 'material' organisation of an 'Economy' of Activity - and the interaction of these in the frame of a Law, whose 'material' embodiment was the Army, responsible for upholding the Law within, and maintaining those borders which defined the limit of the Law, from incursion from without - from Franks and Goths in the North, and Persians in the East.

Thus we might say, as a sort of first approximation, that the military 'economy' of the Empire in the third century amounted to the inscription of the triple order of Policy, Constitution, and Economy, within a dominant order of material 'Economy' - within an interlay of these three orders, framed in the material 'image' of the Law (that is, the Army or armies). It is in the 'outward' context of such a chaotic or undirected Economy of Empire, that the figure of a duality (and opposition) of worldly Economy, and a Mystery which distinguishes itself from such an Economy, first becomes focussed in the decian persecution.
In this confrontation of worldly Economy and heavenly Mystery, Anthony of Thebes in Upper Egypt, retreated from the World into the egyptian 'desert' — went to live, as it were, the other side of the boundary of worldly Culture, in the isolation of Nature. This life 'alone' — ἐκιώμα — this 'desertion' of the 'hermit' to the theban Θεσίνα, the uncultivated 'desert' place — is the primary image in that physical order of 'inside' and 'outside' the boundary of Culture, of the physical economy of the State, of the distinction of one's activity from the worldly Economy or play of the Image.

In his solitude, we are told, Anthony, alone, found himself involved in the interaction of Actuality and Image in the simple figure of Divinity distinguishing itself from the demonic illusions of hallucinatory sexuality. It was from the Desert that Cyril came, and the monks who tore apart the demonic Hypatia.

At last, in 305, Anthony was finally persuaded to leave his retreat to direct the isolation of a numerous group of imitators — to frame as it were a new 'spiritual culture' in the primary figure of life 'outside' Culture. He became a figure of great authority in the dissen-sions that were fragmenting the egyptian church: the distinction of 'inside' and 'outside' Culture had itself quickly become incorporated in a wider Culture, distinguishing itself, in this, from its physical image as one 'side' of a physical boundary.

In the two preceding years Diocletian, who had been acclaimed as Emperor by his army in 284, had carried out the last imperial attack on or confrontation with, the expanding Church. — This as part of his attempt to reorganise the Empire as a unitary frame in which his own part would be to frame a unified and coherent policy. The familiar circularity of this part of the 'Augustus' as framing his part in framing activity throughout the Empire corresponds, in the case of Diocletian, as in those of Caligula and others before him, with his identification with the figure of Zeus (Jove). Zeus, in this case, framing a story, a destiny, in which his recognition of his part in the story was a primary component.

Diocletian set about his reform by appointing a western 'Augustus', Maximian, in 286, to frame policy there, while he framed eastern policy, and the integration of the two. In 292 he took as deputy a Caes
sar' Galerius, in charge, under him, of the government of the northern part of his eastern half of the Empire, and appointed Constantius to the control, under Maximian's authority, to the northern part of the West. This double division of the administration, with each of the four sections given a certain autonomy, but this autonomy itself subject to the direction, first of himself together with Maximian, and this collaboration in its turn framed by Diocletian, was reflected in the systematic reorganisation of all levels of Policy, Law, Army (with a separation of the roles of the armies of border defence, and the army of the interior), and Economy (in which last reform there figured the decree against 'the egyptian art' or 'alchemy'). In short, Diocletian aimed to integrate the interaction of Policy, Law, and Economy, within the frame of a policy in which he himself played the decisive part. On the coins that played their part in the reformed Economy, Diocletian appears as dominus et deus, and as Zeus; Maximian appears as Heracles (Hercules). Diocletian is platonic Wisdom, governing the relations between that ruling virtue and herculean Strength.

If this integration of the Empire into a unitary frame of activity, focussed in Diocletian's Zeus' wise judgement were to be effected, then the interplay of the dual frames of Economy and Mystery must be achieved through the Mystery of a Policy which, itself entering into the Economy of the Empire, 'worked' in that Economy so as to effect the integration of activity, action-within-action, within the ruling actuality of this mystery of government, which reflected the heavenly government of Jupiter or Zeus above. The interplay of the christian frame of activity with an economy of fragmentation stood in the way of such a unitary integration. But, in that interplay, the christian frame as it were fed, grew, on persecution, finding in this opposition figures of distinction of heavenly and earthly orders, through which its frame could be ever further extended into the 'earthly' order from which it - in this very working, indeed distinguished itself.

Diocletian abdicated in 305, insisting that Maximian do likewise, and devoted the remainder of his life (like Gallienus before) to philosophy and gardening, on the Adriatic coast. After a confused contest between Constantius' son Constantine and Maximian's son, for the control of the West, Constantine found himself, in 313 sharing the Empire with Galerius' eventual successor Licinius in the East. In the final struggle
with Maximian's son (312), the story runs that Constantine had two visions that he would overcome his rival by inscribing (literally) his campaign in the Christian mystery. First he saw in the sky a cross and the words 'In this, prevail', and before the last battle he was instructed in a vision to have his soldiers paint on their shields ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ, Christ.

Whatever be the true account, Constantine and Licinius passed a decree of toleration for Christians the following year, and by the time the less-than-saintly Constantine had finally consummated his ensuing contest with Licinius (begun in 314) in the latter's defeat and murder in 323, and murdered his wife (Licinius' sister), their son, and various other rivals the following year, he was ready to replace Diocletian's story, which had framed the latter's policy, by the Christian story, and his part in it. One may well suppose that his part in this story was determined by considerations of policy, and that Diocletian's policy was determined by a deeper conviction in his story, than Constantine (who was not baptised - and that in the end only by an Arian bishop) until very shortly before his death) in that of the Church.

Having consolidated his position as sole Emperor, and chosen as the new imperial capital Byzantium (henceforth Constantinople), Constantine summoned the contending parties of the Church to the first general or ecumenical Council at Nicæa, on the coast south of Byzantium. I noted some way above that the Novatians could not be persuaded to integrate their churches and activity within the unitary frame that Constantine wished the Council to achieve. The most significant division, though, that was nominally resolved at the first Council, was based on a theological division in the Alexandrian church (like so many other divisions thereafter). Arius, a rather argumentative presbyter ('elder'), had in 318 denied his bishop's public assertion that the Three Persons of the Trinity partook of a single unitary Actuality or Act of Being, Θεόλογος. Arius insisted that the Second Person, the Son, incarnate as the Christ, was 'created', an emanation of the One First Person, and not himself the immediate frame of all Creation. Arius' position parallels the account given by Plotinus of the relations between the Three Hypostases: the mystery of the primary Trinity is framed in a logical order of procession from the One, rather than in the 'poetic' symmetry of the three primary 'hypostases' that we find in Proclus' account.
A parallel or analogy only: for while Plotinus' account
moves logically from first hypostasis, through second and third to
Nature, and finally Matter, the Christian analogue—the mystery of
a primary 'Trinity', is at work, from the first, in a radical symmetry
of Above and Below, Heaven and Earth, Actuality and Image, Inward and
Outward Word. In the symmetry of the Christian scheme, Arius' 'logical'
approach involves the supposition of an initial Act of Creation, in which
the One Father distinguishes himself from and in Matter (as symmetric
pole 'Below'), prior to the inscription in this radical Act of Creation,
of the next (and thus 'created') actuality of Inward distinguishing itself
from, and in, Outward 'Word': the 'Son'.

Arius' 'logical' scheme: his initial objection to his bishop's assertion of the symmetry of the Three Persons of God, was that no
sense could be made of such a figure. How could we begin with three? If
there is to be three, must there not first be One, a Unity, and then a
distinction of Persons, inscribed in the primary figure of Distinction,
in the I AM that as One distinguishes itself from the 'fictional' reference or identity of a 'Matter' outside?

The initial confrontation of bishop and presbyter spread from
Alexandria through all the churches of the East. Councils in Egypt and
Syria excommunicated one another's bishops. Arius was summoned to de-
defend his position before the bishops of East and West assembled by the
Emperor at Nicaea, where his logic was opposed by the bishop of Constan-
tinople and his young deacon Athanasius. In the end Arius and the
two (of 318) bishops who would not be bound by the Council's decision
in favour of Athanasius, were banished to Illyria.

The controversy, however, continued, as different factions of
the church combined with different court parties. Eusebius, (bishop of
Constantinople after the death of Constantine) combined with Constantine's
sister Constantia to influence the Emperor in favour of Arius. When Ath-
anasius, now bishop of Alexandria ..., would not receive Arius back into
the alexandrian 'communion' in 335, he was, through Eusebius' influence
denosed and himself banished to Gaul. Under Constantine's sons, between
whom the Empire was divided upon the former's death in 337, the western
bishops came to support Athanasius, while in the East various positions of more or less modified arianism dominated the contest, with Eusebius at Constantinople maintaining Arius' initial objections to the equality of the Three Persons, Father, Son and Spirit. Various local councils, under the influence of various parties, continued the process of mutual excommunication. Athanasius was several times restored, and then again deposed, from the bishopric of Alexandria. The barbarians on the northern borders of the Empire, converted in this period by arians, were to remain arian until the sixth and seventh centuries. Within the Empire this first great schism, corresponding to the first phase of integration of Church and Empire, was more or less concluded by the second general Council, summoned by Theodosius to Constantinople in 381, as part of that last head of a single Empire's reassertion of the integrative principles of Diocletian and Constantine. With Theodosius' death in the arms of Ambrose, archbishop of his capital Milan, in 395, the final administrative division of the Empire into an independent East and West, under the rule of his two sons, coincides with a related divergence between Latin and Greek churches.

In the East the interaction of Church and State was developed, over the period between the first two Councils (325-381), in the frame of the arian contest. At one pole of that conflict the contending versions of Trinity and Incarnation, as contending frames of the Christian mystery, were articulated within the scheme developed by Origen towards the middle of the third century. The parallel between the part of Origen's scheme in the development of Greek 'theology', and the part of Plotinus analogous Trinity in the development of 'neoplatonism' is marked. In either case contending Alexandrian and Syrian schools (or churches) are finally integrated in an 'athenian' synthesis. In the case of the Church this synthesis begins around the middle of the fourth century with those two (of three) 'hierarchs' or preeminent 'fathers' of the Greek Church, Basil 'the Great' and Gregory of Nazianzus, who were Julian the Emperor's fellow-students and associates at Athens. Apart from articulating the mystery of Trinity and Incarnation in the light of the arian 'logical' formulation, Gregory as the bishop of Constantinople appointed by Theodosius, was in the forefront of the conflict focussed in Constantinople (the arian stronghold) by the second general Council, and Basil formulated the Rule or Constitution of the 'monachism' that had begun with Anthony of Thebes and his first disciples.
Basil and Gregory Nazianzen, together with Basil's younger brother Gregory of Nyssa (in their common association with Theodosius) were responsible for the framing of 'nicene' orthodoxy. After the Council of Constantinople Gregory of Nyssa travelled through the East reforming churches. He, following the expositions of his brother, and their fellow caesarodian Gregory Nazianzen, systematically presented the scheme of Origen in terms of the complementary figures of Trinity and Incarnation.

A Trinity that amounts to the correlation in a unitary Actuality of the familiar triple two-sidedness, and this common two-sidedness focussed in an Incarnation that mirrors the 'inward' articulation of the Invisible Word in the 'outward' forms of the Visible Creation.

The Reform instituted by Theodosius was continued under his son Arcadius by the third 'hierarch' John 'Chrysostom', gushed-mouthed, consecrated bishop of Constantinople in 398, but by 404 a combination of a church party led by the patriarch Theophilus, and a court party attached to Arcadius' wife Eudoxia, had secured Chrysostom's banishment.

The pattern of interaction of theology, as the 'logical' frame of the Church, with the interplay of factions in Church and Empire (as dual frames of activity), established in the fourth century might be traced through the details of conflict in the succeeding century, punctuated by the Councils of Ephesus in 431 and of Chalcedon in 451. I have already noted the conflict of Cyril of Alexandria and the bishop Nestorius of Constantinople which led to the expulsion of Nestorius' party from the Church at Ephesus. The Council of Chalcedon further defined the 'two sides' of the Word by reiterating the condemnation of Nestorius' distinction of two persons, but at the same time insisting upon a distinction of two 'natures', ♦♦♦♦, divine and human, heavenly and earthly, against those 'monophysites' who had gone to the other extreme. The great majority of the Egyptian christians, and a large proportion of the Syrians thereupon detached themselves from the imperial Church and Constantinople to form the national 'monophysite' churches that persist to this time at which I write.

The opposition to the monophysite 'confounding of natures' was at Chalcedon led by the bishop of Rome. By 484 the strains between Eastern theorists of Trinity and Incarnation, and the Latin patriarch who was
attaining to a leading position in the West after the abdication of the
last Emperor in 476, were focussed in the eastern Emperor's decree of union
of orthodox and monophysite churches. The roman bishop excommunicated
the eastern Emperor, together with the patriarchs of Constantinople and
Alexandria. The resulting separation of eastern and western churches, though
formally overcome in 519, was to be reiterated with greater and greater
force over the following centuries.

I will not enter into the details of these fifth-century con-


flicts, since the principles at work in them that are relevant to this


outline should by now be clear enough, and their results around the begin-

ning of the sixth century have already been briefly considered in relat-


ion to Justinian's reforms. Let it suffice to relate the 'theological'
questions of Trinity and Incarnation, which frame the disputes of the eastern
fourth and fifth centuries to the imperial policy in which they play so
important a part.


It must be remembered that this frame of Trinity and Incarnation,
the 'christian' analogue of the primary neoplatonic scheme of a triple or-
der of 'hypoostasis' and its mirroring in Time and Matter, is simply the lim-
ting expression of the essentially 'dramatic' frame of the christian 'myst-
ery'. As such it amounts not simply to some abstruse philosophical dis-
agreement among speculative bishops, but a frame of conflict of different
framings of 'christian' activity - most importantly the complementary 'fram-
ings' in the different traditions of Syria and Egypt. Such conflicting 'theo-


logical' frames of activity do not, of course, subsist in abstraction from
the earthly activity integrated more or less through imperial policy, again
in an analogous configuration, embodied by Justinian in the integration of
such activity in a Law which mirrors the Authority of the Emperor in a tri-
ple order of text, action, and situation - in an 'economy' of logical, poet-
ic and physical figures of possible actions.


With the simple configuration of Justinian's constitutional re-
form of the Empire, embodied in a text which defines its part in the 'dram-
atic' frame it thus defines, one may associate a simple figure of mirror-
ing of this imperial Constitution in a complementary Church 'constitution'
in which the 'theological' frame defines the part of the text or credal
statement within the unitary Drama it, itself, defines.

The integration of these two complementary 'sides' of byzantine 'Culture' - of these two analogous orders of imperial Law and ecclesiatical Mystery - within the very 'mirror' of which they are complementary 'versions', leads, from the sixth century on, to an ever more rigidly closed circuit of activity or Culture. The principle of identification with some 'part', already seen in that circuit which defined Justinian's Authority and excluded Damascius from any place in his scheme, tends towards an ever more static abstraction of the interaction of the two sides of the 'Culture', State and Church, within ever contracting imperial boundaries, physical limits.

In the West, on the contrary, a corresponding division of roman Church and barbarian power leads to a very different dynamic. Before passing to the antecedents of that formative interaction in the fifth century, I will first pause to note how an obscure greek theologian, around the beginning of the sixth century, expresses in a simple scheme the theological analogue of Justinian's Law, as a 'mystical theology'. For this simple scheme of Mystery was to become the frame in which eastern theology was eventually transposed into the latin tradition.

While, as we will see, the latin theology of the fifth century was framed in a formative dispute between Augustine and the british monk Pelagius over the part of individual choice in the cosmic Drama, the greek theology of the East was, as we saw, primarily concerned with an analogous question of the relation of the two sides of Creation, heavenly and earthly, Form and Matter, Actuality and Image, in the Incarnation.

In 533 a monophysite sect cited, against the ruling on the two natures of the Second Person given by the Council of Chalcedon, an otherwise unknown text of an Athenian Dionysius, who was known, through the account of Paul's hearing before the Athenian Court of the Areopagus, as that member of the Court who was converted by Paul's defence. Some time shortly before this emergence of 'Dionysius' writings, they had been composed by (probably) a Syrian monk familiar with some of Proclus' work.

These writings constitute a direct christian parallel to Dam-
ascius' impasse. 'Dionysius' shares with Damascius the question of the part of the logical order which frames the primarily dramatic configuration of Actuality in that order of figuration, but in Dionysius' mystery, and in the primary configuration of Trinity and Incarnation which frames a Mystical Theology, the Absolute Unity of Actuality most directly expresses itself, precisely as what distinguishes itself, in the order of 'fiction' of which the logical order of the text is one side, from that order. The Text which expresses the configuration of this distinction inscribes itself in the dramatic configuration of this mystery of self-distinction, just as Justinian's Codex inscribes itself in the dramatic configuration of the Authority it frames. God, the One, the Unity of the Trinity, expresses himself most directly in this simple configuration of a logical text which marks its place in the poetic order of the mystery as itself a 'fiction'.

In a treatise on The Divine Names this simple dramatic frame of the Mystical Theology, with its converse 'negative' path of inscription in the text of the distinction of Actuality from the order of the text, and 'positive' path in which Actuality, in this very distinction, is seen to express itself in the text, this frame is extended to a configuration of names, marks of this self-distinction and self-expression, which Dionysius finds articulating the self-expression of what is most properly called simply 'One', in the christian Text. The primary configuration in which this One expresses itself, is simply the configuration of logically elementary Name, ontical Reference, and the 'fictional' or poetic order of their symmetry, from which the 'Life' of God is to distinguish itself. The primary self-expression of 'God' is thus a triple order of Being, Intelligence, and Life, distinguishing itself from its Image in the configuration of the Names of these three aspects, as One unitary principle of this distinction, the Unutterable.

Within this simple figure of Trinity and Unity, defined in relation to the logical order of the Text which distinguishes itself from what it thus frames, in terms of that frame, Dionysius articulates a Heavenly Hierarchy corresponding to the Trinity that distinguishes itself from the Visible Order of the Text, with its earthly economy of incarnation - a Hierarchy in which, by analogy with Proclus' divine hierarchy, the radical configuration of Trinity itself becomes the organising unity of a further triple division. Mirroring this in the earthly order of the Text is the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy of the Church, its com-
monent 'mysteries' inscribed in the primary mystery of the Eucharist, that Drama which mirrors the Incarnation in its configuration of text, Bread and Wine, and the Action of Drama in which these mirror one another.

In this symmetrical scheme of the Christian mystery, one may see a conclusion of the parallel developments of Neoplatonism and Greek theology from the third century up to the beginning of the sixth. The question of the symmetry of 'logical' and 'poetic' orders in Proclus' scheme, posed 'logically' by Damascius, here marks a point of coincidence of 'logical' and 'poetic' orders of the text, a point of transition from the logical frame of Neoplatonism to the logical identification of the part of the logical order in the dramatic order of Mystery. At the same time these pseudonymous texts (the pseudonym, as it were, framing at the outset their character as 'fictions') mark a limit of the development of the part of the logical order — of Reflection — within the dramatic frame of the Christian mystery, instituted 'mysteriously' in the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Church. Indeed the symmetry of logical and 'dramatic' or 'poetic' orders in the frame of Dionysius' mystical reflection on Unity and Trinity, is itself 'theologically' questionable, precisely where it treats of the symmetry of heavenly and earthly orders in the figure of Incarnation — whence the initial appeal to Dionysius of the monophysites in 533, in their confrontation with the doctrine of the Council of Chalcedon, which insists upon a strict subordination of the symmetry of the logical order of Heaven and the physical order of Earth to the mystery of the Person, the self-expression of heavenly divinity in its earthly Incarnation. Is Dionysius' frame really a limiting expression of that Christian mystery, of which the text is only one side... or is it rather a subordination of the poetic frame of that mystery, the Christian story, to a logical frame of determination of the relations of logical and physical orders, in which this poetic figuration is then, in its turn, to be considered determined — just as the poetic symmetry of Heaven and Earth is determined by Plotinus, for example, as a tertiary order of hypostasis? The coincidence of the 'poetic' order of the Christian mystery, and the 'logical' order of pagan philosophy in these writings constitutes, perhaps, a question, which brings full-circle, in a way, the parallel 'logical' and 'poetic' framings of that 'question' that invisibly marks the beginning of our Era.
A parallel course of development in the Latin West stretches from that same transitional question ('the beginning of our Era') to Dionysius' Roman contemporary Boethius. I have already noted the novatian schism, beginning at Rome and Carthage with the death of Decius, which might be taken as a mid-point of this western parallel.

Rome and Carthage: those two western capitals present two formative influences in the shaping of Latin Christianity. Over the course of the first five centuries Rome was transformed from the organising focus of the Augustan Empire to the organising focus of the Latin Church. From the third century the city ceased to occupy the centre of a fragmented imperial administration; from that time onwards the declining importance of Rome as a political focus was matched by the rising authority of the bishop of Rome in 'spiritual' matters. Thus in the fifth century this bishop began to issue decrees to the Latin church as a whole - this as the 'Emperor of the West' was progressively ceding the western provinces to local barbarian chiefs, until in 476 Italy itself was ceded to the Gothic chieftain Odoacer by the last Augustus, Romulus Augustulus - whose very name reflects both the diminution of the function of the 'emperor' of the West, and the enochial character of this last Roman, namesake of the first. In 498 the election of the Roman bishop was transferred from the Romans themselves to the Roman clergy, and the transfer of Augustan institutions from Empire to Church was completed by this establishment of a 'papal' successor to the imperial 'court'. I have already noted how the new 'spiritual' administration which thus replaces the 'temporal' administration of an emperor was 'codified' in the early years of the sixth century by the Roman abbot Dionysius Exiguus, who also defined a new Era, to replace that of the foundation of the imperial city in 753 'BC'.

Rome and Carthage: for while the bishop of Rome was steadily assuming the titles and functions (the latter simply transferred from temporal to spiritual administration - from the civic 'frame' of activity, to the framing of activity within the Christian story or 'mystery') of the old Roman emperors, the advocacy that had been central to the old civic order found itself (again transferred from the 'temporal' to the 'spiritual' domain) focussed at Carthage, the old Phoenician colony rebuilt by Augustus.

Thus the theological controversy that in the West parallels the philosophical contests of the Greek Church of the East, is played out, from
the third century to the fifth, in a Carthaginian court. And it is framed in the forms of Roman advocacy, rather than those of Greek Reflection - and framed by men whose education was that of the Roman jurists, rather than that of a Greek philosopher. Even the Illyrian Jerome, the associate of Gregory of Nazianzus, who might be thought to believe such a simple and schematic parallel, rather embodies precisely the meeting of Latin and Greek (this even in the most literal sense). - A meeting that reflects the cultural interface of East and West in his native Illyria.

Jerome the Palestinian abbot whose primary activity from 386 until 420 was the criticism of all the contending parties of the West, from his detached perspective at Bethlehem. - The 'Critic', outside the physical circuit of Western advocacy, but this position 'outside' an integral part of that Latin culture, just as his 'monastic' detachment was a part of the Greek culture he also stood 'outside', but in the Greek manner of the recluse. 'Outside' the theological frame of Greek theology in the very homeland of its Origenist scheme - against which he poured the invective of his maturity. Against Augustine, against Augustine's Carthaginian adversaries the Donatists (those heirs of Novatian), against his old friend Rufinus, and against the Origen his earlier associate was presenting to the Latin West.

The Greek theology of the East was framed, from the time of Clement and Origen, as a logical determination of the place or 'part' of this Reflection in the Christian 'story' or mystery, drama. From the third century on this Christian Reflection was inscribed in the primary frame of a triune heavenly order (a Trinity) mirrored in an 'earthly' order of the Image - of mirroring. In Carthage, on the other hand (a sort of Western equivalent of Alexandria, as the focus of Latin theology) the same radical figure of a Christian 'story' about one's part in that story is framed in terms of the familiar Ciceroonian scheme of Law: in terms of a judicious or judicial consideration of the Christian 'story' as frame of action.

Why Carthage?

- Because at Carthage this Ciceroonian scheme met a Phoenician
(or, more broadly, syrian) scheme of a cosmic Economy, articulated within a primary duality and interaction of two figures (Heaven and Earth, Light and Dark, Sun and Moon, Male and Female: Baal and Ashtoreth). The christian scheme of the Kingdom of Heaven as activity 'in' the christian frame or story, and the World as what, in that frame, corresponds to being 'outside' the Grace of Heaven - this allows a transposition of the roman principles of Law into a cosmic Economy of Heaven and Earth. In the first carthaginian exponent of this meeting of roman Law and semitic Economy of Kosmos in the frame of the christian Story - in Tertullian, the contemporary of Clement and Origen - the scheme leads to forthright montanism. - The christian frame of activity, corresponding to an identification with one's part in the christian Story, is separate from the 'worldly' frame of activity by the closed circle of faith - of that recognition of one's 'part' in the Story which one thus recognises (the very recognition, that is) as one's part. The heavenly order of Grace attaches to an activity inscribed within this primary circular identification: there can be no worldly compromise of acting within the christian frame in some things and in an earthly way in others - that primary circle of faith, of entry into the Story, marks a radical divide between two disjunct frames of activity. Cicero's scheme of Law as the primary choice of a frame of choice is transposed into the semitic Economy of Heaven and Earth. The circular step into Grace, out of 'Sin' - out of that 'Fall' into the converse circuit of the World - cannot itself be inscribed in the worldly frame, here and there. The very absurdity, according to the worldly common sense that guides earthly activity and its conception, of that circle marks the mutual exclusion of the two inverse frames. This 'foolish' in the World's eyes, which closes off the christian frame from the World, marks in turn the christian 'part' and frame distinguishing itself from the worldly part. God's wisdom is man's folly, says Paul; Tertullian's

...credibile est, quia ineptum est...certum est, quia impossibile. (1)

...it is credible because absurd...it is certain because impossible.

1: De Carne Christi, V. 4; the full text runs:
Crucifixus est dei filius; non pudet quia pudendum est. Et mortuus est
stands midway between Paul's warning to the speculative corinthians (1) and Augustine's

"Dicite mihi homo: intellegam ut credam. Respondeo: Crede ut intellegas."(2)

A man says to me: Let me understand, that I may believe. I reply: Believe, that you may understand.

Tertullian's part in his version of the Story, is to mark this radical distinction of two sides, 'inside' and 'outside' his story. In particular, as 'advocate' of this his version, he must fix the point 'outside' - the point of error - corresponding to each of the other contending versions - jewish, gnostic, worldly-compromising, and so on. He must even exactly distinguish between this his true part, and the forces which naturally lead him, as well as all the others, into error. He must recognise at work even in himself that Sin about which turns the converse or inverse circle of the World, out of which one steps into the closed circle of the christian Story, into the order of Heaven, of Grace.

The path from Tertullian to Augustine is organised about that question of the lapsi, those who 'fell', renouncing their parts

\[ \text{dei filius; credibile est, quia ineptum est. Et sepultus resurrexit; certum est, quia impossibile.} \]

1: cf p424 above 2: Sermon on the second Letter of Peter, I.18 (chapter iv - cf ch vii, and Augustine's Commentary on John, XXIX.6, XXVII.9, XL.9, as well as dozens of related texts gathered in Przywara & Martindale, An Augustinian Synthesis, section II).
in the christian Story, during the persecutions of Decius and his successors, down to Diocletian.

The decian persecution was particularly severe at Carthage. Cyprian, who had become bishop in 248, only preserved his life by leaving the city in 250, to return after Decius' death in 251. He died as a 'witness', μαθητής, of the Story, in 258, in the persecution under Valeriean - one of a succession of those attempts by roman emperors over the second half of the third century to systematically dismantle the christian frame of activity, beginning with Decius, and ending with Diocletian, and Constantine's edict of 313.

In the seven years between Decius' death and his own, Cyprian was engaged in the application of Tertullian's principles to the schism threatened by the followers of Novatian. - This, notably, through further defining the unity of the Church as frame of christian activity in his treatise On the Unity of the Catholic Church.

The division within the carthaginian church did not, however, end with this framing of what it is to act 'within' the christian Story as frame, and with this discussion of the place of those who under threat of torture and death had moved 'out' of that frame, in the Story - did not end with this discussion of the question of their re-admission into the Drama they had for a while renounced. After the last persecutions under Diocletian the successors of Novatian at Carthage - who came to be called, after one of their leaders (Donatus) 'Donatists', continued to maintain the strictest division between the unity of the Church or collective frame of christian activity, and the 'World' as frame of a material economy of 'natural' activity, in which the identity of the human 'agent' or 'actor' was that of a mere material image of the true part, revealed as such in death. To enter into the christian frame through a circular identification of one's part in the Story, and then to
distinguish oneself from that identification and part, under persecution, was to irrevocably close off that personal principle of access to the Church, revealed once for all in 'conversion', and lost, once for all in relapse into the image of identity from which that renounced principle is the sole access to the Unity of the Church 'in Spirit and Truth'.

About the time that this 'Donatist' controversy was dividing the carthaginian (which is to say, african) church into two opposed parties, Constantine was beginning the integration of Church and Empire as two sides of a unitary frame of earthly activity. In 313 Lactantius, 'the christian Cicero' was called from Africa to be the tutor of Constantine's son Crispus, and paralleled the course of this christian instruction of the Emperor's heir with a presentation of the christian frame of activity which reflects (even in point of style) Cicero's analogous presentation of Law as a primary choice of the frame of choice.

At the same time, the manichaean story that had originated it the persian court around 250, as a sort of limiting form of syrian gnosis, spread, through Syria and its phoenician coastland, to the old colony of Carthage. The 'Donatist' scheme of a unitary frame of the Church, indeed, might almost be taken as a sort of intermediate position between the manichaean scheme of a unitary Light in which the manichaean knew himself as a fragment - a 'spark' or 'ray', a part - and the 'catholic' scheme of a christian frame of activity articulated within the institutions of a natural World. The catholic scheme, one might say, is dominated by the roman figure of Law, and the manichaean by the phoenician or syrian Drama articulated between the contrary forces of Light (recognition of the Drama) and Dark.

It is Augustine who, towards the end of the fourth century, as it were 'focusses' these complementary figures in the central expression of latin theology - and this in the frame of an association at the western capital, Milan, with the Ambrose who was framing parallel
principles of the complementaritv of Church and Empire as two sides of activity. The combination of Italian and African figures, indeed, over the course of the fifth and sixth centuries, might be taken to define the emerging 'Roman' Catholicism of the West, a Latin Church whose incorporation in its frame of a definition of that frame (as one element) parallels the contemporary inscription of 'logical' within 'poetic' orders which in the East marks the close of 'classical' Antiquity.

I have already drawn a more specific, if rudimentary, parallel between Cyril at Alexandria presenting the distinction of Actuality and Image within a 'dogmatic' frame of Trinity and Incarnation, and Augustine at Carthage presenting his doctrinal authority in the West. The parallel might be extended much further. In particular we might try to frame a common figure of the meeting (in East and West) of 'logical' and 'poetic' orders of the Christian Story, around the beginning of the fifth century, in the figure of 'Dogma' which itself figures the wider integration of 'logical' in 'poetic' order a century later.

Here, however, I will leave aside such general considerations, and merely note in Cyril and Augustine an analogous 'sexual' configuration of their parallel schemes of Truth distinguishing itself - in them - from Image. In Cyril this sexuality might be taken to be in large measure associated with the monk trying to free his spirit from the inner conflict of Spirit and Flesh, whose results in Cyril's monastic prototype Anthony are well known. In Augustine, on the other hand, the analogous conflict is framed rather in many years' adherence to the Manichaean 'myth', and the corresponding conflict between Light and Dark in a body whose flesh he came to regard as foreign to his true self, while still somehow inextricably 'his', along with the 'sinful' activity that was the 'part' of this flesh.

At the same time Augustine was absorbed in the writings of Cicero, and teaching the literary principles he there found, (372-381). What, perhaps, makes Augustine so central a 'figure' in the Latin Church is precisely the way that he embodies the two sides of Manichaean conflict and ciceronian latinity, Carthaginian and Roman, in such a 'schem-
atic' manner. - Thus does he enter as a leading 'figure' into the simple schemes or configurations that play such an axial part in a development of Reflection to, in, which he is so 'central': a 'central figure' in this Story.

At twenty-seven Augustine finally found himself 'outside' the circuit, the circular Frame, of the manichaean Story, the manichaean 'myths'. Cicero had prevailed. But the figure of a story turning about the reader's recognition of his 'part' in the story - that 'poetic' circularity, embodied in the logically unacceptable manichaean myth - remained as a question. For three years (383-6) as a teacher in Milan, Augustine was caught in the interplay of this 'poetic' figure - as embodied, now, in the story propounded by Ambrose - and the logical figuration he found in the writings of the 'platonists' to whom he had been introduced by Cicero (and whom he seems to have read only in Latin: in the accounts of Cicero, of his fellow-African Apuleius (a native of Madaura where Augustine was schooled) who published a schematic Latin 'platonism' in the second century, and in some Latin versions of writings of Plotinus and Porphyry).

In August 386 Augustine was visited at Milan by a high imperial functionary who, finding a book of Paul's letters on the table, began to tell Augustine of the remarkable effect that a chance reading of a Life of Anthony of Thebes had had on a friend of his, one day in Treves, and which he had himself witnessed...

Tum in illa grandi rixa interioris domus meae, quam fortiter excitaveram cum anima mea in cubiculo nostro, corde meo, tam vultu quam mente turbatus invado Alypium, exclamo:

Quid patimur? Quid est hoc, quod audisti? Surgunt indocti et caelum rapiunt, et nos cum doctrinis nostris ecce ubi voluntamur in carne et sanguine! An quia praecesserunt, pudet sequi, et non pudet nec saltem sequi? (1)

Now, in that great commotion of my inner home, which I had so strongly stirred up against my soul in our bedchamber, my heart, I turned upon Alypius, my expression wrought as my mind, and cried out:

1: Confessions, VIII, 8
What is wrong with us? What is this we have heard? The unschooled rise up and take heaven, and here we are with our scholarship wallowing in flesh and blood. Is it shameful to follow, because they have led...or is it not rather shameful not to follow?

[Illuc] me abstulerat tumultus pectoris, ubi nemo impediret ardentem litem, quam mecum agressus eram, donec exiret, qua tu sciebas, ego autem non: sed tantum insaniebam salubriter et moriabar vitaliter... (1)

The tumult in my breast drew me away, there where no-one might block the suit into which I had entered against myself, until its issue, which You knew, but I myself did not: rather was I healthily mad, dying a vital death..

Sentiebam enim eis me tenere. Iactabam voces miserabiles:

Quamdiu, quamdiu 'cras et cras'? Quare non modo? Quare non hac hora finis turpitudinis meae?

Dicebam haec, et flebam, amarissima contritione cordis mei. Et ecce audio vocem de vicina domo cum cantu dicentis, et crebro repentis, quasi pueri an puellae, nescio:

Tolle lege, tolle lege.

Statimque mutato vultu intentissimus cogitare coepi, utrumnam solerent pueri in aliquo genere ludendi cantitare tale aliquid, nec occurebat omnino audisse me uspiam: repressoque impetu lacinrarum surrexi, nihil aliud interpretans divinitus mihi iuberi, nisi ut aperirem codicem et legerem quod primum caput invenissem. Audieram enim de Antonio, quod ex evangelica lectione, cum forte supervenerat, admonitus fuerit, tamquam sibi dicetur quod legatur:

Vade, vende omnia, quae habes, da pauperibus et habetis thesaurum in caelis; et veni, sequere me - et tali oraculo confestim ad te esse conversum.

Itaque concitus redii in eum locum, ubi sedebat Alypius: ibi enim posueram codicem apostoli, cum inde surrexeram. Arripui, aperui et legi in silentio capitulum, quo primum coniecti sunt oculi mei:

Non in comissionibus et ebrietatibus, non in cubilibus et

1: ibid, VIII, 8
impudicitias, non in contentione et aemulatione, sed induite
dominum Iesum Christum, et carnis providentiam ne feceritis
in concupiscentiis.

Nec ultra volui legere, nec opus erat. Statim quippe cum fine
huiusce sententiae, quasi luce securitatis infusa cordi meo, om-
nes dubitationis tenebrae diffugerunt.

Tum interiecto aut digito aut nescio quo alio signo, codicem clausi,
et tranquillo iam vultu indicavi Alypio. At ille quid in se ager-
etur - quod ego nesciebam - sic indicavit. Petit videre quid leg-
issem: ostendi, et adtendit etiam ultra quam ego legeram, et ig-
norabam quid sequeretur. Sequebatur autem:

Infirnnum vero in fide recipite.

Quid ille ad se rettulit mihi aperuit. (1)

I still felt held in [my sins]. In a miserable voice I was
crying:

How long, how long 'Tomorrow and tomorrow'? Why not now? Why
not in this moment, the end of my foulness?
I was saying this, and weeping in the most bitter sorrow of my
heart. And here I hear a voice from the adjoining house, utter-
ing in song, and again and again repeating (whether a boy or girl
I do not know):

Take and read, take and read.

And at once, my expression changed, I began most intently to won-
der, whether children sing any such thing in any sort of play,
but I could not remember ever having heard it before: stemming
my pouring tears I rose, finding no explanation but that the
divinity was bidding me to open the book and read the first pas-
sage I should find. For I had heard of Anthony, that coming by
chance upon a recitation of the Good News, he was called just as
though what was being read was being said to him:

Go, sell everything you have, give it to the poor, and you
will have your store-house in Heaven; then come and follow me
- and by this divine address was at once turned to you.
So, excited, I returned to the place where Alypius was sitting:
for there I had put down the Apostle's book as I got up to leave.
I grabbed it, opened it, and silently read the short passage
where my eyes first fell:

1: ibid, VIII, 12
PAGE NUMBERING AS ORIGINAL
Not in revelling and drunkenness, not in beds and lewdness, 
not in quarrel and rivalry, but clothe yourselves in the mast-
er Jesus Christ, and make provision no more for the desires of 
flesh.

I did not want to read any further, nor was there any need. For 
at once, just at the end of this sentence, my heart as though 
filled with the light of assurance, all the shadows of doubt 
were dispelled.

A finger or I know not what other mark inserted, I now closed the 
book, and with an expression now calm, I explained to Alypius. 
And he showed what had been going on inside him - of which I was 
unaware - as follows. He asked to see what I had read: I showed 
him, and he read on beyond what I had read, though I did not know 
what might follow. But there followed:

Admit among you, certainly, one weak in faith. 
Which he took to refer to himself, and told me so.

This account which Augustine gives of his (and his friend Alypius') 
'conversion' from the conflict of two 'I's (a duality which is itself 
one 'side' of the opposition) to the 'I' which distinguishes itself 
in and from this symmetric opposition is framed (as eighth book of 
the Confessions) in a reflection on the platonism and manichaeanism 
which are two components in the figure of the 'turning-point' or con-
version: neither of these complementary 'sides' of the central distinct-
on of the two 'I's comprehends the actual conflict of the two in the 
focal and primary union of Augustine's own Flesh and Spirit. An actual 
union from which those complementary sides are themselves abstractions 
- which hide the primary 'practical' opposition of which they are im-
ge. - Images, and so themselves components in that earthly side of 
opposition from which they appear to distinguish themselves: in which 
they appear to be opposed to the order of Appearance and Opposition.

Two sides: 'logical' and 'physical' versions of the differ-
ence between Augustine's two 'I's. And in the configuration of his con-
version, of his identification of his part in the christian Story or 
Drama, we find the familiar triple two-sidedness that we have seen framed 
by the eastern theologians as the Drama or Mystery of Trinity and Incarnation

In the 'drama' of Augustine's 'conversion' we find a comple-
mentarity of orders of text and situation or context, within a poetic or 
dramatic configuration of Mystery: a mystery by which the actuality of 
the Word distinguishes itself from its material image in a text (this in
the platonic figure of the psychical actuality of the logical order), and this 'illumination' distinguishes itself from the darkness of the material order (in the manichaean figure), and this in the 'dramatic' mirroring of these two orders in Augustine's (and Alypius') recognition of his part in choosing the christian Story as frame of Choice, and at the same time, finding this part of his choice in that unitary actuality of divine Choice already inscribed within the pauline scheme of conversion.

It is this 'drama' of conversion, framed in a ciceronian scheme of a radical choice of a Frame of Choice in a providential Cosmos, that is the direct 'latin' or western analogue of the greek Frame of Trinity and Incarnation. In the triple two-sidedness by which the christian story frames a mirroring of 'logical' and 'physical' orders as its two sides (both of those, then, images of this mirroring), the 'divine' actuality which articulates this 'mirroring' distinguishes itself, in a correlation or mirroring of the 'psychical' and 'ontical sides or images of this radical distinction, in the poetic frame in which this actuality of correlation dramatically expresses itself, and marks, names itself, as the God of Moses, I AM.

The entering into that Mystery which expresses itself in the logical and physical orders of the christian Story, involves a circular choice of Choice, an identification with one's part in that scheme as thus recognizing that part, an identification with the part in the Story of this identification. Augustine finds this 'part' focussed in a text, a sentence, of Paul - Alypius finds his part in the following sentence. Eleven years later Augustine has extended this configuration of conversion this identification of his part, to the frame of his whole life up to that time, and his baptism the following year. He frames the identification of this part of identification in the Confessions that record it in a text, as itself belonging to this 'part', framed in the same radical figure of identification which marks his 'conversion' in that text. The text itself thus has two sides, corresponding to Augustine's individual embodiment and the I AM that articulates the drama of his life just as Augustine, in this drama, articulates its expression in his text. In the Confessions his earlier 'sins' are redeemed by finding their place - as 'outside' the instance of I AM - in the radical self-
distinction or self-expression of I AM in the poetic articulation of Augustine's life. The Confessions end with the question of the self-expression of I AM in the wider but analogous frame of All Life, of the cosmic Drama or Story itself, as Drama or divine Scheme of articulation of logical and physical orders in the poetic order reflected in that Scheme in the text of the Bible, the 'text', as it were, of the cosmic Drama. And the primary question, then, which marks the transition from the personal story of the Confessions to the universal prototype and analogue and frame of that particular story, is the question of Time. In the tenth book which begins (the ninth having closed the narrative of his life up to his conversion and baptism, and the death of his mother) with Augustine finding himself composing, closing, his narrative, he considers his situation, writing, in the figure of Drama he has discovered through writing his account of himself. His narrative has been articulated in Memory, with its mysterious two sides, 'in' time and yet 'outside' time. The last three books, which follow, transpose this his own situation of writing to the situation of the Author of Creation, as expressed, in that Creation (this Creation). In book XI Augustine discusses these two sides of Time - 'inside' and 'outside' - in the frame of the first verse of the book of the Beginning, 'Genesis'. In the following book he extends the discussion to the second verse, and the articulation in this primary distinction of two sides of Time (of the 'poetic' order of mirroring of logical and physical orders) within the triple order whose image is presented later in the work of the first three 'days'. In the next book he extends this triply double order of Heaven and Earth to the narrative of the divine frame of Creation as a whole, presented as the work of seven (6+1) days. The Confessions close in a reflection on the close of the work of Creation on the seventh day, of the full-circle through which the books have come, and which prefigures the full-circle of each individual life, of which Augustine's, whose first half he has traced, is an example - an exemplary one.

This scheme, in its turn, was extended by Augustine after the sack of Rome in 410, to the poetic frame of the History inscribed within the Kosmos of those first seven days of 'Genesis'. The fall of Rome frames a 'conversion' of the World: the image of the frame of Creation as a whole, of Kosmos, in the earthly Law which frames the interaction of human groups, and of which the roman Law is the very epitome, breaks. Breaks as Augustine had 'broken' in the garden. And with this comes the recognition of a cosmic Law, the frame of the Kosmos as the City of God.
distinguishing itself from its last and most complete image in Rome, the 'earthly City'. From 413 until 426 Augustine, bishop of Hippo near Carthage from 391 (when the Confessions were begun) articulated the History of the World, with its philosophy and 'mythology' (parallelling the platonism and manichaeanism of the Confessions) as a cosmic Drama of divine self-expression analogous to the drama of his own life, and concluding with the Fall of Rome, and 'conversion' of the City of Man to the City of God, and the corresponding image of this conversion in the passage from the subordination of Church to Empire as frame of earthly activity, to the 'converse' subordination of Empire to Church, prefigured in the relations of Ambrose and Theodosius.

Following the embarkation for Africa with which the confessionnal narrative closes, Augustine had lived for four years in the monastic community (the first in Africa) which he established in his birthplace, Tagaste. Visiting Hippo in 391 he was reluctantly made a priest, founding at the same time the monastic community there where he subsequently lived, directing the affairs of the hiphonian church until his death in 430, during the siege of the city by the Vandals, to whom Africa was ceded by the roman Emperor of the West in 440.

Parallelling the scheme of conversion developed in the Confessions and extended in the City of God there run the controversial writings in which Augustine plays his part in the particular situations in which he finds himself over the whole period from conversion to death, as well as short treatises devoted to the themes shared by these controversial works and the systematic accounts of his own, and the World's, conversion. Thus the first year after his conversion produced a controversial expression of his recognition of manichaeanism as but an image of the Truth, a tract on choice, De Libero Arbitrio, and one on the soul, De Quantitate Animae. Upon his return to Africa he resumed the criticism of the Manichees in De Genesi contra Manicheeos. One may perhaps regard these early treatises, and many of those that followed, as constituting developments of the figure of conversion in various directions, incorporated as correlative elements or component figures in the scheme of the Confessions in 397-8. About this time the integration of his position and authority in the writing of these 'confessions' was reflected in his assumption of the direction of the church of Hippo, and the beginning of his attack on
the Donatists, who by this time formed a parallel church in Africa. Augustine reasserted Cyprian's earlier criticism of the Novatians, in terms of the Church as the frame of the Christian Drama inscribed in the figure of access to that Drama presented in the Confessions. The controversy with the Donatists extends almost exactly from the period of composition of the Confessions, and that of the commencement of the City of God. When his early exhortation to the rival hierarchy failed, Augustine supported a forced integration of the schismatics in the 'catholic' church, corresponding to the unitary frame of the Christian Story in the natural World:

And the Master said to the Servant:

Go out to the highways and hedges, and compel people to come in, that my house may be filled. (1)

Eventually the western Emperor Honorius called the rival bishops to Carthage in 411, where the Catholic party was led by Augustine, whose advocacy prevailed: the Emperor's deputy, who presided, decided in favour of the Catholics. In 414 the Donatists were deprived of civic rights, and in the following year death was ordered as the penalty for attending a Donatist assembly. Thus does the Novatian schism in Africa, turning upon the renunciation of the Christian story under threat of death, come full circle, with a Christian decree threatening with death those who maintain that such a renunciation cuts the land off irrevocably from access to a universal or 'Catholic' Church. By a bitter irony, the division in this finds a nominal close: a Donatist who believes that his is the true Church, must expect to accept death as the 'witness' of this truth. On the other hand, those who do not accept death, thereby, in effect, become Catholics (for whom renunciation does not have the same radical significance), insofar as they remain Christians. As in Cyril's persecution of Novatians and pagans at Alexandria (at exactly the same time), one should perhaps see in these developments rather a relentless and fatal logic, than an arbitrary evil (as it were underlined by the transposition into the established Church of the persecution to which it was itself subject under earlier Emperors).

As this conflict, in which Augustine was the leading figure, asserting in practice the frame of Christian activity, as earlier he had asserted it in writing—drew to a close, there began another.

After the sack of Rome in 410— which forms the introduction to

Luke XVI, 23
Augustine's *City of God*, the British monk Pelagius, and his 'advocate' Coelestius (an Irish lawyer when he first attached himself to Pelagius in Rome) left the city for Carthage. In three African Councils the doctrines Pelagius as presented by his disciple were condemned (416, 416, 416), and as a result of the last of these the decrees of Augustine's party were ratified by the bishop of Rome and the Emperor Honorius. Nineteen Italian bishops who demurred were deposed, and their leader banished by the Emperor. The ruling of Carthage and Rome was adopted by the universal Council of Ephesus (which, it will be remembered, banished Nestorius, at the instance of Cyril of Alexandria and Celestine of Rome), in the year that followed Augustine's death.

This dispute, then, carried on over the period of composition of the *City of God*, turns (again) upon the relations of the two 'sides', heavenly and earthly, of Christian activity, and on the figure of our access to the frame of that Drama or Mystery. But whereas the Donatist conflict was focussed in the earlier question of the sort of man 'fallen', during the persecutions of Emperors from Decius to Diocletian, the pelagian controversy was concerned rather with the 'fall' of man 'in' his father Adam — with the figure of that radically divided self which, following the framing of Creation in those seven days with which the *Confessions* close, institutes earthly History in the expulsion of Man from Paradise and the divorce of Heaven and Earth whose mirroring had been framed within that primal boundary.

Where Augustine and the Catholic Church framed Christian activity within this primary figure of the patrimony of Adam, Pelagius and Coelestius asserted a radical freedom of choice in each man, simply as man (or woman). For Augustine choice must be inscribed within the frame of the cosmic Drama beginning with Creation and Adam's Fall, figure within figure, choice within choice — just as he had discovered, in the *Confessions*, the place of that choice which marked his 'conversion' in the divine articulation of that Drama, and of his own life within it. In the unitary frame of that divine Providence our finding of our part is, for Augustine, a self-expression of a circular Grace in which we discover ourselves, but into which we cannot in principle enter in any action framed by our earthly self, which is only known through that 'external' Grace for what it truly is, as the operation of Grace distinguishes itself from the earthly framing of activity in the figure of an earthly or natural self, divorced from
Heaven in Adam’s Fall. For Pelagius, on the other hand, choice was rather to be understood as that figure of the resolution of symmetrical options in which will, simply as will, ‘naturally’ partakes. The symmetry of Good and Evil as simply the primary ‘natural’ alternative, coordinate with the figure of choice simply as such, is nothing but the limiting case of this natural exercise of will and choice, of that figure which belongs to ‘man’ simply as ‘human’: without this actuality of choice he would not be ‘man’. Adam fell in making the wrong choice; but that was simply his choice, not ours or anyone else’s. It is the character of choice to attach to the symmetry of a particular situation in which a particular person finds himself or herself, and in this situation they can make their choice, independent (inasmuch as it is theirs, inscribed in the configuration of their situation) of Adam’s. And it is only through their own mistakes that they ‘sin’ and incur the penalty of a cosmic Law which articulates the cosmic Drama (indeed) in the primary symmetry of Choice, but which leaves each man as a radical instance of choice, at an analogous or equivalent interface of the two ‘sides’, Above and Below, independent in its radical symmetry of other equally independent loci of choice, of other ‘men’ and ‘women’. For it is just this independence which is constitutive of ‘choice’ and ‘humanity’, along with guilt and sin.

Roughly, one might compare and relate the opposed perspectives of Augustine and Pelagius, in terms of those two instances of ‘I’, whose conflict Augustine had described in the Confessions. There the true ‘I’, a participation in the I AM which articulates the cosmic Story or Mystery, distinguishes itself from the earthly ‘image’ of an ‘I’ which seems independently of other ‘I’s’ to attach to our bodily – and by extension, moral – activity. Pelagius and Coelestius, one might say, extend the figure of ‘choice’ embodied in the multiple instance of ‘I’ in our many different bodies, to a ‘natural’ account of the part of each independent ‘I’, confronted by the symmetry of a unitary actuality of identification (by which is each equally ‘I’) and an essentially multiple differentiation of each different instance of this identification as ‘me’. One might say that Augustine inscribes Choice as a unitary frame (framing figure) of the cosmic Drama (as Mystery) the systematic resolution of the difference between its own self-identification (I AM) and the earthly images of this Divinity (different men). Choice itself determines in a unitary way the
difference between single I AM, and multiple instances of 'it's' embodiment. From the pelagian point of view, on the other hand, that radical self-distinction of 'I' is first framed in the individual instance of 'I' distinguishing itself from the common principle of identification ('I') in its 'own' case (which it thus 'assumes' as its own, as the primary figure in which its 'own' acts which it 'owns' or 'assumes' responsibility are then inscribed).

- In other words, Augustine inscribes the distinction of 'inward' and 'outward' Word, in the 'inward' Word as primary actuality of distinction. - As the unitary actuality of Distinction of 'inward' and 'outward', which itself (then) 'informs' those distinctions between different possible actualities which reflect the articulation of divine Choice in the cosmic Plan or Story - including some possibilities and 'excluding' others, from Actuality, one within and without another in a unitary Actuality, distinguishing itself (this corresponding to the Act of Creation) from what might otherwise have been. Insofar as an earthly choice is 'inscribed' in this cosmic scheme, through the choice of that scheme as frame of action, it knows itself as a participation in eternal Actuality. On the other hand, the 'outward' image of choice as actually seeming to choose itself as frame of choice and action, is the very illusion of independence from the unitary Choice of God which, as the primary self-assertion of 'Satan', 'the Power of Darkness', itself directly 'frames' in the cosmic scheme, the Fall of Adam and Man. And the ineluctable accompaniment of that radical figure of illusion - the very figure of Sin and Darkness - is a restlessness which never attains the primary end of choice, which is to choose Choice, and know itself in that 'working' of God. A restlessness trapped in the Fire below the Earth, which is the blind image of divine illumination. - Of the self-knowledge or illumination which attaches to the part of knowing one's part in the unitary divine Scheme, presented by Augustine (over the period in which he was involved in the controversy with Pelagius) as the City of God.

The Pelagian Controversy, turning upon the conflict of these 'inward' and 'outward' framing of choice may be seen to closely parallel the controversy turning (at this time) in the greek East about the
nature of the Incarnation. Indeed parallel developments in East and West over the fifth century lead finally to the 'Acacian' schism of 484-519 which opens in the Roman patriarch's excommunication of the eastern Emperor and patriarchs who had sanctioned Monophysite views by admitting their proponents once more to 'communion'.

In general, the theological conflicts of East and of West in this century (as well as the development of pagan neoplatonism) are framed in the question of the relation of inward and outward word: is this relation to be understood 'inwardly' or 'outwardly' - or how can one frame the relation of these two 'aspects' of the relation? Pelagius, one might say, frames the relation 'outwardly'; Augustine tends towards an inscription of the relation of 'inward' and 'outward' in the inward 'side'. In each case the question is articulated in terms of Law. Coelestius the Celtic lawyer expresses the relation of God and man in terms of 'natural law'; Augustine, in the City of God, inscribes natural and civic laws within the supernatural cosmic law which articulates the divine Scheme. The question turns about our part in the scheme, and most particularly about our part in finding our part. As Augustine's narrative of his 'conversion' illustrates, for him the discovery of his part is also the discovery that his 'natural' will cannot determine this 'part', which knows itself through the 'Grace' that distinguishes itself from natural law, a Choice which distinguishes itself in 'our' choice of Choice, from the image which seems to choose it, rather than itself. For Pelagius, on the other hand, this configuration of choosing Choice, is simply our natural knowledge of Good, as the proper object of our natural faculty of choice. We might say that Pelagius' 'naturalistic psychology' mirrored in the 'natural' or physical order of embodiment Augustine's 'supernatural' scheme framed in its self-distinction as primary actuality, from the 'natural' order of the Image, which corresponds simply to the 'part' of illusion in the scheme. - The part of self-deception, as it were - illusion framed in a primary illusion as to its 'own' nature, a circular turning-upon-itself. The conflict of Augustine and Pelagius or Coelestius in the West is a conflict of two parts, and of two 'versions' of the Christian story in which the two parts are (in their respective 'versions') to present these versions. It is a 'legal' contest: two 'advocates' presenting contrary versions of the same story before the Emperor or bishop of Rome. - And the other version being inscribed, in each case, in terms
of its 'part' in the rival version (as deception or self-deception).
- And the issue, in effect, a 'constitutional' one - for what is in
dispute is precisely the proper account of cosmic law, the proper account
of the 'constitution' of the City of God, and, within it, of the Church
which must somehow 'decide' the issue, choose between the two versions
of choice.

The Church decided in favour of Augustine's version - itself
open to various interpretations or constructions, according to the de-
gree of relative independence assigned to human choice, within the gen-
eral scheme of subordination of human actions to the unitary action of
the cosmic drama as a whole. Modified pelagian positions were maintained
over the course of the fifth century, notably in celtic Gaul - the access
to knowledge of Good, as accordance of human choice with the interaction
of possible actions within a unitary whole, within the figure of Choice,
action within action, was the primary expression of the individual's self-
recognition, his ciceronian conscientia. Given (though) this individual
access, Grace was to be allowed an operation relative to the configuration
of group activity thus framed.

Within theital church, however, through the integration of
that body in the middle of the century by the roman bishops Leo 'the Great'
(440-461), the unitary framing of 'christian' activity determined the
part in that frame of the augustinian account of the place of that frame
in the unitary cosmic drama, articulated in the primary figure of divine
Choice. As the various provinces of the latin west were ceded to Vandals,
Franks and Goths, this unitary frame of the roman Church asserted itself
the more strongly in its detachment from a fragmented civic order. While
the civic frame of activity as a sort of dual order preserved its own uni-


ty and force, the cartthaginian schemes (from Tertullian to Augustine) of


the unity of the Church as christian frame of activity, interacted with


a complementary civic unity, more or less balancing the tendency of the
church towards integration, as the Empire had earlier been integrated by
Caesar and Augustus. As the civic order of Augustus disintegrated, its
schemes were transposed into the dual order of the christian Story or Mystery as primary frame. Indeed the disintegration of the western Empire
has sometimes been largely attributed to the rise of christianity.
Leo 'the Great' effected the convocation of the general Council of Chalcedon in 451, and through this, the condemnation of the 'mono-physite' scheme. Why?

In the first place, that scheme conflicts with the basic principle of duality of Church and State through which Innocent and Leo were organizing the integration of the Latin Church as a unitary frame of activity in the Augustinian pattern. The doctrinal formula of the Council of Chalcedon respecting the Person of Christ as a unity expressing itself through the difference of dual natures, heavenly and earthly, corresponds directly to the analogous place of the Church, with its two sides, visible and invisible 'body' of Christ, in the World in which the Council met. The schism at the end of the century, turning about the intercommunication in the East of monophysite and Catholic churches marks not only a doctrinal difference - not only a formal difference of description of the 'frame' of the Christian Mystery in East and West - but also a disjunction of the unitary frame of western Christianity that had supplanted the unitary frame of Augustus' Roman Empire, from the eastern relations of Church and Emperor that were soon to be reflected in Justinian's Code. After this initial schism, the 'disjunction' of frames, of 'stories' was reiterated with ever greater force, century after century, until the final definitive separation of East and West in the eleventh century.

How does this 'Acacian' schism (so named from the Eastern patriarch Acacius) parallel the 'close of classical Antiquity' that I thought to find in the transition from Proclus to Damascius, and the vanishing of the 'logical' order of pagan Reflection into the poetic order of Mystery?

I think the parallel may best be seen in the career of Boethius. He knew Proclus' Commentary on the Timaeus, and wished to present in his systematic way a 'Latin' version of Plato and Aristotle which would reveal them as two sides of a coherent and unitary scheme. This through translations of, and commentaries upon, the whole Platonic and Aristotelian canons, and then an integration of the resulting corpus in one system, by resolving apparent conflicts of these complementary 'sides' of Reflection. He was the head of the Italian administration under the Gothic king Theodoric, from 510 until his imprisonment and death on a charge of treason in 524/5. This last, it seems, arising in part from his part in the reunion of East and Western churches, to which end he had written several theological works.
I have noted, above, Boethius’ discussion—his very beginning of his vast philosophical project—of Porphyry’s question relating, in effect, to the elementary configuration of different senses of ‘in’. Boethius’ discussion here (in the second version of his Commentary on Porphyry’s Introduction to the Categories) reads rather like a rendering of the Parmenides in aristotelian terms—like an attempt to ‘translate’ as it were Parmenides’ questions to the young Socrates into an elementary correlation of the primary orders of the aristotelian Economy.

First of all I shall state a few things concerning the ambiguity of the question, and then I shall attempt to remove and untie that knot of doubt (1).

Second versions exist of his commentaries on Porphyry’s Introduction, and on On Interpretation. It seems that Boethius wrote commentaries on all the books of the Organon, then translated Porphyry’s Introduction, the Categories, and On Interpretation, writing new commentaries as a result. (2) It is in the commentary on the work On Interpretation that he outlines his project, and this may well be as far as he got with it (one must bear in mind that he was made Theodoric’s Magister Officiorum in his thirties).

Boethius’ conception of the part of Logic—both as ἀρχή τῆς ὀργάνωσης, ‘instrument’ of Philosophy, end at the same time a specific division of or ‘in’ Philosophy— he expresses in those chapters of his Commentary on Porphyry’s Introduction which precede the primary ‘logical’ question of the elementary configuration of ‘in’—the correlation of its various senses or modes. Logic treats of the formal frame of the various orders corresponding to the ‘categories’ as primary configuration or frame of correlation of different ‘in’s of ‘in’. The primary ‘logical’ frame is just that formal correlation which defines logical ‘in’ itself, and this configuration must then attach to each of the various orders of ‘in’ by whose correlation the logical ‘in’ is defined or identified. Boethius follows Porphyry in framing this elementary configuration of ‘identification’ (or definition or differentiation) in terms of five aspects that attach analogically to each of the aristotelian categories—the five praedicabilia, ‘predicables’: genus, species, difference, property, accident. The unitary framing of the logical structure of identification in terms of these ‘common notions’ (attaching to different categories as ‘common sense’ attaches to the ‘special’ senses, and frames identification in the ‘imagination’) is more directly presented in Boethius’ own ‘logical’ treatises—on Division (of genera), Definition (or identification), Topical Differences (the application of division in induction),
the Categorical Syllogism (the correlation of division and definition) and the Hypothetical Syllogism (complementing the latter as topical difference complements categorical difference).

This logical scheme, corresponding to the project of systematic integration of the Platonic dialogues and the Aristotelian canon – of the five 'categories' of the Sophist (in particular) with the ten categories of the first book of the peripatetic canon – will be seen to involve the logical articulation of the various kinds of difference (or distinction, or division) in the identification of the logical order of distinction – that 'logical' side of two-sidedness, mirroring physical two-sidedness as the 'other side' of the poetic order of their symmetry (or: of poetic 'two-sidedness'). The radical questioning of the Parmenides and the circular assertion of the character of assertion in the work On Interpretation met in the 'poetic' interface of 'discourse', trying to discover its part in the scheme of things. But here in Boethius' texts there is no question of identifying in this very scheme of discourse an Identity which distinguishes itself from its inscription in the logical order of the text, and calling this Identity, with Dionysius, 'God'. Rather do we find, as the western analogue of Dionysius' systematic mystery, a dual presentation of that dramatic figure, which might be taken to reflect the analogous duality of Church and State in the West, as complementary 'frames' of activity. The Monophysites who appealed to Dionysius in defence of their rejection of the doctrine of the Person of Christ formulated by Leo the Great, were precisely those responsible for the first divorce of East and West under Leo's successor. Boethius, indeed, presents a systematic defence of the leonine doctrine of the Person of Christ in a tract Against Eutyches and Nestorius – against those complementary metaphysical reductions of one 'side' of the distinction of two natures to the other – against Eutyches' definition of the 'monophysite' abstraction of the Word from its mirroring in the Flesh, and also against the Nestorian abstraction of two symmetric persons from this same mirroring. It is in Boethius' definition of personas that one finds the focus of his reflection, not in any systematic framing of the duality of Mystery and Economy within the logical frame which he found expressed in complementary fashions by Plato and Aristotle.

A definition of personas that reflects his own position 'between' the gothic economy of civil order and the catholic policy of the western Church, between these two interacting 'laws', natural and spiritual — rather than in a monastic abstraction from the Economy of the World. — A definition introduced by Boethius' recognition of the initial sense of the word
as a theatrical 'persona', a mask, and finally discovering this radical principle of 'identification' as

\[
\text{naturae rationalis individua substantia (1)}
\]

- an individual or single substance of a rational (reasoning) nature. A 'form' whose primary actuality is simply the distinction of form (and thus itself) from its embodiment - and this, necessarily, in a particular 'individual' case. A form, then, which directly reflects the initial 'logical' principle of logically 'identifying' the logical order of definition or identification - logically distinguishing logical distinction from the correlative orders of difference articulated logically in the scheme of the *Categories*.

An actuality, though, not identifying itself in the logical order of its definition, as 'outside' discourse, as the actor might distinguish himself from any mask. Rather expressing itself as 'at work' in the interface of text or discourse and context. In this working three Persons in particular distinguish themselves, according to this figure of persona. The first is the simple Identity of Form distinguishing itself, mirroring the logical order formally defining itself, and so the radical configuration of definition or identification. The second is the 'person' who expresses himself as the first person distinguishing himself (or itself) from and in the symmetric human nature of a particular material body, and the third is the same principle of persona embodied in these first two instances, expressing or identifying itself as the mirroring of these first two 'persons'. This triple personality expressing itself in the interface of Form and Matter, as the primary configuration of Form expressing itself mirrors (as 'theology') the complementary 'logical' configuration of identification, as its primary 'actuality' or working in fact.

The correlation in this simple form of the logical frame of the aristotelian Economy of Cosmos, and the theological frame of the Christian Story or Drama or Mystery is fully worked out in the thirteenth century: Boethius may be taken to here make the first step which frames that subsequent elaboration. The elementary correlation of logical and theological frames in this 'western' manner - in terms of a dual Mystery and Economy, rather than their integration in the unitary frame of Dionysius and the eastern Monophysites, it itself reflected
in the organisation of the 'dual' or relatively independent frames (for example, this relation of theological and logical orders is reflected in the theological doctrine of the Second Person, just noted). In turn it reflects the 'dramatic' context of the theological and logical texts - the dual 'temporal' and 'spiritual' frames of Latin church and barbarian kingdoms, a unitary Mystery (the Catholic Church) and a plural and fragmentary Economy of civil order in the West. This complex system of correlations is further reflected in the other theological tracts that are (definitely) to be ascribed to Boethius: De Sancta Trinitate, and Utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus de Divinitate substantiatrix praedicentur. - What is the unitary actuality of this triple 'personality', which mirrors the unitary logical identity within the triple difference or distinction which articulates the categories? And do the forms 'Father', 'Son', 'Spirit' belong 'substantially' to this unity or unitary actuality, or only analogically? Are the forms 'Father' and 'Son' actually at work in this actuality of self-expression?

Boethius further frames in terms of an aristotelian Economy the question of the interration of actuality within the unity of the Good, the proper object of choice - this in his discussion duonodo substantiae in eo quod sint bona sint cum non sint substantialia bona. Here the platonic order of the Good, distinguishing itself in an aristotelian 'economy' of possibility, possible action and actuality, reflects the fifth-century conflict of Augustinian and pelagian accounts of Good and Bad, Law and Sin. The question marks, as it were, an 'interface' of triple divine actuality, and cosmic Economy - 'Above' and 'Below' - that parallels the question of the Incarnation that had dominated eastern theology in the fifth century, as the conflict of Augustine and Pelagius had dominated the western Church.

This 'interface', in which the 'theological' order of a Trinity mirrors the logical order of Boethius' commentaries and original 'logical' works (the order of 'division' and 'definition', the logic of 'in' and 'out') is also framed in the 'mathematical' order of 'applied logic', which Boethius articulates as a quadrivium, a 'fourfold way'. A fourfold framing of the 'poetic' order of Creation which reflects the platonic mathematics of the Republic and the Timaeus. - Of the Republic, for there Plato (or 'Socrates') frames the primary division of mathematics into Arithmetic...
Geometry, 'harmonics and Sphaeric (or Astronomy) as comprising that part of education of future 'guardians' which intervenes between the 'music' and gymnastics of earlier youth, and the dialectic which completes their studies (1). And in the Timaeus Geometry appears as the 'outward' mirror of the Arithmetic which deals with unity and plurality simply as such, and the Sphere of Kosmos and its contents are there articulated according to the forms of a Harmonics (or Music in the strict sense) which treats of the 'numbering' or arithmetic of Time, and the Astronomy or Spheric which reflects this Harmonics in the primary cycles of the Sphere (the stellar motions), as the 'geometric' Sphere itself reflects an arithmetic unity.

Porphyry attributed this organisation of mathematics to the early pythagoreans, citing Archytas (2) — in this following Nichomachus and Theon of Smyrna, and anticipating Proclus. Boethius wrote treatises on each of these four branches of the mathematical 'quadrivium' — his Geometry amounts to the statement of the most elementary results of Euclid (with proofs of the first three propositions, only, amended as examples); his Arithmetic is an adaptation from Nicomachus, the Music (and presumably, a lost Astronomy) from Ptolemy.

Boethius also wrote a Rhetoric, and the boethian corpus thus constitutes a whole, a more or less complete model for the educational frame of the following seven centuries. His 'logical' works lead to a complementary theology, and the common Kosmos of these two 'sides of reflection is framed in the mathematics or 'applied logic' of the quadrivium. Subsequently this iunici. scheme was systematised according to the succession from a 'trivium' of grammar, rhetoric and logic (or 'dialectic'), through the quadrivium, to the study of theology. As in Boethius' exposition, the logical 'economy' of Kosmos was predominantly aristotelian, the complementary theology predominantly platonic or augustinian, and the mathematical frame (as far as it went) more or less 'pythagorean'. The scheme of trivium and quadrivium was first systematically presented in the allegory of a carthaginian contemporary of Augustine — Martianus Capella's Satiricon: nine books written in the 'menippean satire' or stylistic medley (ranging between prose and verse) introduced into Latin literature by Cicero's friend Varro. The first two books are framed as the 'Marriage of Mercury and Philology', and the following seven, each presenting one of the artes liberales — grammar, rhetoric, logic, arithmetic, geometry,
music and astronomy - are framed by the first two books as Philology introducing to Mercury (Venus) her attendant maids.

Now the allegorical scheme of the first two books is adopted by Boethius (together with its 'menippean' form) for the frame of his last work - an allegorical Consolation of Philosophy addressed to the fallen Minister Officiorum in orison. In many ways Boethius' position might be seen as a sort of meeting of the parallel carthaginian or african currents of Augustine's theology and Martianus Capella's allegory of 'Philosophy' (as the liberal arts came to be collectively designated). This convergence of currents is itself reflected in the parallel incorporation by Augustine and his african contemporary of the earlier labours of Varro: the City (or Commonwealth) of God draws heavily upon Varro's compilation of roman history, institutions, mythology & of roman 'culture'. Martianus Capella draws upon Varro's attempt to define the frame of a 'liberal' education (in his nine books on 'disciplines'), as also upon the 'satiric' form that Varro himself borrowed (in the Saturae Menippeae) from the slave-born phoenician philosopher Menippo, a contemporary of Timon the syllogographer noted above. Cicero the equestrian judiciously identified his part as upholder of republican law; his friend the patrician Varro, on the other hand, marks his detachment from the cultural 'economy' into which neither he nor Cicero could prevent Rome passing, in a 'play' of his encyclopaedic 'culture' reflected in the play of styles in which his detachment expresses itself. In this he echoes not only Menippo but also that alexandrian 'critic' Callimachus (Menippo's contemporary) who marks his 'part' of critic 'outside' the play of forms in that play of forms. The patrician detaches himself from any 'part' in the cultural economy of democratic or demagogic Rome, and this in detaching himself from any definite point and frame of assertion - manifesting a truly aristocratic 'culture'.

In Martianus Capella the education which is (as in Aristotle's figure) an identification of one's true 'part' or identity through detachment from the superficial 'play' or 'economy' of sense, is expressed in the frame of a symbolic drama, in which Mercury, the figure of learning, itself enters into the 'play' from which the drama is to effect (in that other aristotelian figure) the detachment, and this through the figure of this 'Mercury', and that of his 'marriage' to female Philology.
Such a 'logical' mystery, in which the figure of logical detachment from the play of figure enters into the play or economy of figure as one element, Mercury - like the Hermes of that other symbolical literature of Alexandria - in a way reflects the augustinian mystery (equally framed as the part of a text in effecting detachment from the earthly economy in which it is itself involved).

Then Boethius' integration of these two sides - the seven liberal arts, and the theological frame of the christian Story - in his projected union of an aristotelian logical economy and a platonic thematic of Ideas, turning about its focus in the theatrical figure of persona amounts to a sort of western analogue of Dionysius' logical determination of the logical order as a 'fiction' through which a theological order 'outside' that fiction distinguishes itself.

Each of these schemes, then, corresponds to one version of the common 'dramatic' figure first expressly noted in the discussion of Aristotle's account of Tragedy. In the case of Dionysius' scheme, all we know of its context is related to its part in the interplay of eastern Church and Empire, as framed by Justinian's Code. In Boethius' case, he himself tells us from his prison much about the fate that led him there, the drama of which this prison was to be the last scene. And in this prison-scene we find framed that figure of tragic fate in which Boethius as it were discovers his own persona, in detachment from the part he has played.

- The part he has played: theologian and logician, combining those two sides expressed at the beginning of the previous century by the africans Augustine and Martianus Capella. And finding himself, at last, actually embodying that figure of persona in which logic and theology mirror one another in the mathematical frame of a platonic cosmos. - And within that frame, playing a focal part between the theological frame of the 'Catholic' Church, split between East and West on the question of the relations of 'logical' and 'poetic' orders of its frame, and the civic frame dominated by an arian gothic king, Theodoric.

- A catholic, caught between an arian king and a monophysite Emperor, and a roman senator (consul in 510, and whose sons were joint consuls in 522) caught between latin Church and State.
With the Acacian schism healed, and the eastern Emperor once more a catholic, Theodoric was led by court factions that feared the loss of their western independence in a reintegrated catholic Empire to have his minister Boethius imprisoned. The opening of the Consolation finds Boethius, in prison, 'musing' with his pen, entering into the frame of his text through the 'tragic' figure of his situation - that tragic figure in which a 'part' leads one into an im masse or 'prison' from which that 'part' has no way out.

But the first poem, with which the text opens, closes with a recognition by the poet of 'a woman standing over me'. Reflection, Philosophy, asserts itself, in Boethius' tragic imprisonment, through an initial 'logical' figure of detachment from the fascination of the poetic order of (Muse') with which the boethian drama of the persona begins. Echoing the aristotelian scheme, Lady Philosophy presents herself as the physician who will effect Boethius 'return' to his true self, from his tragic identification with a 'part' in the dramatic Economy of the World.

- A part: Boethius complains of the systematic substitution of part, mask, for actuality, truth, in the World in which he has been wrongfully imprisoned through the factional forces of misrepresentation that dominate the institutions which frame worldly activity. Nothing is what it seems. The Senate concurred in an impeachment on the grounds of Boethius' support for the Senate, suspected of combining with the eastern Emperor against the arian goths. A subordinate element in the impeachment was Boethius' part of 'philosopher' itself: his love of truth cited as an indication of his being false to institutions which thus declare their own radical falseness, like the Law which condemned Socrates. Boethius philosophical 'detachment' from the instituted circuits of deception is itself the ultimate ground of his exile, and loss of his position, part, in that 'institution'.

In the second book Philosophy suggests, reiterating her healing instance of detachment from identification with a worldly 'part' and its deceptive economy, that this exile and loss of his position, this ill 'fortune', is properly a reward for his moral and philosophical detachment from the self-interest of a worldly part or position. For through this detachment he now sees - as a direct result of it - the systematic illusion and deception of the World, in which he had 'forgotten' himself and become lost in a mask, a part, rather than 'remembering' (in the platonic figure) what he was, is, in truth. That is the true prison, and cast into an earthly
prison, as a result of the earthly part he played, he can now detach himself from both 'prisons' by seeing how one simply reflects the other in the fatal logic of earthly activity, of that drama of deception, that drama which we enter through losing ourselves in images, in tragic figures of correlation of apparent part and apparent object or end.

In the third book, the instance of detachment, 'return', is again reiterated. Detachment now - stronger medicine - from the simple figure of attachment, identification of correlative part and end, in the interplay of such images which frames the working, the Economy, of the World. And throughout this interplay, the same figure of correlation of part and object - the same 'framing' of activity in analogous schemes of imaginary self pursuing imaginary end asserts itself. And all of these schemes in which a false identification of oneself, of a persona, is reflected in a false identification of one's object, are alike images of true self and true end - which coincide in the detachment from the restless play of images. In this detachment one returns to one's true self, distinguishing itself from the part with which it had forgotten itself, and in this return one recognises this truth as the true end of which the apparent ends identified by the part with which one had identified oneself, were all so many images. So many images, drawing one on in the movement the detachment from which all these 'ends' themselves reflect. This 'Economy' of the Image articulates the whole order of Kosmos - everything moving towards One Good, through the outward frame of the Image, in a scheme which combines platonic and aristotelian 'sides'. One Good or End of detachment, a divine Life or Person (of triune aspect) which expresses itself primarily as Father of all, distinguishing itself from Nothing in the process of descent into this Nothing, and Return to itself. Nothing is simply nothing - outside this Unity of Good which frames Kosmos. Evil is nothing - the fiction that one's end escapes one through ill chance or fortune, when in fact this evasion is the frame of our recognition of the correlation of deceptive part and deceptive end. In our recognition through 'ill fortune' of this correlation we step out of the frame of identification with that 'part', and this recognition is also the self-expression of Good and Knowledge 'descending' to where we had become imprisoned, lost, in a part - as Lady Philosophy has 'descended' to Boethius in prison. The descent of Philosophy is simply the other side of the detachment and ascent of Boethius.
The Economy of figures of correlation and mirroring of identification with a part, and identification of an end, constitutes a system of Fate. As one progressively steps out of frame-within-frame of fateful identification - this corresponding to a rising of the spirit or soul through the nested cycles of Heaven through which the earthly Economy of the Image is framed and governed - one recognizes more and more clearly a dual order of Providence, in which the particular 'local' and passing figures or frames of Fate are integrated, at higher and higher levels, within the primary frame of Good passing through the Image, the frame of Kosmos as a whole, to return to itself - the Form of distinction of Form and Matter distinguishing itself, knowing itself as Knowledge - and this Knowledge as Life itself, this Life as Being.

This order, presented by Philosophy in the fourth book, operates as it were seamlessly, effortlessly, to articulate Kosmos in Law and Justice. The reward of that evil which is rooted in forgetting one's true self and true good in some part or image is effected precisely through the 'working' of this figure of identification itself, this figure of descent into ever stricter Fate, so that the choice of an image rather than true good directly leads the misguided agent or actor deeper into the circles of the Image, and further from his true good. And this Good is constantly at work, as it were doubling this process of forgetfulness, illusion, descent, as the instance of distinction of true self and part, true good and its images, precisely through the ineluctable correlation of part and fate throughout the whole Kosmos. The 'working' of this unitary Good, integrating all 'actions' within a single Providence, extends down from frame to subordinate frame - this 'invisible' order or actuality exactly mirroring the visible order of the Frame. - So that as one rises in Spirit through wider and wider frames of action, through the cycles of Heaven to the God at the circumference, one also leaves behind the 'outerward' physical order of this cosmic Frame, to discover oneself returning through concentric actualities of images of Good, Unity, God, Father, to the divine focus and source of Kosmos, a single point framing the order of Providence, with Matter as it were a distant sphere, distant from this divine Centre, as the physical circumference of Kosmos is distant from the physical Centre about which Matter turns and gravitates.

But, asks Poethus in the final book, if we are indeed in such a mechanical order of Kosmos, integrated, figure within figure within a unitary scheme of Providence, what then is the part of our
choice in the scheme? Doesn't our choice become as it were a last illusion, a last part to be resigned to fatal truth? And if so, then what becomes of the Law and Justice that has been presented as the Frame of the unitary Whole? — For our choice of good or evil is then not really choice at all, and the inherent logic of reward and punishment generated ineluctably by our actions themselves dissolves, evaporates into nothing, mere words... and we no longer have any way of framing our actions. Our choice turns upon itself in a hopeless impasse... our only true choice seems to be the recognition that this very choice is illusion. The 'working' of the scheme seems to determine this very figure of 'working' as the last illusory frame in which we think to play a part. We can no longer 'identify' with that part of our choice... and yet we cannot be anything 'outside' that figure of choice and action.

The answer seems to be that this last 'step' out of the frame of our very personal identity (framed in terms of the choice which articulates our action as 'ours') should not itself be framed on the model of the earlier steps up through particular frames of action towards this common figure in which all the particular frames participate. The mistake which leads to this impasse is to try and frame the figure of Action itself, the 'poetic' order of correlation of our assertion and its consequence, within the 'part' of finite thought — within a 'logical' order in which we have as it were forgotten ourselves, asking the question of the difference between 'inside' and 'outside' the order of Action — Time as its ultimate 'poetic' frame — with us remembering that this logical order of the question is itself 'in' the frame of our asking it. The impasse is itself the limiting case in which we must distinguish the psychical order of divine Knowledge from our identification with the logical 'part' of reflection.

The situation parallels that in which Aristotle shows that there is a domain 'outside' the logical order of 'inside' and 'outside', which cannot be 'logically' understood in terms of a logical distinction of the logical order as one 'side' of a wider and limiting order. Rather must such an 'outside' of the logical order be understood 'analytically', in terms of the 'working' of correlative orders of difference (division or definition), in which we discover this last distinction of two 'sides' of the logical order itself 'at work' in the constitution of the logical order.

— It also parallels Dionysius' 'logical' determination of God as 'outside' the logical order of discourse, expressing himself in the 'dramatic' working of this configuration in which the 'logical' order...
is recognised as simply one component in the dramatic self-expression of God as 'outside' that order. The 'working' of that 'outside' cannot be reduced to its logical component, and circumscribed by the 'logical' order of the text or discourse — rather does it express itself, assert itself, 'work', precisely by distinguishing itself from any such inscription or circumscription. It 'responds' to its invocation as 'the unutterable', as 'outside' discourse and text.

— And it is with this inscription of discourse within a more radical actuality that Boethius' discourse itself ends. — It ends by stepping out of the very order of the text by withdrawing into which (in the form of a poem, with its 'poetic' order of symmetry, closure) it had begun. By 'stepping out' of the poetic order of Action, not 'in' that order, not framing that step in the 'logical' opposition of two 'sides' that is itself one side in that poetic frame of the text, but rather by stepping out of that last illusion, that last identification with the 'part' of Reflection — that 'forgetting ourselves' in thought, forgetting the limitations of thought imposed by our actual situation, our embodiment in the 'poetic' order of Time, of which our thinking is one side, correlative with our physical embodiment.

In this configuration of the fifth and last book — the book that frames the last step out of the logical order itself, in Philosophy's final distinction from that order, as 'outside' it in a way that cannot be reinscribed in terms of a logical opposition — the 'divine' order of foreseeing Providence asserts itself in distinction from our 'mechanical' reason as Active Mind or Reason (1). Our reason and choice is framed in the operation of this actuality of provident reason that frames Kosmos in the figure of Action, in the symmetry of Law in Time, from 'outside' Time. The recognition of this 'outside' the poetic symmetry of Time is the last 'step' of detachment from unthinking identification with a part, a 'mask'. And this step cannot itself be 'framed' in the Creation it itself frames. Eternity is 'at work' 'in' Time, in the providential order of Creation, of Visible Kosmos — but at work in a way that can be recognised (which 'expresses' itself) in the image of 'outside' this order. The image 'works' as the self-expression in Time of an Eternity formally 'outside' Time. This divine Eternity expresses itself also in the 'working' of the moral order of our choice. It is 'outside' the radical identification of ourselves we discover in our choice and action, but expresses itself 'in' the correlation of action and effect as a constant actuality of Good. Our choice participates in this
radical distinction from the merely possible or imaginary actuality of the poetic symmetry of choice and situation (and effect) which frames the cosmic Drama in the figure of Action, of Working - the working of this radical distinction itself being the absolute Working or Actuality in which all actualities, including our own, are framed. This primary figure in which Kosmos is 'framed' is both Active Reason, distinguishing itself from the merely formal possibility of this distinction, and also the very 'form' and 'actuality' of Life:

Aeternitas igitur est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio. (1)

Eternity, then, is the complete, simultaneous and perfect possession of unending Life.

Insofar as our choice and activity is itself framed as a particular figure or form within this radical Frame of Kosmos as Drama, from 'outside' the figure of Time - insofar as it is 'in' the figure of Time itself - it is also 'in' the actuality of Reason 'outside' Time, and 'known' timelessly by God. But this timeless knowledge of our choice by (or 'in') God, in the identical actuality or form of Active Reason, is not 'before' our choice, thus dissolving the very 'working' or actuality of our free choice. Rather must we understand this 'working' of our choice in Time - and this in terms of the self-knowledge of ourselves as free in the step out of some image of ourselves, some 'mask'. Our very persona, our individual life and being, we discover at work in this figure of detachment, in a particular situation. And this freedom and personality is a participation in the radical Freedom and Actuality as such, which is God. It is a sort of intermediate term between the Eternity of divine Reason, and the nothingness of the passing image of ourselves, of sense, from which we distinguish ourselves in the working of our finite embodied reason. Our finite reason distinguishes between itself and sense: this is its very form and working or actuality - the very figure of our self-knowledge, freedom, identity, and moral being. Sense cannot distinguish between sense and this reason - the terms are correlative, and it is just this asymmetry which allows reason to know itself, a form of distinction of form and matter which thus distinguishes itself. Active Reason, in turn, distinguishes itself from this 'formal' ('passive') working of reason distinguishing itself from sense. It distinguishes itself, knows itself, as what distinguishes actual distinction from its formal possibility. It distinguishes itself from its 'image' in finite reason(s), as what determines the actuality of distinction 'in' which we know ourselves. - In which we know ourselves as 'in' a Kosmos whose actuality, whose fact, we cannot inscribe in the finite

1: Consclatio V, pr. sc vi
operation of distinction within it. We can only formally distinguish between our finite reason and a distinction of actuality from possibility which is formally 'outside' our comprehension, and find the 'working' of this Active Reason distinguishing itself from that formal distinction - actually - in the same figure of 'reason' through which our finite reason distinguishes itself from sense.

The logical order of Boethius' text, then, closes as it marks an actuality of distinction which distinguishes itself from its inscription 'in' the logical distinctions - the 'finite reason' - of the text. In the drama of distinction between actuality and image which is the Consolation, this conclusion or close parallels the figure of 'conversion' in Augustine's Confessions. But Boethius does not, like Augustine, extend the logical order of finite reason to the final step, the final distinction, of 'poetic' and 'theological' orders. Rather does he, following perhaps Aristotle, refuse to frame 'logically' the distinction of the logical order of his text, and what is 'outside' this order. Thus in the last book of the Consolation he maintains a precarious balance between Augustine's tendency to frame the two 'sides' of Kosmos in terms of a distinction of Heaven and Earth inscribed in the uniterly order of Heaven, and Pelagius' insistence upon human freedom - reflected in Boethius' question which opens the last book. The order of Providence is not, as in Augustine, a more or less rigid Story or unitary History in which 'inside' and 'outside' of the poetic order are themselves inscribed in a poetic order of detachment from the poetic order of 'sense', and from any recognition of our own freedom (this simply inscribed as one figure in the cosmic scheme framed in extenso). Neither is our freedom and constitutive self-knowledge abstracted, though, from the cosmic scheme to a pelagian inscription of the symmetry of 'poetic' and 'theological' orders within the figure of finite choice. Rather do these two pelagian and augustinian 'versions' of our part in Kosmos now appear as two converse attempts to frame the distinction of poetic and theological orders within the poetic order - this in each case through an unquestioned identification with the 'part' of assertion. - In Augustine's case, with the part of detachment from the 'logical' order of human choice - the part of the dogmatic theologian who replies to the question 'What was God doing before the Creation?' with 'Thinking of torments for those who ask over-subtle questions'. In Pelagius' case, with the part identifying one's being with choice of the figure of human choice, without
considering the radical question of the context of this self-assertion, the actual scheme which makes it possible - the theological instance of a distinction between the actual Kosmos in which this assertion is possible, and a merely possible Kosmos in which no choice can be 'mine' until Choice as such, 'God', has asserted itself in choosing this Kosmos, in which I, in 'my' embodiment, can assert myself.

The close of the Consolation, marking a western analogue of Dionysius' inscription of rational discourse within a dramatic frame of which it was identified as only one component, presents the same familiar limiting figure of classical Antiquity: the logical inscription of the logical order of text or discourse or assertion within a simple correlation of orders which cannot itself be 'logically' defined or 'comprehended', circumscribed. From the sixth century on the 'logical' order of Philosophy or Reflection finds itself at work within the instituted orders of that 'dramatic' frame of correlation of different orders, and it is not until the thirteenth century, and Aquinas' identification of the part in that dramatic frame of the logical definition of the logical order, that there reappears the radical figure of a Theory which inscribes in the logical order of the text the relation of that order to its context.

Boethius' interface of logical and 'poetic' orders, in a configuration in which the text itself embodies the logical order in a context it describes, is, like its dionysian analogue, radically ambiguous between these two schemes of inscription of context in text, and inscription of text in context - ambiguous between a 'logical' or 'poetic' framing of the act of writing. As in the case of Dionysius' Mystical Theology, this ambiguity is reflected, indeed embodied, in abstraction from the figure of Incarnation - or rather, the figure of the Christ, who is hardly echoed, even, in the Consolation. It is as though, unless the poetic and logical orders of Reflection as it were coincide - as in the texts of Dionysius and Boethius (each in his way a successor of the pagan Proclus in philosophy) - the matter is clear enough: either the logical order is inscribed in the poetic order of the Christian Story, and framed in the Incarnation of the Word; or the poetic order is inscribed in the logical order of Reflection, as in Neoplatonic allegory. Where the logical order of the configuration itself identified the part of this order in the 'dramatic' configuration, it is almost up to the reader to frame what is 'going on' as
'christian' or 'pagan'. In the 'christian' tradition of those 'Dark ages' that succeed the close of 'classical Antiquity', both Dionysius and Boethius were known as leading figures in the christian Story - Dionysius the 'first bishop of Athens', and Boethius the 'martyr of Pavia' (where he was imprisoned), a victim of arian persecution. Their texts were thus found a place as limiting instances of the logical order of Reflection within the 'poetic' order of the christian mystery. Only later was the 'christianity' of each to be questioned: with the questioning of the earlier identification of their 'parts' in the christian Story, came the questioning of the symmetry of the interface of logical and poetic orders in their texts. Some 'christians' felt that that symmetry (corresponding to the question which marks the beginning of this our Era) must itself be definitely inscribed in the poetic frame of the christian 'Story' as the question of access to that Story, framed in the question of the Christ. The symmetry or ambiguity of the logical and poetic orders of those texts (what is 'going on in their writing') then marks these texts as 'outside' the christian frame of activity: as unambiguous failures to identify the question of this interface as it appears 'in' the Story, as the Incarnation of the Word. The ambiguity, the coincidence of logical and poetic orders in a question, is the interface of christian Story and Context. To see this question, and not to identify it with the figure of the 'Incarnation of the Word', is then to act the part, in the Story, of one who is 'outside' - one who has not, faced with the choice of 'poetic' inside and 'logical' outside (like Augustine in the garden) chosen to identify with the part in the Story of identifying with that part, recognising oneself in that part, and recognising the interface of logical and poetic orders inscribed in the poetic order as the 'historical' Incarnation of the Word.

... But what exactly is this Story, in which we should find our part? What 'Incarnation', what 'Word'? It is as though one were being judged according to another story, in which these terms were quite fixed and definite, so that the Story unambiguously framed our part in it. Were in the circular 'poetic' figure of a fixed story in which the relation of 'inside' and 'outside' the story is a fixed element in the story, we see that 'superstition' recognised by Celsus, and the 'dogma' of Cyril and Augustine - an ironical losing of oneself in an image of detachment from the Image in the case of these two monks - an abstraction from the 'logical' order of questioning which attaches ineluctably to any assertion, any identification with some part.
We have seen how the substitution of a 'poetic' order - closed, and in which the logical order of 'inside' and 'outside' the closed scheme appears as one fixed element in the scheme - for the open mystery of a 'dramatic' order of correlation of all orders of 'figure', corresponds to the 'material' institution of the Christian Story. We saw how the analogously closed frame of activity instituted by Justinian's Code left no place for Damascius' reflection framed in a formal starting-point 'outside' such a closed 'poetic' frame. We saw how the parallel 'Canon Law' codified by Dionysius Exiguus about the same time instituted the Roman Catholic Church through a parallel inscription of the logical order of the Code itself in the configuration of activity it defines. And, again, Boethius recognises his exile and imprisonment - his twofold exclusion from the Italian frame of activity in 524 - as a correlate or result of his 'philosophical' detachment from the closed circuits in which the various factions moved.

The end of the fifth, and beginning of the sixth centuries might thus be seen to constitute a transition into a common figure of activity framed in a closed poetic circuit in which the relation of 'inside' and 'outside' is defined and codified as one component of the circuit, identified 'within' the poetic configuration whose very 'closure' this inscription itself defines (just as the 'closure' of the logical order in which reflection until this time was framed as 'philosophy' or 'theory' was defined by the logical determination of the relation of discourse and context, the logical distinction of 'logical' and 'physical' orders of two-sidedness). Over the following centuries the development of the 'institutions' or frames of activity embodying this principle of poetic closure exemplified by Justinian's Law and the Roman Church (and soon by Islam) preclude any systematic assertion of the 'logical' order of questioning: for a long time there is simply no 'place' for 'original' thought. The logical order of distinction appears only to symmetrically articulate an encyclopaedic scheme of Kosmos within the primary closed circuit of some instituted Story, some 'poetic' frame of activity, turning upon itself.

The final sections of this First Part (of this story) amount to a sketch of the development of the various 'closed frames' into which reflection now passes, to the point(s) at which the 'logical' circuit of inscription of the relations of text and context in a text reasserts itself.
Of primary importance in this re-emergence of a radical instance of 'theory' is the interaction, in the lands of the old Latin Empire, of the instituted Christian 'mystery' codified at the beginning of the sixth century, and the 'barbarian' institutions which succeed the 'Roman' civil order. I will only note those Byzantine and Islamic elements which bear some fairly direct relation to the reassertion of theory in the 'Latin' West of the thirteenth century.

As I noted at the end of the first half of this First Part, the remaining sections, covering the period from the sixth to the thirteenth century, fall into three subordinate phases—roughly 500-750, 750-1000 and 1000-1250. I will begin an account of the first phase of development with a correlation of the various elementary orders and figures thus far identified, around the beginning of the sixth century—this, with reference to the simplest figuration of the period of classical Antiquity, extending from the Pythagoreans of a thousand years before, through the 'Question' I take to mark the beginning of 'our Era' (defined around the beginning of the sixth century). The resulting frame of correlation will then serve to articulate the transition from sixth to thirteenth centuries, which I take to close a 'Part' of the Tradition of Reflection that may be characterised in a very simple manner.
From the Acacian Schism to Iconoclasm

Boethius' master Theodoric was king of the East Goths (Ostrogoths) - a confederation of 'germanic' tribes - from the death of his father in 474 until his own death in 526, a year or so after the judicial murder of his minister, and a year or so before the accession of Justinian in the East. Theodoric had been sent as a hostage to Constantinople in 462, to guarantee a treaty between his uncle the ostrogothic king, and the eastern emperor. He there received the education of a byzantine noble; in 488 he was given the mission to restore imperial authority in Italy, where Odoacer had led a revolt of the germanic soldiery in 476 - a revolt which began with the western emperor's refusal to grant a third of Italian lands to his 'barbarian' troops, and which closed with the abdication of the last western emperor.

From the time of Theodosius, towards the end of the fourth century a pattern of interaction of roman and barbarian had been set: the barbarians, pressed forward by the asiatic huns (the *hiung-nu* later known as 'mongols') in their turn pushed forward into eastern and western empires. The germenic tribes and their confederations were 'bought off' by successive emperors with grants of land, and incorporated into the imperial armies, their leaders given prominent positions in Army and State. When the pay of the West Gothic (Visigoth) army was reduced after the death of Theodosius, by his son and successor in the East, there followed a revolt led by an officer, Alaric, which was concluded by his appointment as governor of Illyria. A second revolt under Alaric led to the invasion of Italy, and the sack of Rome in 410 with which Augustine begins the *City of God*. The pattern of cession and revolt had led by the time of Theodoric to barbarian rule throughout the old provinces of the West.

The germenic wave or migration of the fifth century was itself only another instance of the successive waves of linguistically and culturally allied peoples which had earlier led to the settlement of Greece and Italy. A first such wave, about two millenia before our Era, resulted in the 'ionian' settlement of the Greek peninsula; another, from about
the thirteenth century before our Era, displaced the 'ionic' greeks to the coast and islands of Asia Minor (to 'Ionia'), and led to the 'doric' settlement of much of the peninsula. A further double wave led to the italic settlement of the next peninsula (Italy). The first part of this wave may be distinguished from the second by a characteristic linguistic difference: the second group generally has a 'P' sound, while, in a similar word, the first has a 'Q' sound. An analogous double wave of 'P' celts and 'Q' celts moved into Gaul and Britain to the north of the italic people, and thence into Spain and Ireland.

Behind the celts came a 'germanic' wave, forced forward by the huns behind. - Findred, 'germane' tribes, forming, in the fifth century, the great confederations of East Goths, West Goths, Vandals who moved in the fifth century through Spain into Africa (the West Goths behind them, settling in Spain and southern Gaul), Franks behind the Goths, to the north, along with various other groupings. Behind these 'germanic' peoples were the allied slaves, through which groups the huns had broken in the latter part of the fourth century. - Huns, quite distinct in their east-asian origins from all these allied tribes, and breaking through, tower's the middle of the fifth century, into the remains of the western Empire already fragmented by the incursions of the tribes that the huns had pressed, for a century, from behind. Near Chalons in Gaul the huns met the combined visigothic and roman armies. Contemporary accounts number those slain in the Battle of Chalons at 252,000.

The 'Scourge of God', Attila, descended into Italy the following year. Rome was saved only by Leo the Great's meeting with Attila in his camp. The succeeding year, amid preparations for a new campaign, Attila died on his wedding-night. The huns seem, thereupon, to have retreated in consternation, their faith in the story of world-dominion under their war-god broken, not to reappear in Europe until the thirteenth century.

Parallel waves of these same pastoral 'indo-european' peoples moved down from some common homeland into Persia, India, Asia Minor, and perhaps (as the 'Hyksos' or 'shepherd-kings') into Egypt. A first wave destroyed 'Ur of the Chaldees' in 2004, and is echoed in the story of Abraham. The earliest centre of settlement of this eastern or south-easter division of the 'aryans' (as the indian group called themselves, distingui-
ishing themselves as agriculturalists from the nomadic ancestors of the huns) seems to have been the upper Oxus and Jaxartes, corresponding to the 'Garden east of Eden' watered by two rivers that is the Paradise of the hebrew book of the Beginning. From Bactria, the valley of the Oxus, comes the 'persian' culture from the Zend-Avesta, to the reform of Zoroaster in the sixth century of our Era, and the dominant influence in the islamic culture of Baghdad, from the eighth to thirteenth centuries. The oldest traditions of the eastern division are framed (in the Rik-Veda) in that simple figure already noted of 'culture' - a boundary of cultivation and pasture, and a 'foreign' wilderness 'beyond the pale', the home of nomadic raiders.

The common linguistic and cultural focus of all these waves, although it cannot be identified with any definite point in space and time, yet seems to lie in the operation of the simple correlation of the 'boundary' of settlement in the physical order of the earth's surface, and a simple 'topology' of the phonetic 'mark' or sign constituting the other pole of the common 'indo-european' culture of all the waves of settlement, east and west. Thus, for example, the simple physical 'boundary' or 'limit' that defines the outward frame of this single uniform 'aryan' culture is reflected in an elementary 'topology' of the linguistic 'mark' or 'sign', a simple 'phonology' that 'inwardly' frames these allied 'cultures'. Corresponding to the interface of 'inside' and 'outside' (the speaking body) at which the significant sound is 'made', or 'appears', we find the 'radicals'

\[ M \begin{array}{c} \searrow \end{array} T \]

- the inward 'M' of me, am (sanskrit asmi), the outward 'T' of it, that (asti) and the meeting of these in an 'inside' which is 'outside' (asi, you are) and in the 'verbal' character of their mirroring (is, the 's' of asmi, asti). - Or the primary inflections of the oldest greek verbs, corresponding to the \(-\text{θι}, -\tau\etaι, -\tauι\), of the middle voice.

Corresponding to the order of subordination of the distinction of the two 'sides' to one side, and to the two converse orders or 'directions' of this primary self-assertion or activity of one side or the other we find the radicals
- And corresponding to the 'breaking' of the symmetry of the two sides, common to each of these 'directions', to 'action' itself, and the 'actuality' which expresses itself in the meaningful sound, is the single radical

\[ K \]

It will I hope be seen (for this is not the place to go into the matter in any detail) that this simple 'phonology' corresponding to significant interface of 'inside' and 'outside' the body in the voice, parallels the correlation of the various primary orders of 'dramatic' actuality - 'logical', 'poetic', 'physical'; psychical and ontical; mystical. I wish here only to suggest the correlation of this radical 'logical' side of the poetic order of Indo-European culture, with the complementary 'physical' framing of this poetic order of activity in the 'boundary' of settlement in which culture is framed first of all as 'agriculture'. I have already noted the Greek correlation of these 'logical' and 'physical' frames in the figure of Hermes, god of the ὕπωψ, boundary and (as we saw in Euclid) 'term'.

Back now to the 'Germans'. Their activity was framed, before their incorporation into the disintegrating Latin Empire, in what is called the 'Mark System' - the frame of Germanic Law. 'Mark' or its equivalent in the older Teutonic dialects corresponds to the Greek ὕπωψ. Thus the Gothic marka is a 'mark' in the sense of a 'sign', but primarily a 'boundary' - most particularly, the boundary of a settlement, later the boundary of a union of settlements - a boundary of 'settlement' itself, of a land - the English 'march', or the 'Denmark' of the Danes.

The primary sense is the 'boundary' of a particular settlement, this 'boundary' sometimes being identified with the woods and wastes - the 'wild' land - that 'bounds' or limits the cultivated land. By the fifth century Gothic tribes had become more or less settled at the confines of the Roman Empire, East and West, and the system whereby the head of a single pastoral group (in the earlier days of a less settled way of life) would allot to each family a 'lot' within the communal vale (together with the use of common pasture-land) for home and hayfield had become extended as it were by analogy to the 'lot' of a particular 'mark' or village within
a group of villages (called by the latins a _paganus_), and the 'lot' of each such group within a 'nation' of such groups, presided over by a king such as, say, Theodoric.

As well as allotting land within the 'mark' the village chief was also responsible for the maintenance of the frame of the community outwardly embodied in the mark and the division of the 'space' of activity within it: responsible, in settled times or phases, for the maintenance of the mark within which the communities activity was spatially framed. This through the organisation of the physical 'force' which marks the boundary of the community within the 'physical' economy of the 'wild' outside. The agency of this 'military' preservation of the frame of activity - young men chosen by the chief from those leading families from which he was himself chosen (by their heads, the 'council' of the community) - the romans called the _comitatus_ (whence our 'count', comites), 'going along' with the chief. Like the roman army preserving the frontiers of the empire, this _comitatus_ was also the agency of internal order, framed within the primary 'force' which maintains the frame of the community within the 'mark'. Thus infringement of the 'law' of the mark might result in enforced 'exile' or forcible prevention of entry into the mark as frame of activity. Lesser transgression might result in a forcible restriction of activity, corresponding to the particular overstepping of the bounds of activity framed by law. The limiting case of this figure would amount to confiscation of the 'goods' within which one framed one's activity, and a subjection to another's good and activity - this would seem to be the lot of 'captives', for example, in the war in which one 'mark' confronted another, and subordinated it by force to its own organisation. The analogue of this restriction of activity in the settled roman civilisation would be the loss of 'freedom' through imprisonment or slavery. Boethius' imprisonment in exile within the romano-gothic kingdom of Theodoric might be seen as a meeting of gothic and roman law.

'Law' - or rather gothic 'custom', like homeric Themis, which allots a 'part' to each, be it a part of land (like the 'wards', _Ωδήμος_ of the _Δήμος_ of Athens founded by 'Theseus'), or a part in the affairs of the community, or a part in any 'affair'. Custom administered by the council and enforced by the _comitatus_ as its executive side. Custom which itself defines the 'part' of custom in the oral tradition it frames, as the written codes of the romans integrated by Justinian define the part of the written code in the activity it frames. Custom as the very frame
of activity in which the 'outward' physical Mark is reflected in the phonological order of the oral tradition, transposed into an 'aryan' theology - θεός, Themis, daughter of Heaven and Earth, germanic Thor, and all the others, three seasons, three fates, three graces, daughters of Themis and the King of the gods, articulating an early oral Greek culture, and so on and on, into all the stories of gods and heroes (like Theseus) articulated between these 'physical' and 'logical' limits of the Mark.

- Custom, a closed circuit of Convention in which questions may be asked, choices made, but in which Custom itself cannot be questioned, except at the risk of exile. - Reflecting that primary figure of 'Culture' in which the physical order is abstracted from in the closed circuit by which the distinction of 'outward' wilderness ('beyond the pale') and inward order is inscribed as one element of that 'logical' order of the Mark, of cultivation and Culture, with its seasons, laws, fruits.

And this germanic 'Custom' of the Mark, which is nothing but a certain stage of development of a common 'aryan' culture of greeks, italians, germans, at a time when 'roman' culture had developed far beyond its initial frame of military expansion, to borders it could no longer defend from these allied 'germans', meets and combines with the more developed 'latin' culture of the romans at a common border or boundary, over the course of the fifth and sixth centuries, to form the basic frame of the civic order of 'medieval' Europe, standing between the romans and ourselves.

What is the primary figure of this 'meeting' and combination?

Thus far I have only noted the simplest figure of 'settlement' at the bounds of the Empire. This settlement, though, is 'doubled', as I have also noted, by a 'military' organisation which meets the order of settlement in the defence of the village or Mark. - And this, most particularly, in the organisation of the community 'between' successive settlements, whether the migration be occasioned by pressure from kinred people or huns from behind, or by failing pasture, or whatever other reason. In the 'military' order of a migration 'marks' are joined into wider federations, the chiefs of each mark constituting the council of a king, the chiefs of each of these councils constituting the council of a gothic or frankish or vandall king. Thus in Theodoric's migration into Italy with the
East Goths at the end of the fifth century he was accompanied by about a quarter of a million people, organised within the frame of an 'army' which amounted to comitati under chiefs who again formed comitati of chiefs, the last the 'counts' of the king's council. When the army controlled a new land, these latter 'counts' apportioned the land among themselves, each (shall we say) 'county' dividing into allotted 'mark' within which the chief in council allotted the lands, favour being given to those prominent in the conquest. Characteristically it is a conflict between an elected chief of a 'Germanic' people (like Alaric or Odoacer) and an eastern or western emperor over the granting of land by the emperor recognised as 'chief of chiefs' or 'king of kings' which leads to the 'military' insurrections of Germanic soldiery (partly now incorporated into the forms of the Roman armies) which finally fragment the Latin Empire, and lead to the formation of Germanic 'kingdoms' corresponding to the old provinciae or Roman conquests.

By the fifth century, Roman law had developed to the point where provinciae were settled by people who would pay a 'rent' which guaranteed tenure of a homestead, defended by the Roman army, for life - the system of Emphyteusis. The rent would go towards paying for the imperial organisation of the territory within the wider policy of the Empire and its Economy. More generally, land might be held, not directly of the Emperors, but of a landowner, to whom rent was paid. At the frontier of the Empire the Germanic mark System and Roman Emphyteusis were combined in a tenure from the Empire of lands, where military service there or elsewhere in the Empire was substituted for the monetary 'fee' or rent. With the settlement, then, of Theodoric's army in Italy, or of a Visigothic migration in southern Gaul, the two systems were combined in the tenure by the Germanic 'counts' and their subordinates from the king or count or local chief (knight) according to the 'feudal' system by which land was held of one's immediate superior on condition of military service. The radical difference between this system and the earlier 'mark' system, was that the military organisation in the latter related only to migrations of a whole people, and settled land was held simply through a systematic division of the new territory, law administered by the 'democratic' consent of the community, through a council which elected its leader. In the 'feudal' system, the military order remained as it were the frame of the various orders of the 'nation' after settlement, and law was administered 'from above' through the 'counts' of the king, count, or knight. The different combination of Roman and Germanic
elements led, eventually, to the different 'constitutions' of the various 'kingdoms' that replaced the Roman provinces of the West. In England, notably, the Saxon 'mark' system remained more or less organised on the primitive German 'democratic' model until the importation of feudal elements from France in the eleventh century - even then the 'Norman' king granted land to his 'barons' or 'counts', not in vast units, but rather as a collection of manors scattered over the country, and he instituted a direct relation of authority between himself, the chief of chiefs of chiefs, and manorial knights, making the counts or barons his officers, where in France the jurisdiction of the baronial court was absolute, with no appeal that might pass beyond it to the king, and no direct relation between king and knight.

East of the Rhine, where Roman elements were less established than in Gaul, the Germanic order became by the tenth century fragmented into more or less independent minor courts within 'counties' or duchies whose chiefs elected (in the Germanic scheme) a leader - a 'Holy Roman emperor' - from among themselves. West of the Rhine, where the Roman tradition was stronger, the struggle for supremacy among the counts (or 'barons' or 'dukes', dukes) eventually led to a centralised kingdom in which the 'king', who could not, as in England, integrate his counties and duchies into a secure administration by proxy, had broken the power of his feudal vassals and assumed more or less absolute authority in the kingdom.

So much for the primary figure of integration of 'Latin' and 'barbarian' civic order in the West, reflected (for example) in Theodoric's settlement in Italy as Gothic king of Goths and Romans, each subject to their own law (the Romans to their 'senate'), within the simple integration of these two laws in the Romano-Gothic military organisation and common laws of property. But this is only 'one side' of the frame of activity under Theodoric, a limiting interaction of Roman and German 'law' in the organisation of 'boundaries', that had itself begun at the Romano-Gothic 'boundary' of the Latin Empire.

Complementing this 'pole' of integration is the meeting of Gothic 'arian' Christianity, and Roman 'catholic' Church. The Gothic order frames the primary figure of the civic order in that of the phys-
ical boundaries of Land. At the other extreme of Law as frame of activity stand Dionysius' Exiguus' canonical definition of the frame of the 'catholic' church. through defining the place in that 'universal' frame of 'christian' activity of the Canons which frame that activity.

- And defining, as the focus of this 'Canon Law' that parallels Justinians combined civil and religious Law in the East, the authority of the bishop of Rome, the 'father' of the Catholic Church, *papa*, per eminentia.

The two 'faiths' of roman and goth, 'catholic' and 'arian', reflect the dominance of goths in the 'physical' economy of activity, framed in the 'outward' order of the 'mark', and the dominance at the other pole of 'mark' and activity - the Church framed as mystery of text and Word - of an augustinian scheme of inscription of civic order in heavenly order - City of Man in City of God. The arian frame of gothic christianity reflects the gothic frame of 'earthly' activity, with the Christ on the 'earthly' created side of worldly activity, and the 'Father' on the 'other' heavenly side. The 'catholic' roman frame, on the other hand, equally reflects, from the roman side, the principle of integration of this complementarity of two 'sides' of western activity within the frame of a Church embodying the mystery of the Incarnation, of the relation of the two 'sides' or natures of the Second Person (of the Trinity) as defined by Leo the Great in the middle of the fifth century.

It will, I hope, be seen then, that over the period of the Acacian schism, and Theodoric's rule in Italy, the 'close of classical Antiquity' corresponds to a simple correlation of what were above determined as the primary 'physical' and 'logical' determinations of the poetic frame of group activity. - The 'logical' determination, corresponding to the aristotelian 'poetics' of drama, with the correlation of the logical order of a text, and a 'psychical' distinction of personal identity from its image in the 'play' of logical and physical sides of tragic action, frames the instituted mystery of the Church in the primary drama of the Mass, with its Text, Bread and Wine, and Action or Ritual. The 'physical' determination is framed, rather, in the framing of the policy of the group (kingdom) defined by a certain 'land'.

In the West these two complementary determinations of the poetic frame of action appear as limiting cases of a common frame of
Law, divine and human, in which they mirror one the other, and inter-
act - this five centuries after Cicero's correlation of an earthly or-
der of Law, and a heavenly order of Providence. Thus Leo the Great
strenuously opposes the 'monophysite' figure of an abstraction of the
'logical' poetics of the christian mystery (or frame of activity) from
a more radical mirroring of this logical 'working' in an earthly order
of 'physical' working. And the gothic kings seek to legitimise their
rule by as it were inscribing the 'Mark System' within the roman frame
of Law.

In the East, on the other hand, around the beginning of the
sixth century, the 'greek' abstraction of 'logical' poetics of civil
law and religious mystery frames these as two sides of activity of a
byzantine ruling order - a 'court' of higher clergy and civil servants -
at last 'cut off' from the physical economy of the eastern Empire. - A
court circle turning upon itself, as its increasing 'abstraction' from
the material economy of its 'lands' is reflected in a successive con-
traction of the 'boundaries' within which court rule or policy is effect-
ive. The Acacian Schism, indeed, marks the break between this 'greek'
or byzantine order, and the latin order of Law as the frame of Empire -
marks the full-circle by which the greek 'logical' frame has been first
incorporated within the roman frame of Empire (in the second century be-
fore our Hx), and now abstracts itself as the 'ruling order' (at By-
zantium or Constantinople) of an Empire which is 'roman' only in name.

This 'ruling' order of the higher byzantine officials and
clergy is, as we saw, 'instituted' by Justinian from 529 on. By the mid-
century it has been formally reasserted in Italy by Justinian's generals:
but such a formal determination of the relations of byzantine court and
the wider frame of the 'roman Empire' from within the court circle, râ-
ther than by inscribing the court circle in a more radical interaction
of 'physical' and 'logical' (economic and political) orders of activity,
is only an image of byzantine authority in the West, which cannot accommo-
date the arrival of the germanic Lombards in 568.

The closed frame of court authority codified by Justinian,
in which there is no 'place' for the autonoous 'logical' order of Da-
massius, or political critics, or economic 'realism' amounts to a 'log-
ical' framing of the situation as it stood in the East at the beginning
of the sixth century. The first thirty years or so of the sixth century
thus in a way parallel those first thirty years of the first century, in which the situation — the correlation of various orders of reflection and activity I have marked as 'Question' — is first framed 'poetically' in the Christ, and 'logically' in alexandrian philosophy. Just as those framings of the 'Question' themselves frame the related developments that lead to Dionysius, Damascius, and the greek Church — and the 'vanishing' of the logical frame of the Question in the 'poetic' frame of the Church around the beginning of the sixth century — so does the byzantine Culture framed in Justinian's reform frame the byzantine tradition until its close in 1453 with the fall of Byzantium (to which the 'eastern Empire' had then contracted) to the islamic Turks.

Similarly, the complementarity of 'roman' Catholic Church, and Germanic feudalism, instituted around the same time in the latin West, frame the development to be sketched in this last (triple) phase of the First Part of what I have called the 'Tradition' of Reflection of Philosophy. Boethius, over the first twenty-five years of the sixth century may be taken as an exemplary figure. He 'frames' the western Reflection of the sixth until the thirteenth century, by his correlation of an 'aristotelian' logical Economy and a 'platonic' (christian) theology — and this, most importantly, from a position which is caught between the two instances of roman Church and gothic State... a position dramatically focussed in his last work.

East and West, then, the logical order of that Question which marks the beginning of our Era is inscribed within a poetic 'closed circuit' — in the East by the position of reflection within the ever-more-rigid structure of the court drama, where the 'scholar' adapted himself more and more to a stylised 'part', more and more rigidly fixed in its artificial conventionality in every detail. In the West by a process of inscription of reflection in the theoretical figure framed by the determination within the Church (or the catholic frame) of the relations of the 'logical' (rather political or theological) order of this frame and its complementary barbarian economy — the two sides mirroring one another in a common order of earthly activity which itself reflected the wider mirroring of divine government and material economy of a closed "cosmos."
This situation, East and West, thus mirrors, historically, the figure of the pythagorean irruption of the logical order of theory from another 'closed circuit' of the 'poetic' order of greek activity in the sixth century before our Era. - This mirroring in the correlation of logical and poetic orders in that configuration of question which lies midway between this 'opening' and 'close' of classical Philosophy, and is itself marked by the resurgence of 'pythagorean' figures at Alexandria, just as the close of Philosophy in Proclus and his successors is characterised by a recurrence of the simple symmetries and figuration of pythagorean 'theory'.

There is a formal, logical mirroring or symmetry of the initial configuration of the pythagorean 'mystery' of theory at Croton, and the final configuration in which 'philosophy' passes into the closed circuit of the christian story a thousand years later. In a way it is just such formality, such a symmetry of development of the pythagorean figures of 'theory', which corresponds to the 'close' of this 'classical' philosophy. For that logical order of classical 'philosophy' is differentiated from the 'poetic' order of the christan mystery precisely by what 'breaks' this symmetry of unfolding and return from and to pythagorean unity and limit. At the midpoint of that development 'christian' reflection inscribes itself in the primary physical context of this reflection as activity, by finding itself mirrored in that 'outward' order in the poetic order of cosmic Drama. Thus at the beginning of the sixth century this 'breaking' of the logical neoplatonic symmetry of unfolding from and return to logical Identity is marked by Dionysius Exiguus inscribing his identification of this 'breaking' of symmetry in a cosmic Time whose 'zero-point' he identifies as that 'breaking': the Incarnation of the Word, the christian inscription of the Question in the christian framing of the Question.

Thus where, in Damascius, the 'pagan' order of Reflection discovers the logical figure of dramatic inscription of the logical order of Reflection in the dramatic order of Mystery, it simply 'dissolves', disappears, 'no longer has a place', and is lost, closes upon itself. Where, at the same time, this same figure of logical inscription of the logical order of reflection is identified in the christian 'frame', this frame, like the frame of Justinian's Law, closes in the poetic circuit of inscription of the 'logical order' as one term in the poetic order of the cosmic Story or History - this in the figure of 'Incarnation of Νόες'.
That is, by the sixth century the logical order of Reflection of Theory has either 'entered into' or 'been excluded from' the poetic frame of an actual 'History' which is recognised as a cosmic Drama turning upon our recognition of our part in it. A reflection which begins with an abstract logical Identity, a logical determination of the distinction between logical discourse and physical context, has no 'part' in the Drama, for it does not correspond to any possible position of an 'actor' in the Drama. Rather does it amount to a sort of illusory identification of the 'philosopher' with some imaginary focus of Reflection, abstracted from his actual situation - and this 'identification', this 'part', is no longer possible.

With the recognition of this order of Reflection as itself one activity within the dramatic order of cosmic History - and this recognition in a finite or definite configuration of terms - in a 'poetic' frame - the 'logical' determination of the poetic order of mirroring of logical and physical orders of Cosmos and cosmic History is inscribed, as I noted, as simply one term in a primary 'poetic' order of activity, with its two sides, Church and State. The logical order is at last inscribed in the poetic order, and with this the poetic mirroring of logical and physical orders over a thousand years may be inscribed in the actual time of a closed history of a Reflection that does not recognise its part in the actual history of a certain group - an 'us' - articulated in this our 'actual' time - in the 'working' of Time in which we find ourselves 'reflecting', thinking - rather than an abstract 'working' of time in the logical order of reflection, which cannot distinguish (for example) between the mirror developments of a thousand years 'unfolding' of pythagorean theory, and a thousand years 'convergence' of that theory towards its close in the immediate successors of Proclus. This Earth and its History are recognised as the mysteriously actual frame of our thinking, rather than some one instance among others of an abstract scheme of Creation inscribed in some logical frame of Theory taken as primary, as somehow 'prior' to the actual Creation in which it is articulated within some living and dying human group.

It is not until the logical figure of this inscription of Philosophy in the 'poetic' order of cosmic History, Creation, is identified in the thirteenth century that Reflection once more reasserts itself, and a new period of original philosophy, rather than a re-working of old forms, begins.
For our part, we might note here, in passing, that this first 'cycle' of theory—from the beginning of the fifth century before our Era, to the end of the fifth century of our Era—is itself framed in a symmetric physical order of Time, History—so that this 'symmetrical' phase or cycle itself embodies the simplest 'poetic' figure of the 'mirroring' of physical and logical orders, as two complementary 'spaces' or 'sides of Space', in a common poetic articulation of Time. A cycle whose rather symmetrical constitution of about a thousand cycles of the Sun, the earthly 'year', must remain a tantalising question at this point. As must the significance, if any, of the division, in the same symmetric manner, of the remaining part of this 'story' of Reflection, by that thirteenth century which marks the beginning of the Second Part, and which reflects, for example, the thirteenth century before our Era (the time of 'Moses'), just as the close of the whole story reflects the configuration of the story of 'Abraham' two millennia before our Era.

On then to that thirteenth century. I have not taken the symmetrical cycle of 'classical philosophy' as constituting a First Part, by itself. For although from a 'logical' point of view the recurrence of the pythagorean mystery of Tetractys and Kosmos in Proclus and his successors, mirrored as it is in an earlier recurrence at Alexandria around the beginning of our Era, defines a highly symmetric 'phase', I am framing the 'story' not in the 'logical' space (and time) of Theory, but rather in a primary 'dramatic' Space and Time, of which that 'logical' space of logical configuration is but one 'side' or component. The primary 'phases' or 'periods' or symmetrical divisions of this Story must thus be articulated within the correlation of 'logical' and 'physical' orders of this text and its context with which we began in the Introduction, and in which the pythagorean 'mystery' as starting-point of the story or History was itself identified. The First Part, then, ends, and the Second Part begins, in the logical identification of the part of the logical order of 'Philosophy' in a primary 'dramatic' order, itself identified as the 'poetic' frame of Kosmos—this in the thirteenth century of this our Era.
I have already identified 'eastern' and 'western' versions of a common figure of a closed poetic circuit, embodied in its 'logical' or rather 'political' articulation, in byzantine Court and roman Church. Now I will sketch the development from the beginning of the sixth century until the break of roman Church and eastern Court over Image-Worship, which led to the fall to the Lombards of the byzantine presence in Italy in 752, the invocation by the Pope of the frankish king Pepin who defeated the Lombards in 754, and established the temporal power of the papacy in Italy by donating the old byzantine exarchate to the see of Rome in 756. This period may be taken to turn about the establishment in Arabia (622-632) of a Story or Frame of activity whose locus of assertion is inscribed in the poetic order of the Story, Qur'an 'Book', in the figure of the 'Prophet', Voice of 'God' (al-ilah: 'Him', the empty form of the definite article, hebrew (el-)eloh or elohim). - A story where the part of the hearer is inscribed as islam, submission (to the part of he who, in the story, thus submits to his part).

I will begin in the West. First I must note a 'part' that parallels that of Boethius, and like it frames Reflection over the following centuries, as well as playing a major role in the interaction of Church and State.

- This is the 'part' of Benedict who reformed western monasticism, and established (while Boethius was the minister of Theodoric) the benedictine Rule of monastic life which gradually supplanted in the West the eastern rule of Basil, and the fifth-century rule (this in southern Gaul) of the semi-nagian Cassian. This 'Rule' or Reform reflects the familiar figure of a Code which determines its own part or place in the activity it frames - but in the case of the Rule drawn up by Benedict about 515 the Rule does not, like Justinian's Code, embody a systematic economy of Authority, but rather frames the life of a monk who chooses to live in the simple frame of a Rule, one of whose few provisions is absolute Obedience. What is characteristic of the benedictine rule, as distinct from those of Basil, Athanasius, Augustine or Cassian (which uniformly inculcate the three vows of Obedience, Poverty and Chastity, corresponding to simple 'abstraction' from the Economy of the World) are two features which reflect the western romano-gothic frame of Theodoric's rule, just noted. Benedict requires Stability: remaining within the 'enclosure' or 'cloister', the bounds of one particular 'monastery', and this for the whole of one's life. The eastern usage was
one of entering or leaving a monastery and its rule according to one's choice. - So that Benedict's reform extends the Rule, as it were, to 'both' sides of the frame of activity bounded by the pale of the cloister. Complementing this radical importance of 'enclosure' (which itself might be taken to parallel the gothic prominence of the 'ark'), is the further instruction to spend a part of one's time in study, teaching, and the copying of books. - The monasteries were to be the locus of the reflection carried on in the Latin Church within the formal frame of Boethius' scheme of the 'liberal arts' as propaedeutic to theology. The Rule as a whole is framed as organizing a systematic 'Conversion of Manners' - a 'conversion', a life framed in that Augustinian figure of the relations of Heaven and Earth. In general, one may say that the monastic Rule approximates to a sort of analogue or reflection within the Catholic Church, of the figure of that wider frame of Church in the still wider frame of activity of which the Church constituted one side (that side the analogue, in activity, of the logical order; the 'logical' version of the poetic order of activity, instituted in the Christian Story). The Benedictine order (and its later variants, until the Franciscan and Dominican 'Friars' of the thirteenth century) comes to be an often dominant party in the Church, as the Church comes to often dominate the affairs of the 'medieval' West (the two combining, for example, in the first Benedictine 'One, Gregory the Great' at the end of the sixth century, and in Gregory VII in the eleventh).

'A dominant party': just what does that mean?

... Simply that (in this case of the Benedictines, for example) the monastic institution as frame of activity is in a 'position' within the wider frame of the Catholic Church, to determine the relations between Monastery and Church: within the wider frame of the Christian Story instituted as Church, the framing of individual activity in that 'frame' is itself framed by the inscription of the relations of Monastery and Church within the 'frame' instituted by the Rule of Benedict. Formally, the situation is analogous to the 'logical' determination of the relations of 'physical' and 'logical' orders. Just as through that latter inscription of 'inside' and 'outside' in the 'inside' of the logical order, 'assertion' in general is 'framed', so, from time to time, through the determination within the Benedictine frame of the relations of Cloister
Sl s
and Church, a benedictine pope (like Gregory the Great or Gregory VII) may be in a 'position' to frame the activity (and thus the 'policy') of the Church as a whole, by as it were 'inscribing' this whole frame in the 'assertion' of his 'part'.

'ore generally, we have seen how the open 'Economy' of inter-play of 'figures' (those, for example, of Church and State, East and West, roman and barbarian, lawyer and philosopher, and so on) finds, in the figure of the 'person' - persona, 'actor', 'part' - an interface between the potentiality or 'possibility' embodied in this 'play' (with its schemes or frames of possible assertion), and its integration into a unitary 'actuality' or reality, fact. This 'interface' is of course simply the locus of 'choice' - a choice which constitutes the 'assertion' or self-assertion of the 'person' or agent. This 'choice' in each case must depend upon the inscription of this figure of 'person' and choice in the 'play' or Economy of figure from which (as mere possibility) the actuality of 'psychical' self-assertion (as, conversely, the 'ontical self-assertion of 'fact', 'things') in this very figure, distinguishes itself - as 'actually' outside the symmetrical and indifferent 'play' of mere possibility. An individual 'person' finds himself or herself 'in' an Economy of possible 'choices'. As we saw a while ago, the range of this individual 'choice', as 'frame of (his or her) activity' is itself in part defined by an identification with a 'part', with a figure of 'oneself' in that general Economy of possible action. The great force of the 'christian Story' lies precisely in the identification of the 'christian', the actor in that Story, as he or she who identifies with the part of distinguishing oneself from an 'unthinking' identification with a 'worldly' part - with a 'part' mechanically determined by an unchosen Economy in which we (or rather that unchosen 'part') find ourselves (or rather, 'itself').

Within the figure then, of the 'part' of formulating christian activity (in particular the part, in the latin West, of the Bishop of Rome, the 'pope'), the relations between the christian Story or Mystery, and the 'worldly' Economy of an unthinking 'identification', may to a great extent be 'framed' in the christian Story, and so frame activity throughout the 'christian' West. Of course the inscription of the germ-anic 'Economy' of civil power or authority within this figure of the christian Mystery, as instituted in the 'closed' poetic frame of a 'Catholic' Church, is only 'one side' of the 'medieval' framing of activity.
The various instances of assertion of panel authority in such a 'figure' (whose most notable or forceful expression is to be found in the writings of Augustine) must themselves (in turn) enter into play with the 'worldly Economy' dominated by the 'feudal' interpretation of roman and germanic civil orders. This, in general, since the 'outward' identification of various components of a situation in terms of their inscription in a 'theoretically' or nominally unitary frame of the 'Catholic' Church, is itself one component, only one 'side' of whatever is thus 'identified'. Any particular situation asserts its 'ontical' independence of its inscription with the closed 'poetic' frame of the Church. In particular, there may, in general, be multiple 'interpretations' or identifications of the components of any situation, even within the 'Story' instituted as Church: the very unity of the Church is itself only one component at work in a general Economy of figures from which the authority of the Church distinguishes itself chiefly through this very figure of Unity.

Thus, in the West, the Church as 'Catholic' (which is as much as to say 'roman') is at work in the framing of activity in a common order of interaction of Church 'Mystery and State Economy. In the 'poetic' order of mirroring of these complementary figures or instances of Church and State, the primary self-assertion of the Church as unitary order of determination of the relations between heavenly Mystery and earthly Economy, corresponds to a logical 'side' of the dramatic order of interaction of Church and State, framed (roughly) in the 'logical' determination of the poetic order of activity in terms of a 'poetics' of Drama (in this case, framed in the 'mystery of the Mass). As we have just seen, this is complemented by a 'physical' order of the framing of activity within those 'bounds' determined by romano-germanic civil law — this embodied, notably in the early sixth-century Edicts of Theodoric and the Lex Romana Visigothorum published in the visigothic kingdom of southern Gaul in 506, where Alaric's successor had led the West Goths after Alaric's death shortly after the sack of Rome in 410.

Now these West Goths were, like the East Goths under Theodoric, Arians. Clovis, king of the Franks to their north, had vowed to become a christian should he conquer the Alemanni and Suevi to his east, and he became a catholic on Christmas Day, 496. Obtaining from the roman bishop a commission to subdue the arian West Goths to his south, he ended the visigothic kingdom of Toulouse, and incorporated it into the catholic frankish confederation in 507. The arian West Goths of Spain were con-
verted to romanism (or catholicism) under Gregory the Great at the close of the century. The arian East Goths were finally overcome by Justinian's army and permitted by his general to migrate back out of Italy in 553, following which last migration the confederation broke up. This migration out of Italy was quickly succeeded, as I have already noticed, by the migration into northern Italy of the arian Lombards in 568. By the end of the century they controlled most of north and central Italy apart from coastal cities like Ravenna (the seat of the byzantine exarch) and Rome (whose policy was directed by the pope, nominally subject to the civil authority of exarch and eastern Emperor), and had been converted to catholicism by Gregory. In the following century eastern and western churches were once more split by the 'monothelite' controversy, turning upon the eastern reduction of the will, principle of choice, in Christ, to a single 'divine' will (as the word suggests). This doctrine, which the eastern Emperor wished to enforce in the West through the civil authority of his exarch was strenuously opposed by the bishop of Rome, just as Leo and his successors had opposed the earlier and analogous doctrine of the eastern monophysites. The pope was duly arrested and carried off to Constantinople, where he soon died. The same conflict of eastern and western theology led, in the following century, to the attempt on the part of the eastern Emperor to ban 'image-worship' in the West, as in the East. Again the roman bishop upheld the poetic order of duality of heavenly actuality and earthly image, against the persistent greek tendency to incorporate the distinction of the two 'sides' (wills, natures) in the logical order of the 'heavenly' side. The italians rebelled in support of their effective leader, the bishop of Rome, and the Lombards seized the opportunity to incorporate within their feudal kingdom the last remains of byzantine rule (752). The pope thereupon called the franskish king Pepin to prevent the subordination of the western Church to Lombard power, and Pepin, defeating the Lombards in 754, bestowed the byzantine territories upon the roman see, adding in those territories civic authority of the pope to the spiritual authority he already possessed. Frankish king and roman bishop now framed the formal recognition of one another's parts, religious and civil, that was to be further instituted in the coronation by the pope of Pepin's son as 'Emperor of the Romans' in 800. Thus the pope formally consecrated Pepin king of the Franks, recognising his effective deposition of the last titular merovingian king by this his nominal vessel. That deposition had effectively been accomplished by Pepin's father, the elected duke of the East Franks, Charles 'Martel', the 'Hammer', who had himself, over the first half of the century, checked the advance of Islam.
The year 622 saw in the East both the beginning of the emperor Heraclius' restoration of Byzantine rule in Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt, and the 'Flight' of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina which marks the beginning of the Mohammedan Era.

Heraclius, exarch of Africa (which had been regained under Justinian's generals from the Vandals) had seized the Byzantine throne in 610. In the ten subsequent years the Persians conquered Egypt, Syria, Byzantium and Asia Minor. By 628 Heraclius had driven the Persian king back to his capital, and forced him to give up the Cross ('found' by Constantine's mother at Jerusalem) stolen by the Persians fourteen years before. The close of Heraclius' campaign coincides with the extension of Muhammad's 'surrender' to the Faith throughout Arabia. Heraclius now devoted himself to the pleasures of the court and theological controversy. By the time of his death in 641 the 'Califs', 'Successors', of the Prophet, had retaken in Muhammad's name Egypt and Syria, as well as Persia from whose king Heraclius had wrested these same provinces so shortly before. Carthage was finally razed once more to the ground in 698, and the Islamic progress through Spain into Gaul only halted by Charles Martel and Pepin towards the middle of the eighth century. Meanwhile the Prophet's succession had been disputed in the East by Abbas, who defeated the Umayyid Calif in 750. His successor as Calif, Al Mansur, founded the Abbasid capital of Baghdad in 762; the following year the sole survivor of the Umayyid line, who had escaped to Spain, founded the western califate of Cordova.

It is in the configuration of Frankish dominance in Europe, and the new califates of Baghdad and Cordova, around the middle of the eighth century, that a new phase of reflection begins in East and West, as parallel articulations of the logical order within the 'poetic' closed circuits of Catholicism and Islam - and also, to some extent, within the closed circuit of Byzantine Culture.
Before proceeding to that first step in the re-emergence of Reflection (culminating in the thirteenth century) I will briefly note the most rudimentary figure of the 'poetic closed-circuit' of Islam as a frame of activity.

I have already considered the correlation between the 'abstraction' of the byzantine elite (whether of Empire of Church), and the contraction of the boundaries of the eastern Empire after Justinian. And I have noted the relation between this contraction in the East, and the parallel conjunction of the 'physical' frame of romanogermanic civil order and the 'logici' frame of a (roman) Catholic Church in the West. Just as, at the beginning of our Era, the graeco-roman figure of Law was reflected in the situation of a Jewish Law, culturally intermediate between the hierarchical frame of egyptian culture, and the economic frame of babylonian ('chaleean') culture - so now the dual religious and civil order of the 'latin' West, is reflected in a new semitic framing of Culture in Law, again intermediate between egyptian and syrio-persian cultures. - This in the desert to the south of Palestine, among those other sons of Abraham, tracing their descent through Ishmael rather than Isaac.

The new Law, inscribed by the 'last and greatest of the prophets' in the line of Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses and Jesus - as the close of that series of revised contracts between God and Man, was defined in the same arabian desert of the Exodus, where Moses defined the correlation of within-and-without the Contract, and within-and-without the Land. - Defined in the same nomadic tribal culture, in the same radical distinction of divine Actuality, Allah, Al-Ilah, Eloh, the One, from Image - here the fetish-objects of the desert tribes.

- Defined in the same identification of Law as frame of activity, in which the symmetry of Heaven and Earth is reflected in the integration in the frame of the Law of policy (government), and the economy of earthly life. But whereas for the sons of Isaac this correlation was framed, as the lineal heirs of Abraham, in terms of the Land of the Contract, their Exile and Return, for the merchant Muhammad it is framed rather as an Expansion, an integration of the 'economy' of interaction of the two 'sides' of the Law as frame, in the unitary order of that frame. An Economy focussed in the Kaaba, the Black Stone of Mecca, the center of the frame, point of coincidence of Heaven and Earth. An Economy whose first 'circuit' is formed by the 'Flight', Herira, from
Mecca to Medina ('City') the focus of the Arabian 'economy' in the restricted sense) in 622, and the first Hajj, return to Mecca, in 629, anticipating the integration of Mecca in the frame of the Law in the following year, and of all Arabia with it.

Islam is the one Law, the one true frame of activity, revealed to the Prophet, framed in that Law as the locus of its assertion. To act within the Law is to identify with one's part in the Law. The Law prescribes the penalty for departure from this part of surrender, and so re-defines the part of one who has neglected some prior part. Thus in the Economy of Islam, those who would not identify with their part as subject to the Law were, according to the Law, to be killed—excluded altogether from activity (later a tax was substituted for the other sons of Abraham who preferred an earlier prophet). 'Economy' of Islam: framed in the distinction of God from any part in the economy of the Image: 'There is no god but God', La ilaha ill' Allah. The Law forbids the mechanical economy of 'play', from gambling to representation, and forbids lending money for profit.

In short the complementary 'western' frames of Catholic Church, with its 'logical' poetics of Book and Mystery, and Romano-Germanic civil order, articulated in the military preservation of the 'boundary' of the community, are integrated in the unitary frame of Islam within the 'poetic' frame of instituted Law. A Law which frames the military economy of integration of the two sides of the 'boundary' within which Mohammedans frame activity in the Law (on the one hand) and which frames the focus of the Law in the ritual 'return' to the Kaaba on the other. And within this frame the Book, Qur'an, which frames the assertion of the Law by the Prophet, in his account of the relations of Heaven and Earth which frame the mirroring of these relations in the Law (these focussed, in the heavenly and earthly configuration of his part as locus of assertion).

I will now attempt to show the relations between the logical identification of the logical component of the parallel 'closed frames' of activity of Islam and Latin West, over the five centuries between the institution of the califates of East and West (in Baghdad and Cordova), and the integration of Islamic and Latin figures of this 'identification' in the thirteenth century.
The western Church became 'catholic' under the first Benedictine pope, Gregory the Great, around the end of the sixth century. With the conversion of the Arian Visigothic king of Spain, the Catholic clergy, under Isidore, archbishop of Seville, came to dominate the country, and this dominance was in some measure responsible for the weakness of the civil government in the face of the Mohammedan invasion at the beginning of the following century. Under the presidency of Isidore, joint civil and religious councils determined in Seville in 618/9 and Toledo in 633 the 'canons' or constitution of a frame of Spanish activity in which the civil order was to a great extent inscribed within the church order, on the Augustinian plan (it was the Isidorian canons, integrating in the Canon Law of Dionysius Exiguus the subsequent papal decrees, that - supplemented by a spurious 'Donation of Constantine' in the first half of the eighth century - framed the order of the medieval Latin church).

As well as framing the constitution of the Western church, and within it the Spanish kingdom (and those later kingdoms that slowly recovered the peninsula to Christendom between the eighth and thirteenth centuries), Isidore articulated in his twenty books of Etymologies or Origin a systematic 'encyclopaedic' outline of the various orders of the Creation. This scheme, abstracted from the vast range of classical Antiquity, frames - in principle and in fact - the coordination of details of 'Natural History' (in Pliny's sense), rather as Boethius' 'liberal arts' and theology frame the coordination of the primary orders of that creation or Cosmos, over the following several centuries in the Latin West. Until the introduction of Arabic schemes in the twelfth, and to a far greater extent, in the thirteenth centuries.

Spain was the primary interface of Latin and Arabic cultures through which that introduction took place (with Provence, and Sicily taken from the Byzantine governors in the ninth century and retaken by Norman Byzantine armies in the eleventh). Isidore's dominance of the first phase of the 'middle ages' is reflected by the dominance of the Spanish cultural interface of Islam and Christendom in the third phase,
which may be taken to open in Spain with the battle of Calacanazor (1001) when the combined armies of Christendom broke Ummayad rule in the peninsular (and with it the unity of Moorish culture). By the middle of the thirteenth century the court of the philosopher-king Alfonso the Wise, alchemist, astronomer/astrologer, historian, legislator, soldier, at Toledo had replaced the Islamic schools as the focus of Iberian culture.

This cultural 'geography' is hardly to be considered accidental. The integration of Church and State after the conversion of the Visigothic kings of Toledo under Gregory itself constitutes a Latin approximation to the integration in Islam of religious and civil orders in the 'poetic' frame of a single Law. Indeed the transition from Catholic dominance to Islamic Law in the peninsular, in the first half of the eight century, may be seen as a more or less continuous and natural development. Islam was literally welcomed into Spain by the civil governor of the Emperor's last possession, the Straits - as by the many Jews whose forbears had been transported to Spain by Trajan, and by a populace whose interests conflicted radically with those of the Catholic clergy and the feudal nobility they controlled.

But surely the combined Arab and Berber forces of Islam simply advanced into Spain because it was the 'other side' of the 'boundary' of Islam? Surely they would have advanced into Spain, according to the Islamic dynamic of inscription of such physical boundaries within the expanding frame of Islam, whatever the configuration of Spanish culture? And, on the other hand, they would not have taken to sea to conquer, say, Ireland, even if the cultural configuration there was even more propitious than that in Spain?

Yes indeed: but that physical boundary of Islam, marked by the Byzantine Straits, was not somehow independent of its prior 'inscription' in Spanish and African culture. The configuration of that boundary, as the other bounds of Islam in the earlier stages of conquest, was itself part of the 'economy' of the whole Mediterranean (and adjacent) area, in which Islam itself emerged - at the very boundary of this 'economy' of the disintegrating Empire(s). And within that general 'cultural economy' - within the general 'play' or interaction of different figures and frames of activity (the interfaces of frames themselves being 'inscribed' in their interesting 'sides') - the substitution of Islamic Law for Catholic domin-
ence in Spain 'works' in a way in which the incorporation of northern Europe doesn't (at least not at all so readily). Similarly the gothic 'economy' of the Mark 'works' in the configuration of the fragmented Latin empire of the fifth and sixth centuries, in a way that Byzantine authority doesn't.

Now within the 'feudal' economy which repulsed further Islamic progress in Europe under the leadership of the Frankish dukes Charles Martel and Pepin, the figure of the Mark was extended by Pepin's son Charles the Great (Carolus Magnus, Charlemagne), into the 'Spanish March' (or Mark) of north-eastern Spain, to the limits of the Germanic confederations (late Ingelorsburg, Saxony) to the east, and throughout Burgundy and Italy (except the Byzantine extreme south and Sicily) to the south. In the east, the conquest of the Saxons took the form of their conversion to Catholic Christianity. In the south the assumption by Charles of the iron crown of the Lombard kings was also the establishment of the part of the Roman bishop in the civic order of the great Mark, reflecting that bishop's inscription of Charles' temporal authority within his own spiritual direction of the new 'Roman' Empire of the West.

- Put this simple correlation of the Church and Romano-Germanic State as two sides of a single frame of Christian activity - of Christendom - as itself but one figure or moment of the interaction of Catholic Church and feudal civic order, an 'idea' as it were of their integration, which could not, after the death of Charles and the partition of the Empire into feudal duchies under his sons and their successors, dominate the feudal economy of that civic order. - An idea whose part in the interaction of ecclesiastical and civil orders defines the rise of papal power over the next five centuries, until it frames the conflict of Emperor and Pope in the thirteenth century, and the Counter-Reformation in the sixteenth.

An idea - but 'in fact' the feudal economy of civil power led, towards the end of the tenth century, to the establishment of two complementary feudal orders which were to frame (in their interaction) the European order of the following seven centuries. The more Romanised West Franks then came under the growing power of the Counts of Paris, after
the election of Hugh Capet as feudal lord — 'king of France' — by the western dukes (or counts) in 987. — This closely following the integration of a new 'Holy Roman Empire' in the east and in Italy by Otto the Great.

The 'learning' of this period (from the eighth century to the eleventh) parallels, in its organisation or frame, the complex economy of the feudal order in which it was prosecuted. The primary characteristic of its 'outward' frame in place(s) and time, is the temporary ascendancy of local schools, organised in monasteries and cathedrals around particular teachers and perhaps one or two successors, just as feudal dominance was achieved from time to time in different duchies, through some particular configuration of succession and focussing of power in some leader or short line of leaders, 'dukes'.

This 'economy' of learning, parallelling the complex feudal economy of civil power (and church faction, these last two inextricably intertwined) was itself momentarily focussed in the carolingian 'idea' of a new Empire in which civil and religious orders would be integrated as two sides. Charlemagne instituted 'schools' or systematic instruction at those 'cathedrals' or 'seats' of bishops, whose function as ecclesiastical focal points mirrored the focus of civil administration in the cathedral city: matrix ecclesiae. The bishop was often also abbot of the attached cloister. This was generally the case in northern Britain, where the Church had been introduced from Ireland in the monastic frame of the celtic church of Patrick and Columba; it was true of York, the old roman capital of the North. Alcuin studied at the cloister-school there which had been founded by a student of Bede, abbot of Jarrow to the north, under two successive archbishops. On the death of the second he himself took charge of the school, and shortly thereafter was sent to Rome to collect the pallium or official scarf of the new archbishop. His meeting with Charlemagne on his return journey led to Alcuin's appointment as head of the court school at Aix-la-Chapelle, whence he organised the establishment of Charlemagne's new schools throughout the Empire. Latterly he was abbot of Tours, and head of the school he founded there, whence he continued the educational reform begun at Aix. He composed for these schools elementary treatises on the subjects of the trivium, as on the complementary theological frame of the Trinity.

In the time of Alcuin the British Isles were the dominant
source for the eighth-century diffusion of learning, and of the 'missionary' work among the eastern Germanic peoples, which accompanied the Frankish assimilation of these 'Germans' to the new Empire. In the missionary work the southern British church, instituted under Gregory, dominated in the person of the Devonian monk Boniface, 'Apostle to the Germans'. In learning it was the church of Ireland and the North, instituted on the monastic principles of Patrick, Columba and Cuthbert that dominated.

Patrick, before organising the Irish church had been a monk under the semi-Pelagian Cassian in Gaul (Augustine, as his name suggests, converted the Angles of southern Britain on other principles; Gregory, whose envoy he was, had himself wished to establish the Roman Church in the South, but was prevented by his election to the papacy). Pelagius himself was a British Celt, perhaps Irish, but more probably 'Brythonic' (a 'P' Celt of Roman Britain). The 'Goidelic' 'Q' Celts of the first wave of Celtic migration had never been subjected to central Roman authority, and Patrick's importation of Cassian's monastic order (instituted by the latter after his return from Egypt via Constantinople, where he had been ordained by Chrysostom) led to a distinctive Celtic Christian culture, more or less independent of Rome for several centuries. It seems, also, that learned Celts fled to the comparative tranquility of Ireland during the Germanic migrations into Gaul in the fifth and sixth centuries.

In the sixth century Columba transmitted Celtic Christianity to Scotland, with Iona as centre of diffusion, and in the following century monks from Iona carried the tradition to Northumbria, with Holy Island (Lindisfarne) as centre. In the seventh and eighth centuries this Celtic church met the Romano-Germanic English church, coming with the Germanic tribes from the south; in the ninth century the North was overrun by heathen North-Germanic people from Scandinavia. In France these 'north-men' or Normans were eventually contained by the grant of the duchy of Normandy as a French fief to their leader, whence Romano-Germanic feudalism was introduced, rather late, into the English mark-system in the eleventh century. Meanwhile, isolated Ireland remained a centre of learning, while the scholastic reform of Alcuin and Charlemagne became fragmented like the new Empire. In the middle of the ninth century a new impulse was given (once more) to this scholastic economy by the Irish monk John (Scotus) Erigena, who was made head of the court
school of Charles the Bald in France. I will not treat Erigena's writings in much detail, since his original work had little direct influence on the re-emergence of Philosophy several centuries later - his importance in relation to this revival lies rather in his translations from Dionysius, whose writings (sent by the eastern Emperor to the western Emperor, and by him to the abbot of the monastery reputedly founded by 'Denys' near Paris) I have already noted.

Erigena, coming around the middle of the phase of reflection now under discussion - as Isidore stands out around the middle of the previous phase, rather expresses, in a fairly representative way, the configuration of learning or reflection in this phase (from eighth to eleventh centuries). In his chief original work - on the Division of Nature - the complementary eastern and western figures of the close of classical Antiquity, Dionysius and Boethius, meet in a simple mirroring of their principles of mystical theology and aristotelian 'division'.

Thus the 'Division of Nature', the Frame of Kosmos, is itself framed, as a whole, in the familiar figure of a double duality in which One Actuality distinguishes itself - this formal frame of unity-in-trinity (on the divine side) and opposition-of-versions-of-opposition (on the logical side) of cosmic Economy itself being the very mirror of Dionysius' dramatric self-inscription of the logical order of discourse in the Mystery of Actuality, and Boethius' logical Economy of distinction of the logical order within Categories and Predicables.

This mirroring is articulated in the order of the seven 'liberal arts' of Martianus Capella's allegory: Erigena wrote a commentary on that work. He wrote, also, a Life of Boethius - in effect a sort of commentary on that other menippean satire, the Consolation, or rather, an inscription of the logical and theological and mathematical works within the frame of the Consolation. On his arrival at the French court he quickly became involved in an eighth-century revival of the pelagian controversy. Here the semi-pelagian background of the Celtic Church may be seen directly in its relations to the mirroring of dionysian and boethian 'logic' focused in Erigena. The figure of Freedom presented in the dramaturgical bohème of the Consolation is articulated in the systematic greek correlation of the various orders of Boethius' drama. In the correspondence of this articulation with the logical order of its own very assertion by Erigena, the Irish monk finds himself repeating Pelagius' exemplification of his principle of human freedom, in the very assertion of the
configuration of this freedom. Where earlier pelagians were condemned, however, Eriugena was protected by his royal patron from the hostile Church as represented at the Council of Valence. This correspondence of a philosophical position with the position of a secular patron - since Eriugena's assertion of freedom itself reflects Charles' assertion of his authority against the Church - was to have an extensive sequel.

Eriugena's systematic statement of his position - his inscription of the logical order of his system within the symmetrical articulation of the Kosmos it defined - must be seen as a passing focus of a complex interaction of civil, religious, and speculative orders, between the earlier focus in Alcuin, and the systematic convergence of these various orders towards the 'scholastic' synthesis or focus of the thirteenth century. As with the parallel foci of civil or ecclesiastical orders in the feudal economy of the Dark Ages, it is not possible to trace a unitary or single line through the various interacting developments, and so define a uniform or coherent 'tradition' or line of descent. Another focus, for example, is to be found in Gerbert, chosen towards the end of the tenth century by Hugh Capet as tutor to his son (the future king Robert), and (reluctantly) chosen pope in 999 (dying four years later). But one can no more trace a simple line from Alcuin through Eriugena to Gerbert and beyond, than one can trace a simple line from Charlemagne through Charles the Bald to Hugh Capet and his son. One might attempt to sketch a web of interactions, perhaps, but much of the material for any such systematic reconstruction is simply lost or unrecorded. In that sense this phase, these ages, are 'dark', and constitute a 'break' in the Tradition. Yet the basic principles of development in this period, if not the details, are clear and systematic enough. The same principles apply to the fragmentation of Catholic Unity over this period - most notably in the 'pornocracy' of its second half, when the papacy, fallen altogether into the control of the local Counts of Tusculum, became more attached to the 'orgies' of Dionysus, than the 'works' of the Christian mystery. Indeed it should not be too difficult to see the principles of interaction of these three orders of Church, State, and School within the feudal Economy of the Dark Ages. It is by identifying these principles that I will open the discussion of the next phase, from the eleventh century to the thirteenth - a phase in which these various interwoven orders develop, as it were, by identifying themselves, in relation to the others, and in distinction from their confusion in a common Economy.
The Greek Emperor Michael sent the writings of Dionysius to the Latin Emperor in the middle of the ninth century. In general there was very little direct influence of the 'abstracted' Greek culture of Byzantium upon western reflection in this phase. Erigena was one of the few Latins (outside Ireland, at least) who could even read Greek, let alone see the significance of what he read. And all his Greek sources antedate this interaction of East and West by several centuries.

Here, then, I will simply note the simplest parallels between developments in East and West.

In the eighth century John of Damascus (then the seat of the Calif) produced an encyclopaedic exposition of the 'Orthodox Faith', in which later deviations from the theological frame of the cacocolian Fathers of the fourth century, such as the views of the monophysites ('copt monothelites', later 'maronites'), and those of the 'iconoclasts' then dominant at Constantinople, were shown to be 'outside' the systematic articulation of the 'orthodox' view. It is said that the Emperor tried to implicate John in a fictitious plot against the Calif.

In the time of Charlemagne the Empress Irene restored Image-Worship, and devised the scheme of integrating Charles' idea of a united West in a still wider re-uniting of East and West through the marriage of Emperor and Empress. Charles' idea was, at the time, unrealistic, though it was to play an important part in the development of the West. Irene's idea, still more unrealistic, was later reflected in successive attempts to reunite, not the Empires, but the churches that became separate, in effect, after the Photian Schism of the following century.

—Michael (who sent Dionysius' books to the West) argued with the Patriarch of Constantinople, deposed him, and installed in his place a layman, Photius, rushed through all the Holy orders lower than Patriarch in a week. The pope sided with the deposed Patriarch, and excommunicated the learned Photius. After various rounds of mutual excommunication and reconciliation, Photius eventually drew up a list of unorthodox practices and doctrines of the Latin Church, excommunicated its leaders, and withdrew from communion with the Church as a whole. The chief doctrinal matter related to the interpolation in the credal statement of Micaea and Constantinople of 'and the Son' in 'The Spirit, who proceeds from
the Father and the Son' ('procession' being the familiar ἐμφάνισις of the neoplatonists). After various attempts at reconciliation, the rupture was at last definitively formalised in 1054, when the pope's representative laid the Roman bishop's anathema on the altar of the church of Saint Sophia - Ἱερός Ναός - 'Holy Wisdom' - in Constantinople.

Meanwhile the abbasid Califs had made Baghdad the chief school of Islam. As I have noted above, the middle of the eighth century marks the close of the first Islamic expansion, as of the united government of Islam, civil and religious, under the Umayyad 'Califs' or Successors of the Prophet. The revolt of the Persian Abbasids in the East, which coincides with the first limit of Islamic expansion, and the beginnings of fragmentation of the Islamic frame into more or less independent provinces (albeit in nominal subordination to eastern or western Calif), also marks the beginnings of a largely Persian - Islamic learning that is to become further and further detached from the Koranic commentary that preceded and paralleled it. - A learning whose decline corresponds with a religious revival or reaction in the following 'phase' (eleventh to thirteenth centuries).

Here, as in Byzantium and the Latin West, intellectual, religious and civil orders parallel one another and interact in a fairly systematic way. Thus the political orders of Charlemagne and the Empress Irene are paralleled or reflected by the early abbasid order in Egypt, Syria, Arabia and Persia. The greatest abbasid, Haroun al-Raschid, 'the Righteous', actually sent ambassadors to the court of Charlemagne in 798, as Irene was planning the union of East and West. Haroun, like Charlemagne, was the foremost patron of learning of his time. In the case of Haroun, as in that of Charlemagne, a focal ideal of a systematic and integrated frame of - Islamic or Christian - activity, was but one 'moment', the passing dominance of that figure among many others, in an economy of power which was not to be reduced to its inscription in some formal scheme of
subordination of complex 'economy' to a unitary policy framed by one or two men. The successors of Waroun maintained the abbasid tradition of a cultured court only by delegating the framing of civic order to turkish governors and armies. The initial authority of the Calif (nominally both civil and religious focus of Islam), preserved through this delegation, was quickly reduced by the incorporation of that figure of delegation, of the relation of religious and civil orders, within the civil economy of turkish power. Eventually the Calif, in 946, called upon the persian dynasty of Powid governors to wrest Bagdad from his turkish officers, and reestablish his authority, civil and religious. In 1050, the same pattern of inscription of the Calif's authority in a Powid economy of power led to the expulsion of the Powids by the Seljuk Turks, called in by a descendant of the Calif who had earlier called upon the force of other Turks, as of the Powids. Finally, in the thirteenth century, the Seljuks were displaced by Mongol incursions, which eventually led to the sack of Bagdad and end of the Abbasids, as of the institution of Calif, in 1258.

In the first phase of the califate of Bagdad one may see, in the figure of an islamic court distinguishing itself within the islamic frame articulated by the middle of the eighth century, a familiar correlation of analogous figures of 'physical' and 'logical' determinations of the 'poetic' frame of activity. The 'political' assertion of the early Calif of Bagdad, in their new capital, within the physical hands of Islam now instituted through an earlier 'economy' of conquest, both incorporates as one element, and is itself inscribed in, the 'logical' poetics of court culture, focused in those texts which glorify the patron Waroun (as, for example, the complex stories-within-stories of the Thousand-and-One Nights, within which he so often appears and reappears).

The 'logical' analogue of Waroun's version (as 'Successor') of the Prophet's identification of himself as locus of assertion, in the unitary frame of Islam he asserts, is to be found in texts which reflect, in the logical order of their discourse, the place of this logical order of assertion in the symmetrical Cosmos it frames. The 'religious' reaction of the eleventh century, paralleling the decline of Bagdad, and of the Calif's authority, denounces the inscription of this order of mirroring of text and Cosmos in the logical order of the 'philosoph-
ical' text. In the next phase we will see how the emergence of this figure of Islamic 'rationalism' around the beginning of the eleventh century (with Avicenna) is criticised around the end of that century by Al-Ghazzali, and how this criticism provokes a more radical re-assertion of 'rationalism' in Spain (in the figure of Averroes), which in turn constitutes one component of the thirteenth century synthesis of Reason and (Christian) Faith. The main principle of this new self-assertion of Reason has, in fact, already been seen in Erigena's logical framing of Boethius' dramatisation (in the Consolation) of the question of human freedom. That the question of the orthodoxy of such 'rationalism' should first arise within the Islamic frame is not surprising, since there the conflict of the logical figure of rational self-assertion with the principle of 'surrender' to one's part in the poetic circuit framed by the Koran is direct, whereas the analogous conflict of Pelagian freedom and Augustinian predestination involves a radical complementarity and interplay of these two sides, focussed in the problematic character of the Incarnation.


The pattern of development of the Abbasid culture focussed in the court at Baghdad is, in what concerns us here, very simple. The pattern as a whole might be taken to be represented by an encyclopaedic corpus attributed to a 'Jabir' (Latinised Geber') said to have flourished in the earliest years of Abbasid rule. 'Jabir's' texts as we have them in arabic were, it seems, organised or edited in the tenth century, but they seem to represent a 'tradition' beginning with a real Jabir in the latter part of the eighth century. Like the writings of unquestionable authorship in this same period (notably those of Al-Razi around the end of the ninth century), those of 'Jabir' treat of 'philosophy' in precisely those figures of 'applied logic' whose development in classical Antiquity I discussed at various places above: mathematics, magic, medicine, alchemy, music and astrology (the latter two treated 'mathematically' in the Ptolemaic tradition). Logic figures as prooaeuetic to this symmetrical articulation of 'applied sciences', and the Kosmos in which they are integrated as various orders of 'philosophy' is itself framed 'mathematically': in that 'applied logic' which is the formal articulation of the logical order, as correlated with those other orders whose primary theories of 'application' are numbered here, within the 'poetic' order of symmetry.
That is to say, the orders of the Jabirian corpus (and of the other encyclopaedic corpora of this phase) unfolds from the simple figure of inscription in a text of the relation of text and cosmic context, as these two sides are mirrored in the figure of poetic 'closure' which frames Islam. And this 'poetics' (or logical dramatics) of Kosmos itself reflects the 'physical' poetics of the Abbasid framing of Islamic activity as a whole.

What though of the integration of these various orders of 'applied science' or 'applied reflection' (that is, of these theories of application of theory, framed in the inscription of their common 'logical' order in a 'poetic order' itself logically determined)? What of 'Islamic philosophy' as the cosmic economy of correlation of these symmetrical orders?

The component figures of the encyclopaedic Islamic synthesis of the eighth to eleventh centuries were first derived through Graeco-Syrian channels. I have already noted that John of Damascus prepared an encyclopaedia of 'orthodox' theology under the 'Abbasid Califs of Damascus. John is said to have been educated by an Italian monk brought as a slave to the Mosaic capital, but eventually made a minister by the Calif. By this time the forced conversion of infidels (the choice of 'surrender' or death) had been replaced by a tax on those who recognised Abraham but not the complete succession of prophets down to Muhammad.

Most of the Graeco-Syrian subjects of the Califs were not as 'orthodox' as John. Indeed, most of the learned men in the area of the new Abbasid capital Baghdad were Nestorians who had been expelled from the Empire in the fifth century. The theological frame of Nestorius, it will be remembered, involved a division of natures, heavenly and earthly, of the Second Person. After Nestorius this theological 'economy' of interaction of Heaven and Earth became dominant in Syria, just as the 'hierarchical' scheme of the 'Monophysites' became dominant in Egypt. - These complementary heresies (condemned, it will also be remembered, through Leo the Great's influence at the Council of Chalcedon in 451) reflect complementary figures of Egyptian and Syrian 'mythology' and culture, established a couple of millennia before the time of the Christ.
It will also be remembered that the close of classical Antiquity, East and West, was marked by an integration (notably by Proclus) of aristotelian 'Economy' of Kosmos, and the platonic actualities, 'ideas', distinguishing themselves, as the integrative order of unitary Actuality, from their reflection in the 'play' of Economy of figure.

Now the dominant frame or scheme of nestorian reflection turns out to have been (not very surprisingly) an inscription of this mirroring of aristotelian and platonic 'sides' of the cosmic order (of, among other things, our incarnation) in the aristotelian Economy of Kosmos - or rather in the aristotelian correlation of various orders as primary frame, the actual details modified by the identification of the 'working' or actuality of this frame in the mirroring of platonic and aristotelian 'sides' in the 'figuration' of the Incarnation. (A parallel may be seen in the part of allegory and the 'poetic' order of 'figuration' in the syrian school of neoplatonism deriving from Porphyry and Iamblichus).

- For is it surprising to find that this aristotelian frame of correlation of the various orders of Kosmos, articulated in the primary 'poetic' working or actuality of figure, should have been embodied in nestorian traditions of those two fundamental 'applied sciences', mathematics and medicine, and that it was Euclid, Ptolemy and nestorian medical works that were first translated under the abbasid Califs.
- That 'greek' learning first appears at Baghdad in the persons of greek-syrian physicians and astronomers (or astrologers).

In the unfolding of this initial impulse (which frames, then, the 'logical' analogue of abbasid rule, already defined), the latter part of the ninth century (the time of Erigena and Photius) sees the first systematic correlation of the various 'applied theories' - the various orders of inscription of theory in the 'circular' poetic frame of Islam - in a symmetrical encyclopaedic scheme. The earlier part of that century anticipates such an integration in the mathematical figure of 'algorism' or 'algebra' - the Al-ja'br wa'l muqabalah of Al-Kwar-
ismi, the Calif's librarian. 'Algorism': Al-Khwarismi, as the name indicates, was, like a great part of the learned representatives of abbasid culture, a native of Khoraṣan. Khoraṣan: 'East' — that focus of the eastern aryan migrations already referred to above, that prime locus of the 'aryan' mirroring of the organisation of the physical boundary of culture, in its 'logical' articulation. — Also the eastern limit of Islam, its boundary, where it confronts the successive waves of turkic migration or invasion, and behind them, the 'huns', hWinter-mongols. — This cultural configuration outwardly reflects the part of eastern persians at the abbasid court: it was they, largely, who embodied the interaction of the closed poetic frame of Islam, and the graeco-syrian logical analogue of this frame, represented by the nestorians.

"Al-jebr wa'l muqabalah: 'Putting-together of parts, and equation', 'Joining and bringing-together' — the title of Al-Khwarismi's book, 'Algebra'.

— Which is to say, just that correlation of mathematical 'figure' in abstraction from the reduction or euclidean decomposition to point and line, which we saw in Diophantus, marking there a limit of greek mathematical theory.

— From the early thirteenth century, when Al-Khwarismi's methods were introduced into Italy by Leonardo (Fibonacci) of Pisa under a latin title 'Algebra' et 'Almucha', 'algorism' came to mean the arithmetic based on Al-Khwarismi's 'arabic' numeration — the cyclical notation of units, tens of units, tens of tens, and so on, used in the arabian's (rather, persian's) work.

As this 'algebra' in a way prefigures the encyclopaedic articulation of the sciences within an aristotelian terminology in the ninth century, that 'encyclopaedic' approach (of, say, Al-Razi) itself prepares the islamic 'philosophy' proper of the next century. Al-Farabi integrates the correlated orders within a unitary 'philosophical' scheme, which represents a step beyond encyclopaedic correlation, just as that itself represents a step beyond the mathematical figure of the 'applied' logical order common to the various orders of application. — This intermediary character of encyclopaedic correlations may be seen in Jabir's 'principle of the 'alchemical balance' — mizan — for which he is perhaps best known. Every kind of matter has a numerical index of its constitution, and each
alchemical operation has a certain power of conversion, represented by a quotient, say \( \frac{x}{y} \), which converts matter \( y \) to matter \( x \). It will be seen that by attempting to describe complex operations in this manner, alchemy might be approximated to an 'algebraic' frame.

That is, of course, a merely fortuitous correlation of two orders, which might work in some particular situations, but which is not based on some more radical 'philosophical' principle of correlation, applicable in general.

Such an integration of the various orders within a systematic 'philosophical' frame - within a cosmos with 'platonic' and aristotelian 'sides', in which the various figures of 'applied science' might be systematically 'inscribed' and correlated, marks the close of this phase now under consideration, and the opening of the next, as Avicenna - Ibn Sina - wanders from court to court in search of a suitable locus for his reflection. Meanwhile, in the West, the umayyad schools had begun to flourish under the cordovan Califs of the ninth century - their impetus derived largely from the abbasid schools of the East. It is to the interaction of islamic and latin traditions in the West that I now pass, first noting the reaction which, in the East, frames the position of the central figure in that western interaction, Averroes, Ibn Raschid.
Avicenna may be taken as a focal figure in the development of the 'islamic' culture which dominates the intellectual transition from the 'logical' frame of the Philosophy of classical Antiquity to the re-emergence of a philosophical tradition in the medieval universities of the Latin West. I have suggested that this Islamic transition might be framed in the figure of the simple 'poetic' closed-circuit of Islam - a unitary or integral law, civil and religious, which frames its own locus of assertion in the figure of the divine Voice, the Prophet. And, within this simple closed-circuit, I have attempted to identify a correlation of the 'logical' order of ('applied') Reflection, and the rule of the Abbasids. - A rule whose civil order is dominated by the interface of Islam and successive Turkic and Mongolic waves in Khorasan, just as the court culture of Baghdad and the provincial capitals is dominated that 'East' of Persia.

Avicenna, himself from that 'East', and playing the characteristic part at various (now more or less independent) Persian courts of physician, stands, in the early years of the eleventh century, midway between the encyclopaedic correlations of Al-Razi around the end of the ninth century, and the re-assertion by Al-Ghazzali around the end of the eleventh century, of the primacy of the dramatic order of Islam over the logical order of 'science' or 'philosophy'. More generally, he stands between the encyclopaedic correlations of the ninth and tenth centuries, and the religious reaction or revival of the following two centuries - midway between the beginnings, then, of Abbasid culture in the eighth century, and its close in the wake of the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century.

More generally still, one might regard the beginning of the eleventh century as the point at which the symmetry of logical and poetic orders of Abbasid culture comes into question, and Avicenna's years of teaching at Isfahan, around 1030, as a 'logical' framing of that central or focal configuration of Islamic reflection, Islamic 'philosophy'. Then we might see Avicenna's scheme (developed over his years as court physician) as the first step in the interaction of 'logical' and 'poetic' framings of that focus, which dominates the phase now to be considered, and leads to the close of the logical order of Islamic philosophy in its definitive inscription within the poetic order framed by the Koran.
What, then, is the 'configuration' of this focus, as 'framed' by Avicenna?

- Its simplest aspect is implicit in the discussion of the last 'phase' of Islamic reflection: a complementarity of Aristotelian Economy and (neo)Platonic self-distinguishing 'Actuality' (this last corresponding to the 'working' of Aristotelian Form). - And this complementarity framed in the poetic 'closed-circuit' of Law, as expressed in the Koran, which, focussed in the figure of the Prophet, reflects the primary theological actuality of divine self-expression.

Within such a primary 'poetic' frame of Cosmos, the various correlative orders of reflection may be inscribed in a primary symmetrical configuration of what I have called the (primary) 'applied' orders - mathematics, magic, medicine, alchemy, music and astrology.

Formally, the whole is framed in a mathematical order of Cosmos, in which Platonic and Aristotelian 'sides' are mirrored through the identification of the Aristotelian figure of 'Active Intellect' (psychical actuality, distinguishing itself from the formal possibility of this distinction - from 'passive intellect' and its own Economy of form-within-form) with the Aristotelian figure of the 'sphere' of the Moon as interface of heavenly actuality and earthly economy, potentiality - as 'poetic' interface of psychical and physical orders, in which their mirroring is articulated.

Within this formal frame, theological actuality is articulated, form within form, in the scheme of an astrology which organises the 'musical' economy of the 'poetics' of earthly activity. Within that scheme, Avicenna's medicine is mirrored in his alchemy, according to the galenic figure of the human body as physical interface of physical and psychical orders. Magic amounts to a participation in sharing actuality through the invocation of 'forces', astral and elemental, corresponding to particular 'figures', numerical, talismanic, and so on.

These orders, 'sciences', correspond to correlative 'abstractions' from the primary poetic frame of cosmic Law - but this primacy of Law, as the dramatic frame in which the Actual Kosmos distinguishes itself
from its mere possibility, Matter, is itself here determined formally. The abstraction of the discursive order of the text or science from the Drama of cosmic Law, is itself inscribed in the order of the text, rather than the actual instance of this abstraction, in a particular text, being inscribed in the Drama, in the Law.

The latter figure has, as we have already seen in relation to byzantine culture, two complementary instances, there corresponding to the civil Law of Justinian, in which the Code is itself inscribed in the Law it frames, and the 'mystical theology' of Dionysius, in which the distance of text or discourse from the Drama in which it corresponds to one order, is itself 'invoked' in the text - the text is itself 'inscribed' in the 'actual' distance between the text and the Actuality which is its primary 'object'. The 'logical' order of the text is inscribed in a dramatic Actuality marked in the text as 'outside' the logical order of the text - and as 'outside' the logical order of 'inside' and 'outside' the text which, as marked in the text, is constitutive of the 'distance' of abstraction.

In the Islamic frame these two figures meet in the Prophet's inscription of the 'order' of his discourse in the cosmic Law it frames. There they constitute the domains of an Islamic Law, articulating the detailed figures of inscription of every action within the frame of the Koran, and an Islamic 'mysticism' in which the act of writing is inscribed in the cosmic Drama as that particular instance of the discursive order, in its 'distance' from the dramatic order which it cannot 'comprehend' in this, one of the components of that dramatic order.

These 'domains' parallel, in their development, the unfolding of the 'logical' order of Islamic reflection. Thus Abu Panifa, first of the four orthodox Sunni Imams, died in prison in Baghdad in 769, having refused to act as Cadi or (supreme) judge under the abbasid Calif. Also, under the first abbasid Califs there appeared in Khurasan those 'sufis' or wool-wearers who were to develop the Persian tradition of Islamic mysticism.

'Sunni Imam': Abu Panifa was the first to collect the Sunna or oral traditions relating to the Prophet, and to integrate these within the
frame of activity defined by the Koran. These 'traditions' were inscribed within the frame of the Koran, according to the framing of that principle of inscription in terms of the koranic frame. - And the grounds for rejecting some traditions as spurious were themselves a simple corollary of these principles of further specification or definition of the 'orthodox' frame.

Within this frame of the 'first orthodox Imam', the same principle was reiterated by successors, who eventually collected hundreds of thousands of stories purporting to further specify the primary story of the Koran. The vast majority were rejected, as due to the deceptions of one of the Prophets' associates who, according to the Koran, was a great liar. The definitive frame, then, elaborated by the 'four orthodox Imams' in the eighth and ninth centuries (the last died in 870) is to be understood as a complete principle of decision for every circumstance, to which the orthodox or 'sunni' mohammedan should unconditionally 'surrender' anything in the way of personal judgement or self-assertion. The first orthodox Imam, Abu Fanifa, had refused to be the great Cadi for fear of the punishment he had himself defined, for a wrong decision, a wrong choice, a self-assertion under the semblance of assertion of the Koran. The second orthodox Imam, Malik, taught at Medina:

On his death-bed he regretted with tears that he had ever used his own judgement in pronouncing an opinion on a point of law, and wished that he had been flogged and re-flogged every time (1).

It will be seen that this systematisation of the koranic framing of activity parallels the framing of an encyclopaedic 'science' within the same frame of the Book, Qur'an, Koran. A far closer parallel development is that of 'Shiah', sects, 'parties' - predominantly persian - who rejected the authority of the four orthodox Imams. The first such 'sect' recognised as definitive only the rulings of the fourth Calif, Ali, and his successors down to the middle of the eighth century, ending with their sixth Imam, Ja'afar, the reputed teacher of Jabir. Another major sect (or rather group of sects) accepted twelve such Imams, down to the death - or rather 'disappearance' - of the last in 879 (about the same date as the completion of the definitive Sunni system). Parallel, again, to this persian reaction against arabic formalism, beginning (again) towards the end of the eighth century, in eastern Persia, is the 'Sufi' tradition.
It was largely through Shi'ah support that the Abbasids of Persia overthrew the Umayyad califate of Damascus in 750. It was largely in the face of rising Shiite power that Paroun's son and third successor in the califate (833-842) appointed Turkic officers and governors who soon, in their turn, controlled the Calif. The Persian Bowids, called in a century later (949) to counter this Turkic control, were themselves Shiites. The Seljuk Turks, another century later (1050), called in to oust Bowid control, were orthodox. Their leader was established as 'Defender of the Faith'. With the overthrow of the Bowids we can see the orthodox reaction which quickly follows the 'liberal' Persian culture of Avicenna, and in which Al-Ghazzali is a central figure.

Yet Al-Ghazzali himself criticizes merely domastic orthodoxy, dominant under the Seljuks: the 'theological' criticism of the logically circular 'philosophical' self-assertion (of which he takes Al-Parabi and Avicenna as the two most acceptable proponents) is itself involved in a similar circularity. In the closed poetic circuit of Koran and Sunna, it is not enough simply to counter philosophical criticism simply by identifying that 'logical' figure of self-assertion within the koranic or sunni frame as 'wrong'. For such circular theological criticism of the philosophers can itself be 'logically' regarded as amounting to the figure of mere superstition, with which the teaching of the Koran (for whose representative the orthodox teachers are taken) thus becomes confused. And, at the same time, just because intellectual self-assertion is (indeed) a wrong framing of activity, counter to the teaching of the Prophet, this does not mean that the logical frame of that self-assertion — notably the fundamental frame of mathematical figure — is itself 'wrong'. In itself mathematical figure, for example, is neither 'right' nor 'wrong': it is the inscription of the koranic frame in mathematical figure taken as more radical that is 'wrong', and to argue that mathematics is counter to theology simply leads to another lowering of people's estimation of theology, since they see that mathematics, in itself, 'works'.

In his Confessions, Al-Ghazzali (born in Khorasan in 1058) explains how, seeing the common circularity of 'philosophy' and dogmatic theology, gave up his professorship at Baghdad in 1096 (where he had been the leading orthodox theologian). Philosophical self-assertion he had seen to be even 'logically' circular: for how could one frame the starting-
point of logical deduction? - Such a framing must itself be open to question - it amounts to one story among others, which can itself, in turn, be framed as illusory. Thus, for example, we might dream we are awake, and this wakefulness will seem to know itself, in the dream, as wakefulness. How do we know that the situation is not analogous with any 'logical' starting-point?

- Indeed within the circularity of this 'logical' order Al-Farabi and Avicenna, following Aristotle, have articulated all figures quite properly. In this though, although closest of all philosophers to the truth, their primary mistake of substituting the logical frame of Philosophy for Actuality is reflected in their mistaken denial of a physical resurrection, as in their belief that God knows only universals, and not individuals, and that the Kosmos is eternal, without beginning in Time. Each of these radical misconceptions derive from taking the logical frame constituted in the figure of abstraction from Actuality, as itself the primary figure in which Actuality itself is to be logically inscribed.

In the sufi discourses, however, Al-Ghazzali found the very order of discourse, and its logical articulation, itself 'practically', dramatically inscribed in Actuality, as an abstraction from Actuality. It was at this point that he resigned his professorship, since theological discourse was itself articulated within the frame of word and text, without the recognition that such a discursive frame must itself be dramatically identified 'at work' in a more radical Drama. The theological frame of 'faith' and the logical frame of discursive 'reason' each involve an identification with some 'part' - a right part in the former, an illusory part in the latter case. The sufi distinguishes the actuality of 'I' from both parts - this in figures of such self-distinction of self-asserting actuality: figures actually 'at work' in the actual situation of this distinction of Actuality from its inscription in the discursive order(s) of philosophy or dogmatic theology. The first experience of such a more-embracing dramatic actuality, of which its inscription in discourse is itself simply one component (as the sufi discourses insist) this 'negative' aspect being itself a primary figure of Actuality's self-distinction) through some particular figure, the sufi's call waqfd, 'ecstasy': 'standing-outside' one-self (or rather outside that 'art' one had until then taken for oneself).
When, through the dramatic interaction of actuality and discursive 'conception' of this interaction, one distinguishes oneself from one's 'part' solely as such (rather than from some aspect, in some particular figure), 'ecstasy' passes into 'knowledge':

From the time that they set out on this (sufi) path, revelations commence for them. They come to see in the waking state angels and souls of prophets; they hear their voices and wise counsels. By means of this contemplation of heavenly forms and images they rise by degrees to heights which human language cannot reach, which one cannot even indicate without falling into great and inevitable errors. The degree of proximity to Deity which they attain is regarded by some as an intermixture of being (haloul), by others as identification (ittihad), by others as intimate union (wasil). But all these expressions are wrong, as we have explained in our work entitled The Chief Aim. Those who have reached that stage should confine themselves to repeating the verse:

What I experience I shall not try to say;
Call me happy, but ask me no more.

In short, he who does not arrive at the intuition of these truths by means of ecstasy knows only the name of inspiration. (1)

Al-Ghazali goes on to frame the figure of an inscription of the logical order of Reason within this dramatic order where

The miracles wrought by the saints are, in fact, merely the earliest forms of prophetic manifestation. (2)

- on the analogy of the inscription within this rational or discursive order of the distinction of Reason and Sense (according to the familiar figure of that first 'recurrence' of the logical order in which logical and physical orders are distinguished - a recurrence which defines the very 'logical' circularity which 'closure' separates logical inside and outside).

Within this principle of inscription (then) of the discursive order of Reason and Philosophy within the dramatic order, to step 'into' which through ecstasy is to become a sufi, Al-Ghazali, over the early years of the twelfth century (before his death in 1111) re-inscribed the figuration of the 'philosophical' sciences.
Before the time of Al-Ghazzali 'sufis' had been caught in the same series of alternating prominence and persecution as other Persian 'sects'. Around the time when the close circuit of 'sunni' orthodoxy was being completed by the fourth orthodox Imam, after the middle of the ninth century - when the most prominent shiah or sect appeared to contest that orthodoxy - there arose the question of whether sufism was 'within' the Law. Many of those who expressed their ecstasy as 'identification' - itiḥad - with God (as the identification of al-ilah with the 'I' which distinguishes itself from our 'part' in that ecstasy: Hallaj said: I am God) were executed. Others found descriptions of this 'union' more in accord with the 'poetic' or theological circuit of Koranic Law, and were regarded as 'saints'. Al-Ghazzali integrated sufism with orthodoxy by finding the articulation of the distinction of dramatic actuality from its definition in the discursive order of the Koran and sunna, in the Koranic text.

Al-Ghazzali thus defines the 'part' of the logical order in the dramatic frame articulated through the self-inscription of the Koranic text in the dramatic frame it defines, and in which it defines itself as one component. This dramatic articulation of this Kosmos (since the word which describes the Kosmos of Al-Ghazzali must indicate its part in the Kosmos it identifies) is focussed in the figure of a discursive order in which is inscribed the distinction between the actuality in which this order is one component, and the inscription of this relation of actuality and discourse in discourse. A discursive order which thus inscribes itself in a wider actuality as one component. This figure is embodied in the Prophet, in his words - as it is embodied in prayer - and, as it were the 'focus' of prayer, the simple invocation of the actuality, 'power', which distinguishes itself from the discursive order of the words, in the Name of God: Allahu Akbar. Al-Ghazzali, immediately before the passages quoted above, presents prayer as the primary figure of sufi activity:

The drawing up of the heart by prayer is the keystone of (their cathartic method), as the cry Allahu Akbar is the keystone of prayer (12).

This inscription of the 'logical' order of discourse in the dramatic order framed by the part of the Koran in the Kosmos it frames (the part of primary frame of all assertion, whether that of the Prophet through whom this primacy is asserted, or that of the 'Mohammedan' who is to frame his assertion and his self-assertion in his action, by finding his
part in this frame) marks a limit of abbasid 'philosophy' as framed in the 'logical' circle or circuit of an order of discourse taken as primary - just as Dionysius' analogous 'mystical theology' marks a limit of 'classical' greek philosophy.

This limit - corresponding to Al-Ghazzali's resignation of his chair of theology at Baghdad - coincides with the renewed fragmentation of the abbasid califate which had been reunited by the Seljuks fifty years before. - A fragmentation, again, into independent provinces, each ruled by a seljuk dynasty, chief among these Khorassan and Rum or Asia Minor (extending by the beginning of the thirteenth century well into Mesopotamia and Persia). The mongol invasion of Khorassan, beginning with Genghis Khan's campaign of 1225, and concluding with the establishment by his grandson Hulagu of a new perso-mongol dynasty in 1253, precipitated a widespread migration of persians and turks into Rum. A small turkic tribe, fleeing to Rum from their camping-grounds in Khorassan, joined in the seljuk defence of the former province against the mongols proceeding westwards, and were as a result granted land bordering on the byzantine possessions in the north-west. Hence they expanded over the succeeding two-and-a-half centuries westward into Europe and southwards and eastwards, assimilating all of the old califate but Persia, where in 1500 Ismail the Sufi, at the head of a confederation of turkic tribes, began to establish a new persian kingdom framed by a 'sufi' dynasty, with shiah Islam as the national order, civil and religious. The 'Ottoman Empire' in Europe and the 'Near East' (corresponding roughly to the old eastern 'roman' Empire) endured until the twentieth century, the sufi dynasty of Persia until the eighteenth.

Among the persians who migrated from Khorassan to Rum on the eve of the mongol invasion were the family of Rumi, who in 1240 became a professor of theology in the capital, Koza (Ikonium) of Rum. 'Rumi's' conversion to sufism several years later - through his intercourse with a wandering dervish - might be taken as the close of the phase beginning in the East with Avicenna's encyclopaedic system. - For in Rumi's poems the inscription of their logical or discursive order in the dramatic order of their enunciation (that figure already discovered in the discourses of Al-Ghazzali) becomes one symmetrical component of a mystical 'invocation' - one among various orders symmetrically inscribed within
the dramatic order of those night-long assemblies which begun after Rumi's theological students at Konia had driven away the mysterious dervish in 1247.

In the outward physical frame of a circling movement— a 'dance' inscribed within the circuits-within-circuits of bodily rotation and the corresponding temporal rhythm of music, Rumi now began to articulate the sufi's 'mystery', through the invocation of the dervish who had framed his access to that dramatic order, and who was now physically gone, though the 'working' of this figure of access through him to the mystery remained, like the Spirit of the Christ after his 'disappearance'.

The songs of the dancing Rumi embody or reflect in the discursive order of their words a working or dramatic actuality which distinguishes itself (in these very words, the figure they embody) from its 'naming', from its inscription in the words, as outside them. Many of the songs close in a silence where the words stop and Shams al-Din 'arrives' in the assembly:

Shams-i Tabrizi, you are the Sun within the cloud of words; when your Sun arose, all speech was obliterated (1).

The 'working' of the sufi figuration of 'ecstasy' in the dramatic situation of which the description of this working in words designates itself as one component, is inscribed within the frame of the 'working' in Rumi's life as a whole, of the arrival at Konia of the wandering mystic of Tabriz. In the order of Rumi's poetry, then, the inscription of the logical or discursive order of islamic philosophy within the poetic circuit framed in the Voran (and focused for Rumi in Shams-al-Din as the primary figure of his access to the Drama) is completed. - This at the close of the phase which begins with Avicenna and the earliest sufi poetry, and passes through Al-Ghazzali's inscription of the logical in the 'poetic' circuit, in the discursive medium of 'logical' arose.

Reason says: The six directions are the boundary, and there is no way out; - Love says: There is a way, and I have many times travelled it.

Reason held a bazaar, and began trading; Love beheld many bazaars beyond Reason's bazaar. (2)

This integration in Asia Minor of 'Reason' and its discursive or logical order within the symmetric figuration of the poetic order — within the mystery of Love embodied in the heart (rather than Reason of the head) — parallels the primary figure of the integration of these same orders in the Latin West, corresponding to the beginning around the middle of the same century of Aquinas' teaching at the University of Paris.

And just as Aquinas proceeded to articulate the Frame of Kosmos within the figuration of his initial teaching, until a 'mystical' experience in the year (1273) of Rumi's death (the year before his own) led him to forsake the discursive order of Reason — so Rumi proceeded to articulate the poetic figuration of ecstasy within the systematic prose of the Mathnawi which frames (as in Martianus Capella or Boethius) the poetry that in its turn 'punctuates' that system, that prose.

Rumi and Aquinas mark, in their different ways and different situations, the close of the phase that begins with Avicenna's encyclopaedic integration of the various orders of Islamic 'science' within an aristotelian 'economy' of Kosmos which mirrors a (neo)platonistic scheme of Actuality within the poetic frame of the Koran (or rather the poetic frame reflected in the Koran as one component of that frame — as focal configuration of the discursive order of Book, Quran, Text, in that order the Book 'frames' — so framing, of course, its own 'part' in the wider order).

Within the unfolding of a more radical figure than that which defines the phase from Avicenna to Rumi and Aquinas, we might see these two — the Christian and the mohammedan theologians, as closing the development that opens in the close of classical 'Antiquity', reflected, say, in Boethius in the Latin West, and Dionysius in the hellenistic East. I have already indicated that the close of this wider phase or period in the thirteenth century corresponds to a re-assertion of the (logical) order of reflection in its independence of the poetic order of 'Faith' (of the Christian 'Drama' instituted in the Church). — This, at least, in the Latin West: for the close of this phase in the East, corresponding to the establishment of Hulagu's Mongol kingdom in Khurasan, his sack of Baghdad, and the end of the abbasid caliphate, amounts to the 'definitive inscription' of the logical order of the Text within the poetic frame of Islam.
Within the general figure of a transition from the end of 'classical' Antiquity around the beginning of the sixth century, to the 'scholastic' synthesis of the thirteenth in the Latin West, one might then inscribe - as a component of this 'western' transition - the Islamic 'cycle' beginning in the first appearance of Islam in the first third of the seventh century, and closing with the reassertion of the Islamic primacy of the poetic frame of the Koran in the religious revival focussed in Al-Ghazzali around the beginning of the twelfth century. - That is: one might see the rise of Islam in the first phase of this transition (500-750) mirrored in the reintegration of the logical order of Islamic 'sciences' and philosophy over the closing phase (1000-1250). The intellectual interaction of Islam and Latin West over this last phase of the transition might then be inscribed in the figure of the 'cultural' interaction of Islam and Christian whose primary expression in this phase is to be found in the military advance of the 'latins' into Moorish Spain in the West, and into the Seljuk kingdoms of Rum and Syria in the east - this latter advance appearing in the periodic figure of 'crusade'.

The Christian advance in Spain, after the disintegration of the umayyad caliphate of Cordova at the beginning of the eleventh century, was accompanied by a 'religious revival' or reaction paralleling that which, in the newly independent Seljuk kingdoms of the East, was the primary motive (nominally at least) of the 'crusades' (the new rulers of Asia Minor and Syria were, according to Peter the Hermit upon his return from Jerusalem, persecuting Christian pilgrims to Palestine, through their Sunni zeal). In the fragmentation of the political order of Spain and North Africa following the collapse of the Cordovan caliphate, the government of the various small kingdoms came, over the second half of the eleventh century, into the control of tribes from the slopes of the Atlas mountains, stirred up by the teaching of Abiyy Allah ben-Yasin. By 1086 these Almoravids - 'dedicated to the service of God' - had established once more central rule at Cordova. From the middle of the following century another group of Atlas tribes - Almohads - 'worshippers of the One True God' began, in their turn, to displace their Almoravid predecessors.

Averroes, born in Cordova in 1126 to the Cadi or judge there, was instructed by his father in Law, as well as studying theology, philosophy and medicine. He eventually succeeded his father as Cadi, and subsequently acted as Court physician to the Almohad leader, then to his...
son, Al-Mansur. His views coming into conflict with the orthodox al-
moahads after Al-Mansur's great military success against Castile in
1195, the physician was banished to his home in Cordova, and only re-
instated at the moroccan court - having recanted - shortly before his
death in 1198.

I have noted the duality, in Avicenna's encyclopaedic system,
of the inscription of the sciences in the formal frame of a platonic
actuality of Ideas 'distinguishing itself' or 'at work' in an aristotel-
ian Economy, and their inscription within the 'poetic' frame of the kor-
anic scheme of the part of the Koran in that scheme. - Indeed I suggested
that this duality might be taken to define the configuration of 'islamic'
philosophy at the beginning of the eleventh century.

Was this logical abstraction to an Economy of Kosmos properly
to be itself inscribed as one component in the koranic frame - as a fig-
ure of 'abstraction' common to the correlative abst actions of the various
sciences from the koranic scheme? - or was the koranic scheme, rather,
to be inscribed in the logical order, according to the aristotelian fig-
ure of its 'poetics'?

In the Destruction of the Philosophers(1) Al-Ghazzali had criti-
cised Avicenna (while yet admitting him to have come closest of all phil-
osophers to the primary koranic frame) for taking the logical frame of
his scientific discourse as primary in the articulation of his reflect-
ion. - This, rather than inscribing this very discursive frame within
the theological order of the cosmic Drama framed in the Koran. Avicenna,
as it were, didn't know what he was doing: he was lost in the identifi-
cation with the part of abstraction or reflection, not seeing that this
abstraction was itself one activity among others, articulated according
to the Koran and its Law.

Averroes' reply, Destruction of the Destruction(2), is framed
in the logic of a critical commentary on Al-Ghazzali's text, its organ-
isng figure the psychical order of Aristotle's Active Reason distinguishing
itself from its formal inscription in the open 'economy' of Matter, in
which it is reflected by the mere potentiality of Passive Reason. Within
this primary frame - in which Averroes' assertion of the frame inscribes
itself, just as the Koran inscribes itself in the scheme it presents -

1: Tahafut al-Falasifa, Destructio Philosophorum 2: Tahafut al-Tahafut
(1180), Destructio Destructionis; tahafut: 'incoherence', 'disintegration',
'breakdown'.

1: Tahafut al-Falasifa, Destructio Philosophorum 2: Tahafut al-Tahafut
(1180), Destructio Destructionis; tahafut: 'incoherence', 'disintegration',
'breakdown'.
the theological circle of Al-Ghazzali's orthodoxy is itself inscribed.

- This according to the aristotelian poetics of analogy, whose 'working' in any particular configuration is essentially specific (local and transitory), and whose 'circle' can never be closed so as to include a logical order. For the latter 'abstracts' from the particular configurations of our activity, and as it were stands outside it in principle. And it is only from the principles discovered at the limit of this abstraction - the complementary psychical actuality of a logical distinction of logical and physical orders, and the material possibility of this self-expression of Active Reason, that a 'science' can be framed, in the aristotelian figure of a deductive return from the limit of induction. The 'poetic' order of religion, framed in the Koran, is essentially the practical business of the judge, the Cadi, and cannot be articulated in the systematic frame of an orthodox 'theology'. The frame of religious activity is essentially specific, relating to the abstraction from the global 'scientific' frame to the poetic frame of a particular action, itself inextricably implicated in an essentially open economy of inscription of action within further action, in an open time.

What we regard as our own identity is itself only a passing figure, constant over the action of a 'life', in which it is physically reflected in an identity of body. The actuality of the 'I' which over this period I ('I' identify with my particular body, distinguishes itself from this passing identification. And the 'I' which thus distinguishes itself from the particular 'I' that identifies itself with a particular body, when the brief 'play' of life is over, 'returns to itself', and knows itself as the simple and unitary psychical actuality of the Active Reason distinguishing itself from the poetic order of identification, from the entry of this figure of 'I' into the open Economy of Matter.

This inscription of the 'poetic circle' of religion within an aristotelian Economy of Cosmos, in which (as mere potentiality) the unitary frame of Actuality first distinguishes itself (and so frames Actuality) in the psychical order of distinction of Active Reason from its mere logical possibility (this self-distinction amounting to the inscription of a platonic Actuality in an aristotelian Economy of distinction of Actuality from its formal possibility) - this frames the transition from the inscription of the logical order in the closed kuranic frame of Al-Ghazzali, to its inscription in the dual christian order of complementary heavenly Mystery and earthly (or material) Economy. We might
regard Averroes' scheme as a sort of interface between Islamic and Christian culture—a sort of step outside the closed theological frame of Islamic orthodoxy from which it is one more step to the Christian framing of the duality of Faith and Reason in the middle of the thirteenth century. A simple scheme of the interface of Christian and Islamic reflection between the time of Al-Ghazzali at Baghdad, and that of Albert the Great and his pupil Thomas Aquinas at Paris, in which the transmission from Islam to Christendom of schemes derived largely from classical Antiquity complements the scheme of the seven liberal arts and a correspondingly schematic theology, as represented, say, by Gerbert at the close of the last phase.

What, then, is the parallel development in the Latin West from Gerbert through Al-Ghazzali's contemporaries (and the controversy over Universals framed by Porphyry's question) which leads, with the assimilation of Islamic culture framed in the representative figure of Averroes, to the Summae of the thirteenth century?

The civil and ecclesiastical context of the second phase of this 'parallel development' (from the question of Universals to the scholastic synthesis) has already been, in part, indicated, in an allusion above to the combined advance of Western Church and States in Spain and in the old eastern Empire. By considering, now, the antecedents of the 'crusades' that begin at the end of the eleventh century, we may frame the intellectual interaction of Islam and Christendom in the closing phase of the period from about the beginning of the fifth century before this our 'Era', to about the middle of this Era's thirteenth century, and so close this 'First Part' of the story.

I concluded the discussion of the last phase in the Latin West by suggesting that the Frenchman Gerbert, who as Sylvester II was pope from 999 until his death in 1003, might be taken as representative of the close of that phase, just as Erigena might be taken as a representative or focal figure in the transition from the Carolingian revival of learning in the eighth century, to the situation exemplified in Gerbert's papacy at the close of the tenth century.
I suggested that the 'representative' character of Erigena as of Gerbert should be seen in terms of those principles of interaction of ecclesiastical, civil and intellectual orders articulated between a formally unitary 'catholic' Church as religious frame of European activity, and a 'feudal' economy of the civic order. And I drew a parallel between the shifting dominance of local dukes in the civil order, the shifting (and closely related) authority of local bishops and abbots within the nominally unitary frame of the ecclesiastical order, and the shifting dominance of particular cathedral or abbey schools in the order of reflection.

Gerbert is representative, in that in him are focussed these principles of interaction towards the close of the tenth century, and that from this 'focus' one may plot the development of the conflict of Church and civil order over the following centuries, as also the part of 'learning' in this pervasive confrontation of catholic unity and civil 'economy'. From the convergence of these three orders in Gerbert, one may pass to the complementary and correlative integrations of those orders, each as it were 'distinguishing' itself, and its primary principles or 'frame', within the general interplay of these principles or 'figures' in which each frames its own part, and its relations with the other orders.

Gerbert was born around the middle of the tenth century. Having mastered, at various schools in France, the Spanish March, and Italy, the principles of all the liberal sciences except the 'logic' or dialectic which frames their correlation (and through this its own mirroring in that scheme in theology), he proceeded to the cathedral school at Rheims to study logic under the archbishop, Adalbero, then reputed the most eminent dialectician in Europe. Here mastering logic, and with it the whole scheme of the boethian philosophy, he quickly became the leading 'philosopher' of the Latin West. The king of France engaged him as tutor to his son and heir, and the Emperor, Otto II, presented him (982) with the abbey of Bobbio. He succeeded his master Adalbero as archbishop of Rheims in 991, and at the Council of Rheims that same year framed the principle of the independence of the French church from Rome in various matters of organisation, and the part of civil authority in this organisation of the Church.
Gerbert thus appears as at once the leading 'philosopher' of Europe, and a focal figure in the interaction of French king, German emperor, and 'catholic' pope, which three dominant 'parts' in the European order first become definitely established over the latter part of the tenth century, under Hugh Capet in France, and Otto the Great in Germany and northern Italy (where this Emperor re-asserted his feudal authority over the Lombard duchies). Characteristically, Gerbert's teaching was best known for those celestial and terrestrial globes (embodying as it were the mathematical frame of the Kosmos) by which it was illustrated, and which Gerbert himself constructed on a regular basis — exchanging them for scarce Latin manuscripts of classical works (for whose discovery he established agents throughout Europe).

Becoming reconciled to a new pope — a German, rather than (like his predecessor) a Roman — Gerbert was translated to Ravenna in 998, and himself succeeded the German at Rome the following year.

Over the following century the conflict of civil and ecclesiastical frames of activity — represented by the contest between Pope and Emperor — unfolds — and with it the frame of reflection. Gerbert, in his short vanity, had called upon the civil leaders of Europe to unite in the assertion of the feudal military order across that physical boundary of Christendom which separated the Church from a Jerusalem that was an integral part of the ecclesiastical frame of Christian activity. This figure of inscription of the civil order of European feudalism within the wider ecclesiastical order focussed at Rome — within a universal or 'catholic' order in which the civil order is inscribed as one side of the physical boundary that separates Jerusalem and Rome — eventually became embodied in the 'first crusade', and the capture of Jerusalem from the Seljuk Sultan of Syria in 1099. The principle of inscription of the civil order as one 'side' of the 'universal' order embodied in the Church, focussed between 1099 and the fall of Jerusalem in 1249 in the recurrent figure of the 'crusade', may itself be seen to embody the assertion of an Augustinian inscription of civil order in ecclesiastical order developed by successive popes over the course of the eleventh century, with Gregory VII (1073-1085) foremost among them. The Emperors, in their turn, insisted
upon the inscription of the temporal or earthly relations of Church and civil order, within the unitary economy of earthly activity framed and integrated through their independent authority. Kings of France asserted similar rights within their borders, but the conflict of Pope and Emperor was more radical, since the Pope as civil head of the 'papal states' of central Italy might be supposed subject to the feudal authority of the Emperor, in the latter's claim to kingship of Italy. The conflict of these dual papal and imperial 'frames' thus came to be focussed largely in the chief towns of the old lombard duchies (with the old capital of the North, Milan, chief amongst them) which constituted the interface of ecclesiastical and civil orders.

In the wider conflict in which this 'physical' interface of Papacy and Empire was itself one side, it was to be the French king - after the death of the Emperor Frederick II in 1250 - who would come to dominate the wider interface of civil and ecclesiastical orders in Europe as a whole, just as the lombard cities would then dominate the economic order of Europe, through the privileges and organisation acquired through their part as 'physical' interface of the complementary and conflicting frames of Emperor and Pope during this phase.

This conflict of 'spiritual' and 'temporal' frames is reflected within the organisation of the church (this again focussed in the papacy of Gregory VII) in organisational reform. Thus, in the eleventh century, just as the papacy (representing the 'catholic' principle of a unitary frame of Christian activity) attempted to inscribe the relations of spiritual and temporal frames within a unitary 'spiritual' framing of activity, so it attempted to abstract itself from inscription in the 'earthly' civil economy, through enforcing clerical celibacy and repressing 'simony'.

Clerical celibacy had been insisted upon by the Latin Church since the classical period, when it (also) reflected the 'catholic' figure of a unitary frame rooted in the primary authority of the bishop of Rome. Indeed celibacy had been an important factor in the divisions of eastern and western Churches. Through a rigid celibacy, enforced over the eleventh century, the clergy through whom the ecclesiastical order was framed, could assert themselves as 'outside' the
earthly economy of Sense, outside the figure of identification with an earthly body (subject to a temporal prince) whose primary 'poetic' symmetry of Male and Female framed the 'fall' into the earthly economy of embodiment. The clergy thus 'outside' the material or physical Economy framed in the civil order by Emperors and Kings, could then assert the inscription of this 'civil' or temporal frame in a wider order of which it was simply one subordinate side or component.

Simony: the analogous entry of ecclesiastical organisation into the economy of worldly ends, some of which might be procured through ecclesiastical office. Just as the symmetry of Male and Female is the primary figure of the earthly Economy of identification with a body, and corresponding identification of an 'end' - a material end - so the involvement of ecclesiastical offices in the play of that Money which is a common index of worldly ends or 'goods', must be inscribed within the wider universal order framed by Church through clergy - and so the clergy must 'abstract' themselves from identification of their clerical 'part' with some part in the civil order, and its Economy, subordinate to the 'political' authority of Emperor or King or other temporal lord.

As we saw earlier, the 'intellectual' order of the christian 'middle' ages that succeed classical Antiquity, was dominated by a (celibate) benedictine 'order' which as it were reflected within the nominally or ideally unitary frame of a 'catholic' Church the figure of that Church's distinction of its part in and from the earthly Economy of the World. Thus, for example, the most forceful proponent of the inscription of the civil order within a wider order of activity framed by the Church, Gregory VII, was himself a benedictine who took as his model the earlier benedictine Pope Gregory (the Great). It is Gregory's contemporary and fellow benedictine Anselm, as Archbishop of Canterbury in conflict with the norman King of England (as Gregory was in conflict with the german Emperor) from 1093, who first frames the question of the relation of boethian logic to a predominantly augustinian theology, which is to dominate the reflection of this phase. - A question which, as is readily seen, reflects within the benedictine order of a learned 'regular' clergy, the outward conflict of spiritual and temporal orders of activity and authority.
Anselm (like his contemporary Al-Ghazzali in the East) is concerned with the inscription of the logical order of discursive Reason within the wider theological frame of which it is one component order. This inscription he effects by recognising in the logical order the formal distinction of formal distinction (or determination) and actual distinction. By finding the Actuality within which the logical order is one component distinguishing itself from that merely formal logical order in that order, and thus (in this radical configuration) framing the inscription of the natural Economy of which the logical order is one side in an Actuality whose primary dimension is this distinction of itself from that Economy or play of figure in which we first - naturally - find ourselves.

- The 'logical' order in which we first find ourselves thinking (even the Fool who says in his heart 'There is no God') thus 'naturally' finds itself inscribed in an Actuality, an actual correlation of various orders, through an initial inscription of the distinction of Actuality and its mere formal inscription in the 'logical' order in that logical order of formal distinction. Through naturally asking this question of the distinction of actual and possible, we suddenly find this very question, and its discursive order, inscribed in the very distinction (of actual and possible) we thought to inscribe in the logical order of our initial question. And we recognise in this 'conversion' (as it were) of the question, the self-exression of that radical pole of Actuality distinguishing itself from a mere name, which we must call 'God'. Thus, through our natural questioning of the formal correlation of various orders and figurations in the 'theological' frame of a 'Faith' in which we inscribe our activity, we discover the part of this order of questioning in the natural economy of Kosmos, and we find this natural Economy as one side of the cosmic order, in which 'God' expresses himself - and this, primarily, in the figure of Incarnation - the analogue in the Economy of which the logical order of reflection is one side, of God distinguishing himself in that order from that order.

This simple figure of a duality of inscription of the difference of actuality and merely 'nominal' distinction in the logical order, and of a 'converse' inscription of the logical order of distinction within the distinction of actuality and possibility frames the
complementarity of logic ('dialectic') and theology in the reflection of the following two centuries. The first question to arise—constituting the primary articulation of the 'logical' order in the 'Schools', and leading to a correspondingly fundamental articulation of 'scholastic' theology, relates to the 'working' of this double order of 'inside' and 'outside' the logical order. In Anselm's inscription of the logical order in the theological order, the first step is a simple 'ontological argument', which leads to the recognition of an ontical actuality distinguishing itself in the logical order, from its 'inscription' in that order in a merely 'nominal' or formal way. But 'faith seeking understanding' (to give the title of the book in which this argument is presented) involves the inscription of this simple duality within a wider order of the duality of an Economy of which the logical order is only one side, and a 'mystery of which this ontical actuality is but one component. Indeed this 'wider' order of Actuality distinguishing itself from (and in) an Economy of Possibility or Potentiality is framed by Anselm in terms of a Trinity, and an Incarnation which marks in the poetic symmetry of logical and physical orders, the inscription of this poetic order of the Christian 'story' in a theological Actuality.

Now this inscription of the duality of logical and ontological orders within an analogous duality of poetic and theological orders, involves a correlation of the logical order of 'inside' and 'outside' with a complementary physical order. Towards the end of the eleventh century Roscellinus attempted the correlation of the various orders by inscribing the logical order of 'in' and 'out' in the physical order, as Anselm had inscribed it in an 'ontical' or 'ontological' order. Logical distinction is, he seems to have asserted, indeed merely 'nominal'—a flatus vocis (if we are to accept Anselm's account of Roscellinus' position). Words, and the logical distinctions they embody, are to be inscribed as mere sounds in a primary physical economy, reflecting Anselm's ontical Actuality, now to be taken as primary. William of Champeaux, teaching at Paris, on the other hand, seems to have inscribed the physical order of difference within a primary logical order, in the familiar figure of a logical distinction of the two orders. William's position, though, was considerably modified over the first years of the twelfth century, to accommodate the criticism of his young student Abelard. About this time various versions of the relations of logical and physical orders of 'inclusion', of being-in, were put for-
ward by various different teachers at their different schools. Abelard's correlation of their different views as so many aspects of the solution of Porphyry's question about the being of genera (or universals) constitutes a first step in the inward and outward integration of the teaching at the different European schools within a common scheme of 'scholastic' inquiry. This step of Abelard's is itself framed by, for example, Gerbert's systematic instruction in the (liberal) Arts, and Anselm's subsequent inscription of the logical order of the Arts in a theological frame of which this order is one primary component. Anselm's principle of the complementarity of logical and theological orders leads directly to an inquiry framed by Porphyry's question:

At present, he says, I shall refuse to say concerning genera and species whether they subsist or whether they are placed in the naked understanding alone, or whether subsisting they are corporeal or incorporeal, and whether they are separated from sensibles or placed in sensibles and in accord with them. Questions of this sort are most exalted business and require very great diligence of inquiry. (1)

- Anselm had posed the question of the inscription of the ontical order of difference of actual and possible within the logical articulation of possibility. Roscellinus, in transplanting this figure to the relation of logical and physical orders of Anselm's Economy of Nature, thereby seems (according to Anselm, at least) to have implied the inscription of the difference of ontical and logical orders within a physical Economy of Cosmos - and with this to have inclined towards the inscription of the triple order of distinction of Actual and Possible (Mystery and Economy) - the Christian Trinity - within the natural order.

In general, Porphyry's question, and Boethius' exposition of the problem, attaches simply to the different modes of being-in. How is such difference to be itself framed? Are we, for example, to frame the different 'physical' and 'logical' orders of 'in' - of species 'in' a common genus; of species 'in' a common matter or thing - logically? Or physically? How are we to frame the Economy, the interplay, of these complementary frames? - Surely to frame that Economy 'logically' with William of Champeaux, or 'physically' with Roscellinus is only to unthinkingly identify the part of reflection with some component in the Economy. Must not the Economy of 'in' - of that triple twosidedness of logical, physical and 'poetic' orders (the first two themselves
two 'sides' of the matter - the theological actuality of the difference of Actual and Possible, and its inscription in the Economy of distinction (whether the latter be framed 'logically' or physically' or 'poetically') is not merely a further 'logical' question of resolving their formal symmetry or complementarity. Through this complementarity of logical and theological components, the logical frame of the inquiry is itself inscribed in the theological framing of reflection in the Church - this through the matter of the orthodoxy or otherwise of the account of Trinity and Incarnation implied in the logical framing of the relations of logical and theological orders of the question. Thus Roscellinus' position was condemned by the Council of Rheims in 1092; Abelard's account of the Trinity was condemned at the Council of Soissons in 1121, and a further systematic condemnation of his position was obtained by Bernard of Clairvaux at Sens twenty years later.

Roscellinus' heresy amounts simply to the inscription of the Mystery which frames the unitary catholic Church in a material Economy, through the inscription of the 'psychical' order of the \( \Lambda \gamma \nu \sigma \) in the physical order, in terms of his inscription of the logical order in that physical order. A new 'nominalism' two centuries later was to be supported by the German Emperor against ecclesiastical condemnation, as part of his assertion of the inscription of the ecclesiastical frame within the civil Economy which he ruled.

Abelard's position involves the recognition of the complementarity of physical and logical orders of our thinking, but he frames the articulation of this complementarity, along with the complementarity of Mystery and Economy which it reflects, within the part of his own self-assertion - within the figure of an 'abstraction' which frames his account of the cosmic relations of the various orders of 'in', in the Economy which is in turn framed in his account. He recognises the 'psychical' actuality of 'universals' in this Economy of Cosmos, but only insofar as this participates in, and is thus 'comprehended' in,
the primary circuit of the abstraction which frames his text. - A
text, then, which itself 'frames' Creation logically, and 'compre-
hends' Actuality by the inscription of its correlative figures within
a primary actuality of self-assertion framing the logical order of
the text.

Bernard, abbot of Clairvaux, on the other hand, inscribes
the instance of assertion which frames his texts within a theological
figuration of Creation in which this logical order is only a subordi-
nate component. The determination in Councils of the inscription of
the logical order of reflection within the primary theological fram-
ing of activity in the Church, which Bernard considered his part in
theological controversy, itself amounts to one component of Bernard's
attempted inscription of the earthly Economy of life within the unitary
framing of activity in the Church - an attempt which led to his advocacy
of the disastrous Second Crusade of 1147, led by the King of France
and the German Emperor.

If Abelard's self-assertion is wrong, and judgement should
be inscribed within the closed circuit of the theological configura-
tion in which it finds itself as simply one component, then how is one to
decide between different and apparently contradictory theological fig-
ures of this inscription? Following the condemnation of his book on
the Trinity in 1121, Abelard compiled a series of questions attaching
to the various aspects of the 'theological' frame in which he was re-
quired to inscribe his reflection. In the case of each question he
cited apparently opposed views, culled from the 'Scriptures' and the
church Fathers. If one attempts to inscribe one's reflection in a
closed theological circuit, then, beginning with some natural quest-
on, one must find the place or part of that question in the orthodox
theological scheme, and so inscribe its 'logical' order within a wid-
er theological order - just as Anselm had inscribed the logical order
of the question of the distinction of Actual and Possible within the
theological order of Creation. - But if different possible inscrip-
tions of the question in a supposedly unitary 'orthodox' scheme conflict,
then how is one to resolve that conflict - how is one to decide that
question? One must try to find its place in the orthodox scheme, again
supposing that it has a definite place. And here again Abelard finds
another conflict of theological 'framings' of the question. One such
conflict leads into another more radical conflict, until in the end we
arrive at the question of whether we are to solve all our questions by such inscription of question within question — whether indeed it is in fact 'orthodox' to suppose the inscription of any question within a minatory theological frame. Thus the series of questions leads, precisely, to the question of the Trinity as limiting theological frame, and the question of the part of our questioning — of its logical order — in this relation of questioning to Trinity. That is to say: Abelard as it were 'works back', after the condemnation of his self-assertion in the logical framing of the relations of the various orders of Creation, to a point at which the locus of our assertion in relation to a Trinity — itself questionable — invites our recognition of the part of our self-assertion in the theological scheme. — For the theological scheme must itself be somehow discovered, if we are to inscribe our judgment within it, and it seems that it is in some way up to us to decide the theological frame in which this our decision is to inscribe itself. Thus the scheme of *Sic et Non*, 'Yes and No', actually invites the recognition of the radical logical instance, and its framing of and in the 'Trinity', for which Abelard has been condemned.

This 'backward' induction (as it were) to the part of the 'logical' order of our reflection within the primary theological scheme of the Trinity appears as one component, around the middle of the twelfth century in the scheme that was to dominate the Schools for several centuries. Peter (the) Lombard had studied at Bologna, where there had been a school of civil law since the beginning of the eleventh century, organised as a professional guild of students and teachers, which administered the practice of law, and was incorporated — like other guilds — with certain privileges and rights in the civic order of the city. Peter came thence to France — with recommendations to Bernard. At Paris he seems to have studied under Abelard, and himself was teaching theology around the middle of the century. In 1159 he became bishop of Paris, and he died shortly thereafter. His four books of *Sententiae* — 'Sentences': views or opinions — constitute an attempt to integrate the various components of the 'theological' frame brought into question by Abelard, by starting with the Unity and Trinity of God, and as it were articulating the views of Scripture and the leading Fathers, figure within figure within this primary configuration, by a sort of inversion of Abelard's 'induction'. The first book treats of God;
the triple order of the 'Trinity, and its self-expression in the triple Economy of logical, physical and poetic orders—that is, the theological inscription of the logical order of reason in its primary frame. The second book treats of the Creation, inscribed within this initial order: the framing of Heaven and Earth in six days, the heavenly order of angels and the infernal order of demons, and the Fall of Man with which human history begins. The third book treats of the focus of this 'economy' of History in the Incarnation, the last the mysteries or sacraments. His own part Peter inscribes in the correlation of figures as that of articulating their organisation, one within another—the converse of Abelard's identification of the part of our individual reason in the cosmic scheme.

Peter's work is in a way that of the lawyer, integrating different accounts, one within the other, within a consistent story. His teaching and his episcopacy also mark the organisation of the 'university'—the universitas or guild of teachers and students—at Paris; and within this University or studium generale, his Sentences were to frame instruction in the succeeding centuries. Among the 'authorities' Peter cites, Augustine, and the Augustinian figures of a heavenly determination of the relations of Heaven and Earth, predominate. Indeed one might say that the Augustinian inscription of Economy in Mystery frames the whole: not so much as a dogmatic scheme, but rather as the primary scheme of organisation of the questions arising from the relations of the various patristic schemes. In this respect Peter stands somewhat ambiguously midway between Bernard's practical exposition of a unitary orthodoxy (even if he could not systematically define just what this was) and Abelard's contrary assertion of the radical autonomy of Reason, coordinate with the question of the Trinity.

Around the end of the century the Augustinian scheme of arrangement of the Sentences was being complemented by Averroes' systematic 'edition' of the Aristotelian canon. And when in 1204, the leaders of the Fourth Crusade had won control of the Byzantine Empire, the interface between Christendom and Islam in the East, the work of the Spanish translators (chiefly at the court of Toledo) from the Arabic was complemented by direct translations from Byzantine texts.
The third interface of Christendom and Islam was in Sicily, whose conquest by mohammedans had been completed in the second half of the tenth century and whose reconquest by Normans and Byzantines was begun in the first half of the eleventh century. In the second half of the twelfth century the Emperor Frederick I (the Great) had consolidated his feudal authority in Germany and Lombardy. He died in 1090 while leading (with the Kings of France and England) the third Crusade; his son marrying the Norman heiress of Sicily, left in 1197 his son Frederick as infant King of Sicily. Frederick's mother, as Guardian, acknowledged the Pope rather than the Emperor as feudal lord, whereupon the new Emperor (of the house of Guelph or Welf) attempted to recover Sicily Quarelling with Pope Innocent III, he was deposed by Innocent who in 1212 supported Frederick's claim to the Empire (as representative of the house of Waiblingen - a 'ghibelline'). Apart from being an important focus of interaction of Latin Christendom with Greek and Arabic culture, Frederick's court at Palermo was a principal focus in the conflict of Emperor and successive Popes until his death in 1250. From this point on the power of Papacy and Empire decline, while that of France and the Italian cities rise. In the latter the conflict of 'Guelph' and 'Ghibelline' passed from the confrontation of Pope and Emperor in Italy into the complex contests of aristocratic, merchant, and popular factions. The Papacy, from an alliance with France against the German Emperor, soon becomes subordinate to French policy after the fragmentation of the Empire effected by that alliance.

At the beginning of the century, Innocent's scheme of a Christendom integrated, East and West, within the unitary frame of a Roman Catholic Church was strengthened by the 'Latin' occupation of the remnants of the Eastern Empire, as by the installation of (as it seemed) his protege as Emperor. In 1209 his authority in France was asserted in an internal 'crusade' against the 'Manichaean' or 'dualist' heretics of the kingdom of Toulouse, which was to extend over the next twenty years. Here as elsewhere Catholic orthodoxy was pursued by the followers of Dominic (thus succeeding the Benedictines of earlier centuries as the primary exponents and proponents of the theological framing within the Church, of the unitary frame of the Church in the cosmic scheme) who founded his new 'order' at Toulouse in 1215. At the Lateran Council of that year Innocent agreed to the rule of the new order. Five years earlier he had assented to the rule drawn up by Francis of Assisi (by opening the Bible upon the
altar three times). These two orders of mendicant friars (as opposed to the 'enclosed' or cloistered benedictines with their various branch-embry two complementary aspects of the figure of ecclesiastical reform already noticed at work in the eleventh century. Francis framed his 'order' in the simple figure of complete detachment from the worldly economy of 'goods', property — a detachment focused in the particular situation of this initial renunciation of a 'worldly' part, and unfolding from this personal focus in a poetic or mystical figuration which extends (notably in his hymns) to its place in the Creation as a whole. Dominic, on the other hand, framed within the initial figure of detachment, the systematic inscription of the worldly economy (which is one pole, as it were, of this initial figure) within the wider unitary theological frame of orthodoxy, coming to his own personal part at the close of this systematic articulation, rather than unfolding the theological frame of Creation from this part as starting-point. In the eleventh century these two components of reform — personal detachment from the worldly economy, and consequent inscription of this economy and its civil order within a wider frame (from the position of detachment 'outside' that economy) embodied in the Church — were joined in the benedictine order (most notably at the abbey of Cluny and its subordinate foundations). In the first half of the twelfth century Bernard (despatched from Citeaux to found the abbey of Clairvaux) embodies this same combination. And just as, around the middle of the twelfth century Peter Lombard frames the studies at the School of Paris through an integration of the converse principles of his two mentors Bernard and Abelard, so, around the middle of the thirteenth century the 'franciscan' and 'dominican' components of Bernard's position meet the 'averroist' development of Abelard's assertion of philosophical reason, in the Parisian forum framed by Peter's articulation of the relations of theology and logic in the system of questions presented by the Sentences.

I have already noted that Averroes' 'edition' of Aristotle was appearing in Latin at the beginning of the thirteenth century. In 1209 the use of Aristotle's works beyond those of the Cyprian was prohibited at Paris. In 1215, a call was made to prohibit the use of the Sentences, but the Lateran Council under Innocent (himself like Peter Lombard a student of Bologna and Paris) rejected this appeal. The guild or 'university' of students and teachers of Paris was accorded a royal charter (like that of a mercantile guild) in 1200; it received a papal charter in 1230, and the following year the Pope instituted a
commission to decide what part of Aristotle's system was compatible with Christian orthodoxy, and what contrary—under increasing pressure from teachers and students, the University of Paris had in 1225 again allowed the study of Aristotle.

Two years later the Inquisition was formally instituted, thus spreading from the kingdom of Toulouse at the close of the 'Crusade' against the heretics in which the order of Dominic had arisen. The work of the papal commission of 1231 (which never reported) was taken over by dominicans and franciscans who (against opposition from within the orders, as from the secular clergy at the universities) now began to assert themselves in the guilds of 'bachelors', 'masters' and 'doctors'. The principle of integration of studies throughout Christendom in a unitary frame of orthodoxy, reflected in a unitary educational institution (with the 'degrees' of the various guilds recognised in all the other guilds, each articulated within a common method and matter of inquiry) parallels the work of the Inquisition, both being soon in the hands of the new orders of friars. Thus the Parisian teacher Alexander of Saintes (from Gloucestershire), who became a franciscan in 1222, was charged by Pope Innocent IV to write the first Summa, or systematic exposition of Christian orthodoxy, which was required to be studied (by Innocent's successor) in all faculties of theology. Around the same time, the Inquisition was organised into a general tribunal (1248) under dominican direction (where before it had been local and temporary). Alexander systematically inscribes the natural economy of Creation within a unitary order of divine policy or government, and within this effects a parallel inscription of the civil order and its earthly economy within the unitary order of ecclesiastical government.

In 1245 Albert (the Great) who became dominican provincial of Germany in 1254, began to teach at Paris, bringing with him from Cologne his student Thomas Aquinas, who had been educated at the abbey of Monte Cassino (founded by Benedict) and the University of Naples (founded by Frederick II) where he joined the dominican order in about 1243. In the same year (1245) Alexander of Saintes died. Bonaventure, who had become a franciscan around the same time that Aquinas entered the dominican order, and who was studying at Paris at this time, began to teach there as one of the two franciscan professors of theology allowed by the University in 1253, the year after Aquinas had been called from Cologne by his order to occupy one of the two dominican chairs.
The first two years of a newly appointed professor's lectiones or textual exposition were, by a custom by now established, devoted to the Scriptures; the following two to the Sentences. With the parallel commentaries of Thomas and Bonaventure of the Sentences the 'Second Part' of the Tradition might be taken to begin at Paris, following closely upon the death of Frederick II in 1250. A first step in that 'Second Part' closes with the deaths of Bonaventure and Thomas in 1274, the first at the Council of Lyons called by the Pope to effect the union of eastern and western Churches, the second as Thomas was on his way to the Council, having been summoned to present the papal case. From 1256 Bonaventure had been general of the franciscan order, and Aquinas had been engaged on the systematic articulation of the augustinian frame of the Sentences within the aristotelian Economy of Kosmos as transmitted through Averroes.

At mid-century the faculty of 'Arts' at Paris, comprising the organisation of teaching in the liberal arts (the degree of bachelor following upon four years study of the trivium, that of master upon three years study of the quadrivium) became a focus of 'averr-ism' which proposed the inscription of the christian frame in an eternal aristotelian Economy, with its two poles of uncreated matter and self-thinking-thought, and the mirroring of Active and Passive Reason in-between. A complementarity was proposed between the 'working' of this 'philosophical' frame (including the inscription within it of the frame of christian activity) and the working of the 'theological' frame through our identification of a 'part' within it (without understanding this 'part' as more broadly and 'philosophically' framed by the inscription of the christian frame of activity within a philosophical Economy of Kosmos). It is this duality of inscription of the poetic frame of christianity within the 'logical' or philosophical frame of the aristotelian Economy (as represented by Averroes), and of the logical frame of philosophy within the poetics of the theological frame on the other hand that constitutes the principal question with which the Second Part opens. Franciscans, most notably Bonaventure, begin with a theological framing of our situation, and proceed to extend this frame to Creation as a whole, thus transposing the initial frame of the franciscan order to the University. This tendency is expressed in the very
titles of the works that complement Bonaventure's *Commentary* on the 
Sentences: *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, *De Reductione Artium ad Theol-
ogiam*. The principle is extended into biblical exposition in his 
*Biblia Primum*, an allegorical (or mystical) articulation of scriptur-
al figures within the Franciscan passage from individual situation to 
Creation.

Aquinas, on the other hand, begins his encyclopaedic synthesis 
in a characteristically Dominican manner. A point is first marked 'out-
side' the Aristotelian Economy of mere possibility (outside that formal 
order): the *Actus Purus* or simple Actuality of God. Within this ini-
tial polarity of Actual Mystery and Possible Economy, then, the comple-
mentary orders of theological actuality and the formal possibility from 
which it distinguishes itself are articulated, question within question, 
in approximately the manner and order of the *Sentences*. The basic frame 
of this articulation of theological actuality within a formally wider 
frame of systematic possibility was already presented by Thomas around 
the middle of the century in the short treatise on *Being and Essence* - 
the 'that' and the 'what' of things. The first pole of actuality 'out-
side' the formal Aristotelian Economy of figure-within-figure (assort 
of systematic possibility of Creation) - outside the 'poetic' frame of 
any correlation of logical and physical orders in some account, some 
accounting for 'whatness', is that there is an Actuality in which we 
can recognise that the formal frame is included (actually) in it, whereas (formally) we can see that this difference of its actuality and its 
mere possibility cannot itself be inscribed or determined within the 
merely formal order of definition, rational accounting, 'what'. But 
formally we can thus see that the fundamental polarity in which 'that' 
and 'what' must be articulated may be defined as the distinction of 
'inside' and 'outside' the Aristotelian Economy of what-ness, of def-
inition or essence.

Now although this self-expression of the distinction of Being 
and Essence is thus 'philosophically' primary, we can at once see that 
it itself partakes of a figure of self-expression of which this 'onto-
logical' order is itself a fairly marginal figure. This self-expression 
is focused in the figure of the Incarnation, which marks in the Eco-
nomy of our earthly existence this same pole of Actuality which is
'logically' outside the logical order of the philosophical text.

That is to say, we can recognise the figure of 'that' distinguishing itself from 'what', the self-expression which appears in the wider order of earthly existence (of which the philosophical text is itself but one subordinate component) as 'I AM "I AM" ', the God of Moses. Thus we are at once involved in a double movement of inscription of logical in theological, and theological in logical orders, of Kosmos in Reason and Reason in Kosmos. The primary 'philosophical' dimension of Reflection or discourse, recognised in the definition of what is 'outside' the discursive order of definition - the 'that' a thing is - leads into the inscription of this rational order in the theological configuration of self-expression in the cosmic Drama with which Thomas' parisian lecturing began.

Within the commentary on the Scriptures, this principle of commentary itself enters into the theological configuration of the divine Drama or 'Mystery in terms of the logical order of text. This configuration of the relation of commentary, reflection, to the scriptural order, leads naturally into the commentary on the Sentences.

Thus the initial ontological distinction of 'that' and 'what' leads into the theological order of self-expression in a Mystery in which the 'scriptural' text inscribes itself as one component order. The circle is closed when, working back from the recognition of the formal part of the initial logical distinction in the 'scriptural' or theological order - from the figure of the Trinity to that of the christian 'mysteries' or sacraments - we find ourselves again with the figure of 'text'. "Now a Summa of Theology, beginning where the liberal arts - the 'philosophy' of the Faculty of Arts ends, must articulate this circuit within the logical order of a text beginning with the identification of God as the primary pole 'outside' the merely formal articulation of the text, passing through the articulation of Creation or Actuality within this primary duality or two-sidedness of Actuality and Possibility, until we at last find the initial figure of text inscribed in the Creation thus articulated. The 'that' of the text and its reflection is inscribed in the text as a 'what'; this then induces (as it were) a new figure of divine self-expression in the new configuration of text and context (from the Unity of God we first pass to the Trinity). This in turn is logically articulated within the aristotelian Economy of whatness - this leads to a new
theological figure, and so on and on.

In fact the formal scheme of this double movement of theology and philosophy was itself eventually inscribed as belonging to the restricted order of the Text. The project in fact - actually - comes full-circle in a sort of more radical inscription of the text of the Summa Theologica in the dual movement framed up to that point in the text:

In December 1273, after an experience while saying Mass, he suspended work on the third part of his Summa Theologica, telling his secretary that he had reached the end of his writing and giving as his reason the fact that 'all I have written seem to me like so much straw compared with what I have seen and with what has been revealed to me'. (1)

The Paris Averroists had presented theology and philosophy as complementary, and on the basis of this principle of dual 'truths' had proceeded to work out the articulation of the aristotelian Economy within a merely logical or ontological opposition of God as Prime Mover and self-thinking-thought. Thomas articulated the Cosmos, rather, not in their static duality, but through a dual movement ultimately focussed in our freedom at the point of intersection of theology and philosophy, Economy of the World, and Mystery of Heaven. In this locus of our choice the fundamental difference of 'that' and 'what' was reflected in our personal participation in Being or actuality, through the choice to frame our activity within the theological configuration of the christian Mystery or Drama. Thus against the Averroists, Thomas defended the principles of correlation of our individual personality, of the Creation of the Kosmos in Time (and with it, of Matter). But Bonaventure regarded Thomas as an 'averroist' himself, in that he maintained, for example, the possible eternity of the World, and the 'unity of substantial forms' - the unitary identity of the human form, for example, which now distinguished itself from this its material embodiment. - For Thomas 'dual movement' of philosophy and theology was ultimately to be inscribed in a theological forms through the figure of Choice - whether the choice of God to create, or the choice in which we know ourselves as agents and so know ourselves.
This choice was actually determinative of the relations of theology and philosophy, but could not itself be inscribed in a closed theological system, on the augustinian principles of Bonaventure and the franciscans. It marks the point of closure of the thomist circle, and the radically ambiguous part of this choice 'in' the theological order or logical order of the text of the Summa Theologica itself comes out, and is as it were underlined, in Thomas' choice, at a certain point in the text, to stop working 'in' the logical order of the text, and to stand as it were outside it in a theological or mystical configuration of Actuality determined not in the text, but rather by the dramatic configuration of this text in the theological or logical order focused in the Mass. The franciscan schoolmen, on the other hand, begin with this radical configuration of choice, which is as it were the end of Thomas' circle which he did not live to inscribe in the text of the Summa as the point of inscription of text in Creation.

Thomas' master Albert died on the way to defend his student's orthodoxy at Paris (1280) where various elements of Thomas' system had been implicated in the condemnation by the bishop of Paris of Averroism three years after the theologian's death. It was Albert who had earlier prepared the thomist synthesis of aristotelian Economy of Kosmos, and christian Mystery, by his epochal commentary (or perhaps 'reading' -lectiones, indeed) on the newly available aristotelian canon. As Peter Lombard had articulated the Sentences within a primary polarity of augustinian scheme and economy of questioning, so Albert worked through the aristotelian corpus, articulating his commentary 'between' the two roles of the aristotelian logical Economy of Kosmos, and a dual platonic actuality 'outside' this Economy. Thus the logical figuration of the aristotelian Economy here constitutes the unitary frame of the reading (or questioning or commentary), just as an augustinian Mystery constitutes the unitary frame of the Sentences. Within the shifting figuration of a platonic 'complement' (as it were) of the developing figures of Aristotelian texts, Albert articulates the various figures of this complementarity: his main sources are Dionysius, John of Damascus, Averroes, his Jewish contemporary and compatriot Maimonides, Al-Ghazzali, and - preeminently - Avicenna. - Avicenna foremost, for his systematic inscription of the 'sciences' amounts to the primary six-fold figure of inscription of Dionysius' doxics of Mystery within the logical Economy of an aristotelian Kosmos.
Albert's essentially fragmentary or multiple inscription of Dionysius' neoplatonic 'poetics' within the figuration of his 'reading' of the aristotelian canon, reflected in his own treatises on the various 'sciences' whose organising principles dominate the commentary, corresponds to his part as the primary scientific authority of the Schools, the central channel or interface in the transmission of islamic science - of the encyclopaedia of Avicenna most particularly - to the latin West. It was left to Thomas integrate this 'reading' of Aristotle with the complementary 'reading' of Augustine in the Sentences, through the radical figure of two 'sides' of Kosmos, a duality of Economy and Mystery, What and That, which Albert presented from the side of aristotelian 'science' or 'philosophy', and which the augustinian tradition, embodied in the Sentences presented from the side of the christinan Mystery. The averroists, on the one hand, insisted that the circle of Philosophy could be as it were closed by the inscription of the 'working' of the christian Mystery - its theological order - within the logical order of a cosmic frame in which this logical order was itself inscribed (logically) as one term. The franciscan tendency was to close the theological scheme of the Sentences by inscribing the duality of scheme and questioning as itself one component of the unitary scheme. We might take Thomas' working with or in the complementarity of these two 'circuits' as marking the principle of transition from this First Part to the Second Part of this inquiry or account.

What, in the simplest terms is the configuration of this 'working' with the duality?

I have tried to sketch above the complementarity of the 'philosophical' figuration of a 'Pure Act' or simple instance of Actuality outside the formal Economy of philosophical or logical 'possibility', and the theological configuration of self-expression in which this logical figure of what is 'outside' the logical order may itself be inscribed as one component. I further suggested that the 'philosophical' order of Kosmos might be inscribed, figure within figure, within that initial polarity of That and What, and that the theological 'grammar' (as it were) of divine self-expression might be inscribed, figure within figure, within the scriptural frame of the Word. What is characteristic of Thomas' position, is that neither of these orders of inscription - of theology in philosophy, or of philosophy in theol-
ogy - can be 'closed' or completed by us. For example, Anselm's figure of the inscription of the distinction of actuality and possibility 'in' the logical order of demonstration amounts to the mistake of inscribing the distinction of 'inside' and 'outside' the logical order in the logical order of distinction, rather than recognizing that this 'working' of logical distinction in the relations of 'inside' and 'outside' the logical order is essentially 'analogical', and belongs to the 'dramatic' order of Mystery, rather than the logical order of demonstration. There can be no 'ontological' argument which takes the distinction of essence and existence as itself 'essential', and thus moves 'logically' from the logical order of mere possibility to the ontological order of actuality. Rather must we start from the inscription of logical, physical and poetic orders in an 'already' actual Kosmos, and derive from these simple figures those three 'indications' of God presented by Maimonides, three 'ways' of knowing him under three primary aspects.

Nor can the logical order of possibility in which our choice is articulated be (then, by a sort of converse inscription) determined by inscription in some closed theological circuit which would mirror (as in Anselm) the logical circuit of 'demonstration' of the necessity of Actuality. The finite configuration of the theological correlation of the various orders of Creation or Kosmos is not to be understood in the same way as some corresponding 'natural' and mechanical correlation of various orders in a finitely-determined working of nature, any more than the relation of 'inside' and 'outside' the logical and physical orders is itself to be considered as logically or physically 'determined'. We cannot understand the 'theological' order, as expressed in some particular configuration, as simply inscribed in the 'poetic' order of natural or mechanical 'working' of figures. Rather is the 'working' of, say, the 'story' of Creation, essentially analogical - we cannot give any finitary account, for example, of the relation of the poetic Economy of possibility, and the divine mystery of Actuality, in the Act of Creation in Time - as the franciscans suppose. We must rather recognize in the self-expression of God in some poetic configuration of his distinction of theological and poetic orders, the radical character of the dramatic Creation as Mystery, in which both the logical order of definition and its physical correlate, finite determination, participate in the figure of Analogy - the figure of the correspondence of finite and infinite, their 'mirroring', which cannot be definitively inscribed within any finite closure of philosophical or theological schemes.
Thus we find two complementary 'circuits', philosophical and theological, which, in their common limits - the logical difference of actuality and possibility in which the Being of God is known analogically, and the physical difference of Creation and Nothing - coincide. These common limits are themselves abstractions from the focal dramatic case of rational action - the working of our choice. We stand at the interface in Creation (in which, at the limits, the two orders coincide) of natural and supernatural orders - of the systematic possibility presented by Nature, and the actuality of Grace, whose working we can only understand in the finite figuration of analogy. Yet the working of this analogy is exactly 'adapted' to our situation as agents, as the focal interface in Creation of Matter and Form. The configuration of possibility in which we find ourselves is, of its very nature, partly 'open'; this 'open-ness', corresponding to the impossibility of inscribing the Story of Creation within the philosophical Economy of an essentially aristotelian Kosmos (as system of possibility), mirrors an actuality of Grace, in which we can participate through the recognition of our part (the part of our action) as the interface of Nature and Grace, actuality and possibility, in essentially local and transient finite figurations. In this situation we know ourselves through the implication of our action in the figure of an End which is in principle 'outside' the finite poetic figure of symmetry of identification with a particular part and identification of a particular end.

In the configuration of our situation and action, we at once stand within a natural Economy of mechanical mirroring of material embodiment and material ends or goods, and 'outside' that mechanical nature, in the figure of an actuality (in which we participate) distinguishing itself from that order, through the actuality of that order. - In particular, we know ourselves in the interface of the logical order of distinction of actual and possible, and the actual distinction of this possible distinction of actual and possible end its actuality.

Finally, the frame of this interface of Nature and Grace, is to be found in our choice - in the open-ness of our 'natural' situation - of law as frame of choice. Law, and the Community it frames, is the primary figure in which we 'stand outside' the in-principle open play of natural possibility. In it we recognise the principle of free choice in which natural and supernatural orders meet, tracing a closed circuit in an otherwise open natural Economy, a circuit which frames the primary poetic 'analogies', of which the analogies of knowledge and being are two limiting
components. In the analogy of this order of human community with the community of Creation as a whole (the City of Man and the City of God) we then again find the relative independence of natural and supernatural orders, here appearing as the natural order of civil society, and the supernatural order embodied in the Church.

I will not here go into any of the details of Thomas' working out of these various orders - I only suggest some of the directions of that extensive system in order to attempt the identification of a simple figure of transition from First Part to Second Part of the 'Tradition' - a figure embodied, notably, in the Thomist scheme which is its central 'theoretical' framing. - A figure of the relations of 'logical' and 'theological' orders as radically dual, with this duality dramatically focussed in our situation in the interface of these two orders.

In the second half of the thirteenth century, Aquinas' scheme is only the dominant 'version' of this transitional figure - one version among others, paralleled by that of the Averr̄ists (notably Siger of Brabant) in the Faculty of Arts - in which the theological order is inscribed in the logical order of the 'liberal arts' - and by Bonaventure's 'Reduction of the Arts to Theology'. Parallels between the schemes of Bonaventure and Thomas reflect parallels between the two orders of friars. In a wider context, this parallel part of dominicans and franciscans in the University of Paris (more particularly, in the Faculty of Theology, itself paralleled from 1213 by Faculties of Medicine and Civil Law) is itself reflected in the parallel dominance of franciscans at Oxford, where Robert Grosseteste had organised the part of these friars in 1224. In the first half of the century Albert's dominican science was paralleled by the work of Grosseteste's school. Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln (the commercial centre of thirteenth-century England) and the leading english churchman of his day presents a characteristic english converse to the work of the German Universal Doctor. Each gives an eminent position to Dionysius (whose works Grosseteste translated anew into latin), but whereas with Albert the move is from the logical order of the aristotelian text to the dramatic configuration of that discursive order in Avicenna's Kosmos, the franciscan begins with the Unity of God, marking the first point of Matter 'outside' God.
and then proceeding (within this primary polarity) to articulate the Sphere of "cosmos in a mathematical frame corresponding to the (logical) inscription of the logical order of finite reason in the poetic order of the initial Mystery of Creation. Outwardly the complementary physical order is inscribed in the Sphere in the primary figure of Light; the double movement which in Albert leads from the logical order of Aristotle's text back to the text, leads in Grosseteste's school from initial divine Unity into experience or sense, and back to Unity. In a way the Oxford scheme corresponds more closely to the Augustinian frame of the Sentences, than to Albert's Kosmos. It is closer still to the school of Chartres which in the twelfth century (latterly under the English bishop John of Salisbury) rivalled the systematic theology of Paris with its brief tradition of scientific platonism.

The parallel developments at Oxford and Paris over the course of the thirteenth century converge at its close in the figure of Duns Scotus — in his two extensive Commentaries on the Sentences (called, from their places of delivery the Onus Oxoniense and the Reportata Parisiensia). Two branches of his students and successors at Merton (the Oxford theological Faculty) over the fourteenth century define the primary principles of autonomy of logical and physical orders (the supnositio of Ockham and the Terminists, the intellectus of the 'Merton Schoolmen') whose integration in the seventeenth century corresponds to the central focus of the Second Part.

What, then, is that configuration of Paris and Oxford, of France and England, of Germany and Italy, of Papacy and Empire, of dominican and franciscan, of logic, science and theology, and of so many other factors or figures, which constitutes the University of the mid-thirteenth century as the focus in which the first part of a Tradition of Reflection, beginning with the Pythagorean 'mystery' at Croton, may be said to close?

'First Part'...a primary circuit of the figure of 'Tradition' defined at the outset simply in terms of various 'orders' of the context of this text — orders whose configuration was inscribed
or identified in the interface of text and context: a logical order of the text (considered simply in its formal complexity or articulation), a physical order of context, mirroring this logical order, a 'poetic' order of this mirroring or symmetry... and then three corresponding ontical, psychical and mystical orders 'distinguishing' or asserting themselves in this 'Economy' of text and context.

The opening of the 'Tradition' was identified with the pythagorean configuration of these correlative orders in the 'mathematical' point - the limit 'text' of the simple mark, $\mu\nu\alpha\omega$. The radical circuit implicit in the Tetractys as a 'logical' figure of the part of the logical order of this figure in the correlative orders of 'Kosmos' it embodied, framed access to the pythagorean 'circle', which to enter was to learn the part of this entry in the cosmic scheme. The logical circuit embodied in the Tetractys reflects in the 'poetic' frame of the pythagorean mystery - in the pythagorean 'circle' - the physical order of Kosmos.

The 'Tradition' then unfolds from this initial figure of 'theory' - $\theta\epsilon\rho\mu\pi\alpha$ - through a sequence of 'critical' positions 'outside' successive logical circuits of theory elaborated through a prior criticism of a still earlier closed circuit. Thus Parmenides 'stands outside' the logical circuit of the pythagorean 'mystery', to identify an 'ontical' order inscribed in the logical order of the text as 'outside' that order - an Actuality which cannot be inscribed in the logical circuit taken as primary, but in which this logical circuit must itself be inscribed.

This 'Tradition' was then traced down to the appearance - in the 'beginning of our Era' of the question of inscription of the logical order of 'theory' in the poetic - or rather theological - order... and the logical circuit, finally inscribed in the poetic order of Justinian's Code and Dionysius' mystical theology, unable any longer to determine logically the relations of logical and poetic orders, inscribes itself in the theological frame of the Christian Story, then in that of the Islamic Story.

The middle of the thirteenth century marks a transition into the 'dramatic' figure of a logical determination of this configur-
ation of inscription of logical in poetic order, within a wider scheme of correlation, in which no particular closure of the poetic frame of 'theology' can fully determine the organization of the logical order, inscribed as one term in the theological scheme. The 'Second Part' (or rather a second part or period or phase) of the unfolding of the 'logical circuit' of Theory, then, begins with the possibility of a new 'logic' which identifies a new part in a cosmic scheme in which it reflects the physical order of Cosmos in the 'poetic' frame of Christendom. This new beginning in the Latin West, prefigured in various ways by Pelagius, Eriugena, Abelard, Averroes, and many other 'heretics' of various sorts, asserting themselves 'outside' the theological circle of Christian or Islamic orthodoxy, is at the same time the close of the development of Reflection within the frame of Islam. - For the poetic circuit of Islamic Law, framed in the Book, Koran, is not open to a radical duality of heavenly Mystery and earthly Economy. The part of individual choice cannot - and this in principle - be marked in the theological circuit of Koranic Law as essentially open, as it is marked in the scheme of Aquinas as a direct correlate of the essentially finite circuit of any poetic closure in which law might be embodied. With the correlation with that part of radical freedom or choice, with our being as identification of ourselves in such a part (this, notably, in Thomas' tract Against the Averroists) - our knowledge of ourselves as thus free in a divine scheme, as moral agents - a new phase of Reflection may be taken to open. At the same time this radical figure also marks the parallel (or rather, converse) close of the part of Reflection in Islam for 'surrender', Islam, is precisely abstraction from that intrinsic openness of the logical order of choice within any theological circuit. To assert oneself within that radical figure of choice, is simply to choose not to surrender, not to act as though the logical order of assertion can in principle be comprehended in a frame of Islamic law which (in principle) determines the method of justification of that law in any possible situation.

How, then, is this 'logical' figure of the transition into a new phase (marked by the question of our part in the dual order of inscription of logical in theological, and theological in logical orders) embodied in the cultural configuration or circuit of thirteenth-century Europe? How does the guild of teachers and students reflect
as 'university' the medieval 'Universe' (universum, universitas, each having this dual meaning (1)) in which - within the circle of a 'universal' or 'catholic' Culture which it itself inscribes in that Universe - it frames and identifies its part? How does this part of Reflection, as instituted in the thirteenth century, amount to a recurrence of the initial figure of the pythagorean 'mystery' ('mystery' itself being a medieval synonomy of 'guild'), and in this close a period or 'circuit' of Reflection?

Can we give some figure in which this circuit or 'period' might itself be inscribed within the wider circuit corresponding to a Tradition beginning in the pythagorean mystery, and closing with the identification of that Tradition or circuit here?

Well, the materials are already arranged here before us, by the progress of the narrative thus far. We may easily see that a 'circuit' from the pythagoreans to the thirteenth century might be defined in terms of the widening of the logical 'circle' of Reflection first embodied at Croton, to the point where the recognition of the 'analogy' between closed logical circuit and closed poetic (or theological) circuit leads to the logical inscription of the logical circuit in an essentially open dramatic order, of which the closed circuit of any supposedly complete 'theology' is an essentially incomplete image or representation. This recognition amounts, as we have just seen, to the individual's recognition of his being in a radical autonomy of choice, an identity or personality irreducible to any finite scheme. The primary identification of this part of the 'individual' we saw framed by the Italian dominican Thomas Aquinas - this primarily as a question in which we can know ourselves at the point of mirroring or duality of logical ('philosophical') and theological spheres, circuits, domains. His franciscan contemporary Bonaventure begins with the part of the individual at that radical focus; Duns Scotus transposes the dominican scheme of Thomas, by making that open question of the duality of the two orders, the very beginning or focus of a systematic franciscan theology and philosophy (or rather of a systematic franciscan integration of these dual orders).

- Thus the initial focus of a new logical identification of the part of the logical order in a 'Kosmos' in which we find our-
selves begins to unfold over the second half of the thirteenth century, from the initial recognition of ourselves (as it were) - our 'part' in the scheme - at the formally irresoluble interface of logical and theological orders - of 'theological' that, and logical 'what'. Aquinas insists upon the radical duality of these two sides of Creation, Existence and Essence... Duns finds these as two complementary aspects of a more radical 'thisness', whose own very 'thisness' is simply to be itself:

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\text{haecceitas est de se haec (1) simpliciter falsum est quod esse sit aliud ab essentia (2)}
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- but what of the cultural configuration of the mid-thirteenth century of which franciscan and dominican, Paris and Oxford, University, guild, Church and so on, are components? How does this mirror the 'logical' configuration of which Thomas' and Duns' schemes are preeminent expressions? How does it frame that very preminence, as a new 'period' is opened by these dominican and franciscan schemes?

The University, whether at Bologna, Paris or Oxford, is a guild, instituted by royal and papal charter. Guilds, together in effect constituting the organisation of any medieval town or city, in an independance from the complementary ecclesiastical and feudal orders, conferred by charter, controlled the access to the various 'parts' in the business of a medieval town. The University might be regarded as a limiting case of the guild - first of all in that it embodies the aristotelian figure of education as access to one's part in the community through the 'rhetetics' of abstraction from the confused 'play' of identification - then, in that this access - first through the order of 'logic', then into the 'applied logic' (or logical 'rhetetics of logic') of the quadrivium, whence into the civic frame of Civil Law, of the complementary ecclesiastical frame of Theology, or the intermediate frame of a medicine that related to the individual at the interface of these frames - this access it is, which puts one in the position or part to direct another's access, as 'doctor', teacher.

1: Opera Oxoniensis - commentary on text 5, distinction 13: first part, thirty-eighth orth.
2: Opera Parisienses, 11, 12: fifth part, eighth article
The craft and trade guilds, with their dual civil and religious characters, are organised analogously to this limiting 'guild' of teachers and students. At another extreme, all the craft and trade guilds cooperated in the common dramatic festivals of the 'mysteries' that were the focus of the guilds' year, and which eventually came to be themselves organised by specific actor's guilds.

The guilds in general, like the lombard cities with their corporate papal and imperial charters, present the figure of a third order - the 'third estate' - growing up in the towns and cities of the Middle Ages, with ecclesiastical and imperial or royal 'sides' or components, but coming to have a more and more independent organisation. The universities present (here again) a limiting case, in the almost complete ecclesiastical control of the instruction. Yet the mirroring of the 'highest' faculty (that of theology) by the faculty of civil law, as of papal charter by royal or imperial charter, already embodies the tension of ecclesiastical and civil orders, albeit in an extreme instance. The failure of the Church to inscribe this dual order of learning within a strictly ecclesiastical frame, paralleling the failure of Innocent III's attempt to inscribe the civil order of Christendom within the unitary frame of the Church, is brought out forcibly in the associations of French king and German emperor with anti-papal jurists and theologians at the beginning of the fourteenth century (John of Paris, William of Ockham, Marsilio of Padua).

More generally, over the course of the thirteenth century the guild-organisation of the towns and cities came to assert itself as an intermediate order between the first two 'estates' of clergy and nobility. Between the ecclesiastical order whose unitary frame was framed in the logical poetics of a 'theology' organised in the figure of a Book whose logical order was to be taken to reflect the part of this book in the spiritual frame of which it was itself one component, and a civil order framed by Frederick II in terms of a unitary integration of Europe within the feudal economy of a single Mark, a single boundary, and the 'physical' framing of the 'poetics' of European activity, with the papacy contained within the bounds of the Roman see.
The first half of the century embodies the convergence of this conflict towards the death of Frederick II in 1250. Thereafter the Empire declines, without a central controlling figure, and the influence of the papacy, earlier paramount as the only force balancing an ambitious and powerful Emperor, itself declines. Over the first half of the century these complementary or converse frames, with their principles of mutual inscription, one in the other, as simply one component order in either the 'physical' or 'logical' poetic frame of a Universal Church or unitary feudal Empire, come to embody two sides of a more radical dramatic frame of their symmetric and contrary assertion. In this wider order it is primarily the independent towns that begin to organise the frame of interaction of civil and ecclesiastical orders. In Germany, the independence of the towns and merchants grows at the expense of the Feudal Emperor, of the bishops and feudal landowners (these last two classes often joined in one individual: Albert the Great was at once bishop, count, and dominican provincial). The teutonic organisation of these towns reflects the Latin towns to the south, with the powerful lombard cities between. Meanwhile in France and England, with their complex feudal ties (one with another), the capetian and norman kings begin to assert themselves against a clergy dominated by Rome and a feudal nobility, by an alliance with the 'third estate' representing the growing power of the towns. In each of these rising 'nations' the century begins with the reaction of a feudal nobility to a strong king, and concludes with the institution of a fixed 'parliament' of the three estates, replacing the earlier feudal Council as instrument of national government. Between the French kingdom and the Empire, and facing England across the sea are the powerful independent towns of the Low Countries; in Spain the 'moors' are expelled (except from Granada), and the islamic courts eclipsed by that of the castilian philosopher-king at Toledo. With the fall of Jerusalem in 1249 the Crusades effectively cease to be an important factor in European policy, and with the fall of the Latin kingdom of Byzantium shortly afterwards, the prospects for a re-united Christendom dramatically decline.

The counts or barons (the feudal vassals) of the weak successor of the crusading Richard, assembled at Runnymede in 1215, were demanding the restoration of the saxon privileges associated with the original 'mark' system, lost after the imposition of Latin feudalism by the norman kings. Over the century the new kingdom was articulat-
in a balancing of the norman and saxon principles of autocracy and democracy - this in large part through the activity of Simon de Montfort (the son of the leader of the albigensian 'crusade') towards the time of the Parliament of Oxford in 1258... Simon de Montfort who, before being despatched on feudal service to France (to assert the English king's feudal rights there) in 1248-52, had spent six years in close association with Robert Grosseteste (the founder of the franciscan Oxford School) and the latter's leading student (discounting the eccentric Roger Bacon), Adam Marsh.

The new civil order established by the French kings of the thirteenth century, from Philippe Auguste who granted its royal charter to the University of Paris in 1200, to Philippe le Bel who summoned the three estates to a Parliament in 1300, is by contrast autocratic. If we may say that the inscription of royal authority under Edward I in the legal frame of a Parliament dominated by the rising towns and cities corresponds to a 'poetic' figure of balance of the 'logical' frame of the Church and the 'physical' frame of the feudal order, then we might say that the corresponding order elaborated in France amounts to the beginning by the French monarchy of an essentially 'logical' integration of the kingdom within the frame of three orders dominated by the king. Thus, at the beginning of the fourteenth century the old unitary 'logical' poetics of the Catholic Church opposed to the 'physical' poetics of a feudal Empire, is itself physically inscribed in the new 'logical' order of autocracy asserted in the new frame of which Church and feudal Empire are inscribed as two complementary sides.

Finally, then: how can we now frame the configuration of Reflection in this thirteenth-century cultural frame, which has grown out of the dual orders of European feudalism and Catholic Church, as those have developed and interacted since the close of classical antiquity?

I have already noted the emergence of franciscan and dominican orders within the Church at the beginning of the century. The 'theological' framing of the logical order of Reflection within the 'logical' poetic frame of the Church (in the complementary images of the principles of these two orders) with the parallel emergence after
the mid-century of the focal question of the duality of theological and logical orders in our identification of our part of choice, might be seen to embody in the University a reflection of the wider figure of self-assertion (of burghers and kings) in a dramatic frame of which ecclesiastical and civil orders were but two sides.

Up to the focal question of our individuality, corresponding to the inscription of complementary logical framing of the theological order and theological framing of the logical order within a wider dramatic frame, posed at mid-century, the logical order might be assumed to be logically inscribed in the closed circuit of an orthodox theology, this in turn framed in, and theoretically framing, the unitary scheme of a 'catholic' Roman Church, with Rome at its head, and civil order inscribed within. It is in the figure of the University as guild of students and teachers that a new order of reflection now identifies itself in a wider dramatic frame of which the feudal order of inscription of Church in Empire, and the papal order of inscription of Empire in Church are seen to be but two sides.

At Paris the new order of reflection is embodied in a guild partaking of the new centralised order of the French state, notably by Averroists in the Faculty of Arts, asserting the symmetry of inscription of logical in theological, and theological in logical orders, by Thomas resolving the symmetry in the identification of his part in the Church as practical frame of activity; by Bonaventure finding in such a part a radical mystery.

At Oxford the Parisian guild is reflected in the town that is in many respects the birthplace of the English Constitution, as framed by the associate of Grosseteste, the founder of Franciscan studies there. This dominant part of the Franciscans is consonant with the democratic principles of that order, as contrasted with the Rule of Augustine chosen by Dominic for his order. In each place the configuration of Reflection—of the new logical order of choice asserting itself in the frame of 'scholastic' theology—whether in dominican or franciscan figures, plays an analogous part within the new order of the University, as it appears in the interplay of city, nation, feudalism and Church.
Thus, at mid-century, we may define a radically new 'part' of the 'individual' person, at the focus of a unitary 'European' Culture: the part of recognising his place in the dramatic frame of which Church and Empire are seen to be two symmetric 'sides' - a recognition of his part in this dramatic symmetry, as acceded to in the University, as embodiment of the logical order of discursive reason within the 'logical poetics' of the Christian Story framed in the Church. A University, though, of which, in this recognition, the ecclesiastical frame of the papal charter and episcopal jurisdiction is now seen to be but one side, complemented by the incorporation of the body of students and teachers by royal charter in the civic order of the City - whether Oxford, Paris, Cologne, Bologna, or elsewhere. The identification of this part (implicit, for example, in Thomas' defence before the Pope of the part of Dominicans and Franciscans in the University, in a disputatio occasioned by the refusal of the Parisian authorities to grant doctorates to him and to Bonaventure) of the University as framing the radical identification of the part of teachers and students in the ecclesiastical and civil order of Christendom, is reflected through the 'physical' poetics of the feudal order in a Kosmos in which the theological frame of Creation (expressed in Scripture) is mirrored in an aristotelian Economy of its logical figuration. Furthermore, the framing in the University of the individual's identification of his part in this two-sided Kosmos - in its 'dramatic' order which reflects the complementarity of ecclesiastical and civil orders of the 'part' - is in turn reflected in the triple organisation of the University into the 'higher' faculties of 'ecclesiastical' theology, civil law, and an essentially Avicennian medicine framed in the familiar duality of the cosmic orders of 'Above' and 'Below' embodied in theology and civil law respectively. This triple order is itself framed in the fourth 'faculty' - that of Arts - which embodies the access to the three higher faculties.

Thus we can see in the framing at mid-century of the new question of the individual's part in the wider dramatic order of which Church and Empire, theology and logic are two 'sides' a focal recurrence of the figure of correlation of 'logical', 'physical' and 'poetic' orders sketched above in relation to the analogous schemes of this correlation from about the middle of the third century to the close of classical Antiquity.
At one 'pole' of that scheme we found (it will, I hope, be remembered) the primary articulation of the 'logical' order of the text in terms of the correlative orders of 'theory' of text, 'physical' context, 'poetic' interface, and their three 'co-finitary' complements or analogues - psychical, mystical and ontical orders (these articulated 'psychologically', 'theologically' and 'ontologically'; insofar as their organisation is reflected in or assimilated to the 'Economy' of the finitary orders of 'earthly' things). At the other 'pole' of that scheme common to the various 'classical' versions, whose correlations could then be expressed in terms of their different positions of enunciation within that formal scheme, was a 'physical' order of Kosmos reflecting that logical order of the text. The 'poetic' order of symmetry of these two 'poles' was determined 'logically' in the figure of a text which framed its discursive order in the poetic or dramatic order of which it identified itself as one component: this logical poetics is embodied at the middle of the thirteenth century in the scheme of a unitary or 'catholic' Church, embodying the configuration of a text of the 'Christian' Story (or Drama) which itself defines its part in the Drama it frames.

Complementing this 'logical' poetics of the Christian Story, understood in terms of a unitary orthodoxy, is the 'physical' poetics of the civil order, framed in the primary figure of the feudal 'Mark'. The radical focus framed in the University (which institution appears in the 'logical' poetics of the Papacy as embodying the 'logical' order of the 'text' of the Story as 'theology') amounts to the first appearance of a figure of this dramatic Economy of the various orders of figures - 'logical', 'poetic', 'physical' - the first identification of our part in the radically dramatic symmetry of 'physical' and 'logical' orders of activity - the first identification of a 'poetic' frame of symmetry of text and Kosmos, and of Church and civil order within that wider symmetry - which is not itself 'mechanically' or unthinkingly subordinated to the interplay of its converse 'logical' and 'physical' versions or framings. Schematically the relations of the various orders of this self-identification of the 'individual' in the Kosmos and Culture of the thirteenth century (this in a discourse which now first identifies its part in this radical identification) may be presented as thus articulated between the two poles of logical text and physical Kosmos:
- The text, within the ecclesiastical frame of the University in medieval Culture, frames its part in the Kosmos it defines: the text presents, in the interplay of these figures 'inside' and 'outside' the text, the 'logical' frame of a dramatic identification of writer or reader in the 'Drama' of self-recognition through a choice inscribed in the Economy of interplay of these various orders or figures as 'outside' the formal play of that mechanical Economy - a choice recognised, in the aristotelian medieval Kosmos in which it thus inscribes itself, as an individual's actuality at the middle of the thirteenth century.

The way that the logical order of identification of this radical actuality enters into the dramatic configuration of that actuality as one component, and identifies itself as such, marks a close of the 'unfolding' of the logical order, from its initial self-inscription in the radically 'logical' frame of the pythagorean Kosmos, to its logical inscription in a wider dramatic order of choice, having passed, at the close of 'classical Antiquity', into the 'poetic' circuit of a Story embodied in catholic Church and Islam. The new identification of the 'individual' amounts to an inscription of that poetic subordination of the logical order in the logical order of a Reflection which begins to recognise its part in a cosmic drama which is formally 'outside' comprehension in any closed order: this now in a 'logical' figure, rather than in some 'poetic' configuration in which the logical order is determined as simply one component 'comprehended' fully in the scheme of some definite drama.

This circuit from pythagorean mystery to thirteenth-century University, can thus be inscribed in a wider circuit from that mystery to a figuration of the part of the logical order in the 'cosmic' drama, which itself 'opens out' or unfolds, from the new self-recogni-
... But does not the principle of inscription of period-within-period, within the simple formal 'poetic' circuit and symmetry of a Tradition, supposed to be some unitary whole, itself repeat the principle of inscription of the logical order of Reflection in some 'closed' poetic or theological order, which one might suppose left behind after the thirteenth century? Does not such a principle of inscription of logical in poetic amount to a naive 'determinism' from which Thomas, already, distances himself?

... Yes indeed... but that 'distancing', that opening step of a new period, a new 'framing' of Reflection, of the 'closure' of the logical order, is the first step cut of an 'economy' in which earlier Reflection is 'unthinkingly' implicated, for want of seeing this figure of implication, for want of choosing whether to think 'within' that figure or not - for want of the very figure of choice which makes this choice possible, by itself being brought 'into play', into the play of figures in which action (including reflection) is, up to that point, 'open' to being framed.

That is: until the appearance of this new figure of identification, this new 'part' of the individual (person) - until it is brought 'into play' in the thirteenth century, Reflection is 'unthinkingly' implicated - and so 'determined' - in a 'mechanical' interplay or economy of 'logical', 'poetic' and 'physical' orders. Thus the unfolding of the initial logical 'circuit' of pythagorean 'theory' up to the point of its inscription in the poetic order of the Christian Story (the point that marks the close of 'classical' or pagan Antiquity) may itself be inscribed in a corresponding 'physical'
cycle which appears to cover about a thousand 'years' - a thousand of those 'physical' cycles of the Sun, which 'mechanically' dominate so much 'natural' and unthinking activity on the surface of this earth in which the physical circuit of Culture (first as 'agriculture') is inscribed. The 'poetic' order of symmetry of this unfolding of 'classical Antiquity' is itself reflected in the more or less equal 'physical' division of the whole 'period' or circuit into two subordinate periods, punctuated by the point around the beginning of 'our Era', in which the logical question of the symmetry of logical and poetic orders arises - this in the form of that transitional 'question' of the framing of activity, of which Philo and the 'Christ', give two complementary 'versions', logical and poetic, respectively.

It will be seen that the period of a thousand years in which Reflection as it were 'turns about' that question of framing activity, reappears - 'doubled'- both in the cultural circuit that leads from the period of 'Abraham' - say the fall of Ur, the Chaldean metropolis, in 2004 'BC' - to the 'beginning of our Era' (give or take a few years), as also (more or less) in the further (and in some ways analogous) circuit which opens with that transitional configuration of the 'question' of framing action (the 'beginning of our Era'), to the closing configuration of the Tradition of Reflection, of which the writing of this book is itself (it seems) a component. And within this configuration we may identify another simple 'physical' symmetry of two cycles, in the symmetric division of the period from 'Abraham' to the Pythagoreans (about 2000-500 'BC') by, say, the point of Return of the Israelites to 'the Land', as in the division of the period from the close of 'classical Antiquity' to the close of the Tradition of Reflection (defined by the 'mechanical' dominance of the 'logical circle' of thinking), by the cultural configuration of the mid-thirteenth century.

That cultural configuration more or less equally divides the period from the close of classical Antiquity to the close of the 'Tradition' inscribed in the 'logical circle' of Reflection, into two physically symmetric periods - as though the 'poetic' symmetry of the 'story' of Reflection from the time of Aquinas to that of writing this book, might be thus directly inscribed within the primary physical symmetry of the temporal order - of that primary physical 'image' of the poetic order of symmetry of physical and logical orders, in the 'two sides of Space' - in the 'mirror' of Time.
Now such a simple 'outward' symmetry of logical and physical orders - the direct inscription of the 'poetic' order of the interface of Text and Context in the 'physical' symmetry of Time - is not easily assimilated by a Reflection which - since the time of Aquinas notably - thinks to determine itself as independant self-activity. For if each act of thought, assertion, judgement, is to be a 'free' act of choice, independant of all the other free acts of choice that go together to determine the pattern of european activity since the thirteenth century, surely the combined inscrutabilities of those uncountable separate acts or choices, will imply that that 'period' is thoroughly abstracted from any simple pattern - and from the extreme superficiality of any equation of a symmetry or pattern in the development of Reflection, and an unthinking mechanical symmetry of solar orbits? in particular?

Here we must return to the initial figure of that 'free choice', though: it amounts to the interface of the complementary inscriptions of the logical order of reflection in the poetic circuit of theology (more particularly, averroistic astrology), and of this poetic order (in its turn) in the logical order of reflection. This figure of freedom corresponds to the recognition of the impossibility of definitively 'inscribing' or subordinating one of these complementary principles of 'inscription' in the other. Yet that symmetry does, all the same, constitute a very particular and definite figure of choice, with direct correlations with the logical order of reason and the 'astrological' order of heavenly cycles, within which simple correlations this 'choice' must be inscribed. - The 'choice', although it is not 'determined' within either a logical or theological frame, yet has its part in that frame exactly determined, so as to leave open (precisely) that particular choice.

- And this simple correlation, governing all choices inscribed in this figure of 'choice' will thus organise an economy of choice over a fairly definite 'period' determined by the primary correlation of the component orders of choice. - An 'economy': thus insofar as a certain activity is 'thinking' or Reflection, inscribed in the constitutive 'logical circle' which constitutes it as Reflection (rather than walking, say, or dreaming, or any other activity), it will also be (simply through this simple figure of the logical
'circle' or circuit of Reflection, inscribed in a simple 'economy' of the interplay of logical, physical and poetic orders. - And although each particular act of thinking inscribed in this simple 'economy' or interplay may, in the complexity of figuration of its 'text' (so to speak) and 'context' may be of an incalculable complexity, yet that simple correlation will still determine a constitutive finality corresponding to a simple overall 'periodicity' of the incalculably complex correlations of incalculably complex single acts. That is: Aquinas' free assertion of the character of free choice, which opens a 'second period' of Reflection, itself enters, on various levels, into the 'economy' of correlation or interplay of logical, physical, and poetic orders of subsequent choices. A next choice is 'opened up' by the configuration of this identification of choice in the simple correlation of orders of choice which define the structure of a 'period' of Reflection. At each subsequent step the initial 'finality' corresponding to the simple temporal symmetry of the period frame, in relation to the figuration of previous 'choices', now choices, each equally 'free', but each leading, through their correlation with the overall figure of correlation of logical, physical and poetic orders, to determine subsequent choices, as it were in the new space left 'in-between' choices thus far, and the organizing finality of the correlations constituting the period as a whole.

I have intentionally tried to stick to the articulation of 'periods' of Reflection, in terms of a few simple orders of 'figuration' within the formal frame of the period as a whole. In this way the correlations between the different primary figures of Reflection (as of 'Culture') which interact within the simple physical, logical and poetic 'frames' of an elementary 'period' or circuit of activity, may be articulated in a fairly symmetric 'economy' of development, organised by a simple 'finality' which is itself a direct correlate of the character of the subordinate activity within the 'economy' as Reflection. To try and give a simple articulation, on the other hand, of the historical development of, say, clothing, would be more difficult...since the correlations with, for example, the physical symmetry of Time, are far less 'direct'...

I will now move on to a sketch of the remaining 'periods' which intervene between the thirteenth century and the writing of this book. I will treat these in a more abstract manner, in accordance with
these general and abstract principles of an 'economy' of Reflection found at work in the First Part.
The First Part of this Story opened with the breaking of the pythagorean Circle at Croton— with that circular mystery in question—and closed with the question posed by the mirroring of Christian Mystery and earthly Economy of Creation in individual embodiment, incarnation. —Opened with the configuration of an individual confronting at Croton the closed circuit of pythagorean mystery, the opening of that mystery in access, initiation into, or breaking from without of the Circle... and closed with the complementary configuration of Christian mystery as, so to speak, the Open Secret of Kosmos.

The circuit which leads, in that First Part, from opening to closing questions, was articulated as narrative and inquiry by successive questioning of successive closed circuits of inscription in the Kosmos it identified of the discursive or logical order of its framing, identification—this in the 'critical' figure of questioning 'logical' abstraction from the symmetry of logical and other orders of inquiry: a symmetry itself discovered in the very 'terms' of the logic it brings into question.
Thus the opening figure of the symmetry of the logical order of its identification with the other coordinates of pythagorean Kosmos, marked by the simple symmetry of the ten 'points' of the Tetractys, unfolds to the questioning of the 'part' of reflection in Kosmos, posed by the radical 'poetic' scheme of framing the part of framing in that Story of stories which relates that to act according to a story open in one's situation makes it true (the Story thus making itself Truth)...to the questioning or Question of the individual's part, about which the first section as a whole 'turns'. This 'opening' of questioning towards that radical Question of our part in the universal Story is itself mirrored in an order of closing, and convergence of questioning towards the question posed by the interface of circular Mystery and open Economy of questions in the human 'individual', around the middle of the thirteenth century of solar cycles after the turning-point: an order of closing as an organising finality of questioning, which is coordinate with an economy of 'opening-up' of questions.

Within the human 'group', circle, community, as primary 'space' or frame of this mirroring and finality, then, we may see a simple coordination of the abstraction of the pythagorean mystery in the Silence of the governing circle at Croton, within the wider circuits of City and Earth, to the 'global' inscription of the evangelical, 'crusading', christian mystery and 'mission', in the 'medieval' World - itself symmetrically articulated 'in theory', within the opening pythagorean symmetries, interfaces, of Heaven and Earth, Culture and Nature, governing and governed, 'theology' and government.

Now this Second Part opens, then, with the individual 'finding himself' (or herself) in the interface of Heaven and Earth, confronting the circuit of the christian mystery as the postulant at Croton earlier confronted the earlier mystery. But the thirteenth-century 'individual' now finds himself precisely in that interface of Closed christian Mystery of Creation, and its open aristotelian Economy. If his eventual access to the closed circuit of mystery and its Salvation be decided 'outside' earthly time, yet the steps
from the actual situation in which the symmetry of closed Mystery and open Economy is articulated in the radical open-ness of his 'choices', his choice, in that situation, are simply not decided 'in' the closed circuit of the Mystery. Within the governing finality of that order of closing, decision, the individual's steps towards his eventual salvation or damnation partake of the open-ness of mirroring of Mystery and Economy in which he (or she) is the locus of 'decision': the mystery leaves its own earthly 'economy' radically open to individual choice...and indeed itself closes with the very inscription of this order of open-ness as an irreducible component of the mystery...a very mysterious freedom of the individual in the radically dual interplay of Economy and Mystery of Creation. Of an individual whose actuality, then, is at the very focus of this Creation from which any attempt to 'logically' frame that focus abstracts: to attempt, indeed, to 'logically' comprehend that radical coordination of the various orders of Creation in the individual, amounts itself to a false or misguided choice of just such an individual (who loses himself, as it were, in the part of philosopher, forgetting that he is incarnate individual first, and only then, and through that incarnation, philosopher).

That is to say: the focal choice of the 'actual' individual, who knows himself most radically as actual instance of choice and responsibility, is articulated at once in the two complementary and mutually irreducible orders of Closed Mystery and its Open Economy. Mysterious divine finality adapts itself to successive free choices as an order of 'closing' which as from a fixed point in the otherwise 'open' future determines in successive configurations arising from successive choices, the right choice - the choice informed by conscience as choice of Choice, of God. But even a wrong choice leads to a new configuration of choice, in which the same constant finality determines another right choice (different from what would have been the right choice in the different configuration arising from a previous right, rather than wrong, 'choice').

From such a simple coordination of the various orders of Kosmos, and of the interface of mysterious actuality and open economy of possibility in particular, in the individual who, embodied
on this Earth partakes symmetrically of both orders, as from an initial point or focus, there 'opens' that phase, period, circuit, of questioning framed in this Second Part.

And now, once again, we find the figure of our 'reading' of the Story or Tradition of Reflection precisely in - indeed as - what it reads...and now we find even the figure of this correspondence through which such figurations as it were express themselves or 'speak' to us in a Tradition, reflected at this point in our Story, in the figure of the mysterious actuality of Spirit in the supposedly unitary Tradition leading from Incarnation of the Word down to a thirteenth century 'catholic' Church.

Our opening framing of this Second Part, then, embodies a figuration of a finality of Tradition articulated over its various circuits of subordinate finality in the human time of more or less 'free' choice. In particular, the circuit of the First Part can now be framed as one of three subordinate circuits within the circuit articulated, between opening of the first and close of the third, within the simple finality of Reflection, Inquiry, Question, simply as such. - A finality or order of 'closing' which, if it determines the transition from a first to second of three symmetric 'parts' or periods in terms of the simple topology of various orders whose 'internal' articulation (Heaven-Earth, Culture-Nature, Policy-Economy, for example) mirrors their 'external' coordination with the other symmetric orders, yet does not fully constrain the actuality of, say, Thomas' choice of the details of his exposition of the actuality of choice - let alone, say, what the Angelic Doctor chooses for his breakfast before settling down to give an account of that choice.

If we open then, with the mid-thirteenth-century configuration of this question of individual choice, the individual as radically free agent in the interface of heavenly Mystery and
earthly Economy, we can, even now at the outset, set out a preliminary (or rather, liminary) frame of this Second Part in terms of a complementarity of 'unfolding' of questions from that initial focal question, and 'closing' convergence and coordination of the questions that thus arise towards a 'symmetric' focus which marks a further transition from Second to Third (or 'closing') Part.

How do we then divide the period from thirteenth century to the configuration of writing this book, with which the Third Part ('already') closes? How articulate that circuit as a whole, first into two cycles - the first opening with the question of individual choice and closing with some symmetric configuration - and then in terms of subordinate cycles corresponding to subordinate figurations - amounting to subordinate 'inquiries' and their stories - within that Second Part or period?

We might consider all sorts of possible 'choices' of schemes or frames of division - though all of these must in turn be inscribed in the organising finality both of the closing of this very book, and of the wider Inquiry it transcribes - these two 'parallel' orders meeting, indeed, in a common Close.

We might even, then, consider articulating the Second Part within this radical mirroring of our Story in its story as framed in this and other books 'in' the Story...

...And this simple mirroring of Story and its stories in a common order of closing does indeed provide the primary frame of this Second Part: opening with the thirteenth-century configuration of inscription of the Book which tells the Story of Creation in that Creation, and closing in a symmetrical configuration of the ideal or imaginary finality of a (unfinished) story in whose close the wider coordination of that closing and the wider circuit of Mystery would be articulated as in a perfect Symbol.
The Part or circuit which thus opens and closes, turns about the mirroring of this opening and close in the seventeenth-century configuration of a 'Scientific Revolution': which 'revolutionary' transition thus mirrors in the wider order of Inquiry as such, the opening of the First Part in the closing of the Third. - This through the opening up from the thirteenth-century focus in the individual of an order of questioning which inscribes the mirroring of Heaven and Earth as two complementary sides of a symmetrical open Economy of questions coordinated about the part of that focal 'individual', and the interplay of actuality and possibility in the universal order of their interface as 'Experience'.

Such a frame seems to be a right enough choice within the organising finality of the inquiry embodied in this book. Of course many other divisions might be made in other books. One might frame the Second Part in the parallel development of the 'institution' of Reflection, from medieval University through renaissance Academy, scientific 'society', enlightenment salon to romantic group (and on to the 'modern' university as it first appears in Germany at the opening of the nineteenth century). Or one might trace an analogous circuit from the 'Romance' of the thirteenth century to the 'Romanticism' that marks a transition from eighteenth to nineteenth. Thus we find that a 'poetic' analogue of Thomas' scheme - the second part of the Roman de la Rose composed by the Doctor's next-door neighbour at Paris, Jean de Meung - presents an order of allegory whose dominant part in the European literature of the following two centuries reflects that of Aquinas' theological 'analogy' of finite and infinite, poetic and theological in the contemporary Reflection. We might frame a period or circuit which brings that Romance 'full-circle!' in, say, Novalis' Blue Flower, organising symbol of that 'prophet' of German Romanticism, just as well as bringing Parisian scholasticism full-circle in German 'romantic' philosophy. Indeed the two circuits converge, so to speak, in the very part of Novalis.
...But these 'institutional' and 'poetic' parallels must here be taken as subordinate components or coordinates of a 'Story' (and its transcription here) governed by the closing or finality of a questioning articulated in the progressive opening up, in the form of questions, of the symmetries of the logical order of framing their coordination, and the other coordinate orders of that framing - institutional and poetic among them: governed by a finality of Reflection in the choice or assertion of inscription of a new logical order, a new discourse, as one coordinate of the Kosmos it frames, in successive configurations arising from such 'choices', from such self-assertion of the 'philosopher' in Reflection. The parallel figurations of the coordinate orders enter, then, into the Story, only as they enter into successive configurations of re-assertion of the 'logical' order of Reflection, as it comes again and again 'into question', within the overall 'logical' dynamic of a Tradition of Reflection, Inquiry, questioning.

Thus the Romance of Jean de Meung enters as one component into the 'poetic' figuration of the latter part of the thirteenth century, in which the elementary 'poetic' symmetry of the logical order of Reflection and the 'physical' order of its 'context' itself becomes a question for a Reflection unfolding from the opening mid-century question of individual choice. By the mid-seventeenth century the logical order of Reflection 'logically' frames its part in the symmetric coordination of the various orders of its 'context', within the mathematical frame of a logical poetic of Kosmos - the logical coordination of the various orders of that context reflected in the symmetrical mathematical 'space' in which the physical order is logically articulated. By the close of the Second Part, in the transition from eighteenth to nineteenth century, the abstract logical framing of the 'space' of coordination of the various orders coordinate with the logical order of Reflection, itself comes into question: for such a framing itself at the outset abstracts from the radical symmetry of coordination in which the framing of that symmetry must itself be effected.

One component in this closing configuration is the logical framing - the 'theory' - of the articulation of the 'logical' (or psychological) order of finality in the physical economy of activity:
'political economy', the inscription and articulation of the 'logic' of choice in the open play of choices within choices, within what is physically 'open' in the material configuration of a society arrived at through the cumulative effects of earlier choices. Such a mechanical or 'physical' economy of the logical or psychological order of our self-assertion in activity is a sort of formal converse (as the organisation of the 'logical' order in the physical) of an earlier logical framing of the coordination of logical with other coordinate orders. Finality at work in the material coordination of choice, and through it of our activity, is a sort of converse in the Story of the ideal finality of a Tradition of Reflection; and indeed the symmetry of this conversion is one component of the closing configuration of that Tradition in which Reflection, Inquiry, Question, is itself 'in question', the question of what is open in the symmetry of its various orders (that is, the various orders of Reflection and its Context).

At the close of the eighteenth century, then, the doubling of an ideal finality of Reflection, with its circuits within circuits ('periods' within 'periods' corresponding to subordinate figurations of inquiry within Reflection as a whole) in, say, Adam Smith's 'logic' of the Invisible Hand's material coordination of activity and the play of ends... 'goods'... that informs it: and in the closing configuration of this Second Part this complementarity of logical and physical orders embedded in the complementarity in the activity of a group and its organising finality of 'logical' Policy and 'physical' Economy, itself enters as a central component into the question of the abstract character of an earlier abstract logical framing of the relations of logical and other orders of individual choice and activity, as it were from 'outside' the actual configuration of our 'theory' (theological, economic, or other) in individual embodied theorising (itself already recognised at the opening of this Part as simply one choice among others, the 'part' of the philosopher).

Together with 'institutional' and 'poetic' components of the story (then), which, parallelling the axial finality of the Story, and this story of it, as Inquiry, converge with that axis toward the closing 'focus' of this Part, we may count a complementary physical economy of finality - the 'economy' of the Story in the restricted sense of that term. Who pays for Thomas Aquinas' breakfast?
Or rather: how does the 'logical' finality of Thomas' reflection enter into the outward play of ends, along with the end of having breakfast. Does the Doctor, for example, write the Summae in order to get his breakfast from the Church—or does he eat breakfast in order to stay alive to write the Summae?

Here, then, we meet again the dual orders of ideal finality and a complementary earthly 'economy': but not in terms of the initial duality of heavenly Mystery and earthly Economy, rather as the image of that interface of Heaven and Earth in the interplay of logical economy of Reflection, and the converse physical economy of earthly activity in which Reflection, as human activity, is to be inscribed: the earthly image of the interface of Heaven and Earth.

At the close of the period corresponding to this Second Part, Adam Smith closes his logic of the inscription of the logical order of choice in its physical economy, with a brief application of the principles he has articulated to a survey of the price of wheat in England since the thirteenth century: that is with a survey of the rates of exchange, weight for weight (pound for pound), of wheat and gold since market records were kept following the decree of the first Parliament in 1258. By considering the variation in this 'price' of the staple or primary 'good', the staff of life, and further, by comparing the parallel variations in the 'prices' or gold equivalent of other 'goods', Smith illustrates structural changes in the 'configuration' (so to speak) of activity in the physical order since the thirteenth century.

If we chart this data (or rather data from the systematic survey begun by James Thorold Rogers in 1860 (1)) according to the system of mathematical 'coordination' introduced over the mid-seventeenth century, we find a 'periodic' articulation which directly reflects the periodic structure governed by the 'converse' finality of Reflection. In each case we find (coordinate) articulations of choice.

1: A History of Agriculture and Prices in England, from the year after the Oxford Parliament (1259) to the Commencement of the Continental War (1793) 8 vols Oxford 1866-189.
successively framed by the configurations arising from prior choices. Corresponding to the major structural changes in the 'physical' coordination of the logical order of framing activity are those 'structural' developments of Reflection from one phase to another, associated with the opening-up of new orders of question in the new configurations of the logical and other correlative orders here considered in relation to the logical economy of Inquiry. Thus if we chart the variation in relative value of constant weights of wheat and gold (the scale being arbitrary):

weight of gold for constant weight of wheat (1)

...We can immediately coordinate 'economic' components with the turning-point (around 1650) and close (around 1800) of this Part as a whole, as with the 'turning-point' in the 'Reform' of the thirteenth-century order, about which the development from mid-thirteenth to mid-seventeenth centuries may itself be taken to 'turn' (around 1500). (I have extended the chart to cover most of the Third Part, 'turning' about the close of the nineteenth century with Davis' continuation of Rogers' data).

If, now we abstract from the long-term structural changes by plotting average prices over successive ten-year periods against averages for fifty-year periods around each decade, we discern a symmetric periodicity or cyclical structure:

10-year average as percentage of 50-year average (2)

1,2: charts adapted from E. Dewey & E. Dakin, Cycles New York, 1947
This fifty-four (2·3²) year cycle was first noted in the variation of prices since around 1800, around the time of the last peak on the chart; in the introduction to his first volume in 1866 Rogers had noted indefinite cyclical factors and raised the question of their significance. Around the same time a French physician was discerning the primary component nine (3²) year 'Juglar' cycle of the longer Kondratieff or 'war' cycle identified the following century. Just as, in relation to Pythagorean Kosmos, we noted the 'harmonics' of Kosmos, cycle within cycle corresponding to symmetry within symmetry, articulated in the basic solar cycle governing the interface of Heaven and Earth. There was a certain simple symmetry of physical and logical 'economies' of the Reflection of the 'classical' Antiquity opening up from that Pythagorean inscription of the logical order of its framing in symmetric Kosmos. Indeed the Reflection of that Antiquity was articulated in a thousand-year cycle turning about the mid-point of its elementary symmetry in 'physical', solar, time. That millennial circuit was articulated in a 'pagan' reflection abstracted from the 'poetic' symmetry of its mirroring in the physical economy of classical Antiquity, and from the 'dramatic' order of activity of which reflection itself, as activity, is one component.

Just as a structural change corresponding to the close (with the closing of the pagan schools by Justinian) of 'pagan' reflection is mirrored in the structural change in its cultural context with the opening of the 'middle' (or rather, 'dark') ages in the sixth century, so does the transition from fifteenth to sixteenth century mark, with the 'Reform' of the thirteenth-century 'medieval' order in Church, Empire, 'Economy', Reflection, an entry into a 'symmetric' development turning about the mid-seventeenth century and closing with the eighteenth (passing into another symmetric phase turning about the close of the nineteenth century). Yet just as the symmetry of 'classical Antiquity' was taken as abstracted from the deeper 'dramatic' order of the Story as a whole, so these subsequent symmetries are also to be regarded as abstract. For just as, within the dramatic order of interplay of Reflection with the various orders of its Context, the 'circuit' opening with the Pythagorean mystery, and in which the First Part is articulated, closes with the mid-thirteenth century, so does the Reform of that thirteenth century order opening roughly with the sixteenth century and
leading to the 'Scientific Revolution' of the following century, amount only to one phase of the first 'half' of this Second Part. For the 'elementary' symmetry of physical and logical orders reflected in the mechanical circuits of planets and clocks is only one component of the dramatic 'circuit' of the story of interplay of logical and physical 'economies' of Reflection. As the configuration of the logical order of Reflection in the 'dramatic' coordination of the various correlative orders changes, so does the configuration of articulation of the Story in relation to symmetric 'mechanical' time. And these changes of rhythm, so to speak, are reflected in correlative changes in the articulation in time of the physical 'economy' - as, say, it goes through the 'mercantile' structural revolution associated with the opening-up of a 'New World' at the opening of the sixteenth century.

Now although the epochal structures of Reform (or structural reform) in the various orders coordinate with the logic of Reflection and its 'economy' (circuit within circuit, configuration within configuration) associated with the transition from fifteenth to sixteenth century constitute a 'turning-point' about which the unfolding from the cultural configuration of classical Scholasticism and convergence toward a seventeenth-century 'Scientific Revolution' may be symmetrically articulated (in that elementary 'poetic' symmetry of unfolding and convergence or involution, coordinate with the elementary 'conversion' of logical and physical 'economies', those two complementary 'sides' of the cultural dynamic of human activity) ...yet the structural change in the configuration of the logical order in the coordination of correlative orders which is its 'Context', is more directly associated with a mid-fifteenth-century logic of inscription of that logical order in its context, outwardly reflected, say, in the embedding of discourse in the 'mechanical' economy of 'printing'. Thus we may, within the general 'economy' of the Story as a whole (the economy reflected in the 'logic' of its transcription into this book as 'inquiry') articulate a 'middle' age of transition from 'classical' or pagan Antiquity to a certain 'renaissance' of...
of pagan classicism (or classical paganism), between the opening of the sixth century and the mid-fifteenth century. This simple 'symmetry' of a certain phase or transition about the question of individual choice at mid-thirteenth century corresponds to a change of 'rhythm' in the various orders of development coordinate with the order of Reflection, over the course of the fifteenth century (mirroring an earlier change of scale or rhythm between fifth and sixth centuries). The coordination of these two changes, marking the opening and close of a certain 'middle' age - identified as such, precisely, in the configuration of its close - as 'renaissance' - is associated, for example, with the centrality of the closing configuration of 'neo-platonic' reflection, in the analogous cultural articulation of the fifteenth century. Of course we cannot identify some point at mid-fifteenth century when the rhythm suddenly changes; the configuration of Reform at the close of the century, indeed, may be taken as more 'definitive' in this respect than the interplay of 'medieval' and 'renaissance' over the previous century. Yet that interplay may itself be articulated about a sort of formal focus at mid-century in the focussing of a coordination of the various orders of Reflection and Kosmos in the part of Leo Battista Alberti - archetypal 'renaissance man' inscribing himself as 'architect' in the symmetric Kosmos he frames. - This in terms of the poetic 'element' of symmetrical inscription of the logical or psychological in the physical order through the physical image of the symmetry of inner and outer, psychological and physical, 'ideal' and material or real, in the two-dimensional poetic frame of the square, quadro, 'picture', as interface in the physical order of these two orders - organised through the simple coordination of the various orders of this inscription according to albertine 'central perspective', at whose focus the painter or viewer 'finds himself'. A focus, then, in relation to which the 'architect' articulates a three-dimensional order of surfaces (volumes, then; 'spaces') within the wider interface of Culture (City-State) and Nature; and this within the still wider interface of Heaven and Earth. - And this 'spatial' poetic itself mirrored in Alberti's Discorsi, in which the order of the discourse itself is inscribed in the ciceronian dialogue it frames, and which it articulates through this inscription just as the perspectival 'picture' articulates the space of action in which it is 'inscribed' or embedded.
'Space' of action: and we will be able to identify a formal focus of the Reform opening in the transition from fifteenth to sixteenth century precisely in terms of the more radical 'poetic' of action - of an action articulated by the self-inscription of focal agent or actor as locus of framing the action he frames - from which the temporal axis of discourse, and the complementary articulation of albertine space may be seen as coordinate abstractions.

We must now proceed (then) to articulate the unfolding from the initial focus in a mere point, as it were, of individual choice, in the interface of Heaven and Earth (from which an earlier logic and theology appear, over the thirteenth century to be abstractions), in the spatial and temporal 'axes' of spatiotemporal action: an unfolding which, turning about the question of the part of the individual in the action he frames (in the configuration of Reform opening with the sixteenth century), is mirrored in the convergence of the various figurations of such sixteenth-century 'action' toward their symmetric integration in the universal Frame of Experience around the middle of the seventeenth century.

What of the overall 'economy' of cycle-within-cycle, in which I have suggested the 'physical' economy of 'political economy' is reflected in the 'economy' of Inquiry governed by the ideal finality of questioning Reflection? What, say, of the relation between a symmetric base rhythm of $3^2$ or $2\times3^3$ solar cycles ('harvests') in the agri-cultural interface of Culture and Nature (wheat), and a wider cultural cycle of $10^3$ 'years' of 'classical Antiquity' or $2\times10^3$ years from the turning point of the First Part to the close of the Story as a whole? What of the coordination of these 'symmetries' or circuits associated with elementary coordinations of logical and physical orders, and the opening configuration of that coordination marked by the ternary and decadic symmetry of the Tetractys...? I will not confront this question here, but postpone a consideration of the coordination of elementary physical cycles with the circuit of a Culture embedded in that cyclical Nature, to the point in the Third Part where it appears as a question in the configuration of a later
Reflection. Let it here suffice to suggest a counter to the alarming prospect of the free reflection of the reader following this inquiry inscribed with all its free elaboration of detail, in its own time, brutally transcribed, with all the detailed reflections of earlier writers, into a schematic symmetry of its various orders over thousands of years: we may consider the matter from the 'other' side, and regard the whole story as the minor detail of the inscription of its 'logical' order, its 'theory', in the physical Kosmos elaborated by physical theory over those thousand or so years, almost imperceptible, perhaps, in the thousands of thousands of thousands of 'years' (ten of these, it appears at the Close) in which, as its elementary physical 'context', it is embedded.
Within an 'economy' of transition over a 'period' between thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, we may inscribe as an initial component or phase, then, a transition from an opening in the 'focal' coordination of Church, Empire, City, Guild, Theology, Philosophy, Individual and Choice, to a further 'focus' of the mid-fifteenth century. Just as this initial 'phase' is inscribed in the economy of a 'Second Part' (from mid-thirteenth to close of eighteenth century) as a whole, and that whole in turn in the wider circuit of a Tradition opening with a pythagorean 'mystery' and closing in a question marked by this inquiry or book, so may various component figures be articulated within the economy of this initial phase, extending roughly over two centuries. In general, indeed, one might coordinate the articulation of certain figures in the configurations of two nodes or foci, and the articulation of those figures in an 'economy' of transition between them.

'Focus': I found the close of the First Part, and opening of this Second, 'focussed' in the configuration of a thirteenth-century 'individual' recognising himself (or perhaps herself) in his choice - as actor, agent, at the interface of 'logical' and 'theological' components, and of the 'heavenly' and 'earthly' orders from which those components are abstracted. That first focus or 'point' at which the individual discovers himself 'in question' at the opening of the Second Part - as focus of a new 'dramatic' configuration in which feudal and ecclesiastical orders are recognised as two complementary components, two sides - was organised around the figure of the Individual, as it appears in the discursive order of texts, defining its (his) part in an order in which that discursive order of Text is itself identified as one component. In the configuration of Reason, University, City, Church, and Civil order, this new 'part' of the individual constitutes
as it were a first 'point' in a dramatic 'space' in which all these component figures, 'coordinates' of the individual's 'part', are inscribed to define or 'frame' that point and space.

There is, we saw, a sense in which the University of Paris is at a 'centre' of this new order - the 'focus' of individuality being so to speak marked at the interface of the Faculty of Theology and the Faculty of Arts around the middle of the century, as a question: the opening question of a new period of inquiry. The 'focal' part of the University of Paris at the centre of this dramatic European frame finds expression in the centrality of the 'thomist' version of this 'part' of the individual in that frame.

At this initial point or focus of the Second Part, then, the individual finds the point of assertion of his texts determined in the discursive order of those texts, as a central point in a dramatic frame of which the text is one component. By the fifteenth century, in Florence, this bare initial point of choice and assertion in which he has first recognised himself (in a European order of which the embodiment of this recognition in a text is one component) has as it were 'unfolded' to a poetic frame of symmetry of 'logical' and 'physical' orders of this individuality which finds its primary or focal expression in the 'frame' of a 'picture' organised according to the principles (laws, rules) of 'central' (or 'focussed') perspective. And just as the initial figure of bare individuality was 'focussed' in Paris, and more particularly in the University there, so this new 'perspective' is 'focussed' in the frame of a Florence, and an ideal City, articulated by a Florentine at its 'architectural' focus - this albeit, over the mid-century, by a Florentine standing like a painter 'outside' that frame, and planning with the first 'Renaissance pope', Nicholas V, an ideal City as a new Rome. We will see in the next section how the central version of 'Reform' is in its turn framed by Luther standing at the focus, as 'architect', of a new 'picture' of Kosmos: Hie steh' Ich, und kann nicht anders'.
Why Florence?

We must remember the dramatic configuration or frame of European Christendom in the thirteenth century. In the first half of that century, Italian towns were torn between papal and imperialist factions - 'guelphs' and 'ghibellines', taking their names from the two rival feudal houses whose contest for the Empire had become a central factor in papal policy. Frederick II was a Waiblingen, 'ghibellino', and the supporters of his papal rivals called themselves guelfi. On the death of Frederick rival aristocratic factions within the city guilds - arti - which controlled the affairs of Florence, allied themselves either with Frederick's illegitimate son Manfred, or with the French duke Charles of Anjou, to whom a pope had 'granted' Frederick's southern Italian kingdom in 1262, on condition of a 'crusade' against Manfred, who was threatening him from the south. The guelfic or papal party triumphed, but the great principles of papal or imperial supremacy to which the rival factions had become attached earlier in the century tended, with the decline of Empire and Papacy after the resolution of the conflict with the deaths of Frederick and Manfred (with the balance broken the papacy ironically lost importance as an organising focus of other contests), to be lost in the continuing conflict of the factions defined and named in the earlier configuration. Thus Pisa was 'ghibelline', but the conflict between Pisa and Florence was rather an expression of the contest between two rising cities, than of declining Church and feudal Empire.

Dante had risen through the guild of apothecaries (though inscribing himself in their books as 'poet': the guilds, like the great factions, were becoming detached from their nominal principles of organisation) to become one of the six 'priors' (first citizens) elected by the guilds every two months (at this critical period) in 1300, and as such secured the banishment of contending guelphs and ghibellines from the city. The extreme guelfic party soon returning, however, to power, Dante was himself excluded, from the following year, from his native city - on pain of being burnt at the stake - and spent the remainder of his life wandering about Italy in exile.
It was over Holy Week (Dante tells us) in 1300, at the mid-point of his threescore-years-and-ten, that he had the vision of Kosmos, and of his part in it, that he later framed in terze rime: framing in that cosmic scheme the political order of Italy around the turn of the century. I will not go into the details of this 'focal' florentine configuration of 1300 (which presents an initial component or step in the 'economy' of the phase now under consideration). Still less will I discuss the poet's scheme of the symmetry of Papacy and Empire (presented in De Monarchia) or his defence of the Italian language in which he as it were 'finds himself' in the frame of his vision (De Vulgare Eloquentia). What is relevant, in this focus, for the general economy of a transition from Paris around 1250 to the florentine order around 1450, is the convergence in the Commedia Divina, of the theology of Thomas, and the Romance Jean de Meung completed from what had been left by Guillaume de Lorris as an unresolved question around 1245-50: the conflict of Raison and Amour. - Or rather of the two parallel traditions of which these are the most prominent expressions in the second half of the thirteenth century (and, indeed, over the 'middle ages' as a whole: the two central 'theological' and 'poetic' versions of the question of the Individual opened up over the middle of that century). Dante himself appears to have studied Paris (and Bologna) in the latter part of the century.

Commedia: the guild dramas or 'mysteries', forerunners of the commedia dell'arte which displaced these when the players themselves became incorporated as an arte or guild, are here transposed into a dramatisation of the part of the 'individual' poet in the new dramatic space focussed at mid-century in Paris. The drama is prefigured in the boethian form of the Vita Nuova in which Philosophy appears allegorically as the gentil'donna who consoles the poet in his abstraction from the poetic mirror of sexuality in which he finds himself and Beatrice as two poles. It was in that primary poetic axis or symmetry of sexuality as its 'element' that the Roman de la Rose had been framed, as an 'analogy', or rather narrative allegory, of the cosmic order as a whole. In the 'divine drama' this element of transfigured sexuality – the transfiguration of the 'poetic' symmetry of bodily self-identification and corresponding desire, 'end', in a boethian ascent from
that 'earthly' order of the Image to its 'heavenly' archetype - is complemented by the thomist theology of inscription of the individual in the interface of 'analogous' heavenly and earthly orders. In the 'vision' of 1300, Thomas' identification of the human individual or persona as point of self-assertion at the interface of Heaven and Earth, has unfolded to the point where Dante can 'dramatise' the part of his assertion of the poetics of 'divine comedy' in that drama he frames in the writing that is one component of it. - This in terms of the simple poetic 'element' of sexual symmetry, the very axis of the earthly Image, at one pole of which Dante 'finds himself'. The 'transcription' of the initial confusion, lost in the Image (its image the bosco'Oscur[318x1950]a), through, first, the poetic frame as focussed, personified, in Virgil, and then the poetic symmetry 'embodied' in his love of Beatrice, into the heavenly order of the divine Trinity with which the poem closes, might be taken as a parallel of Anselm's progress from the inscription of the theological order in the logical order of finite reason, to the transcription of that inscription and its discursive progress toward transcription, into the theological order, the mystery of that economy of access to mystery.

'Faith seeking understanding': but here it is not merely the logical order which is 'transfigured', transcribed into the heavenly order of a 'mystery' (a drama, then, commedia), but rather the elementary poetic order of symmetry of logical and physical orders in the earthly situation in which Dante, as persona, finds himself - not as some abstract logical instance of question and assertion, but as Dante Alighieri the florentine, in the year 1300. The initial point of coincidence of logical and physical orders in the choice of an actual individual (marked by Thomas) has as it were 'unfolded' into the poetic dimension or axis of sexual polarity, which is an earthly 'analogy' of the divine order of desire mystically transfigured in Love. And Dante, embodying this configuration in the 'logical', discursive, order of a text, written in the language of the 'everyday' poetic of earthly life, actually finds himself, and his writing - finds himself as 'poet' - at one pole of this simple axis, itself one pole of the mystical axis of which it is also the earthly image, into which the initial thomist 'point' or focus of self-assertion has unfolded.
Paralleling this simple unfolding of a 'poetic' order of commedia, in which the discursive component of Dante's text inscribes itself, from the simple point in which Thomas marks his resolution of the focal question of the symmetry of the logical and theological orders of mid-thirteenth century (this, then, inscribing this resolution in the very figure of 'resolution', choice, in which the symmetry is articulated)...Dante's fellow florentine and friend, Giotto, first unfolds into the new poetic dimension the axis of artist and object as two 'sides' of the elementary visual 'frame' of the 'picture'. His master Cimabue, the contemporary of Aquinas and Jean de Meung, had as it were marked a first point of 'presence', assertion, in the interface of artist or viewer and object (more particularly, the transfigured or divine female, Madonna) in a 'picture': thus moving, opening up, from 'theological' byzantine abstraction into a new vitality - articulating the visual 'poetic' of the image, in the new dramatic european frame, focussed in a coincidence of the individual's recognition of his assertion as agent (and, in this case, 'artist'), and the assertion of life, personality in the image....rather than in the abstract theological poetic of a closed ecclesiatical order, abstracted from the more radical dramatic 'play' of which Church and Empire are two 'ideal' poles.

These opening parallels, this development 'in words and pictures', are in turn paralleled by a new economic and political order, unfolding analogously in the european frame, in which the complementary (and often opposed) frames of ideal unitary Church or Empire are themselves becoming symmetrically inscribed, articulated, subordinated (where before their symmetry had been inscribed in conflicting ways in either side, framing the attempted subordination of one to the other). Thus at the end of the thirteenth century, the kings of France and England (Philip the Fair in 1300, Edward I in 1295-7) first summoned 'parliaments' of the 'three estates': lords spiritual and temporal (clergy and nobility), and as 'third estate' representatives of the towns and their guild organisations. By the middle of the fifteenth century the french and english successors of these kings had established their ascendancy
over the first two estates - Roman Church and feudal nobility -
through an alliance with the third estate: the rival 'frames' and
corresponding forces of papacy and feudal order had themselves been
incorporated in the 'dramatic' frame of their symmetry or mirroring.
- Integrated in that order of Constitution by which Charles VII and
Louis XI or the Duke of York and his son Edward IV, 'frame' the ac-
tivity of France or England (subordinating the rival interests of
clergy and nobility to a unitary policy) in the interplay of royal
authority and national 'economy' of activity in a 'middle' class.
We might present this new coordination schematically:

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... And we might here see a
simple analogy between this new national integration of various
orders or estates, and the contemporary organisation of visual
space - its 'economy' of representation - in terms of the elementary
frame of central perspective. The king corresponds to the albertine
architect, and to the artist or viewer at the 'focus' of the ele-
mentary frame: in the new urban frame national Economy is focu-
sed and coordinated in unitary regal Policy.

In the Iberian Peninsula this same 'mirroring' of inte-
grated Policy and Economy appears in the figure of the navigator-
king Henry of Portugal, in whom is focussed the new economic order
articulated in the national boundary as 'interface' of Nation and
World: and in the Atlantic boundary of Henry's Portugal is (in turn)
first focussed the opening coordination of european material economies in the common interface of Europe and Beyond. Meanwhile the Hapsburgs of 'Austria' - grown from the old East Mark, of which the margravate (Mark-Graf-schaft: 'Mark-count-ship') had lapsed under Frederick II, to be conferred upon his son by Rudolf of Hapsburg who eventually (after the 'Great Interregnum') succeeded Frederick as Emperor - established themselves around this time as hereditary german Emperors, dominating the three estates of the imperial Diet or Council, which it fell to them to summon. While this 'mark' or border, the interface of Empire and Italy, came thus to dominate the Empire, the North Mark of Brandenburg was expanding at the north-eastern (slavic) boundary, and the towns of the Rhine 'Netherlands' at the interface of France, Empire and (across the water) England were rising to a dominance of northern trade complementing the rise of the italian cities to the south. In Italy Pope Nicholas V was establishing, at mid-century, a dominance of the Papacy which mirrors (in his breaking of the power of the General Council) the new dominance of the national monarchies in France and England...and planning with Alberti the rebuilding of Rome as ideal focus of an ideal ecclesiatical order: the interplay of the new national orders an economy focussed, on its spiritual side, in him (as the new civic scheme was 'focussed' in his architect). In Florence the Medici family rose to dominate the affairs of that mercantile city; in Milan the military Sforzas succeeded the ghibelline Visconti who had controlled Lombardy from 1277; in the South a descendant of the aragonese king who had succeeded the angevins after the 'Sicilian Vespers' (which quickly followed Manfred's demise) finally recovered Frederick and Manfred's Naples, in angevin hands since the papal deposition of Manfred in favour of Charles of Anjou. Italy in the fifteenth century was dominated by these states - the 'Two Sicilies', Milan, and Florence, together with papal Rome, and Venice (an oligarchy since 1297, controlling mediterranean trade).

What is to be made of this fifteenth-century order of 'national' boundaries, outwardly framing newly-integrated national orders of activity, focussed in 'ruling' individuals?
The national limits or boundaries of England and France only came to be defined at the close of the 'Hundred Years War', toward the middle of the fifteenth century. That feudal conflict from which the new nation-states emerged began toward the middle of the previous century - the midpoint, then, of the phase from thirteenth to fifteenth centuries now in question. The western duchies or counties of the Franks had fallen to the kings of England, while yet remaining 'fiefs' of the French king; the English king, then, sought to replace the counts of Paris - the Capetian 'kings' of the Franks as a whole - as feudal overlords of 'France', thus integrating the French duchies with those of England in a single feudal 'kingdom'. Over the course of a hundred years the old feudal order of independent duchies and elective monarchy - the old economy of the Mark - had been supplanted by a new national order of stable hereditary 'monarchy' within more or less fixed boundaries - boundaries in which the old 'marks' or county-boundaries had been integrated and subordinated. The new definition of definite physical limits of 'France' and 'England' from 'outside', then, mirrors this subordination to a focal 'monarchy' of the old feudal marks or counties (and their fluid 'economy' of power) within.

Within the Italian and Flemish towns, meanwhile, the analogue of the old interplay of feudal allegiance, in the old interplay of factions in the guild organisation (associated with changing alliances of different guilds with rival noble families) is succeeded by the integration of the formerly independent guilds within a 'mercantile' economy - dominated at Florence by the Medici family. This 'urban' integration (in alliance with which the national monarchies of England and France take their rise) is itself coordinated within the primary economic 'boundary' or interface of town and World, rather as national integration is coordinated in the new national boundaries. Thus the Medici dominance of Florentine policy over the mid-fifteenth century reflects their part as a 'merchant-house' in the Florentine economy - its very frame. 'Merchant-house': the transactions of Florentine merchants with those of the Lombard cities, Venice, the Netherlands, France, and England are 'integrated' by a Medicean
'balancing' of external trade... One florentine merchant might sell some cloth to a French nobleman, another might buy wool from an English wool-merchant; the Medici as 'bankers', as central Florentine 'clearing-house', arrange that the 'bill' for Florentine cloth is balanced in their Paris office with the English bill for wool, through another transaction, between London and Paris (a commission being taken from each party), arranged through their offices in those towns. Of course three individual 'bills' are unlikely simply to cancel one another exactly in three transactions; the European 'circulation' of goods and capital will involve Medici offices in the chief towns of Europe 'balancing' a vast number of coordinated transactions in the 'accounts' of various merchants in those towns. Ultimately, asymmetries or 'imbalance' of trade at each town (or rather an excess or deficit of importation or exportation organised by the Medici through their office there) will be covered by a transfer of gold or silver; and the balance of gold or silver accrued through Medici operations as a whole, transferred to the central Uffizi at Florence amounted to a very rapid expansion of Medici 'capital' there around the beginning of the fifteenth century. By mid-century the dominance of the family in the 'internal' framing of Florentine activity - the old frame of the arti or guilds now integrated through the activity of the bankers with whom the guilds held their 'accounts' - reflects, under Cosimo, Pater Patriae, their dominance of the economic interface of 'internal' and 'external' Florentine affairs. In particular, the organisation of the Church in Florence and the adjacent towns and countryside whose economy is dominated by the Medici, reflects the part in the medicean order of the flow of gold from all parts of Europe to the papacy at Rome - that component of the European economy upon which the ascendancy of Italian banking-houses was built from the thirteenth century on.

The mirroring of Policy and Economy in medicean Florence may, then, be taken as a 'focus' of a wider integration of European 'economics' and 'politics', of which the rise of centralised nation-states in 'France' and 'England', the beginnings of mercantile colonialism in Portugal, the ascendancy of the East Mark in the Empire, the rise of the Netherlands in the north... are so many other parallel and coordinate components. For example, the rise of the Medici from the beginning of the fourteenth century, along with that of the lombard
bankers or merchant-houses that 'balanced' the flow of papal gold to the Church with ever more complex frames of international trade, parallels another order of inscription of the 'logical' poetic of the papacy within the physical 'economy' of activity: its physical transposition, for a century, to France. The Papacy that emerges in the person of Nicholas V from the 'Captivity' at Avignon and the resulting 'Great Schism' between French and German factions in the Church and its Councils itself parallels, as I have noted, a new centralisation in the towns and nations of mid-fifteenth century Europe.

- A new 'focussing' of the Church rising out of the fragmentation of the ecclesiastical 'parliaments', Councils, of the first half of the century: the critical point in the final contest of Roman Pope and Franco-German Council might be taken to be marked by the Council of Florence called (first to Ferrara in 1438) to succeed the Council of Basel (sitting from 1431 and formally dissolved only in 1449 with the universal recognition of the authority of Nicholas V). The rival Council of Florence was called - nominally at least - to effect the union of Latin and Greek Churches, as one 'side' of an alliance of the West with Byzantium, now reduced almost to the limits of the imperial city itself, and its very survival menaced by the Ottoman Turks. To Florence in 1439 came the Eastern Emperor, John, attended by the leading Byzantine theologians, Pletho and Bessarion. At the Council Pletho expounded to the West the superiority of Plato (or rather, of Neoplatonism represented by a systematic working-out of Dionysius' scheme) to the Aristotle who dominated the theology of the Latin Church - the theology which was the major formal obstacle in the way of reunion of the two sides of Christendom, sundered by systematic theological divorce over the 'dark ages' of the West. The coordination of mid-century focussing of the Latin Church in a Roman Pope with this ecclesiastical interface of East and West as a whole (paralleling the focussing of civil policy in the component kingdoms of the West) is coupled with a new articulation of theology in this interface: a Neoplatonic focussing of the relations of Platonic Mystery and Aristotelian Economy of Kosmos. During the Council of Florence Cosimo de' Medici established, under Pletho's direction, a 'Platonic Academy', and began to systematically prepare the young son Marsilio of his physician Ficino to be the expositor of Plato to a Latin West focussed in medicean Florence. Bessarion joined the
latin Church, becoming titular patriarch of Constantinople, and, under Nicholas V, bishop of Frascati near Rome whence he assisted the first 'renaissance pope' in the reorganisation of the Vatican Library, while Alberti worked at the reorganisation of the papal city itself. Where also he joined with Nicholas in energetic advocacy of the union of the two Churches within the frame of their new theology, as of the military assertion of latin Christendom in its eastern interface with the old greek Empire. ..But they prevailed in neither of these causes in time: Constantinople fell in 1453, and with it went the prime eastern motive for ecclesiatical reunion. The mid-century also marks, then, the close of the systematic eastern articulation of neoplatonic theology within the dionysian scheme, as there opens up the interplay of this mystery with the aristotelian frame of western theology, with the flood of literate refugees to Italy: an interplay prefigured at Florence by the establishment of a chair of greek ature in 1397, and the foundation of the Academy.

...And as Byzantium is finally integrated, after having contracted since the latin occupation of the thirteenth century to a single spot, in the ottoman Empire, and the more or less static byzantine tradition is transposed in the form of scholars and manuscripts into the latin culture of the West, germans are at work integrating the discursive order of the manuscript (in its archetypal instance of Book, Bible) into the new technical and economic order of the mercantile town: at work 'printing' at Mainz the Book from 'types', analogues of the platonic archetypes being brought from Byzantium...and these analogues might be said to meet in Marsilio Ficino's transcription of the greek Plato into latin, printed at Florence in 1483...

But let us consider another coordination of italian and german with East and West. Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, proponent in 1433 of the subordination of the part of Pope to General Council as primary instance of framing christian activity, had, by the time of the breakdown of the Council of Basel in 1436, become an advocate of the focussing of the unity of the Church in the person of the Pope.
year it was he who was sent by the Pope to Byzantium to attempt the reunion of East and West under that Pope. The focussing of the interface of eastern and western Churches and theologies in this critical journey of 1437-8 (leading to the Council of Florence in 1439) led to the theology of 'learned ignorance' by 1440, parallel-ling Cosimo's founding of the florentine Academy (as perhaps the spiritual crisis and vision of 1437 parallels the perspective of Alberti's De Pictura of that year, in their common prefiguration of the focal configuration of mid-century).

Docta Ignorantia: the mathematical symmetry of the logical inscription of the logical order of discursive finite reason in a dramatic order of Mystery of which, as in Dionysius' theology, it is but one component - one component which knows itself in knowing its limitation, knowing that it cannot 'comprehend' the coordination in which it is 'comprehended' or comprised as one order.

In 1453 Nicholas, made bishop of Brixen (at the interface of Austria and Italy) by Nicholas V in 1450, received a request from the benedictine abbey of Tegernsee to explain to the monks Dionysius' 'Lift yourself into Ignorance'. Nicholas responds by sending to the abbey a Flemish painting, and an accompanying essay, De Visione Dei: the picture, whose eyes follow the viewer as he moves about the room, is to serve as access to the order of Mystery, according to the complementary unfolding of the discursive order of the viewer's reflection as he confronts the picture, traced in the essay: from the elementary 'poetic' symmetry in their pictorial interface of viewer and object of vision (here a gaze, a viewing of its viewing), into the symmetry of this poetic order of Image, and mystical Actuality, Divinity...the Picture, Image, the very image of the mirroring of Actuality and Image...a 'dramatisation' in the space in which the monk and the Flemish picture are embodied, of the discursive order of the monk or viewer's finite reason, according to the 'script' so to speak of the essay, which itself inscribes itself in this dramatic configuration, this...divine comedy, analogous to the articulation of Dante's poem in relation to an earlier sexual symmetry of the Image (from which sexuality the monastic order, of course, is 'abstracted').

Now the simple figure of the symmetry of two 'sides' of
the image, the picture, the poetic frame, square, quadro, embedded in the extension of outward space, and the two 'sides' of a mysterious Actuality, and the Economy of the Image - the two sides of which the two-sidedness of the Image is at once one side, and an 'image' of its relation to the 'other' side - corresponds directly to the 'mathematical' order of an inscription of a configuration of marks (the pythagorean Tetractys) as one order in a configuration of orders of the mark that 'Symbol' reflects. And Cusanus articulates the symmetry, conversion, transcription of 'outward' Image and the wider configuration of which it is both an image and one component, in a mathematical frame of mirroring, conversion, of heavenly or divine implicatio, nesting of symmetry within symmetry, unfolding from the simple configuration of two sides of the mere mark or image 'outside' unitary Divinity (the initial 'nothing' of finitude, definition), reflecting the two-sidedness of divine 'inside' and this 'outside'... and converse explicatio, inverting that unitary order of involution in the dynamic articulation of the same symmetry about the formal 'definition' of the mark, its 'Economy' turning inside-out, so to say, the unitary symmetry and hierarchy of Mystery. To 'lift oneself into Ignorance', then, is to play one's 'part' in the working of this Mystery or Actuality, which cannot be inscribed in the logical 'side' of the finite Image, and its economy: that economy of assertion must rather be organised by its inscription in the wider coordination, and this through the simple figure of that coordination not being logically 'comprehended'. The logical order can only define itself 'logically' in this negative 'not', this nescience which in its turn opens up our true part in the question it poses.

Now this simple coordination of 'mathematical' symmetry with the symmetry of two sides of the two-dimensional pictorial interface of viewer and object - of mathematics and painting - directly complements Alberti's definition of the part of the architect the previous year - in the closing chapter of the penultimate book of De Re Aedificatoria. The architect asserts himself in response to the question posed in a particular situation by the integration, symmetry 'within symmetry', of the economy of Surface defined in 1437: himself a coordinating focus in response to the question posed by
a particular building operation...both knowing all that has been written - discursively elaborated - on the subject, and the working of the various figures or factors in the Economy of Nature....and this whole Art is comprised in the complementary orders of pictorial economy of surface, and mathematical frame of coordination of its various dimensions ('dimensions', literally and figuratively):

Verum pictura et mathematica non carere magis poterit quam voce et syllabis poeta. (1)

Truly, he can no more lack the arts of painting and mathematics, than a poet skill in rhyme and metre.

...And albertine Mathematics is framed in the configuration, so familiar now, of pythagorean marking of the coordination, harmony, of the various orders of that marking: in figurate number and the unitary articulation (Finitio) of the symmetries of Number by the Tetractys:

Et profecto iterum atque iterum affirmo illud Pythagorae. Cer-tissimum est naturam in omnibus sui esse persimilem. Sic se habet res. Hi quidem numeri per quos fiat ut vocum illa concinnitas auribus gratissima reddatur, iidem ipsi numeri perficient, ut oculi animusque voluptate mirifica compleantur. Ex musicis igitur quibus hii tales numeri exploratissimi sunt: atque ex his praeterea quibus natura aliquid de se conspicuum dignumque praestat tota finitionis ratio producetur. (2)

And indeed I confirm again and again that famous discovery of Pythagoras': It is beyond all doubt that Nature maintains a thorough analogy in all her components, and this as follows:

Those very numbers by which sound is brought into concord and rendered most pleasing to the ears, are the same numbers which bring it about that the eyes and the mind are filled with wonderful delight. From musicians, then, who have looked most deeply into such numbers, as also from those things wherein Nature shows herself somehow striking or fine, the whole system of articulation may be developed.

The coordination, Finitio, of spatial elements is to be articulated by analogy with the temporal harmony of the musical line: the principles in each case being the 'musical numbers', 1,2,3,4. (3)

1: De Re Aedificatoria IX, 10 (1485: z2v, 1512: f CLv) 2,3: IX,5(y2v;CXLII)
Alberti, though, abstracts from the limiting question or Mystery of Cusanus' reflection (as indeed Nicholas in turn abstracts from the embedding of the order of surface, image, in the sexual economy of the Family and House, central to Alberti's frame): his reflection is articulated within the abstraction of the circuit of City and architecture from Nature, as from the coordinate symmetry of natural Earth and Heaven above, and the embedding of his practical scheme in such a limiting symmetry appears only occasionally in his reflection as a recurrent unanswered musing or questioning. His 'platonism' is roman, ciceronian, rather than greek. But the complementarity of these two coordinations of the symmetry of the two sides of surface...

Quid est enim aliud pingere quam arte superficium illam fontis amplécti? (1)

What then is painting but the art of comprehending surfaces by their origins.

...with the mathematical symmetry or coordination through which the economy of surface is integrated, presents both a primary axis of the mid-century 'focus' which I have suggested may be articulated in relation to the inscription of the circuit of florentine activity in the (european) interface of Heaven and Earth, and a question posed by this complementarity marking the convergence of two lines of development toward the reflection of the florentine Academy around 1470. One line is the german dominican mysticism or mystical theology of the fourteenth century (Eckhardt, Tauler, Suso, the Friends of God, the Brethren of the Common Life - at whose school at Deventer in the Netherlands Nicholas, like Erasmus after him, was schooled), leading to the coordination of two-sided Image (perhaps a painting of Nicholas by his friend Roger van der Weyden) and the two-sidedness of which that Image is one side. The other is a line leading from the configuration of 'perspective' which we left with Dante and Giotto at the opening of the thirteenth century, and which passes through Brunelleschi's epochal demonstration of central perspective in two compositions on wooden panels produced at Santa Maria Novella in Florence in 1428 and the association of the architect of Florence cathedral's dome with the young Alberti

1: De Pictura, 748, ad fin.
in the fourteen-thirties when the latter was writing his series of Italian discorsi Della Famiglia.

What is this 'central' perspective?

... Simply, as Alberti suggests in his treatise, the first systematic presentation of Brunelleschi's discovery, the organisation of 'figures' in a two-dimensional frame, (s)quadro, surface, as though that surface were inscribed in an (imaginary) three-dimensional euclidean 'space' of objects, in which we were at a certain point in front of the surface viewing the objects 'behind': so that the figures or lines of the picture are the tracing-out in the plane within the frame of the straight lines of sight joining our 'point of view' (the 'focus' of the picture) with the boundaries of the objects on the 'other side'. Looking, then, from a point corresponding to the focus of the perspective in the real space of the picture and its two dimensional painted surface, we can, 'forgetting' the real space in which we and the picture are in fact embedded, 'identify' ourselves 'in imagination' with someone in the imaginary space containing this other 'self' and its imaginary 'objects'. Brunelleschi's demonstration involved the placing of a painted panel on the other side of a screen in which a hole was bored corresponding to the 'focus' of the composition on the panel...and when the panel was removed that focus opening precisely onto the very same, but now real, scene, represented by the panel (the view from the church door). The individual finds himself at a point of coincidence of real and imaginary 'spaces', the 'focus' of their interface, in either three-dimensional reality or three-dimensional imagination, in a two-dimensional surface. And with Alberti's mid-century coordination of the 'economy' of this poetic 'element' or elementary frame of the action in which we assert our actuality in response to the question posed by that symmetry of real and imaginary, with the order of coordination of activity in a City (focussed like, say, Rome in the person of Nicholas V), of which it is itself (analogously to Cusanus' image) an image, we arrive at a new focus of action, of individual choice, which has
as it were 'unfolded' from the initial 'point' in the thirteenth-century interface of Heaven and Earth, into the coordination of such points as 'foci' in the visual or spatial 'economy' of choice and the activity it informs, in three symmetric 'dimensions', axes.

I have already marked one 'step' in this unfolding as the complementary 'unfolding' of a single axis (so to speak) of this fifteenth-century 'space' of action (in which the individual knows himself as a 'focus' of interplay of real actuality and imaginary possibility embodied in three-dimensional physical space), from the initial mid-thirteenth-century 'question' of the individual, in the parts of Dante and Giotto. - Dante's identification of the writing of the Comedy as one part in the configuration of Italy in 1300 which it frames: his writing of the choice of the part of writing, of poet, in this configuration which presents itself, so to speak, as the question of Dante's part. I noted that this 'perspective', integrating the initial parisian 'versions' of the mid-century question of Thomas Aquinas and Jean de Meung, might be taken as a discursive correlate or parallel of Giotto's 'unfolding' of Cimabue's initial 'presence' of viewer and viewed in the pictorial frame (in the Madonna's return of the viewer's gaze, and the transfiguration of this vision). - An unfolding of that initial point of coincidence of viewer and viewed, earthly and heavenly, through a self-recognition of artist (and viewer) on one 'side' of a pictorial interface - here and now, in this familiar world, whose objects and activities Giotto 'traces' in the figuration of his surface - the actions, most particularly, of Francis, depicted in the new technique of fresco, on the very walls of the chapel at Assisi.

Petrarch, around the middle of the fourteenth century, discovers the symmetry of the two sides in the axis opened up at the beginning of the century, identifies that 'poetic' order - say in his ciceronian open letters to friends, articulated deliberately in the symmetry of reader and writer in this common - actual - situation... in his marking of a detachment from the poetic element of sexual symmetry after the death of Laura in 1348... in his recognition of poetic symmetry systematically articulated in the style of Cicero...
and Virgil at the beginning of our Era, and so on. At mid-century he was crowned on the Capitol as Prince of Poets - this quickly followed by the analogous 'poetic' of Rienzi's restoration of the 'classical' roman Republic.

At Paris Jean Buridan was, meanwhile, confronting the question of choice in terms of the symmetry of our (or an ass') situation, this in turn mirrored by a 'self-assertion' so to speak of the objects of our reflection in the outward order (such complementary identifications of 'subjective' and 'objective' self-assertion have already been noted in Scotus' succession at Oxford). Another component in the mid-fourteenth century configuration intermediate between Paris a century before and Florence a century later is the breakdown of the old feudal economy associated with the Black Death of 1348-9 (which might perhaps be regarded as occasion rather than direct cause of a transition from the social and economic order of the thirteenth century to that of the fifteenth...the part of the epidemic in the development of the florentine order is recorded by Petrarch's associate Boccaccio).

...But I will not enter into any details of that transitional configuration. At the close of the century the byzantine representatives of classical Antiquity that Petrarch and Boccaccio had sought more or less in vain, were appearing in Italy to wander like greek sophists of old from city to city. Manuel Chrysolaris, sent as envoy by the Emperor John in 1391, was the first to settle in one city - to open a school - this in Florence in 1397, where he showed a rising generation of young florentines their way about in the poetic order discovered (so to speak) by Petrarch. The pictorial or visual correlate of this new discursive order in the early fifteenth century might be seen in the work of Masolini and Masaccio in the Brancacci Chapel, which was to become the very 'school' of young florentine painters toward the middle of the century - in whose interface with the Florence outside Brunelleschi articulated the new perspective in 1528. In the Brancacci fresci different components of picture and story are no more simply juxtaposed: rather are the different axes of viewer (or artist) and components integrated in a 'dramatic' interplay, in an economy of a common 'space'. Thus the
relation of viewer or artist to one 'actor' in the scene leads the gaze to another component, which is in turn referred to another component or axis. One person looks at another who looks at a third who is in turn engaged with the first in some common action. The poetic interplay or economy of figuration in the pictorial 'space' is articulated in such circuits within the unitary action of the whole, within an istoria itself articulated in a dramatic 'space' in which the various component 'circuits' are coordinated, one within another. We might take this first phase of fifteenth-century development opening with Masolino as closing in Brunelleschi's system of integration of the action in 1428: a unitary Space framing a unitary Action, defined simply in terms of frame and viewer, and in which all components may be in principle inscribed in a coherent system - in the primary poetic order of symmetry of the two 'sides' of the picture, real and imaginary. This step may be taken to correspond in a way to the earlier step from Cimabue to Giotto at the close of the thirteenth century. The transition from Cimabue to Giotto is 'reflected' in the integration of Masaccio's 'circuits' in the primary circuit of abstraction of the quadro from the imaginary space in which, as interface of that and the real order of actual painting, it is embedded. in the unitary action focussed in the viewer or artist's assertion and question at the focal coincidence of these two orders, mirrored in the actuality of the other 'foci' on the other 'side' of the frame, about which components of the 'action' are articulated.

...And the final step of integration of an economy of such perspectival Surface in the wider interface of real (or actual) and imaginary (or possible) in the unitary activity and policy of a City, through a 'focussing' of the economy of question and assertion, of which the elementary 'frame' of that economy is itself an image - in Alberti's De Re Aedificatoria - and the question posed in the complementarity of this frame of activity and Cusanus' mystery - may be taken to reflect, toward mid-century, the initial step in which Thomas, Jean de Meung, Cimabue and others asserted themselves in response to the mid-thirteenth-century 'question' of the individual, in asserting their various coordinate versions, framings, of individuality and its assertion. Furthermore the 'circuits' of Masaccio's composition in the early part of the century are reflected, in their turn, in the breakdown of unitary space in the harmonics of Botticelli's line and, say, Piero della Francesca's incorporation in a picture of Christ
rising from his tomb of two centres of perspective - 'heavenly' and 'earthly' so to speak. ...And these developments are coordinated, in the florentine Academy after Cosimo's death, say, in 1469 and his succession by Lorenzo, with a central first step in the 'response' of the Academy to the question posed by the configuration of mid-century.

Now Masolino's and Masaccio's 'circuits' of elements in their pictures also reflect contemporary circuits in the physical economy of florentine activity. The Medici wealth was amassed by Cosimo's father Giovanni through a policy that parallels in the material order the integration of Masolino's and Masaccio's circuits in the 'poetic' economy of composition. The circuit of a transaction involving Medici agents in Florence, Paris and London is analogous to three component actions in the dramatic circuit of a Brancacci fresco; and just as an elementary 'circuit' cannot be abstracted altogether from the complex interaction of Medici offices throughout Europe and focussed in Florence, nor can one dramatic component of that pictorial or poetic economy focussed in the 'part' of the artist in the action he articulates or frames on the surface of a wall, be abstracted from the complex interaction of the various components of the composition as a whole. The integration of the pictorial economy within the systematic frame of central perspective, where the pictorial 'economy' of composition reflects the integrating or controlling instance of focal artist or viewer, in turn reflects the articulation of the material economy of florentine activity, as indeed the wider 'economy' of florentine activity as a whole (of which the poetic economy of painting is itself one component), in a policy, a political order, focussed in Giovanni's son Cosimo.

...Or rather the systematisation of the articulation of an 'action' in the elementary two-dimensional interface of Real and Imaginary 'Space' reflects the systematisation over the opening part of the century of the elementary coordination of component 'circuits' in a single medicean transaction; this corresponding to a simple locus of choice, of an elementary decision, in the play
of possible and actual. The part of Cosimo is rather the analogue of the focal spectator or artist in relation to the play of, the 'economy' of transactions as a whole, rather than in relation to a single elementary transaction or decision: this within the primary physical circuit which frames the florentine republic, with Cosimo at the centre 'inside', governing the circuits of transaction 'outside' through the simple embedding of the economic interface of Florence and Europe in the wider space of european material economy, and his central direction - like the simple embedding of the quadro in the three dimensions of physical space, and the articulation of that interface in relation to the central instance of the artist or viewer, at the point of coincidence of real and imaginary, of actual and possible - the instance of assertion, choice.

Now I have suggested that the 'focal' character of Alberti's part over the mid-century corresponds to an analogous coordination of the elementary articulation of surface in the poetic frame of the 'picture', through the integration of the 'economy' of that interface of real and imaginary, in the mathematical frame of an analogous symmetry of economy of possibility and actual integration (to speak with Cusanus, of explicatio and implicatio). - And this scheme of integration outwardly framed - like Cosimo's integrated economic policy (or Nicholas V complementary european politics) - in the primary circuit of a city-state inscribed in the interface of Heaven and Earth.

Alberti had been born in 1404 to a prominent florentine family then in exile at Venice. Receiving his doctorate of canon law from Bologna in the year of Brunelleschi's discovery of the principles of central perspective, he entered in 1431 the papal service as a secretary in the chancery - coordinating the circulation of ecclesiastical correspondence in what had become a natural post for a young humanist (Valla was among his colleagues). Over the 'thirties, travelling with the papal court he elaborated on the one hand the principles of central perspective, articulated theoretically through the 'mathematics' of inscription of quadro in three-dimensional space, and on the other a series of ciceronian dialogues, Della Famiglia, articulated by an analogous inscription of the form of the dialogue
as one component of the discussion it frames. Just as, in De Pictura, the pictorial frame is identified as the very element of all the other arts, these coordinated within the architectural frame of activity as a whole as its elements within a picture...

..pictoris regula et arte diriguntur.. (1)
..they are directed by the rule and art of the painter..

...so the elementary sexual order of the family contains the principle of articulation of all activity in the city-state which is as it were a family of families. And just as the visual order is articulated and integrated through the focal self-assertion of artist and architect amidst the otherwise open play of figure, so the general economy or play of fortuna is integrated through the self-assertion which is virtù; indeed the painter or architect in his virtù participates in the integrative actuality of divinity, and shares in the worship, almost, evoked by this divinity:

Has ergo laudes habet pictura, ut ea instructi cum opera sua admirari videant, tum deo se paene simillimos esse intelligant.

Quid, quod omnium artium vel magistra vel sane praecipuum pictura ornamentum est? (2)

This praise then is due the art of painting, that seeing their works admired, those instructed in it know themselves almost the likeness of God. Is not painting either as master, or indeed precondition, the ornament of all arts?

- The ornament of all arts, all art in turn being the 'ornament' of Nature. In the 'thirties the analogy between the elementary frame, whether painted wall and house or the family to whose institution such a house corresponds as architectural unity; remains only a question framing the analysis of the element. But in the appendix to Della Famiglia ('De Amicitia') composed around 1440, and read in a public festival at Florence in 1441, the question of the coordination of activity within and without the family is directly approached. This period of residence at Ferrara (1438) and Florence (1439-1443) during the Council marks also the parallel opening-up of the architectural integration of spatial elements, surfaces, with the initial engagement in architectural projects, and the

1: De Pictura 3:26 2: ibid.
project of conjectural restoration of the lost books of Vitruvius' De Architectura. By the mid-century Alberti is working with the new pope on the principles of a new systematic architectural frame of roman activity, and the completion of Vitruvius has been superseded by the theoretical articulation of the spatial frame of activity within the primary bound of inscription of Culture in Nature, in relation to the earlier analysis of the pictorial or 'superficial' element: the elementary interface of real and imaginary reflecting the actual integration of activity on the base of an economy of what is possible. Just as De Pictura is complemented in the discursive order by Della Famiglia, the mid-century poetics of spatial organisation of activity is complemented by the satire Momus in which the king of the gods comes down to Earth, his dialogues with mortals (and philosophers in particular) articulating a systematic questioning of the order of earthly activity at mid-century, corresponding to, or rather complementing, the articulation of De Re Aedificatoria within the civic order inscribed in (and abstracted from) the wider interface of Heaven and Earth. By 1469-70, two years before his death we may see a convergence of the two orders of Alberti's 'poetics' - architectural and discursive - in the last dialogue, framed as a discussion under Brunelleschi's dome in which the protagonist, Alberti himself, questions his own part, in the coordination of the schemes of the mid-century (architecture, then, and systematic irony), and in the reflection of this questioning in the last architectural project (the Church of Santa Annunziata) left unfinished. The coordination of architectural assertion in the simple symmetric frame of the mid-century albertine city, and the complementary frame of irony, questioning of human activity in Momus may also be seen in Alberti's part in the discussions of the Academy around this time, as recorded by Landino in the Disputationes Camaldulenses: reconstructions of the discussions carried on by the 'Academy' at Lorenzo's villa at Camaldola outside Florence. The response of the Academy, in the first years (from 1469) of Lorenzo's control of Florence, to the mid-century configuration marks the transition to the configuration of Reform at the close of the century, to be discussed in the next section of this Part. What then, is that mid-century coordination of questions in which Alberti's part of architect is central?

I have already suggested an elementary coordination of medicean political economy in the first part of the century with
a parallel visual poetic. One might trace such a parallel from the time of Dante through the fourteenth century, and one might inscribe that parallel in a wider European frame. Indeed it should be apparent how an interplay of various coordinate elements might be articulated in a complex European cultural 'economy', analysed or resolved into several component phases corresponding roughly to the several steps through which a Florentine 'poetics' of discursive time and visual space passes between thirteenth and fifteenth centuries. I will not attempt to trace such a development, but rather now simply correlate a mid-thirteenth century focus in Paris, and the mid-fifteenth century Florentine focus of the unfolding 'dramatic' European order, whence the various other coordinates of the intervening development may be coordinated the unfolding of the 'poetic' axis (or axes) already sketched.

I suggested one might consider that 'poetic' order of unfolding as leading to the individual finding himself at the interface of a 'real' and 'imaginary' space in front of Brunelleschi's panel in 1428. With Alberti's integration of an 'economy' of such elementary interfaces of real and imaginary - complemented, I suggested, by Cusanus' formal coordination of the two sides of the Image and the two-sidedness of which that two-sidedness of the Image is itself one side... from which Alberti in his practical self-assertion as architect abstracts - the individual finds himself at mid-century in an interface of real and imaginary, actual and possible, orders: confronting not the elementary quadro of 1428, but rather the interface in Alberti's architecture of a real and an imaginary World... these coordinated in the interface of Florence and Real World, and Alberti 'outside' this circuit or frame reorganising with Nicholas V the City of Rome in a sort of imaginary World outside Florence.

Florence, then, is focal, as a sort of 'picture' of, or rather perspective on, the World of mid-fifteenth century. And Alberti, in relation to that civic frame embedded in real fifteenth-century Europe, asserts himself in the imaginary space in which the civic circuit is also embedded as 'focus' so to speak of (in Burckhardt's phrase) 'the State as a Work of Art'. In relation to this configuration the 'real World' outside Florence may be coordinated in relation
simply to this frame and focus, with a sort of imaginary frame. Or rather, the mid-fifteenth-century European order may be articulated in an interface of imaginary and real 'spaces' of which Florence, inscribed so to speak in both, is the interface.

I have already suggested how the Medicean component of European trade might be inscribed in such a scheme. One might further find in the French order framed in a new national boundary after the Hundred Years War, and focussed in the French king, a 'perspective' or frame of self-assertion in 'centralised' unitary policy. In England, one might say, within the natural boundary (more or less) of an island, the central order of monarchical assertion is determined relative to the constitutional or legal frame evolved since the thirteenth century (balancing Norman feudalism with Saxon democracy): the monarchy following upon the Wars of the Roses finds itself on one side so to speak of a symmetrical 'poetic' frame, coordinate with multiple foci of activity on the 'other' side of the picture. These French and English foci of 'nationality' are in turn coordinate with what appears in the German order of the Mark as a sort of missing focus, the 'German Nation' (in Luther's phrase) as a question: the question of a focus of German activity; a question posed in the new order of 'poetic' symmetry of a 'logical poetic' of a 'catholic' Church and a 'physical poetic' of a feudal Empire. A question posed, most particularly, after the abstraction of a 'centralised' French kingdom - posed in the mirroring or complementarity of a centralised order of 'logical' French policy, and the physical economy of multiple foci of organisation in the remaining Empire...a logical French policy to which the old orders of clergy and nobility were being subordinated. That 'German question' - the integration or focussing of activity within Germany as a question - might itself be taken to 'organise' or focus in a sort of negative manner a broader European question and conflicting attempts to frame a European order, from the early years of the sixteenth century until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which might be taken as the close of the Reform to be considered in the next section - the end too of the old feudal order of the Empire and of the 'catholic' pretensions of the Roman Church. I have already noticed how the 'perspective' of Reform is focussed in Luther's 'Here I stand, and can do no else': finding himself on the earthly 'side'
of a Creation focussed in the divine Artist (and all-seeing Viewer) who frames all from his heavenly side... and finding himself, on Earth, in the 'german' order of a play of figures and forces in which one finds oneself as one among many foci... looking perhaps to the new Emperor to supply the missing focus which will coordinate the whole picture.

Alberti, then, at mid-century, might be said to 'set the scene' for Reform. The initial thirteenth-century 'point' of self-assertion, that point of coincidence of heavenly and earthly, psychological and physical, in individual embodiment, has unfolded into a three-dimensional space of activity, of coordination of these various 'sides' in the interface of heavenly actuality and earthly possibility. Alberti's part is to coordinate the elementary interfaces of real or actual and imaginary or possible by analogy with the way that the elementary components of the elementary interfaces are themselves 'focussed' and integrated. This in the spatial circuit of Culture within the open play of Nature, according to the mathematical articulation of symmetry within symmetry: framing Culture as a systematic space of possible activity, as the architectural coordination of possible actions. The architect's assertion corresponds as it were to the coordination of questions through the coordination of possible actions in the framing of cultural 'space'. His part, confronted with a project, whether ornamentation or change of an existing building or group, whether building a new house or church, or even considering the architectural reform of a whole city, is to coordinate the possible actions to be framed by the new arrangement according to the general scheme of ideal coordination of the unitary activity of a city-state as a whole. And the framing of that unitary space of questions, possible activity, as simple and focal self-assertion of 'renaissance man' (rather like Cicero's simple assertion of Law as frame of self-assertion), is doubled at mid-century by a systematic questioning of actual human activity (in Momus). The thirteenth century 'focus' of individuality has unfolded into a systematic coordination, of which the architectural coordination of possible actions in the general 'space' of culture inscribed as a circuit in Nature is a static frame. The linear discursive order of articulation
in time is disjoint, as an order of questioning, from the complementary architectural assertion of the civic space of possible assertion and action - just as Cusanus' complementary 'poetic' of inscription of discourse in a mystery formally symmetric with Alberti's frame is so to speak disjoint...abstracted, indeed, from the very familial element of engagement in the albertine order of surface.

Alberti then, sets the static empty scene, and the articulation of actual activity in it remains a disjoint order of questions, meeting the spatial order of the scene only in the limiting focus or coincidence in the architect's assertion. Yet by around 1470 this complementarity itself becomes a question for Alberti: a question, indeed, symbolised by his entry into the interplay of question and assertion in Landino's Disputations of Lorenzo's and Ficino's circle, the 'Academy'.

...An interplay of the formal spatial coordinates of action, as interface of heavenly actuality and earthly play of possibilities... and the discursive time of assertion in that frame, in an interplay of the civic space of the architect's assertion abstracted from the wider interface of Heaven and Earth as a whole, as Kosmos, and the order of questions from which that assertion abstracts. The interplay in the common 'pythagorean' or neoplatonic mathematical frame of Cusanus' Mystery and the practical albertine order of civic activity embedded in it, like the City in the surface of Earth...or like Plato's Republic in Timaeus' Kosmos.

...And the integration as two complementary sides of Alberti's and Cusanus' Image as image of the mirroring of Image and Reality. The opening out, then, into the pythagorean or neoplatonic mathematical Kosmos, of which Alberti's symmetric civic frame is, like Plato's Republic, an image, of Dante's initial mirroring of the heavenly and earthly schemes of Thomas and Jean de Meung. The coordination of the order of Dialogue in its circuits of question and assertion, in the mirroring of the sexual order of (earthly) surface in the relations of that earthly order of Nature with the heavenly order Above: Cusanus'
has abstracted from the radical sexual polarity of earthly surface, of the Image. The coordination of the order of Dialogue, then, in a dialogue both upon, and embedded in, this scheme: Ficino had completed his translation of Plato (for which he had been prepared by Cosimo from 1440, producing his first translation from Greek into Latin in 1460 - so that his formative period may be said to extend fairly exactly over the mid-century) in 1468; this was followed by his coordination of the 'system' of the Platonic dialogues in an elaborate Commentary on the Symposium. And on Plato's birthday the Symposium was reenacted by the circle around Ficino, who himself kept a light continually burning before an image of the Divine Philosopher.
Reform

The circle around Ficino - the Academy - at the time of Lorenzo's succession (1469) frame, then, in their dialogues (in the architectural space of Lorenzo's villa outside Florence) a dramatic platonic or pythagorean Kosmos in which they frame, in turn, this very circle as locus of framing. A circle 'focussed' in Ficino at the interface of cosmic and civic orders of a 'logical' poetic of Creation which frames its own part in that Creation, and so frames the self-assertion or actuality of its members in that interface: the self assertion, for example, of Lorenzo at the 'focus' of florentine activity as a whole, and of Botticelli, associated with the Academy from this time, at a primary focus of the pictorial order of the quadro - the albertine formal focus of central perspective in its turn superseded by a sort of circuit or dialogue of foci reflecting the 'harmonics' of Botticelli's composition. Yet this 'logical' order of a group or circle framing its part in a dramatic Kosmos remains - like the pythagorean 'circle' before it, or Lorenzo's governing 'circle', abstracted from a more radical embodiment in Alberti's 'scene' or abstract coordination of the 'space' of action. The complementarity of spatial scene and discursive articulation of action in time is still determined, as it were, from the 'logical' side, still abstracted, like the circuit of interaction in academic dialogue from the wider circuit of florentine activity as a whole. And in the question posed in Lorenzo's city by the various coordinate abstractions of ruling and academic circles, in the general albertine 'scene' of coordination of questions in the interface of Heaven and Earth articulated in the focal 'frame' of Florence itself as 'Work of Art' - a frame in which may be coordinated the various 'foci' of activity - french, german and so on - 'outside' (these albeit rather orders of question 'inside' Florence rather than definitive of the 'real' french or german orders outside)...In this symmetrical 'scene' framed by the inscription of the circuit of Alberti's City in the interface of Heaven and Earth, it is Girolamo Savonarola who, towards the close of the century, appears to focus a more radical order of activity, a more radical drama, from which the 'circles' of Ficino and Lorenzo are abstracted. In Ficino's inscription of the logical instance of its
framing in the Academy in the Kosmos he frames, the poetic circuit of the Christian mystery, articulated about the Incarnation of the Word, is a limiting symbolism within the primary neoplatonic poetic. For Savonarola, on the other hand, that neoplatonic coordination is articulated about the residual abstraction of academic reflection from the primary order of activity as a whole.

By the time of Lorenzo's death in 1492, Savonarola was framing the cosmic order within Alberti's 'scene' in the figuration of biblical Apocalypse. The Florentines were forgetting themselves in the play of the Image, of Sense, in another 'abstraction' from the symmetric order of a divine Comedy, coordinate with abstract Reflection. The question which he found articulated about his enunciation in Florence of the dramatic order of Kosmos, presented him with the part of focal prophet of an imminent millenial Revelation. Savonarola's part was to call the Florentines who were forgetting their true part in the scheme of things to the recognition of that part. In 1494 the coordination of Florentine affairs passed from Lorenzo's weak son, and from the abstracted Medicean 'focus', to the Preacher, framing the Drama in his vivid imagery. And when Pico della Mirandola died that year, aged only thirty-one, and Savonarola buried him in the habit of a dominican - his own order which Savonarola asserted that the prodigy of the Academy had eventually decided to join just before his untimely death - one might see a parallel loss of the earlier academic focus coordinate with Lorenzo in 1470: Pico who perhaps marks this transition in the fourteen-eighties in his articulation of the interface of Heaven and Earth about Man the Actor, framed in the Jewish Pythagoreanism of a Qabala elaborated by Moses de Leon into a system in the time of Aquinas. ..A transition marked too, over the 'eighties, by Botticelli's gradual articulation of the pictorial order in Savonarola's scheme.

In the focal preacher's vision the City of God was to be established (in the coordination of the interface of Heaven and Earth in relation to the Florentine frame) from an initial focus in the Florentine Republic, with himself as Florentine vicar of God. But the monk's scheme is itself still 'abstract', in its one-sided determination
of his part in the interface of Heaven and Earth from the heavenly side: just as Lorenzo's abstraction or excessive central control from within his circle led to the popular reaction which, with French assistance, displaced his son in 1494, so in turn Savonarola's one-sidedness provoked an earthly reaction in which a restored Medici direction (albeit without the earlier focus and subject to popular constraints) burned the dominican at the stake with papal approval in 1498, following his excommunication the previous year.

The apocalyptic scheme in which the French invasion (for the recovery of Naples from Aragon) which brought Savonarola to power figured prominently was, in rather a different version from that of the prophet, to engulf Italy in the year after his death (in which year Ficino died). In 1499 France took Milan; Ferdinand of Aragon, now in control of most of Spain, regained Naples, and the italian republics became the principal scene or focus of the great European conflict between France and the old order of Church and Empire represented by a newly integrated Spain, with its vast supply of gold and silver following the discovery by Columbus of a New World in 1492 (when, also, the Moors were driven from their last stronghold of Granada, and the Jews who had previously controlled Spanish finance expelled).

Florence, like England, had embodied a sort of 'poetic' symmetry of material economy framed in the interface of state and European context, and policy focussed in one individual. In Florence this 'middle' class mercantile order was reflected in the same symmetry of artist and object in the pictorial frame, as is found in the parallel rise of a new order of painting in the mercantile towns of the Netherlands. Just as an analogous symmetry of policy and economy had not given rise in the more complex integration of towns in an English nation to a 'renaissance' of Culture (which was, rather, transposed by men like the Colet and Linacre who had studied in the frame of the Florentine Academy towards the end of the fifteenth century), nor, on the other hand, could Italian and Flemish towns maintain an independent urban or republican order within the wider economy of European boundaries, as England could maintain
political independence within her more extensive boundary defined by the sea (rather than neighbouring continental states). With the rise of France and Spain out of the same old order of Church and Empire from which the independent cities themselves had emerged, the independence of the latter was soon lost, and the florentine 'poetic' focussed within a small state was unfolded into the wider and more complex european 'scene' (in a sort of parallel of Savonarola's vision) dominated for a century-and-a-half by the emergence of a new order out of the opening configuration of the sixteenth century that corresponds to the Italian Apocalypse.

..An opening configuration, then, of 'Reform', prefigured at Florence in Savonarola's visionary scheme.

..Reform framed in the simple mirroring of 'logical' and 'physical' orders - corresponding to the medieval orders of Church and Empire, as two 'sides' of a new poetic of Culture prefigured in Medici Florence, in the circuit of abstraction of that Republic from the wider order, broken over the turn of the century. A break corresponding to the coordination of the previously abstracted discursive and spatial orders of Scene and Dialogue in Savonarola's Drama. The static symmetry of 'imaginary' psychological or logical 'side' or space, and 'real' physical side (or space) of an image further unfolds, continuing the unfolding of Giotto's axis from Cimabue's point, into spatiotemporal action, and its articulation in Alberti's static formal frame. And discursive time is in its turn embedded in activity where before it had abstracted from the coordination of its 'inner' and 'outer' orders in the space of action. Of course the discursive order of narrative had embodied a play of imagery, and an implicit 'space', just as the spatial configuration of the image had implied a play of corresponding discursive constructions, possible actions - a play in time of real and imaginary orders of the picture in our questioning gaze, our discursive reflection before it (as I suggested in relation to Botticelli's departure from static focus). But at the close of the fifteenth century it is as though these two lines of development, these parallel and coordinate unfoldings of discursive and pictorial 'poetics', converge in a dramatic vision, so to say, in which the two orders coincide, or from which their earlier axes may be seen
to be abstractions. Thus Leonardo now insists that the frame of a picture, and the order of composition within it, be understood as not only a two-dimensional interface in which real and imaginary space are mirrored, but also an interface, as it were, of real and imaginary time: a two-dimensional slice through the space and time of a ('four-dimensional') action, in which the various components are integrated in a dynamic unity or system of coordination, in a coherent 'working' of the action thus abstracted to two of its four dimensions. This insistence is in turn complemented by the 'punctu- ation' (we might say) of Leonardo's notes on the 'working' the 'dy- namic' of various components of Creation as a unitary four-dimensional Action, by sketches which embed the discursive line of the inquiry in the working from which it is also a (complementary) abstraction. Thus Creation as a whole is framed as a harmonic dynamic of waves of light, of which the play of waves on two-dimensional surfaces is an image (which abstracts, then, from one spatial dimension - and in this perhaps, is 'water'): a cosmic dynamic, then, of 'aspect', 'perspect- ive' indeed, from which image and narration are complementary abstract- ions: a dynamic reflected in the interplay of narrative and image in the finite frame of the notebooks - these almost as Creation in little, in which again and again recur the apocalyptic coordination of the narrative line of History as a whole with initial abstraction from the primal surface of Water, whether at the opening of the Book, or in the past Deluge..or the Deluge to come, prefigured by the swirling waters punctuating the narration of these scenes.

The 'individual', then, finds himself in a spatiotemporal frame of Action, of which heavenly actuality and earthly possibility are two sides, reflecting the two-sidedness of the elementary action from which word and image in their complementary manner abstract - our earthly activity integrated in a 'scene' of which the old orders of Church and Empire are also sides, abstracted from the focal coor- dination of all these orders in the Actor, Man. Ficino's 'magical' schemes translated from the hermetic books (for whose translation Cosimo ordered that the great project of translating Plato itself be interrupted in the early 'sixties), the oracles, and neoplatonic
commentaries, prefigure in the discursive order of narrative the 'heavenly' actuality associated with inscription of the locus of its framing in the configuration of an action - and Savonarola's inscription of its framing by him as a focal element in the flor-entine Apocalypse may be taken as a dramatic prefiguration of the wider symmetry of heavenly and earthly orders of sixteenth-century 'self-dramatisation'. Leonardo's contemporary Trithemius, abbot of Spanheim at the turn of the century, articulates his 'version' of the new dramatic order in the part of Alchemist, and his pupil 'Paracelsus' was to present an axial version of the new part of individual in a symmetric Kosmos (one might note the parallel between this version and that of another pupil, Agrippa).

Paracelsus played his part in his version first as town-physician of Basel from 1526 to 1528, where he lectured at the university in the vernacular German (breaking with the universal European tradition of teaching in Latin) and - it is said - publicly burned the works of Avicenna and Galen which (in Latin) had framed instruction in European medical faculties since the time of Albert the Great. Meanwhile his fellow-citizen Erasmus was engaged in his epochal polemic with Luther, having broken with that reformer on the question, precisely, of our part in action - of the Freedom of the Will, of which controversy more in the next section.

The period now opening up (roughly 1500-1650) is in many ways characterised by this figure of 'polemic'. Both Luther's and Paracelsus' reforms are framed in a polemic focussed in Germany - wars of words that reflect the outward disturbances from the old order of Church and Empire to the new mercantile national order. Paracelsus' polemics occasioned his expulsion from Basel in 1528. The following year he was in Augsburg, publishing the first account of his reform. The year after that the imperial Diet or Parliament met there in an attempt to resolve the opposition between 'catholic' and reforming parties in the Church. Melancthon there presented the first systematic exposition of ecclesiastical Reform - the 'Augsburg Confession' of Faith drawn up by him as a compromise between Luther's and Zwingli's parties. Luther directed the presentation of the 'protestant' case from a nearby town, his place in deliberations at the Diet taken by his milder colleague in the interest of reconciliation. The Emperor stayed in the house of Anthony Fugger, in whose
father's tyrolean mines Paracelsus had discovered the part of practical involvement in the workings of Nature, that was, he insisted, to supplant the old circle of academic (or rather, peripatetic) abstraction.

Let us continue the circuit or play of elements of the new configuration: Augsburg, a focal city in the early Reformation, was, along with Nuremberg, the focus of German trade—the interface of Flemish and German cities in the North with Italian cities to the South. The Fuggers had risen to prominence in Augsburg under Jakob, the contemporary of Cosimo de' Medici, and in the sixteenth century Augsburg in its turn became the focus of interaction of Flemish and Italian traditions of painting under Fugger patronage. But differences between the part of the Fuggers at Augsburg and the Medici at Florence are characteristic, and reflect relations between German and Italian elements in a 'cultural economy' of Europe which frame the different parts of Luther and Paracelsus in Germany and—for example—that of their Florentine contemporary Machiavelli.

First of all: the great wealth of Jakob Fugger's son, Jakob II, was derived from tyrolean mines in which Paracelsus (and Agricola after him) had studied. The 'school': of the Fuggers was the practical exploitation of physical Nature in a mine, rather than a Platonic Academy. Their wealth was framed in that physical interface of Culture and Nature, rather than a Medicean economy of the interface of Florence and Europe. And the Fugger's political influence, reflecting their 'industry' in that 'natural' interface, lay rather in the inscription of their economic power in the old frame of Church and feudal Empire: their services to Church and Empire were recognised by Charles V in the conferral on Jakob II's sons of the rights of imperial princes, along with feudal tenure of lands mortgaged to them by his father. These 'princes' find themselves, as it were, in virtue of their part in the physical economy of the Empire, at a nominal 'focus' of that frame, whereas the Medici had asserted themselves in the interplay of political 'focus' and civic 'economy'.

The difference is reflected at the opening of the century in the 'part' of Machiavelli in the Florentine Republic which succeeded
the rule of Savonarola in 1498, and preceded the restoration of the Medici in 1512. In those years Machiavelli was florentine ambassador, dominating the external relations of Florence with Europe (that is, with Milan, Rome, France, Spain and Empire) in the political turmoil which succeeded the relative stability of the second half of the previous century. When the Medici returned (the Pope having summoned to Italy a Spanish army) and Ficino's pupil Giovanni de' Medici became Pope Leo X the following year, integrating Medici policy in Tuscany and the Papal States, Machiavelli, displaced from his office, wrote an account of the part of the Prince, in order to present to the Medici the part he might play in the new medicean order.

The 'part' of the Prince: Machiavelli's account - itself an instance of the diplomacy it frames - embodies, like the reforms of Luther and Paracelsus, that 'poetic' of Action in which orders of image and narrative converge around the beginning of the century...and indeed Leo X, the first Medici Pope, in 1519 appointed Machiavelli to frame a 'reform' of the florentine Republic.

The account 'frames' the part of a Medici prince, as an earlier 'poetic' had 'framed' the part of Cosimo of Lorenzo; like the private reports prepared for the ruling Council of the Republic in his period as ambassador, the framing of policy in *Del Principe* is presented privately to rulers - the treatise was not published until five years after its author's death. In *Politics*, the Art of the Possible, the 'space' of possible actions (the analogue of Alberti's architectural space), if itself known by others than the policy-makers, is thereby changed, restricted. The part of the Prince lies at the 'focus' of possible action and actual decision, at which policy is framed. The 'machiavellian' part of ambassador or diplomat lies in framing for the Prince this part of choice - framing as extensive as possible a range of possible actions, their 'economy', and focussing this 'economy' (as a 'picture' of the situation) in the 'central' perspective of the ruler. This dramatic framing of the Prince's part finds an 'outward' or public analogue in Machiavelli's focussing of the everyday life that constitutes as it were the 'element' of the cultural economy of possible actions, in his comedies. These were published: 'public' framings of the situation, focussed in the Viewer, Spectator - in that 'part' in the dramatic space of the imaginary
action from which the actual spectator's detachment constitutes 'comic' distance. Machiavelli's public framing of his situation in this poetics of 'comedy' constitutes (along with Ariosto's contemporary work) an epochal component of the new poetic, reflected in the simultaneous rise of the Spanish drama at the opening of the sixteenth century. Machiavelli's part, in these complementary 'private' and 'public' versions of the Florentine frame at the beginning of the century may thus be seen as a sort of natural further 'step' from the earlier Scenes of Alberti or Savonarola. And this part might be taken as a Florentine parallel of the parts of Luther and Paracelsus - of Ulrich von Hutten, Erasmus, More...of Leo X, Ficino's pupil, of the Emperor Maximilian who directed the composition of works in prose and verse in which he appears as the protagonist... as of many others. Thus for example Machiavelli's framing of the part of framing the part of Prince, as rooted in the 'practical' or 'empirical' interplay of real and imaginary situations discovered in the diplomatic experience which it in turn articulates - parallels Paracelsus' identification in the actual situation in which he finds himself, of the part of 'experience' - at the Fugger mines for example - in his identification of his part.

The new 'poetic' that unfolds from the initial mirroring of the theological frame of the Christian mystery and the logical frame of an Aristotelian Economy (framed in the initial 'logic' of logical determination of the relation of logical and physical 'space' -logical and physical 'being-in' - expressed in the coordination of 'thesis', 'position' in the frame of Excluded Middle and Non-Contradiction) slowly comes to mark its distance from the canonical Aristotelian scheme. Thus Aquinas inscribes the Aristotelian Economy within a primary distinction of 'what' and 'that' - inscribes the Aristotelian Economy of Philosophy as a whole within the radical Actuality of this distinction in which the Christian mystery of Creation expresses itself - this rather than, with Aristotle, attempting the inscription of the distinction of actuality and possibility within a logical Economy of Kosmos. Scotus takes a further step, inscribing the articulation of 'position' in a radical order of 'thisness', of which the logical and physical are two complementary sides
-unfolding then the elementary axes of psychological and physical
and earthly-heavenly from the initial thomist point of individuality,
like Giotto unfolding Cimabue's initial point. Scotus' poetic symmetry
of 'thisness' is further unfolded by his successors at Merton into a
radical 'poetic' interplay of logical 'supposition' and physical 'im-
petus' (or, as it later appears, inertia). By 1500 Cajetan has sys-
tematically articulated Thomas scheme in the frame of Analogy at Padua,
and passes into the practical poetic of ecclesiastical reorganisation
(in which capacity he is sent as papal representative to bring Luther
to reason at the outbreak of the Reform). Pomponazzi, on the other
hand presents that mystery of Analogy as a system of questions within
a restored aristotelian Economy, re-focussed so to speak in abstract-
tion from its inscription as one term in the circuit of Mystery. Mean-
while Pletho has been arguing for the integration of Mystery and Eco-
nomy of Kosmos in a platonic scheme. With Paracelsus' attack on Avi-
cenna and Galen, and the common aristotelian scholastic frame in which
the debate between the via antiqua or logica vetera of Thomas and Duns,
and the via moderna or logica nova of the ockhamists had been carried
on for two centuries, the distance from Aristotle begins to be expres-
sed, not 'within' the working of the aristotelian Economy, but rather
in a new 'poetic' frame in which the sterile circularity of the scholast-
ic logical order is identified as one side - that of formal reflection
- abstracted from the more radical dramatic order of experience and
action. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries this distance from
Aristotle is slowly unfolded in a new frame which still, however, re-
tains various aristotelian figures in the very distinction of the new
frame from the old 'scholastic' one. Thus the progress from thirteenth
to seventeenth century is properly far more continuous than those who
announce the break with the stagyrite would have their audiences be-
lieve. Aquinas had framed the part of the aristotelian logical Economy
in the actual Kosmos in terms of the aristotelian distinction of Ens
and Essentia, and found the initial 'point' of a new 'dramatic' order
in the locus of choice in the interface of these two terms - of christ-
ian Mystery and aristotelian Economy. From that initial point the new
dramatic frame of Action slowly unfolds, the part of the aristotelian
logic in the new frame still defined in terms of that very logic and
of the cosmic Economy it articulates. Thus an unfolding of the 'schol-
astic' frame that leads from Thomas' distinction of That a thing is from
What a thing is, through Scotus on the one hand, and through Eckhardt
and Cusanus on the other, to the dramatic vision of Pico della Mirandola, parallels the unfolding of the 'poetic' frame of picture and narrative already traced through Dante and the Academy, again to Pico and Savonarola. The identification of a radical 'dramatic' frame of individuality, framed in different ways by Luther, Paracelsus, Machiavelli and many others, corresponding to a point of convergence of the parallel developments of the poetics of discourse and image, also marks the beginning of a repudiation of the aristotelian logic - this still in a 'distance' whose definition embodies aristotelian components, but which comes to recognise itself as radically 'outside' the aristotelian tradition of the Schools. This dramatic recognition of one's individuality, one's actuality, at the focus of a dramatic order from which the closed circle of Aristotle's scheme amounts to an illusive abstraction, of course parallels Luther's self-discovery in a dramatic order from which the scholastic theology and the roman Church of which it is a primary component are equally 'abstracted'. (We will see how, following the thomist revival led by the Cajetan sent to hear Luther's case at Augsburg in 1518 leads to the presence of two books - the Bible and the Summa Theologiae - on the altar throughout the sittings of the Council of Trent).

It is at the University of Paris, the focus of aristotelian scholasticism in the thirteenth century that the question of a 'reform' of logic itself is focussed: Ramus (Pierre de la Ramée) attempts, amid virulently hostile opposition from that great bastion of scholastic conservatism which pronounced against Luther in 1521 and petitioned Francois I for the outlawing of printing in 1533, the substitution of the 'applied poetics' of the Rhetoric for the Organon, as primary frame of Reason. At the age of twenty-one he had shocked the Establishment by maintaining as his Master's thesis 'That Everything Aristotle Said Was False'. By the beginning of the next century the Lord Chancellor of England was framing a New Organon, and by the middle of that century a group of englishmen were meeting regularly to put something like Bacon's programme into effect - a concerted Reformation of Knowledge, in the frame of Experientia - both passive 'experience' and active 'experiment'. Characteristically, Bacon's proposed Instauratio Magna to which the new Organon was to be the access, was framed in terms of Aristotle's 'induction', just as Ramus' new frame was to be the Rhetoric of the old canon.
I will not now analyse the second part of the transition from thirteenth to seventeenth century even in the meagre detail pursued thus far. Rather will I simply attempt to identify a 'focal' configuration of Action at the opening of the sixteenth century analogous to the earlier 'foci' around the middle of thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, and then frame a figure of transition to a seventeenth-century 'focus' about which this Second Part as a whole turns.
The 'poetic' of the opening of the sixteenth century is framed in various parallel ways in various different 'orders' of framing over the first thirty or so years of the century - say, the thirty years leading up to the Diet of Augsburg in 1530. The components of these parallel frames, and the general principles according to which a rudimentary 'economy' of their interaction might be sketched, should by now be fairly familiar. Thus one can here again (as in discussion of earlier foci or 'nodes' of Reflection) identify primary 'logical', 'cultural' and 'physical' frames - the first and last having been associated with the parts of Church and Empire over the mid-thirteenth century, when the question of a radical self-discovery of the human 'individual' at a sort of initial point or focus from which a new 'cultural' frame opens up or unfolds (with Church and State two component 'sides'): a new 'dramatic' space of European 'Culture'. The centrality or focal character of Luther's part in the 'cultural' space and its dynamic in the early sixteenth century lies, in relation to this narration, in the way that he expresses, within the 'logical' or 'theological' poetic of the Christian mystery, the inscription of its logic in a more radical dramatic scheme or order, in which the logic so to speak identifies itself as one 'side'. This amounts to an unfolding of the initial mid-thirteenth century 'logical' identification of the primary locus of that logic in individual choice (with, say, Aquinas), into the logical identification or inscription of this radical locus of Choice within the dramatic spatiotemporal framing of Action.

Luther's expression of this new self-inscription of the logical order of Reflection in the coordination of the various other dimensions of Action (following, say, Savonarola's integration of the complementary poetics of discourse and image) is central, focal, through its integration of the discursive order of the Book ('Bible') as primary narrative 'axis' or component of the new poetic. The logical component of the new frame is to break the closed theological circuit instituted in a visible Church abstracted from the radical individuality of choice and conscience in the frame of cosmic Law: to bring that
logical circuit into question by framing the logic of individual choice through the inscription of the Book as frame of the discursive order in a primary configuration of Action of which it identifies itself as one component. The Church as instituted on Earth is itself to be judged by its approximation to the 'Christian' frame of choice and action whose articulation is coordinated through the inscription of the discursive order of the Book in the Drama it frames, as one critical component: actively coordinated through the reading in the Book of a configuration of further reading, and so on and on in the dynamic interplay of Text and Context in which the individual discovers the actuality of the Word.

What of Luther's 'part' in this scheme or frame over the first thirty years of the century? We might take as 'turning-point' in his recognition or identification of such a part, the part of conscience, the question of the sale of indulgences, against which the Wittenberg theologian drew up his ninety-five theses in 1517. This question is hardly an accidental or arbitrary occasion for the break with the instituted western Church into which it eventually unfolded. Independently, the same question framed the beginning of Reform in Zürich under Zwingli in 1518. For the traffic in these cancellations of the debts of sin, sold for earthly money, and a major source of papal revenue, embodies precisely the merely formal authority of the Roman bishop, framed in the logical circuit of a 'poetics' of the Christian story abstracted from its dramatic actuality of Word, and through this abstraction lost in the earthly 'economy' of Church: the Spirit lost and hidden in that mere image in its Body.

- An earthly 'economy': the first thing printed in England by Caxton, introducing the new art in 1476, was a letter of Indulgence - or rather, identical letters of Indulgence, identical 'copies' - for the use (like later printed money) of the abbot of Abingdon. By 1520, in his address An den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation, Luther had found the part of the new 'economy' of printing, of the printed letter, in his reform of such abuses: his tract was printed at Wittenberg, and four thousand copies were in circulation in a few days.

By this time the question extended to that of papal authority itself. Luther had been attacked by Eck upon the publication of his
initial 'theses' (this publication effected in the traditional manner of posting the theses, and the implicit or explicit promise or responsibility to defend them, on the door of the chief church - like Pico posting his nine hundred theses at Rome upon his arrival there); the argument drew Melancthon (the professor of greek at Wittenberg) to his colleague's aid the following year. In 1519 Luther and Eck met in formal disputatio at Leipzig. The disputation was referred to the higher instance of the Doctors of Paris for adjudication, that university having been long before invested with decisive authority in questions of Doctrine, parallelling the Pope's authority in matters of Faith and Morals. Luther was now joined by Erasmus and Ulrich von Hutten, and the question became that of (Reform of) the whole medieval order of Church and Empire. In 1521 the Doctors of Paris finally announced their complete rejection of Luther's position, his theses. The new Emperor, on his succession to his father Maximilian finding himself possessed also of Spain and the Netherlands through recent Hapsburg marriages, summoned the first parliament or Diet of his reign at Worms, summoning Luther to this imperial court, as his case had earlier been referred to the theological 'court' of Paris. After two days questioning Luther was eventually persuaded to give a direct answer to the question, whether he would recant the propositions condemned in his many publications lying on the table before the court. At last, before Charles, he directly framed his position, took his stand at the focus of Reform:

Hic ego: Quando ergo S. Maiestas vestra dominationesque vestrae - simplex responsum petunt, dabo illud neque cornutum neque dentatum in hunc modum:
Nisi convictus fuero testimoniis scriptarum aut ratione evidente (nam neque Papae neque conciliis solis credo, cum constet eos et errasse sepius et sibiipsiis contradixisse), victus sum scripturis a me adductis et capta conscientia in verbis dei, revocare neque possum nec volo quicquam, cum contra conscientiam agere neque tutum neque integrum est.
Ich kan nicht anderst, hie stehe ich, Gott helff mir, Amen. (1)

1: Acta of the Diet - WA VII,838, where minor textual variants among the ten latin editions of the Acta and Luther's reply published in 1521 (all based on Luther's personal record) are given. Thus the first edition published by Luther's printer at Wittenberg within a couple of weeks ends: Hie stehe ich, ich kan nicht anders.
Darauf ich gesagt hab: Weyl dann Eur kay. Mayt. und Gnaden eine schlechte antwort begern, so will ich eyn unstöffige und unpeyssige antwort geben disser massen: 
Es sei dann, das ich durch getzeugnuss der schrifft uberwunden werd oder aber durch scheynlich ursachen (dann ich glaub wider dem Bapst nach den Concilien allein, weil es am tag ist, das dieselben zu mermaln geirrt und wider sich selbs geredt habenn) uberwunden werd, Ich bin uberwunden durch die schrifffen, so von mir gefurt, und gefangen im gewissen an dem wort Gottes. Derhalben ich nichts mag noch will widerruffenn, Weil wider das gewissen zu handeln beschwerlich, unheilsam und ferlich ist. 
Ich kan nicht anderst, hie stehe ich, Gott helff mir, Amű. (1)

Thereupon I said: Since then your imperial majesty and your nobles desire a simple answer, I will give it without horns or teeth thus: Unless I be convinced by the testimony of the Scriptures or by clear argument ( for I have faith neither in Pope nor Councils on their own, since it is well-known that they have both often erred and contradicted themselves), I must be convinced by the Scriptures adduced by myself, and my conscience held captive in the Word of God, and I neither can nor will retract anything, for to act against conscience is neither safe nor sound. 
I can do no else, here I stand, God help me, Amen.

For the following year Luther was kept secretly, for his own safety, in the castle of his protector the saxon Elector (who had arranged his 'disappearance' in the guise of a forcible abduction on the road back from Worms to Wittenberg). Erasmus had just published his critical text of the New Testament, the rewritten Contract between God and Man - the first printing, this, of the original greek. Luther now proceeded in his seclusion to translate it into german, to transpose this its discursive frame into the german order of activity, and one more component of the framing of his part was in place. Shortly thereafter the monk married a reformed nun, and in the same year broke with Erasmus, finally, on the question of the Freedom (rather, as Luther would have it, the bondage, captivity) of the Will. For in Luther's vision, the Text he had inscribed in the new

dramatic frame of his action itself embodied the logical inscription of the discursive order of Reason and Choice in a poetic or theological frame of divine Law, which was thus as Mystery closed upon itself according to the earlier figure of Augustine, by whose conventual rule Luther had lived until that year of marriage. Indeed it was the discovery of Augustine that had led him to join the augustinian order upon receiving the degree of Master of Arts at Erfurt in 1505. Erasmus had himself praised the 'true folly' - Paul's 'wisdom of God that is folly to men' - of such an inscription of the logical order of one's reason in the dramatic frame of the christian Story, in 1512: a folly he had contrasted with the analogous worldly folly of inscribing one's reason and assertion in some worldly story - whether it be passed off for religion, common sense, the story of 'reason' itself, or whatever else. Now the central Humanist found himself caught between the one-sided poetic of the Reformer and the equally one-sided poetic of worldly sense - the Critic standing outside the complementary closed circuits of inscription of a divine mystery in the earthly economy of the instituted Church, or inscription of that economy as one term in the closed circuit of Mystery: standing between the symmetry of Luther's identification of his position in the perspectival frame articulated about the inscription of the discursive order of Scripture, Book, Writing, in the Action it framed (Hie stehe ich, ich kan nicht anders; like the albertine spectator before the picture which embeds its quadro in the four dimensional frame of activity as interface of that 'real' worldly space with the ideal space and time it mirrors), and the complementary closed frame of a worldly religion embodied in a visible Church 'focussed' in the formal authority of another Medici pope (at the sight of whom with his cardinals in suits of armour he was physically sick).

Erasmus, then, caught in the question of the symmetry of these two 'sides', his freedom impotently caught in the open-ness which to assert is paradoxically to contradict: for by choosing between these two heavenly and earthly versions of Choice, must he not enter into one circuit or the other? To assert what is open between them - is this not necessarily to choose...? In a way Erasmus standing or caught in this interface of the 'heavenly' mystery of Luther's unitary augustinian Story or Drama of universal History, and the earthly economy of those competing stories in which others unthinkingly find their parts.
(the interplay or economy of these stories, then, that of 'elements'
of a new dramatic order focussed, as in the Colloquia, in our part
in the interplay of 'stories') — Erasmus attacked from both 'sides',
presents a more central embodiment of the new order than his erstwhile
associate. Yet Luther's part derives its centrality for this narra-
tive as primary, focal, assertion of the new order (as it were in the
ambiguous frame of Erasmus' poetic of reflection and action), in the
recurrence of the perennial pauline figure of the Story or Drama whose
very assertion or framing is the discursive axis of that Action: the
pauline figure in which Luther frames his part, takes his stand.

Following the break with Erasmus over this question of
Choice, the question of the various orders of the Mystery in the
central 'action' of the Sacrament (framing the mirroring of heavenly
and earthly orders, and in relation to which the question of Will
appears as a last abstraction), of 'Communion', community of assert-
ton, faith, as organising frame of the universal Action — began to
divide the followers of Luther and Zwingli — with Melancthon trying
(the counterpart as it were in this humanist of Erasmus' questioning)
to frame a unitary scheme in which Luther's theology of the actual
Presence of the Body and Blood of the Christ in the Bread and Wine
of the Mass could be combined with Zwingli's rational poetics of
Symbolism. The order of the western or latin Mass had been formally
framed by Gregory the Great, and the theological mirroring of this
dramatic scheme of the central 'mystery' (defining the coordinates
of 'christian' activity) in a doctrine of 'transubstantiation' (actual
conversion of the 'substance' under the 'accidents' of physical Bread
and Wine into the 'substance' of the Second Person — or of the Trinity) was formally introduced in the time of Anselm. Innocent had made this doctrine a matter of faith, reflecting as it does
in the focal frame of the Mystery the unitary frame or poetics of
a roman Church.

A compromise was framed by Melancthon in the common Con-
fession of Faith presented to the Emperor at the Diet of Augsburg in
1530. But thereafter Melancthon was caught (like Erasmus on the wider
stage) in the conflict of two parties — and it was eventually on the
question of Real Presence that the 'Lutherans' broke with Calvin and the 'Reformed' party, who insisted upon a view intermediate between those of the first two leaders of the Reform: the Bread and Wine were only symbols, but through them the communicant did actually partake of, participate in, the Body of Christ. The Council of Trent, meanwhile, reasserted in the strongest terms Aquinas' account of Transubstantiation.

In 1527 Rome had been sacked by imperialist troops, the nominal allies of the Papacy against France. Machiavelli died; three years later Florence was sacked by another imperial army under the Duke of Orange, and the republican constitution of the city for whose reform Machiavelli had been asked by the first Medici pope to draw up a plan, was overthrown for good by the second (his half-brother), who created a Medici duchy of Tuscany. That same year, 1530, which marks the close of florentine independence also marks (as we saw) the first systematic presentation of the Reform at Augsburg: as also the death of Wolsey in England and the opening of the break between Henry VIII and Rome. This last may itself be taken as a natural sequel to Wolsey's policy of framing the part of England in Europe (and the World it dominated) in the 'balance of power' between France and Empire, in the conflict that had begun at Naples and Milan at the turn of the century, and was still focussed in the small italian states unable, from their size, situation, and factional disorder, to maintain any secure independence, any part, but that of military interface, in the 'balance' of french and Hapsburg power.

Around this time (following, then, upon the part of the Doctors of Theology around 1520) the question of Reform was polarised at the University of Paris. François I began to counter the rise of the reforming party in University and City in 1533: I have already
noted the proposition in this year (by the theological faculty) that mechanical printing should be banned in France: the Doctors who had condemned Luther at the time of the Diet of Worms associated reform of the Church with reform of learning, together embodied in the new economy of the printed word. Calvin fled the city, having slowly come to adopt the principles of the Reformers, and that year resigned his office in the Church of Rome. Ignatius Loyola, an erstwhile Spanish soldier, then studying at the University, formed with four fellow Iberians and a Savoyard a 'Society of Jesus', an army of the Roman Church, the following year.

Geneva rebelled against the Catholic duke of Savoy. Calvin, still wandering about Europe after his flight from Paris, having published a new 'institution' of Christian Religion in Basel in 1536, arrived shortly afterwards in rebel Geneva, where he was persuaded to play his part in helping to organise the religious and civil defence of the city. By the middle of the century Loyola had systematically organised his new forces, trained in the discipline of Spiritual (rather, that is, than military) Exercises (the system published in 1548); Loyola placed his forces under the direction of the Pope, who was framing the opposition of Rome and Reform in the spiritual court of a General Council (which Charles V had been urging upon the papacy from 1527) which he effectively controlled: reinscribing or determining the opposition within the Roman frame of a 'Catholic' tradition. Calvin, meanwhile, his wandering so to speak definitively interrupted, had organised at Geneva a new frame of Christian activity, systematically articulating Church and State as two complementary sides of a dramatic order 'focussed' in himself as head of each; as centre of a systematic 'perspective' articulated about the inscription of Book in the Action it framed (comparable with Alberti's organisation of the City about the elementary interface of real and imaginary orders of the picture, focussed in the individual, and more particularly, the architect) as interface, like the architect of the new Christian order, of ideal Heaven and the material reality of Earth. Calvin as systematic focus and architect in the new perspective of Luther and Zwingli, coordinated within the primary circuit of the city-state and its systematic constitution. Focus at Geneva of the new Institution of Christianity, reflected within the city as a new constitution, driving the wider institution it prefigured through its organisation of the relations of Geneva and outside World.
For Luther the Augustinian frame of inscription of the logical order of choice, assertion, and its articulation in reason, in the poetic of a theology, through the reading in the book of the place of its discursive order in the cosmic frame in which it identified itself as one component (as canonical instance and frame of the discursive order of Text, Scripture, Writing which organizes its own reading) had replaced the formal poetic of Roman theology and papal authority as frame of action, of identification of one's true part. Frame of choice and action in which the old circular logic of the Roman version of the Christian Story or Drama, and the complementary poetic of worldly Empire were to be identified as abstractions: in which the discursive inscription of the Book in the Action it framed, and German Nation as 'outward' frame in which activity would be directed by that new 'logic', were to be in principle integrated as two sides of Christian activity in Germany. In the development of Luther's understanding - his 'reading' indeed - of his part of framing the new order of Christian activity - and so in successive attempts at the new frame successively framing more exactly his part, in it, of framing the unity of the new order focussed in God can be seen 'at work' as a guiding ideal, taking on various particular configurations in successive particular situations. In Calvin's new order at Geneva, on the other hand, the logic of the ideal is systematically worked out in the fixed frame of the City and the earthly circuit of its boundary inscribed in the interface of Heaven and Earth: the closed circuit in which (as indeed earlier at Croton..) the economy of mirroring of 'physical' and 'logical' orders of Christian activity - and in their relation the wider mirroring of heavenly mystery and that earthly economy - is logically articulated as frame of unitary Christian Action, as systematic frame of Christian activity within the wider unitary Story of the World, of Creation.

This logical articulation of the new poetic or dramatic frame over the mid-century by a focal Frenchman, at the French side of the Swiss interface of France and Empire itself mirrors the conservative theology of the Council of Trent (at the border of more or less papal Italy and more or less imperial Germany). - A theology formally framed in a logical determination of the coordination of logical, theological, ecclesiastical and civil orders in a sort of ideal sixteenth-century reconstruction of the thirteenth-century
focus at which the logical order of catholic theology (as 'logical poetics' of the christian Story) defined its own part by inscribing the symmetry of logical and physical 'poetics' in the Economy of Earth in the formal Mystery which, distinguishing itself in and from that open Economy as heavenly Actuality, decides the relations of Heaven and Earth, and through this decides the earthly relations of catholic 'ideology' and the complementary civil order by articulating their relation as the very image or reflection in ('on') Earth of the relations of Heaven and Earth.

The dogma of Transubstantiation occupied the critical second phase of the Council in 1551-2: at this focal point, the point in which the opposition of Reform and Counter-Reform had come to be articulated about this central coordination of the various dimensions of christian activity as focal question, representatives of the Reform were admitted to the proceedings. But they quickly perceived that the formal frame of the roman Church, focussed in the Pope as head, was not itself, in this central question, in question: rather did they find themselves at the very centre of its systematic reassertion. In the doctrinal decrees of the Council, for example, a unitary frame was being articulated (corresponding, as has just been suggested, to a sort of ideal version of the thirteenth-century focus) in which the various different lines of development from the thirteenth century - notably those embodied in the rival schools of the dominicans and franciscans; thomists and scotists - could be incorporated as open questions within an unquestionable formal frame of 'catholic' theology as a systematic whole: theology systematically inscribed in, and defining itself as, the logical component of a roman poetic, systematically abstracted from the Book, and the engagement in it, 'prisoner to God's Word' of Luther's conscience. Luther had wished to call a General Council of all christians, where the canonical Text would frame the proceedings by framing its part in them (and their part in the wider frame of activity informed by the Book and its reading). His earliest impulse to Reform had been the discovery in the library at Erfurt that the Church had edited the Bible for daily reading, leaving out, in particular, passages that called such a proceeding itself into question: indeed the Church actually discouraged reading of the Book by the laity, and forcibly opposed its translation into language that the laity could understand. ...At the Council of Trent Thomas' Summa Theologicae lay side by side with the Book on the altar.
Around the middle of the century, then, there appear a logical articulation of the new 'reformed' frame of Christian activity, defined in relation to the civil and ecclesiastical order focussed in Calvin himself at Geneva, with its common consistorial court governing integrated Church and State, and a complementary systematic re-assertion of the formal order of the medieval Church, with Loyola taking upon himself the part of a second Dominic (the story of whose life had made such a deep impression upon that convalescing young soldier). Loyola at the head of the largely Spanish Spiritual Army of Rome...and Charles V at the head of another Spanish army, seeking to assert the old outward imperial order of the thirteenth century idealised in sixteenth century Spanish romance. Spain at mid-century embodying, as at the close of classical Antiquity and under the Councils of Isidore, as under the direction of Cardinal Ximenes at the beginning of the sixteenth century, a formal integration of ecclesiastical and feudal orders abstracted from what is open in the poetic order of their mirroring and interplay. Thus Charles' ideal feudal vision, reflected in the feudal visions that were to be subjected to Cervantes' irony half a century later, and which he was unable to sustain in the outer World, the complicated European order of the mid-century, led him, after the Diet of Augsburg of 1555 which recognised the Reform, to resign the Empire to his brother, and the Spanish throne with its Low Country dependencies to his son, and to withdraw to the monastery of Yuste to spend his last years in complete abstraction from the World, engaged in Loyola's spiritual exercises. - An abstraction mirrored in the contemporary 'mysticism' of the Carmelite Reform, in that systematic abstraction from an earthly part. - An abstraction reflected also in the developing abstraction of the Spanish order of affairs from the rapidly unfolding material economy of Europe fed by the supplies of American bullion which encouraged the expansion of French, Netherlandish, and English economies, but paralysed any incentive to economic development in Spain herself, who could simply buy everything from those other countries with her gold and silver.

Upon Charles' resignation of his part in the earthly order the Netherlands rebelled; over the following half-century the German (that is 'Dutch' or low-German) Netherlands established a political order which reflected the emerging dominance of a trade that had
previously been restricted by the arbitrary policy of aristocratic
spanish governors. France, after the long war with Charles for poli-
tical supremacy in Europe, turned to the 'wars of religion' within -
the old aristocratic factions earlier overcome by Louis XI now polarised
between the protestant house of Bourbon and the catholic house of
Guise. Eventually a bourbon succeeded to the throne and, though him-
self maintaining the association of the french monarchy with the roman
Church by becoming a catholic, concluded the religious contest by de-
creeing religious freedom at Nantes in 1598. The next phase in France
turns about the systematic centralisation of the french state under
Richelieu, the cardinal inscribing the 'logical' poetic of a distinctly
'gallican' catholic Church, and the complementary civil order of the
old aristocracy, within the 'logical' policy of a unified France at
whose expanding frontiers Richelieu himself led armies against the
Hapsburgs of Spain and the fragmenting Empire. The subordination in
his person of Church to State is reflected in leagues with protestant
german princes against the papacy...

The close of a phase opening with the sixteenth century and
extending to the middle of the seventeenth might be taken to be marked
in France by the final struggle, in the regency of Louis XIV, in which
Mazarin, appointed by Richelieu as his successor, and continuing his
policy of centralisation, completely broke the residual independence
of the old nobility (in the 'Fronde' of 1648-53), along with that of
the 'middle' classes, the 'third estate', of the towns, represented
chiefly by the old Parliament of Paris.

In Germany, on the other hand, the close of the Thirty Years
War in 1648, and the final establishment of the Reform, with the old
North Mark of Brandenburg at the head of the protestant Princes, and
the old East Mark, the Hapsburg archduchy (and along with it the titu-
lar Empire) of Austria in the South as the leading catholic state,
the 'logical' articulation of policy in Mazarin's France is reflected
in utter economic and political fragmentation, with a multitude of
petty princes finding themselves at multiple political 'foci' within
a play of power without any centre, in the predominantly 'physical'
economy of their mutual and constantly shifting boundaries.
The development of the English order, in an interplay of figures and associated forces represents the slow establishment of an English 'constitution' of which the new English Church (framed in an interplay of which the complementary systems of Trent and Geneva - of 'papists' and 'puritans' - are limiting poles) and the new English State, of the sixteenth century, are complementary sides - their interplay articulated in the interplay of monarch and subjects in Parliament and Law: a legal order, a primarily 'poetic' frame of English activity, intermediate in organisational principles between the centralised 'logic' of French policy, and the 'physical' economy of German disorder.

By the middle of the seventeenth century the power of the Catholic Spain left to his heirs a century before by Charles was quite as broken as the Empire he had left to his brother's heirs was fragmented - and with the demise of Spain went the European role of the Papacy. The old 'medieval' order of feudal Christendom, its unitary Catholic Church focussed in the bishop of Rome, is by the mid-seventeenth century supplanted by a European order articulated in a 'dramatic' frame unfolding from the mid-thirteenth century, in which a new 'perspective' of reflection inscribes itself as one among other symmetric components of activity, in 'Experience' as its limiting frame.

Just as the turning-point in the cultural frame of Reform (in the reform, that is, of the cultural frame), in a development from the 'focal' configuration of mid-thirteenth century to another 'focus' three centuries later might be found in the Reformation opening with the sixteenth century, so, as we saw, that reform of the medieval Church (and Empire) is reflected in an analogous 'turning-point' in a transition from the inscription of reflection in the logical order of an Aristotelian Economy of a Christian universal History - in a 'logical' poetic framed in the Aristotelian figure of abstraction - to an inscription of that logical circle or circuit within a new dramatic order in which, and from which, it is recognised, precisely, as an abstraction of one side, one component inseparably coordinate with others. I noted the proposed 'reforms' of logic by Ramus at Paris, and by the lawyer Bacon, at the 'focus' of the English 'poetics' of Law (as Lord Chancellor, like More before him). I will not now attempt to plot the implication of the various parallel movements of scientific
or philosophical reform in the cultural 'economy' of Europe over the century-and-a-half between about 1500 and about 1650. Rather will I now attempt simply to define a simple figure of transition from a 'focussing' of Reflection in the question of Action around 1500, and a new 'focus' which might be taken to organise a complex interplay of various components, in various parts of Europe, of a seventeenth-century 'Scientific Revolution' - to organise, in particular, the coordination and interplay of a few 'central' components around the middle of the seventeenth century. The identification of this new focus, corresponding to the figure of Experientia (Experience or Experiment), around 1650 is itself coordinate with the definition or articulation of a movement of scientific 'reform' from (say) Paracelsus to Descartes as itself an 'action' opening out of the initial figure of Action: an 'action' symmetrically articulated within an 'economy' of the various component figures and forces of transition.
In order to frame the context of the transition from the new 'poetics' of Action around 1500, to a poetics of Experience, Experiment - of *Experientia* - around 1650, I considered the 'central' part of Luther. For within the cultural frame of this period, in which the logical order of Reflection (as expressed in texts and discourse generally) mirrors the 'cosmic' context or configuration of text and Culture, Luther's step - that 'step', say, opening with the sixteenth century and closing with the Diet of Augsburg in 1530 - defines an articulation of the interplay of various factors coordinate with the discursive factor of the step, which in their turn enter into the discursive or textual identification of the step. - An articulation of a 'context' as interplay of the factors or figures of Church, Empire, Nationality, Reason, Conscience, Action, Text, Heaven, Earth, and so on, which interplay then frames several further analogous 'steps' between 1500 and 1650.

Thus one further step from Augsburg might be defined by the systematic (and complementary) framing of Reform and Counter-Reform by Calvin and the Council of Trent - this axis of development paralleled (indeed 'reflected') in Reflection by, say, Ramus' reform of logic, Cardanus' reform of the sciences (say, *De Subtilitate* in 1550), Agricola's 'technology' of the Fugger mines, and so on.

Given an initial coordination of various correlative or coordinate orders of Reflection and Context 'around' 1500, 'in terms' of the step from the perspectival scene or 'space' around 1450 to the convergence of that space and the complementarity temporality of the verbal order of discourse in a poetics of Action (rather than disjoint Word and Image)...then the opening step of Luther's theological 'version' or framing of that poetic of Action defines at the outset the articulation of an 'economy', and a 'story', of transition from the
figure of Action to that of Experience, Experiment - *Experientia*.
The opening step, as initial coordination of various factors (or or-
ders or figures) in relation to the opening configuration of 'Action',
defines, precisely, the articulation of the transition it opens as an
action.

The initial coordination of figures, the opening frame, of
1500 corresponds as it were to a 'slice' or section through the tem-
poral dynamic of a Tradition, from which slice (in the axis defined
by Luther's 'step') a transition to a slice 'through' the dynamic con-
figuration of 1650 is organised, articulated, spatiotemporally 'framed'.
Once again, with this articulation of the transition from Action to
Experientia, as an action, the scheme or frame of 'reading' a Tradit-
ion corresponds precisely to a scheme it reads in that Tradition.

...Or perhaps 'reads into'? Once again the question of the
symmetry of the logical order of this text, this reading, and the eco-
nomy or interplay of terms it reads in the texts which are its primary
objects, must be deferred. For here we confront, as it now begins to
appear, just the question of that very 'logical circle' which has been
taken to define the discursive 'logical' order of this text itself, as
of the texts which are the primary objects of its 'reflection'. And
we can only directly confront this question, and hope to resolve it,
by further tracing the Tradition now identified to that (rather, this)
point at which this text itself, with its definition of Text in terms
of 'logical circle', is discovered as (its own) last 'object': in that
closing of the circle in the Close of this book: the final 'object' or
'end' in the economy of 'closing', of inquiry, embodied in these pages.
Meanwhile each text in the series of which this text itself is the
'closing' term, 'reflects' in the 'past' of this book some component
or figuration of the coordination of logical, physical and cultural
orders of this book itself. Thus (for example) this text marks a sort
of point of convergence or 'focus' of an 'imaginary' order in which
(in their abstraction from their own actuality as texts) 'past' texts
are systematically articulated in the common 'space' of their Context:
in that 'real' order to which this book, like all its objects, belongs.
What, though, is the frame of this 'perspective', the 'perspective' of
this text, prefigured in, 'reflecting', the perspectives of Renaissance
and Reformation? We must now proceed to 'unfold' the picture, and,
first of all, see how the perspective of Reform, whether in theology, 'science' or logic, or in their common cultural context of Church, Nation and Empire, unfolds into the 'perspective' of a 'Scientific Revolution'.

'Unfolds': for the new perspective of mid-seventeenth century may be discovered emerging from the structure of the phase or transition from around 1500 to around 1650 as an action. An action articulated in the elementary 'poetic' symmetry of unfolding of component figures, component 'versions' of the perspective of Reform, and a complementary convergence toward the new 'focus' which thus 'mirrors' in the time of the transition, and the 'space' of Reflection and Context articulated in that time, the initial focus - framed in the figure of Action - to which discursive and pictorial orders have converged around 1500, thence to unfold or diverge at the beginning of another 'phase'. A phase or circuit of opening and closing, of unfolding and convergence, in which subordinate components of the transition are inscribed and articulated, circuit within circuit, in a sort of 'harmony' or poetic order of 'fitting-together', ἔκμοινι.

Within this order of transition, this 'economy' of Reflection articulated between two foci or points of opening divergence and closing convergence, this figure of circuit-within-circuit (or period within period) which 'closes' in the new perspective of around 1650, itself appears between 1500 and 1530 as one opening 'version' of the perspective of Reform. The 'opening' configuration of the 'applied theology' of Copernicus' reform of astronomy or astrology is mirrored in a final step beginning around 1630, notably in Galileo's Dialogue... on the Two Chief Systems of the World, Ptolemaic and Copernican, published in January 1632, banned in August, and leading to its author's trial before the Inquisition, beginning in October.

Copernicus, having studied under the pythagorising neoplatonists of Italy, began to lecture in Rome in 1500. The subsequent unfolding of his 'reform' closely parallels that of Luther, to which it is, indeed, coupled through the association of both with the closing
phase of the Teutonic Order of knighthood.

Copernicus, back in West Prussia in 1506 dates (in the preface to the treatise De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium completed in 1530, and published at Nuremberg in 1543) the beginning of his work of reform to that year of return from Rome - the time of Luther's entry into the convent of Erfurt and his initial study of the Book and of Augustine. The new system was completed, closed, in the year of the Diet of Augsburg - in which year manuscripts of the abstract, the Commentariolus, began to circulate.

The leader of the Teutonic Order (founded in the thirteenth century as a 'crusade' against the prussian slavers at the border of the Mark of Brandenburg), an associate of Luther, adopted the Reform in 1525. Two years earlier Copernicus had been appointed to reform the coinage of West Prussia, which shortly after the formal adoption of the Reform (and so abstraction of the Order from its formal place in the coordination of Church and Empire) was incorporated in the protestant Mark of Brandenburg. Such an 'outward' relation between Luther (who, however, personally regarded the new system as the expression of arrogant self-assertion on the part of the astronomer/administrator-general of West Prussia) might be taken to mirror the inward relations between the two reforms, as expressed, say, at Augsburg in the economic interface of Empire and Italy, and at Frauenstadt on the extreme north-eastern border of the Empire where a thirteenth-century feudal order of chivalry ruled the slavic population. (Transposing the configuration to the close of this Second Part, we might here note how the 'copernican revolution in philosophy' was announced, if not at Frauenstadt, at nearby Königsberg - this 'revolution' of about 1770-1800 then mirroring that of 1500-1530 in the frame of around 1650).

What, then, is the copernican reform or 'revolution' in the physical frame or framing of Kosmos, which, largely unnoticed at the time of its initial publication (although Ramus was a forceful proponent of the new system at mid-century), eventually frames a last step in the convergence of various figures of reform towards the middle of the following century? What is Copernicus' 'perspective'?
At the focus, the pythagorean Hearth, of Kosmos, is Sol:

In medio vero omnium resedit Sol. Quis enim in hoc pulcerrimo templo lampadem hunc in alio vel meliori loco poneret, quam unde totum simul possit illuminare? Siquidem non inepte quidam lucernam mundi, alii mentem, alii rectorem vacant. Trismegistus visibilem deum, Sophoclis Electra intuentem omnia. Ita profecto tanquam in solio regali Sol residens circumagentem gubernat astro-rum familiam...

Invenimus igitur sub hac ordinatione admirandam mundi symmetriam, ac certum armoniae nexum motus et magnitudinis orbium, qualis alio modo reperiri non potest. (1)

In the very middle of all dwells Sun. For who in this most beautiful of temples would place the torch in any other or better place, than that whence it may at the same time light the whole? Thus indeed not unfittingly some call it the Lamp of Kosmos, others the Mind, others the Director - Trismegistus 'the Visible God', Sophocles 'Electra' contemplating all. This rightly, in that Sun, set on his kingly throne, governs his circling family of stars...

..We discover then, in this orderly arrangement the wonderful symmetry of Kosmos, and an exact relation of Harmony in the motion and dimension of the spheres, which cannot be found any other way.

- Thus the limiting 'astrological' or 'cosmological' frame of the 'perspective' of Reform, 'focussed' - literally - in all-seeing Sun. The way had been prepared from around the middle of the fifteenth century by Peurbach and his pupil 'Regiomontanus' (that is, Johannes Müller 'the Königsberger' - latinised according to the fashion of the time) who was associated with Bessarion in the reform of the calendr, on the one hand, and by the florentine publication in latin of the pythagorising (neo)platonists and the Hermetic Books on the other. Those components met in the mathematical perspective, the formal spatio-temporal frame, of the turn of the century: that frame already noted in the 'perspective' or vision of Leonardo as one component of the 'focal' configuration of 1500. I have noticed Luther's 'version' or framing of that 'focus' in an Invisible God, rather than the 'Visible God' of Hermes Trismegistus and Copernicus. This solar focus is in turn reflected in Paracelsus' cabalistic focussing of Macrocosm in...
Microcosm. These, and other coordinate 'versions' - other 'foci' at which the instance of framing a version or perspective is inscribed in the scheme it frames - as it were unfold or diverge from the formal 'focus' of their coordination around 1500 in a poetics of Action. What, then, is the complementary configuration of convergence of these various parallel components, framed in the new Kosmos of Copernicus, towards their coordination in a poetic of Experientia around the time of the death of Descartes at the Swedish court in 1650? What this figure of coordination of parallel reflections, which now appears in the configuration of reflection upon Reflection itself, to close the question opened up by the unfolding of various versions of the 'Action' of around 1500, in the transition from Action to Experientia articulated as an 'action'?

Descartes, by his own account, left books - and the logical circle of scholastic formalism framed in books by the inscription of their reading and writing, and so the articulation of debate, in that circuit they framed and 'closed' - for 'experience' in 1619, around the time of the opening of the Thirty Years' War - whose close in 1648 may be taken as a primary component in the 'cultural' frame of the new focus of Experience and Experiment. In his winter quarters, on the Eve of Saint Martin's Day (the formal start of Winter), after the opening campaign of the War, Descartes found himself (so to speak) at a new focus: 'I'.

He set out, for ten years, to discover the 'working' of this new perspective in practice, in action, and then retired in 1629 to great seclusion in Holland - lasting until 1649 - over which latter period he now framed the new perspective in the 'logical' order of a series of books that were to inaugurate, open, a new economy, a new Method, of Reason: the systematic Reform of our perspective on our focal part in Kosmos. The Method, 'logically' framed in the economy of the French language, and focussed in 'I' as marking the 'circular' psychical self-assertion which Descartes had found himself to be, was publicly announced in 1637, together with three initial applications. - Primary 'workings' or applications of the new perspective in its mathematical 'Space' of coordination, and the 'physical' World framed
in this new Space (or rather the 'meteorology' of the primary physical interface of Heaven and Earth), and the Optics organising the logical focus of 'I' in that physical order, as two 'sides' of their common mathematical frame. Thus the Discours of 1637, in its critical relation to the new 'perspective' of around 1650, may be compared with Alberti's epochal Trattato of 1437 in its relation to the Renaissance 'perspective' of around 1450.

In the configuration of around 1450 an analogy was drawn between the part of the 'logical' version of the perspective of pictorial composition, in which the relation of central 'focus' and its multiple 'objects' (on the 'other side' of the frame) was articulated in a unitary manner (as if 'from' the side of 'reflection') with the picture as a kind of mirror, and the articulation of a centralised French policy focussed in a French king, within the physical frame of the boundaries of fifteenth-century France. When the Discours was published, Richelieu's part within the boundaries of seventeenth-century France might be taken as an analogue in the order of French policy to the emerging 'perspective' framed by Descartes in seclusion at the Dutch boundary of that France: Richelieu's part in the cultural frame of Europe in the open physical 'economy' of forces in the Thirty Years' War an analogue of Descartes' focal part in the emerging mathematical frame of Reflection and of Science as coordination of natural forces.

He faced the inevitable at last with calm tranquillity - when the priest bade him forgive his enemies, he made answer 'I have never had any other enemies than the State's. We see the same inhuman personality in the identification of himself with the state in his Mémoires -

I have been severe to some in order to be good to all...It is Justice that I have loved and not vengeance...I wished to give to Gaul the limits that Nature had marked out for her...to identify Gaul with France, and wherever the ancient Gaul had been, there to restore the new.

He died 4 December 1642, bequeathing Mazarin to the king as his successor...

...The weakest point in Richelieu's character was his literary
ambition and the extraordinary pains he took to construct a literary reputation. His own plays, for the sake of which he trembled with anxiety, sleep in safe oblivion, but his Mémoires are still read with interest, forming a subtle and elaborate panegyric upon himself, so that Michelet says in his paradoxical manner, though not without truth:

If one would not know Richelieu, one should read his Memoirs.(1)

Richelieu presided, in the frame of the Academy he founded in the year of the Discours de la Méthode..., 1637, over the very frame of French language itself, and over the rise of that French 'classical' Drama that was to hold up a mirror to the court of the Roi Soleil - that focal figure who in his turn founded the Academy of Sciences in 1666, and who would eventually see his own focal image in the mirror of the State inherited from Richelieu and Mazarin: L'Etat, c'est Moi.

Meanwhile, across the water in England, the monarch's attempt to centralise or focus the order(s) of State and Church in his own person met with disparate results. The 'logical' order of culture - 'policy' - was there framed in 1649 in a 'poetic' of parliamentary legality. It was from the court of the young Louis XIV that the 'logical' or 'political' focus of autocratic monarchy had to be restored or rekindled in 1660, and to which court (in the person of that restored monarch's catholic brother) that it finally returned once for all in 1688.

In 1687 the perspective of the 'poetic' frame of Law, in the mathematical order of a newtonian Kosmos, supplanted in England the cartesian perspective of 1637...and with the Glorious Revolution of the following year there came from Amsterdam with the new king invited by a supreme Parliament, the old Earl of Shaftesbury's physician, with his new 'poetic' of english Constitution. A constitution of the social order framing the interplay of those individuals in whom civil and ecclesiastical orders were multiply 'focussed' - multiple foci of action and perception whose interplay in the wider newtonian constitution of Kosmos was framed as the 'constitution' of Experience. - The latter 'constitution' articulated as interplay of the limiting poles of individual and Kosmos in the frame of the 'mechanical philosophy' of

1: C, sv. Richelieu
Galileo and Boyle: in a galilean frame of which the logical order of Descartes' reflection was found to be but one side - the formal focus of Experience in an 'I' abstracted from embodied individuals. - A 'side' and its formal focus or organising pole, abstracted from René Descartes, John Locke, Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton, Galileo Galilei... and all the other independent individuals of England, Holland, Italy... and even France.

Italy: a 'galilean' frame; the frame of 1632 already noted in passing, the frame of Experience-Experiment elaborated by the 'Mathematician and Philosopher to the Grand Duke of Tuscany' - say from his first finding himself at the focus of a 'telescope' (or rather a perspicilium as the new arrangement was first called) in 1609, through the theoretical development over the period of controversy with the jesuits (1619-1623) over the three comets of 1619, and on through 1632 to the Discorsi e Dimostrazioni Matematiche (intorno a due nuove scienze attenente alla Mecanica & i Movimenti Locali) of 1638. Descartes new 'perspective' opened up from 1619 is paralleled by the mathematical frame of Galileo's self-assertion in the controversy of the Comets. First the rejection of the formal logical circuit of scholastic disputation:

Parmi, oltre a ciò, di scorgere nel Sarsi ferma credenza, che nel filosofare sia necessario appoggiarsi all'opinioni di qualche celebre autore, sì che la mente nostra, quando non se maritasse col discorso d'un altro, ne dovresse in tutto rimanere sterile ed infecconda; e forse stima che la filosofia sia un libro e una fantasia d'un uomo, come l'Iliade e l'Orlando Furioso, libri ne' quali la meno importante cosa è che quello che vi è scritto sia vero. Sig. Sarsi, in cosa non sta cosi. (1)

I seem, besides this, to see in Sarsi a solid faith, that in philosophising it is necessary to find support in the opinion of some famous author or other, as if our mind, unless it be married with another's discourse, must remain in all things sterile and unproductive; and he probably thinks that Philosophy is the book and the fancy of a man, like the Iliad or Orlando Furioso, books in which the thing of least importance is whether what is there

1: Il Saggiatore, 26 (EN VI, 232)
written is true. Mr. Sarsi, the one case is not like the other.

Experience brings into question the logical (and more particularly the theological) circuit by which the order of reading and writing, question and answer, is inscribed in a coordination it frames as 'scholastic' disputation. Rather should the logical order of reflection be coordinated with the other orders of a poetics of Experience in the primary mathematical frame of formal inscription of logical in poetic order — in that primary formal language of Kosmos... as Simplicio realises in the Second Day of debate (1636-8):

Veramente comincio a comprendere che la logica, benchè strumento prestantissimo per regolare il nostro discorso, non arriva, quanto al destar la mente all'invenzione, all'acutezza della geometria. (1)

I really now begin to understand that logic, while a most excellent instrument for the ordering of our discourse, does not attain, in the rousing of the mind to discovery, to the precision of geometry.

The circuit of abstraction closed by the inscription of debate in the world it logically frames, by which the book of Philosophy partakes precisely of the figure of a fiction is broken in the new order of Experientia, and to step out of that scholastic circle is to find oneself in the mathematical frame of inscription of the order of discourse, of the mark, of books, in an actual or working coordination of logical and physical orders, Reflection ('Philosophy') and Nature... the mathematical frame of the reflection in the order of the mark, of language, of the primary working, actuality, of coordination of orders of the mark:

...Sig. Sarsi, in cosa non sta cosi.
La filosofia è scritta in questo grandissimo libro che continua-mento ci sta aperto innanzi a gli occhi (io dico l'universo), ma non si può intenderse se prima non s'impara a intender la lingua, e conoscere i caratteri, ne' quali è scritto. Egli è scritto in lingua mathematica, e i caratteri son triangoli, cerchi, ed altre figure geometriche, senza i quali mezi è impossibile a intender umanamente parola; senza questi è un aggirarsi vanamente per un oscuro laberintho. (2)

1: Discorsi..., Giornata Seconda (EN ,175) 2: continuation of passage from Il Saggiatore above. One may compare a letter of 1641 to
Mr. Sarsi, the one case is not like the other.
Philosophy is written in this grandest of all books which stands continuously open before our eyes (I mean the Universe), but it cannot be understood if one does not first learn the language, and recognise the characters, in which it is written. It is written in the mathematical language, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures, without whose means it is humanly impossible to understand a word; without these we wander vainly in circles through a dark labyrinth.

in a labyrinthine play of forms, figuration, in which we have no coordinates, and cannot see where we are, or where we are going.

..gran ventura sarà d'alcuno che, scorto da straordinario lume naturale, si sapra torre da i tenebrosi e confusi laberinthi ne i quali si sarebbe coll'universale andate sempre aggirando e tuttan- via più aviluppando..(1)

..it will be a great adventure for him who, escorted by uncommon natural light, will know himself out of the dark and confused labyrinths in which he might have gone on with all the others forever wandering, and forever more enveloped.

- Out of the labyrinthine play of forms, figures; out of that endless circuit, in which the logical circuit of scholastic fictions passing for Philosophy is embedded. Into the light of day: led by the mathematical marking of the coordination of the various orders of this marking, this language, these characters, out of the platonic Cave, like Euridice led by Orpheus and his musical language out of labyrinthine Hades.

1: Il Saggiatore 9 (EN VI, 237)

Fortunio Liceti (EN XVIII, 295): ..Quando la filosofia fosse quella che ne i libri di Aristotele è contenuta, V.S. per mio parere sarebbe il maggior filosofo del mondo, tanto mi par che ella habbia alle mani et in pronto tutti i luoghi di quello. Ma io veramente stimo, il libro della filosofia esser quello che perpetuamente ci sta aperto innanzi a gli occhi; ma perché è scritto in caratteri diversi da quelli del nostro alfabeto, non può esser da tutti letto: e sono i caratteri di tal libro triangoli, quadrati, cerchi, sfere, coni, piramidi et altre figure matematiche, attissimi per tal lettera.
It was Galileo's father Vincentio who had been at the centre of the discussions of the (second) Florentine Academy, upon the nature of Greek drama, which had led to its supposed reconstruction in *Drama per la Musica*: first in the *Euridice* of Peri and Caccini (1600), then in Monteverde's *Orfeo* the following year. In each the drama, the story, was drawn from the orphic root of Greek tragedy; Orpheus 'wanders vainly through a dark labyrinth' unless he remembers that the Universe is written in the language of Music in its mathematical harmony.

The element of the son's analogous 'poetics' is the Archimedean frame of mathematical 'position' - or rather the Archimedean figuration of Mechanics transcribed from its inscription in Euclidean geometry of the ideal 'point' or position, into the 'actual' poetics of a physical point-mass in time; the direct physical correlate of the focal logical part of the mathematician-philosopher integrating the articulation of such masses in time, through the mathematical frame of their symmetry, their symmetries.

Above, 'we discover then, in this orderly arrangement the wonderful symmetry of Kosmos, and an exact relation of Harmony in the motion and dimension of the spheres, which cannot be found in any other way'; Below this Copernican Heaven a mathematical coordination of point-masses in the symmetry of physical interaction. But this frame of coordination is not to be understood as itself inscribed - like the rectangular frame of some perspectival picture, in a primary Aristotelian system of 'position'; it is not to be understood as simply inscribed in a more radical distinction of celestial 'Above' and terrestrial 'Below' - as simply one 'side' of the Copernican scheme. Rather is the new mathematical frame itself more 'radical' than the formal 'position' of an object. That position is itself defined by its mathematical coordination or correlation with other positions in a single unitary mechanical Frame of Heaven and Earth; that opposition itself to be inscribed in the spatiotemporal coordination of masses (as what is primarily 'possited') in a radical mathematical frame in which Heaven and Earth are 'mechanically' distinguished, opposed, coordinated. We must start simply from 'matter' or 'mass' as direct physical correlate of the primary mathematical frame in which Kosmos is logically integrated, figure within figure, within the limiting figure or Frame of the simple correlation of mass in space and time and logical integration: Mathe-
matics is the very Language of 'Philosophy'.

We may then inscribe the elementary mathematical frame of 'dynamic' galilean perspective within a 'global' coordination of logical integration and physical interaction - a 'Universe' - just as the elementary 'frame' of central perspective was earlier inscribed as two-dimensional quadro within three dimensions of space and one of time. Thus, corresponding to the physical 'focus' of our perception, this body I call 'I' (or 'me'. or 'mine'), we find our relations to other bodies - these composed, like ours, in principle, of point-'atoms' of mass or matter - framed in the elementary perspective of Sense. We should not, then, refer the everyday logical order of definition of things, bodies, in terms of arbitrary differentiae of Sense (by which we naturally integrate our experience in practice) to the physical order of the bodies themselves, in the manner of Aristotle defining the primary characters of Body, Matter, in terms of sensations - Hot and Cold. Rather should we attempt to define the physical properties of bodies simply in terms of the physical configuration of the 'point' at which 'we' integrate our perceptions, and the other 'points', 'atoms', to which we must ultimately refer our sensation. Only 'primary' differentiae or 'qualities', defined in terms of the mathematical configuration of perceiving and perceived bodies - defined in terms of the inscription of the elementary mathematical frame of perception itself in the primary Frame of Matter in Space and Time, can be referred to the physical (or ontical) order of the objects of our perception.

With this framing of our 'experience' - this inscription of the relation of perceiving subject and perceived object, itself, in the ('objective') domain of the object - we can begin to systematically articulate Experience in a physical order 'between' the mathematical Frame of the Universe as a whole, and the elementary figure of simple 'position' or 'positing' in that order. - Between the simple principle of 'impetus' - or rather of inertia - which amounts to the elementary physical object (atomic point-mass) as one pole of the mathematical frame of position, and the integration of the mutual interactions of all such 'points' or atoms within the unitary System of a physical 'Universe'. In this basic correlation of elementary 'positing' or
position, with the integration of all 'positions' in the unity of the Whole, we enter into the mathematical 'language' of that Universe, and we can begin to frame questions - 'experiments': begin to enter into the interrogation of...indeed into a dialogue with...Nature.

Galileo's 'starry messenger' of 1610 revealed the symmetry of rugged Moon and rugged Earth, and a heavenly dynamic of sunspots mirroring the spatiotemporal order of earthly change. The 'meteorology' of comets was around 1620 shown to involve change in spheres above that of the Moon. The 'wonderful symmetry' of Copernicus' orbits above was inscribed in a wider symmetry of Above and Below - the closed circuits of 'heavenly' actuality inscribed in a universal mathematical Economy of symmetry - in that radical or primary coordination of orders of the Mark, that mathematical language of the Universe, from which the scholastic circuit of articulation of reading and writing of books in the fictional World such disputation framed had been abstracted. In the Discorsi written in 1636 and published two years later the elementary symmetries of the dynamic frame of 'positing' point-masses were presented. One might draw an analogy between the elaboration of this 'elementary' frame of the new poetic (or 'New Philosophy'), and the general configuration of an Actuality articulated in the general 'Economy' of that frame and its symmetries over the mid-century, and the part of Alberti's 'elementary' frame of central perspective, presented in 1437, in the wider architectural framing of activity within the general economy of real and imaginary (or possible) actions around the middle of the fifteenth century. That step from Galileo's 'elementary' coordination of 'subjective' and 'objective' poles of position or positing - and the corresponding correlation of the complementary orders of Nature and Inquiry (or Philosophy) in the mathematical language of Experientia - to the configuration of mid-century parallels the cartesian step from the 'elementary' inscription of reflection in a mathematical frame of experience, to the convergence of galilean, cartesian, and other parallel elements in that wider poetic of Experientia which as it were closes the 'action' of developing Reflection from around 1500, in the inscription of Reflection as such in the mathematical frame of coordination of the various orders of its Context, rather than the parallel inscriptions of various orders of Reflection in corresponding orders of Context, in those various figurations of Action which 'unfold' from around 1500, to 'converge' toward the middle of the following century.
One might speak of the convergence of galilean and cartesian frames of 1636-8 - of those 'poetic' and 'logical' elements, so to say, of the New Philosophy - in terms of a systematic 'focussing' of the play of galilean symmetry in the formal subjectivity of Descartes' 'I', itself constituting the elementary symmetry or circuit of the locus of framing the new order, which frames itself in the simple question which invites or demands the self-assertion 'I'. Galileo frames the complementarity or symmetry of subjective and objective 'foci', so to speak, in his mathematical frame, and the dynamic economy of its elementary 'positions'. The frenchman abstracts from the unitary mathematical frame of cartesian 'position' to the limiting focus, 'I' simply as such, within whose 'subjective' domain (then) the opposition of that subjective pole and its 'objective' correlate is inscribed and determined. From 1629 on the whole system of the World is unfolded from the limiting pole of cartesian abstraction, the limiting Question and its radical answer, within whose frame all particular questions can then be determined and answered, resolved - according to the systematic progress of Method: the articulation of all questions, all inquiry, within this radical Question.

Within the limiting 'open-ness' or Question, then, inviting our response of simple self-assertion (framing our part of framing as unquestionable 'I'), first the symmetry of subjective and objective foci of position or positing is inscribed and articulated: the formal correlate of self-assertion in simple 'position' is thus framed in the systematic perspectival Frame of a mathematical Space of coordination. Within this mathematical coordination of subjective and objective poles of 'position', then, are inscribed the 'perspective' of the Dioptrica and the corresponding economy of Meteorology (in 1637). The analysis proceeds, figure within figure, symmetry within symmetry (that is, open-ness within open-ness): every given relation of subject and object in 'experience' in principle analysable into its primary terms, those 'clear and distinct ideas', 'in terms of' which the experience may be methodically inscribed in the unitary scheme or perspective.

In particular, the simple figure of 'positing', the relation of a simple 'idea' and the 'object' to which it is formally referred (thus far, then, just another 'idea'), leads to the question of whether there is an actuality of the object corresponding to the
actuality of our self-assertion in positing 'it' as formal correlate of our 'idea'. Here in a sense it is the logical circuit itself which comes into question, as it were from 'outside'. In the anselmian figure of the 'Ontological Argument' the question of the distinction between a finite or definite idea (its 'logical' order of definition) and the ontological order of an actuality corresponding to the idea (Thomas' distinction between 'what' and 'that') leads, through the very idea of such distinction, to the inscription of the order of ideas in a theological order of actuality - corresponding to the inscription of the logical order of clear and distinct ideas and the corresponding actuality of our self-assertion in them, in the wider dramatic 'moral' ('practical') order of their coordination with the actuality of their objects in a unitary Kosmos, and its 'divine' actuality, in which the complementary actualities of res cogitans and res extensa participate: God as simple Actuality, simple self-distinction of Actuality from idea - through the idea of this distinction, which is seen not to contain within it the actuality of distinction, but rather to be itself contained in it. With this primary inscription, then, of the 'logical' order of positing within the coordination of logical, psychological, physical, ontological, poetic and theological orders - within a logical poetics of the 'idea' - the principle of experimental or experiential correlation of 'internal' idea with 'external' object (whether physical object, or the ontological, psychological or theological actuality 'outside' its mere idea) is discoverable and the activity of scientific reform can proceed, inscribing judgement, figure within figure, in the frame of a Method itself now 'metaphysically' framed: in the radical frame in which we can judge the principle of judgement to be itself true, and so the guarantee of truth. Between 1637 and his death in 1650 Descartes, thus, proceeds to the inscription of his 'logic' in the metaphysical frame of the Meditations and the ensuing debate, while articulating according to that logic of the new Method the details of his 'roman' du Monde, albeit without ever resolving the radical complementarity of inscription of its theological justification in the logical frame of self-assertion on the one hand, and the inscription of this self-assertion in the theological self-assertion of Actuality on the other.
I have suggested, then, that the focus of a 'New Philosophy' around the year of Descartes' death in Sweden might be characterised by the coordination of Descartes' 'logical' poetic of experience, and Galileo's scheme of experiment. - This in a 'dramatic' order in which Descartes' logical organisation of the mathematical frame of experience and World in relation to a 'psychological' focus amounts to one 'side', to be complemented by a symmetrical physical organisation in the mathematical galilean symmetry of the two 'sides'. We might take such a coordination of cartesian and galilean figures to be 'focussed' in the meetings of the 'Invisible College' in England - more precisely, in its move to Oxford over the period 1648-9, while Parliament was judging the english king, and while Henry More, at Cambridge, was carrying on that correspondence with Descartes in which he (More) criticised the cartesian separation of Mind and Matter, insisting that these should be considered dual or complementary aspects of the more radical dramatic, indeed mystical, order of their mirroring.

'Invisible College': while the florentine Academy was producing the first Dramma per la Musica or 'Opera', and Shakespeare was dramatising Action (or rather Hamlet's inaction) itself - the poetic frame closed in the inscription of the figure of its 'play' in the play itself - Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake in Rome at the instance of the Inquisition. I will not here enter further into the poetics of 1600, the 'World as Stage'...but, from that initial configuration of the new century, over the next thirty years or so, there developed a figure focussed in Germany, toward the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, as the 'mystery' of the Rose-Cross. This was framed by some ('mysterious') publications, framing the logical order of their text which announced the Reform of Science (and with it of the european cultural order) in a theatrical or dramatic configuration of alchemical symbolism. Learned Europe was thrown into something of a stir. Descartes, among others, was suspected of some part in the mysterious drama. In 1623 notices appeared in the streets of Paris announcing the imminent arrival there of the rosicrucian order, and its New Order.

One component of this obscure interlude involves a sort of 'logical' analogue of the figure of an 'Invisible Church' as 'mystical body of Christ' into which the christian enters (in the scheme of Paul noted above) by recognising his part in the christian Story - by recognising just this part of recognition. The access to the dramatic
frame of the christian mystery lies in the inscription of the relation of 'inside' and 'outside' of the story (as externally perceived) in the story: the entry from outside 'into' the Story by recognising in the story this relation of 'inside' and 'outside'. The 'visible' Church, as we saw, is the outward frame, the image, of the drama into which one thus enters. Similarly one might enter into the 'Invisible College' of the Rosicrucians, by identifying one's part in the Drama announced by the rosicrucian tracts, in which the appearance of the tracts, and the symbolic figuration in them of entry into the Drama as into an 'Invisible College' of the New Science, are recognised as primary components.

That germanic focus of a New Science as a mystery, framed in an Invisible College, may be taken as a further component of the mid-century configuration. It is in this figure - albeit without the mysterious dramatisation of the first appearance - that the coordination of galilean and cartesian frames is effected: in the activity of a group or circle, each understanding his part in terms of its place in a dramatic Reform of Knowledge - just as members of the Commonwealth were to understand their parts in the dramatic Reform of England framed by Parliament.

The 'Invisible College' at Oxford: closing a phase of the 'action', the interplay of Reflection and 'Context', here traced, which opens with this Second Part, and the endowment of the first 'college' ('University' college) at Oxford in 1249. The new college or societas, society, met in the rooms of Wilkins, the Warden of Wadham. They assembled there once a week to discuss developments in England, on the Continent of Europe, and, most particularly, developments in their several parts in the common programme of inquiry, 'research', at Oxford. This group 'focusses' for the first time those various elements or components of the new figure of Experientia, the new reflection on the part of the logical order of reflection in the World it frames - the New Philosophy or New Science - which has developed through various parallel channels from the focal configuration of Action - the question of framing the part of framing as self-assertion
An invisible college: for the visible colleges of Oxford were rigidly prosecuting the study of 'Arts' in the frame of Aristotle's Organon - the battle with cartesian logic or 'philosophy' was not to be opened until the end of the century. Linacre and Colet, returning from Florence at the end of the fifteenth century had indeed introduced the study of the greek language, and of greek and latin 'classical' writers who were now read in the 'grammar' schools, such as that (Saint Paul's) founded by Colet himself in London, and those of the University itself. Such grammar, along with exercises in 'rhetoric' and the study of Aristotle's logic and the science it framed ('philosophy') now constituted the trivium studied by candidates for the degree of Bachelor. The introduction of classical writers in the schools of grammar and rhetoric was paralleled in the mid-seventeenth century by the introduction of a quadrivium founded upon the classical writers themselves, rather than boethian epitomes. Thus Wallis came from Cambridge to fill the recently created savilian chair of Geometry in 1649, and played a leading part both in the reform of the teaching of mathematics in the University, and in the reform of Science carried on by the Invisible College - the latter itself framed in Galileo's mathematical 'language' of Nature. This same year, Descartes' new 'coordinate' geometry, abstracted like Galileo's physics from the aristotelian-euclidean scheme of 'position', appeared in the latin language of learned Europe, and this with the commentary by the leader of the dutch school of mathematicians (founded by Descartes in Holland) which rendered his master's professedly cryptic style of exposition accessible.

...An Invisible College, then, framed by joint work at a programme which is a direct correlate of the framing of the group itself - just as the scholastic 'programme' framed in the Sentences was a direct correlate of the constition of the thirteenth-century university, still materially, visibly, embodied in the colleges instituted since that time at Oxford, Paris, and elsewhere.

...'Elsewhere' in England being Cambridge: instituted by the secession from Oxford of a group of students and teachers in the
two sides. In the interface of these two sides - in its mechanical articulation as Nature - the part of Man is framed in the primary bound (and bond) of Community. Our natural part, then, is to frame our life in an earthly scheme which mirrors the wider cosmic scheme, by focussing the economy of Community in the person of a king. Indeed there is a natural mirroring of this our part of Man, and Kosmos as a whole, in the intermediate order of the State, whose organisation may thus be taken as simply that of Man writ large. Within this frame of the Commonwealth in which we find our part in relation to the 'central' perspective of the monarch, Hobbes inscribes the logical order of the Sciences: the reflection of the Kosmos in which the State is organised, in the order, within the State, of the framing of Kosmos, State, and Reflection. The articulation of the Sciences within this (scientific) framing of Science reflects the articulation of Kosmos, and the focal or central science which organises the whole perspective, is the Science of Man: the science of the mirroring of Individual and Kosmos in the State inscribed in the interface of Heaven and Earth.

This Economy of galilean position, an analogue of the general Economy of central perspective as articulated by Alberti in the primary circuit of community in Nature, may be taken as one pole, then - a sort of limiting instance - of the new configuration. A limit corresponding to Hobbes' solitary industry and cultural isolation. The general figure of which this may thus be taken as an extreme case, presents the practical organisation of the sciences, not in relation to an abstract unitary scheme, focussed either in hobbesian individual or platonic divinity, but rather in relation to the group of which the isolated focus (Hobbes, King, God) is a limiting case. In relation to such a group the galilean frame of Experientia appears in particular experimental configurations of the scheme, from which the dogmatic assertion of formal elements is rather an abstraction than a more radical 'base'. Such a group operates, not within a unitary ideal hobbesian State or Commonwealth, but within an actual State as an actual group among other groups. The galilean frame is indeed the 'language' in which the dialogue with Nature may be carried on - in which passive 'experience' and active framing of 'experiment' interact, and in which the interplay of these two moments or movements of observation and assertive framing is not to be reduced to one side. Just as this 'poetics' of Experientia is prefigured by Galileo (himself a member of the 'Academy
early part of the thirteenth century, and where a parallel to the Oxford group of the mid-seventeenth century might be seen in the group of Benjamin Whichcote's students at Christ's College — notably Henry More and Ralph Cudworth (master from 1654). These Cambridge 'platonists', though, were effecting a reform framed by neoplatonic 'theology' (if we take the latter in Proclus' broad sense) which reflects the relative 'abstraction' of Cambridge (since the thirteenth century) from the World, and it is the Oxford group who present the central component of the reform of learning.

Outside both universities the 'abstraction' of the Cambridge Platonists is as it were mirrored (inverted almost) in what might be taken as the other pole of the focal configuration of the mid-century: this the singular figure of Hobbes. Instead of framing the mirroring of 'heavenly' and 'earthly' orders of the new scheme of Experience (corresponding to the 'dramatic' frame of Oxford inquiry) from (as at Cambridge) the 'heavenly' side of Mystery, Hobbes presents rather in 1651 (that is, in *Leviathan*) the inscription of that mirroring in the 'earthly economy framed in the physical boundary of a Commonwealth 'ecclesiatical and civil', within the 'mechanical' order of the new physical Kosmos.

Hobbes' frame may serve to introduce the central configuration of the new 'focus' in the Invisible College of Oxford. At the close of the previous century Hooker had presented a duality of natural and supernatural orders framed in a unitary Law, and reflected on Earth in the duality of civil and ecclesiatical 'polity' in the unitary constitution of an earthly community or commonwealth. The question of the focussing of these two orders in the single person of the monarch, at which Hooker had arrived at the time of his death in 1600 was embodied in an eighth book of his *Laws* published from his manuscripts in 1651. That same year Hobbes inscribed Hooker's scheme (itself a focal figure of English Reflection in 1600) in a 'galilean' poetics of Matter. The Kosmos is articulated as the integration of a mechanical Economy whose element (replacing Aristotle's initial figure of positing or position) is the galilean inscription of Sense in the perspective of atomic Matter, in a physical unity of which Heaven and Earth are
of Lynxes' at Rome until its dissolution by the Church in 1630), and
that prefiguration reflects the initial 'step' of various parallel
framings of the poetics of 'Action' from about 1500-1530, so the
phase opened by the Oxford 'Programme' of 1649 finds a central ex-
pression or 'version' in the work of Boyle in the 'sixties and 'seven-
ties. A further step, analogous in some ways to the systematisation
of Luther's central step by Calvin around the middle of the previous
century, is presented by Newton's combination of hobbesian mechanism
and More's cabalistic platonism - of elementary mechanical 'position'
and cosmic integration - in the Law of Nature...or rather, by Newton's
Law on the one hand, and Locke's account of Experience on the other;
the two mirrored in Locke's account of the primary frame or constitu-
tion of Community, focussed in a monarch whose part is itself 'consti-
tuted' by Law - by Law framed by a king, in Parliament.

These few 'coordinates' of a mid-century 'poetic' of Exper-
ience or Experiment must serve to indicate some of the poetic symmetries
of the transition from the first parallel 'versions' of the question
posed by the figure of Action around 1500, to parallel steps toward
the integration of the parallel figurations in a Reflection on the
part of Reflection in a poetic of Experientia - and so to indicate
the character of this transition itself as an action. I will now
indicate how the transition through the mid-seventeenth century con-
figuration may be taken to embody in that century the figure of a
'Scientific Revolution', and then mark a mirroring in that 'Revolut-
ion' (not so much the circuit of an opening and closing, as the open-
ing of a previously closed circuit of Reflection, its self-discovery
'at work' in Experience) of the transition from about 1500 to 1650,
in a further transition to about 1800...and to the 'Romantic' group
at Jena and the 'Revolution' which closes this Second Part - literary..
..industrial...and french...
Scientific Revolution

The configuration focussed in the Invisible College at Oxford marks not only a mid-point in a transition from the middle of the thirteenth century to the end of the eighteenth, but also - and in this - a central point in the development of Reflection as a whole...in the development of 'Theory' from pythagorean Θεός to a reflection which marks the close of a dynamic of inquiry which opens out of the pythagorean mystery. Thus the transition from 1500 to 1650 articulated in the poetic symmetry of an 'action', the symmetry of its opening and closing in various orders of Reflection and Context - most particularly those orders of Reflection and correlative orders of Context which, in their symmetric coordination frame a 'space' of Reflection - reflects the articulation of the whole dynamic of which it is but one subordinate phase, as also an 'action', as corresponding to the organisation of a story, a history.

In particular, that phase from around 1500 to around 1650 may be seen as the convergence to a new 'focus' of an order which unfolds from the mirroring of aristotelian Economy and christian Mystery around the middle of the thirteenth century. The configuration of Action around 1500 organises a symmetry of unfolding from mid-thirteenth century and convergence toward mid-seventeenth century: this symmetry reflected in the convergence toward 1500 of complementary 'poetics' of pictorial space and discursive or narrative time, and the opening out from around 1500 of various versions of the dramatic order from which that space and time are complementary abstractions. The convergence of those two axes or lines of development was itself seen to mirror their unfolding from an initial 'point' of coincidence of discursive 'logical' order and cosmic 'poetics' in the question of 'individual' choice. And we saw how a 'poetics of Action' in which that initial point has as it were unfolded into the spatiotemporal frame of an actual 'story' - as the 'perspective' in which the logical order inscribes itself as one 'focus' in a drama framed in a community of such foci, itself spatiotemporally inscribed in the interface of Earth and Heaven, marked the beginning of various 'reforms' of the 'medieval'
order of the thirteenth century. A Reformation of the Church, in
which the closed circuit of her logical or theological poetic was
inscribed in a more radical poetic of the Book; a parallel movement
for Reform of the feudal Empire; a reform of astronomy, a reform of
medicine; a reform of the aristotelian poetic in which these two sci-
ences are articulated; a reform of the aristotelian logic of 'abstraction'
framed in an initial logical determination of the relations of
logical and physical orders of thesis: positing, position.

We saw how the various parallel figurations of inscription
of this aristotelian circuit of abstraction (and a correlative figure
of Authority) in a wider or more radical play of its various orders
unfold from the primary 'question' of (or, posed by) inscription of
reflection in a wider dramatic order of Action. The integration of
these various developing figures of marking a 'distance' from Aris-
totle - these various figures of 'Aristotle in question' - over the
following century-and-a-half might (it is suggested) be understood as
a sort of structural ('figurative') analogue or inverse of the unfold-
ing of the figure of Action as radical poetic element over the previous
two-and-a-half centuries. The succeeding steps of unfolding ('opening-
up' in questioning) of this spatiotemporal Action from the initial
thirteenth-century question of individual choice might be seen to be
'mirrored' over the subsequent phase from Reform to Scientific Revolut-
ion, in the convergence of various 'versions' of the 'poetic' of Action
corresponding to various parallel identifications of the locus (or loci)
of assertion of a new frame of action in ('in terms of') that frame:
various 'foci' of the various perspectives of Reform. - A convergence
of these parallel or symmetric 'versions' toward their coordination
as various orders of inscription of a common order of Reflection in
the most general Frame of Action (that is, then, in 'Actuality'), in
the 'Scientific Revolution' of the seventeenth century - more particu-
larly, in that 'focal' mid-century configuration of which the limiting
cartesian question of the duality of the logical order of Reflection
and the cosmological order of Actuality may be taken as a primary com-
ponent, indeed as 'one side'. The symmetries unfolded from the initial
indeterminate locus of choice in the mid-thirteenth century to the spa-
tiotemporality of an Action around 1500 are also the symmetries through
which the various parallel or symmetrical orders of that Action are
coordinated and integrated - through which they 'converge' - toward
the 'focal' coordination of the various primary orders of Experience,
that most general 'element' or medium of activity, around 1650.

Of course a 'Scientific Revolution' does not happen from one day, or month, or year, to the next: the 'focal' configuration which I marked at Oxford at mid-century itself derives its aspect of 'centrality' precisely through its coordination with countless other components of a wider scheme of transition 'through' the mid-century. We might, for example, begin to 'unfold' that central or focal character of the Invisible College into a transition articulated from the opening of the century to its close - from Kepler to Newton, say, these in their turn deriving their character of 'centrality' in the Revolution from their relations, from the coordination of their 'versions' of a new Frame of things with other components, other versions of (in particular) just the limiting frame of this coordination.

That is to say, we might embed the Invisible College in various 'actions', 'dramas', 'stories' ('histories') of a transition, a 'Revolution', articulated between some 'opening' and some 'close'.

How choose, identify, an opening and a corresponding close of 'the Scientific Revolution'? How choose, indeed, a 'turning-point' between these - and itself necessarily coordinate with the choice of opening and closing configurations? Why not have the story turn about, say, the publication of Descartes' Discours...or Galileo's contemporaneous Discorsi...or their contemporaneity...? Why the Invisible College, why Oxford, why mid-century? Why not the invention of the telescope...why not the Peace of Augsburg, even, as the beginning of 'modern' Europe?

By now it must be clear that the 'focal' coordination of various interacting components of the 'Revolution' in terms of the embryonic Royal Society (like the 'focal' character earlier ascribed to the University of Paris or the florentine Academy) is to be understood simply in terms of the opening and closing of this book, and the opening and closing within it of a 'history' of Reflection: the opening question of a pythagorean 'mystery' and the closing question of this book itself. Indeed the 'focal' character of the Oxford group itself constitutes a primary 'middle term' so to speak, between the opening and closing of the account as a whole: between the initial marking of coordination of the orders of the mark (as 'mathematical'
Kosmos) and the closing circuit of inscription of this book itself in the configuration of its various orders which it frames. Thus, in particular, we may now identify the 'focal' configuration of a 'Scientific Revolution' as framed here, as a sort of mirroring of that Question (the story of different versions of that story) about which the First Part turns between the fifth century before its focal expression and the thirteenth century afterward, in the systematic thirteenth century mirroring of the Mystery of Actuality in the aristotelian Economy of (its) possibility (of what is 'open'). Aristotle's logic of 'positing' now appears as doubly abstracted from the engagement of the embodied individual as perspectival 'focus' and interface of reality (actuality, working) and 'imaginary' order or Economy of what is 'open': its logical order of thesis abstracted from the mirroring of (hypothetical) positing and the converse passivity of Sense in which 'outward' things impinge, assert themselves, and this Economy of elementary position and sensation abstracted as 'earthly' order of change from the heavenly circuits of actuality Above. The individual finds himself, between the poles of cartesian self-assertion and passive sensation, and between the analogous poles of passive earthly embodiment and mysterious actuality, 'actively' engaged in the interplay of inner and outer, Above and Below, engaged in the actual articulation of what is open in the symmetry of the various orders of his 'part'. Thus within the widest cosmological circuit of Actuality drawn in the open Economy of galilean 'position' and the dynamic of point-masses (whose symmetries define that 'open-ness'), the individual finds it to be his part to frame the symmetrical Kosmos in Law, and thus to frame and define in this widest circuit his self-assertion in the experimental working of hypothesis, of which the newtonian Frame of Reality is the limiting case. The various 'workings' unfolded from around 1500 in figures of Action - actualities or workings of the various parts of framing a particular order of the 'Universe', and of that part of framing as self-assertion in that order - are finally inscribed and coordinated in this limiting working of 'experiencing' itself - in particular, the part of experimentally reaching the unitary framing of circular 'heavenly' actuality of the 'Universe', as the divine circuit by which the newtonian Kosmos is inscribed in the systematic Economy of point-masses. The configuration of the focal 'mystery' of Incarnation in the First Part - the circuit of Mystery
drawn in an earthly Economy closing in embodied Man as the locus of framing that circuit, is now found to be, in its turn, but one 'side' of a wider Economy, and the individual finds his part 'open' in the coordination of the symmetry of these two 'sides' of Real and Possible, with that of an 'inner' reflection and outer world. Reflection finds itself at work in the play of different figures of working, action: finds itself as the very instance of experimental, hypothetical, positing, framing...framing the mathematical coordination of its various orders, heavenly and earthly, inner and outer.

'Scientific Revolution', then: here framed as access to such a universal poetic of Experientia...as the very mirror of opening and closing configurations of this 'drama' of Reflection. As a configuration embodied in the familiar framings of seventeenth-century transitions from Kepler's mystical cosmology to Newton's inscription of its circuits in a galilean material Economy, or from Bacon's economy of inquiry to Locke's...dramatisation. In general a 'story' of 'the' Scientific Revolution will 'open' as a question in a later phase of Reflection; a question arising, more particularly, in the abstraction of a particular 'line' of inquiry precisely from its embodiment in the narrative order of 'stories'. Thus the story of a 'Scientific Revolution' which freed scientific reflection from a 'mythological' order of story-telling, from Signor Sarsi's supposed equivalence between the 'book of Philosophy' and a romance (in Galileo's image cited above), presents us with a radical question attaching to an Enlightenment ushered in by the dawn of Galileo's lume naturale, as the circular mystifications of benighted or cynical priests and others are left behind in the dark labyrinths of pre-scientific Thought.

Just as the 'story' of the 'middle' ages is itself a critical component in the framing of a 'renaissance' in relation to which (in its turn) that 'middle' intervening between 'classical' learning and its rebirth is itself identified, so now the story of a 'scientific revolution' in the seventeenth century is itself a primary component of a consequent 'enlightenment'. And it is just this inscription of the part of the 'scientific revolution' as a story, as itself a sort
of enlightenment myth of escape from labyrinthine mythology, in the development of Reflection which perhaps allows us best to define both that 'revolution' and, indeed, the 'enlightened' age it (retrospectively as it were) inaugurates.

An Enlightenment associated with the introduction of English ideas into France (together with parallel or coordinate developments in Germany and England, or rather Britain, herself) from the seventeen-thirties on. That characteristically 'logical' and unitary French accounting for the developments of the seventeenth century may itself be taken as a turning-point between the focal part of the Oxford group in the 'revolution' of the seventeenth century, and the 'revolutions' coordinate with (marked by) the focal part of the Jena group at the very close of the eighteenth century. I do not (of course) mean to suggest that (say) Voltaire's exile in Britain around 1730 is a sort of node or nexus through which all the Reflection between about 1650 and 1800 somehow 'passes'. The focal character of that visit is no sine qua non of an 'Enlightenment', but rather does its importance lie precisely in the complex relations among it and many other relatively independent components of a transition from Oxford to Jena, whose collective coordination or economy over the whole period determine the 'centrality' of that particular coordinate. Just as the critical importance of the work of le grand Neuton in the sixteen-eighties in the vision of around 1730, is in turn framed by the economy of Reflection between 1650 and 1730 as a whole.
Enlightenment

Enlightenment: Lumières...Aufklärung....the same thing in a different language?

- The same European configuration following upon the half-light of a seventeenth-century dawn...as marked differently 'in' the different systems of marks, the different languages, framing these different components of an eighteenth-century European culture within the respective bounds, frontiers, 'marks' ('marches') of Britain, France, 'Germany'? Their common configuration marked differently within those different physical boundaries wherein British, French, German orders of activity are framed in British, French and German words...except that in 'Germany' it is often enough a Latin or French language of Reflection that is embedded in the 'German' activity which is its 'context'. Leibniz, for example, wrote his Monadologie in French, the language of German princely courts and international diplomacy...and it was said that the great Frederick, literary focus of mid-century 'Germany', could not even speak 'German' fluently.

In discussing the Reformation I suggested that one might see in the old Empire a 'physical' poetic of the old feudal Mark framing German activity and 'culture', and that the Reformation in its various aspects amounted at first to an attempt to find or frame a logical order of 'focussing' the Economy of that feudal scheme in the new poetic or question of Action. I later drew an analogy between the 'perspective' of Descartes (albeit at this period on the Dutch border of French culture) and that of his contemporary Richelieu, in terms of a common figure of inscription of the relations of 'logical' and 'physical' orders of their respective situations, in a primary 'logical' frame of assertion focussed in themselves. Characteristically the 'culture' of the petty courts that succeeded the old Empire after 1648 was framed in 'French' - was, indeed, an attempted transcription of that French logic into the disordered cultural economy of a fragmented 'Germany'. Characteristically, again, it is the 'philosophe' Frederick the Great ('le philosophe du sans-souci' as he subscribed his (French) literary efforts)
who, around the middle of the eighteenth century, framed the integrated prussian order eventually leading to the integration of 'Germany' after the conflicts with France at the close of the eighteenth century, and then in 1870 under Bismarck...another Richelieu. — Frederick who drew to his court Voltaire and Maupertuis, Frederick who wrote and wrote... in french.

Leibniz' Monadologie was written at Vienna in 1714 for Prince Eugene who had, at the head of the Hapsburg army, broken (in alliance with England) the power of Louis XIV, over those years around the turn of the century which had seen Leibniz' elaboration (in french) of the system now presented in schematic form. Descartes — like Richelieu or Louis XIV — had framed his World in relation to the primary focus at which he found himself. Eugene and Leibniz found their parts within a complementary Economy of the World, an economy of possibility, of the Open, so to speak. I will not enter into the details of either of these 'parts': suffice it to say that the Monadologie framed for Eugene (so that he could see his way in or through the leibnizian system, find his place in the scheme) amounts to a sort of universal Perspective, a perspectival World framed in terms of the dynamic of that primary correlation of subjective pole and point-mass which supplants, with Galileo, aristotelian 'position'. This relation of two elementary poles — symmetric in Galileo's frame — is inscribed in a primary circuit of Actuality drawn in what is absolutely 'open' and focussed in God as supreme 'Monad' (asserting itself as it were in response to the leibnizian question 'Why is there something rather than nothing?', Actuality as a question): inscribed in a primary Frame of actuality articulated in what is a still more radical possibility. Descartes' converse logical determination of the relation of subjective and objective pole asserts its part of assertion in the divine actuality it asserts — as asserting itself, then, both in subjects and objects and framing the subjective access to Truth as the reciprocity of subjective and objective actuality, self-assertion. Leibniz starts with the inscription or discovery of the logical order of focus in the physical economy or play of frames, Descartes with the inscription of the 'physical' order in the logical in terms of the logical determination of their relation. Spinoza in Holland, as it were 'in-between' these extreme perspectives (and writing generally in latin, though occasional:
in Dutch) temporally, culturally, had framed the common theological order to which both Descartes and Leibniz must ultimately, ambiguously, appeal, in inscribing their primary relation between subject and object in the mathematical 'poetic' of Actuality. Characteristically, while Spinoza articulates in this scheme of mirroring of Cartesian logic and a complementary physics the coupled mirroring of theological and (earthly) poetic orders of human community (in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*), Descartes and Leibniz, in their converse schemes, abstract from this order of their symmetry or mirroring.

We might take the 'physical' poetics of Leibniz and Eugene to define, in its relations with Britain and France, a principal coordinate in the European transition from the order of around 1650 to one around 1800. Leibniz' 'perspective', the symmetrical play of elementary 'foci', dynamic 'monads', may be coordinated by English parallels in the physics and psychology of Newton and Locke—or rather in the configuration of successive editions over the turn of the century of *Principia* and *Opticks* on the one hand, and a 'psychology' of which the successive editions of Locke's *Essay* toward the end of the century may be taken as the primary exposition, to be as it were balanced, in its tendency to inscribe the interface of subject and object too readily 'in' Newton's physical World, by Berkeley's contrary tendency at the beginning of the new century. - Or we might simply coordinate with the Leibnizian system a wider configuration opened up, say, by Boyle in the 'sixties and 'seventies.

With Eugene's part we might coordinate those British developments over the turn of the century (say, from 1689 to 1714) in which constitutional government takes the form of an interplay of two complementary 'parties' (two complementary framings of 'parts').—first of all 'Whigs' and 'Tories'—which it retains to the time of this writing as a primary component of its British 'context'. And we might further note the part of the turn-of-the-century campaigns of Marlborough and Eugene in an initial fragmentation of Louis XIV's 'logical' policies which leads, at the close of the eighteenth century to the subjection of Louis' great-grandson to the fate prefigured in England in 1649. — The fragmentation, that is, of the military order of Liouville
articulated at the border of Richelieu's 'Gaul': in Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany; and of the financial order of Colbert associated with the earlier success of Liouville's armies.

After the breakdown of the old feudal order in the Thirty Years' War came the rise of the old North Mark - from 1701, through the incorporation of the old mark of the Teutonic Knights, the 'kingdom' of Prussia - and that of the Hapsburg archduchy of Austria, the old East Mark: Prussia the champion of protestant North and East, Austria of catholic South and West. By the middle of the eighteenth century this parallel rise of new german orders produced the inevitable contest at the common eastern border: the War of austrian succession in 1740-8 and the Seven Years' War in 1756-63. Protestant Britain was again allied with Prussia: this time against not only France, but Austria. The ascendancy of the former alliance was now marked by the cession of german territory to Frederick the Great, and of a large part of french possessions outside Europe to Britain. Britain had supplanted Holland as the chief mercantile nation of Europe by the close of the seventeenth century; now she began to dominate the economic order of Europe as a whole through its 'interface' with the colonial World outside. That interface was, on seventeenth-century mercantilist principles, subordinated to the home economy through the emphasis given to the 'balance of trade'. In the second half of the eighteenth century the coming-into-question of the 'mercantilism' developed from the fifteenth century is reflected in the secession of the seventeenth-century colonies of british puritans or calvinists along the north-american coast, as by the first components of that 'Industrial Revolution' which, in England, parallels the political Revolution of the french middle class, and the 'romantic' revolution in Germany which I take to represent a transition from this Second Part to the Third. - European 'revolution' paralleled 'outside' by the integration (say, 1787-1816) of an american 'revolution'.

So much, very briefly, for some primary components of the economic and political - or more broadly the 'cultural' - 'context' of european 'Reflection' over the second 'half' of this Second Part (about 1650-1800). How is such a context reflected in, how does it itself reflect, 'Reflection', the logical 'economy' of 'ideas' (to
borrow from the seventeenth century that identification of the element of that economy?  

I have already indicated that its logical or intellectual economy might be coordinated, over this period, in relation to the configuration of Voltaire's visit to England in 1726-9 (forced upon him after his satirical attack upon a leading courtier) and the resulting publication of his *Lettres sur les Anglais* ('Lettres Philosophiques' in 1733-4. We might take this importation of English figures into France as closing a phase or circuit of reflection opened by the completion of a Cartesian 'system' towards the middle of the seventeenth century, and turning, precisely, upon the English sequels of that Cartesian systematisation, represented by Locke and Newton from the 'eighties onward, now brought back, around 1730, to France. The France of the 'thirties where Voltaire marks as it were an initial focus of a Cartesian logical circuit, and its cultural analogue in the Court, in question – this in the familiar figure of irony, satire, already noted in Aristophanes' comedy, Timon's *Δέκατος*, Callimachus' *Πραξις*.  

- The logical and cultural 'circuit' framing mid-seventeenth century French reflection and its context 'in question': the self-assertion of Descartes or Richelieu or Roi Soleil in framing their focal part of framing seen to be an abstraction from a symmetrical British 'poetic' of interplay of logical and physical orders in reflection, of political and economic orders in a culture framed, like the Newtonian Kosmos, in Law, in the symmetry of an open economy of question or possibility, and the unitary finality of assertion or choice and its actuality... and Voltaire asserting himself as Critic in a system of questions attaching to the various circuits or components of closed French culture and reflection, framed in the presentation of British figures of the symmetric interplay from which those components abstract. The transcription, then, of the unitary character of the Cartesian focus of self-assertion, to a characteristically 'logical' articulation of the questioning of that system of self-assertion, focussed now in the part of Critic. A Critic, like Montesquieu (who had also spent a critical period in England around the same time as Voltaire) after him, who presented the English 'system' of Law and Constitution as a sort of simple picture derived from a questioning whose systematicity derives from the unity of what is in question, as 'negative' (to use
that anachronistic figure) of a positive Enlightenment, Lumière(s). The same foreign systematicity thus imposed in the coordination of British figures, corresponding to a systematic coordination of questions, is itself, then, precisely what is in question. Thus the French Enlightenment typified at first by Voltaire inhabits in its salons an ambiguous order at once 'outside' the systematic cartesian circuit it questions, yet deriving the systematicity of its questioning from that tradition which it thus still maintains. Indeed one might trace the unfolding of that Enlightenment from the seventeen-thirties to the seventeen-nineties in the widening domain of an activity of criticism corresponding to an interplay of French 'cartesian' logic, and the questioning of that logic in which criticism asserts itself. Characteristically it is a German, d'Holbach, who in 1770 marks the limiting pole of criticism in the systematic assertion of a Nature which amounts to a kind of positive converse of the whole order of critical questioning. Meanwhile, in the 'fifties and 'sixties, the watershed between the opening of criticism in the thirties and its dramatic culmination in the 'nineties, we might perhaps see in the parts of Diderot and Rousseau - the 'open' coordination of various lines of criticism in the group writing of the Encyclopédie, and the closing circuit of a singular writing of the questioning of that writing - two complementary 'foci' of the developing framing of reflection as part of critical activity, embodying the form of cartesian self-assertion in the open economy of questions (and correlative Sense: feeling, want) from which it had abstracted in the Siècle de Louis XIV.

- A French inscription, then, of 'centralised' cartesian reflection or French administration, in an 'economy' and a poetics of reflection from which it has been abstracted: a figure of Reform analogous to the earlier figure of Lutheran Reformation, Voltaire's initially focal part corresponding to Luther's part in that dramatic order in which he inscribed the 'logical' or theological poetic of the Roman Church as an abstraction. And in relation to Voltaire's focal part in the coming-into-question of 'classical' French culture, we may begin to articulate a wider coordination of French, British, and German Enlightenment(s): the two lines of development from the cogito, in France and England, which converge again in him, French logic and British poetic...and the contemporary systematisation of the
leibnizian cosmic economy of possibility (by Wolff) in Germany, which would become the object of Voltaire's most celebrated satire in 1759. - Another component of that configuration of around 1760 (the focal parts of Diderot and Rousseau; perhaps of Helvetius...) which I take to mark a turning-point from the reforms of the 'thirties to the revolutions of the nineties, from the opening of a European Enlightenment with its parallel French, British, and German components, to a more radical coordination of these parallel developments in the convulsive play of figures and forces marking the passage from one century to the next.

..A coordination of French, German and British developments: for the primary interface of developments over this period on either side of the channel is to be found not in any English 'enlightenment' so much as in a Scottish order of reflection.

Found, that is to say, to the north of the old Roman province of Britannia, in a Scotland where Norman knights had established independent 'counties' beyond the rule of the new English 'kings', the successors of Duke William of Normandy who integrated the Norman feudal system with the earlier Saxon Mark system south of the old Roman border. In the period of Reformation the slow integration of the civil and ecclesiastical order south of the border may be contrasted with the Scottish polarisation of staunchly Catholic Stuarts and staunchly Calvinistic reformers in the mould of Knox. Indeed the integration of the polarised Scottish order with a parliamentary English order over the course of the seventeenth century articulates, as a primary component, the civil and ecclesiastical disorder from which the new British order eventually emerges in the eighteenth - this itself punctuated by Stuart alliances with France towards the end of those conflicts which mark the beginning of the latter century, as at the beginning of those which mark its middle.

...A Scottish 'school': George Buchanan, the tutor of the first Stuart king of a 'united' kingdom of Britain, and one of Europe's leading Latinists in the second half of the sixteenth century, had studied and taught for many years in France, before becoming involved
in the civil and religious conflicts. Regarded on the continent as the leading British 'humanist' of the second half, if not the whole of, the sixteenth century, he might be taken to first focus the intellectual relations of Britain and Europe in Scotland, rather as another of his royal pupils, Mary Stuart focus political relations (and, with Knox, ecclesiatical ones). This figure opened up in the person of Buchanan might be traced down to Hume's part in the interplay of various 'enlightenments' - that in Germany intervening between Leibniz and the Romantics, that in England between, say, Shaftesbury and the Utilitarians...Locke's pupil the third Earl who stands between Locke himself, whose analysis he integrated with the 'poetics' of Cambridge Platonism, and the Scottish enlightenment inaugurated by his proponent Hutcheson - as indeed between Locke and the German Romantics at the close of the century (a Romanticism in its turn brought to Britain largely by the Scots Carlyle and Hamilton).

...Hume, then, as a 'focal' figure in this Scottish configuration of interaction of Britain and Continent. Locke had framed our part in the interplay of inscriptions of 'outer' physical world in 'inner' mental world, and (conversely) of that inner mental world in the outer order of bodies. He had attempted to frame the constitution of experience and experimental science in the 'economy' of these converse movements, in terms of their mirroring in the elementary 'ideas' symmetric between their two 'sides', inner and outer. - A constitution of experience articulated between this mechanical economy and the circuit in it of a divine Actuality closed in the actuality of our assertion of it, rather as, within this Universe of the Mechanical Philosophy, the community of those individuals who are so to speak the middle term in the constitution of the Universe, is 'constituted' in its elementary 'economy' as the moral order of integration of activity (policy, then). Berkeley, posing the cartesian question of the reference of 'inner' ideas to an 'outer' actuality, solved it in a manner analogous to Descartes' or Malebranche's inscription of the inner logical order in a wider theological scheme: the actuality of which our self-assertion asserts itself to be one component distinguishes itself from and in the order of ideas. Hume asks: How do we frame these 'ideas' in the first place, with their two poles...what ideas do we have of such poles?
If we are to recognise our knowledge as built up from the elementary interface of 'inner' and 'outer' worlds, how can we even know or frame that distinction of 'inner' pole or focus of subjective identity, and 'outer' identity of its 'object' in a complementary physical order? What is the place in the 'empiricist' picture of that very picture or 'idea' itself? Where does it come from, this figure of an 'idea' with a subjective focus on one side, and a corresponding objective focus on the 'other' side? It cannot, by definition, come, as yet by definition it must, from the simple 'impressions' from which the whole economy of lockean psychology and newtonian physics is articulated. Where in the economy of impressions are we to find the initial distinction of two 'sides', in terms of which the 'logical' order of inscription of the relations of logical and physical, inner and outer, in the (psycho)logical side, and the physical or ontological order of inscription of these relations (of the interface of the two orders in 'impressions') 'outside', are supposed identified? Isn't that radical distinction itself merely nominal, a formal 'idea' abstracted from the primary actuality of that play of 'impressions' already somehow defined as primary interface of inner and outer? Should we, must we, not, then, try to find how such an 'idea' which can correspond to no impression, itself enters into the economy of 'experience'? But where on earth are we to start from, in the framing of this 'economy', this poetic of experience?

We might, perhaps, begin from some sort of idea of an 'idea', from some sort of idea of an actuality 'outside' impressions, in which the order of their economy might figure as one term (closing, then, in the familiar figure, the circuit or sphere of actuality or reality within the otherwise open economy of the possible): from God, for example - the God of Descartes or Berkeley. We might then find that the radical opposition of that nominal focus of integration of our experience 'outside' the play or economy of that 'experience' - 'outside' impressions, and so it seems outside our knowledge - and the play of impressions (in which 'truth' appears as the reduction of a configuration of experience to the simple figuration of the interface or mirroring, equivalence, of inside and outside) itself in turn frames the 'moral' order of integration of activity in a 'society': in a community of experiential interfaces which is itself so to speak the interface of an 'ideal' Mystery and the economy of elementary impressions. ...But we now find, rather, that this opposition of divine focus of integration and 'earthly'
economy, framing and establishing the Law of Nature and of Grace, is itself, properly, a component in the earthly economy of the social order it would nominally frame. - A formal component in the play of ideas and impressions which rather reflects, than frames, the practical integration of activity in Society. Such a 'God' or unitary focus of Actuality, of which or whom we can in principle have no 'impression' cannot be aduced to establish the analogous idea of a focal 'I' 'within', or its supposedly substantial or actual 'objects' without. In each of these coordinate foci or supposed actualities we find only a sort of idea of an idea, turning upon itself, a mere name corresponding to no impression, resolving itself into no definite reference 'outside' impressions, no truth - but rather entering as a sort of organising figure (indeed as a sort of organising mistake) into the economy of impressions. This organising principle, the play of names or ideas turning upon themselves - this circularity or circuit - amounts indeed to the very frame of Society, to the interface of Society with the wider Economy from which it thus formally abstracts in terms of the nominal opposition of Heaven and Earth, or 'moral' and 'natural' orders, laws. Such a circuit must now itself be inscribed in the general Economy of what it formally determines as 'Nature', rather than that Economy being formally inscribed as one term, one 'side', of the circuit of a merely formal psychological, ontological or theological actuality.

The opening of such a radical questioning or scepticism with regard to the initial 'logical' suppositions of traditional Reflection, the association of that traditional logic with a circuit of ideas or names turning upon themselves in abstraction from the radical play or economy of figuration of 'impressions' - names which as (a supposedly unitary) language frame the cultural circuit of Society, as physical tokens (Money) frame the material articulation of Society in 'Nature' - was marked by Hume in 1739-40. By the middle of the century his questioning had proceeded from these logical or formal limits to the 'practical' frame of 'Society' - its ethical and 'economic' orders, its inscription in moral and natural Law as two sides of the primary circuit of Law itself, the primary frame of a humean inquiry, the primary circuit as primary Question in the radical humean open-ness of that general Economy in whose terms the
inquiries are framed. Ten years later Hume the inquiring lawyer had proceeded to the part of self-assertion in framing the social order in which he (actually) found himself: framing this part of assertion of the primacy of social order in an increasingly 'tory' History of England down to the coming-into question of the formal focus of that society in the last Stuart king. - Framing so to speak a conservative moral imperative demanded as a response to his systematic questions by his actual situation.

...Meanwhile, in France, where the questioning Hume was at last recognised as a central or focal figure in the 'sixties (more precisely during his visit of 1763-6 at the opening of what I have suggested may be taken as a second 'half' of the 'Enlightenment as itself a 'second half' of the phase from around 1650 to around 1800), a parallel development of the 'questioning' of a traditional logic, and of a traditional cultural 'circuit' in which it was embedded, had been embodied in the ever-broadening project of an encyclopaedic articulation of that British figuration of the questioning of France by Frenchmen which is opened by Voltaire, Condillac and Montesquieu. - Opened around the time of an initial focus of British 'Enlightenment' in Ephraim Chambers' attempt, in 1728, to integrate the results of the New Sciences (and 'Arts' or applications) in the frame of an 'Encyclopaedia'.

The Invisible College, having become the 'Royal Society' with the Stuart restoration had been prosecuting their research both in the old frame of weekly meetings and, since 1665, in a monthly journal. In 1704 John Harris organised a sort of register of these results in the form of a Dictionary, a Lexicon Technicum to whose accounts, arranged alphabetically under their various heads, Newton himself had contributed. Chambers went one step further and introduced systematic 'cross-reference' into the alphabetical order — thus framing in this interplay of accounting a systematic (albeit 'unfocussed') circuit through the new Economy of the World: a Cyclopaedia in which were coordinated the component cycles or circuits of cross-reference; a Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences. This Cyclopaedia might then be taken as a British 'focus' of the development from the first meetings of the Oxford group of 'philosophers' (through the focus in a royal patron
of the new learning, and from 1703 the focal figure of Newton as President midway between the mid-sixteenth century and the 'Industrial Revolution' over the close of the eighteenth (in which the earlier embodiment of the configuration of 'experiment' in scientific 'instruments' was to be extended to an embodiment in 'machines' at work in the material economy of British society). The Scottish focus of the latter phase (British 'Enlightenment') might be taken to be marked by the displacement of the expanded editions of Chambers' *Cyclopaedia*, in 1768-71 by the Edinburgh *Britannica*.

Encyclopaedia: a German parallel may be found in the encyclopedic Wolffian System which opens the Aufklärung: a *mathesis universalis* or systematic framing of all science (in the broadest sense) articulated in a systematic 'perspective' within the cosmic economy of the Monadology: an integration of a Leibnizian 'system' within Spinoza's symmetrical correlation of the various primary orders, logical, physical, psychological, ontological, and so on - but with Spinoza's coordination now embedded in the economy of Leibniz's monadological perspective in terms of Actuality as a response to Leiniz's limiting question, Why is there Something rather than Nothing - with the theological 'focus' distinguishing itself in the open play of possibility, rather than the poetic element of Spinoza's 'economy', defined by its formal opposition to a primary simple divine Actuality or Substance (and engendering the primary frame of a 'double mirroring' of Finite-Infinite and their two sides of inner Mind and outer Nature).

In France the unfolding of the opening configuration of *Lumières* in the 'thirties and 'forties led by the mid-century to the project of transposing the circuit of Chambers' *Cyclopaedia* into the French language and into the culture it framed. The order of questions opened up in the 'thirties in the French presentation of English schemes from which France had abstracted one side in a characteristic logical circle might thus be systematised. The circuit drawn by Chambers in the British play or economy would itself organise those particular criticisms of the components of the French order corresponding to the various subordinate circuits of cross-reference. An *Encyclopédie* would frame a general poetic of Society and Kosmos in which the closed circuit of
'classical' French culture and reflection would as a whole be inscribed, and as a whole come systematically 'in question'. To be articulated in a Reform progressing as the critical individual renewed the characteristically systematic self-assertion in the wider play opened up by the questions implicit in the British Cyclopaedia, rather than in the abstract Cartesian frame of the previous century.

By 1749 Diderot (until then something of a literary hack) had framed a Société de Gens de Lettres, and produced a Prospectus for a French 'version' of Chambers' Circle of the Sciences and Arts. In 1751 the first volume appeared. Over the following years, as the volumes slowly appeared one after the other, and the original idea of a mere adaptation of the two-volume English scheme was left behind in the new configuration of French reflection precipitated precisely by the circulation of the first volumes, the Encyclopédie became the frame of a more and more active programme of Reform, and a more and more general and radical criticism of the old order of Church and State. By 1768 Laporte could publish a conspectus of the new critical frame: L'Esprit de l'Encyclopédie following Helvétius' De l'Esprit a decade before, and De l'Esprit des Lois a decade before that. In 1770 Voltaire could consider the new frame in Questions sur l'Encyclopédie: the articulation of the configuration of the Encyclopaedia in its French context precisely as an order of questions. The answer to this systematic question by the old order, prefigured by sporadic interruptions in publication before, was the cessation of publication in France in 1772.

The 'poetic' of this vast frame of Reform is well reflected in the volumes of Plates (images, illustrations to the technical articles). In the spirit — one might say — of Leonardo, Diderot insisted upon the complementarity of discursive and pictorial orders. The coordination of these two orders in the systematic exposition of the working of processes and machinery then in use may in turn be taken as a parallel to the incipient British inscription of 'scientific' principles in an 'industrial' articulation of the material 'economy' of British society.

...An interplay, then, of discursive and sensible figurations; and in the play open in the general order of questions, a new man could discover himself through the working of his assertion and
indeed his questioning (his assertion, that is, as Critic) in this play. The years around 1770 might be taken to constitute a focal point in the elaboration of the criticism of the 'philosophes' closing the mid-century phase opening around 1730 with Voltaire's criticism and turning about the beginning of publication of the Encyclopédie. The configuration of questions then presents as it were the general question of the primacy of action in self-assertion within the newly articulated critical frame. The cessation of publication might be taken to mark the Old Regime's recognition of this transition from reflective to active 'criticism' and activity. Voltaire's coordination of 'questions' in 1770 is paralleled (as I have noted above) by d'Holbach's german framing of the general economy of questions as the economy of 'Nature'. After 1770 reflection would become more and more radically engaged in self-assertive action - and after the turn-of-the-century convulsion a new analogue of the old cartesian figure of self-assertion in response to the limiting question of an abstract Reflection would appear in Maine de Biran's scheme of self-discovery in action rather than the limiting act of reflection.

1770, then, as an 'epoch' in french 'enlightenment', as the various 'questions' attaching to the various orders of french culture are coordinated in the question of action, or rather, of what to do about, what to do in, France. In particular, critical reflection becomes increasingly closely coordinated with political and economic 'questions', and the question of the coordination of those two orders of question in the question of the very constitution of french society of which they are the two sides. The question, for example, of the abstraction of the Court and its Policy from the 'physical' order of the material economy of France. From the middle of the century the political economy of the Encyclopédie, the 'physiocracy' of Turgot, Quesnay and their circle, had brought into question the 'mercantilism' of seventeenth-century theory and practice (already, like the political centralisation of the seventeenth century, beginning to fragment by the time of the collapse of Law's 'Mississippi Scheme' shortly after the bursting of the South Sea Bubble across the channel): had brought
into question the theory and policy of central direction of an economy articulated in the interface of national importation and exportation as primary. The 'physiocrats' proposed rather the primacy of the interface of French society with Nature in agriculture, then under the hopelessly unproductive management of the nobility, and constrained (rather than the free 'economy' of what was 'open' to a society in that interface with Nature) by all sorts of artificial interests and privileges.

Just as British schemes served to frame the bringing-into-question of the old order in France, so in turn this physiocratic criticism is transposed in the Scottish school of Hume into a system of political economy: a systematic account of one side of the humean 'circulation' of signs: the material economy framed by the circulation of money. Adam Smith's part around 1770 might be taken to mark a transition from that of the Tory Hume of the 'fifties to the 'philosophical' Radicals of the 'nineties framing the moral order of the social frame as a whole in an economy of questions that corresponds to Hume's later conservative assertion (or rather converts it) into a scheme of which Smith's material economy is one side, and which also incorporates the French radicalisation of physiocratic criticism to criticism of the social order as a whole.

1770, then: an epoch of French Lumières, corresponding to an epoch (as we shall see) in the British economy reflected in the elaboration in Hume's Scottish school of a new economic theory. An epoch marked in France by Freiherr von Holbach's Système de la Nature as one limiting component, and marked in Germany – or rather at the extreme limit of Prussia – by a German reaction to Hume (to leave aside the critical developments that year in the parts of Lessing and Herder). Marked by the prefiguration of a turn-of-the-century 'Romantic' poetic in the first framing of a 'transcendental aesthetic'.

1770: the Inaugural Dissertation of the new Professor of Philosophy in Königsberg. The initial focus of another Baltic 'Copernican revolution' at that north-eastern limit of Germany where one critical component of a prussian Aufklärung beginning with Wolff's
articulation of Kosmos within a systematic economy of perspective
would be framed by Hamann at mid-century, preparing the way for his
associates Herder and Kant in 1770. A mid-century component paralleled by brandenburgian reforms of Winckelmann, Lessing, Mendelssohn
and many others from the time of Wolff's death in 1754 as Chancellor
of the University of Halle: that monument of the rise of Brandenburg
after the Thirty Years War.

In his inaugural dissertation a new professor traditionally framed his orientation - the orientation of the teaching which was opened by this public statement of position. The new Königsberg professor's first works, in the years around the middle of the century (1747-55) had been addressed to 'a true account of vis viva' and a 'general natural history of the heavens': that is, first of all a consideration of the element of the leibnizian or wolffian economy of the physical Kosmos (the 'vital force' constitutive of the physical 'pole' of the leibnizian frame of mirroring of 'physical' and 'logical' poles identified in this symmetry as monads or atoms), then an analysis of the global frame in which the economy of these elements is articulated in newtonian Law in relation to an initial breaking of the symmetry of all elements in a unitary Sphere, a primal 'nebula'.

In 1769 Kant discovered Hume's criticism of the presupposition of both the 'german' inscription of the elementary interface of inner and outer orders in the radical economy of a physical or ontological order nominally defined by this supposed inscription, and the 'french' inscription of the interface in a primary logical or psychological order nominally constituted by that converse inscription. The Privatdozent awoke from his slumbers and the new professor presented in his Inaugural Dissertation 'On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible Worlds' the following year, the new position in which he now, so to speak, found himself.

...What if Hume's contraction to the symmetry of an elementary interface, and the articulation in these terms of what is 'open' in the Economy of the World - an interface not to be understood as inscribed at the outset in circular fashion in one of its 'sides' - were to be turned as it were upside-down: what if we were to ask about
the actuality of that element itself, taken as (so to speak) pure possibility of experience (as well as asking with Hume about the actuality of its formal or nominal poles)? If there is actually to be an impression, must it not be inscribed in (the thirteenth-century figure of) a distinction or self-distinction of Actuality from its mere possibility - and this in the formal scheme of coordination and integration of 'perspectives' corresponding to Leibniz' universal 'community' of monads, on a wider analogy of the 'working' of the formal order of names or formal ideas turning upon themselves in the constitutive circuit of human (indeed, human) Society or Community?

Consider, then, the humane Economy of the interface and symmetry of 'inner' and 'outer': for such an interface to be articulated in an actual experience, it must itself be inscribed in the 'ideal' or formal distinction of a unitary Actuality 'in' which there is that experience, in and from the free or open play, Economy, of possibility. Here, then, the leibnizian figure of inscription of the elementary interface of logical and physical orders in the physical economy of possibility (or indeed physical 'potential' as opposed to actual force, vis viva) is articulated in a radical primacy of self-distinction of Actuality from its possibility (Something rather than Nothing). We thus meet at the close (rather, at the opening in 1770 of the close) of this Second Part a mirroring of the opening figure of Aquinas' and Scotus' distinction of Being and Essence, That and What.

The 'perspectival' frame of integration of experiences formally 'open' in the Economy of the elementary interface of 'inner' and 'outer', within the primary circuit of an Actuality distinguishing itself from, and in, the inscription of the formal distinction of actual and possible in the play of possibility (of what is formally 'open'), is (as it were the wider cosmic analogue of humane 'community' - a common participation in actuality rather than human activity), we know already, simply the cartesian Frame of 'coordination' of perspectives: the schemata coordinandi as Kant now calls them, of outer Space and inner Time (1).

We already know: for Wolff had already articulated Actuality in the symmetrical formal economy of distinction of Actual and Possible; but the open system of Possibility (in which 'this' actual World was articulated in relation to the divine Finality of self-expression in
the Choice, as what is o-en in the symmetry of Actual and Possible, of Actuality, the actuality of choosing le meilleur des mondes possibles) is there only nominally or formally 'posited' in terms of a circular nominal resolution of the two roles of 'position' in the inscription of the interface of inner and outer in the out-side — in an initial formal position and order of resolution and definition which comes into question in the radical humean symmetry of the two sides (as frame of Hume's inquiry). With Hume's questions the symmetric wolffian coordination of the resolution of logical and physical poles of possible experience, with the cosmic Economy of resolution of the analogous sides of Actuality and Possibility, itself now frames Actuality as a Question... in which, in the 'empiricist' figure of the british school, we now find ourselves engaged. - We, or rather the new professor, as he begins to articulate his 'position' in relation to this conversion of the symmetric wolffian coordination of formal principles of definition or resolution, into the coordination of questions, of a radical inquiry into Actuality - which prefigures this inquiry into the actuality of this inquiry, toward the close of the Third Part (of this inquiry).

To be an actual experience (and here we return to the figure of Descartes' "ontological argument" for the actual reference of an 'idea') the humean interface of inner and outer must at least be inscribed in the formal articulation of the 'formal' distinction of actuality and possibility. As Hume saw, the actuality of this distinction of actual and possible cannot be contained or comprehended 'in' the 'impression' itself, any more can the correlative distinction of 'inner' and 'outer' poles, actualities, to which the impression is formally referred. Thus the very possibility of an actual experience embeds it in the formal frame of mathematical spatiotemporality. The interplay of psychical and ontical orders in actual experience (that is, of Mind and Matter) must be formally framed by the coordination of experiences as Experience, in a unitary Space and Time.

Kant has thus found the elementary order of his 'position' or assertion framed in the pure Economy of questions corresponding to the open play of interfaces of 'inner' and 'outer'. An 'open-ness'
then, 'in' Space and Time: what is 'open' as a Space and a Time in the primary symmetry of coordination of the various orders of distinction of actual from possible. A 'transcendental aesthetic', then, framing the actuality of his self-assertion distinguishing what is actual from what is not - an actuality coordinate with the formal theological 'focus' of leibnizian or wolffian Actuality articulated in the formal 'open-ness' of pure Possibility. A 'transcendental aesthetic' presents an initial formal framing of the new professor's 'position', an initial assertion of the frame of that assertion, the spatiotemporal coordination of experiences in a unitary Actuality. Over the following eleven years the new frame of assertion in a radical economy of questions - the systematic assertion, then, of the part of the 'Critic' - would be so to speak concreted into the newtonian Kosmos of Kant's first reflections. And fifteen years later the professor would eventually come full-circle in identifying the part of critical self-assertion in the (humean) frame within that Kosmos of human, moral, community.

What then, are the next steps after 1770 in a systematic 'criticism' of the 'dogmatic' positions of wolffian logic, physics, ontology, psychology, theology, jurisprudence - of their common circular logic or logical short-circuit of the more radical poetic of Experience? What steps lead from the formal spatiotemporal frame of Kant's new 'position' to the actual self-assertion in a human community embodied in that initial critical position?

Within the limiting or opening frame of the transcendental aesthetic we may find a further step articulated in the question of the symmetry of two 'sides' ('left' and 'right' hand or glove, for example) of 'out-side' Space itself, and the left- or right-handedness of an actual hand or glove: the question of that primary symmetry 'in' the limiting frame of spatiotemporal coordination, which is itself an outward image of the symmetry of logical and physical orders of actuality...the logical frame of our actual assertion, and the physical frame of objective actualities expressing themselves in 'forces'. Here again the coordination of psychical and ontical actualities must frame any possible experience - in an order of coordination of action within the spatiotemporal coordination of Actuality itself. As in cartesian Method, we proceed from the limiting frame of assertion simply as such,
through the resolution of the symmetries and associated questions as it were 'nested' within the limiting symmetry or coordination of the primary orders of assertion. Within the Aesthetic as general frame of resolution of Actual and Possible experience, we now find inscribed a coordination of the two 'sides' of an experience, a coordination of the logical symmetry of logical and physical orders in which psychical actuality asserts itself simply as self-assertion, with the outward physical image of the symmetry of logical and physical orders in two formally indistinguishable 'sides' of Space. A local coordination, then, of the two 'sides' in the poetic symmetry of action articulated in Time. Just as we mark in the general Economy of Possibility an initial formal distinction of Actuality and Possibility which cannot itself be resolved in that Economy (whence, for example, the impropriety of an anselmian 'ontological argument' which makes of the 'that' of a thing a certain 'what', makes Existence a 'predicate'), so we may inscribe in this general Economy an analogous formal distinction an actuality of 'I' in which 'my' experiences are integrated, along with a correlative distinction of noumenal and phenomenal (formal and empirical) 'object' of my experiences - each of these complementary or correlative actualities as it were participating in the limiting self-distinction of Actuality simply as such, and so embedded in the spatiotemporal frame of that initial distinction.

'I', then, an organising focus which is no more to be identified with the 'empirical' object of any of its experiences, (as Hume saw where Descartes had not), than the actual distinction of Actuality from its Possibility is to be identified with the formal inscription of this distinction in the Economy of Possibility (as Aquinas saw so clearly). Hume was right to find in this 'idea' of my Self, formally reflected in the name 'I' give 'myself', an essential organising function in experience - essential indeed to the very framing of an 'experience', but which could not be defined or identified in the play or economy of 'my' experiences. Descartes was right to see in this circular self-assertion of 'I' a primary and focal component in the distinction of actual and non-actual. But each, in their complementary ways, failed to recognise the complementarity of these two aspects. 'I' is, am, indeed 'formal' as Hume saw, but this very form, like those of Space and Time, is itself an irreducible component in the frame of any experience that is to be an actual experience. The possibility of its recognition as 'mine' must in
principle, essentially, attach to any actual experience.

This then implies that all experience must be framed in or constrained by this order of my self-assertion in the logical frame of judgement, my 'part' in the primary configuration of distinction of Actual and non-Actual (but Possible), my self-assertion as it is formally coordinate with the ontical self-assertion of 'objects' of experience. Within the primary distinction of Actuality and Possibility formally framed in the schemata coordinandi which we call 'Space' and 'Time', are coordinated the complementary actualities of a 'synthetic unity of apperception' and 'things in themselves': this in the formal frame of coordination of the logical laws of judgement and the physical laws (of Newton) governing the interplay of 'forces'.

Laws of Judgement: the articulation of inscription of the relations of logical and physical orders in the logical order which, in the bare aristotelian 'topology' of syllogism, of inscription of one figure or scheme of the interface of inner or outer in another, exactly mirrors the articulation of that physical order of 'inside' and 'outside' which is its image...which provides the outward 'image' of two 'sides' in which the logical order itself can distinguish the two-sidedness of logical 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' from that physical 'side' of distinction, of two-sidedness.

Thus all (any) experience must be formally framed as judgement referred to an object, the 'physical' coordination of objects according to the symmetry of Newton's Law(s) in Space and Time directly and inseparably coordinate with the logical coordination of judgements in what we might call 'logical space and time': the space of distinction and the time of logical consequence. And the 'poetic' frame of mirroring or coordination of these complementary orders thus constitutes the articulation of their symmetry in a 'schematism' in whose schemata any experience, in order to be an (actual) experience, to be 'experience' must be framed, just as it must conform to the limiting schemata coordinandi of that Space and Time within which the mirroring of logical and physical orders 'before' any further coordination of the specific figures or schemes of particular distinct experiences, determines the 'schematism' of Experience in general.
Any particular 'object' of experience must, then, simply to be an 'object', be coordinated with other objects in the frame of this general or pure schematism - a focus, for example, of the various possible judgements anyone might make about that 'object', outwardly coordinating the order of judgements, or rather the objective actualities asserted in those judgements about it and other objects, just as assertion is 'inwardly' coordinated in the simple figure of my self-assertion as 'I', as subjective focus of experiences. It makes no sense to ask 'what' an object 'is', 'outside' the schematism of this coordination of 'inner' and 'outer' orders of experience, 'in' itself. The 'what' of an object (which is in principle an object of judgement) is just its place in this coordination of logical and physical 'space' and 'time': that's what's what. That's what's 'what'...Scotus, from whom the figuration of the 'transcendental' derives at the close of this phase which he opens had insisted: haecceitas est de se haec.

So much for 'transcendental' Analysis, the primary articulation of the various orders of question in which Actuality is coordinated with the actuality of its assertion. The 'working' of the schematism as Actuality is, no more than the 'working' of Aristotle's analogous 'scheme' or configuration of 'categories', is not to be understood 'within' the logical circuit which formally abstracts from actual Experience. Rather must this 'logical' order of abstraction be itself understood, as in Aristotle's figure of σχήμα, in terms of its working in the Scheme. A scheme 'before' any particular experience in 'logical time', in this sense a priori 'anticipating' any experience simply as 'experience'. But this 'before' does not imply the abstract comprehension of all experience in an abstract logical time of deduction. The Actuality in which logical analysis is 'at work' is not comprehended in that circuit of abstraction which constitutes the 'logical' order of analysis, that ordering of questions. The actual coordination of the various orders of experience must itself articulate its own discovery or definition. In this sense the analysis is essentially 'transcendental', like the unity, goodness, truth, being that are not comprehended in the aristotelian categories, but which must be understood 'analogically'. In order for us to identify the kantian categories they must already be at work in the constitution, the synthesis, of that very identification of their working: in its working.
What, then, of our recognition, 'at work' in (cur) experience, of forms, 'ideas', which can (as in the old humean figure) correspond to no particular experience, no true presentation, Vorstellung? For Kant maintains, through its transposition from humean 'impression' to critical 'experience', a characterisation or conception of 'truth' in terms of the reduction or 'analysis' of experience (or of a configuration of experiences) to the simple or elementary mirroring or coincidence of physical and logical order in position or presentation — to the figure of complementary logical and physical 'sides' of an interface of logical 'inner' and physical 'outer'.

... Yet there is an analogical 'experience' — a correlation of the 'schemes' of experience — of (— with —) the various forms, 'ideas', at work 'regulatively' in Experience — which cannot yet be reduced to any analytic comprehension in Understanding, any inscription of such 'experience' in the primary interface of Truth.

This merely formal 'working' of the figure of experience — an 'appearance' which cannot itself be integrated or comprehended in any finite configuration of experience(s), 'appears' most notably in the three radical forms, Ideas, through which actual Experience is (simply as 'experience') inescapably regulated and coordinated. It appears in those 'transcendental' Ideas corresponding to an initial distinction of Actuality from the mere play of Possibility ('God') — this 'Idea' corresponding to the framing of a unitary Actuality as such, Creation — and to the distinction of two 'poles' of the spatio-temporal frame of that primary distinction — to 'I' and to 'Kosmos', psychical and ontical limits of the scheme, which cannot themselves be objects of experience, but which (as indeed in the humean definition of an 'impression') are found at work organising Experience, as direct correlates of any 'experience' simply as such.

In the 'eighties Kant proceeds to frame the 'moral' or practical order of Community, the 'working' of human Society, within the working of these 'Ideas' (here again following Hume), and
then, in a 'critical' investigation of the 'faculty' of Judgement, the 'working' of the analogy of the two orders of Understanding and Reason, in the figure of a judgement common both to the former articulated in the categorial frame of Experience, and to the latter analogically articulated within the working of the transcendental Ideas.

In 1785 appeared Kant's outline of the principles of the Moral Law that frames the activity of a rational subject, in 1786 an outline of the physical Law that frames the complementary order of objects (1). In 1784 had appeared the first part of Herder's Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, outlining the cosmic frame of mirroring of natural and moral orders in a human Culture articulated in a unitary History - this framing the reflections of Herder from his intellectual revolution of 1769-70, down to his systematic criticism of Kant in 1799-1800. In the same year appeared Kant's own Idee zu einen allgemeinen Geschichte im weltbürglichen Absicht, in which the Professor of Königsberg had himself considered the integration of natural and moral orders of efficiency and finality in the figure of a world-history, as well as his severe criticism of the articulation of the 'ideas' of his friend and compatriot, according to a 'poetic' play of analogy, rather than according to the formal frame of his own 'idea' of History, inscribed within the critical frame of the 'working' of the Ideas. This same year appeared Jacobi's account of his conversation with Lessing in 1780, in which the latter had asserted that Spinoza's theological frame seemed to him the most radical figure of Reason. Jacobi at once assented to this assertion, and took it as the clearest expression of the irreducibility of the Faith in which we frame our activity to the Reason which abstracts from our particular identification with some particular part, to a formal and foreign instance of impersonal Reflection.

Spinoza was studied intently at Weimar, in the circle of Goethe, Wieland, Herder and their associates, over the winter of 1784-5, and by 1785 the intellectual life of northern Germany had become focussed in a Pantheismusstreit, a controversy over Spinoza's 'pantheism' (the duality of natura naturans and naturata, God and Nature) in which the split between Kant and Herder over the Ideen
became polarised in a confrontation of logical and 'poetic' frames of Kosmos, which might be taken to mark a midpoint of the transition from the perspectives of 1770, and those of 1800, with their romantic 'focus' in the Athenäum at Jena, and the 'romantic' circle whose literary 'organ' that was.

The perspectives of 1770: that turning-point in the development of Kant, Lessing, Herder, as also of Goethe and a German 'poetic' of Sturm und Drang which then first broke with the classical, logical poetics of French models — this break itself reflected in the situation of imaginary protagonists (such as Goethe's Götz von Berlichingen of 1771) outside the closed order of a Society abstracted from the free poetic Economy of Nature.

By 1785 the parallel developments of a German critical philosophy, and a German poetic (focused respectively in the figures of Kant at Konigsberg and Goethe as Minister of the Weimar Court) meet in the configuration of the Pantheismusstreit, and Herder's quarrel with Kant over the relations of logical and poetic orders in History as the primary frame of activity; by 1800 these parallel 'logical' and 'poetic' frames, whose relations have been brought into question in the mid-eighties, converge in the Synnoesie or Symphilosophie which are equated in the 'poetisation of the World', the Universalnoesie, announced in the Athenäum.

Around 1785, Goethe begins to apply 'poetic' principles to the 'scientific' account of Kosmos, treated, in association with Herder, as simply a sort of limiting Story, whose form is directly reflected in the poetic order of those lesser stories which articulate the workings of details within the cosmic whole. About this time too, Schiller, in his poem Der Künstler, was expressing a parallel scheme of a poetics of Kosmos. In 1786 Goethe departed for Italy, to return to Weimar in 1788. Meanwhile Schiller, having taken up the study of philosophy and history about 1785, had arrived in Weimar (1787), and been introduced to the Kantian philosophy by the new professor at the university of Jena a dozen miles to the south-east of the administrative capital of Saxe-Weimar. In 1788 Schiller joined Reinhold (the professor of philosophy) at Jena as professor of history. From this time until his collaboration with Goethe in 1794-6 on their journal Die Horen, Schiller forsook the practice of poetry
for the elaboration of a theoretical poetics of human activity, finally presented in the Briefe über die aesthetische Erziehung des Menschen published in Die Horen. This statement by Schiller of a universal poetic was paralleled by the final publication by Goethe (largely through Schiller's encouragement) of the 'education', the Erziehung, Bildung, Lehrjahre, of Wilhelm Meister - a story of the induction of a young man into a 'brotherhood', a 'mystery', framed in a poetics of self-discovery whose very element is that 'story' of which the novel or romance of Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre is itself the focal instance. Goethe had been working on this poetic 'mystery' since the completion of the final version of Werther in the late 'seventies' - indeed Meister, as the 'romantics' were to call this dominant instance of Goethe's poetic, might be said to unfold from the initial tragic distance of writer and reader from Werther's identification with the subjective role of the 'feeling' which was the poetic element of Sturm und Drang, paralleling the Sense of the Inaugural Dissertation, and Herder's contemporaneous discovery of Gefühl as primary element in his poetics of Culture.

In 1799 Schiller, having returned through his theoretical detour, to the practice of poetry, and completed his trilogy of Wallenstein, whose materials he had assembled in his History of the Thirty-Years War (the writing of which had paralleled his theoretical researches at Jena), joined Goethe in Weimar to collaborate in the work of embodying their shared vision of a poetics of Culture in a new German Theatre. Meanwhile the young Fichte had succeeded Reinhold as professor of philosophy at the university (1794), and had effected a parallel development of the logical frame of critical philosophy, so that towards the end of 1798 Friedrich Schlegel could publish in the Athenäum:

Die Französische Revolution, Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre und Goethes Meister sind die größten Tendenzen des Zeitalters. Wer an dieser Zusammenstellung Anstoss nimmt, wem keine Revolution wichtig scheinen kann, die nicht laut und materiell ist, der hat sich noch nicht auf den hohen weiten Standpunkt der Geschichte der Menschheit erhoben. Selbst in unseren dürftigen Kulturgeschichten, die meistens einer mit fortlaufendem Kommentar begleiteten Variantensammlung, wozu der klassische Text verloren ging, gleich, spielt manches kleine Buch, von dem die lärmende Menge
zu seiner Zeit nicht viel zu Notiz nahm, eine grössere Rolle
als alles, was diese trieb. (1)

The French Revolution, Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre and Goethe's
Meister are the greatest forces of this age. He who is shocked
by this juxtaposition, to whom no revolution can seem important
which is not noisy and material - he has not yet raised himself
to the broad high standpoint of the History of Mankind. Even in
our sketchy cultural histories, which generally amount to vari-
ant readings of a missing standard text, many a little book, of
which, in its time, the clamoring crowd took little notice, plays
a greater part than all the striving of that crowd.

- Fichte's systematisation of the critical philosophy, and Goethe's
parallel and complementary poetics of induction into a 'poetic' Wor-
ld, are the two sides of a german 'revolution', of which the outward
political revolution of Europe, focussed in France, is itself the other
side (2), the 'outward' reflection.

This german revolution, this 'movement' of transition into
'an altogether new era of Sciences and Arts' (3) is 'romantic': Friedrich
Schlegel transposes (1798) Schiller's distinction of 'naive' and
'sentimental' poetics (1795) into a distinction of 'romantic' and
'classical'. The 'classic' in poetry, philosophy, and in Culture
generally, frames his poteisis, his activity, within a formal, a log-
cical determination of the poetic frame of the World... the 'romantic'
rather finds the logical order of his assertion as one element in a
more radical poetical working of this World. The Romantic Revolut-
ion is announced in Fragments, in those circular interplays of fig-
ures (including the figures of 'romantic', 'revolution', 'fragment',
and so on) the integration of this figuration in the limiting and
absolute circuit, the poetic closure of the true Roman, the true
Book... The fragments of 'Novalis' (the figure assumed by Friedrich
von Hardenberg in his subscription of the Blütenstaub edited by Frie-
drich Schlegel in the first issue of the Athenäum) close with the

1: Athenäum I, ii (Fragments), p58 2: ibid, p133 3: ibid, p32
after a thirteenth-century forbear, de Novali (latin: Novalis).
Die Kunst Bücher zu schreiben ist noch nicht erfunden. Sie ist aber auf dem Punkt erfunden zu werden. Fragmente dieser Art sind literarische Samereien. Es mag freilich manches taube Körnchen darunter sein; indessen, wenn nur einiges aufgeht!

The art of writing books has not yet been invented. It is, however, on the verge of invention. Fragments like this are literary seeds. There may well be many unfruitful little grains among them: but...if only one were to germinate!

The same year Novalis wrote:


The novel, as such, contains no definite close – it is not the representation and expression of a proposition. It is the visible working-out, realisation, of an idea. But an idea will not be expressed in a proposition. An idea is an infinite series of propositions.

In 1793 Schiller had accused Kant and Goethe of complementary one-sidedness: Goethe was too 'naive' (in the terms of 1795), Kant too 'classical' (in the terms of 1798). The 'poetisation of the World' announced in the Athenäum by Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis was to amount to the convergence and integration of these parallel logical and poetic orders.

A Fragment was a closed circuit of interplay of figures:

Ein Fragment muss gleich einem kleinen Kunstwerk von der umgebenden Welt ganz abgesondert und in sich selbst vollendet sein wie ein Igel (1).

1: Schriften, II, 570
2: Fragmente (Athenäum I, 11), p 54
A Fragment must, like a little work of art be quite cut off from the surrounding world, and closed upon itself, like a hedgehog.

... Yet this fragmentary figure of distinction of fragment (this fragment in particular) from context - exemplified in this fragment, itself enters as a figure into the play of fragments, figures, which turns in a wider and analogous circuit, of which the Roman is the 'ideal' figure. Thus in editing Novalis' Blütenstaub for the first issue of his journal, Friedrich Schlegel inserted several 'fragments' of his own, by which he inscribes the part or figure of 'editor' in the play of the fragmentary text. In the following issue (for the second half of 1798), fragments of Novalis, Schleiermacher, Friedrich's brother August-Wilhelm Schlegel (his co-editor) and of the latter's wife Caroline were brought into play by Friedrich with fragments of his own, in the circle of Fragmente of which some examples have already been given. This circuit prefigures the Symnoesie or Symphilosophie, elaborated by a multiple 'I', and announced as follows:

Vielleicht würde eine ganz neue Epoche der Wissenschaften und Künste beginnen, wenn die Symphilosophie und Symnoesie so allgemein und so innig würde, dass es nichts Seltenes mehr wäre, wenn mehr sich gegenseitig ergänzende Naturen gemeinschaftliche Werke bildeten... (1)

An altogether new era of Sciences and Arts might begin, if Symphilosophie and Symnoesie were to become so general and so deeply impressed, that nothing singular remained in the production of collective works by mutually complementary natures...

... A multiple 'I': an interplay between the unitary 'I' of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, and the poetic identification with the characters of a fiction. Friedrich Schlegel enters into this interplay as the instance of assertion which frames the circuit, the indefinite interplay of the various figures, of the various fragments with their various figures of 'I', their various 'authors', confused in the common assertion of the group. Symnoesie: framed in this group 'I'... Symphilosophie: the recognition by the group of this multiplicity as the interface of Fichte's absolute 'I', and its reflection in the play of 'I's in the poetic Economy of the World. A new era
of the Sciences: a *Wissenschaftslehre* framed as *Sympphilosophie*, as one side of the primary circuit of the Group, as *Enzyklopädie*:

Die Philosophie geht noch zu sehr gradeaus, ist noch nicht zyklisch genug (1)

Philosophy still proceeds much too directly – isn't yet circular enough

The New Science will be framed in the circle of which the figure of abstraction to Fichte's 'I' will itself be one component: it will be 'circular', 'encyclopaedic', since the abstraction in which it is framed will itself reappear as one component of the circle of abstraction. Thus it will reflect the new era of the Arts, exemplified by the 'art of writing books' which 'has not yet been created', by the *Roman* which incorporates as one component of its closed circuit the figure of distinction of imaginary World of the novel, and 'real' context. And these two circuits, of Encyclopaedia and Novel, will appear as two complementary sides of a thoroughly 'poetic' Kosmos:

Die romantische Poesie ist eine progressive Universalpoesie. Ihre Bestimmung ist nicht bloss, alle getrennte Gattungen der Poesie wieder zu vereinigen und die Poesie mit der Philosophie und Rhetorik in Berührung zu setzen. Sie will und soll auch... das Leben und die Gesellschaft poetisch machen... Nur sie kann gleich dem Enos ein Spiegel der ganzen umgebenden Welt, ein Bild der Zeitalters werden...

... Die romantische Dichtart ist noch im Werden; ja das ist ihr eigentliches Wesen, dass sie ewig nur werden, nie vollendet sein kann... (2)

Romantic poetry is a progressive Universal Poetry. Its vocation is not simply to reunite all the sundered species of poetry, and bring poetry into contact with philosophy and rhetoric. It will and must also... make life and society poetic... Only it can, like the Epic, become a mirror of the whole surrounding World, a picture of the Age...

1: Fragmente p 13 2: Fragmente p 21
... The romantic Art of Poetry is still coming into being – indeed that is its very being, that it is always only coming into being, and can never be completed...

This figure of a 'romantic' transition into a new era of European society, of which the outward turmoil of the French Revolution is inscribed as one component, as an 'outward' side, may perhaps be taken to be focussed in the close of the unfinished project of the Athenäum in 1800, and the part of Novalis' unfinished Roman, Heinrich von Ofterdingen, in that configuration. The first half of this novel, intended as an embodiment in a Book of the mystery of the poetic frame of poem, story, book, word, as the direct expression of the poetic mystery prefigured in Goethe's Wilhelm Meister (itself only the first half of a book)... the first half, in which the protagonist, at the close, accedes to the primary figure of that mystery (to be systematically unfolded in the second half... which could have ended only in the inscription of the book itself in the story, of the distinction of imaginary world of the book and real context in the imaginary world) was written over the winter of 1799-1800. The following winter Novalis was at work on the second half, and on the projects organised in the figure of the close of the Book. In the spring he died, at the age of twenty-eight – a transition into that other side of the visible world reflected in this visible world in the figure of the imaginary world which is one side of a fiction, a picture – which picture, inscribed in this analogy, becomes Symbol. This transition, corresponding in a way to the 'close' of the second part, and prefigured in the Hymnen an der Nacht in the last issue of the Athenäum, was in turn taken in the following year by Friedrich Schlegel and Tieck to frame the 'story' of Novalis, prefaced to their edition of his 'works', in which a selection from the vast field of the notes, the fragments, he 'left behind', was appended – Schegel and Tieck's 'edition' of 1802 complementing Schlegel's initial framing of the Blütenstaub of 1798.

The figure, then, of this transition from 1798 to 1802, might perhaps – with the central 'Symbol' of the winter of 1799-1800, the Blue Flower around which the symbolism of the Romance is articulated (like the Roman de la Rose about a pink flower, its earthly
counterpart of the complementary colour - day rather than night) - be taken as a figure in which the 'romantic' revolution of Germany is organised: the transition from the prospective romanticism of the Athenaeum to the retrospective romanticisation of the story of Novalis.

How then are the two parallel currents of 'logical' philosophy and pre-romantic poetic, turning in their parallel development from 1770 to 1800 about the Weimar of 1785, focussed in this Blue Flower... and how can that focus of logical and poetic figures of Romantik be as it were unfolded so as to constitute a focus of the wider developments of Reflection in the European context, in the period from the end of the Thirty-Years War, say, to Napoleon's seizure of power in the winter of 1799-1800?

- First to the first question - then the transition to the answer to the second will soon become clear.

I have already noted the confrontation in 1784-6 of the 'logical' scheme of the critical philosophy, and the pre-romantic 'poetics' of the World - the meeting, one might say, of Goethe and Kant in Herder's Ideen and the question of Spinoza's theology. Reinhold, in 1786, published at Weimar, in the Teutsche Merkur of his uncle, Wieland, Letters on the Kantian Philosophy: this was the first attempt at the presentation of the critical philosophy to a general audience, and marks the entry of the leading schemes of that baltic reflection into the circle of German Culture. Reinhold was, unlike the various figures considered thus far in the development of the German thought of the eighteenth century, an Austrian... born in 1758, he entered into the Jesuit novitiate. The order was dissolved throughout Europe by the Pope in 1773 (this concluding the process beginning with its dissolution in France in
1764, under the joint opposition of Court and philosophers), and Reinhold took a post teaching philosophy in a rather monastic catholic college, until breaking with the church at the age of twenty-five.

In his schematic presentation at Weimar of the new system of reflection, he called for a more unitary presentation or organisation, principle within principle, within some radical principle—like Spinoza's Substance—proposed at the outset. It is perhaps characteristic that all of Reinhold's chief successors in the development of the critical philosophy began their careers with the study of theology...

The following year he was appointed professor of philosophy at the duchies university of Jena nearby— a university founded in 1548 by Luther's prime supporter, the saxon elector, as the centre for dissemination of a 'lutheran' Reform, as opposed to the calvinism that had supplanted the initial Reform at Wittenberg. Melanchthon had been the first to hold Reinhold's chair of philosophy. The saxon elector had reverted to catholicism in the seventeenth century, and Prussia took over the leadership of the protestants of Germany. Reinhold at Jena, and his school, might perhaps be taken to exemplify a focal interface of the prussian protestant culture of the North, and the catholic culture of the South, dominated by Austria: the initial focus of the Reformation passes over into the initial focus of another 'revolution', which Novalis defines (in *Die Christenheit oder Europa*) as a reintegration of the thirteenth-century figure of a unitary christian Culture, a european Christendom, with the figure of the individual which marks the transition from fifteenth to sixteenth century and the fragmentation of the old european order which culminates in the French Revolution.

When Reinhold was succeeded in 1794 by Fichte, Jena was indeed the centre or focus of the german discussion of the kantian philosophy. It was to be Fichte who was to frame the 'system' sought by Reinhold: two years earlier, at the age of thirty, he had presented to Kant in Königsberg his *Critique of all Revelation*, which Kant had had published (by mistake omitting the author's name) by his own publisher. The work was generally taken to be a further
step by Kant himself—the integration or coordination of the principles of the critical philosophy of the 'eighties in a discussion of the 'working' of the form or figure—the 'transcendental Idea'—of that primary distinction of Actual and Possible in which the distinction of subjective and objective roles of actual experience, and their correlation in the figures of Judgement, are inscribed. A discussion, then, of the 'theological' figure of a self-distinguishing Actuality, a sort of 'transcendental' self-expression or self-activity—of Revelation: the correlation of the transcendental Ideas of Soul and Kosmos in the working of the transcendental Idea of God.

Kant had insisted in his criticism of any 'ontological argument'—as in his contribution to the controversy of 1785 over the system of Spinoza (Was heisst: sich im Denken orientieren) that the formal figure of distinction of the actuality of an experience from its possibility—its 'that' from its 'what'—could not itself be a 'what', a content of any experience. Rather was the 'positing' of such a figure the introduction of a merely formal 'object' into the categorial frame of coordination of theoretical and practical judgements, which through this coordination with actual experiences regulated our intellectual and moral activity. Not a positing that could correspond to any object of experience and discursive knowledge—rather a formal coordinate or position 'at infinity', corresponding to a direction or 'orientation'—an axis of the World relative to which experience and activity could be coordinated, but not itself something that could be thus 'coordinated' as one experience among others. Not a term to be posited like the initial 'Substance' of Spinoza's demonstrative Ethics, corresponding to the initial 'point' of Euclid's Elements.

By the time he succeeded Reinhold at Jena Fichte had taken a step beyond this 'critical' point of view. Taking the 'working' of the transcendental Idea of self-distinction as primary, he proceeded to inscribe the 'working' of the various schemes of the critical philosophy, figure within figure, within this primary 'working' of our participation in the self-distinction of Actuality from Possibility. This radical or originary distinction expresses itself
most directly in the very act or actuality - the 'working', Wirklichkeit - of 'our' making or recognition of this distinction: we know the distinction directly by participating in it in our self-recognition as an 'I' that makes the distinction. The three Critiques of the eighties (1781-90) are inscribed, in their outlines, in a familiar scheme of a radical double distinction: the 'vertical' order (so to say) of the distinction of Actuality from the play of figure, from Possibility; and within this the 'horizontal' distinction of 'subjective' and 'objective' roles of Judgement - of experience and activity. Within the open 'poetic' Economy of possible experience and activity, Actuality is articulated within the primary figure or 'transcendental Idea' of the distinction of Actual and Possible. We participate directly in this Actuality in judging that the finite or limited frame of our judgements - the poetic order of their figuration (whether as experience or activity) - is itself inscribed in Actuality through a Judgement which distinguishes its own actuality from its mere formal possibility, from its inscription as simply a figure or idea of 'judgement' within the open play of figuration in general. - The scheme is of course a direct analogue of Aristotle's σοφία - the participation in self-positing σοφίας - which, in the figure of distinction of logical distinction and its actuality, frames the logical articulation of aristotelian Kosmos.

Over the years 1794-1800, Fichte worked back, as it were, from this primary frame of 'Science', theoretical knowledge, to the figure of its inscription in the very Kosmos formally articulated within it. Here again we find the primary expression of this theoretical circuit, familiar since Aristotle's inscription of the part of the 'theory' of Kosmos in Kosmos, in the circuit of Community or Culture (in the broadest sense). And by 1800, just as Schiller had moved from the theoretical poetic of 1794-5 into his part in the application of this poetic in or to German Culture (this in his association with Goethe in the reform of German drama), so Fichte had moved from his first discovery of the working of 'I', to his part in the assertion of a 'German' Culture. In the latter case, the transition from the initial framing of a Wissenschaftslehre to Fichte's identification of his 'part' in Germany, passes through the formal poetic of Kosmos, the formal figure of an abstract kantian Community of Ends, while Schiller's move from the poeticics
of 1794-5 to the implication of 'aesthetic education' in the actual context of its 'theory' (presented in the *Briefe...*) moves through the complementary abstraction of historical dramas or dramatised history.

In 1796 Fichte published his *Grundlage des Natursechfts*, inscribing the circuit of Community in the frame of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, as the formal interface of finite individual 'I' and infinite ideal 'I' in which each individual participates. In 1798 he published a *System der Sittenlehre*, framing the part of our activity in this mirroring of finite and infinite 'I'. The following year he was accused of atheism: he had insisted that the working of the transcendental Idea of distinction of Actuality and Possibility, God, could not properly be identified with some part in the finite configuration of any story, any representation, any 'poetic' frame. Any attempt to inscribe that Idea in a story amounts to idolatry: I AM must and can only be truly found at work in the interplay of moral and natural orders of Community. Fichte threatened to resign his chair if he were not permitted to pursue reflection wherever it might lead: this was a moral imperative. Under pressure from the saxon government the councillors of Saxe-Weimar, Goethe among them, took this threat as an offer of resignation, and promptly accepted it, naming the young Schelling, a lecturer from 1798, as Fichte's successor. The latter, bewildered, moved to the prussian capital, Berlin, where in 1800 he published popular lectures (for a general rather than an 'academic' audience) 'on the vocation of Man'.

With the victory of Napoleon at Jena in 1806, and the closure of the university, Berlin became the intellectual and political focus of german resistance to french domination - and this self-assertion of a deutsche Nation was focussed in 1807-8 in Fichte's *Reden* - his Addresses to the German Nation of Luther. The move from Jena to Berlin marks a transition from the formal circuit of 'academic' reflection, through the recognition in 1799 of the moral inscription of this abstract circuit in a wider circuit of community, to the demand in 1807 for a new educational institution which would embody reflection in the moral order of this wider frame. The prussian king asked Fichte to draw up the constitution of a University of Berlin, which was established in 1810, and Fichte, as professor of philosophy, unanimously chosen by his fel-
low professors, Wilhelm von Humboldt and Schleiermacher among them.

Fichte's death in 1814 from a fever caught from his wife, who was nursing those wounded in the War of Prussian Independence from France, might be taken to mark the close of a transition from the mid-eighties to the new order after Waterloo. That 'transition' might in its turn be inscribed in a wider transition from about 1770 to about 1830 — to another French revolution (with a 'poetic' revolution from Classic to 'Romantique' as one component, the reform of the University another) — to the deaths of Goethe and Hegel, to the Reform of English government, and to much else. The consideration of these nineteenth-century developments belongs of course to the next 'Part' of this narrative, the transition to which I have already focussed in Novalis' Blue Flower — its 'Symbol', as it were. I took that 'symbol' to organise the transformation of Novalis' 'part' between 1798 to 1802; the 'poetic' configuration of that transition or transformation involves, as one component — as its 'logical' order — Schelling's parallel account of the 'Symbol' which, in the logical order marks a transition from Fichte's frame of 1794 to the intellectual frame succeeding the Battle of Jena in 1806 — Hegel's marking of his distance from Schelling's closed circuit of abstraction, as he moves from the now-closed university to edit a newspaper, and Fichte defines the part of the University in a new German Society.

In many ways the transition from the 'nineties to the first decade of the following century corresponds to a transition from a time of young men to older men. Schelling in 1795, at the age of nineteen, framed the part of a radical Reflection in the scheme of the Wissenschaftslehre (in an essay 'On the Possibility of Any Form of Philosophy'). Over the years 1796-8, while Fichte was articulating the formal mirroring of finite 'I' and infinite 'I' in the frame of Kantian Community, Schelling (in his Letters on Dornatism and Criticism) was defining the participation of the 'working' of the Transcendental Idea of the individual Soul and a correlative Kosmos in the more radical 'working' of the distinction of Actuality and Possibility as 'intellectual intuition', a direct, non-discursive, Knowledge, a 'position' involved in the critical definition of 'experience' itself. By 1800, when he had succeeded Fichte at Jena, he had framed the inscription of Nature in the working of the Idea of
Kosmos (Spekulative Physik), and Spirit in the working of the Idea of Self (Fichte's 'I'), and proposed the integration of these complementary 'workings' or actualities in a common working or poetic of Symbol. This correlation of the transcendental Ideas in a 'system of Transcendental Idealism' (1800) marks the transition to an Identitätspolenohie articulated in a unitary 'symbolic' logic which parallels the transition marked in Fichte's reflection by his move to Berlin, as also the transition announced by his friend Hegel, in a letter of November 2 of that year 'from the Ideal of youth... to a System' (1).

'The Ideal of youth': Hegel was thirty. But Schelling was only twenty-five. His associates Novalis and Schhylding were both twenty-eight. Hegel's career was just beginning, Novalis' closing. The transition from one century to the next embodies as it were the figure of an 'education' which, in the aristotelian scheme of Society already compared with that of Fichte, amounts to the individual's distinction of his part from its imaginary identification with some story – the individual emerging, as it were, from the 'theatre' of adolescence into a recognition of a definite part in Society. Novalis' part was, in what would have been his thirty-first year, to become identified with a character in Schlegel and Tieck's 'story' of Novalis – the poetic circuit of the romantic scheme closed, in the inscription of the author in that circuit as one component. Hegel's part was to inscribe his abstraction from such a 'romantic' identification as one component in the closed circuit of the Enzyklopädie that Friedrich Schlegel had identified as the logical counterpart of the romantic novel.

The german 'revolution' of the Jena Romantics was (as earlier in Schlegel's fragment of 1798) reflected 'outwardly' in the assumption of power in France on the ninth of November 1799 by the thirty-year-old Bonaparte. As in Germany the 'play' of figure – Schiller's Spieltrieb of 1795, mediate between a logical Formtrieb of Reason and a physical Stofftrieb of Sense – was leading, in the configuration of Novalis' 'fragments', to the articulation of this play in the figure of Symbol, and the logical identification of the part of the logical order as one component in a primary 'symbolic' order, so 'outwardly' the interplay of forces in a french 'revolution' was leading to their integration in a new cen-
terisation of the French order, focused in a man of thirty. In the parallel German 'play' of fragmentary 'romantic' figuration, converging toward the closed figuration, the circuit, of the romantic Roman on the one hand, and toward the complementary logical or critical determination of the Symbol as frame of the romantic poetic on the other, the (or a) relation of the romantic 'revolution' focused in this point of convergence to the French Revolution of its context itself enters into the 'romantic movement' or romantic revolution as one component - just as that German 'Romanticism' in turn enters (for example in the person of Fichte in Prussia, or August-Wilhelm Schlegel in Austria) into the political configuration. One might take Novalis' Die Christenheit oder Europa as a project for such an entry of romanticism into its European context: In the autumn of 1799, Novalis was assembling materials for the canonical Roman, set in the thirteenth century, with as its central character the Minnesinger Heinrich von Ofterdingen. The frame of the novel was to be the integration of the various orders of the thirteenth-century Kosmos in the idealised poetic of a Christian mystery, in which a story contains as one component its part in the World it describes - a mystery, then, framed in the divine Word as absolute Symbol, a figure which embodies the distinction of its actuality from its mere possibility. In the working of this Christian story or mystery in the thirteenth century Novalis found a reflection or prefiguration of the new order that was to emerge from the play of forces opened up by the French Revolution. This chaotic play was itself to be seen as the limiting fragmentation of the medieval order - the figure of this fragmentation itself embodied in a German Reformation which had broken, as it were, the closed circuit of the thirteenth-century scheme. In the play of forces that outwardly mirrored the play of figures in the romantic Fragments, a new order was to be articulated within the radical figure and force of the mystery of the Word - a new order of which the romantic revolution and the French revolution would be seen as two complementary components, as in Schlegel's celebrated Fragment quoted above. The essay was to have been published in the Athenäum of Spring, 1800, but Goethe advised August-Wilhelm Schlegel against this.

In the framing of German reflection from Leibniz through
Wolff and Kant to Fichte, the same figure of an 'ontological' distinction of Actuality from the open Economy of Possibility recurs to frame each new 'system'. I have already suggested that this primary figure of 'german' reflection corresponds to the inscription of the 'logical' order of Reflection within the dominant 'physical' economy of its context... this dominant economy of german Culture since the medieval Holy Roman Empire complementing the predominantly 'logical' articulation of french policy. In the configuration of 1800 Schelling inscribes this german order of reflection as one side of a more radical 'poetic' or 'symbolic' order, in which the distinction of Actual and Possible is itself inscribed in the play or natural Economy of figuration from which it distinguishes itself, just as this 'play' or Nature is in turn given a certain 'actuality'.

'Play': Spiel, like a drama or Schauspiel in which the figure of spectator is itself 'in play'... in which everyone is an 'actor'... Spiel: the interplay of Reason and Sense, Spirit and Nature, which Schiller had identified in 1795 as more radical than Kant's formal Reason or rationality... a play of figures in which Actuality is at work in the figure of distinction of Actual and Possible, whether in our activity which decides among various possible actions, or in the actuality of a situation which turns out to correspond to one of various possible 'constructions'.

... And this logical identification of the part of the logical order of Reflection in a 'universal poetic', in Germany, is in turn one component of a wider transition of Novalis' Europa into a new, nineteenth-century, 'poetic' and Culture...

... or is it?... Is not such a play of figures: Reflection, Germany, France, Revolution, Play, Poetic and so on... is that not some 'romantic' abstraction... some symmetrical story abstracted from the open play of an unlimited range of other constructions or reconstructions of this 'revolutionary' period? Abstracted just as Novalis' idealised thirteenth century is abstracted
from what really happened five-and-a-half centuries before?

Here again we find the framing of a certain phase or configuration of Reflection mirrored in the very Reflection it frames. Again the question which attaches to this framing of a certain phase appears to frame the succeeding phase. I have tried to characterise a romantic 'focus' of 1800 at Jena - in the group around the Athenäum - in terms of the play of figures which appears in the fragments of 1798, and which converges, by 1800, into complementary 'logical' and 'poetic' circuits of Enzyklopädie and Roman - philosophy, as one of the fragments had announced (1) the theory of poetry, poetry the embodiment of philosophy. I suggested that Novalis plays a focal part in this configuration - seventy years later the historian of the 'Romantic School' would take the association of Novalis with the Schegels from 1798-1801 as marking an epoch in the story of the 'movement', of that transition from eighteenth to nineteenth century(2). But that framing of the 'School' itself belongs to the german 'historical school' of the nineteenth century, and cannot be considered here...

...Novalis as a focal figure: I have suggested how the transition from one century to the next is reflected in the way that the young romantic, dying halfway through the writing of the absolute romantic Novel, Roman, himself becomes a 'romanticised' character. But that figure is only one component of his focal part. It was Novalis, above all the others, who wrote fragments... with Heinrich von Ofterdingen (whose close Tieck tried to frame in 1802) as simply a sort of limiting fragment. In his imagination, around the turn of the century, was carried on a play of figures of almost every order which reflects in a focal manner the play of forces outside from which the frame of the nineteenth century was to emerge. By far the greater part of the material he left behind, from which Friedrich Schlegel and Tieck published two volumes of Werke the year after his death, consisted of fragments. As I have already noted, these editors constructed a configuration of selected fragments that would embody their own version of Novalis' part in the fragments, just as Schlegel had 'edited' other fragments in 1798. Thus, for example, a great mass of mathematical and scientific fragments were abstracted from altogether, and one might easily fail to find in them the...
Assessor of the saxon salt-mines from 1796, the student of chemistry under Wiegleb, of geology with Werner, the student of Paracelsus who had studied, like him and Agricola, in the german mines, in that interface of german Culture and Nature, as also in the mathematical works of Lagrange and Laplace:

Die Mathematik ist gleichsam eine sinnliche Logik, sie verhält sich zur Philosophie wie die materiellen Künste, Musik und Plastik, zur Poesie (1)

Mathematics is a perceptible logic - it stands in relation to philosophy as the concrete arts - plastic and musical - to poetry.

In the general play of analogy - the 'magic wand of analogy' which allows the correlation of thirteenth century and close of the eighteenth century in Die Christenheit oder Europa (2) - mathematics appears in the figure of an applied logic, just as music appears as a kind of applied poetic. In the mathematical fragments of 1798, this 'applied logic' is found to be the frame of Kosmos, a pure 'symbolism' articulated in relation to the 'sign', Zeichen, simply as such:

Die ganze Mathematik ist eigentlich eine Gleichung im großen für die andern Wissenschaften. Was ihr die Logarithmen sind, das ist sie den andern Wissenschaften (3)

Mathematics as a whole is truly equivalent on a wider scale to the other sciences. What logarithms are to it, so is it to the other sciences.

Mathematics is the eigentliche Element des Magiers, the true domain of the magician, the radical frame of magical actuality, an actuality which asserts itself in the figure of distinction from the play of figure.

X: Gott ist.. das personisierte X ... (4)

X: God is.. X personified

... 'X', Kant's nommenon, a simple position like the initial

The life of the gods is mathematics. Pure mathematics is religion. One accedes to mathematics only through a theophany.

The element of the universal poetic is the sign:

Die idealischen, repräsentativen Elemente sind die Zeichen - die Zeichen sind also ebenfalls materiell. Die Ordnung der Zeichen muss also der Ordnung der Elementarheitigkeiten - so wie die Zeichen diese Elemente selbst - analogisch (allegorisch) entsprechen. Die Urthätigkeit wird durch einen Begriff von sich selbst elementarisirt. Die Welt oder das Resultat dieser Elementarisierung ist diesem Urbegriffe (diese Urreflexion) conform... Die Wissenschaft von den Weltelementen ist ein der Welt simultanes Produkt.

The ideal representative Elements are signs - and signs are thus equally material. The order of signs must thus correspond analogically (allegorically) to the order of elementary facts - just as the signs correspond to these very elements. The primary Fact must correspond to an elementary concept of itself. The World, or result of this elementary correlation conforms to this primary conception (this primary reflection). The Science of the world-elements is produced simultaneously with the World.

... Again, this primary actuality of self-position corresponds to Kant's working of the transcendental Ideas:

Antinomien sind Urgleichungen... eine antinomische Frage kann sich der Frager selbst antworten - und lediglich nur selbst. Eine solche Frage ist also Erinnerungsanlass an die Selbstmachtan das Prinzip was die Welt geschaffen hat. Durch eine solche Frage nöthigt sich der Frager zur absoluten Selbstgleiderung - zum Echtsynthetischen (simultanen), philosophischen oder...
Antinomies are primary equations. The questioner himself can answer an antinomic question - and, indeed, only he. Thus such a question is a reminding mark of self-activity - of the principle which has created the World. Through such a question the questioner must arrive at absolute self-participation - at purely synthetic (simultaneous) philosophical or genial productive thought. Thus does man awake his genius. The silly questions of children now appear in a wholly different light. One can say: the World has arisen from a silly question.

Fragments: a play of figures, of forms - of Zeichen, in the limit, with their two sides, ideal and material... a play in which the figures by which this 'play' is characterised are themselves components, are themselves inextricably involved.

Friedrich von Hardenberg enters into this play as the 'Novalis' which, who, marks the part of author in the subscription to the first Athenäum fragments. 'The Prophet of Romanticism': playing the part in that Universal Poetic of the locus of its assertion, as earlier prophets had played the part in their framing of the World, of the locus of assertion in that frame of the frame. Schiller's 'genius', framing its part of framing the situation, in the radical 'play' of frames which is this World. Fichte's self-activity of 'I'.

In the configuration of 1800, this 'Novalis' - this character or figure - may be taken as a 'focus' about which or whom the various other leading 'parts' or 'figures' of the 'Romantic Movement' may be organised. The frame or poetic 'space' (or spatiotemporality) of this romantic configuration or constellation may be characterised in terms of various figures of self-assertion in the open play of fragmentary figures, converging at the turn of the century in various 'versions' of the figure of distinction in and from this 'play', of Actuality. I have already noted the 'versions' of Fichte, Schiller, Schelling, Hegel, Friedrich Schlegel... in each case a part in the
transition from one century to the next (so to speak) is defined relative to the common Jena group between 1799 and 1801 - each of these 'figures' of the Romantic movement finds its 'part' as self-assertion in the assertion of some radical frame of this self-assertion or self-activity - each discovers his particular Genie.

... And Novalis, at work on the Book, from 1799 to 1801, plays the part of self-assertion in the frame of the 'Universal Poetic', of which each of these figures are as it were analogous or parallel 'versions'. Novalis' part defines itself as the focus of the interplay of these 'versions', and is in turn incorporated, after his death - which amounts to an essential component of his 'tragic' part - in various forms in these various 'versions', as they are consolidated in the early years of the nineteenth century. I have already noted this interplay in the cases of Friedrich Schlegel and Tieck. Equally important, perhaps, is the figure of Schleiermacher, who at the age of thirty defined his position at Berlin (where he was in close correspondence with the Jena group, most notably with Friedrich Schlegel) in his addresses (Reden über die Religion) which Novalis had studied upon their publication in 1799, and whose identification of the Christian God as the primary figure of the framing of Actuality within the play of Possibility, and of Community as articulated in this primary axis of Actuality, is a fundamental component in Novalis' vision of 1799-1801. In the second edition of the Reden, after Novalis' death, Schleiermacher in his turn drew a parallel or analogy between Spinoza's self-inscription in the frame of his theology, and Novalis' self-inscription in the poetic which this self-inscription defined and by which it was defined.

One might further proceed, in the romantic fashion, to consider Novalis in relation to a figure who marks as it were another pole of the 'romantic' configuration. Hölderlin, born in 1770, and who studied theology at Tübingen with Hegel and Schelling before moving to Jena, where he associated with Fichte and Schiller from 1793-5 - and where he and Fichte met Novalis in the summer of 1795 - was from 1798 to 1802 working on the drama of Der Tod des Empedokles, set in an idealised Greece that parallels Novalis' idealised Middle Ages. Novalis' death in 1801 is paralleled by the fragmentation over the period 1798-1802 of Hölderlin's identity - as the part of 'author' becomes as it were lost in the fragmentation of his text, up to the point where, in the year of the
battle of Jena, the figure of the 'author', of 'Hölderlin', is no longer in a position to frame even the most fragmentary text, and is lost in silence.

One might then extend the configuration further, outside of the german 'poetic' framed at Jena in the Athenaeum, into the figuration of the mathematics and natural science that Novalis identifies as sinnliche Logik, as the formal frame of the Universal Poetic. In this correlation of philosophy and mathematics in a universal poetic whose element is the open play of figure (mathematical, philosophical, musical, medical, chemical, magical, and all the rest) one may see a wider convergence of 'parallel eighteenth-century currents, of which 'poetic' and 'logical' in Germany from 1770 to 1800, along with, say, german and french reflection over this period - the close of this 'second Part' of a historical dynamic of Reflection - are themselves complementary components.

Thus I have noted the part of the figures of French Revolution and german self-consciousness in the fragmentary play which prefigures the poetic of 1800, and I have noted the part of the mathematics of Lagrange and Laplace in Novalis' Universalpoesie. I have also suggested that this german poetic in which logical and poetic orders meet as two sides of dramatic 'romantic' activity may itself be considered as inscribed in the figure of a german reflection framed in an initial or constitutive assertion of the logical order within a cultural 'economy' dominated by the 'physical' economy of Germany after the Thirty-Years War.

I traced parallel figures of Reflection within the cultural frames of a Britain dominated by Law, and a France dominated by the logical order of centralised Policy, up to the last third of the eighteenth century. It remains now only to inscribe the figure of german Romantik in a wider and symmetrical cultural frame of 1800, of which it is one component. - 'Symmetrical', in that one must find the part of the 'romantic' determination of the relations of French Revolution, for example, and abstract 'romantic' revolution, in a configuration
in which that abstract determination is itself inscribed in the 'physical' context of French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars.
In *Die Christenheit oder Europa*, Novalis mirrors the configuration of Europe at the turn of the century— in the month of Napoleon's seizure of power, November 1799— in the configuration of the thirteenth century, the time of Frederick II, in the library of whose biographer (General von Funk) Novalis was at this time working, preparing the materials for his Book:

> An die Geschichte verweise Ich euch, forsch in ihrem belehrenden Zusammenhang, nach ähnlichen Zeitpunkten, und lernt den Zaub erstab der Analogie gebrauchen. (1)

I direct you to history—look in its instructive coherence for similar points in time, and learn to use the magic wand of analogy.

... We know how Friedrich Schlegel saw the reflection of the romantic revolution in the French Revolution from the 'high broad standpoint of the history of Man', and how in the same play of figures, the *Fragmente* of 1798, the romantic poetic was to 'make life and society poetic' and 'become a mirror of the whole surrounding World, a picture of the Age'. I found, at the outset of this 'Part' the figure of the individual's self-discovery as instance of choice, self-activity, in the meeting or mirroring of logical and theological figures in mid-thirteenth-century Paris, in the frame of the University; I traced the unfolding of this 'initial point', in which the logical instance of judgement judged itself to be at the focus of a dramatic order of individual activity, through the parallel developments of pictorial and narrative perspectives to the convergence of these at the beginning of the sixteenth century, to the individual's self-discovery, around the end of the Thirty-Years War, as one pole of a mathematical frame of Experience and Experiment, this self-discovery taking different forms, for example, in the different cultural frames of France and England: in the former case the scheme of identification was framed in a logical order of determination of the relations of logical and physical orders, in the latter in a 'poetic' or dramatic order of two-sided experience and experiment.

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n: *Die Christenheit oder Europa*—Schriften² III, p518
The 'Scientific Revolution' of the seventeenth century, dominated by these complementary English and French ('poetic' and 'logical') components, may be taken as a configuration which 'mirrors' as it were the initial point or question of individual self-discovery in the thirteenth century, and (to use Novalis' expression) the 'analogous' figure of individual self-assertion which closes the eighteenth. At Jena - or rather in the configuration of German Romantik focussed at the turn of the century at Jena - this self-assertion appears in the German (indeed 'Saxon') form of the logical inscription of a radical or initial logical self-distinction of the logical order from and in a 'physical' economy of the play of figure, in the 'poetic' order of mirroring of these complementary physical and logical sides. We might say that this 'romantic' figure of individuality is framed logically by Schelling and poetically by Novalis. This 'romantic' configuration may in turn be regarded as one primary component of the discovery of the poetic order framed in the community of European Culture as a question. This German version of the question is itself one component of the more general order of the question relative to the circuit of European culture as such. In this more general order the German version of the question reflects the part of German culture as one side, one component of that 'European' Culture, of Novalis' *Europa*. Thus we may attempt to as it were 'step back' from this German version to the more general question, through the correlation of the figure the question takes in Germany, and the part of Germany in the configuration of European Culture at the turn of that century. And then we find that the German abstraction of the play of figure from the play of forces of which this force or figure of German abstraction is one component can itself be regarded, indeed, as a representation, a Bild of the Age, a mirror of the surrounding World... ein Spiegel der ganzen umgebenden Welt.

Stepping then from the German side of the European Mirror to the complementary French order of its outward context, we find Napoleon at the age of thirty dominating the physical configuration of the European Culture of November 1799; we find Laplace presenting to the First Consul the first volumes of the Mecanique Celeste, in which he frames the mechanical *Système du Monde* in terms of Lagrange's analytical mechanics - a mathematical 'poetic' of the physical Kosmos.
Laplace went in state to beg Napoleon to accept a copy of his work, and the following account of the interview is well authenticated, and so characteristic of the parties concerned that I quote it in full. Someone had told Napoleon that the book contained no mention of the name of God; Napoleon, who was fond of putting embarrassing questions, received it with the remark, 'M. Laplace, they tell me you have written this large book on the system of the universe, and have never even mentioned the Creator'. Laplace, who, though the most supple of politicians, was as stiff as a martyr on every point of his philosophy, drew himself up and answered bluntly, 'Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là'. Napoleon, greatly amused, told this reply to Lagrange, who exclaimed, 'Ah, c'est une belle hypothèse; ça explique beaucoup de choses'. (1)

Meanwhile, in the Institut National set up by the Directory in 1795, the work of Lagrange and Laplace in the Classe des Sciences was paralleled by the group around Destutt de Tracy and Cabanis in the Classe des Sciences Morales et Politiques. While the convergence of the mathematical researches of the eighteenth century towards the synthesis, the 'mathematical poetic' of Lagrange and Laplace can be traced from d'Alembert's general framing of mechanical systems around the middle of the century, the work of the Idéologues at the Institut represents a parallel convergence of the work associated with the other side of the Encyclopédie. In 1748 appeared Montesquieu's Esprit des Lois and La Mettrie's L'Homme Machine, in the following year Diderot's prospectus for the Encyclopédie, and in 1751 the first volume, prefaced by D'Alembert's Discours Prélable to the whole work. In 1770 appeared Holbach's Système de la Nature. Towards 1800 the Ideologues were attempting the systematic organisation of the philosophes' psychology in terms of an elementary idée, the sensation identified by Condillac as the interface of 'physical' and 'moral' orders at the surface of the body (or Condillac's notionnal statue), and the systematic articulation of the political order in the natural economy of this interface through Rousseau's figure of the Social Contract, and Montesquieu's analysis of the interface of Culture and Nature. They set themselves the project of establishing a systematic social order which would correspond to the new language or idéographie whose elementary terms would be reducible to the interface of natural and moral orders in sensations.
and whose articulation would mirror the articulation of Nature in that of Thought.

Around the turn of the century, then, the Universal Poetic of Germany was mirrored in a French Ideology and its project of universal rational representation and reform of the world-order. Each of these two components of the new dramatic order of European Culture at the time of Napoleon’s 18 Brumaire was framed by a logical inscription of the logical order in the poetic order of symmetry of logical and physical, 'moral' and 'natural' — this whether it be in Novalis’ poetic, Schelling’s philosophy, Laplace’s Celestial Mechanics or Cabanis’ Rapports du Physique et du Morale chez l’Homme of 1797–1802. At Paris this radical figure of the logical inscription of the logical and physical orders in the poetic order of their symmetry was determined in terms of a formal interface of inner and outer, according to the common figure of logical determination of the relations of logical and physical that runs from Descartes through Condillac to the idéologues. In Germany it was determined, on the other hand, in terms of the inscription of the logical order of distinction of logical and physical in a natural economy of the play of figure, in the tradition of Leibniz, Wolff and Kant. In each case the 'logical' or philosophical framing of the general 'poetic' of the world corresponds, as in Novalis’ figure of the relations of logical and mathematical orders, to a formal mathematical frame. At Paris at the turn of the century Lagrange, President of the Commission of Weights and Measures established to systematise the elementary mathematics which frames society, and professor at the new École Polytechnique instituted as the scientific school of the new Republic, was at work on the systematisation of the differential and integral Calculus of Leibniz and his successors in France and Germany; Laplace (as already noted) was at work on the mathematicalisation of the physical Kosmos. The young Gauss, twenty-three years old, sent from Brunswick to the Institut, in 1800, a memoir which effected a parallel systematisation of the Theory of Numbers, but this was rejected and returned to Gauss who published it in Germany as Disquisitiones Arithmeticae in the following year.
I have not attempted to trace the developments of the mathematical frame of the eighteenth century which parallel the 'logical' developments sketched already. Nor have I attempted to trace the various parallel developments of 'experimental' science from the identification of the figure of experientia in the seventeenth century through to the more radical integration of logical and 'poetic' orders around 1800. It should be fairly clear from the principles already discussed how the various components of 'applied' science or reflection might be traced in a parallel development to the formal mathematical frame which is eine Gleichung im großen für die andern Wissenschaften, and how the parallel developments of logical and mathematical frames from 1650 to 1800 might be articulated in the figure of mathematics as 'applied logic' developed at some length in Part One of this book. The primary figures in this complex development from mid-seventeenth century to around 1800 are set out in a table at the end of this Second Part. I will here note just a few of the most elementary characteristics of the period, illustrated by that table.

First of all, the parallel development of philosophy in the restricted sense of abstract Reflection, and mathematics and the 'applied' Reflection of chemistry, medicine and so on, in France, is brought out fairly clearly from the middle of the eighteenth century in the Encyclopédie, and the complementary parts of Diderot and D'Alembert as editors (this relation being reflected, in Diderot's perspective, in the Rêve d'Alembert and the Dialogue entre Diderot et D'Alembert). Diderot's part in framing the Encyclopédie is mirrored in D'Alembert's general framing of a mechanical system, and his framing, within the Encyclopédie of the scientific articles. In a wider context, this collaboration of Diderot and D'Alembert is reflected at the middle of the century in Frederick the Great's reorganisation of the Berlin Academy established by Leibniz in 1700. Maupertuis was made president in the remodelled academy of 1750; the following year he enunciated the Principle of Least Action which, with D'Alembert's general figure of a mechanical system, was to frame the analytic mechanics of Lagrange, and through it Laplace's Système du Monde. Euler, working at Berlin, published in 1748 his Analysis Infinitorum, the frame of his systematic integration of the differential and integral Calculus of Leibniz' school, over the
The calculus of variations — the mathematical frame of application of Maupertuis' Principle of Least Action, was established in a series of papers beginning with Euler's in 1741, extended by those of Euler and D'Alembert in the 'forties and 'fifties, and systematised in Lagrange's first work in 1759. In general one may say that over the middle years of the century Euler coordinated the various developments of the mathematical frame defined by the introduction of cartesian geometry and Fermat and Cavalieri's 'infinitesimals' around the middle of the previous century, while D'Alembert at Paris outlined the logical articulation of a frame in which Euler's coordination was to be unified by Lagrange, Laplace and Gauss. This interaction of French and German mathematicians at the middle of the century may be taken as the midpoint of the development from Leibniz and l'Hôpital at the close of the previous century: the 'continental' school of the eighteenth century derives from the work of Leibniz over the last thirty years of the seventeenth century, and the transmission of this work through his German-Swiss pupils John and James Bernouilli was framed by l'Hôpital's first attempt at a unitary presentation of the principles of the new Analysis or Calculus in 1696. In the last thirty years of the seventeenth century European mathematics were dominated by Leibniz and Newton; the acrimonious dispute between their respective disciples over the rival claims of these two figures to the invention of the differential 'calculus' marks the break of English and continental schools at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and the rejection by the English school of Leibniz' combinatorial methods, in which the developments of Analysis in the eighteenth century were to be effected. English mathematics then ceases to play an important part in the development of that science until continental methods are introduced over the first thirty years of the nineteenth century.

In the 'practical' or experimental sciences and arts, on the other hand, Britain comes over the eighteenth century to achieve a dominant position. The integration of logical and physical orders whose French and German expressions at the close of the century have been noted appear in Britain in the machines which mark an 'industrial revolution' comparable to the political revolution on the continent. The dominant 'logic' was the 'common sense' of the 'Scottish school' of Hume's successors and critics, paralleled outside the educational and political institutions by the programme of Reform of the Philosophical Radicals, the followers of Bentham.
This English reform parallels the revolutionary 'poetic' of the continent: the systematic articulation of society in the frame of Law is to be worked out in terms of the inscription of that primary circuit or frame in a natural 'economy' of ends whose element is taken to be the simple figure of an action directed towards satisfaction, pleasure - 'happiness'. Adam Smith's rational economy of the material component of this satisfaction of wants and needs, itself articulated in a sort of humean working of monetary tokens or signs, is to be extended to the more general 'constitution' of society, of which the material economy is one side or component. Priestley, with his sympathy for the principles of the American and French revolutions, and his association with Watt and the other leaders of the 'industrial revolution', might be taken as representative of the 'radical' tendencies in England towards the end of the century, when he was forced to emigrate to America.

The convulsion of the European order which marks the transition from one century to the next (as from this Second Part to the Third) may be characterized in terms of a 'logical' order of interaction of the various American, English, German and French principles of reform and revolution which reflects and in part determines the political configuration of the context in which different principles dominate in different components - England, France, Germany (and indeed America) - of the 'outward' context. I have taken the German poetics of a 'romantic' revolution, which were to play a leading part in the emergence of a new Prussian order out of the European convulsion, as an index of this wider European configuration, and have attempted to mark the figuration of that Romantik in terms of the Jena group and Novalis. In the wider frame this 'German' revolution enters as one figure into the French and English scene through the journey of Wordsworth and Coleridge to Germany in 1798-9 - between the first publication of their joint manifesto of poetic reform in 1798, and the extended second edition, with Wordsworth's preface in 1800 - the year in which Coleridge published his translation of Schiller's Wallenstein, joined William and Dorothy in the Lakes (where they had settled the previous year, upon returning from Germany independently of their friend), and began to be drawn into the imaginary world of Opium. - Into the French
scene through Madame de Staël's *De la Littérature considérée dans ses Rapports avec les Institutions Sociales* of 1800, and her association with August Wilhelm Schlegel from 1804. The principles of the French Revolution, on the other hand, entered into the frame of English Reform through the American (or 'cosmopolitan') Tom Paine's *The Rights of Man* of 1791-2... and the complex interaction of European Reflection with its context over the transition from one century to the next might be traced in a play of logical configurations and configurations of their context, from which the already complex interplay of the *Fragment* would constitute an abstraction correlated with the outward play of forces at Jena that were to lead to the decisive battle of 1806 and the closure of the university the following year. On the other hand, the discovery by Napoleon of his focal part in the primary physical economy of that context constitutes a complementary component, equally 'abstracted' from the more general play of logical and 'physical' orders of European Culture – of the European Community – as a whole. Then one might consider, for example, the failure of Napoleon in 1807 to dominate the English framing of resistance after Jena through his attempt – the 'Continental System' – to close continental Europe to English trade – to dominate the European economy in such a way as to exclude the 'poetic' frame of English resistance through a political control of the relation between political and economic orders in Europe. Over the period of the great European convulsion, it is rather the English 'working' of an interplay of political and economic orders, framed in the physical order of literal 'isolation', which – after the setback of the American Revolution – is reasserted in a more radical domination of the interface of Europe and colonies. – This prefigured in the results of the German conflicts of mid-century, and now framed in the 'poetic' of mechanisation – 'industrialisation' – whose elementary component, mechanical power, is incorporated in the new order at the beginning of the century. As half-a-century before, it is an Anglo-Prussian alliance which eventually overcomes a Franco-Austrian alliance, and it is the rise of England and Prussia which dominates the following century.

I will not attempt to analyse the detail of the interaction of the various orders of the European convulsion I take to mark a transition from one phase of Reflection, beginning in the thirteenth century, to the next, covering nineteenth and twentieth cent-
uries. I will here close this Second part with the simple characterisation of the transition from eighteenth to nineteenth century, and from one phase of Reflection to another, as yet again a question, posed now by the 'poetic' order of symmetry and correlation of the various versions of this newly discovered order, and their revolutionary implications. For the moment this 'order' of interplay of its different 'versions' with one another, in their various contexts, must remain a question, since we cannot simply characterise this order 'from one side' or the other, but as yet have no way of characterising it in a more radical and symmetrical way, save as the question it presents of how to so characterise 'it'.

... For to speak or write of a common 'poetic' or dramatic cultural frame, with its physical component inscribed simply in the geographical boundary and boundaries of Europe (and now we must consider this 'Europe' to have as it were two sides, for the transition from Second to Third Part involves the assertion of an independant 'american' theatre of interplay of Reflection and Context, which at once 'belongs' to the european order from which its principles derive, but at the same time somehow stands 'outside' it) is not so much to define the relations of the various versions of this 'dramatic' order, as to mark their complementarity as a question: what does this 'Drama' mean?... Most particularly what does it mean to us? That is the question that must be somehow answered in the Conclusion, which considers the close of the third phase of Reflection around the end of the twentieth century - and this Third Part turns about the recognition in America, internally integrated, and at last entering into a part in the european order at the close of the nineteenth century, of the part in the 'meaning' of things of 'how they work', and our part in this working.