I have attempted to find, in the transition from nineteenth to twentieth century the pattern or structure of a 'period'. A period or circuit opening around 1870 and closing around 1930.

A 'period', a circuit or cycle or phase of development, in which various analogous strands or components unfold from an initial nexus or focus around 1870, exhibit analogous configurations of 'crisis' (analogous 'turning-points') around the turn of the century, and converge towards a new focus or nexus around 1930.

Over this 'period' a cyclical or periodic articulation is well reflected in the material 'economy' organised at the outset in the primary interface of Europe and colonial World, the relations of these two 'sides' of the World-Market (or economic frame) being primarily determined in Europe. Over the turn of the century - say from the Crash of 1873 to that of 1929 - America emerges as the primary locus in which the World-Economy is framed. This emergence may itself be broken down into various components - first of all, perhaps, into the fragmentation of the Economy built up from mid-century, and the reintegration of a new Economy after the 'bottom' of this process around the turn of the century... then this process of reintegration over the first thirty years of the twentieth century may itself be broken down in relation to the great European War as the principal focus of an economic restructuring of the World from which the New World emerged as that dominant focus reflected in the part of the Wall Street Crash in the opening of a new phase of fragmentation and subsequent rebuilding.

Within the overall cycle or 'long wave' of about fifty or sixty years, from the Great Depression of the eighteen-seventies and eighties to that of the nineteen-thirties, various more specific factors may be articulated - various subordinate 'actions' relating to specific components of the World Economy and specific periods within the cycle as a whole... various elements coordinated in the overall 'space-time' of the World Market as a whole.
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Such an analysis or breakdown of the 'action' or drama of the Economy over this period - corresponding to a 'story' of economic development, to an 'economic history' of the period - might be paralleled, it was suggested, by a story or history of the development of a complementary 'ideological' frame of activity. Indeed one might see in Weber's correlation of these two orders of ideology and economy, around the turn of the century, a primary component or factor in the ideological crisis which constitutes the transition from the thought of one century to that of the next.

One might then, further, begin to trace the interplay of these 'material' and 'mental' sides of activity over the turn of the century. These two sides of an activity, of the 'action' or drama of the period as a whole, in all its various sides or aspects, of an 'action' the recognition (in various different ways) of whose primacy over the twin abstractions of the purely 'mental' and purely 'material' itself might be taken to constitute a turning point in the action of the period as a whole.

- Or rather: the emergence, of whose primacy as an organizing frame, whether recognised or not, might be regarded as the most critical factor in the story or history of the period.

Within the period as a whole considered as an 'action', corresponding to the various accounts, stories, histories that might be constructed 'of' this unaccountably complex web of activity, we might then find a 'poetic' of the twentieth century, of the 'modern', which was articulated in the symmetric interplay of 'inner' and 'outer' worlds - of ideology and material economy. Then, articulating the mirroring of these inner and outer orders in our 'history' of the turn-of-the-century crisis, we might, for example, inscribe Weber's identification of such a mirroring as itself one 'theoretical' component of the ideological dimension or 'side' of the story or history.
... Yet here we come upon a paradox characteristic of the turn-of-the-century 'crisis' itself. Our frame or framing of the 'history', of the period, as a 'poetic' unity, is at once to articulate the symmetry or mirroring of 'inner' and 'outer' worlds, and at the same time to be inscribed as a 'theoretical' abstraction from the ideological order which is itself to be regarded as but one side 'abstracted' from the dramatic unity of the period.

The 'crisis' thus marks, as indeed we have already seen, the question of a transition from an 'abstract' theoretical 'poetic' or framing of action, to a poetic that recognises itself as (itself) an act of assertion in the drama it identifies.

This 'activist' or 'pragmatic' framing in which the act of framing asserts itself as one element of what it frames appears, as we saw, in various analogous forms in the various orders or 'dimensions' of turn-of-the-century Reflection, Theory. The 'abstract' form of the crisis or paradox is of course most clearly to be seen in the 'logic' which is the theoretical reconstruction or analysis of the structure of Theory simply as such. 'Mathematical' logic had begun, in the eighteen-seventies (in the papers of Dedekind, Cantor and Frege) to formally define the inclusion and exclusion - the logical 'in'-constitutive of logical order. Frege had assumed a primary principle or axiom of 'Extensionality': the 'intension' or sense of a predicate mirrored its 'extension', the 'set' of terms or individuals to which the predicate or concept applied. But (the question arose, with the enunciation of Russell's Paradox) could this very principle of abstraction, this logical 'in' which frames logical theory itself, itself be accepted as a definite 'concept' having a definite 'extension'? Can we abstract from the activity of abstraction itself to an 'in' which articulates a purely logical space?

If 'in' is itself definable as an abstract pole of logical or (more generally) theoretical 'abstraction', then the mathematical articulation of the sign of 'inclusion' (say, \( e \)) will mirror the 'concept' of inclusion in an extensional order of formulae of 'inclusion' which are \( \text{in} \) the extension of our radical term, \( e \), and those which are not (which are 'false', then). In particular, we will be able to determine whether ...
Russell's 'set' of all sets which are not included in themselves, is itself included or excluded from itself. But if it is included then (by definition) it isn't, and vice-versa. That is to say, the mirroring of 'intension' and 'extension' in relation to which the logical order logically defines or identifies itself, cannot itself be logically identified or defined. We cannot inscribe the mirroring of 'inner' and 'outer' in the abstract logical space of 'inside', in an interiority of meaning or conception; rather must we inscribe this logical order of abstraction, of logical 'inclusion', in the dynamic or working of the mathematical interface of 'intension' and 'extension', in the 'poetic' order of the sign, the mark. The logical order of abstraction, of formal Theory, will then reflect in this mathematical order the converse 'physical' dynamic, which in its turn cannot be supposed abstracted from the radical mirroring of physical and logical (or physical and psychological, or logical and ontological) in the mark.

'Mark': but we can no more abstract an intermediate 'poetic' order of the mark or sign, of mirroring of 'inner' and 'outer', from the dramatic or dynamic order of interplay of logical, physical and poetic. The 'logical' failure of abstraction itself attaches directly to the logical order of such an 'abstract' poetic. We can no more have a 'value-free' sociology of the mirroring of 'inner' and 'outer' orders of Society, than we can have a pure logic abstracted from the social use of signs. The period of transition from nineteenth to twentieth century just discussed, which turns about analogues of the logical crisis of Russell's Paradox, around the turn of the century, may be taken to close, in the domain or domains of theory, with Gödel's inscription of its logical frame in the mathematical order and its analogues in Dirac's physics, Heidegger's ontology, and so on.

Thus we may trace a 'logical' component of the period opening around 1870 and closing around 1930, which parallels ideological and economic components. But we cannot well attempt to simply 'frame' the whole period 'logically', say by logically determining a mirroring of this 'inner' logical circuit from Dedekind's set theory to...
kind to Gödel in its outward frame as determined by the physical theory of the period, and then inscribing intermediate orders of ideology, culture and economy in this formal mirroring. For it is precisely such an abstract framing of 'the World' in which that abstraction appears as one activity among others, which comes, logically, in question over the course of this period. We can only inscribe the circuit of logical theory as one component in the as yet indefinite 'dramatic' order of the period as a whole, as an index of parallel developments. - As one axis, so to speak, in relation to which other developments may be to some extent coordinated, rather than as a comprehensive logical space in which a systematic and unitary development might be supposed framed.

It is precisely that figure of the inscription of theory in an theoretical figure of mirroring of theory and context which constitutes the formal closure or circularity of the ideological domain. - Not that we might now expect to systematically deduce the ideology of 1870 or 1900 or 1930 from a contemporary logic: rather can we thus mark as it were an ideological 'coordinate' of a moment or conjuncture, indexed or marked by a certain 'logic' which frames the abstract form of the questions that may arise at that moment. The logical order of a period limits as it were what is 'open', what is in question, by expressing in the most abstract form what is thinkable then. It does not, except perhaps 'in theory' - in that abstract domain of comprehension, of 'in' - determine what precisely is in question, does not determine which questions will arise: rather is it a limiting abstraction: from the dramatic situation in which various things are 'open' to the participants. One thing (of course) which is always open is the part of the logician as critic - the part of insisting upon a logical approach to all questions that arise. One finds this ideal in play around 1930, for example, in the activity of the 'Vienna Circle' framed in the pursuit of approximation to an Ideal Language inscribed in a logical space itself abstracted from the imperfect
mirror of 'ordinary' language. If Wittgenstein's wartime attempt to embody this ideal in a particular text has been replaced by 1930 by a project of purification of ordinary language tending towards the ideal in the practically unattainable limit ('a point at infinity' determining the direction of the project), still any particular deviations from the moral imperative - most notably the heideggerian ontology whose circularity is almost a simple inversion of the viennese ideal - may be 'overcome... through the logical analysis of language'.

Yet the weakness of this viennese anti-ideology is the failure to recognise itself as a competing frame of analysis and deliberation among others - the blindness to its own ineluctable character of 'ideology'. The practical or actual frame of deliberation between the logician and the avowed ideologist is not so much 'logical' as dramatic. The logician must first persuade his audience to choose his logical frame of deliberation, before they can logically or 'rationally' decide between, say, Carnap and Rosenberg, or Carnap and Hitler. An extreme example of this conflict of logic and 'myth' is provided by the interplay of Schlick's part as the central figure of the 'Circle', and the part of one his students who shot him on the way to a lecture in 1936. In the conflict of Schlick's attempt to induce in or educe from the student rationality, and the part of this attempt in the student's paranoid framing of his own situation, it was Schlick whose logic was finally inscribed in the student's fantasy. This assassination of the professor who from his installation in Ernst Mach's chair in 1922 had formed the nucleus of the Circle might be taken as the prelude for the dissolution of the Circle upon Hitler's annexation of his native Austria two years later. Indeed the career of the Circle, and that of Hitler between Schlick's appointment (and the Munich Putsch) and the Anschluss might be taken as two parallel strands or components in a phase or period around 1930 (the critical date in either case) which constitutes a transition from the configuration of transition from nineteenth to twentieth century (say, 1870-1930) to that (say, 1930-1970) which turns about the mid-century configuration arising from Hitler's War.
In earlier characterising the close of the period extending from about 1870 to 1930, I have already noted the focal part in Germany of Rosenberg's systematisation of 'völkisch' theory (or ideology, mythology, 'Weltanschauung'). In the ideological order one may trace in Germany a development from 1870 to 1930 which parallels economic and 'theoretical' components of the period. One may trace, say, a line or axis of development from german unification in 1870 to the emergence of National Socialism as a critical force in 1930 through Chamberlain's Foundations of the Nineteenth Century of 1899 to Rosenberg's sequel of 1930, The Myth of the Twentieth Century. Here we move as it were to the interface between the abstract logical order of Theory, and the central cultural order of interplay of Theory and Context: into the ideological order of attempted framings of that indefinite interplay in a unitary scheme. Indeed we have just seen how this 'move' from logical to ideological registers or axes is also the recognition of 'logic', abstract Theory, as a sort of limiting frame of ideology - the ideology, indeed, of abstraction, governed by that 'Value of Truth' which is the paradoxical value of 'value-free' Science.

Now the ideological axis of 'german' culture from Bismarck through Chamberlain to Rosenberg closes with the latter's avowed inscription of his framing of the cultural mirroring of 'inner' and 'outer' orders of Culture in that frame - with the recognition in this circuity of the figure of 'myth'. Rosenberg proposes a Myth for the twentieth century as a frame of activity, of self-assertion in the open interplay of inner and outer, Spirit and Nature, which Chamberlain had proposed as a radical question at the turn of the century. The common frame of Chamberlain's question of the fate or future of Culture, and Rosenberg's answer, is a simple scheme of mirroring of 'inner' and 'outer' orders in World-History. World-History as a dynamic of community framing the interplay of an integrative spiritual or psychical force of coordinated group action, and a converse disruptive force. This radical polarity itself unfolds from Nature out of the primary community of Blood - for Rosenberg from a sort of germ of Culture in a hyperborean Eden. The primary force of integration, of that abstraction of community from wild Nature, lies in this germane, german, Blood. For in that Blood which frames the integration of individual activity in the primary end of integration and preservation
of the group, lies the germ of the recognition that it is by pur-
ifying this blood diluted by admixture of blood which is not germane,
that the group, and that principle of integration of activity which
is Culture, may alone be preserved. Chamberlain posed the question:
will this dilution proceed to the point where 'german' forces of
integration will be too weak to organise the restoration of purity,
too weak to integrate the activity of reintegration? Too weak to
organise the restoration of purity and so - precisely - of those
very forces which alone can direct the restoration?

In the second chapter of the second volume of Mein Kampf
Hitler identifies this question as the basic frame of the völkisch
'Movement' or Struggle, on which hangs the future of Man: History
is framed by the 'original sin' of 'bastardisation'. There must be
a twin process of restoration of Culture and Blood: Activity must
be integrated about the end of restoring the forces of integration,
which can in turn carry further the process of preparation of new
forces of integration; in particular the State must organise the
purification of aryan blood, from which purified stock the State
will recruit the agents of further purification. For it is in the
aryan germ of Culture, from aryan blood, that ultimately derive
those integrative or organisational forces which are required to
implement the eugenic programme, along with all the other program-
mes of integration, Gleichshaltung.

Rosenberg, of german blood, but born on the russian
Baltic and trained as an architect in Moscow, had left for Germ-
any during the Revolution, and by 1924 was serving as deputy for
the imprisoned Hitler. In the year, 1930, in which he presented
his systematic ideology or mythology of Blut und Boden, he became
the editor of the National Socialist journal. The previous year
he had organised the Kampfbund für das Kultur, the United Struggle
for Culture. In the year of Nazi assumption of power, he was ap-
pointed head of Foreign Policy; in the following year (1934), with
Hitler's engineering of the transition from parliamentary govern-
ment to Party State, Rosenberg became head of the Amt für der Über-
wachung der gesamten geistigen und weltanschaulichen Schulung und
Erziehung der NSDAP: Framing the individual's identification, then, of his part in the Struggle, the völkisch scheme. With the advance into the East in 1941, he was appointed Reichsminister for eastern occupied territories, in charge of the central element in the foreign policy already outlined in Mein Kampf: the colonisation of the slavs as first step in the expansion of German Land. In the fourth chapter of the first book, dictated by Hitler in prison after the failure of the 1923 uprising, the acquisition of this Lebensraum had been deduced as an imperative from the basic scheme. German culture must extend its agricultural base, its borders, and its population, otherwise the organisational principles it embodies will be diluted by the contrary principles embodied in other races growing elsewhere until all available land is exploited, and the German order will be dissolved by an overwhelming external majority, either by the imposition of democratic principles by a majority which controls a democratic order, or by a more patent conflict of armed force in which the majority will possess overwhelming numerical superiority.

I have suggested a parallel in German (or Austro-German, or 'Germanic') culture, over the period from the Munich Putsch to the Anschluss, and turning about the economic crisis of 1929-31 (and its analogues in other orders of activity), of the logic of the Vienna Circle around Schlick, and the rise of the National Socialist or völkisch ideology which in 1938 excluded further activity in the Circle. Drawing on earlier analysis, one might consider the circular 'logic' which frames language and social activity in an abstract space itself abstracted from that activity and its linguistic frame, and the analogously circular ideology which inscribes its assertion within a mirroring of inner and outer orders which it asserts, as two forces interacting in a common cultural matrix or dynamic. Forces: for in each case activity, and the choice or decision between different possible actions, is framed within a circuit which is itself unquestionable from within - a circuit constituted by the inscription in the frame of decision, of the choice or assertion of that frame:
In the final analysis, any philosophy which goes beyond a formal critique of Reason is less a mode of perception than one of faith, a psychic and racial faith, a faith in character values.

That our researchers remain transfixed by historical forms without being able to construct anything themselves only demonstrates that their will to construct has been broken. There is no justification, however, in saying that their own unproductivity is the fate of the whole. The new Myth and the new type-creating strength which today is struggling within us for expression cannot be 'confronted'. It itself will break its own trail and create facts.

This is the task of our century: to create a new human type from a new Life-Myth... The New Man of the approaching third German Reich will have but one answer for all doubts and questions - simply 'I Will!'.

This Will is our Fate.
Viennese logic and Nazi myth, in the analogous circularity of their parallel self-assertion, amount to two frames of action which, in their characterisations of, say, a particular choice, may conflict. In particular, how is one to choose between these two frames themselves? In the Nazi frame it is simply choice which chooses itself, rather than remaining in a position of ineffectual critical detachment. Nietzsche has identified this circularity of choice - of Will to Will, Will to Power - as the radical axis of historical actuality. The figure of choice, will, chooses itself in the free play of forces which is Nature, and this is the movement of integration at work in the articulation of the World in cultural space and historical time. History itself chooses Will rather than the ascetic ideal of 'scientific' or critical abstraction:

Die Natur kennt keine politischen Grenzen. Sie setzt die Lebewesen zunächst auf diesem Erdball und sieht den freien Spiel der Kräfte zu. Der Stärkste an Mut und Fleiss erhält dann als ihr liebstes Kind das Herrenrecht des Daseins zugesprochen (1)

Nature knows no political boundaries. She sets creatures together on this ball of earth and watches over the free play of forces. The strongest in courage and industry then wins, as her favourite child, the prize of the right of rule over all existence.

Around 1940 - say from 1938 to 1942 - this view of History seemed to be confirmed. The new Myth struggling in 1930 'for expression cannot be confronted'; it 'breaks its own trail', 'and creates facts'. But between 1940 and 1945 the Myth, in its circular self-confirmation, had fallen apart. History unfolded the nietzschean figure of Tragedy. Hitler's direction of the Struggle became further and further abstracted from the actual play of forces; 'facts' were excluded if they would not fit into the self-confirming scheme of historical Reason. Nazi vision would not be 'confronted', any more than Oedipus' rational vision... and the circularity of an initially triumphant vision and reason began to undergo the tragic transformation into a narrowing circuit, a prison framing the final exit from the scene in blindness or suicide.

1: Mein Kampf - Gesamtausgabe 147
Hitler, the 'Leader' - the focal locus in the framing of the aryam Struggle, framing himself as locus of assertion of the frame - might be taken as the analogue or parallel in the cultural order of activity of which ideological systematisation is only one 'side', of the central position of Rosenberg in framing that ideology, that 'new Myth'. Rosenberg himself was caught in a radical tension between the logical unity of theory, and the theoretical imperative of inscribing this unity in the primary domain of action. His mythology or 'poetic' would frequently conflict with the frames controlled by others among Hitler's deputies - most notably with Goebbels' propaganda and Himmler's SS. His wish to incorporate 'modernism' in a nazi aesthetic or poetic which he conceived as the final consummation of the wagnerian ideal of the Gesamtkunstwerk - the coincidence of Art and World - itself directly conflicted with Hitler's own view of modernism as Bolschewismus der Kunst, bolshevism in Art. Such conflicts were indeed central to Hitler's social-darwinist or nietzschean vision of his own part of Herrenrecht in the 'free play of forces' embodied in sometimes conflicting frames of different components of the State. But the breakdown of a unitary political frame in which the various forces could be inscribed - the frame of the 'Leader' who decided between conflicting ministries or deputies - was paralleled by the breakdown of Rosenberg's 'ideology'. Biimler, Hitler's appointee at Berlin and the chief academic representative of the Party (who had in the early days spoken of the substitution for the cold abstraction of Dasein, of the living person of Adolf Hitler), in his Report to Rosenberg in 1944 underlined the growing rift between academic abstraction from National Socialism, and political subordination of ideology to the exigencies of specific situations. Rosenberg was caught in a widening split between Theory and Action, like Hitler in the widening split between millenial scheme and outward actuality. In the final reckoning at Nuremberg he was judged to have abstracted himself from the moral instance of critical reflection, and hanged with the other principal deputies for crimes against Humanity.

The justice of that final judgement was inscribed in a moral order of natural law - in a moral or practical order of act-
ivity in which the greater the abstraction from the instance of Reflection which is Conscience, the greater the compensating abstraction (in a just penalty) from that freedom of action which is a correlate of the social duty of respecting other's freedom. Rosenberg had abstracted from common Humanity a German Volk as constitutive mirror of such rights (or freedom) and duties:

> Freedom means fellowship of race.

This abstraction was in its turn inscribed in a wider and more radical practical order, just as the abstraction of Oedipus' tragic reason was earlier inscribed in the earlier dramatic order of divine, poetic, justice. Rosenberg, Goebbels and their colleagues had been directly responsible, under Hitler, for framing Action and freedom to act within the circuit of an assertion of their parts in their respective frames as the framers of activity within their domain. The only appeal from such an otherwise unquestionable authority in each domain was to the Leader who himself framed their interplay, played the part of deciding between conflicting subordinates. Those executed at Nuremberg were thus directly responsible for the abstraction of the activity of the Reich from reflection or conscience, to the order of arbitrary self-assertion. Such an act of abstraction from freedom, from common humanity, could only be balanced in the moral order of activity, of freedom, by the abstraction of those responsible from the earthly frame of self-assertion in activity - in death.

In a parallel move the French authorities occupying south-west Germany in 1946 abstracted Martin Heidegger from his earlier part in the German University, which had been framed by his recto-oral address of 1934 'On the Self-Assertion of the German University', closing the phase of abstraction, over the period around 1930, from Husserl's 'subjectivism', from a Reflection abstracted from Action. In the year of the French ban Heidegger wrote to his French associate Jean Beaufret an open letter 'On Humanism' - repudiating the 'subjectivist' interpretation of his thought by French 'existentialists' like Sartre (whose contact with Heideggerian activism itself dated from his study in Germany in 1933-4).
Here a familiar franco-german polarity - the german inscription of logical and physical in physical and ontical orders, and the converse movement of french reflection - is brought into a sharp focus. 'Existence' - Da-Sein: is the radical question the Sein of the Da, so to speak, or the Da of Sein? That is: is this Da of 'human' Being the locus in Sein of the Question of Being... or is 'what is to be?' rather the frame, the primary locus, of the open-ness of the situation in which I always find myself Da, Lä, Here? Am I as Da-Sein the locus of the Question of Being, or is 'What is to be?' rather the question of my part in framing what is to be: the frame of my self-discovery as free agent in the recognition of the circularity of my choosing who to be (what part to play) in order to know what to choose, what to do? ('What is to be?' or 'What is 'to be'?')? - 'translation' or transposition into an 'english' frame, into the linguistic frame of english activity, abstracts from the Question common to converse french and german versions: the Question, and the question of which of the dual forms of the question is more radical or primary, does not naturally arise in that language castigated by Heidegger as unmetaphysical. The british spirit of compromise, the middle term between french and german extremes of a poetic or pragmatic order, abstracts from the symmetry of psychological and ontological poles of 'continental' reflection to an everyday interplay of the complementary orders. 'Existentialism... stands, to British philosophers, for Continental excess and rankness... professional philosophers, for the most part, dismiss it with a contemptuous shrug' (1).

What is, then, this 'moral' order in which, at the particular insistence of France, german activity was to be inscribed and held to account, in 1946 as in 1919? Hitler and Rosenberg saw the Great War as the historic turning-point in the struggle for the unity of the german Volk. The scandalous 'injustice' of the Versailles 'Diktat' exacted by France from Wilson and Lloyd George was, as it were the proximate frame of justification of the claims and strategy which led to further war and a new tribunal at its close. The Treaty of 1919 was no balanced redress of the old european order which had led to war, but rather an attempt to inscribe a broken Germany in the old french component of that order.

1: John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (Revised Ed, 1966), 476
artificially maintained by America and Britain in pursuit of a factitious balance leaving them free to deal with their own affairs outside Europe. Because the settlement was thus unilaterally imposed, 'dictated', it was not legally binding, and Germany had a right to restore the natural order in Europe, to assert herself in the free and natural 'play of forces' artificially limited by the Peace to a French frame - a right, indeed, precisely to that 'self-determination' presented by Wilson as the central principle for a new and just order. This reassertion, Hitler reasoned, involving of necessity the fragmentation of an artificially prolonged survival of 'bastardised' France, would necessarily involve conflict with France. Effete France must therefore be quickly immobilised (as in 1940) before a united German Volk could proceed (as in 1941) to its natural self-assertion in the East. Britain would recognise the emergence of a rational European order from the breakdown of the nineteenth-century order into which she was unwillingly drawn in 1914.

Hitler's scheme, if one were able to forget its consequences, might appear natural enough: a natural continuation of the old figure of Fichte, of Bismarck - German self-assertion in 'the free play of forces', in the Economy of Nature as primary frame of Life and Community. Its one-sided or circular, self-confirming character is no more exaggerated than, indeed parallel to, the organisation of a German philosophy countenanced both in Europe and America - indeed the two orders meet in Fichte's philosophical nationalism. Santayana, indeed, in 1916, had emphasised the unity and coherence of German reflection and action, within the common figure of self-assertion... and so argued back from the part of Germany in the Great War to the moral status of the philosophic systematisation of that self-assertion, dominant still in American universities:

My object is neither to repeat [the German philosopher's] familiar arguments in their usual form, nor to refute them; my object is to describe them intelligibly and to judge them from the point of view of the layman, and his interests. For those who wish to study German philosophy, the
original authors are at hand: all I would wish to give here is the aroma of German philosophy as it has reached my nostrils. (1)

In 1939 the essay was reissued, with an additional preface and postscript on 'The Nature of Egotism and of the Moral Conflicts which Disturb the World': the simple frame of German self-assertion, traced in the body of the essay from Fichte to Nietzsche and Bismarck and the Great War, could now be traced a step further, and its tragic consequences prefigured.

What, though, is this practical frame of 'the Moral Conflicts which disturb the World' in which Hitler's policy and Rosenberg's ideology are to be inscribed? How can we get away from the relativity of the French morality of the Versailles Treaty, the German morality of retribution for this Diktat, the American morality of 'the layman and his interests' or of Santayana's nostrils - Santayana whose own aesthetics of detachment William James had felt to be 'the quintessence of rottenness'?

That is: how can we frame the interplay of these various frames, in what space inscribe the various circuits of self-justification by which each is abstracted from some more radical symmetry of these circuits; from the common question of how to decide how to decide between them - how to decide 'in' which of the frames the choice between the frames is to be made, as in International Law the question can arise of determining under which country's Law a decision is to be sought?

.. That is (then): how account for the interplay of these 'frames' or national orders over mid-century, and in this frame that period or phase of this history, story, account?

Here then we meet once more the now familiar situation or figure of a reflection in the 'object' of the story of the

1: George Santayana, Egotism in German Philosophy, New York - London 1919, Preface (ix in 1939 edition)
reflection attaching to the 'framing' of that object, the 'subjective' locus of the history or account. And now, precisely in terms of that symmetry or mirroring ('reflection', indeed), we can proceed to articulate the 'space' of the account. A space or frame of coordinates, in which the locus of framing is itself one component, and where the various complementary circuits of those frames of the mid-century which are themselves each inscribed as one term or coordinate in the frame, may now be inscribed and coordinated in relation to this common figure of 'self-reference' or self-inscription. In the next (and final) section of the account, the locus of this framing, in the mid-nineteen-eighties, itself becomes one 'outward' element in play towards the close of the century, an index of the phase from around 1970 to around 2000, and it is the question posed by this still more radical 'mirroring' or symmetry of 'inner' and 'outer' orders of this book which leads into the Conclusion or Close of the book.

Back now, though, to the mid-century, or more precisely to the circuit, period, phase, unfolding from a certain 'symmetry' of various orders or 'frames' around 1930, and converging, over the middle of the twentieth century to another nexus around 1970.

In the theoretical or 'logical' order (the theory of whose formal articulation, as we have seen, appears as one dimension of that order - the theory of the logical order, 'logic' in the stricter sense of ) I have already noted the closing around 1930 of a transition from around 1870 which turns about 'crises' or the opening-up of a radically new, 'modern' questioning at the 'turn' of the century. A 'closing' - whether in Heidegger's ontology, Dirac's physics, Gödel's logic, Barth's (say) theology, Dali's (say) poetic, Freud's extension of his analysis to the limiting frame of Culture, Civilisation, as a whole... or indeed in the many parallel developments of which perhaps these might be taken as indices in each 'order' of theory, of questioning - a 'closing' which in each case embodies an analogous figure of a 'framing' of the turn-of-the-century question or 'opening' of a new, 'modern', problematic. - Which in each case embodies the framing of the order in terms of the inscription of the locus of 'framing' in the frame.
In each case the 'circularity' of this 'framing', the constitutive circularity which in returning upon itself closes the frame and constitutes the various orders, is recognised as amounting to an 'open-ness' which addresses us directly - is recognised as the locus of our assertion. Thus in Gödel's inscription of the logical order of mathematical theory (more particularly, of elementary 'number theory' or arithmetic) in the mathematical frame of formal symmetry (in the frame of symmetry of logical and physical, or onto-logical, orders), we discover the 'logical' locus of our assertion in that frame as formally 'open' - a *formale unentscheidbar Satz*, a 'formally undecidable proposition' which we must yet assert to be true - which reflects, as it were, the very assertion of assertion.

Analogously, in Heidegger's *Fundamentalontologie* which marks the transition from *Sein und Zeit* (itself as it were the interface of 'phenomenology' and the more radical questioning) to the Rectoral Address (itself marking a transition to the questioning of Nietzsche's *Will* as the closing onto-logical determination of *Sein* as *Seiende*) - here we find ourselves as the radical locus of the 'opening' of *Sein*, confronting the Question of Being, Being as a Question, in the recognition of our part in Being as Da-Sein: Framing our part in *Sein* as the Da which is the locus of assertion, of framing *Sein* and thus of our Da-Sein 'in' it. The recognition that to be thus 'in being' is - essentially - to be 'in quest' of Being.

Analogously, in the 'new physics' systematised, framed, in Dirac's *Quantum Mechanics* of 1930, we find ourselves as the locus of a radical open-ness, the coincidence of Einstein's 'observer' framing Space and Time from a point 'here and now' in this frame, and Heisenberg's 'experimenter' or 'measurer' framing the determination of physical 'quantities' ('quantum numbers') which are radically indeterminate 'before' (or 'outside') our act of determination. In Dirac's integration in 'Quantum Electrodynamics' of the complementary developments from microscopic and macroscopic paradoxes appearing in Maxwell's electrodynamics around the turn of the century, the 'guage symmetry' of charge-separation which Maxwell had inscribed in an unquestioned 'classical' Space and Time to articulate an infinitely divisible electromagnetic
'action', itself becomes the radical mathematical frame of correlation of 'logical' and 'physical' orders of determination.
- The radical frame from which the classical poles of unlimited determination of the action, and fixed spatiotemporal frame, are themselves now discovered to be abstractions. The primary actuality is a mathematically articulated chemical - rather, indeed, 'alchemical' - order of charge-separation in relativistic 'Space-Time', these last being the microscopic and macroscopic limits (respectively) of the symmetry of logical (or psychological) and physical orders of experience - of appearance and activity, interaction.

A further analogy is to be found in Karl Barth's framing of protestant theology around 1930 - say from the Christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf (1927) through the reflection on Anselm published as Fides Quaerens Intellectum in 1931, to the publication of the first volume - the Prolegomena, 'Doctrine of the Word of God' - of his Kirkliche Dogmatik in 1932. Here the 'Church' appears both as the frame of theological reflection and activity, and as what, precisely, is framed in that activity: the theologian is the locus or focus in the Church of a radical open-ness... and the Church itself must always be 'in question'. But this Church is in this open-ness the frame of a quest which articulates the dramatic order of history, in which the theologian himself (unlike the theologian of nineteenth-century 'liberal theology' in its abstracted reflection) discovers himself as radically and irrevocably engaged. Engaged as he is physically engaged, in the figure of Incarnation, in the earthly, material, frame of the drama. A drama in which a divine or heavenly order distinguishes itself from its material embodiment, from the 'World' as the closed circuit of earthly identification with the material being that frames the World, and so himself or herself as material, as circuit of abstraction from the divine, from 'God'.

Anselm: the radically questioning faith from which the system of Aquinas formally instituted as the frame of catholic theology after the first Vatican Council abstracts in the circular figure of an 'ideology' (in Barth's sense) in which the roman locus of its assertion abstracts from the most radical question of theology. The period of the 'mid-century' now being considered
leads from this opposition of the 'neo-orthodoxy' of Barth and Bultmann to the neo-thomism of contemporary French Catholic theology (Marcel, Maritain, Gilson...) to the Second Vatican Council, and the dialogue of Barth and the Catholic theologian Hans Küng: a period through which the four parts of the *Kirkliche Dogmatik* published over the years from 1932 to 1967 themselves constitute a major axis of theological inquiry. Of inquiry... and 'engagement': for with the rise in Germany of a systematic 'earthly' ideology of *Blut und Boden* Barth and Bultmann instituted at Basel a 'Confessing Church' as a pole of German faith distinguishing itself from the remnant of the fragmented Protestant churches which allowed itself to become an organ of the National Socialist state.

Dali arrived in Paris in 1930 and there instituted a *paranoïa-critique* which once more embodies the figure of a frame in which the locus of framing is inscribed as a question... a question, here, which replaces the classical locus of artist and viewer and the correlative poetic frame which came into question over the turn of the century. Paranoia: the locus of critical reflection recognises in itself an openness attaching to the circuit of inscription of locus of framing in frame. Dali's poetic brings into question the classical focus of subjectivity, and opens up the possibility of a more radical identity or self which asserts itself in a positive assumption of the part of the 'subject' in the closed circuit of psychosis. The closed circuit of an abstraction from 'classical' subjectivity as a Cartesian pole of reflection, in a paranoid framing of the 'World' or 'Reality' in which the locus of assertion and its 'reason' is inscribed in the vision it frames. A vision, then, which like Rosenberg's new Myth, 'cannot be confronted'.

Freud had characterised psychosis by just such a figure of abstraction, in which the access of the analyst was systematically excluded, precluded, 'foreclosed'. - A vision which (like Hitler's refusal to believe he was losing the war after 1943) 'cannot be confronted'. Around 1930 he was applying the scheme opened up by the *Traumdeutung* of 1900 to the question of the part of the individual in the limiting Group, in Society. Here the circuit of inscription of the locus of framing in the (social) frame appeared in the negative form of a social order of 'repression' which
'precluded' full or 'free' individual self-assertion. Historically the locus of this repressive circuit embodied in Civilisation - a repression which involved a symptomatic 'discontent', a 'natural' counter-assertion which threatened the integrative function of Civilisation itself - was the formal figure of self-assertion of a disembodied 'I', a collective 'super-ego' whose function or functioning is inscribed in history through the story of the origin, the initial focus, of the Jewish Law.

Thus we find analogous circuits framing correlative primary orders of Theory, of theoretical questioning, of Reflection, around 1930. Where, though, are we to find some more radical circuit in which these analogues might be inscribed and coordinated, rather as species of some higher genus, specifications of some common 'form' or figure of self-inscription? We saw how the abstract attempt to take the logical figure as primary, and to inscribe the other orders as axes in some 'logical space' framed by the formal figure of assertion amounted to a supposed abstraction from the (once more) analogous circuit of 'ideology', and that this character of abstraction was as it were 'confirmed' by the failure of its confrontation with an ideology of 'force' - by the lack of force, as it were, of a logical determination (and so 'critique') of Ideology.

But this very ideology of will, of force, itself 'fails' and is contradicted by the History, the Actuality, to which it appeals in the last instance. Here again a German Ideology has been abstracted, like the German Volk which it posits as its frame, from a more radical interplay which it would inscribe within the closed poetic of a mirroring of 'inner' and 'outer' worlds, Weltanschauung and Welt, in Volk. - A mirroring locally determined in the 'german' figure of a 'physical' poetic, an inscription of the logical order of assertion in a primary Economy of Nature, 'the Free Play of Forces' presented in Mein Kampf.
Now if the correlation of a german ideology of the mirroring of physical and psychical orders, with the physical order of 'politische Grenzen.. auf diesem Erdball' which constitutes the german Land is to be inscribed in some more radical order than the space of that ideology - or of some conflicting ideology - this cannot, of course, be a matter of retreating to some abstract 'logic' of the mirroring of 'inner' and 'outer' orders of 'nations', national 'groups' of agents.

And yet such a step back to the familiar formal frame of coordination of various orders, the familiar inscription of the 'theoretical' order of logical inclusion and exclusion in a formal context of a 'physical' order from which the topology (so to speak) of Theory has been abstracted - this is a half-way step in the identification of the required radical frame. For this step allows us to identify the formal 'coordinates' of the 'outside' or context in which the logical configuration of these coordinates is to be inscribed as one side of the story. That is: this formal frame of correlation of theory, ideology, culture, economy, nature - the theoretical characterisation of the actual configuration from which this characterisation abstracts - may be taken to define what is open in the interplay of the various orders of the 'account', story, history, to be framed. At the other extreme a 'physical' order enters into the account - say the severity of the russian winter in 1942, for example - which organises the story, the history, the frame, as it were from 'outside' the logical order of what is theoretically open.. although this 'physical' organisation or 'side' is itself logically constrained to (for example) a certain spatiotemporal structure, for example, to the geographic and climatic constraints imposed by the inscription of the earthly frame of activity in a cosmological order, and so on. The logical frame here simply provides as it were the 'language' in which the organising actualities of this 'external' order express themselves, without determining what they will 'say'. In the limit the logical order here confronts the ontical actuality of there being a story to tell in the first place.

Between these extremes lies the interplay in which must be traced the 'story', the account. Here various accounts are
'open'. To articulate the interplay of theory, ideology, culture, economy and nature in a particular story - to frame the interplay in one way rather than another - is itself to enter into the 'dramatic' order of their interplay (though here as it were hors scène) which is to be framed. It is, as I have already suggested, this analogue in the frame of the account of the frames whose interplay is to be accounted for, which allows a symmetrical framing of the story. The more radical question attaching to the entry of this very locus of framing - these words - into what they frame, must - I have already noted - be left as a closing question framing the close of this part and the opening of the Conclusion, the close of the book as a whole.

How, then, does the inscription of the order of its framing in the account of the interplay of Reflection and Context over the mid-century itself frame, articulate, the account?

- Roughly, by framing the account as an Action, as $\Delta_p\gamma_n$.

For, as term of the account, corresponding to the simple circuit by which the order of its framing appears as one component of the account, there appears the simple figure of the 'part' - the human part of framing action by framing a World and one's part in it, from among what is 'open'.

'What is open': thus what is open within the circuit of Gödel's inscription of its logical order in mathematics, in the mathematical order of 'applied' logic (the latter logically determined as the inscription of the logical order of its definition in the 'poetic' symmetry of logical and ontological or physical) amounts to one axis or dimension of what is 'open' in the situation of that inscription - what is 'open' in a situation in which that closed 'logical' circuit is one of several analogous constraints.

Indeed, since Gödel's 'logic' itself embodies certain 'constraints' or determinants which are not 'purely' logical - that
is, since its framing leaves unanswered, and indeed poses, certain 'logical' questions (which then frame further steps in the development of logical theory), it must itself be recognised as one (representative) component of an essentially multiple or fragmented inscription of a common 'logical' circuit in various different, if related, contemporary contexts. Similarly, Heidegger's ontology or Freud's psychology, insofar as they are not fully abstracted from non-theoretical determinants—and insofar, that is, as they open up further questions of a 'theoretical' order—must themselves be inscribed, for example, within the complementary 'physical' order of their loci of enunciation—and so in the linguistic order associated with the physical boundaries of nations, and in the different (if related) traditions of theory or reflection in different linguistic orders. Here again, as in taking Gödel's mathematisation of logic as representative of logical theory around 1930, I have taken as representative a psychology and ontology whose enunciation may be inscribed in the austro-prussian axis of Reflection framed in the 'german' language. As representative of physical theory I have taken the contribution of (the swiss) Paul Dirac to the Cambridge School instituted by Maxwell, since this Cambridge axis from around 1870 to 1930 leads to a simple and symmetric characterisation of the development from 'classical' to 'modern' physics over the turn of the century—this even though the central contribution of Einstein is itself to be inscribed in the north-south axis of 'german' Reflection. We will shortly see that there is a simple correlation of british and german orders, of which the part of Wittgenstein as intermediary between Cambridge and the Vienna Circle might itself be taken as representative around 1930, when the Tractatus was accepted by Russell and Moore in lieu of a doctoral dissertation and Wittgenstein became a fellow of Trinity College—while maintaining by vacations (until 1932) in his native Vienna the links established with the Circle in 1927.

The central or focal part of south-german culture over the transition from nineteenth to twentieth centuries (with the fragmentation of nineteenth-century Europe focussed in the breakdown of the feudal order of the Habsburg empire) was earlier correlated with the inscription of that european order as a whole in
global configuration of North-South and East-West from which Europe had until the turn-of-the-century crisis of the old order been more or less abstracted. - 'Abstracted' in the sense in which the interplay of Europe and that World outside had been determined in Europe - rather as the European 'logic' before the parallel turn-of-the-century crisis of theory had been framed by a logical determination of the relations of logical abstraction and a physical order logically 'external' to these relations.

In taking Dali's parano\(a\)-critique as representative of the order of a theoretical 'poetic' around 1930, I am once more focussing a theoretical order in that North-South and East-West configuration of European culture, in which I have already emphasised the focal part of Swiss 'Dada' between 1900 and 1930. The Franco-Iberian component of a 'modernist' poetic, from Picasso's arrival in Paris at the turn of the century, to Dali's in 1930, may be regarded as one side (the 'Western' component as it were) whose Parisian coherence over the Dadaist transformation from the Cubism of 1907 to the Surrealist Manifesto of 1924 serves as a simple axis in relation to which more diffuse developments to the east may be coordinated.

So much, then, for these coordinates of what is 'theoretically' open in Europe, and outside, around 1930. Just as the correlation of 'logical' and 'physical' orders in different traditions or 'schools' amounts to a sort of residual inscription of the logical order of Theory in its physical context, from which it has not been fully 'abstracted', so, more generally, we may consider the inscription of Theory in the more complex cultural dynamic of interplay of these limiting orders, for example in the domain of 'ideology', and in that of the material 'economy' or organisation of the activity of which the activity of reflection is itself one component.

The constitutive circuits of 'self-reference', of recurrence of framing as one term of the configuration it frames, by their 'closure' or circuit 'frame' what is open to reflection.
in these limiting abstractions from the wider interplay in which abstraction itself is one component. I have noted the correlation of those 'external' constraints, corresponding to the inscription of the figure of 'abstraction' in its external context(s), in limiting what is open to reflection in these constitutive 'circuits', with the further questioning by which the dynamic of abstraction proceeds to inscribe these circuits in a more radical Reflection. In this correlation we may see a configuration of what is 'physically' open or possible around 1930, in the limiting case of geographic constraints upon Reflection. More generally, the 'physical' organisation of activity in relation to national frames of integration, in relation to national policy or policies, the 'geopolitical' frame, determines to a certain (or perhaps not so very certain) degree what is 'open' in the way of activity other than abstract Reflection. At the other 'pole' of activity from Reflection, 'Nature' itself constrains our activity. Yet this is not a Nature altogether abstracted from the instance of Reflection or Theory, any more than the theories of around 1930 are altogether abstracted from Nature. That is, just as the limitations of Reflection can be correlated with the spatiotemporal organisation of theory in traditions or schools, as one component of a wider activity, so 'Nature' itself, in determining what is 'physically' possible, is constrained by the 'logic' of a particular time and place, by its framing as 'Nature'.

In particular, this 'Nature' is framed in relation to the interface of Nature and Culture... and indeed in this interface we thus find a symmetric inscription of Thought in Nature, and Nature in Thought. Then in this symmetry we may inscribe, further, the symmetry of the 'ideological' interface of Thought (or rather Abstraction or Reflection) and Culture, and the material 'economy' of the interface of Culture and Nature. In this general interplay then of an 'ideology' (of which abstract Reflection may be taken as an ideal pole) and an 'economy' (of which uncharted 'Nature' may be taken as a complementary limit) we may organise the interplay of the various orders of what is 'open', from the 'machines' and the mechanical organisation of Nature (amounting to the inscription of physical theory in Nature) on the one hand, to the ideological limitations of the situation in time and place of Thought, on the other. And as a mean between these extremes we may see the 'insti-
117

Institutions' with their abstract rules and concrete buildings ('Institutions' of one sort and another), of which the Law (as framed, for example, in Justinian's Code(x) or 'Institutes') has been taken as central representative. - 'Institutions' which frame the interplay of 'logical' and 'physical' orders in our activity.

So much for the 'logic', then, of the interplay of Logic, Thought, and Nature. - A 'logic' which is one of the elements here in play. That an actual order of things is open to its framing by such a logic pertains, theoretically, to an 'ontological' order of actuality. - 'That an actual order of things is open' to this construction: that such an assertion of the logical order is possible in the configuration of Europe in the twentieth century... and also that, within this formal frame, Germany or France or Britain may be inscribed as actual determinations of what is logically 'open' in the abstract reflection upon the part of physical boundaries in the organisation of earthly activity. More radically: the particular configuration of 'natural' regions in relation to which political divisions are roughly organised is left 'open' by the 'logic' of cosmology and geology, but some configuration of 'natural' boundaries is deducible from the formal 'laws' of physics and chemistry, framing the organisation of 'earth', of matter.

Now the frame, the 'closure', of the story of Reflection over the mid-century, is here determined by the inscription of the logical order of the frame in the actual mirroring of logical and 'ontological' - or rather, 'ontical' - orders over the middle of the twentieth century. The locus of this particular framing of the story is (just) 'outside' the story it frames - yet it enters more closely 'into' this story than into previous episodes in the account of Reflection on this Earth, by directly identifying, at work in the 'story' or history, the same force of 'framing' actuality or history in which it itself partakes - which I myself avow or assert. I, writing, find myself 'in' this 'modern' history, this story of the mid-twentieth century, not only in the sense that my own activity on this 'Earth' begins around the mid-century, but also insofar as the theoretical question attaching to this figure of a mid-century 'framing' which itself
enters as one term into what it frames, applies directly, towards the close of the century, to this my activity of writing.

I enter, then, into the configuration of the current phase of the story, but as it were in the wings, rather than onto the scene, and into the action, itself.

This figure of the inscription of the 'logic' of the account as one component in the account itself, then 'frames' the story over the mid-century: it constitutes as it were what is 'open' at the outset, the 'historical' order in which the various constraints operative in the Action, the 'drama' (such as logical, physical, institutional constraints or limitations on what is 'open' to the actors) may be inscribed and articulated as correlative axes, orders, dimensions. It defines at the outset - the configuration of 1930 (or 'around 1930') a complex of orders, subordinate 'frames', in 'interplay'. - It defines then an 'Economy' (to use an analogy from one of the orders of the Action) of inscription of one frame in another, of the inscription of that inscription in a further frame, and so on. That 'Economy' is not enough to determine the Action, though: it formally determines 'psychological', 'ontological' and 'theological' (or 'mythological') orders of determination - of framing the Action and subordinate actions in one way rather than another, out of those 'open' or possible - but it does not thereby determine the actual course of the Action or Drama. It determines only what is 'open' at a given point, the locus or frame of individual choices, objective results, and figures of their coordination.

- That is to say: 'psychological', 'ontological' and 'mythological' orders enter into the general Economy of the Action, into the play of 'logical' figures, 'physical' forces. But the Actuality of the mid-twentieth century distinguishes itself from this Economy - and that in this Economy - 'in' the psychical, ontical and mystical orders of self-distinction or self-expression; in these 'actualities'.

Now the 'term' or element in which these orders meet is simply the 'person', the boethian persona, as primary 'part' in the whole Action. We may articulate the Action as a whole
between the interplay of Culture and Nature in the 'sexual' economy or dynamic which frames the access of the person to the earthly 'scene' of the Action (in a certain 'biology') and the 'mystical' focus of the person's actuality. - That focus of a 'moral' order of integration of the Action recognised by Freud in the mosaic mythology of I AM, and its primary expression in the sexual morality (or 'repression') which is framed by the individual's self-distinction from the bodily image of his or her identity which enters passively into the sexual economy of passion - a self-distinction articulated by the instance of a 'super-ego' which amounts to the individual's participation in the mosaic function of 'I AM'.

.. A 'moral' order? Like that in which the history of the Third Reich was inscribed at Nuremberg?

Freud, like Hitler, inscribed this 'morality' in a radical Economy of Nature, by inscribing in that Nature the circular self-assertion of a moral 'code' - whether this be the Jewish Law which frames its own enunciation it the cosmic history it frames, or the aryan imperative of integrating activity in a social order that will organise sexual relations so as to produce offspring that will be of the biological type to carry the process of integration further. For Freud the 'germ' of morality thus lies in the mythological order of a story which contains as one term its locus of enunciation, for Hitler this 'germ' lies not in the seed of Abraham, but in the seed which as it were 'codes' the abstraction of social integration from the free sexual economy of Nature. Each inscribes the cultural polarity of Nature and Morality in Nature, but whereas Rosenberg identifies the 'Myth' of Blood as the positive frame of German activity, Freud as it were stands outside the mythological circuit of Rosenberg's 'freedom as fellowship of Race' and sees such myth rather as the frame of a Repression which precludes free self-expression. In the National Socialist mythology this position of Freud's 'outside' the Wölkish Myth is a direct reflection of that 'germ' of dissolution which undermines the morality of integration: the International Jew.

Freud left Vienna for London as Hitler moved into that city of his formative youth in 1938. Here again - as in the parallel with the career of National Socialism and that of the Vienna
Circle, we may see the interplay of two complementary or correlative components around 1930 - say from the opening-up of Freud's 'third topic', the economy of interplay of Es, Ich and Uberich in the early twenties, and the correlation of Ich-Analyse and Group-Psychology, through the reflection on contemporary Culture, to his flight from Vienna.

In the general frame of the 'Action' to be traced from its 'opening' around 1930 to its close around 1970, these two 'parts' of Freud and Hitler, each framed, precisely, in terms of the part of the individual in Culture, may be taken as exemplary (if not in every sense of that word).

For here, in converse enunciations of the frame of action as interplay of a play or economy of figuration or force articulated in the bodily mirror of sexuality, and a 'moral' order of abstraction from that Economy, articulated by choice or Will, here we find as characteristic terms, 'parts' of the Action, the framing in the interplay of figures of a Choice which is the locus of distinction of Actuality from its open Economy.

That is: here we find framed the part of framing activity in the open play of possible frames - in a characteristically german inscription of that part in the Economy of the play as primary. Here we find the part of framing the 'part'. Here we find, within the analogous frame of the action as a whole, opening choices of a certain account of choice, and of the part of such choices in the articulation of Actuality between the limiting poles of sexual economy and moral integration of activity.

That is: in these two converse 'versions' of the 'part', we see, as terms in the Action framed in an analogous circuit of framing which is a term in the order it frames (that being my 'part'), reflections of the frame of the whole Action, in the configuration of 'axes' or 'dimensions' of the Action. The 'part' of Hitler or the 'part' of Freud at the opening (around 1930) amounts as it were to the 'intersection' of the various 'dimensions' or coordinates of the Action in a particular way: Hitler as framing a german constitutional or cultural order over the period from the Putsch to the Anschluss, Freud on the other hand framing in (german) Austria
a central articulation of psychological theory around 1930. These two 'parts' meet (almost) physically in the Vienna of 1938, this constituting a focus of the ideological interplay of freudian theory and Hitler's policy over the years around 1930: of the ideological conflict of a mass-psychology of National Socialism, and the National Socialist characterisation of this abstract 'theory' in terms of the conspiracy of the International Jew — whether communist, capitalist or psychoanalyst, — to dissolve the integrative force of arian Culture — in terms of a hostile 'germ' of dissolution eating away at the body politic from within.

Of course, there are millions of other 'parts' in the Action — each a locus of the framing of action, which frames itself in the action as 'I'. Indeed we might inscribe the focussing of the reflection of the circuit of the Action as a whole in its subordinate 'dimensions' (of theory, ideology, and so on, identified above), in a Sigmund Freud or an Adolf Hitler, in terms of an order of complexity of the Action as a whole relating the physical frame of the Action, 'dieses Erdball', to the sum of relations, from the family on outwards, which unfold from birth, into an individual part. But the circuit which 'frames' the account — this account — of the Action, abstracts in its very constitution from the great mass of individual actions which would have to be taken 'into account' in a truly 'comprehensive' Eitgeschichte, of which that undertaken as an open project by the Munich Institut für Zeitgeschichte from the 'fifties on might be taken as a first approximation (based on the ideal of a complete archive of german printed material over the period of the two Wars, and external material relating to the Germany of this period). This is only a history of the interplay of Reflection and its context, and, itself of the order of Reflection, abstracts from all but a very restricted and symmetric set of terms and 'dimensions'.

The 'part', in some story or history, will correspond to that instance of framing which inscribes itself in what it frames, as 'I'. As 'I, Sigmund Freud', 'I, Adolf Hitler', 'I,...' (whoever it may be). As an instance of psychical or psychological determination of one 'action' from what is 'open' in the
Action as a whole - what is open to that instance of framing (decision, choice) at that 'point' in the Action. Such an individual or indivisible elementary choice (the 'element' of the Whole Action rather as a sentence describing the choice is the 'element' of an account of the Action) in its turn partly determines or constrains what is (subsequently) open to further choice. - Further choice by that individual, or by other participants in the 'history' - other 'I's interacting with the 'I' that asserts itself (himself or herself) in the initial choice. - Asserts himself or herself in action, paralleled perhaps by assertion in a sentence which describes the action - and by which a certain 'response-ability' is recognised by the agent, the 'actor'. - A 'responsability' corresponding to the 'part' of such an avowal in that interplay of the framings of activity in language which is argument, discussion, deliberation, justification.. and which constitutes one dimension or order of integration of the activity of a linguistic community, a group which 'communicates' in a common language. 'Ideology' may be taken as what frames, constitutes, and so constrains this interplay of Thought and Action in language. I have already noted (some way above) the mirroring of this 'ideological' poetic of the Mark (in language and the linguistic 'sign') and the complementary material economy of 'mark' as monetary 'sign' in the 'Market'.

In the present case the elementary 'part' is abstracted from the more general instance of self-inscription of framing in the 'situation' framed (the general instance of this self-inscription simply as 'I'), to the limiting cases of self-inscription of the instance of framing a primary dimension of 'World' as most general situation, in that dimension. - To the framing of the limiting constraints constituted by the closed circuits by which these 'dimensions' are framed - circuits here inscribed in the analogous circuit of an 'Action' framed by the inscription of its 'logical' order of framing as one dimension or component. - Circuits which in their turn frame what is 'open' in the Action through the play or interplay of inscription of one 'dimension' or frame in another, over the period from about 1930 to about 1970.

The 'story' or Action, then, is articulated by the way that parallel determinations of the 'theoretical', 'political', and other dimensions of the Action (each determined at any part-
icular 'point' in the Action from what is there (then) 'open')
together frame what is open to subsequent determination. The
initial determinations of various correlative dimensions of a
'World' around 1930 may thus be collectively considered as the
'opening' of the story or Action, as an initial 'point' or con-
figuration of coordinates determined from what is 'open' in the
abstract circuit framing the 'Action' in terms of the inscrip-
tion of the order of its framing in its frame. The abstract 'log-
cal' circuit organising the story as an 'Action' may, that is,
 itself be considered as a limiting initial constraint 'before the
story even begins', rather (perhaps) as a certain 'harmonic' space
might be considered as a general constraint upon musical composit-
on at a certain period, or in a certain 'school'. The opening
determination of an actual 'World' - that figure of transition into
the period from 1930 to 1970 - might then be likened, say, to the
'opening statement' in a piece of music, determining a particular
configuration from among the abstract possibilities left open by
the general 'harmonic space' in which this opening 'theme' or 'pos-
iton' is inscribed. Characteristically, such considerations of
harmonic space, and of a musical 'dynamic' opening out of an initial
thematic configuration, were being explored in the 'Second
Viennese School' around 1930 - this exploration itself closing a
development from the breakdown of 'classical' (diatonic) harmo-
nic space over the turn of the century.

Harmonic 'space'... and musical 'dynamic' of a Serialism
which may be taken as a 'poetic' analogue of the mathematical log-
ic of the Vienna Circle and its ideal dynamic of Theory. A harm-
onics, too, directly reflected in the mathematical chemistry of
Dirac's Quantum Mechanics - this latter articulated within the
symmetric 'space' of charge-separation, identified with Maxwell's
'electromagnetic field': a Quantum Electrodynamics, then, 'con-
strained' by the symmetry of charge-separation constituting the
electromagnetic field in an einsteinian 'space-time' itself con-
stituted by the symmetry of the Lorentz 'group' of transformations
from one set of spatial 'axes' to another. A particular configura-
tion of the 'field', then, unfolds according to a certain 'dyn-
amic' or 'mechanics', governed by the invariance of the elec-
tromagnetic 'symmetry' over the Lorentz transformation which appears
in a particular 'space' of coordinates as 'motion'. But these con-
straints - the symmetry of the Lorentz Group, and the symmetry of
charge separation (this last mathematically identified as the 'special unitary group in one dimension', $SU(1)$) are not enough to fully determine how the initial configuration will 'unfold', any more than Schoenberg's initial tone-row is enough to determine the subsequent transformations of the series in the symmetry of tonal space. Those latter symmetries, like the 'external' Lorentz symmetry and internal gauge (Maxwell) symmetry of Dirac's physical dynamic, only provide 'selection rules' limiting what is open, but not fully determining the actual 'choice' from the limited range of what is open.

We may see in these subordinate theoretical 'dynamics' of around 1930 analogues of the 'dynamic' of the Action as a whole, just as we see in the circuits which frame these dynamic orders (in terms of our part in determining what actually happens from the range of what is left open) analogues of the circuit which frames the Action as a whole.

But now the image of the 'symmetry' which governs Dirac's quantum mechanics, or Schoenberg's serial composition (or Carnap's logical syntax) is to be found precisely in the analogy, the symmetry, of these subordinate or component symmetries. - An overall 'symmetry', then, by or in which the 'internal' symmetry of one 'dimension' of the action, theoretical... or political... or economic, or whatever else..., simply mirrors the external coordination of these dimensions in which that particular 'dimension', with its internal 'symmetry' or articulation, is itself 'framed'.

Now the determination of that overall 'dramatic' symmetry, simply in relation to an 'inside' and 'outside' of this book, in which the 'Action' from 1930 to 1970 is itself inscribed as one component, does not itself belong to that 'period', but rather to that which succeeds it (this period, indeed, in which I write). Indeed the closure of the period covering the mid-twentieth century may be determined 'in' the more radical theoretical space articulated in terms of an 'in' side and 'out' side of this book precisely by the way this locus of framing the Action is itself 'outside' the Action itself, and is itself determined by the theoretical question attaching to the symmetric articulat-
ion of Theory, Reflection, over the mid-century: the question opened up by the recognition of an analogous limitation or circularity in the various domains of theoretical questioning over that period—a common limitation or constraint amounting to parallel abstractions of the various domains of Theory from a common 'context' or 'World', and so from one another.

- The 'abstraction' of the logical order of Theory from its 'World'—and, in particular, from the 'physical' symmetry of separation of points in Time—the Lorentz symmetry of 'time-inversion'.—A symmetry between the unfolding of an 'action' from an opening configuration and its convergence towards its close.—A symmetry, for example, between the opening determinations of the various dimensions of a 'World' from around 1930, and correlative closing determinations around 1970—between (for example) Dirac's framing of Quantum Electrodynamics in terms of the 'guage' symmetry SU(1) around 1930, and the question of the integration of the 'physical' symmetries SU(1), SU(2) (governing 'radioactive' decay), and recognised around 1950) and SU(3) (the special unitary group in three dimensions governing intra-nuclear forces, the 'strong' interaction, as SU(2) governs the 'weak' interaction of microphysical 'particles'), in a 'Grand Unified Theory', arising around 1970.—A 'symmetry' of successive inscriptions of determinations in what is left 'open' (or opened-up) by prior determinations, as the Action unfolds from the intial configuration ('in' which, then, these subsequent determinations may be inscribed, one within the other), and the converse order (a certain 'finality') by which parallel determinations are themselves coordinated in subsequent determinations, so as to constitute an order of convergence towards the coordination of all the orders in the configuration of a close which thus 'reflects' or mirrors 'in Time' the initial configuration or nexus.

I intimated such a temporal symmetry (first formally noted in the symmetry of efficient and final causality in Arist-
ote's Economy of the various orders of Kosmos) in characterizing the transition through the 'Scientific Revolution' (from the mid-thirteenth century to the close of the eighteenth century) as a 'period'. Period: 'circuit' - for the symmetry of unfolding and convergence of determinations 'over' some period constitutes or frames a 'closure', in which various subordinate periods or circuits may be inscribed, articulated, one within the other - as in Kepler's Harmonice Mundi, or in the harmonics of De Broglie's and Schrödinger's 'Wave Mechanics' integrated in Dirac's system. Thus, for example, within the Seventeenth Century considered as the 'period' of the Scientific Revolution (at least as its central component, its critical phase), Kepler's astrological harmonics is itself (as was earlier suggested in the discussion of that phase of the Second Part of this account) 'mirrored' in Newton's mathematical Kosmos. One system 'opens' the century - opens the 'circuit' of that 'revolution' - the other closes a development or unfolding of the parallel schemes of Kepler and Galileo, a development which amounts to a 'convergence' of heavenly and earthly perspectives. And at mid-century, as a primary component of the 'mirroring' across the course of the century of Kepler's Kosmos in Newton's, lies the 'close' of Descartes' lifelong elaboration of a 'system', a Kosmos, central not only to the development of the seventeenth-century Scientific Revolution, but to the wider development from the thirteenth-century Summae to the systems of Jena, and indeed to the still wider development from the initial pythagorean identification of 'Kosmos' as harmonic system, to the reflection of that pythagorean order at the close of the twentieth century - at the close of a 'history' of Reflection which opens in that mystery.

I have suggested that the developments of the twentieth century as a whole are opened (at the turn of the century) by the question attaching to the 'circular' character of the inscription of their 'framing' in various dimensions (in logical theory, for example, by Russell's Paradox). Analogous questions or paradoxes constitute parallel 'crises' in various domains of Reflection, and this crisis of Thought parallels the political crisis leading to the Great War. In the 'philosophical' reflection framed by the simple figure of abstraction common to the various 'dimensions' of Theory, each theoretically inscribed, or to be inscribed, in
the unitary perspective of the Philosopher, it is Abstraction itself which comes into question. By around 1930 the radical questioning opened up over the turn of the century is itself 'framed': the inscription of locus of framing in the frame of each order of theory as a question in which the theorist is himself or herself somehow 'engaged' itself is taken as the frame for a reconstruction of Theory - for the coordination of the then recent developments turning about the radical turn-of-the-century questions which are thus 'identified'.

Yet these 'identifications' of what is brought into question at the turn of the century are only, in each case, a first step of reconstruction: they remain in part 'abstract', 'theoretical' determinations of the crisis of Theory. In particular, the development from about 1930 to about 1970, 'framed' in each order of Reflection by the new schemes of around 1930, remains constrained by an abstraction from the physical order of its context rooted in the cartesian figure of self-assertion, of an 'I' which frames itself, in a residual immediacy of action - most particularly of the activity of thinking - abstracted from the radical 'poetic' symmetry of 'logical' and 'physical' orders of action, and from the 'dramatic' character of theorist - 'scientist', 'philosopher', and so on, as 'part' of (or 'in') an open play.

Which is not to suggest that this figure of 'one's part', and of a Theatrum Mundi, cannot be found in this period. Indeed the figure may be traced back through the stoical detachment of Jacques in the Forest of Arden to Epictetus' manual and beyond. But in such a tradition it remains an image for Reflection, a musing, rather than the radical frame of an activity, an actuality, in which the logical order of framing such Universalpoesie is inscribed, inscribes itself, from the very outset, in the Drama it frames... and such an inscription itself articulates the activity of the Philosopher, rather than being subordinated to the constraints imposed by the instituted tradition of abstract Reflection.
The 'abstraction' of Theory from the radical 'poetic' symmetry of its 'logical' and 'physical' orders, then, amounting to the residual constraint of a certain millenial logic, is 'reflected' in its abstraction from the physical order of time-reversal symmetry which governs the regularity of clocks, days, and years. Still now in the 'eighties, at the time of this my writing, I am aware of the rather scandalous character of this particular (indeed limiting) physical constraint upon 'the freedom of thought'. Yet the mirroring, say, in the temporal 'symmetry' of the development of gauge theories of physical interaction (the theories of interactions governed, precisely, by 'internal' symmetries that mirror the external symmetries of the physical 'space' of interaction), of the time-symmetry from which the mirroring of internal and external physical symmetries was still, around 1970, abstracted, itself poses the question, towards the close of the century, of the simple 'poetics' of mirroring of logical and physical orders of (here, 'physical') theory over the middle of the century.

That is (then): as a primary 'symmetry' constraining the 'Action' or phase extending from about 1930 to about 1970 - a phase 'abstracted' from the most radical aspect of what is opened up by the crisis around 1900 - of a development which converges upon the close of the century - a primary symmetry within which the development from 1930 to 1970 is articulated, is the mirroring of a logical constraint of mid-century Theory, in the very structure of time in which that logic is, over the middle of the century, embedded, as the other 'pole' of a, 'the', World.

It is precisely this correlation which, in the 'wider' space articulated in terms of the radical symmetry of 'inside' and 'outside' of this book, frames 'from outside' the Action, limiting logical and physical poles between which the mid-century drama may be articulated. A certain figure of finality, choice, abstracted from the symmetry of physical time, and so from the poetic symmetry over this period of that 'psychological' time thus abstracted, and the physical time from which it abstracts, inscribes days and years in the organising finality of a certain activity, and is itself in its turn 'passively' articulated in an order somehow counter to this abstract finality, and largely identified with some anti-human demonic force threatening the Future of the World.
This coming-into-question of the finality which integrates human activity on Earth - of the 'direction' of twentieth-century Culture is, as was noted, prefigured in Nietzsche's questioning of the 'moral' order of 'western' Culture subsequent to the breakdown (notably in Euripides and Socrates) of the tragic vision embodied in the birth of Theatre out of the Mystery of Dionysos, in the transition from sixth to fifth century, the age of Heraclitus. The limiting 'mirroring' or symmetry of the abstract finality of Theory, Reflection, and its outward articulation in physical Time, may be taken as central 'poetic' axis of the 'Action' now being considered.

In England Keynes had questioned the goal of the Versailles Treaty; in the early 'thirties - following the Crash - he began to insist upon economic policies framed in relation to the cyclical time of the Market, rather than the 'classical' policies governed by the 'capitalist' finality of profit (in an imaginary linear time of economic growth), which themselves unwittingly generated cyclical contraction in the Market. In the preface (19) to the second edition of his critique of the Treaty, he noted (as it were a prefiguration of the later reflection) the political analogue of such 'abstraction' of economic policy from the external constraints operating in the Market: in the new era of mass democracy policies had to be subordinated to the finality of the wishes of the masses, framed by the popular press, and abstracted from external constraints upon what is actually possible. A politician refusing to appeal to the wishes and perception of the masses would not be delegated by them to organise their affairs, yet the prosecution of policies selected in this way must inevitably lead to a political crisis sooner or later... and the replacement of the delegate who cannot realise mass expectations by another, with a new version of reality, equally doomed to break down sooner or later. In practice, Keynes notes, politicians say one thing and, as far as possible, do another, treating the mass perception of their activity as simply one further constraint to be added to those external constraints the masses do not - or rather will not - perceive.

One may draw a parallel between Keynes' perception of
the Peace, and Hitler's, as between their parallel perceptions of mass democracy at work in the War and its aftermath. - The aftermath: whether the breakdown of the German economy in 1923 or the more radical crisis opened by the Crash of 1929. Under the strain of the reparations due to France under the punitive clauses exacted by French public opinion in the Treaty, the German economy was weakened to the point that reparations falling due in 1922 could not be paid; the French occupation of the Rhineland, allowed under the Treaty to ensure or exact payment itself exacerbated the difficulty of repayment by further fragmenting the economic order whose industrial base was in the occupied area. In the last chapter of Mein Kampf Hitler identifies the configuration of this French occupation as systematically expressing, as it were in the form of a question, the frame of assertion of a new German order, a correlation of an internal 'reckoning' with Marxism and democracy, and an external 'reckoning' with the international order these forces cannot confront.

Such was the 'logic' of the Putsch of 1923 - a logic framed in the correlation of the finality of action and its physical frame in the völkisch Movement and its 'Bodenpolitik der Zukunft'(1) The coup failed insofar as it was an attempt to impose the new logic from 'outside' the then current legal frame or Constitution. But in fact that constitution framed by academics was itself an abstraction from a truer deeper law of the Movement, of its radical mirroring of assertion and Nature in the frame of the Volk. The 'law' of the Movement is 'almost mathematical': the völkisch Movement grows with a 'fast mathematisches Gesetzmaßigkeit' from the configuration of opposition to it. The Struggle itself elicits the principle of Race in which, itself, lies the end of the struggle and the means to that end. In particular, out of the apparent conflict with the formal 'constitution' of 1923 there grows, most particularly after the wider crisis of 1929 of which that of 1923 was a prefiguration, a recognition that the old academic law is itself a prefiguration of the true 'constitution' of the Volk, into which it is step by step transformed.

This demonic finality of National Socialism may be taken as a representative political 'coordinate' of the 'opening' of the
'Action' - of a wider, less conscious 'movement' - around 1930. The 'crisis' associated with the 'abstraction' of the Nazi ideology of transition from abstract democratic 'ideas' to a concrete mirroring of 'inner' and 'outer' orders of activity in a 'Volk' (defined, indeed, by an abstract symmetry of 'Spirit' and 'Nature'), develops around 1940 - say, between the Anschluss and the failure of eastern and southern fronts at the close of 1942. By around 1950 - say by the outbreak of the Korean War in that year - a 'western' order increasingly subordinated to the finality of 'free enterprise' focussed in America, identifies a contrary demonic finality of international 'communism'. A 'communism' whose focus is identified as Moscow, and which in its turn inscribes the finality of 'imperialist' american capitalism in a demonology articulated as a History - as a story in which the periodic crises associated with a capitalist economy prefigure the imminent crisis of Capitalism itself.

I have already noted the systematisation of 'capitalism' leading to the focus of an international economic crisis in the New York financial market at the close of 1929, and the complementary systematisation by Stalin of a centrally planned russian economy around the same time - this in the discussion of the emergence over the turn of the century (from the eighteen-seventies to the nineteen-twenties) of an East-West axis ('open' America and 'closed' Soviet Union as foci of international capitalism and international marxist activism) no longer defined in Europe, but (rather) in which european activity itself was increasingly articulated. The polarisation of the international order in the 'cold' war which followed upon soviet-american collaboration in Hitler's hot war, may be taken as the primary determination of the 'symmetry' of economic and ideological orders, in which the 'Action' over the middle of the century is to be now articulated. 'East' and 'West' here correspond, 'in the Abstract', to two contrary framings of the interplay of ideological and economic orders: the systematised leninism of Stalin's Constitution, in which the ideological framing of the interplay of ideology and economy is inscribed as one side or component of the closed circuit thus framed, and the converse recognition in the american Constitution of the frame of individual self-assertion, 'freedom', constitutionally asserting its part in framing the Constitution - in framing the equality or 'symmetry' of all citizens' access to the media, the law, the market. A symmetry which in leaving 'open' the part of the indiv-
idual to frame his own activity, and so frame himself as free agent and 'self-made-man', amounts to a direct converse of the Russian inscription of the individual's action, equally 'symmetrically', within institution within institution, within the primary institution of Stalin's Constitution, itself framing the State as a unity of Action, focussed in Stalin's radical framing of his own part of self-assertion within the frame he asserts: autocrator, like the earlier tsars, 'caesars' who took this title from the byzantine emperors whose successors, after the fall of Byzantium, they conceived themselves to be.

This East-West axis, 'symmetry', as determination of the abstract symmetry of ideological and economic orders 'governing' the Action now to be articulated, may then be considered as inscribed in the elementary 'symmetry' of the theoretical assertion which frames theory over the mid-century in its abstract finality, and the mirroring of that 'theoretical' order in the articulation of the 'physical' Time in which it is inscribed.

...But... surely this last formal symmetry of thinking and the time it 'takes', must itself really, in fact, be inscribed in the actual interplay of incalculably complex economic and ideological orders of the whole Life of the period?

- Indeed, but this inscription is itself here framed by the articulation of the Action as precisely the story of self-inscription of Theory in an actuality which it recognises itself as 'logically' framing. The Action as a whole is articulated from 'outside' in the formal circuit of self-inscription of logical in 'dramatic' order, and the part or parts of Theory in the Action is avowedly a reflection of this overall 'logical' constraint on the Action as a whole. An 'Action', then, which does not pretend to be 'the' History or story of the period somehow (this latter) 'in itself', but rather is proposed as the identification of a particular configuration of 'actualities' - 'forces', or whatever - 'at work' in, and in this frame of identification partly abstracted from, 'wider' histories. Some of these 'actualities' assert themselves 'ontically' - for example the actuality of there being this Earth as frame of the Action, at all. Others assert themselves 'psychically' - 'comprehended' so to speak, in the psychical instance of framing the Action as a story - a 'comprehension' amounting to an 'identification' not so much of the theorists of the per-
iod, as with them. An identification, then, which might for example be extended back to a comprehension, say, of Dilthey’s account of Verstehen itself, around the turn of the century—but of this more in the sequel.

An identification also, of certain mysterious 'forces' at work in the period, whose figuration has been touched upon in allusion to the 'mythology' of the century, and in particular to its 'demonological' side.

... A side, for example, felt by Einstein, which led him in 1932 to enter into a correspondence with Freud. A correspondence in which Freud corroborated the identification, by his fellow alpine germanophone jew, of a force of dissolution directing the Culture of the World— an antithesis of that einsteinian identification of Spinoza's God framing Creation.

Now this part of Einstein around 1930—the period of his isolation from the main axis of development of the 'modern' physics, in the quest of a Unified Field Theory first framed in 1929, inconsistent with the radical indeterminacy just then recognised on the atomic scale, and pursued from 1933 in exile at Princeton—may serve to introduce a fuller characterisation of the frame of the Action. A fuller characterisation of the symmetry of the various 'dimensions' of the Action, and the way the logical order of this symmetry constrains or partly 'governs' the Action, rather as the symmetry of charge-separation, for example, 'governs' electromagnetic interaction.

For how is the mirroring or 'symmetry' of ideological and economic configurations, for example (in, say, the 'East-West' axis or dimension of the Action) to be inscribed in the elementary axis of thinking and the time it takes? And just how, precisely, do such 'symmetries' constrain or govern 'history'?

Let us consider the physical 'frame' of the Action, and the way its 'symmetry' governs the 'things' whose ontical self-
assertion, left 'open' and indeed 'framed' by that symmetry, mirrors the psychical self-assertion of the 'actors' in their various parts - a mirroring whose irreducibility to the 'psychical' or psychological finality abstracted from that mirroring is reflected in the theoretical determination of the articulation of the Action in physical time as 'Chance'.

'Chance': the nominal inscription in the logical order of our calculation of 'what cannot be calculated': the irreducibility of the radical physical difference of Hot and Cold, of what rises and what falls, and of what befalls (cadentia, casus; what is the 'case', der Fall), to the logical order of the activity of an earthly being in that order (if not - perhaps - to the logic of the whole, and the Thought of the First Mover). A 'chance' inscribed by Epicurus in that radical physical order of falling, 'gravity', as a variation from its lateral symmetry in principle beyond the perceptual apparatus of a finite being (itself 'animated' precisely by such asymmetry articulated in Choice).

I earlier suggested that Archimedes' mechanics may be articulated within the simple figure of aristotelian 'gravity' - of that articulation of a 'physical' order of Nature within the organising polarity of Hot and Cold, of that 'elementary' physical difference. 'Hot': the outward image of that Form of logical distinction, which distinguishes itself from what may negatively determined as form-less Matter. Outwardly, the Hot, distinguishing itself from what is indistinct, articulates a physical 'dimension' or 'space' of distinction - of 'up' and 'down'. Within this primary 'axis' or dimension of differentiation we identify as it were a lateral axis of configuration (configurations of distinctions): the 'moist' or coherent, integrated, and the 'dry'. The limiting inert configuration, 'dry' cold, constitutes a sort of fixed reference point, from which the movement organised by Heat may be articulated, measured: a fixed pole, 'Earth', of physical action.

Archimedes framed this 'physics' mathematically by considering the lateral symmetry of this radical frame of physical differentiation: a laterally symmetrical object - in the simple case a rod - fixed at some point on the axis of lateral symmetry,
will not of itself begin to turn about that point: for anything inducing it to turn one way would (considering the symmetry of the system) equally induce it to turn the other way. The forces of 'gravity' must be balanced about the centre. Within this elementary symmetry may then be inscribed Archimedes' correlation of mass, or amount of matter, and force required to balance its tendency to fall - for example two masses attached to a 'balance' will balance one another at distances inversely proportional to their 'masses' ('mass' being initially determined by correlation with the masses of, say, different areas of a uniform sheet of matter - this notional uniformity being itself abstracted from, for example, a mechanical determination of the uniform density of the sheet.). This 'static' symmetry itself leads, by considering the action of disturbing forces, to the dynamic symmetry correlating change of position and change of momentum. These dynamical considerations may then be extended to configurations much more complex than the simple symmetry of the uniform rod fixed at its centre. By the time of Lagrange and Hamilton the formal correlation of positions and momenta of the components of a mechanical system had led to simple 'canonical equations' governing the mechanics of any gravitational system, and any other 'mechanical' systems at work in the matter of such a system.

Laplace had introduced gravitational 'potentials' measured by the work done in separating matter, and Hamilton's canonical equations correlated these potentials, as the 'actions' of their variations in time corresponding to the relative movements of matter in the system, as laws of a gravitational 'field', analogous to Maxwell's electromagnetic field articulated in the symmetry of charge-separation. Such a 'field' of potentials, whether gravitational or electromagnetic, and the corresponding 'Hamiltonian Principle' of Least Action, amounted to an integration of all its components within a unitary system framed in the simple initial symmetry of separation of mass or charge.

But the mathematical 'space' and 'time' of such separation had been abstracted by Newton from the aristotelian correlation of Space, Time, and Matter in the primary physical frame of an action of separation or differentiation. Maxwell's laws and Newton's laws could not both be combined in an abstract Space and Time, abstracted
from the configurations which were then, in turn, to be articulated by 'fields' of the potentials at each point of an absolute Space and Time.

Beginning in 1905, Einstein framed Maxwell's field of charge-separation in a 'Space-Time' articulated in terms of the symmetry of physical separation of charge, rather than inscribing such separation in a presupposed system of spatiotemporal coordinates. In 1915 he in turn inscribed the symmetry of this 'empty' Space-Time of separation, in the wider and more radical symmetry of separation of (massive) material configurations (a material reference-point being already implicit in the formulation of the more restricted symmetry) from which the earlier considerations had been abstracted. He thus arrived at a field-theory of the radical physical order of Aristotle's primary differentiation — in which space-separation, time-separation and matter-separation are seen to be correlative components or aspects abstracted from an irreducible or radical 'action' of separation in which these spatial, temporal, and material orders — and most particularly their related measures — may be coordinated.

- Coordinated then, in a primary 'field' as general frame of physical 'action' or (as it here appears more symmetrically) interaction. A 'field' which, as we earlier saw, amounts to a sort of general calculus of integration of action within action within the unitary Actuality of a single coherent Nature. A 'field', here, then, in which measurements of spatial, temporal, and material (mass) can be coordinated, the coordination leading in principle (if everything be somehow taken into 'account') to a consistent characterisation of the Matter, Time, and Space — the physical order of Kosmos — in which we find ourselves on this 'matter' we call Earth, making measurements, and correcting these in the light of further measurements of distorting forces... and so on.

The 'Field Equations' of 1915-16, giving the general frame or principles of such coordination, deduced from the correlation in the general symmetry of 'gravitational interaction' (or mass-separation — rather mass-space-time separation) of the 'metric field' of Space-Time separation, and the 'matter-field', 'govern' as it were the interplay of these two 'sides' or complementary abstractions from the more radical action. — This rather as the symmetry of a
But Einstein's equations, expressing the general symmetry of the gravitational interaction, do not specify the actual configuration of Matter in Space-Time, any more than a cube specifies the position of anyone viewing it and the particular aspects of its faces. The general symmetry of Space-Time-Mass leaves open the actual organisation of a material World. The question at once arises of what 'solutions' of the Field Equations are possible, how far certain formally possible solutions are 'physically' impossible (contradicting some other constraints), and how far we may determine just what 'solution' this is (in which we pose this very question), and how far it is determined by physical constraints upon 'all possible' solutions.

That is, the complementary questions arise of working 'down' from the primary symmetry towards the actual interplay of Matter and Space-Time (with its associated Radiation or electromagnetic field), determining 'this' actuality, this overall 'Action', from what is left open by its abstract symmetry — and of working back 'up', integrating our various measurements or observations of 'this' World, by coordinating them in terms of the governing symmetry.

The first solutions, derived almost immediately by Einstein himself and De Sitter were 'static': within a fixed overall spatial frame (most simply the three-dimensional analogue of the two-dimensional surface of a sphere) the field equations could be used to calculate the dynamics of local fluctuations in the matter-field — for example, could be used to model the solar system in the new theory, leading to discrepancies between it and the classical (newtonian-laplacian) account, observed by Eddington in 1919 (when Relativity first hit the headlines of the newspapers). Such static solutions required the introduction of a 'cosmological term', a mutual repulsion of all matter, increasing with distance, to balance the self-gravitation of the whole. From the early 'twenties Friedmann and (independently) the belgian abbé, Lemaître, began to develop solutions in which the interact-
ion governed a dynamic of the average 'background' Space itself, and in which the arbitrary 'cosmological term' introduced by Einstein could be discarded - self-gravitation here in dynamic interaction with an expansion of 'Space' itself, rather than simply of local configurations within it.

In the early 'twenties Lemaître worked at Cambridge with Eddington (the professor of astronomy who was then publishing the standard systematic mathematical presentation of relativistic dynamics), and then in the late twenties cooperated in America with the observational astronomer Hubble, who in 1929 (having already identified certain 'nebulae' as outside the 'Galaxy' or Milky Way, and suggested that these themselves might be other 'galaxies') found a systematic correlation of luminosity of these 'galaxies', and shift towards red of certain sets of spectral lines identified with those corresponding to the emission of radiation by familiar atoms. By interpreting these 'red shifts' as indicative of a recession of the emitter (the observed frequency then being lower, as each succeeding peak of the electromagnetic wave had to travel further than the previous one - at the same velocity of light - and so arrived systematically later than would those from a relatively stationary source), Hubble had first noted that some recessional velocities were inconsistent with the emitter's belonging to this 'galaxy' (for any length of time). Now the recessional velocities could be correlated with the distance from 'this' galaxy (if one assumed a certain uniformity of emission of radiation by the galaxies, and so a correlation of luminosity and distance), and this 'law' of increase of recessional velocity with distance could be interpreted in terms of Lemaître's 'Expanding Universe'. Lemaître could now frame the 'Universe' within the symmetries of the General Theory of Relativity as a unitary Action unfolding from an initial single spatiotemporal 'point': the point amounting to the Act of Creation, deciding what was left 'open' (but undetermined) by the symmetry - the 'logic', 'concept' - of Action, Actuality, itself.

That is: the abbé could frame Creation, action within action, within this decisive initial act, framing the Action as a whole - with subordinate determinations of what is 'open' at particular times and places thus framed, as participating in this radical actuality. - An actuality in which Lemaître recognised the theological figure of a God, both 'outside' the Time he creates,
and yet 'in' that Time, insofar as we (for example) in this created Time recognise an actuality distinguishing itself in the figure of an 'outside'. An 'outside' which we recognise, precisely, to be only a 'figure' - by which Infinity thus finitely distinguishes itself from the finitude of such an opposition. Lemaître returned from America to become professor of astrophysics at the Catholic University of Louvain; working in that neo-thomist frame he could reflect the part of the physical order within a Creation of which it was just one side - the outward side, the 'out' side which God is both 'in' and 'out' side.

In such an astro-ontology - both an 'astrology', indeed, and a sort of phenomenological cosmogony (Lemaître worked at Louvain alongside Mercier's student van Breda who established there, upon Husserl's death, the Husserl Archives as centre for phenomenological research) - the initial simple point, the exploding 'primaeval atom' (Einstein stood up and applauded when first hearing of this in a lecture by Lemaître, upon arriving in his American exile), may be seen as a simple reflection of the integration of Space, Time, and Matter in the formal symmetry of separation, the gravitational Action, simply as such. Space, Time and Matter meet outwardly in this initial point, in which they can be first distinguished (without which distinction the unity is meaningless, although there is no ground for this distinction itself in the unity or symmetry), rather as a sort of mirroring in extenso of their 'inner' coordination and symmetry. The initial point embodies the function of the reference point, the 'observer', which corresponds to the 'thisness' of a particular distinction of Space, Time, and Matter, a particular intersection of these separated dimensions, relative to which (alone) the coordinates can begin to be assigned, and so abstracted from to their abstract symmetry. Indeed Lemaître's initial point is a point of coincidence of 'inner' logical order of symmetry-within-symmetry, and 'outer' physical order of points 'in' Space, Time, and 'in' Matter. We begin from a symmetry of the 'logical' order of the symmetries, and the 'physical' order of identification of a particular local reference-point somehow abstracted from the symmetry of the whole, and this symmetry itself is preserved in the outward differentiation of (and movement 'from') the initial point, governed by a converse 'gravitational' instance of integration. - Preserved in a symmetrical 'poetic' order - indeed a 'theology' - of 'modern' physics.
What is this identification, this 'thisness', of a particular point distinguished from its symmetrical reflection in all the other 'points', which abstracts from the einsteinian symmetry of all points, all frames of 'spatial', 'temporal', and 'material' measures of which such irreducible 'reference-points' are the outward intersections, mirroring the inward integration of those dimensions in the abstract symmetry of the General Theory?

Einstein, in 1929, as Hubble and Lemaitre framed the physical order as a unitary Action unfolding from a single break in the abstract symmetry of Space-Time-Matter, proposed his 'Unified Field Theory' of a still more radical symmetry of abstract relativistic symmetry and its 'embodiment' in somehow identifiable different, and so somehow asymmetric, 'points', 'in' Space-Time. As I have noted already, the parallel developments in microphysics were at just that time ruling out in principle a reduction of the 'local' order of identification of mass-points (or rather their new analogues) to global symmetry. Indeed we may take the limiting indeterminacy of an initial 'point' in Einstein's theory (the initial determination of a system of coordinates from which the symmetry of this and any other system of coordinates is to be derived) as a limiting case of Heisenberg's 'Uncertainty Principle', as Eddington was showing around 1930.

... For consider again the aristotelian and epicurean figures of 'chance'. These derive from the inscription of the logical order of identification and determination of physical systems itself in the physical order: in a human body which is itself a physical system. Because the whole system of Nature cannot be represented, reflected, in this subordinate part (for fear of various vicious circles and their contradictions) we can actually determine a figure of the limitations of representation of physical systems - which Epicurus indeed, within the general scheme of post-aristotelian inscription of logical distinction, as simply one more figure, in a more radical drama, actually finds at work, organising (along with other 'figures') Actuality, participating in the drama, the 'play' of figures.
More generally, one may correlate this figure of the recurrence in the frame of Nature of the logical instance of its framing, with a certain 'open-ness' of physical systems identified in this frame of Nature, of which the physical system of the human body, reflecting the open-ness attaching to the logical circuit of self-inscription of framing in frame, is simply one (central) instance among others - among all the others. Indeed this case of the human body may be taken as the frame of 'representation' of physical 'systems' in a human body: the frame, through the symmetry of two such bodies, one of which I discover myself to be 'in', of the mirroring of what is open to me (to do), and what is open in my framing of that (other) system 'there' (rather than 'here').

To put it another way: the open-ness of psychical self-determination implicit in the 'I', 'this', 'here', 'now', which I frame as the instance of framing my situation, is reflected directly in the ontical openness of any system 'I' can frame. - Any 'system', the very identification or 'framing' of which as 'system', as closed, partakes of the closed circuit of my self-inscription in what I frame. My framing of 'Nature' as a closed system, in which (as if Aristotle or Epicurus) I naturally frame myself as a physical being, without appealing to anything (other than the mere form of self-distinction, self-assertion, 'me' rather than 'you') outside that system of Nature I frame (precisely) as closed, is a limiting case of 'framing' my situation in general. - A limiting abstraction from the symmetry of this pole and the other limiting circuit or system of Thought (and, say, Husserl's bare reference of Thought (in thought) to an 'outside-Thought').

'I' stand, stands, in this closed system of 'Nature' framed in the radical physical symmetry of mass-separation, like an image in this Nature of Lemaitre's Creator, of that unitary creative Act of self-assertion, Choice. I stand between the limiting Action of Creation as coordination of spatial temporal and material dimensions as a single whole, and the reflection of this coordination outwardly in the dynamics of a point-mass. I embody the breaking of the abstract symmetry of spatial, temporal, material dimensions in the cosmological or cosmogonic Action, by framing a particular set of coordinates in which I locate myself 'here, now' as a basic 'point' of reference. At the same time I coordinate component actions with-
in this frame according to the abstract symmetries 'in' which I inscribe this frame itself as simply one local representation.

But what do I identify as 'elementary' in such a frame, what in that frame mirrors in extenso the global unity of Space-Time-Matter in intenso?

Here I do not, it turns out, find some newtonian point-mass of continuous (infinitely divisible) matter in continuous mathematical newtonian Space and Time, stretching out without limit from 'here, now'. For here I find as elementary physical 'term' a definite elementary action, whose definition - like that of Epicurus' imperceptible 'swerve', ὄμημος, before it, is a direct correlate of the minimal self-assertion I make in framing, identifying, anything at all - a minimal 'interaction', then, of framing and what is framed, a minimal component of framing in which physical system of observation (framing) and observed system meet - meet in the 'elementary' action from which these two sides as it were diverge, are separated, in ever more complex systems, until 'we' reach the 'human' system of my framing myself, and begin a complementary convergence towards the global symmetry of Nature as a whole thus 'mirrored' (in the human order of framing which is itself a term in what it frames) in its minimal element, in an elementary physical 'system' corresponding to the bare form of identification itself.

'Identification': we have already seen how, even in abstraction from any 'human' considerations of 'indexing' physical systems, this 'identification', involving a difference within the global symmetry, a distinction not derivable from, though implicit in, the General Theory of Relativity (a distinction without which there would not be two terms in the primary mass-separation - without which there would be no spatial, temporal, or material axes of separation) corresponds to the radical instance of 'breaking' of the governing dynamical symmetry. - An identification which constitutes formally another 'pole' of Nature, mirroring in some particular 'frame', some particular axes of Space, Time, Matter (or simply: in some particular axes of Space and Time, since the Matter will then take care of itself, as it were, according to the symmetry of Matter and Space-Time in the General Theory), the integration of these separated axes in the unitary symmetry of Space-Time-Matter.
Around 1930 Eddington, at Cambridge, began to attempt the articulation of a systematic symmetry of the relativistic symmetry of Space-Time-Mass separation, and the complementary quantum mechanics of identification. The radical invariance of the 'velocity of light' in empty Space-Time organises, as we saw, a Field-Theory of Gravitation, in which Space-Time itself appears as the field in which mass-separation is integrated into a unitary Action of Nature as a whole. The organising function (working now, as it were, 'up' from the elementary level, rather than 'down' from the global level) of Planck's constant, the 'quantum' of action, the basic element of the actions integrated in unitary Space-Time as a whole, directly mirrors (in a kind of inverted form) this 'velocity of light' as frame of global integration. The relativistic symmetry frames the inscription of actions or interactions, one within another, within the Action of the whole; the quantum symmetry of the elementary components out of which these actions are as it were built organises an analogous 'field' of probability. A 'field' of probability in which the various determinations left 'open' in a particular framing of a system abstracted from the whole of Nature are systematically coordinated. - Coordinated not in the 'physical' or external Space-Time of Relativity, but in an infinite-dimensional 'space' of independent determinations of 'variables', 'parameters', 'configurations' of a general physical 'system'. 'Configurations' represented, in general, in an abstract 'configuration-space' of 'positions' and 'momenta' (in the subordinate space of what is open to it) of each elementary 'component' of the system. The structure of the 'configuration-space' is built up from the elementary action, unfolding, as it were, into more and more complex separations, distinctions, dimensions. Meanwhile the coordination of probabilities attaching to different measurements upon a system over time is constrained, as in the earlier 'classical' case, by Hamilton's canonical correlation of positions and momenta - this correlation or covariance now governing Heisenberg's calculus of transitions from one configuration to another or (equivalently) governing 'waves' of probability in Schrödinger's abstract multidimensional 'phase space', as they had earlier governed the electromagnetic waves which now appear as waves determining the probable outcome of measuring the electromagnetic potential at some point and time - or rather in a certain 'cell' of the phase-space now replacing the classical electromagnetic field.
While Dirac was correlating, in the (old) framework of Hamilton's canonical relation of positions and momenta, the two new constraints of relativistic constancy of the 'velocity of light in vacuo', and the quantum-mechanical constraint of the constancy of the elementary component of all interaction, all systems, in the particular (but central) case of charge-separation, his colleague Eddington was attempting to analyse the relation or symmetry between the two new constraints from 'first principles': to frame from these two complementary constraints, in the hamiltonian frame which mirrored the global in the microphysical symmetry, a 'cosmology' governed by the simple relation of observer and observed - to frame a sort of 'transcendental deduction' of physical actuality... in which the physical frame as a whole would mirror a kind of unitary observing spirit in which - as at Meetings of the Society of Friends to which Eddington belonged - we would participate as it thus distinguished itself from its images in ourselves.

The frame of correlation of the two new constraints - the symmetry of the two limiting symmetries - was to be found in the consideration that in a closed Space the identification of a point (without further specification) was to some extent constrained. To this constraint - the restriction of position to a certain (rather large, by human standards) 'cell' of Space - there corresponded a certain (rather small) association of momentum with that position (this directly from the fundamental symmetry of position and momentum at the base of quantum mechanics: here we are in effect concerned with the elementary 'action' of identifying a point). Eddington then considers the configuration in relation to such an initial simple configuration space of the action of 'measurement' of one part of the momentum (by a system corresponding to the rest of the 'Universe' itself) - the identification of 'a' momentum. He finds that such a determination will result in one of two values (corresponding to two solutions of an equation embodying the symmetry of separation of measuring system and object). The ratio of these momenta turns out to be almost exactly the observed ratio of the masses (when travelling with the same velocity) of proton and electron.
A parallel consideration attaches to the electromagnetic interaction - to the symmetry of charge-separation. In Dirac's theory charge is oriented in the four dimensions of Space-Time; the electromagnetic interaction amounts to the exchange by charged particles of a quantum of electromagnetic radiation, a 'photon', which amounts to an exchange of energy and of this orientation or 'spin' between the particles (the orientation thus corresponding to the classical polarisation of the electromagnetic field). To specify the symmetry of exchange of spin we have to consider a 'configuration space' corresponding to all possible transformations from the probabilities of spatial orientation of the field around one particle, to those of the other. The number of transformations from four axes to another four axes is $4^4$ - this is the order of a general space of symmetry of spin-separation or exchange. Of these 256 transformations of the space-time orientation, though, only 136 are 'spacelike', rather as only 3 of the 4 symmetries of the more restricted situation with only one spatial (and still one temporal) axis at each 'end' are 'spacelike' - this symmetry itself underlying the triple symmetry of 'physical' space itself. To these 136 'dimensions' of the space of photon-exchange we must add one further symmetry in which we can distinguish which 'end' of the interaction is which. This then leads us (or rather Eddington) to the experimental value correlating the energies of electrostatic (unoriented) and electromagnetic 'energies of interaction' - to the value of $1/137$ for the 'fine-structure constant' governing the interaction of radiation and matter.

Eventually, around 1940, Eddington, having earlier noticed that the observed value of another dimensionless constant, corresponding to the number of protons in the 'Universe' ($1.2 \times 10^{78}$) was close to $2^{256}$ or $2^{(4^4)}$, identified this number of protons with

$$\frac{3}{2} \cdot 136 \cdot 2^{(4^4)}$$

- the number of independent wave-functions articulating possibility itself in the frame of a unitary Space-Time, not further specified. In his Fundamental Theory published after his death in 1946 he had extended the analysis to the question of the dimensionality of Space-Time itself, the whole being now seen as the unfolding of the radical initial distinction of Observer and Observed, of the
symmetric logical and physical orders mirrored in mathematics.

Eddington, then, from around 1930, proposes a 'cosmology' of the physical order, framed by the inscription of the logical order of its framing in the frame as one component. This physical Nature is also Creation, since the recurrence in the frame of such a cosmo-logy of the logical order of its framing constitutes what is 'open' to a radical psychical order of assertion of this, actual Kosmos. Indeed the formal inscription of the logical in the physical order is converted into the inscription of this framing of Nature in a radical psychical actuality - of which the logical order of our scientific inquiry is then as it were a 'reflection' in the outward order of Nature.

What then of this 'symmetry'? Can we extend the physical dynamic to some more radical dynamic, of which it is just one 'side', an 'out' side, abstracted from the interplay of psychical actuality and physical economy, of which the cosmological symmetry of micro-physical economy and global integration is the image in the physical economy?

Physical symmetries, we have just seen, reflect that global order of integration of all actions in a unitary Action framing Space, Time and Mass themselves, in a local 'economy' of framing. We are not to conceive of all the possible actions framed in that economy as somehow 'already' integrated in or excluded from the unitary scheme of a single Action. - For we, in the radical breaking of global symmetry in our 'I', 'here', 'now', are ourselves in the interface of the relativistic constraints of integration of our actions in a common actuality, and the quantum-mechanical play of possibilities, probabilities.

... And it is we, again, who find ourselves in the interface of that physical order - of 'probabilities' abstracted from their character of possibilities for us (as we as it were blindly fulfill the bare function of 'observing' ontological determinations within the frame of what is physically 'open') - and the logical order of a theory which at once 'frames' the physical order and is itself physically framed in it.
Here we find analogues, in the 'poetic' symmetry of physical and logical orders, of the 'dynamic' discovered organizing the 'physical' side. It is not now simply a question of inscribing physical symmetries in a more radical poetic symmetry of physical and logical orders (as time-symmetry and space-symmetry, governing conservation of 'energy' and 'momentum' are inscribed in the more radical symmetry of mirroring in 'space-time', governing conservation of four-dimensional 'energy-momentum', and this in its turn in the symmetry governing conservation of mass-energy-momentum). For what is the force of that 'more radical' 'in' of the poetic order? Is it any more basic (to use another figure ambiguous between logic and physics) than the logical inscription of physical theory 'in' the logical order, or of the logical order of its theory 'in' the physical World?

How are we to organise the symmetry of these three 'ins' in the poetic order, and so find a 'poetic' analogue of the quantum-mechanical 'economy' of probability, and the relativistic integration of physical actuality?

.. In fact what thus appears as a problem is in fact its own solution (so to say). For it is precisely what is 'open' in the play of these 'ins', of logical, poetic and physical orders, which is the poetic analogue of the radical 'open-ness' of quantum mechanics - as of the radical open-ness of our own 'existential' predicament, framed by the circularity of framing our part of framing. The interplay of these three orders frames a poetic 'economy', a play of figures, in which the figuration of this play is itself one component.

I have already noted the 'sexual' figuration of this play or economy around 1930 - in the complementary schemes of Freud and Hitler. In such a 'biology' the 'economy' of the World is governed by the initial distinction of male and female 'sides' of the common figure of life as dynamic of the interface of body and world. Rosenberg's Myth, for example, might be articulated in the frame of such a primary 'symmetry' governing the dynamic of Life, rather as an analogous primary symmetry of, say, 'charge' separation governs the dynamic of Light. Such an analogy had, indeed, from the Romantic period, the authority of Goethe himself.
A 'sexual interaction', then? Personal magnetism, electric atmospheres - or do these belong rather to some private domain abstracted from the outward economy of Culture - organising, say, a certain kind of fiction, story, but hardly Society itself?

I alluded to the part of the mirroring of 'I' and another 'I' in the physical symmetry of two 'human' bodies, as itself central to the interface of the global scale of the physical frame as a whole, and the microphysical economy of elementary 'identification' (identity, indeed) in that frame. Might one perhaps see in the 'chemical' order of interplay of the microphysical economy and the global frame of integration an image of this human mirroring of 'inward' and 'outward' orders of personality? Can we perhaps regard the part of human 'interaction' in the interface of an economy of possible interactions, and their integration in social or cultural 'actuality' as parallel to the part in the outward physical order of human activity of the electromagnetic (around 1930 seen to be precisely the 'chemical' order) order of vision and the outward 'qualities' of physical bodies? Can we talk of an interface of 'inner' and 'outer' orders of human interaction organised by the 'symmetry' of 'I' distinguishing itself (as 'me', myself) from its reflection in another 'I' - in some-body else?

This would indeed correspond (at this abstract level of discussion) with Freud's characterisation around 1930 of the interface of a sexual 'economy' of desire governed by the symmetry of sexual 'separation' and 'charge' (so to speak), and the frame of cultural integration focussed in the formal function of self-distinction - an 'I' as it were 'above' me, distinguishing itself from its reflection in my body, as 'It' governs (even as it 'thinks' it frames its actions) by the dynamic of an impersonal sexual interface of inside and outside of that body.

In that case 'culture' is the frame of a mirroring of the 'psychological' order of self-identification in an analogous or 'symmetrical' Nature - a sort of Second Nature governed by the dynamic of human nature. But I have tried to identify this inscription of the mirroring of 'inner' and 'outer' orders in the outer order of Nature as itself only one side of the question - one component, 'german', indeed, of a wider cultural symmetry in which
the 'physical' poetic is itself mirrored in a 'french' logical poetic (or inscription of the mirroring of logical and physical orders in the logical order as primary). 'French', 'german': both an order of language and of land, marking, indeed, in the correlation of these two sides of the 'Mark' (and its poetic order), that 'wider' symmetry or mirroring of 'inward' and 'outward' orders of a Culture that attaches somehow to the general dynamic of boundaries on this Erdball, and its mirroring in the dynamic of language in general - not only in some 'local' dynamic of french or german or english - not some 'local' account of this mirroring, in some particular language.

'Language': the frame of 'stories', 'accounts', with its elementary 'periods' (sentences) of self-assertion, of assertion, framing, in which we frame ourselves as 'I'... and with its dynamic of integration of accounts into some global account, the Truth. Here we see a reflection in the limiting 'logical' frame of language - in the 'topology' so to speak, in which the economy of elementary sentences is mirrored in the logical symmetry of their formal integration in the Truth, of the interplay of global integration and elementary 'economy' in the physical order. And if, now, we move from these abstract 'logical' symmetries of Language to our parts in the interplay of sentences and Truth, rather as we moved from the formal frame of 'any Universe' to our part in the interface of those two formal orders, not only do we find a further analogue of the 'poetic' mirroring of these 'logical' and 'physical' orders: we also now discover that poetic symmetry at work, in the correlation of these two 'moves'. For in moving from the physical symmetries of global and elementary frames to their interplay in our (there 'bodily') situation, we are also moving from the formal, logical order of that physics, that 'cosmology', to the 'application' of that logic to our situation - or rather to the situation, the activity, from which that 'logic' has itself been abstracted.

A situation of 'framing': in the linguistic order of the mark (in that 'side' of the poetic order we are trying to find) we find ourselves at work with - in, rather - an interplay of an 'economy' of accounting and assertion - of 'framing' - and a complementary instance of integration. This instance of integration...
we might call 'relativistic': for in integrating stories into a unitary Story - 'History', indeed, as the story of Culture - we have to correlate the story with the locus or perspective of its proposal or proposition. And the identification of that locus will in turn involve us in the same figure.

On the elementary level of the sentence, on the other hand, we find our assertion, and the activity (upon) which it reflects (and, reflecting, sees itself to participate in), framed and coordinated. Returning to the aristotelian scheme, in relation to which I framed the physical order in terms of the coordinating symmetry of physical separation or differentiation, we might pursue an analogous analysis of the complementary logical order of 'in', and the corresponding logical distinction which mirrors physical difference.

Rather, though, than delaying any further, I will proceed directly to the poetic analogue of these two orders. I have called the order of stories 'ideology'; and I have called its outward analogue, the material frame of our activity, an 'economy' - deriving from this complementarity of inward and outward orders of our activity a figure of an 'economy' which the logic of each order (physical or ideological or cultural or whatever) opposes to what it traditionally distinguishes as its own instance of integration. Bearing in mind (as Adam Smith discovered) that the 'economy' of the material framing of our activity itself embodies both a 'play' of possibility and a complementary 'invisible hand' integrating this 'play', we may (with this reservation) talk of a 'poetic' economy of the interplay of 'mental' and 'material' (or 'ideological' and 'economic') orders, and a corresponding poetic order of integration of 'story' and complementary outward actuality. A poetic order framed by the symmetry of separation of these two orders, 'inward' and 'outward', 'subject(ive)' and 'object(ive)', just as each 'side' is itself governed by an analogous symmetry. A poetic order, then, framed precisely by the symmetry of the symmetries of its two 'sides'... and of itself.

This, thus formally expressed, is of course now a fam-
ilar enough scheme. But now it is more systematically embodied in a particular 'cultural' configuration of Reflection than before. The physics of around 1930 now provides, for example, a model for the the cultural dynamic in which that physical dynamic of symmetry frames - in theory - the physical context of that its theory. And now, in the simple figure of the reflection of the inward articulation of Theory in the configuration of that Theory, we find a simple 'poetic' in which a story of Theory over the period from around 1930 to around 1970 may be framed. For now we can inscribe the Reflection of that 'period' or phase (a cultural analogue of the physical 'harmonic' of the period) in a particular figure of mirroring of Theory and Context - now we can simply frame the 'period' as a unitary 'Action' governed by a particular 'poetic'. - A 'poetic' of the symmetrical abstraction, in its various 'dimensions' or orders, from this radical symmetry of abstraction, 'dislocation', of the various orders. - Not that we might not now look back upon all the earlier 'phases' of the story as governed by a similar abstraction (the transition from one period to the next being indeed constituted by the coming 'into question' of a common 'abstraction'): but here, over this period itself abstracted from the twentieth century as a whole (period), it is a limiting figure of that millennial abstraction which at last presents itself. and which comes at last into question in the attempt to frame that period. A Question prefigured by the 'untimely' Nietzsche a century before.
I have already identified the ideological order of Rosenberg's Myth as a representative coordinate of the configuration of around 1930. We must pass now into the wider 'cultural' order from which this german mythology is an abstraction: first from the systematic ideology of the Myth as inscription of the mirroring of 'natural' and 'spiritual' orders in Nature to the 'Movement' of which this was one side or component, and then to the inscription of that Movement itself as the primary german axis of a global configuration. A configuration unfolding from around 1930, over the mid-century, and converging upon a temporally 'symmetrical' configuration around 1970, in which we may inscribe the Theory of the period as one component. An inscription, then, leading to the question of this locus of theoretical inscription of that Theory in its Context, and so into the Close of this book.

In the 'symmetry' in which this story of Reflection over the mid-century is to be framed, the symmetries by which the various correlative orders or dimensions of Reflection are to be articulated in the 'logical' order of Theory as a whole, are 'reflected' in the various orders of Context. It is precisely this 'reflection', the inscription of Theory in a configuration of which it is one pole, which frames what is 'open' at the start of the Action or story around 1930. The narrative then proceeds by finding the component figures of this opening frame specified, determined, embodied, in particular 'historical' figures or configurations. Such an opening specification of what is open in the formal characterisation of the frame (simply as the reflection of a certain configuration of Thought, from which that Thought itself is 'abstracted') in its turn frames what is next 'open' to determination - to a 'historical' determination from 'outside' the formal frame which is simply a logical constraint on the story. - A logical order of symmetry or constraint upon the 'Action', which itself identifies a complementary 'ontological' order 'outside' which it cannot - except thus formally - 'comprehend'. Once more I should perhaps stress that what is thus logically constrained is not 'History' as some supposed comprehensive
Story, account, of (accounting for) a 'period' (a 'period', one must then suppose, quite 'arbitrarily' - as if 'by chance' - abstracted from Time, from before and after). The 'story' here amounts only to the identification of a certain 'configuration' and its development - to the 'description' of certain abstract figures 'in play' over this period of 1930 to 1970. Figures (then) which correspond, indeed, to certain 'forces' in play, insofar as such a correlation of figure and 'force' itself enters into play - but 'forces' whose precise 'nature' remains, like the framing of the configuration as a whole, 'open to question'. - To a question which, as I have already suggested, will be seen to be as it were one side of the configuration of the period, complementing the closure, the 'circuit', 'period' of the configuration or frame itself. - A question, then, attaching directly to my express part in 'framing' the period as a story.

'Forces' at work: I have characterised as one central component or dimension of the period a 'demonic' force contrary to the finality of traditional Reflection. A 'force' embodied for example, in Rosenberg's inscription of reflection in the closed circuit of Myth; and embodied in the 'Movement' of which this mythological systematisation is one side. A Movement which critical reflection stands 'outside', refusing the abstraction of Action from Thought in the poetic order of the 'Movement' and its finality. A Movement whose systematic direction of german Culture, then, presents as an elementary imperative the elimination, by whatever means available, of the locus of critical reflection (whether Frankfurt 'Critical Theory', viennese logic and psychoanalysis, south-german critical theology, or whatever else - 'jewish' thought as a whole, for example).

- Not, though, forces which are somehow 'there', 'outside' all Reason, simple 'brute' force; rather 'forces' embodied in a cultural configuration which we partly frame, in which we are radically 'engaged'. - In which the open-ness attaching directly to our part(s) of framing in a situation our part as framing the situation, is itself reflected in the radical ambiguity of these 'forces'. - Forces, then, which are truly 'demonic' in that they depend upon our entry into the configuration in which they express themselves - upon a kind of 'possession' - forces, then, rooted in a cultural
configuration in which, after the turn of the twentieth century, and most particularly after the Great War and the Crash, we are ourselves inescapably engaged, in the very constitution of our 'part', in our very constitution, as if through a kind of radical engagement in a 'matter' which can no longer be simply disavowed, any more than the physicist can any more pretend to have nothing to do with, no part in, the determination of the 'forces' he identifies.

In particular, we may recognise that the retreat to a self-assurance, and a 'morality', which identifies the demonic force of National Socialism as separable from that perception of it as opposed, somehow, from 'outside', to that earlier figure of self-knowledge and moral self-assurance, is itself a morally questionable reaction to the new configuration. - An attempt to return to an abstraction from the 'material' order, which is brought into question by what are, in this perspective, 'external' forces. An attempt which itself enters into the new configuration, but which, in its blindness to its refusal of the question posed by that configuration of our part in the new play of forces, is impotent against what it will not 'see'.

... And still, after the mid-century, a certain 'demonology' of 'western' Culture, would attempt to refuse the question posed by National Socialism, excluding the 'Movement' as an aberration from which a traditional liberal morality could abstract itself by constructing its own mythology focussed in a caricature of the Leader. .. And a complementary 'soviet' ideology would refuse the same question, refuse to recognise the radical character of what was indeed a national socialism by its caricature of the Leader as 'agent' of Capital.

How 'dramatise' the emergence of a new 'mythology', focussed in the part of a 'charismatic leader', which Weber had anticipated in his reflection? .. I will try and show how the 'dramatic' configuration of around 1930, as characterised by the 'sym-
metry' of Reflection in its Context, is focussed in Germany in
the part of Adolf Hitler, embodying in the 'cultural' interface
of Reflection and its physical frame that figure of inscription of
locus of framing in frame already found at work in the 'Theory' of
that time.

- That time, that 'period' - say the period from the
abortive Putsch to the Anschluss, in which I have already suggested
a parallel between 'movements' associated with Hitler, Schlick, and
Freud - a parallel which might of course be extended across the
whole range of Theory around this time.

This short period opens with Hitler in prison, reflect-
ing upon his situation. Mein Kampf, which embodies this dictated
reflection, will serve here as a primary reference about which to
articulate the configuration of Hitler's part before and after
the sudden force acquired by the Movement after the Crash.

The part of this book as embodying the Leader's reflection,
in the frame of the Movement, presents a further instance of a by
now familiar figure of inscription of a book in what it frames.
- A figure associated with those seminal books which come, in the
cultural orders they frame, to have as their place in that order
simply that of the Book: Bible, Code(x), Scripture, Quran..

.. And which come, in this simple mystical or mythological
configuration of the 'poetic' they frame, and in which they frame
themselves simply as the scriptural order, to acquire a 'ritual'
force - a central part in the dramatic invocation of an actuality
of the poetic order framed in the book as distinguishing itself
from that inscription, that formal framing in the book, which, in
the book itself is identified as only one component abstracted from
the dramatic situation or configuration it thus identifies - or rather,
the dramatic actuality whose self-assertion it thus frames, makes
possible, 'open', 'points' to, invokes.
Werner Maser, the German historian whose attempt to reconstruct (in the 'sixties) a story from which Hitler's own account of himself, and those opposed to it, might be understood as converse abstractions, 'myths', may be taken as a central component in the closing of a certain 'history' of this fateful book (1). In his book devoted to Mein Kampf itself he records how insignificant sales suddenly increased in 1930, then still more dramatically upon Hitler's assumption of the chancellery in 1933 (when one-and-a-half million copies were sold). In that year the book became literally 'a new Bible of the Volk' (2): it was planned that every home should have a copy; it was now bound in the manner previously reserved for bibles and devotional works; a copy was to be given to couples upon their marriage by the registrar. By 1945 sales had reached ten million copies in German, when upon the war ending the book was banned by the forces of occupation. The ban was continued by the West German government that succeeded the allies; in 1960 the Berlin police confiscated second-hand copies which had begun to be offered for sale in bookshops, and booksellers agreed that the book was only to be sold for purposes of academic research. Maser, working in the National Socialist Party archives after their return to West Germany in 1962 (whence they had been confiscated to America in 1945) noted in 1966 that since 1945 'there had hardly been a mention of Mein Kampf in Germany' (3). The book was unavailable in England between 1944 and 1969, when a new translation appeared, prefaced by the publisher's note of pressure exerted upon him from the West German government, opposing publication, and by his own argument in support of republication.

The book is organised as a narrative of the author's life from birth to the eve of the Putsch and of subsequent trial and imprisonment, interrupted, apparently rather arbitrarily by theoretical interludes. But it is in each case the narrative of the unfolding life, the Bildung, which leads to reflection, and in each case the reflection follows a course which in its turn leads back to the next episode of narrative. Reflection enters into the dynamic of Hitler's framing of his situation after the

1: Die Frühgeschichte der NSDAP, ; Hitlers Mein Kampf, Munich 196[4].
failed coup, itself as it were a silent break, a caesura, between the past upon which Hitler now reflects, and the future activity which the inscription of locus of its framing in the frame, arrived at in the course of dictating the account, is to organise.

Thus the book opens with its inscription in the primary 'poetic' or dramatic frame which has been articulated by the close. The preface, as it were, thus closes the book, inscribes it in the frame the book is to unfold in the pages that follow. The inscription of the (dictated) book in the situation it frames, here as in the body of the book itself, is effected by the comparison of the written word abstracted from its context, and the spoken word rooted in the dramatic configuration of its utterance, its particular situation. But with this in mind, the book may be taken as a sort of limiting case of the political speech, relating not (like the speech) to some particular situation, but rather to the global situation in which these particular contexts must themselves be coordinated (though they, rather than abstract reflection, remain the model for the limiting situation in which the dictated book is thus inscribed)...

Ich weiss, dass man Menschen weniger durch das geschriebene Wort als vielmehr durch das gesprochene zu gewinnen vermag, dass jede grosse Bewegung auf dieser Erde ihr Wachsen den grossen Rednern und nicht den grossen Schreibern verdankt. .. Dennoch muss zur gleichmassigen und einheitlichen Vertretung einer Lehre das Grundsätzliche desselben niedgelegt werden für immer. Hierbei sollen diese beiden Bände als Bausteine gelten, die ich dem gemeinsamen Werke beifüge. (1)

I know that one is able to win men less through the written word than - much better - through the spoken; that each great Movement on this Earth owes its growth to great speakers and not to great writers. .. Yet the basic principles of a doctrine must still be laid down for all time, in the end of a balanced and unitary presentation. To this end these two volumes are to be considered as foundation-stones, which I contribute to the collective Work.

1: Preface; cf the discussion of the 'poetics' of public speaking in II.6
Here we catch in the very syntax a first glimpse of the subordination of reflection to the dynamic of the situation..

.. weniger durch das geschriebene Wort als vielmehr durch das gesprochene..

- I have felt bound by the exigencies of writing to translate the redundant comparative as an interpolation. The text as a whole abounds in such features, as Hitler asserts the instance of authority, of an 'I', in the play of figures, images, forces, in which he finds himself engaged - in 'my struggle', reflected here in the dynamic of language itself. Again and again (and again) a position is established, and the newly-won perception as it were fixed or stabilised by a redundant 'in sich', 'an sich', 'als solcher', underlining the 'objective' character of the remorseless substantives which complement the subjective pole of self-assertion. Between such points of assertion the reflection often proceeds through the play of image, figuration, in complex and extended mixed metaphors. Often the struggle through (Plato's) 'sea of words' does not reach a new point of assertion, but returns to a reassertion before striking out on a different figuration.. or simply hesitates before moving on. Of course such are characteristics of any speech, as opposed to the systematic forward movement of reflective prose, but here they are particularly exaggerated, and serve to structure the expanse of what presents itself as a written book.

Architectural imagery has a central role - the 'Bausteine' of the Preface, and other images of foundation - notably that of a 'graniten Fundament'- recur again and again (and again): for Hitler (whom Speer, like Rosenberg, an architect in both literal and figurative senses, from his postwar prison affirmed to be primarily a frustrated architect) architecture, the framing of activity in space and the time it organises, was the primary art-form, the frame of a 'poetic' in the restricted sense, in which sculpture, and then painting were to be considered subordinate - but of this more in a moment.

- For we must begin at the beginning, like our author. In a beginning of the story where, as in the backward projection of a myth which frames the locus of its enunciation to a mythical 'origin', the action and the reflection coincide. - An initial
point from which the complementary orders of reflection and narrative separate, and from which their interplay unfolds in the symmetry rooted in an initial coincidence.

- A legendary beginning, then, a legendary birth, into the unfolding of whose sequel the symmetry of reflection and narrative sometimes intervenes to substitute for what actually happened (as ascertained, for example, by Maser) what, from the point of view of the whole scheme, should have happened — were it not for the disturbing forces which in their turn find their distorted reflections in the reconstructed narrative.

A legendary beginning: the spatial frame of the birth, by the side of the river separating Germany and Austria (dividing, then, the unity of the true Reich) announced in the opening sentence, immediately frames the initial reflection — on the correlation of this spatial order with the temporal order of a 'fate' — to pose the question of german unity — and the first mirroring of the questions raised by this unity (by this dominant question), in the wider configuration of the birth, as we return from this initial reflection to its reflection in the configuration of the next phase of the narrative — childhood.

A childhood in which the young Adolf claims that his greatest success at school was in history and geography (the study as it were of the spatial and temporal frames of activity) on the reflective or academic side — and, of course, in Art, with its complementary order of framing a particular situation, an image abstracted from the wider spatiotemporal frame of the World.

Hitler then was to proceed to the Vienna Academy. As the first chapter had opened with birth and the reflection it framed, so the second opens with the proposed entry to the Academy, to which the first had led up.

But no: it opens rather with rejection at the examination for entrance in 1907 — What Is Going On? The fateful import soon appears as Hitler recounts his interview with the Director: Hitler suddenly realises that he is not an artist, but an architect.
'Not enough heads' noted the examiners of the eighteen-year-old aspirant's portfolio. A subsequent 'mythology' would identify the organising will of National Socialism as that of a 'failed artist', joined as if by chance with all the other frustrations of the Weimar Republic. Similarly the long reflections on Jews, prostitution, and syphilis in *Mein Kampf*, would be taken as a reflection of Hitler's chance contraction of syphilis from a Jewish prostitute in his early Vienna days — and this 'chance' encounter proposed as the frame of Hitler's ideological perspective. A configuration of such historical accidents, focussed in the person of Hitler, might then organise the relegation of 'hitlerism' to the realm of a Chance from which the Reason attacked by National Socialism thus abstracts itself and asserts its underlying continuity through an arbitrary perversion of Culture — the passing subordination of Reason in History to irrational Chance, to a combination of 'circumstances'.

But as Maser points out — and as he illustrates with reproductions of Hitler's paintings and sketches — it was not the young artist's technical ability which was in question. Indeed the work that remains is certainly of a high enough standard, but indicates, as the Director of the Academy and the candidate himself agreed, an architectural rather than painterly calling. The 'expressionist' painting of Hitler's Vienna and Munich, like expressionist German theatre, had inscribed the locus of its 'perspective' in the work itself. Hitler marks as it were another pole of that 'poetic' or 'aesthetic' order: the locus of its perspective is altogether absent from the painting — an empty space of activity which must, so to speak, be populated from 'outside'. In the paintings from whose sale Hitler after his failure to enter the Academy made his rather uneven living, the great public buildings of Vienna are set in an empty 'space' (these were sold mainly to tourists). Most of the subjects were on the Ringstrasse built just before the defeat of Austria by Prussia in 1867 — a circuit of buildings built as frame for the activity of imperial administration. Hitler's favourite was the Parliament Building itself, and in a deposition to the police in 1910 (relating to a study in whose sale he believed himself to have been cheated by his intermediary) he speaks of a painting of this building.
...fotografisch genau gemalten...mit plastisch wirkenden Architektur- und Dekor-Detail. (1)

...executed with photographic exactitude which lends a three-dimensional effect to the architectural and decorative detail.

Around this time he was introduced to Roller, the stage-designer at the Opera - and the grand forms of the public buildings of the Ringstrasse are reflected in the grand settings he sketched for the plays he also sketched in this period. The question posed by the empty scene of either series of paintings and sketch-s (the real scenes of imperial administration, and the imaginary scenes of grand actions) might be seen as that of access to the dramatic order they frame - of the identification of a part in which the two orders would coincide, and the distance between Hitler and the parliamentarians on the one hand, and the wagnerian tenors (to see whom at the Opera he would go without food) on the other, would be overcome. Hitler himself would enter upon the scene he painted. A progression in this direction might be seen first in the water-colours of (still unpeopled) scenes at the Front (in the War which was to be the critical turning-point in the aspirant 'architect's' fate), and then perhaps in the great architectural projects whose elaboration in prison in 1924 parallels the political project of Mein Kampf. The implementation of these projects (for the reconstruction of Vienna, Linz, Berlin; for the construction of the largest building (by far) in the world, under a huge dome) by Hitler and Speer, as part of a reconstructed World whose direction they would frame, was only cut short by the failure of that wider project.

The later frame of action, then, is in its turn framed by the viennese Bildung of which the public and private (or imaginary) 'spaces' of action are two complementary components: Hitler chooses an architectural figure for the framing around this time of the other components or dimensions of a general dramatic 'space':

In dieser Zeit bildete sich mir ein Weltbild und eine

1: Maser, Adolf Hitler, p 87.
Weltanschauung, die zum graniten Fundament meines derzeitigen Handels wurden. Ich habe zu dem, was ich mir so einst schaf, nur weniges hinzulernen müssen, zu ändern brauchte ich nichts.

Im Gegenteil.

...(the architectural analogy is extended).. (1)

In this period there formed for me a World-Picture and World-Perception which became the granite foundation of my present activity. I have had to learn but little in addition to what I then worked out, and to others I owed nothing.

On the contrary.

... 

The spatiotemporal frame - the 'scene' - of action serves as a model (a Bild, indeed) for the coordination of the more abstract components of the Weltanschauung, assembled from the books that Hitler assimilated at this time. - Assimilated: for the point of reading (we are told toward the close of the second chapter) is not, like the 'intellectuals', to passively store up 'ballast'. Rather is the first principle of 'reading' to fit what of a book can be so accommodated, as further details of one's basic frame or picture, and to discard and forget the rest. The following chapter is a reflection upon the necessity for having a complete frame or Bild before oneself actually entering upon the scene; thus one should not enter politics until (as in Hitler's case) one is thirty. The Vienna period and third chapter close with the recognition that the author's part on the World-Stage is not that of an architect in Vienna - as the second opened with the transition from artist to architect. The transition to Munich which opens the following chapter leads to a reflection on national boundaries, from which I have already extracted a characterisation of the 'free play' of natural forces:

Die Natur kennt keine politischen Grenzen. Sie setzt die Lebe-wesen zunächst auf diesem Erdball und sieht dem freien
Der Stärkste an Mut und Fleiss erhält als ihr liebstes Kind das Herrenrecht des Daseins zugesprochen.

I have already noted how this economy of forces dictates to the German people a policy of expansion in the East, in alliance with an England whose colonial interests in their turn dictate the need of a stable European order at home. This will leave Germany free to counter the inevitable objections of France.

From the architectural 'space' of buildings, framing a dynamic of human interaction, we move to the more general space of activity articulated, first of all, in the circuit of a national boundary. Germany, framing her activity directly in that figure, is properly the focus of an international order of integration of activity. At the other pole — and threatening the disintegration of the German order both from within and without — are those people whose unity lies, as it were, in being outside the boundaries of a home-land:

Der jüdische Staat war nie in sich räumlich begrenzt, sondern universell unbegrenzt auf den Raum, aber beschränkt auf die Zusammenfassung einer Rasse. Daher bildete dieses Volk auch immer einen Staat innerhalb der Staaten. (1)

The Jewish state was never in itself spatially limited, but rather in principle unlimited in space, and limited by the unity of a race. Thus has this people always formed a state within the state.

The radical polarity of German and Jew is thus set up in the radical spatial frame of human activity. The primary element in the dynamic interaction in this frame is the Volk of which these are the two poles. Characteristically it is to the Jews that the Germans owe that divisive figure of the economic order as more radical than the national order framed in national boundaries: to the International Jew, whether capitalist or communist, who inscribes...
the national order of integration of leaders and workers in that 'international' material economy which is but one side of the unitary activity of the Volk.

Such reflection leads to the narrative of the War - that dynamic of boundaries, with its economic and political sides. If the material economy is only one side of the primary unity of the Volk, so the failure of German political leadership to recognise its part as one side of united German activity is also characterised by a 'false' abstraction of this complementary side from its root in the People. 'False': the War was stolen from the Volk by the treachery of their nominal leaders, who 'stabbed them in the back'. Hitler, returned from the interface of peoples, the 'Front', to convalesce, was dismayed by the political disorder. In the sixth chapter he moves from the dynamic of the Front to the war at home - to the war of words and images, of propaganda, in which the British were so successful and the German leadership so completely incompetent. And now, in this reflection, paralleling the transition from the art and architecture of Vienna and Munich to the inscription of representation in the primary 'poetic' of the Volk framed in a Land, we can see the experience of the War as a turning-point in Hitler's Bildung. The relation of an 'abstract' presentation of a situation with 'Propaganda', 'publicity', 'advertising', may be compared with the relation of the 'art' in an exhibition to the poster advertising the exhibition - whose 'art' is to work on the viewer so as to govern his action (to make him go to see the other paintings, the 'Art'). Hitler had himself designed some posters in Munich.

.. die allererste Voraussetzung jeder propagandistischen Tätigkeit überhaupt: nämlich die grundsätzlich subjektiv einsetzende Stellungnahme zu jeder von ihr bearbeiteten Frage. (1)

.. the altogether primary prerequisite of any propagandistic activity at all: that is, the fundamentally subjectively determined point of view on each question with which it deals.
Propaganda is *politische Reklame*, political advertising. It must be based on a simple configuration of themes or images, specifically adapted to the perceptions of the unintelligent masses. This simple and connected configuration must be embedded in the economy of mass perception, introduced into that play of perceptions in various reiterated forms, in which the outline of the simple configuration is from each point - in each situation - recognisable. Thus the simple figures will frame mass perception and activity. In Germany (as opposed to Britain) in the period of the War, their was no direction framing its own part in such a simple national poetic, no perception of the part of the press, in particular, in organising, framing, national perception and national activity.

Returned from the War (in the eighth chapter) to Munich, Hitler then secured a job in the only half-demobilised army 'educating' jobless ex-soldiers: once more the reflections on the previous episode (the War) lead into the narrative of a new episode. In this rather humble 'social work' Hitler begins to discern his part in 'educating' the ex-soldiers about their part in postwar Germany. Through the War has come a glimpse of that 'entry onto the scene' blocked before the War - and this just through the figure of a sort of 'social' poetic in which he has the part of framing parts in a Nation he frames in the spatial order of frontier and Front. At the age of thirty Hitler no longer stands invisible in the empty space surrounding the Parliament Building, framing that architectural construction which in its turn frames the governmental activity of framing activity in the State. Now for the first time, in the wider space of that activity of the State as a whole, he begins as it were to find himself in the picture he paints.

A picture whose simple 'propagandistic' forms are inscribed in the primary figure of a Volk rooted within the spatial frame of its activity. A picture in which he can now identify the two divisive forces of capitalism and communism as simply two complementary sides of a Jewish conspiracy to undermine the unity of the germanic Volk. In the tenth chapter of the first volume further components of this simple polarity of German and Jewish Völker are inscribed within the simple poetic: in the ideological order of press and education, con-
largely by Jewish newspaper-proprietors on the one hand and Jewish intellectuals on the other, can be found the same germs of degeneration that appear more openly in the sexual diseases attendant upon prostitution (here associated with Jews, money and the 'blood-sin' of miscegenation). The germ which combines with the Teutonic seed in the impure sexual Mischung, leading to progeny in which the Teutonic seed of sexual purity is weakened, diluted, is in prostitution associated with that subordination of the national to the economic order of the transaction already associated with the International Jew. The subordination of Volk, that unity of activity associated with Aryan seed, to an uncontrolled 'economy' or play, whether sexual or monetary, is itself indicative of the dilution of that seed attendant upon such subordination. In a long discussion of syphilis Hitler finds in that germ the very image of the germ that eats away at German society.

A further solvent of an integrated social order is to be found in the Art since the turn of the century which is the aesthetic analogue of 'bolshevism':

Der Bolschewismus der Kunst ist die einzige mögliche kulturelle Lebensform und geistige Ausserung des Bolschewismus überhaupt (1)

Art-Bolshevism is the only possible form in cultural life, and the spiritual expression, of Bolshevism in general.

- It may be 'inner experience' outwardly expressed... but it is the 'inner experience', then, of Geisteskranken oder Verbrechern, hallucination. As such it is diametrically opposed to the outward frame of unified national activity in great public architecture. 
  
  - And parallel disintegration is evident in religion, in politics, and in the military establishment.

All these components, then (Hitler summarises in the eleventh chapter) are to be understood through their inscriptio n in the primary dynamic of Race - in the frame of cultural order and decay
articulated between the antithetical poles of German and Jew, between the 'Aryan' principle of subordination of self or part to community (of individual activity to the integration of all activity in a common end), and its Semitic antithesis.

Within this basic frame - the polarity of German integration and Jewish disintegration - the enunciation of the frame itself constitutes the principle of a dynamic, a 'movement', of restoration of German unity. - A dynamic in which this simple frame of 'Völkisch' perception, and the action it informs, 'injected' as it were into the body politic, generates new configurations in the social order which are themselves then interpreted in the new frame, leading to further Völkisch activity, wider configurations of the conflict in the social order of this interpretation and its antithesis - and so on. The germ of the movement lies simply in the perception by one man of the part of the enunciation of the frame in the Völkisch dynamic it frames or enunciates: this reflection on the part of enunciation attached to the narrative of Hitler's work as educational officer in postwar Munich. That narrative then recounted how (in his official capacity) he had been sent to investigate a small 'German Worker's Party' that had been attempting to recruit members from the ranks of the demobilised army. The investigator now found in the formal organisation of that ineffectual little group the bare frame in which his part of enunciation of the regenerative dynamic might be embodied in the social order: the dynamic or 'movement' of re-integration of Germany must be organised through the form of a party in which the activity of promoting the new perception was itself inscribed in the frame thus promoted. The 'movement' must itself be integrated as an activity, according to those very principles of integration of national activity as a whole which it was its end to realise in a united Volk. In particular, the basic frame of the Volk at first informing the perception and action of a small group who share this perception (which coordinates their action), will generate opposition (most particularly from Marxist groups who subordinate Volk to the international material economy of production): but it is precisely such an opposition in relation to the frame of figure of the Volk which is the basic dimension of the Völkisch perception and activity. The 'Movement' or dynamic feeds on, has its very life in, such opposition to it, which confirms the primary perception of
the polarity of integration and disintegration in the Volk. The first volume closes with the spectacle of the first 'mass meeting' of the new NSDAP, in which marxist opposition to such public enunciation of racist propaganda is itself incorporated into the public spectacle. - A configuration of opposition has been generated publicly, which the National Socialist German Worker's Party, on one side of the configuration, frames in its own terms. This will generate a wider opposition to this framing, which will in turn be inscribed by the new party in its oppositional frame: the Movement is under way, the spark has found its tinder, and the Strife or Struggle begins to grow from opposition to its oppositional scheme.

This mass meeting was chosen by Hitler for the enunciation of the twenty-five-point Programme of the party: a reduction of the frame of perception and action to a minimum configuration reflecting the situation or configuration of enunciation, and so directly confronting the spectators of the carefully arranged spectacle with the simple choice of a part in the Movement. The second volume, covering the period (on its narrative side) from the first mass meeting to the eve of the Putsch of 1923, constitutes Hitler's reflection on 'The National-Socialist Movement' (the title of this second part of Mein Kampf). As the first volume began with his fateful entry onto the german scene on the border dividing the german people into the old empires of Germany and Austria, and closed with his entry into the public arena, so the second begins with a reflection upon his part in the Movement whose beginning has been identified in that close. His part is, precisely, to frame the 'völkisch' Weltanschauung in a Party and Movement. Within the german Volk as a whole the Party organises the promotion of the perception of that Volk, as an activity; within the Party the Leader frames this activity as a unity by inscribing it in the völkisch frame it promotes. He integrates the activity of promoting integration of activity in the german People. This reflection on his part in the first chapter is followed by the question: what is 'völkisch'? - What, among all the diverse 'völkisch' programmes of the various racist groups of the early 'twenties; is essential? What is this frame of Volk whose promotion by the Party the Leader is to inscribe in that frame?
In the second chapter comes the framing of the radical völkisch perception of the german seed of an integration of activity which will in its turn organise the purification of this german seed, to which I have already referred. This primary principle of integration, paralleling in its closed circuit the part of the Leader as framing his own part in the völkisch scheme as that of its enunciation, then serves, in the three following chapters, as the fundamental circuit or frame in which the programme of the Movement is articulated. We then return to the mass meeting at which this programme was enunciated, first inscribed in the public 'economy' or play of perceptions. Here, in the discussion of the dynamic of such spectacles, we find another analogue of the position of the 'Leader': for the orator is to fit the part of characterising the situation to which he addresses himself into this characterisation, taking the frame of the meeting itself as a sort of mirror of that external situation he enunciates, in which his part of enunciation is reflected. The public meeting is an analogue of the Party itself, whose very life it constitutes: for the Party is similarly a mirroring as it were of Leader (as one pole of focus) and the general 'situation' to whose particular aspects the public meeting addresses itself.

In the laboratory of the early public meetings, then, the leader discovered the principles to be applied in the organisation of the party: concentration upon Versailles, stage-management of the conflict at the meetings with communist opposition, and the associated organisation of the Sturmabteilung, the SA, who would at the right moment turn the ideological opposition of the marxist hecklers into physical conflict. Then the organisation of a kind of iconology, reflecting these principles in the dynamic of the image, notably the black swastika in a white circle on a red ground: Red for socialism, and to antagonise the communists, Red-White-Black for german nationalism, the swastika for the aryan life of the Movement.

Three chapters then follow on these three primary components coordinated in this dominant image. In each one component frames the interplay of narration and reflection: Aryan Volk and the assimilation to National Socialism of the Federation of völkisch
Organisations, insofar as its components could be subordinated to the dynamic of a unitary Movement; Consideration of the part of the SA and physical force in the Movement, in relation to the failure of the communist insurrections in Berlin and Munich; Consideration of elements of division and elements of unity in the old feudal order still embodied in the separate German states. Then a return once more to the correlation of the dynamic of the mass meeting and that of the Party. Propaganda had been likened in the first book to 'politische-Reklame', to the 'art' of the poster. The emblem of the party had been conceived rather as such a 'poster'. Propaganda was the activity of 'promoting' (as the advertisers say) völkisch perception, and so informing the activity of participation in the Movement whose end was precisely this same 'promotion'. Once again we find the familiar circularity which frames the Movement..

Der erste Aufgabe der Propaganda ist die Gewinnung von Menschen für die spätere Organisation; die erste Aufgabe der Organisation ist die Gewinnung von Menschen zur Fortführung der Propaganda.

Die zweite Aufgabe der Propaganda ist die Zersetzung des bestehenden Zustandes und die Durchsetzung dieses Zustandes mit der neuen Lehre, während die zweite Aufgabe der Organisation der Kampf und die Macht sein muss, um durch sie den endgültigen Erfolg der Lehre zu erreichen. (1)

The primary problem of Propaganda is the winning of men for subsequent Organisation; the primary problem of Organisation is the winning of men for the carrying on of Propaganda.

The second problem of Propaganda is the disruption of the existing situation and the restructuring of this situation through the new doctrine, while the second problem of Organisation is necessarily struggle for power, through which the final establishment of the doctrine is to be achieved.

Whole pages of this chapter on 'Propaganda and Organisation' are underlined (or rather in the printed equivalent), as if to emphasise the centrality of this enunciation of the framing of Party and Movement... which leads, towards the close of the chapter to the as-
sertion of the locus of this framing in what it frames as Führer-
prinzip. And here Hitler stands back, as it were, from the words
and figures, and emphasises that this Führerprinzip is not simply
one element in the propagandistic play of figures, but rather marks
an actuality which stands outside and organises that play - as he
now stands outside the inscription of himself in the book, and in-
scribes the propagandistic order of the book in the primary order
of action, Organisation. The emphasis as it were echoes the Führer's
voice 'outside' the text, dictating the words, in that dramatic order
in which the text as a whole is inscribed at the outset (in the Pre-
face to the first volume already quoted).

The perspective now shifts to the organisational imperat-
tives of the situation or context, to which propaganda is to be sub-
ordinated: we work back from the primary organisation of the State,
of Power, 'through which the final establishment of the doctrine is
to be achieved' - from the end of that struggle for power when doctrine
is in place in the new state, to the place of the propagandistic est-
ablishment of doctrine in the organisation of that struggle.

On the home front, economic divisions must be subordinated
to the integration of activity in the State - thus the unions must
be brought into the Movement. Similarly foreign relations must be
determined by the basic principle of the unity of the Volk. Here,
as already noted, the basic principle implies an alliance with Bri-
tain (and Italy) in a north-south axis, and a correlation of expansion
of Lebensraum in the East (prepared by the 1917 Revolution) and a 'fin-
al reckoning' with France in the West. The Auseinandersetzung with
France

cann und wird nur Sinn erhalten, wenn sie ein Rückendeckung
bietet für eine Vergrösserung der Lebensraumes unseres Volkes
in Europa. (1)
can and will only make sense as the support for an extension
of the living-space of our people in Europe.

Wir schliessen endlich ab die Kolonial- und Handelspolitik
der Vorkriegzeit und gehen über zur Bodenspolitik der Zukunft.(2)
We are finally finishing with the colonial and economic poli-
cies of prewar days, and passing on to the soil policy of
the future.

- The 'existing situation' to be disrupted and restructured by National Socialist propaganda (as one side of the struggle for power) presents, after the War and Versailles, the primary components of the völkisch scheme, in a configuration whose transformation requires only the introduction of that scheme itself in Germany. Thus the French occupation of the Ruhr was taken as a 'signal' for the völkisch coordination of an internal 'reckoning' with communism and effete liberal democracy (in their 'united front' against the Volk itself) and an external reckoning with the France these internal forces of the Weimar Republic cannot confront. In the völkisch scheme of a primary opposition of the internal integration of the Volk and the internal and external forces of disintegration the situation appears simply as the question of self-assertion in the völkisch, racist, frame: in, that is, of, that frame.

The occupation of the Ruhr and collapse of the German economy in 1923 thus appeared as the sequel to the first entry of the Movement into the public arena to which the closing chapter of the first book was devoted: now the transition was to be made to the national stage, through a confrontation with the forces of democracy and marxism at Munich which would polarise Germany as the first mass meetings had begun to polarise the political scene at Munich. In the event the Putsch failed: but in a way it succeeded in bringing into the oppositional scheme of the Struggle the national political order framed by the Weimar Constitution. The second book, and the whole, closes with this step, and with the assurance born at the period dealt with at the close of the first book, that the Struggle grows in opposition as its medium and life, that the Struggle itself elicits the principle of Race, of the Volk, which it is a struggle towards. The movement cannot fail, it grows in this way with a 'fast mathematisches Gesetzmaßigkeit' from the opposition it provokes.

The physical confrontation with the existing order, led by the 'stormtroopers' on the analogy of the dynamic of local contests with opposed factions, against the Munich representatives of the Berlin government, was, then, to be determined within the legal frame of
of that constitutional government, rather than within the Nazi frame of opposition which Hitler considered to confer a kind of higher legality upon opposition to a law rooted in abstract institutions rather than the self-assertion of Volk.

- 'Abstract' institutions - institutions abstracted from the primary order of integration of activity in the Volk, of individual actions in that one Action, Act, Actuality, Drama. Abstract institutions framed by academic democrats, whose subordination (in the Weimar Constitution) of the unity of the State to a reflection abstracted from the primary activity which is its social context (and in which, as one 'side', it partakes), is analogous to the marxist subordination of the unitary actuality of the Volk to its material, 'economic', side. The Code framing the Constitution does not, like Hitler's book, inscribe itself in the dramatic order of Action, but rather turns things upside-down by inscribing that order in the abstract domain of Reflection. Hitler's action in 1923, framed in the assertion of german Volk as primary frame of activity, is determined in the Weimar Republic according to the inverted order of the formal constitutional scheme. Henceforth National Socialist activity must be fitted to the constraints imposed by the formal framing of german activity in the Constitution, which enters as one order into the play of forces. - One very special order, though: for the formal constraint imposed by this circular inscription of Code in the social order it frames is not something which can be opposed, physically, from without. It itself formally determines the locus of opposition to it: it is not of the same order of, say, the marxist ideological frame - indeed the opposition between National Socialism and Marxism must itself be formally constrained by the Constitution, which is now seen to present as it were the progressive approximation of reflection to its own inscription in the radical order of völkisch action - the national representation, so to say, of the Volk as perceived at a certain time, the Volk's still somewhat abstract consciousness of itself, its representation to itself.

The formal frame of the Constitution, then, provides as it were a sort of formal space of coordinates in the more radical space framed by the physical order of the Boden itself. But from the very character of its (constitutive) abstraction from that more radical
space of Bodenpolitik, this formal frame leaves open activity within the more radical frame of Volk, and amounts simply to one constraint among others which enters into the framing of völkisch action. The dynamic of constitutional change, which as it were 'thinks' itself the primary instance of framing social activity, is in fact only one side, constituted in a certain abstraction from the actual working of social interaction, in the more radical dynamic of the Volk recognising itself as such (rather in the indirect mode of 'representation', ideological or parliamentary - which are of course two aspects of the same academic abstraction).

Thus, while appearing, after 1923, to be working (after the sobering experience of prison) 'within' the Weimar Constitution, the National Socialist 'Party' is in fact working for the constitutional transformation of the abstract frame of the Republic into the representation within the Volk of the natural 'constitution' of a People as the principles of integration of their activities into a unitary Action or actuality. The turning-point, prefigured in the economic collapse of 1923, was to come with the economic collapse at the close of the decade - a more radical configuration which could not, like that of 1923 be controlled by forces outside Germany, since these forces were themselves fully occupied by collapse at home. There could in 1930 be no Dawes Plan imposing economic and political stability in Germany from across the Atlantic, and the Nazi 'Party' in the formal guise of contender in democratic elections, suddenly emerged as the second-largest component in the Reichstag. Seven years later the Party had transformed this transitional participation in the old Constitution (more or less constitutionally) into a unitary control over all aspects of german activity. Whereas before 1930 the party organisation might have appeared as subordinate to the democratic policy of gaining parliamentary representation, that earlier function now appeared as itself a subordinate component in the move towards the establishment of the Party as dynamic frame of integration of the activity of the Volk 'as such', and not simply as 'represented' in the formal institutions of the old Republic. The 'Third Reich' proposed by Moeller van den Bruck in 1923 had become an actuality, and Hitler's attention could be directed to the primary order of völkisch self-assertion - the foreign policy articulated in the physical interface of 'inside' and 'outside' the State.
Within the period from the Putsch of 1923 to the consolidation of the internal order of a Volk whose integrated activity was framed by the Party, and the Party by the Leader, the configuration of around 1930 may be taken as critical - critical in the transition from the framing of German activity within the formal order of an abstract constitution to the framing of that abstract order of 'representation' as a secondary component of the integrated action governed by the Party. I have noted how Rosenberg's systematisation of the configuration of inscription of story in context in 1930 amounts to the dominant 'ideological' analogue of the theoretical inscription (around that time) of the framing of an order in the order thus framed. On the other side, as it were, Rosenberg's inscription of Reflection in Action - their mirroring in the narrative order of his 'Myth' - may be seen as the systematic articulation of the 'ideological' side of the analogous configuration of Mein Kampf (that book framing its own inscription in the order of integration of activity it frames). The configuration of Mein Kampf, in its turn, itself framed by the Viennese transition from artist to the question of entry upon the scene he frames of the 'architect' of a new German order, provides in outline the scheme of transition from the Putsch, through the parliamentary success of 1930, to the Gleichschaltung of the Party State, and on to a foreign policy whose attempted implementation (until its breakdown in the latter phase of the Second World War) covers a further six or seven years around 1940 (the extent to which 'Hitler's War Aims' were framed within the scheme of Mein Kampf's 'granite foundation' has been systematically shown by Norman Rich (1)).

If we take the inscription of Reflection in Action upon which Rosenberg himself insists as the radical determinant of the relations of ideology ('propaganda') and party organisation - reflected in Rosenberg's own position in the party as chief ideologist, subordinate to the Party Leader and in competition with Goebbels - then we may take Rosenberg's articulation of a unitary narrative frame for the activity of an integrated Volk, as an analogue in one of the component orders of the Party State of the central 'cultural' position of the Leader who frames himself as the locus of framing the unity of the Party, and so, through it, of the Volk. Then we may find various other analogues of Rosenberg's subordinate position around

1: Hitler's War Aims; 1: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of
1930. I have already noted the analogy between Rosenberg's 'poetic' or mythology, and the heideggerian perspective which made possible Heidegger's flirtation with National Socialism between the period of Hitler's accession to the Chancellery in 1933, and the systematic introduction of Gleichschaltung beginning with the Enabling Bill of the following year. More generally I have noted the 'existential' inscription of Reflection in Action associated with the 'discovery' of Kierkegaard (for example) in the late 'twenties. In the order of juridical reflection on the 'constitutional' frame of the State, the transition in the years around 1930 from the inscription of Party in an abstract 'Constitution', towards the inscription of that abstract legal order in the Party State, is reflected in the 'Legal Decisionism' of Schmidt. Society is framed as integrated individual activity through the inscription of what is open at each level to a Decision, Entscheidung, at the next level (from what is left open by a higher decision, and so on). The social order of Decision is framed as a unity by the pure self-assertion of a Leader, accepting that part, open to him, of framing himself as framing what is open in the State as a whole. This primary 'decisive' self-assertion as it were closes the circuit which frames the State as a unity, and is therefore, in principle, not open to question: there is no locus in the State thus framed in which the decisive part of the Leader can be brought into question. The primary circuit by which his Decision to be Leader is traced in what is 'open' to the State, or rather to a body of people in its self-constitution as a 'State' (the primary circuit, then, of Culture itself in radical Nature) can only be brought into question by physical force within or without - by revolution of war. And the legal frame of a state amounts to choices of sanctions (at various levels of organisation) as part of the organisation of activity at that level - including the radical sanction of physical force itself, by which the unity of the state must ultimately seek to conserve itself within and without.

Such an insistence upon the dynamic of integration of activity which constitutes the force of Culture in the otherwise free play of 'natural' forces combines, like Rosenberg's parallel Myth (with its narrative order complementing the legal 'space' of Schmidt's Decisionism), the 'socialist' inscription of the State in a radical Economy of natural forces, and the 'nationalist' principle of integration of activity within the closed physical circuit of a boundary.
As in the Nazi banner these two components, and the hitherto opposed prussian aristocratic nationalism and working-class international socialism to which in Germany they correspond, meet in the central figure of an aryan life-blood from which unfolds the germ of abstraction of integrated Culture from disordered Nature. Rosenberg's mythology may be paralleled by the attempt of the group (including Oswald Spengler and Ernst Jünger) of 'nietzscheans' with their periodical Der Tat, The Act, as organ of a 'Conservative Revolution' combining the previously antagonistic forces of nationalism and socialism.

Here, in the ideological context of Rosenberg's exemplary 'story' or myth, which inscribes itself as one component in the dramatic configuration it identifies, we find again and again that same simple figure of the primacy of the Act, the figure of an abdication of the critical force of Reflection, faced with the reflection upon its own character as, itself, act. Nazi reflection thus acknowledges its character as indeed the 'reflection' of the analogous circuit by which the organising focus of the Leader inscribed itself as self-assertion in the primary domain of Action (I have already alluded to Blümler's substitution for the cold abstraction of Dasein, of the living person of Adolf Hitler - of which it is now seen to be but the 'reflection').

Such an inscription of its ideological 'side' in the political order of National Socialist integration of activity is paralleled by a 'socialist' inscription of the material economy of Germany after 1933-4 within the same organising frame of the Party, subordinate to its leader. But here, in contradistinction to Stalin's control of the russian system, we see - as in the ideological order, and in the organisation of Party and State institutions generally - that 'social darwinism' which, in its emphasis upon the free play of forces within the State as organising frame, has more in common with the most ruthless free enterprise than with (equally ruthless) stalinist control of all details of activity. (More or less) as in Schmidt's scheme, the leader frames the unity of the State in his iron rule, itself unquestionable - or questionable only at the risk of draconian physical sanctions. But within the closed circuit of his self-assertion as Leader in the Party he leaves
altogether open a complementary play or economy of subordinate decisions. Within this play subordinates assert themselves in a sort of analogy with the Leader, to whom their conflicts with one another are in principle to be referred. Each deputy carves out from what is left open by the Leader his own domain, in which his own decisive position is unquestionable - except in that conflict between and within these domains from which the deputies themselves emerge and consolidate their positions (and which reflects the natural darwinian conflict among rival states for territory, and among rivals within each group for leadership). The same interplay of rival framings of what is left open by the immediately superior level of decision runs right down through the Party organisation, and into the interface of Party and State itself. Thus the Leader's part of framing his position as 'Leader' within the physical territory of the State involves a certain constraint upon the possible configurations of the interface of Party and State at the lowest level, and this figuration of constraint and control, itself inscribed within the figure of self-assertion as Leader within the physical order of the State as a whole, serves as frame for constraints working back up through each level of Party organisation. The dynamic of the State then appears analogous to the dynamic of the mass meetings from which the Party itself was born: Hitler's policy is framed in the 'feedback' through the Party of his 'decisions', as mediated by the play of forces within the organisation, at each level. The apparently loose character of such control led various elements in the State and Party, before the purge of 1934, to imagine the Party organisation could be subordinated to their own aims. At one extreme industrialists imagined that the Party would be of use to them in their manipulation of the free play of forces at the base level of the material economy of the State as a whole. The Strasser brothers, on the other hand, imagined that the Party could be used to promote an antithetical 'socialist' programme of state-planning of the economy. Rohm imagined he could achieve a dominant position in the State as head of the SA, the arm within the Party of physical control of all activity within the State. Army officers believed that the Party might be of use in restoring the old nationalist order of prussian militarism. Lastly - and perhaps decisively - the international community believed that german National Socialism might work
as a counter to Russian exportation of communist internationalism, its critical confrontation with German socialism controlling the eastern interface of Russian and 'western' forces, whose dynamic would be reflected, for better or for worse, within the Western states facing the social disorder attendant upon another Great Depression.

In each case the 'local' experience of freedom of manoeuvre hides the global constraints exercised by Hitler, which, in their simple and radical 'symmetry', rooted in the figure of integration of activity in a general 'economy' of free play of forces, coordinate the various parallel local 'moves' of the various internal and external factions. Blinded by their own local interests, these factions could not recognise until too late, the way that these competing interests were being manipulated by Hitler's system to the 'tragic' loss of each. - Tragic, here, in the sense of that failure to see the part one is playing which leads to a sort of correlative imprisonment in an 'impossible' situation - or the playing of an imaginary part which leads one into a situation in which that part has no way forward or out, in which the illusory part breaks down. In a more radical way, of course, Hitler's own self-assertion in this scheme of manipulation of perceptions of self-assertion at various points in the scheme, is caught in the same 'tragic' figure of identification with a part - with a mere 'image' of oneself: in this limiting case that of German Leader, framing German action as the integration of a Volk grown from the Aryan germ informing the subordination of self to community.

The integration at home by around 1937 opened the way for the foreign policy framed in prison after 1923: first of all the assertion, beyond the 'unnatural' borders of Germany proper, of the unity of the German Volk of Germany, Austria, and the Eastern European states earlier 'colonised' by the first German Reich. The formal boundaries imposed at Versailles were, like the Weimar Constitution now eventually recognised as an abstraction from the 'constitution'
of the German People 'as such', an abstraction from the 'natural' racial order of integration of activity within certain 'natural' bounds of settlement of a People. - From a 'natural' order whose principles of national self-determination had even been formally proposed by Wilson at Versailles as the basis in Natural Law of the new post-war order. Now the internal readjustment which had led to the integration of activity within 'Germany' as defined from 'outside' at Versailles - that is, the transition from the abstract Weimar Constitution to the true constitution of the Volk of which it was an academic reflection - was to be extended to the transition from the formal international order framed after the War to the natural interplay of Peoples of which it was but a pale (and one-sided: French) reflection.

This transformation of Germany between the two Wars - the two World Wars of the first half of the twentieth century - is itself but one component or axis in the transformation of the international or 'World' order between the two 'German' wars. How do analogous transformations outside Germany reflect the rise of Hitler and National Socialism over the period around 1930 (say, from 1923 to 1937), in an international or World dynamic of interaction, reflected in Germany by Hitler's version of the international order?

I have noted the tendency in the 'West' to regard Hitler as a useful element in the international confrontation with the Russian exportation of international socialism - the tendency to correlate Germany's part in the interface of East and West in Europe with the domestic conflict of western principles with those of an eastern socialism. This principle of correlation of the international order focussed in Europe's eastern border (insofar as the traditional eurocentric view of World-History still made sense) with analogous configurations within each state may serve as a first approximation towards the inscription of the German transition from the occupation of the Ruhr to the entry of a rearmed Germany into the international arena, in the 'symmetric' configuration of the various correlative components or dimensions of that international order.
I have several times drawn an analogy between the various 'primary' correlative dimensions of theory (the theoretical analogues, themselves, of the outward symmetry of physical space), and 'national' dimensions (or traditions or schools) of European Reflection. Thus I have compared a certain Franco-German polarity in reflection with a theoretical symmetry or complementarity of 'logical' and 'physical' orders. I have also, in discussing the part of 'symmetry' in the most general configuration of Reflection and its Context, drawn an analogy for the whole from the particular case or component of physical theory ('theoretical physics'). We may now pass from the German dimension of 'Culture' - of activity as integrated in different cultures and their interplay - around 1930, to the general cultural configuration of which it is one dimension, by relating these two orders of analogy.

First, then, we might note the parallel between the ordering of German activity under National Socialism, and the principles identified around the same time as ordering the 'physical' order of 'action' or interaction. For the interplay of an integrative order of Entscheidung at the various levels of Party and State with the 'economy' of what is left open in that order of Decision presents a direct analogy with the physical principles of a global integrative symmetry (of Space-Time-Matter) and the local economy of interaction (and particularly of our interaction with - measurement of - local systems) in which it is reflected. We may directly compare the Party with the global constraints, everywhere reflected in the cultural 'economy' of personal interaction - in that complementary order, the other 'side' of the Party State.

When we (then) pass to the contemporary French order, we find, in the order of activity as a whole, something analogous to that logical order of Entscheidung brought into question (by Gödel's paper 'Über unentscheidbaren Satz...' ) around the same time. Where we should find the focal locus of assertion at the centre of the French 'scene' in the 'thirties - at the apex of a traditional 'logical' organisation of French activity - we find rather a space, a vacuum ('of power'), a question, Indecision. Symbolically, when in the first days of September 1939 Britain wished to consult with the French government before issuing a joint declaration of war against Germany, the mechanism for the French decision was, as so often in those years, 'out of order'.
The 'decisive' leadership of Germany, and the indecisive leadership of France may be taken as two roles in the political configuration of Europe in the 'thirties. - Two poles of a common play of forces already identified in the German 'arena': a play of parliamentary government with 'party' organisations (Comintern marxism on the 'left', National Socialism or Italian Fascism in the 'centre', and extreme reactionary groups on the 'right') regarding 'representation' as a secondary order of integrated 'revolutionary' activity - of a more radical 'movement', and a reflection of the extra-parliamentary spectrum in the avowedly parliamentary parties themselves ('socialists' on the left, the Catholic Zentrum (for example) at the centre of the parliamentary scene before its subordination to the Party State.. and so on ('reactionary' elements tending less to that systematic 'party' organisation, whether within or without the parliamentary frame, which Hitler himself claims to have learnt (like the European parliamentary 'parties' developed over the turn of the century) from the 'communists' and 'socialists'). Indicative of the wider interplay of these forces of which the German dimension is but one component, one might take the direction from Moscow to Comintern parties in 1934 to form a 'Popular Front' against Fascism (in its various national forms), cooperating with the gradualist parliamentary socialist parties which they had earlier been directed to oppose. One might further see Hitler's successful combination of 'socialist' planning and traditional capitalism - a German component of the wider implementation (after 1929) of 'mixed' economies throughout the capitalist West (reflected to the east in Stalin's 'State Capitalism' associated with Socialism in One Country).

- So much for initial indications.. but how now can we pass through these onto a general characterisation of the cultural 'dynamic' in which the German order of the 'thirties might be characterised by certain 'coordinates' as one component or dimension?

I have already abstractly identified the general order now sought as an 'Action'. .. And I have characterised the German component in terms of the Nazi framing of what actions are 'open'. We must then extend the 'local' German constraints on what is 'open' in the 'thirties to the wider frame of global activity, by considering how it comes into play with what is 'open' elsewhere.
In particular we must inscribe the German frame within global economic constraints, and within the global interplay of 'ideology', of 'stories' of what is going on in general in the World. I indicated how the interplay of National Socialism and Marxism in prewar Germany was in many groups outside Germany regarded as a useful element to be inscribed in the general dynamic of opposition of competing ideologies (characterised by complementary and conflicting accounts or stories of the part of its material economy in the social order - or vice-versa). Such a conception of Hitler's usefulness to the West, much played upon by Hitler himself in his dealings with western leaders, itself involves some appreciation of precisely that global order of mutually constraining forces into which the German Leader was himself manoeuvring these anti-communist (or anti-Russian) fears and aims. I have indicated how the structure of National Socialist Party-Government, unlike Stalinist Party-Government, systematically left open various framings of activity at each 'level', while assuring (on analogy with the integrative symmetry of physical rather than cultural 'space' and 'time') a coordination and mutual constraining of these 'freedoms' at each level towards the unitary end of integration of the German Volk, of their collective activity and identity in it. Similarly one may apply such principles of integration of activity through its 'symmetry' or symmetries - through overall constraints such as the global integrative functions of ideology and material economy, and the integration of these two sides themselves in a shared World of activity - to the analysis of the 'interaction' of Germany and its Context.

In particular one can consider how Hitler's own German version of the mirroring of internal and external orders in the physical bounds of the German Volk - his attempt in effect to frame the part of German Volk in the wider World in 'Volkisch' terms - itself induces a 'symmetrical' reaction outside Germany, a countervailing figuration or configuration of World-Activity, with its corresponding global force to which the force of the local German self-assertion is soon subordinated.

The 'symmetry' of this international 'reaction' to the self-assertion of a German Volk in its own terms is most directly expressed in what I have called the 'poetic' order of symmetry of assertion and its context. The 'Popular Front' of European Comin-
tern and socialist parties is itself only one 'side' of a wider front of Stalin's Russia to the East, Roosevelt's America to the West, and Britain with her equally theatrical wartime Leader representing the common front in Europe (rather - in western Europe).

- A 'poetic' order - that 'poetic' order I have associated with the Reflection of these Three (whether in its 'open' american form, its 'closed' russian form, or the more traditional european abstraction from these extremes). - A 'poetic' order as 'central' component of a dramatic order of interplay of 'logical', 'physical' and 'poetic' orders of symmetry. Hitler had identified in the traditionally conflicting order of french policy a principle of reaction to his designs that must sooner or later be faced; but he did not take into account a global reaction to the german framing of this natural conflict or opposition - a global reaction to the german framing of the global order of this opposition, the global order of which this franco-german polarity was one dimension. - A dimension of the european order Hitler imagined might be abstracted from the british 'dimension' (or rather a british-italian axis) in Europe, as from the american 'dimension' of the global configuration.

- A 'poetic' order asserting itself, as it were, to confound the $U(3)\Rightarrow S$ of german self-assertion, german framing of her 'part' in the World. a 'poetic' symmetry, balance, justice, symbolically or ritually restored at Nuremburg.

At the level of this general 'cultural' dynamic, how can we characterise in outline the transition from around 1930, through Hitler's attempt from (say) 1937 to 1943 to frame Germany's position in the World in his german terms, to a point or period around the mid-century which might itself constitute a central 'turning-point' in the global development from about 1930 to about 1970?

Here again I find an analogue of the configuration of the 'Action' over the years 1930-1970 in the 'theoretical' component of that Action. Just as, say, Dirac's circuit, framing the physical theory of around 1930 in the inscription of framing in frame, or Heidegger's analogous 'ontological' circuit - or their analogues
in other 'theories' - partake of a common figure of abstraction of these analogous 'circuits' from a wider circuit constitutive of the theoretical domain as a whole - and from their coordination in this wider circuit, and through it with a common context - so perhaps one might speak of an 'abstraction' of the various national orders of around 1930 - of their local organisation of action - from the global order of their interaction.

- That is to say, the german frame of self-inscription in the global order as german Volk, framing what is 'open' in Germany, and what is 'open' in german diplomacy or foreign policy, involves a sort of short-circuit in, an abstraction from, the global symmetry of the various dimensions - the global 'space' - of human activity upon Earth simply 'as such'. This german 'abstraction' in turn mirrors in its own way the parallel 'abstraction' of other frames of action - other 'circuits' closing or constraining what is open to other participants in the global interaction. - Constraints embodying, for example, as major factors, constraints of certain economic configurations, and of certain ideological configurations, in the various 'societies' or 'cultures' in question.

- That is, certain constraints upon what is 'open' in a particular place - within particular 'boundaries' or 'frontiers', their physical 'circuit' - are correlated with analogous constraints in another cultural 'circuit' across the physical frontier. The interplay does not on either side lead out of the analogous 'circuits' framing activity within each physical domain and (on either side) framing the interaction of the domains or those in them. If we consider such international correlation of cultures or frames of action as governed by the primary symmetries already identified through the inscription of Reflection in its Context (its 'global' Context), we may speak of the dynamic associated with these underlying symmetries constrained within a particular configuration or 'circuit' constituted in or by the interplay of the various 'local' circuits framing what is 'open' (so framing activity, or at least constraining it) in particular areas of the 'globe'. This general circuit of a common 'World' may thus be considered as an abstraction from, a 'closed circuit' in, what is formally 'open' in the symmetry which governs the dynamic. - Which governs the global dynamic within the 'boundary conditions' or additional constraint of that closed circuit of which, say, the closed circuit of Hitler's framing of german activity...
through his part in it, is the expression 'in' Germany in the 'thirties.

I have suggested that the international 'reaction' to this German activity thus framed, a reaction coming fully into play around 1940, and decisive by 1943, involves the inscription of that German frame of self-assertion — that figure of twentieth-century national self — in a wider dramatic order represented or framed by an international law or justice. We might perhaps regard the new international configuration emerging around the mid-century from the global dynamic focussed around 1940 in World War, as an inscription of the configuration of 1930 which led to War in a wider frame. — This for example reflected in a rather elementary frame of interplay of national perspectives and activities in a United Nations Organisation including as members (unlike Wilson's League) the United States and Soviet Union. In the economic and ideological orders the European abstraction from East-West and North-South 'symmetries' of the global order — the residual European isolation from these organising polarities — reflected in the closed circuit of Hitler's Germany, its relative independence as a national frame of action — is broken over the mid-century as postwar European policies are inscribed in the new ideological and economic frame of systematic East-West confrontation in the 'North-South' axis of decolonisation.

In the widening perspective of the latter part of this 'Action' or activity over mid-century, the European perception of the conflict of forces in Europe leading to War can be seen as more properly the reflection in Europe of a wider configuration of forces associated with global structures of transition into the twentieth century discussed earlier. 'Europe' itself appears as an abstraction from a wider dynamic: the ideological and economic frame of the old European order comes into question.

Thus, for example the European 'theatre' of War around 1940 may be seen — and here the 'global' sphere of human activity becomes radically apparent — as simply one 'side' of the global dynamic, paralleled by the Pacific 'theatre' dominated by Germany's chief ally, Japan. Germany's early success in Europe is reflected in early Japanese success in the old colonial Far East (or why not...
Far West?... because of the course of European expansion, and the primary channels of European trade and communications...). The severance of most economic and administrative ties between Europe and the Pacific by Germany on the one hand and Japan on the other is crucial in the framing the transition from colonial Europe's residual independence of the East-West axis of the World before the War, to the coupled loss of dominance in 'North-South' relations, and subordination to East-West relations, after the War. - This coupling reflected in the postwar conflict of Russia and America in the linked 'vacua' left by defeated Germany and Japan - a conflict focussed in Germany and Korea where the advancing American and Soviet forces met.

With 'fascist' abstraction from the complementary economies and ideologies of 'East' and 'West' broken ('Fascism', then, 'extremism of the centre') - whether in the guise of Hitler's National Socialism, Mussolini's national... theatre... (where, as in Germany, the 'corporate' state framed the coordination of what was 'open' at every level, but where the frame of Leader and State was subordinate to the play of factions at every level), or the Japanese army - the 'World' is framed in the remaining 'abstractions' from its global dynamic of 'open' West and 'closed' Soviet bloc in the 'North' dominating a 'third' world in the 'South'.

'Third World': I have already indicated above some basic principles of the mirroring in Europe and colonies of a common transition 'through' colonialism. Typically the economic and political frame of the colony, subordinated to the economic and political aims of the colonizing power, itself frames the reaction against that subordination. The European frame of colonial administration organises a transition from a pre-colonial culture to a post-colonial culture, in which latter various components of American and Soviet criticisms of European colonialism are combined in a 'nationalist' matrix corresponding to some pre-colonial configuration. In the Pacific arena such principles lead, with Japanese defeat, to the assumption of the administration by various party organisations elaborated between the two World Wars.
In China the close of the War led to the final phase in the contest between two such "parties" - Nationalist and Communist - interrupted by the formation of a united front against Japan in 1937. The 'colonial' period in China, of course, owing to American intervention in 1900, never took the form of political and economic subordination of the country to (a) particular European power(s) - but rather of a general political and economic subordination to the interplay of European and American - and latterly Japanese - forces. Japan itself presents an extreme case of the transition through a 'colonial' phase, the interplay of European, American and Russian forces being subordinate from the 1870's on (after the Meiji Restoration partly induced by the arrival of those forces) to Japanese self-assertion in a 'nationalist' matrix continuous with the 'pre-colonial' culture.

American independence, 'North' and 'South', had itself been associated with the earlier European crisis or transition turning about the French Revolution - in South America, as a century-and-a-half later in the Pacific, autonomy was asserted in the breakdown of old ties over a period of war in Europe. Canada attained to effective autonomy in the latter part of the century, and the 'white' colonies of the southern Pacific achieved independence in 1931. I earlier noted 'Boer' 'nationalism' in the Cape Colony (formally established in the time of the Napoleonic Wars) around the turn of the twentieth century. Here the cultural matrix of nationalism strangely partakes of an 'african' order, to the extent that the Boers have often been characterised as a 'white tribe'. The National Government at the close of the second World War might then perhaps be taken as the first gust of the Wind of Change blowing through the continent around 1960. An equally anomalous Jewish nationalism, also dating from the turn of the century, finally established, in 1948, the state of Israel within the British protectorate of Palestine (dating from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the Great War).

'The Jewish state was never in itself spatially limited', claimed Hitler in an extract from Mein Kampf already cited, 'but rather in principle unlimited in Space, and limited by the unity of a race. Thus has this people always formed a state within the state'. But Hitler's self-assertion within the figure of a German race, integrated within the boundary of their Boden, itself directly parallels contemp-
orary Jewish assertion of 'Zion' as the spatial frame of the Jewish drama, of Jewish history - as framing the radical spatial order of 'inside' and 'outside' the borders of a Jewish Land, whose very assertion constitutes a critical point in the drama whose scene it frames. Hitler's version of the polarity of German and Jewish Völke is the German side of the story; the focal part of Chamberlain in this German version (the assertion of the part of framing the spatial order of a national boundary in that bounded area - rather than, as in the Jewish case, from outside, from millennial exile) is mirrored by the part of Herzl, and the first World Zionist Conference in Vienna in 1900. Herzl, in advocating an end to the economic and political subordination of the Jewish people to the European states, through this self-assertion in a 'precolonial' frame, presents the strange configuration of the familiar transition through European 'colonisation' framed from outside the projected autonomous Jewish state - framed in Europe as the assertion of a centre outside... whether it be, as Herzl initially wondered, in Palestine or South America.

At the close of the War this 'outside' pressure from Jewish groups in the victorious 'western' nations forced the establishment of a State of Israel in a still largely Arab Palestine, as part of the British withdrawal from the Middle East in which she had become implicated between the first intervention in Egypt in the eighteen-eighties (to protect communications with India through the Franco-British Suez Canal opened in 1870) and the definitive breakdown of the Turkish Empire in the Great War.

How, now, before proceeding into any more detail, can we characterise some overall dynamic of transition from the residual prewar European independence of the East-West axis, and coupled residual dominance of the North-South axis, to the coupled postwar loss of that independence and dominance?

... Can we find in the configuration as indicated thus far something like a 'symmetry' of which the East-West and North-South polarities or dimensions are two complementary components... a symmetry, then, with its associated dynamic?
As a first approximation to the 'global' configuration, we might begin with the following 'cubic' coordination of various elements of the general configuration in terms of 'East-West' and 'North-South' dimensions:

Such an elementary cultural configuration serves, first of all, to identify the specifically European perspective which
is embodied in the characterisation of the global configuration in terms of East-West and North-South: these 'dimensions' are confused in the Pacific 'arena' - at the 'other side' of the World from which the European perspective is as it were 'abstracted'. Thus 'X' here marks, perhaps, that hidden pole, that antipodes, which over the nineteenth century Britain, mistress of the World, constituted as her primary prison, where those who offended against the British order of things could be excluded from that ordered World. A British prison traced in that Pacific emptiness which was as it were the other side of Europe as a whole. An emptiness which throughout the South serves as a gap between those southern cultures whose tenuous links pass through the dominant North. A 'North', though, which has been abstracted from the cultural interface of Far East and Far West in China and Japan.

China and Japan - that theatre of interplay of 'northern' forces - of a 'colonial' order dominating the earlier culture of China, and dominated by the reassertion of Japanese culture from the eighteen-seventies on.

- Feudal Japan, whose 'nationalist' or rather 'imperialist' pretensions in the Pacific around 1940 I have already compared with the coupled pretensions of Germany in Europe - with that European reassertion of the feudal order of Empire.

And might we not go further, and compare the interplay of Chinese and Japanese cultures in the 'Far East' with that of French and German cultures in Europe? - Compare the simple figures in each case of feudal play of forces and complementary (French or Chinese) centralisation with its 'logical' scheme of administration?

- Might we not then attempt to correlate the abstraction of 'European' culture from this wider global frame, with the 'logical' dimension of that European culture - that is, correlate an abstraction from the 'global' physical order of a World, with a 'logic' of Reflection still dominated, around the middle of the twentieth century, by a European tradition dating back to around 500 'BC', five
hundred annual circuits of the Sun before that coincidence of 'earthly' and 'heavenly' orders theologically determined as focus of the european tradition?

... Then we might, for example, hope to find some frame in which to coordinate not only the transition into a 'european' tradition around 500 BC with the parallel transition into the jew- ish tradition (in the middle-eastern interface of egyptian and 'chaldean' cultures - in that afro-asian axis which intersects the indo-european axis in a 'middle' East, in the 'cubic' model), but also the enigmatically parallel contemporary transitions into indian and chinese cultures - into indian and chinese 'history', indeed.- associated with, say, Gautama 'Buddha' and Kung Fu Tse (latinised as 'Confucius'). In the first instance, for example, we might note an analogy between the chaldeo-egyptian axis in the Middle East, already characterised in terms of a complementary hierarchy in Egypt and systematic mythological 'economy' in Mesopotamia, and the indo- chinese axis further east (a chinese hierarchy framed in the primary 'scene' of the State as mirror of Heaven and Earth below - as 'Middle Kingdom' - through a 'hieroglyphy'; and the indian inscription of the opposition or polarity of Heaven and Earth in a mythological economy of figuration and configuration).

But rather than now proceed directly upon such a formal basis, we must first consider how the 'european' logic of abstraction from this global dynamic frames a mirroring of the predominantly euro- pean activity of 'reflection' in its global context, over the mid- twentieth century. And now, just as Germany was taken as focal in the configuration of Reflection around 1930, France will be taken as focal around 1970. I have already briefly indicated the config- uration of the interface of french and german reflection in the im- mediate aftermath of the War (around mid-century). I will now trace the global context whose development from mid-century to around 1970 converges towards that latter date, in Paris, with the parallel de- velopment of postwar Reflection. - Converges towards a configuration around 1970 of which the Paris Peace Talks of 1968 (intended to close the process of vietnamese decolonisation begun at mid-century), the
'Student Revolution' focussed in the Spring of that year, the related fall of President De Gaulle the following year, for example, are prominent components.

In the closing phase of the War, and the immediately following period, France and the south-western sector of Germany were administered by what had been the Government-in-Exile under the leader of the 'free French' army, De Gaulle. In Indo-China French administration was reasserted along the coastal strip bordering the South China Sea, contested by a Communist Party of Vietnam (French administration of Indo-China to the west of Vietnam having been indirect 'protection') linked with Moscow and the Communists in China.

Elections in 1946 replaced De Gaulle's provisional government with the first of the left-centre coalitions that were to control France and her remaining colonies until De Gaulle's return in 1958. By 1947 the Russian administration - rather Communist Party administration - in the eastern sector of Germany, as in the Slav states (and Hungary) whose German 'colonisation' had been begun by Hitler and Rosenberg, had transformed itself from provisional to established government. Between 1947 and 1952 the pragmatic frame of activity in the southern and western zones controlled by France, Britain, and America, in its turn led to a 'West German' government dominated by Adenauer's reconstituted Zentrum (about half of the population of these zones being Catholic, and the Catholic organisation and its political wing constituting the primary principle of continuity from Weimar days).

Vice-President Truman in America, having succeeded Roosevelt upon the latter's death, enunciated the 'Truman Doctrine' of American interests in Western Europe - of the political and economic unity of the Western alliance (confronting the unity of the Communist administration(s) to the East). The principle was reflected by
the Marshall Plan for european reconstruction under a massive american programme of economic aid (or perhaps investment...) administered in Europe by governments who after intervention in the 'thirties and the war economies of the 'forties had become used to the idea of central economic planning as one side of national economic activity. In the first year of Marshall Aid 71% of the sum of GNP's of non-communist countries was under american control - between two-thirds and three-quarters of the World Market was american. Russia and Comintern (or rather, now, 'Cominform') countries, offered the chance to participate in this Market through american Marshall Aid, declined. The economic and political separation of East and West (if we use Europe as our frame of reference) were reflected in the establishment of an integrated military command on either side - the Warsaw Pact in the East, and NATO in the West in 1949. The head of the former was a russian general, of the latter an american. Eisenhower, the first american commander of western military forces in Europe (this from the end of the War) succeeded Truman as president in 1952, embodying the postwar reassertion of 'american' values - a dogmatic pragmatism opposed to the closed system of any 'ideology'.

I have noted the focal conflict of Soviet Union and United States in Korea in 1950 - leading eventually to a partition of the country framed by the United Nations Organisation (the latter, like the integration of european and american activity after the war already formulated by Churchill and Roosevelt in the Atlantic Charter of 1941-2, paralleling the internal british planning after 1940 of the 'Welfare State' implemented with Marshall Aid by the Labour government which replaced Churchill's coalition). - Rather the conflict in Korea, the focus of the interplay of chinese, japanese, soviet and american dimensions, of an american-backed administration taking over from Japan, and a korean Communist Party supported by Russia and China.

This configuration is paralleled in French Indo-China - 'Cochin-China' or 'Vietnam' by the confrontation of Ho Chi Minh's Communist Party and the re-established french administration. Ho's military opposition (backed by Russia and China) from 1947 led to United Nations partition in 1954. In Vietnam as in Korea an artificial division of a cultural unity left agents of american capitalism in the south confronting agents of soviet communism in the
north across an imaginary straight line through the earlier spatial frame of national activity, drawn at the United Nations as a sort of formal resolution of the political confrontation dividing the country (as a sort of Judgement of Solomon upon the nation, or Alexander’s answer to the gordian knot).

The close of the French confrontation with a national liberation front in Indo-China signalled the opening of a more radical confrontation nearer home, just across the Mediterranean, in the Algeria colonised from 1830.

- More radical, in that the interface of colonising and colonised countries is an inland sea... and the 'symmetry' of the two shores of France and Algeria, as inscribed in the French order from 1830, lies deeper in that 'French' order than the more recent interface of France and Vietnam, itself inscribed in the colonial interface of Europe and the East as a whole. The break with Algeria would involve the restructuring of France herself, the conflict of colonial interests and a predominantly Marxist Algerian nationalism directly reflecting the economic and ideological divisions of France herself, and directly tied to, integrated with, these. No one 'side' in France could resolve the conflict of the various sides, and in 1958 De Gaulle, as the representative of French unity, was recalled from retirement to solve the Algerian Question.

The first steps in his reassertion of French unity involved withdrawal from NATO and the opposition to British entry into the European 'Common Market' established in the early 'fifties as the prefiguration of a wider integration of European activity in the postwar World, and dominated by France.

De Gaulle's framing of French unity around 1960, in terms of French dominance of a Franco-German Europe abstracted from the East-West dimension, and from the North-South dimension of the old colonialism - that is, in effect, from American dominance on the one hand and the 'North-South' aspect of the British 'Commonwealth' on the other, may be seen in some ways as a sort of converse of the German framing of the part of Germany-in-Europe-in-the-World around 1940 (when De Gaulle's popular nationalism was first framed outside France, in opposition to the German version of a Franco-
german dimension of Europe abstracted from the british control
of the colonial interface of Europe and World). Thus De Gaulle
was determined to overcome the 'decline' and fragmentation of France
rather as Hitler was determined to overcome the decline and fragment-
ation of Germany and the World; and De Gaulle framed his position
and strategy through the 'feedback' of 'media' and direct appeals
to the Nation in referenda or plebiscites, just as the german Leader
had framed his part in the framing of german unity through similar
'feedback'.

I took the german 'frame' of reflection as focal around
1930; the systematic exclusion from this frame of critical reflection
on the one hand, and anything (else...) referrable to the antithetical
jewish cultural pole on the other, generated a sort of german intel-
lectual diaspora in the 'thirties dominated by its central jewish
component. As I have taken the configuration around 1930 as initial
point of divergence of various lines of german reflection over the
mid-century (in its interaction with reflection outside the New Order),
so I take french - or rather parisian - reflection around 1970 as a
complementary point of convergence closing a phase of reflection over
the 'mid-century'. I have already briefly indicated a central con-
figuration of a mid-century transition from german to french 'phenom-
enology' (taken very broadly as a reflection dominated by Hegel, Hus-
serl and Heidegger). And I have just indicated a certain complemen-
tarity between the german frame around 1940 - the invasion of France
and the setting-up of De Gaulle's Free French government-in-exile -
and the french frame focussed in De Gaulle around 1960. I earlier
wrote of a symmetry of Hitler's self-assertion around 1940 and a glo-
bal 'reaction'; one might see the transition from De Gaulle's pos-
iton framing french unity from outside France in 1940, to his central
part in the assertion of french unity around 1960 in terms of that
same dynamic or action and reaction, assertion and counter, and its
elementary physical image in the analogous swing of the pendulum
which articulates lesser intervals of time.

... But I tried to characterise Hitler's self-assertion
in his german framing of a global poetic or dynamic as a turning-
point in the subordination of european (whether french, german or e
british) perspectives to a wider global frame of East-West and North-
South (these being themselves characteristically 'european' percept-
ions of the primary and correlative 'dimensions' of the global frame, as I have already remarked. If De Gaulle's assertion of French unity from outside France in 1940 may be taken as another component in the same abstract European perspective then being asserted by Germany in France, then how can this abstraction persist through the mid-century, to be reasserted in the confrontation with Algeria?

In the first place the part of De Gaulle around 1960 may be taken simply as the formal frame, an image of French unity, brought into play in the transition from the crisis of 1958 to the establishment of an independent Algeria in 1962 - as, then, simply one 'side' of a deeper configuration of transition culminating in De Gaulle's resignation in 1969, when the 'image' was eventually discarded by France (concluding a wider transition from the early thirties - corresponding to the close of the French component of the phase currently being discussed). - One 'side', one component in play, rather than the primary frame of a new French order like the German New Order of the early 'forties. - One side: the 'logical' order of a central focus of what is French and what is not, working in an order of distinctions within a wider play of global forces in which the focal identification of a central French figure provides merely a working reference-point, to be eventually discarded... a figure only of the 'logical' order of French self-assertion in the World. A figure reminiscent perhaps of that of Victor Hugo outside the Second Empire a century before, eventually becoming a parody of himself, 'Victor Hugo...un fou qui se prenait pour Victor Hugo'. So perhaps in the late sixties one might see in the French president a madman who thought he was General De Gaulle.

General De Gaulle, then - whether real or imaginary - performing the symbolic function, embodying the figure, of a French identity distinguishing itself in a wider play of figures and forces: distinguishing Europe from an external inscription in a global frame of East-West and North-South, and distinguishing the focal part of France, in Europe, framing this distinction, and, this its part. One may speak, then, of a 'logical' poetic focused in De Gaulle - in particular in De Gaulle appearing before the Nation in the new medium of television (unavailable to the other central 'actors' of the 'forties - Roosevelt, Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, Churchill..).
as one 'side' of the wider frame of French activity, subordinate to the dynamic of that wider frame, rather than controlling it like Nazi 'organisation and propaganda' in the Germany of the 'thirties. One figure, then, of an order of integration which is at work from around 1930, and which is eventually brought fully into question around 1970 - this in a global crisis of 'Culture' of which the rejection in France of the residual logic of De Gaulle's self-assertion in the late 'sixties is but one French component.

Over the 'sixties the 'logic' of De Gaulle's identification with the part of framing French unity (and so his focal part in it) - his 'existential' self-assertion as it were, in that 'hole' at the centre of France corresponding to Sartrean Man as a 'hole in Being' - was complemented by a new order of French Reflection framed by successively more radical inscriptions of the 'logical' order of reflection, self-assertion, identification, distinction (and so on), in a wider 'play' of figures and corresponding forces. Hitler had excluded critical reflection from the Germany he framed, but De Gaulle's popular nationalism (rather than national socialism) was complemented (as simply one force in play, rather than the frame of interaction of all forces in play) by an increasingly opposed frame of French Reflection - until in 1969 the very identity, part, of locus of self-assertion of De Gaulle in his 'poetic', like its academic analogue in the 'magisterial' French tradition, was brought into question - a question prefigured by the confrontation of the General and the Students in the Spring of the previous year.

The 'Student Revolution' focussed in the 'Events' of May 1968 in Paris, but with more diffuse parallels throughout the globe in the late 'sixties, and beginning at Nanterre in the autumn of 1967, may be taken as the closing component of the Action over the mid-century corresponding to the German 'diaspora' of 1933. In discussing an earlier configuration of Reflection (around 1250) I sketched the central part of the University of Paris in the 'scholastic' frame of education as induction into a 'part' in European Culture - in 'Christendom' - this figure itself prefigured in Aristotle's Lyceum (that is - in the Aristotelian theory of education). In the late 'sixties - in Paris as in Berlin or Prague or Peking and
other focal points in the global configuration of a twentieth-century World-Culture (its universality comparable to that of medieval Europe) - it is in the educational frame of induction into the wider poetic (the 'mirror' of the wider Culture, in Dewey's figure), that the calling-into-question of that Culture - of the circuit in which over the mid-century it is framed - finds its ideological focus.

In France - or rather, in Paris - the calling-into-question of the circle of De Gaulle's identification of his part as focus of the political order of integration of french activity is only, then, one element in a wider questioning framed by the student's questioning of his part as identifying his part in De Gaulle's France, and so in the World in which De Gaulle identifies his focal french part. The circuit of identification into which such a 'part' of 'the student' leads - a circuit reflected in De Gaulle's televisual self-inscription in the french order is refused, eliciting those hidden forces of repression which reflect the reality of the normally hidden, elided, short-circuited 'outside'. The wider play of figures and forces in which the constitutive circuit of the 'Société de Spectacle', turning upon itself, can be inscribed. With the calling-into-question of the magisterial relation in which instituted Knowledge is recycled in the university 'amphithéâtres', the wider theatre in which that relation and its force or power is inscribed is itself brought into question: the 'evidence' of the distinction articulated in the television screen(s) of France of the nation's actors or protagonists, on one side, and a passive 'audience' on the other, is revealed as simply a self-effacing and universal constraint upon a more radical activity - in which, for example, the students can turn the Odéon, the home of classical french theatre, of the studied oratory of Racine (the model of the General's symmetrical exposition and balanced intonation), into a debating-hall - the twenty-four hour debate on the identity (or not) of the Revolution framed in the interplay of stage and auditorium, the interaction of the 'direction' of the interplay, and its own framing from the floor... its direction of the criticism of that direction.

Criticism eventually turning upon itself in a radical question that reflects (and is soon reincorporated in) the closed circuit of its initial object - or rather objects, in a World itself framed in the primary circuit of abstraction from a more ra-
ical play of forces. A play of forces like that freed by Mao in China in the late sixties, and framing a 'cultural revolution' led by the chinese counterparts of the students of Paris (and led on, as Teng's party would later insist, by Mao's actress wife).

Let a thousand flowers blossom, a hundred schools of thought contend..

.. l'imagination au pouvoir.. and in this Paris-Peking axis (as perceived in Paris) it is above all the western circuit or circulation of american Capital, both as a dominant component in the closed circuit of the french arena or theatre, and as coupled repressive force in the old french Indo-China, which is in question.

Not that this question marks any alignment with Moscow: for soviet opposition to the circuit and force of western capitalism itself partakes of the same figure of abstraction from the free play of forces affirmed in Paris or Peking: thus the french Communist Party, faced with the 'Revolution' of 1968, consulted with Moscow and identified the Events as an isolated 'adventure' that did not fit into the global frame of a revolution planned from Moscow as focussed in Moscow as its centre. The Nixon Doctrine of the unity of the West threatened in Vietnam, where communist success would simply shift the configuration of the East-West axis and make communist takeover harder to contain in the next conflict of capitalism and communism in the South (more particularly on the vietnamese border) was matched in that same year (of Nixon's election and Prague and Paris Spring) by the Brezhnev Doctrine that a threat to Communism in any one communist country (more particularly, in Czechoslovakia) was a threat to communism in every communist country. Moscow's - or Brezhnev's - self-identification in the Soviet frame of marxism-leninism as the locus of framing World Communism in a primary interface of Soviet Union and World, belonged to the same order of repression, of the closed circuit, as De Gaulle's identification of his part in France, or Nixon's identification of his part in the United States and the Free World articulated in the economic interface of United States and World. The complicity of these various circuits in the same underlying dynamic of power and repression, the same World now brought into question, was to be focussed in the Vietnam Peace Talks opened at Paris a few months after May - the General having returned from the french army command in Germany to which he had instinctually
flown at the height of the crisis, confronted on the one side by the Students, on the other by the trades unions' call for a General Strike. - His perception of France was rooted in an earlier military command of French forces outside France, in 1940.

A year later, visiting Montreal, the General was carried away by another oddly analogous configuration - a public speech to a French community subordinate to government from without: once more he identified with the earlier part of the focus of unity - from without - of Free French: *Vive le Québec... Vive le Québec libre!* Returned again to France, the questioning of his identification of his part was met by the General's framing of this part as a question addressed to the Nation as a whole, in the television interface of France's leading actor, and his audience. The audience in the main distinguished themselves in the ensuing referendum from their framing by De Gaulle as frame of his self-assertion, his identification of his part. - Which is to say, they now collectively identified the General's part as just a part - as an image of the President now to be discarded to reveal what lay behind - Georges Pompidou.

- Georges Pompidou who, as prime minister, had been responsible for the interplay of the formal focus embodied in the General's part, and the practical constraints upon French activity. As the General's successor he could now represent the General's framing of the focal identity of the President in a united France, that 'logic' of French activity, as an organising ideal to be inscribed in a more radical pragmatic framing of that activity, as its guiding direction, as one side no longer abstracted from that order of 'situation' central to the 'Revolution', its primary frame.

One might take the part of the 'Revolution' of 1968 in the France of around 1970 on the analogy of the part of the revolution of 1848 in the France of around 1850. And just as Paris was the focus in the mid-nineteenth century for the Year of Revolutions throughout Europe (except, perhaps, in Britain), so, as I have already suggested, Paris in 1968 might be taken as focal in a wider cultural crisis throughout the Globe - in the global 'theatre'.
I have characterised the 'Revolution' of May 1968 in terms of the inscription of the closed 'theatre' of a Société de Spectacle in a wider 'play' - or 'drama', or dynamic of figures and forces. A play of figures, then, in which, were human interaction articulated freely within it, rather than constrained by the closed circuits of instituted Power (whether the General on Television, the American capitalist World Market, the Politburo controlling Communism from Moscow, or the confucian bureaucracy criticised in the Cultural Revolution), we would see L'Imagination au Pouvoir.

I earlier tried to characterise the frame of an Action over the mid-century in which the activity of Reflection might be inscribed - might indeed thus inscribe itself - in terms of global constraints upon the radical dynamic associated with the 'symmetry' of the various component 'dimensions' of the Action. The Action 'opened' in Germany around 1930 with the introduction into the political configuration of Germany and World of the closed circuit of Hitler's identification in the 'völkisch' frame of his part of identifying that frame of action. I had previously tried to sketch how the 'symmetries' of the various primary correlative orders of dimensions of activity, while constraining the 'economy' of activity and its integration into what 'actually' happens, left open the initial configuration or 'boundary conditions' which further constrained the action rather as an opening theme (embodiing in its structure constraints upon the dynamic associated with 'harmonic' space and 'rhythmic' time) or thematic constrains the subsequent unfolding of a piece of 'music'. I attempted to identify Hitler's frame of activity - at once constraining and coordinating what was 'open' in Germany-as one component of a global configuration of what was 'open' in the 'thirties, constrained by a general circuit of abstraction from the unrestricted symmetry of the various orders
or dimensions of action. - A general circuit in which the various analogous circuits of theories, institutions and so on, in various different places might be considered 'inscribed', and coordinated by the symmetries in which the primary or general circuit itself was inscribed as a 'closed circuit'. - A closed circuit, then, framing the various subordinate and analogous circuits, and their interplay, in such a way as never to lead out of their common figure (just as, say, the interplay of apparently contradictory American capitalism and Soviet communism preserves in ideological, economic, and military conflict, a structure of power or force, a common figure of a closed circuit of inscription of the opposition in one side, or the other, which is symmetrically abstracted from and elided on either side - left no place).

It is the 'bounding' circuit already evinced in various dimensions of the configuration of around 1930 (then), and its articulation over the mid-century of the geopolitical frame of East-West/North-South, which eventually comes into question, in various forms in different places, around 1970. Thus on the 'cubic' scheme of East-West/North-South of this Globe, we may conclude the framing of the 'context' of Reflection over mid-century (the 'Action' of which it is one dimension), by inscribing the symmetry of the Parisian expression of this radical questioning around 1970 and its correlative expressions elsewhere, in a general circuit or configuration inscribed in the global frame 'symmetrically'.

I have already indicated an initial outline of such a configuration by noting the Parisian perspective on the global frame of the Revolution of May: the conflict of American capitalist 'imperialism' with Ho Chi Minh's struggle for Vietnamese independence in Indo-China, backed by Moscow and Peking, this conflict in the colony France had left over the mid-century - before the Algerian experience - coupled with the repressive order of American capitalism in France herself. Moscow's part in opposing America was largely recognised as embodying the same repressive circuit, but in a converse form, and the 'situationist' attempt to open up the wider play
constrained in these circuits of power seen as a parisian reflection of the Cultural Revolution framed in China as systematic questioning of such circuits both within the Chinese administration, and outside China. The conflict in Indo-China was itself reflected in the Middle East - in the Russian-dominated Arab axis of Syria and Egypt confronting in Palestine a Jewish identity imposed from outside - from a West dominated by America, here breaking the Soviet axis at its centre, and leaving the indigenous Arabs, the 'Palestinians', with no identity, no place. - No identity, no place, except the gaps, as it were, in the circuit of Western power - a 'terrorism' marking an identity 'outside' that circuit, in a more radical play of forces marked, as in the streets of Paris, by the overt repression which showed there was indeed such an outside, such a locus where the circuit thus inscribing itself 'physically' in the wider play, might be brought into question. In France the Palestinian question could be directly paralleled in the Algerian question of around 1960; in the global context the Palestinian 'terror' focussed in the gaps between the Western nations - literally, in the air between - was reflected around 1970 by 'urban' terrorism in which the circuits of power in the various nations of the 'West' were to be brought into question in those nations, rather than (as by the Palestinians) 'in-between'. Meanwhile, in the East, a complementary 'dissidence' after the Prague Spring expressed itself intellectually in the cultural 'gaps' in the circulation of Soviet power. In the free Western play of ideologies the constraints imposed by those who gained the power to organise the play to their own ends (like the big international corporations whose monetary power could be used to organise the protection of that power - to control the Market) could only be brought into question, it seemed, from an 'outside' of the ideological market of words - in a contrary articulation of gestural violence. In the Soviet bloc, on the other hand, it was precisely the articulation of a free 'medium' of communication which was opposed to the inscription of words in the closed circuit of what avowed itself openly to be ideology.

In the West such Terror around 1970 might be taken as one pole of a spectrum of dissent focussed in France, in young people - 'adolescents' - dissenting from the part of 'student' as frame of
induction into the closed circuit of Market and Media. In Paris the Terror of 1968 was rather pale by palestinian or south-american standards – pale too, compared with the Terror of the earlier French Revolution. Nobody was killed: the rejection of the Société de Spectacle was itself a theatrical spectacle, more reminiscent of the Revolution of 1830 than those of the 1790's, of 1848 or 1870. Indeed the 'Student Revolution' of Paris might be seen as belonging to a fairly regular succession of 'revolutions' which mark over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the transitions from one phase of french administration to another. For the centralised 'logical' configuration of the administration passes from one phase to another by an abrupt change of focus or centre, reflecting an underlying continuity of the more radical practical order of everyday activity. Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. In Britain, on the other hand, the inscription of the 'logical' order of centralised policy in the dominant practical order of british 'culture' allows that continuity in administration and constitution which presents a global paradigm of political stability.

Passing from the spectacular break, then, of the 'logical' order which constitutes Paris in 1968 as the focus of 'Student Protest' throughout the West, to Britain and North America, we might see the 'Students' as representing in France a wider crisis of identity among western adolescents as a whole. What appears in the 'practical' or 'poetic' order of british or american culture as a generalised adolescent dissent from induction into a 'part' in the traditional arena of british or american activity – from an identity as determined within the closed circuit of those cultures or societies – appears focussed in France in an ideological contest framed by the logical poetic of the University of Paris. The traditional 'logic' of french society is to be inscribed in a more radical poetic. The opposition of the two frames is expressed in a month of physical confrontation in the streets of Paris. Then around 1970 it is recognised that the 'poetic' in which the old logic was to be inscribed was still, itself, framed in that same old logic it thought to depose. By about 1973 the deeper transformation of which the Student Revolution begun at Nanterre in 1967 was as it were the prelude or opening act has led to a new configuration in which something rather like the old order appears to assert its continuity.
What thus appears predominantly in France as an opposition in 1967-8 to the closed circuit of a prevailing ideology (an opposition mirrored in the industrial opposition to the associated economic order) - an opposition in its turn inscribed in another circuit of what appears as the same old order in the 'seventies - appears in a more diffuse form in Britain and America. - Not so much an alternative ideology (or alternative to ideology) as an 'alternative society' organised in the play of 'sub-cultures' asserting their independence from traditional inscription in the unitary circuit of a dominant Culture.

Thus in America the traditional abstraction of white male dominance from the more radical symmetry of the mirroring of black in white and male in female - the circuit in which a repressive white male Culture abstracts from this base level of bodily interaction, of mirroring of the various 'parts' in Society - is brought into question. More generally, the internal american dissent from a dominant culture framed in the closed circuit or circulation of Capital is focussed in dissent from the self-assertion of that circuit and its associated physical power or force in Vietnam. The inscription of the circuit of an American Dream and all its inducements (into which the young americans refuse to be induced or inducted, with which they refuse to identify, in which they refuse to identify their 'parts') in a wider freer play is coupled with the imperative to 'do one's own thing'. The repressive Reason which appears now as simply one side or component of the repressive circuit of unitary white male american capitalist culture may be locally dissolved by self-administration of chemicals that break the circle of waking logic in a sort of new alchemy. Urban terrorists can bring into question the ideological circuit of the Media by abducting the daughter of the owner of the leading american newspaper syndicate from her prison in her father's empire, and focus in her subsequent detachment and dissent from her previous part the critique of the correlative capitalist, ideological, male, white components of american repression. All this opening-up of the poetics of the American Dream focussed in the californian hinterland of the old Dream Factory in Los Angeles, earlier purged by McCarthy's crusade against Un-American Activity.

... And - rather as the parisian dissent from a dominant
poetic of induction into french society itself turned out to share the logic it opposed, to present the spectacle of opposition to Spectacle - so in a way the place outside Hollywood's American Dream was itself something of a dream, and not altogether un-american in its reassertion of individual freedom.

In Britain, in Germany, analogues of french and american dissent of adolescents from induction into some image of themselves inscribed in the closed circuit which framed the traditional theatre of western activity, may be taken as further components of a generalised questioning. In this general dissent a german pupil of Lukacs and Heidegger, who fled with the Frankfurt School from Hitler in the 'thirties is assigned a central part in the framing of a poetics of dissidence: dissent from a logic that inscribes itself or finds itself inscribed, in the mythological circuit of an established order - as in 'thirties Germany. Marcuse at Berkeley finds himself suddenly identified as the prophet of Student Revolution in Paris, Berlin, London, Columbia, Berkeley itself.

I earlier contrasted the complementary figures of Rosenberg inscribing the logical order of assertion in the Myth of the aryan Volk, and the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School framed in the analogy between the Critic standing outside the closed order of a work of Art, and the critical stance of Theory outside the mythological or ideological order of a Culture of which the New Order might be taken as the extreme expression. Heidegger in the 'thirties might be taken to embody an uneasy tension between the critical perspective outside Germany and the mythology of Will within. And Heidegger teaching again after 1950, and Adorno returned from America to teach again after the War, might be taken to reflect in Germany Marcuse's criticism of the One-Dimensional Man arising from the inscription of the logical and psychological order of reflection and assertion in the closed circuit of a social order eliding the question of any distinction between one's image or part in that order, and oneself. A social order corresponding to a frame of activity abstracted from the radical question associated with the human part of framing its part in framing its World.
A Frame, Gestell: already there, set in abstraction from the question of its Stellung, its setting. After 1950 this Gestell as abstraction from the radical question or open-ness or opening where one finds oneself in being, finds oneself being, becomes as it were one side of the primary dimension of Heidegger's reflection.

- The other side, inversion, converse, obverse, of the complementary configuration of our Stelle in Sein. As the systematic network of the Gestell extends, the opening or Lichtung of our place in Sein contracts. Questions and reflections, turning in subordinate circuits of the Frame, cease to be problematic, and become merely 'technical', the principles of their resolution already decided, 'in place'.

In the simplest terms the Frame as obverse of the open-ness of our place in Being, our part in Being, appears as that inscription of the 'logical' order of questions in the physical order which we call technology. And the λογική τέχνη, the 'formal logic' or Logistik of Aristotle and his successors down to the twentieth century is simply, as the inscription of the open-ness of the Question as a sort of 'topology' of the Frame, the obverse of that Denken which frames the opening or revelation of Sein.

The 'machines', or 'means' to an end set in advance, which embody the logical order of questions in a 'matter' which is not itself in question, thus in effect - as articulated in an ever wider and more systemically integrated 'economy' of ends - organise or frame the logical and psychological order of our assertion and activity to which we imagine them subordinate as simple means to our end.

I will return shortly to Heidegger's perception or framing of this 'Frame' of human activity in the latter part of the twentieth century. But for the moment I will simply take this german correlate of Marcuse's criticism taken up by the 'student revolutionaries' as a central configuration of their critique of the dominant Culture, as indicative of a certain global 'economy' of activity over the mid-century, a 'technical' order of mirroring of deliberation and outward context in 'elementary' activities common to the various 'cultures'.
of the Globe, and reflecting in its organisation the integrative symmetries of the 'cubic' order of East-West/North-South, rather as the quantum-mechanical 'economy' of elementary interaction in the physical order reflects the global relativistic symmetry of integration in a unitary Action or physical actuality.

Thus far I have considered (in relation to the transition over the mid-twentieth century) only the 'global' symmetry of complementary ideologies and economies in the 'cubic' frame of their interplay in cultures of East, West, North and South (to use, once more, that 'two-dimensional' and 'European' projection of the global configuration onto a eurocentric map). Indeed I have only considered that overall symmetry in a very incomplete way, emphasising simple ideological polarities of the 'East-West' dimension, and their interplay in the 'North-South' dimension of decolonisation. In a moment I will sketch in a correlation of this ideological dimension with its mirroring in the order of material economy. First, though, I will suggest how the global 'cultural' order of which these ideological and economic dimensions are complementary sides is reflected as a whole in the 'local' economy of what Heidegger calls the Frame of activity.

I have earlier suggested that we might consider the interplay of 'logical' and 'physical' orders of culture in institutions as articulated between the two limiting institutions of the material economy of a society or 'culture', amounting to an inscription of the logical order of reflection and deliberation in the physical order of 'mechanism', and the ideological articulation of the culture in language, as that circulation of marks or 'signs', tokens, of which the circulation of money is the converse, the 'other' side. I suggested that these two 'sides' of a culture - as it were the material and 'ideal' economies or articulations - might be seen to mirror one another in the central institution of Law... or more generally, perhaps, in that cultural order of the Code in which Law partakes, which it as it were frames in a culture.

In discussing the various dimensions of the 'institution' of the material economy of a society, in terms of the central...
'economic' interface of that Market etymologically cognate with the Mark in which early culture is ('agri-cultrally') inscribed and the 'mark' as monetary token in such a Mark, I noted the part of machines in the industrial interface of financial market on the one hand, and agriculture on the other. And I later characterised the machines of that 'industrial' order as components of the 'economic' order of an 'instituted' inscription of logical in physical orders of activity, complementing the converse ideological order of 'institutions' which the machinery mirrored in the intermediate order of those 'institutes' which float somewhat ambiguously between physical buildings and the particular order of activity they physically frame.

I associated the separation of financial, industrial and agricultural 'sectors' of a material economy with the coupled development of an urban centralisation of culture (the city abstracted, for example, as locus of the 'financial' or money market from the local markets of (market-) towns. Of course such 'urbanisation' was already associated with the emergence of mesopotamian and egyptian cultures (coupled with the 'invention' of writing) between fourth and third millenia 'BC', and the populations of Rome and Alexandria were to be numbered in millions of people, although the 'machinery' of antiquity remained fairly rudimentary. The earlier discussion of urbanisation, though, was linked to the discussion of the rapid american industrialisation in the transition from nineteenth to twentieth centuries, coupled to the emergence of New York as the centre of global finance in which the Crash of 1929 was focussed. That transition was characterised by the 'Second Industrial Revolution' associated (among other things) with the introduction of Electricity around 1870, just as the earlier 'Revolution' in which Britain had risen to nineteenth-century dominance had been associated with the introduction of Steam from around 1770. Each of these epochal transitions - from around 1770 to 1830, and from around 1870 to 1930 - were associated with corresponding figures of 'development' in the 'Third World' producers of raw materials and consumers of processed materials. In particular the process of decolonisation over the mid-twentieth century may be associated with that 'development' of
an indigenous industrialisation and urbanisation which would reproduce in the newly autonomous colony the economic structure of industrial production of which colonial production and consumption was formerly but one side.

Now the process of mechanisation thus linked to the 'industrial revolutions' of Steam and Electricity (the latter together with Petroleum, Chemical Industry, and so on) may thus be understood as global, and directly linked to both North-South and East-West dimensions - these dimensions themselves corresponding to the elementary articulation of the economic order itself. The global material economy associated with 'industrialisation' in its various phases thus constitutes one side (the 'material' side) of the 'Frame' of what is open in any particular situation. The interplay of 'machines', 'means' (to take the Greek original of the word literally), is directly linked to the economy of 'ends' in which our deliberation and action is articulated.

I have already considered - from time to time in the narrative of this Part, that is from the opening discussion of the British 'Industrial Revolution' onwards - various prominent elements in the 'mechanical' order of inscription of physical theory (of its essentially 'logical' articulation) in the physical order upon which it is a reflection. In particular I tried to emphasise relations between the Maxwellian 'logic' of Electricity, as articulated around 1870, and the physical implementation of this 'logic' in the technology of the Second Industrial Revolution led by America and Germany over the turn of the century. Over the course of the twentieth century - most particularly over the period now being discussed between around 1930 and around 1970 - a still more radical inscription of the logical order of theory in the physical order of machines is framed, opening a Third Industrial Revolution beginning with the 'printing' of the logical order of Entscheidung in the physical matrix of the atomic lattice ('crystal') around 1970 - this printing of 'integrated circuits' itself the inscription of a new order in the electrical order of 1870, which was in turn the inscription of a new order within the order of mechanical power of 1770.

Now we may take the 'technological' configuration of around 1950 as marking a sort of interface or transition between the techno-
logy of around 1930 and that of around 1970 — or between the begin¬
ning and end of the twentieth century. Indeed the logic of the new
technology of 'information' was itself framed in a few years around
1950. We might thus regard Heidegger's reflection upon the Gestell
after the mid-century as itself a reflection or mirroring of the rad¬
ical physical principles of the inscription of logical in physical
orders then being worked out: we may see a certain symmetry between
Heidegger's inscription of the psychical order in the ontical (as
Denken) and the radical principles of the 'New Technology' of In¬
formation being worked out by Von Neumann, Shannon, Weaver and others.

... Von Neumann, having left Germany in the 'thirties, like
Einstein, for Princeton, having worked in the early 'forties with
other exiles from Germany and Italy on the Manhattan Project insti¬
tuted after Einstein's personal representation to President Roose¬
velt in 1939. That work, beginning with the War, marks, as one com¬
ponent among others, the transition between the theoretical work on
the Hilbert Programme in logical theory, the mathematical theory of
games (of strategy or choice), and the mathematical foundations of
quantum mechanics, in Germany around 1930, to the practical combina¬
tion of these complementary theories in the first 'computers', at Prince¬
ton around 1950, as in various parallel applications. Shannon and
Weaver, on the other hand, arrived at the abstract theory of Inform¬
ation, also around 1950, from practical considerations arising out
of work in the Bell Telephone Laboratories.

Heidegger and Von Neumann, then, two sides as it were of
the same configuration or 'Frame'. Von Neumann, in his article on
'The Formalist Foundations of Mathematics' in the journal of the
Vienna Circle, Erkenntnis, submitted to the Circle's review of the
major schools of Logistik in the first year of publication (1930),
may be taken as presenting the extreme pole of that formal approach
to language antithetical to Heidegger's own perspective — presenting
a 'topology' of the Frame based on the minimal configuration of log¬
ical abstraction from the physical order of the 'mark'. Von Neumann,
as his colleague on the Manhattan Project Eugene Wigner remarks in
his biographical sketch (in Symmetries and Reflections), became in¬
furiated towards the end of his life that death should be able to break off arbitrarily a Reflection which could make no sense of such radical contingency. - Of the radical contingency which Heidegger had taken, on the other hand, as framing our very being and human freedom.

... Back, though, to the common 'Frame' of which these are two German 'sides'. The inscription of the logical order of 1930 in the physical order of 1970, whose possibility was first recognised around 1950, corresponds to a primary axis or dimension of the development of 'technology' over the middle part of the century. That the complementary orders of Von Neumann's 'technical' inscription of the logical order in the physical, and Heidegger's inscription of the psychical order in the ontical should be carried out, as it were, on two sides of the German frame of activity over mid-century (in-side and out-side, home and exile: Von Neumann's exile as it were from the heideggerian 'home' of the German language) itself suggests another side of the matter. I have associated Reflection in that cultural frame of which German language is one side with a 'physical' poetic of inscription of the logical or psychological order of Reflection in a more radical physical or ontological domain (whether the primacy of this radical frame be interpreted as that of a possibility or potentiality in which a psychical order of actuality asserts itself, or whether it be itself framed as the primary actuality).

And I have suggested a complementarity, a mirroring, between this 'physical' poetic dominant in German culture and a converse 'logical' poetic associated with France. Thus I emphasised the 'situationist' critique in Paris of the complicity of representation and power in a Société de Spectacle.

When the Revolution of May broke out, Jean-Luc Godard was in the midst of making a film. What finally appeared as Vent d'Est is the film of the interruption of the earlier filming by the Events of that month. Thus in one scene the characters sit in a field and discuss what to do with this film... this activity of making a film in which the filming of this discussion is a part, which may or may not enter into the film, and which may enter into the film in a way there decided... or not. The East Wind blows from Peking, or rather from the Chinese field where the workers and students sit down to
sit down to discuss the Cultural Revolution which brings the students into the fields. And the 'actors' discussing whether they should appear in the film discussing the 'direction' of the film echo the students at the Odéon discussing the direction of the Revolution and, in particular, the direction of this very discussion from the stage.

An East Wind blowing through the fields, and through the film, the 'medium' of representation, of telling stories. Hollywood and its soviet double, Mosfilm, are engaged in the inscription of its representation in the ideological frame of american capitalism or russian hegemony - in the recycling of the prevailing power through stories, words, images which it articulates in the society it controls. Godard over the sixties had been attempting to open up this ideological circuit by inscribing it in a play of stories, of their component words and imagery, in which the 'parts' of the characters, mirroring the focal part of the viewer or critic, were, like the latter, 'opened up', turned into a question... the question of a certain freedom... of an uncertain freedom.

Spectacle, film, medium, representation. I have already suggested that the 'ideological' economy of stories, and their ideological dynamic of integration into comprehensive stories, into a comprehensive Story or History, of what is going on, might be seen as the complement, framed in language, of the material economy organised as Market. Word and image, though? From about 1930, for example, stories in the mass-'circulation' newspapers were 'illustrated' with photographic images. I have thus far characterised the 'press' as embodying that interface of 'logical' poetic and 'cultural' poetic identified as 'ideological': as the 'linguistic' side of cultural interaction which doubles or mirrors the material, 'outward' dynamic of that interaction. - And I have identified the 'image', as bounded plane or surface of 'representation', as belonging primarily to the cultural 'poetic' first analysed in relation to Aristotle's account of athenian tragedy, and further discussed in relation to the renaissance 'poetic' of central perspective 'focused', so to speak, in the part of Alberti.

The 'poetics' of central perspective were framed, as we then saw, in the inscription of a limited square plane - a quadro,
both 'square' and 'picture' - in three-dimensional (or indeed, with the temporal dynamic, four-dimensional) 'spaces', one 'real', the other 'imaginary', as their interface. Thus in Brunelleschi's initial experiments, the two 'images', the two quadri, were set in a 'real' florentine space so as to exactly mirror this florentine 'reality' in their 'imaginary' order, and as it were induct or induce the viewer into the mysterious order of this mirroring - to 'induce wonder' in the florentines who found themselves, as it were, in both orders at once, as themselves, indeed, at the focal coincidence of the two orders.

I tried to show how, in Alberti's mid-fifteenth century scheme, the quadro of central perspective is inscribed in the wider 'architectural' frame of human activity, whether in Alberti's rewriting of Vitruvius, or in the architectural practice reflected in that book - and how this inscription of the two-dimensional frame of the image in the three-dimensional frame of action is doubled over the mid-century by Alberti's inscription of his ciceronian dialogues in the civic frame of action which is the subject of discussion. How around 1470 these two components of Alberti's part in the civic order coincide in the architectural frame of his last dialogue, as they had earlier opened out of the first writings from around 1430.

The 'image', the quadro, is thus inscribed in a 'four-dimensional' moral or practical order of activity, of human interaction, framed by a three-dimensional architectural 'space' or frame which is seen to imply that wider dynamic, just as the quadro implies the 'third' dimension of mirroring of real and imaginary architectural 'spaces'. - Inscribed, then, in that 'dramatic' order of identification with a 'part' central to the poetics of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, the later platonists, the interplay of these two latter in the florentine Academy, and so on.

Indeed the elementary configuration of the 'dimensions' of action articulated in albertine 'architectural' space - the two-dimensional fresco as interface of real and imaginary space in a three-dimensional 'building' set in the material interface of Town and Country (this in turn in the interface of Culture and Nature which it mirrors), with this architectural space itself the interface of the dimensionless focus of the fresco's perspective, and the four-
dimensional order of activity in which the viewer's eye coincides for a moment with that point - this static articulation of real and imaginary in three dimensions, might be taken as the 'scene', the static frame, of a four-dimensional interplay of those human 'points' of perception and deliberation. Alberti, for example, attaches much importance in his architectural treatise to the spectacle of government in a city-state - to the architecture and 'ornamentation' with fresci of the loggie where government is 'enacted' publicly. Particular buildings in the city correspond to particular orders of activity; the ancient 'theatres' discussed in the fifth book might be taken to reflect the essentially theatrical order of the civic scene in one component of that scene, framed in one particular building.

- A particular building, a particular scene, specifically framed as locus of fiction, of imaginary 'actions'. In discussing Aristotle's 'poetics', I noted how the abstraction of such an 'imaginary' scene from the cultural 'economy' of various framings of civic activity might itself be inscribed in that wider 'play'. Similarly, the abstraction of that 'inner' theatre of 'imagination' in each agent or actor in the wider civic drama might be inscribed as simply one 'figure' or framing of individual activity in a more radical 'play' of 'imaginary' and 'real' situations: the individual act of framing a situation as 'only' imaginary, as a mere dream.

Then we might regard the articulation of quadri as interfaces of 'imaginary' and 'real' space in the walls of three-dimensional buildings, as framing, within the three-dimensional architectural space of possible actions, a certain articulation of the play of 'real' and 'imaginary' in which the human agent's perception and deliberation, his identification of the part he has played, is playing, and is to play, 'takes place'.

That is: the inscription of two-dimensional 'images' in three-dimensional architectural space frames (in however minimal a manner) a cultural 'space' of action in which the images to some extent frame the interface of imagination and reality in perception and action, rather as architecture to some extent frames or structures our activity in three dimensions (thus reflecting the immaterial 'institutions' it embodies - government, family, and so on).
Around the turn of the twentieth century the Lumière brothers had constructing a 'cinematograph' which on the one hand mechanically produced a regular series of photographic images, and on the other mechanically reproduced the series, now 'fixed' on a transparent celluloid 'film', on a bare white wall, by focussing on that wall the light shone through the moving picture in a dark room. By the time of the Great War the new form of theatre was beginning to be instituted in 'cinema' buildings; by 1930, when photographic images were being introduced into the newspapers, a sound 'track' was added to the moving pictures: beside the translucent pictures of the action on the 'film', was a translucent 'picture' of the aural component of the action. The varying opacity or translucence of the 'sound track' caused, when light passed through it onto a photo-electric cell, a varying electrical current which could be 'amplified' and fed to an electromagnet, which in its turn caused a varying magnetic force on the centre of a diaphragm. The vibrating diaphragm thus eventually produced sound 'waves' in the auditorium with the same wave-profile as the opacity of the sound-track. If the 16mm 'film' was run at 16 'frames' per second, then the optical 'grain' of the image would be of the same sensory order of 'definition' as the aural 'grain' of the sound-track. Thus a 'grain' in the film (corresponding to the size of silver chloride crystals) of about 1/60mm would allow a frequency of variation in the sound-track of about 16,000 per second, or five octaves above 'middle' C (16,384 = 512 x 2^5), and would allow about 1000 x 1000 'grains' in the image (about 1000 variations of opacity along each side of the frame).

Now five octaves of sound below middle C is just 16 vibrations per second, the optical 'frequency' of the frame, and also the point at which sound vibrations begin to be individually discernible, just as optical 'flicker' in the film becomes indiscernible. (Organ pipes range over the ten octaves between this interface of 'mechanical' vibration and sound, and the highest audible tones of about 16,000 cycles; most other keyboard instruments range over the six vocally producible octaves from about 64 to 4,000 cycles, while an individual human voice covers about three of these octaves).

Such a standard 'film' of 1930, then, reproduces fairly closely the 'grain' of experience. I have already noted how between the turn of the century and around 1930 'wireless' transmis-
sion of sound became a public 'medium' like popular newspapers and 'moving pictures' (by 1930, illustrated newspapers, and 'talkies'). Just as the wave-profile of sound could be mapped onto photo-sensitive 'film', so it could be mapped onto the 'airwaves' — onto the 'carrier' electromagnetic waves of some particular frequency, generated by the electromagnetic 'valve' — the 'triode' (or, originally, the 'audion') invented in 1906. By around 1930 it became possible to transmit very coarse-grained images 'on the air': a conventionally produced optical image was 'scanned' in successive horizontal 'lines', from top to bottom, and a photo-electric cell transformed the varying intensity of the points scanned on successive lines into an electrical 'wave' which could then be transmitted by being superimposed in the familiar 'wireless' manner on an electromagnetic carrier wave, received in the equally familiar manner, and then used to direct the intensity of an electron beam scanning a phosphorescent 'television' screen. After the war this 'television' became another 'medium' competing with 'cinema' and radio and newspapers in mid-century America — by which time the initial coarse grain of the early 'thirties had been greatly refined, the American television picture of the 'fifties having 525 scanning-lines per frame'.

The 'cathode ray' tube first introduced in 1869, and central to these developments, was simply a glass bulb evacuated of air, into which protruded two ends of an electrical 'circuit': two 'electrodes', one positive (the 'anode') and the other negative (the 'cathode') in electrical charge. In 1897 Thomson showed that the 'rays' proceeding from cathode towards the anode (some of them thus completing the electrical circuit) were charged particles, identified around the turn of the century with Lorentz' 'electrons' or elementary charged particles. Thomson's experiments had involved the manufacture in 1897 of a bulb or 'tube' with phosphorescent glass behind (as it were) the anode, on which the magnetically focussed beam of 'cathode rays' or electrons produced a spot of light by the converse of the photo-electric effect. This cathode-ray tube, or rather its phosphorescent side, became the 'television' screen.

In 1904 another development of the vacuum tube led to the first electrical 'valve', the 'diode': if an electrical potential was applied across the electrodes of a 'tube', then an alternating current, also applied, would pass from cathode to anode, but could
not pass in the reverse direction. The current would be thus converted into a unidirectional or 'direct' current, as by the electrical equivalent of a hydraulic valve. Two years later another 'valve' was introduced. A sufficient charge applied to the central wire grid of the 'triode' would prevent the passage of electrons between the electrodes on either side. A small variation in charge (or transverse current) towards the critical value may be applied to the grid to produce a much greater variation in the current between anode and cathode. By taking a small fraction of the current between the two primary electrodes and applying it to the grid a carrier wave of fixed frequency may be generated, and by further applying to the grid the varying small current from a microphone (or from the photo-electric cell in the 'television' camera) a powerful modulated carrier-wave may be generated in the electromagnetic field around the primary circuit of this 'transmitter'.

Von Neumann realised, in 1946, that such electronic 'valves' could be used as simple 'switches' (or rather, 'gates') in a 'logic machine'. Thus (forgetting the use of the triode as an 'amplifier' for the moment) a transverse electronic pulse could, in the appropriate circuit, open or close another circuit across which it was applied. If another (separate) pulse was applied to that other circuit, its transmission could thus be made dependent on the initial transverse pulse. And further pulses could in turn be made dependent on that dependent pulse. Thus, with electronic valves, we can model the logical structure of 'if' - of logical consequence or argument. We can construct simple circuits corresponding to Wittgenstein and Russell's 'truth-functions' - and thus electrically model the mathematics that had been translated into that 'binary' logic.

Two years later (in 1948) it was discovered that the 'triode' and 'diode' could themselves be modelled in the regular atomic lattice of a silicon crystal. The old grid could be replaced by the atomic grid of the crystal, and a small transverse potential could determine the 'conductivity' of the crystal, this response constituting that crystal a 'transistor' - a producer of an electrical current controlled by the transverse current. Here it was not, as with the earlier vacuum 'valve', a case of modifying the movement of electrons between two poles of a circuit. Rather, in the regular atomic configuration of the crystal lattice, it was the prob-
abilistic electron wave-function in the symmetrical lattice that was modified by the transverse potential; not any 'individual' or identifiable electron associated with a particular atom in the lattice, but a general function characterising 'the' outermost electron in terms of the overall symmetry of the whole array. Similar considerations applied to the neutron in an array of uranium atoms had led Von Neumann and his colleagues to calculate the critical configuration that would lead to the 'nuclear' explosion of 1945, and was leading around the mid-century towards the design of the central matrix for the controlled 'burning' of uranium in 'nuclear' power stations).

I have noted how, by around 1970, 'logic' circuits were being 'printed' or etched in the crystalline matrix of silicon and other 'semiconductors', rather than the individual crystals being simply used to replace 'valves' in conventional circuits. The vacuum or 'cathode ray' tube remained, of course, as the central component of the television 'set' - that tube now having three cathodes corresponding to the three colour-signals now generally encoded in the television transmission, and defining the three axes of the colour 'space' now complementing the old 'black-and-white' intensity signal. Those three dimensions of the image, along with the further dimension of sound - the image itself being broken down into $640 \times 480$ 'picture elements' ('pixels') for each frame - require a complex 'encoding' of the transmitted wave, and a parallel complex decoding in the television receiver. For just as the 'sound track' of the moving picture of 1930 was optically 'encoded' on the film, beside the two-dimensional visual image, so now it is as though the two spatial and three tonal dimensions of the (colour) film (of the late 'thirties) are to be combined with the aural dimension on one 'track', in one electrical wave-form at transmitter and receiver, corresponding to one electromagnetic wave in between - and perhaps to one analogous magnetic variation on the magnetic film or 'tape' upon which the waveform can be stored, recorded.

In general, distortions in the electromagnetic 'medium' (rather, the electromagnetic field) between encoding and decoding such 'waves' required adding to the bare electromagnetic analogue of the initial image and sound, further components which would as
it were arrive at the receiver having 'encoded' the distortion produced in the initial signal by the medium.

Now it was a practical problem for the corporations involved in wireless or cable transmission of such 'signals' (whether telephone, 'radio', or television) to minimise the complexity of the signal required to transmit a particular amount of material or 'message' within particular limits of acceptable distortion. - This because the cable or wireless 'channels' in which such a corporation operated were themselves only able to handle a certain amount of transmission - a channel would be as it were of limited 'dimensions', and of a certain 'grain'. Moreover, more complicated encoding would require more complicated, and more expensive, equipment for transmission and reception; and the basic carrier signals (or in the simplest case the elementary modulation of a telegraphic pulse) themselves had to be generated at the expense of considerable power.

Before the papers of Shannon and Weaver in 1948-9 these problems of transmission had been approached piecemeal. But in the Bell research laboratories funded by the largest communication corporation in the World (a small part of the profits of the corporation fed as it were into this side-channel which might in turn, fed back into the main system, 'amplify' profits so as to far outweigh the research expenditure incurred), Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver had decided to approach the general question of communication of 'information' along a channel systematically, in abstraction from any particular problem that might then have been facing the Bell engineers.

The general configuration of the 'Mathematical Theory of Communication' published in the Bell Systems Technical Journal in 1949, then, was that of source-transmitter-channel-receiver-destination (later modified to source-encoder-message-channel-decoder-receiver). This configuration amounts to a sort of abstract 'space' of transmission and reception in which a certain range of messages is 'open'. The most elementary characteristic of a message, then, is that it should restrict what is 'open' in that space: from this abstract point of view the part of the sender or transmitter is to restrict as far as possible, with the means at his disposal, the possible interpretations of his 'message' open at the receiving end.
A message must restrict the open range of possible messages corresponding to the abstract 'space' of transmission: it must involve a distinction between what it leaves open and what it does not. It must somehow constrain its interpretation, even if this be only to the minimal extent or message that there is a message, rather than not. Within such an initial distinction, corresponding to one 'binary unit' or 'bit' of information, the message may be further refined: the range left open may be successively divided in this binary manner to give a simple measure of the 'information' contained in a particular restriction or selection of a message from the range corresponding to the elementary configuration of transmission and reception.

Given a system of communication, then, the amount of 'information' required to encode a configuration of the source - to inscribe that configuration of the source in a configuration of the code or code-space - must be as least as great as the information in the source-configuration (over all possible messages - 'on average'). Here there is a direct analogy with the statistical mechanics of physical configurations, and in general we may consider the 'entropy' of a physical configuration as simply the converse of the 'information' in (or, equivalently, needed to specify) a closed system. On the other hand, the Fundamental Theorem of Information Theory - the 'Noisy Channel Coding Theorem' - provides that if the channel capacity (in bits per unit time) is (however slightly) greater than the rate of production of information at the source, then encoders and decoders can be constructed so that the source configuration can be reconstructed at the destination with an error as small as desired (that is, given a maximum allowable error, a suitable system may be constructed, as long as some redundancy - however small - is allowed in the coding). The channel capacity is limited by noise, or the uncertainty of the source configuration, given the final form of the message or output.

This simple frame of quantitative analysis of systems of communication - 'media' of communication - may be developed easily enough from the case of discrete input (the initial analysis was given in terms of a source configuration of 'letters' from some finite alphabet) to continuous or 'analogue' (rather than 'digital') systems. Typically, in the digital system with coding in discrete
'bits' - say the electrical pulses of a telegraphic message, or of Von Neumann's first Princeton 'computer' - the redundancy in the coding involves the introduction into the message of pulses or bits which characterise patterns in the message whose disruption in the channel or medium can be recognised and corrected at the destination.

In the case of the general 'system' of communication, the configuration of source, encoder, channel, message, decoder, and output are neither known or static, as the abstract considerations tend to suggest. Rather are these configurations themselves deduced from the system of interaction. Thus Norbert Wiener's 'cybernetics' or theory of 'Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine' introduces the crucial figure of 'feedback' in a system: for example a 'decoder' might have to decode the specification of the 'code' itself; in such a circular configuration or 'feedback loop' an initial approximation to or guess at the code might uncover a message which gave further information about the code.

In the most general case one might simply hypothesise a global system. I have already suggested how in one limit - the 'physical' system of statistical mechanics - information is simply the converse of entropy. In this limit the quantum of action appears as 'bit' of information, and the physical Kosmos itself as 'system', the probabilistic coordination of local systems appears as 'communication'. As a primary sub-system one might take the 'electromagnetic' system, its parts 'communicating' by the photon or quantum of electromagnetic (inter)action. Wireless and telephone systems then appear as sub-systems of this wider system.

Within such a global physical 'system' one might more naturally consider a 'global'(in the restricted, earthly, sense) cultural 'system' of communication of which the 'mechanical' communication or interaction of physical systems appears as one side or pole abstracted from the psychological order of 'intention' in messages, 'meaning'. Here once more we come upon the words and images with whose discussion this excursus into 'media' began. But how, now, are we to identify 'source', 'code', 'channel' of
this 'cultural' communication system (and so on)? For until we understand these 'cultural' media of words, images, and perhaps money, how are we to characterise the very terms of the 'system', those 'terms', their configuration(s), themselves being already inextricably 'coded', inscribed in the play of 'messages'. Indeed how are we even to frame the question, how begin? Are not these 'I's themselves, is not this 'we' already source, encoder, message, channel, decoder, destination?...

... Indeed... but we may transpose the principles of the mid-century analysis of 'mechanical' communication systems, the frame of source-encoder-channel-message-decoder-output into a more radical 'cultural' system of communication, of which it is but one side - the mechanical economy, as it were, abstracted from our traditional identification as 'source' of communication and meaning. And of course that traditional principle of 'decoding' cultural communication whereby we abstract our identification of ourselves as 'sources' from the wider system of communication or interaction of this framing of the situation and our part in it - as a particular system of encoding and decoding, a particular 'code' or system of communication - that is also a (converse) abstraction to the side of a certain ideology, a certain restriction of available codes and messages.

Marshall McLuhan, in the 'fifties an academic canadian literary critic (professor of literature), moving to New York in 1967, there inscribed himself in the global system of communication as source of the message that

The Medium is the Massage

- the primary principle of decoding, understanding, is simply the reception of the message that there is a message, that there is communication. That is to say the basic principle of decoding is the inscription of the structure of communication, of the frame of transmission and reception, in that frame as primary 'code'. Corresponding to this radical 'feedback' loop, the system itself appears as primary 'source', emitting the radical 'message' which is
its identification of itself: there is a System. McLuhan's part at New York is simply to encode this message in the System - to inscribe at New York, that focus of global communications, the message that we are decoders, that we discover our part in the System by identifying ourselves with the locus of identification of the System itself as primary 'code'. We must identify this radical Code before we can properly become a true source, inscribing our messages in the frame of this Code, coding, for example, like McLuhan, the identification of the System within the structure of the System as communication system, within the System itself as Code.

According to McLuhan, then (this twin guru, along with Marcuse, of the Student Revolution), this opening out of the structure of communication itself as primary 'channel' or 'medium', frames a global Culture or circuit of communication (or 'community') whose closed circuit as primary cultural frame repeats after three thousand years (according to his... message) the pre-historic circuit of communication or community in 'tribe' or 'village' - repeats that circuit of cultural 'feedback' whose closure upon itself was broken to generate the dynamic of 'history' as cumulative interpretation.

Before moving to New York, and inscribing his message in the radical frame of the 'Global Village' itself, McLuhan had made the transition from the complementary abstraction of communication 'machines', and the literary author as focal 'source' of the meaning of his words, to the configuration opened up in western history five hundred years before by the invention of mechanical printing (around 1450). This coupling opened up a new 'space' of communication, in which the 'message' until then subordinate to its 'author's' intention, now became primarily defined by its configuration in the cultural space or channel or medium of which the physical 'economy' of printing, and the old closed circuit in which writer and reader shared a common code, a common frame of encoding and decoding a particular identification of man as source of his meaning, were two coupled, interacting, sides.
Now this coupling, around 1960, by McLuhan, of the ideological correlation of code and a certain characterisation or identification of the source, with the mechanical economy of the channel or medium — their symmetrical inscription as two sides of a wider system of interaction or communication, may itself be taken as a central or critical component of the interaction of linguistic and mechanical (or 'economic') orders over the mid-century. I have noted the interplay of traditional literary 'poetics' or 'criticism', and Shannon and Weaver's Information Theory, in McLuhan's conception of the revolution associated with the introduction of printing with movable type around 1450, and I have suggested that this identification by McLuhan of a radical cultural interaction or 'communication' of which these were two abstracted sides, first expressed in the conventional form of 'criticism' around 1960, may be regarded as a transition to the more radical inscription of the 'message' in the configuration or System or Medium it identifies, towards the close of the 'sixties. Thus by Counterblast, for example, 'published' first in 1969, the verbal or linguistic component of the 'message' is inscribed in a play of word, image and economy of production in which it now identifies itself as merely one component interacting with the others. Typically the orders of 'word' and 'image' are confused in the order of 'layout'; and McLuhan complains at one point that his layout encountered considerable opposition from the various levels of the publishing institution: it broke various entrenched 'codes' of production, and was opposed at the various levels as bringing into question the authority of those responsible — of the 'sources' of knowledge or expertise — at each level. The inscription of the verbal order and the authority of the source in the wider play is found in the very title of another production of that year, already quoted:

The Medium is the Massage

Massage? — The message is itself inscribed in the System which it identifies, and in which the Noise or transformation of the Massage between source (McLuhan) and destination (reader) is an irreducible component — the elimination of 'noise' being a direct corollary of the traditional abstraction of source from System, the presupposition of its identity 'outside' or before the System in which it identifies itself. The disruption in which the Message can still
be recognised, is itself an essential component of the Message: the character of the System itself as primary Code appears in the 'decoding' of the 'distorted' message. The distortion itself codes a part of the System, a component of the configuration which identifies itself in the primary Message - which without this distortion could not identify itself as itself transmitted and received, as itself the Message which is all the firmer for being unexpected... a Message which relaxes the tension of the traditional closed circuit of reader's and writer's abstraction of their traditional identity from the wider play.

Word, image, matter. I approached the twentieth-century 'technology' of communication through the visual space opened up by Alberti around 1450, rather than through the German inscription of the verbal order in a mechanical economy. Now perhaps we may combine these two - or rather three - components of the Frame of twentieth-century culture and community, by considering the 'symmetry' of the three orders of cultural 'space', and the associated interaction or dynamic.
Alberti inscribed the two-dimensional frame of the 'image', the 'square' or quadro (french: cadre) as interface of real and imaginary, as two-dimensional wall in a three-dimensional architectural space of human interaction. The three-dimensional architectural space framed by Alberti within the primary circuit of Culture in wild Nature may itself be regarded as an interface of real and imaginary actions - as the physical frame in which certain actions are open, possible, as a range of imaginary action from which reality is 'actualised', realised. This physical frame in its turn may be seen as one side of a cultural architectonic in which it is mirrored by an 'ideological' framing of the individual (as 'source' of action) and what is open to him or her. I have noted how the order of the 'institution' floats as it were between these two sides. I also noted how the central perspective in which the quadri of Brunelleschi and Alberti are constructed as the interface of complementary three- (or rather, four-) dimensional 'spaces' constitutes the 'point of view', the point of the viewer as dimensionless focus of that interface, as point of coincidence of two 'worlds' for a moment. Thus the articulation of the two-dimensional interfaces of 'real' and 'imaginary' worlds - or rather of real and imaginary situations - in the three-dimensional architectural frame of human activity may be taken to constitute a fragmented outward reflection of the interface in the individual imagined to move through this space as dimensionless 'point of view', of a subjective interface of 'imaginary' and 'real' worlds in that individual.

The two-dimensional frame of the image is thus not only a mirror of real and imaginary worlds (the two dimensional mirror in its frame as it were a limiting case in which the two orders symmetrically double one another), but also a mirror of the dimensionless 'point' of view with the four-dimensional frame of action. It is an image, indeed, of the 'four-dimensional' mirror of 'inner' and 'outer' orders of an action or interaction in a group of individuals. Outwardly it gives the configuration of an inscription of the mirroring of real and imaginary in the four dimensions of physical 'reality', and this outward configuration may in turn be 'inwardly' construed as an image of the constitution of the 'outer' world in imagination from an inward play of images in 'imag-
ination'. The 'image' of the mid-fifteenth century, then, may be taken as the mirror of an 'inner' order of 'imagination' in an 'outer' order of physical reality (whichever be considered more 'real' in some more radical sense). The two-sidedness of the two-dimensional image in three-dimensional physical space provides an image of distinction of real and imaginary, 'inner' and 'outer', which may then be extended to the play of possible ('four-dimensional') actions. And yet this very dynamic of distinction of two 'sides' of such actions, by which a certain order of possibility is framed, may also itself be inscribed as simply the activity of framing a more radical possibility in one particular way. - That is to say, the two-dimensional image of the image as primary interface of 'inner' and 'outer' orders of action may itself be inscribed in a wider play - just as, indeed the central perspective of the mid-fifteenth century itself soon becomes simply one component in an expressive 'mannerism'.

We might regard the opening up of this wider play through the 'mechanical' perspective of the mid-fifteenth century as a direct parallel of the contemporary opening-up of the verbal 'medium' by mechanical 'printing'. Indeed the two are coupled from the 1430's by the application of the 'technology' of printing wood-block images in a 'press' to the chiselled pages of the 'blockbooks' that are the direct precursors of printing with separate metal 'types' for each letter of the alphabet. With the inscription of the word in the order of the image, mechanically reproduced, the three orders of word, image, and 'machine' are coupled in an elementary symmetry of language, culture, and material economy.

The breakdown of central perspective at the beginning of the twentieth century is itself paralleled by the introduction of a temporal dimension into the mechanically produced central perspective of the 'photograph'. The early experiments of Paris 'cubism' are frequently linked by practitioners and critics with that new dimension of the 'moving' picture, as with the spatiotemporal configuration of a new physical 'Relativity'. What, then, of the configuration of word, image and machine over the mid-century?
- If the architectural articulation of the painted interface of 'inner' and 'outer' worlds in the three dimensions of Alberti's mid-fifteenth century frame of action may be taken to constitute a certain 'space' of action, from which the framing of inner 'imaginary' world and outer 'material' world may be regarded as complementary abstractions associated with two complementary 'dynamics' at work in the organisation of action... if these may be taken as two complementary 'sides' of a dramatic order framed in a 'poetic' of an economy of the 'image' integrated in a cultural order reflected in its architectural frame... then what are we to make of the twentieth-century 'space' of action or interaction which succeeds this fifteenth-century 'World'?

For by 1930 Alberti's static painted walls have been succeeded by black-and-white walls picturing an action in its temporal and aural dimensions, as well as the two dimensions of the image. Are we to see in the 'cinema' merely an approximation to the 'theatre' introduced into Athens over the turn of the fifth century, and reconstituted out of a new mystery from the thirteenth century on (and housed in albertine or vitruvian buildings in the sixteenth)?

There is certainly a strong analogy between the two 'media'. And yet, as Aristotle noted, theatre involves the 'representation of an action by another action' - even if Aristotle believed that the embodying of the verbal order of the text in the visible order of spectacle was in principle subordinate to that verbal order - so that any drama might in principle be quite as well enacted 'in imagination' as in the dramatic order of an action which intervenes between inner imagination and outer 'reality' (as the painted image intervenes between these two 'sides' as very 'image' of their separation). Yet the cultural 'space' of theatre constituted by an action, as mirror of 'inner' and 'outer' is very different from the cultural 'space' constituted in the mechanical reproduction of a recorded series of images (of which there may be many 'prints') on the wall of cinema 'auditorium'. And still more different is the cultural 'space' constituted by the simultaneous transmission of a television film to millions of two-dimensional 'screens' set against the walls of rooms in perhaps the majority of houses in a country.
I earlier compared sexual 'polarity' in the spatiotemporal symmetry of human bodies with electrical polarity whose symmetry governs a 'field' of integration of interactions. Cinema 'films' of the 'thirties generally embody such a sexual dimension or 'field' - a 'romantic interest' - in their movement or dynamic. A dimension associated with the mirror-symmetry of the two-dimensional frame of the image, and in which the cinematic dynamic may be inscribed in the wider social or cultural dynamic from which it is abstracted. A sexual dynamic, we might say, of the 'film' of Epicurus, reflecting the cultural dynamic of surfaces in the electromagnetic order of physical surfaces... epicurean 'films' in either case mediating the interaction of surfaces.

'Abstracted' from a wider dynamic: from that dynamic of action in general, in which theatre proper is inscribed as 'representation of an action by another action'. - Abstracted from the constraints upon the articulation of the image imposed by the inscription of theatre actors and audience in a common physical space of the theatre building - this in its turn generally articulated within the interface of 'scene' and fixed spectators in the 'orchestra'. Thus the interface of real and imaginary in the screen of cinema or television may be articulated within the symmetry of the two-dimensional image abstracted from the three dimensions of theatrical action - and from the more radical poetic or drama framed by the mirroring of the four dimensions of its context or World in the four dimensions of an action. Characteristically it is the analogous electromagnetic order of physical interaction which provides the 'medium' for transmission of the two-dimensional image.

How, now, do the 'pictures' in the 'thirties partake of the wider cultural space of action or interaction, for example? The 'economy' of that cultural order of interaction coordinates the interplay of 'inner' and 'outer' orders in those human configurations or 'groups' which frame actions - the 'four-dimensional' order of human interaction as the primary 'mirror' of inner and outer from which the three-dimensional order of 'film' is abstracted.
In the cinematographic order of the image, the two physical 'sides' of the image (of the screen) mirror in the physical order the relations of material and ideal (or ideological) 'sides' of the cinematic configuration or of the cinematic 'dimension' of culture. The physical surface of screen or film is as it were one component of the mirroring of that physical order in the corresponding psychological order; the perspectival configuration of the image in physical space is a physical 'image' of the cultural order of 'perspectives' articulated by the film. The two-sidedness of the physical order of the film is itself one side of the cultural order of the film, an image of the mirroring of that physical order in a psychological order, and an image of the mirroring of the material economy of the image in its 'ideological' economy. The 'symmetry' of these three orders of 'perception' in the film, these three analogous orders of 'perspective' itself frames a cultural 'space' of the film, and governs a certain cinematographic 'dynamic', a certain dynamic of interaction of the three orders of the institution of cinema. This dynamic of 'film' is itself in turn coupled, in the wider symmetry of the three orders (material, cultural, ideological) with the dynamics of other 'media' - the interaction of these media with one another and with their common culture inscribed in or governed by that wider symmetry, just as the two dimensions of the image are physically inscribed in the three dimensions of physical 'space', or the electromagnetic symmetry of that third dimension orthogonal to physical surface (an electromagnetic symmetry which governs the electromagnetic, electric, magnetic, optical and chemical orders of radio, film, and television) is inscribed in the wider relativistic and quantum-mechanical symmetries of that space, and its correlative time.

Thus the configuration of cultural 'media' or 'systems' of communication around 1930 might be correlated, in the broadest 'symmetry' of that configuration, with the symmetry of physical theory (or the theory of physical symmetry and the associated dynamic) at that time. Such a correlation involves the coordination of the logical order of physical theory, itself only one component of the logical order of Theory as a whole, which is in its turn one component of the 'ideological' order of language, with the physical order which is the object of that theory - a physical
order which enters as one component into the material economy of
the culture in which that inscription of physical order in econ-
omy, and the analogous inscription of the logical order of Theory
in ideology, mirror one another. - A 'mirroring' in which the
two-dimensional interface of these two orders in 'film' is itself
one component.

- One component abstracted from the radical 'dramatic'
order of framing and 'identification', articulated between the
two 'cultural' poles of integration of activity in a global frame,
and the configuration of abstraction of an elementary 'action' from
that global frame, embodied in the theatrical order of 'drama' in
the restricted sense.

If the physical theory of around 1930 may be taken as
an index marking (but not, of course, determining) a wider cultur-
al configuration of that period, then we might consider the un-
folding of the global dynamic of the various media or channels of
communication over the mid-century, by taking the coupling of log-
ical and physical orders of 'system' and 'machine' over that mid-
century, and the subsequent identification of a global System of
the various orders of 'communication', around 1970, as further 'in-
dices' of the changing configuration as a whole. Now, for example,
may we speak of the systematic coupling of the various 'systems'
of communication and control in the global television coverage of
Man on the Moon in 1969, in terms of the 'symmetry' of the various
orders or dimensions of this 'drama'?

Various 'dimensions': ideological, economic, cultural. ..
within the cultural order the political decisions controlling the
'Space Program', within the 'economic' the mechanical order of the
project, articulated by 'logic machines' (computers) and electro-
magnetic channels of communications between Earth and Moon, and
(linked to these) over the surface of the Earth.. within the ideolog-
ical order, another 'new frontier', and the focussing in that last
frontier of the conflict of United States and Soviet Union.

.. And within the cultural order, too, complementing the
political order of integration of the Space Program, the elementary poetics of identification of the millions of television viewers around the Globe with the protagonists on their screens — an order of identification, structuring the dramatic 'space' of activity around the World, which is not subordinate to the distinction of television (or theatrical) 'fiction' and 'fact', but in which this order of distinction is itself articulated in the radical symmetry of the image. An order of identification here framed in an image on the television screens, for the first time, of the whole earthly order of television and all the rest, inscribed in a wider order of 'heavenly' detachment... rather as earlier tragedy and mystery presented an image of the inscription of the dramatic order of image and identification in a wider heavenly order of detachment from identification with an earthly part.

What, then, of the global 'scene' or 'space' or frame of action, in which this physical image of that Globe enters as one component? In the electromagnetic network of global communications the transmission of this colour television image and its 'soundtrack' is open: the image can be introduced as 'message' into that network, into that global 'system'. And this itself amounts to only one side of the matter: for that system is only the physical side of a wider global System of 'messages'. The transmission is also a 'message' in the ideological 'space' or network or system, a selection from what is open in that order. More generally still the whole configuration is a 'selection' from what is 'dramatically' open in the global mirroring of ideological and material orders; the political decision to produce this 'show' is itself based on an interpretation or 'decoding' of a vast array of 'messages', of interactions — an interpretation or decoding which is itself only partial, based on a certain interpretation of the global System in which the American president understands himself as 'source' of a certain authority, of certain 'messages' transmitted through a certain administrative machine (or rather, an only partially understood configuration interpreted as administrative machine) in the exercise of a certain
(or rather, uncertain) 'control'.

System... the Book of Splendour, Sefr-i-Zohar, in the thirteenth century, had framed Creation in a certain symmetry, this System of symmetry-within-symmetry framing, then, a certain Code in which the qabalist could intervene, 'magically' coordinating the various correlative orders of Kosmos through the dramatic inscription, verbal or written, of a particular 'message' in what the System framed as open to him. This part of 'source' or control had itself to be learnt, and the first step in this direction was the decoding of the radical message that there was a System - a system as very frame of this self-expression. The radical message, then, of I AM, corresponding to the visible order of effulgence, splendour, in which that radical 'voice' of absolute self-expression spoke, in the story, to Moses.

Around 1970 the Jewish-American physicist David Finkelstein framed the physical order as 'The Space-Time Code', and physics as the process of its decoding, in which the first step was the identification in the 'physics' thus framed as System, of the radical part of observer-measurer as 'decoder'.

'Space-Time Code': I have already noted the character of the electromagnetic interaction (the exchange of photons) as limiting electromagnetic 'system' of communication. On the other hand the global (in the widest sense) frame of Space-Time as 'space' or 'channel' of this communication corresponds to the frame of coordination of different electromagnetic 'messages' 'relativistically': for a certain set of messages may allow one to 'decode' or interpret a further message upon 'reception' as 'distorted' by the intervening field or channel. This identification of the message's 'source' will further characterise the electromagnetic 'field' as channel of electromagnetic 'communication' or interaction, and to make further adjustments for 'distortion' or 'noise' (that is, intervening fields) in the new bigger message-set as a whole.

Space-Time thus appears as the first or primary 'frame' of 'decoding' the physical Kosmos, the identification of the physical order simply as System. This 'decoding' is itself recognised as 'interaction', whether as relativistic 'observer' or quantum-mechanical measurer - this latter intervening in the System to further
determine what is left open by earlier interventions or measurements.

The step from the formal intervention of the physicist in such a physical 'system' to an actual economy of intervention in the physical order articulated in the symmetries of the atomic lattices of 'integrated circuits' around 1970, is the step from the limiting physical order of Nature to the physical interface of Nature and Culture in a material economy. A material economy in which the machine as framing human intervention in the 'natural' order of forces, appears as the interface of the integration of that economy through the financial order of money on the one hand, and the primary production of 'raw' material on the other.

Thus the 'transistor' in an electrical circuit may be used to produce a large (an 'amplified') increase of electrical power in the circuit through a small increase in transverse power, rather as the elementary machines of Archimedes' Mechanics (lever, pulley, and so on) allow the control of a large mechanical power through exertion of a smaller one. In the first Industrial Revolution, say from 1770 to 1830, as I noted, a new economy of power, based on the steam engine was introduced: a relatively small exertion of forces - of steam power - would procure and transport the materials (coal, iron ore, and so on) for producing not only vast power in steam 'engines' (including those used in procuring and transporting the 'raw' materials), but also for producing more of those steam engines themselves. Within this basic 'economy' of human intervention in the order of natural forces (or of Nature), the Electricity of the 'Second Industrial Revolution' over the turn of the twentieth century opened up a new order of 'economy' in the material order of activity as a whole, paralleled by the Chemistry of new 'materials'. I have noted how this 'Second Revolution' may be taken to begin with Siemens' electro-mechanical 'dynamos' and 'motors' allowing the transformation of mechanical (mainly steam) power into electrical power at one point in a 'system' of production, and the reverse transformation at another point to which the electrical power was transmitted (this around 1870, parallelling the introduction of the steam 'engine' around 1770). The three successive 'revolutions' beginning around 1770, 1870, and 1970, then, may, as I have already
suggested, be regarded as successive inscriptions of a new order of human intervention within the 'mechanical' order of Nature.

Now this 'mechanical' order of intervention and its 'economy' may, I have suggested, be regarded as the frame of a global 'economy' of the material order of Culture in the latter part of the twentieth century - the primary interface of a 'financial' order of central coordination and a complementary order of 'primary production' (agriculture, mining and so on). Over the turn of the twentieth century (from around 1870 to around 1930) the new 'space' of the Second Industrial Revolution is opened up: the electrical economy of power is mirrored in the electrical (or rather, electromagnetic) system of communications by which that primary system or 'grid' of 'transmission' is controlled. In this new 'space' of material 'economy', whose physical inscription in the old economy of mechanical power is mirrored by the inscription of that old economic order as only one 'dimension' of the new 'space' of intervention in Nature, the 'planner' framing some component of the global economy (whether in Wall Street or Stalin's Soviet Union) appears in the familiar figure of both 'decoder' and 'transmitter' in a feedback-loop of intervention guided by analysis of its results. The economist or 'manager' frames an economic (sub-)system in which he intervenes; the results of this intervention are in turn interpreted or 'decoded', and the frame altered accordingly. Around 1930 Von Neumann had in fact analysed 'economic behaviour' in terms of his new abstract Game Theory of optimal strategies, given a certain configuration of information and a certain set of rules or laws of development (I have noted the parallel between this and Von Neumann's contemporary formalisation of the probabilistic 'space' of Quantum Mechanics, as of the logical 'space' of inference). Around 1930, of course, a certain order of planning - a macroeconomic or indeed global 'economy' based on local ('microeconomic') optimisation - broke down. An element of national 'planning', whether rigourously organised in Stalin's five-year feedback cycle (Five Year Plan), or whether, as in America, designed to optimise the frame of local optimisation, was everywhere introduced - despite protests against this constraint upon the American freedom to frame one's part in the open play without artificial limits imposed on (or rather, in) that play.
I have noted how the centralised war-economies and war-planning of 1940 was continued throughout the World until the mid-century, when the question began to turn to the proper balance or interaction between such central integration and the free play of local optimisation or choice in an open market. In America a reaction set in against Roosevelt's planning, coupled to reaction against all things 'communist' after the outbreak of the Korean War. In Russia, with Stalin's death and the close of the war in 1953, a new pragmatism began to emerge. An element of free play was introduced, notably into the agricultural market (the economic base) - and reflected in the open play in the Politburo around the centre left vacant by Stalin's death. An open play in which the pragmatic Kruschev himself emerged as the embodiment of assertion in - and of - such economic and political 'mixing'. By 1964 the new open-ness had gone too far: Russia's security was threatened by its decline as organising centre of World Communism, with the assertion of independence in China, Yugoslavia, Italy. By 1970 Brezhnev had emerged as embodying a new assertion of economic and political centralism.

That secession of China - in 1960 - was itself the reflection of the departure from the Soviet model of central planning in Mao's Great Leap Forward in the late 'fifties. After the defeat of the Kuomintang in 1949 and association with the Soviet Union in North Korea, China had introduced a First Five Year Plan in 1950. The 'feedback' from the rural peasantry led to the abrogation of the second Plan - of central planning itself - less than half way through. Then, after the split with Moscow in 1960, and the mounting chaos in China resulting from Mao's decentralisation, the opposing faction around Teng and Liu managed to reassert a more traditional central coordination. It was just this 'confucian' bureaucratic centralisation of planning that was in its turn overthrown by Mao's Cultural Revolution already noted as perceived in Paris, at least.

In Europe the economic order of complementary central planning and open market became established, outside the Soviet bloc, as the common frame in which 'conservative' and 'socialist' parties came to disagree only about the balance of the two sides - about which side was in principle subordinate to the other, and
how this was to be reflected in policy. Thus in 1960 the SPD congress at Goteborg abjured its traditional view of itself as a 'class' party, and asserted itself to be, henceforth, a 'people's party'. Brandt's implementation of the 'Goteborg Programme' in the late 'sixties was paralleled by the implementation of similar policies by a British Labour Party, itself no longer a class party, differing from the Conservative policies of the 'fifties reaction to the Welfare State only in the question of emphasis upon one side or other of the mixture. I have already noted Pompidou's centrist (in the political spectrum) pragmatism in France over this period. In the United States the 'conservatism' of the 'fifties was replaced in the 'sixties, as in Britain, by an energetic direction of the Mix, with an emphasis upon central direction of internal and external expansion - overall Growth, 'amplification' of production, framed by 'technology'.

At the beginning of American intervention in the Second World War Churchill and Roosevelt had conceived the frame of a new postwar world order, partly realised in the United Nations and its component institutions. In particular, the principles of application of wartime economic planning to the postwar economies of Britain, America, and the other nations, were reflected in the establishment as part of the United Nations Organisation of global economic planning, its frame worked out at the Bretton Woods Conference dominated by Keynes (in person), and embodied in a World Bank, an International Monetary Fund, and so on. In the end the communist states would not join in this application of Keynesian principles to the global economy, any more than those of Europe would accept Marshall Aid - so that the new economic order eventually reflected, in the economic relations of North-West (so to speak) and South the new market structure of 'mixed' economy, the whole dominated by the American version or recipe of that mixture. - That is to say, America framing her part in a global free or open Market, within a whole constrained so as to optimise the system of local optimisation, of maximum local or microeconomic 'amplification' of production, maximum growth, this principle of 'amplification' reflected or rather measured in percentage 'profit', or proportional excess of 'output' over 'input', in the mechanical intervention of Man in Nature.
In keynesian terms, the optimal intervention of central planning in this global Open Market is measured by the 'multiplier' or the amplification of the whole Economy (or Market) by the injection of a certain amount of extra money spent by the central planners, and borrowed in the Market itself at those rates of 'interest' which measure the rate of amplification of money itself - what money itself is 'worth' on the Market.

Now with 'keynesian' expansion of the World Market (or rather, of its open 'side') the cyclical structural crisis which had earlier begun to appear after the Great War, and which culminated in the Crash of 1929, began to appear once more around 1970, but now in a new form.

'Stagflation': a previously unknown combination of expensive money (common enough in a period of expansion when there is competition for money) and decreasing growth. 'Planning' in the West had been pursued as an attempt to optimise the functioning of a whole national economy through central intervention; the whole economic order of a 'western' nation, then, was still framed in terms of a 'logic' of optimisation in which microeconomic and macroeconomic planning together participated. The successive abstraction of the 'logic' of planning, then, from a corresponding real growth in primary production - from growth of the economy as a whole - led to growing structural problems. But central planning continued the injection of money, indeed increased it to attempt to promote expansion, while the 'multiplier' effect fell below the rate at which central finance was raised. In the South, where the western economic structure was being implemented in what still remained primarily an area of primary production, and of consumption, in the American-dominated Open Market, raw material prices began to fall along with profit margins in the North - except where the southern producers of the primary raw material - petroleum as primary source of mechanical power - managed to organise themselves to force their price up, just as the developed countries organised themselves to force the prices of other raw materials down. This focal development in 1973 was itself a political gesture opposed not only to the economic dominance of South by North, but also to the political dominance reflected in western imposition of the state of Israel upon the oil-producing Middle East.
Parallel structural problems arose in the planning of the closed economy of the (North-)East, linked or coupled to the West through primary production in the South. Integration through overall planning, like the converse western principle of integration through an economy of local optimisation, in which to plan was to intervene with government finance raised on the western Open Market, led, as in the free market, to a progressive abstraction of the structure of policy from the global economic System.

System, different aspects interacting or 'communicating' in various 'channels' articulated between those along which physical material is actually conveyed on the one hand, and those by which information about the Economy is coordinated on the other. In East and West intervention is locked in complementary circuits. In each case the planner's identification of his own position, decoding and intervening in an attempt to control the System, or some part of it, is itself constrained by the way his very part enters into that global System. A constraint that is as much 'ideological' as economic, a constraint, indeed, framed by the systematic interaction of converse and self-confirming and self-perpetuating economic ideas or economic ideologies. The parallel, the convertibility of the two converse constraints is reflected in a speech made by the man who was in charge of American foreign relations around 1970, speaking to the representatives of the London financial market a decade later:

The (economic) problems of the West are only organisational, those of the East are structural.

Which is to say: 'We believe we can solve ours, but that they can't solve theirs'... and it is just such a belief, such an 'ideological' faith, which generates the structural problems of the Open Market.

... That is: in the System of mechanical intervention in Nature, in the material economy of the Globe, around 1970 there appear questions associated with the constraining of 'eastern' and 'western' (and thereby the 'southern' which they dominate) economies within frames of interpretation and control abstracted, as converse
economic 'codes', institutions, 'systems', from the wider System of intervention in Nature in which the converse circuits are together inscribed. Together inscribed, each interpreting the other in its own terms, and playing out the physical order of their conflict in the South, in that order of primary production, of the interface of Culture and the natural order of raw material and naked force.

That is: the South as interface of global Culture and global Nature in that 'side' of the material economy I have called 'primary production' - of 'raw' material for the economy as a whole - also appears as embodying that 'economy' of inscription of a particular society or 'culture' in the order of natural forces associated with those machines called 'arms'. The converse 'open' and 'closed' economies of West and East in the North are coupled through the South not only as source of raw materials (exchanged for manufactured 'products'), but also as locus of inscription of the conflict of northern 'codes' or systems, northern cultures, in the 'primary' domain of power, force. The economic, ideological, and military dimensions of the conflict of East and West in the South are thus coupled in the order of machines, the mechanical interface of primary production and eastern/western modes of integration, planning, as the conflict of 'military-industrial complexes' dominated by America on the one hand, and the Soviet Union (or rather, Russia) on the other. This global configuration of two conflicting material 'economies' of activity is reflected in the dominant part (around 1970) of the Defence Department of the United States Administration both in 'new technology' (and the biggest computer in the World), and in the funding of scientific research in America.

I have already sketched a 'cubic' configuration of a sort of global ideological 'space'. And I have now attempted to suggest an elementary coupling of this ideological order with the material 'economy' of global activity, whose analysis or 'decoding' in converse ways in East and West directly reflects the converse circuits of 'western' and 'eastern' (or 'soviet') ideology. I have also suggested that the closed circuits of East and West, manifest both in eco-
each as it were turn upon 'systematic' constraints in each case upon the participants' identification of their parts, imposed precisely by their positions in those economic and ideological 'systems' or 'frames' - or networks of 'input' and 'output'. More generally one might say that the economic and ideological 'circuits' are complementary sides of cultural systems or codes in which the first step of interpretation and corresponding 'input' is the framing of the decoder/transmitter's place in the elementary configuration of reception and transmission; the familiar configuration of framing one's part as that of framing.

Frame-Code-System. I have suggested that this 'culture', this cultural frame, code, institution, system, may be articulated in a 'poetic' configuration, of which Aristotle's analysis of greek drama constitutes one expression - one interpretation, one decoding, corresponding to Aristotle's identification of his part in the wider universal System or Economy of Kosmos. Of a Kosmos in which this civic order articulated in the institution of Theatre (for example) was a reflection, framed in the circuit of community in the wider interface of Heaven and Earth, of the cosmic order as a whole. That is: Culture, the order of what is within the pale, within the Mark which divides cultural in-side from natural out-side, mirrors in that circuit of the Mark inscribed in the spherical interface of Globe and physical Kosmos, the whole order or system of Kosmos divided by that earthly surface into complementary orders of 'above' and 'below'.

I have suggested that the 'perspectival' configuration of two 'four-dimensional' sides of a two-dimensional quadro, of the Image, coinciding in the dimensionless 'focus' of the viewer, itself constitutes an 'image' (in some more radical sense of which the square or physical surface is one 'side') of the mirroring of 'inner' or ideal and 'outer' or material 'sides' of that four dimensional closed configuration of an 'action' which, in Aristotle's account of drama, is intermediate between 'imaginary' inner action ('in' the spectator's - or reader's - imagination) and (in a way equally imaginary) real 'physical' action (which the action or acting played out on the stage 'represents').

If, now, we take this ambiguous intermediate order of a configuration (whether in two, three, or four dimensions) as
central, as 'dramatically' primary, then we may regard the ideal focus or aristotelian rationality on the one hand, and the complementary order of physical 'identity' on the other, as two formal poles abstracted from the the radical symmetries of the order of action itself, and its associated dynamic. - That dynamic which defines action, the actuality or 'working' of particular figures or configurations, itself. Defines or rather allows the identification of the working or actuality of an 'I' as the locus in a frame or configuration of action, of its framing - and in this repeats the figure of Aristotle's detachment at the close of a (theatrical) action, from identification with an 'I', an 'actor', at work in the closed configuration or frame of a drama. Repeats, as itself one figure at work in the wider civic and indeed cosmic drama, the figure of self-identification in abstraction from identification with the locus of framing in some particular finite configuration or frame, which in the mystery of tragedy is itself reflected in the very actor's distinction, in the frame of that tragedy, from his 'earthly' part, from the ἕρως of self-assertion as locus of framing in a finite 'earthly' frame abstracted from the cosmic frame whose locus of framing is divinity.

What now, of the 'economy' of particular configurations of 'action' - of that wider economy in and from which the closed circuit of a theatrical 'action' or 'drama' is abstracted? We may now at last give a better sense to the analogy between the 'physical' symmetry of charge-separation associated with the physical surface, and the 'sexual' symmetry of the image, of that 'cultural' surface or 'film'. For the interplay of imaginary and real in the physical 'economy' of possibility, articulated in the electromagnetic symmetry of the configuration of 'measurement', of passive intervention in the physical order, now appears as the 'physical side' of an analogous cultural 'economy' of human intervention in 'actions' - an economy from which that physical order is a limiting abstraction, an extreme role of undirected material intervention. The 'economy' of mechanical intervention in the 'material' economy of society, then, appears as the interface of these two orders of intervention or 'action'.
The physical order of 'action' - its quantum-mechanical economy of possibility in the play of configurations, and its relativistic integration in a unitary spatiotemporal frame - is thus reflected in a cultural economy of interplay of configurations of action in an order of 'possibility' with its real and imaginary 'sides' like the real and imaginary 'sides' of a two-dimensional image or four-dimensional 'drama', 'play', and an equally 'relativistic' order of integration of this 'cultural economy' of 'possible' frames and framing of actions (past, present and future) in a global frame of earthly activity as a whole. The 'sexual' dynamic of surfaces thus appears as one component in the cultural 'system', just as the electromagnetic dynamic appears as one sub-system within the physical order or 'system' as a whole. In turn these cultural and physical 'systems' or orders or dimensions, themselves appear as correlative dimensions of a still wider System.

A crucial difference between the physical and cultural dimensions of 'action' - of that 'action' of which physical and cultural interactions are correlative aspects - lies in the cultural symmetry of 'physical' organisation and that 'psychical' (or psychological) order of self-assertion whose abstract pole is the pure self-assertion of 'I'. In the physical limit the intervention of the physicist appears as itself an 'action' in the physical order; in the psychical limit 'thought' appears to itself as pure self-assertion, intention, meaning, abstracted from its physical 'side'. In the intermediate 'cultural' order or poetic, these poles appear as themselves figures of abstraction from their 'dramatic' symmetry and interplay in particular configurations or situations - most particularly, from the interplay of those orders of language or ideology, and material economy, which are the interfaces of the central 'cultural' order, and the limiting formal symmetries of its logical and physical 'frames'.

In the cultural order, then, 'intervention' embodies a 'psychological' order of intention and self-assertion, which appears only formally - 'passively' as it were - in the physical order of 'observation' and 'measurement'. In the play of configurations or frames of situations in which 'I's find themselves (and we find ourselves), the psychical or psychological (the distinction of course depending upon how that distinction is itself framed) order or 'side'
self-identification, framing itself as the locus of framing (or rather, as a locus of framing) confronts and mirrors the ontological (or ontical) 'self-assertion' of 'things' (of the 'objects' of thinking, of 'thinging' indeed, framing things).

It will, then, at once be apparent how this 'cultural' order which, from its dramatic configuration, I have throughout called 'poetic', amounts to a 'system', in which what I have generally called 'framing' appears both as receptive interpretation or decoding, and as intervention according to some frame or 'code'. In particular the 'system' itself expresses itself in the familiar way in the elementary decoding which identifies this act of decoding as itself one term in the primary Code or Frame or System itself. Thus we might say that the protagonist in tragedy enters into this 'system' without realising that it is a system, a relentless machine (on one side, at any rate), and his primary task is to 'decode' in his situation this governing system, this self-expression of divinity and fate. And this decoding is effected by that 'feedback' from the nature of things, from his dramatic situation, which reflects the inadequacy of an initial 'code', of a closed circuit of identification of a particular figure of source, intervention, reception, system, and so on, a particular story, a particular frame in which the acceptance of this frame as 'code' is itself one term (closing, then, the circuit of that frame or code, its abstraction from a wider system). I noted earlier how the institution of Athenian tragedy, over the turn of the fifth century, was a 'poetic' analogue of the Pythagorean institution of 'philosophy', of a radical Reflection, at Croton. Attic tragedy marks a certain discovery of a radical figure of system, of an Athenian order of Law within it, breaking (as in the Oresteia) with older stories and 'heroic' codes by subjecting them to a radical questioning: discovering a new figure of the 'actor' or agent distinguishing himself from a mere 'part', from the of a self-assertion as one term in a story framed by that term, of an abstraction from the cosmic System which expresses itself in the institution of theatre.
From the recognition of system at Athens we must return to that recognition of system at Paris in the late 'sixties which was identified in the press as 'Structuralism'.

First, though, I must complete the global Frame or System in which this identification can itself be inscribed.

I had reached, proceeding from natural to cultural orders, a system of 'surfaces' associated with 'film', as one component in (or dimension of) a wider dramatic order - rather as the two-dimensional order of surfaces is one (rather, two) dimension(s) of physical space, and as the associated electromagnetic order (of light, among other things) is one 'dimension' or component of the physical order of interaction as a whole.

Now we find ourselves, as it were, in the midst of film, of filming, back again in the fields with Jean-Luc Godard and his 'actors'. The cultural system - rather the cultural systems - of America, France, Russia, are in question. In question, inscribed in an order of questioning, of opening-up, as the closed circuits by which a certain order of control and integration is reflected in the order or orders of 'representation' - notably, of film - as instituted in a 'system'. That is: the primary 'message' in the instituted cinema around the World is the self-assertion of the system in which that cinema, that order of representation, is instituted. The Medium is the Message.

And just as in greek tragedy or in medieval qabala this self-expression of the system is hidden in the system, and organises our unconscious or passive part in that system until decoded (when it mysteriously appears, and we, seeing our part, can intervene in it directly, consciously), so in cinema a certain system, code, law, is hidden, and organises our 'parts' in its hidden circuit. In this latter case, though, the decoding and unveiling, revealing, exposure, of the 'system' is itself the passage into a more radical system, an open play in which the circuit of the repressive system may be inscribed, described, and in which we can throw off the pas-
sive role of spectator (or mere actor) and intervene. Intervene, primarily, by inscribing in the closed system the message of its abstraction, its closure, the message of the wider system 'outside'. ... Thus, in a way, Godard's subversive tragicomedy repeats an older figure of enlightenment: like the Greek and Jewish mysteries which led out of earthly appearances into an order this sensible order itself concealed, so Godard's intervention in a closed culture points to an order which that culture systematically conceals, in this concealing its own circuit, its own circumscription or comprehension, its own corresponding questionability. His images invite entry into an order that is hidden behind the coded images of everyday culture, and from which these images and their codes abstract by leading, from one configuration to another, in a circuit - weaving a closed cultural space which appears to have no outside, to be nothing in particular, nothing thinkable, there being within it no distinction in which it could be inscribed or determined or identified.

... But just where do these strange 'films' lead, then?

... Well, 'eastwards', perhaps, to another 'cultural revolution'? ... Or is this itself, this China glimpsed behind the veil, glimpsed in a certain analogy, a certain mirror, perhaps itself another 'image'?

What about the 'sexual system' in which the action of Godard's films before 1968 was articulated? Could we begin by finding some primary identification of the 'actor' or participant in the sexual space or 'field' articulated in that 'mirror' - a configuration in which the closed sexual order, for example, of the prevailing system could be revealed? A configuration in which a viewer, for example, could make a first ('imaginary') step into an order in which the transmission and reception (the exchange) of sexual 'messages' - sexual interaction - might be framed in the radical order of sexual difference itself? - That is, in which the 'space' or channel of communication or interaction frames itself as system in which the 'code' framing what is 'open' is simply com-
complementary male and female identification in the marking of that complementarity or difference, symmetric difference. Identification of one's 'part' of intervention and interpretation - of framing the difference - is then simply the identification of the difference as different framings of the difference. The identification of oneself as on one side of two (or three, allowing the duality of the two framings of the duality as a sort of middle term). - This rather than the two 'sides' or 'sexes' each framing the difference of framing unilaterally, and then not being able to understand the activity framed in the converse figure of assertion - or rather, blindly interpreting it from one's own side, in unquestioned male and female codes framed by and framing unquestioned male and female 'parts'. - With the male part itself coupled to the dominant configuration of a 'logical' order of integration: of planning, assertion, reflection, control, repression, and so on.

.. An order of male control or repression reflected in a general constraint, for example, upon - rather in - the 'sexual' economy or play of 'films', 'surfaces': an articulation of this order of surface in its male 'side', in the male bodily surface (the interface of male body and what is 'outside') as primary frame of 'sexuality'. - A determination of the female body as mirror of this male sexuality 'outside', and the determination of the image as order of this mirroring as a secondary order of 'surface' inscribed within the primary interface of male 'body' and world, the circuit of male code and associated control abstracted from this radical order of surface and image through the substitution for that primary symmetry of an order of 'bodies' symmetric between the (male) identification of male and female sexuality (of male and female), in which the male order of this difference (then) recognises and presents itself, hiding as it were the more radical masculinity at work in this secondary identification. - Hiding in the difference of masculine protrusion and the feminine 'sex' into which it intrudes, inscribed at the complementary centres of otherwise symmetric bodies, the more radical sexuality of this interface or mirroring itself, throughout the whole cultural fabric or matrix from which this male image is abstracted.
Such a male image of sexuality, then, occludes, along with the radical sexuality of the more general surface of the 'image' (for example, a 'film') as elementary symmetry of the 'microeconomy' of Culture, the symmetry of this elementary 'occlusion' in the cultural economy of images and a corresponding male determination of the 'political' order of integration of Culture as a whole. Correlatively, female 'identity', the frame of female identification of a female 'part' in the cultural order of activity, is abstracted from the radical cultural mirroring of the sexual order of cultural integration ('political') and cultural economy (here, the economy of the 'image', of 'surfaces', figurations), to a reflection of the male order of 'focus' in that 'economy' of the culture: to a mirroring of male sexuality in the \( \sigma_{w} \) as elementary architectural frame of elementary sexual symmetry. - As a cultural prison, then: the elementary spatial frame of the mirroring of male and female bodies, from which a male order of identity or identification abstracts on the basic level of the image, thus occluding any female access to the wider cultural order, secluding the 'second sex'.

This radical circuit of the male 'code' might be simply figured thus:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Order of Integration:} & \quad \text{Male} \quad \text{(Female)} \quad \text{eg: 'Political Economy'} \\
\text{Order of Play:} & \quad \text{Male} \quad \text{Female'} \quad \text{eg: 'Domestic Economy'}
\end{align*}
\]

- Where \( \leftarrow \rightarrow \) indicates the three coupled orders of mirroring or symmetry, from which the male 'code' abstracts 'Female' identity, the 'woman's part' ('in the home'). The bracketing of the female side of cultural integration reflects a more radical femininity from which the woman in the home (her very name reflecting the male
identification of this 'better half' as a prenomial difference within a (for example, legal) primary symmetry) is 'abstracted' - this, in particular, through the inscription of the male determination of house, ἀγνός, as frame of sexual symmetry, in the analogous order of the code or Law, which mirrors on that 'elementary' level, the global order of the male code as frame of cultural integration, of that political order, of which 'political' economy is the material component, just as 'domestic' economy is the material side of the house and 'family' as cultural base.

Such sexual repression of women 'encoded', for example, in so many films (themselves almost exclusively, over the mid-century 'directed' and 'produced' by men) itself elides or occludes the (scandalously) simple question of the male articulation of 'Culture' or Society within an apparently arbitrary symmetry of two sorts of bodies, two symmetric and complementary 'sides' of human being. Why, for example, is Hypatia the only female 'theorist' in this narrative so far? ... And is her gruesome fate - the scraping of her living flesh from her naked body before the altar of Alexandria by Cyril's monks - not itself the marking, in this exceptional lady, of the rule?

Besides Godard's 'sixties attempt at the decoding of such male sexuality - this attempt itself framed or focussed in his relation with Anna Karina, 'La Chinoise' of 1967, his reflection as it were in the surfaces of film - I have already noted a 'feminist' component of 'dissent' in the late 'sixties (Anna Karina herself embodying a more radical feminism than Godard's in asserting her independence after 1968). In the literary or 'ideological' domain of language one might perhaps take the parallel lives of Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir from around 1930 to around 1970 as axial in the French dimension of this question over the mid-century. What, though, of the interplay of a 'sexual' dynamic of surfaces and other correlative dimensions in the radical 'dramatic' order of Culture - reflected, for example, 'theatrically' by Ibsen towards the turn of the twentieth century, in the order of (a) 'play', in the elementary 'economy' framed in Family and House - in that 'Doll's House' in which a male code frames its female image, its image of the 'Female'?
I earlier noted the embodiment of a spatial frame of the 'cultural' order in Alberti's architecture - the building, whether palace, church, theatre or private house, as the 'material' side of the various corresponding 'institutions' or instituted components of a culture as a whole. I noted the inscription of the quadro in the three dimensions of this albertine scheme, and the passage from the part of the painted wall in Alberti's cultural dynamic, to the part of the cinema screen in the cultural order of 1930. And I compared the articulation of cinematic action within the symmetry of the film or image as primary, with the articulation of the theatrical configuration in which the 'action' must be inscribed in the same space (and time) as the viewing. I drew an analogy with the cultural dynamic of the 'image', and the physical dynamic associated with the electromagnetic symmetry which is as it were one 'side' or pole of that cultural order of the image. How can that analogy now be extended to the wider cultural and physical symmetry or 'system' from which the symmetries of their two analogous orders of 'film' or 'surface' are (in parallel manners) abstracted?

How do we make the transition from cinema to theatre... from that sexual symmetry predominantly determined over the mid-century (in the North, at least) in terms of bodily surface, to the wider symmetry reflected on the elementary level (the 'microcultural' order, as it were, reflecting microphysical and microeconomic orders) in the three-dimensional 'house' (as architectural unit), and the institution of the family of which the house is as it were one side - the inscription of the Αρχός in the wider sense, in the order of a material economy?

First of all, we might compare the architectural integration of activity in the primary circuit of the civic order as a whole (within the Mark or Pale dividing Culture and Nature) with the physical integration of the economy of elementary interaction in the unitary frame of Space-and-Time (and its 'extensional' four-dimensional symmetry doubling the complementary 'internal' symmetry of elementary interactions).
On the other hand (or secondly) we might now draw a direct analogy between the reflection of that global 'relativistic' physical symmetry of Space-and-Time in the probabilistic coordination of elementary interactions, and the reflection of the 'political' order of integration of human activity (or interaction) in the cultural 'economy' articulated by the elementary symmetries of human interaction.

Now I have identified the 'cultural' order as the order of mirroring of an 'ideal' or 'ideological' economy and integration in language (the dimension of the 'story') in (or and) a converse 'material' economy (and its integration). These 'ideological' and 'material' (or 'economic', in the restricted sense) 'sides' of Culture may in turn be taken as the interfaces of logical and physical frames of ideology and economy (respectively), and an analogous symmetric 'poetic' frame. And now (at last) we may find in the triple symmetry of these three orders, the radical symmetry of a cultural 'space', of which physical and logical 'spaces' are two sides. And we may see in the duality of sexual difference, inscribed in this cultural 'space' the direct analogue of electrical 'difference' or polarity inscribed in physical space.

We may further see that just as the formal 'physical', 'logical' and 'poetic' spaces of Nature, Reflection, and Culture are in a sense abstracted from their 'interfaces' in ideological and economic 'sides' of activity, so we may regard these two 'sides' themselves, and an analogous concretisation of the 'poetic' frame in an intermediate 'applied poetic', as themselves abstractions from a 'dramatic' order of actuality — from a 'dynamic' associated with the 'symmetry' of the configuration as a whole.

Let us then try to proceed to that widest order of symmetry, through its 'image' in the central 'poetic' order of Culture.

To pursue the physical analogy a little further, we might compare the poetic figure of 'identification' in which male and fe-
male (in their different or differing ways) partake, with the material identity of the elementary 'particles' which bear their different electrical charge. Thus in human interaction (in the central 'cultural' order) we might take human 'individuals' as elementary 'parts' (rather than diminutive 'particles') of which the material order of the body and 'ideal' order of self-consciousness are symmetrical sides. The economic integration of the material order of interaction and the ideological integration of the 'ideal' order appear as the two 'sides' of global cultural integration of human interaction - as two sides of a single World, materially integrated on (or 'in') the surface of a Globe (this Globe).

Once more, then, we return to the central part of the 'sexual interaction' in this cultural analogue of economic and ideological 'systems'. Just as, for example, Dirac around 1930 made a first step in the correlation of 'elementary' ('internal') and 'global' (external) physical symmetries, by coordinating global and elementary electromagnetic symmetries (abstracted from the wider relativistic and elementary symmetries as a whole), so (as I have already noted) Freud, around the same time, correlated the sexual orders of cultural integration and 'microcultural' (or 'elementary') interaction. In a moment I will sketch the crucial part of Levi-Strauss' identification of the interplay of sexual, economic and ideological orders of a social 'system' (articulated between individuals and social whole in a network of 'kinship') around 1950, in the transition from the analogous theories of around 1930 to a parisian 'structuralism' of around 1970. First I must complete the schematic characterisation of the 'cultural' order of the mid-century, in order to pass on to the inscription in a global 'System' (or 'Frame') of those analogous identifications of various dimensions of such a 'System', relative to the linguistic order of 'code' taken as primary, which may together be taken to constitute 'structuralism' as a more or less determinate French Ideology of around 1970.

... 'Cultural system', then. - Back for the last time to the part of that order of 'surface' of which 'film' is one expression, in order to pass from that limited 'code' to the (?) cultural 'code' - that 'hidden law' - as a whole.
How can we (then) inscribe the circuit of male sexuality, of 'masculinity' - one of the primary orders of human interaction - in some wider system of 'surfaces' from which it may then be recognised as an abstraction? - For then this 'sexual' order of 'identification' and its dynamic may lead to the characterisation of the dramatic dynamic of 'identification' in general.

I linked the male 'code' with a certain order of 'control' - of inscription of self-assertion (as 'input', 'transmitter') in the frame (code, system) it asserts. This leads immediately to a converse linkage of a 'female' order with the order of 'reception', interpretation. That is: we may associate 'male' identification with a circular order of self-assertion, and a 'female' identification with a complementary circularity of interpretation. In particular we may see in the mutual 'feedback' of these two orders of identification of complementary 'parts' of transmission and reception, a sexual 'interaction' in which one side as it were frames what is open, and the other ('male') asserts itself in this open-ness. That assertion is in its turn inscribed in the female 'matrix' to produce a new configuration of what is open, to which the same instance of assertion or control may again respond, and so on. More generally the space or 'matrix' of male assertion involves various organising figures of 'reception', and each of those figures of 'reception' accommodates various instances of assertion, so that in general we may speak of a sexual 'field' or 'system' of human interaction. In each case the instance of 'identification' involves the constancy or invariance of a certain figure of assertion or reception in this wider 'field': we might liken the male instance to a fixed 'message' constantly reasserted in a constantly changing 'space' or system of interaction, and the female instance to a constant order of interpretation, as it were organising the 'space' by constantly identifying itself as focus of new configurations, constantly finding itself (rather herself) as it were 'from the outside', while the male constantly asserts himself from some imaginary (or ideal or ideological) focus of assertion, of 'I', 'inside'. That is: we may say that 'femininity' is as it were 'in' the cultural matrix in which it organises the activity of a certain body or person 'from outside', while 'masculinity', conversely, is as it were 'in' a certain body or person which (who) then inscribes this 'inner' identity in his outward activity as message, control. In the limit we might liken the female 'circle' of identification to the constant
frame which coordinates various elements or components so as to preserve its constancy (and in which this frame itself is reflected and embodied in one of the elements, whose part it defines); the frame imposes itself on each element, whereas in the converse male order one element tries to impose itself on the frame, to control all the elements, inscribe the whole within its own self-assertion. Thus, for example, the 'external' order of a Nature as frame of male activity appears as the self-expression of a limiting femininity: Nature, Dame Nature. And 'matter', as material frame, matrix, is the very mater, mother, of things.

To put it all another way: on the one hand is a constant open-ness, corresponding to the circuit of inscription of 'receiver' in system (the 'female' code), on the other hand a persistent inscription in the 'male' code of the identification of that code itself as order of control. In the one case control is inscribed in the order of reception, 'decoding' - on the other (male) hand, this order of reception is inscribed as one term in the converse code, which thus asserts its control of the female order.

In the limiting case, the order of bodily surface, 'the sexual interaction' becomes simply 'the sexual act'. The interaction of male and female in a wide cultural system or frame of symmetrical message and interpretation is successively focussed until, all covering surfaces removed, assertion and reception become reduced to insertion in 'the' matrix. Separate identities dissolve for a moment, coinciding in a common surface or interface. Out of this coincidence (sometimes) emerges (eventually), along with the sexual-actors who return to themselves, another order of unfolding from that focal coincidence of sexes - another human being. - And with it (by then him or her), the order of the 'family'.

In this passage from two to three we may see the coupling (?) of sexual interaction - that order of the mirroring of bodies - with a wider or more radical configuration of identification - the order of entry into the network of interaction, into the World. In this ternary configuration the dual order of sexual interaction is inscribed in the general frame of human interaction, rather as in the meeting of electric charges (in 'inelastic scattering') the electromagnetic interaction is inscribed in the wider symmetry of in-
teraction in general. With this configuration of the Family, sexuality enters into the wider play of material and reflective components of human interaction. In particular, the 'two-dimensional' play of surfaces becomes inscribed in the 'three-dimensional' order of a 'building', a 'home'.

Now that order of the family house has already been correlated with a 'male code': it may now be considered as an inscription of the female 'matrix' of action in a male order of ideological and material control - a contraction of the general 'female' space of action, the general cultural frame in which male assertion is inscribed, to the closed frame of domesticity, to a limited space whose 'external relations', so to speak, are under male control.

But this enclosure of women may now be inscribed as the inscription of the feminine 'matrix' of Culture in the male circuit of control, the male 'code' and system, as that male circuit is in turn inscribed in a wider - and symmetrical - cultural 'system'. If we return to the order of the two-dimensional image or surface, we may now at last see how, rather than being a secondary order of mirroring of male and female 'insides', it may be recognised as the symmetrical interface of a male 'focus' or perspective determined from 'inside' a man, and a complementary female order of the space whose order is reflected in a female body in it. The order of the 'image' appears, then, as the primary order of interface of 'inside' and 'outside', and the male determination of the 'space' outside from within, and his inscription of the play of 'surfaces' or of the symmetry of 'inside' and 'outside' in that assertive framing of a 'space' or frame of action, appears as only one side of this order of surface, of mirroring - as 'unilateral'.

The inscription of the female order of cultural 'space' within a male order of control - the inscription of that order of 'reception' within a male assertion of the male code of control and assertion - is of course mirrored in a 'hidden' or indirect 'female' order of framing and 'control' of that very figure of control and its social institution in ideological, political and economic orders. The female 'room' or 'space' of the domestic order may itself, as
in the informal order of the salon, play a central part in the ideological or political integration of a culture, in coordinating the parts of the males who outwardly control those orders. In the limiting cases of royal (or imperial) court on the one hand, and boudoir (or bedroom) on the other, the mirroring of male and female codes in the integration of a cultural order may be analysed in relation to the culture as a whole - the part of Theodora at Justinian's court has already been noted, and this itself might be paralleled by the parts of queens and mistresses in France from Roi Soleil to Revolution.

The part of the 'queen', indeed, is readily taken as the figure of a transposition of the female code into a male body (as conversely, Elizabeth I of England's famous assumption of the male code of self-assertion, a male 'heart' or will, in her 'weak and feeble body of a woman'). It was well known that the greeks were a bunch of queens, though this 'problem in greek ethics' was not directly confronted until the close of the nineteenth century. Socrates himself provides, in the Marquis de Sade's Philosophie dans le Boudoir, one of the prominent figures of the 'sadist' dynamic: socratizer, with rather unsocratic irony, is to physically inscribe the mirroring of male and female orders in the male order, the dynamic of male bodily surface(s). - And this order of greek sexuality, familiar enough from the Symposium, might indeed be taken as a cultural analogue of the figure of greek abstraction from the interface of 'ideal' and 'material' in Reflection. One might further note that in the late 'sixties order of dissent or 'liberation', woman's liberation is paralleled by 'gay liberation' within a wider order of sexual liberation, of the breakdown of the dominant sexual 'code'.

I have already noted the parallel between this sexual order of liberation and a wider order of dissent to the dominant cultural system or code of 'repression' (or short-circuit, exclusion) as a whole. It is perhaps of interest in this relation that the 'libertins' of La Philosophie dans le Boudoir mark the transition (or a transitional phase) between the eighteenth-century libertin as 'free-thinker', and a more restricted sexual 'libertinage' - perhaps of interest, also, that the divin Marquis was to become one of the prophets or fore-runners acknowledged by French dissenters of the 'sixties.
And more widely recognised (as in Peter Gay's (?) influential narratives) as the last philosopher, the culminating focus of Enlightenment criticism in France, parallelling the part of Kant in Germany.

The organising figuration of the female in the 'sexual field' of Culture (to return to our main theme) appears perhaps still more clearly in the 'mythical' (often 'mystical' or 'theological') order that doubles the finitary poetic of human interaction. Thus Socrates (or rather Plato) passes from the homosexual order of Greek passion to frame the dialogue or 'symposium' as a whole in the figure of a mystery 'received' through Diotima the priestess. The order of 'Greek' Culture as a whole was framed in relation to the focal opening of Mother Earth as a whole at Delphi, upon which the prophetess sat to receive, entranced, the messages that were decisive for Greece as a whole, the last court or instance of the Greek cultural order. The male political order of Greece (that is) was itself ultimately framed in the mirroring of the terrestrial 'matrix' of all activity in the 'matrix' of the ('hysteric') priestess, at the focal 'centre' of the World.

... The poets, in this frame, invoked the Muses to frame their 'reception' of this mystery, to frame their assertive πρός. Politicians invoke a Motherland as frame of their integrative activity, bishops Mother Church. If Hitler invoked patria, (la), patrie, as 'Fatherland', this invocation was itself doubled by an inscription of that Fatherland in a more radical female Nature.

In the Paris of around 1970 it was Julia Kristeva who framed a 'semiotics' in which the various dimensions of System or Structure might be inscribed and coordinated. In the ideological order it was the Tel Quel of Julia Kristeva and her assertive consort which framed the French Cultural Revolution. A 'revolution' with its mythical 'origin' in Levi-Strauss' analysis of the sexual order of cultural integration, of 'primitive' culture as itself framed by the order of a Family, of which royal and 'nuclear' western families are as it were the residual poles.

I have already suggested that a Parisian 'ideology' of around 1970 might be framed as various dimensions of discourse framed
as 'systems' within the system of language as primary 'system'.

I have also suggested that the discursive or linguistic system of 'ideology' (of those 'systems of thought' for the analysis of whose 'history' or 'story' Foucault's new chair at the Collège de France was instituted in 1970) may itself be framed as one 'side' of a cultural order, mirroring the material 'economy' as converse 'side' (and my insistence on the primacy of the linguistic 'side' as frame of a certain (or uncertain) 'structuralism' amounts only to an insistence upon the systematic order of that 'ideology', of which, for example, Althusser's insistence upon the primacy of the material converse may be framed as one term - one term in an 'out-side' which is itself one dimension of the ideological configuration as a whole).

What is, then, the configuration of 'cultural', 'ideological' and 'economic' orders, what the 'global' configuration, and what its mirroring in a local 'economy' of 'Culture' or 'World', around 1970, in which this Parisian identification of 'systems' of discourse might be inscribed? - Inscribed as a fairly systematic reflection of that 'World' of 1970, in that World - at Paris, indeed, as a fairly systematic focus.

I have often compared sexual and electromagnetic 'interactions' - their corresponding central parts in 'cultural' and 'physical' orders. The ideological configuration, focussed in Rosenberg's Myth of the Twentieth Century, which I have taken as focal in the year (1930) of publication of that 'New Myth', I characterised in terms of the inscription of the sexual dynamic of Volk in a primary order of Nature. Levi-Strauss' analysis of a cultural order, around 1950, as a system, in which economic, sexual and ideological orders are correlated in the social frame of kinship, modelled on the linguistic system of Roman Jakobson (with whom Levi-Strauss 'interacted' when cultural attaché in New York in the 'forties) is itself reflected in the physical order of around 1950 by the identification of a genetic 'code', coordinating sexual interaction between the poles of 'sexual act' and its global frame, in terms of intermediate eco-systems. Such a 'genetics' was not of course open to exploitation
by Hitler and Rosenberg before their demise in 1945-6; indeed the coupling of genetic code and ideological order in a 'sociobiology' is itself rather a component of the configuration of 1970 - along with the inscription of the order of that 'code' in the material economy as 'bio-technology' (paralleling the 'new technology' of integrated circuits on the same base-scale of around 1970: the wavelength of visible light, around $10^{-7}$ metres... a scale intermediate between, and mediating between, the scale of the atom (about $10^{-10}$) and that of the cell (around $10^{-5}$).

Now I earlier suggested that the primary order of 'identification' and framing, the primary interface of the microphysical order of (quantum-mechanical) identification or 'measurement', and the macrophysical order of (relativistic) framing, was to be found in the 'mirroring' of one human in another. The 'cultural' order of that mirroring may be inscribed in the physical order, in terms of the human body whose scale (about 1 metre) is exactly intermediate between the scale of visible light (or proteins, $10^{-7}$) and that of the Globe or Earth or 'World' as a whole (diameter $10^7$ metres). This physical frame of earthly 'biology' - the physical frame of a culture articulated between the seeds of agriculture and human pro-creation, and the political order of cultural integration - may be seen as the physical order of mirroring of the wider physical order of, say, protons and $\mu$-meson ($10^{-15}$ to around $10^{15}$), in the psychological order of (among others) the physicist (about $10^0$) - of the 'reflection' framed in the interface of human body and World (or Kosmos).

Analogously, this physical order itself may be taken as one 'side' of that cultural 'mirroring' of physical and psychological (or logical) orders, just as the (electromagnetic) order of visible surface, of light, of the 'physical' image, was taken as one 'side' of a cultural order of 'surfaces' (defined thus far precisely as that order of which the image is the physical 'side'). - Of a cultural order of 'surfaces' which mirrors the order of 'physical' space and surface in 'logical space', in the analogous articulation (or coordination, or symmetry) of Theory, Reflection.
Thus, just as the physical 'side' of the cultural order of mirroring of physical and psychological 'sides' of Culture, is an inscription of this mirroring in the physical order of 'in', so the logical or psychological side is the converse inscription of this (same) mirroring in the logical order of 'in' (earlier defined simply in terms of Aristotle's mirroring of physical and logical orders of 'in', in the theory of the syllogism). Now it is just these two 'sides' of the mirroring, these 'versions', which are themselves two of the three 'terms' on each side. They are, like 'male' and 'female', different versions of this difference, 'their' difference. And the third or 'middle' term, in each case, amounts to the symmetry of these 'versions' of symmetry, the difference, as it were, 'between' these two versions of what is 'between'.

- What does that come to in practice?

- Well, roughly, it comes just to that 'in' of practice, that practical order of 'in'. - That 'poetic' order of framing and figuration, 'in' which any 'logical' configuration of an 'action' is doubled by a complementary physical configuration. In particular, an 'action' simply as such will involve an interplay of the logical or psychological order of integration of its components (of 'finality') and the physical or ontological order of integration of its outward frame. These orders meet in the 'actor' as interface of physical and psychological orders - body and 'mind' (or 'soul') being as it were two 'sides' or 'versions' of that interface. The bare frame of physical 'space' outwardly frames the physical order of symmetry of these two orders of interface and their interface in a 'person', persona, 'mask', actor: the three symmetric 'dimensions' of physical space are a limiting physical 'image' of this symmetry. - And the 'external' symmetry of these 'global' dimensions are of course reflected in the 'internal' symmetry (the 'colour'-symmetry of the strong interaction, as defined around 1970) of the micro-physical order... and as I have just reiterated, these 'internal' and 'external' physical symmetries are themselves mirrored in the physical order of human interaction, articulated in the 'dynamics' or mechanics of human bodies in 'physical' or 'material' Nature. Similarly, the bare frame of logical 'space' embodies the complementary symmetries of logical integration, reflected (once more in the interface of 'I' and 'not-I', but now in the 'psychological' or 'logical', rather than 'physical', version) in the elementary
'economy' of the logical order of 'reflection'.

In the 'cultural' order the two-sided (or three-sided) 'human' being again appears as the interface of a global order - of 'World' - and an 'elementary' order of interaction, whose 'physical' side extends down to the scale of the wavelength of visible electromagnetic radiation ('light'). The organisation of this interface in the configurations of 'action' (in the restricted sense of its cultural or 'poetic' articulation) is thus as it were unfolded from the central focus of the individual persona, into the interactions of a 'group' articulated in the symmetry of this 'unfolding'. The various poetic 'symmetries' of the poetic order of this 'action' are thus inscribed in a poetic frame in which the individual persona is a mirror of 'inner' and 'outer', as of 'global' and 'elementary' orders of the action: and the other participants, as other such mirrors, themselves enter into each individual's framing of the action as a whole, and of his part in it (as, in particular, asserting himself as thus framing it). In particular, the individual may, standing 'outside' an action (even if he be also a participant in the action), frame the action in a 'story', an 'account' which articulates the action in the 'ideological' interface of the 'cultural' order of the action 'itself' (as thus 'represented') and the psychological or logical instance of simple self-assertion. The ideological order thus appears as the dynamic interface of 'logical' symmetry of 'pure' reflection, and the finitary poetic symmetry of the abstract frame of the action as action (rather than 'story'). The 'material' articulation of the action mirrors the ideological 'economy' and integration of this order of 'stories', of 'discourse'. The 'cultural' (rather than abstract 'poetic') order of the action may then be associated with the interface of 'logical' and 'physical' dynamics in a particular case: a case in which the interplay of 'logical', 'physical' and 'poetic' orders is essentially open, the framing of some particular 'action' itself being one possibility among others, whereas in the abstract 'poetic' order (which thus betrays itself as irreducibly 'theoretical') an action is as it were presupposed at the outset - as already, so to speak, concluded, closed (in principle, at least).

The 'sexual' order of symmetry then appears as the simple order of mirroring of two sides, psychological and physical, of the action (or: of action), abstracted from the wider symmetry of this
poetic of the image, of surface, and its two 'sides' - abstracted from that complementary triple symmetry of the framing of action, which itself appears, for example, in the 'theatrical' order of identification of, and distinction from, 'parts': in the theatrical order in which (unlike the cinematic order of the 'image') the dynamic of 'surface' must be articulated in the same spatial frame as embodied actors and embodied viewer. In particular, this wider combination of 'triple' and 'dual' symmetry of action constrains the 'unfolding' of a whole 'life' as an 'action', from the initial focussing of the sexual interaction, in its wider context, in 'the sexual act'. Most particularly, the coordination of 'dual' and 'triple' symmetries of 'identification' (in which they are combined) articulates a 'family' as elementary group, as initial frame of the human being's 'unfolding' in the World - of the 'unfolding' of the inner and outer 'dimensions' of his activity (or her activity), and in this of the 'person' as their interface.

'Identification': for in the cultural 'system' framed by what is 'open' in the 'space' of these symmetries of action, what is 'possible' is found in the 'play' of the various 'dimensions' of these symmetries. Within the 'dual' symmetry in which we find ourselves either male or female (however confusedly), we further discover a psychological instance of assertion in play with analogous instances of physical limitations and that intermediate order of 'wanting', in which that physical limitation reflects something 'wanting' in the converse order of assertion. In particular the physical 'limitation' of having a body of one sex or the other (rather than both or neither) is found to reflect in one case a male, in the other a female 'want'. In the logical order of deliberation these three components are organised towards an integrated or coherent self-assertion. In the physical order the sometimes contrary instances of assertion, both within a particular individual, and between differing individuals, are forcibly integrated in a converse manner. Finally, these two 'sides' are themselves coordinated in the order of 'wants'. And the 'logical' or 'psychological' order of reflection or assertion may in its turn identify its part, more or less successfully, within the play of the three orders of which it is but one.
The sexual frame of 'wanting' which thus appears as a sort of central order of coordination, mirroring the 'elementary' dynamic of the image in the systematic order of political 'control' (these themselves two 'sides' of the sexual interaction - 'local' (or domestic) and global - as figured in the scheme of that male 'code' which keeps women at home... or, after the Great War, on the factory floor) was on the one hand brought into question by Godard and others in the 'sixties. On the other hand (conversely), the figure of an image whose primary message is the 'system' itself (of which it is a part) - the closed circuit of 'control' which Godard tried to open up - appears in an extreme form in the order of the 'advertisement'. The advertisement which, most particularly in America, frames the part of television in the 'system', in the cultural order in which, embodying particular configurations of images, it intervenes in the elementary economy of choice, in the play of those two 'sides' of the television image in which it is inscribed. - This intervention dominating, around 1970, the parallel 'economies' of stories (the ideological order), of action (the political and cultural order) and the material economy itself.

- A short 'film' is so articulated as to induce in that general economy an order of 'wants'. On the 'material' side the marginal increase of 'want' or demand for a product induced by a particular frequency and 'audience' of a certain 'transmission' may itself be compared with the cost of this 'advertisement', and a probable correlation of expenditure and subsequent increase in demand and sales may then be entered into the overall calculation of the planners responsible for optimising their 'business'. The films intervening between such advertisements, on the other hand, must be what a certain audience 'wants' to see and hear. The television company or corporation is itself a 'business', and must itself induce people to watch its products. In this sense the whole 'programme' of a television corporation is a sort of self-advertisement, in which the avowed 'advertisements' which fund this self-)advertisement must in their turn be inscribed (this being the 'business' of the advertising company (whose audience, though, is formed by corporate planners). In this order of 'wants', in consequence, the dominant 'stories' and their articulation are organised by what the television 'planners' imagine the audience wants to see and hear.
Last of all, those planners who are 'politicians' must make themselves 'wanted' by organising their 'image' and their policies in this order of what is as it were wanting in the culture as a whole. Thus the cultural order of America around 1970 is articulated by that same figure of intervention of planners in the open 'economy' (here in the cultural economy of the image), which characterises the economic and ideological orders. The latter are thus mirrored in a cultural order whose dynamic is largely framed by television — that is, the cultural dynamic as a whole — in its 'theatrical' or dramatic 'space' from which the order of the image is abstracted — is framed in the 'system' of the image, dominated by Television, and inscribed as the circuit of a 'code' in that general space of Action.

In Europe (western Europe) this 'open' american order of televisual culture is doubled (like the analogous economic 'open market') by an order of 'planning', by a political order, embodied in the 'mixed' televisual order of 'public' and 'private' television corporations. Characteristically, the pattern was set by the establishment of the various national 'radio' networks around 1930 (radio, then, the aural dimension of 'broadcasting' complementing the visual dimension(s) of the image). American radio was then organised as a free market, French radio was made a government department, in Britain a state broadcasting corporation was set up, but with an administration ('planning') independent of the central government. In Germany the various companies set up over the 'twenties were all nationalised in 1932.

In the East the economic and ideological analogy may of course be simply extended to the closed order in which television, as in America and Europe, is first of all an 'advertisement' for the whole 'system' of which it forms one component.

The Whole System. Godard, around 1970, left Paris, like Voltaire (for example) before him, for the country near Geneva. Left the abstract 'art' cinema of Paris behind to work in the more radical frame of the television screen, in that primary circuit of economic, ideological, and cultural control. 'Control': for we may now frame
a System - or indeed a 'Frame', Gestell - elaborated over the mid-century, simply in terms of the 'space' of symmetries within and between these three ideological, cultural, and economic orders or 'sub-systems'. A System in which a 'message' is a restriction on what is 'open' in the particular configuration of that 'message'. A System, then, in which the closed circuit of a global Culture, a global 'Frame' of activity, towards 1970, was itself determined as a particular, a primary, 'message' - as a message, then (rather than the unquestionable frame of all questions and actions), which might itself be brought into question.

The 'System', then, corresponds to a primary closed circuit, abstracted in, and from, the symmetry of the global and elementary symmetries of its various 'dimensions' or 'sub-systems', and governed by the dynamic associated with that radical symmetry of the various orders of symmetry - by a general dynamic of which the physical dynamic associated with internal and external 'physical' symmetry is an 'image', a projection of the analogous symmetry of the whole onto one 'dimension' of that whole (rather as an 'image' in the restricted sense appears in that physical order as the projection of a three-dimensional onto a two-dimensional order).

Now within such a general 'System', the mirroring over the mid-century of theoretical determinations of that System or of component 'systems' or 'structures', in the 'outward' context of these textual orders of determination, may itself be simply framed as an action: framed in the 'cultural' symmetry of the 'ideological' order of those texts or discourses, and the 'economy' of their material context. The organisation of the dynamic associated with this mirroring in terms of Beginning, Middle and End - in the temporal symmetry of 'opening' around 1930 and 'closing' around 1970 - may be framed in the 'general' symmetry of the various orders, abstractly determined simply in relation to the 'logical' order of marking in a text the difference of that 'inside' and an 'outside' context (the physical order being framed then as the reflection 'outside' of this 'logical' distinction, and so on), as 'opening' in the common 'circuit' identified in the various
'dimensions' of Reflection and Context around 1930, and 'closing' in analogous figures of inscription of this opening circuit in a wider 'system' around 1970. - Closing, that is, in the inscription of the analogous 'circuits' or frames of the various orders of Theory around 1930, as themselves 'dimensions' abstracted from a wider frame, a more radical system, structure, or symmetry. Thus the frame of Dirac's Quantum Electrodynamics, as I have noted several times now, was inscribed as the dynamic associated with the 'internal' symmetry SU(1), in a wider order or dynamic in which it was to be 'coupled' with the symmetry of the 'weak' (SU(2)) and 'strong' (SU(3)) interactions - the general frame of coordination of symmetry and dynamic itself being transposed, by analogy, from the particular case of Dirac's 'QED' or Quantum Electrodynamics to a general 'guage-field theory', of which this, and the 'Quantum Chromodynamics' ('QCD') associated with the 'colour' symmetry SU(3), were to be seen as correlative components. It must of course be emphasised that this programme of 'Grand Unification' of the 'elementary' interactions was only perceived around 1970 as a question - as in some fairly indefinite sense 'open'... with the further question of the relation of this 'Grand Unified Theory' ('GUT') to the complementary symmetry of General Relativity still less definite. Indeed the first actual 'success' of the general project came only with the combination of SU(1) and SU(2) in a satisfactory way in 1973; the further combination of such an 'electroweak' theory with colour-symmetry had still not been satisfactorily worked out as I write; the practical reflection of any proposed unification with the (as I write undetected) 'neutrino mass' and 'proton half-life' which would decide between rival unifications experimentally is the central question of quantum mechanics in the 'eighties, doubled by the attempt to coordinate such quantum-mechanical with relativistic symmetry in the closed space-time of 'black holes' - or rather in the interface of this closure and the wider and analogous closure of Space-Time as a whole, which is their 'event horizon'. ...But of this physical theory more later; for the moment it may serve to indicate the simple temporal 'symmetry' of the 'drama' of Reflection over the mid-century, through its reflection onto (or restriction to) one dimension of Theory. - Of a Theory which is itself only one 'dimension' of the Action as a whole... of the Action as a whole in which this inscription of the physical order in the 'logical' frame of theory is itself symmetrically reflected in (by) the inscription of that logical order of theory as a whole in the
physical order of its context — in the actual physical order of which this mid-century 'physics' is the theory, of which this physics is the 'reflection'... 'upon' which this physics is a reflection. — In that 'actuality', then, which I have called 'ontical', and whose inscription in the logical order of theory I have called 'ontology'.

On, now, to Paris. But where is Paris?

... Where is Paris 'in' the cultural order framed by the 'poetic' order of mirroring of logical and physical frames of the Action over mid-century?

Well, first of all, it is in France... the 'capital' city, indeed. France is in 'Europe', Europe in the 'World' — in or 'on' the face of the Earth, the Globe. And I have tried to trace on that 'global' order a 'cubic' configuration of cultural interfaces: a configuration in which 'geographical' boundaries or interfaces, in which a global material economy is organised, are seen as the 'other side' of the linguistic and ideological interfaces of the central 'cultural' order(s) of interfaces. So much for the simple 'global' frame of integration of the 'Action'. This is, in the familiar manner, reflected in the cultural 'economy' of those different possible 'actions' which, from the point of view of the 'poetic' of the Action here under consideration, may be regarded as 'elementary' — as elementary 'terms' of the narrative, its 'elements'. The order of this cultural 'interplay' has already been characterised in relation to the global ideological, 'economic' (or 'material'), and cultural orders considered in abstraction from the actual configuration of 'boundaries' — considered so far principally in relation to the abstract circuit of that Mark or Pale within which a 'culture' is inscribed in the spherical order of global Nature.

Earlier, though, I have characterised the cultural order framed in the interface of Europe and World, in relation to an order of integration of which the logical order of 'western' Theory is one
'dimension'. I have attempted to trace the unfolding, from the beginning of the fifth century 'BC', of the inter-lay between this 'logical' dimension of Theory, and the parallel ideological, cultural and economic 'dimensions' of its context. In particular, I have tried to show that this 'logical' order is coupled with the wider cultural order of European 'boundaries', of which the linguistic, political and economic orders of integration are three principal dimensions. Thus I have suggested that the 'linguistic' frame of the 'French' language, fairly closely linked in the integration of 'French' activity with the 'material' boundary of 'France', is also to be equally closely coupled or linked with a certain dominant framing of 'French' reflection. A framing governed by an initial inscription of the distinction of psychological and physical orders of text and context in the order of the text. 'German' reflection, on the other hand, I suggested was strongly coupled to an initial inscription of logical or psychological orders of Reflection, in a physical or ontological order (be it only an economy of possibility) taken as primary. That is: the logical frame of German theory is dominated by the inscription of that logical order as a whole, in a physical or ontological order, as the latter is somehow or other (often 'logically') identified. In the wider interplay of 'French' and 'German' reflection, for example, we may find a German 'theory' inscribed in a physical frame (as primary) whose configuration has itself been determined in France (or in the French tradition) through the inscription of, say, an earlier German configuration in a logical distinction of logical and physical, framed 'psychologically'. Such an interplay may be seen, for example, in the relations of Kepler, Descartes, and Leibniz - although it is not of course the sole component of this relation, of its 'frame'. We must take into account the 'poetic' orders, for example, of Galileo's 'Italian' theory, of Huyghens' and Spinoza's 'Dutch' reflection, of Newton's 'English' synthesis. And Spinoza must himself be located in the International Jewish tradition, framed by that Law analogous to, but different enough from, the constitutional order of seventeenth-century Holland.

I further suggested that this 'European' order of Reflection, opening in the configuration of the Pythagorean 'mystery' (itself reflected in Athenian 'drama' and Heraclitus' singular position), was 'unfolded' over the transition from nineteenth to twen-
tieth centuries into a wider cultural order typified by american 'pragmatism' to the West, and russian 'activism' to the East: the Reflection still dominated by its european 'dimensions' discovered itself, 'outside' Europe, as organised by its inscription in a more radical order of action - a discovery reflected in the 'poetic' order of british and italian reflection by european variants of James' 'pragmatism', dominated by that new american frame. In America, particularly, the principle of individual self-determination in an open play - whether in politics or economics or ideas - framed an interplay and coordination of 'euroean' theories which had no secure place in the internal articulation of european Reflection. Thus around the turn of the century, we may say that, with the marking of distinctively 'pragmatist' and 'activist' perspectives outside Europe, Reflection begins to be articulated in the interplay of 'inside' and 'outside' Europe as two 'sides' of the same Reflection. This 'ideological' opening-up of the euroean order itself, of course, parallels the political and economic 'opening-up' of the interface of Europe and World previously dominated by - determined and articulated within - Europe... determined from 'inside', in a sort of 'euroean' system, code, or control of the World, brought into question at the turn of the twentieth century. A euroean 'code' in which the World might be articulated in 'East-West' and 'North-South' dimensions of that question itself, as perceived from Europe.

North-South/East-West: yet those complementary axes, continued far enough - to that 'hidden' other side of the Globe, meet in the Pacific Basin, and in the cultural order of China and Japan. ... And in the extreme 'southern' order of those south-pacific 'aboriginals', whose pre-european 'reflection' was confronted by Claude Lévi-Strauss around 1960.

This confrontation with such 'wild' reflection - with an order of reflection whose closed circuit doubled the complementary closure of the euroean 'code'... with a 'tribal' culture which McLuhan was to compare with the new global System - was itself, as I have noted, preceded by the confrontation with the circuit of 'southern' social systems around the mid-century. This confrontation was itself to be later identified as a primary origin in what might be called the 'myth' of 'structuralism'... a mythical origin of that questioning of mythical origins...
Now Levi-Strauss himself had displaced the 'origin' of his conception of 'system' or 'structure' - this, as already noted, in connection with Roman Jakobson's 'formalism' transferred from Prague to New York in the intellectual diaspora of the 'thirties - to the turn of the century - to Ferdinand de Saussure's perception of language as a system. Mauss, Durkheim's matrilineal successor, had in the twenties shown how 'gifts' in 'primitive' societies (societies framed within the elementary agricultural circuit of 'culture') were not at all 'free' in the sense of 'arbitrarily given', but that they themselves framed a primitive 'economy' of 'symbolic exchange'. From the position of Mauss towards 1930 it is a simple step to the extension of this economic 'system' to the wider frame of mirroring of 'symbolic exchange' of goods in the primary 'system' of Saussure's language, through the sexual exchange which in marriage articulates the 'cultural' order of the 'social system' as a whole. That is to say, the 'code' governing the 'constitution' of a primitive culture, as a law-'code' framed in a 'Constitution' governs 'western' societies, is articulated in the family 'system' whose primary dimensions I have already attempted to analyse. The 'family' is not restricted to that single 'home' which typifies the inscription of the female order of 'reception' in the western order of male 'control'. Rather, in the predominantly matrilineal kinship-systems analysed around 1950 by Levi-Strauss, the whole society is articulated as a single family (with its mythical ancestor), in the interplay of 'male' and 'female' control and reception - rather, transmission and reception - in a simple system of overall symbolic 'exchange' or 'communication', framed in the code that governs exchange of marriage-partners between different groups in the society. - Different 'groups' themselves framed in terms of this central 'kinship' system.

... Back to Paris, now, with Mauss' new successor. To Paris where parallel developments are taking place in the analysis of other dimensions of Culture, of the World, as 'systems'. In 1953 Roland Barthes begins his analysis of discourse, of the 'story', as part of an 'ideological' system, formally framed by the supposedly neutral system of 'language' itself (whatever that 'self', that zero-degree of discourse, might itself be supposed to be in fact). In
1953, too, Jacques Lacan, having finally broken with the French section of an International Psychoanalytical Society dominated by the Austro-American axis of the 'thirties diaspora (and focussed in the person of Freud's daughter and 'successor' in America), over their refusal to let him speak at their Rome congress, presented his heretical ('gallican', perhaps) position in a parallel congress at Rome of his dissident faction. - The split in the psychoanalytical hierarchy at Paris had itself been focussed since 1950 in a disagreement over the 'constitution' of a new Institut de Psychanalyse, and the orthodox faction, eventually successful in framing the new Institute within the unitary international 'movement' presided over by Anna Freud, had (constitutionally enough) precluded Lacan's questioning of the new constitution - precluded his perspective from finding any place or part in the framing of the programme of francophone psychoanalysis at Rome. - The criticism of the new constitution as frame of French psychoanalysis was itself excluded from that frame: the familiar figure of a 'repressive' code or institution, the closed circuit of the inscription of the locus of framing in what is there framed, in the frame.

In the Discours de Rome, 'Fonction et Champ de la Parole et du Langage en Psychanalyse', language appears once more as primary code, primary system, frame, of what Freud had foreseen in his Project of 1895 as a 'Scientific Psychology'. - As the radical frame of an 'analysis' in which the circular abstraction from this frame of the 'repressive' code of the new Institut may be inscribed, interpreted, decoded - and more importantly, as the primary 'symbolic order' in which the Freudian dynamic of the bodily interface of 'imaginary' and 'real', inner and outer, self and World, may at last be systematically articulated: the 'field' of that dynamic of identification and want, the very frame of psychoanalytic interaction of analyst and 'patient'. The parallel with Levi-Strauss' structural anthropology is explicit:

La linguistique peut ici nous servir de guide, puisque c'est là le rôle qu'elle tient en flèche de l'anthropologie contemporaine, et nous ne saurions en rester indifférent.
La forme de mathématisation où s'inscrit la découverte du phonème comme fonction des couples d'opposition formés par les plus petits éléments discriminatifs saisissables de la sémantique, nous mène aux fondements mêmes où la dernière doctrine de Freud désigne, dans une connotation vocalique de la présence et de l'absence, les sources subjectives de la fonction symbolique.

Et la réduction de toute langue au groupe d'un tout petit nombre de ces oppositions phonémiques amorçant une aussi rigoureuse formalisation des ses morphèmes les plus élevés, met à notre portée un abord strict de notre champ.

A nous de nous en apparailler pour y trouver nos incidences, comme fait déjà, d'être en une ligne parallèle, l'ethnographie en déchiffrant les mythes selon la synchronie des mythes.

N'est-il pas sensible qu'un Lévi-Strauss en suggérant l'implication des structures du langage et de cette part des lois sociales qui règlent l'alliance et la parenté conquiert déjà le terrain même où Freud assoit l'inconscient?

Dès lors il est impossible de ne pas axer sur une théorie générale du symbole une nouvelle classification de sciences où les sciences de l'homme reprennent leur place centrale en tant que sciences de la subjectivité. Indiquons-en le principe, qui ne laisse pas d'appeler l'élaboration.

La fonction symbolique se présente comme un double mouvement dans le sujet: l'homme fait un objet de son action, mais pour rendre à celle-ci en temps voulu sa place fondatrice. Dans cette équivoque, opérant à tout instant, c'est tout le progrès d'une fonction où alternent action et connaissance (1).

Linguistics may here serve as a guide, for that is the role it holds as directing contemporary anthropology, and we cannot ignore it.

The form of mathematisation in which is inscribed the discovery of the phoneme as a function of the oppositional

1: op cit - Ecrits pp284-5. The reference to Freud's dernière doctrine is to the dynamic of Fort-Da.
couples formed by the minimal differential elements reached by semantic analysis, leads us to the very foundations, where Freud's last teaching indicates, in a connotation of presence and of absence in the voice, the subjective root of the symbolic function. And the reduction of any language to a very small group of these phonemic oppositions, leading towards an equally rigorous formalisation of its highest morphemes, allows a strict approach to our field. It is for us to avail ourselves of this, and to see how it applies in our case, just as, in a parallel line of inquiry, ethnography is already at work, decoding myths through the synchronic articulation of mythemes. Is it not striking that a Lévi-Strauss, in suggesting the correlation of structures of language and of that part of social codes which govern marriage and kinship, is already mastering the very domain in which Freud seats the unconscious? Henceforth it is impossible not to take a general theory of the symbol as axis for a new classification of the sciences in which the human sciences resume their central place, as the sciences of subjectivity. Let us indicate the general principle, which cannot but invite further elaboration. The symbolic function presents itself as a double movement in the subject: man makes of his action an object, but so as to return to it, when he chooses, its primary place. In this ambiguity, always at work, there lies all the movement of a function in which alternate activity and consciousness.

The other faction at Paris (and Rome) had proposed as model for psychoanalysis as 'science' the 'physical' science in which the 'subject' would find himself mirrored in the frame of 'human neurobiology':

.. la séparation en embryologie, anatomie, physiologie, psychologie, sociologie, clinique, n'existe pas dans la nature... il n'y a qu'une discipline: la neurobiologie à laquelle l'observation nous oblige d'ajouter l'épithète
d'humaine en ce qui nous concerne. (1)

.. the separation into embryology, anatomy, physiology, psychology, sociology, clinical practice, does not exist in nature... there is but one discipline: neurobiology, to which our experience requires us to add the epithet human in our particular case.

- such was the formal framing of the project of the new Institut in 1952, which Lacan cited at the head of his 1956 preface to the Discours de Rome: and it is the criticism of this 'physical' topic of psychology as sub-system within medicine, and that medicine as a subordinate department of biology, which precedes the passage above. The passage is immediately succeeded by two examples of the 'symbolic function' defined at the close: in the simple mathematics of counting, numbering, we can, in a second temps, identify as one 'side', so to speak, of the numbers, the synthetic activity whose locus we recognise as our selves; and the identification of a certain activity as 'work' (in the second example) may lead to the 'worker's' identification of his part in a conflict of 'classes', and to the further act of a general strike.

These two examples are themselves significant. The mathematical one points forwards to the systematic inscription of the 'psychological' order in the formal space opened up by Saussure's 'mathematisation' of language. The second example at once leads back to the dialectic of Master and Slave and Kojève's reading of Hegel's Phenomenology, echoes - like the insistence upon the dialectic of connaissance and action at the end of the passage, and throughout the Discours as radical dynamic of the 'symbolic function'- the dominant mid-century 'phenomenology' of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, and itself leads forward to the formalisation of that 'dialectic' as a major axis of Lacan's overall mathème-atisation, his identification of the elementary 'mat-thèmes' which are to be the correlates, in a structural psychology, of the morphèmes of structural linguistics and the mythèmes of a structural anthropology.

The passage itself, which leads to these two examples of the 'symbolic function', might itself, as a preliminary to a more
general account of 'structuralism' of around 1970 (including, then, under this general head both a 'post-structuralism' into which the period around 1970 may be taken to mark a transition, and a 'classical' structuralism of the sixties), be 'decoded', 'deciphered'.

- The figures of analysis developed in this passage may themselves be applied to their configuration in the passage - revealing in the 'synchronic' order of their coordination the 'diachronic' order of a development of a certain 'language', from Saussure and Kojeve, through this configuration of 1953; to a parisian configuration of 'structuralism' around 1970.

First of all, 'synchrony' itself - or rather synchrony/dia-
chrony, for in Lacan's characteristically allusive manner, it is not merely the second term of this 'oppositional couple', but Saussure himself, silently presiding over all such couples (from elementary phonetic distinctions, through various levels of morpheme, on to this last couple) who is 'absent' in the text. Saussure is not once mentioned in this long paper (and Kojeve, whose 'dialectic' here doubles Saussure's 'synchrony', is not once mentioned in the nine hundred pages dating from 'thirties to 'sixties, and collected as Ecrits in 1966).

Saussure, then, like Lacan's subject involved in the element-
ary mathematics of counting, is implicit in the symbolic order of the terms, but is only himself identified in a 'second temps', in a furt-
er reflection upon the initial configuration - as patently missing, so to speak, in that configuration. In the case of this text as a whole (rather than the analogous example of counting) the second temps amounting to a reflection on the configuration of the initial text might be taken, as it were, to be 1957: In L'Instance de la Lettre dans l'Inconscient, ou la Raison depuis Freud Saussure as locus of enunciation of the synchronic order of the elementary chaîne signifiante (the direct syntagmatic order of a series of signifiers, and the 'transverse' paradigmatic order, making of the whole a sort of matrix of differential elements, of which more in a moment) becomes central, and explicitly so.

For in 1957 it is the explicit inscription of the two com-
plemetary differential axes of the chaîne signifiante - of the ele-
mentary order of the chaîne, then - in analogous 'metaphoric' and
'metonymic' axes of language (already identified by Jakobson) which mediate between the elementary synchrony of the chaîne and the global synchrony of the language as a whole, between the implicit wider space of langue and the explicit chaîne of parole - it is this inscription which at once embodies in relation to the earlier paper the figure of the second temps of a reflection there defined (a reflection then, on the symbolic configuration of that earlier paper), and, in this, further defines just that reflection and its dynamic. - The paper, of 1953 (that is) is itself inscribed (implicitly) in the dynamic of the 'symbolic function' it identifies... and - according to the principles of that earlier account itself - this itself amounts to the redefinition of those principles. 

What, though, of Saussure's part in all this? I have suggested that the part of Saussure in the elementary configuration of parole as identified in the 1953 paper, corresponds in a way to the part of the counting subject who is implicit in his act of counting, but is only himself 'explicated', made explicit (as, precisely, implicit in the earlier act) in a further act, a further account. - Suggested then, that the explicit entry of Saussure into the subsequent paper or reflection parallels the inscription, in that paper, of Saussure's differential axes of parole, within the metaphoric and metonymic axes of the langue silently implicit in any parole, now identified as primary.

I will not insist upon the significance of Saussure's absence 'in' the Discours de Rome. Suffice it to say that this particular figure of something (rather, someone) 'missing' may itself be taken, in the terms of 1957, as a 'metonymic' instance of the more general absence of the 'subject' in general - of that 'whole' subjectivity of which Saussure is but a part, a participant - from 'his' discourse. Let us pass from this questionable analysis of the transition from 1953 to 1957 (the question attaching, precisely to those 'fifties reflections which provide both terms and objects of the analysis) to its inscription in a wider synchrony, a wider 'space' or configuration, framing that diachronic axis that leads from Saussure at the turn of the century to Paris around 1970.
Synchrony/diachrony - langue/parole - syntagmatic/paradigmatic - phoneme, morpheme, phonology, morphology... and so on... the 'space' as it were of a certain analysis... of a certain 'system', identified as language. Identified as the general frame of language, any language, and so of 'linguistic' analysis in Saussure's course at Geneva, from 1908 to 1913, edited and published posthumously by his pupils in 1916. Synchrony/diachrony: the identification of language as a 'space' of differences, distinctions, slowly unfolding over time, whose articulation is to be discovered by the systematic analysis of the complementary 'syntagmatic' and 'paradigmatic' axes of the series of 'signifiers' that constitute speech, parole. 'Paradigmatic': the axis of possible substitutions at some point in the series or 'chain' of signifiers, which 'make sense' - the dimension or space, then, from which the signifier actually used at that point is selected, determining the sense of the chain from among the range of possible senses corresponding to the possible substitutions for that particular signifier. 'Syntagmatic': the axis (as it were 'horizontal', along the chain, rather than 'vertically' through it like the paradigmatic axis) of possible chains in which the particular signifier can occur. Now the actual figures of correlation of the two axes by which the analysis of a particular language proceeds are themselves essentially correlative: the analysis is as it were 'relativistic', guided by the figure of a unitary 'space' or synchrony of the language as a whole... articulated between this unitary synchronic-diachronic space-time in which the historical corpus of a particular language is to be organised, and the elementary 'matrices' governing the constitution of phonemes from the minimal significant phonetic differences.

Such a 'relativistic' frame of linguistic research elaborated at Geneva by the French-Swiss Saussure may be compared with the German-Swiss Einstein's parallel (contemporary) elaboration of a 'relativistic' frame of physical research at Zürich. Einstein's physical 'Space-Time', and his complementary identification of the elementary configuration of electromagnetic interaction in the photoelectric effect served to frame the integration of the experimental data amassed over the turn of the century. Saussure's frame - his linguistic 'Space-Time' and its elementary components - was produced in response to the vast data of comparative Indo-European phi-
ology, amassed over the turn of the century by Brugmann and Delbrück (presented in five volumes of their *Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen* between 1886 and 1916). In the nineteenth century tradition opened by Friedrich Schlegel (in his *Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier*) in 1808, the young Saussure had made a first step towards his 'systematic' perspective in 1879 in his *Mémoire sur le système primitif des voyelles dans les langues indo-européennes*, finding in the extant vowel-systems of that family of languages a system corresponding to an initial phonetic element that had itself been lost, the corresponding differential structure as it were mapped or transcribed into the remaining phonetic structure. An initial embodiment, as it were, of the symmetric-al phonetic differentiation of the primitive *langue* in primitive *parole*, was reflected in the discovery of that symmetrical space of the *langue* in a contracted order of *parole* in which one dimension of the initial phonetic order had been transposed into a secondary order of differentiation, inscribed within the primary differentiations of the reduced phonetic order. Here we see already precisely that silent presence of a 'missing' signifier in the order of *parole*, that is to become central to Lacan's reflection over the mid-century.

- So much, in passing, for the linguistic Space-Time of the beginning of the century, and a certain 'synchrony' of this linguistic frame of the interface of inner *signifié* and outer *signifiant*, and the contemporary 'physical' frame of 'observation' and 'measurement'. We might further, perhaps, see in the Russian 'morphology of the folk-tale' elaborated towards 1930 (and passing through Prague and New York to Paris around 1950) - in the analysis of those traditional stories in terms of a system of oppositions and the diachrony of dialectic of a circuit through them which constitutes a 'tale' - an order of correlation, an interface, of elementary oppositions and the synchrony of the language as a whole, paralleling Dirac's correlation of elementary and global physical 'spaces'. Around 1930, also, we may trace a Parisian configuration out of which unfolds, on the one hand, the existentialism and phenomenology of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, and on the other Lacan's 'dialectic' around the mid-century. I have already noted Sartre's visit to Germany in 1933-4. This might itself be viewed as a sequel to
Husserl's Paris lectures, given upon his bequest of the Freiburg chair to Heidegger in 1929, and appearing, reworked, in the French translation of Levinas and Pfeiffer in 1931 (as *Meditations Cartesiennes*). I have already noted the publication at Paris of Marx's early 'hegelian' manuscripts at Paris around this time; the discovery of the dialectic of Master and Slave as frame of a social critique framed within a wider dialectic of action and connaissance, paralleling the effect of the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts upon the Frankfurt School - prefigured by Lukács' 'twenties dialectic of framing a situation and the frame of which this 'consciousness' was itself an element - was focussed from 1933 (until 1939) in Alexandre Kojève's 'introduction' to Hegel, through the Phenomenology, in his lectures at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes.

These lectures were eventually published by the poet Raymond Queneau (as *Introduction à la Lecture de Hegel*) in 1947 (following, then, upon Jean Hyppolite's *Gendse et Structure de la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit* of the previous year). - By a poet and dramatist... characteristically. For these lectures amount to an induction of the parisian intelligentsia of the 'thirties into the hegelian System: an induction into that circuit, anneau, into the recognition of one's part in - as another smaller circuit within that Circle - as an opening in and to the System, a bâance, a néant, inviting our self-assertion... first becoming something in our very recognition of ourselves in that open-ness, that opening... our recognition of ourselves as becoming.

Hegel had framed his final System as a 'circle of circles': of the three circuits of Logic, Nature and Spirit. Kojève's framing of entry, induction, introduction, into the System partakes of that general figure of around 1930, already discovered in various 'dimensions' of an open-ness corresponding to the circularity of inscription in some dimension of the instance or locus of its framing - Heidegger's inscription of human being as Da-sein in Sein, for example. The logical - or rather psychological - circuit attaching to the locus of its framing in the play of Nature frames, opens, the dialectic of the Phenomenon. The reader, or the audience listening to Kojève's reading, find themselves, with Hegel, in this elementary configuration of identification itself. One might speak of a 'dramatisation' of the Phenomenology, of Kojève's impersonation, almost,
of Spirit slowly recognising itself in successive self-distinction from earlier identifications (from earlier 'moments', then, of this same radical distinction or negation). One might see in the configuration of the 'thirties Cours at the Ecole Pratique the familiar configuration of theatre: Kojève at his table on the podium, the stage, playing out before his audience, as he reads, the protagonist's self-distinction from an initial identification of his part in the action, in the play of figures. In a Greek tragedy, I suggested, one may see mirrored in the actor's working-through of his part of self-discovery in the action (his self-distinction from an initial unquestioned 'mere' part) the spectator's implicit working-through, in this, of his identification with the actor. At the close of the action the spectator returns to himself. In Kojève's dramatisation of Hegel, the audience works through an identification with Kojève identifying with Hegel identifying with Spirit which at last distinguishes itself from its images in Nature. And in this closing scene of the drama, these various parallel moments or movements of identification converge, coinciding in the close of the Cours: the audience, returning to itself, recognises in this return precisely the figure of Spirit discovering itself. Spirit returning to itself in the inscription of the initial movement of identification, the initial movement into the book and into the 'play' of Nature, in the circuit which this inscription closes. The reader, then, the audience identifying with Kojève in his public 'reading' or commentary, discovers himself within the circuit of the System into which he has been induced by the dynamic of reading: his place 'in' the frame of that System articulated, as it were, in the interface of the initial circuit of that simple identification which is the entry into the text and into Nature, and the complementary circuit of a Logic whose circuit is abstracted from that initial movement. In between these two circuits the reader now finds himself not so much at the beginning of the book, or at the end, but in the social circuit of the interface of initial individuality (me, here, now), and final universality (Spirit) - in the social order articulated in the dynamic or dialectic of Master and Slave which is the turning-point in the drama of reading the Phenomenology.

The hegelian 'system', then, is as it were the language, the logical frame, in which the reader, the individual, can decode or interpret his place in the System - whether in the texts in which this System is articulated by Hegel, or in the wider System those texts reflect in the circuit of the central social order.
The 'introduction to the reading of Hegel', is the introduction to the 'reading' of the World, of Society, and one's part in its central dynamic or 'dialectic'. - In the dynamic of that interface of man and Nature, in which the primary production of the Slave has been inscribed within the Code, the Law, of the Master. To identify one's part in the wider system - an identification reflected in finding one's part in Hegel's text (this itself framed by the reading of the Phenomenology) - in which this Law of the Master can be deciphered, is to discover oneself as a free actor, no longer bound, whether as Master or Slave, to a part one has not freely chosen (but which has as it were chosen one).

Queneau relates (1) that Lacan, Merleau-Ponty, Georges Bataille, along with many others who were to dominate the mid-century, regularly attended the Cours. Is one, then, to trace back to Kojeve the analogous schemes of Lacan and Merleau-Ponty at mid-century? -To see, as it were, in Kojeve, Lacan's unacknowledged Master?

... Certainly the dynamic of parisian reflection associated with the Cours must be recognised as a central channel, so to speak, of the 'dialectic' of parisian intellectual life in the 'thirties as a whole. But how could one possibly propose to determine the specific contribution of attendance at the lectures ('readings') of Kojeve to, say, Lacan's mid-century 'movement of a function in which alternate activity and consciousness'? How, except by an exhaustive survey of Lacan's other interactions, of the 'thirties and 'forties... and before... interactions through books, dialogue, images perhaps... through his work as a psychiatrist and then as a psychoanalyst... and everything else besides (interactions of which the traces are of course now radically incomplete)... and the coordination with all these other elements of the attendance at Kojeve's Cours, in some huge economy or interplay of figures, in which all the details of Lacan's use of 'dialectic' at the mid-century might be supposed determined?

- All the details: that is, the inscription of the word 'dialectic' in an exhaustive 'saussurian' analysis of the 'syntagmatic' and 'paradigmatic' axes of its occurrence in Lacan's texts.
- In all his texts... including indeed a parole which is in large... in an article in the annual edition (195-6) of Critique invited to 'be friendly, Batill.
measure already irretrievably lost, as I write... and of which the hundred or so projected volumes of, say, Heidegger's 'Works', in preparation as I write, would themselves be but a poor imitation?

Let us rather proceed, not from the exhaustive economy of such 'intellectual' interaction, but rather from the 'global' configuration, from the global 'symmetry' of the system or synchronic 'space' of parisian reflection in the 'thirties, in which we may inscribe Kojeve's 'position', the locus of his 'parole' selected from that common parisian 'space' of 'thirties reflection, as focal. Let us then characterise the relations between Kojeve and his contemporaries, and between Kojeve and Lacan, or Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, not as some supposedly definite 'channel' of influence in an overall space which, as in the paroles of all these, remains silent, but rather in terms of a correlation of, say, Kojeve's 'focal' position in the synchronic order of a (certain or rather incertain) parisian intellectual 'language' of the 'thirties, Sartre's analogous 'focal' position over the mid-century, and Lacan's 'focal' position around 1970 - this changing order of parisian 'focus' being itself inscribed within the overall 'diachrony' of the language in which it expresses itself, from which it selects or abstracts a discourse, corresponding - if we are to take Lacan's word - to the organising function of a certain 'I', of a 'proper' name attached for a while to the bodily interface of 'I' and World (...rather, Paris). - An 'I', 'Lacan' says (rather, said, except that his 'I' is still present (absent rather) in the 'space' in which these words themselves are chosen), which is itself only a mark of one side of a signifier - something always, and essentially missing, wanting; wanting precisely in the very marking of itself with a further signifier, unavoidably rooted in this dynamic of repetition; of which the repetition of this simple position in a string of propositions, terminated only by the physical dissolution of the bodily interface which 'supports' this position, is the instance now in question. Lacan, whose 'seminar' in his last years presented the dominant 'theatre' of parisian reflection, like Kojeve's Cours in the 'thirties, would begin, each year: Alors... je recommence - puis que vous êtes encore là.

I have already noted, in a preliminary fashion, how Lacan's discours of 1953 might itself be inscribed as a certain parole within the silent space of a parisian 'language' of reflection around the mid-century. And I have suggested in passing that it is Sartre who,
over the mid-century, is the central protagonist in the Parisian intellectual 'theatre' — whether it be in the cultural frame of theatre 'proper', the theoretical frame of his long books, or in the 'primary interface of these in the *Temps Modernes* which he founded at the close of the war, and edited, over the mid-century, with Merleau-Ponty.

What, then, is the intellectual or ideological 'space' or 'language' of Paris, in the 'synchronic' order of its various 'focussings' from around 1930 to around 1970, and the 'diachronic' order of transition from one of these configurations to another?

I have suggested that we might frame a 'French' space of Reflection in terms of the dominant 'psychology' which frames the World through the inscription of the difference of psychological and physical ('natural') orders in a certain psychology, in the psychological order. The primary frame, then, whether in Descartes, Victor Cousin, Kojève, Sartre, or Lacan, amounts to the configuration of the 'subject's self-identification (even, as in the latter cases, only as an 'absence', as missing or wanting) as framing the distinction of psychological and physical orders in the frame of the orders thus distinguished. This figure of the 'subject' as focal is itself reflected both in the focal part of Paris in French reflection, as in French society generally, and the organisation of Parisian reflection around focal figures in successive phases or configurations of Theory. The German frame of inscription of the 'subject' in a radical physical or ontical order, on the other hand, is reflected in the framing of German reflection in the interplay of various different foci — Berlin, Marburg, Freiburg, Heidelberg, Göttingen, Frankfurt, and so on.

Thus one might compare the focal parts of Kojève at Paris in the nineteen-thirties, and Cousin a century before: each presenting a 'humanised' Hegel, and framing an 'eclectic' system in terms of a mirroring of the individual subjects' access to the system, and the analogous global frame of a psychical distinction of psychical and physical orders. I have already remarked upon Heidegger's repudiation, in the Letter on Humanism published in German in 1947 and
in French in 1953, of Sartre's interpretation of his earlier work. The 'phenomenological ontology' of *L'Être et le Néant* might perhaps more appropriately be called an existential psychology, whose 'phenomenology' owes quite as much to Kojeve's Hegel as to Husserl, or to Heidegger (whom Sartre first studied systematically during his nine months imprisonment at the beginning of the war, when *Sein und Zeit* was one of the few philosophical works he could obtain).

Heidegger himself had left behind 'phenomenology' in the period around 1930. One might see his reading of Hegel's 'phenomenology' in his Freiburg course of 1931-2 - his passage through that dynamic of identification, of subject and being, psychology and ontology - as organizing the latter phase of his transition from a 'phenomenological ontology' in 1927 to the rectoral address of 1933. I have already noted the complementary configuration of a sartrian 'existentialism' (asserted in 1947 to be that very 'humanism' which Heidegger repudiated) in which questions are inscribed within the primary question of the 'subject' as the 'part' of framing his situation and so of this part in it, and Heidegger's inscription of this 'subjective' circuit or circle in the wider more radical Question of Being. One might take the parts of Heidegger and Kojeve as complementary reactions to Hegel in Germany and France, after 1930; then one might 'read' Sartre's reading of Heidegger in 1940 as the inscription of the heideggerian frame of 'reading Hegel' in Kojeve's conversion of, transposition of, that Hegel.

But let us finally leave such particular configurations aside and attempt the characterization of a more general 'space' of mid-century French reflection, in which such relations would themselves have to be inscribed.

I characterized the configuration of Reflection around 1930, as a whole, in terms of the inscription of the developments in various dimensions of Reflection over the turn of the century in the circuits of inscription of locus of framing each dimension in that frame as primary scheme in each 'theory'. Generally, I tried to determine the overall configuration in relation to 'representative' German versions of the various schemes, just as I tried
to characterise global 'ideological' and 'cultural' configurations around this time in relation to Rosenberg's Myth and its part in Hitler's 'Movement', as a sort of 'index' in that wider order. Only in the 'poetic' order of reflection did I take a parisian figure as representative - as 'index'. Husserl's inscription of his 'phenomenology' in a 'cartesian' order of reflection around 1930, and the complementarity of sartrian 'existentialism' and Heidegger's questioning of Being from 1947 to 1953, both already briefly alluded to, may be taken as preliminary 'indications' of the more general figure of a franco-german axis of reflection over the middle of the century. - That is to say, the complementarity of 'french' and 'german' versions or perspectives in the correletion of Subject and Being as questions may be taken over this period as an index of a certain complementarity of 'french' and 'german' orders of Reflection as a whole (insofar, of course, as these complementary orders themselves embody a certain unity or 'wholeness': we must remember that such unity is itself only one side or moment in the dynamics of the two traditions).

We may begin by characterising what is unitary or 'global' in the french 'space' of Reflection around 1930 simply as the french 'side' of the general figure of inscription of locus of framing each 'dimension' or order of theory in that order, as a 'question', as in some way open. In this general figure we may identify, as framing each order, three circuits and three associated primary orders of question or determination. The circularity of the self-inscription of locus of framing in what it frames at once present three correlative circuits of locus of framing, frame, and object framed. In the physical order of Dirac's theory, for example, these are found in the parts of 'measurer'/'observer', mathematical frame of measurement or observation, and measured/observed object or system (the 'measuring' itself being a system inscribed in the first 'circuit', of which the physicist or 'subject' may be regarded as a limiting case or pole, corresponding 'elementary' particle as limiting 'object').

We may call 'french' (since in the wider cultural dynamic that is where this figure is focussed) an order of Reflection in which the complementarity of subjective and objective orders of question in the various orders of theory is itself inscribed in, and determined 'through' the subjective determination as primary.
Thus in Kojeve's reading (or re-writing) of the Phenomenology, the 'object' posited at the outset, of which the Subject begins by discovering himself (or herself?... perhaps not in this case) as the negation, eventually turns out to a merely formal term, which the primary actuality of negation eventually realises as the negation of itself in which it failed to recognise itself as this act of negation. For Heidegger as for Sartre this actuality of negation is 'noth-ing': das Nichts nichtet, le Néant néantise. But in one case the radical opposition of Sein and Nichts is inscribed in Sein as frame of its self-expression (as pheno menon, as a ἐκsein, self-restriction of the pure verbality of ἐκsein, as a ἐφταίς, mode of that being which expresses itself in the indogermanic root BHU). In the other the opposition of Être and Néant is the formal frame of the human agent's radical self-assertion or freedom.

Around the mid-century it is, whether in France or Germany, the middle term of the two complementary, 'subjective' and 'objective', versions which is identified as primary: yet this middle term - the 'frame' of appearing or action - has itself already been determined from one 'side' or the other - is itself still intrinsically 'subjective' or 'objective'. Thus Lacan writes, for example (in the passage already cited) of:

(les) fondaments mêmes où la dernière doctrine de Freud désigne, dans une connotation vocalique de la présence et de l'absence, les sources subjectives de la fonction symbolique.

il est impossible de ne pas axer sur une théorie générale du symbole une nouvelle classification de sciences où les sciences de l'homme reprennent leur place centrale en tant que sciences de la subjectivité.

Between about 1930 and about 1950 the psychology of Freud and the ontology of Heidegger have been inscribed (as analogous figures of mirroring of subjective and objective) in a 'subjective' determination of that 'psychology' or 'ontology' by Lacan and Sartre: 'converted' from objective mirroring into a subjective determination of that objectivity as one side of a more radical mirroring, the relation of whose two sides is determined by the 'central' instance of subjectivity.
These 'sartrian' and 'lacanian' versions of german theories (these 'conversions' of german theories) are themselves two components of a parisian configuration of Reflection around 1950. I have suggested that Sartre's part then is in some sense central or 'focal' - like Lacan's part around 1970. Now we might take either Sartre's or Lacan's position at mid-century as an 'index' in relation to which the general parisian 'space' in which they mark two contemporary 'positions' might be identified. Why, in this 'space', in the 'synchrony' of Sartre's mid-century 'existentialism' and Lacan's critical break with the parisian psychoanalytical establishment, and all other contemporary 'positions' (Merleau-Ponty's, Levi-Strauss', Barthes', Hyppolite's, Marcel's, Levinas'... and so on) should Sartre be now 'focal', 'representative'?

... Well, simply because, in the dramatic order of mirroring of french Reflection in its european and global context over the period now under discussion, Sartre's version of this order of mirroring - in the triple activity of his book-writing, journalism (editing), and play-writing - reflects the part of this version in that wider cultural order of which it is thus a 'focal' french version. Sartre finds himself at the centre of a wider group, the coordination of whose reflection, in relation to the central figure of Sartre's 'dramatisation' of Reflection, mirrors, in the elementary symmetry of the 'cultural' order as embodied in the World of around 1950, the various dimensions of the context of that group's reflection. In particular, if we abstract from the global context to the french context, and in that context see the coupling of the ideological, cultural, and economic dominance of Paris with the 'logical' or subjectivist tradition in french reflection, we can then further see how the parisian ideological order framed by a certain communication of ideas (through the press, educational institutions, and so on) is in turn focussed in Sartre's 'logic' of this order - his 'part' in this configuration of presenting the logical order of the 'part'. - Reflecting, that is, in the order of individual action, in the coordination of his 'part' in the french tradition of Reflection with the many other contemporary parts, the complementary order of integration of those many interacting parts in a more or less unitary action or drama of parisian reflection.

- Or, to take rather the configuration of 1970, we might characterise the 'focal' part of Lacan as that of 'embodying' the primary or elementary symmetry of the parisian 'space' of Reflection around that time, in the part 'I' (Jacques Lacan) in a discourse which marks the inscript-
ion of discourse as \textit{parole} in \textit{french langue}; a part which thus inscribes itself simply in the figure of 'I' in the \textit{french language} of \textit{french reflection} of his time. Sartre and Lacan, we might say, in their turn(s) play the part of the \textit{Subject} in the \textit{framing of \textit{french reflection}} - in this actually articulating a certain circuit or frame of \textit{french reflection} in the \textit{french language}, like Descartes before them. Lacan presents an extreme case, for he identifies his part as the locus of identification of the \textit{french language} as frame of \textit{french thought}: as the marking or identification of the 'function' of \textit{Je/Moi} in 'french' - which is almost to say: in France.

Since in this case, here in Baltimore, it would seem that the Other is naturally \textit{english-speaking}, it would really be doing myself violence to speak \textit{french} (1)

\ldots apologised Lacan, opening his bilingual address to the Johns Hopkins symposium on 'The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man' in 1966. For his 'message', itself 'the message as I will explain it to you', was 'Of Structure as an Inmixing of Otherness Pre-requisite to Any Subject Whatever'\ldots

The message, our message, in all cases comes from the Other, by which I understand 'from the place of the Other'.

Characteristically Lacan's american editors thought to convey his 'message' in an \textit{edited english paraphrase}:

Since Dr. Lacan, as he remarks in his introduction, chose to deliver his communication alternately in \textit{English} and \textit{French} (and at points in a composite of the two languages), this text represents an \textit{edited transcription} and \textit{paraphrase} of his address (2)

Returning from another trip to America, ten years later, Lacan opened the following Wednesday's 'seminar' by expressing his relief at being back home in the \textit{french language}, and back from the embarrassing attempts by his american hosts at a sort of 'arranged marriage' with Noam Chomsky with whom he had been forced to have a conversation.

1: \textit{The Structuralist Controversy}, p186
2: p186n
But of the free play of European ideas in American English ('la langue américaine'), of...

L'idéologie de la libre-entreprise: American Way of life, human relations, human engineering, braintrust, success, happiness, happy end, basic personality, pattern, etc:
245-246, 325, 357, 376, 395, 397-398, 402-403, 416, 441-442, 475, 591, 604, 833, 859. (1)

more later.

'Focal' parts of Sartre and Lacan, then: the locus of framing the 'space' of Parisian Reflection, of enunciating the part of 'I' in that space - itself, of course, merely one position among others in that space - the perspective of 'I', tout court, with which Sartre or Lacan 'identifies' - 'at' which they, in turn, find themselves. In Lacan's case the 'position', the 'I', that will be focal around 1970, begins to frame its part in 1953 - in the 'space' or synchrony of positions then focussed in Sartre's framing of the inscription of reflection in action as frame of reflection. And the change of focus, the refocussing of a 'continuously' changing space, around 1960, is itself reflected in the focal part of De Gaulle's resolution of the Algerian war (1958-1962), in the very political order (the 'political' side of the cultural order) in which Sartre inscribed his reflection, his 'poetic' whose logical order was to be inscribed in that interface of Reflection and World as merely one side. By 1970 Lacan would be framing his parole as inscription of parole in langue - langue by then the very 'space' of discourse, and of Parisian discourses on language and discourse, in particular. Framing his discourse by, as analyst, 'standing-in' for the Other, l'Autre, 'taking the place' of this Autre in the 'transference' framed at Paris by his 'seminar'. A 'seminar' that by 1970 was held in the largest amphithéâtre in Paris (at the Law Faculty) - two thousand sitting (if they arrived an hour beforehand) on chairs or in the alleys or around the podium, or standing crammed in.

1: Ecrits, 'Index Raisonné des Concepts Majeurs', V, B, 2 (last entry).
the doorways... the table on the podium covered with microphones, more of which hung on walls around the auditorium. Lacan arriving at midday in grey fur coat, smoking, always, a bent cigar. Speaking, then, at half normal speed, for two hours. Meanwhile, in the dilapidated 'sixties site in the Bois de Vincennes just outside the old city walls, the old peripheral railway, and the new peripheral motorway, Gilles Deleuze, Schopenhauer to Lacan's Hegel, would try to find a voice in a much smaller and much more cramped room as haggard figures climbed in through the windows from the neighbouring first floor room, to join the children; animals, and other deleuzians. Anti-lacanian slogans painted on walls and ceiling. Deleuze and his friend Felix Guattari (once a lacanian psychoanalyst) breaking the oedipal code of ideological, cultural, and economic repression.

Two antipodes, two poles, of parisian reflection - one the focus of a closed circuit, the locus of inscription in (french) language of that configuration of language and inscription as frame of discourse, the other an epicurean self-inscription in a play of forces, affirming itself as open movement of affirmation, for which the greatest danger was to become locked in the closed circuit or circulation of money, of institution (most particularly, the primary institution of the oedipal family), of ideology.

One might trace the unfolding of this polarity from Lacan's framing of his position in 1953, and Deleuze' first book published that same year: Empirisme et Subjectivité - the marking, in a 'singularity', indicated as simply 'outside' any closed system of oppositions, 'outside' the closed circuit of traditional abstraction, any system, of two complementary singularities: a singularity of each individual subject, who cannot be defined by any system of abstract determinations, but knows himself precisely in the assertion of this irreducible difference of actual from logical, just as the singularity of an actual object of such a subject's experience expresses itself in differing from any logical or 'conceptual' determination. By around 1970 Deleuze marks this singularity, his own singular position, as 'outside' any parisian system or code - and outside the circuit of Lacan's scheme, most particularly. If I take Lacan's position in this configuration as primary, it is simply because Deleuze' movement is itself articulated and directed by the simple difference of Gilles Deleuze from Lacan's inscription of 'I' in the limiting system of language. Jacques Lacan's own difference is that he plays the
part (singular enough, indeed) of a simple 'I', which only one at a time can play. His singularity is just to be thus universal or indifferent. Deleuze' universality, paradoxically, lies in a fairly systematic difference from this focal part, working 'out' this difference in an affirmation which unfolds from an initial difference of difference from lacanian identity, through the figure of repetition in which Lacan finds that identity, and so on.. to Lacan's lire the complementary délire, to Lacan's seminar the complementary wednesday lunchtime dissemination, and so on. A position whose radical movement might be itself, perhaps, identified as the movement of differing from successive inscriptions of this difference in the systematic order from which it repeatedly differs.

So much, then, for an elementary 'synchrony' of parisian reflection around 1970. I have already briefly noted the sartrian 'focus' of the parisian 'space' of Reflection in which Lacan and Deleuze make their parallel steps in 1953. The analogy of Sartre's position at mid-century and Lacan's around 1970 is echoed in Boris Vian's 'surrealist' account of Jean-Sol Partre's public meetings, and their wider context, in L'Ecume des Jours. This in its turn amounts in a way to the inscription of Sartre/Partre's focal position, in the parisian order focussed around 1930 in the poetic of Surrealism. And it is the split of 1930 of the surrealist 'movement', with Breton's consolidation of his focal position in the Second Manifesto, his excommunication of Artaud and other revisionists, his proclamation of Le Surréalisme au Service de la Révolution which, itself analogous to Lacan's part forty years later, frames Lacan's first steps towards 1953 and his own emergence as parisian (anti)pope.

Back, now, then, for the last time, to Paris around 1930, to frame a synchronic and diachronic order of parisian reflection as a more or less unitary whole over the middle of the century, then to pass on to parallel 'frames' of german, british and american reflections over the same period.
Around 1930 Lacan was mixing with surrealists of various persuasions, and preparing his doctoral thesis, published in 1932 as *De la psychose paranôaâque dans ses rapports avec la personnalite*. The central case study was framed in the 'schizopraphie' (or to take the title of a 1931 paper, the 'Troubles du langage écrit chez une paranôaâque présentant des éléments délirants du type paranôâde') of a young woman, Aimé - writing subsequently published by Paul Eluard as surrealist 'automatic writing'. Already in his first independent paper (1931) Lacan had been concerned with 'Structures de psychoses paranôaâques', and his work on the structure of psychosis as exhibited in the 'automatic' writing of patients around this time was central to Dali's elaboration of the paranôaâ-critique I have taken as an index of poetic theory around 1930. From the surrealists Lacan himself felt the influence of Freud, and from the psychiatry of around 1930 moved, by 1934, to the practice of psychoanalysis within the French section of the International Psychoanalytical Association. In 1933 he published two articles in Bataille's *Minotaure* (where Dali was publishing examples of paranôaâ-critique) - one on 'Le problême du style et la conception psychiatrique des formes paranôaâques de l'expérience'.

In 1933, also, began Kojeve's course, attended by Lacan and many of the 'surrealists'. I have characterised this course as marking a first step, in the configuration of space of around 1930, towards the 'space' of French reflection around the mid-century, in whose 'synchrony' I have suggested Lacan's *Discours de Rome* might be inscribed, and through whose synchrony, marked by this inscription, Lacan's 'focal' position around 1970 might be identified - as inscription in the synchrony of the language of Parisian reflection around 1970, of the figure of this inscription... the figure, then, of Lacanian psychoanalysis as a 'mystery'.

'Mystery'. The analysts, complained Deleuze, are the priests of secular capitalism. The part of the philosopher, the true philosopher as Critic - a Lucretius or Nietzsche - is demystification. 'Mystery', though: the familiar figure of inscription of a text or discourse as the logical order of a more radical poetic which it frames, and in which it thus frames its part. The closed circuit, here, of both hermeticism and superstition, mystery, myth and mystification, mystagogy and priestcraft.
A logical framing of the poetic order - or rather the dramatic order logically framed as a 'poetic' - as primary, in which the logical order of its framing inscribes and subordinates itself. I have already attempted to discern such a poetic in the paranoia-critique of around 1930. By 1930 Breton was framing his focal part in a wider social 'poetic' of Revolution: as the focal locus of framing that poetic and the revolutionary activity it was to induce. Artaud's poetic - the 'théâtre de la cruauté' was left to turn in the contracting circuit of psychosis, Breton's focal position in Surrealism at the Service of the Revolution doubled by the 'psychotic' circuit of Artaud's abstraction from any such focal identity, rather as Lacan's focal position would be doubled by the 'schizoid' affirmation of Deleuze or Deleuze-Guattari... except that the 'logical' component of the cultural schism in the surrealist 'movement' is but one 'side' subordinated to the primary 'ideological' order of that movement, whereas the closed circuit of Lacan's inscription of the logical order of its framing in the 'mystery' of psychoanalysis, and Deleuze differing from his formal identity as marked in the closure of that order, amount to two poles of reflection, 'logically' identifying its inscription in a radical poetic. By 1970 the logical and poetic orders of Lacan's situation around 1930 have been almost integrated in a theory and practice of identification. At the earlier date Artaud's metaphysics - or, rather, anti-metaphysics - which prefigure in a way that Theatrum Philosophicum in which Foucault in 1970 finds Deleuze, are inscribed in the vocal dynamic of Artaud's celebrated radio broadcast, Pour en finir avec le Jurement de Dieu:

(fortissimo): L'ETRE... C'EST LA MERDE!

The bodily assertion that judgement, assertion, is to be inscribed in the dynamic of the bodily interface of actor and World, and the consequent - or concommittant - abstraction from subjective, objective, and global or theological poles of determination, is vocally framed in that oral or vocal marking of the anal order which, embodying the very figure of refusal by which Being is vocally abstracted from all that other shit (in Plato's Parménides, for example, when Parmenides refuses an 'idea' to muck), is itself brought into play to refuse this identity founded on a refusal, upon an unmentionable tip of refuse to which it is now itself added.
Breton, then, the 'Pope of Surrealism', Artaud as parisian antipope or heresiarch in the schism of 1930. Dali, Lacan, Bataille and others caught between these two poles of Surrealism - these complementary 'paranoid' positions... these two sides of a poetic of which I have taken Dali's programme of active or self-induced paranoia as a central index: as inscription of a classical perceiving Subject and a classically perceived Object (as mere formal poles of either side) in their more radical Interface or interfaces, in human body, in voice, 'picture', group, society.

In the ideological order of Surrealism, as embodied, for example, in the orthodox and schismatic texts of around 1930, the logical order of a theoretical version of 'surrealism' enters as only one component - as the logical or theoretical 'side' of the ideological conflict - the logical side or 'version' of that 'ideological' order I have tried to characterise as the interface and interplay of logical 'theory' and cultural 'poetic'. Such a 'logical' poetic, or 'logic' of Culture (of which 'Art', as both parties to the schism of 1930 insist, is but one component, an image in the wider 'poetic' of Culture) in its turn appears as one component of the logical order of Theory, framed (Theory) as a whole, a unity, by 'philosophy'.

Now the unfolding of these two orders of Theory and Culture, of logical and poetic orders, from 1930, itself involves successive inscriptions of Theory and Culture as two 'sides' of their common 'ideological' interface, in progressively more radical configurations of that interface and interplay. Theory as it were on the one hand, and the cultural 'poetic' on the other, each unfold so as to coincide more and more nearly with the other - so that we may say that Lacan's theoretical integration of the two sides of his activity - his 'logical' identification of logical theory and cultural poetic as two sides of their interface in Language, in the order of discours, parole - is as it were only one step away from a complete and systematic enunciation of the symmetry or complementarity, and of the coincidence in action, of these two orders. And I will try to show how the residual 'distance' of Lacan's theory, his 'theoretical practice', perhaps, from such a coincidence, corresponds directly to a residual abstraction of the French order of Lacan's reflection from its inscription in a global or 'cosmopolitan' order of Reflection, itself in turn inscribed in a Kosmos in which that earthly Globe is a primary interface of Above and Below.
These considerations allow us to frame the complementary synchrony and diachrony or 'space' and 'time' of a 'french' reflection over the middle of the century within the symmetry and associated dynamic of French reflection over that period as a drama, an 'action'.

- And it is precisely the characterisation of reflection as one side of 'action', about which this action itself turns at mid-century. Who are the 'actors'? I have noted, most particularly, the focal figures of Sartre and Lacan. I have also, already, characterised the 'symmetry' of an action, in general, as focussed in a human body as a sort of organising centre - whether this centre be actually embodied in a protagonist or merely a formal pole of the action from which the various dimensions, 'inner' and 'outer' (or: of 'finality' and 'efficiency') unfold, and in which they meet. A 'formal' pole, embodied, I have suggested, successively by Kojeve, Sartre and Lacan: but disembodied, as it were, around 1930 (Breton then playing the part of an ideological focus), around 1940 and the outbreak of war - when a political focus was equally lacking - and around 1960, when De Gaulle played the part he had assumed in the political vacuum of 1940.

What, though, of the 'space' of this action? I have not been considering, say, the interplay of the French material economy over the middle of the century, and Parisian theory: the structure of the 'action' which interests us here has only (earlier on) been coordinated with that 'economy' through the 'cultural' mirroring of that 'economy' and the 'ideological' order of which theory is only one side - as it were the formal or logical frame, interacting in 'ideology' with the political or cultural order of the mirroring of ideology and economy.

Nor have I been considering as 'space' of Parisian theory over the middle of the twentieth century the 'ideological' order of mirroring of 'theory' and 'culture' - though I have suggested that the inscription of theory in this interface comes into question over the period - say between Lacan's part in the 'surrealist' group(s) and his first independent paper of 1931, and his Vincennes address to the 'revolutionaries' of 1969, in which it was the very institutional frame of the address which was in question (from the podium and the auditorium) - or between the start of Kojeve's 'reading' in 1933 to the first 'events' at Nanterre in 1967. Rather than attempt-
ing to frame the action in terms of the interplay of the 'ideas' of parisian theorists and the bodily interaction of the theorists with other frenchmen in the cultural frame of french theory as a whole, we may first 'abstract' individual interactions from this widest symmetry of human interaction by considering only the more abstract interaction within the ideological order of parisian press and educational institutions of these 'intellectuals', inscribing this more abstract order of interaction within the symmetry and dynamic of the interplay of ideological and material orders over this period, in France, as a whole. We may further abstract from the detailed interaction of 'theoretical' and 'cultural' orders in parisian 'ideology' - among the 'intelligentsia' as a whole - through the inscription of 'theoretical' interaction within the further symmetry (in the already abstracted 'ideological' order) of the 'logical' order of theory and the 'poetics' of french Culture. Thus I have suggested that the development of a parisian theoretical 'space' as a whole over this period may be framed as the progressively more radical theoretical determination of the inscription of theory in that ideological interface of Theory and Culture - as the progressive intrusion, so to speak, of a 'poetic' order rooted in its cultural context, into 'theory'.

We are left, then, with a group of 'theorists' in their 'theoretical' space. Still embodied, indeed, but with the 'cultural' order of their bodily interaction, and within that the 'ideological' order of interaction of theory with that cultural order, framed more or less schematically, as general context for the detailed 'theoretical' interaction as a whole. Thus, in abstraction from the geographical context of France, and the coupling within that of 'logical' or centralist political order and the logical order of theory in the centralised institutional space and educational policy framing french reflection as essentially parisian, we may begin to articulate our 'theoretical' interaction (analogous, then, to an 'electromagnetic interaction' abstracted from Culture, or a 'sexual interaction' abstracted, say, in dream, film or fantasy) within a french order of subjective determination of the relation of subjective and objective orders, which is itself fairly rigidly instituted in abstraction from the physical and cultural orders of interaction of those who 'embody' it. - That is to say, the very possibility of articulating a 'theoretical' interaction in relative independence from its local
coupling to other orders of interaction, is itself the dominant aspect of the coupling of these very orders in French reflection as an institution. An institution whose 'code' of recycling intellectual authority, in its coupling or complicity with other ideological, cultural and economic 'codes' is brought into question around 1970, and then — in classically 'French' manner — frames the wider questioning of its 'objective' economic correlate, and the cultural interface of these 'subjective' and 'objective' codes. First, in 1967-8 the 'codes' are simply confronted. Over the following few years the initial 'naive' locus of this questioning or confrontation itself comes into question, as that initial opposition is itself 'recuperated' by a system it thought to oppose.

A 'recycling' of authority, with the educational system, for example, framed, as in the thirteenth century, by the dynamic of the student's attempt to accede to intellectual authority — this through the first, second and third 'cycles' of university study: the maîtrise at the close of the 'deuxième cycle' leads to the competitive examination for the teaching posts that have fallen vacant over the year — posts in universities, in the École Normale Supérieure which prepares students specifically for this examination, and in the higher classes of the lycée where students are prepared for the competitive entrance examination to the École Normale itself and other analogous grandes écoles (such as the Polytechnique), all at Paris. That is, the teaching in the educational institutions — most particularly in that 'philosophy' which has no direct application outside the teaching system — is itself the framing of the access to that position of framing that access.

French philosophy, then, reflects in its very 'institution' that figure of access to 'I' as instance of assertion found 'in' the philosophy thus instituted. The repudiation of both theory and institution in 1967-8 are thus directly coupled. The decoding of classical theory, and the theory of decoding are two sides of the same dissent from identification with the part of a formal 'I' to which a student might be expected to aspire. So that we may regard the 'structuralist' profession, from that very instituted locus itself, of a theoretical dissent from the traditional focus, as the formal framing, thus as one 'side', of the wider 'ideological' order of dissent from the part of identifying with one's part in French Culture, and of the traditional student's part of accession to 'his' (or 'her')
part. As a result of the Events of May, in particular, we might note the reorganisation of the old University of Paris into a dozen new 'universities', the eighth among them, opened in 1969 in the Bois de Vincennes instituted as independent in its organisation from the traditional pattern of teaching preserved in Paris itself. And with Gilles Deleuze as marking, so to speak, at the philosophical focus of the establishment, a missing instance of authority, an abdication of that focal 'I'. Foucault, too, was there for a year, but was almost immediately translated to the new chair of Histoire des Systèmes de Pensée at the Collège de France. At the Collège de France: an agrégé, having passed the competitive examination for teaching posts, might first find himself at a lycée in the 'provinces' - after leaving the École Normale Sartre was appointed to a post at such a school in Le Havre (1930). Thence he would attempt to return to Paris, applying for parisian jobs that fell vacant during the years that followed (Sartre, after his nauseating years in Le Havre - punctuated by his year at the Institut Français at Berlin - to the Lycée Condorcet, from which he eventually resigned in 1944, to live by writing alone). All this time he would be preparing, perhaps, the Doctorat d'État, without which he could not become a full university professor. And from the professors who had particularly distinguished themselves in their field, traditionally, were chosen the exemplary authorities of the Collège de France founded by the humanist-king François I at the time of the Reformation. Foucault's inaugural lecture in 1970, published as L'Ordre du Discours, opens with a reflection on the position from which he must speak, before passing on to frame the institution of discourse which is to be the field of his own discourse in the following years:

Voici l'hypothèse que je voudrais avancer, ce soir, pour fixer le lieu - ou peut-être le très provisoire théâtre - du travail que je fais: je suppose que dans toute société la production du discours est à la fois contrôlée, sélectionnée, organisée et redistribuée par un certain nombre de procédures qui ont pour rôle d'en conjurer les pouvoirs et les dangers, d'en maîtriser l'événement aléatoire, d'en esquiver la lourde, la redoutable matérialité. (1)

1: L'Ordre du Discours, p10
Here is the hypothesis I would like to advance, this evening, to fix the place - or perhaps the very provisional theatre - of my work: I suppose that in every society the production of discourse is at the same time controlled, selected, organised and recycled by a certain number of procedures whose role is to exorcise its powers and dangers, to master its chance occurrence (or: advent), to elide its weighty, its fearful, materiality.

Lacan's mystery, Deleuze' theatrum philosophicum, Foucault's theatre set up provisionally in the Forum. So many different 'versions' or orientations of, and in, the 'space' of around 1970. Correlative axes, so to speak, in and of that 'space' of discourse, which one might transform one into another by some strange rotation or conversion in - of - that 'space'.

... And Lacan's version I take as somehow central: for if this 'space' is the abstract or formal frame of the 'ideological' order of discourse, and if we may call 'language' the space, the possibility, from which discourse is 'selected', then in the 'psychological' order of subjective framing of the mirroring of subjective and objective, which I have taken to be instituted in the very frame of parisian reflection, it is the 'I' framed by Lacan in language as locus of this framing - in a 'language' itself framed in terms of two sides, 'imaginary' and 'real', of the 'symbolic' order or function of the sign, - from which the 'theoretical' symmetry of the 'space' of 1970 may be unfolded... in which symmetry the diachronic order of a certain dynamic may be identified, and coupled, through the inscription of this 'theoretical' symmetry in the wider symmetry from which it abstracts, with the dynamics of various parallel orders. - Inscribed then, in the wider 'theatre' which we may well call The Globe.

Theatre: before mapping the space in which Foucault inscribed, in the passage cited, his place - the very provisional
of his work, we must trace the dynamic associated with the symmetry of that French 'space' through the focal configuration, at mid-century, of Sartre's triple production of discourse: theoretical, topical, theatrical. And we proceed to that focus and its 'topic' or space from the missing 'I' of 1930, reflected in the schism framed by Artaud's Theatre (both in the wider sense, and in the restricted sense of the Théâtre Alfred Jarry) which Breton in the Second Manifesto compares (unfavourably) with the epochal storm of 1830, raised by Hugo's Hernani.

I have taken that ideological conflict, and Dalí's associated 'poetics' of paranoia, as an index of the 'space' of 1930, in its synchrony. In a synchrony in which this 'poetic' component may be taken to constitute an axis in the wider space of reflection - of Parisian reflection - with which other axes may be coordinated, within the simple 'space' of inscription of the correlation of circuits of Subject, Frame, and Object, within the primary circuit of the Subject as question. - As a question, then, which in the philosophical order of Reflection as a whole, corresponds to a lack of focus, a period of transition from, say, Bergson's focal principle of radical identification in the coordination of Subject, Space-and-Time, and Matter, to Sartre's focal subjectivity at mid-century. In the psychological order we may take Lacan's correlation of the 'missing' subject of psychosis and 'her' writing - a sort of passive or pathological correlate of Dalí's 'active' psychosis - as his first step into the Parisian 'space' of reflection. A first step paralleling Kojève's framing of his focal part of 'reading Hegel': 'playing' as it were the Parisian 'I' in the wider 'philosophical' order of a French conversion, inversion, translation, transcription, of the Phenomenology.

'I': the focus of a 'space' articulated between the elementary distinction of subjective and objective, psychological and physical, in the 'here, now' of Sense, and the global abstraction of Reason from this order of 'position' in the Negation of the Negation. 'I' - the configuration of Kojève's identification with this instance of negation, in the human interface of global and elementary orders - dramatically rooted in the dialectic of mirroring of one 'I' in another, in the central diachrony of this 'space': the 'dialectic' of Master and Slave. A
'space' of coordination, then, of hegelian figures: the hegelian 'space' or textuality into which this focal figure of the reflection of one 'I' in another was the access, from which the dramatic order could be unfolded in its various dimensions or axes. A hegelian 'space' whose diachrony, whose 'time', whose associated dynamic, was framed in the 'dialectical' movement of negation - in the dramatic order of self-distinction from the 'subjective' pole of a previous self-distinction or identification.

In this 'thirties 'space', then, framed by a hegelian textuality focussed in the part of Kojeve as Reader, we find, midway through the period of the Cour - in 1936 - Sartre framing the 'synchrony' of a 'champ transcendental sans sujet', and Lacan, at his first psychoanalytical congress (at Marienbad), framing the central figure of the self-discovery or 'identification' of 'I' in a mirroring: most particularly the dynamic of identification to be observed when a young baby between about six and eighteen months (the 'mirror phase') faces its image in a physical mirror (this 'physical' mirror, interface of real and imaginary orders in the perspectival 'doubling' of space, itself an 'image' of the mirroring of baby in mother).

Champ transcendental sans sujet: complementing the dialectical articulation of the parisian 'space' of the 'thirties in Kojeve's course, in the movement of that reading, we find Sartre making a further reduction of or abstraction from Husserl's radical 'space' of the Cartesian Meditations (the 'sphere of Eigenheit') by distinguishing transcendental subjectivity from its last identification with a term in the more radical space - from a residual inert 'identity' in this last movement of self-distinction or negation. Husserl's 'german' order of inscription of the 'subject' in a more radical order or space of ontological identity is thus, in the now familiar figure, itself inscribed in a still more radical psychological space - in a french 'phenomenological psychology'. - A 'psychology' in which the ontological order of identity (or, equivalently, the physical order of 'things', of la Chose) is itself inscribed precisely through the correlative identification of the more radical free subjectivity with a term in its 'space', and of the 'objects', correlative terms, in that embodied subject's 'World'.
Complementing this 1936 essay on La Transcendance de l'Ego, Sartre published a 'phenomenological psychology' of the Imagination: of the dynamic or 'dialectic' of free subjectivity and its identification with a particular term. The order of 'imagination' was as it were the phenomenological 'variation' of the subject him- or herself, on analogy with the classical phenomenological variation 'in' imagination of the 'object'.

We might take the invasion of France in 1940, and Sartre's study of Heidegger, as marking the transition from the 'kojevian' focus of the 'thirties to a sartrian focus at mid-century. Thus in 1943 the kojevian diachrony of identification, the 'dialectic' focussed in the mirroring of Master and Slave, Self and Other, is inscribed in the sartrian phenomenological 'space' of 1936. The base or elementary level of self-distinction as 'here, now, I' is transcribed as 'pre-reflexive cogito', and the global complement or frame (Spirit) is transcribed into a Néant in which, as free subjectivity, the Être of terms, finite identities, is inscribed as an irreducible forgetfulness of Nothing, elided, eliding itself as 'only' nothing, as nothing-at-all, hidden as it were in a Being or Identity which it does not recognise as its own negation (in every sense).

Yet we cannot abstract ourselves from being and identity, from the order of inert senseless 'things', to some identity of Nothing, some Nirvana (the nearest approach to this is the chosen death which closes sartrian fiction, closes an imaginary identification). From Heidegger Sartre has transcribed the radical or originary correlation of subject and object in action. We can never be Nothing itself: such a supposed 'identity' of Nothing is nothing at all. That 'Nothing' just marks an endless movement of negation of any particular identity or part we assume - a movement in which, alone, we are truly, 'authentically', ourselves. What is constant is the correlation of the subject's identification of his part, and the other terms in the diachrony or dialectic of his action. The 'subject' is condemned to a part in the situation in which he finds himself or herself. The best part to take is that of responsibility for the part one plays, the worst that of inscribing one's action in the part of an identity for which one has no choice.
1943: within the formal 'space' of action, the formal 'poetic' of action can be unfolded from the focal mirroring of 'I' in another 'I': the space of Kojeve's 'dialectic' can be articulated between the two poles of global \( \text{Etre} \) and \( \text{Néant} \), and elementary pre-reflexive cogito. But this formal space is itself an abstraction from the radical particularity of the situation in which we (and Sartre writing in 1943) find ourselves. 'Find' ourselves: in that central order of mirroring of 'I's which frames our particular choices, frames the possible 'variation' of the parts from which we must choose - which we must inscribe in the radical part of Choice, of Freedom.

1943: this formal frame is doubled by the complementary abstraction from the actual situation of 1943 - the German occupation of Paris - of two exemplary 'actions' or 'dramas': *Les Mouches* and *Huis Clos*. One the configuration of the protagonist, Orestes', discovery of the part of Freedom, the other the closed circuit in which a group imprisons each member in a 'part'. Sartre's part in framing these actions (action, then, seen from 'within', complementing its formal framing, in the theory of *L'Être et le Néant*, from 'without'), is to frame, through the imaginary identification of audience with the 'parts' in these configurations of action, the parts and choices of the spectators in the wider 'scene' of the occupation mirrored in the scene of the theatre. Sartre's part is thus to frame parisian 'parts': on the one hand, formally, on the other embodying the primary-dimensions of parisian 'parts', and their coordination in the radical figure of identification (of a part), in the closed configuration of a 'fiction'. In 1947, in an essay in the journal founded with Simone de Beauvoir in 1945, Sartre identified the complementarity of these two orders of theory and fiction - thus assuming, in the pages of *Les Temps Modernes* themselves, the focal 'part' of the writer of which the theoretical and fictional orders of 1943 (themselves somewhat mixed in the dramatic episodes of *L'Être et le Néant*, and the reflection embodied in the plays) now appear as two sides. Around the mid-century, then, this part of framing the part of the 'engaged writer', may be taken as a new 'focus' in the parisian 'space' of reflection. - Of a reflection whose inscription in that 'action' of which the earlier theory and fiction were two complementary 'abstracted' sides, Sartre himself exemplifies. Sartre finds himself as Writer succeeding to Kojeve's position as Reader. Finds himself in, and accepts, chooses, the part of framing.
the french order of action, and of his part of Choice in it.

- A focus, then, between, say, Qu'est-ce que la Littérature in 1947, and the break with his colleague on Les Temps Modernes, Merleau-Ponty, over the question of commitment to Communism at the close of the Korean War in 1953. Between the break between French 'existentialism' and Heidegger in 1947, and Sartre's visit to Freiburg in 1953 (and the French translation of the Letter on Humanism).


... A space of around 1950, though, which frames the passage from the German invasion of 1940 and Sartre's transcription of the Heideggerian correlation of Da-Sein and Sein in the frame of action, to the comparable transition around 1960... or which frames the wider transition from around 1930 to around 1970... and from the opening of Kojève's Cours in 1933 to the Events at Nanterre in 1967. Sartre as embodying the focal figure of 'I', of the Subject, in this space in which he framed this his part.

I have suggested that, in general, an 'action' may be articulated in the symmetry, and associated dynamic (synchrony and associated dialectic or diachrony) of the 'dimensions' of a space of action which meet in the figure of 'I' as central organizing pole. In the minimal case we thus find the elementary act of 'embodying' this 'I', which applies symmetrically to everyone incarnate on this Globe. In a group this common figure frames a mirroring in 'human interaction' of 'inner' orders of the 'perspectives' on the group of the various members, and 'outer' orders of the 'economy' of their interaction. In the limiting 'physical' order of the member's interaction, for example the different optical 'perspectives' of the members are different perspectives on a common 'space' in which they are coordinated as an objective configuration of 'points of view' - different perspectives on the same configuration of these different pers-
pectives. This 'outward' space, framing the sartrian regard by which we see our selves as also the object of regards in a common optical space, is itself one side of a 'cultural' space of 'perceptions' of the different perceptions, in a group, of the 'space' of these different perceptions. The 'intellectual' space now under discussion, in which Sartre (I have suggested) plays a 'focal' part around the mid-century, is then simply the 'other side' of the physical space in which the parisian intellectuals interact (the 'other side', that is, of the cultural space 'from' the physical side). And to some extent we can abstract interaction in this 'logical' space of reflection (upon the different 'perspectives' of the others 'in' a common 'space' of terms, and a more or less common 'logic' or dynamic of questions and answers) from the wider mirroring of it - as more or less formal frame - in the ideological or linguistic ('discursive') interface of theory and cultural interaction, and the further mirroring of this ideological interface and interaction in the 'material economy' of that Culture.

In 1953, Lacan identifies two significant steps towards his 'perspective' as then enunciated. The first is the step of recognising the central part of the 'stade du miroir' as frame of identification from which the child's and then adult's 'identity' unfolds - this 'stage' itself an initial unfolding of two 'sides', two 'spaces' indeed, of the mirror, and of the body mirrored. The coordination of these in the child's action, and in the related 'mimetism' of others' actions (most particularly, the mother's), frames the child's access to more complex orders of activity. Physical self-assertion in front of the mirror is itself a mirroring of the psychological order of assertion, and the whole configuration an access to the figure or function of 'I'. This figure of 1936 was followed in 1945 (in an article in Les Cahiers d'Art: Le Temps Logique et l'Assertion de Certitude Anticipée) by the inscription of this 'binary' symmetry of the subject and his action in a ternary order: three prisoners are told that one of five discs (three white, two black) will be fixed to their backs. The first to correctly deduce his own colour and report it at the door of the cell will go free. All three are then given white discs. Each prisoner, seeing two other whites, considers: if I were black each of the others, seeing my black and a white, and seeing that the other did not immediately upon his initial regard move to the door, knows that he cannot be a black. But after this first temps de com-
prendre, still neither leaves. So I cannot be black. All three, therefore, in the ideal articulation of the situation in two phases of regard and reflection, move together towards the door. In the 'real' situation this 'logical time' articulates a more complex 'diachrony' of the complementary moments of regard. Such a dynamic is obviously enough articulated within the primary binary order of identification within the same 'space' of regard as Sartre's discussion of the third person seeing - and seen to see - two others seeing each other. More particularly it provides Lacan with a formal frame in which to inscribe the oedipal phase (around three years) within the structure of identification, and interaction of child and mother elaborated in the 'mirror phase'. Within this scheme, as Lacan notes in a second paper on the mirror phase presented to the second Marienbad congress (1949), Anna Freud's discussion of The Eco and its Mechanisms of Defence can be articulated within a genetic order of unfolding of structures of identification, back through which the 'I' regresses (into 'madness') when a later more complex structure breaks down:

Ainsi se comprend cette inertie propre aux formations du je ou l'on peut voir la définition la plus extensive de la névrose: comme la captation du sujet par la situation donne la formule la plus générale de la folie... (1)

Thus can be understood that inertia rooted in the structure of I in which may be seen the widest definition of neurosis: just as the trapping of subject in situation provides the most general scheme of madness...

- The trapping of the subject in a situation: in a frame trapping the subject in a certain part which cannot question that frame... in a closed circuit of a structure of 'I' which frames its situation so as to restrict the subject, within it, to that very structure. And psychosis amounts, then, to a regression beyond the oedipal 'structure' and its ternary symmetry, to the 'mirror phase'.

Now this short passage follows a comparison with Sartre's analogous characterisation, by then developed into the 'existential psychoanalysis' which traced a 'part' back through structures of choice - back to the symmetry of two 'I's elaborated by Sartre

1: Ecrits, p99
over the same period (from 1936) as Lacan's complementary account.

- An 'existential psychoanalysis' applied at mid-century to Baudelaire and to 'Saint Genet, Comédien et Martyre'. A life structured as a novel, one choice leading to the configuration of the next choice.

Sartre's 'I', notes Lacan, framing itself in the 'système perception-conscience' is itself embedded in a deeper structure of méconnaissance, of which the originary abstraction of the 'I', in the coordination of action and image, from the structure of specular inversion in which this coordination is articulated, may be taken as a primary image. This 'I', finding itself in that coordination (and only at a much later phase being even able to frame the symmetry of that initial self-discovery), is a function rooted in the 'mirror' in which the structure of action unfolds. The 'transcendental subjectivity' in which Sartre has framed the 'subject' as the identification of that subjectivity in one term in it, and in which the coordination of this subject-term with other terms, in action, is framed, is itself the abstraction of one 'side' from the more radical order of coordination, which is then inscribed, as the structure of action, in that side.

That is: the 'space' or 'field' of consciousness is abstracted from its interface, in the mirror for example, with a converse or inverse order of objects, and this symmetry is then inscribed in the subjective 'space' which has been abstracted from it. The coordination of subject-term and other terms in this 'subjective' space thus frames a certain 'part' or dynamic of the embodied sartrian subject:

... une liberté qui ne s'affirme jamais si authentique que dans les murs d'une prison, une exigence d'engagement où s'exprime l'impuissance de la pure conscience à surmonter aucune situation, une idéalisation voyeuristique-sadique du rapport sexual, une personnalité qui ne se réalise que dans le suicide, une conscience de l'autre qui ne se satisfait que par le meurtre hégélien. (1)

... a freedom which never affirms itself more authentically than within prison walls, a demand for engagement which
reflects the powerlessness of pure consciousness to master any situation, a voyeuristic-sadistic idealisation of sexual relations, a personality realised only in suicide, a consciousness of the other which is satisfied only by hegelian murder.

The initial abstraction of 'subjectivity', of a transcendental field, from the mirror-symmetry identified by Lacan as radical frame of identification and action in 1936 (and its unfolding into the ternary oedipal symmetry of the regard) - this abstract frame then organises the choice articulated in it by sartrian 'identification' with one's part - that is, organises the sartrian diachrony or 'dialec'tic' of that frame of action, and the symptomatic impresses listed above. - This even though, within the initial abstraction of that frame, it is the configuration of questions attaching to subjects, objects, and their configurations in situations and actions, which is now asserted as primary: this primacy of 'engagement' in action, in the symmetries of action in which 'I' am only one term among others (other 'I's and other 'things'), is itself framed within the abstract 'phenomenological' space in which those terms are coordinated, the unquestioned space of their very syntax, their implicit logic.

What more radical space, then, does Lacan unfold from his radical discovery of 'I' in the symmetry of the mirror? Are not many of the key terms in his 1953 programme themselves governed by a 'phenomenological' syntax, by their coordination in that abstract space which Lacan has now brought into question? This 'fonction symbolique', for example, discussed by Merleau-Ponty in his paper on the Phenomenology of Language the previous year, and which Lacan frames in the équivoque of a double mouvement 'dans le sujet', an alternation of action and connaissance. Does not that Merleau-Pontian equivocation echo an equivocation between the space or language or syntax of parisiense 'dialectical' phenomenology in which Lacan frames his criticism of that space, and a space in which the symbolic order of mirroring of 'imaginary' and 'real' sides or spaces could be consistently inscribed?

Indeed we may see the transition from phenomenological language (and a phenomenology of language) in which the lacanian space of symmetry unfolding from the mirror and oedipal symmetries, and...
the associated critique of phenomenological abstraction, are them-
selves first framed, to the final framing of a lacanian 'space' or
language around 1970, in terms of the binary and ternary symmetry of
'real', 'imaginary' and 'symbolic' orders, as a characteristic com-
ponent of the wider change of 'focus' from 'phenomenology' to 'struct-
uralism' around 1960. This transition then appears as a sort of 're-
stolt' (that is, itself, 'structural') shift in apperception of the
parisian 'frame' of reflection, from the 'structural' criticism of
the 'phenomenological' frame from within, to the inscription of the
structure of phenomenological abstraction - the structure of 'consti-
tution' of that dominant frame of around 1950 - in the new frame of
a 'structure' or symmetry typified by the neo-saussurian coordination
of syntagmatic and paradigmatic, or diachronic and synchronic, axes
of language.

1950: I have sketched the circuit of Sartre's framing of
his part of framing a parisian 'space' of action. - A circuit whose
closure, abstracted from the wider phenomenological or subjectivist
'space' in whose syntax it is first framed, determines the radical part
of the 'subjectiv' self-inscription in that radical circuit as 'commit-
ment'. The dynamic or 'dialectic' of Sartre's part of 'committed'
Writer over the mid-century led, as I have noted, to the eventual for-
mal break with Merleau-Ponty on the question of commitment to the com-
munist side in the Korean War. This break, paralleled by Merleau-
Ponty's new appointment at the Collège de France, may itself, I have
suggested, be regarded as one component of a first step out of the
configuration of 1950. 1950 - when Merleau-Ponty was appointed to
a professorship at the Sorbonne - might be taken as a critical point
in the divergence which led through 1953 to Merleau-Ponty's open cri-
icism of Sartre in 1955, paralleled by Simone de Beauvoir's open
criticism of the Professor in Les Temps Modernes - which Merleau-
Ponty had himself effectively co-edited with Sartre until 1950.

For in Merleau-Ponty's opening lectures at the Sorbonne,
on Les Sciences de l'Homme et la Phénoménologie we may see the cir-
cuit of commitment in which Sartre has just found his part doubled
or complemented by a similar circuit as frame of question, and of
reflection in general. Within the same 'phenomenological' space of
subjectivity as that in which Sartre eventually closes the circuit
of commitment, assertion, Merleau-Ponty had himself been unfolding
'The Structure of Action (Comportement)' from the interface of subject and World of objects in the Body. His initial inscription of this structure, unfolded in the genetic order of developmental psychology framed in a 'transcendental field', preceded by a year Sartre's parallel framing of action within the field of transcendental subjectivity in 1943. Merleau-Ponty's systematic articulation of the structure of 'intersubjectivity' as primary frame of coordination of the individual perspectives that discover themselves in a common cultural space and time, in 1945, doubles Sartre's post-war frame of 'commitment' in joint work on Les Temps Modernes until 1950. But from that point on Merleau-Ponty's systematic questioning or reflection, and Sartre's systematic engagement diverge. When Merleau-Ponty's questioning and Sartre's activity have as it were together reached that circuit or frame of questioning and action which is the radical interface of the complementary orders of theory and action still some way apart in, for example, the sartrian theory and the sartrian theatre of 1943, then the area of Merleau-Ponty's agreement with Sartre's action, and Sartre's sharing of Merleau-Ponty's questioning, has become the merely formal sharing of a circle, an interface without breadth or content, which will itself be broken, as it were, in 1953: there will no longer be even a common interface of the contracting frame of Sartre's abstraction from reflection, and Merleau-Ponty's growing detachment.

Around 1950, though, the focal part of Sartre's assertion as 'I', as author, writer, in the frame of writing identified in this writing, is directly complemented by Merleau-Ponty's coordination of language as the frame of human interaction, and the human sciences which question the various dimensions of that primary order of interaction. Around 1970, analogously, it is Jacques Derrida's framing of questioning in the radical order of the text which as it were doubles the closed circuit of Lacan's inscription in language of a discourse on the inscription of discourse in language. And just as Merleau-Ponty will frame his disagreement with Sartre in 1955 in the coordination of the elementary circuit of 'pre-reflexive cogito' and the wider space of sartrian theory in the circuit and dialectic of a commitment which abstracts from a radical questioning, so will Derrida in his turn criticise the closed circuit of lacanian elements and theory reflected in the inscription of the 'I' in a closed circuit of signification - in a particular text.
through the years when De Gaulle was engaged with the Algerian Question, a shift of focus that leads from Sartre’s framing of his part around 1950 to Lacan’s framing of his part around 1970, and from Merleau-Ponty’s questions around 1950 to Derrida’s around 1970.

Thus, for example, at the Cerisy colloquium (that annual focus of Parisian discussion) of 1959, significantly directed to the question of Génèse et Structure (which Hyppolite had already raised in 1946 in relation to the ‘synchronic’ and ‘diachronic’ or ‘dialectic’ orders of Hegel’s phenomenology) the young Jacques Derrida posed the question of genetic and structural dimensions of that husserlian field or space of transcendental subjectivity in which Merleau-Ponty had framed ‘intersubjectivity’ as primary (referring this assertion of primacy to le dernier Husserl whose manuscripts he had studied at Louvain after the war... but ‘the repeated quotation of a Husserl statement to the effect that ‘transcendental subjectivity is an intersubjectivity’... supposedly contained in the unpublished sections of Husserl’s Krisis articles, cannot be traced in this form... and the passages which come closest to it clearly indicate the prerogative of transcendental subjectivity over transcendental intersubjectivity’(1)).

- How was the framing of the space of ‘transcendental subjectivity’, in which the structure of intersubjectivity was to be unfolded, itself to be inscribed in the structural and genetic (synchronic and diachronic) frame of the ‘empirical’ order, between which and the ‘transcendental’ order this frame of ‘intersubjectivity’ was to be the interface. For to frame this abstraction of transcendental subjectivity in terms of the husserlian or merleau-pontian dynamic of intersubjective History directed by a sort of kantian Idea was to argue in a circle, and to find only what one had put into History as the abstract ‘direction’ which articulated it in a presupposed transcendental subjectivity, as explaining the constitutive abstraction from History of that subjectivity.

La question de la possibilité de la réduction transcendental-ale ne peut être en attente de sa réponse. Elle est la

1: Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, vol 2, p517n1
question de la possibilité de la question, l'ouverture elle-même, la béance à partir de laquelle le transcendantal... est convoqué à s'interroger sur tout.. (1)

The question of the possibility of the transcendental reduction cannot depend upon its answer. It is the question of the possibility of the question, the very opening, the gap, in which the transcendental I... is called to question everything..

Everything: including the 'constitution' of this abstraction itself. How – in particular – is introduced, in a differential space of signs or terms (in the linguistic frame of intersubjectivity as interface between empirical and transcendental sides or spaces... with their corresponding orders of diechrony or genesis) the distinction of transcendental and empirical: in what space is that distinction made.. what is its structure and genesis... its diachrony, which is inscribed in the 'transcendental' space as the very project of 'phenomenology'?

The distinction must be presupposed in order to be framed. But if we posit the difference, we also posit an inscription of that 'transcendental' difference in a different empirical difference from and in which it asserts its difference: these are two sides of the difference of the two sides ambiguously marked in language:

La raison.. est la parole comme auto-affection: le s'entendre-parler. Il sort de soi pour se reprendre en soi, dans le 'présent-vivant' de sa présence à soi. Sortant de lui-même, le s'entendre-parler se constitue en histoire de la raison par le détour d'une écriture. Il se différencie ainsi pour se réapproprier. L'origine de la géométrie décrit la nécessité de cette exposition de la raison dans l'inscription mondaine. Exposition indispensable à la constitution de la vérité et de l'idéalité des objets mais aussi menace du sens par le dehors du signe. (2)

Reason... is speech as self-affection: hearing-oneself-speak. It goes out of itself to be in itself, in the 'living-pre-
sent' of its presence to itself. Going out of itself, hearing oneself-speak constitutes itself as the history of reason by the detour of writing. It thus differs from itself (or: defers itself) to re-appropriate itself. The Origin of Geometry describes the necessity of this exposition of reason in its worldly inscription. An exposition indispensable to the constitution of truth and of the ideality of objects, but also a meaning at risk in the other side of the sign.

The Origin of Geometry: an essay of the 'dernier Husserl' written to complement Die Krise der europäischer Wissenschaften und die transzendentalen Phänomenologie (upon which Merleau-Ponty placed such emphasis, and from which he 'transcribed', so to speak, the scheme of 'intersubjectivity') in 1936, and published by Fink in 1939. In it Husserl confronts the historical relativism or 'historicism' that would have to determine the greek constitution of a euclidean spatio-temporal frame in a history that is itself—timelessly—framed in this space and time. In 1962, in a long introduction to his translation of this essay, Derrida extends his 1959 analysis of the 'constitution' of an abstract reason—the structure and genesis of its 'project'—in a more radical order of writing, of the sign. By 1967 he has passed to a systematic framing of 'phenomenology'—of the synchrony and diechrony of the phenomenological space and project (in La Voix et le Phénomène) within the more radical space of 'Writing and Difference' (to take the title of the 1967 collection of essays from that of 1959 already cited, down to 1966—paralleling Lacan's collection of Ecrits in the latter year). The space, to take the title of yet another of his publications of 1967, of a 'grammatology' (rather than a 'phenomenology').

...The 'space': rather, now a 'space-time' in which genetic and structural dimensions are complementary, so that a particular 'genesis' or 'structure' is recognised as an abstraction from their more radical coordination in a 'grammatical' order. A 'space-time': or indeed, rather a 'time-space' articulated as that triple order of past, present and future from which Husserl's 'phenomenology of internal time-consciousness' and its 'transcription' at the close of Merleau-Ponty's Phénoménologie de la Perception is the inscription in the 'space' of subjectivity, that 'space' of presence, of a more
radical 'present' in which the three axes of past, future, and 'temporal' present (the image of the more radical present in the mirroring of 'protension' and 'retention' of sense) are inscribed. A time-space, then, of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, which thus appears as the imaginary doubling of real, 'empirical', physical, space-time.

But can we not, now, discover a more radical order of synchrony-diachrony, of which this 'phenomenology', this inscription in the transcendental order of a difference which distinguishes itself from the empirical order of spatial and temporal separation, is one side, so to speak - one side abstracted from the mirroring of transcendental and empirical in that order of the sign whose inscription in the 'transcendental' order of pure subjectivity would be Merleau-Ponty's projected 'phenomenology of language'?

- For Derrida's identification of the constitutive circuit by which a 'transcendental' order of distinction distinguishes itself from what it thus defines as a converse 'empirical' order - this 'deconstruction' of phenomenology or inscription of its 'constitution' in a more-radical order of questioning ('deconstruction' itself, then, the 'deconstruction' of phenomenological 'constitution') - is itself the reconstitution (so to speak) of the more radical frame from which the phenomenological 'space' and 'time' of distinction 'in' transcendental subjectivity has itself been abstracted, 'in' which phenomenology as a project has itself been framed, constituted.

The move from phenomenology to grammatology presents a familiar figure: a logical or psychological framing of the interface of this order of distinction (this 'space') and a physical 'space' in which the distinction of this order from the physical order of difference is marked (by a physical difference) is itself, in turn, inscribed in the order of mirroring of logical and physical, of which the logical definition is now identified as only one side, as an image abstracted from the more radical 'poetic' order.

In this case Merleau-Ponty's inscription of the interface of 'transcendental' and 'empirical' in the transcendental order, as the framing of questions, of inquiry, phenomenology, as the 'logical' side of the project of History (the latter identified as the diachronic axis of intersubjectivity as primary frame or space of questions
and determinations), is itself questioned, as to its constitution in that 'History', in that 'intersubjective' 'space' and 'time' which this phenomenology itself frames as primary. - As primary frame of questions, and so as frame of the question of this framing, this 'phenomenology' which frames it as primary, itself.

The analysis of the constitution, then, of that 'phenomenological' space and time, structure and genesis - the 'deconstruction' of phenomenology - itself constitutes (to use another heideggerian expression associated like 'destruction' or 'deconstruction' of the historical constitution of the 'metaphysical' project that eventually becomes 'phenomenology') a 'step back' to the more radical space or space-time which has been inscribed within phenomenology - within one of its sides. The 'deconstruction' of the various terms or structures or geneses inscribed at a certain point in the metaphysical 'project' of Reason in the articulation of a 'transcendental subjectivity', in that pure 'interiority', that pure imaginary order or imagination, - this itself amounts to a transcription from such images of configurations of the more radical space-time in one 'side' (or rather in an image of that 'side') to the more radical configurations upon which these 'images' are as it were metaphysical 'perspectives', coordinated in the frame of the phenomenological 'space' of subjectivity.

We must proceed, then, to the deconstruction of the metaphysics of language, in order to discover the radical grammatical space-time from which it abstracts, and which is itself, in turn, inscribed in the order of that abstraction. A 'deconstruction' of the metaphysics of language - of which a 'phenomenology of language' provides for Derrida an exemplary figure - will discover a more radical order by finding in the image the very configuration of the abstraction in which that image is 'constituted'. We can as it were restore the missing dimension elided in the 'metaphysical' perspective, by discovering in the metaphysical image an image of the projection or transcription in which it has been constituted.

What, then, of the primary frame of this 'grammatology' itself, the frame of this work in general? First of all we must unfold the 'space' and time of what we may call 'writing' (in some as yet problematic sense) from the simple opening-up of that radical 'frame 'marked' in some sense (again problematic) by the initial quest-
ion of its difference - its difference from the transcendental and empirical orders of differentiation of transcendental (or more generally, 'metaphysical') and empirical (or physical). The mark, as marking that radical arôrie or impasse of Reason, is itself the σήμα through which Derrida's inquiry must pass.

Mark, language: Saussure's 'space-time' of the differential elements of language, dating from the same period, at the turn of the century, as the husserlian project (and the parallel framing of spatio-temporal 'action' as element of empirical or physical space-time) is itself, Derrida finds, framed in the same 'metaphysics of the voice' already identified in Husserl's writing. The Reason, λόγος, identified in 1959 as a 'hearing-onerself-speak' that 'goes out of itself to be in itself' and 'constitutes itself as the history of reason by the detour of writing' - this very 'logic' or rationality frames Saussure's 'difference', his differential space of language, in a preliminary 'phonology' coupled with the abstraction from writing which opens the Cours. - An abstraction from the graphical or grammatical space and time of a writing which simply mirrors the differential space of signifiants (outer phonetic 'space') in the differential space of signifiés (inner conceptual space). - Writing, then, as a transparency of writing as visible interface of signifiant and signifié - a transparency amounting to the abstraction from the order of differentiation of these two orders themselves, from the complementary inscriptions of their difference in each order (from the marking of these two 'sides' 'in' language)... an abstraction from the 'difference' of phonetic and conceptual difference, in the assertion of l'arbitraire du signe.

We may then 'deconstruct' the complementary 'inner' conceptual and 'outer' physical space and time, synchrony and diachrony, of difference, by inscribing Saussure's 'phonology' in the dynamic of a more radical différence - with its complementary aspects of space of distinctions and time of deferral. - In a complementarity seen already in the correlation of the phenomenological project of articulation of the mirroring of inner and outer in an 'inner' space of subjectivity, with a deferral of the question of the possibility of that project underwritten, so to speak, by the inscription of that time of deferral in the supposed space of distinctions in terms of the unitary finality
of Reason.

What then...is...this more radical order of writing, of a
grammatology of which any 'science of language' is a metaphysical
image framed in the abstraction of Reason? Derrida finds it in a
dynamic of differentiation of inner and outer of which the closed
frame of a book - of 'writing' in the traditional sense - is itself
but an image or instance, inscribed in a wider order of differentia-
tion in which it is thus differentiated from that wider order:

Origine de l'expérience de l'espace et du temps, cette
écriture de la différence, ce tissu de la trace permet à
la différence entre l'espace et le temps de s'articuler,
d'apparaître comme telle dans l'unité d'une expérience (d'un
'même' vécu à partir d'un 'même' corps propre). Cette art-
iculation permet donc à une chaîne graphique ('visuelle' ou'
tactile', 'spatiale') de s'adapter, éventuellement de façon
linéaire, sur une chaîne parlée ('phonique', 'temporelle').
C'est de la possibilité première de cette articulation qu'il
faut partir. La différence est l'articulation. (1)

The origin of the experience of space and time, this writing
of difference, this web of the trace, allows the articula-
tion of the difference between space and time, allows it to
appear as such in the unity of an experience (of a 'same' ex-
perience of a 'same' body). This articulation thus allows
a graphic chain ('visual' or 'tactile', 'spatial') to be
correlated, perhaps in a linear manner, with a spoken chain
('phonetic', 'temporal'). It is from the initial possibility
of this articulation that we must start. Difference is art-
iculation.

An order of difference, then: an irreducible or 'original'
coordination of differences, an 'initial' differentiation of 'inner'
and 'outer', a coordination of their complementary 'spaces' and 'times'
in an irreducible actuality in which we find ourselves, differentiate
ourselves in various ways. A 'schematism', perhaps...

1: De la Grammatologie p96
l'apparition et le fonctionnement de la différence supposent une synthèse originaire qu'aucune simplicité ne précède. Tellement serait donc la trace originaire. Sans une rétention dans l'unité minimale de l'expérience temporelle, sans une trace retenant l'autre comme autre dans le même, aucune différence ne ferait son œuvre et aucun sens n'apparaîtrait. Il ne s'agit donc pas ici d'une différence constituée mais, avant toute détermination du contenu, du mouvement pur qui produit la différence. La trace (pure) est la différence. (1)

...But just where, so to speak, are these 'origins', these 'initials', this 'precedence'... this 'in'? 'In a minimal unity of temporal experience'...a 'minimal unity': an 'element', perhaps? And what is the frame of a supposition of an order 'in' which this irreducibility or minimality differs from impossible simplicity or prior priority? When is 'before' any determination of content, what is this 'purity'? Something unmarked, with no trace of contagion or contingency? Where does a 'pure' movement 'take place'... Out of what does it 'produce' difference?

Derrida is himself conscious of the interface and interplay of old space and time and new in his writing. Grammatology, indeed... the first part of the book (if we begin at the beginning...), a Discours de la Methode, as it were, closes:

Grammatolologie, cette pensée se tirerait encore muee dans la présence. (1)
As grammatical this reflection is still imprisoned in presence.

In 'presence', that space in which the mark, trace, opens into another space, of writing. But at first the opening-up of the new space must (since we need quite a lot of words, structures, images, to describe this initial point or mark itself) itself be framed largely in the 'space' of distinctions which it brings 'into question'. Itself first understood, in particular, as a 'project', a projected 'grammatology' in which the old space is considered in principle inscribed, an inscription and project whose elementary coordination is perhaps, in some still more radical *aporia* than that encountered in the old space of 'presence', reasonable enough in the old order of finality, but not in the new. Grammatology itself seems not so much (then) a new frame, as the articulation of the radically unstable interface of \( \phi \eta \mu \mu \) and \( \lambda \gamma \nu \sigma \). The process of deconstruction must itself be carried on in a partly un-deconstructed language or space, in the 'axis' (to use the word Derrida chooses at the outset to recognise the linear order or direction of his inquiry) of a finality which has itself, at the very 'outset', been called into question. Inquiry, the dynamic of questioning of which the transparent finality of Re-son is the image in the space of traditional abstraction must still somehow answer Nietzsche's questioning of the value of Truth, the morality, so to say, of theory, reflection.

The inscription of a classical space of determinations in a more 'radical' space or space-time of the 'sign' from which the former is then seen as an abstraction - the abstraction of a certain order of coordination which is then framed as a 'space' of coordinates (that movement Husserl had analysed 'phenomenologically' in *The Origin of Geometry*) is, in particular, coordinated with other dimensions of this 'sign' in a space and time, a synchrony and diachrony, that have themselves not yet been 'transcribed'. For the 'old' synchrony and diachrony must themselves, in a transitional 'phase' frame that 'transcription'. More particularly, this 'impurity' of the new frame (which, paradoxically, attaches directly to Derrida's 'pure' trace and movement as framing *difference*) may be.. traced.. in that coordination of 'ideological', 'cultural' and 'economic' orders of the sign
(of symbolic exchange) which, from 1949, has served as a model for the articulation of a new 'structuralist' space and project of inquiry in those various orders. Lévi-Strauss' framing of the three correlated 'spaces' of language, kinship and material economy, is itself determined by the saussurian abstraction of 'inner' and 'outer' spaces of language from their interface, determined as simple mirror of two sides, two homologous spaces coupled by the arbitraire du signe. This determination of the space of language and néro/e/détit as transparent interface is thus carried over to an analogous determination of the cultural interface of language and material economy. Thus the criticism or deconstruction of Husserl and Saussure may now be transposed from the determination of writing as transparent mirror of signifiant and signifié (or, to take Saussure's image, signifiant and signifié as two sides of a common space, in a piece of paper, bounded by a closed curve) to the determination of Culture as mirror of this order of language in an economy of Nature which is its mirror-image. To a determination of writing, then (in Lévi-Strauss), as something which intervenes to disrupt the 'natural' inscription of Culture in Nature which, in an order of 'primitivity' which doubles the converse finality of entendre-parler and 'natural' reason, is assigned to an historically 'original' order of society... without writing, without Arts and Sciences, the Law a sort of Social Contract between free men, noble savages.

Now Lévi-Strauss, around 1960, was asserting just such a rousseauisme. This significantly, as Rousseau marks a turning point in the configuration of the Age of Reason, of that Brogue Classique between Louis XIV and the Revolution whose opening constitution of the 'subject', prefigured in philosophy by Descartes, had been analysed by Foucault and Barthes (in Histoire de la Folie à l'Age Classique and Sur Racine) in the latter part of that phase of transition from 'fifties to 'sixties parisian 'space', to which I have already assigned Derrida's first book (his edition of L'Origine de la Géométrie). Thus Derrida passes from his 'Discourse on Method', the first section of De la Grammatologie, through a discussion of Lévi-Strauss' 'rousseauisme' to the 'deconstruction' of the appearance or initial constitution of this configuration of 'phonology' and 'primitivism' in Saussure's fellow gènévois.
TEXT BOUND INTO

THE SPINE
A text of Rousseau's, L'Essai sur l'Origine des Langues, dating from the central productive period of Rousseau's writing, around 1760 (Rousseau refers to this manuscript as just ready in 1761), will serve as matrix for the 'deconstruction' of the primary configuration of différence, in which the abstraction from 'writing' as transparent interface of abstract reason and the outward 'empirical' order of sound (as interface, difference, of those two complementary orders of difference - those two orders of their difference - coupled by l'arbitraire du signe) is coupled with the abstraction from the analogous interface of that writing, and a 'natural' economy, in 'Culture'. We might schematise this configuration as follows:

This graphical configuration embodying as it were in the physical space of this page what has been already identified in the verbal 'space' of these words. Derrida, although confining himself in De la Grammaotologie to the latter space of 'writing' in the restricted sense, yet inscribed such traditional 'writing' (in the traditional written order of his text) in a wider order - identifying the domain of 'language' with 'World'. In particular, to 'texte' as grammatical analogue of saussurian parole or of Levi-Strauss' redcit, corresponds, in general, a radical texture of the World (or the deconstruction of 'World', whatever 'that' may turn out to be or not to be. Derrida would appear to be committed to 'Experience'), of which the configuration of a 'written' text in the restricted sense of
'written' (of Rousseau's Essai or Derrida's 'own' book) is but one order. - Is just that order of abstraction of 'writing' in the restricted sense (and 'books' in particular) from the more general configuration, which repeats the abstraction of Reason from a supposedly transparent 'expression' in such books. Indeed such a determination of the 'text' as simply book, and the books in which Reason articulates this determination constitute inseparable components of the simple circuit of abstraction of this 'Reason' from 'Writing' in Derrida's radical sense.

In particular, Derrida inscribes the part of the 'text' in the restricted sense in the wider 'textuality' which is as it were the writing of Rousseau's life, reflected, through the configuration of this inscription, in the 'autobiographical' movement succeeding the configuration of narrower and wider 'texts' around 1760. In particular the detour through writing as a 'supplement' to s'entendre-parler is directly coupled in the 'textuality' of Jean-Jacques Rousseau to the sexual 'supplementation' of Jean-Jacques' simple existence. That is to say: Rousseau's texts (or text: the figure of the text - in the restricted sense - 'in' Rousseau) themselves express the configuration of such text, writing, in the wider textuality of their subject matter (of which, most particularly after 1763, they come to be central components). We can 'deconstruct' the traditional figures of 'text', by seeing how, for example, Rousseau's text (as a figure in the wider 'textuality' of Rousseau) expresses its 'textuality' through the account it gives of the configuration of text (which it embodies) in that textuality. We can reconstruct this 'textuality' by seeing how the abstraction of the text which describes this textuality (and its part in it) itself articulates this description.

Rousseau inscrit donc la textualité dans le texte. (1)

Rousseau thus inscribes textuality in the text

... And we cannot 'account' for this configuration of the Rousseau text, while remaining in the same 'abstract' order, the same abstraction, of text from textuality. We cannot, for example, 'account' for, give a satisfactory account of, Rousseau's text(s) by
inscribing that configuration of text and textuality in another order of identification of this same textuality, which in an analogous movement of abstraction of (its) text from textuality, constitutes an inscription of Rousseau's text in some 'hors-texte' - for example in the order of some 'biography' in which the texts are inscribed... most particularly in a psychoanalysis of the part of Rousseau's text in an analogous sexuality which does not recognise itself as textuality.

Il n'y a pas de hors-texte. (1)

There is nothing beside the text.

And this deconstruction of the traditional figure of 'text' will be exemplified by the discovery of its 'textuality' in that Rousseau text which frames simply language and writing itself, L'Essai sur l'Origine des Langues. That text which, in framing the text, and writing generally, as interface of inner meaning and outer expression, and framing Culture as analogous interface of such language and the natural economy of a society or group of men and women and children, confirms its account of 'textuality' by defining its own configuration of accounting as one order of the account it gives. And we can discover a radical textuality as order of correlation of determination of writing in the account, and the writing of this account.

Si nous considérons, selon le propos axial de cet essai, qu'il n'y a rien hors du texte, notre ultime justification serait donc la suivante: le concept de supplément et la théorie de l'écriture designe, comme on dit si souvent aujourd'hui, en abyme, la textualité elle-même dans le texte de Rousseau. (2)

If we consider, according to the axial thesis of this essay, that there is nothing besides text, our ultimate justification would be the following: the concept of supplement and the theory of writing indicate, as we so often say nowadays,
as a gap, textuality itself in Rousseau's text.

... Why Rousseau? Is this attempt to discover textuality in a particular text some sort of inversion of the attempt to inscribe language and text, writing, in a 'transcendental' space of generality? Is it an empirical attempt to find 'the text' in that other side, that outer 'empirical' space, which appears in the transcendental project as a sort of 'supplementary' space though which analysis must pass, although at the origin the movement into that outward order is generated out of an 'inner' necessity, which as it were prefigures and guarantees a final return, as the detour closes in the inscription of its whole configuration in the 'inner' space and time?

... Well...that inversion of the transcendental order is at work here. But we can of course no more abstract the 'difference' difference which transcendental phenomenology must posit in order to identify itself, from the difference of these two differences, from their différence, their unstable differing rooted in a detour and deferral that may at any moment be interrupted, called in question. than we can abstract the converse transcendental difference of transcendental and empirical differences between transcendental and empirical orders, from the play of différence.

... Why Rousseau, then, if we are not engaging in a purely formal determination of this order of différence, texte, écriture, but not in a converse empirical determination of the working of a certain configuration, either?

- Well, simply because, in the interplay of these converse orders in which we find ourselves, in the 'historical' space and time in which Reason is at once 'empirically' inscribed in a certain circuit of abstraction, and yet irreducibly implicit in our very framing of this abstraction, Rousseau's text on The Origin of Languages constitutes, in its 'textuality', a primary coordinate in Derrida's mapping of those primary dimensions of 'textuality' in which Rousseau's text and Derrida's - these texts each framing a common textuality - find themselves.
A 'textuality' in which Rousseau's and Derrida's texts are two expressions, in the frame of a 'text' in the restricted sense (here: in a book), of the configuration of a wider textuality in which that frame of the text or book is one component. And in each case the circularity of the text which frames its part in framing the wider order of 'textuality', partakes of that figure of 'abstraction' of text from textuality, whose continuity from Rousseau's text to Derrida's links the two texts in a tradition which (traditionally) is framed as a History of Reason or Thought in the wider diachrony of 'textuality' which this Reason determines as rational History.

Now this tradition of abstraction - of the complicity, so to say, of Reason and History - is 'constituted' or framed in a double movement: the abstraction of 'pure' reflection or interiority from its interface with Culture (in language) is doubled by the abstraction of this linguistic or ideological interface from 'textuality' (in the widest sense) as its interface with the natural order of society, Culture. In the symmetry or duplication of the common figure of abstraction of one 'side' from an interface, from a radical 'difference' between its determination of the difference of two 'sides', and the other side of that difference (which, in defining the difference it must posit - as 'supplement') - in this doubling of the figure of abstraction - the figure itself, as it were, drops out of consideration. What I have called the 'logical' order of Reflection identifies itself in a double abstraction from its 'outside' (which I have called the 'physical' order). A double abstraction in which the 'poetic' order of the interface is doubled and elided.

Now this elision - textuality 'en abyme' in the text, as it were between the lines - can itself be discovered in the 'openness' that unfolds from the radical symmetry of two 'sides' of the interface, which must be posited in the framing of Reason, but which cannot be resolved. Différence appears as a purely nominal difference in, say, the symmetry of signifiant and signifié reflected in l'arbitraire du signe. Différence itself, then, appears as the radical frame of a questioning which opens out of what Derrida calls the space and time of 'presence' (or transcendental subjectivity) into the 'space' and 'time' - or 'space-time'/'time-space' of 'différence'. Différence cannot itself, in principle, be 'identified', 'defined',...
in the differential 'space' and 'time', the synchrony and diachrony, of 'presence'. For the coordination of the coordinates of that traditional space is itself organised by the inscription of subordinate differences within the primary difference of that 'space' of reflection or reason, and its 'other' side, its 'empirical' supplement. And 'différence' inscribed in the 'inner' side of this internal order of distinction or differentiation of 'inner' and 'outer', as a question - inscribed in the order of symmetry of 'inner' and 'outer' which cannot, in principle, be 'internally' resolved, systematically organises question within question as 'deconstruction' of the complementary order of difference within difference. And thus Derrida finds himself in the figure of the 'Critic' as locus of systematic questioning, corresponding to the traditional figure of 'I' as question. As question of the two 'sides' of the philosophical 'I', pure subjectivity and empirical embodiment, in the 'author' who, in some questionable sense, 'frames' a text, 'his' text.

Textuality, then, is first of all, like Merleau-Ponty's analogous historicity - of which it is in a sense the 'deconstruction' - a 'space-time' of questioning, a radical and primary openness in which the traditional circuits of abstraction, framed in the primary circuit of abstraction from the symmetry of 'transcendental' and 'empirical' distinction, may be articulated. In 1967 Derrida's 'part', the part of his text, in the 'textuality' in which it framed the abstraction of Rousseau's text, was not itself brought systematically into question. This more radical questioning, the opening up of 'deconstruction' as radically 'critical', and systematically self-critical, may be traced in the confrontation in early 1968 with Différence as a question - in a text framed in that very question ('What is différence?') (1) - through the confrontation with the systematic organization of différence in the two 'sides' of the textuality of a text in 1970 (2), towards the collection of texts from around 1970 in 1972 (3) and the publication of a text actually written directly 'in' the order of difference and textuality in 1974 (4).

1: La Différence, opening the selection of texts from 1967-72, Marques de la Philosophie (1972) 2: La Double Scène, repeated...in La Dissemination (1972) 3: Marques, La Dissemination, and Positions (interviews of 1967, 1968, 1971) 4: Glas
I have already suggested that this radical 'open-ness' framing Derrida's part of 'I' in the Parisian 'space' or synchrony of reflections, around 1970, is analogous to the part of Merleau-Ponty around 1950. And that this systematic questioning, framed in the textual inscription of text in 'textuality', is a sort of converse in the Parisian 'space' or 'space-time' of reflection, of Lacan's framing of his part of 'I' in the discursive inscription of his discourse in French 'language' - in that order which by 1970 is no longer identified as la langue, but rather as lelangue - in which 'reference' the 'identity' or 'reality' marked in lelangue by the word ('lalangue') which frames this order of its inscription, is as it were 'bracketed', brought into question - like l'enceinte (for example). Further, that this order of 'conversion' of Lacan's self-assertion as 'I' in lelangue, around 1970, and Derrida's contemporary systematic questioning, repeats in a more radical 'space' or 'space-time' of Parisian reflection, the complementarity of the parts of a committed Sartre and a critical Merleau-Ponty around 1950.

Thus far I have marked a first step from the configuration of 1950 to that of 1970, in which Lacan's 1953 'Discours de Ronce' is one component, and a last step from 1967 to 1970, in whose initial configuration Derrida's publications of that year constitute a component. I have noted how De la Grammatologie presents itself as a 'deconstruction' of the residual 'metaphysics of presence' embedded in the 'structuralism' framed in terms of the saussurian differential space-time of language as interface of psychological and cultural orders, correlating these, and through this correlation correlating its own 'differential' economy and the complementary 'natural' economy of a 'Culture' determined as the 'other' side (from thought) of language, as the space and time of the signifiant (of the vocalic signifiant, the vive voix embedded in the 'poetics' of cultural activity - and most particularly in its sexual order and the family as cultural frame). I suggested that the few years around 1960 - the years of De Gaulle's resolution of the Algerian Question - might be regarded as marking a shift of focus in the Parisian 'space' of reflection, and that Derrida's critique in 1967 of the residual 'metaphysics' of 'sixties 'structuralism' might be taken as a further step in the gradual transition from the 'phenomenology' of 1950.
to the refined 'structuralism' of 1970. I have suggested how the self-criticism, the 'deconstruction' of the deconstruction of 1967 (with its uneasy balance of old and new spaces and times - its 'concept' du supplément, its 'théorie' de l'écriture, its 'synthèse' originale, its 'unité minimale' de l'expérience temporelle, its mouvement 'pur' qui 'produit' la différence, its 'origine' de l'expérience de l'espace et du temps, its 'avant tout', its 'précède!', its 'possibilité première', its 'dans', its 'autre'... and so on and on in a 'project' which has not systematically questioned its own residue of the metaphysics it would inscribe in another 'space' and 'time' of différence.

Let us remain for a moment at 1967, and the 'deconstruction' of the saussurian 'space-time' of language. One 'side' of Derrida's project - the side which maintains the frame of the old 'space' and 'time' when inscribing that old space-time in a wider space-time of différence - amounts to the transcription or translation of the saussurian synchrony-diachrony of langue into the global space-time of textuality, the transcription of Saussure's phonemes, as minimal elements of the syntagmatic-paradigmatic chaîne, into 'trace originale', that 'synthèse originale qu'aucune similitude ne précède', that 'unité minimale de l'expérience temporelle' in its 'mouvement pur qui produit la différence', and the transcription of the interface or interplay of these two poles in saussurian parole, into en écriture of the texte, a space-time of différence and that suplémentation which, itself an element or theme in a text, as thème...

...n'est sans doute, à certains égard, qu'un thème parmi d'autres. Il est dans une chaîne, porté par elle. Peut-être pourrait-on lui substituer autre chose. Mais il se trouve qu'il décrit la chaîne elle-même, l'être-chaîne d'une chaîne textuelle, la structure de la substitution, l'articulation du désir et du langage, la logique de toutes les oppositions conceptuelles prises en charge par Rousseau. (1)

...is doubtless, in certain respects, only one theme among others. It is in a chain, supported by it. Perhaps one could substitute for it something else. But it turns out...
that it describes the chain itself, the way a textual chain is a chain, the structure of substitution, the articulation of desire and of language, the logic of all the conceptual oppositions taken up by Rousseau.

That is: langue-parole-phonème are transcribed into the textualité-texte-trace from which—and in which—analogous order the former 'space' and 'time', its phonetic elements and their interface in speech, are abstracted. Textuality the 'deconstruction' of language as it were, texte of parole, trace of phonème. In the restricted order of the linear text—Derrida's or Rousseau's, for example—the interface, the writing, from which signifiant and signifié are abstracted, is framed in differential space and time which closely parallels, in the order of 'différence', the conceptual and vocal 'space-times' of which it is to be considered the radical intermediary. The chaîne textuelle, like the chaîne marlée of Saussure's General Linguistics, is inscribed as linear chain in a matrix of possible substitutions articulated in the 'syntagmatic' axis of textual diachrony and the 'paradigmatic' axis of textual synchrony. As the 'text' is taken as the radical order of a différenciation from which complete spaces and times of conceptual and morphological 'difference' on either side are to be regarded as limiting poles of abstraction, so, perhaps, should the text be regarded as the radical order of that same différence from which a minimal 'trace pure' and global 'textualité' are themselves to be regarded as limiting abstractions of simplicity and complexity, formal poles. The Formalism of around 1930 was already working within a synchrony and diachrony of figuration of text or récit 'abstracted' so to speak from the exhaustive correlation of phonology and language as the two limits of the space and time in which the récit might be supposed articulated. And although Derrida 'theoretically' frames his new space-time in terms of elementary and global poles, the analysis to which he then proceeds is itself articulated within the figuration of text as primary, rather than as theoretically articulated in the interface of those two limiting orders of différence.

Those two poles, 'elementary' and 'global', minimal and maximal, of the spatiotemporality of différence. A minimal 'movement' of detour through the 'outward' space and time of empirical
difference, in which a minimal 'conceptual' differentiation is ef-

cected - this directly parallelling the elementary 'action' as ir-

creducible elementary component of the complementary 'physical' order

as identified contemporaneously with Saussure's phonology. A maximal

or global detour through the 'empirical' order or side of History as-

sociated with the framing of History in a unitary finality of Reason:

this directly parallelling the global 'relativistic' symmetry or ir-

reducible unity of 'space-time' identified contemporaneously with

Saussure's correlation of the synchronic and diachronic orders of

language as a whole. And the coupling of elementary and global or-
ders of language in the frame of the récit around 1930 directly para-

llelling the coupling of global and elementary 'physical' spatiotemp-

orality (global and elementary symmetries or frames of 'action' or

physical interaction) around that same time.

Dirac's coordination of the elementary order of quantum-

mechanical 'measurement' (articulated by Planck's minimal 'quantum'
of action) and the 'relativistic' global frame of 'observation',

around 1930, opens, I have suggested, that intermediate order of

human interaction of physicists on this Globe, which leads through

the mid-century to the attempt to extend Dirac's initial symmetry of

elementary and global symmetries of electromagnetic interaction, to

the general symmetry of global and elementary orders of (all inter-

action around 1970. Now the 'unfolding' of Dirac's initial coordin-

ation of elementary and global symmetries of physical 'action' or

'interaction' parallels, from the 'thirties to the 'sixties, the

analogous 'unfolding' of the psychological 'symmetries' of human

action and interaction. This first of all in the 'kojevian' space-
time of the 'thirties (the space-time of hegelian textuality so to

say), then in the 'phenomenology of 'forties and 'fifties, and finally

in the 'structuralist' space of the 'sixties. I have (thus) noted

Merleau-Ponty's unfolding of the symmetry or 'structure' of action

and interaction within a 'phenomenological' space-time of 'intersub-

jectivity' (criticised by Derrida in 1959) from 1942 (La Structure du

Comportement). And I have noted Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's comple-

mentary framings of action, intermediate between elementary percep-
tion and global World (and History), as primary frame of self-assertion

(engagement) and questioning, around 1950. I have also noted Lacan'
coordination, around 1950, of the binary symmetry of the 'mirror-phase' first framed in 1936, and the ternary symmetry of 'oedipal' intersubjectivity, first framed in 1945. The 'turning-point' or transitional phase, from a 'phenomenological' frame of Parisian reflection around 1950, to the 'structuralist' frame of around 1970, I have associated with Derrida's inscription as radical aporia in the phenomenological space, of the question of the 'constitution' of that space itself in the structure of human interaction which it framed as primary - this around 1960. And I have suggested that the move of radicalisation from the residual 'globality' of textuality, and complementary 'elementarity' of trace pure, which theoretically frame the 'space-time' of that différencé in whose order the unitary space-time (or time-space) of Saussure and Husserl are to be 'deconstructed', to a radical primacy of the text - the move, say, from *De la Grammatologie* to *La Double Séance*, from 1967 to 1970 - I have suggested that this move of radicalisation marks, as one component, the definitive abstraction (or perhaps concretion) of the *discourse* of 1970 from the phenomenological 'space-time' of 1950.

I have suggested that the axis of a certain questioning, from that of Merleau-Ponty around 1950 to that of Derrida around 1970 parallels or complements the axis which leads from Sartre's self-assertion in the figure of an 'I' which frames its own assertion in the Parisian space of 1950, to the analogous Lacanian figuration of 1970. And, as I have marked a 'last step' in the former axis of diachrony, from 1967 to 1970, so I have marked a 'first step' in the complementary axis, from 1950 to 1953, and Lacan's identification of Saussure's space-time of conceptual and phonetic difference as interface of 'subject' as formal pole of the 'imaginary' order of reflection, and oedipal frame of his social interaction with other subjects (corresponding to Levi-Strauss' correlation in *parole* as *récit* of 'primitive' subjectivity and the 'kinship' structure as frame of 'primitive' Culture).

Now Lacan's progress from 1953 to 1967 and 1970 (and 1973) involves successive moves of abstraction (or concretion) of the 'subject's' *parole* from its initial implication in Merleau-Ponty's correlation of Husserl's and Saussure's 'space-time/time-space' in a 'phenomenology' of what Lacan in 1953 calls, after Merleau-Ponty,
I have already shown how, in 1953, Lacan has identified the subject's parole merely as a 'chain' in the differential space-time of saussurian langue articulated in the syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes or coordination of phonemes in a strictly dual morphology of phonetic and conceptual sides of language - of signifiant and signifie. By 1967 Derrida has identified the place of the word supplément in the chaîne textuelle as that (whether or not another term may be substituted for 'supplément' in this central place) from which the axes and structures of substitution which articulate the text in the syntagmatic and paradigmatic matrix of textuality, unfold. The place of supplément in the web or matrix of 'textuality' itself marks that order of substitution in terms of which the saussurian axes and matrices of coordination of the 'space-time' of signifiants or signifiées are themselves 'defined':

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The order of the text, then, as interface of an 'elementary' trace and the global matrix of 'textuality' in which its 'chain' of traces is to be considered inscribed (like parole as interface of phoneme and langue), is to be considered to unfold from that 'place' in the general order of axes of substitution, which marks the structure or 'logic' of substitution itself. A place marked by the word supplément.

One axis of this unfolding, then, is the 'supplementation' of the 'space' of conceptual difference by the 'space' of empirical differences by which these conceptual differences are ('extrinsically', according to tradition) marked. Another is the time in which the circuits or detours of 'supplementation' are articulated, one within another, in the interplay of the two 'sides', inner and outer.
Saussurian or husserlian analysis of language must assume a difference of these two sides marked at the outset 'in' either side, a difference, a dimensionality of the space and time of either 'side', in which either side is to be supposed systematically framed, difference within difference, within the radical 'difference' which simply defines spatiotemporal 'separation' on either side - 'separation' of points or terms in either an ideal space and time of subjectivity or 'concepts', or a real space and time of physical marks by which such concepts are 'outwardly' distinguished. In the radical symmetry of these two 'sides' in the order of the text, complementary internal and external components of articulation of the text unfold from their coincidence in that order of the 'place' in the textual matrix marked by the word 'supplément'. And the corresponding articulation of the space-time of the text in the symmetry of internal and external 'spaces' and 'times' of subjective finality and objective efficiency is itself to be considered as abstracted from the wider symmetry and articulation of the order of 'experience' in which the 'text' of a book is embedded:

Origine de l'expérience de l'espace et du temps, cette écriture de la différence, ce tissu de la trace permet à la différence entre l'espace et le temps de s'articuler, d'apparaître comme telle dans l'unité d'une expérience (d'un 'même' vécu à partir d'un 'même' corps propre). Cette articulation permet donc à une chaîne graphique ('visuelle' ou 'tactile', 'spatiale') de s'adapter, éventuellement de façon linéaire, sur une chaîne parlée ('phonique', 'tempor-elle'). C'est de la possibilité première de cette articulation qu'il faut partir. La différence est l'articulation.

The order of the ideal finality, then, of vouloir-dire, is now embedded in an articulation du désir in which the text in the restricted sense is inscribed. And the text constitutes a model of the wider matrix of textuality (in the general sense of the matrix of 'experience': 'World', perhaps) in which the temporality of desire is coupled with the 'subject's' framing of his or her 'place' in the matrix. In particular the 'space' of differentiation of 'subjective' and 'objective' sides - whether of 'experience', text, or that bodily interface of 'inner' and 'outer' in which the vocal 'text' of parole
is articulated - this mirroring of inner and outer is coupled directly to, and unfolds with, the complementary time of the subject's 'ends' or desire.

The text in the restricted sense, then (say, the text of parole) models the space-time (or time-space) of subjectivity and desire as one 'side' of the wider 'textuality' of the subject's embodiment in his experience and world. Indeed since the order of 'text' in the restricted sense ('language') is itself precisely one side of that wider textuality (the other 'side' being a complementary 'natural' economy of 'material' wants), it corresponds precisely to the frame or space-time of subjectivity and desire themselves - parole, then, the very embodiment of that 'inner' side of social interaction. Yet this does not mean that the words, the chain, 'I want...', simply and transparently expresses 'my desire'. The identification of the 'I' of my 'textuality' in the wider sense with the 'I' of my parole abstracts from, short-circuits, the detour through the textuality in which these two 'I's, signifié and signifiant, are coupled, and through which one spoken chain can be 'substituted' for the unspoken articulation of desire.

That is: we never simply 'say what we want' transparently in our words, but always rather say what we want by what is wanting in those words: we always, in trying to say what we want, want to say, want to say what we want.

Thus to find out what we want, we must unfold the articulation of that wider order of substitution, of which language is a model, until we find the order of substitution of the model, for the wider order of substitution. Since the inquiry is itself necessarily carried on in the order of the model, this amounts to finding in the model a model of the substitution of model for the wider order of which it is one side. In particular, my discovery of myself as the 'signifié' for which I substitute 'I', must itself begin from an initial identification with that 'I', through which I can then, as it were, go to work to return to myself through the detour of a complicated analysis. An analysis of which the self-discovery of
Spirit in Hegel's *Phenomenology* might be taken as a model, and which is from the first rooted in a radical *méconnaissance* of self-identification and self-consciousness which Lacan, in 1949, opposes to a sartrian identification of one's part in a naïve framing (in framing one's situation) of the part of framing. A framing of oneself, as in self-assertion as 'I' in language, which abstracts from the constitutive distance of any I from 'I' - a distance and *méconnaissance* which Lacan had himself framed in terms of the abstraction of a child's initial self-identification from the specular inversion of the limiting case of identification with an image in a mirror. - An initial abstraction, then, from an order of inversion in which the initial identification of the 'mirror phase' is - unconsciously - embedded.

Now Saussure had articulated language itself in terms of syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes of possible substitutions for a term in a chain (paradigmatic axis) or for a chain in which a certain term was retained (syntagmatic). - That is, in terms of the synchronic and diachronic symmetry of parole, intermediate between the synchrony and diachrony of the phonetic chain as minimal level of elementary articulation, and the synchrony and diachrony of the language as a whole. Derrida in 1967 takes the term *supplément* - 'supplementation' being the substitution for an ideal unity or term in the limited space and time of textual 'exposition' - as itself the mark of, substitute for, supplement of, in the text, the ideal order of substitution of *signifiant* for *signifié*, articulated in the global and unitary differential space of 'language' as a whole. *Supplément* marks the space, the missing coordination or coincidence of *signifiant* and *signifié*, about which the axes of the text are organised as it were in abstraction from the ideal saussurian poles of phoneme and differential space-time of language as a whole.

Lacan had, in 1957 (1), shown how a 'second' order of figuration, 'figurative' meaning, could be found at work in the saussurian-matrix of substitution. In 'metaphor' and 'metonymy' as characterised by Jakobson around 1950, the substitution of one signifier for another in a particular chain itself calls into play the syntagmatic and paradigmatic orders of substitution 'around' the metaphorical or metonymic term. Thus a 'metaphoric' substitution inscribes

1: in *L'Instance de la Lettre dans l'Inconscient, ou la Raison depuis Fre...*
the 'missing' term in other chains in which it and the substituted term would occur (in a very simple case of purely nominal substitution, a man calling a woman 'queen', 'angel', and so on, implies the chains in which the woman and a queen (or angel) could both occur).

A 'metonymic' substitution (in the restricted sense of 'metonymy' taken up by Jakobson and Lacan, as 'substitution of a part for the whole') embeds the chain with the missing term in a wider order implied by the restriction, in the substituted term, to one aspect of the term 'called for' by the rest of the chain (thus if the sheriff asks the deputy how many reliable guns there are in town, this embeds the inquiry as to the number of reliable men in the wider context of the end to which the inquiry is directed). The 'metaphoric' order of substitution, then, brings into play the 'space' of the chain, the 'metonymic' that movement of substitution already associated with desire. In 1960 (if we are to believe Lacan's 1961 re-writing of his intervention in a discussion on rhetoric the previous year: this element of the récrit being a constant problem in determining precisely the synchrony and diachrony of the Ecrits) Lacan pointed out that the 'zero degree' of pure saussurian differential symmetry - exemplified (almost) in mathematics - was the limit of formal abstraction from the primary articulation of language in the complementary axes of 'metaphor' and 'metonymy'... of which rhetorical 'figures' were but the repetition or image in that primary order, rather than an occasional divergence from the formal saussurian analysis (which he had taken as the frame of language in 1953):

N'est-ce pas donner le statut des effets de la rhétorique, en montrant qu'ils s'étendent à toute signification? Qu'on nous objecte qu'ils s'arrêtent au discours mathématique, nous en sommes d'autant plus d'accord que ce discours, nous l'apprécions au plus haut degré de ce qu'il ne signifie rien. (1)

Is not showing that they extend to all meaning, to identify the status of rhetorical effects? If it be objected that they stop with mathematical discourse, we agree all the more, in that the great value of this discourse lies in its meaning nothing.

1: Ecrits, Appendice II: La Métaphore du Sujet, p892
Métaphore du sujet, métonymie du désir: these two axes of substitution of text (parole) for the analogously structured space and time of subjectivity - of inscription of text in that textuality or 'writing' of subjectivity as vouloir-dire, 'meaning', are thus here identified, represented, substituted for, in a text: in Lacan's parole. The parole marks the two primary axes of its inscription in langue as space-time of subjectivity: two axes unfolding out of the minimal figure of substitution of text for configuration of subjectivity, as marked in the text by the 'missing' term in metaphor or metonymy.

The lacanian parole thus marks its inscription in two primary axes of 'language' as structure of that 'substitution' in which the text itself partakes. And these words 'metaphor' and 'metonymy' are thus not simply 'substitutes' in the text for something 'else', somehow 'outside' the text: their configuration in the text marks the inscription of the text in the axes of metaphor and metonymy.

... si le symptôme est une métaphore, ce n'est pas une métaphore que de le dire, non plus que de dire que le désir de l'homme est une métonymie. Car le symptôme est une métaphore, que l'on veuille ou non se le dire, comme le désir est une métonymie, même si l'homme s'en gausse. (1)

... if the symptom is a metaphor, to say so is not a metaphor, any more than to say that the desire of man is a metonymy. For the symptom is a metaphor, whether or not one is prepared to say so, just as desire is a metonymy, even if one laughs at the proposition.

The two axes of substitution opening out of the marking in a text of what is missing in the substitution of text for an analogous configuration of subjectivity in a wider 'cultural' order of 'textuality' thus correspond to the spatial and temporal dimensions of that order of substitution Derrida in 1967 unfolds from its marking in the order of the text as 'supplement'.

We mark in the order of the text the elementary configuration of inscription of text in textuality or language - and this in that order of analogy by which Aristotle and Aquinas articulate the textual in-
inscription of text or discourse in a wider frame of which the closed or finite ἀρχή is but one component order. This inscription of parole in langue or text in textuality, with its familiar binary and ternary symmetry (of which the symmetry of physical 'time' and 'space' is an image) is doubled by the inscription of 'textuality' (in the restricted sense of 'language') as the order of text (book, discourse..) in the wider configuration of various orders whose configuration is mirrored in the dimensions of language as itself one dimension of that wider configuration (first of all in its ternary order of language-cultural-economy). It is just the converse abstraction from this double inscription which Derrida identified as the constitution of the traditional text, exemplified by saussurian parole, as transparent mirror of signifiant and signifié.

Thus the lacanian inscription of parole in the elementary metaphorico-metonymic matrix of a silent subjectivity, an 'unconscious' or order of absence marked in the words present in the text and its 'conscious' enunciation in an identification with the 'I' of the text, is also the inscription of this order of language (as 'structure of the Unconscious') in a cultural poetic of human interaction framed in language. In particular, the order of parole identified in its articulation of substitution in language, is now seen to frame the 'theatrical' order of dream and day-dream (fantasme). In the mise-en-scène that Freud has called the Träumarbeit.

La Verdichtung, condensation, c'est la structure de surimposition des signifiants où prend son champ le métaphore. Le Verschiebung ou déplacement, c'est plus près du terme allemand ce virement de la signification que la métonymie démontre. (1)

Verdichtung, condensation - this is the structure of superimposition of signifiers which is the field of metaphor.
Verschiebung, displacement - closer to the german term, this detour of signification presented by metonymy.

'Metaphor' and 'metonymy', then, mark in words the inscription of this marking in the matrix of substitutions which is language, and which in its turn articulates the substitution of language for

1: Ecrits, p511
those other dimensions of 'Experience' or 'World' or 'Globe' which are mirrored in the dimensions of language.

Now the 'logical' order of theory, as one 'side' of language, is framed in the linguistic abstraction of the theoretical text from its inscription in language, and through language in a World. In particular traditional 'linguistics' as logical theory of language, frames as we have just seen, language as the order of abstraction of the text which thus frames language, from language. Similarly, in the 'ideology' which is framed in language - and of which such 'abstract' theory is itself one pole - the 'story' supposedly presented by a spoken or written text is analogously abstracted from the matrix of substitutions in which it is itself substituted for an 'action' of which it is the story or account. And, on the other 'side' of language from 'theory' another analogous abstraction from a wider order (of which language itself is an image, one side) closes that order of identification of subject in a situation in which he frames himself (or herself) as 'I', or rather as a 'self' which speaks of itself as 'I'. That order of identification analysed already in relation to Aristotle's account of theatre (and the abstraction of an 'action' or drama from its World), and articulating analogously the 'inner' theatre of dreams and fantasies, as well as that outer order of appearances, ϕωνήσεως, coupled to the 'inner' imagination in the instituted theatre in particular, and the dramatic order of activity in general.

What, then, of Lacan's inscription of the theory of this inscription of discourse in 'language', in that order of parole (most of his 'theory' after 1950 being spoken - like Heidegger's) of which theoretical discourse is one pole?

Here we may distinguish, as earlier with Sartre's position around 1950, three complementary components.

First of all, as the frame of theory, that 'mathematical' logic of inscription of the logical in the 'poetic' order of symmetry of logical and physical, first identified, in 1953, in

La forme de mathématisation où s'inscrit la découverte du phonème comme fonction des couples d'opposition formées.
par les plus petits éléments discriminatifs saisissables de la sémantique.. (qui).. nous mène aux fondements mêmes où la dernière doctrine de Freud désigne, dans une connotation vocalique de la présence et l'absence, les sources subjectives de la fonction symbolique.

- identified first, then, in language as that stratitotemporal matrix of difference, in which in 1957 the order of metaphoric and metonymic substitution which defines the particular text (as interface of limiting formal orders of elementary difference and global matrix) is inscribed.

- A 'mathematics' which articulates the empty formal frame of inscription of parole in langue (a meaningless 'formal' language, then) in a configuration of marks which mark the inscription of the empty mark in that space of symmetry or substitution which is language. A configuration of marks which mark the inscription of that configuration in an order which it thus 'models' - for which it substitutes and, precisely in this, embodies. Thus the configurations of the 'mathèmes' which from 1955 embody certain elementary or primary orders of subjectivity and desire - certain primary symmetries and frames of that order of the mark in which selves, desires and those selves' 'objects' are coordinated and articulated, double 'mathematically' the analogous order of terms such as 'metaphor' and 'metonymy' which inscribe the order of their enunciation (parole) in 'actual' (rather than merely 'formal') language.

Lastly (thirdly), corresponding to the central 'story' of 'metaphor' and 'metonymy' (and the other words and discourse inscribed in this primary order of inscription of discourse in language), and to the 'mathematical' side or frame of that story, is the articulation of the theatrical order of 'analysis' proper; that order of ἡσυχία analogous to aristotelian returning-to-oneself through identification in, then abstraction from, a tragic order of identification.

From 1953 the order of 'medical' practice embodied in the dramatic order of the analytical séance appears as one side of the mise-en-scène of analytic theory at the Séminaire begun at the Hôpital Saint-Anne in that year, and extended the private tuition Lacan had
begun in 1950, and which had been a primary component in his eventual split with the new Institut in 1953.

Let us now trace these three components through to the Séminaire of around 1970, where their configuration, I have suggested, might be directly compared to the configuration of Sartre's theoretical, editorial-journalistic, and theatrical production around 1950.

First the séance. I have already cited Lacan's 1949 framing of insanity in general as 'la captation du sujet par la situation', and of neurosis, in particular, as the 'inertie propre aux formations du je'. The neurotic is trapped in a certain circuit of 'I'; the psychotic is trapped in a converse order in which access to the 'I' is 'forclos', precluded: trapped in an order or frame of situations in which he cannot accede to the part of framing the situation (and this his part of framing in it). The neurotic is trapped by the familiar correlation of subject, frame (or situation) and object, in a short-circuit of subjectivity, of 'I'. The is as it were trapped 'outside' this 'I' in a kind of short-circuit of the frame - of the 'symbolic' order of coordination of subject and object in desire and its 'space' of articulation. The 'analysis' of the neurotic is relatively straightforward. In the 'transference' which frames the analytic scene, the analyst as other pole of the patient's vouloir-dire listens while the patient's 'story' articulates itself between neurotic subject and a missing object whose 'repression' or exclusion organises a system of substitutions which blocks the subject's self-inscription in speech as in the action framed in speech. The analyst, himself in the position of the missing object of desire and, after 1950, understanding the configuration of the patient's parole in that system of substitution which is language, is in a position to find out who he is by asking questions which successively open up the patient's access to the systematically missing object, and so to the complementary self-assertion as subject - eventually finding a way back from the 'I' of his or her speech to the I which has been lost with its repressed object of desire.

The situation in psychosis is altogether more difficult, insofar as the function of 'I' which merely has to be opened up by
the analyst's questions in neurosis, and which as it were does most of the work itself, is now itself missing. In his seminar of 1955-6 Lacan addressed 'Une Question préliminaire à tout Traitement possible de la psychose'. Psychosis had thus far proved intractable at that point of 'regression' through the structure and genesis of the 'I' where the 'I' dropped out. In order to see what could in principle be done at this point, the analyst must first frame its configuration in the order of speech and language developed up to that point. And the framing of this configuration had itself been opened up over the three previous years by the schematisation of the combination of binary and ternary symmetries or structures of identification. By 1957, when the accounts of the critical work on identification of 1955 were récrits, the formal 'mathèmes' in which the structure of identification was schematised, were brought into relation with the analogous structures found in the metaphoric and metonymic axes of language. Since the 'rewriting', the primary repetition (with elided differences) in which Lacan asserts himself in his spoken and written texts, according precisely to the structure of repetition which in those texts he coordinates with the structure of assertion is here inseparable from the 'original', it will be best to treat the structures of mathematisation, discourse, and analytic frame of that discourse, developed over the mid-fifties, as simply together marking a transition from 1953 to 1957.

Over the 'thirties and 'forties, as already noted, Lacan had unfolded the binary structure of identification in the 'mirror phase' and the ternary structure associated with the oedipal phase, and as it were inscribed within the binary specular symmetry. The two had been correlated through the figure of 'transitivity' of desire associated with the mirror-phase of identification, and itself leading into the oedipal phase. That is, through the mirroring of two binary relations, in which desire passes not only between child and mother (who 'supplies his or her wants'), but also through parallel separations of 'two sides of the mirror', in which the child identifies, for example, with another child, or with a father, or with the mother herself (in a 'primary narcissism' in which the child, as for example reflected in a physical mirror, becomes himself or herself an image of the object that would 'supply' the complementary 'want' - what is missing - in the 'subject').
The configuration of such 'transitivity' leads into a more radical question, and an oedipal configuration in which the symmetry of two mirror-symmetries is articulated to define the now familiar space-time of subject, objects of desire, and the symbolic frame of their dynamic. In the 1957 introduction to the séance of the 1954-1955 seminar (April 1955) devoted to an inscription of the Poe text, The Purloined Letter, in the symbolic order of language (the séance whose 1956 récit opens the Ecrits, à titre d'exemple), Lacan presents thus the elementary configuration of this double mirroring, and the ternary order which appears in it:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(Es)} & \quad \text{(A(utre))} \\
\text{(Moi)} & \quad \text{(A(utre))} \\
\end{align*}
\]

'S' here is as it were the oedipal question for every subject, corresponding to the freudian maxim often reiterated by Lacan, Wo Es war, soll Ich werden. Es is simply the question of 'I' as locus of my desire, in face of the (somewhat sartrian) inscription of my self-image along with other of 'my' objects, 'a', 'others' (myself being an other, 'a'). In the symmetry of substitution of a for a' or vice-versa, corresponding to my 'place' in language, there corresponds an absence which is itself marked in language as 'I', an assertion responding formally to what is 'o-en' in this symmetry, the locus of 'my' desire, which inasmuch as it belongs to the mere function of 'I', I may call not 'mine' (since I have not chosen it) but 'it' in me, Es.

Thus in the symmetry of this elementary configuration, my identity and assertion, insofar as it is a question, inducing a 'mechanical' self-assertion of 'my' signifier in the frame of language (marked by the 'phallus' as 'my' signifier in the bodily order of action - whether I have a male or female body, since the phallus marks, precisely, an absence), corresponds to a converse locus of asking this question. What is 'missing' in my words, my identification as subject in that order of substitution or symmetry
which is language, is itself organised in the 'space' of my words, in the space of substitution which is language, as question within question. In its complementarity to the radical question posed by my 'I', the locus of this questioning, which articulates the 'want' in me which is my desire, may be called Other, A(utre). And just as the primary object of desire coordinated with my self-image as body is the Mother, or at least a function articulating an order of substitution whose place is usually taken by an actual mother, and we may mark the 'place' of that function in language with the signifier M 'signifiant de l'objet primordial', so we may mark the place where the Other is first marked in the symbolic order by the signifier of the (place of) the Father: le Nom du Père, P.

As my expression in language unfolds, so this is doubled by a structure of openness, questioning, in the matrix of substitutions which is language, which structures the wider space of that matrix or language in which I identify with an image in language, articulated about the place of the signifier of the self-image, I. This structure, the 'Unconscious', may thus be called 'le discours de l'Autre'. The Unconscious may be called 'le lieu de l'Autre', in the sense that the articulation of an absence and desire corresponding to the place of the signifiant du phallus, ß, is articulated about this function A. We thus arrive at the schema which frames Lacan's discussion of psychosis in the mid-fifties:

- Where the 'short circuit' M - I represents the narcissism which frames the ternary order of l'Imaginaire, J, mirroring in the

1: Ecrits, p553
symbolic order of the representation as a whole the ternary oedipal structure, \( P - M - I \) as primary frame of the symbolic order, \( S \), here represented within its own coordination of itself with its imaginary 'side'.

In a long footnote to this scheme, dated July 1966, Léonc's numbers in the scheme of ten years before the 'topology' of the mid-sixties:

Cette note est indicative pour le moment actuel de notre élaboration topologique. (1)

This note is indicative of the present direction of our topological elaboration.

- The doubling of the symbolic order in the imaginary 'side' and the \( \mathbb{R} \) which coordinates these two orders \((\mathbb{R})\) is now seen to frame a projective plane (the simplest representation of which is a sphere with opposite points on the surface identified - or, equivalently, the 'space' of all the straight lines through the centre of the sphere). And the whole structure or system of identification, the articulation in the symbolic order of the relations of Real, Symbolic and Imaginary, is implicit in the representation of this symbolic space which is itself represented in the representation as formally equivalent to cutting a Möbius strip in the space \( S \), and so articulating the spaces or orders \( \mathbb{R}, S, I \), in their radical coordination and interdependence. A Möbius strip here framed as \( \mathbb{R} \) through the cut which organises the mirroring and identification of \( a \) and \( a' \), \( m \) and \( M \), \( i \) and \( I \), and in this space of signifiants coordinates those two complementary 'places' marked by \( i \) and \( P \).

This coordination on the level of the 'mathematical' side or frame of mid-fifties and mid-sixties may be filled out with various other components. I will not go any further into the detailed dis-
cussion of

la forclusion du Nom-du-Père à la place de l'Autre, et...
..l'échec de la métaphore paternelle.. le défaut qui donne
à la psychose sa condition essentielle, avec la structure
qui la sépare de la névrose. (1)

the preclusion of the Nom-du-Père at the place of the Other
and..the failure of the paternal metaphor.. the lack which
provides for psychosis its essential condition, along with
the structure which separates it from neurosis..

.. framed in this schematisation. I will here note simply
the coordination in the inscription of the Purloined Letter in language
as matrix of desire and of that vouloir-dire of the message which..

nous vient de l'Autre...sous une forme inversée. (2)

comes to us from the Other...in an inverted form

..the coordination in this matrix of the simple schema of
symmetry and substitution of self and others (as the elementary 'space'
of the subject and of metaphor, supporting the metonymy of desire) with
another quaternary structure elicited by Lacan from the bare form of
a chain formed of a random succession of marks in a 'paradigmatic'
axis whose members are simply 1 and 0, presence and absence.

This quaternary structure amounts to an elementary space-
time of the 'connotation vocale de la présence et de l'absence où
la dernière doctrine de Freud désigne les sources subjectives de la
fonction symbolique', the empty mathematical matrix of coordination
of substitutions, the empty 'syntax' of a temps logique: independently
of the chance order of the 'base' level of presence and absence, we
may coordinate, for example, terms characterising the last three terms
at each step of the base chain. If we then consider the coordination,
on a further level, of terms characterising the succession at thin
second level, we obtain a symmetric 'time-space' linking the ternary
temps logique of intersubjectivity of 1945, with the ternary oedipal frame of the symbolic order of around 1955 (the fourth term, $\Phi$, marking as it were the question provoked by the Nom du Père, $P$).

Now in 1960, in his contribution to the Royeumont Colloque Philosophique Internationale devoted to La Dialectique, Lacan brought these various orders of the 'fifties together in a paper, 'Subversion du Sujet et Dialectique du Désir dans l'Inconscient Freudien', which may be directly coordinated with Derrida's contribution on 'Génése et Structure' et la Phénoménologie' at Cerisy the previous summer. Each marks the transition from 'fifties to 'sixties, framing the configuration of abstraction of a 'subject' and its ideal 'space' and time, from a more radical configuration of the space-time of language. The elaboration of the 'scheme' or 'topology' which frames Lacan's discussion here proceeds from the 'cellule élémentaire' corresponding to the base level of substitution, of presence and absence in language, which corresponds to the 'subject' as simple locus of besoin, 'want' as need — through the 'second temps' of the text or parole in which the subject, identifying with that locus of need by the 'trait unitaire' of the signifier of the radical absence at the base level, articulates his need as demande: the 'I want...' by which he or she identifies his or her 'want' in language. On a third level the subject can recognize the signifier by which he inscribes his want in language as itself marking something wanting in that inscription: in this second order of reflection, the subject then accedes to what is wanting as desire, this through the question whose organisation is articulated about the function of the signifiant de l'Autre, the Nom du Père. — Through the passage from the symmetry in language of different 'I's to the question 'what am I?' posed by an absolutely different 'I', by the Other. This turning-point in the 'dialectic of desire', then, corresponds to the hegelian dialectic of the symmetry of myself and others, if in the Other we recognise the place of the Master.

Hegel had inscribed this dialectic in the imaginary order of a Science in which the figure of an analysis as the passage through the 'detour' of language to discovery of oneself as sujet du désir.
is transposed from the symbolic order of language to the familiar passage of an absolute Subject out into the empirical or Real, in order to eventually rediscover itself, at the end of this histoire as what thus differed from itself in the first place - to return in the end to close the imaginary order in which the symbolic order of language is inscribed simply as frame of mirroring of Imaginary and Real.

In 1963 Lacan published in Critique a coordination of this figure of the sujet de la science as it first appears through Kant's reflection, with a converse (french) subjectivity to be found at work in Sade. 'Kant avec Sade' was originally intended as an Introduction or preface to La Philosophie dans le Boudoir upon its publication in (the first ever) Oeuvres Complètes du Marquis de Sade. Here the inscription of the quaternary schema of Real-Symbolic-Imaginary of the mid-fifties in the three levels of the dialectique - the synchrony and diachrony - du désir is applied to the correlation of the kantian 'version' of identification and finality (in the second Critique) in which the pure (noumenal) subject replaces the self-image a' (corresponding to a 'version' or turning of the symbolic space through a right-angle anticlockwise), with the sadian perversion (later called père-version) in which the subject identifies with the position of the Other, the place marked by the Nom du Père (corresponding to a 'version' of the space in which the axis a-a' is substituted for by A-S, a quarter-turn clockwise).

That is: in the space-time of desire framed by the simple configuration of the mid-fifties - the space-time of identification and its dialectic or diachrony - the various constituent axes or relations, in their various symmetries and coordinations, may become transposed. The subject's 'perverse' desire, for example, may be articulated through an identification with the 'place' in the symbolic order marked by P, the Nom-du-Père, rather than with I, the 'normal' self-image. This will in turn organise a coordination of the subjectivity articulated in this structure of identification (which Lacan now symbolises $\mathcal{G}$, 'G-barré'), the subject radically divided by the barre which articulates the symbolic order of correlation of real
significant, S, and imaginary signifié, s, according to his 1957 formalisation of Saussure's complementarity as \( \frac{S}{s} \), with \( S \), the 'sujet brut du plaisir', whose place is marked by the signifiant du phallus, \( \Phi \), replacing the 'normal' object of desire, \( e \), whose place is marked in language by the maternal function, \( M \). If we indicate the quaternary matrix of identification by '\( \Omega \)', then we may indicate the frame of the sadian fantasme articulated in the discourse which is La Philosophie dans le Boudoir, as \( S \circ \Phi \) (and the general structure of the fantasme articulated between the poles \( S \) and the 'object a' as \( a \circ \Phi a \)). The kantian finality, on the other hand, and the Moral Law which it frames and in which it frames itself as the finality of the sujet de la science, may be indicated \( S \circ A \) - the moral law articulating finality within the law which articulates the symbolic order about the place marked by the Nom du Père - the place marked in the second Critique as the universal Father and Law-giver, the Idea of Good, the transcendental Ideal of Reason.

At the end of 1963 Lacan closed the frame of his teaching at the Hôpital Sainte-Anne set up in 1953, and, forming the Ecole Freudien de Paris as a new frame of lacanian psychoanalysis, and moving his seminar, under the auspices now of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, to the Ecole Normale Supérieure (where Derrida and Althusser were preparing philosophy students for the arrière), devoted the first of the new series of seminars to framing anew Les Quatre Concepts Fondamentaux de la Psychanalyse.

Over the mid-sixties, as I have already noted, the basic quaternary symmetry of identification, coordinating the Real, Symbolic and Imaginary orders, the space-time of subjectivity and desire, came to be understood by Lacan in terms of the structure of a Möbius strip. The primary 'space' of the symbolic order was not to be modelled so much by 'real' physical space, in which the surface of the body, for example, might be modelled as simple separation of 'inside' and 'outside' (embodying thus the symbolic order of coordination of 'real' space outside and 'imaginary' space inside), but rather as that pro-
jective space (in two dimensions a projective 'plane') of identifi-
cation of two 'sides' of a real space, of which real physical
space might be regarded (and is indeed structured) as the abstraction
of one side. That is to say: if we are to frame the 'space-time' of
identification opening up through the mirror-phase, we must begin,
not with the structure of the physical space in which the mirror
may be inscribed as two-dimensional interface of that real space and
an imaginary space of specular inversion which doubles that space,
but rather with the space of perspective and projection corresponding
to the 'symbolic' order of the image (the space of central perspective
of which the mirror embodies an empty cuadro or frame), in which the
coordination of separation of 'real' and 'imaginary' in the binary
mirror-phase and the ternary oedipal phase into which it leads may
be articulated. Once more the analogy with the Déridean inscription
of 'inner' ideal space in a wider space of differentiation of inner
(time-space) and outer (space-time), rather than the traditional
inscription of this distinction of inner and outer in the inner space
(and so in the 'physical' space implicit in this inner 'reality' of
an outward complement), is direct.

Now in order to represent the projective plane in 'flat'
physical 'space' (in order to represent, then, the symmetry of phys-
ical and psychological orders within the 'physical' symmetry of phys-
ical differences or dimensions of difference, distance), we have to
'cut' the projective plane twice, the coordination of physical 'points'
identified in the resulting physical plane reflecting in the physical
order the otherwise unrepresentable symmetry thus as it were projected
on the 'real' space. And the orientation of the lines produced by
these two cuts correspond to a representation of the temporal correl-
ation of inner finality and outer efficiency.

That is to say, the symmetry in physical space of the con-
figuration of identification first sketched in the 'fifties, corres-
ponds simply to the structure of representation of the space or dif-
ference of which physical space or difference is one 'side', in that
'out' side.

Formally, if we start from a physical plane whose structure
is embodied in the distinction of four points:

.. then the Möbius band is obtained by identifying (joining) the points from A to C, and those from D to B - the lines AC, DB:

..and the projective plane by identifying the two remaining edges (which, it will be noted, now already constitute one continuous boundary of the Möbius strip):

The symmetry of the representation of the projective plane thus embodies a reflection in the order of representation of the abstraction of this order from the order thus represented. The symmetry of the orders of identification or substitution represented by the presentation of the symbolic order as a projective plane 'in' the physical plane, gives simply the 'outward' reflection of a corresponding 'inner' order of difference, of différence, indeed - a time-space of finality, desire.

The first cut gives the structure of the mirror phase, the second the quaternary system of identification:
C'est tout dire, puisque dès lors ce champ ne sera que le tenant-lieu du fantasme dont cette coupure donne toute la structure. (1)

That's the whole story, for from that point this field (as of identifications) is just the frame of fantasme, of which the cut gives the whole structure.

- That is: the outward configuration of the old scheme of the two axes ($S-A$, $a-a'$) of symmetry unfolding from the radical order of substitution which frames language and the 'want' framed in language (both 'in' language in the strict sense...and 'in'-between the lines), is simply the outward marking of the configuration of abstraction of that 'out' side from a symbolic interface of out-side and in-side. An in-side, then, whose space of identification and time of desire is directly mirrored, in its radical frame or structure, in that complementary out-side.

If we stop at the first cut, we arrive at a structure of mirroring of in-side in out-side which Lacan in the mid-sixties calls le huit intérieur:

- A Möbius strip can be embedded in a 'physical' plane, apart from the point where it crosses over. The further cut organises at this point the axis $\phi - P$: cut here in an important sense, since Freud associates this oedipal axis of the cutting of the child-mother symmetry (of the mirror phase, in Lacan's terminology) with the fear of castration: $P$ bringing into question the phallic function $\phi$. We may here further see how this two-dimensional configuration is to be embedded in the coupling of imaginary and real orders in the topology of their symbolic interface, whose physical image is the surface of the body.
Angus Fletcher:

...All the talk I have heard here has been so abstract!...
The diagram was very interesting, but it doesn't seem to have any connection with the reality of our actions, with eating, sexual intercourse, and so on.

Harry Woolf:
May I ask if this fundamental arithmetic and this to-ology are not in themselves a myth or merely at best an analogy for an explanation of the life of the mind?

Jacques Lacan:
Analogy to what? 'S' designates something which can be written exactly as this 'S'. And I have said that the 'S' which designates the subject is instrument, matter, to symbolise a loss... where is the analogon? Either the loss exists or it doesn't exist. If it exists it is only possible to designate the loss by a system of symbols. In any case the loss does not exist before this symbolisation indicates its place. It is not an analogy...

...This torus (supporting the mūbius band) really exists and is exactly the structure of the neurotic. It is not an analogon; it is not even an abstraction, because an abstraction is some sort of diminution of reality, and I think it is reality itself. (1)

...Thus the initial reaction to Lacan's presentation in America of his mūbius band and the subject, marked by a mark of what is absent in the mark, and so rooted in a structure of repetition of marking what is then absent in the first mark (and so on) identical to the structure of counting, of numbers, from the trait unitaire, the mere mark of identity or unity, onwards.

Not 'analogies', because the order of presentation itself enters into the figure as one component. With the mūbius band, for example, we are introduced to a configuration in physical space of the relation between physical space and the inner space of the 'subject'. A physical engagement then, literally, of Jacques Lacan or

1: The Structuralist Controversy (ie Johns Hopkins Symposium, 1966) p195-6
Angus Fletcher (or you or I) in a 'space' and 'time' of which the 'physical' ('outward') space and time in which the Möbius strip is embedded (or imagined embedded) is one component, one 'side' (the 'out' side). A 'reality' (actuality or 'working') of the same order as eating or sexual intercourse. A reality indeed, in which the latter is itself organised as a dynamic of human surfaces - of bodily surfaces in physical space and time coupled to an 'inner' space and time of desire(s).

The Paris 'seminar' which followed the Baltimore symposium (that, then, of 1966-7) was devoted to La Logique du Fantasme: to the unfolding in the primary quaternary frame or symmetry of 'substitution' of the fantasme and associated discours articulated between the complementary poles of subject and object of desire. - The unfolding of the complementarity of subject and object of desire, then, from the minimal or primitive quaternary configuration of the representation of representation, the substitution for the three orders of any substitution (that is: the 'real', 'symbolic' and 'imaginary' orders of substitution or representation, corresponding to signifiant, barre, and signifié respectively), of three terms in one of those orders.

- Three terms, and a common 'place' of those symmetric terms: the signifiants, for example of the ternary oedipal symmetry of the symbolic order, and the phallic function marking the place of this symmetry as a question. In all a quaternary order articulated in a double mirroring, a doubling of the initial binary symmetry of self and other, a' and a. A quaternary order represented by a double breaking of the symmetry of the 'projective' space of the image, and of the mirror in particular - a double breaking of the symmetry of that symbolic space represented in the physical order of identity and difference (identity and dimension, point and line) constituted in that double breaking, as the two cuts in the projective plane that define the 'physical' plane in which the projective plane is then defined as what results from the (physically impossible) joining of two pairs of lines.

The quaternary order of a double mirroring, then, a double duality. a minimal coordination of those two axes of substitution,
Metaphor and Metonymy, which together unfold from their correlation in the simple 'place' of substitution itself - which is (on the other hand) not even a 'place' before it is the intersection of these two axes. These two axes articulating language as the interface of the limiting poles of a paradigmatic-syntagmatic space-time of elementary differences, and a synchrony-diachrony of the whole.

A Logique du Fantasme, then, unfolding from the radical marking of the mark as locus of substitution, unfolding in two complementary axes of symmetry or mirroring, and in the quaternary space-time of language and the human interaction it frames (as one side of this interaction). - Space-time of substitution: of supplémentarité, of différence, in Derrida's parallel formulation of the same year. Substitution, supplement... a presentation in language, in a discourse, of the axes of the matrix of substitution (textuality, language) in which that discourse is itself embedded. A marking of the mark itself as substitution for its 'place' - and of 'supplement', 'metaphor', 'metonymy' in particular, as marking the places from which precisely those orders of substitution unfold. A marking of the place of the mark, of this marking as itself a substitution, a marking of the place from which an order of substitution may be articulated. An articulation in which discourse itself may be identified as a substitute. An articulation of the place of the mark doubling that of the mark which marks this articulation of the place, its place. An articulation, then, of the 'place' of discourse, which doubles any subject's discourse in a discours de l'Autre. A discourse articulated in 'Unconscious' as le lieu de l'Autre, by an Autre which doubles the 'conscious' subject. A discours de l'Autre with a logic or topology doubling the subjective logic of implication or 'inclusion', of what is 'included' in a discourse.

Logique du supplément, Logique du Fantasme: presentations in language of a dynamic of substitution, in which the discourse determines itself as substitution. Inscribes itself, then, in a wider space and time (or space-time) of substitution - in a language or textuality (in the restricted sense of discursive text) which is itself only one side of actuality substituted for the whole. Presents
in discourse a figure of the double abstraction of that discourse from the wider working or actuality of substitution. And presents this presentation as itself substitution — but not substitution for something else, but rather the inscription of the discourse in an actuality or working of irreducible 'substitution'. In thomist terms, the 'analogy' of the figure presented in discourse of the configuration from which that discourse is abstracted, is not a substitution for something else, as in an analogy which could be explicated as a simple substitution of one discursive configuration for another. Rather is it an inscription of that discourse (and the finite subject identifying himself in that discourse) in a more radical working or actuality of Analogy, in which the 'logical' order of the discourse itself identifies itself as one term, and the configuration as 'logically' determined (as 'analogy', by analogy with intra-discursive analogy or substitution) as the reflection of the order in which that term is coordinated with complementary terms, in the order of that term.

The logic of analogy, then, frames the access to a dramatic order of 'working' or actuality; in which that logic is (then) itself inscribed. Logically the transition is of course impossible (like actuality itself, or the World, or me...). The actual working of the transition is thus only understood when the 'logical' order is understood in the wider 'dramatic' order as an abstraction, an identification of a more radical 'subjectivity' with a particular self-image, corresponding to a particular structure of perception (or fantasme) and a particular self-inscription in the symbolic order of language, closed in a self-confirming circle of abstraction from the double mirroring which unfolds from the radically open place of substitution. From the perspective of such abstraction — of which the 'logical' inscription of analogy (metaphor and metonymy) in discourse as a subordinate order of substitution constitutes one of four primary modes or components — 'le Réel, c'est l'Impossible'. The dramatic working of actuality, of le Réel, is a mystery. A mystery in which the 'patient' finds himself or herself talking in the analytic session, only to realise the point of this strange business in that access to the dramatic order in which it makes sense, 'works', which is la fin de la cure. We might here note in passing the systematic analogy between the instituted mystery of psychoanalysis in Paris (and elsewhere) around 1970, and the thirteenth-century 'mystery' instituted in the Church, and between the analyst's couch and the confessional in particular.
... Logique du Fantasme, then... with its four primary axes corresponding to the symmetric orders of abstraction from the unfolding of a logic of supplement or substitution from the 'place' marked by the mark simply as mark. So many 'versions', then, of the 'normal' identification, in which I seem simply to be myself, sharing the impasses of that all-too-human perception with most others in a shared Fantasme du Monde, in which none of us are singled out as in need of psychoanalysis... although we are all crazy enough to see in our shared normality (except at odd moments of love, death and so on) something more or less unquestionable: the question attaching to the dual 'impossibility' of each of ourselves and our World being subject to a sort of collective elision.

This everyday 'logic' Lacan associates with a structure of identification linked to the kantian and hegelian project of Science, dominating 'modernity'. The transcendental subject, amounting to a noumenal pole with which the scientist in some sense identifies - at whose place in the symbolic order the scientist is at work articulating a scientific culture - in its turn identifies the scientist and his fellows, as sujets de la science, as the 'subject' of psychological investigation, for example, by the pure scientific Subject (a certain equivocation here corresponding in Lacan's discussions to the 'split' of the sujet de la science between the places $S$ and $a'$)... identifies these, or induces their identification with, a simple self-image or 'me' abstracted from the radical open-ness of the part of framing my part, from the question attaching to the symmetry of $a'$ and $a$, myself and others.

This dominant order of modern western identification (the heideggerian resonance, generally allusive, is occasionally even explicit) has already been linked to that identification with the Other, $A$ in the quaternary scheme (that père-version) which Lacan has characterised in terms of the discours and fantasme du Maître. Now the quaternary scheme is filled out by the structure of identification constituting hysteria, and the question, in this symmetrical configuration of discours and fantasme, of the discours de l'analyste himself.

Discours/fantasme de l'hystérique: identification, in the symmetry of that double mirroring and its four orders of subjectivity, with the place of the object, the other, $a$, rather than 'myself', $a'$. 
Trapped de l'autre côté du miroir, in a figure in which self-assertion has to be mediated by the activity of another 'self' in the position a': Freud's adolescent viennese girls about to be trapped in a Doll's House which frames their identity as a simple mirroring of their husbands', their identification as object of his desire, their activity framed in this mirroring as passive reflex of their husband's activity. And the object of the 'hysterical' desire framed by this inverse identification, is thus (as we see by analogy of this 'version' of identification with the others, and the 'normal' identification of the husband in particular) the place and instance of self-assertion, self-expression, itself: the hysterical frustration which soon leads to the substitution for this missing object (the subject herself as subject) of the structure of the hysterical symptom, lying precisely in the circular trap of not being able to assert one's object, or indeed know it, until it is already attained.

What, then, of the analyst? We have already seen how the part of the analyst is to 'take the place' of the missing object, in the dramatic order from which the patient's identification (and with it the object of desire) has been abstracted. We cannot then frame analysis from the abstract 'theoretical' starting-point of 'science' since that itself is organised (like the International Psychoanalytical Association) in a constitutive abstraction from the dramatic order to which the patient is to accede. Nor on the other hand can we start from the complementary place of the Master - from the cultural order of identification of politicians and husbands, in order, say, to force the hysterical woman to be sensible: this order of identification is precisely that responsible for the hysteria in the first place.

In the seminar of 1967-8 Lacan began to radicalise his inquiry, through the question of a systematic inscription of the locus of its enunciation in the psychoanalytical scheme, which parallels Derrida's radicalisation of the 'project' of a Grammatology through a direct questioning of the frame of that project - as still a metaphysical project - itself. The seminar was to be devoted to the analyst's discovery of his part in the dramatic order of L'Acte Psychanalytique (this very framing supporting the metaphor of l'acte sexuel, the 'sexual interaction').
Lacan soon felt that it was his part, in the dramatic configuration of the winter of 1967-8 (which finally led to the paroxysm of May) to interrupt this his 'psychoanalytical act'. After May the general questioning of 'parts' in French society, and of education as induction into such 'parts' or identities, was reflected in the question of induction into the part of the 'analyst'. Lacan now proceeded to the central question of the transition or 'passe' from the initial 'taking the place' of the other (a) in 'transference', to the direction of the analysis through the inscription of this part and its configuration in the systematic dramatic frame of identification in general, and of the parts of patient and analyst in particular.

The configuration of this 'passe', 'D'un autre à l'Autre' (to give the title of the 1968-9 seminar) - of this transition into the dramatic order, the instituted 'mystery', of analysis - might now itself be understood within the primary quaternary scheme of identification. That Freud's initial step into that order - into the drama of 'the Unconscious' - had passed through the 'medical' approach to hysteria was no accident. For in the transference Freud discovered at work in his rapport with hysterical patients, Freud was discovering his part of 'taking the place of' the object a, in the minimal configuration of mirroring of his earlier identification as 'sujet de la science' (and that nice man Dr. Freud) and the symmetrical hysterical identification as object trying to accede to Freud's position as subject. This symmetry, corresponding to the primary mirror-symmetry out of which the structure of substitution and identification unfolds, is also the frame of the passe, of access to that point from which the binary 'hysterical' symmetry unfolds (historically) into Freud's versions of the ternary oedipal symmetry and the quaternary structure of identification in which it is embedded (and correlated with the mirror-symmetry of absence and presence, Fort and Da). The analyst must pass, in acceding to his part as 'analyst', framing (then) his part in the dramatic order of identification and its pathology, to the discovery of the point (this through the regression of self-analysis) from which the symmetry of identification unfolds, and with it his part of analyst, doubling the unfolding through hysteria into other 'versions' of neurosis. A passe which must often remain an impasse, since it is a transition into that dramatic order in which the analyst (doubling the baby in the mirror-phase) first discovers himself playing a part that was before impossible, which could not even
be framed or imagined in his (or her) earlier part.

The mathèmes, then, or elementary figures of inscription of the 'logical' order of discourse upon the inscription of discourse in the dramatic order of language and the psychoanalytical interaction it frames, in that dramatic order of interaction, will serve as an initial map of the strange drama to which the analyst, through the 'passe', accedes. While the patient or analyst is directed in the analytic interaction to the discovery of a and the self (and self-assertion) hidden with that its 'object', the analyst, in order to direct this path of discovery by framing it within the dynamic of the Unconscious, must himself or herself discover A as the 'locus' of the Unconscious, must discover the general frame or space (and time or dynamic) of correlation of particular subjects and their particular objects. The patient must be brought back to the symmetry of the configuration which has been broken with the loss or losing of self and object, and finally confronted with the question which frames the last step back to a self-assertion lost in the first step of abstraction from a certain order of questions (rather like Derrida's transcendental subjectivity confronted with the question of its difference from the empirical subjectivity from which it distinguishes itself precisely by supposing a transcendental order of difference abstracted from the empirical order). The analyst must be induced, on the other hand, towards the confrontation with the question of subjectivity in general, to the question of the object of his reflection, the discovery of the Other, and of his part as analyst as someone prepared to play someone else's other.

Now Freud proceeded from his initial position or part of 'scientist', through the discovery of the part he was playing in the 'analysis' of hysteria, to successive framings of the dramatic order in which he thus found himself. His position was thus always at the interface of two orders: the orders of a discourse upon the 'psychoanalytic interaction', framed in successive analogies, and the order in which the figures of these analogies were found 'at work'. The inscription of the dramatic order of their working in the order of psychoanalytic discourse, of 'le discours de l'analyste' constitutes a certain 'diachrony' of psychoanalytic discourse, psychoanalytic language constitutes psychoanalysis as a 'project for a scientific psychology'. What, then, is 'real' in psychoanalytic discourse, and
what, still, the projection of a certain fantasme of a sujet de la science onto (or into) a dramatic reality in which this 'scientificity' must itself be 'analysed'?

We might now draw a parallel between La Double Séance of 1970, and the question taken by Lacan to frame his seminar that year: the question 'D'un Discours qui ne serait pas du Semblant'. The question of the logic of a discours on the logic of discours and associated structures of fantasme.

Derrida inscribes the symmetry of a traditional logic of transcendental and empirical difference, and of the opening up in their differing in the question of différence, in the order of that radical questioning itself, as radical open-ness from which the circular positing of 'metaphysical' difference abstracts. Lacan had already, opening his seminar of 1965-6, insisted upon the synchronic and diachronic orders of Freud's writing(s), Freud's language(s) (1). Now the diachrony or dialectic of the interplay between Freud's discourse and the dramatic configuration of 'analysis' may be framed in terms of the residual 'scientific' abstraction of both discursive and dramatic frames from the synchrony of language itself as their common element. In relation to the quaternary frame of the discours du Maître, de la science, de l'hystérique, the discours de l'analyse appears as a discourse framed in the quaternary symmetry of inscription of discursive in dramatic order. A discours framed by the part of the analyst as framing his part in the dramatic order to which he has acceded. A discourse inscribed in the analytic dynamic of the Unconscious through the articulation of its 'scientific' order in the inscription of discours de la science in the quaternary symmetry from which it has traditionally been abstracted. - This inscription, then, that of a logique, a logic, du fantasme, in the quaternary symmetry of that logical dimension of articulation of the symmetry from one 'corner' (so to speak) abstracted from the configuration, and the three other terms of the configuration in which this determination is inscribed. The inscription, then, of this 'logical' dimension of the discours de l'analyste in a dynamic of language, of the symbolic order, in which this assertion is doubled by the silence of...
the **discours de l'Autre** - the complementarity or interplay of these two articulated as it were in the *punctuation* of the *discours*. Articulated at the **Séminaire** in the half-speed delivery of Lacan.

A **scientificity**, then, doubling the silence of the analyst as taking the place in the reality of the cultural order of the *séance*, of the Other, as limiting pole of his (or her) questions. Doubling, in particular, Lacan's deliberate silence on 'political' matters: the real Master is not he who **speaks** from the place of the *Maître* (like the politician), but rather the silent Other... and to enter into 'political' discussions would be to simply perpetuate an illusion of power (and with it the power of illusion) - rather as to act 'sensibly' with the hysteric is to provoke hysteria.  

Between these two poles, then, of the 'logical' finality of assertion, and the silence of the analyst 'in place of' the Other, corresponding to two 'sides' of language, and of the *discours de l'analyste* in particular, is the symmetry of the analyst as speaking, and the analyst as *destinataire* at the Séminaire: the Ecole as framing and framed in the *discours de l'analyse*. The *discours de l'analyse*, then, rather than being framed liked *fantasme* and *discours qui sont du semblant*, in the coordination of the primary orders of abstraction from the double mirroring, the two axes, unfolding from the radical order of the 'place' (marked by any term simply as term), is framed in the dynamic of this 'place', this order of substitution, itself. - Is framed simply as the discourse on the inscription of discourse (itself in particular) in the dynamic symmetry of the two axes of identification and dramatic interaction.

Thus *theory*, 'science', inscribes itself in the linguistic interface of pure reflection and the cultural order of sexuality, the family, and so on - this cultural order itself the interface of language and a material 'economy' from which Lacan largely abstracts, articulating his discourse between scientific assertion and the analyst's silence in the *séance* (or his inscription of questions and suggestions in this silence). The empty logic of formal self-assertion, the silence of the Other, the 'elementary' and 'global' matrices of language as order of substitution, are so many formal poles of the
dramatic order, the poetic, unfolding from the Mark... or rather, from the 'place' marked by the mark: the place formally identified as lieu de l'Autre, marked by the signifiant du Nom-du-Père, on the one hand, and as the place of assertion of the sujet barre, Œ, on the other. - And these two poles of the discours de l'analyse, of the enunciation of their 'theory', are themselves mirrored in the intervening symmetry of the 'I' which enunciates the theory, and the 'I's to whom, in the seminar this 'Jacques Lacan' directs his enunciation. The discours de l'analyse, which is simply the discourse on the inscription of discourse in lalangue - a discours, then, articulated in the dramatic order through its identification of its part in that order..is itself, then, the unfolding of an analytic language in which analysts may frame their activity and interaction - the elaboration of this frame - itself framed as the interface of discourse and activity - constituting a primary axis or dimension of that activity.

Discours de l'analyse, then, as a sort of new language within the french language: as lalangue. - But no; rather the unfolding of the synchrony in which french discourse has been traditionally articulated, along with a fantasmatic french World. Not the elaboration of a strange analogical 'mallarmean' way of speaking 'in' traditional french, so much as the inscription of one's french discourse in the more radical articulation of lalangue in the primary analogical axes of metaphor and metonymy. - And this diachrony or dialectic of unfolding of a wider more radical frame in which traditional discourse can be identified as a certain order of abstraction, framed by the elementary reflection in analytic discourse of the double mirroring, the quaternary order of identification, in which that discourse is itself (along with the analyst's other activity) dramatically framed, inscribed, articulated.

And Lacan, then, the analogue of the Master in the ideological order of this analytic discourse and language: Lacan's discourse at the seminar, on the radio (Radiophonie, 1970), on the television (Télévision, 1973), at his Ecole, in the school's journal founded in 1968 (Scilicet (tu peux savoir ce que pense l'Ecole Freudien de Paris) in which most discours of the Maître, apart from the Séminaire, appeared after that year). As the Master, in the cultural order, frames
'in place of' (au lieu de) *l' Autre* what is open (the part of Hitler might here be taken as exemplary of such a 'dictator'), so Lacan frames the discourse and activity of the *Ecole* in the configuration of his inscription of his discourse on the inscription of discourse in *lalangue*, in *lalangue*. - Frames the discussion, the articulation of the interface of individual assertion and the systematic Question posed by the Other. Frames, in particular, the 'scientific' elaboration of analytic discourse, after 1969, at Vincennes, through the *Ecole*’s recognition of the first university *Département de Psychanalyse* directed by his *son-in-law* (and editor of the *Séminaire*) Jacques-Alain Miller.

'Son-in-law': in that Law, according to Lacan, articulated around the significant du *Nom-du-Père*. Lacan’s academic representative, then, articulating lacanian *mathématique* in the discourse in which the Father-in-Law, Lacan, stands in place of *l' Autre*. Jacques-Alain Miller who had appended his Table *Commentée des Représentations Graphiques* to the *Ecrits*. Jacques-Alain Miller inscribing the 'scientific' axis of *lalangue* in the activity of the school as a primary dimension of the school’s activity as a whole: as the primary order of 'scientific' assertion, at the place of the phallic function in the quaternary scheme of discourse unfolding from Lacan’s focal position. Lacan’s focal position as *Maître de l'Ecole* about whose place, from which lacanian discourse unfolds, the activity of the *Ecole* is articulated. Lacan the primary locus of inscription of psychoanalytical discourse in the order of interaction which that discourse frames by framing its part in it.

The activity of the School, then, framed in the symmetry or synchrony, and associated diachrony, of the identification of the theoretical 'I' and the cultural Other as organising (as two poles) two sides of language or *lalangue*, itself opening up in the radical symmetry of particular subjects as themselves one another’s 'objects'. We might figure these three orders of Lacan’s position (corresponding to the quaternary frame of inscription of his discourse on *lalangue in lalangue*) in terms of the correlation
of 'theoretical', 'ideological', and 'cultural' orders already indicated:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{theoretical} & \text{ideological/linguistic} & \text{cultural (economic)} \\
\text{('Imaginary')} & \text{('Symbolic')} & \text{('Real')} \\
\end{array}
\]

- \( B \) and \( A \) are poles of the symbolic order of \( \text{langue} \), organising (as in the original quaternary scheme of unfolding of a double mirroring from the synchrony-diachrony of the Mark) the unfolding of the interaction of different embodied subjects, framed in the symbolic order of language. Analysis 'proper' is organised in the cultural order of interaction: here, in the analyst's silence and questions the 'pathology' of a patient's discourse can be articulated in those 'secondary' orders of metaphor and metonymy, of systematic substitution for a missing object (for which, the patient's looking has led them to the analyst), which provide a model for a more general 'psychopathology of everyday life', for the poetic articulated in the central linguistic interface of theory and practice (in which theory is itself theoretically inscribed). The metaphoric and metonymic axes of a radical analogy are asserted to frame 'everyday' discourse itself: but these axes are only identified through the identification of a 'pathological' closed circuit within 'normal' discourse, in terms of the symptom as a 'metaphor' in the restricted sense, identifiable within that discourse. In the theoretical domain or axis (on the theoretical side), on the other hand, particular figures of inscription of discourse in language are articulated, one within the other, in relation to the empty form of 'discourse' simply as such. Between these complementary poles (once more: those of theoretical assertion and practical questioning), in their interface of \( \text{langue} \), Lacan plays the part of locus of framing \( \text{langue} \) (as frame of interaction), in \( \text{langue} \): his activity framed by, inscribed in, that 'part'.
Jacques-Alain Miller, then (for example) plays the subordinate 'part' of the Son 'in Law'. 'Paternity may be a legal fiction' muses Stephen Dedalus midway through Joyce's Ulysses. In the lacanian frame of a language which, after 1970, becomes progressively more 'joycean', the 'Father' marks a certain primary function or place in the symbolic order of la langue (rather than some complementary biological function in the natural economy of a society). Jacques-Alain Miller plays the part of the theorist, his father 'in law' - in the 'loi du signifiant' - 'as frame of all laws' - as destinataire of his ('scientific') assertion - of his scientific discourse on the inscription of scientific discourse in the analytic frame... of his scientific framing of analysis in the mathematics of the Mark.

In order to complete the configuration of around 1970, I must last of all situate it in the phase of 1967-8 to 1972-3 as a whole. For the configuration of 1970 itself is in many respects better defined in terms of the transition from 1967-8 to 1972-3, than in terms of some critical section through the diachrony of the parisian space of reflection in that year alone - just as the configuration of around 1950 was defined in relation to a transition from around 1947 to around 1953.

The configuration of the transition through the seminar of 1970 (that is that of 1969-70 beginning - as usual - in mid-december) may be most simply indicated by the transition from the möbius band of the mid-sixties to the noued borromean of the seventies (first introduced at the seminar in 1972, and taken up in detail at the close of the following seminar).

The borromean knot...
.. is simply another, more radical presentation of the coordination of the three primary 'sides' of presentation or representation: a minimal inscription of the order of the representation itself, in the coordination it thus 'presents' - whose working it itself embodies. The three orders of the 'sign': Real (R), Symbolic (S), Imaginary (I), corresponding to signifiant, barre, signifié. In the 'working' of the three orders embodied in the representation of this working in one 'side' - the 'out' side of 'real' space - the workings of the earlier mathèmes may themselves be inscribed and coordinated as partial presentations, aspects.

How? How inscribe in this presentation of the coordination of the three orders in that presentation, the 'working' of the Möbius band - the presentation in 'flat' physical space of the quaternary symmetry (S - a - a' - A) from which symmetry or space the physical space of its presentation is identified as resulting from two 'cuts' or breakings of that symmetry: as a double abstraction of the mirror-symmetry articulated in the 'projective' space of the quadro. A double abstraction strictly analogous to, indeed 'representing', the symbolic order of abstraction from the radical quaternary symmetry of the symbolic order of lalangue, to the discursive order of inscription of a discourse on that symmetry or symbolic 'space' in that space (and its time): these two abstractions coordinated, then, in the working or actuality, the dramatic or theatrical order, of which the discourse on that order or coordination identifies itself as script. As the script which - according precisely to the script - enters itself into the (re)presentation or 'play' of which it is the script. Into a reality which must be determined in the script as l'Impossible: for the Real as real cannot be inscribed 'in' the Symbolic order of the script. The script can only determine this reality as in some sense 'outside' the symbolic order itself. This real distinction of Real and Symbolic orders of inside and outside cannot itself be inscribed in the script, but only marked, represented, presented, in that order of the mark.

Yet this distinction of Symbolic and Real must be really marked in the Real order, for there to be that reality, and the Symbolic order must, on the other hand, be inscribed in the real difference of Symbolic and Real to be what it is. And, finally,
this double way that Real and Symbolic are each both inside and outside one another embodies a third 'Imaginary' space of their coordination - the familiar 'imaginary' distinction of real and imaginary orders of marking the distinction between Real and Imaginary. this coordination of Real and Imaginary framed in the Symbolic order of the script.

The coordination of logical and physical, Imaginary and Real, orders of the script (whether philosophical, theatrical or other) was, as we saw, already systematically at work in the complementary logical and physical 'sides' of Aristotle's Kosmos - the familiar 'topology' of a ('imaginary') logical distinction of logical and physical orders of 'inside' and 'outside', marked by a physical distinction, in and from which the logical order distinguishes itself. We have further seen how the symmetry of these logical and physical orders of 'in' side and 'out' side (themselves taken as the 'inner' and 'outer' orders of 'inside' and 'outside') presents itself, eventually, as the logical irresolvable question of the difference of these two orders of difference - the question of différence as locus and time of their differentiation. We saw how, similarly, Lacan's Symbolic order opens out of the radical question of the mirroring of two subjectivities (one another's objects) - the symmetry of the mirror-phase posing the radical question, not of one particular other, but of a structural otherness, of the Other as place of my 'imaginary' identification: an identification of a radical subjectivity that is missing in the initial binary (or mirror) symmetry of self and others: an identification of myself precisely as this organising want.

Lacan and Derrida arrive at complementary 'versions' of a 'symbolic' order of langage or of textuality, around 1970, from two sides of this 'symbolic' interface of 'imaginary' and 'real': Lacan from the 'reality' or working of certain figures in the analytic interaction or drama, Derrida from the 'theoretical' space of traditional 'metaphysics', itself coming into question in its symmetry with the 'empirical' order from which it traditionally abstracts (if only to then, sometimes, inscribe itself in that empirical order as theoretically determined by that abstraction).
What, then, of Lacan's 'outward' presentation of the coordination of these three orders of difference - 'transcendental', 'textual', 'empirical'.. 'Imaginary', 'Symbolic', 'Real' - in 1972-3? Or rather: what of the presentation of their coordination, in which the borromean knot is one 'side', itself re-presented in the knot as one of three symmetric components, circles?

'Closed' simply in that another closed circuit which passes 'through' one such closed circuit, cannot be taken 'out' of it unless one or other is 'broken', 'opened'. Now it will be seen that each circuit of the borromean 'knot' or complex is 'outside' each of the others in this sense, although each is 'in' the other two taken together. Or, equivalently, each pair is 'in' the remaining circuit. Thus if we break or open any of the three, the other two are then quite independent, 'outside', one another.

Now from the turn of the century mathematicians had begun to analyse the structure of 'spaces', their 'topology', in terms of the different sorts of closed circuits that could be 'drawn' (so to speak) in the 'space' - in terms, then, of the structuring of the space in terms of what parts were 'in' what other parts - in the simplest case, what circuits were 'in' a certain circuit in the sense that one must be opened if they were to be separated. The 'space' articulated by a simple closed circuit, then, has simply two 'sides' corresponding to the two sorts of closed circuit defined by the closure of that initial circuit: those 'in' it and those 'outside' it. In the more general case a 'space' can be analysed to give a group of different classes of circuits in the space, so that the members of one class cannot be stretched and displaced so as to join another class, without being opened, 'broken'. The space is defined by a collection of circuits which cannot be thus transposed, but which, all passing through some arbitrary point in the space, may be there combined so as to together, in their various combinations, to generate all the types of closed circuit through the space. The different classes of circuit through the space then amount to a 'group' in the strict mathematical sense that any two may be...
Poincaré around the turn of the century noted the analogy between a 'physical' space or order of separation of 'in' side and 'out' side, and the symbolic or algebraic 'space' of chains of letters. In the case of a 'space' defined by the structure of 'inside' and 'outside' closed curves, the 'geometric' coordination of insides and outsides is equivalent to an algebraic 'space' of coordination of chains of letters through substitution (i.e., $e$ may be substituted in any chain for $r^{-1}$ or $r^{-1}r$ or $ss^{-1}...$, $r$ for $er$, $re...$ and so on).

Except that the algebraic 'spaces' of symbols corresponding to geometrical mirror-images are the same: the symbolism cannot distinguish the 'real' difference of 'left-handed' and 'right-handed'. In general, apart from the 'syntax' common to all spaces ($r$ for $er$ and so on), to a particular geometric structure will correspond certain other substitutions - $rsr$ for $srs$, say. We may then organise the algebraic 'space' as the group of all strings which can be reduced by substitutions to the null string $e$, for if, say, $srs$ may be substituted for $srs$, we may embody this equivalence by having $rsr(srs)^{-1}$ - that is, $r^{-1}s^{-1}r^{-1}$ - in our 'space' of null strings. The 'logic' of one string reached by substitution from a string in the space being itself 'in' the space, is the same as the logic of a corresponding geometrical configuration of 'in' and 'out': these are two presentations of the same 'topology'. Similar considerations apply to 'spaces' defined by 'closed' surfaces (two-dimensional, rather than one-dimensional 'closure').

Lacan does not enter into the detailed mathematical frame of his 'knot' of 'places' in the symbolic chain - his noeud des signifiants as algebraic structure of coordination of Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary, represented in the real 'out'-side, marked as one term in the 'knot' ES1 (as 'R') by a certain 'geometry'. This quite characteristically, since such a 'scientific' discourse is itself to be regarded as only one axis of coordination (coordination in 'imaginary' space) of analytic discourse on the inscription of discourse in lalangue.
I, on the other hand, must present such an 'abstract' coordination of algebraic and geometric 'topology', precisely because, in a moment, we will see how the inscription of the remaining 'logical' side in this 'mathematical' configuration defines a critical point in the twentieth-century development of 'logic' in the restricted sense (formal theory of theory), around 1970, and how this theory of 'topoi', while on the one hand a formal analogue of the parisian 'philosophy' of discourse around 1970, is on the other an exact 'logical' analogue of the critical articulation of physical theory around 1970—these being two sides ('imaginary' and 'real') of a common formal symbolism or 'mathematics' of 1970.


Here we have, embedded in 'real' space, three symmetrical 'differences' corresponding to three frames of articulation, three 'spaces' in the common space in which they are together inscribed, corresponding to three terms, R, S, I, as the inscription of these three orders or spaces or 'dimensions' in the Symbolic order, represented in the symbolic order as one of three terms, just as the 'real' space of the geometric representation of the coordination of these three 'terms', is itself geometrically presented as one space or dimension geometrically coordinated with two other symmetric ones (by a sort of 'metonymy'). Now none of these three 'spaces' is 'in' another, but the coordination of each pair is precisely 'in' the remaining order—or equivalently: each order is 'in' the other two together... but these 'other' two do not themselves have their particular identity 'before' the third term is 'in' their coordination.

A further step: we may take, say, the Real and Imaginary as two 'sides' which are separated in the 'breaking' of the symbolic symmetry of R, S, I as three terms in 'symbolic' space, or Imaginary and Symbolic as two 'sides' of the real space in which they are coordinated. If we 'combine', say, S and I:
We find once again the \textit{huit intérieur} corresponding to the first step of separating 'sides' of the overall space — the \textit{huit intérieur} or single edge of a Möbius strip here, as in the earlier mathème, supported by the inscription in 'real' space of two sides (inside and outside of the human 'body'). If we take a further 'step back' we arrive at the familiar cloverleaf or 'trinity' knot of the Introduction to this book:

...For the moment let it suffice to note that the symmetry of Imaginary, Symbolic and Real is 'presented' in Lacan's borromean knot through its reflection 'in' the real order of the knot. The 'outward' difference of the three symmetric orders of 'difference', the three 'spaces', is itself correlated or coordinated with the logic of this 'presentation', in the discursive coordination of the 'places' of the terms R, S, I, in Lacan's discourse: the discursive 'topology' of the knot, the 'grammar' as it were of
the 'geometry' of 'inside' and 'outside' in the knot, is strictly analogous to (a 'metaphor' of) the grammar which identifies that physical order as a whole in the linguistic or symbolic order of coordination of the terms 'Real', 'Symbolic', 'Imaginary'. The 'algebra' of the terms describing the 'space' of the knot is the algebraic frame of language itself – of that formal order of 'substitution' earlier articulated in the double mirroring, the metaphoric and metonymic axes, unfolding from the place of the 'term' simply as such.

That is to say: Lacan's discussion of his knot of 1972-3 articulates the systematic inscription of his discourse in the quaternary order of substitution already identified as lalangue, and so completes a transition from the Logique du Fantasme in 1967, through the radical question of inscription of discourse on lalangue in la-langue, of around 1970.
Paris around 1970

In the elementary figure of inscription of discourse on lalangue in lalangue, the mathém-ätique of abstraction of various primary modes or axes of discourse from a double mirroring which organises the question of my assertion in the ternary oedipal frame of the symbolic order (whether presented in terms of mÑbius strip or noeud borroméen), we find a familiar figure of the closed circuit whereby the locus of assertion of the frame - the framing of lalangue in this case - inscribes itself in the frame, in what it frames: the figure alike of the instituted mysteries of antiquity, medieval christianity, Rosenberg's New Myth, Medium as Message...and Control, and so on.

I have several times suggested that Lacan's 'part' around 1970, as defined by this self-inscription in lalangue as locus of its framing - as the 'I' which asserts the place of 'I' in lalangue - is complemented in a fairly precise way by that of Derrida. 'Qui êtes vous?' I asked him on an Oxford lawn several years later... 'Je ne sais pas' he replied. For in a converse of Lacan's circuit of self-inscription in lalangue, Derrida's inquiry is framed and organised by the determination in the questioning opening up in the symmetry of 'transcendental' and 'empirical' sides of writing, of the bare word 'I' marking the the formal locus of asking the question. If by 1975 Lacan was articulating the text - and the texts of James Joyce in particular - as the circuit of the Sinthôme (symptom, Saint Thomas, and so on, in the various axes that meet in this 'place' in lalangue) corresponding to the abstraction of one of the circuits from his knot:

[Diagram of interlocking circles representing the mathematical and logical relationships described in the text]

..Derrida was reading in the lacanian reading of The Purloined Letter (which opens the Ecrits) precisely the double abstraction which abstracts a 'text' from the open matrix of the textuality it shares with the text of Lacan's reading. The double abstraction of psychoanalytic 'discourse' itself mirrored in the analytic determination of the isolated 'text'.

[Diagram of interlocking circles representing the interconnections between the texts and the lacanian reading]
Now I found, around 1950, a complementarity in Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's positions, in relation to a common figure of human interaction as primary frame of assertion and question - human interaction in which language appeared as the interface of that primary dramatic order, and the order of radical reflection or subjectivity in which the configuration of action or interaction as primary was framed. And I have suggested that we might see an analogous complementarity around 1970 in Lacan's and Derrida's positions, in relation, now, to a more radical space or configuration of theory opened up by a coordination of the two 'sides' of language, from which the 'imaginary' or 'transcendental' space-time in which the 'real' or 'empirical' other side of language was framed as primary, was now recognised as an abstraction.

In terms of the elementary configuration of inscription of its 'theory' in this interface of theory and action or interaction, we may coordinate Lacan's and Derrida's 'positions' as two versions of a common circuit by which a discourse on the space and time of discourse is itself framed in that space-time it frames.

I have already suggested a further complementarity between Lacan's 'I' around 1970, and Deleuze's position - as represented, say, by his publication in 1969 of three books: Différence et Répétition, Logique du Sens, and Spinoza et le Problème de l'Expression. The enunciation of Spinoza's system is, in the system, impossible; actual difference is actually different from its articulation within the unity of any closed system: that is its actuality. If Lacan's inscription of his assertion of lalangue in lalangue repeats the closed circuit of the stoic inscription in the ἀόρατος of the individual instance of its assertion, then we might compare Deleuze with a third-century epicurean and Derrida with, say, Arcesilaus (in his radicalisation of that ἐκσύργατον which Husserl borrowed from the founder of the Middle Academy).

What, though, is the point of comparing Paris around 1970 with Athens around 250BC?

Well, simply that in each of these cases we are presented with three different framings of a triple difference ('inner' and 'out-
er' orders of 'in', and their difference - or rather, the question of their symmetry)... and if that triple difference is taken as a certain 'space' of reflection open to these three framings corresponding to a primary symmetry of the 'space' itself, we may perhaps see the prominence of Lacan, Deleuze and Derrida - or of Stoa, Academy and Garden - as much in terms of the symmetry of the common 'space' of their correlative positions, as we see such a 'space' as a subsequent coordination of the 'positions' of prominent theorists.

- That is to say, we may see these three as playing certain primary parts, and their prominence lying precisely in their responses to certain correlative questions presented by the configuration of mid-century French reflection - questions relating to the mid-century framing of questions, to the mid-century 'space' of reflection. And such a perspective is hardly less appropriate than the traditional view of each of these 'I's as spontaneous 'authors' of their 'thought', precisely because it is just this tradition which, in their parallel ways, they bring into question.

How, then, might we characterise this 'space' of reflection, insofar as there is such a space, such a symmetry in these three 'positions', in the texts or discourses organised by these three 'I's we call Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze?

- This is just the question, in effect, which leads to the framing of the common 'space' as langue, textualité, and the deleuzian antithesis of the former, which Foucault called 'une nouvelle cartographie'. The question, then, of finding a frame in which different versions of that frame can be coordinated as perspectives from different points in the frame.

Let us consider Foucault's 'version' of L'Ordre du Discours around 1970, as presented in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in that year. Here, once more, we find a characterisation of two 'sides' of discourse - 'inner', so to speak, and 'outer' - each art-
iculated in an interface of a global frame or circuit which operates to exclude a certain discourse, and a complementary elementary order of coordination of question and assertion in a certain discourse. Thus on the global level a Volonté de Vérité, the Will to Truth, organises as 'inner' finality an abstraction from the discursive interface of 'inner' and 'outer' orders in that Partage de la Folie whose description in 1961, already noted, directly parallels Derrida's initial description or deconstruction of the husserlian finality of an analogous detour through the order of discourse. Outwardly this ideal finality of Truth is reflected in the cultural exclusion of the unspeakable, the Parole Interdite, in particular in the interdiction of a certain order of discourse on political and sexual orders of Culture.

This Volonté de Vérité as inner finality is coupled to the coordination of the elements of a discourse by or in the figure of the 'Author', the inner pole as it were of an intention expressed in one element of a discourse, and to be coordinated with other elements and intentions in a systematic Doctrine articulated between the correlative poles of this Author as origin of meaning, and Truth as his 'end'. 'Doctrine' as the interface of these elementary and global orders of a certain 'intentionality' (if we emphasise the parallel or analogy with Derrida's 'position' - though Foucault does not himself use this term): as the determination in an order of discourse of the position or part of its enunciation - as the inscription of the 'author' of such a discourse as one component in the 'doctrinal' framing of the discourse.

'Outwardly' the elementary coordination of a discourse by the figure of the 'Author' is complemented by what Foucault calls the instance of 'Discipline', the elementary coordination of a discourse by a certain supposed identity of its 'object' or 'objects', its domain. And the interface of Author and finality of Truth in 'Doctrine' is outwardly complemented by the interface of Discipline and Parole Interdit in the ritual instance of inscription of enunciation in a certain framing of activity, in which enunciation enters as one component.

Between these global and elementary instances of 'inward' and 'outward' control of discourse, the global order of that Partage
de la Folie which abstracts these two sides, inner and outer, from their interface in discourse, is complemented by the elementary coordination of instances of Author and Object (Discipline) in the order of Commentary: a certain range of privileged 'textes premiers', 'authorities', provide a matrix in which a discourse is organised as another 'reading' of the primary text, another permutation of the terms and figures of the primary text, another version of the articulation of those terms between one of the identifications of the poles of 'author' (what the authority really meant) and object, permitted by the text as a matrix of terms of that order of discourse, allowing a limited 'play' of interpretation, 'open' to a certain range of readings or reconstructions.

Finally, the interface of these global and elementary interfaces of global and elementary inner and outer orders - the interface, then, of a global Partage de la Folie as separation of inner finality of Reason against a background of Silence, and the corresponding normative frame of correlation of author and objects in primary texts - is found in the inscription of the part of writing in the 'institutional' axis of the Group as interface of inner Doctrine and Outer Ritual:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>global order of exclusion:</th>
<th>Volonté de Vérité</th>
<th>Partage de la Folie</th>
<th>Parole Interdite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'institution' of discourse:</td>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>Groupe</td>
<td>Ritel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elementary coordination:</td>
<td>Auteur</td>
<td>Commentaire</td>
<td>Discipline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in-side (reflection)</td>
<td>discursive inter-face of inner Reason and outer activity</td>
<td>cultural order of activity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now Foucault does not present these instances in any such symmetric matrix - rather does he present in turn triple orders of 'exclusion', 'maîtrise de l'événement et du hasard', 'assujettissement,
appropriation sociale, du discours', then to explicitly renounce any pretension to some unitary space or field in which traditional discourse(s), constrained by these instances, might be inscribed. Such a unitary space and time in which discourse might be supposed inscribed belongs to that 'philosophy of transparency' rooted, precisely, in a coordination of these factors which abstracts from the radical interface of inner and outer, global and elementary orders of discourse, in its hasard, discontinuité, matérialité: which abstracts from the complementary coordination of these in the Événement or avénement of a discourse. Which abstracts, then, from this radical double mirroring (inner-outer, global-elementary) from or in which the dramatic order of discourse unfolds.

Foucault's discourse (on discourse) itself is to be inscribed in the radical articulation of such Événement - articulated, then, in a 'Philosophie de l'Événement' which is as it were the envers of the 'Philosophie de la Transparence' which abstracts from this central actuality of all discourse. An articulation of this envers in a discourse on the 'Événement' or opening up of various orders of discursive abstraction from the actuality of that discursive order itself, involves a critical moment of standing outside the global and elementary circuits of control, and the coordination of these circuits (which would soon be recognised as pouvoir and micropouvoir) in a genealogy of those orders. Such a 'genealogical' discourse can neither be inscribed in some 'global' space and time of a unitary history of ideas, nor be governed by some systematic mechanical coordination of the elements of elaboration of some order of discourse. Indeed it is precisely the genealogy of such a correlation of global and elementary orders of abstraction from the actuality of its discursive elaboration which Foucault proposes as his initial project at the Collège de France. The part of articulating that coordination is itself framed in a radical open-ness of 'author', 'commentary', 'objects', an open-ness of Foucault's part of 'reading' which is itself what is primarily 'asserted' in that reading. - Asserted not as some 'theoretical' proposition by which such an order of open-ness might itself be 'socially appropriated' and Foucault's 'part' 'subjected' to a traditional abstraction from what is open in Événement: rather asserted as the inscription in the social matrix of a (in) certain discourse on the actuality of discourse, which begins to open up the frame of inscription of discourse in the
dramatic order which the inscription of this discourse in the social matrix itself frames as a possibility, as open.

Such 'activism', reflected for example in collaboration with Sartre and others after the Evénements of May 1968 upon the opening-up of a new ideological space by the publication of the journal Libération, was expressed in the early 'seventies by the archaeology or genealogy of a criminology coupled to the elaboration of the systematic closed space of the modern prison in the years around 1800, leading to the publication of Surveiller et Punir in 1975, a genealogy itself coupled to the opening-up of a discussion on the contemporary french penal system through the formation of a 'Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons', 'GIP'. Interviewed on the occasion of the publication of his genealogy of criminological discourse, Foucault concluded by opposing 'une logique de la stratégie' to 'la logique de l'inconscient':

..Au privilège accordé à présent au signifiant et à ses chaînes, il faut substituer les tactiques avec leurs dispositifs.

(Roger-Pol Droit:) A quelles luttes peuvent servir vos ouvrages?

- Mon discours est évidemment un discours d'intellectuel, et comme tel il fonctionne dans les réseaux de pouvoir en place. Mais un livre est fait pour servir à des usages non définis par celui qui l'a écrit. Plus il y aura d'usages nouveaux, possibles, imprévus, plus je serai content.

Tous mes livres, que ce soit l'Histoire de la Folie ou celui-là, sont, si vous voulez, de petites boîtes à outils. Si les gens veulent bien les ouvrir, se servir de telle phrase, telle idée, telle analyse comme d'un tournevis ou d'un desserre-boulon pour court-circuiter, disqualifier, casser les systèmes de pouvoir, y compris éventuellement ceux-là mêmes dont mes livres sont issus.. eh bien, c'est tant mieux! (1)

..For the privilege currently given to the signifiant and its chains should be substituted tactics and their frames.

(Roger-Pol Droit:) In what struggles can your works play a part?

1: Le Monde, 21 February 1975
- My discourse is obviously that of an intellectual, and as such functions in the present networks of power. But a book serves ends undefined by its writer. The more new, possible, unforeseen uses there are, the happier I'll be. All my books, whether it be the History of Madness or this one, are, if you will, little toolboxes. If people are prepared to open them, to use some sentence, some idea, some analysis like a screwdriver or a spanner to short-circuit, rule out, break power-systems, including perhaps the very ones from which my books have come... well, so much the better!

...Thus we find in Foucault, around 1970, the locus of enunciation of a certain discourse on the inscription of discourse(s) in the cultural order. We might draw a parallel between Foucault's History of Madness from the cartesian period to the Revolution and Levi-Strauss' Pensée Sauvage of the following year in terms of a similar correlation of discursive, cultural, and economic orders - in the first case, at that turning-point of the western tradition associated with cartesian subjectivity, in the second case, in a 'wild', 'natural' inscription of 'primitive' or primary Culture in Nature. We might further correlate Foucault's position, elaborated in the inscription of certain histories or stories in the cultural order, with that of his colleague at the new university of Vincennes in 1969-70: a complementarity or mirroring of Deleuze's general framing of a radical 'empiricism', and Foucault's empirical analyses, itself best reflected in the articles they devoted to each other in Critique in 1970. Similarly, perhaps, one might compare the 'poetics' of Derrida and Barthes. I have already noted Barthes' analysis of the 'subject' in classical french drama in 1963 - and I earlier noted his part in the configuration of 1953. From his Système de la Mode of 1967, through S/Z in 1970 to Le Plaisir du Texte in 1973, Barthes' 'reading', 'criticism', constitutes yet another prominent coordinate in the 'space' of 1970, or of 1967-73, which I am trying to identify.

S/Z: the substitution of 'S' for the 'natural' 'Z' expected by the french ear at the place of the second 'S' in the title of Balzac's short story Sarrasine is taken by Barthes in his 1970 writing
of his 1969 reading of that text (at his seminar at the Ecole Pratique) as the 'place' in the text from which a now familiar two axes of articulation unfold. Once more a systematic 'space' - the formalism for example of the *Eléments de Sémiologie* of 1964 - is abrogated, for an essentially open matrix as text. A matrix here broken down into ninety-three elementary components or 'lexemes' (varying in length from a few words to a few sentences), and the reading closes in the identification in the final lexeme - 'Et la marquise resta pensive' - of the 'closure' of the open text in the marking ('at the close') of the very open-ness or *pensivité* of the text itself. The text closes in the mark of its open-ness, rather as the lacanian *sujet barré* is the *signifiant* which marks the difference between the subject and his marking, marks the absence of the subject in the mark.

The reading opens in the unfolding, as simply what is 'open' at the start merely in virtue of the finality, the supposed closed system, of the text as text, as story, of five axes of articulation of the progressive closure or delimitation of these initial open-nesses. Five 'codes' governing, then, at the same time, the structure of question, reflection, *pensivité*, which articulates the reading.

Five coordinates, 'codes': in which we find again the four poles of a double mirroring unfolding from the central (fifth) 'place' in which - precisely at the midpoint of the textual matrix, in the forty-seventh of ninety-three lexemes - we read the substitution of 'S' for 'Z'. Five codes which we may display in the familiar axes of substitution in which text or discourse unfolds thus:

- One term rather than Foucault's three here marking each 'side', 'inner' and 'outer', of the discursive order: the 'semantic'
code articulating the personae of the story, the agents or actors, and the complementary 'cultural' code the outward frame of the action. The 'proaeretic' code articulates the elements of the action in a play of models of coordination of actors in their common frame, and the 'hermeneutic' code complements this in the global order of the action as a whole. And at the centre that 'symbolic' order of metonymy and metaphor, of substitution of one signifiant for another - here, most particularly, in Lacan's symbolism, 'S/Z' - which articulates a textual matrix of correlation of the paradigmatic and syntagmatic orders implicit in the substitution. Which articulates, in particular, the interplay of the finality of the text, the reader's desire, and the openness of the textual matrix which induces this desire and the movement of reading - the metaphoric 'space' of the metonymic temporality of that desire.

In 1967 Barthes had 'read' clothing, that cultural order of surfaces, of the image, mirroring the linguistic order of the text. Clothing as a metaphoric order of surfaces, a space, organised about those gaps in which it is correlated with the movement of desire. In 1973 that desire articulated in the cultural surfaces of clothing articulated a general writing of reading, already at work in the particular reading of 1970. 'Le Plaisir du Texte': the very title marks the opening of the 'erotic' axis of our reading of Barthes' writing of reading, and the text closes in the marking (as 'jouissance') of an order of openness 'between the lines' organising the desire of the subject marked by his or her distinction from his or her inscription or identification in the literal order of questions organising plaisir (in what Lacan calls the order of demande - what I say I want, rather than what is wanting in that request).

Thus we have now found in the configuration of the 'positions' of Lacan, Derrida, Barthes, Deleuze, Foucault, around 1970, a correlation of perspectives upon a certain 'double mirroring',
with the configuration of that mirroring or symmetry itself. If I take Lacan's position as 'focal', this is to be correlated with the suggestion that in the coordination of questions of subject, object, and their relation, it is in France the question of the subject which frames the relation of these three orders of question - even when, as with Lacan, that subject appears precisely as a question, as something missing, 'wanting'. Althusser's 'position' around 1970, which I have thus far passed over may itself be taken as 'symptomatic' of such a subjectivism or psychologism - as the exception, so to speak, who proves the rule. For the mid-sixties frame of Althusser's assertion of the primacy, in the cultural order of mirroring of 'economy' and 'ideology' (infrastructure and superstructure), of the material economy (that dernière instance, in the dominant legal metaphor), is itself framed by the mirroring in the 'reading' of that economy (in Das Kapital), of the 'superstructural' order of Lacan's (psycho)analysis. The 'events' of 1967-8 mark at once a crisis in this althusserian idea of the subordination of ideas to the material side of culture which (as a system, rather than individually) they 'mirror', and a 'psychological' crisis of the leading 'ideologist' of the PCF himself, who was now undergoing lacanian psychoanalysis and suffering from recurrent severe depression. In 1969 - in a movement parallelling the other moves from the systematic frames of 1967 to the primacy of the particular situation as interface of global and elementary orders of analysis - Althusser subordinated the earlier system of mirroring to the primacy of the leninist figure of inscription of its framing as one component in a particular configuration - the primacy of that 'prise de parti en philosophie' asserted by Lenin at the turn of the century. The final abstraction from the part of the althusserian scheme of the mirroring of ideology in the material economy in the french ideology of the 'sixties takes the form of an 'autocritique' in which the organising pole of reflection serves only to articulate its own renunciation. The impasse might be taken to reach its limit in the final hospitalisation at Sainte-Anne a decade later following the contraction of the earlier 'mirroring' to the domestic configuration of Althusser's killing of his wife during a further depressive phase.

...In Germany, meanwhile, the framing of the correlation of economy and ideology in terms of the 'objective' primacy of the
former - and in particular the correlation of psychoanalysis and neo-marxism in Jürgen Habermas' extension of 'Critical Theory' around 1970 - marks a german focus complementary to the lacanian focus of the contemporary 'french ideology', rather than some symptomatic im-passe. Furthermore, the questioning of that lacanian focus of 'semi-ology', through its correlation with or mirroring in the systematic economy of Capitalism, as two sides of the radical cultural closed circuit of the oedipal code - the questioning opened up by Deleuze and Guattari in 1972, and compounded with the publications of Deleuze' Vincennes colleague Francois Lyotard the following year - marks rather the opening-up of a questioning in the lacanian 'space' of around 1970 (just as Derrida's questioning, say, of around 1960 marks the opening-up of an analogous questioning 'in' the phenomenological 'space' of 1950), than the complementation of that 'subjectivist' space by any french 'materialism'.

...Yet I have sug; jested that Deleuze' 'position' does mark a sort of antithetical point in the 'space' of 1970, to Lacan's focal framing of that space by the inscription in it of the 'I' which is the locus of its framing - or rather, the locus of framing the parole which is a discourse upon its own inscription in lalangue.

...Yes: it just happened (to take a prominent figure of 1970) that that other 'pole' of the double mirroring of 1970 is formally, nominally, in the (cultural) interface of the configuration of 1970 as a whole and that complementary 'material' order which Althusser had tried to frame as the 'other side' of the linguistic order of ideology, in which the relations of the two sides was to be inscribed or determined. The situation is analogous to that of the question opening up after 1950 of the 'phenomenology of language' as interface of a primary order of interaction, and the phenomenological 'space' in which that primacy was framed: the radical question of the symmetry of the dominant 'space' of reflection and its other side (here, action), is itself posed in the terms of that dominant 'space'. In 1972-3 the question of the symmetry of language (as now the dominant 'space' of reflection) and the 'material' economy is itself posed within the earlier space of determination of Deleuze' position in terms of the framing of the interface of 'transcendental' and 'empirical' sides of ideology and its language, from the 'empirical' side. Deleuze and Lyotard join the other members of the Old Guard in 1977 to denounce
a 'New Philosophy' articulated afresh in the interface of ideology and economy, as mere journalism and ideology, rather than 'philosophy' proper. A propriety, in turn, which the 'Nouveaux Philosophes' interpret as the assertion of a certain intellectual property or proprietorship by these 'Maitres Penseurs' of 'Structuralism' - with Lacan identified, precisely, as playing the role of Maitre in the ideological order, tout court.

'Structuralism'. Foucault closes his framing of his project in 1970:

Et maintenant que ceux qui ont des lacunes de vocabulaire disent - si ça leur chante mieux que ça ne leur parle - que c'est là du structuralisme. (1)

And now let those who have a gap in their vocabulary say - if they like the sound of it better than what has been said - that this is structuralism.

...Une lacune de vocabulaire: a missing term. A missing term from which the various versions of the two axes of unfolding from the 'place' of the term might themselves be seen as various instances, various complementary substitutions, various positions in a 'structuralist' space unfolding into the configuration of these analogous 'positions'.

A missing term, then, 'structuralism', as marking the order of interplay of these different 'versions' in that ideological order of analogies and substitutions which, in the parisian intellectual marketplace, and in the journalism which has invented this 'structuralism' which the structuralists themselves renounce as a merely imaginary unity of 'doctrine' (to use a term from Foucault's version), happily mixes the various figures of this 'structuralist' space taken from the various perspectives 'on' that space of Derrida, Lacan, Deleuze, Foucault, Barthes, Kristeva, and the others. This 'structuralism' then as marking precisely the place in the configuration of these various 'versions', of the central 'place' or question from which, in each 'version', that version of the configuration unfolds.
'Structuralism', then, as a question: 'Qu'est-ce que le Structuralisme?' as the Editions du Seuil framed their part in the forum - or market - in 1968. A missing term about which the journalistic 'ideological' abstraction from the systematic presentations of the various 'positions' in the matrix, by their various 'authors', organises itself as a play of figures which cannot be 'pinned down' to any particular author, any particular 'position', any particular systematic presentation. A mere jumble of what is 'in the air', like the stories in the newspapers which abstract from any systematic History, any coherent attempt at explanation in terms of beginnings and ends. In the newspapers which are the same length each day, no matter what has happened or what has not happened, one is always in the middle of the story.

The 'Maîtres Penseurs' of 1970 repudiated a 'structuralism' which didn't mean anything in particular - that 'missing place', gap, in vocabulary, about which was articulated the thoughtless desire for thoughts in the marketplace of ideas, that term about which was articulated the mindless symmetry of the advertising jingle abstracted from the steady progression of Foucault's (or the others') parole, their prose.

Yet was not that figure of intellectual respectability and authority itself, perhaps, the insidious ideology of a certain maîtrise? If the missing space about which the various versions of the central 'place' were to be now inscribed as so many positions in the ideological, 'journalistic', order of that place, could not a still more radical question of that ideology of the 'Maîtres Penseurs' associated with their common abstraction from that place - from that place of coordination of this ideology with a certain 'leftist' version of an ideal material economy - be inscribed in the ideological space of discourse (as, once more, Derrida had inscribed the question of the symmetry of transcendental and empirical 'spaces' and 'times' as a radical question in the transcendental order, marking the opening-up of the order of the scriptural interface of those two 'sides' of difference)? In 1976 Guy Lardreau and Christian Jambet thus proposed to set up a 'theological' space and time from which the ideology of 1970, of their maoist days of their study of philosophe at the Ecole Normale (with most of the other 'nouveaux philosophes') and its economics had been abstracted, rather as the transcendental and empirical
'sides' of that 1970 order of discourse had earlier been identified as complementary abstractions from it. On the 'publicity' on the back cover of their book they face 'only those who count: Lacan, Hegel, Marx'. The figure of Lacan's inscription of the 'I' which takes the place of the Master in the ideological order, and a complementary leftism in the economic order are to be replaced by the opening up of the frame of a question in the cultural - moral or theological - order: the opening up, doubling their inscription of their assertion in this more radical theology or morality; of the figure of l'Ange - of an 'angelic' order opening up in this inscription of their radical question in the ideological order, rather as the order of a radical discourse was opened up over the 'fifties and 'sixties. Editions Grasset followed up the success of this proposal in the marketplace with a brisk succession of other titles from this 'group'. (to use Foucault's characterisation of the central frame of ideology) of anciens élèves de l'Ecole Normale around 1970. In the following year, 1977, appeared, notably, André Glucksmann's Les Maîtres-Penseurs and, from the 'leader' of the group, Bernard-Henri Levy, La Barbarie au Visage Humain. Phillipe Sollers, who had in 1970 framed the maoist 'engagement' of Tel Quel (upon which Derrida left the group) aligned himself with the new 'dissidence'. The New Philosphers were feted in the newspapers and journals and colour-magazines, on radio, on television, and, at the Elysée Palace by the other radical conservative who had succeeded to the presidency at the time of the economic crisis of 1973-4, upon Pompidou's death in the latter year.

..Phillipe Sollers, the fonction phallique complementing or coupled to Julia Kristeva's matrix of coordination - this in the three orders of 'semiotic' theory, the Tel Quel 'group', or the domestic scene of the oedipal group in 1975 (when their baby was born).

..Matrix.. Julia Kristeva's theoretical frame of coordination of the various 'semiotic' theories of the 'structuralism' around 1970 - of the derridean axes of the text, say in the lacanian order of langage, the intratextual in the intertextual matrix..this itself constitutes one final element or version of the 'matrix' of around 1970: another side of the various male assertions or 'positions', a feminine - and feminist - space of coordination, its identity residing precisely in a focus of their interplay, a feminine complement of Lacan's 'I', and a complement of Sollers' assertion or 'phallic
function' (to speak with Sollers and Kristeva), to which it is coupled in that lacune de vocabulaire which organises 'structuralism'.

Back for the last time, then, to that central lacune in relation to which the various versions of their coordination may be coordinated in a 'french ideology' of 1970. I have already introduced a simple presentation of Levi-Strauss' coordination of ideological, cultural and economic orders around the mid-century, and the figure of the inscription in that scheme of the lacanian, derridean, foucauldian, barthesian axes of discourse or text. If we now introduce our lacune de vocabulaire itself into the scheme, we can in turn organise these latter versions - and a few others - in a 'space' of which they may be considered 'versions', 'perspectives':

- Where the horizontal and vertical inscriptions may be taken to mark the complementarity of a general framing of the 'order of discourse' as it were from 'without' (vertical) and the particular articulation of a certain reading as it were from within - the complementarity of a general framing of the interface of 'global' and 'elementary' orders, and the practical articulation of a certain body of material. Now this rather tentative scheme may be taken to indicate how the 'outward' order of inscription of theory in the discursive interface of theory and the 'empirical' order of Culture, and the theoretical inscription of this interface as one side of a wider cultural
interface of it and the material economy of Culture, is itself reflected in the theory of this inscription. That is, the configuration of 'positions' in the wider order of which these positions are versions 'in' the order of reflection which is one component, is intended to mark the primacy accorded, in those versions, to that axis or order of the configuration, in which each is marked. In particular, the whole configuration thus marks the abstraction of the configuration of French reflection around 1970 as a whole from the dramatic order of the cultural mirroring of language and 'outward' economy - the abstraction of the articulation of language or textuality from the cultural interface in which it is, to be sure, inscribed, but which is determined, even in the assertion of its primacy, as simply the other side, from the 'I', of language, discourse, or 'textuality' in the restricted sense. - Determined, for example, by Derrida in 1967, as the order of textuality 'proper' in which the written (in the stricter sense) or spoken textuality of 'language' is to be inscribed: but determined, in this primacy, precisely as a double of the linguistic 'textuality' which is then asserted to be secondary or derivative. Most particularly, Foucault's or Deleuze's framing of this 'cultural' order as the primary frame in which discourse is to be inscribed - as the 'empirical' order of discourse - is itself determined as the 'other', different, side of discourse from the traditional identity of the Subject who would inscribe the difference of these two 'sides' in the subjective and abstract space and time of identity. The Nouveaux Philosophes, then, in telling the story of the inscription of their story in the moral order of the interface of that story and the material or physical economy (of force) of its cultural context, do indeed open up a correlation of the lacuna of 'structuralism' with its material economy, in the dramatic order of mystery and morality. - At the same time, though, and to the extent that they open up this 'moral' order, they in their turn abstract themselves from what then appears as the more radical reflection of the 'Maître-Penseurs', those erstwhile teachers they disavow in their new 'commitment'.

Still, for those old masters the lacune about which their versions of the lacune are articulated does mark the radical question of the symmetry or substitutability of these 'versions'. For example, the same question may be addressed to Derrida by a lacanian as was addressed by stoics to academics - most particularly in those dialogues.
in which Cicero proposed to integrate those complementary positions in a more radical order of deliberation: 'Why assert the primacy of a critical openness? What if the primacy of the question is itself brought, by its own precept, into question?' Is it not 'bad faith', when we must assert the primacy of questioning over assertion, to leave that assertion itself 'out of the question'? Since we cannot help but assert ourselves one way or the other (say, in Lacan's, Derrida's or Deleuze's symmetric 'versions' of the double mirroring, or triple difference), surely we must frame our position within this primacy of assertion?

In Derrida's case, as in Cicero's, Merleau-Ponty's, the New philosophers', this question is played out after the period around 1970 (as indeed it 'must' be) in the 'moral' order of activity. Thus in the mid-seventies, as a reaction to Giscard's bringing into question of the part of Philosophy in French Culture, in the straitened circumstances of Energy Crisis and Stagflation, and in the climate of a 'new conservative' pragmatism, Derrida organises a Groupe de Recherche sur l'Enseignement Philosophique (GREPH - compare Foucault's GIP) in order to actively assert the part of questioning. Disappointed foreign audiences, expecting to witness some subtle extension of the radical questioning unfolding out of the 'originary' configuration of différence are lectured upon the practical questions relating to the assertion of the locus of such questioning in French society, and are surprised that the pragmatic problematic of this opposition to the new pragmatism is not itself to be brought into question, or rather, into the dynamic of the double séance. At a meeting of GREPH in the Sorbonne at the beginning of 1980 a student interrupted the detailed discussion of policy by shouting that the primary question was simply the moral one of Good and Evil, not all this business of de-centred organisation. He was followed by condescending laughter as he left the amphithéâtre, but Derrida, who had just conducted a seminar on the Jewish Law at the École Normale, looked somewhat perplexed. The following year he was much shaken by his arrest in Prague, as he attempted to assert the primacy of questioning there.

This amounts only to one instance of the opening up of that order of Law, moral and institutional determined by Lacan, Derrida, Foucault and others as one 'side' of the articulation of discourse. Derrida notes the complicity in Levi-Strauss and Rousseau of a certain
determination of language and a certain determination of the cultural interface of language and natural economy, but the assertion of a radical 'opacity' of the cultural order from which Rousseau's ideal origin abstracts is itself determined or framed by the opacity of a language which is only one side of that cultural order. Of that cultural order determined 'subjectively' as 'textuality': as a textuality in which the 'writing' of theoretical space and time is simply mirrored in an *écriture de l'espace et du temps* of the World as a whole.

That is to say: the 'subjectivism' of the frame of around 1970 organised about an absent subject, rather as the cartesian frame is organised about the cartesian subject, preserves the 'traditional' french figure of a determination of the relations of the two 'sides' of (french) Culture from the 'logical' or 'psychological' side. The identification of the interface of 'phenomenological' subjectivity and the 'empirical' order of an action inscribed in that formal frame as primary, is itself opened up as a configuration of questions framed in that space. The phenomenological space is then identified as one side of the scriptural order of these questions, and a new parisiian space of 'discourse' is articulated. The residual 'subjectivism' of this 'space' appears in the inscription of the relations of (a now linguistic or discursive) subjectivity, 'physical' objectivity, and their cultural interface in the new 'space' presented as a final overcoming of subjectivity, a final inscription of that traditional abstraction in a strictly 'critical' space of reflection - in which the instance or focus of this reflection itself is articulated in that inscription of the subject in the space. But that circuit which frames the order of question or assertion in the new space itself once more repeats the (converse) circuit of the cogito, and Sartre's analogous revision (the 'champ transcendental sans sujet' and the originary identification of the 'pre-reflexive cogito'). And it is in that little lacune de vocabulaire which makes of the new space a 'Structuralism', focussed in Lacan's inscription of the locus of its framing in that 'space', that a still more radical question, of the inscription of that new space itself as one side of something more dramatic begins to open up.
Twentieth Century

Germany 1930...France 1970. I have taken these as two indices of a configuration of Reflection extending over the middle of the twentieth century. France 1970: rather - Paris around 1970 - a configuration of reflection organised about a 'missing point', a 'place' of discourse about which is articulated an 'ideological' play of various 'versions' of that articulation, of that 'place' of discourse. Various versions, then, of the space of those various 'points of view', of its unfolding from that missing point, the 'place' of the word.

- A missing point from which, in these various versions, discourse unfolds along two correlative axes: unfolds on the one hand in a differentiation of 'inner' and 'outer' 'sides' of discourse, and on the other is articulated between 'global' and 'elementary' figures of this differentiation of 'in' and 'out' sides. And the relative 'autonomy' of the various discourses on discourse, the various 'versions' of discourse is governed by a double abstraction from the symmetry of these four poles, which abstraction each of the discourses identifies in its own terms. An abstraction corresponding to the constancy of a certain 'I' in Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and the other 'Maitres-Penseurs'. An autonomy and a 'reflectiveness', a certain authority and a certain valorisation of reflection, confused in the 'ideological' permutations of elements from different versions according to a finality and a market organised about the lacune at the centre of the 'ideological' space (and its time), from which these versions of the lacune abstract...as from a mere mindless circulation of 'ideas' leading nowhere in particular. A circulation which mirrors in the intellectual 'forum' the market in which the various discourses on discourse are physically embodied as books, articles, and so on.

In Barthes' 1970 'version' it is a substitution of 'S' for 'Z' which 'takes the place' of the focal lacuna. A substitution of 'S' for 'Z' from which the axes of Balzac's short story, of its 'action', are unfolded. In Foucault's 'version' the central place is taken by
that figure of the 'group' which I have suggested may be taken to frame an action or interaction in its 'symmetry'. In particular we might speak of the 'group' of Foucault, Barthes, and the others in analogous, 'symmetrical' positions - symmetrical instances of 'I' in the Paris of around 1970. I have suggested that Lacan's 'I' may be taken as 'focal' in such a parisian 'group' of authorities, versions in a common 'space' of reflection, of that space and its time. Lacan's 'I' articulating a lacanian 'version' in which the 'space' unfolds in a double mirroring (in the central 'place' of the signifier) of four axes of discourse and corresponding self-assertion in interaction (the 'analytic' interaction in particular).

May we not then take different versions of interaction - Barthes' story, Foucault's group with its various 'dimensions', Lacan's space-time of identification and desire, and so on, as so many 'aspects' of the 'ideological' configuration of their interaction? Then we might speak of an ideological 'symmetry' in which the decisive parts of the 'master-thinkers' (or thinking-masters) attached directly to their 'positions' in that abstract frame of Reflection which is one 'side' of ideological interaction - just as the decisive parts of, say, french government ministers in the cultural context of that reflection, attach to their 'positions' in the cultural space of institutions, framing what is 'open' in the cultural order ('globally': what is open in the french order of activity as a whole).

If we talk, with Derrida, of a dynamic of 'differentiation' in the discursive order, then we might speak, by analogy with the contemporary framing of the 'physical' dynamic of Paris, France, Globe, Kosmos, of the positions of the 'leading' thinkers in terms of a 'partial differentiation' along the correlative axes of french reflection around 1970. That is: we might try to (partially) characterise the 'dynamic' of reflection by analogy with the contemporary framing, in 'global' Reflection, of a complementary outward, 'physical' dynamic associated with the symmetry of physical space-time. We might associate with the various 'positions' or rather 'coordinates' of the configuration of 'versions' of a common space of reflection, certain
'directions' of development, 'within' the overall dynamic of abstraction or 'differentiation' of reflection from the 'ideological' or discursive interface of reflection and Culture (as two complementary 'sides' of discourse). 'Partial' differentiation, since the various 'directions' within the 'differentiation' of Reflection as a whole together lead towards a new configuration in which positions (and 'directions') are redefined, interacting, then, within the 'symmetry' of the 'space' of Reflection - of its 'differentiation' from a complementary 'empirical' order - as a whole.

This 'differentiation' of Reflection, furthermore, is itself only 'partial', not to be abstracted (as some 'transcendental' space of logical difference) from the complementary order of that 'empirical' difference or differentiation ('in' the discursive interface of transcendental and empirical) which Derrida takes as the 'other' (side) of reflection. The two complementary orders of difference - of différence, differentiation - are themselves 'coordinated' in the symmetry of 'différence'.

And it is precisely this 'differential' symmetry of the two sides of discourse, which is reflected in the 'internal' symmetry of different 'versions' of this dynamic of reflection in that 'differentiation' which is 'reflection'. - That is, three complementary orders of parisian 'philosophy' or articulation of Reflection simply as such are characterised by (lacanian) assertion of the 'sujet barre' as locus of that assertion, (deleuzian) assertion of an 'empirically' differing subject as locus of assertion of its difference, (derridean) discovery of the subject in the symmetry of these complementary orders. Three orders of differentiation of symmetric 'positions', symmetric 'I's, symmetric 'dimensions' of a common 'space' of reflection. Three 'versions' corresponding to the three 'sides' (the triple 'difference') of the space of 'discourse' from which the 'phenomenological' space of around 1950 has been identified as an abstraction. Three correlative 'dimensions', then, of a french framing of Reflection in terms of an initial identification of the locus of assertion or question - Lacan's 'focal' in that he determines the locus (like Sartre and Descartes before him) according to the same french bias that determines the subjective locus of assertion as primary question,
French ('subjectivist') bias: a 'differentiation' of French 'schools' (or a French 'school' as a whole) from German, British and American 'schools', in a common configuration of Reflection. Here a still wider configuration of complementary linguistic and 'natural' or material orders of the several cultures or societies comes 'into question' and into play. A wider order of 'partial differentiation' of the various 'directions' of different schools, within the frame of a greater or lesser degree of interaction. Thus the French, British and American 'reflections' - or rather 'philosophies' - of the thirties and 'forties (like the parallel political orders) turn about the assertion of a national 'direction' in parallel confrontations with the German direction of around 1930. A British, French or American direction is found in the symmetry of French and German (this, as already noticed, through the influence, for example, of Hegel (via Kojève), Heidegger and Husserl (through Sartre and Merleau-Ponty), Freud (through Sartre, Lacan and others)), British and Austrian (through Wittgenstein and Ayer, Popper and others), American and Austrian (Morris, Nagel, Quine; Carnap, Feigl, Tarski...), American and German (New School for Social Research... the Germanic 'influence' on French and British philosophy of the period being largely independent - like the French and British schools themselves - of one another.

'Partial differentiation': abstracting from the coordination of variations in the many different orders of Theory and Context, to the discovery of a certain 'direction' associated with one component in the whole configuration at a particular time... then, returning to the whole through the coordination of these various tendencies (like physical 'momenta') within the constraints of the symmetry of the whole. But what of the coordination in the whole of this 'physical' dynamic itself, and the wider configuration for which thus far it provides only a loose analogy?

We must now consider a matter noticed in passing in the discussion of Lacan's 'topology': the 'logic' and 'physics' of around 1970 as two 'sides' of the elementary topology already briefly discussed.
Here we may take the primary figure of transition from a German 'space' of reflection around 1930 to a French 'space' of around 1970 as a 'model' for parallel axes of development of logical, physical and mathematical theory. Indeed we will see how the mathematical 'space' of around 1970— with its 'logical' and 'physical' 'sides'— is itself strictly 'symmetric' to the contemporary discursive 'space' of French reflection. In each case we may speak of a French 'topology': in the 'mathematical' case, of an articulation in the 'formal' language of mathematics of two axes of 'unfolding' from the place of the 'mark' or mathematical sign, which fairly exactly 'mirrors' the 'informal' unfolding of that discursive space in which—as indeed in Lacan's 'matières'—that mathematical topology is embedded.

I have already noted the 'crisis' at the turn of the century focussed in Russell's Paradox: the bringing into question of that millenial principle of 'extensionality' which assumes a transparent mirroring in a purely conventional or formal system of marks, of an 'internal' or intensional logical 'space' of distinctions, and an 'external' or extensional 'space' of inclusion and exclusion of things from collections of things (selected according to 'logical' or intensional criteria)—in particular, of 'points' from 'sets' of points ('point-sets'). This question of the 'transparency' of a formal language directly parallels, of course, the Saussurian scheme of 'informal' language. Indeed Frege had abstracted his 'formal' language (in the Begriffsschrift) precisely through the coordination of the two axes (which Saussurian analysis calls 'syntagmatic' (horizontal, so to speak) and 'paradigmatic' (vertical)) of the 'place' of each significant mark in the linear chain of language. Given a chain of marks, if we mark a 'place' in the chain in which some term must be selected from the 'paradigmatic' order of that 'place', while leaving the other terms alone, then we may consider the formal character of coordination of the various resulting 'incomplete' chains (say $a_1a_2\ldots a_{i-1}x_{i1}a_{i2}\ldots a_n$, $b_1b_2\ldots b_{j-1}y_{j1}b_{j2}\ldots b_m$, and so on): when the assertion of one (no matter what is supplied in the 'variable' place implies that of another, when two, or perhaps a certain 'set', are mutually incompatible, and so on. The logical 'frame' of assertion in a language can thus be worked out in the coordination of terms in a formal language, these terms being of the form $Fx$, $Gy$, $Fxy$, $Fxx$, $Hx(Gy)y$, and so on, where the capital letters present 'variable' contexts of our initial (lower case) 'vari-
ables'. Present, then, those 'functions' of a variable, the question of which opened up 'mathematical logic' around 1870.

Now Frege had taken his 'variables' to range over a common 'universe of discourse': if there were no further restriction on a 'variable' term (marking the place in a 'formula' or string of marks, in which the term for something in particular was to be considered substituted) - a restriction which must itself be expressed in the form of a function involving this variable - then it was to be supposed that any term might be substituted, with the sole restriction that terms for individuals were to be substituted for lower-case variables, terms for functions (or 'concepts') for roman capitals, terms for 'second order' functions or 'functionals' for, say, gothic letters (functions like 'quantification' which asserted that any substitutions for functional and individual variables in a formula, for example, might be truthfully asserted) and, finally, 'third order' functions, such as numbers, in Frege's analysis, which were equivalent to individual terms, closing as it were the circle.

Russell's paradox showed that Frege's principle of 'class abstraction', allowing the passage from a function of some variable to the 'class' of all terms of which the function could be truthfully asserted, together with the principle that these 'classes' or sets were themselves ('closing the circle') among the individuals marked by lower-case variables (indeed, in the purely formal frame of mathematics, the only 'things' one could suppose at the outset in the 'universe of discourse') - the general principle of complementarity of 'intension' of a concept corresponding to a function, and 'extension' of that concept as the set of individuals of which the function could be truthfully asserted - could not itself be properly asserted. If we consider the class $\mathcal{C}(x \notin x)$ of all 'x' such that $x \notin x$, or x is not itself, as an individual, in x as class, then, marking such a supposed class '$a$', $a \in a$ if and only if $a \notin a$.

Poincaré, confronted with this and the related 'paradoxes' at the turn of the century, proposed, as I earlier noted, his 'vicious circle principle', amounting to an insistence upon the inscription of what is 'posited' within a primary logical frame of 'position'. His elaboration of a mathematical 'topology' or analysis situs over the turn of the century - the correlation of 'logical' and 'physical'
orders of inclusion and exclusion in the mathematics of strings of letters, and substitutions in those strings (that is - the theory of 'groups' in the strict sense) - might be seen as a correlate of his 'logic' - as the 'mathematical' order, indeed, of the interface between his 'mathematical physics' of space-time, and his 'mathematical logic' of a sort of logical 'space-time', articulated in relation to complementary orders of 'position' or 'positing'.

In particular, Poincaré's 'topology' reflects in the four levels of dimensionless 'points' (as elementary terms), the one-dimensional closed circuits (1-cycles) 'bounded' as lines by these points, the two-dimensional closed surfaces 'bounded' (as 2-cycles) by those 1-cycles, and the 3-space of points 'bounded' by 2-cycles, the three levels of Frege's terms (if the 0th level is identified with the third). I gave above only the group-structure associated with 1-cycles or elementary closed circuits, defining the 'homotopy' of a space defined by classes of circuit separated by one-dimensional curves ('knots').

It is fairly straightforward to extend the analysis to the 'homology' of Poincaré's 'cells' or elementary 2-cycles, and to characterise the sense in which the elementary 1-cycles are inscribed as boundaries 'in' the two-cycles, just as the latter are inscribed as boundaries 'in' the 3-space of dimensionless points. We can thus define the 'topology' of a spatial configuration in a symbolism of which one 'side' is the 'external' order of 'inside' and 'outside', and the other is the 'internal' logical order of what is logically contained 'in' a certain formula or string of letters, articulated according to a structure of 'variation' analogous to the 'variation' of a point in the outward space of points. In particular, we may draw an analogy between the 'continuity' of logical argument or implication which does not lead from the 'space' of true assertions into falsehood, and the continuity which guarantees that we remain within a closed spatial configuration through an analogous 'logic' or topology of physical 'inside' and 'outside'.

Another pioneer of 'topology' over the turn of the century was the Dutch mathematician Brouwer. In his work we find a direct connection of the traditional 'aristotelian' logic of the transparent mirroring of logical and physical 'space', and the turn-of-the-century paradoxes. We must not assume some static 'global' separation of
truth and falsity, and then articulate our 'logic' in terms of a mechanical application to all formulae of the Excluded Middle. Rather should we unfold the complementary logical and physical 'spaces' of mathematics from the initial configuration of their 'differentiation' in the elementary time of identification, the 'pure two-oneness' of repetition in that interface of 'inner' and 'outer' which is 'intuition'. Rather than starting with Poincaré from the 'logical' side of mathematics, or with Hilbert from the spatial configuration of marks, we are to start as it were in the middle (excluded by these one-sided reductions). Russell also began 'in the middle', in the actual working of mathematics in the interface of 'logical' and 'physical' sides, but he as it were worked towards the actual activity of mathematicians from the complementary poles of a global 'universal class' which was not in the order of 'individuals' on the one hand, and an 'empty set' which was, on the other. On the one hand this gave a calculus of strings of marks ('propositional functions') working 'down' from the global order, coordinating terms without any presupposition of the existence of a set corresponding to a particular function; on the other, one could work up from the empty set (\( \exists(x \neq x) \) or 'Ø' or 'Λ'), generating further 'sets' which are individuals, and can be substituted for variables (of the appropriate level or 'type') in order to define yet further sets.

In 1931 Gödel showed the essential incompleteness of the system built up by Russell and Whitehead between the turn of the century and the Great War. If one were to avoid the paradoxes (in which one found oneself, as it were, on both sides of a logical distinction at once, simply by arguing from the 'naive' supposition of a global 'space' of distinction), then one could not fully model the 'logical' order of distinction in the mathematics of determining which formulae or strings were 'in' mathematical theory and which not. Equivalently, one could not mathematically decide which strings of terms in group theory were reducible, by substitution, to the null term (this the 'Word Problem' for group theory). One could construct a 'proposition' of the 'elementary' arithmetic supposedly modelled in the set-theory built up from empty set (as arithmetical 'zero' or null term) and the 'successor function' for defining '+1', which could not be reached by proceeding up from the null set and down through propositional functions: a proposition embodying the configuration of the inter-
face of these 'global' and 'elementary' orders - these global and elementary orders (in turn) of the mathematical interface of logical and ontological (or indeed, physical) 'spaces'. A proposition, then, embodying the focal configuration of 'differentiation' of inner and outer at which Brouwer and his school of 'intuitionists' were at work.

The configuration thus opening up around 1930 leads, by around 1970, to the project of an articulation of mathematics, not from the 'logical' side of Poincaré's 'conventionalism' - not 'in' that logical space - or in the converse 'empirical' space of Hilbert and Von Neumann's 'formalism'...nor, indeed, by building it up from the 'null set'...but rather in the unfolding of these various dimensions in a sort of 'differentiation' reminiscent of Brouwer's scheme. An order of 'differentiation' unfolding from the configuration of these various aspects in the 'formal language' of the mathematical sign, just as the 'discursive' order of language in general unfolds along analogous axes.

In the case of the 'formal language' of mathematics, we may take the part of F. William Lawvere around 1970 as focal. In his programme of that period there converge the general theory of 'objects' and 'functions' (corresponding to Frege's individual and functorial 'variables') as organised (by Eilenberg and MacLane) as that 'structural' study of mathematical systems as belonging to certain 'categories' of coordination of terms and transformations or functions, articulated by an analysis of the figures of 'object' and 'function' abstracted from their analogous parts in group theory, set theory, topology and so on ('Category Theory' as a sort of Universal Algebra)...the 'logic' of 'differentiation' (or the topology of what is 'logically' contained in what)... and the converse 'differential topology' in the strict sense associated with continuous functions in 'external' space.

It will be seen that here, once more, we have a by now familiar configuration of 'differentiation', expressed in relation to 'formal language' rather than discourse in general:
It was precisely, it will be remembered, in relation to Husserl's inscription of the difference between 'logical difference' and 'physical difference' in the space of a 'transcendental logic', in that abstraction correlated with a complementary order of 'position' in a global space of points in mathematical 'geometry', that Derrida, around 1960, posed the question of the dynamic of the interface of 'inner' and 'outer' 'spaces' in the order of the mark or sign. By around 1970 the 'transcendental' difference articulating 'logical space', and the 'empirical' difference articulating 'physical space', are coordinated as complementary poles of traditional abstraction from their interface in the order of the mark. And that order of the mark is understood to unfold from the radical 'place' of the mark along two correlative axes of 'symmetry' or substitution of terms. I noted Lacan's simple 'topology' of this 'place', developed in the 'sixties through an 'outward' presentation of the three orders, 'Imaginary, Symbolic, Real', of that 'presentation'. Over the same period a group of french topologists whose work was focussed in the Séminaire de Géométrie Algébrique at the Institut des Hautes Etudes Scientifiques (IHES) outside Paris were developing a general theory of the duality of the homology and cohomology of topological spaces, abstracted like Category Theory from particular instances, and from point-set topology in particular: the theory of 'topoi' as frame of algebraic geometry. 'Homology' I have already characterised as the group-theoretic or algebraic modelling of 'inside' and 'outside' in three dimensions (though the construction can be extended to higher-dimensional 'spaces'). If we consider 'functions' (taking x to Fx, say, where 'F' marks the context of 'x' as.place in some string of terms) 'on' such a 'base' space of 'points' (that is, rather, ordered 'n-tuples' or sets of n inde-
pendent terms or 'coordinates', for a base of n 'dimensions') then, if the functions are defined by strings of terms (with up to n 'variable' terms, on an n-dimensional base) by 'functional abstraction' (in one variable, $\lambda x. a_1 \ldots x \ldots a_k$ is 'the function which takes x to $a_1 \ldots x \ldots a_k$', and so on), those functions themselves constitute an infinite-dimensional 'space' of functions over the base space. In particular the algebraic 'homology' of 3-dimensional space already very briefly characterised as the group-theoretic (algebraic) model of 'inside' and 'outside' in the space of boundaries or separations, is doubled by an algebraic (and formally equivalent) 'cohomology' of the function space. Just as 1-cycles and 2-cycles are defined in the base, so corresponding 'co-cycles' are defined in the function-space, in terms of the first- and second-order differential operators which 'bound' the functions (as 'points' in the function-space) in an exactly analogous manner to points bounding lines and lines surfaces, surfaces volumes, in the base-space. From the first-order operators we can define 1-cocycles, from the second order operators ($\frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial x \partial y}$ and so on, where $F$ is variable) 2-cocycles.

What are these general 'spaces' of correlation of homology and cohomology, though? The IHES group had abstracted the 'structure' of correlation of 'space' of terms ('points' of the general space) and functions on that topological space from the traditional set-theoretic framing, just as Eilenberg and Maclane around the mid-century had abstracted algebraic structure from the traditional set-theoretical 'base' (ultimately deriving from the global correlation of 'logical' and 'physical' 'spaces' of distinction in classical geometry). Around 1970 Lawvere took the categorial structure of the French 'topos' as frame for a systematic correlation of 'logical', 'algebraic', and 'geometrical' 'spaces' or 'differences', in the category-theoretic interface of 'internal' logical space and 'external' geometric space - Category Theory then generalising the group-theoretic correlation of algebraic and geometric 'space' in Poincaré's initial 'homology'.

- A correlation, rather of logical space and time with outward space and time in the reformulation of Brouwer's initial
insistence upon the radical temporality of mathematics as the complementary articulation of 'inner' and 'outer' space in the 'inner architecture' (Brouwer's expression) which is mathematical activity.

'Inner' and 'outer'...Lawvere notes in his preface to the proceedings of his January 1971 conference on 'Connections between Category Theory, Algebraic Geometry and Intuitionistic Logic' the discontinuation of his teaching contract on account of the 'political activities' correlated with what he calls in his introduction 'the form of objective dialectics known as category theory' (1). This correlation of the 'economy' of formal language on the one hand, and that of the material frame of mathematical activity on the other may serve to underline the parallel between the mathematical topology of 1970 and the discursive 'topology' already discussed.

In the lacanian form of the latter as a 'mathèm-atiq', we found a primary or 'originary' configuration of 'representation', in the marking, in a triple 'dimensionality' of 'outward' space, the symmetry or correlation of 'outward' Real space, 'inner' Imaginary space, and their mirroring in the Symbolic space of their interface, of their 'mirroring'. The corresponding radical configuration of 'formal' language around 1970 is strictly analogous, the 'imaginary' logical space and its structure or 'topology' mirrored, by the 'algebraic' space of mathematical symbolism, in the 'geometry' of 'real' ('physical' space). A geometry which, as we will see in a moment, defines, in its correlation with the radical temporality of 'intuitionist' mathematical space-time, just that order of symmetry and coordination in which arises, around 1970, the question of a Grand Unification of 'physical' dynamics.

Let us approach this configuration of 'formal' language around 1970 in terms of Frege's formal analysis of language as strings of terms, parallelling Saussure's 'chains' of signifiers, in terms of which we framed the 'discursive' topology of the parisian space.

To generate the irreducible 'logic' of substitution, we must have three symmetric 'places' in our string or chain of letters.
This since we are modelling the string itself one of three correlative orders, in that order of substitution, and, equivalently, because if we are to articulate a structure of substitution, we will have to be able to define the substitutability of one term for two in the chain — which will involve the substitutability of the null term for a chain of three terms, in the definition of the 'topology' in terms of the set of strings reducible to the identity. It will now be remembered that we cannot expect to define the 'mathematics' of substitution simply in terms of reduction to a single null term: that this 'zero' of our general homology or group theory corresponds to the null set of set-theoretic arithmetic, and we can in either case (set theory or group theory) define 'undecidable' formulae: the equivalence of a particular string to the zero string, or of a particular set to the null set is not in general decidable. We can parallel Gödel's construction in either of these 'theories'.

In our general frame, then, the structure of the three orders, logical, algebraic, geometric, will frame the algebraic order through the algebra of correlation of these three orders, which first defines the coherence of an 'algebraic' or symbolic order (the latterday correlate then, of the transparency of the cartesian 'ideas' modelled in Descartes' founding of algebraic geometry).

The 'logic' of this frame may be considered simply in terms of the general character of a 'place' in the chain or string. We may model a general theory of assertion, what is logically 'in' or 'included', 'implied' in, a particular string, in terms of the set of strings equivalent to the null string (the set, then, of 'true' strings). By leaving a place in a string open or variable we define a function whose values are simply 'true', 'false'...or undecidable. We may then begin to coordinate 'sets' of terms whose substitution in the open string leads to a 'true' string or, equivalently, coordinate the assertion of strings or formulae irrespective of substitution (giving a logic of 'quantification'). Our 'topology' of the logical order will then be articulated in the interplay of considerations of 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' from the (progressively elaborated) space of Truth. In particular, we may assert the truth of a 'disjunction' of strings by asserting the 'exclusion' of the 'conjunction' constituted by an open formula. Logic formally reduces to a
'topology' of strings, in which we can quickly find the familiar figures of implication, negation, conjunction (or infinite conjunction as universal quantification), disjunction (or existential quantification), functional abstraction, set theory, and so on...as ways of talking about chains of terms - as the empty frame of any 'language' determined simply in terms of the figure of 'substitution'.

This formal 'logic' is 'in principle' just mathematics: what we are committed to simply by talking, before we start to talk about anything 'in particular'. 'In principle', though, for as we have already seen, we cannot frame mathematics simply by working 'up' from the empty set and 'down' from the universal class. Mathematics is rooted in the interplay of these two moments, from which their formal poles are abstractions. Mathematics is articulated in time as a progressive formalisation of the discursive configuration in which we find ourselves. The formal logical frame presents merely a dynamic of unfolding which can no more be abstracted to an absolutely unitary transcendental logical space, defined mathematically, and in which mathematics is then inscribed, than Husserl's analogous transcendental subjectivity can be abstracted from the language and time of its definition, through the promised 'phenomenology of language' which can only be carried out once it has already been presupposed. It is precisely an analogue of this derridean configuration in the relations of mathematics (as 'formal' language) and 'logic' that may be taken as playing a focal part in the anglo-american philosophical 'space' of around 1970, to which we must pass in a moment.

Gödel had in effect opened up the coordination of these logical and mathematical orders by mapping its parallel 'logical' topology of conjunction and disjunction into the elementary arithmetic of multiplication and addition. The logical 'side' of mathematics cannot be abstracted from some completed mathematics as the 'Ideal Language' of the Vienna Circle. More particularly, the dynamic of 'differentiation' of inner and outer in which mathematics unfolds is irreducibly rooted in the play of terms coordinating 'inner' conception and 'outer' empirical reality, which cannot be reduced to a particular place in the universal matrix of the Ideal Language and its logic of quantification over a base space whose terms would correspond to spatiotemporal points as 'base' of a logical physics (as in Carnap's programme of a 'logical construction of the World')
in 1928). In the 'outward' side or order of the central 'algebraic' symbolism, though, we can define an abstract frame of a 'real' (or 'geometrical' or 'physical') dynamic or unfolding. More exactly, the articulation in reflection of such a dynamic, such a 'mathematical physics' directly mirrors the articulation of 'mathematical logic' in the mathematics which unfolds over the mid-century. The algebraic geometry or differential topology of the mathematical physics of around 1970, in particular, mirrors or reflects a 'topological' logic in the order of category-theoretical 'topoi', those abstract unfolding 'spaces' of which logical and physical orders are two complementary 'sides'.

Thus the elementary 'quantum numbers', on the physical side parallel the elementary arithmetic built up from the null set, as elementary 'terms' on the physical side. If we consider the 'function space' of 'continuous' transformations of sets of quantum numbers ('continuous', here, in the abstract sense of transformations which preserve some as yet unspecified homology of such configurations of quantum numbers) we see at once that it is just the space of Hamilton's 'quaternions': an order of three 'dimensions' of substitution, three symmetric 'functions' of our elementary terms, with the symmetry of substitution of one of these orders for the other in the common order of the 'place' of mapping of configurations, given by Hamilton's relations (for the three orders of transformation, i, j, k):

\[ i^2 = j^2 = k^2 = ijk = -1 \]

The ternary order of the function-space, and the common 'time' of substitution or mapping from one elementary configuration to another corresponds, then, simply to the physical 'space' and 'time' (or rather, 'space-time') in which quantum configurations are supposed embedded. But this space-time may on the other hand be regarded as the abstract general frame of mapping of abstract quantum configurations onto one another. 'Mathematically' we may regard this 'space-time' of quaternions (denoted, after Hamilton, \( \mathbb{H} \)) as simply the formal frame of coordination of our elementary 'quantum numbers' which specify elementary physical identities or 'particles'; we may regard this 'space' and 'time' as 'in' the particles (like Leibniz' monads).
just as well as the reverse. Each of the four 'dimensions' of this space or space-time is (separately) equivalent to the 'physically' continuous 'real line': to 'all the points' on a physically continuous one-dimensional line. If we call the structure of such a continuous line - of 'the continuum' - 'C', we may say that the 'number' of points in each dimension is the 'number' of mappings from the finite whole numbers (N') to the finite whole numbers: R = N x N (and |R| = |N| x |N| or H x H). This according to Cantor's extension of the arithmetic of finite sets (where 4 = 2^2 is read: the number of ways of going from 0,1 to 0,1 (from '2' to '2') is '4'; 0 can go to 0 or 1, and 1 can go to 0 or 1) to infinite sets.

Just as the logical order was closed by identifying as elementary terms certain sets defined by operators on functions in which those terms themselves were to be considered the terms to be substituted for the variables (with, after 1901, some allowance made for Russell's Paradox), so we may 'close' the physical order by identifying our elementary 'homology' of quanta with the cohomology of functions from H to H, as defined by first and second order differential operators constrained by the structure of the elementary symmetry groups SU(1), SU(2) and SU(3). The elementary group-structure or homology of quantum configurations constrained by the latter symmetries (the symmetry of charge-separation for one-, two-, and three-dimensional 'charge' respectively: electromagnetic, weak and colour charges), defining the range of possible transformations of a given configuration, is reflected in the correlation of differential operators constraining continuous 'electric', 'weak', and 'strong' 'fields' over H. The correlation of the operators of infinitesimal changes (dx, dy, dz, dt) in four dimensions, finally, governs the 'relativistic' symmetry of the 'metric' field itself, corresponding in the quantum homology to the invariance of Planck's constant of action, the basic 'unit' correlating those minuscule (but not strictly 'infinitesimal') changes or differences on the quantum level which mirror the infinitesimal differences defining the corresponding continuous fields in space-time. We may actually identify the minuscule differences of the quantum homology with the infinitesimal differentials of the corresponding field cohomology, by regarding the component differences of the minimal 'quantum' of action rather like Leibniz' 'infinitesimals', basing our field theory
upon Abraham Robinson's 'Non-Standard Analysis' of 1966. For the finite if minuscule size of the differentials (as components of the quantum of action; we might put dH for 'h', in line with dx or dq, and so on) might be taken as a reflection, in the physical interface of elementary and global orders, of that 'incommensurability' of elementary and global mathematical orders, the 'incompleteness' or open-ness expressed by Gödel's construction, from which Robinson's non-archimedean continuum (or model of Leibniz' incommensurability of 'ordinary' numbers and non-zero 'infinitesimals') derives.

That is, we may correlate the complementarity of elementary quantum symmetries and 'global' fields in their interface in the human scale of 'action' or interaction (the scale, indeed, of the 'observer' or 'measurer') with the formal locus of our assertion in the formal language of mathematical physics. Indeed we have already found a radical configuration of that interface of an 'internal' space of symmetry, and its mirroring in 'external' physical space in Lacan's topology of the human body. Such a 'human' body, and its associated 'I' or dynamic of assertion lies at the interface of a global space-time and the elementary 'knottedness' of the associated field(s) about an elementary particle as singularity of the field, which gives one representation of the elementary homology mirroring the cohomology of the field(s).

We might quite as well regard the dynamic of the physical macrocosm as articulated about the elementary dynamic of 'human' self-assertion and 'desire' - formally unfolding from the 'dynamic' of that interface or surface of 'internal' and 'external' space - as we regard our 'bodies' as mysteriously 'in' the wider dynamic of physical 'bodies' in general. We must then, however, extend Lacan's 'sixties scheme of the projective plane to projective (3-)space, and model, say, Freud's dynamic of oral anal and genital 'dimensions' in the knotted surface of the Klein Bottle.

We may see in the mathematical physics of around 1970, then, one 'side' of the formal coordination of three 'sides' (inside, interface, outside): the complement of the formal logical frame of coordination of our assertions; the 'empty' limiting physical frame of our action as interface of global and elementary physical 'actions', itself abstracted from the 'symbolic' order of the interface of 'outside' and 'inside' of our (self-)assertion. The coordination of elementary and
global orders of the two 'sides' of the 'formal language' which is mathematics ('proper') might, then, be taken (as the mathematical terminology itself suggests) as successor to earlier 'category theories' of Kant...or indeed of Aristotle, upon whose 'formal language' of syllogism Kant himself purports to model his Kategorienlehre.

Now the positing as (somewhat kantian or neo-kantian) ideal of a purely 'formal' language - of a sort of mathematics 'in itself' as frame of actuality, from which everyday identifications of our selves and their objects in informal language abstract, defines the viennese project of a 'Unified Science' and complementary demystification of language, around 1930. - A demystification framed by the principles of transcription of everyday language into the formal frame from which it amounts to a practical abstraction, a sort of short-hand or short-circuit. - A transcription itself framed by the 'mystery' of the informal presentation (in the Tractatus) of the formal language in which the informal language of its presentation is to be inscribed ('taking up the ladder up which one has climbed').

In his inaugural lecture at Freiburg in 1929 (Was ist Metaphysik?) Heidegger had sought to effect a parallel or complementary inscription of 'everyday' identification of selves and their objects in a radical order of questioning 'outside' that everyday identification, in which that everyday order was itself to be inscribed as an abstraction (an abstraction, then, from a systematic order of questioning, as Carnap regarded it as abstracting from the systematic articulation of assertion). Insofar as the 'object' of this radical questioning is not any 'thing' in the everyday order, but rather the actuality or 'working' of the distinction of inside and outside this thetic order of correlation of subjects and objects, we may see it reflected in the correlative 'working' of that 'Nothing' or no-thing which marks in this order of everyday what is not in it. Carnap inscribed the everyday language which identified the elementary physical actuality of the spatiotemporal mark, in that physical order as more radical. Heidegger, in a parallel inscription of the restricted order in a 'working' or (ontological) actuality which expressed itself in
the restricted order as 'outside' the everyday logic of inclusion and exclusion, affirmation and negation — of that order — echoes the aristotelian or thomist discussion of 'Being' as radical analogy (as 'transcendental' in the sense of Thomas, Kant, Brentano — whose doctoral dissertation on the 'equivocation' of 'Being' in Aristotle had such a decisive impact on the young Heidegger — or Husserl) — the aristotelian discussion echoed in the quotation from the Metaphysics with which Heidegger closes Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik that same year. And in the everyday order it is the 'nothing' or openness to self-determination of Da-Sein (to stray in this orthography into the following year) which opens up the possibility of Sein expressing itself in the figure of (being) outside everyday inclusion and exclusion.

There is a working of 'no-thing' in the everyday order of things: Das Nichts selbst nichtet. Dasein as framing our being as 'in question', as open, constitutes the inscription in Sein of a no-thing which mirrors the no-thing which is Sein in the interface of these two poles of our World, rather as in the Ideal Language the 'subjective' pole is inscribed in the ideal frame as focus of that open alternative of affirmation or negation (a negation to which there corresponds nothing, however one construes this correspondence) in which question and assertion are framed. But Carnap in his celebrated article of 1931 in the Vienna Circle's organ Erkenntnis ('Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache') found in Heidegger's formulation of the working of Nothing, both a 'metaphysical' use of language (the verb 'nichten' coined by Heidegger) not sanctioned by any primary practical usage, and a misconstrual of the logical syntax of quantification in the use of 'das Nichts' as a substantive.

I have already taken Heidegger at Freiburg and the 'Circle' around Schlick at Vienna — along with the Frankfurt School and National Socialist Weltanschauung — as indices of german 'philosophy' around 1930, and I have already noted Heidegger's inscription, over the mid-century, of formal language as Logistik in the order of Technik and Ge-Stell which doubles or complements the poetic inscription of the language which identifies the Mystery of Being as one term of the mystery. Now I must quickly identify the two parallel axes of in-
scription of the viennese logic in british and american reflection over the mid-century, before finally coordinating this order of interaction with the franco-german 'phenomenological' axis, in a common 'global' context.

I have already noted the meeting in Schlick's circle of german, french, british and american components (Mach, Russell, Poincaré, and the pragmatism represented by Morris, for example), and the part of the Prague Congress of 1929 as focus and platform for the programme or manifesto drafted that year by Carnap (and first identifying a 'Vienna Circle'). In 1930 *Erkenntnis* was established as journal of the various groups associated with the programme of Unified Science - the group around Carnap himself at Prague (in Mach's old chair) from 1931 until 1936, and the group around Tarski at Warsaw in particular (the 'Warsaw School' of logicians deriving from Brentano's pupil Twardowski). In the early thirties Ayer sat in on the Vienna discussions, returning to Oxford to transcribe the german programme into the british empiricist tradition (*Language Truth and Logic*: 1936). I have noted Wittgenstein's return to philosophy and to Cambridge between 1927 and 1932 - attendance at a lecture on the Foundations of Mathematics given by Brouwer in Vienna in 1929 constituting, so the story goes, the decisive turning-point in that transition. The link with american pragmatism had already been established by Morris by the time of Quine and Nagel's visit to Vienna, Prague and Warsaw. Feigl had moved to Iowa in 1931; Carnap moved to Chicago in the year of Schlick's murder, and Tarski followed before the occupation of Vienna and Warsaw (and the dissolution of the Circle) two years later (1938).

I will take the part of Quine at Harvard over the mid-century as an index of the wider interaction of the Circle with the american scene dominated by pragmatism. And I will attempt only to elicit the parallel with the sketch of parisian reflection over the middle of the century which has been approached in greater detail.
Carnap had proposed a unification of Science in a formal language framed by an initial or radical epicurean inscription of the 'logical' order of assertion in the outward physical order. The mathematical order of mirroring of logical and physical in the physical order was abstracted from in the familiar figure of a 'de-tour' from elementary 'position' or positing, through the formal 'language' in which 'meaning' was in principle determined by 'cashing out' (to use an 'economic' metaphor for language which subsequently attained to a certain..currency..) expressions in terms of elementary 'position', to the global order of inscription of such secondary linguistic articulation in the primary physical order, by the logical definition of 'analytic' logical statements as saying nothing. - A global articulation of the 'logical' order of coordination of assertions by the familiar figure of an 'abdication' which inscribes the logical distinction of logical and physical orders of distinction or differentiation in the figure of a purely formal abstraction from the physical order of the mark. The logical circle of 'saying nothing' by simply talking about the use of differential marks or signs in relation to 'elementary' positing is inscribed in the physical circuit, the closed physical System of the Whole, in terms of the mirroring of these two circuits in the formalist mathematics of the mark. One may compare the 'physicalism' of this project after Godel's 1931 paper with the transcendentalism of Husserl's parallel ideal. And one may then compare Quine's inscription of this project around the mid-century in the pragmatic order of scientific activity, in terms of the linguistic interface of theory and action - a linguistic order of theory itself articulated in the interface of formal and informal language - with the mid-century French assertion of the primacy of action or interaction (albeit framed in terms of a transcendental logical space and time).

Quine, born in 1908, moved to Harvard to work on a doctorate under Whitehead in 1930. Whitehead had the previous year published (as Process and Reality) that wider system whose evolution from the prewar logic of the Principia parallels Russell's British development through 'logical atomism'. By 1936 ('New Foundations') Quine had (in a development which, to again pursue a French analogy, might be compared with Sartre's champ transcendental of that year) inscribed the logic of the Principia in a more radical frame unfolded from the Fregean
principle of substitution for a variable in a string of terms. The syntax of the Principia could now be unfolded from a more primitive syntax of class membership ('\( \ldots \epsilon \ldots \)'), Sheffer's stroke (alternative denial: \( \phi \uparrow \uparrow \) as 'not both \( \phi \) and \( \psi \)') and universal quantification ('\((x)\ldots x\ldots\) as 'for any term in place of \( x, \ldots x \ldots \)'). The following year Quine showed how this radical syntax could be reduced further to that of class abstraction and class inclusion alone: the logical 'topology', then of formulae in terms of the elementary order of substitution, of the 'place' of the term in an expression. This 'topology' of abstraction may be taken as a direct parallel to Tarski's formal semantics of 1936, articulated in terms of objects 'satisfying' a formula in a theory (giving a theory of 'models' for a theory or set of recursively specified sentences in a formal language, by embedding that formal language in a formal metalanguage obtained by the addition of the predicate '\( T \ldots \)' ( '\( \ldots \) is true') and its simple formal syntax), to Church's functional (rather than class) abstraction (proposed as equivalent to Post's algorithms or Turing's theory of computability or Gödel's recursion, and so on)...

Around 1950 this quinean economy of language was further unfolded to the point where the complementary abstractions of Carnap's logical circuit of 'analyticity' and the associated 'reduction' to a closed physical System in which statement-meaning could be 'cashed-out' in a Tarski semantics upon an elementary base of pure (synthetic) observation-statements, could be framed as complementary abstractions from the more radical 'economy':

Carnap, Lewis, and others take a pragmatic stand on the question of choosing between language-forms, scientific frameworks; but their pragmatism leaves off at the imagined boundary between the analytic and the synthetic. In repudiating such a boundary I espouse a more thorough pragmatism. Each man is given a scientific heritage plus a continuing barrage of sensory stimulation; and the considerations which guide him in warping his scientific heritage to fit his continuing sensory promptings are, where rational, pragmatic. (1)

1: From a Logical Point of View, p46
So closes Quine's influential criticism of *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*, first delivered as a lecture to the American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division) in 1950. Other papers in the 1953 collection, *From a Logical Point of View*, dating from the years around 1950, deal with various aspects of this pragmatic 'economy' of rational inquiry. An economy in which our ontological 'outlay' - or 'commitment' (itself a term with an economic resonance, not to speak of a contemporary Parisian resonance) - is determined by the range of terms for objects which may be substituted for the variables of quantification in some particular domain of formal - and indeed informal - language (the part of variables in the latter being played by pronouns). Rational inquiry is inscribed in the wider economy of rational activity as a whole through a radical (American) finality that appears in the material economy as minimalisation of outlay (this coordination of scientific inquiry and a technical 'interest' constituting as we will see in a moment a primary component in the mid-century detour of German philosophy through America between the 'thirties and 'sixties).

By 1960, and the publication of *Word and Object* (dedicated to Carnap, and prefaced by a quotation from Neurath comparing the systematisation of language in language to rebuilding a ship, at sea... the 'sea of words' of Plato's *Parmenides*, perhaps) the various aspects of the Quinean frame of an economy of rational inquiry had been coordinated in a book based upon the lectures and papers of the 'fifties. The material mode in which Quine's position over the mid-century was elaborated and presented might itself be taken as a reflection of the academic 'economy' of philosophical inquiry in Britain and America over this period, reminiscent of the medieval economy of academic disputation. More particularly, the Anglo-American axis of a debate in which Quine's book may be taken to follow Strawson's *Individuals* of the previous year may be gauged by the bibliography of the former: a few dozen classic books and articles (Frege, Peirce, Russell, Carnap and so on) and over a hundred pieces from various journals marking so many moments of the 'fifties debate - in which the seven entries under Strawson (or in one case, 'In Defence of a Dogma', under Grice and Strawson), five papers between the *Introduction to Logical Theory* of 1952 and *Individuals*, come next in number after the dozen or so, over this period, under Quine.
...But we are not, surely, to approach this anglo-american economy of disputation statistically, standing outside the language of the debate like some quinean anthropologist - as if the academic debate had no meaning outside the circulation or currency of terms or themes in which (as in the ideological order of 'current affairs') one is always in the middle of the story, whose abstraction from historical beginnings and ends (or finality) is then to be regarded as almost constitutive of the institution?

How are we then to frame a debate upon the linguistic frame in which (among other things) the debate itself is organised? Are we quite 'at sea' like Neurath's sailors, or can we find some invariants which are not in question if indeed there is a debate, there are to be these questions at all?

...Of course there is a great deal that is not in question in the debate. That distasteful and un-american theme of 'ideology' for a start, with which Quine toys for a page or so, having first changed its meaning ('to give a good sense to a bad word'), before rejecting-(1). The finality of Rationality or Science too (which is perhaps the same question: the value of value-freedom; the Value of Truth). ... But within this presupposition of rationality, Quine is in 1950 nothing if not liberal. The economy of Science is a very model of free enterprise. Too free by half (the 'analytic' side) for Mr. Strawson. If we are going to differ in argument (including, one supposes, this one) about argument itself it seems we must first agree to differ. We must share in what Wittgenstein calls 'agreement in language'. We must surely share, that is, in at least that order of 'position' or positing or referring in which Aristotle finds those radical principles of his logical topology (Excluded Middle and Non-Contradiction) without which there cannot even be any argument about these principles. How can there be any question about the structure, the invariance, which defines questioning or inquiry itself?

One might not unreasonably feel that the systematic transatlantic misunderstanding from the days of Russell and Dewey through those of Quine and Strawson to the Dummett-Davidson 'controversy' opening up around 1970, itself turns about a sort of 'excluded middle' and

1: From a Logical Point of View, pp131-2
a sort of disagreement in language veiled by the apparent identity (barring a few differences in spelling) of the American and English 'language' of the perennial debate...

This line of thought (sc. of Ayer and Ryle) derives a wishful vigor [sic] from a distaste for abstract objects coupled with a taste for their systematic efficacy. The motivation has proved sufficient to induce remarkable extremes. We find philosophers allowing themselves not only abstract terms but even pretty unmistakable quantifications over abstract objects... and still blandly disavowing, within the paragraph, any claim that there are such objects. (1)

Quine has already asserted that the logical form of argument, as articulated in terms of predication, truth-functional combination, and quantification (ie, precisely the logic of Ayer and Ryle's arguments dismissed here as 'extreme'), cannot be in question in translation - even in that translation from English into English which is our understanding of what a speaker of our language is saying. If someone is speaking a language at all, then he must draw distinctions, and so his language must embody the elementary 'topology' of logical form, even if we find someone apparently flouting the radical principle of separation of what is asserted and what not, corresponding to the Law of Non-Contradiction. In Two Dogmas Quine had asserted that any statement could be questioned, and cited as an extreme case the Law of Excluded Middle questioned in some versions of the 'logic' of Quantum Mechanics... but the questioning of the Law of Contradiction, one further step, was not there confronted. By 1960 he admits that if they appear to flout this very base of logical topology, we must assume that they mean something different in the two occurrences of the proposition which is at once affirmed and denied (the fact that, say, Hegel or Marx would then deny this, makes them, one supposes, beyond the pale, not worth arguing with). And it is in this configuration that Ayer and Ryle... and Strawson and Grice... affirm a meaning of this 'mean'. For Quine, however, this 'meaning something different' is rather an informal direction that we are not 'speaking the same language', and is not itself a term which can be properly translated into Quine's 'language'. And since that language is itself framed.
as the language, translation into which defines 'what there is' in 'meaning', we cannot attach any meaning to an informal distinction between 'meaning' in the language of the British philosophers, and Quine's version of the distinction they want to make as self-contradictory.

But in Quine's own terms, then - if Ayer and Ryle appear on his translation of their argument against such translation, to be contradicting themselves - shouldn't we assume that they are not speaking that same language? But Quine can't assume this without contradicting himself, for he has already characterised meaningful debate as debate as ordered in the economy of his translation into 'regimented' language.

...So when American and British philosophers appear to one another to be contradicting themselves, and argue from that contradiction (each in their own language), by the exclusion of some middle term, to the truth of their own version ('agreeing' then, on each side, on the polarity of disagreement in the same 'English' language), are we as, say, 'anthropologists' surveying the debate, to assume they are speaking a different language - that there is a 'divergence in language':

That fair translation preserves logical laws is implicit in practice even where, to speak paradoxically, no foreign language is involved. Thus when to our querying of an English [sic] sentence an 'English speaker answers 'Yes and no', we assume that the queried sentence is meant differently in the affirmation and the negation; this rather than that he would be so silly as to affirm and deny the same thing. Again, when someone espouses a logic whose laws are ostensibly contrary to our own, we are ready to speculate that he is just giving some familiar old vocables ('and', 'or', 'not', 'all', etc.) new meanings. This talk of meaning is intuitive, uncritical and undefined, but it is of a piece with translation; what it registers is our reluctance under such circumstances to 'translate' the speaker's English into our English by the normal tacit method of homophonic translation...

The maxim of translation underlying all this is that assertions startlingly false on the face of them are likely to
turn on hidden differences of language. This maxim is strong enough in all of us to swerve us even from the homophonous method that is so fundamental to the very acquisition and use of one's mother tongue.
The common sense behind the maxim is that one's interlocutor's silliness, beyond a certain point, is less likely than bad translation - or, in the domestic case, linguistic divergence. (1)

The contradiction between a British informal account of 'meaning' as definite in that informal pragmatics of 'translation' which is (from the British point of view) what we mean by 'understanding', and an American framing of 'meaning' in informal language in terms of the formal translation of the terms governing translation from informal to formal language, does not, then, go 'beyond a certain point': the 'silliness' of Quine's interlocutors Ayer and Ryle appears more likely than 'linguistic divergence', 'hidden differences of language'...and this even though we must then attribute to these interlocutors self-contradiction, 'allowing...and blandly disavowing, within the paragraph'. And the terms of disagreement, indeed, are embedded in Quine's very version of the relation of informal 'English' to 'regimented' English: 'implicit in practice', 'assume', 'meant', 'same thing', 'meaning', 'intuitive', 'normal', 'acquisition and use of one's mother tongue', 'common sense', and, last but primary: 'a certain point'.

'A certain point' beyond which one's interlocutor's silliness is less likely than bad translation. How certain a point? And how far is this point or demarcation as radical to 'meaning' as the formal structure of predication, truth-functional composition, and quantification?

The focus of dissent lies near this 'certain point', and turns, precisely, upon a certain equivocation in 'some familiar old vocables' - 'and', 'or', 'not', 'all'...and, most particularly, 'any'.

'Not any', for example: if there is not any point outside Quine's projected Regimentation of language, does that mean the latter is a regimentation of all language? On the other hand, if the project cannot be considered to as it were contain all language, does this then mean that there is 'a certain point' which is not amenable
to regimentation?

If we attempt to define that 'certain point' at which 'meaning' comes into play, in a shift from questions about objects to questions about the words used to talk of them, then the translation of that attempted demarcation into Quine's regimented language allows him to bring the 'analytic' side (talk about the use of words) into question precisely through the indeterminacy of translation into that language (involving the possibility of bringing the order of 'presupposition' supposedly underlying analyticity into question, and so finding in it a content which might be otherwise construed).

We cannot paraphrase our opponent's sentences into canonical notation for him and convict him of the consequences, for there is no synonymy; rather we must ask him what canonical sentences he is prepared to offer, consonantly with his own inadequately expressed purposes. If he declines to play this game the argument terminates. To decline to explain oneself in terms of quantification, or in terms of those special idioms of ordinary language by which quantification is directly explained, is simply to decline to disclose one's referential intent. We saw in our consideration of radical translation that an alien language may well fail to share the object-positing pattern of our own; and now our suppositious opponent is simply standing, however legalistically, on his alien rights. We remain free as always to project analytical hypotheses and translate his sentences into canonical notation as seems most reasonable; but he is no more bound by our conclusions than the native by the field linguist's. (1)

- I have already noted Quine's translation of Ayer and Ryle's sentences 'as seems most reasonable', before dismissing them, on the previous page. The British adversary then 'stands, however legalistically, upon his alien rights', meaning something different by this his differing about 'meaning'...meaning, indeed, a somewhat 'legalistic' account of 'meaning' itself, as presented for example by Austin at Quine's Harvard in 1955 (2).

1: Word and Object, p242 2: William James Lectures, the notes for which were the basis of How to Do Things with Words (ed. Urmson, 1962)
Now if we _are_ as British and American speaking the same language, then either we can resolve our differences of conception by the process of 'semantic ascent' to more and more general frames of the Quinean economy of inquiry.

The strategy of semantic ascent is that it carries the discussion into a domain where both parties are better agreed on the objects (viz., words) and on the main terms concerning them. Words, or their inscriptions, unlike points, miles, classes, and the rest, are tangible objects of the size so popular in the marketplace, where men of unlike conceptual schemes communicate at their best. The strategy is one of ascending to the common part of two fundamentally disparate conceptual schemes, the better to discuss the disparate foundations. No wonder it helps in philosophy. (1)

...or 'the argument terminates'... or the argument about what we're arguing about leads on from Russell to Strawson to Dummett, or from Dewey to Quine to Davidson. For what are we to do if we disagree with Quine's version of what the argument is between us, Quine's version of the inscription of the principles of translation from informal into regimented language in regimented language? How are we to convey the meaning of meaning which lies in an 'informal' difference between informal and formal? In Quine's marketplace we must first 'cash out' the currency our terms enjoy over the sea before we can compete. No credit is given to promissory notes which promise only other promissory notes. Quine has seen where speculation leads—say at Harvard (Process and Reality) or Wall Street, in 1929.

Across the sea, meanwhile, quinean claims are ruled out of court in the ciceronian scheme, the 'legalistic' frame of discussion or debate, where to assert our position we must accept the institution or rules which constitute our assertion as assertion, as our case. In stating our case we are to respect the established forms of breaking it down into elementary clauses, which we then resolve by citation of precedents and putative applications, noting and disposing of apparently dissenting authorities where we deem it appropriate. Cases typically extend over many years. Mr. A or Professor B may suggest a situation in which Mr. C's clause 5c(2) of 1957 seems not to apply;
Mr. D, however, notices that Mr. A's counter-instance is in fact covered by clause 3a of Professor B's initial case of 1954, which the professor had eventually felt bound to withdraw faced with Mr. C's argument for the initial form of clause 5c, '5c(1)'; if however we now replace 5c(2) by 5c(3), then we may reassert 3a in the form 3a(2), compatible it seems with 5c(3), and circumvent Mr. A's objection...

Now just as any competition is welcome in Quine's marketplace of 'conceptual schemes', as long as transactions are made in quinean terms, in terms whose currency is proven ('strictly no credit' otherwise)...so any claims may be brought before the British court of inquiry, as long as the jurisdiction of that court is not itself brought into question (in which case there is no definite claim). The court may even examine, in the International division, cases of Conflict of Laws, in which its jurisdiction is contested: but only insofar as the claim is brought forward according to the court's own recognition of its position in International Law. If Quine is not prepared to present his case against British jurisdiction in the transatlantic business of determining the viability of British credit in the American marketplace at the British end of the transaction, then there is no way of enforcing that credit on the American side. For the British rules cannot determine that the conflict must be resolved in the 'legalistic' frame of British disputation, failing any transatlantic treaty securing bilateral agreement upon the 'last instance' of appeal in transatlantic commerce. If Quine will not present his case against British jurisdiction within the 'legalistic' frame of disputation which he disputes, then there is no higher jurisdiction which can enforce the primacy of the British court in the resolution of the question of its competence. Why then should Quine agree to British terms of resolution of the conflict as to which is to be the last instance of resolution? To recognise the legalistic tribunal would ipso facto be to concede the case.

In America the law is formally framed to ensure free play in the quinean marketplace or forum. The law which constitutes the frame of that play, formally allows for its own amendment: but this must itself be in accordance with the formal framing of the formal law as then one element in the primary economy of free action.
American insistence upon the right of Americans to have the law formally defined on any point; British case-law framed in an unwritten constitution. Meanwhile, in the Soviet Union in 1950, the primacy of political rather than economic or legal orders of language was being marked by Stalin's personal intervention in the contemporary Russian debate about the nature of language and meaning. The debate itself was primarily political: should the various national languages of the various Soviets be replaced by Russian...and should Russian language itself be reformed? — For a debate had opened up between the old formalist school of linguists and a new school which regarded language as part of the ideological superstructure. Was divisive nationalism embedded in the very structure of the separate national languages? — At any rate the diverging accounts of language had become the frame of a power struggle within the linguistics faculties of universities in various Soviets. Stalin intervened in a series of articles in Pravda in 1950. 'Pravda': the Truth...No, language was not part of the superstructure, nor was it embedded in the base as primarily a material interaction with the world, nor was it something intermediate between base and superstructure. Rather was it of the nature of an institution partaking of base, superstructure, and their interface, belonging as activity of coordinating these orders to none of them in particular. In particular, it was not to be regarded as the expression of thought, but rather as articulating the frame in which thinking and ideology, on the one hand, and material activity on the other, interacted. Thus Stalin's framing of language in language, in his Pravda articles, as the inscription of words in the general order of activity as a whole, may itself be regarded as a limiting self-assertion of his political authority: using words to inscribe words in the frame of activity, and so to in effect determine the focal political locus of this his determination of words and so of the most general frame of action, constrained only by his self-inscription in it as last instance of assertion...last instance, notably, in the debate over what was the last instance in the determination of language (1).

Well, no further argument there: 'that' was 'that', and... that was that. Full Stop. Might we then suppose that the conflict

1: Pravda articles collected and translated as Marxism and Problems of Linguistics (Moscow, 1954)
between the formal quinean constitution of language (or reconstitution) and the unwritten laws appealed to by his opponents, was to be resolved in some decisive analogue of the political order of decision? After all, international conflicts, whether of laws or other forces, were ultimately resolved politically: if one were to agree to some 'legalistic' frame of decision, or if one were to subordinate strict legal considerations to economic ones, that would be a political decision. Quine's opponents, otherwise, could take their legalistic stand and refuse to do business; Quine could equally well refuse the jurisdiction of his opponents' principles or 'rules'. In the end each side was free to decide for itself the principles of decision. The only question then remaining was: what decided them to decide in their different ways?

...For the conflict between Quine's formal determination of the relations between formal and informal language, and a complementary 'informal' assertion of the difference between formal and informal assertion, is, on the face of it, 'undecidable'. For we know from Gödel and Tarski, for example, that the semantic order to which the 'ordinary language' philosophers appeal is either formally incomplete or formally contradictory ...so what, precisely, can they be talking about? On the other hand, they may find in the dynamic of the interface of formal and informal, logic and language, precisely the invariance of an order of meaning and questioning which cannot be formally defined in principle, which must be, as it were, found at work in the shifting boundary of what is in question at any time, in any situation, and what is not (and whose calling into question, then, amounts to a further different situation).

That is: we might see on the british side an attempt to elicit the invariant structure of the dynamic of 'positing': the intension or intention embodied for example in a specific predication might be identified with a 'function' whose interface with the order of extension cannot be mapped into that order. - A situation reflected formally by the radical 'gap' between the logical homology of terms and the logical cohomology of functions, in any formal logic (since Russell's Paradox) - but this formal incompleteness or gap reflecting the primary gap between the order of intentions outside this formal order, and the formal order into which they are mapped as 'open sentences' formally coordinated by extensional truth-functions. We might, to put it more simply, see in the british and american positions, two complementary 'versions' of the interface of formal and informal lan-
guage. On the american side, an inscription of the invariant configuration of the dynamic of 'translation' into formally regimented language, in the regimented language, 'meaning' then corresponding to the inscription of the finality of transcription in the formal order into which this finality organised the project of transcription. On the other side, we may see an unfolding of the essentially local and dynamic interface of informal and formal orders of language as the elaboration of what we mean by 'meaning' something, the structure of intention, in everyday activity.

I have associated this 'intention' or intension, corresponding at once to the finality of the british inquiry, and the object of that inquiry, with its formal image as a 'gap' between the logical 'function-space' of open sentences, and the 'base' of terms substitutable for the variables in those open sentences. We cannot mark that gap in the formal frame of Quine's regimentation - as some boundary between 'analytic' and synthetic - and yet we might see that formal gap as marking the very dynamic interface of what is, and what is not, in question in a particular situation. If we start from Quine's 'periphery' and proceed towards logical truth at the centre of his 'conceptual scheme' we will not come upon this boundary: an interface of two sides at any stage can always, as it were, be pushed one stage further. And yet we cannot thus assume that there is no such boundary. As we have seen, one finds at the extreme pole of Contradiction that one is in a sense 'over' the boundary, 'beyond a certain point' - even though such a point cannot be specified in abstraction from particular situations. To argue that because a stable boundary cannot be fixed in regimented language there is no 'function' of such a boundary is in effect to apply a global principle of logical dichotomy or Excluded Middle to the attempted determination of a function which is perhaps essentially 'local'. Now the complementarity of this 'local' function, primary in the everyday dynamic of a 'boundary' of concept and object or function and variable, and the formal 'gap' between function and individual term in a formal theory abstracted from any particular situation, we saw already in Brouwer's unfolding of mathematics as it were from the 'dynamic' of the interface of function and variable, which corresponds to the 'gap' we cannot reach by classically proceeding from the classical poles of formal mathematical 'space'.

Now, having proceeded from the Vienna Circle of around 1930
to an index (in Quine's project of a general economy of scientific or rational inquiry) of its impact upon mid-century America, we must proceed, as it were along a parallel path, from Wittgenstein at Brouwer's Vienna lecture on the Foundations of Mathematics in 1929, to Dummett's generalised Intuitionism (or 'Anti-Realism') of around 1970, in its complementarity with the formal semantics of the group around Quine's pupil and successor at Harvard.

I have noted how the Tractatus, as framed by the 'informal' presentation of the formal frame of 'logical space', from which the informal order of presentation might be identified as an abstraction, provided an initial model from which the viennese project of an Ideal Language could proceed. The period around 1930 marks at once Wittgenstein's renunciation of the attempt to thus inscribe informal language in what was thus informally defined as prior, more radical, than the informal order of its identification (and the informal order of 'prior', 'radical', and so on.. and of 'outside' the informal order of inside and outside), and his 'renunciation' of Vienna, so to speak, for Cambridge. For the british order of reflection, as represented by his examiners (for the doctorate for which the Tractatus was now submitted), itself embodied - most particularly in the person of Moore - just the primacy of that informal order from which he now saw the earlier imaginary formal 'logical space' of the Tractatus had been abstracted.

Philosophers had in general used the everyday order of language to define an order supposedly prior to this its order of definit- ion. In philosophy language 'goes on holiday'. And once one gets stuck in imagination 'outside' the everyday order of identifying this imaginary 'outside' in which the everyday order is then supposed to be inscribed, one necessarily wanders round and round in circles until one remembers or recognises what one has done, or rather, where one has been all the time.

So we are to 'assemble reminders' which will as it were bring us back to ourselves if we get drawn into the philosophers' castles in the air or climb up logico-philosophical ladders, reminders that will bring us down to earth. On the one hand we can provide figures that lead back from the abstract spaces of philosophy
to the everyday situations from which we have absent-mindedly taken leave: we can find images in the everyday situation for the configuration of the everyday situation in the imaginary space of philosophy. This constitutes a sort of reverse analogy back from metaphysical space to the everyday language and situations from which other analogies have first led us astray. On the other hand we may ask questions which induce a rediscovery of ourselves in the locus of everyday assertion in everyday language and situations. Perhaps after a few years we will be well enough recovered to, say, resign our philosophy professorships and go off to everyday living on the west coast of Ireland. Trouble is, these British philosophers take all this business of rules and games and so on as some sort of theory, in the British common-sense mode, 'about' language and a common-sense World... rather than the renunciation of a German theoretical 'space' for a more radical actuality metaphysically speaking 'in' it... except that this 'in' is nothing until it is an illusion.

This Wittgensteinian nothing is indeed strangely like Heideggerian Being, a sort of negative almost, in the photographic sense. In either case we have everyday language, around 1930 (Heidegger's Gerede), in a wider 'space', determined 'in' ordinary language as that which ordinary language is 'in'. In his discussions with the Vienna Circle Wittgenstein sees Heidegger as faced with this limiting form of question, corresponding to the linguistic inscription of language and 'things' in a sort of limiting alternative which might formally be supposed to further define them: 'Man feels the urge to run up against the limits of language' (1). Faced with the aristotelian analogy of 'Being', the formal inscription of the logical order of 'in' as a whole in something of which it is formally identified as one side or component, Heidegger like Thomas before him inscribes ordinary 'logic' in a more radical analogy from which it is identified as an abstraction, as the figure of Abstraction, while Wittgenstein, seeing that the 'logic' of such a 'wider' space is illusory, discovers the working of ordinary language as very frame of actuality, 'outside' which there is not anything, not even Nothing. We might speak of a common German(ic) figure of inscription of Everyday, of what Husserl now called the Lebenswelt, in a wider space from which it is 'abstracted'. In Wittgenstein Everyday is the radical 'working' of self-distinction in and from the metaphysical fiction(s) of such a 'wider' order, in Heidegger a converse 'working' or actuality of Being embeds Everyday
in Being as the interface of this Being and the Nothing in which we discover the possibility of self-assertion.

Now the 'working' or actuality of Everyday, as described in everyday language, which is itself one element in the order of working it describes, was already at work (so to speak) in the British tradition of 'empiricism'. In that tradition, however, the circuit of everyday reality traced by Wittgenstein over the 'thirties and 'forties in his German notebooks and (from 1930-9 and 1945-7) in his unusual Cambridge lectures and seminars, 'in' the fictional space of philosophical reflection ('in' which it marked as it were the concretion or concreteness of actuality), was happily organised in the practical order of a poetics of actuality in which the extreme Germanic inscription of the logical order in a primary 'space' did not arise as a problem. The 'hegelianism' against which Russell and Moore at Cambridge, Cook-Wilson and Prichard at Oxford had reacted after the turn of the century was, as I earlier noted, a pretty schematic theology of the Absolute, in the tradition of the Church of England from which the universities were emancipating themselves over the latter part of the nineteenth century, quite as much as in that of systematic Germany. The adaptation of Wittgenstein's 'therapy' over the mid-century, most particularly after the posthumous publication of the notes assembled by him to forestall further misrepresentation, as the Investigations (1953), was for the most part equally 'British'. The element of the new poetic was the 'language game': if one were to assert something, or indeed to play any of the other parts available to the language-user, that was to identify with a certain part in a certain 'language-game' with its set of rules - like cricket, football, tennis, rounders (baseball) and all the other games spread by the sporting British all around the Globe.

'Game'...a sort of 'play' with its parts with which one identifies for the duration of the game, parts which one can stand outside like parts in a theatrical play. But now the various modes of 'standing outside' were themselves to be interpreted as so many further 'games', each with its set of rules (unwritten like the rules which constitute Britain itself as a huge game), and together constituting a 'form of life' which, corresponding to the openness of a question in which a player must define his or her part, the question of the 'part' itself, could not itself be in question: there could be no
game in which one 'stood outside' the form of life, the order of part, game, rule, itself.

What about making up the rules as we go along, breaking the rules, refusing to accept that we must define our part, accept the part of identification? What of, say, systematic irony? Just not being serious. Fairly british, after all...but perhaps it's just not cricket. You had to be pretty serious with Professor Wittgenstein anyway. If you didn't have a good excuse for missing one of his lectures you weren't allowed to attend any more. You had to play the part without reserve. Regular attendance.

Here we are almost back at the legalism of Quine's stubborn opponents. ...And the question: 'Why must I suppose there are 'rules', on the analogy of formal games? Whence this categorical imperative? Why the finality of always acting as if my action is governed by an impersonal rule?' ...And the answer: that is just the part of playing a part: of being what we are, what 'I' am, what 'you' are. Playing according to the rules can't itself be brought into question, since questioning itself is playing a certain part. At the limit we are faced with the argument ad hominem: Just who do you think you are, questioning the part of playing one's part(s) in language and the acting of which it is one component? Where do you stand? What's your game?

...But we are not quite back at Oxford...rather moving as it were between Cambridge and Oxford at mid-century, like Wittgenstein having resigned his professorship (having formally succeeded Moore in 1939, but only assuming the post at the close of the War), and returned from his 1948-9 stay with Norman Malcolm in America. Wittgenstein, between 1949 and his death from (real rather than metaphysical) cancer in 1951, moving between Oxford and Cambridge, and reflecting, finally, on the question of Certainty, of what is not in question if there are to be questions, and most particularly the cartesian part of recognising the part of questioning, the part of 'I' thus knowing itself as 'I'...and this being 'knowing oneself'.
The notes *Über Gewissheit* eventually joined the series of posthumously published notebooks (beginning with the *Investigations* of the 'thirties (I) and of 1947-9 (II) in 1953) in 1969: their publication (like the others, at Oxford) at the close of the period now being considered might itself be taken as an index of the closing configuration of around 1970 in Britain. To see how we must for the last time return to the Vienna of around 1930.

Ayer returned thence to Oxford in 1933, and published his schematic or programmatic transcription of British empiricism into Viennese language (or rather the reverse) in 1936, this new definition of the poetic 'space' (with its elementary sensation, and its analytic and synthetic 'sides' of logical and physical, articulated on this base) of 'logical positivism' paralleling the various other new 'spaces' (Sartre's, Lacan's, Quine's, Tarski's... and so on) of 1936 already noticed. Also, that academic year at Oxford, there began the weekly meetings of Austin, Ryle and others, from whose discussions the mid-century Oxford 'poetic' of inscription of linguistic activity in the primary order of activity as a whole might be said to unfold as from an initial focus, which again belongs to that configuration of a sort of global first step (of say three) from the configuration of around 1930 to that of around 1950 - a step which, in the political order, is organised in large measure about Hitler's consolidation of the Third Reich, just as, in reflection, it is organised about parallel reactions to Germanic culture, to the Germanic configuration of around 1930.

Ryle's *Concept of Mind* was published in 1949: there was no Cartesian pole of self-consciousness 'behind' the working of 'my' use (or possible uses) of 'I' in language. No inscription of that everyday order of ordinary language and activity in some rider frame of some metaphysical language and its 'I' as actuality of some formal psychological pole of that frame. Austin first lectured on 'Words and Deeds' (the series given as William James Lectures at Harvard in 1955) in 1952. The *Investigations* were published the following year, and Strawson's review focussed attention on the 'Private Language Argument' in the notes from 1947-9 (i.e. Part II). Strawson's *Introduction to Logical Theory*, with its subordination of formal to informal language...
dates from 1952. Hampshire's *Spinoza* dates from 1951, and the books published by Strawson and Hampshire in 1959 (*Individuals and Thought and Action*), directly confronting the question of what there must be for there to be questions and actions - of the radical invariants, so to speak, of any 'conceptual schemes' - may be taken as joint indices of the transition from around 1950 at Oxford to around 1970. Indices of a transition at Oxford from 'fifties to 'sixties which may be taken as a parallel to that transition marked in France by Derrida's paper of 1959 and Lacan's of 1960, noticed above.

I will not dwell on the details of this British transition from around 1950 to around 1970, but will only note a few 'structural' aspects of the transition as a whole which may serve to identify a parallel with the Parisian 'scene' of thinking. In the most general terms, we may, I suggest, speak of a 'poetic' analogue, in Britain, of the 'logical' or rather 'psychological', 'subjectivist', French 'space' of reflection.

I identified earlier three correlative orders of question, relating to 'subject', 'object' and 'frame' of their correlation, and suggested that one might associate with a French 'space' of reflection (this of course itself an abstraction from the wider cultural configuration of French activity as a whole, amounting only to one figuration or force 'in play' in French reflection) a subordination of the questions of objects and frames to the question of the Subject - whether this be in terms of a Sartrian recognition of the radical 'openness' of my part, my action, or indeed in terms of a subsequent anti-subjectivism in which 'the Subject' is itself radically 'in question'. I suggested that the complementarity of this French 'subjectivism' (in the limit an 'anti-subjectivism', but with this opposition or question itself primary, organizing) and a parallel German(ic) primacy of what one might call an 'objective' questioning, might be traced around 1950 in the interaction (say, from 1947 to 1953) of Heidegger with French 'existentialism'. I will add a few details of that suggested Franco-German complementarity from the time of Heidegger's resumption of teaching and Adorno's return to Frankfurt from America the previous year (1950), up to around 1970, in a moment. Here, though, I want to suggest that
we might see in the mid-century British inscription of linguistic activity in the primary poetic frame of action — as primary frame of questions — a sort of third order of framing questions, intermediate in a way between French subjectivism and German 'objectivism' (to return Heidegger's criticism).

...For now it is the order of the frame of action, intermediate between (intermediary between) the subjective locus of framing itself as locus of framing, and the objective locus of a complementary self-assertion or actuality (whether of 'beings' in some frame or (a)Being which distinguishes itself from any framing as a being), which appears primary. - To the point of a reflection 'abstracted' from the radical 'continental' questions of subjectivity and objectivity, Subject and Being. An existential anguish, for example, in the circular open-ness attaching to the part of framing, choosing, one's part, is just not British. It betrays indeed a typically continental lack of resolve, a reprehensible lack of tone in the upper lip. Play up and play the game. Be a man, my son. Kipling for breakfast. Read Professor Hare's account of his attempt to restore common sense in a poor young man who'd been reading Camus' L'Etranger.

...That is: the question of my part is subordinate to the question of what my game is. Or rather, my part is just to play my part: most radically, to play the part of having a part, even if one is not quite sure just which it is. If I don't know, then, in a way, at once it is my part to define my part, to explain it either to myself or to someone else. Activity and interaction is framed and coordinated in the radical assumption that everyone is in the same game, the same play so to speak. Framed, then, in the limit, by an 'agreement in language', in the language in whose jurisdiction everyone finds themselves, whether they like it or not, in which everyone may be called to explain themselves, called to account, called to play the part of assertion, the simple self-assertion of the part that informs some activity which anyone may bring 'into question' (this activity of questioning then itself in turn open to question: 'Why do you want to know?', 'Why should I tell you?'). The ciceronian morality of debate: deliberation, rational activity, as itself the primary finality, which to attempt to question is itself to affirm.
'Words and Deeds': imagine a situation in which somebody says something. 'What?' we say; 'What do you mean, 'What'?'...

We may not have understood the words - the locutionary act. We may have understood the words, but failed to understand just what 'illocutionary' act ('speech act' proper) is meant by them: 'Is that a promise?'.. 'Are you joking?'.. Or: 'What!'... we may question the order of activity into which the illocutionary act enters as one component: 'What do you mean by suggesting such a thing!'; 'Look, just what is it you're after?'.

What, though, is not in question in any such questioning? What are, so to speak, the 'categories' of possible question associated with the inscription of the linguistic order of questions in that working or actuality to which our questions are addressed?

Well, for a start, not everything can be in question or there wouldn't be a question. The situation is analogous to the aristotelian inscription of the logical order of questions in the 'working' of distinctions by which the logical order is itself identified. For a start we must have at least a frame or situation in which there is the 'part' of assertion to which questions are directed, the part to which it belongs, in the limiting case, to assert itself as this part - by the use, in english (or american) of the word 'I'. And we must also, as elementary frame of indication, have this 'I' whose use characterises the 'sortal' or category of 'person', coordinated with the working of the other 'indexicals' (Jakobson's 'shifters') 'this/that', 'here', 'now'. And more generally we must have a complementarity of what is in question and what is not in any situation, embodied in this limiting frame of indication, 'position' (or conversely 'experience' in which a situation asserts itself rather than us asserting it) or positing, and corresponding to a distinction of 'analytic' and 'synthetic'.

We must have all this if we are to mean anything, and we must have it 'at work' in a dynamic of experience and activity in which we are necessarily engaged, as it were, in the indexical functions of 'I', 'here', 'now', 'this', which Quine supposes can be transcribed into the 'eternal sentences' of his space-time. It's all very well
transcribing the abstract syntax of indication (for example) into an eternal quinean space-time, but within that formal frame there's no way we can ever get back to my self-assertion as 'I', or this use of 'this', because we could never in principle exclude the possibility of another situation which would fit our description just as well as 'this' one.

One might see in strawsonian actuality a parallel of deleuzian 'empiricism'. And one might perhaps find in Hampshire's Spinoza a kind of deleuzian resonance too. How does one judge a metaphysical 'system', of which the Ethics present an extreme case? Where will one find the terms to criticise it, and what systematic foundation should one provide for one's criticism. For such a system is in effect a system of determination within determination (in Spinoza's case, indeed; it is precisely this), corresponding to a reflection or questioning which questions in its turn the presuppositions implicit in the reply to the previous questioning of previous presuppositions (on the model, say, of socratic 'irony'). If one questions such a system, then one must be able, must one not, to answer for the presuppositions of one's own questioning. This in turn leads in effect simply to another 'system'. What's the difference, how can one decide between the two? In 1951 Hampshire recognises that Spinoza's 'system' is indeed an ethics. Even at the limit of questioning, a system remains a frame of action, remains rooted in that elementary configuration of presupposition and assertion in action in which questions first arise. Indeed the circularity of inscription of the order of its assertion - of one's assertion 'in' the system, frames the whole as system of one's self-assertion, rather than (ever) a pure space of impersonal reflection, in which one's assertion (in the limit, one's assertion of that space) is to be supposed inscribed, determined 'beyond question'.

Thus by 1959 Hampshire has generalised from his 1951 reading of Spinoza the moral order of action as a radical invariant, which itself frames questioning and answering, rather than being itself determined within some supposedly prior order (of, say, thought). We are always engaged in a particular framing of our situation (of which metaphysical systems may be taken as limiting cases), but the moral order, attaching to our position in any frame as the part of framing, and so of framing this part as 'I', and this 'I's (my) framing of its action, with the inescapable moral openness of choice (with the assertion and
questioning that belongs to it; reflection or thought) is a general invariant coordinating all these particular frames or situations, a general frame, then, of action, a limiting 'system'.

I have already briefly noted some figurations of Quine's position over the middle of the century. 'Position'...rather the symmetric frame of assertion in which all parts are supposed equal; the free economy of assertion in which the citizen is not bound by any closed British system of parts and rules, unquestionable institutions, but where everything is open to question, apart from (the American part of) asserting oneself as locus of strategic decision in this free play. The formal constitution is there, the same for everyone, and the particular situation in which one finds oneself - with a particular 'conceptual scheme' - merely determines a range of possibilities, indefinite until we make something of them, in the open play of assertion. By around 1970 Donald Davidson had extended the Quinean project to that of accounting in that formal frame for the dynamics of informal ('natural') languages. Meanwhile Michael Dummett at Oxford was insisting upon the radical character of the particular situation that Davidson was inscribing in the Quinean scheme. One might say that the debate of the 'fifties was here being continued on into the 'seventies...but that it was now being carried on (as it were by hand to hand fighting) in the very dynamic of the interface of formal and informal languages. Davidson as it were transcribing the dynamic of the controversy of the early seventies into the systematic Quinean economy of his formal semantics of natural languages, Dummett inscribing the same interaction in the intuitionistic scheme of the unfolding of formal language. Saul Kripke on the American side was framing a formal semantics of intuitionist logic.

Now I have already tried to draw a parallel between the formal logic of 'topoi' around 1970, and the 'double mirroring' or two axes of the Parisian discursive order of around the same time. The question of the relations of formal and informal (or 'natural')
language I have associated in turn with Wittgenstein's transition from the inscription of the informal language of its supposed definition in the ideal language of the Tractatus, to the fairly extreme intuitionism (if such we may call it) of, say, the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. - The transition, around 1930, from the inscription of informal in formal language to the assertion of the primacy of 'ordinary' informal language...and the transition from Vienna to Cambridge.

Quine's project over the mid-century, which I have taken as a rudimentary index of a 'pragmatic' american tradition over that period, turns upon the elementary 'topology' of the string of letters in a formal language or morphemes in an informal language. Here already, then, we may begin to correlate the anglo-american dynamics of the interface of formal and informal language (and the interaction of the two 'languages' of reflection on either side of the Atlantic on their 'homophonic' base) around 1970, with the parisian dynamics of the 'place' of words and discourse around the same time.

I will not stop now to trace the 'philosophy of science' which, on either side of the Atlantic, complements - primarily in the correlative discussion of physical theory - the 'philosophical logic' sketchily discussed above. I noted before Popper's transition to the british scene as part of the germanic 'diaspora' of the 'thirties, and the parallel move of many of his viennese associates to the United States. In the United States the collaboration of Quine and Nelson Goodman around the mid-century, representing the parallel transcriptions of two orders of Carnap's project into the american tradition, might perhaps be taken as an index of the wider parallel between two strands of american mid-century philosophy. Thomas Kuhn's questioning in 1962 of the 'standard' economy of Science - this rather ironically in his contribution to Carnap, Morris and Neurath's project of 'Unified Science' as embodied in the International Encyclo-
pedia of Unified Science begun in Vienna - might be taken as marking in the 'philosophy of science' a characteristic shift from the configuration of around 1950 to that of around 1970.

Nor will I consider now american transcriptions of french and german reflection between the 'thirties and the 'sixties. I have already noted the presentation of french 'structuralism' at Johns Hop- kins in 1966, and the part of Herbert Marcuse in the student 'revolut- ion' of the following several years. In discussing the emergence of 'pragmatism' as a distinctively 'american' frame of reflection around the turn of the century I suggested that what there was radically new and independent of the european tradition was precisely the free in- terplay, 'economy' of european ideas transcribed into the culture of the New World. The ideas may have been european, and only the arrange- ment american, rather as Cicero's ideas were greek. But in either case the identification in such arrangement of the arranger, and his self- assertion in this identification, even if it only introduces as it were one single new term, yet serves to organise in a radically new dynamic all the borrowed terms by which it characterises its new actuality, and in this constitutes in one step (whether literally in Cicero's case, or metaphorically in that of James and Dewey) their systematic trans- cription into a new 'language'.

Now Quine's frame of transcription over the mid-century may be taken as a sort of limiting expression of this transcription of 'conceptual schemes' into the pragmatic economy of american reflection. Indeed he presents, or takes as object of his inquiry, just the eco- nomy of inquiry itself, and in this, as we saw, expresses in a fairly direct way the circular or unquestionable finality of american ration- ality, which doubles the closed 'poetic' of british philosophy in its open play of questions. If british philosophy traditionally abstracts, in subordinating the 'questions' of Subject and Object to that of the frame of their interplay, from the polarised 'systems' of french and german reflection, then the american tradition abstracts from the pri- macy, so to speak, of reflection in each of these three Old World tra- ditions. French, german, and british (not to speak of indian, chinese, japanese..) components are appropriated in the wider and yet narrower economy of what works. In the interplay of these elements abstraction is at once made both from the limiting questions of Subject, Frame, Ob-
ject, and from the systematic subordination of two of these orders of question to a third in the parallel orders of questioning that constitute the Philosophy of the Old World. An abstraction then, from a radical European order of questioning, of theory, from three symmetric 'versions' ('psychological', 'poetic', 'ontological') of a reflection on the inscription of reflection in the linguistic interface of Reflection and Action, and so in the cultural interface of language and a complementary material order—an abstraction from three radical questionings of this abstraction, framed by the 'applied logic' of mathematics, the 'language of Science'. A circuit of abstraction from the symmetric European 'logic' of Theory, through the inscription of the logical order in the logical poetic of 'formal language'.

A more radical logic as it were 'cancels out', is elided: first European theory determines 'logically' the formal structure of the linguistic interface of Theory and Action, then an American abstraction is made from the logic of that European determination, from the symmetry, so to speak, of the three complementary European orders of the theoretical determination of language. The formal economy of inquiry, then, with Quine's 'regimentation' as its limiting frame organizing (in its formal space) a temporal finality of Science, is doubled in the material economy of Free Enterprise, the 'marketplace' of things rather than 'conceptual schemes', and each of these two 'sides' is in turn coordinated in the axial pragmatism of American culture, American activity as a whole. Precisely because the central cultural axis is not to be reduced to the mathematical frame of inquiry, Quine can leave the particular situation central to British inquiry as systematically 'open' in his frame, just as the activity of the citizen is left symmetrically open in the liberty and equality of all Americans 'in' a formal constitution. In America you choose your part; you're not trapped in the conservative British assumption that everyone has their allotted part in the social order, which they should stoically play without question. On the one hand, then, the free American is freed from the British subordination of individual part to frame; but on the other he is abstracted, through his constitutive self-inscription in the economy framed in its formal constitution, from unAmerican existential anguish or radical self-inscription of his assertion of its German primacy in the material order of Carnap's physics, Frankfurt Marxism, or Freiburg-Being (if Da be there).

This American 'Frame' then, abstracted from the limiting
questions organising French, British or German inquiry as three parallel strands of a European reflection, three different ‘times’ of inquiry, three complementary finalities, corresponds fairly exactly to the worldly ‘space’ of technology (the ‘logic’ of applied theory, ἀλγόν), Heidegger’s Gestell.

To Heidegger’s identification of Ge-Stell as the frame of that limiting abstraction from the question of Being, in which symmetrical abstraction is made from the complementary questions of Sein, Da-Sein, and Frame itself, as Lichtung, as frame of the coordination of the questions of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ being in that Truth, Ἀλήθεια, in which our assertion in the open-ness of the part of Da-Sein inscribes itself in that radical assertion of Sein in which it thus avows its radical ‘participation’.

The complementarity of this systematic ‘technology’ of abstraction of the frame of twentieth-century Culture from the question of the Being in which this circuit of abstraction was drawn, and the opening configuration of the questioning of that Being in Parmenides’ inscription of the actuality of its assertion in the actuality asserted as ὑπὲρ, and the radical choice facing Western Man as Da-Sein in this complementarity – the decisive character of this limiting configuration of the question, the questioning, and the manifestation of Sein – this duality framed Heidegger’s return to teaching in 1951. He would later identify the critical ‘turn’ or turning-point, Kehre, from the questioning embodied in Sein und Zeit to this decisive question for Man as Da-Sein, in the coordination of Da-Sein (rather than Dasein – for the first time), Sein, and Lichtung as frame of their correspondence in Ἀλήθεια, in the 1930 lecture Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.

As with various other strands of mid-century reflection, the transition from around 1930 to around 1950 may be taken to fall into three steps, with an initial configuration of the new ‘space’ (and time) of around 1950 opening up about 1936 (here, for example, in the lecture on �ается; und das Wesen der Dichtung, and the three lectures on Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes). Thus the double mirroring of Das Geviert, Earth-Man/Heaven-Gods, presented in the 1950 lecture Das Ding, in its association with the primary poetic or analogy of Die Sprache, in which this quaternary order amounts so to speak to the ‘categorial’ frame of linguistic inscription of Language in the
radical or originary correspondence of Man and Being, is prefigured in the 1936 question of the greek temple as (compare Husserl's contemporary reflection on the *Ursprung der Geometrie*) 'coordinating' the parts of Man, Gods, and the limiting frame of Earth and Sky 'poetically'. (The origin of the germanic temple being precisely the forest glade or *Lichtung* formalised in 'gothic' architecture).

In the *Letter on Humanism* (or rather, *Letter on 'Humanism'*, in which the title itself marks that 'Humanism' as a question) language has been recognised as the 'House of Being', and around 1950, in general, we may take the radical poetic actuality or working of the linguistic inscription of the linguistic order of this inscription, in the working or actuality of Being, as focal. The transition through this focal configuration is marked by that from the first to second part of the first lecture series given by Heidegger upon his resumption of teaching in 1951: the nietzschean figure of 1933 - the inscription of the assertion of Being as Will in this Will as radical self-assertion - is recognised in the first half of the lecture-series as a reflection in the order of beings of the configuration of Parmenides' opening inscription of its assertion in the self-assertion of Being, which frames the *Denken* (as participation in this assertion) of the second half, and of the title of the series - *Was heisst Denken?* - as a whole. Nietzsche's representation (according to Heidegger) of this assertion as a 'thing' asserted - as 'Will' determined according to the 'logic' of assertion which formally distinguishes itself from the object of assertion it thus formally determines as an 'object' - constitutes the bare or limiting form of identification of this assertion of assertion as an object, as Will to Will. It thus presents, in the frame of metaphysics as ontology, ontological, the question of Being, of a *Sein*, which, in this limiting configuration asserts itself in the ontico-ontological distinction of this assertion from any 'object' of logic, of ontology, from any 'being'. And this actuality of Being differentiating itself from its limiting identification as Will, was itself opened up by Heidegger's introduction into metaphysics of the ontico-ontological difference of *Sein* and *Seiende*, Being and being, being as 'verbal' and being as 'object' - or rather by his inscription of metaphysics in that difference and its dynamic, its actuality, its working, in which Being historically expresses itself in western metaphysics.
In 1955 this figure of the inscription of the assertion of Sein as this actuality of self-distinction from das Seiende, in the working it asserts - the inscription of script in Sein, in its working, rather than the metaphysical inscription of that working in the logical order of the metaphysical text as a term representing some 'object', fixing its 'position' and 'positing' in the text - this figure is embodied in the 'crossing-out of the text': the crossing out of Sein into the text, the crossing-out of Sein 'in' the text: Δημ. This then marking in the text the difference of Sein and a Seindes logically - ontologically - determined 'in' the order of the mark... just as, in a parallel movement, Lacan marks the sujet barré by marking its distinction from the prosaic inscription of the 'sujet de la science' in a complementary 'psychology' - in the logic of the traditional text.

By 1957 the very identity, the Sein, of Sein, is found in this actuality or working of Differenz (the derridean and deleuzian resonance associated here, of course, with other French 'readings' of Heidegger). In the dynamic of self-expression in self-distinction or 'withdrawing', Enteignis, from beings, Being itself appears precisely as Ereignis, the 'appropriation' by Sein of this differing of Sein and Seiende, in the constant actuality of Differenz. By 1962, and the lecture Zeit und Sein, this Ereignis expresses itself in the categorial scheme (if this appellation be... appropriate), again 'fourfold', zeviert, of the inscription of the three temporal dimensions of its assertion and self-presentation to the asserter, of its An-Wesen, in the radical constancy of its self-assertion in the differential dynamic or actuality of this 'four-dimensional' Zeit-Raum, 'time-space' of Ereignis, of the Lichtung.

- The constancy of the An-Wesen which presents itself in the relation of the three modes of An-Wesen as 'tension' of Time to one another: the appropriation of the difference 'between' these primary modes of deferral in Ereignis' active identification and appropriation of itself. The quaternary frame of Lichtung, of the Open, as temporal frame, quadro, cadre, which is - though - still not directly coordinated with the Geviert as 'squared', as the double mirroring of Earth-Sky, Mortal-Immortal, focussed in the architectural poetic of the temple:

Woher bestimmt sich nun aber die Einheit der drei Dimensionen der eigentlichen Zeit, dh, ihrer drei ineinander-spielenden Weisen des Reichens von je eigenem Anwesen?
Wir hörten bereits: Sowohl im Ankommen des noch-nicht-Gen-
gewährigen als auch im Gewesen des nicht-mehr-Gen-
gewährigen und sogar in der Gegenwart selbst spielt jeweils eine Art von
Angang und Anbringen, dh Anwesen. Dieses so zu denkende An-
wesen können wir nicht der einen der drei Dimensionen der
Zeit zuweisen nählich, was nahe liegt, der Gegenwart. Viel-
mehr beruht die Einheit der drei Zeitdimensionen in dem Zu-
spiel jeder für jede. Dieses Zuspiel erweist sich als das
eigentliche, im Eigenen der Zeit spielende Reichen, also gleich-
sam als die vierte Dimension - nicht nur gleichsam, sondern
aus der Sache.

Die eigentliche Zeit ist vierdimensional

Was wir jedoch in der Abzählung die vierte nennen ist der
Sache nach die erste, dh das alles bestimmende Reichen. Es
erbringt in der Ankunft, im Gewesen, in der Gegenwart das ih-
nen jeweils eigene Anwesen, hält sie lichtend auseinander und
hält sie so zueinander in der Nähe, aus der die drei Dimen-
sionen einander genaht bleiben...

Die Zeit ist nicht. Es gibt die Zeit. Das Geben, das Zeit
gibt, bestimmt sich aus der verweigernd-vorenthaltenden Nähe.
Sie gewährt das Offene des Zeit-Raumes und verwührt, was im
Gewesen verweigert, was in der Ankunft vorenthalten bleibt.
Wir nennen das Geben, das die eigentliche Zeit gibt, das licht-
end-verbergende Reichen. Insofern das Reichen selber ein Geb-
en ist, verbirgt sich in der eigentlichen Zeit das Geben eines
Gebens...

..Das Geben im 'Es gibt Zeit' zeigte sich als lichtendes
Reichen des vierdimensionalen Bereiches..(1)''

(Whence, though,now, the determination of the unity of the
three dimensions of proper Time - that is, of the three in-
terplaying ways of the reach of each forwarding [tending,
tense]? This we have already understood: In the approach
of the not-yet-present, just as in the passivity of the no-
more-present, and in the present itself, there plays all the
while a kind of advance and bringing-about - that is, tending
[forwarding]. The tending thus to be thought we cannot as-
sign to one of the three dimensions of Time - not, that is,
however close it may seem, to the present. The unity of the

three Time-dimensions lies, rather, in their interplay, one with another. This interplay proves itself to be what in each of these interplaying reaches of Time is 'each', and so, the same in each, proves itself to be like a fourth dimension - and not only like: the likeness is what matters.

Proper Time is four-dimensional.

But what we here account the fourth is, in what matters, the first reach - that is the all-determining one. It brings forth in future, past, present, the tending proper to each, holds them open to one another: apart from one another, and so towards one another, together, in the closeness of their perpetual relation...

Time is not. There is time. Given there is Time, the giving of this given is framed by denying-withholding closeness. It assures the open-ness of Time-space, and secures what stays denied in the past, withheld in the future. We call the giving which gives proper Time the opening-enclosing reach. Inasmuch as the reaching is itself a giving, there hides or encloses itself in proper Time the giving of a giving...

The giving in 'given Time' showed itself to be an opening reach [extension] of a four-dimensional range...

If I follow this german text with an attempted translation, transposition, 'into' english words - albeit in parenthesis - this is as much to allow a certain actuality of the german text to distinguish itself in the symmetry and asymmetry of the english and german words - to appropriate to itself a certain expression precisely in the radical inappropriateness of this 'attempt on the text', this attempt on its life in german. Traduttore tradittore. Perhaps I should have allowed Heidegger's text to express its radical dwelling, life, enclosure, hiding; in its german language, its lichtend-verbergend obscurity, in the absence of such an attempt...following then the approach to Heraclitus' greek language of Ἀλήθεια.

'Where' is this Time, asks Heidegger...where, properly speaking? properly it is no where, or rather it is the here, the presence, 'in' which all difference, and spatial difference or distance in particular, inheres. It is die vorrÜumliche Ortschaft... it is prepositional.
...Prepositional... and now, here, in English, we might say that Heidegger's vorrNumlich is a poor translation of this its translation into English... just as we might say that Heidegger fails to carry into his exposition, fails in attention to, the radical tension of the English language of tending, extension, tense, retention, intention... attention to a mysterious pregnancy arising from a medieval meeting of French and German parents, a French impregnation, a bodily union of French and German elements precipitated by a medieval play of tongues... a Norman conquest.

...Prepositional: Da-Sein, An-Wesen... Ankunft, Ankomen, Angang, Anbringen... Zuzpiel, Zukunft... Gegenwart... ineinander, auseinander, zueinander... zuweisen... vorenthalten.... a play of substitutions in the position of prefix... a play in the prepositional axis of a certain declension. An-wesen, symmetric between accusative and dative, and in this coordinating a more radical 'dative' Giving. Anwesen: the Wesen of An-, framing the address, the vocative almost, of that 'Es' which marks in the play of German words the locus of a giving which first gives itself... Es gibt 'Es gibt'. A giving which addresses itself, as organising pole of Er-eignis, to that complementary pole of Da-, of the being of Da, Dasein, as simply what is open in that index, the formal coordination of the four axes of An-Wesen.

Might we see here, then - in this formal extrapolation of Heidegger's text, this 'transposition' into these English words, into a scheme of pre-position, which, as 'attempt' upon the German text is surely no more violent or disrespectful than Heidegger's recurrent attempts on Parmenides and Heraclitus - might we see a radical coordination of the temporal and spatial, the inward and outward, orders of a radical Geviert, quaternary; 'square' as primary double mirroring associated with the marking in language of the place of the word? The space-time and time-space, then, of the Geviert, as frame of Differenz and corresponding identification, verbal Sein? Geviert as a 'squaring' of the circle in which language, in the creative Analogy of Being, frames its 'own', 'eigentlich', true, part as framing? Framing then the radical question earlier located in Da-Sein, of the identification, in what it frames, of the locus of this framing?

Might we not then find a still more radical quaternary in a triple order of questions: the question of what is thus open in
language, as it identifies itself, in language, as coordinate with
the Ereignis which appropriates the difference between its marking
'in' language, and this as the linguistic inscription of language in
the actuality, the reality, of this Differenz? The further question,
then, of the common frame in which this symmetry of Language and Being
is bilaterally articulated; as the possibility of the Truth in which
the self-assertion of being is asserted, witnessed.. as the question
of the Gestell? ...And then the fourth question.. but this is 'der
Sache nach die erste'?? of what is open in the symmetry and interplay
of these three orders of question: the question of the Question, the
question of the Sache des Denkens. The question then as simply the
Time-space and Space-time of Lichtung; the question, doubling the
question of the Frame of symmetry of subjective finality and objective
efficacy (or subjective efficacy and objective finality), as the An-
Wesen of Anwesen doubles the Present (as interface, interplay, of Past
and Future; what is open in their mirroring in a 'present' situation),
of the Open. The question of the Open as what is most hidden, closed,
in' the Open. The question, the quest, of what thus expresses itself
in its very absence, in the truth, verity, of this absence of the Open
from the Open. Is this perhaps an Ereignis which now distinguishes
itself from what expresses itself in the question of Being? Must Being
itself now be thought in the Open?

We are 'in' the Lichtung, the 'opening', glade, of the Gestell.
In any of-the-openings!.. serially articulated in a common darkness of
what is unquestioned: in the story, the History, of Western questioning,
what is open is limited. Indeed the very difference between what is
open at a particular place and time and what is not is articulated in,
or rather, articulates, that temporal order of a History. The Lichtung
corresponding to the Gestell as systematic coordination of the three
orders of question in a primary abstraction from the radical figure of
the Question as such, presents an extreme limit of the Open as frame
of History, in which what is 'absent' from the Open (so limiting or de-
limiting it) is precisely the question of the difference of what is
present and what is not, the question of the complementarity of Open
and Closed in the Open: the exclusion of this relation as question of
the Open, is definitive of, frames, the Frame, Gestell.

The marking of this question in the Frame, begun by Hegel,
constitutes Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens
marked as such by Heidegger in his contribution to a UNESCO colloquium held at Paris in 1964. Thus far I have characterised the 'Open', das Offene, which is Lichtung, in terms of a quaternary Question. Question (italicised in French) is the word chosen by his French translators as transposition into the French language of the Sache of Zeit und Sein. In the French translation or transposition of the 1964 lecture (preceding in 1966 its German publication in 1968) Jean Beaufret supplies affaire for this 'matter'. The translator of Zeit und Sein translates the Es gibt of 1962 by Il y a, noting that geben and habere derive from the same Indo-European root, and that the giving of Es gibt is also a tenir, just as, in French 'on dit: 'tenez!' lorsqu'on donne' (1).

Now this 'Es' as marking in language—in German language—of the formal locus 'outside' the Frame—the 'there' of 'There is'—thus appears as the mark in the Frame of what—the open-ness of the Frame itself—is 'outside' it: as Ereignis distinguishing itself in the dative of Anwesen, of An... abstracting itself, in the An of the three modes of An-wesen, one 'towards' the other, from the Da in the Lichtung in which these three directions converge, and from which in turn they diverge, in the movement of History. A Da, now, one must suppose, which attaches both to the 'here' of the subject and the 'there' of his objects. A Da from which, indeed, the texts of after the mid-century (when the open-ness of the situation of the subject is inscribed in the open-ness of inscription of language in language) abstract, the 'there' of 'There is' appearing as pole of this abstraction. In the course of a seminar held at Heidegger's Black Forest cottage in 1962, devoted to 'the clarification and sharpening of what is questionworthy in the text of the lecture' (2) Zeit und Sein, this abstraction from the problematic of Dasein is explicitly formulated: the Analytic of Dasein had opened up the Question of Being, in which, in turn,

die ganze Analytik des Daseins ursprünglicher und in ganz anderer Weise wiederholt werden sollte (3).

the entire Analytic of Dasein had to be repeated in a more radical and entirely different way.

2: Heidegger's note in Zur Sache des Denkens, ad fin. 3: ibid, p34
The Question of Being is now, in turn, to be inscribed in the still more radical question posed by the Es of Es gibt as locus of the self-appropriation of Ereignis: the open-ness of the Open as itself what is excluded from, and in this exclusion itself encloses the Open, 'frames' it - as Frame, Gestell - is the limit (the question of the Question itself, as Sache des Denkens) or 'close', end, of that questioning, that opening-up of questions, which is Philosophy. And this Geben of Geben, this self-giving of se rendre, posing itself as surrender of Denken, as 'positive' giving-up, is the Aufgabe, then, of Denken at the close of Philosophy. An invitation, proposition, which in its refusal to be rendered 'in' the logic of traditional philosophical propositions, presents itself as a mystery. A mystery formally marked as what is open in the global completion of the technical Frame of this planet. Corresponding, then, to the Open-Closed of that Frame as simply the Earth and Sky of the Geviert.

How is this situation thinkable, how may this possibility corresponding to what is open in the limiting circuit of global Gestell, be proposed? How propose the surrender, the se rendre of a Thought which in this se rendre would inscribe itself in the se rendre of Ereignis in Es Gibt, as the mid-century Denken had asserted its 'belonging' in, participation in, the radical self-assertion of Sein which it asserted, in this avowing the actuality of Truth, Ἀλήθεια, Unverhülltheit? - For to attempt to assert this surrender as a proposition is precisely not to surrender, is to maintain a philosophical reserve. Nor can we assert this failure of our self-assertion, as Heidegger makes clear in his discussions with a group of theologians published in 1970: theologians who interpret Heidegger's question as the invitation to surrender thought to the christian story of this surrender of thought first framed as such by Paul.

In the very self-assertion, then, in the questioning of this self-assertion, lies the limit of philosophical questioning: in which we recognise that we must await the part of surrender to a Giving which alone can frame our surrender to, in, 'It'. The lecture Zeit und Sein closes in the marking of this failure of assertion - in the assertion of this failure, itself marking the question, the direction 'towards' die Sache des Denkens as long as we remain 'in' Philosophy.

Ein Hindernis dieser Art bleibt auch das Sagen vom Ereignis
in der Weise eines Vortrags. Er hat nur in Aussagesätzen gesprochen. (1)

The saying of Ereignis in the way of a lecture is itself a hindrance of this kind. It has spoken only in propositions.

The Paris lecture, two years later, closes with the question of Parmenides' opening assertion of the Open, as Well-Rounded Truth, \( \text{έκφραση \ 'Αλήθεια} \), as itself framing the closing of the thinking which, as Philosophy, as Science, Parmenides, according to Heidegger, opens:

...In welchem Kreis bewegen wir uns hier, und zwar unausweichlich?

Ist es die \( \text{έκφραση \ 'Αλήθεια} \) die gut gerundete Unverborgenheit selbst, gedacht als die Lichtung?

Lautet dann der Titel der Aufgabe des Denkens statt 'Sein und Zeit': Lichtung und Anwesenheit?

Woher aber und wie gibt es die Lichtung? Was spricht im Es gibt?

Die Aufgabe des Denkens wäre dann die Preisgabe des bisherigen Denkens an die Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens. (2)

In what circle are we here moving - and that inescapably?

Is it the \( \text{έκφραση \ 'Αλήθεια} \) itself, the well rounded Unhiddenness itself, thought as Lichtung?

Is the title of the Aufgabe of Denken then rather than 'Being and Time': Lichtung and Anwesenheit?

Whence though and how 'is there' Lichtung? What speaks in the 'there is'?

The Aufgabe of Denken would then be the giving up, the sacrifice of Denken thus far, to the order of the Sache of Denken.

1: ibid, p25 2: p80
Around 1970 Heidegger was articulating the Sache des Denkens, as the question attaching to Parmenides' opening assertion of the participation, belonging, of this its assertion, λέγω, to the self-assertion (in this configuration of λέγω and λέγω) of τὸ λέγον - to the circuit of this διάλογος ἄνωθεν - in relation to Heraclitus' inscription of the discourse 'of' λέγειν, of ('the') Ἀόγος, in the λόγος which Heidegger takes as its primary theme, question, invitation to Denken, νοέω. A dynamic of λέγειν 'in' the eternal time-space of the parmenidean Sphere, a dynamic of Differenz associated with the breaking of that symmetry of the Sphere in the Da, and articulated in Parmenides' radical Differenz of Light and Dark which constitutes the 'well-rounded' Sphere 'logically' framed as εἰς αὐτόν ἄνωθεν, as Lichtung. The dynamic, then, identified by Heraclitus 'in' this parmenidean Lichtung - the opening frame of 'metaphysical' Denken and λέγειν - in terms of the 'correspondence' of Ἀόγος and θύρα.

To Parmenides' initial configuration, which frames precisely, when considered as Question, the Es as self-appropriation of the inside and outside, the Open and Closed, of Lichtung, outside - as the outside of western History (now becoming globally articulated), there corresponds, as dynamic of initial marking in that Lichtung of λέγειν, Heraclitus' inauguration of dialectic, the inscription of ζύγειν in the σία of a movement, 'in' Time: the primacy of the Da abstracted from the Es 'outside' the well-rounded Sphere:

Dans le silence qui suit, Jean Beaufret remarque: Le texte que nous venons d'entendre vient en quelque sorte achever la longue méditation où vous avez tour à tour regardé vers Parménide et vers Héraclite. Or entre Héraclite et Parménide, on pourrait dire que votre pensée a varié... Quelle serait aujourd'hui la place d'Héraclite par rapport à Parménide?

Heidegger: D'un point de vue simplement historique, Héraclite est le premier pas en direction de la dialectique. De ce point de vue donc, Parménide est plus profond et plus essentiel...

.. En ce sens il faut: en effet reconnaître que la tautologie est le seul moyen de penser ce que la dialectique ne peut que voiler.

Mais si l'on est capable de lire Héraclite à partir de la tautologie parmanideenne, alors il apparaît lui-même au plus
In the silence which follows, Jean Beaufret remarks: The text we have just heard brings to a close, in a way, the long meditation in which you have looked in turn to Parmenides and to Heraclitus. One might say that your thought has varied between Heraclitus and Parmenides... What is now the place of Heraclitus in relation to Parmenides?

Heidegger: From a purely historical point of view, Heraclitus is the first step in the direction of dialectic. From this point of view, then, Parmenides is deeper and more essential. In this sense it must indeed be recognised that tautology is the only way to think what dialectic can only veil.

But if one is able to read Heraclitus starting from the parmenidean tautology, then he himself appears as near as can be to the same tautology, himself in the unique movement of approach which is access to Being.

Thus closes the French record of the 1973 Zähringen seminar, held as a sequel to those held at Thor in Provence in 1966,68,69 (the 1966 Thor seminar as it were a prefiguration of the Heidegger-Fink Freiburg seminar devoted to Heraclitus in 1967). 'Tautologie': the 1973 seminar opened out of the question of Phenomenology - Husserl's opening up of this 'glade' of western thought. A 'tautology' corresponding to the parmenidean circuit of inscription of its assertion in the Being which is self-assertion, asserting itself as such in this inscription, in this correspondence of Λήμνων and άμα which is Αλεξίων.

... But... as we saw at the outset of this inquiry, Heraclitus at the opening of the fifth century preceded Parmenides' breaking of pythagorean silence. Heidegger, in inscribing the 'dialectic' of Heraclitus' unstable inscription of its speaking in Λήμνων, in the parmenidean tautology of an originary Lichtung framed, enclosed, by its own exclusion from what is 'in' the Lichtung (like Being excluded from the beings 'in' Being), repeats Hegel's subordination of the antithesis of Being and Becoming to Being, and the reflection of this in Hegel's account of Heraclitus 'à partir de' Parmenides in the Lectures on the

1: Questions IV, p339
Now Marx had 'stood Hegel on his head' precisely by inscribing the fixed pole of a Being 'outside' Becoming, in which the antithesis of Being and Becoming was then supposed inscribed, in the Frame of human society, as a mythical formal positing of a more radical 'outside' (in which the Frame was then supposed inscribed) which belonged to a definite moment in the social dynamic - to the configuration, precisely, of a 'German Ideology' of the early nineteenth century.

...And indeed the close of the Züringen seminar, the question of a 'tautology' (compare Novalis 'autology') from which, as most radical Question, dialectic thought cannot but abstract, is prepared by a discussion of Marx:

Radikal sein ist die Sache an der Wurzel fassen. Die Wurzel für den Menschen ist aber der Mensch selbst. (1)
To be radical is to take the matter by the root. But the root for man is man himself.

Marx, then, is the very thinker of the Frame in abstraction from what, in its very open-ness to our action, our self-assertion as agents in a Nature which is now seen as open play of self-asserting forces (of 'matters'), as Production, abstracts.

..And yet this self-assertion as self-asserting Man in a 'radically' open Nature is inscribed by Heidegger in an Appropriation, only in the figure of the tautology which is inscribed by Marx (say in his criticism of Stirner's *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum* in the *German Ideology*), in turn (so to speak), in the 'Frame' of Society where it reflects the primary order of appropriation (and expropriation) embodied in Capital.

In the 1962 lecture, and again towards the close of the 1964 lecture (in the passage immediately preceding the closing 'circuit' into which it leads; cited above), Heidegger had considered the objections: Is this mystery of the 'Es' of *Es gibt* perhaps a mere phantom engendered by the surface grammar of 'Es' (in terms of which the question poses itself) which misrepresents the 'logical grammar' (the
'deep structure' of constructions involving 'Es gibt...', corresponding to existential quantification)? Is not all this grundlose Mystik oder gar schlechte Mythologie, in jedem Fall ein verderblicher Irrationalismus, die Verleugnung der Ratio? (1)
groundless mysticism or thoroughly bad mythology - in any case a destructive irrationalism, the disowning of Ratio?

...But Heidegger returns the question: is not the incongruence of this questioning with the logical order of the Frame perhaps the mark of a limit of that logic, its inclusion in a wider order... the order, precisely, of the Question...of which this reserve in the face of 'logical' critique itself partakes, to which it is radically appropriate?

'Appropriate': geeignet...but is the working of language, the radical analogy, which allows the articulation of a heideggerian language and questioning in the determination 'in' that discourse of the relation between its order of questions and the question of language...is the break-down or breaking-down of the german language into a system of substitutions or permutations of elements (notably prepositions) in which the inscription of the 'place' of such substitution in the system as 'Es' organises an analogic of Ereignis...is this play of Eigen, Ereignis, Eigentlichkeit really, truly (eigentlich) appropriate to the situation in which it is enunciated?

In the same year as Heidegger's Paris lecture, 1964, Marcuse in America published One-Dimensional Man, bringing the technical Frame of coordination of ideological, cultural, and material economies (in its american abstraction from the question of a wider open play of forces) into question...Around 1930 he had been associated both with Heidegger and the Frankfurt School. Marcuse had stayed in America after the war; Adorno had returned to Frankfurt in 1950. In 1964 he published a new 'German Ideology': Jargon der Eigentlichkeit: Zur Deutschen Ideologie.

1: Zur Sache des Denkens, p79
I earlier attempted to coordinate the parts of Heidegger, the 'Frankfurt School', and the 'Vienna Circle' around 1930 as three correlative components of a german(ic) reflection constituting one pole of a german(ic) cultural configuration in which they parallel the ideological order focussed in 1930 in Rosenberg's New Myth. That 'Myth' was framed by the inscription of its own enunciation (by Rosenberg) in the historical dynamic enunciated: this inscription, then, asserting its participation in the self-assertion of the germanic Volk which the New Myth of History as dynamic of self-assertion of Groups, Völker, in a primary Nature, frames as now open, as a possibility for germanic Blood..as the last possibility for Man, for Culture as a whole focussed in this question for the germanic Volk: the invitation to frame its part in World-History.

This framing for the german Volk of the question of the part it is to play in World-History embodies of course that constant figure of the Address to the German Nation that defines the continuity of a certain component of the german tradition from Luther down through Fichte to the twentieth century. More generally it embodies the figure, which I have suggested as a constant frame of 'germanic' reflection from the thirteenth century (say Albert)..if not indeed from the definitive division of Charlemagne's Empire into 'french' and 'german' around the close of the first millennium..of the inscription of the logical order of assertion and reflection in a primary Economy of Nature, or, correlative, in a primary actuality of Being reflected in that Economy of Nature as open potentiality.

Now Rosenberg's embodiment of his assertion in a social (rather, völkisch) Frame asserted as articulated by the (germanic) 'Seed' in Nature of german self-distinction in and from Nature, german Assertion in Nature, as Volk, in its coordination of individual, racial and natural (darwinian or nietzschean or..) assertion, force, will, in its coordination of individual, racial and natural questions, matters, constitutes a direct parallel to the contemporary frame of reflection in Freiburg or Frankfurt or indeed Vienna. Rosenberg's position may be distinguished from those parallels precisely in its self-assertion as 'Myth', in its explicit abdication or renunciation of 'academic' logic, reflection, its stepping into the closed circuit
of a Frame in which the radical 'questioning' which is individual conscience, together with the academic 'conscience' which refuses the abdication of critical reflection is relinquished: in which the radical open-ness of individual choice chooses to enter into this circuit of its abdication. For this step Rosenberg payed in 1946, and for his contemplation of such a step in 1933 Heidegger was forbidden to teach for six years after the War.

A 'Myth' of the, for the, Twentieth Century: presenting the individual with the choice of choosing the Volk as frame of his choice and activity. In the 'decisive' year, 1933-4, the german Volk was formally presented with just such a choice by the man who proposed himself, in the frame of choice proposed, as Leader. A year decisive for Heidegger too, and for the Institut für Sozialforschung at Frankfurt, with Adorno and Horkheimer leaving for America, and Marcuse for America via Oxford.

..For the Criticism of Frankfurt was framed precisely as the opening-up, so to speak, of the social order, through a coordination of questions - those of individual, culture (society), and Nature - whose articulation was framed as in effect the direct inverse or converse of Rosenberg's Myth. - A radical assumption, that is, by the individual, of the position of questioner, rather than Rosenberg's celebrant of the Myth of the Volk, in a Sozialforschung as dynamic of this 'opening-up' of Society - rather than Rosenberg's dynamic of integration - in the coordination of individual questioning and 'natural' possibility...in particular, in the inversion or conversion of the hegelian figure of self-assertion in Nature (which opens the Phenomenology) in the radical correlation of individual questioning and the material possibilities in which society is framed as coordination of individual possibilities.

Thus Adorno's inaugural lecture at Frankfurt in 1931 was directed to 'The Actuality of Philosophy': the coordination of individual reflection or inquiry as questioning with Nature as what is materially 'open' to determination, what is 'possible', but not as abstract coordination of elementary assertion with a Nature 'posited' or asserted at the outset (as in the opening of the Phenomenology): rather as what is open in a particular social coordination of individual and Nature, an open-ness of which the hegelian assertion or
'positing' of assertion itself 'in' the abstract Nature criticised by Marx, presents the mere form, the frame of questioning, the abstract potentiality. The actuality of philosophy is to discover the form of this questioning in the particular social configuration in which one finds oneself. Hegelian assertion has simply converted the abstract frame of this questioning, which is then first of all Sozialforschung, into the formal positing of abstract 'Nature' as one pole of what is 'open' in a social configuration in which the individual (rather than the correlative formal pole of simple self-assertion) actually finds himself. 'Nature', as a mere formal term marking radical openness, in which the opening-up of Society through our individual questioning is possible (actually possible), must itself be recognised as radically open to conflicting determinations - as precisely a radical open-ness to determinations which cannot itself be supposed determined 'in itself' as 'Nature', as a fixed pole which might be 'posited' in its fixity at the outset of an inquiry.

Formally, then, this Frankfurt Nature doubles Freiburg Being as (the latter) itself radically open, as the Question 'in' which our questions are actually possible. But whereas Heidegger formally articulates various orders of question within the coordination of this radical open-ness of Sein, actually open to our determination as we discover ourselves in our self-assertion in what is open to us as Da-Sein 'in' Sein, Adorno and Horkheimer (professor from 1930) at Frankfurt find the actuality of individual and Nature radically rooted, not in some abstract frame of coordination of the 'questions' of Sein and Da-Sein (most particularly, in 1930, in the question of Ἀνθρωπόπως as Unter-borgenheit), but in the actual society in which our questioning of the closed circuit by which any society always abstracts (or rather concretes) from the formal open-ness of individual part on the one hand and Nature on the other, is itself always embedded in the social order it questions, itself rooted in a historical dialectic or dynamic in which its own specificity must always in turn be brought into (further) question.

Corresponding to the various framings around 1936/7 of prefigurations of the new 'spaces' or frames of mid-century Reflection, we might take Horkheimer's programmatic essay of 1937, Traditionelle und Kritische Theorie, as defining a 'critical' part radically engaged in 'the' social frame (which can itself no more be assumed to be some-
how 'there' ('in itself') than Nature) from which 'traditional' logic (or: logic, traditionally) abstracts to frame a system articulated within an initial supposed resolution of what is open in the questions of individual, society, Nature, within an initial formal assertion, a circuit of inscription of that locus of assertion in the frame it asserts, abstracted from the radical question of the social order of this assertion - from the question attaching intrinsically to Society as primary 'circuit' from which that traditional circular logic abstracts..to a System which is the formal conversion of Society just as the abstracted traditional thinker is a formal conversion into assertion of the question of the individual, and Nature as 'object' of traditional Natural Science is the formal conversion of what is open 'to' us..and the model, then, for the 'scientific' treatment of society and individual man.

As a sort of second 'step' from 1930 to, say, Adorno's return to Frankfurt in 1950 (after, then, the initial step of which Horkheimer's embodiment of Critical Theory in the question of Critical Theory 'may be taken as an index) we might consider the configuration of Adorno and Horkheimer's collaboration in New York in 1944 on Dialektik der Aufklärung (eventually published in Amsterdam after the War in 1947). Here the critical frame of 1937 articulates, as it were from without, the dynamic - the social dynamic - of 'positive', self-assertive, self-transparent abstracted Reason, Logic, since its inception in the period of the Scientific Revolution. And here we may see Adorno and Horkheimer sharing as it were in America a german position in a radical german Nature 'outside' the 'scientific' american abstraction from tiefssinnig Europe and its radical questions (whether psychological, ontological, sociological..). Horkheimer and Adorno returned from this New York exile à deux, and we might well enough take Adorno's return to re-establish the School at Frankfurt in its german context as marking a mid-century turning-point in the development of Critical Theory. To continue our regular progress (pace Adorno) we might mark a further step from mid-century towards the configuration of around 1970 by Adorno's pupil Jürgen Habermas' opening up of a Kritik der Kritischen Kritik so to speak in his 1957 paper Zur Philosophischen Diskussion um Marx und Marxismus. Then in 1964, as already noted, Adorno reiterates in relation to Heidegger's conversion of the hegelian positing of an abstract frame 'outside' society in which the society in which it is posited is itself then inscribed as abstract Frame (the conversion of hegelian 'positing' into heideggerian 'quest-
ioning') - or in relation to 'heideggerian' 'jargon of Eigentlichkeit' - Marx's earlier criticism of a 'hegelian' German Ideology. The complementarity of Critical Theory (albeit avant la lettre) and Heidegger's questioning around 1930 is here transposed, with a detour on one side through the experience of a german critical posture 'outside' the frame of the american Frame, to 1964. For just as, after the mid-century, the 1930 part of Da-Sein — the question of Da-Sein has been deepened or radicalised to the question of a reflexive Language, so now Critical Theory has been deepened to a coordination of material economy (natural economy) and ideological economy (embodied in language) in a cultural 'poetics' which in a way leads Theodor Adorno back to his days in the 'twenties as the music student Theodor Wiesengrund, to become music critic and composer before becoming the social theorist of 1931, then eventually the writer of the *Aesthetische Theorie* published in 1970 following his death the previous year, and in which it is the configuration of the individual work (rather piece) of 'Art' in the wider social order (like Wittgenstein's 'game' a sort of reverse analogy leading from abstract frame of society posited (as 'outside' then) from within society, back to the radical primacy of the social order) which now organises the part of the 'critic', the questioner. The configuration of questions, whose empty form had in 1931 been discovered in a conversion of the opening of the *Phenomenology* from order of abstract position to coordination of questions relating to our part as questioner in the particular social configuration in which we thus 'found' ourself as this questioner, critic, has by 1969 been deepened to a configuration of questions coordinated in the 'aesthetics' or poetics of that poetic or 'musical' frame, embodied in the *quadro, cadre*, the elementary double mirroring of the 'square', in which the cultural Frame of society closes - in this its repetition in the 'frame' which is abstracted from it in the double mirroring of language (ideology) and natural economy with (each) their abstract global and elementary poles.

Now this limit of 'classical' Critical Theory around 1970 in an Aesthetic Theory organised about the concrete question or openness of a 'piece' of Art, abstracted in its unity as 'frame' of questions in a double mirroring from the earlier relatively abstract question of 'the' social frame - this through just that dialectic of identification which constantly brings into question one's previous
identification of one's part of questioning, and so leads in the limit to the question of that identification constitutive of the poetic order, and constitutive of the part of 'Critic' — this limit, then, doubles the limit of Heidegger's questioning around 1970:

Adorno's coordination of questions of the social 'frame' in relation to the part of the Critic in that Frame — in relation then to the 'frame' of the piece or work of Art as radical 'production' — mirrors Heidegger's inscription of the Gestell as Frame of an imminent global Culture in the circuit of a 'tautology' — from which radical Denken we are warned, dialectic, even in the limiting case of Heraclitus, cannot but abstract, withdraw.

Two limits of inquiry into a common 'fourfold' symmetry of questions: Adorno's marking of this question in the dialectic of identification in the social 'frame', and his identification of Heidegger's marking of the question as rooted in a 'there(is)' 'outside' the Frame (albeit this 'outside' being just the unthinkability in the Frame of the Frame itself) as the tautology of Myth... and Heidegger's inscription of this 'dialectical' order of identification (or self-appropriation, Ereignis) as self-production, with its inability to think (its systematic blindness to) the Frame itself (as 'outside' the Frame, outside itself and withdrawing into itself)... Heidegger's inscription of this radical 'Da' doubling the Es' in the Frame framed by the absence of the Frame in the Frame.

A common fourfold order of questions, then, inscribed on the one hand 'in' the social frame as radical Question coordinating ideological, cultural (poetic), and natural orders, questions... and on the other hand, this radically open character of questioning Society (as somehow closed upon itself in the work of Art) inscribed as it were as the 'fourth' term, an Enteignis, complementing a primary Ereignis as the 'other side' (so to speak) of the relation of Thinking and Being (in the Frame these reflected as a 'subject' and his or her 'objects', things, matters, Sachen).

A common structure, then, seen as it were from 'inside' and 'outside' respectively, one 'side' mirroring the other in its tautology or dialectic (the latter in the limit a 'negative' as opposed to 'positive' or positing dialectic). What of the question of their
symmetry, with Heidegger as it were marking the orders of question in abstraction from their interplay in specific social situations - say those of his lectures - and Adorno as it were unable to say what he is doing, for fear of sharing in Heidegger's merely formal conversion of traditional positivity or positing into a system of questions - which is still 'at heart' a system. - For fear of constraining the radical open-ness attaching to the formulation of questions themselves.

I have taken 1950-1, 1962-4, 1969-70 as marking three parallel 'steps' of the parallel unfolding of Heidegger's Denken and Adorno's Kritik. Adorno's criticism of the language of Eigentlichkeit turning upon itself marked in Germany or focussed a shift away from the 'heideggerean' dominance of the post-war philosophical scene of the 'fifties, parallelling in this the contemporary french recognition of a shift away from the sartrian 'fifties to the 'structuralism' of around 1970. But this transition from 'fifties to 'sixties might be said, as in France, to be at work in the years around 1960, even if its recognition and definition was only to be clarified in the mid-sixties. Nor here, in Germany, can we identify or mark this shift simply as the emerging dominance of Adorno's 'internal' or immanent Kritik over heideggerian mythology. Indeed the single most influential book in the transition, Gadamer's Wahrheit und Methode of 1960, embodies the inscription of Dilthey's principles of 'identification' in what appears, from outside so to speak, as the Denken of his former teacher Heidegger.

I have noted how, in the limit, Adorno's part becomes just that of distinguishing oneself from any unquestioned identification, any unquestioned 'part', and how this part of Critic is framed, so to speak, by a dialectic of abstraction from any unquestioned 'position' - in particular the 'position' or coordination in the abstract of a frame of inquiry, questions - a position finding its limiting embodiment in Heidegger's coordinates of An-Wesen organised about the formal positing of Es as locus of the question of this temporal-spatial Frame, as the 'outside' of the Open which is the Lichtung, marked as such ('outside') in the Lichtung.
Around 1960 a new order of inquiry opens up, opens out of, as it were, the symmetry of Heidegger's 'external' framing of the cultural Frame 'in' Ereignis - in the coordination of the questions of \( \nu \circ \psi \) and \( \phi \nu \circ \lambda \nu \) in the question of the abstraction of the Gestell from the radical order of the Question - and the complementary immanent criticism of the social frame of this criticism, represented by Adorno at Frankfurt. For what is the configuration in the social frame, for example, of Heidegger's introduction of the radical order of the Question, which then 'abstracts', 'withdraws' itself, for example at the close of the 1962 and 1964 lectures, from the particular form and situation of its invocation? I have noted a symmetry of the 'Es' present in the Frame only through the marking of its absence in the Frame, and the Da as intersection in the Frame, so to speak, of the three temporal axes of Anwesen - a Da, then, indefinite in its abstraction from the fixed pole of Es, and whose restless dynamic of identification defines precisely that 'dialectic' which abstracts, which cannot but abstract, from the 'tautology' of a radical Giving which is itself the primary Given, the primary Datum, and the primary Problem, of Thinking.

But the symmetry of these two poles 'outside' and 'inside' the Frame itself presents as open to our inquiry, as a question, the configuration of a Da (\( -\text{Sein} \)) 'in' the social frame in which the heideggerian configuration of Truth, abstracting from that arbitrarily particular existence, may be discovered. How, within the dynamic of questions in which our thinking is articulated in the practical order of social interaction, do we discover the limiting articulation of questions in the order of the Question, the Sache, simply as such? And what, then, is the way back, so to speak, from this limiting configuration as discovered in the social frame, to the particular orders of questioning, articulated as Methods, Sciences (in the first instance the complementary Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften), in abstraction from the order of the Question as such, of Truth, on the one hand, and the open dynamic of all orders of questions in the radical Da of the theorist's own participation in this radically open order of the Lebenswelt (to borrow from the Husserl of 1937) on the other?

I noted above the radical dialectic of 'identification' in Adorno's part of Critic as embodied in the posthumous \( \text{Aesthetiche} \)
Theorie of 1970 (Adorno’s situation, then, as ‘author’ of this last work, being a literal absence marked by his death in 1969). Now it is just the configuration in the social frame, the open Lebenswelt which is the primary order of what is ‘given’ in a particular situation (doubling the given-ness of this given-ness as such ‘enclosing’ as it withdraws from, such situations in general), of the work of Art which allows Gadamer in 1960 to identify the limiting complementarity of the heideggerian order of the Question, of Truth, and the everyday order of questions from which the methods of the various Sciences abstract. For in the aristotelian configuration of Tragedy (as limiting work of ‘Art’, of the ‘poetic’ order of Culture), in that configuration of identification with and subsequent detachment from a ‘part’ in a certain Action or interaction, a certain Drama abstracted from the cultural configuration as an open whole (abstraction, then, to a primary closed circuit of an action or interaction in this open frame, primary closed configuration of questions opening out of an initial situation and resolved in the closing situation), we may discover that limiting configuration of orders of question attaching to our identification ‘Da’ in the Frame, in which is at work the actuality of Truth, of the Given itself. And now, working back as it were from this discovery of Truth in the mirroring of the heideggerian configuration of limit questions, of \( \text{Αρχιπρεστος} \) or \( \text{Τιττιν} \) and \( \text{τετραγωνο} \), in the social configuration of Tragedy, we may discover the Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften, with their ‘abstract’ methods, as framed by the questions of Language and Material Economy respectively, in the traditional abstraction of these questions from their coordination, their complementarity, in the radical order of questions as such, from the radical Truth in which the heideggerian order of the Question is coordinated in the rather husserlian order of ‘immediate’ everyday questions, the open Lebenswelt of the gadamerian Frame.

Once more, then, we discover a radical ‘fourfold’, a ‘square’ of double mirroring: ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the heideggerian Frame on the one hand, and the two ‘sides’ corresponding in the Frame to the complementary abstractions of Natur and Geist (and ‘Sein’ and ‘Denken’ ‘outside’, ‘in’ Truth). What is more, we discover the primary frame of this Geviert framed in relation to the greek theatre rather than the greek temple of 1936-7, in terms of a Language which embodies the double mirroring, as that ‘side’ both of abstract Method and originary Truth, which frames its own relation to Nature and Being...which is inscribed in the framing of the fourfold configuration as locus of that
framing.

This radical open-ness of a Language - or rather of the stories, accounts, of which it is the open possibility - this open-ness associated with the elementary inscription in the Frame of Language as locus of its framing, as locus of the questions in which the individual ('Da') finds himself involved in the cultural order of interaction, constitutes what it frames as 'History'. - As, then, an open order of that Working which Language identifies as the Working or Actuality in which it inscribes the working of its own identification of this Working, this Wirkungsgeschichte; this then in a 'working', an actuality, indeed, of the aristotelian figure of Actuality. History, then, as the open order of the 'workings' corresponding to Language as the open order of questioning and accounting. History, then, as the radical frame of the recast aristotelian poetic of Tragedy, in which one story, and its working as an Action, is abstracted from this open Frame, in the elementary closure of the aesthetic 'frame', the cadre.

What, then, in all this, is our 'part'? - To frame our part in this History. But not in relation to some abstract framing of a closed unitary History from 'outside', in terms, say, of the hegelian positing of that 'outside' from within History: for that 'History', this History, is essentially a question, the question of what is open, so to speak, in the cultural order...just as Language is the question of what stories, accounts, texts are possible. And our part is to recognise, like the tragic hero perhaps, like blind Oedipus, that we are always the shifting identification, in an open play of stories, of the locus of framing our stories, the locus of questions, and most particularly, of the question of this our part in History. The most general frame of our inquiry, then, must be that radical Hermeneutics which begins with this limiting story of our part, our questions, just as Oedipus' access to Truth must pass through the identification of his earlier Method, μεθέωσις, in its abstraction from the more radical question of the part of this inquiry, ἐνακόπη, in the dramatic working of human interaction...and in a more radical 'story'.
Now this organisation of questions in the symmetry of say, a hegelian 'position' of supposedly primary coordinates of History (as the positing of instances of determination 'outside' the History corresponding to a primary coordination of orders of questioning in a historical configuration)...or, perhaps, of the heideggerian conversion of these coordinated into those of a Question (the coordinates, then, the time-space, of what is ('the') Open)...and the 'natural' situation of the Lebenswelt, the configuration of questions attaching to a particular 'part' in History (or rather in the open play of stories or workings indicated by that term), parallels Derrida's contemporary opening up, in France, of an inquiry articulated in the symmetry of a 'transcendental' space and time of coordinates, and the empirical space and time inscribed in that 'transcendental' order of difference, as the order of natural differences in which the difference 'between' transcendental and empirical difference was supposed 'defined', 'determined', differentiated.

For Gadamer in effect articulates his inquiry, his Hermeneutics, in the symmetry of the abstract heideggerian coordinates of Truth, and the particular questions or coordinates of historical existence in which, for example, Heidegger's own Denkweg is inscribed. - He formally, that is, opens up an inquiry framed in the question of the symmetry of Heidegger's inscription of western History in the projection which is the Schicken, the Geschick opening with Parmenides and closing with the question of the Gestell, and that historical dialectic, that radically open order of 'History', in which Adorno plays his part of Critic. Opens up a more radical questioning, then...but as it were 'out of' the heideggerian order of the Question and of Truth. In this sense one might be tempted to speak of Dilthey's theme of identification with historical 'parts' in historical configurations inscribed in the heideggerian coordinates of Truth: to see Gadamer's part as one sent, so to say, from Heidegger's heaven to inscribe or embody that heavenly Truth in the Frame. - To see his Hermeneutics from this heideggerian 'outside' of History. But we should rather see Gadamer opening up the more radical frame of questions of which Heidegger's Denken and Adorno's Criticism are as it were two 'sides', this albeit, so to speak 'from' the heideggerian side, rather as Derrida opens up his order of Différence 'from' the transcendental 'side', by a questioning of that 'side', and inscription, then, of that side in the configuration of this question (of Différence), which itself
first appears as the 'next step' in the 'line' of questioning previously framed in that 'transcendental' frame. In particular, the language of the new order of questioning is organised by the transcription of the earlier language, the earlier frame, into the simple configuration of the radical question, from which it is now identified, largely 'in its own terms' as an abstraction (this configuration, then, leading in 1970 to the question of a **Double Séance**).

To clarify this situation - and the parallel between old Gadamer in Germany and young Derrida in France - we may consider a complementary 'opening up' of another inquiry framed in the abstract symmetry of heideggerian and critical frames, but now, as it were, from the 'other side', from the side, not of Truth, but of Critical Theory. That is, we may consider the part of young Jürgen Habermas in Germany, paralleling that of old Lacan at Paris.

This radicalisation by Habermas of 'Critical Theory', as expressed, say, in his programmatic inaugural lecture as professor at Frankfurt in 1965 - *Erkenntnis und Interesse* - taken in 1968 as the title of the book in which that programme was worked out in greater depth - might indeed be said to constitute a 'dialectical' reassertion of Critical Theory, not so much in the simple symmetry of the refusal of Adorno to posit any frame or coordinates of Criticism, and Heidegger's coordination of questions, of Reflection, in the abstract frame of the Question, the *Sache des Denkens*, but rather in the complementarity or symmetry of Gadamer's working from the heideggerian 'side' around 1960, and his own questioning of the possibility of a critical frame or method in the years around 1960. That is: we might see the inaugural lecture of 1965 as a further step in the 'dialectical' transition from the complementarity of Heidegger and Adorno's positions (or dispositions) of 1950-1, towards 1969-70, through the turning point marked by the publication of Gadamer's *Wahrheit und Methode* in 1960.

To corroborate, as it were, this 'dialectical' scheme, we might return for a moment to 1964 on the one hand, and to America on the other, where we (with Adorno) left Marcuse in 1950.
I have noted Marcuse's association, around 1930, with both Heidegger and the Frankfurt Institute. And I noted as a sort of second step between Adorno's inaugural lecture at Frankfurt in 1931 and his return in 1950, his collaboration with Horkheimer on their criticism of 'rationalisation' of Society in an exile à deux of these two Germans in a sort of common German Nature from which the American System prevalent in that part of Nature known as New York systematically abstracted.

Horkheimer and Adorno returned to Europe, whereas Marcuse stayed in America, moving to the University of California in 1965, the year following the publication of One Dimensional Man. - Marcuse, then, 'outside' the System in his radical German questioning, like Adorno and Horkheimer before him, yet finding that this order of 'outside' was itself coordinated with the other components in the System (just as, indeed, the many German intellectuals of the thirties diaspora - those from the Vienna Circle in particular - were having their reflection coordinated in the Quinean 'economy' of rational inquiry, as dominant logical frame defined by its inscription in a triple economy of logical, cultural, and natural orders). 'Outsiders', marginals, critics of the System, themselves had these parts coordinated in the System which their opposition thus simply confirmed, reaffirmed. In its systematic character this 'repressive tolerance' simply doubled, in the American-dominated West, the overt repression elsewhere, in excluding the place of the critic of the System as a whole. In the Heideggerian analogy, the Frame systematically excludes the questioning of the Frame - this exclusion itself being constitutive of the structure of what is 'open' in the Frame. But here it is the open play of forces, what is open 'in Nature', which frames, not a coordination of questions, but a coordination of what is open to Man as possibilities, from which the One-Dimensional Man of the approaching global System or Frame is abstracted, removed. Rather than the complementarity of Heidegger's coordinates and Adorno's abdication of any abstract frame in which the Society in which that frame is defined might be supposed to be inscribed and articulated, we have a sort of Heideggerian articulation of Nature. And it is the German Jewish 'outsiders' Marx and Freud who articulate the possibilities from which Technical Society - most particularly the American abstraction from what is radically open in (German) Nature - abstracts, in the limiting figure of inscription of the part of the outsider or marginal
in the System. - Marx who opens up the primary figure of abstraction from that natural order in which (hegelian) Man discovers himself asserting his humanity through the discovery in a natural difference of his distinction from the natural order of that difference: the figure of a closed frame of Culture which is left 'out of the question' by the coordinate abstractions of ideology on the one side and the natural economy of Society on the other. - Freud who presents a model for opening up the question of ideology by his coordination of the (again) coupled abstractions of individual conscious identity and the cultural order of the everyday dramas in which such individuals interact:

psychological order    language/cultural order    material economy    Nature

(Freud's coupled abstractions)

from ideology

(Marx' coupled abstractions)

from Nature

Now the opening up of the free play of Nature from which the technical System, with its coupled ideological, cultural and material economies abstracts (like the heideggerian Frame from the Question as question) must be framed as an 'alternative' interpretation of their position by those whom the System determines as 'marginal'. These marginals can frame their marginalisation precisely by identifying their positions in a radical play of natural forces from which the System in which they are identified as 'problems' to be technically solved, is itself identified as a (mindless) abstraction. Identifying their position, then, in the coordination of the natural possibilities opened up by the coordination of marxist and freudian theory in Nature as the primary frame of what is open to Man. These 'marginals' would then include Marcuse questioning his apparent part in his adopted Society, and framing a questioning, in
the University of California most particularly, but also in the other universities of America, of Europe, of the global System, indeed (or rather the West whose overall 'economy' is framed by the american coordination of ideological, cultural and material orders), among The Students, of a System into which the university 'education' of adolescents is an induction. Students in the process of being assimilated to the part of identifying their 'part' in the System. The alternative interpretation of this social interpretation of Women, Blacks, Students and others, in the late 'sixties was (thus Liberation, 1969) to be recognised as the unfolding of a new open order which would in a dynamic of reinterpretation of parts, of 'liberation' from the coupled constraints of the technical economy of the System, organise a wider play of what is open to Man.

By a strange irony, Marcuse is thus most american, most assimilated, precisely in this schematic version of a wider economy of Nature in which the individual recognises what is open to him as a free and equal member of the natural Constitution of the World. The wider System of Nature is more american than the american System it criticises, for the american System is precisely a system of opening up America in a dynamic of assimilation of european people and ideas, Marcuse and his ideas among them. And the Nature proposed by Marcuse is american rather than german in its abstraction from the complementary limits of the Question as invoked by Heidegger and Adorno, to a Nature which, as simply what is so to speak open 'in itself', is not itself in question, is itself a new Frame.

...Yet the scheme of coordination of these complementary critiques of the Frame or social frame, through the coupling of the analyses of Freud and Marx - the schematic presentation, in abstraction from Adorno's radical open-ness of 'Nature' itself, of its definition - does in the Germany (rather West Germany) of the 'sixties (as one side of Marcuse's ambiguous position, through writings in german, translations of english (or american) writings, and visits to his native country) - correspond to the more 'german' order of Habermas' opening up of the question of a frame for Critical Theory, a set of coordinates of inquiry in which the assumption of that frame corresponds to the part of the individual in his radical identification of his part as Critic.
For in the radical order of questions and assertion - of what is open in the 'natural situation' corresponding to Husserl's **Lebenswelt** in which we 'find ourselves', in which questions first arise - questioning is radically coupled with a certain finality, a certain 'end' in relation to which questions are asked, in relation to which they 'arise' - a certain interest, an **interesse** in which we are always so to speak 'between' certain 'objects' or objectives, and some formal pole of detached subjectivity: this interesse being precisely Feuerbach's characterisation of the 'natural situation' in which the formal position, positing, coordinates, of the hegelian System in which that natural situation was then supposed determined, was itself, in its turn, to be inscribed - this inscription framing in 1843 the primary coordinates, 'positions' or 'propositions', the **Grundsätze**, of a 'Philosophy of the Future'. A philosophy 'of' the Future, of **Zukunft**, both in the sense that it was in the Future then beginning that the philosophy was to be unfolded, and also in the sense that it was framed in the primacy of that orientation towards the future which, as open corresponded to our radical place of self-assertion 'in' that open-ness - rather than our acquiescence in an 'alienated' determination of our selves and our actions from 'outside', in the closed system framed by the hegelian articulation of a closed Past.

In the 'natural situation', then, questions arise in relation to an 'object' or objective. They are framed in a certain **An-Wesen**, so to speak - and primarily in relation to what presents itself as **zu-künftig**, in that primary order of the künftig, of **An-kunft**. In particular, the studied open-ness of Adorno's dis-position (or, perhaps, 'deposition' of traditional Reason), itself comes into question in the natural situation of our activity, of our assertion in, choice from, what is there 'open to us'. The position of critical open-ness is itself open to question, as corresponding, like all questioning or inquiry (and all the **Erkenntnis** articulated by such inquiry) to an interest which articulates it: the determination, so to speak, to bring all assertion into question, and so frame social activity within what is radically open 'in the nature of society'.

The radical **Selbstreflexion** in which the activity of Critical Theory is itself brought 'into question', as one thing among the other things 'open' in the social order, in the nature of the case, thus
begins to resemble the hermeneutic circle of Gadamer's opening-up of an inquiry in the interface, so to speak, of the 'transcendental' coordinates of Ereignis, and the complementary coordinates of our appropriation of a part in the 'natural situation' of the Lebenswelt.

The An-Wesen or positional, positive, character of the interests which organise the Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften, for example, can now be coordinated (as 'practical' and 'technical' cognitive interest respectively) within the primary orientation or position of Interest simply as such - thus systematically framing the weberian coordination of 'values' which organise social activity and interaction. Just as Gadamer can frame the complementary abstractions of the 'methods' of natural and moral (or 'human') sciences, in terms of the primary dynamic of questions and assertions in the Lebenswelt or natural situation (to use Habermas' expression), in its coordination with the heideggerian configuration of Truth, so Habermas can now frame the un-self-consciousness of the inquiries, the Erkenntnisse, articulated by unquestioned practical and technical interests, in terms of a critical inquiry framed precisely in the coordination of questions and interests which organise that questioning. A Critical Theory, then, framed, organised, by the 'rational' interest of organising the various interests or finalities of the various individuals in the society in which the critical theorist himself pursues, and recognises himself precisely as pursuing, acting in the pursuit of, the rational interest of unitary coordination of different interests in consensus.

Critical theory, then, in particular, articulates the inquiries framed by practical and technical interests. This, then, in terms of the coordinations of psychological and cultural components or sides of practical interest in the psychoanalysis opened up by Freud, and the coordination of natural and ideological economies of the cultural order in the Ideologiekritik opened up by Marx. Thus Marcuse's coordination of what is open in 'Nature' becomes as it were the frame of that radical questioning which is Critical Theory. But this coordination is framed, not in a simple 'position' of Nature, which couples Marcuse's own criticism of Technical Society to a certain 'technical interest', but rather in the linguistic frame of a radical Selbstreflexion, corresponding to what is open in the linguistic framing of the part of that Language in the 'working' coordination of Language, Society and Nature. This working of the
actual frame in which language works to frame its part in the working, coordinates working, activity, interaction - and in particular the interaction in the linguistic order of dialogue works to coordinate interests. The interest of Critical Theory, then, works toward the configuration of an 'ideal communication community' organising its activity according to the 'ideal dialogue', in which interests can be completely coordinated. The critical opening-up by questioning of what constrains such ideal dialogue in the actual-situation of this proposition of the ideal, is also (also works) to open up what is open to individual choice or assertion in activity. The coordination of questions, inquiry, then, as organised by this ideal as the interest of Critical Theory (the interest of coordinating interests through question and answer), actually serves to 'promote' (in its various senses) the ideal. In the abstract one can sketch the maximisation, so to speak, of individual interests through the general recognition of this common interest of rational criticism of interests - the dynamic of interaction in the symmetric parts of individual assertion which organises an optimal collective strategy in the frame of what is naturally open to a group simply as such. There is here an aristotelian resonance, a platonic resonance perhaps, a kantian resonance certainly. But although the ideal as frame of self-criticism in a society, as frame of integration of interests through this play of criticism, constitutes an optimal strategy to which a symmetric group might naturally assent in a sort of social contract inaugural of common activity, how does it apply distributively, so to speak, to the various different individuals in the particular situation in which Habermas actually frames the ideal?

Such a question, paralleling the parisian recognition around 1970 of the primacy of, say, the situation of reading a particular text over any systematic frame in which (in a sort of 'classical' structuralism) that particular situation might be supposed articulated as it were from 'outside', leads Habermas around that same time to the question of the particular situation of action and interaction as more radical frame of Critical Theory than the symmetric coordination of what is open to individuals in the formal symmetry of these individuals as a communication community in a common 'natural situation'. Leads, then, to the transition from the ideal dialogue as frame of critical inquiry (the particular situation being opened up by its inscription in that order of what is open to individuals in groups in general) in the sixties to the project of
Universalpragmatik as a sort of Philosophie der Zukunft articulated by a more radical inter-esse in the 'seventies. - And marks, perhaps a divergence between this programme of Habermas', and the Philosophie der Zukunft or Transformation der Philosophie rather, projected by his associate Karl-Otto Apel as Transzendententalpragmatik: as a new Critique of Practical Reason elaborating a categorial frame of what is open in activity, interaction, in terms of an articulation of the considerations just outlined through the theme of an ideal language-game'. - Incorporating then, in a circuit through foreign lands, of another component of the germanic configuration of 1930, along with the complementary configuration of its inscription, since the mid-century, in british-american reflection..along with, in particular (after 1970) Searle's american programme of an economy, so to speak, of Austin's 'speech acts'. Incorporating, then - along with Habermas' parallel elaboration of the particular case (for which Apel is supplying a categorial frame in abstraction from the earlier question of the engagement of the Frankfurt theorist in the social order) - that american 'pragmatism' in Pragmatik which, notably in the scheme of James' isolated contemporary Peirce, provides a model in West Germany for the symmetric coordination of psychological, communal, and natural orders of questions, coming into question around 1970.

I have already suggested that Habermas' part in (West) Germany around 1970 might be taken as a parallel of the focal part of Lacan in Paris - and that the complementarity between the parts of Lacan and Derrida at Paris might be compared with the relations between the 'parts' of Habermas and Gadamer around this time. I have tried to show how on either side of the Rhine around 1970 we arrive at coordinations of three orders of questions in what I have called, on either side, a sort of 'double mirroring'. A double mirroring,
interpreted each time as the coordination of the triple order of questions relating to 'subject', 'object', and 'frame' of their relation or interaction (albeit not always posed in these traditional terms) within the inscription of this triple order in a primary 'space' and 'time' of coordination first identified before the mid-century (as champ transcendentale or Sein/Natur) with one of those orders of questions: the subjective order in France, and the 'objective' order of Being or Nature in Germany.

That is to say, roughly, the frame of questions comes as it were full-circuit, is 'closed' in the traditional subjectivism and objectivism of France and Germany, by a coordination of the whole order of questions with one 'side' so to speak of a symmetry of subjective inside and objective outside, and of the other side, then, with a sort of 'vanishing point' of the system of questioning or reflection as a whole. Thus in the lacanian figure of identification, which may be seen as a sort of radicalisation of the sartrean figure of inscription of the individual 'subject' in the transcendental field of subjectivity as a unitary whole, we find just this configuration:

\[ S \rightarrow a \]

\[ \sim \]

\[ a' \rightarrow A \]

- where A corresponds to the question of the Subject framing, as a sort of universal Subject, as the Other 'behind' a particular other a, the radical self-assertion of the particular subject 'in place of' 'Est', S, 'sujet brut du-blâisir', vanishing-point of the double mirroring a-a' (relation spéculaires) and A-S (primary organising axis of desire).

Now just as in France the double mirroring is framed around 1970 by questions, by a questioning, opening up out of the mid-century 'space' of phenomenological subjectivity, a questioning of discourse or language initially supposed inscribed 'in' the mid-century space,
but in whose order that mid-century subjectivity is now inscribed as an abstraction, so in Germany the primacy of Being or Nature (of those 'outward' orders) is regarded by 1970 as an abstraction from a more radical order of questions opening out of a cultural order initially supposed inscribed 'in' those primary orders of question, of open-ness.

We have just seen how the 'cultural' order of questions unfolding as it were 'out' of the ontical or natural side in West Germany is organised in a characterisation of that order of open-ness in terms of the psychoanalytical questioning opening out of the mirroring of psychological and cultural orders, inscribed in a mirroring of ideology and economy or Language and Being. Lacanian psychoanalysis, in which the freudian (germanic, helmholzian) economy of 'drives', of natural forces, constitutes a sort of 'vanishing point' where the french order of inquiry closes upon itself, abstracts from a radical Nature, itself becomes a sort of question of the 'vanishing point' of Gadamer's and Habermas' inquiries around 1970.

That is: we may take the common french and german concentration upon Language around 1970 as a sort of interface of a french coordination of questions abstracted from radical german Nature, and a complementary german coordination abstracted from a radical french dynamic of the Missing -rather, Wanting - Subject. After 1970, coupled to the renunciation of Language as a systematic frame of articulation of particular discourses, or particular 'workings' of social interaction, there begins to open-up in France and Germany a new order of questions, from which the systematic coordination of questions in relation to language, in the 'sixties, is begun to be seen as itself an abstraction, just as the mid-century spaces in which Language was framed were earlier seen as abstractions from the more radical coordination of questions in relation to the question of Language. I have noted how in Germany this question of Action begins to open up in terms of the configuration of a british-american 'poetic' of Language, as itself developed since the midcentury, parallelling the french and german reflections on (or perhaps rather, 'in') Language. I noted how, in Paris in the late 'seventies, the ideological order of the systematic 'lacune de vocabulaire' of Abstract 'structuralism', was coupled by the 'New Philosophers' with 'leftist' economics in a cri-
ticism framed by the moral or theological 'poetic' of self-inscription as locus in the framing of Action (once more), which might be taken as the reassertion of midcentury littérature engagée. Of an 'engagement' in Action framed at midcentury in the phenomenological 'space' and 'time' later brought into question as (with the Action it framed) an abstraction from the linguistic interface of abstract subjectivity and the 'intersubjectivity' which it determined as frame of Action. - This interface itself now identified as an abstraction from the moral order of an Action prefigured by Sartre.

Entering, now, into an order of Action from which the residual subjectivism and objectivism of French and German reflection around 1970 begin', after that 'turning-point', to be seen as abstracted, we may extend this Franco-German configuration of complementary 'versions' of the coordination of three orders of question (their double mirroring) to a wider symmetry in which the British and American 'poetics' of language around 1970 complement, as parallel abstractions from the symmetry of all four orders of reflection, the Franco-German axis of a certain Action.

That is: the order of questioning opening up after 1970 in France, Germany, Britain and America may begun to be seen as a parallel questionings of those four orders of articulation of four orders of question, in relation to the question (in these various versions) of Language. Language replacing the traditional Subject as organising one 'side' of the cultural order of activity, and the questioning opening up in that cultural configuration of Language, in the transatlantic Culture of the West, the questioning framed in the symmetry which organises the four orders of question dominant in American, French, British, and German cultures - even if this symmetry be still pursued within the relative isolation of the different national traditions of Reflection.

A question, opening up then, in this transatlantic configuration of Reflection, of the constitutive abstractions of each of those national traditions, and with them and their interaction, of Reflection, from their symmetry embodied in the coordination of American, French, British and German activity and interaction as a whole.
A questioning opening up in the symmetry of the four questionings after 1970. But opening up, then, not 'in' those frames, as the question of language opened up in France largely 'in' the phenomenological 'space' which it was to bring into question: a questioning rather from which those parallel questionings of Action might be seen to be abstractions, themselves coordinated with cultural and natural orders of activity in an actual Action, of which French, British, German, and American reflection may now be seen as so many complementary components, interacting through the coupling of 'ideological', 'cultural' and 'natural' 'questions' in those countries over the course of the twentieth century... as for many centuries before.

...And so now to the question, so long postponed, of the locus of framing these various orders of American, French, British, German reflections, philosophies, sciences, as symmetric abstractions from the fourfold symmetry of that Action which is accounted, recounted, in a 'history' of Reflection in the first instance, the, a, story of Reflection over the mid-twentieth century.

...So too, one step further, to the mid-eighties, the temporal locus of the writing of this story... and into the configuration in which this locus is marked simply as a question...