Inquiry in Question

In Four Volumes

IV

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I have tried in the closing sections of the last Part of this Story of books, to relate the 'internal' logic of reflection carried on in various languages ('natural' and 'formal') over the mid-twentieth century, to different components of its 'external' space and time: to correlate figures or structures of reflective texts to a 'global' context whose organisation the words and symbols in some sense 'reflect'.

I suggested that around 1970 one could see the internal articulation of various domains of reflection (the logical domain of reflection on the articulation of the 'internal' order of any theoretical text, the physical domain of reflection on the 'external' context of materially embodied texts, the 'poetic' mirroring of reflection and context in their cultural interaction, and the three psychological, ontological and theological orders or domains of
inner' mind, 'being' to which its reflection refers, and the interaction of these) as so many 'versions' of the coordination of those versions. And I suggested that the various components of the correlation of theoretical text and global context, of which the various components of 1970 Theory were to be considered the 'theories', were likewise open to analysis as so many orders of coordination of these orders (Theory; the 'physical' order of its material production; the cultural order of interaction of these two orders in particular human groups; the material 'economy' by which that interaction is in turn embedded in physical Nature; the complementary 'ideological' articulation of that interaction in an economy of competing stories of what was going on in those groups).

I had traced this 'symmetry' of the various component orders of Theory, and the analogous symmetry of the theoretical order as a whole with the various orders of context, over the mid-century - from a coordination of these orders ('internal' and 'external') of theoretical texts around 1930, to that configuration of Theory and Context (or theories and contexts) around 1970 which I identified in terms of a systematic, coordinated, 'abstraction' of the various orders from the question of their radical symmetry.

Of course I was myself reading this 'symmetry' or coordination into texts and contexts. Progressing through the successive phases of my Story, from my opening questioning of what was going on in the book I found myself writing (the opening questioning, then, precisely of my opening questioning) through an 'historical' sequence whose successive steps were identified as questionings of previous steps (and corresponding assertions of the new step), I have unfolded the figures of the various 'steps' always in terms of, terms derived from, identified in, the texts taken to embody the step in question. From time to time I noted the ultimate questionability of such a proceeding, but always deferred such a radical question to this 'Close', closing, of the book and inquiry.

Now is the time to consider this question of my own 'position'. But now is the time, not only because the question must be faced before
the book can close, but also because this book, and with it my attempt to bring into question the various theoretical productions of around 1970 as 'abstractions' from a deeper symmetry of which I read them as so many analogous 'versions', itself marks the next 'step', from 1970 to around 1985 (in which year I am (re)writing this Close) and on to around the close of this century and millenium.

That is: the two parallel lines which run through the inquiry embodied in this book - the unfolding of successive configurations of correlation of Theory and its World, and the question of the defensibility of my largely implicit position or perspective - now converge in the 'Close' of my Story. And indeed it is this final coincidence of the perspective of the inquiry developed 'internally' in my narrative, and the inquiry which finally appears so to speak 'outside' itself as the identification of the narrative as closing term of the Story it narrates, its identification as one component of its own context, World, which naturally enough corresponds to 'closing the book'. When the Close itself closes readers and writer move out of the 'internal' space marked as we entered through the opening words and questions, into a World in which the book lies closed, an object among other objects in that 'external' order marked in the book as one term among others. An object whose rather (I hope) mysterious character is marked only by the '?' which in its way encompasses the whole inquiry, as do the covers upon which it is marked.

This questioning or inquiry embodied in these copies of this book is, then, now 'in question' directly. Directly: in its own terms - but not altogether 'on its own terms'.

'?'?... In earlier phases of the inquiry I so orchestrated the narrative that the question of that orchestration or coordination of material, identified as belonging to various orders of texts and contexts, was posed in terms, in the terms, belonging to the particular step under consideration. I deferred
at each step the question of my perspective, my orchestration, my reading, by passing on to a further step in which the terms of some provisional questioning of my frame of analysis or narration themselves came 'into question'. Thus my 'idea' of Plato's 'ideas' for example, itself came into question with those 'ideas'; my 'method' with Aristotle's (in relation to which both were, in passing, identified...and together identified with a certain 'working' of the figure of 'working'); my experimental analysis of the 'Scientific Revolution' came into question with Romantic critique of such Science...and so on.

'?'?...the question can no longer be deferred. I have characterised relations of theories and contexts around 1970 in terms of symmetry: the symmetry of various different coordinate domains within Theory or Reflection as a whole, and the symmetry of this articulation of Theory with the coordinate articulations of various different orders of its Context. And it is just this characterisation in terms of 'symmetry', through which the Theory of 1970 is brought 'into question', and into this inquiry, which now itself comes into question with the correlation of this inquiry as itself text, in its various contexts (and most particularly the spatiotemporal context of this Globe of Earth around 1970-2000).

Now 'symmetry' was introduced at the outset in relation to questions considered simply as such. A question amounts to something open. In the strict sense it amounts to something 'open' in the order of words and thoughts, although by 'analogy' rooted in the symmetry of these orders with, for example, cultural and natural orders, we may take as a 'question' anything (like an action) that can come into question: anything 'open', though we might well insist that questions are properly only one sort of open-ness or opening (one thing open within what is open). Theoretical questions correspond to what is 'logically' open: so that we may say two theories are 'symmetrical' insofar as their logical articulation (as a mere manipulation of terms - words or other marks) is the same - insofar as their differentiation is
dependent on some 'external' coordination of 'logical' terms and elements of some other order. So that we can understand a certain 'dynamic' (to use a 'symmetric' term from physical theory) of theoretical questions in terms of questions arising within a particular 'area' (again a physical analogy) which must be 'decided' by the inscription of the symmetry of that 'area' (a group of terms) in some wider configuration which 'decides' what is left open by that symmetry. The radical symmetry of different domains of Theory or Reflection (as itself undifferentiated) was initially introduced through the consideration of the logical symmetry of 'inside' and 'outside' of a theoretical text (this one) - this through the question of marking the difference of the 'internal' and 'external' aspects of that very demarcation (theoretically identified as the question of the physical difference 'used' to mark the logical distinction of logical distinction from that physical difference).

Different orders of questions were 'symmetrically' articulated within the radical 'open-ness' of the questions, 'What is a question?' and 'Which question (is in question)?', these two strange questions being themselves seen to be symmetric, within (so to speak) a common open-ness of question (attaching, then, to the question posed by the symmetry of the matrix of substitutions defining the 'logical' syntax of the term 'question', and the complementary structuring of all the relations of the particular questions open in that 'form' of 'the question' - implicatio and explicatio, universal and particular, sense and reference... 'question' attaching to 'question').

Let us now, then, address the questions: How do the various theories of around 1970 discussed at the close of Part Three symmetrically come into question as coordinate abstractions of Theory from the symmetry of Theory and Context as a whole, and how can we then as it were mark what becomes 'open' around 2000, as this coordination of the symmetric theories of around 1970 in terms of 'questions' articulated in relation to the questioning of questioning embodied in these copies of this book, itself comes into question as one activity open (its marking) in the configuration of what is open around the close of the second millenium, which it marks?
Who? Me?

The first question first. How does the 'next step' from the configuration of 1970 sketched at the close of Part Three amount to the coming-into-question of the various theories of around 1970 as so many symmetric 'versions' or dimensions of a common abstraction from that symmetry, coupled through the abstraction of Theory from the various orders of Context - or rather from the question of the radical symmetry of Theory and the various coordinate dimensions of its 'World'?

At the opening of this inquiry I suggested that this complex system of 'abstraction' from the coupling of various orders of Theory, within the coupling of Theory itself to the various correlative orders of Context (the various orders of which this configuration of abstraction gave the various 'theories'), would be seen as the abstraction of theoretical questions from the question of the theorist's entry into the various words and books in which reflection is carried on. - Or rather we opened the book with the question of what was going on in this questioning (of what was going on), and various orders of question unfolded from this initial 'opening' - and I suggested that various orders of theorising might perhaps be seen to involve a sort of elision of that opening question in an abrupt and 'unconscious', unquestioned, passage between an 'external' World and a coordinate 'internal' logic of the theoretical text.

Of course questions about the traditional coupling of an imaginary (say 'transcendental') space 'in' the words, and the 'external' World of (say 'empirical') objects, were already quite central to, say, Derrida's perspective of around 1970. But the writing of these questions was not articulated in relation to the radically...personal...matter of moving 'in' and 'out' of the very words, marks indeed, 'in' which such questions were posed. We must wait, first, for the 'New Philosophers' of the late 'seventies to bring into question the coupling of a certain unquestioning criticism with a certain cultural order, and for Derrida himself, in
in the early 'eighties, to concretely 'institute' a reflection on
the cultural institution of Theory - whether as first Director
(1983-5) of a parisian Collège International de Philosophie (out-
wardly a four-room flat aptly situated at 1, rue Descartes); or
(under the new aegis of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences
Sociales) as 'Directeur de Recherches' into Les Institutions
Philosophiques, directing a seminar addressing the question(s)
of Philosophie et Nationalité.

I noted at the close of the Third Part the duality of
Derrida's 'deconstructive' questioning of the textual interaction of
text and its (nominal) outside (on the 'margins', then, of the
philosophical Tradition), and the doubling of this systematically
critical approach with a rather unquestioning assertion of the
categorical cultural imperative of maintaining the place of such
criticism within the instituted social order of 'seventies techno-
cracy. - The duality, so to speak, of Derrida's logic and its
ethics, theory and its practical maintenance. I took this dual
part of the Répétiteur of the Rue d'Ulm as a parallel within the
parisian interaction of theory and contexts, of the 'New Philosopher's'
questioning of the coupling of a 'structuralist' ideology (corres-
ponding in the cultural order to that lacune of Foucault's reflection:
what was common to the various different versions of an organising
Absence or lacune) with a formalist economics and politics, and his
assertion in his récit personnel of the years around 1970, of the
ethical imperative of his assertion of an essentially personal and
ethical frame of assertion, and of its articulation as 'theory'.

I saw this new morality of 1977-8 as an initial response
to the question implicit in the coupling or symmetry of a 1970 logic
of the coupling of traditional 'internal' subjectivity and 'external'
intersubjective interaction in language, with the physical economy
(seen in the instituted armed and police 'forces' as well as in the
peaceful market) of the culture in which that logic is embedded or
instituted. - As a sort of reiteration, then, of the 'sixties move
out of a 'transcendental' subjectivity which thought to determine
the linguistic frame of its abstraction from the linguistic inter-
face of 'transcendental' and 'empirical', and into the linguistic
working of this illusory abstraction: now the unitary articulation
of that language or textuality was itself to be seen as an abstrac-
tion from the practical (ethical) cultural interface of discourse
(stories, ideology) and its physical economy; from the coupling
of these orders seen, for example, in physical repression by
police or army of discourse on, stories of, just such repression.

The antagonism of avowedly 'ideological' New Philosophy,
as presented by the 'media', and the systematic criticism of the
academic 'structuralists' or 'post-structuralists' I framed in
the familiar figure of opposition of a logical poetics of coupling
of 'inside' and 'outside' of discourse, to a 'dogmatic' morality
which articulates the logical side of stories and actions within
the frame of a particular story or myth which includes as one of
its terms or themes the order of its own assertion. - And indeed
the figuration of this opposition of critical inquiry and what it
takes for myth, superstition, ideology, in the late 'seventies, was
largely framed in terms of that earlier conflict of logic and poetic,
of Reason and Faith, in relation to which as its turning-point I
articulated the First Part of this Story.

Thus the parisian reflection of 1985 to which I have
just adverted might be seen in relation to the question of the
complementarity of an academic reflection on the textual or dis-
cursive interface of Theory and human interaction in the very
texts of such a reflection, and the cultural force of, say, Bernard
Henri-Levy's framing in the 'media' of his story of the necessity
of his asserting his story.

If I were to frame a parisian parallel of this my
own reflection of 1985, then, I might perhaps take as central the
part of Derrida's successor at the Collège International, Jean-
Francois Lyotard, as I took Lacan as central to the configuration
of 1970. For Lyotard, at once Deleuze' colleague at that Other
Place symbolically outside the formal periphery of Paris, Director
of the college at 1, rue Descartes, and director in 1985 of an
'exposition' at the Beaubourg complex of the new logic articulated
in the new media of the dawning Revolution, organises all this activity in the 'postmodern' cultural economy of multiple 'stories' interacting with institutions and material economies - with the cultural and material analogues of an open ideological play of récits. His story of this open play itself marks what is open in the interplay of these three orders, and the organising direction in this non-unitary interplay is simply to act so as to open up wider, more open, frames of action, 'games': 'maximiser la performance', latterday Will to Will.

...But the question now is not to mark a step on from theories and contexts of around 1970 in relation to some questionable identification of Lyotard's story as closing term of this narrative. Rather does that very questionability of my schematic identification of Lyotard's position in relation to the 'nationality' of French philosophy (Derrida's question of 1985), and to a 'step' on from fifteen years ago, attach directly to the position of writer here, to my 'position'. Indeed to frame, say, Lyotard's position as index of parisian reflection around 1985, in terms of what is 'open' in the coupling of the various symmetric orders of stories and contexts, is not so much to mark his position, as to mark mine - or rather, it is only to mark his position relative to this inquiry, and I cannot then hope to adequately mark my position relative to his, or to Paris...

...Yet such a schematic indication of a dynamic of parisian reflection since around 1970, in terms of the theories of 1970 coming 'into question', into a question which is one dimension of what is open in the symmetry of theories and contexts - a question which is the marking in the logical order of theory of what is open in the coupling of theory and context - may itself serve as a preliminary indication of my 'british' position. For my position itself has
been elaborated in a space charted in relation to Paris as primary reference: as primary index at the close of the third Part for the global interaction of theories and contexts around 1970... but also (and reflected in this choice of index) as the primary context of my own reflection in the mid-seventies, through which passes, after the period around 1970, my own path toward the writing of this book.

...For I might now, in retrospect, take the third Part to close with my own silence, as I joined the parisian audience in 1974: take the part of my reflection in a largely undifferentiated readership and auditory in the years immediately following the period 'around 1970' in Paris, as a transition from the close of the third Part of the book, to this Close of the book.

...For my part, outwardly fairly passive apart from a few expositions of Frege and Wittgenstein in seminars where British authority was recognised, and very few peripheral interventions in the very rare discussion that occasionally interrupts or follows the classical parisian 'seminar', passes through the outwardly undifferentiated silence of, say, 1974-6, in which the parisian reflection of around 1970 was more or less inarticulately 'in question'. 'In question' in the parisian configuration of texts and contexts, from the 'critical' point of view of reader or listener/spectator 'outside' the texts and discourses of Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, Barthes, Deleuze, Kristeva and many others. My own position, sharing in the silent critical potentiality of this mid-seventies configuration of texts and discourses in a common parisian context, was a long way (further even than I then thought) from expression in 'my' text – though I was all the while reflecting with a view to articulating my critical position in (or later, 'in relation to') a text. I was playing the part of working on my 'thesis', on a text constructed precisely as expression of my 'position' in relation to some configuration of prior texts or authorities, positions. That work led after a decade to this very book – and this through a turning-point marking the transition from reading to writing around 1980.
1975, 1980, 1985: my two steps on from the Parisian configuration of around 1970, to this Close, closing the circuit of exposition of my 'position' in a 'thesis' - and this in the recognition three years after opening the book, after writing the opening words of the Introduction (themselves rewritten a year ago), that the sort of ideal writing or exposition or text I then set out to draft, has at the close of the inquiry embodied in all this writing, itself come to be a sort of fiction, one term in the inquiry, but half-supposed in the opening to encompass the whole. Around the New Year 1979/80 I discovered that its writing or assertion was itself a crucial term in the frame or framing of my 'position', and I am only now realising, over the New Year 1984/5, that the intervening five years' work or inquiry amounts to an often wearisome passage out of a residual dominance of the questioning of the relations of questioning or inquiry, and contexts, by a traditional logic of 'abstraction' from the complementarity of inside and outside of the text: the dominance of an essentially 'logical' or internal, rather than a 'dramatic', determination of the relations of texts and contexts - of this text and its contexts, in particular.

This closing of the exposition must involve a summing-up, a consummation, of the inquiry which has led thus far. But in order to find, at last, where I am, as marked by this closing book, this closing of the book, I must pass back to mid-century, then to proceed through 1970 to 1985.

Mid-century, the middle of England, heartland of the Industrial Revolution, where I arrived on this Globe, through the offices of male and female parents, last members of two converging branches of a family tree which roots me in the long Story whose narration I am now closing. I do not propose to pursue the interactions over two and a half millennia, the articulation of generation(s) over the whole Story, which I might suppose has led to my part, in the global context I have sketched, its places and times, my part of writer here. Written records of such cultural interaction, my 'family history', are at any rate unavailable, beyond a few scanty scraps. And, more importantly, it is only my relations with the
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The Republic had come from my father's bookshelves; perhaps loquacity and a sense of being somehow 'outside' a peer group (while making of this my part in the group) also came from Irish parents who every few years moved to another part of England as jobs were exchanged. But Plato was followed soon by Nietzsche, whom I found more or less for myself at fifteen. As far as I remember I was moved by seeing a television play in 1968, turning about the effect of Nietzsche on an initially timid character who discovered his Will to Power as he brought all his earlier repressive beliefs into question (I think he came to a bad end), to ask for books by Der Einzige at the local public library. I began with Zarathustra and moved on through the rest as they succeeded one another in badly translated Penguin editions. Penguins were my constant company on buses, at home, in spare moments at school. An English master thought I would prove a better humanist than scientist (I was studying mathematics and physics) and started to supply me with books that might complement my obsession with Nietzsche. I remember being overwhelmed by the first he gave me, Kafka's Castle; but I was bored with the second, A Passage to India, which I did not finish (I had read The Castle lying on my bed at home in one stunned access of imagination). I moved on to Dostoievski and Mallarmé, and by this time was busily engaged in Automatic Writing, and deciding to read Philosophy, Politics and Economics at University, rather than become an architect as I had planned in early adolescence. Meanwhile I had become rather obsessed with the various beings of different sex from those at school. They were the main subjects, and often the recipients, of the automatic writing which I may have learned from Marcel Raymond's history of French poetry De Baudelaire au Surréalisme, which I carried about at the time as a sort of anthology.

1970: my last year of studying mathematics at school while reading an odd assortment of philosophers, poets, and novelists, and writing automatically. The urge to get outside the familiar group led me through Europe to the Indian subcontinent in my summer holiday, and I returned with double pneumonia to take Oxford examinations.
1970, then: my transition from the early adolescence of grammar schools into that theatre of adolescence, of the interplay of different roles in various adolescent groups, which is still the medieval University. By the time I entered Oxford in 1971 I had decided to read Mathematics and Philosophy rather than PPE. In retrospect I suppose I might differentiate between the latter's coverage of the various current theories of language, the cultural (or political) order, and the material economy of that order, and the former's axis of expressing in formal or informal language the relation of that language to the 'World' it articulated. I remember being asked if I would not regret missing the Ethics which had no place in the Philosophy of Mathematics and Philosophy, and remember replying that I thought Ethics too serious a matter to treat until one had first reflected on the terms of its analysis. I regarded PPE as a rather superficial game of playing with a fairly random collection of stories about language, politics and economics. A game which constituted the ideal frame of access to the management of a social order organised by the superficial ideological interactions of these stories, but hardly designed to satisfy my critical urge, happier in the applied logic or mathematics of the application of formal logic to the World of which it was itself one component.

The study of Philosophy in Oxford, dominated by its part in PPE and the formation of those who would govern the social order in which this their induction or education was instituted, amounted to acquiring skill at the balanced précis of a canonical set of arguments about some point, which however leant in favour of one of the arguments rather than the others - or perhaps to some combination, or occasionally to the judgement that the matter had not yet been adequately analysed. Perfect induction into the part of lawyer or civil servant, but I was more interested by the structure of the process than by the choosing among the arguments proferred by the tutor's recommended authors. Central to the very small school of Mathematics and Philosophy was Formal Logic, the interface of the two orders of questions (though in practice the various
components of the three-year course of study were very weakly coupled or coordinated...the half-dozen students simply wandered from one tutor to another). Formal Logic was effectively Model Theory, the mathematical study of the relations between more or less strictly formal 'theories' and the various actual structures (themselves taken from the mathematics or applied logic of which the (ideally) unitary Theory of logic had been abstracted) to which they could apply.

My only public success at Oxford was in Model Theory. My attempt to analyse the various arguments which I had to coordinate each week in Philosophy, in terms of an analogue of Model Theory - that is, by taking the various arguments each week as symmetric versions of the same unquestioned structure of argument, apparently opposed from week to week over the matter of 'Other Minds' or 'Perception' or 'Truth' or some other stock subject of debate - met with little recognition from my examiners (although my various tutors seemed interested enough in my successive attempts to express a position corresponding to my questioning, but which I could never put into the acceptable form of argument). I managed well enough with Group Theory in mathematics - that is, with the mathematical analogue of Model Theory, but I could find no intelligible structure in Analysis, the practical business of dealing with the mathematics of physical Space and Time.

I remember that my first essay in Philosophy (I think it was addressed to 'The Problem of Perception', or to some more specific 'problem' of Perception) led me into the question of the undecidability of an 'external' framing of the relations of Inner and Outer worlds (in terms of the brain) and an 'internal' framing in terms of the thought or perception of their difference. I was fascinated with the Gedankenexperiment of a man who could somehow outwardly see that functioning of the brain which was responsible for that his perception of it. My first tutor's comment on my first essay was that 'we cannot solve all the problems of philosophy at the same time, we must break the questions down, and treat them one by one'.
He was a jurist. I have often reflected, since that first tutorial that one could only solve any one of the 'problems' of Philosophy, by solving all at once.

...For otherwise, the question of the terms in which one 'problem', one question, is posed, is displaced into another 'problem', into other questions, problems, attaching to the terms of the first problem; another question whose own terms are themselves then to be analysed somewhere else - some of them, perhaps, in the discussion of the original problem.

By my second year I had to face this question of the presuppositional structure(s) of Oxford Philosophy in the then current anglo-american debates about Language. I saw in the positions of Strawson and Quine a symmetry of informal and formal approaches to the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of formal and informal Language, that I tried to express in the terms of that debate - I considered that complementarity of positions undecidable from either position, either side. Over the Easter holidays I began to carry about with me paper on which I would note the interplay of questions within the symmetry of this configuration of Language and World. Returning to Oxford I was placed under the indulgent tutelage, over a summer term unclouded by any immediate prospect of examinations, of a visiting American professor. For my first essay I cut up the notes I had made in the holidays into what seemed elementary components - my Zettel so to speak - and arranged them over the floor of my college room. I then slowly arranged them in a linear order (I suppose there must have been a hundred or so fragments), and presented the resulting sellotaped pages as my first essay of the term, under the title 'Understanding Understanding'.

The American tutor asked me if I had ever invented the typewriter. He explained that people occasionally invented things quite independently of, and unaware of, the fact that those things had been in common use for a considerable time - and that I seemed
to be engaged in inventing Hegel. From then on I read in various areas suggested by Mr Oberdinck, outside the confines of the Oxford chronology and geography of reflection (outside a 'history' of modern Philosophy which was Descartes – LockeBerkeleyandHume – Kant, and 'current' questions derived from reflection in Britain and America since the turn of the century, but abstracted from its history and organised around 'problems'). As I read in these strange areas, where my tutor thought I might find questions similar to those which had arisen in my reflections on the symmetry of British and American approaches to 'current' problems, I made more notes which I occasionally arranged as the basis of discussion.

Unfortunately for my progress in British society my reflection was becoming more and more systematically organised in terms of questions relating to the structure of the arguments I would have to review at the end of the third year. And in that final year, 1973-4, which opened with the fevered articulation of questions relating to the wider presuppositions of Oxford student life, in the Feast of Fools in the 'occupied' examination schools, I set myself to review the 'history' syllabus from Descartes to Kant in an interminable essay on the figures and metaphors of Locke's coordination of 'inner' and 'outer' worlds, while preparing a proposal for study in Paris for submission to the French government.

For having tried to read Hegel and Pierce in my second year I moved on to find a complement to the abstraction of the Anglo-American debate from the question of its history and system, in Heidegger's book on Kant, and Merleau-Ponty's Phénoménologie de la Perception. I saw the answer to my questioning in the complementation of the Anglo-American debate on Language and World by a 'continental' reflection on just those questions of history and system from which the familiar arguments of Oxford had been abstracted. I would put Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty's Parisian successors along with Strawson and Quine, and their successors Dummett and Davidson, into a wider configuration unfolding from what I took to be a common forbearer in Kant. In my final term, with transition to Paris the
following year assured, I took time off from revision to wander down to the weekly Dummett-Davidson confrontation in the Old Library of All Souls. I was at the same time thoroughly frustrated and reassured by this celebrated dialogue des sourds: two systematically complementary positions, each turning in the closed circuit of their abstraction from the complementary view. My alternate philosophical reflection, and mathematical manipulation of related structures, from week to week, had developed into a sort of play of transformations which I could listen to in the interplay of the two opposed themes of the monotonous fugue in the Old Library. Unfortunately my notation for that fugue was unintelligible to my examiners a few weeks later. But by then I had left Oxford on my way to Paris, by way of Cairo, the Nile, and the Equator. I was twenty-one at last in that summer of 1974. While I travelled down the Nile the young lady with whom I had been exploring the questions and presuppositions of the sexual interaction of humans, since the occupation of the Examination Schools in the winter, was continuing her research into those questions, on her way to India with my closest associate in philosophical reflection. On the Nile I shared a boat, then a three-day train journey across the nubian desert to Khartoum, with a group of French adolescents on their way to the Equator, and was altogether confused by the sexual interaction of my world that I carried with me, and that of a young girl in that group: a more or less entirely 'ideal' rather than material or physical interaction, whose words were French.

We met again in Paris in the New Year. I had spent the previous forty or so hours in a darkened room, eventually emerging to feel free of the year-long association with the Oxford girl who was now living with my erstwhile associate, in their final year at the University. Floating about Paris in my new freedom I decided to go along to Foucault's seminar; the French girl who lived with her parents outside Paris had been by chance brought along by a vague acquaintance from the African journey. She had been visiting psychiatrists for about a year, and when she told her parents that she had met in Paris an Englishman she had talked to on the Nile they took it as another sad fall into delusion.
Where is all this autobiography getting us?

...I do not mean to rival my forbearers in philosophical Confessions, whose parts in my story of interaction of Text and Context have already been inscribed in this my text. But the discussion of that interaction, when it finally leads to the question of relations between this, the text of the discussion, and its contexts, naturally involves as one element an enigmatic coincidence of the formal locus of assertion in the text, and the me whose writing is one part of its 'World' outside. - 'Outside' an internal logic of relations of Text and Context, outside the formal authority of the traditional locus of enunciation of Theory, outside that locus which thinks to abstract itself from its external determinations, through an inner, logical system of coordination of the logic and the physics of the text in which such coordination is expressed.

...So just as I have tried to coordinate other texts and their contexts, in this text - and this principally in terms of a 'cultural' interaction of text and context in the life of their writers - so I now introduce, for example, the central sexual index of the cultural interaction of my reflection and my 'world'.

- Or rather, the complementary sexual indices, around 1975, of this interaction. I spent part of the summer vacation on the west coast of Ireland with the english lady, who was emerging from a 'nervous breakdown' precipitated by the final examinations that mark the passage from the 'theatre of adolescence' to a fixed part in the World outside, combined with a parallel and related crisis in the relation with her companion. Over the summer there were phases of dismay approaching paranoia as I became lost in living out the english index as a demonic hysteria that lived upon the assimilation of the relations of male reason and that madness to the very form (or diabolic plasticity) of feminine irrationality. At the same time I was preparing an account of my first year's doctoral research for my nominal french 'supervisor'. Reflection
on the past year's interplay of forms of theory (deriving from
the initial attempt to identify oxonian argument as one version
or dimension of a more general system) and residual theoretical
components in the attempt to identify such form (deriving from
the complementary 'continental' historical system or systematic
history of reflection), led me to attempt a coordination of the
play of inner Reflection and outer World in the figure of Word
I found in the opening verses of the Book of Genesis read in the
light of the Prologue to John's gospel. I had already come to
find the distinction of 'inside' and 'outside' as the most radical
opposition at work in my questioning, and had come to question
the relation of 'inner' and 'outer' versions of this opposition of
inner and outer (which I now regarded as definitive of the old
dialogue of the deaf between 'idealism' and 'materialism').

For a couple of weeks I spent the whole day lost in
texts relating to this configuration of Word; Word as matrix of
coordination of 'inner' and 'outer'. Then in bed one night I
was almost asleep when I thought or felt that someone was coming
through a window into my bedroom. As I slowly reawoke this sense
of an intruder slowly took the shape of a presence in the dark
room of something far more frightful than anything human. The
presence slowly became focussed as the absolute darkness, the
black hole, of Nothing; and Nothing, so to say, in person: what
had so inadequately always been spoken of as a something... as
the Devil.

As this dense cold and horribly tangible black hole
extended its force, becoming more and more focussed, my ability
to reflect, and my very being, slowly ebbed away, until I at
last found myself confronted with a sort of last remnant of my
assertion in this presence of Absence asking the ultimate question:
why should I choose to be, rather than not. - A sort of proposition
of intellectual and spiritual suicide which I experienced as my
very life at stake, on the point of dissolution into a 'madness'
in which there would be no 'I' left to recognise that I was mad:
a 'madness' in which even the supposition of another 'I' to identify
me with that word, with its logic, was dissolved.
At this extreme point of darkness I must have lost consciousness, for the next thing I remember is the consciousness, hours later (I think), that I had somehow come through this meeting with Nothing, but without myself having answered the absolute question it invisibly but tangibly embodied. I felt utterly drained, but transfigured with the sense that something, some other force, had intervened and answered the question for me. I felt as if we were washed up on the shore of Being, saved by the intervention of some invisible Being itself from drowning in the black face of Nothing, in that unutterable Deep, that absolute question.

When I eventually got up from bed and went down to join the others, I found my uncle - a clergyman - and my eldest sister's boyfriend, who had spent the night at the other side of the house. The boyfriend told me that he had woken up at about three in the morning terrified, with his hair actually standing on end. I talked to my uncle, who had driven up that morning, about exorcism: he told me that the ritual was still on rare occasions countenanced by the Church of England; indeed he happened to know the clergyman appointed to supervise exorcism well. The day passed in a kind of delirium. I wrote to an old supervisor at Oxford, who I knew to be interested in 'paranormal' phenomena, asking if I might see him; and I wrote a short and utterly cryptic note to the French girl from the desert.

The Oxford don asked me if I knew anything of Qabala, and suggested I might like to accompany him to one of the regular meetings of representatives of different religions instituted by his grandfather, a prominent Jewish convert to Christianity. When I saw her again in Paris the French girl told me, No, the Devil is not a Black Hole of the Spirit. I thought perhaps that she had misunderstood.

My supervisor, Jean-Toussaint Desanti's, seminar was devoted that year to the philosophy of formal logic. Or rather the seminar of my French supervisor, for I was now also registered as a doctoral student at Warwick in England, having submitted two essays earlier that year together with a proposal for research into 'Time' (my French dissertation title was to be 'Le Signe et le Temps'). One of the essays was an attempt to relate Kant's three Critiques
through the dynamic of interaction of Inner and Outer framed by the Schematism of the first Critique applied to the analysis of the Judgement of the third; the other argued that 'mechanism' was a mistake, since the very concept of 'machine' since the time of Aristotle, and more particularly since the nineteen-thirties, was that of an abstract operation that might be variously embodied in various physical systems, but could not be identified with any such instantiation as the very concept of such a 'system' was already a 'logical' one, imposed on an essentially open external play of different workings.

Desanti asked me to 'expose', to give an exposition of, the *Tractatus*. I spent several weeks preparing the *exposé*, reading and rereading most of Wittgenstein's published work, along with the presocratic fragments which I decided to use as a frame of exposition. In the end I did not have time to translate my essay before my week at the seminar, and so presented my reading as running translation of what I had written, with running blackboard commentary on the 'topological' figuration of that reading. I put the Tractatus within the context of 'three (rather than one or two) Wittgensteins' - from *Tractatus* through the work around 1930 to the *Investigations*, and then on to the fragments *On Certainty*. I called him 'Le Malade Imaginaire'.

The Presocratics provided a figuration of the birth of Logic in a primary abstraction of an 'inner' order from the symmetric interplay of inner and outer which I found in the duality of logic and physics implicit in the *Tractatus* account of Reference in a World of atomic facts, of What Is The Case. I proposed that this configuration of the Tractatus, embedded in Wittgenstein's development as a whole, and this latter in its twentieth-century context, could allow a step out of the inaugural 'abstraction' of Logic. I proposed a 'topology of the Subject and a topography of the World'. Desanti seemed to find my suggestion elementary and evident; all the other students seemed to find it incomprehensible. One of them complained on behalf of the others that rather than giving an 'exposition' of the *Tractatus*, I had taken an acquaintance with, and
reflection upon it as my starting-point. The Tractatus was one of half-a-dozen primary readings on which the postgraduate seminar was supposed based. I asked how many of the participants had read the book, whether in German, English, or Klossowski's imaginative French translation. Two had: the student who complained, and one other from the Ecole Normale, who was attending out of interest. I realised that the spirit of the précis was not confined to the other side of the channel, and that while the Oxonian version required an acceptance of the rules of argument embodied in, and faithfulness to, the short texts of the current debate, the Parisian version abstracted from the British moral of fidelity and let the nominal subject of debate drop out except as a formal pole of competing précis of précis of précis, forms of argument about forms of argument about forms of argument... Castles in the Air du Temps (from the snail's-eye view of Oxford's ivory towers). Nothing much had changed since Richard de Bury's comparison of Oxford and Paris in the early fourteenth century.

Along with a certain cynicism about the institution of Theory in universities on either side of the channel, I had learnt from my work on this paper of a systematic 'duality' of logical and physical (internal and external) orders of things (or rather, of I knew not what), one convertible into the other in a dynamic Time of their interaction. I remember being very excited by the discovery of how far this duality went: the logical order of reflection and deduction was simply the other side of the physical time of causality. I rang my English supervisor to tell him of the discovery, and bemused friends in Paris by my conviction of having made some decisive step, not for myself alone, but also, somehow, for the world outside.

The rest of that second academic year in Paris was passed in the beginnings of coordination of various French, German and Anglo-American figures of Reflection within the question posed by this 'Time and Duality' which I now took as title of my research. I had now assimilated various figures of history and system to complement the Anglo-American logic of Oxford. As I attended over my last weeks in Paris the small and unusually interlocutory seminar of Jean Petitot, who strove to coordinate all Parisian (and most other) theory within his simplified version of Rene Thom's mathematics,
I felt that I had learned all that I needed to learn in Paris - the rules of the game of Theory as played in Paris. I would now spend a couple of years in the quiet abstraction of the Cotswolds putting the patterns of this and the Oxford game onto paper, and present all the players on either 'side' (of the channel, or the bigger game) with the question posed by the symmetries from which both games were abstracted, and which were yet apparent, symptomatically, in the very symmetry of the two opposed versions, British and French (and then, German and American too) - as of the various opposed theories 'internationally' organised as logic or physics or whatever else, within the system of opposed national traditions of Theory.

My first year as 'resident' postgraduate at Warwick was engaged in teaching mathematical logic to first-year undergraduates (that cold bath in which they were to lose any fanciful ideas of Philosophy having any bearings on the questions that had actually induced them to choose that strange subject), and to organising a short-lived interdisciplinary seminar in association with a postgraduate of the Film Department (where I spent much more time than in the Philosophy Department, regarding the spatiotemporal 'frame' of the film as the best frame of coordination of the various different languages or disciplines applied to its analysis). Participants at the seminar later confided that they didn't know what to make of my opening the seminar with Lacan's schematism of inner and outer: I seemed to represent Paris in the raw, and the participants from the various departments soon withdrew to Parisian theory as imported ready for their various divergent uses. I had chosen exactly the wrong place to begin (that is, the end - that vanishing Lacanian focus of Parisian reflection around 1970 which was the blind spot of even the most Francophile British academic).

After this further impulse to cynicism I retreated to the Welsh border for a year, then returned to the Cotswolds whence I attended the brief Oxford spring of Anglo-French dialogue (a largely American importation, soon nipped in the bud) and through
it entered into a far more fruitful dialogue with two Americans, both schooled in Yale and Paris. One was experiencing (as if in reverse of my own experience which had led me to Paris) the frustrations of Mathematics and Philosophy; the second was caught between the sub-faculties of Philosophy and of French as he worked on the figure of Autobiography in Rousseau's writing.

The following year, 1979, my last year sponsored by the British government in my instituted inquiry, I withdrew to a bare croft without electricity atop a Welsh hill between mountains and sea, to finally write, to articulate all the figures of question unfolded over the previous five years in the linear order of a book. I had already written one half of a sort of bilinear account—one of two parallel histories, psychological and physical, unfolding from what I took to be Parmenides' inauguration of Logic. I had traced a story of \( i \sqrt{v, \pi} \) through a sequence of transformations from Parmenides to around 1900, and I had sketched various components of a general introduction beginning in the Greek Mysteries from which I took Parmenides to have abstracted Logic; of a symmetric divergence from that point of a physical theory of the 'outer' world; of a conclusion which would bring together the two symmetrically converging lines (decoupled by Parmenides) after 1900; and of assorted elements of various configurations of analytic frame and historical detail. The analytic frame was itself an attempt at a formal working of the duality of 'inner' and 'outer' ('imaginary' and 'real', coupled in the 'symbolic' order of the signs I, R, S by which these three orders were coordinated). The coordination of theories of 'inner' and 'outer' worlds would itself be articulated over 'real' historical time which I broke down into three phases from Parmenides to the close of the history in my final discovery of the operation of this dual, or perhaps triple, order: a divergence of 'inner' and 'outer' worlds after their decoupling by Parmenides would be mirrored over the history by a symmetric convergence (after the 'Scientific Revolution') towards their recoupling toward the close of the twentieth century. A coupling required by a symmetric logic, psychology, physics and ontology of about 1970 whose limiting questions or aporiai could not be resolved.
within each of these symmetric areas or fields of theory, although these limiting questions generated systematic organisations of paradox within each of those fields. In Wales I resolved to drop the original 'bilinear' plan, and to organise the narrative of the temporal interaction of logical and physical orders in the history of 'decoupled' theories, of Theory, in three successive phases from Parmenides to the present (or rather to 1970), within each of which I would symmetrically articulate parallel steps in theories of 'inner' and 'outer' worlds, together, now, with a third intermediate order of theory embodied in the 'symbolic' order of my mathematical frame.

As I worked, looking out over central Wales, I had a smooth pebble from the beach on the window-ledge of the glass porch where I wrote. The stone was a symbol of the closed system of relations I was constructing, a book posed as an enigmatic machine before the academic world, a little like the penny that Russell had apparently taken from his pocket as subject of inquiry at the opening of one of his Cambridge lectures.

That summer in Wales I finally resolved upon, or discovered, the three-fold trinity-knot as image of the various orders of demarcation, of that spatial 'crossing' of a line which could itself be taken to mark the distinction of its physical from its logical orders, and to relate these to the 'symbolic' order of 'marking' their distinction. By the time I left the hill in the autumn of 1979 I had almost finished coordinating all my material in relation to this Knot, and considered myself finally ready to write my account.

I went to stay in Yorkshire where the girl from Oxford now had a house, and as usual began to 'read myself into' a state of concentration in the new environment, in order to finally begin the final narrative. I read and reread Nietzsche, with whom I had begun ten years before, and I read Cicero and Frazer's
abridgement of his *Golden Bough*. But above all I read Nietzsche's 'intellectual autobiography', *Ecce Homo*.

I had just begun to write (beginning with a sketch of my conclusion to mark the direction from the beginning) when the situation of sharing the young ladies house became unworkable. My establishment in her house of a closed inner space of reflection, in which alone I could write, made it impossible for her to maintain a sense of identity as feminine focus of the matrix of activity articulated in relation to those four walls. She told me I must leave. The day I left there was a phone call from a friend with whom I had stayed in Paris months before. I had sent a letter to the French girl while in Paris for a couple of weeks, giving his phone number, should she wish to see me. She had telephoned several weeks after I had left. My friend simply mentioned this in passing; she had left no message, except that she had now changed her Christian name, and that I should send any more letters addressed to...

I returned to my parents' house twenty miles away, and became increasingly depressed by my inability to control the extrinsic material necessities of writing - time, money, but above all a place to work, an outward order in which I could set up the inner space of reflection. After a few weeks of feeling that I was simply emptying, almost losing the will or direction to finish writing, or indeed to do anything, since anything I might do must pass through the resolution of ten years' reflection and five years since Oxford... I arranged to spend the approaching winter in an uncle's cottage in a little village by the sea in Devon.
My first two weeks at Rose Cottage (which shared one end wall with St Mary's, the church) were once more devoted to 'reading myself into' the space in which alone I could write. I did not much care for the decoration or furniture of the place (or the massed chalets and caravans between old village and beach: the old village had simply become a sort of dead centre of the Town on summer holiday). Over the years I had become increasingly obsessive about the space in which I worked. As Wagner had needed medieval tapestries on the walls of an Italian villa before he could begin work, and had interior decorators prepare the scene of his composition, so I more modestly chose one room in the house, emptied it of all the furniture I disliked, brought in any bearable furniture I could find in any of the other rooms, and hung the walls with thick old velvet curtains. There I began to read Wilhelm Meister.

In one of my daily walks I remember coming upon a very old manor house down a tiny lane. I was filled with wonder at the outwardly unchanged little group of buildings with their old wall, pond, barns, as I saw in them the elementary space of human living within surrounding Nature. I was very happy to have arrived after five or ten years at a position where I could emerge from the old unmetalled track and see in the circuit and organisation of this Norman Clos my own being-in-Nature reflected, as in some three-dimensional picture-frame.

Wilhelm Meister's adolescent Lehrjahre begin in a fascination with the figure of the play, the theatre. As his life and his youthful reflection unfolds, most particularly through his critical impromptu production of Hamlet, he slowly begins to sense that his fascination with theatre, and with this apotheosis, almost, of the play... is itself the fascination of a play within a still wider theatre in which he finally discovers himself to be an actor. His interaction with the other characters is, he finally sees, framed by the organisation of a secret society and its agents or actors, into which, at the close of his Lehrjahre, he is himself admitted, initiated.
As I read Goethe's apotheosis of the novel I slowly, with Wilhelm, began to discern the structures of play or novel, of the closed order of a fiction, in my relations with family and friends, and in my own Lehrjahre, and I had an awesome sense at the close of Wilhelm's journey of self-discovery, that somehow my reading of this novel was itself a component in a bigger Story, a bigger Play; that the play-within-a-play of Hamlet, which reflected in the novel the part of Hamlet itself in the novel, in its turn reflected the part of the novel itself in some wider play, some wider mystery. In my daily walks by the winter sea I became more and more relaxed, less and less desperate about my situation, as I began to feel simply like an actor playing a part, with whose worries I need not too closely identify some truer self.

My days now began an hour or so before twilight, and I would return from my walk as it was growing quite dark. After finishing Wilhelm's Lehrjahre I felt that I could at last begin to write. But first I wanted to write to the French girl, partly in response to her earlier response to my last note, partly simply because, since leaving Paris three years before, I had from time to time felt a need to mark this French reference-point of my emotional life, this index of what was going on. Since I left Paris I must have written on odd occasions about twice a year, and I had not since seen the young lady, or had any response to my occasional letters, until her telephone call to my friend a couple of months before. A very tenuous relation, if a relation at all, yet like a distant landmark one rarely sees, and hardly ever visits, it would from time to time orient me in a certain space and time.

After three years I really didn't know why I should still occasionally write, and I began the letter in the early evening (I think it was about the twenty-third of November) with the question of what I was doing writing another letter to her. As I began to write about the situation in the time and space of my life, of this very writing, I slowly began to understand (and to write) that
it was not the 'I' that I had always thought I was, who was writing. The writing slowly became the description of the part of this writing in a wider order, a 'cosmic' order indeed, of which the thought or reflection it embodied, and which I had always (at least since I had given up the 'Automatic Writing' of my adolescent poetry) thought I expressed in my words, was simply one dimension symmetric with others - the symmetry of these dimensions reflected in the spatiotemporal symmetry of the 'outward' physical space which was itself simply one of the three or six dimensions. It was no longer I who was writing; rather was I somehow being written on the paper before me, as the words expressed their relation to everything about them, in their past, present, and future tenses.

'I' found myself writing. I wrote madly, deliriously, until about five in the morning, when I eventually put down the pen and paper, and found myself in a new world. No longer a collection of worlds that just happened to intersect in what happened over the course of time, but an inner world of imagination and reflection, and an outer world of things, that I experienced, and for the first time lived in, as two sides, two mirrors, in a deeper bigger world living in a cosmic tension of Matter and Spirit, Matter and the unspeakable GOD, the I AM of which I now experienced my 'I' as a part, coordinated in the cosmic Play with all the other parts, and their inner and outer sides.

I went into the kitchen, realising I had neither eaten or drunk for about twelve hours since I had 'breakfasted' the previous afternoon. I had some sausages there, which I could no longer understand how I could have bought. I ate some fish, but that too tasted very strange, a kind of sacrilege. From that point on I bought no more meat or fish, and felt that I had perhaps eventually realised the practical basis of the famous pythagorean taboo. I even gave up eating beans for a few years, without knowing why, but feeling that I had as good grounds to take the matter on trust, than not to.
Over the next few days I wandered about, rising towards twilight, walking by the sea until dark, returning to paper and fire, getting to know this shatteringly new world. I would constantly find myself out of it, back in the old patterns of decoupled thoughts and things and earthly habits, without knowing how or why. And in those moments I would sometimes become convinced that what I was experiencing was what I had earlier only known from outside, by the name of...madness. And then somehow this knowledge of myself as really mad, in its intoxicating horror and fear, would suddenly undergo a kind of transfiguration, a cosmic Gestalt-shift, and I would be back in the bigger yet smaller world (smaller because the unperceived relations of inner and outer, above and below, perceived and unperceived, meant that the range of uncoupled inner and outer 'freedoms' of thoughts and things which I normally experienced as coinciding by chance in what happened, was much reduced; Chance dissolved as an earthly illusion). Back where the matter of table, of massive kitchen range, of my own body, became luminous, ethereal, weightless, translucent, in a perfect mirroring of my perception of it. And with relief I would recognise my 'madness' as the very index in the old world or worlds, in which 'I' was just a habit, a mechanism of thought or body, indeed coupled mechanisms which elided the true I that had been lost or blind or asleep in them for almost twenty-seven years...the very index of inscription of those habits as a closed circuit turning upon itself in the wider Kosmos it hid. As a closed circuit which had its primary image in the closed circuit of Earth, and of the human pale, and its sanity or normality, circles within circles within that madness. I noticed now in my divine madness all the old figures of psychosis and neurosis that I had happily talked about 'from outside'. Now I was experimentally discovering their practical working in myself, laughing at the paradox that no psychotic should know he was mad.

I wrote two further letters to Julia (the french girl's new name). In all, three mad letters, which indeed she could not but take as such, allowing though the residual strangeness that I repeatedly claimed this very madness myself, as the words I found myself writing tried to show it was the index of something
hidden in the daily habitual familiarity with words.

After a week I prepared to leave this scene of isolated initiation, feeling that what had to be done there was done. I spent the last night writing - or rather typing - a long meditation on and in the new world, of which I sent the two carbon copies I made, together with a short covering typed letter, to my supervisor and to the old tutor at Oxford. After a few hours' sleep I tidied the house joyfully (hum-ing, I remember, 'Who sweeps a room as for Thy laws/ Makes that and the action fine'), packed, and left for Yorkshire.

The philosophical meditation was as mad and emotional as the letters to Julia were mad and philosophical. For in the mystery into which I had mysteriously found myself entering I now experienced the ως and άνα of Philosophy as simply complementary aspects of seeing my part in 'Kosmos'. - In the 'coordination' or harmony of various dimensions of life whereby the 'wisdom' of a reflection which reflected on its part as participation in that logical order coupled to the other symmetric orders (their interaction governed by this cosmic symmetry), was coupled to the outer order where it 'took place', by the sexual symmetry of Male and Female - by sexuality played out in its coordination of inner and outer, of my thought and being with your thought and being, her thought and being...as 'love'. As the platonic love of Socrates and Diotima, as the friendship that holds people together in coordinating their actions, as the erotic force which confuses two minds and two bodies in the play of bodily surface.

And at last I saw that while articulating all my questions in the temporal dynamic of inner and outer, I had not noticed the question of the relation of my logical and mathematical analysis of the relations of logical and physical and other dimensions, to its physical and other orders; the question, 'why questions?'. The
question of the relation of questions to other orders of what is open; the question, in particular, of questioning as being simply one course of action open among others. And I saw that the abstract space of coordination of the various orders of Kosmos that I had formally, 'mathematically', articulated in preparation for writing my thesis or antithesis, itself presented to me one final question which I only faced when it came to actually writing this coordination: the question of the part of this writing in the coordination it framed, described. My critique of abstraction had thus far itself been carried on within the very figure of abstraction it sought to question. I had traced the dynamic of theories of inner and outer worlds within the order of reflection abstracted from its interaction with its contexts. In writing to Julia I had discovered the part of writing in the world of which it wrote. Or rather in the Kosmos in which it participated, 'world' corresponding to some figure of 'outer' uncoupled from the inner order of its identification. 'World' being a fiction of some total comprehensive unity in which there might be supposed 'facts' definite in themselves outside our indefinite knowledge of them. Kosmos being only a play of coordination which cannot be comprehended, which is incomprehensible in, any one of its coordinate dimensions. The very word 'Kosmos' being simply one element in the play, the plays, it marks. 'Kosmos': harmony, coordination.

I could now at last begin to write a book. For the secret I could not discover before feeling altogether in a position to frame the coordination of all the theoretical figures of the previous five years, was that the exposition would have to be framed in the coordination of its actual marking, with the other orders of the coordination, the Kosmos, there marked. - That I could only finally see how to write my book by beginning, as it were, to write my writing.

Writing the book, then - this book, eventually - would involve passing from the figures I had amassed over the last five years, to the configuration of a more radical and wider space and
time of coordination of the writing of Theory and its historical contexts, from which my earlier theoretical coordination of theories had itself been abstracted. It was as though I now had to find my part in a three-dimensional configuration, working from a sort of two-dimensional section through it (as a sort of map), and a general figure of the inscription of this map or slice or projection of the wider space in that space, from which it had been abstracted.

- A general figure of the earlier abstraction or projection onto a theoretical map as correlate of my earlier position outside that map, that slice or plane - as correlation of myself framing the earlier map, and that projection itself, in the new space which included both. The inscription of previous Theory, and my previous theory of the coordination of its various dimensions, in a coordination of theory and its 'historical' contexts - in a coordination, most particularly, of that internal space of theory with the external physical space of its historical production, which had thus far only been noticed as the formal 'space' (and time) of physical theory, logically correlated with the logic of all theories (with 'logical theory'), within abstract Theory and its formal dynamic. The coordinate dimensions of Theory had now to be inscribed in a wider coordination of Theory itself, Reflection, with those various orders of Context of which it framed the 'theories'.

I thus began to organise my reflection as simply one dimension of my activity in real physical space and time, coupling these 'inner' and 'outer' dimensions of my life in the symmetry of the various human groups in which I acted or interacted. This organisation of my interactions with others led various members of various of these groups to wonder if I were simply 'mad' - various members of those groups dating from school and university, most particularly, with whom I tried to interact (so as to bring them too into the new space of interaction) through mad letters written 'in' (articulated in or by) the new space and time.

At the outset I was working with the most elementary figures of 'mystery' with which I was already familiar through earlier formal analyses of figures of psycho-physical interaction (magic, the ' paranormal', myth, religion) developed in relation to my attempts to frame the symmetry of logical and physical theory. This was a strange empirical
process or adventure, as I slowly discovered that where some figure or model of 'mystery' - of the coordination of my framing of my situation with the various other orders of the situation thus coordinated or framed - didn't 'work', then this always led to a new coordination of framing and situation framed (in which the framing was one component) which did more or less work to explain why the earlier attempt didn't. A figure of magic or mystery 'not working' (the situation not turning out as I had framed it) was itself mysteriously part of some bigger working. I was again and again the subject of this cosmic Ruse. From time to time I wondered if this figure of Ruse and divine Comedy might not itself be part of some still more mysterious deception. That was Hell.

I tried to draw the old Oxford tutor into the new space, and was met by formal questioning. A few days after such a dialogue (repeated at intervals throughout the following year) I would see how the apparently sceptical questioning actually led into a new figure of assertion of Kosmos, and from time to time I wondered if this fellow of Balliol knew what I was talking about better than I did, and was secretly leading me on through some ruse of incomprehension. I eventually came to consider, though, that in their questioning the members of the various groups through which I passed, were like myself subject to a sort of ruse, not fully conscious of what was going on - indeed not even half-conscious as I felt, but more or less unconscious of any method in their confrontation with their more or less mad friend.

In my first interview with the Balliol tutor I was reminded by him of the meeting nearly five years before, when I had come to discuss the Black Hole of Nothing. He was struck by the analogy or formal parallel of my situation or experience with central figures of jewish Qabala - of which I knew only the name and rather vague relations of numerology and jewish language. Alan Montefiore was telling me I had 'invented' Qabala, rather as Hans Oberdinck had told me (in the same room) in the summer of 1973 that I had 'invented' hegelianism.
Sure enough, when I picked out a few books on Jewish mysticism from the old cinema that had become 'the world's largest bookshop' on the Welsh border fifteen miles from where I have been these last five years, I felt not so much that here was a new system of figuration that would help me articulate better my position, but rather that here were books announcing to me the frame in which I had been more or less blindly blundering along all the time, and in which my attempt at my book could itself be understood in terms of the distance of my conception from the Book which framed the Kosmos or Creation, Fiction indeed, of which it was one element.

Here was Alexandrian Neopythagoreanism articulated in terms not of Pythagorean number as primary, but rather in relation to Jewish SFR of which number was only one dimension: 'cipher', both empty 'mark' (literally 'zero', nothing) and code, both cipher and the ten Sefirot or ten symmetric dimensions, 'channels' of the divine Fiction, and all this in relation to the matrix of Sefer, Book, and to the working of Creation as a staggering Play of stories, into which one might actively enter by hearing (QBL: to receive) the mysterious story that all was a play of stories.

...My earlier reflection had been the abstraction of a Greek component from this dramatic figure, coordinate (this abstraction) with the abstraction of reflection itself from the dramatic order of activity, actuality, of which it was but one component: a component that 'thought' to comprehend its coordination with the various orders of its context, but which could in reality only be itself comprehended in that more radical coordination or Kosmos. And I could now correlate the various figures of psycho-physical coupling which I had taken as formal models of the symmetry of logical and physical theory before the winter of 1979/80, in the actual working of the magical configuration of Book (or Story) and World (Creation).

Over the New Year I began to discover my part in a History articulated as Drama, Story. I hadn't had much success in awakening my friends to their true situation, and was finding how systematically the normality or norms of mechanical and unconscious coupling of the various orders of such situation turned in its almost closed and self-sufficient circle - broken only by
such strange aberrations as birth, love, madness and death.

I felt, though, that I must visit Paris, even if my initial mad visions were becoming transformed into a labyrinthine play of stories in which systematic illusions and deceptions were constant factors. After Christmas I returned for a few days to the welsh border to focus myself in the new world once more. Then I set out for London and Paris, intending to pass the night at Mentmore Towers - this seeming to fit in with the general logic of what was going on.

I arrived at Mentmore and went to meditate in the garden towards sunset (I had found myself as it were by chance in a situation of seeing myself from my situation, rather than the normal converse relation a few weeks before, and had seen that the Maharishi's movement for World Enlightenment was rooted in such trance or self-hypnosis). I was pleased to have read on the grand board at the entrance to the old Rothschild home some designation of 1980, within the New Era proclaimed a few years before, that seemed to correspond to my perceptions - and equally pleased to note that visits were strictly by previous appointment. I mused on the rather odd nature of the 'appointment' I had made, so I thought, simply by deciding to pass by on my way to Paris.

As I entered the great Hall of the country house, the Maharishi's British alternative government were crossing a landing silently before me, with the foam sheets which were to serve as bases for the evening's 'flying' or levitation. Most seemed not to notice me, but one eventually came and told me I had come At the Wrong Time.

Back in Mentmore village I remembered that a (different) old boyfriend of the eldest of my sisters had recently returned to England from Alexandria, and that some people who had met him at a Yorkshire party had for some reason suggested that he contact me. I was rather disappointed about Mentmore, and thought perhaps I might stay with him that night at London, on my way to Paris. My sister had given me his telephone number a couple of weeks before.
As I was wondering whether to phone, as it soon turned out, John was at last sitting down, after thinking about it for a month, to write asking if we might meet. Such coincidences had become a regular feature of life over the previous months, but I was a little surprised to discover that he just laughed as I did.

I arrived just before his old french girlfriend Brigitte (Julia's earlier name: and they were both involved in theatre, too) unexpectedly turned up ('I decided you should come too', said John to her, laughing, as she arrived). Over the evening I heard how, over the ten days which I had spent entering into the strange space in which writing, framing that space or Kosmos, frames its own part of framing, John had spent the ten days before he left Alexandria entering into the same space by 'drawing' it. I had been hopelessly trying to introduce people into the new world, while ignoring the fact that people were saying the same sort of things about John having gone mad as of my own odd manner. Over the following years, as I came to understand the scandalously simple parallel of our two 'parts' of writing and drawing, word and image, I would see John after six weeks and, having been through six weeks of my own transformations, and with a working awareness of the parallel, we could pretty well carry on the same conversation of a month or two before - knowing more or less by analogy just what the other had been through. From that point on John became a basic point of reference in the new world: by seeing where he was, I could see where I was, as in a mirror. In particular, I could see my intellectual verbalisation of the strange new situation as recurrently abstracted from the complementarity of it and John's images, and his central moral feeling.

Paris was a feast of coincidences, but most of them so to speak crept up while I was looking in another direction, and after a week I was pretty well disoriented. I even regretted having missed the dramatic seminar at which Lacan dissolved the Ecole Freudienne, in order to meet Julia in the Buttes Chaumont. She was keen for me to leave Paris, as she found all the coincidences
rather unnerving. I told her just before I left that I felt that it was only my bodily voice that was talking to her in the cafe: that I felt that my mind was already back in England.

While I was busily writing letters to Julia from back in England, I did not really notice that my english girlfriend was heading towards another crisis, largely precipitated by her interaction with a mad visionary. While I was trying to open Julia's eyes to Kosmos, and interpreting that relation as a kind of ideal symmetry of Male and Female, I did not notice that what I saw as a complementary english relation lost in habit, in matter, in the World and the Flesh, was itself opening up a wider configuration of coordination of my formal or ideal schemes of Kosmos with a sort of complementary feminine side. Thus I was both confused and yet reassured when after a complete breakdown of the old relation over Easter 1980, Debbie suddenly knew she must spend the rest of her Easter holiday at a convent at which her mother had once stayed in the South of England. There she found her way into a new world which she recognised as the strange place in which I had been living for the previous few months. What was most confusing was the way that as we came to understand one another, the old interaction or relation quite dissolved, as that axis or dimension was subordinated to the wider scheme. I remember the pain of the evening when the old axis finally broke. Debbie was a little surprised when I told her six weeks later of the day and the hour she had chosen another relation, another male-female axis of her life, since nobody had told me anything about it, and I was over a hundred miles away at the time... but even before 1979 I had become more or less used to an odd correlation of how I sometimes felt or dreamt hundreds of miles away, and what she was feeling or doing.

By now (Easter 1980) this practical part of my reflection in my interactions with others was coupled with the unfolding of the old theoretical axis of the historical dynamic of Reflection into a space of wider 'groups' over 'History' whose configurations reciprocally informed, and were themselves informed by, my own
'experimental' interactions in the groups in which I found myself in 1980. There was an interplay between letters I wrote trying to mark the part of the letter in the particular configuration of writer and addressee it framed, so to effect I hoped a sort of 'induction' of the reader into an experience of the working of the mystery of Word or Kosmos (into the 'new space' in which I found myself), and my attempts to frame the part of the books which embodied the western tradition of Theory in the global historical situation in which I framed the particular situations of letter-writing. These two sides of the question of words as elements, as one dimension, of the coordination of the various complementary dimensions of writing that the words framed, met in a sort of diary I kept (daily, so to say, writing my life) which embodied the move towards the coincidence of global frame and particular situation in the book I had to write, and which I persevered in framing, formally, as a doctoral thesis. When I eventually began on the Introduction (or 'induction') to (or 'into') these words, this book, early in 1982, the journal entries became much less frequent, and quite soon lapsed almost completely. The notable exception to this rule was the necessity of writing a journal or account of any period in which I was away from this old water-mill, and writing, as a sort of passage back into the frame of writing the book, upon my return.

I suppose I might best frame those two years of letters and journals, between early 1980 and early 1982, in terms of the recognition, once more directly a result of conversation with Alan Montefiore, that I must take the book I was about to write, itself, as the radical frame of my attempt to coordinate the books in which western Theory was embodied with the various dimensions of their contexts, their Context, 'History', some imagined unitary Story in which all those books and contexts might be supposed in principle - or rather 'in fact' - coordinated. Just as a Cabala framed in a Jewish neoplatonism whose Kosmos was articulated by a Book which in framing that Kosmos framed its part of framing, in it, revealed itself as a radical frame of correlation of the various figures of 'mystery' which I had formally analysed in the late 'seventies, so the figure of the book in which I posed my questioning of the relations of previous books and contexts, as itself 'marking' my guiding question served, between early 1980 and early 1982 (and indeed beyond), to frame a radical correlation of the labyrinthine play of theoretical figures of correlation of symmetric theories, in which I had been
explicitly engaged since my time in Paris in the mid-'seventies. Served from 1980 until I began writing in 1982, 'and indeed beyond', for the point at which diary gave way to 'book' as frame of my writing was itself a rather 'arbitrary' point in the more or less continuous inquiry or questioning: the point where, under pressure from my supervisor and the university (and it was because I could not manage without such pressure, perhaps, that I continued to frame the book as 'thesis'), I simply took up a new tool of research. It is of course glaringly evident that the figure and practice of 'writing this book' more properly constitutes one dimension of the research or inquiry it embodies, than it 'comprehends' that inquiry as its closed and balanced exposition. One fundamental result of the inquiry actually embodied in the plethora of words above is the recognition that the initial idea of working towards 'this book' as a conventionally poised (posed) 'thesis' has itself finally been brought into (its own) question, and been recognised as a mere guiding 'idea', interacting with all the other components of this activity of questioning. I might now go back and analyse the process of recognition of this 'ideal' character of 'the book' which I initially thought I was beginning to 'draft' three years ago, in the long succession of words above - say from the severe confusion over tense in the introductory discussion of 'I', 'here', 'now', which almost induced me to give up that indexical mode; but the inquiry, as 'book', is already far too long...

David Krell, examining this book (which must indeed be rather an odd thesis to contain a review of its examination as one element...how odd is for my supervisor to decide, since he has been made responsible by the examiners for assuring that the bibliography is made adequate, and the bibliography is the structural centre of this Close, which is thus being rewritten, after it has been examined..)....David Krell in late 1984 asked me how much of the 'indexical' dimension of the Introduction had been rewritten - since any rewriting must introduce a certain falsity into the form. To my mingled relief and chagrin I admitted that none of the Introduction had been rewritten; that the typography of the opening page had been rearranged, and the last three pages reduced
to two, eliminating a certain 'theological' distortion, while I was nominally just improving upon messy typing and annotation. Improving the presentability of the succeeding first fifty pages of Part One allowed me to better express in a more questioning (rather than assertive theological) form the framing of the whole inquiry in relation to that 'zero-point' of its time or story, about which Part One turns. This more radical understanding of that zero-point or basic 'reference' had itself developed from a nominally complete thesis which I had to submit before Christmas 1983 (the date on the title-page), and was simply a restructuring of the opening of the historical narrative, 'my story', in relation to a complementarity of 'heavenly' and 'earthly', 'theological' and 'poetic', which I had in 1982 posed too dogmatically from the 'theological' side. That 'revision' may serve (if read in relation to the related discussion of the 'zero-point' at the centre of Part One, which follows, in the order of reading, but not of writing) to show how from 1980 to 1985 (there, between 1982 and 1984) I was slowly bringing into question a persistent 'logical' dominance of the new reflection on - or rather, 'in' - the inscription of this logic and reflection in a wider Kosmos of dimensions which it cannot 'comprehend', but in which it may participate, so partaking of a wider, more radical comprehension.

...So often the old dynamic of mechanical reflection has simply taken over while I sat at the typewriter. 'I' and 'my' thought become simply a function of the logic of assimilation of the various dimensions of its context, to Theory, mindless thinking. The words, the typewriter, take over...

...and often enough I would simply fall into another more mysterious figure, in which the 'I' who wrote would become a bare reflection in the economy of writing, and thinking, of a unitary actuality of I AM.

Again and again I would oscillate in this opposition of two complementary but symmetric 'logics', caught in their common traditional abstraction from their very complementarity. I would
either see all Earth as a worldly short-circuit within Heaven, from
the visionary perspective of ethereal heavenly illumination - or
I would find myself somehow once more a prisoner in that earthly
circuit, trapped by the very logic of my attempt to frame the short
circuit of that my logic in the wider scheme. As the inquiry pro-
ceeded, and I found various figures of the theology of such a vision
coming into question, I slowly came to see that the traditional op-
position of Heaven and Earth was itself an essentially - let us say -
earthly view of what was going on in that 'mystical' experience
coupled, throughout their common history, with reflection. One some-
how found oneself 'outside' the circuit of 'worldly' habit, as I
had found myself at the close of 1979, and, 'naturally' enough, saw
that circuit simply as a sort of illusion or prison in which one had
lived since birth: Matter as opposed to Spirit, Nothing opposed to
Being, Self as opposed to selflessness or God...

It has taken a long time for me to begin to see that this
powerful actuality of a traditional unitary perspective, male absolute
Mind, God or Being which dominates and determines an opposition of
Heaven and Earth, Mind and Matter, Being and Nothing - is only one
side of 'cosmic' perspective. Thus in the Introduction I was recur-
rently subject to a tendency to equate the universal 'Economy' of
logical, poetic, and physical orders with mindless habit, with worldly
nothing, whose only being lay in its not being Being, Actuality. In-
deed the constant insistence upon the question of the actuality of
this 'book' or materially embodied inquiry into the material embodi-
ment of this inquiry, subordinated as it were the open potency of this
question; and only in closing the first hurried version of this closing
of the book or questioning, did I valorise the open-ness of question-
ing, as the embedding of this book as question in the open-ness of
'feminine' Nature, and her Economy which is the other and equal Face
of Heaven. I had often, it is true, worried about the disymmetry of
my presentation of the symmetry or mirroring of unitary actuality
and its open economy, but I had always found myself posing this very
question in a still one-sided way. Indeed the formal dominance of
'closed' over 'open', of unitary over diverse, identity over difference,
was, I think, the main axis of David Krell's reading of the thesis
as eventually submitted for examination.
In a way, as I tried to point out in 'defence' of the book as thesis, notably in a foreword and postscript to the book '?' which embedded the inquiry governed by the idea or direction of 'writing a book' within the academic frame of presenting the book '?' as record of inquiry, research, into that very writing - such a 'relativisation' of the book as simply one component, a sort of ideal direction, of the inquiry, was but a natural conclusion or close. A closing of the book which brought its character of 'book' into the very questioning which it had organised for a couple of years, and which, as I had repeatedly insisted in the book, could not be comprehended 'in', but only marked by, the 'book'. Rather than bringing the whole inquiry 'as book' into question as into some radical impasse or contradiction, closing the book simply amounted to the marking of the last move of questioning: inscribing the closing or closed book as its 'marking' in an open configuration of the book - or rather all these words - and their problematic 'contexts'. The whole movement of research or inquiry embodied in the 'book' required, at the close, leaving the 'internal' logic of comprehension of context in text, and the successive figures of this comprehension through whose history or story the inquiry has passed, for the configuration of this text and its contexts in the institutional frame of an 'examination' where it eventually, itself, comes into question.

The 'terms' of this odd conclusion or close of this 'book', are already assembled in the configuration of Reflection around 1970, framed as the close of Part Three and the Story traced from Part One on. In the last move now being traced - a further step of inquiry on from 1970 to around the close of this second millenium - the writing of this very book, between 1980 and 1985 (or, more particularly, between 1982 and 1983), must itself be introduced as one term. Then the closing move in which the residual logic of
abstraction and logical 'comprehension', embodied in the writing itself, is brought into question, should somehow lie in the correlation of my writing over the early 'eighties, with its various orders of 'context'.

I have adverted to the interplay from 1980 on of figures by which I inscribed letters in the particular situations and interactions they marked and framed, and figures of correlation of the texts I was to embed in a 'Story' of Reflection, with their 'historical' contexts. If one calls the reflection around 1970 on the various orders of words 'grammatology', then one might perhaps call this closing section of this book in which it is itself inscribed in the last figure of coordination of words and contexts - amounting to the coincidence of those 'historical' and 'contemporary' figures just mentioned - a 'bibliography'. Indeed the examiners' principal requirement that the nominal 'bibliography' - a mere list of books cited, hurriedly inserted between Part Three and a schematic closing reflection - be replaced by a bibliography adequate to the inquiry, is now seen to possess: in its guise of mere formality a pregnancy attested by my supervisor's parting remarks after the examination: Himself engaged in the bibliography of his own thesis, he told me that he now saw why I had left the bibliography until last.

'Bibliography': taking as its primary unit a materially embodied discourse, text - rather than the supposed textual elements of Derrida's grammatology - and proceeding from the historical configuration of actual books to its own frame of their coordination, rather than beginning with some unquestioned theoretical configuration, in which analysis may then be embedded, proceed.

In a way my whole inquiry has been nothing but a bibliography.
A rather odd bibliography, indeed, beginning with the consideration of this book itself. I noticed a couple of years ago that in the canonical arrangement of theses by subject (determined of course by librarians), philosophy is succeeded by theology, but itself preceded (only) by bibliography; and I wondered about the philosophical significance of this canon of theory...and the part of my 'book' or record in it.

Bibliography: description of books...since the institutional support of my inquiry by the British government was concluded in late 1979, I have been assuring its 'material' basis by 'describing books', as well. I was no more to be paid for my ideas, and had the idea of making my knowledge of the ideas of others pay. I had been fascinated by the material embodiment of 'ideas' in old books for about five years; I was delighted by the irony that there should be a market structure or economy organising the history of ideas around that material side of, say, Descartes' or Adam Smith's expression of their 'ideas', from which those ideas were themselves abstracted. - A market structure which would allow me to apply what I had learned in my inquiry about the importance of certain themes in the abstract dynamic of theories, to determine which old books priced in bookshops more or less according to nominal values for age, condition, and genre, had a more than average importance for 'the history of ideas', and so for the academic librarians who were responsible for assuring the textual bases of academic research and 'ideas'. A combination of such academic 'importance', combined with rarity (itself largely determined by fairly straightforward principles of publishing history), itself determined price in the university marketplace. The academic section is of course only one (though dominant) component of the market in old books; I often amused myself in the early days after I set myself up trading as 'Pythagoras' in December 1979, by analysing the structure of this odd market. For example the most pricey theoretical works are just those which deal with...Economics. Surprisingly it took me much longer to determine the rationale of librarians' choices among what seemed to me to be equally important books. Then I eventually noticed the organising function of the term 'gap' in their conversation, and remembering Barthes, realised that their pleasure was rooted in a library, or a book with books as its terms (a
catalogue or bibliography), as less devious readers found their pleasures in simple books of words. This recognition of library psychology was one of the lesser incentives to persist in maintaining '?' as title of my thesis; perhaps it was that psychology which determined the formal unacceptability of that title for a 'thesis'. It was at least one of the criticisms adduced that such a title would be 'difficult to catalogue', and that it did not, at any rate, describe adequately the book (the latter complaint embodying the presupposition of the head of the Philosophy Department at Warwick, who had not even seen the book, let alone perused it, that a question-mark could not in principle 'describe' a book: nor could my first alternative, 'Book as Question-Mark' which he considered ungrammatical; whence 'Inquiry in Question').

So much for, perhaps, another argument for the precedence of bibliography over philosophy. And thus much for the material economy of production of this book after 1979 - or for the simple coupling of the writing of this inquiry, and the material economy of books.

Why should the cultural institution of Reflection or Theory, from Aristotle's Lyceum and the Ptolemies onward, require as a central component the 'library', a collection of texts presided over by librarians responsible for filling the 'gaps' of their collections and perfecting the apparatus of access to the component texts? Why should that exposition or thesis by which a student nominally passes from inquiring reader to instituted 'doctoral' authority, require a catalogue of texts (with no glaring 'gaps') of which his or her writing is his or her reading, for it to become an acceptable academic text, and itself enter into university libraries, and into the range of texts from which the bibliography of any subsequent 'thesis' is to be drawn? Why should my attempt to understand the writing of my own reflection, in letters and diaries, be coupled to the parallel attempt to understand the coordination of previous texts and contexts? Why, indeed, should my inquiry into my inquiry, as 'Inquiry in Question',
pass through a history or story of previous inquiry? Why is inquiry - ἱστορία - 'history', from the beginning of my story on?

Inquiry in question: inquiry into inquiry, history of inquiry, a story of 'theoretical' stories...a kind of 'historiography' - a history of history - 'storiography' perhaps, writing a story of writing stories...bibliography, once more, since the component stories are materially embodied in books and libraries.

My primary reference, which must head the bibliography of this book, is of course

1 (Martin Joughin) np, nd (see (2))


This book (or these books) has been the source from which I derived the frame of this inquiry.

Why go any further?

Well, to begin with, if this book is really to be brought into question, into its questioning, we must ask, with the examiners, the instituted questioners of this book, from which texts this text draws, other than those cited already in Parts One to Three. For we must ask whether its writing is a defensible reading of 'the' History of Reflection, by asking whether it be a defensible reading of the texts I have used; moreover if I have not referred to certain texts, and so cannot list
them now - if there are serious gaps in my reading and inquiry - then the inquiry is *ipso facto* indefensible...

Why?

The answer lies in that interplay of my reading and writing already noticed by which figures discovered in the historical relations of earlier texts and contexts - figures of relation of text and context themselves found in texts relating to various components of the story in which those latter texts must themselves be considered elements - were applied to my writing of the relations of that my writing to its contexts; and by which, conversely, figures discovered in my own writing of my writing (so to speak) framed the reading of earlier texts.

For inquiry into inquiry - bringing reflection into question through what is 'open' in the symmetry of questions and the other dimensions of their marking - must begin not with some 'abstract' configuration of 'the book' and 'its contexts', as 'concepts' coordinated within some logical space of reflection abstracted from its embodiment in some particular copy of some book, but in a configuration of books (a library for example) in which one finds oneself writing, with the book that one begins to write one rather singular 'copy' among all the others. That is: the 'historical' configuration of reflection in its books and contexts cannot be unquestioningly or unthinkingly (any more) supposed articulated as a story 'in' some 'logical space' (and time) abstracted from the question of its embodiment in a book - but the process of 'comprehension' or inscription of the historical coordination in one book (here, in this one) must itself be, as I have tried throughout to make it, only one term in the story or inquiry it marks (and to that extent 'embodies').

That is, the inquiry proceeds, in the configuration of British Library, Bodleian, and various other university libraries, and in these indeed as accessible sections through a temporally
extended interaction of books and contexts over the last two and a half millenia, as the experience of something open in my confrontation with reflection embodied in texts: an open-ness through or into which I progress by actively participating in the configuration, marking successive figures in the one particular book I write, so generating new configurations and finding new figures of my writing, as the 'inquiry' or story proceeds.

...And throughout the inquiry I must constantly remember (but easily forget), that my writing is itself in question, part of the question, the inquiry, I am writing. Part: indeed perhaps the whole, since it is this question which frames all other questions within the inquiry.

Thus far I have only tried to mark what is open in the symmetry of texts and contexts marked by this book as itself 'question-mark', by situating its writing, and the inquiry that writing embodies, in relation to the configuration of 'around' 1970 marked at the close of Part Three (that close of the 'story' proper, before that propriety of distance between story and telling itself comes into question). I have given only a few indices of the configuration of letters I wrote in the early eighties, within very restricted groups of acquaintances, and their parallel in my restructuring of my earlier 'abstract' history of theory, before these two activities converged in the writing of this inquiry. I have noted the complementarity over the last five years of writing this book, and selling old books that embody others' ideas. I have very generally suggested that bringing the writing of inquiry itself into question, and indeed structuring inquiry within this odd question, opens up a 'space' of coordination of various orders of writing and contexts, from which the various dimensions of Theory and Context around 1970 may be described as a sort of last abstraction, rather as a 'grammatology' of around 1970 took the abstraction of the earlier 'space'
and time of western Theory from its 'textuality' to be at last opened up, brought into question, in its epochal deconstruction of the western story, tradition, History. I have suggested that the then unspecified question of the symmetry of such parisian reflection with the various dimensions of its context (the symmetry of various 'structuralisms' associated with the very determination of that unitary term 'structuralism' as 'ideological', and the coupling of this parisian ideology with its cultural and material coordinates within the global context of north-western european activity), allows us to mark or coordinate a more radical spatiality and temporality of our reflection and other activity, in relation to the character of this very book simply as 'question-mark'.

The unitary coordination of what is open insofar as this book itself marks that open-ness as a sort of question for writer and readers, is itself of course implicit in the whole development thus far: it suffices merely to now 'inscribe' the book as question mark, as marking the global symmetry of the various dimensions of its context. That is: articulating in relation to this book as initial reference or coordinate (others might of course do just as well), the symmetry of 'its' dimensions (equally of course just the dimensions, implicitly or explicitly of anything else: for this dimensionality and its 'coordination' of Kosmos is precisely the 'unitary' side of Kosmos, just as the component physical space-time of relativistic coordination is the 'unitary' side of the physical order coordinated in Kosmos with the other dimensions). This unitary side of the situation of this book in a Kosmos it marks is then to be coordinated in relation to the figures of 'thesis' and 'university', of a ritual story or inquiry with its nominally precise function in relation to reflection as nationally instituted in a british university, coupled with instituted reflection in (north-western) Europe (principally France and Germany) and with late twentieth-century reflection as a whole, as Europe is coupled to its global contexts to East, West, and South. All the terms or coordinates of such an inscription of the book in a unitary global frame are already in place, and may be now articulated as global frame of what is 'open' on Earth towards the close
of the second millennium after the 'zero-point' of the inquiry or story, simply through a final step of inscribing and coordinating the various dimensions of theory and contexts around 1970 as abstractions from their symmetry, now marked in relation to the radical question of what is going on in this questioning: the marking of the symmetry of the coordinate dimensions of this their very marking.

That is to say, one might suppose the story at last concluded by the inscription of this book in the unitary coordination it frames, the various details of its global configuration in 1985 coordinated by unfolding from their configuration around 1970, in their various emerging couplings, those ideological, cultural, and economic 'restructurings' that might be taken to characterise progress towards the close of the millenium. - Restructurings that might then be seen as converging components in the global restructuring or structuring of the global theatre of terrestrial activity precisely as Globe and Theatre, around the year 2000.

'Restructuring', East and West, North and South, emerging as dominant figure in the late 'seventies with Reagan, Kohl, Mitterand, Thatcher; in the Kremlin and under Mao's successors. Restructuring in response to the oil crises of 1973/4 and 1979, and the impending economic breakdown, East, West and South of which these were the indices in the Kondratieff cycle unfolding from the last Crash of 1929 and spanning the mid-century; restructuring over the last decades of the century in the Third Industrial Revolution based on Information, as the first two Revolutions at the close of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had been based on Steam and Electricity/Chemicals. Political, ideological, economic restructuring of postwar Europe - or rather the recognition of the necessity of such integration. Restructuring of East-West relations after Detente, with Euromissiles (1979), USSR in Afghanistan (1979), Solidarity in Poland (1980), Sandanistas in Managua (1979) and a right-wing coup in Salvador (1979); with an Egypt-Israel treaty (1979), Vietnam in Cambodia (1979), with China emerging from East-West oscillation to become a third term in the strategic triangle
(Deng Xiaoping's consolidation of Reform, in the period between achieving control of the Central Committee in 1978, and of the Twelfth Congress in 1982). Restructuring of North-South relations urged by the Brandt Commission, and by the Third World itself in the UN and its agencies (the attempt, for example, in UNESCO, to construct a South-South communication to supplant the otherwise unavoidable northern control of the South-North-South channels of 'southern' interaction); the old dominance of East-West over North-South questions itself brought into question by Islam (Iran 1979)... and so on.

Yet the 'inscription' of a book that would mark on Earth the global symmetries governing these various interactions of the principal groups into which the terrestrial community as a whole divides, in the 'space-time' of global dimensions it framed, and in the formally determined interface (the 'situation' of the book) of that global space and time with the complementary economy of the elementary symmetries of ideological, cultural and material orders of individual human interactions.... such a formally determined inscription of this book in the 'situation' of reading and writing it frames, would remain abstract. - This even though one would formally or logically determine as primary frame of coordination of the various orders of the 'situation', precisely the radical circuit of self-inscription of book in the situation it framed; for such a formal insistence upon the primacy of the book's situation, as interface of complementary global space-time and elementary local economy of human interaction, is only a formal negation of that abstraction from the actual situation of this book, in relation to which the complementary global and elementary dynamics are framed: a formal recognition of the abstraction of the 'coordinates' in whose terms that very abstraction is symmetrically, logically, 'defined'. 'Defined': a marking in the internal 'space' of the book of the last abstraction to be brought into the book's questioning: the abstraction of the 'coordinates' by which that very abstraction of their 'internal' space is marked in that 'space'.
Closing the book, we may now see, formally amounts to the passage from the 'internal' configuration of bringing-into-question this very internal or formal 'space' of the inquiry so far, into what we formally mark in this space as a 'situation' of the book, of which its 'inside' is precisely one side. That is to say: the 'internal' determination of the inscription of this logical order of the inquiry in the coordination of text and contexts is not 'wrong' but merely...inconclusive...leaving us with a closing question. It is we, not our logic, which would be 'wrong' to close the book with a merely formal resolution of that closing question. We must close the book. The 'logic' of the inquiry thus far merely determines the 'close' as a question for us (not for 'it'). 'It', our logic, has guided us to the point where it comes itself into question, into our inquiry. We must now actually articulate the relations, in the 'dramatic' interaction of reading and writing, of this 'internal' dynamic of the words as questioning, inquiry, with the 'external' material dynamic that has thus far only been formally determined as 'symmetric' with the dynamic of inquiry (this formal determination being itself inscribed in the 'internal' unfolding of the logical dynamic of inquiry); and with a 'poetic' figuration of that symmetry of 'inside' and 'outside' of the book.

Formally, then, we may say that these words must begin to appear, and indeed 'function', work, as a sort of script of our interaction as readers and writer. 'Script', writing its part in the 'dramatic' dynamic of situations in which we read or write it. Script whose unitary logical space now appears rather as simply one order of organisation, one 'force' in, one figuration in or of, this situation, these situations, in which it is thus, here, written, 'inscribed'.

Script framing its own part as one component in a 'play', interacting now with 'poetic' and 'material' figures or forces ('figure' and 'force' being simply two sides of interaction) which have themselves previously turned in their own closed circuits of 'abstraction' from their situation.

Closed circuits of abstraction: the dramatic illusion of the playhouse, the fictional abstraction of book from context, of material 'thing' from its situation. And what sort of magical library are we entering as we close this book, and begin to see
its place, '?', in strange slightly immaterial dimensions where it is ranged, coordinated, with the other texts it has catalogued in the pages above...slightly immaterial, for the 'library' in which this book must be ranged with other books in the interaction of script and World, is also a sort of theatre, where the books and shelves are as insubstantial as the logic is material, is materialised in the books, and in the logic of their shelving.

What part in the drama being enacted plays this book which frames itself as script in some global theatre? How does the finding of this book in some library enter into play with the other orders of interaction in which a visit to (say) this library (if we be in a library) finds its part?

Let us plot our course out of the book by marking it in the book as we proceed from reading or writing (perhaps unconsciously) to an 'acting' of which reading, writing, conscious and unconscious, are so many varieties...as we proceed to the question, marked by this book, of how the figure of actor, part, may interact with other figures and forces in our activity.

The closing question, then, of the abstract character of the marking of the abstraction from its contexts of the 'internal' logical space of this book, thus far, leads at once into the part of the inquiry as book, as materially embodied, in a play where we find ourselves inextricably caught in a 'dramatic' or theatrical figure of interaction of (say) the Mind and Matter of our inquiry.

But almost at once we see that the figure of the whole Book of Nature as a cosmic Library in which our inquiry has been the search for the catalogue of catalogues - an external space and time articulated in some book (in terms of the formal symmetry of its inside and outside) as merely the out-side of that book of books - we see that this inner version of the 'context' of books, is the
vision, so to speak, of a blind librarian...and may itself duly
be entered in our 'bibliography' as a materially embodied 'fiction'
of the relation of book and World (leaving us as we close that book
with the question of the difference between the actual book in which
that visionary space of The Library has been embodied, and the fict-
ional part or place of that very book in that Library):

3 BORGES, Jorge Luis
La Biblioteca de Babel (in Ficciones 1935-44
BA 1944) tr Irby in Labyrinths (NY 1964) Hswth
1970

... and one might in 1984 have heard the blind librarian reading
on the radio a story of the story Jorge Luis Borges wrote for his
eightieth birthday, written for his eightieth birthday.

...But wait...is that the right reference for such a vision of the
cosmic theatre of our interaction as 'library'? Are we to here inscribe the
vision simply as a book about which we ask no more questions, just
leaving ourself with its question of the relation of fiction and
'reality'? Or might we better see our blind librarian as Jorge of
Burgos in

4 ECO, Umberto
Il Nome della Rosa Sonzogno, 1980)
tr Weaver London 1983

...For if 'external' Reality is only the supremely false fiction
that there is some 'objective' World outside the play of stories
- if all 'reality' is what we make it as we frame stories - then
we cannot hope to fix the position of this story of the play of
fictions by, say, identifying the time and place of Borges' fiction
in some unquestioned global reality of geography and chronology.
If Italy's leading 'philosopher' finds that the 'position' from
which such a relativistic thesis might be supposed proposed is
itself necessarily false insofar as it poses as that of the reflect-
ive Subject (correlate of fictional 'external reality')...then the
only way he can frame what I called the question posed by Borges'
story of The Library, is to embed the blind librarian in a palpable
fiction (to which we enter through palpably fictitious bibli-
ographical 'references': another familiar borgesian figure). We
must relinquish any fiction of some 'theory' of the relativity of all stories (theoretical or other), and proceed in parables, stories laid alongside other stories that we might hear or tell.

When my friend John returned recently from Alexandria with a Mexican girl he met in Israel, they having decided to frame their interaction with others according to the Book of Revelation (the canonical western story of the close of the global Story), having identified such parts (telling the story of the close) in the story - I gave them a copy of Eco's fiction (which brings into question precisely the traditional circuit of interpretation by which the point from which the interpretation is made is itself part of the interpretation or story, and this in the canonical figuration of Revelation). Gloria (such is her name) was dismayed by the philosopher's lack of seriousness; but I tried to explain that the seriousness of the tragic identification with a part of one's story (the part of telling it or acting it) was just what Eco was trying to bring into question, into a play of and playing with stories from which western reflection had abstracted in the poetics of aristotelian reason (and the tragic rationality of the only book of the Poetics we have).

At the same time I agreed that Eco's relativism, his parabolic inquiry into inquiry, through his story set in the opening phase of the period I treated in the second Part of my inquiry, involved an abstraction from those invariants, that invariance, by which we can indeed tell a story in words - involved an abstraction from the actuality of the play or drama, which simply mirrored the converse circle of dogmatic assertion he questioned (indeed the dogmatic closed circuit of the story or interpretation whose locus of enunciation is one component in the story or interpretation, allows him to structure the complementary question). In the early fourteenth-century contest of dogmatic theology and sceptical logic, instituted in the conflict of Church and Empire, that he explores, there is no living trace of the Christian mystery, in that vital sense that Paul took over from pagan religion...
A blind librarian, an array of texts whose physical articulation in 'external' space reflects the logical relations among the internal spaces of Text. We may locate the fiction of a book that, in the Library, would coordinate (as sort of cosmic origin or focus) these inner and outer 'spaces' of the Book, in a particular book produced in southern America around the middle of the twentieth century. And we can further, if we wish, coordinate the transformation of its author into Jorge of Burgos - of an argentinian fiction into one component of an italian parable - with other transatlantic components in the geography and chronology of twentieth-century theory already discussed. But all that matters here is an elementary interplay, in the fictional circuit which is the interface of 'inside' and 'outside' of the text, of those internal and external 'spaces' of books in the 'library' as a sort of theatre, or rather as one 'scene' in the wider theatre of our activity. To call our world a 'library' because the external array of books in this world in some measure reflects the internal matrix of a text amounts perhaps to an initial tentative gesture out of the book and into what we may equally well call this 'theatre', since the symmetry of the internal and external 'spaces' of books calls into play a 'dramatic' force which structures 'acting' in the restricted sense, just as the logical force associated with the symmetry of the internal space of texts structures abstract theory.

All the World's a Stage, then; and a Library; and indeed a School which combines these two aspects - for just as the school is an induction into the drama of adult life, so we may in turn regard the latter drama as the induction into a still wider play of figuration and force which I have followed the pythagoreans in calling Kosmos.

But back to Earth: where we find books arrayed in those special buildings we call libraries, set aside from other public buildings such as theatres. Of course we may find odd shelves of books in private houses, indeed whole libraries; and we find books lying around by themselves. We find them in book-shops, librarie. But since most books that are found outside libraries may be more easily found inside, we may as well consider the part of this book in this world as it stands in, say, the British Library.
Now this text has been constructed in a larger matrix of words constituted by all the books of which it is in a way my reading. Most of them can be found in the British Library Catalogue (for those books I have found which were not in that library, mostly now are). Indeed there are few books printed since the fifteenth century whose title, place and date of publication, are not recorded somewhere in that vast array of words, for among the books that are there are catalogues of other libraries, and selective 'bibliographies', that record most that are not. Thus the longest 'book' in the British Library is the 'union catalogue' of all books in institutional libraries in North America around 1970, itself compiled by computer reading and ordering of all the entries in north-american library catalogues. Since computerisation along the same lines is proceeding in Britain, France, West Germany and Italy (among other countries), by the close of the century practically the whole array of titles of all books published since the mid-fifteenth century will be available at a single computer terminal in all major libraries: a 'data-base' for the array of nearly all printed books in the 'external' space of title, and place and date of appearance, with about fifty million entries, together with the physical 'locations' for each entry.

Needless to say I have taken only a vanishingly small fraction of that array as the 'base' for this inquiry into the relations of text and contexts over two and a half millenia. It is perhaps reassuring that had I spent several centuries rather than a mere decade preparing this inquiry, I would hardly be any nearer to a 'comprehensive' analysis of the 'data'.

Now among my 'base' for the construction of this text there are 'secondary' sources which I have not yet so much as mentioned, and indeed many of the 'primary' sources to which I have referred in the text figure there only because I have attempted to coordinate them with other texts and contexts, by working from their appearance in my 'secondary' texts. That is to say, I have sometimes thought it possible to fix the part of some book in the general configuration of texts and contexts which frames the inquiry embodied in this book, simply by 'working back' from the inscription of that book in several other texts which I have analysed. In general I have 'controlled' this inferential use of secondary texts
by noting how their writers treat primary sources which I have myself used. By fixing the perspective of the 'secondary' text itself in the matrix of texts and contexts as it unfolded — this in relation both to 'primary' texts and to other 'secondary' texts — one can often work from the place of some book in a couple of secondary sources, to an adequate location of that book in the wider array. In many cases I have subsequently checked such a construction by referring to the book in question after having fixed its 'part' in the story or inquiry, and only in a very few cases have I then felt that it was necessary to revise the initial 'construction'.

Within (then) the widest possible array of fifty million books, one may identify, so to speak, two sorts of 'limit' text — those sorts of book which line the walls of the Reading Room of the British Library, the interface as it were of reading itself and the vast hidden ranges of books to which the books in the Reading Room provide the access: those books being mainly catalogues or bibliographies, and *encyclopedias* or lexicons.

'Encyclopedia': the whole circuit of paideia, of induction into the learned array of books and world. A book which abstracts from other books or accounts a single more or less unitary text in which the outlines of all texts are embedded and coordinated; a coordination of the relations of texts and world in the internal 'space' of a single text which integrates the frames of all those internal textual spaces which are embodied in thousands or millions of other books. An 'internal' space which directly complements the 'external' array of authors, titles, places and dates of a general Catalogue.

If one could somehow fix the encyclopedic circuit by which the abstraction was made from so many books to the textual space of a single book, could one not then dispense with all other primary and secondary sources?
...Well, not quite, though my primary 'secondary' source has indeed been:

5 Encyclopedia Britannica  Fifteenth Edition NY/London 1974 (subsequently reprinted periodically from the computerised text constantly in process of revision)

I will not enter separately the various other encyclopedias I have used (the eleventh edition of the Britannica, with its supplements; the Grande Larousse du XIX°; various editions of Chambers' encyclopedia, and so on).

The editor of the fifteenth edition, Mortimer J. Adler, notes how the new edition, in preparation since mid-century, breaks with the tradition of piecemeal revision based on the eleventh edition. The fifteenth combines the two traditional modes of access to an 'encyclopedia', the lexical and the topical. Adler insists upon the unitary editorial direction throughout his 'Circle of Learning', which becomes explicit in his general introduction and in his introduction to the tenth and last section of the topical scheme or 'propaedia':

All preceding editions of Britannica, as most other encyclopaedias, have been constructed from classified lists of articles...

...In sharp contrast...the Fifteenth Edition has the distinction of being planned not in accordance with a classified list of articles, but rather in the light of an orderly topical outline of the whole of human knowledge, in the form of a circle of learning that is an en-cyclo-paedia (1)

- A 'circle': all the sections of the propaedia, notes the editor, are mutually inclusive - but the last, X, is at the centre, as itself devoted to the division, 'The branches of knowledge'. The third and fourth branches, Science, and History and the Humanities, are also treated in other sections; 'there are however three departments of learning that are exclusively treated in part X', Logic, Mathematics, and Philosophy; the first, second and fifth 'departments'.

1: p7
The ten sections follow each other:

Matter and Energy
Earth
Life on Earth
Human Life
Human Society
Art
Technology
Religion
The History of Mankind
The Branches of Knowledge

Reflection proceeds from the physical frame of its world through culture and history to reflection itself; at the close of his introduction ('Knowledge become self-conscious') to the last section, the editor frames the whole articulation of the encyclopedia in this circle of reflection (itself reflecting Hegel's circuit of 'encyclopedia' in the third decade of the last Part of my story):

That conception of the encyclopedia as a totality, as an organised whole, would seem to favour the view that, in the circle of learning, there are no impenetrable barriers to communication or unbridgeable breaks in continuity. Underlying it is the faith that the whole world of knowledge is a single universe of discourse.

- Knowledge is a circle rather than a hierarchy or line.

Proceeding, now, to the entry 'Encyclopedia' itself, we may place this conception itself in, so to speak, section IX, History. I have myself already traced successive articulations of reflection in circuits closed by the inscription of the perspective on a world as one element in that world it frames: this from Aristotle's economy of Kosmos through Proclus (and through the roman tradition of Varro and Pliny to Martianus Capella and Boethius, to Cassiodorus and Isidore and beyond). To byzantine and islamic encyclopedists and on to the thirteenth-century systems and Specula, 'Mirrors' of
Creation. On to Bacon's project, to Chambers' Cyclopædia, to the Encyclopédie and the French tradition of a sequence of essays, to Friedrich Schlegel's vision of philosophy as Encyclopædia and Hegel's circuit of 'knowledge become self-conscious' (to repeat Adler's theme).

How then is the American encyclopedia of 1974, a quarter-century before what I take as the close of the Third Part of this inquiry or story, related in this story to, say, the Hegelian 'encyclopedia' (of the philosophical sciences), a quarter-century after the opening of that phase? .. Or should we properly be comparing Adler and Brockhaus (Hegel's contemporary): Brockhaus' massive system of cross-reference and Adler's free interplay or 'communication' between different spaces, 'topics', in his universal space of discourse, text?

I would have to consult Glockner's Hegel-Lexicon to see what, if anything, Hegel thought of his fellow encyclopedist; but one may well enough imagine how the circuits of cross-reference might be construed in Hegelian terms as contingency itself abstracted from the organizing centre of reflection on reflection, the actuality of self-conscious Spirit. Are we to construe Adler's circuit that way? Or is it rather a kind of New World Symphilosophie conducted in, say, Quine's market or forum of accounts?

.. For the 'philosophy' of the fifteenth edition - the first American Britannica - the philosophy corresponding to the unitary and circular 'conception' of the encyclopedia, which is just the place of the editor, and the point at which the system of accounts comes full-circle and is tied together (let us say, the close of his introduction to section X of the Propaedia, which itself returns to the opening of his general introduction to the whole)... that philosophy or 'conception' of conception itself, is just a working of the open circulation of figures in the 'world' which is itself, in the limit, just the circulation of corresponding physical force, 'Matter and Energy' (section I). We find our part in such a world as the reflexive or reflective point of its conception, conceiving itself as just a still point, the centre, of all that circulation (working back from section I to section X).
'Pragmatism': our world is just the interaction of all these figures of sections I-X, and the dynamic of human culture within the wider dynamic of the physical world - that dynamic of human culture which is the 'History' of section IX - is just the progressive opening-up of ever-freer circulation (one might compare such a conception with the frame of, say, the Catholic Cyclopedia or the Soviet Encyclopedia...). Thus knowledge and its coordination is an essentially technical question; the encyclopedia is the optimal solution to the question of 'accessing' different components of the general system of books (and the reflection they embody) and world. And yet if we consider the encyclopedia of 1974 thus we may ask whether the centre of 'knowledge become self-conscious' about which it is organised, is not itself rather the organising centre of the abstraction of the whole encyclopaedic system from its embedding (to work backwards) in History, Religion, Technology, Art, Human Society, Human Life, Life on Earth, Earth, and Matter and Energy. The encyclopedic 'system', for which the contributors work, is the system of abstraction of the 'internal' spaces of all the texts from which it is compiled, from the dramatic coupling of that imaginary or fictional space with 'Matter' and 'Human Society'. The circuit of 'knowledge' in which the internal space of reflection around 1970 is articulated, is itself abstracted from a more radical circuit which would organise - say - a theatrical 'space' and time of around 2000 in terms of an encyclopedic framing of the world of texts and contexts in relation to some particular material text, some book.

(And I do not mean simply to replace the Britannica with the Catholic Cyclopedia, framed in relation to The Book; to be 'catholic' in the way I mean, is to take the very book in which one frames the relation of books and world as 'the book'.)

We may take this systematic abstraction, in the Britannica, of the 'knowledge' of around 1970 from its expression in a book, to define the 'space', and the axis in it, of this 'bibliography'. For all the books here recorded are about some component in the configuration of those (and other) books in their world(s). My 'inquiry'
over the last decade has proceeded by the correlation of the point in the space and time of the general configuration from which some component of that configuration of texts and contexts is framed, with the way some part of the whole is framed at that 'point' (at that point in the whole of which it frames some part - or of which it frames perhaps, in its way, the whole). Figures of that correlation are themselves, in turn, derived from other books, which must themselves be correlated with the other books in the configuration; and as I have already noted my primary 'reference' in this process over the past few years has been my own very writing of the correlation.

An American encyclopedia of around 1970 frames the configuration of book and contexts, 'the world', in abstraction from the question of its own part in that world as book. It coordinates the multiple abstraction from this question of the book of the various 'internal' spaces in which the general configuration is mapped in the other books to which the Britannica organises access.

Now I took the question posed by the circuit of 'knowledge become self-conscious' in a general play of figures and forces, texts and contexts, as framing the opening of my Third Part - and I have taken Schlegel's proposition of this question, 'Die Philosophie..ist noch nicht zykisch genug' to stand at the opening of this Close. While Friedrich Schlegel was propounding this question as one of the interplay of fragmentary figures he edited in the Athenium, his associate (and fellow contributor of fragments) Schleiermacher was framing the question of the circuit facing the interpreter of the christian story in the fact that any version of the story must itself be understood relative to the point in the story from which that version is framed: the question of the 'hermeneutic circle' taken up by the Tübingen School around 1830, and leading on through the philology of Zeller and Nietzsche (among others) to Dilthey (the dedicatee at the turn of the century of the first systematic 'edition' of the Presocratics..of which more shortly).
With Dilthey, the hermeneutic circle first framed in relation to the axial Text (the Book per eminentia) of the western Story, is extended to the question of the embedding of texts in general in their historical 'context'. I have simply taken the hermeneutic one step further by inscribing the very text in which I question the relations of texts and contexts as itself the primary 'text' whose embedding in the configuration of texts and contexts it questions defines the 'hermeneutic' circuit, and with it the logical axis of this inquiry.

I have suggested that the Britannica of the 'seventies and 'eighties constitutes - after this very text itself - a primary access to the configuration over my whole Story or inquiry of texts and contexts. For the play or circulation of historical and theoretical figures it articulates may itself be associated with the editorial perspective of around 1970 which organises the abstraction of the 'outlines' presented in each section and article from the general configuration of texts and contexts. Access: and here lies the limitation of this primary secondary source - for the more or less balanced and authoritative coordination of themes and questions by editor and contributors, representing the 'state of play' around 1970, itself only gives an 'outline' of the wider configuration from which it abstracts - an 'outline' which may be reached by working back from the abstract articulation of themes or figures in various articles, and the principle of that abstraction, to a sort of initial 'negative' (but extremely useful) determination of the configuration of books and world in which the inquiry embodied in this book is carried on. That is to say: in relation to the circuit drawn in the wider space of this inquiry by the editor and contributors of the Britannica, one may articulate one's questions systematically by bringing into question that circuit of around 1970. That circuit, when brought, with all its component figurations systematically into question, into the question posed by the part of a book which frames some component of its world in that world, defines the whole 'space' of this inquiry from which it abstracts, precisely as a systematic space of questions. - And questions, precisely, on which the distinguished contributors are themselves engaged in the 'seventies and 'eighties, but from which they abstract in inscribing their individual perspectives in the unitary 'objective' frame of the encyclopedia 'abstract' or article.
To actually set to work articulating the relations of this text with other texts in the general array of texts and worlds from which those articles abstract, one must proceed in the 'negatively' determined outline of the 'space' of the inquiry, to the 'hermeneutic' interrogation of particular texts relating to particular components of that space and its 'historical' time (including the texts in which the contributing authors of the encyclopedia articulate their own 'topics' in relation to questions and emphases from which their summary outlines have abstracted).

But now we find ourselves almost back where we started, with the National Union Catalogue. For how are we to know which of fifty million available texts we must now examine in order to concretely articulate the historical space in which this text is to be progressively, hermeneutically, embedded, as its 'coordinates' are fixed in relation to a limited array of other books selected from library shelves or catalogues. Or surely we must bring into question, now, that continuous abstraction of 'important' texts from the vast majority of contemporary productions (which fill up the dusty miles of library shelving throughout the world) which we might equally well use as our 'references'. One has only to engage in that more or less arbitrary process of reading associated with the antiquarian bookseller's perusal of anything that comes his way from old libraries that are being sold, to appreciate how, say, twentieth-century ideas of historical 'importance' of 'classic' texts reflect in large measure the perspective associated with that singular point at which we stand, and read; and to see the gulf between our outline of the eighteenth century intellectual tradition, and the outlines given in that century itself, or in the nineteenth century; or an 'outline' determined by a statistical analysis of themes in eighteenth-century titles, together with the frequencies of those titles over a wide range of eighteenth-century libraries.

That is: how can we properly 'control' the configurations of twentieth-century abstraction from the widest array of texts presented by a computerised data-base drawn from hundreds of libraries,
if we refer only to those very texts which that process of abstraction selects as 'important'?

Back then to the National Union Catalogue, and the catalogues of the British Library and Bibliotheque Nationale... or not quite... let us now take with us

6 VARET, Gilbert

Manuel de Bibliographie Philosophique
Paris, 1956

Here 'bibliographie philosophique' has the twin dimensions of a bibliography of philosophy, and a philosophy of bibliography. The question of structuring the abstraction of titles from the widest possible base of catalogue entries is itself treated in relation to particular items in the bibliography (notably, we might say, in relation to the question of the character of Varet's text itself as both bibliography and philosophy).

At the close of 1984 I went to hear Varet outline the present axis of research at his Besançon Centre de Documentation et Bibliographie Philosophiques (founded in 1957), in the windowless computing complex of the EHESP, two floors underground. His title for the joint CNRS-CIPH seminar, 'Philosophie et Informatique', was 'Index et Contexte', and I could gauge the transition of philosophical bibliography from 1956 to 1984, over the period around 1970 when it began to be 'wired-up' or computerised.

The axial question was: how to frame a matrix of texts (in the limiting case, the matrix of one particular text) within the limiting 'inter textual' field or matrix of all textuality, all words occurring in the data-base constituted by all books and articles. What was the organisation of the abstraction performed unconsciously by a researcher who assembles an array of texts in or through which to pursue his inquiry, and how could this organisation be formalised and effected by computer, thus structuring (better and more easily than the arbitrary unconscious process) a universal
system of access to theoretical texts, continuously updated as mountains of new text accumulated each year around the world?

I will not go into the detailed division and analysis of the question by Varet and his associates; suffice it to say that he insisted upon the complementarity of 'interior' and 'exterior' of a text (Kristeva's intratextual and intertextual) in the process of abstraction from the initial uniform base of mere titles. That is: the deeper one penetrates through the title (first through its elements, then through index, table of contents, bibliography, notes, to the words of the text itself in their statistical co-occurrences) to the 'content', the more one enters into ever-more restricted configurations or matrices of various structures of that and related texts. The internal structure of a text reflects the external coordination of that with other related texts. The single text and the general catalogue are two limits, articulated between title and the formal matrix of possible substitutions for each component — word, sentence, paragraph, chapter — which gives (saussurian) sense to the machine-compilation of a complete lexicon of co-occurrences, defining the warp and weft of that 'text'.

Philosophy by computer? Apparently Deleuze has already dreamed of a concrete embodiment (besides human beings) of a philosophy-machine which might pursue the machine-philosophy of the Anti-Oedipe; and I remember that one of the walls of the room at the CNRS where Ricoeur held his seminar in 1974 was graced with a print-out of a two-dimensional table of co-occurrence of several dozen prominent words in Leibniz' Monadologie (of which more below).

Photius who as patriarch of Constantinople presided over the schism of Latin and Greek culture had simply recorded the books in his 280-volume 'library', with notes of his reading by way of abstract. The alchemist-abbot Trithemius around 1500 recorded a thousand ecclesiastical authors in his and other libraries, and the great classifier Gesner half a century later attempted to arrange all known books (26,000 books by 3,000 writers) in a 'universal
library', systematically divided into twenty-one subjects (in the twenty-one books of his 'universal partition', and further divided by thematic indices. Around 1870 Dewey introduced his decimal classification; at the turn of the century Shakespeare scholars began to analyse texts as material objects, in order to work back from the physical process of publication to the author's own part in 'his' extant books. Around 1970 the question arises of reducing Dewey's approach to mechanical processing of text; by the close of the century, perhaps, one might expect a 'bibliography' that would complement a circular philosophy of 'book', rather than the 'text' of 1970. Thus one might conclude perhaps

7 JASENAS, Michael  
A History of the Bibliography of Philosophy  
(Studien & Materiellen zur Gesch der Ph XIV)  
Hildesheim/NY 1973

- which traces the interplay of philosophy and the organisation of its historical 'data-base' from the sixteenth to the twentieth century. This may be taken as a complement to Totok's exhaustive recording, from 1964, of 'current' philosophical literature (mainly periodical publications after 1920: 'there is nothing as stale as dated academic controversy') together with the first title in the same series:

8 RISSE, Wilhelm  
II 1801-1969 Hildesheim/NY 1973

- the first volume compiled from the catalogues of around 150 libraries (mainly by abstracting all titles with some reference to logic or logical themes), and the second mainly from national bibliographies.

By considering the frequency of locations of the books in the first part (and their successive editions), one could construct a sort of statistically 'weighted' space of different lines of development: with 20-30 titles-per-year in the chronological sequence
it is surprisingly easy to soon approximate to their thematic 'space'. Given such a 'space' one can begin to plot the successive figurations of that abstraction by which 'histories' of philosophy have articulated relations in that space, and on the general base of all available texts. Such is, almost, the programme of the

9 Storia delle Storie Generali della Filosofia ed G SANTINELLA
I Dalle origine rinascimentali alla 'historia philosophica' Brescia, 1981
II Dall'Età Cartesiana a Brucker 1979
(III-V in prep n (c1750-1900)

...But why stop at 'philosophy', as it gradually separates from 'science', any more than Risse (for practical reasons) stops at the subordinate domain of 'logic' within 'philosophy'?

Consider two more books a little further along the shelf:

10 TOBEY, Jeremy L The History of Ideas: A Bibliographical Introduction Santa Barbara/Oxford 1975-7

..Oh dear, these don't actually get us much further at all, since the author articulates his abstraction from all possible material simply by abstracting from any question of the principles of his selection. The essay is organised by two factors: the progressive reduction in scope of the secondary sources listed as the bibliography proceeds, and Tobey's self-assured and didactic 'common sense'. Within the general question of scope the positions of the (mainly contemporary) authors (and most particularly of Tobey himself) are never themselves even peremptorily located within the various 'lines' of the tradition they narrate. For example the Postscript to the first volume retrospectively frames the whole Classical Antiquity to whose bibliography that volume is devoted, in terms of a very elementary stereotype of unfolding greek 'rationalism', that was already becoming dated by the time Nietzsche wrote the Birth of Tragedy a century before.

'Rationalism': the axis is taken over from Lovejoy and
Boas; 'rational', 'non-rational' and assorted variations on this theme occur throughout to direct Tobey's secondary sources illustrative of the progress of Reason. And since the 'current' references all agree on the rationality to which they have at last acceded, Tobey does not bother to indicate even the dates at which they appeared. I have already noted in relation to my years at Oxford the separation of thematically organised 'current' debate, and the elementary sequence of 'important' historical figures which illustrates progress toward modern rationality through the mists of the Romantic nineteenth century (which itself counts neither as history or current debate).

'History of Ideas'; directed by an idea of history which has been abstracted from its history, from that hermeneutic of 'historiography' by which the benighted Romantics placed the locus of framing 'history' in that same history it framed.

Lovejoy himself had come under the influence of Burckhardt and Dilthey before he left Germany to teach at Stanford at the turn of the century, almost immediately to move thence to St. Louis, then the home of American Hegelianism. By the time he moved on to Johns Hopkins in 1908 he had begun to divide his time between criticism of 'current' American philosophy (in the free play of ideas and other figures in the world that went with the idea of 'Pragmatism' he recognised in 1908 thirteen distinct ideas, to which there corresponded no truly coherent idea to be associated with that fashionable theme), and analysis of the history of philosophy. Eventually by the time of

11 LOVEJOY, Arthur Oncken

The Great Chain of Being (Harvard lectures 1933) Cambridge Mass 1936

and the autobiographical essay contributed to the collection Contemporary American Philosophy in 1930, 'A Temporalistic Realism', Lovejoy was combining his criticism of the dominant Neutral Monism
with the tracing of the irreducible tension between 'ideas' and 'things' in their two-sided temporal dynamic, by structuring the unfolding of ideas as a *story* articulated in the poetic symmetry (to use the terms which derive sense from this text) of these two mutually irreducible figurations of 'History'. The German-American of 1930 can abstract from the hermeneutic circle because he now finds himself, like the German-American editor of the Britannica from mid-century on, at that closing point (of the circle, so to say, or of the History he takes as his object) where the history of ideas arrives at the idea that it is articulated as a story, a story organised throughout by that consciousness which now becomes fully self-conscious as just the locus of framing the story, as of the successive historical accounts which tend toward this self-consciousness in what now appears as the progress of Rationality. The German who stood critically outside the pragmatic circle of assertion of the free play of figuration in that play, at the beginning of the century, now finds that his European distance from the American way has itself become incorporated in a new forum, within the new frontier. By 1940 he is directing the interplay of ideas about the history of ideas in the journal of that name, and two years later he writes that 'Our Side is Right', with the assurance of being on the rational side of History while old Europe struggles to break the last circle in which reason is lost.

**Great Chain of Being:** the theme that Lovejoy takes to run through the unfolding of successive figures of the outer World as the story of unfolding reason, reflecting on itself as the locus in that World of its framing, itself proceeds: an initial, indeed canonical, essay in the 'history of ideas', then, in which the guiding theme or figure which directs the interplay of inner and outer worlds is just the figure of World itself, from the Greek birth of rationality to its cartesian self-consciousness in the Galilean and Newtonian World of the Scientific Revolution.

Now this book I left on the shelf between my first reading of it years ago at Oxford, and my review of references a couple of years ago; but the old scheme of Greek reason emerging from the
barbarian mists of the Dark Ages, and coming to fruition in the
Scientific Revolution has remained through its multiple transformat-
ions over the intervening years as a fundamental organising principle
in the 'abstraction' from the vast array of texts available to the
limited 'matrices' of inter- and intra-textuality through which I
have worked.

At this point we may proceed to a fairly compact array
of 'secondary sources', which will be easier to locate if we leave
the British Library and move to the open-access shelves of the
'Science' section of some smaller research library; or rather to
the array of those 'histories of science' which in the Dewey system
precede the 'primary' scientific texts, on which the 'histories' are
based, themselves.

For from around the turn of the century historians of
'science' have been able to abstract from the 'data-base' constituted
by all the texts that might soon after have been taken as material
for the 'history of ideas', to construct a sort of main road through
millions of books produced over the last two and a half millenia, by
tracing those sequences of unfolding figurations of the physical
world, which can be fairly easily identified in sequences of 'primary'
texts in which they are first presented.

That is, the simple coordination of the abstraction to the
'internal' configuration of a scientific text in which a correspond-
ing 'external' configuration of its 'physical' context is articulated,
at once allows us to introduce a simple and drastic principle of
selection of our 'base'. We simply work back from the present artic-
ulation of physical theory, locating the successive appearances of
various structures of the current theory as they unfold in sequence.
Our 'philosophy of science' or theory of the relation of physical
theory to the physical context from which it is abstracted, and in
which it is pursued, allows us to structure a simple series of critical
or epochal texts as embodying so many steps in the logical progress of rationality - so many steps in the same process of abstraction which eventually arrives around the turn of the century at the question (reflected for example in the Theory of Relativity) of the symmetry of logical abstraction and the physical order in which it takes place. The identification of a sequence of structures of abstraction embodied in a series of axial texts, leading through the mathematical coordination of the physical world and its logic over the 'Scientific Revolution' to the mathematical universal poetics of 'Modern Science' after the turn of the century, may be simply presented as a 'history of science', even though the relation of this abstract dynamic of Theory to the actual production of the 'key' texts in the interplay of their various contexts may remain thoroughly unclear. One may regard the 'history of ideas' of around 1930 as a subtle relativisation of this fairly simple programme which introduces 'cultural' configurations intermediate between the logical progress of physical theory and the encompassing physical World, but which at the same time retains the organising principle of 'rationality' which turns, for example, Galileo's dogmatic scepticism into the pinnacle of its martyrology.
Let us then move on to the close-knit group of a thousand or so primary and secondary sources which fill a group of shelves preceding the vast arrays of 'current' science in a university library (I used these shelves in Warwick, Oxford (Radcliffe Science Library), and the Brotherton annex in Leeds). A small array constituted by the simple coordination of the abstraction of physical theory from its physical context (and the material books in which it is embedded), with the abstraction of a sequence of epochal texts from the millions of theoretical texts in the British Library and elsewhere.

At the beginning of these shelves we find a canonical series of 'epochal' texts (its initiation itself an epochal event in the 'history of science'):

12 Ostwalds Klassiker der exacten Wissenschaften
I HELMHOLZ, Hermann von Über die Erhaltung der Kraft (first publd 1847) Leipzig, 1889
(this succeeded by many other texts over the years)

Helmholz' paper which deduced that mathematical formulation of 'closed system' as the frame of coordination of its logical theory with the physical order fitly opens Ostwald's project, the first of its kind, succeeding

13 MACH, Ernst Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung historisch-kritisch dargestellt Leipzig 1883

whose historical analysis or structuring of the components of Helmholtz' frame itself entered into 'current' physical theory at the turn of the century, as well as framing the perspective of the Ernst Mach Verein or 'Vienna Circle', towards 1930. Ostwald's collection in turn inspired Dannemann to produce, as framework for reading the texts of the series, the first comprehensive and systematic 'history' of science' (Die Naturwissenschaften
I do not enter this with Mach and Helmholz in the enumeration of texts as I have not used it in the compilation of this text, in which the mathematical physics ('mechanics') historically structured by Mach is one component - the central axis.

Duhem's transition from mathematical study of the thermodynamics instituted by Helmholz, to ward the embedding of the logical dimension of mechanics in a broader historical and philosophical coordination of that logic with the physical order which is its object, dates from the same period as Mach's parallel research. More particularly it may be associated with the clash between Duhem and Berthelot, during the latter's direction of the Ministry of Education (1885-7): that clash of the catholic church (represented by Duhem) and secular education which dated from the Revolution, and still threatened a french socialist government in 1984. Duhem's epochal survey,

DUHÉM, Pierre

Le Système du Monde: Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic.
I-V (to the Edict of 1277 forbidding the teaching of Aristotle) Paris 1913-17
VI (to early C14th) ed from mss 1954-9

...roughly contemporary with Dannemann's history, amounts to an attempt to show that far from the 'middle ages' constituting a break in scientific rationality, they constitute rather that continuous reformation of the logical order of cosmology, within the broader coordination of logical, theological and physical dimensions of Kosmos, which leads systematically from the abstract logic of pagan antiquity to the classical embedding of logic and science in Experience which constitutes the so-called scientific 'revolution'.

This correlation of the embedding of 'scientific' logic, around 1900, in its coordination with the physical and 'poetic' dimensions of its context (the latter the 'historical' dimension in a broad sense which includes the stories whereby we frame our experience, as well as that widest story we call History), with the question of the medieval transition from the abstract logic of Antiquity to the experimental science of the seventeenth century,
dominates that 'history of science' to which it gives rise, together with the related question of the initial emergence of greek 'rationality' from its sixth- and fifth-century contexts. If 'history of science' is to trace the successive figurations of cosmology and its logic, as these are opened up in successive configurations of Theory and World, then the focus of inquiry naturally tends to those critical points, such as sixth-century Greece or thirteenth-century Europe, where we must either speak of a mysterious 'break' in the logical sequence, or seek to embed the transition from one 'logic' to another in some wider and deeper coordination. And already with Duhem's studies of Leonardo (1906-1913) the question of continuity is posed in terms of a textual matrix: 'ceux qu'il a lu, ceux qui l'ont lu' (Duhem's subtitle for those studies). We will later see a direct parallel in Gilson's catholic aetiology of the cartesian 'revolution'.

I suggested that we moved from the British Library Reading-Room to the first shelves in the Science section of some university library, where we would find a thousand or so related books. One of these (or rather a set of volumes) would be the Isis Cumulative Bibliography of books and articles relating to the History and Philosophy of Science, continued annually from 1913, and with about 75,000 entries to 1952, about the same number from 1952-1985 - mostly articles in the learned periodicals, some of which are nearby, some in other parts of the library; with this we find Sarton's Horus:

SARTON, George
Horus: A Guide to the History of Science
Waltham, Mass 1952

..a much expanded revision of his inaugural lecture at the Harvard Seminar devoted to History of Science (founded by him in 1935). This is a scientific treatment of the 'History of Science' itself, as an activity, considered in terms of base materials, their organisation, and the institutional frame(s) of that organisation. Such a structuring of History of Science reflects the principles of Sarton's analysis of the wider structuration of its object, 'Science'.

Such a duality or complementarity can be traced back to that seminal year 1913 (already figuring in the notices of Dannemann
and Duhem) when, as well as instituting Isis, Sarton began to work on his

Introduction to the History of Science
I From Homer to Omar Khayyam Cambridge Mass 1927
II From Rabbi Ben Ezra to Ibn Rushd 1931
III Science & Learning in the Fourteenth Century 1947-8

Just as Duhem's attempt to reach Copernicus was eventually interrupted in the early fourteenth century, so Sarton's plan to reach 1900 in two or three volumes led, in the mushrooming details of the Islamic tradition, only to the five volumes devoted almost entirely to the Arab transmission of Greek science over the 'middle ages'. In Sarton's case certain characteristics of the historian of science echo the cases already considered. Once more history emerges from an initial confrontation between science and philosophy; once more the passage into a general history moves through a structural analysis of Newtonian mechanics; once more research is focussed in the 'medieval' transition from Greek to seventeenth-century 'science'; and once more an initial finality or directing idea becomes embedded in the multiplication of questions, detail. It is striking to see in Sarton (who left his native Belgium for Harvard in 1915) the complementarity of the most schematic directing idea of rationality, and the profusion of reference and analytic complexity which is organised by the simple scheme. - The scheme which Sarton would periodically abstract from his huge apparatus in short surveys given as lectures, such as

Ancient Science and Modern Civilisation
Lincoln (Nebraska) 1954

- three lectures, 'Euclid and his time', 'Ptolemy and his time', and 'The end of Greek science and culture'. The discussion of Ptolemy is symptomatic; his astrology is briefly dismissed as a perversion of science symptomatic of the decadence of rationalistic Greek culture; the question of the structural unity of the Ptolomaic corpus is not even raised. The figures that fit into the scheme of logic unfolding towards 1900 are noted with admiration; the looming twilight, with its echoes in Sarton's own flight from
Europe in 1915, and the subsequent demonic convulsion of the Third Reich, is exorcised with a scientific shudder, but without analysis. The Islamic detour permits a continuation of logical sequence on from the Greeks (by a sort of cultural transposition, analogous to musical transposition into a new key) while Europe is left behind in growing darkness. For Duhem there is no medieval break in the Western tradition; for Sarton's logic there is a radical break, but if we change our language and culture, we may pass around another way, outside as it were. There then remains the question of what European transformations prepared the incorporation of the Islamic tradition over the thirteenth century; one may tend the flame that will rekindle learning, but one must also ask why the fire should catch again at one period rather than another.

Lynn Thorndyke's perspective presents a fairly strict parallel in its development and in its object, to that of his Belgian-American contemporary. Thus while the philosopher Sarton was passing from the study of philosophy to that of science in the first years of the century, Thorndyke was beginning his postgraduate research at Columbia on the part of magic in the medieval university, which led first to his dissertation on magic in the Roman world which prepared the Latin culture of the university, and then on to his systematic survey,

18 Thorndyke, Lynn

A History of Magic and Experimental Science
7 vols. NY 1923-58

...the first part covering 'A History of Magic and Experimental Science and their relation to Christian Thought during the first thirteen centuries of our era', and the whole extending eventually from that configuration which I have taken as the 'turning-point' of my first Part, through the thirteenth century, to the configuration of Experientia I take to mark the turning-point of my second Part.

Thorndyke, professor of medieval history at Columbia, pursues the transition from the logic of Antiquity to that of the 'Scientific Revolution' in terms of the structural unity of the wider configuration of logic and those 'magical' figurations of activity which complement the (in principle) unitary mystery of
the 'catholic' faith. While Sarton traces the medieval transition through a continuous islamic logic, Thorndyke finds an analogous continuity in the poetics of 'magic' and its story or history (in the story, then, of the development of those magical fables from the point where logic becomes subordinate to 'stories' of which it appears as only one dimension, to the cartesian reassertion of logic coordinated by the fixed point of self-consciousness, of the experience of the subject as the reflexive locus of (experimentally) framing its world, its experience). And Thorndyke's inquiry is, like Sarton's, framed by the attempt to experimentally structure in a unitary narrative, if not all, at least a representative sampling, of the 'data' constituted by the relevant books and manuscripts in the British Library, Bodleian, Bibliotheque Nationale, and other libraries.

I have already suggested the wider parallels to the question of continuity across the 'middle' ages, which we will find in Gilson and others. Sarton left Europe during the Great War; Koyre with the outbreak of the second 'world' war - and his analyses of the emergence of modern reason from its medieval matrix may be seen as drawing upon an interaction of earlier 'history of science' and history of philosophy within the newer frame of the 'history of ideas' and Johns Hopkins:

19 KOYRE, Alexandre From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (lectures at JH) Baltimore 1957

Around mid-century we notice the question of the relations between the emergence of 'modern' science from its medieval matrix, and the initial emergence of Science from the near-eastern matrix whose mythology may be taken by the 'rationalist' as a direct analogue and prefiguration of medieval religion. Thus

20 DIJKSTERHUIS, E (De Mechanisering van het Wereldbied. Amsterdam 1950; tr C Dikshoom as:) The Mechanisation of the World-Picture Oxford 1961
presents the 'middle ages' as formal transposition of the various elements of ancient science into the modern 'picture' articulated over the 'renaissance'. The 'history' presented by Dijksterhuis is the history of this picture, and the history of Science in Antiquity figures only as a reflection or correlate of the renaissance coordination of that ancient science, just as the wider frame of renaissance theory appears only as the reflection of the axial logical sequence of emerging newtonian mechanics:

...we shall describe exclusively the genesis of classical physical science and its establishment in the work of Newton...

...so that the pythagorean mathematics with which his story opens is itself framed (as one of the two basic strands eventually joined in the seventeenth century) in terms of a 'science' abstracted from the pythagorean configuration as a whole. A 'science' abstracted from its pythagorean origins, a logic abstracted from its cultural and historical contexts, is itself used to frame the story of this abstraction; and the seventeenth-century completion of abstraction with which the survey closes is there asserted to be the constant and timeless principle of unitary 'science' down to the mid-twentieth century, the revolution of around 1900 being characterised as a subordinate, secondary, modification of the underlying constant principle.

van der WAERDEN, Bartel Ontwakende Wetenschap (Groningen 1950) tr A Dresden as: Science Awakening Groningen 1954

might be taken as complementing the perspective of the fellow dutchman: the history of greek mathematics is presented as the wider frame of the newtonian revolution, and so of our modern world dominated by science and its technological application. The story turns about Thales' introduction of 'proof', but a familiar figure reappears in van der Waerden's manner of 'proving' his own account of this radical break, its antecedents and consequences (the figure of an unquestioning dogmatism about the value of scepticism). After strong complaints about uncritical repetition by subsequent historians of Cantor's
false conjecture as to Egyptian knowledge of the 3-4-5 triangle, van der Waerden goes on to select (as it fits his scheme) a far older myth by which Hippasus would be the founder of a heretical 'mathematical' sect opposed to superstitious 'acousmatics', quite unsupported by the primary sources. Meanwhile a systematic organisation of the extant remains of Egyptian and Babylonian 'science' (abstracted from its cultural contexts, but also from van der Waerden's Babylonian predilections) was presented at Cornell in 1949:

22 NEUGEBAUER, Otto

The Exact Sciences in Antiquity
Princeton 1952

The earliest British general history I have used (passing over nineteenth-century writers like Whewell and Baden-Powell) is

23 DAMPIER, William C

A History of Science and its Relations with Philosophy and Religion (Cambridge 1929)
4th ed with postscript by I B Cohen, 1961

...but this book is useful rather as a compilation of various figures or elements of 'the' history of 'science' drawn from other sources, and with no specific direction of its own, unless a British arrangement of the interplay of various figures, with pragmatic emphasis (from time to time) on their embedding in the wider scheme which includes pagan and medieval religion, and which is the perennial object of 'philosophy', be itself a 'principle' of organisation. The 'secondary' character of the compilation may be gauged by the transposition of an elementary mathematical error from Rouse Ball's account of Huyghen's crucial analysis of 'centripetal force', which is strangely still uncorrected in the fourth edition (p 152: \( v^2/r \) should read \( v^2/2r \) throughout; the discussion is abstracted almost verbatim from Ball's history, without acknowledgement).

Now thus far we have been taking volumes from the shelves where they are ranged by Dewey's classification and, within the short sequence of Dewey numbers, rearranging the volumes in terms
of place and date of publication. For although Günther's *Early Science at Oxford* or Randall's *The School of Padua and the Emergence of Modern Science* may identify their range of data by place and date of publication as belonging to a 'school', and be classified accordingly, the Dewey classification does not recognise these accounts as themselves belonging to any 'school'. Primary texts from the schools of Oxford, Paris, Chartres, Padua or elsewhere may be ordered by the places and dates of their first appearance, but the 'secondary' texts relating to them will be placed by these primary texts, rather than along with other works of the more recent 'schools' from which they issue.

Dampier's history belongs to the 'english' school of intellectual history, not only through the place and date of its publication, but also through its structure or method, and the way that this reflects Dampier's formation as a chemist, rather than a philosopher or mathematical physicist of the 'school' formed in America by refugees from continental Europe. If we pass now to the Oxford School (sub-faculty from mid-century) of History of Science, we meet with biologists:

24 CROMBIE, A

Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science, 1100-1700 Oxford 1953

25 Augustine to Galileo: The History of Science AD 400-1650 Oxford 1952; revised as:

26 Medieval and Early Modern Science 1958

I Science in the Middle Ages: V-XIII centuries

II Science in the Later Middle Ages and Early Modern Times: XIII-XVII centuries

27 SINGER, Charles

(A Short History of Science to the Nineteenth Century Oxford 1941; expanded as:)

A Short History of Scientific Ideas to 1900 Oxford 1959

28 - editor

A History of Technology Oxford 1954-8

For Crombie the thirteenth century is the turning-point in a continuous transition from the close of classical Antiquity to the 'Revolution'
of the seventeenth century, but where Thorndyke takes the 'poetics' of magic as frame of continuity, Crombie takes the practical or pragmatic interaction with the physical order in technology as crucial. As the unitary thirteenth-century picture slowly breaks down in the following centuries, this breakdown is paralleled by the elaboration of a technical tradition finally integrated with its new logic in the seventeenth-century consummation of this continuous process...

Especially I have tried to bring out, what I believe to be the most striking result of recent scholarship, the essential continuity of the Western scientific tradition from Greek times to the seventeenth century and, therefore, to our own day. (1)

By the beginning of the seventeenth century the systematic use of the new methods of experiment and mathematical abstraction had produced results so striking that this movement has been given the name 'Scientific Revolution'. These new methods were first expounded in the thirteenth century, but were first used with complete maturity and effectiveness by Galileo. (2)

Crombie emphasises that the logical organisation of 'science' is only one human activity or frame among others; and that the relation of this and other relatively independent frames is not a question for science alone to resolve.

The frame of Singer's 1941 essay is, in comparison, still a schematic retrospect of the emancipation of empirical reason, its primary moments the initial attempt at abstract unity in fourth-century Athens, the introduction of the empirical perspective in the seventeenth century, and the emancipation of this perspective from the continuing attempts to inscribe it in the pre-seventeenth-century idea of unitary system in the 'revolution' at the turn of the twentieth century (where the account ends). The short closing discussion of the structure of the 'revolution' of 1900, appended in 1959 may perhaps be seen as preparing the kuhnian heresy published three years later. A heresy echoed in another nearly contemporary
critique of the schematic rationalism of the Old School:


'Historiography of Science': breaking or bringing into question that complex of related abstractions noted in the inaugural phase of 'history of science' around 1900...the abstraction of the historian's own perspective from its time and place coupled with his 'history' as a retrospective formal sequence of unfolding of precisely that abstraction in the logical figurations of successive 'classic' texts. Crombie, identifying 'science' and its logic as only one dimension of human activity coordinate with others (compare his contemporary Austin), and this science unable unilaterally to determine that practical coordination; Singer seeing in the paradoxes of around 1900 the final failure of the attempt to frame in a unitary manner the seventeenth-century bringing-into-question of just such a unilateral and unitary logic of the Theory of Antiquity...these are components which prepare Kuhn's relativisation of successive unitary schemes or 'paradigms' to simply one side of science as primarily activity, whose unity and stability is rather a reflection of the unity and stability of its institution in the human group of scientists, than the reverse (although that reverse, the illusion of continuity of an unfolding logic, has itself functioned as one 'scientific' paradigm of scientific activity):


(What better model of an old paradigm carrying its successor with it like a worm in the bud, than this ironical setting of Kuhn's 'revolutionary' perspective as one section of the Vienna Circle's project of a Unified Science based on the integration of different sciences or theories within a single formal language and its unitary mathematical logic?)
1962: I noted in Part Three Derrida's questioning of an analogous complex of abstraction in his long introductory essay to
Husserl's *Ursprung der Geometrie*, and although one may see in the
group of Kuhn's popperian critics (to whom he replies in his Postscript)
precisely the kuhnian figure of a paradigm of rationality controlling
quite dogmatically the academic institutions of 'History of Science',
one may also place and date Kuhn's questioning of the twin abstraction
of 'history of science' and its purported object, 'science', from their
social institution (interface of Theory and World, or theories and
worlds) in human activity, as itself one more step in the logical
sequence of successively opening up the circuits of previous abstract-
ations of the logic of theories from its coordination with other dimensions
of its World(s). Thus Kuhn's questioning of the attempt from around
1900 to give an ahistorical history of the progress of scientific ratio-
nality, may be seen to bear the same relation to that revolution, as
it bears (in Singer's characterisation) to the Revolution of the seven-
teenth century. That is: although we may not be able to find any pos-
itive theory of kuhnian relativism, any more than we can theoretically
determine between two competing frames of experience which each give
different versions of their difference (compare Quine's Indeterminacy
of Translation), still we may find a sequence of questions or questioning
in which Kuhn's critique of considering the questioning of a previous
theory as belonging to a logical sequence of theories, itself appears
as closing term.

...Well, as almost the last term: as itself posing a last
question; a question analogous to the question already posed at the
close of Part Three in relation to parison theory around 1970. A
question confronted in some measure by Kuhn himself in his Postscript:
how is he to resolve the paradox of his own reflection as science of
science, theory of the incommensurability of theories (and how, at
the same time, are his popperian critics to frame their assertion of
the primacy of questioning)?

How, for example, is Kuhn to confront the question posed
by the circular definition of scientific 'community' in terms of
'paradigm', and 'paradigm' in terms of community? In his Postscript
he remarks on the possibility of correlating community and paradigm directly in terms of the matrix of scientific texts. Consider for example

31 GARFIELD, Eugene 'Citation Measures of the Influence of Robert K Merton' in Science and Social Structure: A Festschrift for Robert K Merton (Transactions of NY Acad Sci, II.39) NY 1980

where a student applies Merton's suggestion of correlation of themes and texts (more systematically dissected by Varet) to the analysis of references to Merton himself, abstracted from the indexes of a wide range of periodicals (I came across this paper while simply working quickly but systematically through the History and Philosophy of Science shelves at the Brotherton Library in Leeds, rather than via any further citation of it).

Once more then (and having replaced books by Burtt, Butterfield and others that I read long ago, but which have no direct place in this brief survey, any more than the classic works of, for example, Tannéry and Olschki, which I never used) we find ourselves confronting in these few dozens of shelves a question of their coherence as an array, a community almost, of books; and the last question is that of the abstraction of the 'science of science' embodied in this array from these very books themselves, and their grouping together in the library of some 'school', university. There, for example is the current textual matrix of the Oxford School:


History of Science being constituted one section of what are effectively reading lists for weekly essays. There is

33 BERNAL, J D Science in History London 1954

- based on lectures in Oxford, 1948-9, tracing the social embedding
of that activity called 'science' in the material dynamic of economic history (this reflecting Bernal's part in articulating the Science policy of the Labour government). Beside it the essays presented to the one-time Cambridge physicist in 1964, 'The Science of Science'. There are Farrington's *Science in Antiquity* and his *Greek Science* (1936, 1944), written in the perspective of the social historian. There are all the books on the 'philosophy of science' of which I have as yet said nothing (we will find other copies in the philosophy section). And over there two 'encyclopedias':

34 TATON, René - editor *Histoire Générale des Sciences* Paris 1957-64


We may quickly note the first as the continuation of a French tradition initiated by Diderot; Taton announces a popular work, a series of essays embodying the avowedly personal views of their authors, which he has managed to arrange to give a uniform and complete analysis of the rise of Science, its 'gigantesque essor' and 'magnifique épanouissement' - his vision of history of science 'comme l'un des principaux fondements du nouvel humanisme scientifique' echoes, somewhat belatedly, the optimism and Progress of the Enlightenment. The bibliographies at the close of each section offer cursory reflections of the individual authors' perspectives, but no indication of the wider range of discussion from which the selection has been made, no attempt to situate those essays in the frame of Taton's 'new humanism'. In short: a French 'encyclopedia'...

Gillespie's sixteen-volume collection of biographical articles is an altogether more serious affair, breaking down the 'history of science' into its articulation as complex intellectual biography, each life traced through the web of textual influences and textual production according to the principles of balanced abstraction already discussed in relation to the *Britannica*.

Thus each text, or rather an abstract, is embedded in the sequence of texts (again, rather, abstracts) that constitute one axis of the author's life; figures 'in' each text are coordinated
with figures 'in' the others, so that the figuration of each is embedded in the figuration of their sequence; this intellectual axis of the author's life is embedded in the wider biographical configuration, which in turn coordinates that sequence of texts, through the other lives in the Dictionary, with other such sequences of texts. So that the Dictionary as a whole amounts to so many thousands of 'projections' of the whole historical configuration of texts and lives, onto the elements of the complex tradition which are the more or less focussed individual experiences of, and parts in, the wider complex. A complex which we no longer need consider (from the side of the Whole, as it were, rather than these 'elements') as a single unitary History - rather does this 'other side' of the individuals' parts constitute a sort of question or order, axis, of questioning, which systematically complements the alphabetical sequence of lives. A question which appears in relation to each individual in terms of the various possible groupings of individual scientists into 'schools', into their interactions in groups, corresponding in a way to more or less restricted arrays of texts and their 'cross-references' within the wider bibliography embodied by the Dictionary as a whole.

'Schools' then (and any scientist may belong more or less strongly to a number of more or less related such frames of intellectual interaction), corresponding to more or less closed circuits of 'cross-reference' among all the texts and individuals in the Dictionary; but as we move from individual to group, we move also away from an abstract sequence of texts, and into a complementary physical economy of their production in historical institutions, in 'groups' and 'schools' physically instituted in the wider cultural interaction of which, say, the interaction of reading and writing in learned journals is only one component.

...The question, then, posed by this complex 'biography', of the historical order of integration of those lives in various 'cultures', which complements the fragmentary array of so many thousand foci, so many thousand 'integrations' of various components of their whole, their totality, in so many individual...heads.
Such a question may be framed in a much more abstract form by, say, taking the more or less canonical series of loci classici which embody the unfolding of mathematical structures over time - over the 'history of mathematics' - and simply asking how this formal sequence (the most extreme form of 'internalist' or retrospective 'logical' history of science) is coordinated through the cultural and physical contexts of that canonical series of 'classic' texts, with the complementary physical 'structures', the physical space and time, of that 'history'. Such, indeed, is the manner in which I first framed the question, and the 'history of mathematics' - on which I was nominally working during my two years in Paris, and which framed my research between 1976 and 1979 - has served to structure the wider question of the embedding of text in contexts, finally posed by this text in its contexts.

Thus a primary component of my work in the year after returning from Paris, was the attempt to mathematically frame the temporal sequence of greek mathematical texts -

36 THOMAS, Ivor - ed & tr Texts to Illustrate the History of Greek Mathematics* London 1939-41

- which were more or less those abstracted as canonical sequence of data for the classic history:

37 HEATH, Sir Thomas A History of Greek Mathematics Oxford 1921
I Thales to Euclid
II Aristarchus to Diophantus + 'Commentators & Byzantines'

The following academic year I continued this 'structural analysis' from the greeks on to the present day, chiefly using:

38 BALL, W W Rouse A Short Account of the History of Mathematics* (Cambridge 1889; facsimile of 1908 ed:) NY 1960


* An asterisk indicates books cited in Parts One to Three
These three texts present three orders of abstraction from biographic context: Ball's is organised by individual and school, Kline's by areas and phases of mathematical theory, and the third reproduces the historical notes from the publications of the Bourbaki (an imaginary name) seminar, presenting in very concise form the historical sequence of elaboration of the structures discussed in that part of the seminar, this sequence itself noted solely in terms of the structures as understood around 1970. I used the three perspectives in complementary ways in my own analysis.

The following year I worked back (so to speak) from the understanding of the 'physics' of around 1970 as mathematics, and the 'chemistry' of around 1930 as physics, over the convergence of these 'sciences' from the seventeenth century, and to their initial divergence through Antiquity and the 'middle' ages and 'renaissance'.

- This using various 'source-books' (catenae of loci classici on the model of Thomas' 'source-book' - or indeed of, say, Ritter & Preller's 'source-book' of ancient philosophy) and complementary specialised 'histories', which I list now with those I have used since:

41 DREYER, Johan
A History of Astronomy from Thales to Kepler (London 1906) NY 1953

42 SAMBURSKY, S
The Physical World of the Greeks London/NY 1956

43 TAYLOR, F Sherwood
The Alchemists: Founders of Modern Chemistry London 1949

44 PARTINGTON, J R
A History of Chemistry London 1961-70

45 GARRISON, F H
An Introduction to the History of Medicine Philadelphia (1913) 1929

46 CASTIGLIONE, Arturo
Storia della Medicina (Milan 1936) tr Krumbhaar NY (1941) 1947
47 TAYLOR, F Sherwood  
A Short History of Science  London 1963  
(mainly original sources in tr)

48 MAGIE, William F  
A Source-Book in Physics  (NY 1935)  
Cambridge 1963

49 Hippocratic Corpus  
ed & tr Jones (Loeb)  London/NY 1923-31

49A HUNTER, R &  
MACALPINE, Ida  
Three Hundred Years of Psychiatry  1535-1860
The problem: the problem posed by the fact that our primary source for the opening of the western tradition of Theory is itself a secondary - or rather tertiary - text, whose own position and perspective in that tradition is not only somewhat uncertain in terms of its chronology, geography, and sources... but this uncertainty must itself be defined, framed, relative to that opening for which it is our best source...

50 LAERTIUS, Diogenes

The Lives, Teachings, and Sayings of the famous Philosophers
ed & tr R D Hicks (Loeb) London/NY 1925

51 NIETZSCHE, Friedrich

Beiträge zur Quellenkunde des Laertios Diogenes Basel 1870 (review of his articles published in Ritschl's Rheinisches Museum, XXIII-XXV (1868-70) as De L.D. Fontibus')

'The Diogenes Laertius Problem': that circularity in which the opening of Philosophy, Theory, appears for the first time as a radical question; as the question which frames the subsequent tradition then, and all the subsequent ways of posing and resolving that question; and the question which frames Nietzsche's own career from this his first separate publication, in 1870.

...A question which I slowly came to correlate with the silence of the pythagoreans, as the inaugural question of 'philosophy', of 'theory' (to use those two pythagorean terms), to which the first answers, echoed by Diogenes Laertius (perhaps around the middle of the third century of our era), are the 'philosophies' of the fifth century.

Ah, je vois! je voisi declared Heinz Wissmann as we walked down the rue d'Ulm after his seminar on Heraclitus at the end of May 1981: what, I had asked, if, rather than framing that pythagorean silence in terms of the extant remains of fifth-century philosophy,
and the subsequent anachronistic testimonium, one turned that normal problem upside-down, and organised all those 'external' accounts of the school in relation to the pythagorean question, that 'mystery', as a sort of missing centre, a point from which all the external accounts diverged, a point from which one could frame the various accounts of this point? The importance of the pythagoreans had been reduced, it seemed, since modern scholars confronted there the most extreme case of the 'problem' posed by Nietzsche, and unable to get any firm bearings worked on other philosophers and schools, and the relations between them. The framing of the opening of 'philosophy' was then posed in terms of these relations, and the pythagorean 'problem' appeared from time to time in a fragmented form, as questions attaching to the other philosophers and schools. But what if one proceeded in a complementary manner, in terms of the relations of questions, rather than of more or less established results... and what if the pythagorean 'mystery' were then to frame a systematic coordination of these questions...

The Problem of Diogenes Laertius... the problem of transmission. Following Schleiermacher, Baur and his school at Tübingen had, from around 1830, determined the christian 'mystery' in just such a configuration: the components of the various early 'versions' of the mystery of Jesus of Nazareth were to be coordinated by finding a wider story of the effects of Jesus' Urtext, his words and actions, on the formation of various groups, and by identifying the locus of framing the various components of various versions of the Urtext (and of the wider story) in the wider story. The christian mystery appears, so to speak, as the question posed by various different versions of the mystery - of, indeed, the question; the question of finding a story which will frame the interaction of different versions of the story, in the wider dynamic in which stories and contexts interact in groups. - The groups deriving from Jesus of Nazareth falling into two main 'tendencies', petrine and pauline, and this opposition or 'antithesis' more or less incorporated as two converse moments in the wider 'catholic' johannine story.

One may see the genesis of such an embedding of texts and versions in a wider cultural and historical frame, in which the dynamic of transmission may be conjectured, and so an Urtext extrapolated back from extant versions (and the history of the
groups through which the various lines of transmission pass itself illustrated), in the opening of that phase of western tradition(s) which I treated in the second Part; and the crucial configuration in which this question of transmission, and the question of the embedding of text in context, is first articulated, we call 'renaissance'.

Such 'hermeneutic' questions do not enter into the alexandrian librarians' 'philology', into their editing of Homer, into Callimachus' articulation of traditions:

52 SANDYS, John Edwin
A History of Classical Scholarship
Cambridge 1903-8

(supplemented by

53 PFEIFFER, R
History of Classical Scholarship from the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age
Oxford 1968

for the initial phase)

Indeed the abstraction of texts from their embedding in cultural history, and even the most elementary temporal sequence by which subsequent texts are implicitly readings and criticisms of prior ones, is almost startling to the twentieth-century reader as he or she confronts the synchronic interplay of Zoroaster, Hermes, Aristotle, Moses, Plotinus, Orpheus, neopythagoreans and pythagoreans, platonists and neoplatonists, in the writings of the last, whether christian or pagan; and as the writings of disciples of Proclus are assigned on the one hand to Aristotle (the Liber de Causis), on the other to Paul's athenian disciple Dionysius, in medieval disputation (though by the second half of the thirteenth century Aquinas had - more or less inarticulate - reservations about both of these attributions).

The question of transmission first appears simply in terms of the unity of language - of the very words - in a text. Thus Laurentius Valla, around 1440 showed how the language of the 'Donation of Constantine' (supposedly grounding the temporal power of the papacy in the fourth century) was rather that of an ill-educated monk of the Dark Ages, than of an imperial secretary schooled in the roman classics. The fundamental principle of such renaissance criticism
appears in the title of the work on which Valla was engaged at the time of his detection of the monkish interpolation in the isidoran Decretals: elegantia, that balanced play instituted by Cicero in relation to which the historical development of Latin could be understood as a progressive decadence or corruption. And in finding the language of the 'Donation' to correspond to a phase of corruption subsequent to the breakdown of the Empire and of its schools in which the classical models were perpetuated, Valla associated this corruption of language with the corruption of Roman institutions – notably of the Western church – which formed the context of linguistic decadence: a double corruption which he as papal secretary strove to expose and excise.

Thus Renaissance editors understood the transmission of the 'classics' as the 'corruption' of texts, which were to be restored by considerations of linguistic unity, itself measured in relation to the canonical unity of 'ciceronian' style. The decadence of this criterion itself by the latter part of the sixteenth century may be seen in the reaction of a Roman audience to the use in his first lecture there, by Antoine Muret, of several words and constructions which were not in the accepted canon abstracted from Cicero's texts and recorded in the stylistic handbooks which the audience had by heart. Muret, having turned the lecture almost into a riot through this scandalous insult to the Roman institutions whose guest he was, proceeded to dumbfound his critics by citing the texts of Cicero himself from which his studied 'inelegancies' had been taken, and which had failed to find their way into the manuals.

The criterion of 'elegance' and what was 'fitting' – the mot juste which had been lost through corrupt transmission – thus degenerated over the sixteenth century into the rigidity of a system of 'received' texts copied by all printers from some epochal edition by one of the great sixteenth-century scholars, whose own often idiosyncratic 'elegance' was thereby canonised as authoritative. Only over the latter part of the seventeenth century, and culminating in the critical editions of Newton's colleague Bentley, did personal taste in selection from the manuscripts and elimination of interpolations, become in some measure displaced by the attempt to identify and characterise structures of distortion in transmission which
could be associated with cultural and historical perspectives of the sequence of editors and transcribers intervening (in the parallel and interacting lines of transmission of the various extant manuscripts) between initial redaction and 'scientific' editing.

'Scientific' editing: and at the close of the seventeenth century Bentley, the first Boyle lecturer, was to find himself at the centre of the great 'Battle of the Books', the dispute of 'Ancients and Moderns' focussed precisely in the 'Moderns' 'insistence that Science marked a step forward and out of the classic unity of the text (where Moderns could not hope to improve on Cicero and the augustan writers) into the experimental interplay of text and World - that interplay that was giving birth to a new method of reconstituting the unitary form of classic texts, as it was also giving birth to the new Natural Philosophy, and to an essentially new literature that would soon become focussed in the Novel.

Mosheim's late seventeenth-century edition of Diogenes Laertius, itself the 'received' text for the following two centuries, itself belongs to this transitional phase, even though, between his edition of the New Testament in 1830, and his Lucretius of 1850, Lachmann had systematised the results of 'scientific' research since Bentley, by analysing the relations between manuscripts, and earlier editions based on groups of those manuscripts, through framing a sort of genealogy, a family-tree or stemma whose nodes corresponded to those manuscripts and earlier editions, together with inferred nodes mediating between various different branches or lines of transmission, and, finally, an initial point: the 'Urtext'. The stemma was itself to be framed in the two-dimensional historical space of the various schools in which the various extant and inferred texts might be supposed to have been produced.

At the same time, as I have already noted, the 'hermeneutics' of Schleiermacher were being articulated in an essentially hegelian historical dynamic or dialectic by Baur and his co-workers at the university of Tübingen. Here Lachmann's stemmae
were embedded as one component (the textual component) in a wider 'genealogy' of historical schools and institutions - the 'christian' schools and institutions whose radical common frame was the circular inscription of the Book in the World in which it framed itself as one term.

By the time of Nietzsche's appointment to Basel, then, of his 1869 inaugural lecture on Homer and Classical Philology, his 'Basel Programme' for research into the sources of Diogenes Laertius, his association with Burckhardt, and, more particularly with Wagner at Tribschen, the place of the new philology, and the New Criticism, in their culture, could be coordinated with the 'birth' of that culture, through its 'genealogy', in the question of a New Poetic which would reconstitute not the Urtext of the western tradition as a whole (like Baur's inferences as to the original sayings and testimonies of Jesus of Nazareth), but rather the wider cultural configuration of Greek tragedy and pre-Socratic philosophy as Ursprung of the wider tradition or transmission of cultural figuration, of which the textual component is but one element, coordinate with the other components of the wider context.

...And why should it be the figure of Drama which frames as its source the wider Tradition? ...If not because the dynamic or dialectic of drama is precisely the unfolding coordination of different versions of their common situation, corresponding to the different personae of the 'play', in that common frame or situation of which they are so many aspects, versions, perspectives? Drama: presenting precisely the primary figures of the cultural interaction in and between the constituent groups of a culture, and indeed between cultures (Greek and Persian, for example), in the theatrical abstraction of a particular group, framing a particular interaction (or action: drama) in that mysterious interface of inner and outer worlds, 'an action which represents another action'.

'On peut admirer de nouveau l'art, que lui reconnaissait Ritschl, de rendre une recherche philologique "poignante comme un roman parisien" ' (1)

1 (54) below, II.135
...Now it seems we are in another section of some library; or rather we have left behind that closed group of texts and histories at the beginning of the 'Science' shelves, and we are wandering between the shelves consecrated to 'classical philology' and those (fortunately ranged beside these) of 'philosophy'. We have just picked out and opened a book:

54 ANDLER, Charles
Nietzsche, sa Vie et sa Pensée
II La Jeunesse de Nietzsche Paris 1921

...which, if this chapter had been published as a separate pamphlet, would perhaps be ranged beside the Basel Programme in the 'classics' section.

Philology and philosophy: Nietzsche around 1870 'confuses' the two - and Dewey's contemporary classification. Philosophy: for Nietzsche around 1870 embeds the transmission of texts in that wider coordination of internal logic and external World which poses questions for philosophers. The transmission of a text involves principles of selection, for example, choices, which can only be understood in terms of the wider coordination of choices in the values of a culture, and their interplay or economy. In particular, the text must be inscribed or embedded in that wider dramatic matrix of choices of which the textual matrix of substitutions (of one word for another, to give a different sense to the whole) corresponds to only one side. The inquiry of the philologist himself becomes to this extent dramatic - as Ritschl, quoted above, observed, and as Nietzsche's marginally younger fellow student under Ritschl, Wilamowitz, stridently complained, upon the appearance of

55 NIETZSCHE, Friedrich
Das Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste
der Musik (Leipzig '1872'(1871), with
ew foreword of 1886 in:) Taschen-Ausgabe
I Leipzig 1906 (74;79**)

** Henceforth I give the dates at which I worked on those texts which dominated some phase of my research, to mark that sequence.
Wilamowitz-Möllendorf the 'scientific' philologist and philological commentator on classical philosophy; Nietzsche the poet, the (im)moralist, the (a)theologian: each confronting the same configuration of text and context, the first framing the questions posed by this configuration as it were from 'inside' the text, the other embedding – with scant regard for the former's 'antiquarian' science – figures from various texts in his cultural history, his 'genealogy'. His genealogy, not of those choices which together constitute the 'editing' of a text, but rather of the values which direct those and all other choices. Values which may appear in the systematic distortions of transmission analysed by Bentley, or in the systematic distortion of Lucretius' poem by a 'interpolator philosophicus' conjectured by Lachmann – but also in Lachmann's abstraction from the 'philosophy' focussed in such a phantom...or in the euripidean or socratic rationalism, the 'value of Truth', whose inaugural distortion of the tragic poetic from which it derives itself elides or occludes its own pathology, the morbidity of its exaggerated self-consciousness.

The 'value of Truth', of human reason, Sophocles' tragic blind Oedipus – whose abstraction or decoupling from its dramatic context (completed by Aristotle) allows the constitution of an imaginary ideal space, in which the 'primitive' presocratic figuration of the drama of reflection, the dramatic tension between Apollo and Dionysus in Orpheus and the musical frame of his Kosmos, can then be dissected. And from the remnants of this dissection, organised in the still deeper abstraction of Diogenes Laertius from his context (so that the man Diogenes is known to us only as the author of his compilation), we have to deduce the initial presocratic point by conjecturing the locus in the unfolding of philosophy from that point of any later account of that point. ...And the socratic 'point' must itself be established by an analogous working-back from the accounts of Socrates, to whose framing Socrates' teaching itself in part gave rise.

The 'value of Truth', then, whose abstraction from the 'dramatic' interplay of text and context frames both the scientific philology which assures the relatively closed matrix of text and
commentary in the 'classics' section of libraries, and the - let us say - philology of science which we have already perused. Now we must be prepared to roam about the library, following Nietzsche from classics to philosophy..perhaps into history, politics, literature..as we consider the wider matrix of interacting 'texts' in the various sections, coupled..in the last analysis..through their common contexts....outside the library.

And in order to map or coordinate this wandering about the library, we may first attempt, as it were, to mark the absence of any pythagorean book before the time of Philolaus. In a way this book must itself mark that absence, that silence, and its question or mystery: for it is crucial to the story or inquiry embodied in these words, and this book, that only in a dramatic space and time coordinated by the inscription in it of this book, which frames it as somehow open to us, as question, as system or play of questions, orders of openness to us, and which frames itself as a mark of this question or openness..only then, only there, here, and not in any 'internal' space of reflection abstracted from its physical embodiment in a book, or in other words, can we enter into the pythagorean 'mystery': through that matrix of interplay of physical and logical 'spaces', the Tetractys.

To enter into that inaugural question or mystery, as the initial point from which the Story unfolded over the three Parts of this book unfolds, we must mark the place of this book among all the others on the shelves. We have noted its absence in that abstraction from the physics of their embodiment which orders all the words in all the books of the History of Science section, and we have already begun to try and array it with the books of the philosophy and philology sections by considering that account of the point at which its 'story' opens given by Diogenes Laertius, and carried over from him, more or less, by all historians of 'philosophy' before Romanticism..and Hegel.
Now to embed this book in that wider matrix of texts in which we have begun to embed the History of Science section, and which must itself eventually be embedded as one dimension in the wider matrix of figures and forces which we may for the moment call World, we will have to approach the configuration of text and World both with Wilamowitz, from 'within' the text, and with Nietzsche, from the dramatic figuration of their interplay 'in' the World ('outside' the text).

More particularly, we must first abstract from Diogenes Laertius and other 'classic' authors, all those 'fragments' which appear to be taken from presocratic dicta or texts, and apply to them the methods of 'scientific philology' in an initial attempt to reconstitute as far as possible the Urtexte, of whose embedding in their World or worlds through the lives of their authors, 'the famous philosophers', the subsequent testimonia, which we must abstract in like manner, are so many - often contradictory - versions. We may then pursue the 'hermeneutic circle' (or spiral) of at once reconstituting the 'mysteries' of presocratic philosophy, and so framing the locus of subsequent versions of those 'philosophies' in a tradition or in traditions which unfold from those 'presocratics', and then arguing back from the 'distortions' to be associated with those classical loci or versions, to a better understanding of the initial configuration.

In 1867 Nietzsche's teacher Ritschl, together with Stein, made the first attempt at the reconstruction of a presocratic text from all the extant citations: Parmenides' poem; indeed Nietzsche's posing of the Diogenesfrage in its general form may be taken in large measure to derive from this attempt (Ritschl subsequently urged the young professor to take as subject for his research at Basel, the application of his new perspective to Homer or Aeschylus). It was eventually, of course, Hermann Diels who extended Ritschl's attempt to the whole presocratic corpus - beginning in 1879 with his general analysis of the doxographical tradition from presocratics down to Diogenes and beyond, passing by 1897 to the application of
these and further results - once more - to Parmenides' poem, extending the scheme to all metrical fragments in 1901, and to an initial attempt at a comprehensive edition of all fragments and testimonia in 1903, dedicated to Dilthey:

56 DIELS, Hermann *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin 1903; 5th ed revised Kranz: ) Berlin 1934-7 (75-79; 73-82)

..Dedicated to Dilthey..the textual matrix and critical apparatus in relation to which any subsequent attempt to resolve the hermeneutic circle by which the texts from which the fragments have been abstracted themselves frame the tradition in which that abstraction, and accompanying testimonia and accounts, must themselves be located and analysed, must be framed. A textual matrix, indeed, in which we must also frame the selections from the fragments and testimonia (and from variants of those texts) on which reconstructions before 1903 are based.

Indeed in the order of this inquiry the hermeneutic circle attaching to - constituting even - the opening of 'inquiry' itself in those texts, in that 'matrix' which is the very womb of the traditions in which our questioning of their origin makes sense - this question, which I have found focussed in the silence of the pythagoreans, attaches in a radical way to the embedding of subsequent accounts of that question, in their 'genealogy'. For if we are to ask the 'hermeneutic' question: What is the locus, what the loci, in their 'world' of subsequent accounts of this 'opening question' of inquiry?..We must somehow be able to coordinate these 'loci' in some 'world'..but what is such a 'world', in abstraction from the 'opening question': for that opening question is precisely the question attaching to this term 'world', 'κόσμος', and to the part or point in such a coordination of points, in such a 'Kosmos', of the framing of their coordination, of the coordination of that (initial) point with the points from which it is subsequently characterised (in subsequent times, and places, and 'schools')

That is, rather than now happily listing, say, an alphabetical sequence of accounts of that matrix, that womb in which the
genealogy of all those accounts is rooted; should we not rather coordinate those accounts of the initial 'coordination' or Kosmos from which they are ultimately born, in terms of the common question, the radical hermeneutic question of the part in a universal coordination of its framing, which each account addresses in its determination of the initial point(s) of the tradition(s) in which it must itself in principle be inscribed.

A 'general relativity', then, of theory, confronting the question of its own place in the matrix of presocratic terms - "κόσμος, φιλοσοφία, θεωρία, λόγος, λεξικόν", and so on - of which it is to give an account. But by 1903 the possibility of working with such 'relativity', in terms, precisely, of what remains 'invariant' in all its transformations, was being established in the various 'local' domains of theory discussed in Part Three. Here the most radical invariant is the constancy of question, of questioning, inquiry, by which I attempted to coordinate the various terms in which I posed the 'initial question' with the opening of Part One.

Parts One to Three derived from that opening configuration a simple 'geography' and 'chronology' of the historical space and time of the tradition(s) unfolding from the sixth and fifth centuries before our 'era', whose structure has reappeared in the twentieth-century problematic of 'History of Science' discussed above: a chronology articulated by the relations of an initial transition into 'theory' over sixth and fifth centuries, the transition from 'pagan' to 'christian' culture beginning at the beginning of our era, the transition, centred on the thirteenth century, from the close of classical Antiquity in the fifth and sixth centuries of our era, to its 'renaissance' in the fifteenth; the transition over the seventeenth century we call a 'scientific revolution', and lastly the transition associated with the 'industrial revolution' at the close of the eighteenth century, and that associated with the 'second industrial revolution' and the crises leading to 'modern' physics and logic around the close of the nineteenth century. I have added one more term to the sequence, corresponding to a question attaching to the 'physics' or rather the wider 'science', of the very texts
in which 'Science' and its History are carried on - and I have suggested, for no very good reason as yet, that this closing transition, whose structure mirrors over two and a half milleniums that of the opening transition into theory of science, is to be identified as taking place over the close of the second millenium. As for geography, the initial 'space' of Theory is clear enough: the Greek city-state and its institutions, within the wider culture of the ancient Near East. From this we pass from the Roman World in which that initial space was incorporated, into the various 'national' European spaces into which that World was reconstituted over the 'Middle Ages', and thence into a still wider 'global' order, defined in relation to Europe in terms of the two axes, East-West and North-South. This chronology and geography of the Story of Parts One to Three was 'coordinated' in terms of the question of the time and place of theory, seen to be part of the initial question or mystery. Here, then, we may attempt to coordinate accounts of that initial question, in terms of their 'time' and 'place' - and 'school': for the physical time and place at which some account was framed is of course only one side of a wider matrix of 'cultures', where the texts upon which theorists draw are embedded in times and places, and those times and places themselves embedded, framed, in texts.

I now give, then, an array of 'versions' of the birth of theory, followed by 'genealogies' of particular dimensions and phases of theory over two and a half milleniums - these genealogies or histories themselves embedded, with the texts on which they are based, in a wider Genealogy. Of course the 'space' and 'time' of questions in which they are now inscribed is itself only one 'side' of this matrix of texts from which I have abstracted it, then to embed in its the texts from which it has been derived by systematic questioning. At the close of this 'bibliography' we must confront the question of that last abstraction, as it relates to the arraying of this book with its companions in the bibliography, and to the recognition of the whole array in a wider 'world' which is not arranged, for the most part, on shelves.
I have located the 'hermeneutic question' of the embedding of a version of a story or indeed of 'History', in that story or History, as it appears around the beginning of the nineteenth century in Germany (rather, in what was shortly to become 'Germany'). At the opening of Part Three I tried to organise various figures of 'Romanticism' precisely in terms of the figure of inscription of the story or history (more particularly the Roman) as one dimension of the world it framed - and I noted in the early part of this Close the part of Goethe's epochal *Wilhelm Meister* in my own inquiry. Here I have concentrated upon Schleiermacher's application of this 'romantic' figure to 'Christian' History; but romantic history, philosophy, religion, and literature enter into a certain unity, a radical interaction, in just this their common figuration. Thus for example in

57 HÖLDERLIN, Friedrich  

*Der Tod Empedokles* (1797-9; ptd 1826)  
ed Benn London 1968

through which the associate of Hegel's youth passes into that 'madness' at the beginning of the nineteenth century which prefigures Nietzsche's at its close, an attempt to restore the spirit of Greek tragedy takes the form of a drama which turns about the interaction of a vision of a wider Kosmos including Heaven and Earth, with the heavenly and earthly orders of that wider world (Earth being precisely the circuit of human abstraction from the wider scheme in which the vision is lost and confused, remembered, until it with the wider scheme, and Heaven, is rediscovered, only as the madness as which it appears to other mortals). - This itself, then, Hölderlin's half-mad vision of a history which frames earthly secular history, a religion which frames the abstraction from it of a worldly Christian theology and church, a dramatic philosophy from which earthly reason has itself been abstracted, earthly 'philosophy' which occludes its source as the 'madness' of Empedocles.

And it is 'romantic' History of Philosophy which first works back beyond the scheme of Diogenes Laertius which dominated western perceptions of the 'presocratics' from Walter de Burleigh in the fourteenth century to Brucker in the eighteenth. Over the first three decades of the nineteenth century Hegel would
systematise 'romantic' history of philosophy in a presocratic frame in which the reactions to the initial phase to be found in Socrates, Plato or Aristotle, were so many subordinate moments (rather than themselves constituting the frame in which the presocratic phase was to be analysed. While Baur was applying his hegelian systematisation of Schleiermacher's hermeneutic to the cultural history which begins with our 'christian' era, Lobeck in 1829 was for the first time attempting to systematise that 'mystical theology' of the greeks which Hölderlin had seen as the common matrix from which abstract western philosophy and theology had diverged. I have noticed where such a deepening of the 'presocratic question' had led by around 1870, and the fruit of that deepening in Diels' editions around 1900. If now we are to find a central term about which this whole nineteenth-century german inquiry into the matrix from which 'philosophy' (and the various 'sciences' into which it subsequently divided) was born may be organised, so to lead us into the wider matrix of other 'versions', other schools, in nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and thence into the still wider array of nineteenth and twentieth century 'versions' of subsequent components of the traditions unfolding from sixth and fifth century Greece, we might well choose:

58 ZELLER, Eduard

Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtliche Entwicklung* (Berlin 1844-52; 2 ed, much revised:) 1859-68 (79;81-2)

..We might well choose: anyway, I did a few years ago - and the first two volumes of the second edition (Zeller's inquiry into Philosophy before Socrates) might be taken with this book, the Britannica, and (so to speak) the absence of any book from the first pythagorean school, to give a very general and open 'matrix' of texts and contexts from which the more detailed array now in question might be derived. Or rather, give a sort of scheme of arrangement for all the books which we are now taking from one shelf after another. We might (if the librarians are not looking) begin to rearrange certain books, say, on the floor...or perhaps to clear a few shelves and start to arrange our own little library there: in the first shelves we will leave, somewhere central, an empty space, or perhaps a book of blank paper, marked on the spine 'First Pythagorean School'; this surrounded by - let us arrange them chronologically on parallel shelves corresponding to Ionia, mainland Greece, and South Italy - library
folders or boxes with pages torn from many other books, collected
together if they appear to contain some citation from some 'presocratic',
or some report of that theorist or his (or her: there were women, such
as Pythagoras' wife, among those early 'theorists', and we have for
example 'a woman should take off her modesty with her clothes' from
that wife, Theano, herself, according to some reports) 'school'.

...Or perhaps we will save space by beginning simply with
Diels' collection...? The only drawback there is that it will be
much more difficult to play with the order of fragments in each section,
and with the order of the sections themselves...

We can then go on, in the later 'greek' shelves, to start
arranging a parallel 'latin' case or series of shelves; and this
will eventually be divided into italian, french, german, british
shelves, perhaps a long and almost empty spanish shelf...and even-
tually another bookcase or set of bookcases for the 'outside' of
Europe as we enter the third section of our little library. And on
the very last shelves we will mark a space for this book itself.

Zeller's book, then. Hmm, where exactly does it go...

...beside the initial pythagorean gap or blank book some-
where on the first shelves...or together with Diels' collection there?
Or shall we put it on the nineteenth-century german shelves...or find
two copies of it and the Vorsokratiker, one for the first shelves
and one for the nineteenth-century german shelves (whoops, Diels has
fallen off the end)?

By this time the librarian has arrived, anyway, and is
insisting with some force on his previous numerical order. And we
are beginning to see that the topology of library shelves soon breaks
down as a model for the geography and chronology attested by title-
pages and catalogues. So we leave the books where they were, and
recognise that library shelving is a linear order, abstracted at
some particular time and place, from the complex temporal and spatial
relations of 'publication'. Anyway, what would we have done with
two rival schools at the same time and place, what about the more
detailed parallelism of 'history of philosophy' with all sorts of other domains of theory (and non-theory)?

So we leave the books in the librarians' order, and begin to consider that array we were trying to reproduce on the linear shelving as a spatial and historical matrix of books of which the linear shelving is a sort of 'projection', framed by the institution of the library, at some place, and over some time. And we begin to see that within the order of the library shelves, the various dimensions of that external topology of publication, correspond to an internal system of coordination of the complex matrices of words which are the texts on those shelves.

We will arrange our various selected texts, then, in their 'external' space and time, through coordinating various elements of their 'internal' spaces and (narrative) times, in the space and time of this book...which will also allow us to eventually link the 'internal' and 'external' coordinates of the other books surrounding it on the shelves, by considering that linkage or coupling simply in this single case.

Eduard Zeller, then. We can now simply coordinate the place and time of his History with, for example, the contemporary lecture by Helmholtz (1847) which has already served to organise the 'History of Science' shelves. In the third Part of this text I tried to discover in that (the twelfth in this 'bibliography'), a 'focal' figure of a mid-nineteenth century german Natural Science: the first logical or theoretical demonstration of the mathematical frame of the embedding of that same logic in the physical order of 'Nature'. Helmholtz' general figure of 'Science' (and implicitly of 'World' and 'Theory') thus enunciated, leads naturally through Mach's identification of the limiting logical and physical poles (Theory and World, or self(-consciousness) and Nature) of Helmholtz' picture as abstractions from a still more radical historical dynamic of interplay of these 'sides' (of mathematical dynamics), to turn-of-the-century 'History of Science'. But it also allowed me to
'coordinate' parallel and interacting sequences of physical theories in the geography and chronology of the third Part (about 1800-2000), and to coordinate this 'physical science' as a whole with the other parallel or coordinate dimensions of Theory over nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and in turn to coordinate this multidimensional Theory with its multidimensional historical context. Of course I might have taken as my initial coordinate Zeller's account of the opening of Theory over the sixth and fifth centuries, and eventually marked the place of Helmholtz' paper in relation to it. But I did not, and now I mark the place of Zeller's history in terms of the coordinates already fixed in relation to Helmholtz.

Mid-century Germany: and Zeller's development over the mid-century may be taken as a central axis of the spatiotemporal configuration of nineteenth and twentieth-century accounts of the opening of Theory. For until he came under the influence of Baur at Tübingen (whose daughter he married, as if to register his place in the matrilineal descent of authority in the School), he had been working within the circuit of Hegel's encyclopaedic system. Under the influence of his father-in-law (and through him of Schleiermacher), Zeller brought into question the historical short-circuit of a Hegelian system which framed the relation of theory and its context, over time, in terms of a purely logical or internal determination of that context, Hegelian 'Nature' in which Philosophy begins as the logical difference of Logic and Nature first differentiates itself in and from that Nature. Zeller proposed rather to begin, not from the internal logic of the Hegelian text abstracted from its cultural interaction with its historical context, but from the hermeneutic interplay between the texts and contexts in which 'Philosophy' opens, and his own logic and culture. To understand the birth of Philosophy one must work from the whole matrix of extant fragments of presocratic theory in their historical context; the organisation of those fragments must proceed from an initial tentative attempt to frame a general scheme of theory in its contexts. But this theory of theory, this mid-nineteenth-century German 'philosophy', is itself only one empirical attempt to theoretically organise the historical dynamic of interaction of theory and its culture, and is essentially in the same case, confronting the same radical question of the story which in framing its world
and 'history', frames its own part in it, as those greek 'stories' or inquiries which are its 'objects'. Philosophy is, as Hegel discovered, History of Philosophy and Philosophy of History; but that 'self-consciousness' which organises this Philosophy and History is not some abstract pole of the hegelian Logic, but rather the organising part in an ambiguous world, of the recognition that one is always engaged, precisely, in trying to organise the relations of this very activity and its world. Theory thus becomes philosophy when it tries, empirically, to frame the story or history of the part of this framing in the world and history it frames. The story or history of the movement by which the mythological stories of the Near East become such 'philosophy' in sixth- and fifth-century Greece thus constitutes a sort of primary workshop for a mid-nineteenth-century philosophy which is becoming self-conscious as a cultural activity. And Zeller's organisation of the greater part of the material subsequently edited by Diels and Kranz is itself directed by just this figure of organising a world, and discovering the part of this organising, this 'theory' of 'Kosmos', in the world which it organises, and of which it is itself one element to be coordinated with the others: this is what the 'presocratics' were up to, and Zeller's version of presocratic philosophy is as so many versions of this process (which was thereafter to organise pagan, then christian, Antiquity, and through it, our own world itself).

For Helmholz' mathematics as frame of Science (then), read Zeller's culture as frame of our account of the World, in that World. Hegel had taken one term in this cultural interaction of theory and World - the internal logical system of his text abstracted from the question of its own interaction with its context - and framed the historical interaction of Logic and History in terms of the internal coordination of those and other terms in his texts. This gives a formal sequence of their 'inner' meaning - as figures eventually to be coordinated in the internal system of hegelian Logic - to the historical sequence of presocratic fragments; and the empirical sequence is forced into this procrustean logic by otherwise arbitrary selection from all the extant material, and by, for example, the inversion of the historical sequence of Heraclitus and Parmenides (an
inversion characteristically retained by Heidegger). Just as Marx at mid-century brings this hegelian 'logic' of History into question by framing its abstraction from 'real material nature' as one element in a cultural dynamic articulated as a sort of second nature in the wider domain of Matter and Force, so Zeller brings it into question as one 'moment' in a cultural dynamic of theories: a decisive moment through which Philosophy must pass, in order to see that attempt to organise the relations of Theory and World in Theory, as itself only one figure of theory in the World.

Of course Zeller's and Marx' criticisms of the abstraction from its 'real', 'human' culture of Hegel's logic, remain themselves abstract schemes - and I have thus framed them, as each an essentially 'logical' questioning of the configuration of Hegel's theory in its cultural context - other abstract schemes which, by that logic of history to which they are perhaps somewhat closer than Hegel, historically supplant the hegelian scheme of such logic.

'Abstract' schemes; practically embedded in mid-nineteenth-century culture, it is true, but still themselves in an all-too-simple lineal descent from the hegelian simplification, if we consider them in their limitation, their limitations, as questions. If we consider not so much what they might include - for a certain open-ness of 'internal' determination is rooted in their very embedding in their german culture - but rather as still 'short-circuits' which exclude certain ranges of figures of that embedding or 'coupling' - figures, for example, we may find in Nietzsche's still deeper embedding of his assertion in 'his World' as the radical self-assertion he calls Will to Power.
Zeller's German mid-nineteenth-century 'organisation', then, of the 'presocratic' material - or at least of a large part of it. And now, in relation to the Pythagorean 'mystery' of 'theory' and 'Kosmos' - the 'theory' of the 'world' in which that theory is itself one element as, precisely, 'Kosmos', 'arrangement', 'coordination', and the associated question of the part of such recognition of its organisation, such theory, in such a 'world' - in relation to this opening question, this focus of the presocratic opening of inquiry, questioning, 'theory' - we may go on to organise the accounts or versions of this initial configuration of 'theory', about Zeller's account, as themselves so many aspects of, perspectives on, that opening question, themselves organised in terms of, in the terms of that question.

In the terms of that question: in the terms, the words, of the presocratic texts or fragments themselves, as these also frame the various components of the contexts in which they are to be embedded - and the play of questions implicit in this reflexive or circular configuration organised by the limiting question, the hermeneutic question *per eminentia*, corresponding to this circularity as embodied in the Pythagorean terms 'theory' and 'Kosmos': the question of the part in Kosmos of the recognition of Kosmos.

I will not attempt to repeat the unfolding of terms from this initial question which constituted the inquiry in Parts One to Three of this book, but only very briefly now mark the locus of the various nineteenth and twentieth-century versions of the opening of questioning in sixth- and fifth-century Greek culture which I have used (components, then, of the textual matrix in which this text must be embedded as a reading), in the space and time of their various 'schools'.

The German school or schools, I have already suggested, may be traced from the Romantic Movement through Hegel, Baur and Lobeck, on through Zeller at mid-century, to Ritschl and Nietzsche and Wilamowitz, and on to Diels at the close of the century (of course Wilamowitz himself spans the two centuries: thus far I have marked only the figure of his early contest with Nietzsche).
I have already attempted, in relation to Hegel, Helmholtz, and others, to characterise 'german' schools in general in terms of the organising force of the question attaching to the embedding of the logical or psychological order of reflection in a complementary physical or ontological order. Implicitly I have characterised Zeller's perspective as in this sense 'german'. Explicitly I have characterised his perspective as belonging to a mid-century figure of this 'german' inscription or embedding, which it shares with Helmholtz' contemporary scheme.

A further component of the german 'school' around 1870, elaborated in association with his fellow-students Nietzsche and Wilamowitz, and - like Nietzsche's perspective - in association with Wagner, may be found in Erwin Rohde's analysis of Die Quellen des Iamblichus in seiner Biographie des Pythagoras (Rheinische Museum, 1871). The general problematic of Nietzsche's posing of the Diogenesfrage is reflected in this inquiry into what I have suggested may be taken as the central organising question or mystery of the 'presocratic question'. As Nietzsche's question may be taken as framing his subsequent development over 'seventies and 'eighties, so his close friend's focussing of that question in the pythagorean mystery may be taken as the initial frame of twenty years' development that would eventually be systematised as:

59 ROHDE, Erwin

Psyche: Seelenkult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen Freiburg iB 1890-4 (77-8)

Here the 'hermeneutic question', still focussed in the question or mystery of the pythagoreans, serves to organise what one might call the whole of extant or explicit greek culture and its 'theory' as only one side, brought into question and complemented by the systematic silence which is the other, and indeed primary, side...and this configuration of silence is, in every sense, 'the greek mystery'. In his introduction Rohde notes that he has himself kept silent on the complex disputes (in an 'antiquarian' school in which Wilamowitz was rising to dominance) attaching to the various details of his 'version' of Greece. Wilamowitz' system or science of the extant remains does indeed correspond to one side of the articulation of his inquiry; but those who are engaged in 'scientific'
disputes must gauge the author's position relative to the various positions taken by other scientific philologians, simply by the way he frames those 'positions' in the orientation of his inquiry as a whole. That is: Wilamowitz' scientific argumentation is itself only a secondary side of Rohde's own inquiry, just as the material on which it is based is only a secondary expression of greek culture, framed, brought into question, by a deeper silence.

Perhaps Rohde, as a sort of intermediary in the polarisation toward the close of the century of Nietzsche's art and Wilamowitz' science, is the true heir of Schleiermacher and the Romantics, at the close of the century they opened (Rohde died two years before Nietzsche, in 1898). It is he, at any rate, who focusses at the close of the century that 'romantic' figure, found in Hölderlin, of the embedding of the familiar — perhaps too familiar — religion and philosophy of the greeks in a deeper question, in 'mystery'. So that just as judaeo-christian biblical hermeneutics must be embedded in:


...so also must an inquiry into the birth of inquiry in sixth- and fifth-century Greece.

One version of such an embedding, framed in the familiar 'rationalism' which, contrary to Rohde's question, articulates the 'mythical' matrix from which logic is abstracted within such a logic, and which I have used is:

61 FRANKFORT, Henri & Henriette; JACOBSEN, Thorkild; Wilson, John (The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man Chicago 1946; rev as: Béfore Philosophy Harmondsworth 1949

A complementary perspective, embedding the linear time of such a logic in a more radical circular mythic time is:

With these one might set another near-contemporary correlation of Eternal Recurrence and the inaugural rupture of the 'mythical' circuit through which are born at once Logic and linear History:

63 HEIDEGGER, Martin

Was Heisst Denken? Tübingen 1954

...and perhaps Snell's account of the transition from poetry through philosophy back to alexandrian poetry:

64 SNELL, Bruno


...I did not use Frankel's account of the relations of 'Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy' (NY 1951); since we now have american, (almost) french, and german figures at mid-century, let us add

65 DODDS, E R

The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley lectures 1949, revised & annotated:) Berkeley/Los Angeles 1951

...where we come, with the english school, almost full-circle back to Rohde's 'question' - here the complementarity and interaction of those two sides of greek culture which Dodds calls Reason and the Irrational, down to Plato's 'reform' (though the author had originally hoped to trace the interaction...full-circle..to the neoplatonists).

Full-circle...well, there is a displacement from Germany to England (well, an englishman lecturing in America), and across half a century. Let us move back towards the beginning of the century by retracing the english career of Francis Cornford:

66 CORNFORD, Francis M

Principium Sapientiae Cambridge 1952 (79)

67

From Religion to Philosophy Cambridge 1912 (78-9)

and let us set Cornford's perspective firmly in England with his survey article 'Philosophy and Mystery Religions' in:
..and by finding as it were a near echo of his first work in:

69 HARRISON, Jane Ellen  
*Themis: A Study on the Social Origins of Greek Religion*  
Cambridge (1912) 1927  

Themis: that fixed frame whose own thesis, positing, is fixed in the frame as the one point which cannot be questioned. Themis grounded in the circuit of stories, 'mythology', in which this bare locus of their framing appears as one component, organising the wider play of figures, the other figures - above all - of such 'divine' self-assertion. For Miss Harrison this greek mirror of british Tradition is a pragmatic framing of the homeric world, organised by a past in which the figures have been empirically articulated in the 'greek experience' (to take Bowra's title of 1957) - and which may be decoded as the genealogy of the particular configuration of Themis at some point - and itself organising the interaction of myths or stories and the World of which they are the stories, in the future. For the young Cornford the birth of Philosophy from a greek Religion itself framed by the wider near-eastern tradition, corresponds to the passage marked in:

70 AESCHYLUS  
*Oresteia* in Murray's ed, Oxford 1937;  
tr Vellacott Harmondsworth 1956 (79)

..from Themis to Nomos. Inquiry, philosophy, appears as the circuit of unquestionable Tradition itself poses a question, and Man finds himself in what one might call the existential predicament of seeing that he is the radical locus of framing stories, of θέμάτα in all its complex sense. The mysteries - the school of Aeschylus and his contemporary Parmenides - frame the entry into the universal mystery of cosmic Law. And by mid-century, at the close of a lifelong reflection on this configuration of the origin of Philosophy and 'logic', Cornford has widened his inquiry from the greek mysteries, back to their own roots in primitive animism and the mystagogic 'shaman'.
Cambridge 1912...back twenty more years to the time of Rohde's *Psyche*, and we find at Oxford:

...which the author presents as an introduction for the English reader of 'the results of the last twenty years' in the German school: a story of the transition from 'a wild tale of the origins of things' to classical Logic, Physics and Ethics, in the perspective of turn-of-the-century British common sense.

'Common sense', that organisation of the World which opens out of the recognition in reflection of the primary organising function of the interplay of those three terms, Thought, World, Action: Thought which eventually arrives at this fundamental interplay through the unfolding play of stories, myths, 'wild tale(s) of the origins of things'. And this British organisation found in the work which Burnet recognises as deriving from Zeller's perspective: found in that vast Germanic economy of inquiry, and abstracted 'for the English reader' - a symmetrical British play or interplay of the three key terms abstracted from their Germanic embedding in a primary World (rather as Bradley was abstracting an Anglican theology from the Hegelian antecedents of Zeller's school). By 1912, at Cambridge, Burnet's common sense interplay had been opened up into a wider drama (which yet preserves his symmetry of Thought and World), through the complementation of the results of German philology by Durkheim's sociology of religion.

Now the synchrony of various national traditions - each dominated, I have suggested, by the primacy of one of the three components, Thought, Action, World, through the cultural institution of Theory in different lands with their different languages - amounts to interacting parallel sequences of working through the 'space' of
that synchrony of questions. If we take the whole range of such parallel sequences of questions, opening out from the presocratics, and converging (I suggest) toward the close of the twentieth century, we can divide this whole system, framed by the opening question posed by a 'theory' which identifies itself as the locus in a Kosmos of its framing, into a general sequence of three phases, corresponding to the three Parts of this inquiry - and this broad time or sequence of questions may be further analysed into subordinate sequences or cycles of questioning. Such an initial sequence corresponds, so to say, to the three primary terms in which the initial question is posed (Thought, Action, World) - but the time of inquiry is not simply a sequential working-through of the initial question which would pass in turn through one term after another. For as I remarked at the opening of the second Part, one step through the 'space' of questions opened up in the sixth and fifth centuries, modifies the very 'space' in which the next step must be made. Thus the third major phase in that historical structure of questions revealed already in terms of the abstract logical sequence of 'History of Science', opens with the 'hermeneutic' questions posed by the explicit embedding of its logic in the coordination or interplay of logic, physics, and their 'poetic' symmetry. In the opening phase of the third Part I noted the synchrony of British, French, and German versions, around 1830 of the synchrony of British, French, and German theory around 1800. The 'space' of some 'step' or phase of the third broad period covered in Part Three, is the space defined by the symmetry of previous versions of their 'space'. I suggested that in Europe this 'space' might be analysed in terms of three national 'schools' dominated by the primacy in each of one of the three radical terms of the overall 'question' or inquiry. And I suggested at the close of the third Part that the third period, and the inquiry as a whole, might be taken to close with the question of the space or synchrony of different ways of posing that question in different languages, and in the different domains of theory in each language.

I have, if always implicitly, broken down the three major 'periods' - roughly 500BC-(0)-1250-(1650)-1800-(1900)-2000, into symmetric component 'cycles' of questions, in synchronic theories and schools. Thus we are presently considering the versions of the opening of the first period - the 'presocratic phase' from Thales to Socrates, or about 570-430BC - given in various European and
American schools between about 1800 and 1985; and just as the
Story as a whole falls into three basic cycles or periods cor-
responding to three successive structurings of questions about
'Kosmos', in Kosmos; so each successive period may be broken roughly
into subordinate phases. I thought to find a sort of temporal
symmetry, for example, over the nineteenth century, turning about
a configuration of theory around the mid-century (represented by
Zeller, Helmholz and others), rather as the Story as a whole 'turns
about' the turning-point of the second Part: the mid-seventeenth
century. I suggested that the third Part might be taken to turn
about the configuration around 1900 from which unfold 'modern' physics,
logic, theology, ontology, psychology, art; and I have always broken
down each 'half' of each of the three major periods into what is
more or less a ternary division, such as BC 500-350-150-0, or
1800-1830-1870-1900, or 1250-1450-1550-1650 (where the temporal
structure of the first phase reflects the last phase of the triple
division 0-250-500-1250). I further broke down each of these three
subordinate cycles of the six 'halves' of the three major periods
into transitions turning about or passing through transitional
configurations: 1800-1815-1830; 1830-1850-1870; 1870-1885-1900 (where,
as in the Story as a whole, the transition through the middle phase
also structures the transition across the whole). In pursuing the
inquiry I determined this overall temporal structure indirectly
through the figures of specific texts 'around' the dates in question
(this 'around' itself being analogously structured: 1967-1970-1973,
for example, and embodying a degree of indeterminacy of a year or
so). In such a general sequence 1985 articulates a transition from
around 1970 to around 2000 - or opens a transition out of the whole,
1985-2000-2015(?) - which reflects the opening phase BC 500-430-350;
(or the 'presocratic' passage into the whole, c 570-430).

Such a sequence may well seem scandalously mechanical as
a frame for what tends to think of itself as the free self-activity
of Thought in its theorising and disputation; but it amounts only
to a cyclical 'time' of the embedding of theoretical logic in the
less scandalous physical time which that logic itself determines
as theoretically symmetrical with itself - and is only an abstract
dimension of their coordination derived from texts set in their minimal context of physical space and time, and a direct correlate of the equally abstract 'laws' of the texts' logical 'space', itself embedded in the physical topology of the mark (notably by the marking of the difference of physical and logical orders of difference).

- Not so much a mechanical constraint, then, on our free self-expression in our own good time, than a sort of collective scansion of the widest community of disputation, in which we may more or less freely express ourselves, rather as, in a more familiar way we express ourselves in the linguistic space of our words and texts through its temporal scansion.

The abstract structure abstracted as one dimension of the actual sequence of texts discussed above may be seen as a direct reflection of the actual embedding of their common sequential time of narration or argument (deduction, inquiry) in a complementary 'physical' time and space: this as inquiry proceeds in its various parallel lines or schools through the symmetry of the wider space of which logical and physical 'spaces' are but two dimensions. I have noted many times how the 'physics' of any period internally mirrors in the articulation of a physical action or interaction in space and time, the wider interaction of that physical dimension of interaction with its other 'dimensions'. In the limiting case, one confronts in the pythagorean school an image of the wider 'space' of interaction (of the pythagorean 'drama' or mystery of Kosmos) in the three symmetrical dimensions of its physical component (physical 'space'; and if we talk of a wider 'space' this is effectively just such an image). One version of the question posed by the embedding of physical 'space' in such a coordination or Kosmos is given in a 'neopythagorean' treatise:

72 THEON of Smyrna

Tetraedra ex ed with lat tr Bulliaud
Paris 1644 (& in (114) below)

Theon's Tetractys frames a complete encyclopaedic circuit of his first- or second-century Kosmos: beginning with the 'arithmetic' tetractys he passes through 'geometric' tetractys, 'musical' tetractys, 'physical' tetractys, on through six others to return to the science of mathematics itself within the tenth: a tetractys of tetractys.
Now the coordination of three dimensions of 'logical' or theoretical space with those three dimensions of physical, cultural and linguistic European 'space' - the French, British and German - and with the American space of their symmetric interplay (reflected by a more or less closed Russian space or Rus) appears nearly as scandalously schematic as a fairly regular temporal scansion of the theoretical, cultural and material economy of that 'space'.

But as is attested by Theon's later version, the question of the relations and interactions of these various orders of the 'mark', is effectively posed by the 'mystery' of the Tetractys as marking of the symmetry of the various orders of that marking, of the mark.

If Roman Europe was indeed physically divided over the Dark Ages into various 'nations', each developing their own centre(s) of organisation of activity, and their own national languages in which such 'national' activity was framed (Latin France, Teutonic Germany, the interplay of their two languages in Britain), then what is the logical organisation, or rather, what organises, complementing the common physical economy of the old Roman Empire, this differentiation, this coordination of a certain order of linguistic 'mark' or word, with a French, German, or British order of the feudal 'mark' or boundary?

That is: it is not as if we simply and arbitrarily had theoretical activity carried on in those three different languages, and now sought to arrive at some arbitrary correlation of that triple and a certain triplicity of logical 'space'. For we may take the question one step further back, and ask why there should have been a partition of the physical and linguistic and political space of Europe at all, and ask (since there was) what was its dynamic, what were its dynamics?

- What, if not the mutual distinction of three 'logical' dimensions of integration of communal stories (or histories), within the migratory interplay of various groups over the period of dissolution of the integrated Roman 'story'?

Here, once more, this ternary European space (and its American complement, somehow at once British and not British) is an abstraction from those textual matrices we call schools, which tend, naturally enough, to be closely tied to particular languages and places. Together these dimensions of a cultural 'space' and 'time'
abstracted from the embedding of our (my) matrix of texts in their contexts (the latter in their turn framed in other texts, and coordinated with the order of text in general, through the attempt to embed or inscribe this text in whatever its 'context(s)' may turn out to be or not to be), serve then, however 'questionably', to coordinate versions of the pythagorean mystery, and of the 'presocratic' schools of which it is one moment or element, 'in terms of' that focal question, and its focal symbol, the Tetractys. The 'time' of the various versions appears 'in these terms' as the synchrony of three or four parallel sequences, each 'working through', from their own point of view, the space of their synchrony. 'In these terms' Zeller's mid-nineteenth century german organisation of presocratic material presents, as 'Kosmos', just a reflection of that very 'organisation'. This version of coordination in its turn serves to coordinate various subsequent steps, various subsequent 'parallel' versions, over the second half of the nineteenth century, and on through the twentieth (where Zeller's very text serves to coordinate subsequent results, through its annotation by Mondolfo). That is: the inscription of Zeller's scheme as a german figure of the turning-point between romantic versions around 1800, and, say, the meeting with Dilthey's hermeneutics and the 'sociology of religion' around the time of Diels' canonical edition of the texts at the turn of the century, serves to bring into question the various nineteenth and twentieth century versions as so many component figures of the initial question, themselves logically related by the embedding of their 'physical' relations in the space and time of two centuries, in the wider question of that 'cosmic' organisation or space of which physical space is one dimension; one dimension which, like the other coordinate dimensions, has an internal organisation mirroring its part in the 'external coordination with the other 'dimensions'.

Within that organisation, then, there appears to be a natural mirroring, over two and a half millenia, of the passage into the european time of Theory in the 'presocratic' phase, and the question of a passage 'out', as posed over the thirty or so years around 2000. Structurally the two transitions appear analogous, partaking (one as it were the inverse of the other), of the same abstract figure of passage in or out of the sequence of 'steps'.
I have already alluded to the primary question directing more or less international research (abstracted from the dominance of national schools insofar as physical theory itself is abstracted from that global theory, 'philosophy') in theoretical physics, from around 1970: the question of the coupling of gravitational interaction and the very local 'strong' interaction, through the intermediate symmetry of a unified 'electroweak' interaction - that is (since a symmetry preserved in time or space-time structures a 'dynamic' of interaction): the question posed by the symmetry of the global symmetry of space-time and the local 'colour' symmetry governing the strong interaction, as coordinated in the 'model' quantised gauge-field presented in the Weinberg-Salam electroweak theory of 1967. - The question of a single unitary symmetry of which the three forces are so many dimensions or sub-symmetries: a 'Theory of Everything' (TOE) integrating GUT ('Grand Unification' - colour plus electroweak fields) 'supersymmetry' with quantised gravity in a sort of super-duper-symmetry, in which the three 'internal' dimensions of an elementary sub-particle (quark), 'colour', mirror the three 'external' dimensions of global 'space', in a common time, and the intermediate symmetry which structures our interaction with tangible and visible medium-size objects in 'sensation'.

I have already, also, suggested that this intermediate dynamic or symmetry structuring the physics of image, sensation, may itself be taken as an 'image' of the broader (but inseparable) question of a still wider symmetry coupling the whole physical order with other 'co-ordinate' or symmetric dimensions of our activity, our actuality. - The symmetry of the physical symmetries with a logical order of Theory (including 'physics') whose two poles are projected as a unitary global logical 'space' and time, and elementary boolean 'atoms', with their interface in the verbal order of a text, which is also the interface of that 'logical' side of its matrix, with Jakobson's complementary poetic space and time of metaphor and metonymy: this 'poetic' embedding of text in the space-time of theatrical action, and its component symmetry of the quadro or 'image', coordinating, then, the various dimensions of its 'physical' and 'logical' sides.

Then we may speak of the coordination of theoretical texts in a simple synchronic symmetry of their various 'dimensions', and its dynamic, 'the western tradition', as a sort of 'general relativity'
of theory (of which Einstein's physical theory of General Relativity is itself one component, one range or 'sheaf' of world-lines corresponding to the group of its twentieth-century exponents). To bring out this order of textual interaction is, then, not to propose some unitary global determinism of theoretical reflection; for this 'global' and unitary 'side' abstracted from the actual texts of the tradition(s) is itself doubled by an essentially indeterministic coordination of the 'quanta', the individual words, of any of the constituent texts. 'Indeterministic', though we can (once more by analogy with the 'external' order of the text) simply and systematically articulate, in a symmetry which mirrors and complements the global 'space-time' of textual coordination, the general matrix of possible substitutions at any point of the text, together with a sort of elementary analysis of their 'co-occurrences', a sort of probability theory, a quantum theory, of the elements of the textual 'atoms' or words.

Just as in the theoretical physics of around 1970, the physics of an actual tangible body (say yours or mine) was framed as a radical question in terms of the formal symmetry of the global and local symmetries governing its interactions with other bodies in a unitary 'Universe' - rather than the unitary global system of physical actuality, and the unitary local system of physical possibility being themselves seen as two 'sides' abstracted from the particular and ambiguous situation of a particular body - so a 'grammatology' contemporary or synchronic with that physics could frame a specific text as the formal interface of hjelmslevian elementary differentiation (the dynamic of différence in terms of 'traces'), and a global Tradition or History (différence in universal textualité).

Now to pass back from a unitary grammatology already 'in question' by 1973-4, to our 'bibliography' - from 'the text' to the particular texts which constitute the textual matrix of this particular text - we must mark the question of the embedding of that matrix of words in a coordination of theoretical, textual (or linguistic or ideological), cultural, material, and physical matrices, which frame so many coordinate 'dimensions' of our writing and reading: this just as the only way to resolve the theoretical question posed by the symmetry of global and local physical symmetries,
is to mark somehow the very abstraction of those symmetries, from their (physical) marking in a particular book (say, this one). That is: the limiting and coordinate questions dominating the various departments and schools of thinking and activity and being in the nineteen-eighties, can only be satisfactorily framed and confronted by the 'external' coordination of those 'internal' theoretical or practical reflections of their mutual decoupling or abstraction. That is: the question is, to couple or coordinate in a text - say, this one - all those coordinate questions in the very question (marked by this book) of their abstraction from such coordination (and, more particularly, from the books in which they are posed).

The question, then, of the coupling of the theoretical questions of the closing twentieth century, with the questions, say, of the interaction of a global money-market with local basic production; of global East-West and North-South coordination of centralised governmental policies interacting with the various elementary components of personal interaction - this in terms of the dynamics of cultural groups; of global ideological differences (particularly as to the relation of ideology and material economy) interacting with the elements of the stories by which people organise their activity, in 'the media' of verbal communication... and so on: towards the close of the century this question of the embedding of theory and its text in the coordination through that text with various coordinate dimensions of its context becomes a question for 'theory'. A question of which one component is the mirroring of this question of the inscription of theory in a coordination of which it is itself one dimension or element (this question marked by this book)...its mirroring in the structurally almost identical question (rather like a photographic negative) of the emergence of 'theory' from a θt-σα, the part of whose coordination with the other dimensions of 'Kosmos' constitutes the question...indeed the mystery, of the first pythagorean school.

What is this 'mirroring' over two and a half thousand years?..Well, this story or inquiry or history opens with the question of 'theory'; the question of an initial marking of the 'logical' order of theory, through the marking of its coordination with other symmetrical orders of the mark; the question of this institution of
logical 'abstraction', of the internal 'space' of theory abstracted from the external physical space of the mark through the marking of their difference: but this question posed by the complete abstraction outwardly marked only by a system of silence, from the 'outside' of the pythagorean group. That is, the coordination of the newly abstracted logical 'space' with its other coordinates first occurs, around 500BC, within that logical 'space' of pythagorean 'theory': the pythagorean 'mathematics' is the logical determination of the coordination of logic, 'theory', with the other dimensions of a mathematical Kosmos. Our initial question is posed by the circuit of outward silence by which this logical coordination is itself embedded in the outward coordination it formally, inwardly, logically, frames. - An embedding marked for us, first of all, by Parmenides' bringing of the silent abstraction of pythagorean theory from its 'outside' into question, and this in the structure of his breaking pythagorean silence. The pythagorean terms of the internal space of coordination of this internal space with its other coordinates in 'Kosmos', themselves serve to frame the bringing-into-question of their very abstraction, as Parmenides marks the symmetry of their 'internal' logic, and its physical and ontological embedding in his world, his Kosmos.

Parmenides' criticism or bringing-into-question of the pythagorean abstraction which he finds himself 'standing outside', was our first 'step'; but Parmenides' framing of his question, and the assertion it evokes (the inscription of his assertion of the self-assertion of What Is, in that self-assertion), in its turn remains 'abstract', and is, in its turn, itself brought into question (to which question Zeno then replies by questioning the point from which it may be supposed asserted). Thus successive versions of the 'theory' which comes full-circle by framing itself as one component of the world or Kosmos it frames, are successively brought into question - a question always framed by posing the figure of the previous abstraction 'in its own terms' - but associating these terms, not with their part or definition within the previous abstract theoretical 'space', but rather with a truer world of their coordination in which that previous space as a whole is embedded or inscribed as one term.
Thus the opening pythagorean question or mystery itself frames the radical coordination of the abstraction it institutes, with its coordinate contexts: it poses in its limiting form the question of theory as the 'space' of coordination in which all the succeeding criticisms or questionings of earlier questioning and assertion, may themselves be together, systematically, 'brought into question' - and brought into the frame of this inquiry. The symmetry of theory and its contexts which may be posed in the initial pythagorean terms by which theory is instituted as an activity, itself poses the question which frames the inscription of this book as inquiry in the coordination of its 'reflection' with its contexts - and herein lies the mirroring - or 'symmetry' - of these opening and closing questions of this inquiry. Within that limiting symmetry which frames the time and space of the inquiry or story, various sequences of abstractions of theory and contexts from their common coordination or coupling may be articulated, as so many steps in the inquiry. In particular, we can differentiate national 'schools' of interpretation of presocratics, or pythagoreans - or of theory as such - and this all the more easily, as 'schools' and 'nations' are linked or coupled precisely in the coordination of their decoupling or abstraction, in each case, from the coupling of school and school or nation and nation in the symmetry of theory and its various contexts. Thus should the question of the coupling, for example, of european nations in an integrated 'european community', be directly confronted and in part resolved in the separate nations; and should national activity in Europe be framed as simply one component of european activity as a whole, then we might find the beginning of a truly european school of 'philosophy' in which the french or german or british elements in an individual's theorising were subordinate to, and largely confused in, a 'european' character.

...But such european integration or conscious coupling would itself of necessity be linked with a complementary coupling of Europe with eastern, western, and southern components of the global order 'outside': in particular with that american school which is already framed in the symmetry of its european components, but which is decoupled from european theory, in its abstraction
from the relative but radical autonomy of those 'deep' questions which are associated with the primacy in each of the three dominant 'schools' of Europe of a certain logic.

The question posed by, for example, this book, then, is that of a 'cosmopolitan' or 'global' philosophy, in which the unavoidably local or national character of its assertion or proposition is not denied, but simply inscribed in and subordinated to a common frame of inquiry and activity which is the space and time of coordination of these different loci of its assertion. - This rather as we already share in a common physical 'space' and time, in which we can coordinate the different points in it from which we frame it.

In the texts now under review, however, this question is not resolved, so that we may still coordinate them in terms of the locus of their production: the coupling of schools through the interaction of these texts is still a matter of that systematic mutual misunderstanding which I noted in the 'Dummett-Davidson Debate' of the early seventies, or the Strawson-Quine debate a decade before: two nations separated by a common language. - Or that systematic distortion of the 'space' of parisian reflection focussed in Lacan around 1970, which occurs in its transposition into anglo-american debate: Derrida's questioning is taken as focus, and the symmetry whereby the primary psychological orientation of the french school is brought into question by Derrida in terms of its 'textuality' is abstracted from its coordination with other components of the parisian 'space' and reconstructed in America as a sort of system of 'deconstruction', pragmatically applied as one technique among others, in the symmetrical interaction of texts with their american contexts.

- Or that 'common-sense' distortion of the 'results of the german school in the last twenty years' presented to the british school in 1892 by Burnet.
Back to the bookshelves.

Back to the shelves, as we bring this still abstract coordination in this book, of the external space of coordination of more or less indeterminate 'books' (or 'the book') into question once more. The 'hermeneutic' alternation between this abstract space and time of coordination 'outside' the books, and the analysis of its figures or configuration in particular books that are to be supposed embedded in it, is now drawing to a close. 'Bibliography' must itself close as we arrive back at this text itself from which its bibliography started; but to complete such a circuit we must first pass through versions of a few specific Presocratics or presocratic schools, thence to texts and versions of an Antiquity beyond the opening presocratic phase; then through texts and versions of the second main period - those texts themselves embodying figures of the coordination of the texts of the first period, and versions of them in the third - and on to texts of that third period, some of them versions of that period itself, or of various of its elements.

First a halfway house on the way back to the pythagoreans:

73 MEURSIUS, Johannes *Denarius Pythagoricus* Leiden 1631

This text, which I found by chance in a bookseller's catalogue in 1976 or 1977 (I forget), may also serve as representative of several thousand old books, more or less closely related to this inquiry, through which I have more or less rapidly skimmed, in general abstracting enough of their 'coordinates' in the intertextual matrix to decide whether or not buying them and describing them to a librarian or to another bookseller was likely to contribute to the material maintenance of the body that now sits at its typewriter, closing this parallel, and on the face of it materially unprofitable, activity.

The prolific dutch scholar here abstracts from the vast matrix of his philological activity (its material side the editing of standard texts that sustained that labour on them) all references, jumbled together with no regard for the perspective of the sources from which he takes them, and which he cites in the margin, to
pythagorean or neopythagorean or neoplatonic associations of any
mythical or theological or physical or logical or..any other..figures
with those 'figures' we call the numbers from One to Ten. I noted
Theon of Smyrna's attempt to articulate these figures fifteen centuries
before as a tetractys of tetractes. Meursius gives as it were the
free play of figuration from which Theon's version may be seen as
one among various possible abstractions. The radical freedom of
this interplay of figures, corresponding to the radical character of
the pythagorean question, also allows another sort of construction,
whose tradition passes through Apollonius of Tyana and Iamblichus
down to less robust modern fancies, represented by, say:

'SCHURE, Edouard

Les Grands Initiés
Paris 1909

'Fancies', fantasies of Pythagoras, here embedded in a fantastic sequence of initiations into Schuré's scheme: Pythagoras, Christ, Krishna, and various other figures somewhat indeterminate between myth and history. Yet in its way such fantasy presents a fundamental aspect of the pythagorean 'mystery' from which more scientific accounts abstract: for the play of pythagorean figures presents precisely the question of the locus in that play of framing its coordination, Kosmos - and precisely the possibility of discovering various figures of 'psychical' self-assertion - and these embedded to a lesser or greater extent in configurations of our actual interaction with others and with our world, our version of Kosmos - by which to some extent we live and act. That is to say, pythagorean figures, whether in neopythagoreanism, in Jewish Qabala and Hassidism, in renaissance magic or otherwise, do frame or open up 'paranormal' figures of action, of 'magical' self-assertion in some coupling of psychical and ontical orders, which we cannot dissociate from 'scientific' pythagoreanism without systematically distorting the whole western tradition subsequent to Pythagoras (whatever he might really have effected 'magically').

- Without distorting the organising part of such 'magical' figuration in the vast body of later texts and testimonia collected as:

CARDINI, M C

Pitagorici Testimonianzi e Frammenti
Florence 1958-64
'Psychical self-assertion': indeed it is just this figure of 'soul' which, with the 'mathematical' coordination of theory, 'vision' of that soul, with the other elements of Kosmos coordinated in such vision; together with the 'wonders' or magic of Pythagoras, dominate these fragments. I have noted an early Christian version of 'prayer' (in the eleventh chapter of Mark's account): the story that if one frames a version of what's going on (within the wider Christian history in which the revelation of the frame of this history is one central term), and acts in accordance with one's part in the story (acts then one's part in this version or story of 'prayer'), then this 'faith' in one's story makes it true, makes things happen that way rather than another. The radical circularity of such a story of the part of stories in the 'world' of which they constitute one dimension, is coordinate with a radical structural openness of 'the world' in which we are thus invited to assert ourselves: to assert ourselves as thus assertive, as 'souls', psychical actualities. That the play of 'Pythagorean' figures articulates such a circularity and openness of 'Kosmos' to our 'making it up' as we go along, means that we may find some configuration of Pythagorean figures, some 'version' of Pythagoras say, which seems to somehow correspond to the fact that we are to some extent 'making it up'. We can participate through such a story or fantasy, to some extent, in the working of the Pythagorean figure of 'soul' in our account of that figure, in our vision of the Pythagorean 'vision'.

Schuré, then, 'making up' a story of the Pythagorean school, a 'fiction'. But Parmenides' criticism of the Pythagorean 'history' of Kosmos itself determined that Pythagorean story itself as a fiction. And before Parmenides so to speak breaks out of that limiting Pythagorean 'mythology', that 'theoretical' story which identified itself as a 'theory' of a Kosmos, a cosmic drama turning about this discovery of Kosmos as Drama - and before Aeschylus in a parallel move abstracts Athenian 'drama' from an analogous 'vision' or spectacle of the world - we must regard the 'logic' and the 'fiction' of the Pythagorean mystery as two complementary components in that unstable figure of the silent passage from a more or less unbroken 'play' of figuration in Burnet's 'wild tale of the origin
of things', to the decoupled internal logical space of theoretical texts, and 'external' embedding of the text of athenian drama in a 'theatrical' action or acting abstracted from its context. A passage through the Socrates who wrote no philosophy, and the growing abstraction of platonic 'theory', over the first half of the fourth century, from the dramatic articulation of dialogue, to Aristotle's logic of the abstraction of such logic from its own 'poetics'.

To abstract the 'theoretical', or rather, logical, component from the mystery in which the pythagorean group and its theory is articulated, reconstituting the dramatic interplay of 'logical' and mythical or 'fictional' sides of pythagorean activity within the practical order of a common sense which is altogether unmysterious, unproblematic:

76 RAVEN, J E Pythagoreans and Eleatics Cambridge 1948

..is thus as much a distortion, indeed itself a 'fiction' of the pythagoreans, as Schure's imaginary reconstruction, which at least enters into something of the working, the actuality, of the pythagorean 'play' of terms - a play which first directly confronts the question of giving a story of the part of a story of 'the world' in that 'world': the question from which 'common sense' abstracts: this abstraction constitutive of the circular interplay of terms - of reason, action, World - which organises that common sense.

In their presentation of the radical 'play' or interplay of terms in which the term \( \chi \sigma \alpha \beta \) organises its own self-distinction or separation from the other words of Heraclitus' fragments, and so expresses itself as self-expression, the french and german editors of those fragments:

77 BOLLACK, Jean & WISSMANN, Heinz Héraclite ou la Séparation Paris 1972 (79,81)

..note that Raven's collaborator on the standard british presentation of the presocratic fragments as a whole (below), G'S Kirk, in his attempt to reconstitute from 'Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments' (NY 1954) a unitary system and universal circuit, goes wrong in his very title, abstracting a common-sense unity of World from an essentially plural and fragmentary play into which the fragments are so many inductions.
A 'play' of pythagorean figures around 500BC, from which the closed circuits of subsequent 'logic' and poetic 'fiction' are consequent abstractions; and I suggested that one might find in Heraclitus' fragments the marking of a complementary pole of this greek play of figures from which Parmenides' italian 'logic' and ontology emerged in the first third of the fifth century. - An eastern, ionian, pole; outside the pythagorean western silence, in his extreme singularity outside any greek group, the limiting expression of the sixth-century ionian 'school'. So perhaps we might take Kirk's and Raven's 'common-sense' abstraction from the mystery, the mysteries, of this transitional play of figures, unstable and ambiguous between anterior mythology and posterior logic, as two complementary components of a pragmatic abstraction from the 'presocratic question' as a whole, combined in 1957.

I further suggested that one might find in Empedocles' poem or poems a mid-fifth century integration of those two 'poles', eastern and western, of the presocratic question. Heinz Wissmann, in a joint review (Critique, Paris 1970) of O'Brien's Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle (Cambridge 1965) and

78 BOLLACK, Jean Empédocle Paris 1965-9

brings out, then, another moment in 'common-sense' abstraction from the radical play of presocratic figuration: O'Brien's schematic and unproblematic categories of interpretation (their simplicity in a sort of inverse proportion to the vast technical apparatus they organise) are set against Bollack's subtle induction into the question posed for us by Empedocles. Bollack, the french centre of a group of younger germans (among them his reviewer and subsequent co-editor), introduces his critical edition of fragments and testimonia with a preliminary volume on the question posed by the transmission of Empedocles' Kosmos through Aristotle's: a decisive element in the more general 'hermeneutic' question posed by the presocratics as a whole. The fragments are followed by a two-volume commentary where the converse movements of philological dissection and hypothetical coordination of empedoclean figures mirror the organising force of the two figures of integration and differentiation thus elicited from the fragments themselves.
Now Empedocles, around the middle of the fifth century, may be taken to mark the first of three steps from the complementary pythagorean and heraclitean 'versions' of the play of figures around 500BC, through mid-century, the death of Socrates at the very beginning of the third, and that of Plato fifty years later. Alternatively (or rather, also) we may take the supposed publication by Philolaus of pythagorean doctrines around the time of the outbreak of the peloponnesian war (and of Socrates' emergence at Athens), as a turning-point in the overall transition from the beginning of the fifth century and the middle of the fourth (the death of Plato, the emergence of 'pythagorising' dominance in the Academy, and the departure of Aristotle from the school). Here the radical 'hermeneutic' question or mystery posed by the presocratic birth of 'theory' (the question posed by the fact that our accounts of this opening are themselves framed by later versions of theory, later theories) appears in a form which reflects the initial pythagorean question. Kirk and Raven -

79 KIRK, G S & RAVEN, J E The Presocratic Philosophers Cambridge 1957 (76-8)

- finding that there are 'platonic' and 'aristotelian' figures in the supposed fragments of Philolaus, and that there is nothing extant before Philolaus of which these figures can be considered the development, simply cut the gordian knot of the Philolaus-question and attribute all the fragments to a post-aristotelian projection into the presocratic matrix from which Plato and Aristotle emerged. The fact that some accounts of some of Philolaus' doctrines contain later conceptions, or are framed in a later philosophic language (and some of the 'fragments' definitely are later 'fictions'), allows them to dispense with the whole set. Yet as Kurt von Fritz carefully argues in his article on Philolaus in the thirteenth supplementary volume to:

80 Pauly's Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft Stuttgart 1832-52; revised Wissowa, Kroll, Ziegler, 1894-(continui

- that the Philolausfrage embodies an essential circularity. If Philolaus did indeed first publish pythagorean doctrine, we cannot expect to find any direct extant antecedents (but only deduce possible antecedents from the supposition of a silent pythagorean tradition synchronous in its various phases after around 500, with the
various phases of the extant tradition: Rohde's problematic). Moreover we cannot date the fragments after Plato and Aristotle because they contain platonic and aristotelian figures, for we would first have to determine that these figures were not in turn taken by Plato and Aristotle from Philolaus or other pythagoreans (as indeed many testimonia insist). The only way to resolve the question is to develop a structural analysis of the presocratic tradition as a whole, based on all the extant material, and following Zeller, Rohde, Bollack and others in directly confronting the hermeneutic question attaching to that structure as a whole - entering into a dialogue with Diels' collection, in which tentative figures of framing the coordination of fragments and subsequent testimonia interact with the figuration of those fragments, from which the interpretative tradition in which one is approaching them itself derives. And it is from just this question which Kirk and Raven's 'History', and their 'Selection of Texts' on which it is based (or is the Selection based on their story?), in the common-sense tradition of Burnet, abstracts.

We go to Pauly and his successors to determine the current state of the question, and its history: for here all the material is reviewed by german scholars in the form of continually updated abstracts of recent research on all extant material from 'classical antiquity'. Organising material: I noted the part of 'organisation' of the material in Zeller's perspective, and the fruits of this in Diels and Kranz' edition of the texts; in the joint work of Bollack and Wiesmann this is complemented by a french problematic of framing the relations of framing a text from the materials, framing the text in which this is effected; the interplay of those two sides of the text; and the 'material' itself. And I noted the 'common-sense' organisation of a selection which illustrates that organisation of its selection, in Burnet's school. In Pauly-Wissowa 'philosophers' appear as one section of classical authors among others, the dominant questions philological. For the philosophers one might supplement the Pauly articles by another german 'organisation of material':
I noted the parallel or synchrony of a range of mid-nineteenth century reactions against the closed circuit of hegelian *Enzyklopädie*, eventually focussed around 1870 in the 'neokantianism' that dominated german universities over the turn of the century. Zeller worked in the interplay of the opening configuration of 'philosophy', and the history since Leibniz of his own organising perspective; Trendelenburg at Berlin took as his focus Aristotle's 'system' - but this as rather a dynamic frame of coordinating questions (in an interplay of nineteenth-century and fourth century mirroring Zeller's hermeneutic interaction with the previous two centuries) than as any closed and unambiguous whole. His student Ueberweg extended this relation to Aristotle by embedding the interaction of fourth century Greece and nineteenth century Germany in a unitary dynamic that comprehended both and their relation. Such a frame then provided for the pursuit of 'history of philosophy' as an ongoing project, the 'aristotelian' problematic serving to coordinate the whole range of new research: a unitary coordination (if we remain with the first volume devoted to classical Antiquity) which complements the biographically organised 'base' assembled by Pauly and his successors. And which complements also (through all five volumes) other bases:

82 *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed Paul Edwards  NY/London 1967

83 *Encyclopedia Filosofica* prepared by the Centro di Studi Filosofici di Gallarate  Venice/Rome 1957-8

(I have hardly used Baldwin’s, Eisler’s or Lalande’s dictionaries)

The second écyclopaedia was rather characteristically prepared by three committees, and covers a broad range of perspectives; the first is limited in its usefulness (but useful within those limits) by the fairly rigid embedding of its perspective in the anglo-american debates of the mid-sixties - and such is Philip Wiener’s criticism (for example) from the complementary anglo-american perspective of the 'History of Ideas' (Journal of the History of Ideas, 1968).
Returning to general histories,

84 RUSSELL, Bertrand  
A History of Western Philosophy  
London 1946

...is of course - although it does indeed propose to give a history of philosophical ideas in their cultural contexts - open to the more extreme criticism, that it is limited by the somewhat arbitrary historical scheme of one individual (rather than a whole school); and this scheme rather projected onto a base than derived from the interplay with that textual base. Yet in its way the scheme is useful enough as something to react against, and indeed invites such a manner of reading by the constant irony which opens up a distance between text and reader (with the author himself chuckling with the reader). One might set against this levity the useful history of Russell's antagonist, begun the same year:

85 COPLESTON, Frederick  
A History of Philosophy  
London 1946-75

...where Russell's irony is mirrored in Jesuit commitment.

I have not used Windelband's neokantian systematisation (Freiburg iB 1892, 2 ed 1900) beyond noting its general frame - a sort of abstraction from Ueberweg's - in the dynamic of frames of inquiry, questions, 'problems'.

So back to Ueberweg; Back to Aristotle (rather than Back to Kant). Back indeed a little further, from Aristotle and the eventual coordination of aristotelian symmetries and Ueberweg's questions in the unitary historical dynamic which comprehends both, along with all the intervening material, through their relation. Back to the last step towards such a synthesis (the last step on from Ueberweg's initial analysis in 1853 of the 'element' of his dynamic, the interplay between Teacher and Pupil): back to Plato. For it was through the analysis of the dynamic or sequence of the Teacher's teaching, over the first half of the fourth century, published in 1861, that Ueberweg moved on, the next year, to his Pupil, Aristotle, and the general scheme of the wider dynamic as a whole.
I had discussed the presocratics, in the first section of my 'story', working with a very schematic conception of Plato's position 'around 470' as organising - through the Republic - a transition from early 'socratic' dialogues to the systematic cosmology of the Timaeus; but as I looked again at the Protagoras and Meno, the Phaedo and Symposium, the Republic, the Sophist, the Parmenides and Timaeus... I was now drawn into a dramatic play which I had in the past more or less disregarded; and as I worked through Plato's development the simplicity of the old scheme of theoretical development through a basic duality of unitary 'internal' space of Ideas, and fragmentary outward, earthly, material play, the terms of my own interpretation entered more and more deeply into the play of platonistic figures: the play, the drama, articulated in the dialogues. Previously I had seen Plato too indirectly through the systems of Proclus or Ficino or Cudworth or Thomas Taylor or Hegel. Now I was discovering that 'hermeneutic' interplay of text and interpretation, first applied (once more) by Schleiermacher in the attempt to enter into the dynamic, the drama, of the dialogues, and articulate its system. I was struck by the circularity of Schleiermacher's and subsequent framings of this platonic drama of reflection: the sequence of the dialogues was established to show the 'space-time' of Plato's thought; but this sequence was itself in the first place framed in the dynamic of some other interpretative system. At this point I had no access to recent work on the question, and was working only with Jowett's translation, which I happened to have with me out at the welsh border: the possible permutations of dialogues and constituent figures became at some points dizzying; Jowett's sequence (he had come, from mid-century, under the influence of Hegel, then Baur) seemed wildly wrong, but I did not know of Lutoslawski's turn-of-the-century 'stilometric' analysis. The sequence I did eventually arrive at does in fact correspond closely to his, with the exception that I placed the Gorgias after the Republic, and the Parmenides immediately after (rather than before) the Sophist-Statesman-Philebus trilogy (thus constituting a sort of Parmenides-Timaeus & Critias-Laws trilogy (which I am still loth to
relinquish).

From this point on I became aware of the systematic function of the interplay between the terms in which the reading of a text was framed, and the terms of the text itself. This provided, in the first instance, a systematic access to:

Now why should a similar access to Aristotle through the dynamic of Plato's development, and a coordination by Uberweg of the internal coordination of the aristotelian scheme, and its outward embedding in his complementary nineteenth-century scheme (framed in aristotelian terms), allow a sort of cannonical 'history of philosophy' which includes both as two fundamental terms or elements, around and between which all the rest may be organised?

I suggested that the transition from first to second half of the fourth century, from Plato to Aristotle, completed a first phase or period of reflection, which might be characterised as a cycle in which 'logic' is abstracted from its dramatic context, culminating in Aristotle's logic of the athenian drama itself. The articulation, then, of the systematic symmetry of the 'internal' logic of Aristotle's Kosmos, and a complementary logic of the embedding of that internal logic in a historical dynamic, presents a sort of structurally minimal form of a logical history of logic, abstracted from the limiting question of its embedding in a wider 'history', articulated in a symmetry and interaction of logic and its 'material' context, in its historical institution.

Such an 'abstract' history of logic, and of the 'philosophy' it formally frames, does at the same time - this through the symmetry of the figuration of the aristotelian scheme, and of the access to it - present the question of the embedding of such a logical dynamic within the wider hermeneutic organised by the question of inscribing the logic of this inquiry in an interaction of reflection and context.
whose first phase closes with Aristotle. Thus I have noted the way that that more general question may be posed in terms of Aristotle's transmission of the opening phase - and more particularly of its first half, 'presocratic philosophy' from the time of Heraclitus and the first pythagoreans, down to the Peloponnesian war. The question is addressed, for example in:

88 CHERNISS, Harold

Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy Baltimore 1935

89

Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy 1944 (followed by The Riddle of the Early Academy in 1945)

90 GUTHRIE, History of Greek Philosophy Cambridge 1962-81

(a history down to Aristotle)

The former address the question of the principles of Aristotle's reading of his forbears, as preparatory to the reconstruction of the pre-aristotelian frame in which these principles themselves are to be embedded (this primary frame of the transmission of its own matrix).

...But this general question attaching to a 'logical' history of philosophy through Aristotle has itself been transmitted primarily through:

91 JAEGGER, Werner

(Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung Berlin 1923; revised by J for the english tr:) Oxford 1934

-based on lectures from 1916 preparatory to a critical edition of the Metaphysics, and contemporary with

92 ROSS, W D

Aristotle London 1923

- which preceded his critical edition of the Metaphysics the following year.
The epochal presentation of the Aristotelesfrage by Wilamowitz' pupil in turn frames the embedding of this question in what I have called its 'pre-aristotelian matrix':

Here the question attaching to Ueberweg's scheme follows an inverse sequence: not through the dynamic of Plato's drama to Aristotle's encyclopaedic system, but rather the inscription of a play of Aristotle's terms in a wider dramatic order framed by Plato's school - and most particularly, the part in that school of Aristotle's lost early dialogues. Finding then, in Jaeger's 'genetic method' which sees in the extant canon no synchrony of a truly aristotelian system, a 'coming-to-be' of Aristotle's reflection, which extends the correlation of the terms in which its logic is framed with the terms of that logic, to a correlation of the 'genetic' approach with the axial aristotelian biology.

In Paideia the question is further opened-up through the figures which form the matrix of Jaeger's own 'formation'. I noted the complementarity of Nietzsche's and Wilamowitz' 'poetics' of the part of logic in greek culture, and Rohde's embedding of the extant 'apollonian' logic in the question posed by (dionysian) silence. Rohde's position which I characterised as intermediate between Nietzsche's Art and Wilamowitz' Science is here incorporated in the perspective of that Science. Aristotle's extant lectures, not a logical system, are embedded in a wider, essentially platonic, poetic of greek culture: a culture, it is asserted, framed from Homer down to the christian period, by the figure of this inscription of logic in the poetics of education, of induction into that very culture, of Paideia. Aristotle provides an induction into the platonic context of his teaching; that context (with which the survey initially intended to extend down to the christian period ends) into greek culture as a whole; and the greeks into Culture itself, framing that conflict of Civilisation with dark dionysian forces which 'Conflict of Cultural Ideals in the Age of Plato' (to take the title
of the last volume) reflects the global conflict which frames Jaeger's own account, his own induction into Culture...

The method also reflects the subject (1)

What is needed is a morphology of culture in the true historical sense (2)

The function of the historian is to use his imagination to plunge deeply into the life, emotion, and colour of another, more vivid world, entirely forgetting himself and his own culture and society, and thus to think himself into strange lives and unfamiliar ways of feeling, in the same way the poet fills his characters with the breath of life....his work becomes a philosophical drama born of the spirit of historical contemplation (3)

(compare this poetics of logic with Aristotle's logic of drama...)

(Ein) Darstellung, die die Paideia der Griechen und zugleich die Griechen als Paideia zum Gegenstand hat (4)

... and this question arising from that of the transmission through the aristotelian canon of the frame in which that canon itself was constituted is eventually linked with a wider cultural history which is articulated between Aristotle and Jager as two terms, as itself transmission: Paideia as transmission, and transmission as Paideia, the very historical dynamic of Culture:

In writing a history of paideia in the fourth century, the historian's choice of materials is largely determined by the type of evidence which has survived. The documents were chosen for preservation in later antiquity entirely because of their relevance to the ideal of paideia; and practically every book which seemed from that point of view to lack representative importance was allowed to perish. The history of greek paideia

1 Preface to tr 2 II.12 3 II.13 (all these only in tr)
4 Close of Preface to 2 ed (1935) of I
merges directly into the history of the transmission and manuscript survival of classical texts (1)

This framing of the question posed by, say, Ueberweg's scheme, as a poetics of Culture (and philosophy as induction into the culture of which it is the theory) is in turn complemented by Jaeger's view of Greek theology as one side of that poetic frame:

94 JAEGGER, Werner The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers (Gifford Lectures, 1936; pubd with revisions and additions:) NY/Oxford 1947

- and here once more an analysis of the opening phase is presented as framing a wider analysis

...down to the time when, under the influence of Greek philosophical theology, the Jewish-Christian religion transformed itself into a theological system in the Greek manner, in order to force its admission to the Hellenistic World (2)

- an analysis of the theological side of the poetics of presocratic philosophy which Jaeger opposes to both the 'positivist' scheme of Burnet, and its irrationalist antithesis in Cornford (these then as complementary abstractions of two sides of Jaeger's analysis).

Now I noted how the rival schools of the third century might themselves be interpreted in terms of the inscription of its logic in a primary poetic of theory, from which the Aristotelian circuit abstracted, and through which it comes practically 'into question': this, in particular through a sort of embedding of Aristotle's logic in a presocratic figure, which that logic had itself determined as one component of its 'internal' theoretical space. And I later noted how Marx in turn embedded Hegel's historical system of philosophical successions in that earlier figure of resurgence of an earlier figure:

95 MARX, Karl Dissertation Uber Demokrit und Epikur (1841) in MEGA²(below),

1 II, preface (in tr only) 2 Preface, v-vi
...and the transmission of Epicurus' 'bringing into question' of an abstract logic represented by Aristotle itself comes into question - as an historical system of so many abstractions of so many aspects from, say, the first of the three Letters preserved by Diogenes Laertius:

96 EPICURUS, La Lettre d'Epicure* ed with intr, tr & comm: J & M Bollack & H Wiseman Paris 1971

I did not use the collections of Epicurus' and Chrysippus' fragments made by Usener (1887, 1886) or von Arnim's wider collection of all early stoic fragments (1903-5: this process directly complementing the parallel collections of pre-fourth century fragments by Diels and others). Rather did I use, directly, the main sources in which these fragments are embedded: for Epicurus the last book of Diogenes Laertius and

97 PLUTARCH of Chaeronea, Moralia ed Babbitt & al*(Loeb) NY/London 1922- tr Philemon Holland London 1603

and for the stoics, Plutarch and

98 CICERO, Marcus Tullius ed Falconer & al*(Loeb) NY/London 1954-77

(most particularly the Academica Posteriora, De Natura Deorum, and De Officiis), together with

99 ARNOLD, Edward Roman Stoicism (Cambridge 1911)London 1958

...and for the alexandrian poets whom I attempted to set in synchrony with third-century stoics, epicureans, academics, and the (other) librarians, mathematicians and physicians, I referred all too rapidly to the Loeb editions of Callimachus, Apollonius Rhodius and Theocritus. For the physicians (and to a lesser extent for the rival schools of philosophers) I also used

100 PLINIUS (Secundus), Gaius Naturalis Historia, tr Ph Holland; London 1601
The Life of Marcellus (containing the death of Archimedes), of the Elder Cato (with the account of Carneades embassy to Rome), of Cicero and others I found in

101 PLUTARCH of Chaeronea *VitaesParallelae* ed Page & Rouse* L/NY 1912-
fr tr Amyot Paris (1559) 1579
tr(from fr) North London 1579

Now if the phase from around 500BC down to the mid-fourth century be considered a 'cycle' of theory amounting (among other things) to the abstraction of logic from its initial embedding in a dramatic interplay of theory, life, and world - and if it is through the coordination of this institution of 'abstraction' with nineteenth and twentieth century framings of it 'in its own terms', that a 'history of philosophy' is to be structured, then we might now consider the embedding of that first 'cycle' of abstraction in the passage from the 'hermeneutic question' posed by the presocratic opening of 'philosophy', to that - coordinated with it at the opening of the nineteenth century - posed by the confrontation of greek logic and Jewish 'story', poetic of History, about which Antiquity may be considered to turn. Then the triple reaction against 'abstract' logic in the three third-century schools may be regarded as so many synchronous or parallel moments of an initial confrontation of 'logic' and the cultural poetics of life, which each prefigures their convergence or conjunction in the radical 'question' which marks the beginning of our era, about which turns the first of the three broad cycles or phases of theory articulated in the inquiry or 'story' above (from about 500BC to about 1250).

That 'radical question' posed for theory by its confrontation with a 'poetic' order it cannot 'comprehend' I approached directly through the question of the framing in this book of the inscription of the Book(s), 'Bible', in the History it purports to frame:

102 The Old Testament according to the Septuagint* Cambridge (1887) 1901

103 Ἡ άλλη Διαθήκη : *Novum Testamentum Graece* Oxford 1910
Both, lat tr Jerome ( :Vulgate); tr London 1611 (AV) rev Weigle & alia 1946-52 (RSV); tr Dodd & alia 1961- (NEB)
(103) tr Rieu & Rieu Hawth 195-7
If as I suggested the emergent 'latin' philosophy of Lucretius and, more particularly, of Cicero, prefigures the integration of the three orders of 'practical' criticism of abstract logic, in the confrontation of logic and Jewish Story which constitutes the 'question' about which Antiquity may be taken to turn, then one might expect to find a sort of 'Cicero Question' which, prefiguring the more radical hermeneutic question of the Book itself, reflects the question attaching to the opening presocratic question from which fourth-century logic 'abstracts'. And indeed just such a question emerges over the twentieth century: should we not rather coordinate the various aspects of Cicero's activity in the unity of the man, the personality, Cicero, than project onto a fragmentary Cicero the missing coordination of our various different approaches - our failure to coordinate the lawyer's reflection and action, the logic of his stoic integration of the three third-century schools (almost), and the poetics of his attempt to integrate thought and action in the frame of Law?

104 Das Neue Cicerobild ed K Büchner Darmstadt 1971 (Wege der Forschung XXVII) - is a collection of articles (in German or German translation), 1924-62, with the editor's general introduction (dated Freiburg iB 1970): 'Das Neue Cicerobild. Der Denker Cicero' (following his Cicero, 1964, and, in the collection of articles of another contributor, Pierre Boyance, 1936-67, published the previous year. We might set this 'developing perspective' of the unitary system of Cicero's reflection and action (attested in one of the citations above from Cicero himself) with a semi-popular work by an American judge:

105 WILKIN, R N Eternal Lawyer: A Legal Biography of Cicero NY 1947

who at mid-century sees Cicero's situation in Rome reflected in the postwar international arena of 1947, and sees the unity of the many aspects of Cicero's life and writing in the constancy of the figure of the lawyer.

The 'Cicero Question' is, like the other coordinate questions already discussed, embedded in the question of transmission. Thus Augustine's deprecation of Cicero as a mere stylist is itself in large
part formative of the tradition which finds Cicero's 'thought' derivative and secondary: a tradition which in its turn fails to recognise the unity and coherence of the ciceronian frame of Augustine's criticism itself:

106 TUTARD, Maurice  
Saint Augustin et Ciceron  
Paris 1958

A parallel question or set of questions is posed by Lucretius' 'epicurean' poem: is it a mere transposition into Latin verse of original Greek thought (as Cicero's dialogues would be a similar transposition into Latin prose)? Or does the relation between poetic form and 'scientific' or philosophical content itself pose a philosophical question?

107 FARRINGTON, B  
'Form and Purpose in the De Rerum Natura'  
in *Lucretius* ed D R Dudley  
London 1965

108 BOLLACK, Mayotte  
La Raison de Lucrèce: Constitution d'une poétique philosophique avec un essai d'interprétation de la critique lucrétienne  
Paris 1978

109 MINADEO, Richard  
The Lyre of Science: Form and Meaning in *Lucretius'* De Rerum Natura  
Detroit 1969

Mayotte Bollack (wife of Jean and collaborator with Wissmann) discusses the 'Fonction de la Poesie' (pp 181-95) before moving into the poem through the 'Position de l'Auditeur' as framed by Lucretius in the introductory dedication to Memmius; the radical unity of form and content brought out serves to bring into question the fragmentation of Lucretius' position by the intervening tradition, and by the transmission of the text itself—typifying in Lachmann's epochal edition the philological tradition as a whole: Lachmann's failure to face the question of the unity of conception (his arbitrary introduction, rather, of an 'interpolator philosophicus'); Bailey's abstraction of a unitary physical theory from the unity of the whole,
reflected in his suggestion that the proem to Book IV (cited in Part I above) about which the six books turn, is displaced from a similar passage in Book I. I used the Loeb edition:

110 LUCRETIUS

De Rerum Natura ed & tr Rouse L/NY (1924)

rev Smith 1975

Bailey's 'apodictic' reasons for his drastic editing are rejected by Bühchner, whose work, along with that of Boyance, on the unity of poetic form and philosophical content in Lucretius, reflects the parallel 'new Cicero'. Minadeo proposes that the reflection of content in form assures the 'moral' working of the poem (that gilded pill). The form is a closed cycle of cycles which works as an induction of the reader into its 'meaning': the form and working of the Nature of which it is a part: 'The meaning is the form' (1)

These two complementary ('stoic' and 'epicurean') latin theoretical components which converge toward the more general question posed by the confrontation of logic and its poetics around the beginning of our era, are themselves synchronous with the 'greek' question of the transition from the 'platonism' (and other schools) of early Antiquity to the 'neoplatonism' emerging at Alexandria in the third century:

111 MERLAN, Philip

From Platonism to Neoplatonism The Hague 1953

112 THEILER, Willy

Die Vorbereitung des Neoplatonismus
(Berlin 1930; revised:) Berlin/Zurich 1964

- Theiler's revision takes into account the intervening discussion of the 'Posidonius Question' (parallelling the Cicero Question), summarised by Karl Reinhardt in Pauly-Wissowa (2).

I took as focus of this question 'on the theoretical side':

113 PHILO Judaeus


1 closing section ('Form & Meaning') p 106 2 RE XXII.i.558-826(1953)
Succeeding Philo's 'theoretical' proposition or framing of the question of the Book, at Alexandria around the beginning of the 'Christian era', we find once more - but now with wider scope - that theoretical atavism which goes forward from a particular question or from its configuration, by going back to an earlier figure from which a subsequent logic had abstracted (articulating that figure in the new 'logical space'), and embedding that subsequent logic as one term in the old figure, the old 'poetic' of that logic. This figure brought out by Marx in his doctoral dissertation - and itself applied as a whole to the historical configuration in which Hegel's logic was to be embedded - in terms of Epicurus' return to Leucippus and Democritus, now appears as a systematic structuring of the mirroring of theory before and after the question of the Book, of the Story organised by the telling of that Story as one element, to constitute 'classical' philosophy, the philosophy of pagan Antiquity, as a broad cycle extending from the sixth and fifth centuries before the beginning of our era, to the fifth and sixth centuries of this era, to the Heraclitean flux of Damascius' pythagoreanism or heavily 'pythagorising' neoplatonism (itself synchronous with 'Dionysius' systematic inscription of its logic as one term in the poetics of the Christian 'mystery'). The thirteenth century then marks a turning-point in a still wider version of this figure of theoretical atavism or regression, as in the opening of the phase articulated in the cycle of Part Two, the abstraction (once more) of an aristotelian logic from Dionysius' poetics of mystery, itself comes into question through being embedded in that neoplatonic poetic from which it had been formally abstracted.

The 'presocratic question', the 'question of the Book (or Story)', the 'question of the thirteenth century': these may themselves be coordinated in the question posed by Part One as a whole; as three components or dimensions of the question of how to frame that whole 'period' or cycle which turns about the beginning of our era as a question. As a question: the question posed by trying to give a story, an account, of this Story which embraces as one component this very figure of giving an account, a version, of it. - As a focal version of the general 'hermeneutic' question posed by the interplay between the configuration of book and context in which one frames an earlier such configuration of book and context, and that earlier configuration (which itself frames an historical dynamic in which one's later account is itself in principle embedded).
I have already suggested that the middle period or Part turning about 'The Scientific Revolution' of the seventeenth century embodies configurations of book and context which in a sense 'mirror' the configurations of Antiquity in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century configurations of framing that Antiquity (or various of its components). And I have already, in the articulation of a 'history of science' which more or less abstracts the logic of the symmetry of the physical order and of the logic in which physical theory is framed, from their embedding in the poetic of a more comprehensive 'history', noted the coordination of the focal 'questions' posed by the 'beginning' of Science (or Philosophy, the former being strictly 'Natural Philosophy' until the seventeenth century), by the transition into 'mystical' alchemy and its analogues over the beginning of our era, by the thirteenth century as transition (unitary or otherwise - that is the question) from Antiquity to modernity, by the seventeenth century as embedding of the logic of Science in the poetics of 'experience' and its mathematical frame; by the revolutions in chemistry, physics, and other sciences around 1800, by the synchronous 'crises' of around 1900 - and lastly perhaps, by the attempt at 'Grand Unification' at the close of the twentieth century.

I suggested too, that one might go one step further in the analysis of this 'global' structure or dynamic of theory. If one considers the history of mathematics rather than the 'history of science' as a whole (itself a subordinate component of the 'history of theory' or indeed 'of ideas'), one may reduce this question to that of the embedding of the logical symmetry of logical and physical orders of the mark - of mathematical theory - in a symmetrical physical configuration of that marking. One may then pass directly to the question of an abstract global dynamic of mathematical theory, articulated in the basic cyclical order of 'physical' time; or rather, to the question (of which this is merely the 'outward' side) of the formal articulation of the cultural poetic of mathematical theory, in the symmetry of the 'logical' time of inquiry and deduction, and the physical time of outward causality. Since mathematical theory is itself synchronous with other elements or dimensions of Science and Theory as (more or less) a whole, we may thus arrive at a global 'scansion' of cultural 'cycles' in which such Theory is historically embedded. - Cycles of 'theory' coordinated, for example, with those cycles in
the material economy (in which theory as an activity is conducted, and interacts with other dimensions of activity in the wider cultural dynamic) noted at the beginning of Part Two: cycles associated with the articulation of a linear time or sequence of decision, planning, in the multi-dimensional economic 'space' in which the three orders of money, manufacture, and primary production are coordinated (since each of these three orders is internally articulated as a reflection of its external coordination with the two others, we find a sequence of global expansion and contraction corresponding to, or coordinated at the base level by, $2.3^3$ primary agricultural cycles or 'years' - this of course an abstraction from the wider interaction of economic, political, and ideological dimensions of activity, as also from the microeconomies of individual and group decisions).

If we consider, then, the embedding of this material economy in the wider cultural interaction of material, political ('cultural', of which political is only the 'global' side), and ideological dynamics, we find a wider coordination through a basic 'cycle' of $2.10^3$ 'years' (I will not now repeat the discussion of the Tetractys where the ten-fold overall symmetry was coordinated with the three-fold symmetry of, for example, physical or logical 'spaces'). Since the story of Theory begins by tracing an abstract 'logical' component of Culture down from around 500BC to the entry into the wider question posed by its symmetry with a synchronous 'poetic', at the beginning of our era, we can organise the $10^3$ year cycle of pagan reflection about the opening question of the wider cultural dynamic of our 'era' (that is, from about 500BC to about 500AD. In the wider cultural dynamic the question of the passage from the 'logic' of 500AD to the convergence of a relatively abstract 'history of theory' and its wider historical context, toward a radical coupling of logical and cultural history around 2000AD, may be taken to be more or less symmetrically ordered around the mid-thirteenth century. If we embed the bimillenial history of the christian era in a wider cultural history traced relative to the transformation of the jewish poetic of History which constitutes a formal beginning of our era as Question, then we may coordinate the 'thirteenth century question' with a sort of 'Moses question' attaching to various synchronous developments in the Near East in the thirteenth century before our era - and we may further coordinate the close of the twentieth century to a sort of 'Abraham question' attaching to various earlier
synchronous near-easter developments around the time of the fall of what the archeologists call 'Ur III' in 2004BC (we might then even follow Archbishop Ussher back to a day in 4004BC when, according to his seventeenth-century calculations, the work of Genesis was begun).

The question then remains: how is the diachrony of parallel questions then articulated in the physical time of cultural 'space' - in 'years' - intervening between around 1250 and 2000 'AD'? Working simply from the sequence of the texts listed below, I eventually came to articulate various cycles of questions, first in three analogous phases 1250-1450-1550-1650 ('turning about' 1500), then in three more phases 1650-1700-1750-1800 ('turning about' around 1730) - the first three phases structurally mirrored in the second three - and finally in a third cycle 1800-1830-1870-1900 and 1900-1930-1970-2000. And I associated a change of rhythm (so to speak) around 1450, 1650 and 1800, with a change in the figure of coupling of theory and 'external' world - this reflected in the structure of focal 'theoretical' questions around those times, as an earlier 'change of rhythm' around 500 (in the sequence 0-250-500-1250) was associated with the final passage, in Damascius and Dionysius, out of an autonomous 'pagan' logic, and into a 'logic' subordinated as one component in a 'medieval' play of stories, in the logical night of the 'Dark Ages'. This changes of pace were themselves, I later discovered, associated with parallel changes of economic structure and pace, in the wider dynamic.

Change of rhythm, change of pace: change of gear, indeed, as the gearing or coupling of the three basic dimensions of 'question', and of their interacting 'cycles' or periods, is restructured by the focal questions which frame the scansion of the three major periods as a whole. Questions which introduce binary or ternary 'couplings' reflected in the 'gearing' of the major transitions: 1:3;2:1;2:1;3:2, with the thirteenth-century transition involving a more complex configuration as 'logic' rediscovers an autonomy lost at the close of classical Antiquity.
...And within this broad 'global' scheme abstracted from the synchrony and diachrony of a thousand or so texts, the figures in which the 'abstraction' of theory as a whole is brought into question after the thirteenth century themselves, I suggested, articulate the complementarity of the 'logic' of classical Antiquity, and the nineteenth- and twentieth-century framings of that logic in its cultural configurations. Thus we might speak of 'pictures' of classical Antiquity, for as the autonomy of philosophy was being asserted in a fifteenth-century (neo)neoplatonism, such logic was discovering itself as one side of a 'perspectival' poetic, in which it was coordinated, as in Alberti's central perspective, with the 'outward' side of things, the 'other' side of the picture, the frame. Such a fifteenth-century figure of 'picture' and frame coordinates a neoplatonic logic of late Antiquity with a nineteenth- or twentieth-century 'framing' of that logic in its 'outward' contexts; and indeed the albertine frame of a 'Renaissance' of classical Antiquity in the fifteenth century itself poses a question (essentially Burckhardt's question of 1860) which opens up new figures of 'cultural history'. If that 'Renaissance' which I focussed in the 'Alberti question' closes the first of three similar phases leading to the embedding of the logic of Antiquity in a four-dimensional frame of experience (the 'scientific revolution'), rather than in Alberti's two-dimensional frame of the quadro, then this more general embedding, about which I suggested the whole Story may be taken to turn, may be taken as organising the complementarity of 'internal' logic of the 'classical' texts, and the external logic (itself framed by the embedding of nineteenth- and twentieth-century texts in some configuration of their contexts) in which they are, more recently, framed: the complementarity, that is, of the periods treated in First and Third Parts, in the wider cycle of the whole Story.

This system of coordination of figures - figures 'in' the classical texts of the First Part, and figures applied to the embedding of those texts in their classical Culture, in the Third - may then be seen to organise the various 'focal' questions already identified in relation to the 'history of science', within the wider and more radical 'hermeneutic question' attaching to the whole - attaching to the framing of the whole cycle from one point in that cycle. More particularly, one may say that the general question is the question of the coordination of these particular 'focal' questions, and that
by bringing into question this very book in which the general question is framed — bringing this questioning into the Question, so to say — one may hope to coordinate not only the figuration of the texts of classical Antiquity, and the embedding in their culture of the partial framings of aspects of that figuration over nineteenth and twentieth centuries...but more generally to coordinate, in closing this book and its Story, a figure of Kosmos where 'internal' and 'external' configurations of a matrix of a thousand or so texts mirror one another, and together mirror the initial figure of 'Kosmos' which stands as a question at the opening of the Story of that mirroring over two and a half thousand years.

This book itself, then, as access to, induction into, a mirroring of 'internal' and 'external' spaces and times of a matrix of books in which it is inscribed, embedded. A kind, once more, of 'cosmic library', in which those external configurations are themselves framed in the texts — the radical question thus posed being organised by this inquiry into its own textual embodiment. But not an imaginary library in which the mirroring of 'internal' and 'external' matrices of texts is itself comprehended and articulated within some unitary internal space of Text. Rather does 'library' give us the figure by which a certain matrix of texts may itself be physically embedded in a range of contexts no text can fully 'comprehend' or coordinate within itself.

Back, then, to some actual library, where this book stands with other actual books on the shelves devoid of the infinity of possible books which would have to be somehow ranged in Borges' imaginary cosmic library. Back to this book, and to the Book, and back once more to that question actually posed in the library and its various contexts, by the framing in this book of the Book which frames its own reading as one element in its Story. Let us set this question now in the rest of that matrix of texts transmitted to this library from classical Antiquity, which it organises as it coordinates
the 'presocratic question' and the 'question of the thirteenth century':

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Editors/Translators</th>
<th>Editions/Translations</th>
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<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>THEON of Smyrna</td>
<td>Expositio Rerum Mathematicarum ad Legendum Platonem utilium</td>
<td>ed E Hiller Leipzig 1878</td>
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<td>115</td>
<td>Corpus Hermeticum</td>
<td>ed &amp; tr A Nock &amp; A-J Festugière (Budé)</td>
<td>Paris 1945-54</td>
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<td>ed &amp; tr W Scott Oxford</td>
<td>1925-36</td>
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<td>116</td>
<td>Chaldean Oracles</td>
<td>Oracles Chaldaeques avec une choix de Commentaires Anciennes</td>
<td>ed &amp; tr E des Places Paris 1978</td>
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<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>Collection des Anciens Alchimistes Grecs</td>
<td>ed &amp; tr M Berthelot &amp; M Ruelle</td>
<td>Paris 1887-8</td>
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<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>PHILOSTRATUS</td>
<td>Life of Apollonius of Tyana</td>
<td>tr Phillimore Oxford 1912</td>
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<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>LUCIAN of Samosata</td>
<td>ed Harmon &amp; al (Loeb) London/NY</td>
<td>1921-67</td>
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<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>APULEIUS, Lucius</td>
<td>The Golden Ass; On the Philosophy of Plato</td>
<td>tr &amp; comm T Taylor London 1822</td>
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<td>121</td>
<td>Documents of the Christian Church</td>
<td>tr &amp; ed H Bettenson Oxford</td>
<td>(1942) 2 ed 1963</td>
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<td>122</td>
<td>The Early Christian Fathers</td>
<td>ibid Oxford</td>
<td>1956</td>
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<td>123</td>
<td>CLEMENT of Alexandria</td>
<td>Protrepticus</td>
<td>ed &amp; tr Butterworth L/NY 1919</td>
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<td>124</td>
<td>TERTULLIAN</td>
<td>De Carne Christi</td>
<td>ed Kroymann Turnhout 1954</td>
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<td>125</td>
<td>ORIGEN</td>
<td>various eds (Sources Chretiennes)</td>
<td>Paris 1944-</td>
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<td>126</td>
<td>LONGINUS</td>
<td>De Sublimitate</td>
<td>tr Boileau Paris 1674;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>tr Dorsch</td>
<td>Harmondsworth 1965</td>
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<td>127</td>
<td>PLOTINUS</td>
<td>Enneads (with Porphyry's Life)</td>
<td>ed &amp; tr A Armstrong (Loeb) London 1946-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>tr MacKenna London</td>
<td>1917-30, rev Page Chicago 1952</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Selections from several of Thomas Taylor 'the Platonist's' translations from pagan neoplatonists were published by Kathleen Raine:

128 TAYLOR, Thomas Selected Writings ed Raine & Harper London 1969

and various specific translations are noted below; Bettenson's selections from the Christian fathers are continued:

129 The Later Christian Fathers London 1970

130 AUGUSTINE Confessiones*. (Loeb) London/NY 1912
    tr Pine-Coffin London, 1961
131 De Civitate Dei ed Vives tr Healey London (1610)
131A Sermones* ed Lambot Turnhout 1961

Passing back to the pagans, the first Parisian philosopher:

132 JULIAN, Emperor ed W C Wright London/NY 1913-23

133 IAMBLICHUS On the Mysteries of the Egyptians, Chaldeans and Assyrians tr & comm Taylor London (1821) facsimile reprint 1968

134 KINGSLEY, Charles Hypatia London 1853

135 PROCLUS The Elements of Theology with tr, intr, comm E R Dodds Oxford 1933 (76-7)
136 Commentary on the Timaeus tr & comm T Taylor London 1820
137 On the Theology of Plato tr & comm T Taylor London 1816
138 Hypotypsis Astronomicarum Positionum ed & german tr Manitz Leipzig 1909
139 Commentary on the Elements of Euclid tr & comm T Taylor 1788, facs.
139A Commentary on the Parmenides ed Cousin Paris 1864 fr tr Chaignet Paris 1905

A formal analysis of the symmetry of the Elements of Theology:
which close of pagan logic, as I take it, opens:

Πρὶς τὴν ἑξῆς τῶν πάνων ἡ τις τῶν πάνων ἡ τοῦ Παρμενίδου ἡ τῆς τῶν πάνων...

Is the one so-called Beginning of All outside the All, or is it one of this All...

(It is in part because of the constant conjunction of the Parmenides and the Timaeus - together with the Oracles - as the central texts of 'neoplatonism' which leads to my great reluctance to follow the turn of the century British school, and Lutoslawski with them, in putting the Parmenides with the 'middle dialogues'.)

Back now to the Latin West, and through

...to:
...and into the Dark...

...Dark Ages punctuated, for example, by the schism of East and West presided over by the patriarch Photius in the ninth century.

A matrix of two hundred and eighty texts which might be taken to frame byzantine culture of the ninth century: the book or text has itself become the frame of reflection...Photius' first entry is a book by Theodorus the Presbyter 'On whether the book of Saint Dionysius is genuine', and his last a book 'On the signification of words in the Scriptures'. In the following century was compiled a work of wider scope, a sort of encyclopaedia known as the Suda, drawn from a larger matrix of texts, most of them now no longer extant. These byzantine matrices reflect the parallel encyclopaedic culture of Islam (physically encroaching on an eastern empire contracting to Byzantium itself), Sarton's medieval 'by-pass' of the dark latin world. Here I have used, apart from brief texts in scientific 'source-books' already noted, secondary sources, together with translations of a couple of Sufi writers:

145 BOETHIUS, Manlius Anicius  De Consolatione & Theological Tractates* ed Stewart & Rand L/NY(1918)rev Tester 1973

146 PHOTIUS  [ie Inventory and Enumeration of books we have read, of which our beloved brother Tarasius' required of us a summary knowledge] ed & tr R Henry (Budé) Paris 1959-7

147 AL GHAZZALI, Abu Hamid  (Al-mungidh min ad-dalal: 'the salvation from error', tr C Field as:) The Confessions of Al Ghazzali* London 1909

148 RUMI, Jalal al-Din  (Diwan-i Shams ad-din Tabrizi, tr A J Arberry as:) Mystical Poems of Rumi* Chicago 1968

149 Mathnawi-i ma'navi ed & tr R A Nicholson London 1925-30

and a glance at Averroes' reply to Al Ghazzali:

150 AVERROES  Tahafut al-Tahafut tr with intr & comm S van den Burgh Oxford 1954
One more parallel...

151 **Sefr-i-Zohar** (Book of Effulgence) tr Sperling, Simon & Levertoff
London 1931-4; sel & tr Scholem NY(1949)1977

152 **ABELSON, Joshua**
*Jewish Mysticism* London 1913

153 **PEERS, Edgar A**
*A Garden of Pomegranates* London 19

154 **PEERS, Edgar A**
*Fool of Love. The Life of Ramon Lull* London 1946

...and here, via islamic spain, we enter thirteenth-century Europe as it were by the back door...and with the question posed by that strange Book of Splendour, the sediment of thirteen centuries of Jewish neopythagoreanism and neoplatonism beginning in Philo's Alexandria (and thirteen centuries of the mosaic tradition before that), we enter into 'the question of the thirteenth century' already touched upon in relation to 'history of science'.

Mediae Tempestates

'Middle' ages: according to Cassirer the expression was first used by John Andreas, Bishop of Aleria, in his obituary of Cusanus (1469). 'Rinascita', in its turn framing this new relation to an Antiquity preceding the question posed by the thirteenth century, first appears in Vasari's Lives of 1550 (1).

The question posed by the thirteenth century, about which 'medieval' philosophy turns. A 'medieval philosophy' whose axis passes through, say, this representative sequence of texts:

155 Selections from Medieval Philosophers ed & tr with intr notes & a glossary
    R McKeon NY 1930

I found this a useful introduction, for at the same time that the texts are set in a sequence linked by McKeon's introductions, the extensive and detailed glossary (the last section of the second volume) embeds each Latin term translated in the texts in a system of its synchrony with the other terms, and its diachrony in various sequences or catenae of authorities.

An introduction, then, an induction into, that mirroring of the internal matrix of a 'scholastic' text, in the synchrony and diachrony of the textual matrix which is 'medieval philosophy', the dynamic associated with this symmetry or mirroring instituted in the 'university':

156 RASHDALL, H The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages
    Oxford 1895

Characteristically, it is only over the turn of the twentieth century that the question arises of a coherent logical dynamic running through the matrix or group of 'scholastic' texts, coordinate with, but not a mere reflection of, or subordinate to, the working of universitas as group or guild (the earliest sense of the word) in the medieval town, or to the wider group of the medieval Church:

1: (181) below, ch 1, note 35
..And this 'logic' directing the dynamic of the medieval textual matrix is itself framed as, around the turn of the century, catholic theology confronts the more general figure of a logic of 1900 which must - logically - be embedded in an interplay of symmetric logical, poetic and physical orders which cannot (as had been attempted over the nineteenth century) itself be 'logically' structured 'from outside' that interplay: the logic of the symmetry (as we saw in a range of synchronous figures in different fields and schools of turn-of-the-century theory) must itself be found at work in the very play of which it is one dimension. The 'neoscholasticism' emergent after the Second Vatican Council and the papal encyclical Aeterni Patris of 1879, and instituted outside Italy by Cardinal Mercier at Louvain in the 'eighties, brings the logic of the 'scientific revolution', and of the german theological revolution of Schleiermacher and Baur, into question, by embedding it once more in the thirteenth-century configuration of logic and (theological) poetic, from which it had been abstracted by Descartes and others: this then a familiar figure of that theoretical 'atavism' or regression - reculer pour mieux sauter - already found in Epicurus and Marx, and to be seen in Heidegger's Parmenides and elsewhere (in other destructions or deconstructions of the Tradition).

At the same time this neoscholastic proposition of the 'question of the thirteenth century' (as the focal configuration through which the axis of the newly discovered 'logic' must pass) reflects Duhem's parallel - and equally catholic - focussing in the thirteenth century of the question of the embedding of the 'logic of science' in the poetics of History - or rather in the interplay of logical, poetic, and physical orders, previously abstracted from the radical poetic or theological symmetry of Logic and World. The embedding of logic in a more radical coordination with various orders of its context, logically required by the development of Science itself (and seen for example in Mach's inquiry) involves the embedding of Science in its history: and one figure of such an embedding, which historically frames (then) the subsequent history or tradition in which the question comes to be 'logically' posed, is the thirteenth-century coordination of 'scholastic' logic and science and theology, with the 'poetic' of the academic and ecclesiastical groups in which
'Scholasticism' was pursued. And out of this complementarity of the 'logical' questioning of the historical dynamic in which logic and Science is embedded, around 1900, and the historical focussing of this question of the history of logic or science in the 'medieval' configuration from which the 'renaissance' of the fifteenth century or the 'scientific revolution' of the seventeenth abstract, it is precisely those earlier figures of 'regression' from 1450 or 1650 to configurations of Antiquity ('theoretical regressions' which have themselves determined the intervening configuration as a 'middle' age) which themselves come into question.

So that the 'history of medieval philosophy', focussed in the 'question of the thirteenth century' becomes organised, over the twentieth century, in large measure in relation to Gilson's attempt to set the great scientific revolutionary Descartes in the 'scholastic' matrix from which he thought, and has since been thought, to abstract. - This first of all by embedding his own texts - and the Discours in particular - in just that elementary matrix of scholastic terms I noted in McKeon's glossary:

158 GILSON, Etienne Index Scholastico-Cartésien Paris 1913, rev 1966

...his doctoral dissertation - the subject suggested by his teacher Levy-Bruhl - which (in the same way that he would have scholasticism and its matrices frame subsequent theory) frames the sequence of subsequent texts, among them

159 La Philosophie au Moyen Age (Paris 1922, 2 ed:) 1944

160 Etudes sur le Role de la Pensee Medievale dans la Formation du Systeme Cartesien Paris 1930

...and his elaborate edition of the Discours de la Methode itself in 1925, revised in the year of his 'break' with Descartes signalled by (160), and noted below in relation to Descartes (rather than Medieval Philosophy).

Now the neoscholastic matrix of discussions of the scholastic matrix of disputation, defined, say, in relation to de Wulf and Gilson
as the two primary exponents of the rival doctrines which, together with variations and combinations articulate the whole field (of neo-scholastic history of scholasticism), itself directly mirrors that earlier matrix (down to details of the institution of the various factions). Thus Gilson opposes to de Wulf's unitary frame defined by the inscription by all 'scholastic' philosophers, of their logic in the scholastic coordination of logic and academico-ecclesiatical culture (resulting in de Wulf's contention of a basic ontological premise of all 'scholasticism', coordinate with this initial 'agreement to differ', which 'by definition' makes the 'pantheistic' monism of Eruigena 'non-scholastic'), Gilson opposes a radical opposition and disagreement of 'aristotelian' and 'augustinian' perspectives. The opposition of the two scholastic perspectives, and of the two neo-scholastic perspectives on that opposition, is itself, precisely, the opposition of two views of the opposition of those two views: whether they are two sides of a basic unity of perspective, or whether such unity (one view) is itself irreducibly involved in the radical duality of opposition of unity and duality. This radical division (how radical we need not here judge...) then immediately generates a whole system of opposition and disputation which, in scholasticism as in neoscholasticism, unfolds from that primary question - which is effectively the question of the relation of God and Matter - through the themes or questions of Incarnation, Trinity, and so right through the whole order of Sentences and Summae. The question of the difference of two perspectives does indeed generate a radically unitary order or system of scholastic and neoscholastic questions, in dispute between the two main factions or sides (dominicans and franciscans, or Toronto and Louvain). The question then becomes that of the difference between the unity of questions, and the radical duality of response...

The state of the question is presented by van Steenbergen, succeeding Mercier and de Wulf at Louvain, both in terms of the general matrix of discussion or questions:

161 VAN STEENBERGEN, Fernand La Bibliothèque du Philosophe Médiévaliste Louvain-Paris 1974
and in terms of the unity of questions, now and then:

(whose first chapter discusses 'L'Etat de la Question')

.. and this axis of inquiry is reflected by his colleagues and students in their Festschrift, published together with (161):

In his bibliography, at the entry for Gilson's history, van Steenberghen asks: Why does Gilson begin the story with Justin Martyr, rather than the New Testament? Thus one may bring into question the closed system of Gilson's neothomism, in terms of the abstraction of his account of the focal 'question of the thirteenth century', from its radical framing by the initial question, opening the Christian era, of the Christian story, its apostolic versions (if such they be) themselves. Gilson's neothomism abstracts Thomas from the configuration of that more radical question, just as the 'positivist' science that neothomism sought to bring into question in the days of Mach, had abstracted Descartes from Gilson's thirteenth-century configuration.

Let us then set Thomas himself in that more radical history of questions...

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La Philosophie au XIII Siècle Louvain/Paris 1966

Introduction à l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale Louvain/Paris 1974
The last I found useful rather in the same way as Ross' Aristotle: as a synoptic coordination of questions which opens up other questions from which those coordinations abstract...or rather which opens up precisely the question posed by that figure of abstraction; a question then attaching to Thomas or Aristotle and Ross or Copleston, and to the relation of the two questions in the respective cases.

The thirteenth century as a whole is also covered in the Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy - surveys of 'questions' edited by Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinberg (Cambridge 1982). The abstraction here is explicitly espoused by the editors in their introduction: there is to be no discussion of 'philosophical theology', and the remaining discussion of a medieval philosophy abstracted from the radical and indeed organising question of the relation of philosophy and theology, is to be embedded in the terms, the matrix, of current 'analytic' philosophy. I felt that an analysis of the resulting image of 'medieval philosophy' would better illuminate Oxford in the twentieth century than in the thirteenth, and so left this book on the shelf, thinking to approach twentieth-century Oxford more directly on other shelves.

Oxford in the thirteenth century...one 'national' component of the wider question attaching to Oxford and Paris, Cologne and Bologna...one 'school' of schoolmen and also dominant in the 'english nation' or 'english college' instituted as one component in the School of Paris: nations within a school, schools within a nation, within the wider international or universal school of Christian Europe, from which the centralised 'nation-states', and their national schools, emerged over the fifteenth century.

Oxford in the fourteenth century and the 'Early Science at Oxford' of the Merton Schoolmen; Chartres in the twelfth century, her english neoplatonists prefiguring the english revival of Science after the great syntheses of the thirteenth century...further components in the spatiotemporal matrix of the 'middle ages' which externally frames the question posed by the matrix of texts and its dynamic.
Chartres in the twelfth century: one component in

169 KLIBANSKY, Raymond The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition
(London 1939; 2 ed: ) 1951

..from Proclus to Cusanus, here articulated in the historical matrix of a Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi, for the editing of which, under Klibansky's direction, this essay is as it were the proposal. A platonic dynamic, then, within the wider matrix characterised at the turn of the century by de Wulf: the 'question of the thirteenth century', then, framing the question of the transition from fifth century to fifteenth, and of the inscription of the aristotelian logic of the thirteenth-century systems in an earlier neoplatonic figure from which it had been extracted or abstracted. - Just as that earlier 'platonism' had embedded the question about which I have taken Antiquity as a whole to turn, in a still earlier Plato...and just as seventeenth-century platonism will take Ficino's Plato to bring into question the 'mechanism' and aristotelian empiricism of an emerging 'New Science'...and just as Klibansky will take this whole dynamic to bring into question a turn-of-the-century embedding of logic in history
Renaissance, Reform, Revolution

At the close of Part Two - in November 1799 - Novalis was proposing the integration of all the previous results of intervening Reforms and Revolutions in a thirteenth-century figure of *Die Christenheit oder Europa*, as frame of a new Europe:

> An die Geschichte verweise Ich euch, forscht in ihrem belehrenden Zusammenhang, nach ähnlichen Zeitpunkten, und lernt den Zauberstaub der Analogie gebrauchen (1)

I direct you to history: look, in its instructive coherence, for similar points in time, and learn to use the magic wand of analogy.

...and I have suggested that the period from mid-thirteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth century (with its emergent gothic novels and architecture) itself be considered a sort of 'middle age' of reflection, turning about the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century, as the earlier 'middle ages' turn about the theological revolution of the thirteenth.

...And I have suggested that this 'middle age' of Theory or Science presents configurations of text and context which as it were mirror the figures of Antiquity in the figures of their nineteenth and twentieth-century framing; mirror in the texts of Antiquity and their contexts, nineteenth- and twentieth-century configurations of text and context (themselves marked in the texts of that third period) - this just as, say, the configuration of thirteenth-century scholasticism is 'mirrored' in the organisation of twentieth-century neoscholasticism (the latter then considered as a bringing-into-question of the intervening period turning about the 'Enlightenment' (the Dark Age of catholic theology).

In this respect we might speak of a temporal symmetry of the opening of the Story from around 500BC, and its closing toward the close of the twentieth century (and we might regard Novalis' identification in late 1799 of the mid-thirteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth as 'ähnliche Zeitpunkten' as itself...
presenting a temporal 'analogy', at the opening of the third major
'period' or cycle, with the configuration of the close of that third
period, and of the whole, in the close of the twentieth century and
second millenium). Such a 'temporal symmetry' between the opening
or unfolding of a story, and its closing or...implications..(Cusanus'
explicatio, then, and implicatio) has already been noted at the opening
of the second Part, and associated with the 'cyclical' character of
each period or phase. Just as Antiquity as a whole constitutes the
first of three overall periods or cycles of questions - the dynamic
of their logical 'implications', then, symmetrical with an 'outward'
unfolding of their physical contexts - and the first phase down to
Aristotle's abstraction of its logic from the drama of platonic dialectic,
the first of three related phases unfolding from the pythagorean mystery
down to the christian mystery or drama; so, I suggested, does the
extraction or abstraction of dramatic or mystical platonism from the
aristotelian matrix of the thirteenth century, constitute a first
of three related cycles or phases unfolding from the thirteenth century
down to the seventeenth. - And a first figure, then, of mirroring of
the texts and contexts of Antiquity in those of the third broad period;
a figure of 'picture' which I unfolded from an initial thirteenth-cen-
tury discovery of the 'individual' as locus of choice, framing himself
or herself as framing his or her situation, the radically autonomous
interface of spiritual Heaven and material Earth, through to the articu-
lation in relation to this initial 'point' of choice, of a whole spatio-
temporal frame of autonomous activity, organised about the interface
of real and imaginary worlds in the 'frame' of Alberti's 'central per-
spective'.

We no longer know which picture (painted on a panel in
central perspective in the revolutionary new flemish medium of oil)
Nicholas sent to the monks of Tegernsee in 1453 with his treatise:

170 NICHOLAS Cusanus

(De Visione Dei fr tr E van Steenberghe:)
Louvain 1925

...but the platonic mystery of his text embeds its logic in a dual
space and time of heavenly implicatio and earthly explicatio, re-
lected in the earthly space as two sides of a picture. Scholastic
logic and text are embedded in a 'platonic' figure: but this neither a merely formal correlate of the internal figuration of the text in which the text formally inscribes its logic (a sort of pagan platonism), nor a 'platonic' figure discovered in the christian story, through which the 'logic' of that story may be embedded in and subordinated to a story in which its 'internal' (pagan) autonomy is renounced. Rather is the 'dionysian' figure in which those two currents of pagan and christian 'neoplatonism' ambiguously coincide, marking the close of pagan 'logic' (that transition into the 'Dark'), now discovered (coming 'full-circle' in the closing 'middle ages') organising the coupling, the duality, of the logic and poetics of the actual situation of Nicholas' text. The aristotelian formalism of the initial thirteenth-century determination of the radical 'coupling' of pagan logic and christian poetic in 'individual' choice (the interface of Heaven and Earth, Actuality and Possibility), drops out as the logic of the dionysian figure of Mystery re-emerges, having been 'lost' in that figure at the close of classical Antiquity. Re-emerges, though, not in the opposition of pagan logic and christian poetic earlier resolved by the subordination of the former to the latter - but rather in a duality or coupling which unfolds from the thirteenth-century configuration of individual choice.

Nicholas' text, then: a 'script' in the wider configuration of its situation with Nicholas and the monks and the two-dimensional frame of the picture, in the 'space' organised by that quadro, in which Nicholas and the monks...and we...find ourselves...and Nicholas' book, and this book, and all the other books now in question.

...All the others, themselves all coupled, since around the time of De Visione Dei (Nicholas' manuscript letter to the monks), in what amounts as it were to the 'other side' of Nicholas' manuscript picture of unitary integration (implicatio) of platonic archetypes, with the material economy of 'mechanical type'.

Nicholas' manuscript, then, this typewritten script, manuscripts and printed 'editions' of Dionysius' Mystica Theologia...printed editions of De Visione Dei, indeed...
...and another manuscript from Basle, printed, like so many other books, at Leipzig:

172 BURCKHARDT, Jacob
Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien
(Leipzig 1860)
tr Middlemore: London 1929

'The Individual as a Work of Art', 'The State as a Work of Art'...to take the titles of two main components of Burckhardt's picture of the Italian Renaissance, articulated as transition from thirteenth century to the configuration of Reform around the beginning of the sixteenth century. The Individual as it were on one side of the picture, the State as space of his activity, on the other. I have tried to trace the 'unfolding' of that space, and of the 'individual's' picture of himself at its centre, precisely in terms of an intermediate quadro or frame of that 'picture', from an 'initial point' of individual choice and self-consciousness associated with Thomas and Cimabue, through the opening-up from, and coordination relative to, that 'initial point', of the various 'dimensions' finally articulated in the frame of Brunelleschi's and Alberti's 'central perspective', and in the Albertine space of De Re Aedificatoria at mid-quattrocento:

173 WHITE, John
The Birth and Rebirth of Pictorial Space
(London 1957; 2 ed:) 1967

174 EGERTON, Samuel
The Renaissance Rediscovery of Linear Perspective

175 KLINE, Morris
Mathematics in Western Culture NY 1953

...trace the transmission through the 'middle ages', or the mirroring on either side of that transition, of a pictorial 'space' implicit in classical frescoes, and finally systematised explicitly in the fifteenth century. Such a dynamic of the spatial coordination of viewing subject and imaginary viewed object is of course 'synchronous' from Pompei and before, through to Italian quattrocento and beyond, with the textual transmission of the platonic scheme coordinated with pictorial space in Cusanus' 'script' of 1453: a scheme in which the earthly economy of subjective and objective sides of the Image reflects the unitary implicatio, hierarchy, of the Idea; in which,
indeed, the coordination of internal and external 'spaces', psychological and physical, in the 'image', is itself an image of the coordination of the 'inner' unity of heavenly ideas, and the 'outward' earthly play of images. In:

176 PANOFSKY, Erwin


the historical dynamic associated with this synchrony or symmetry of conceptual and pictorial 'space' is traced relative to a sequence of texts from Plato down to the mid-seventeenth century: a 'concept' - indeed the concept of 'concept' itself, 'the concept' - in Art History, in the history and historiography of 'Art'; in that dynamic framed by the synchrony of 'sensible' and 'intellectual' spaces - 'in' their common time, articulated by this dynamic as a history.

As the title of a companion essay attests...

177 Die Perspective als 'Symbolische Form' (1924)
in Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg IV, pp 258-330 Leipzig 1927

the initial coordinates or frame of the essays were derived from Cassirer, with whom Panofsky was working in the private library of Aby Warburg at Hamburg, assembled as a textual matrix in which to analyse that transmission of Antiquity to modern Europe which, focussed in quattrocento Florence, we call 'The Renaissance'.

Panofsky went on to frame various more specific components of this general dynamic, inaugurating that analysis of visual art through its embedding in the synchrony of intellectual and visual 'spaces' we call 'iconology':

178 Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Theories in the Art of the Renaissance NY 1939
'Renaissance': rinascita, rebirth... a figure first applied to characterise that catena down from Cimabue and Giotto down to a consummation in Michelangelo in:

180 VASARI, Giorgio
Le Vite de' piu eccellenti Pittori, Scultori ed Architetti Florence (1550) 2 ed: 1568
selection tr Bull Harmondsworth 1965

...while the characterisation of the intervening transition as... an intervening transition, a 'middle' age, mediae tempestates, is, according to

181 CASSIRER, Ernst
Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance Leipzig/Berlin 1927
tr Domandi NY 1964 (78)

first recorded in John Andreas' funeral oration on Cusanus, in 1469 (1).

Now, I tried to structure a transition from around 1250 to around 1450, and thence on to around 1500, in terms of the development through Vasari's catena of masters of the 'symbolic form' of Perspective as primary 'coordinate', with which I attempted to correlate 'parallel' developments in reflection and its cultural contexts.
- This in turn an attempt to articulate a wider transition from Part I to Part II of this inquiry as a 'middle age' turning about ('focussed in') Aquinas' role around the middle of the thirteenth century.
- A transition from the breakdown of the western Empire to the emergence of centralised 'modern' nation-states, say from around 500 to around 1450, or from the time of Constantine to around 1500 (to borrow Burckhardt's 'turning-points').

1: ch 1, note 35
What, then, at the opening of the arrangement and rearrangement of library shelves in accordance with the second of 'my' three major periods, of this whole business of 'periods'? We can group books by dates of composition or publication, and by place of composition or publication, more easily than in any other way - except perhaps alphabetical order of author or title. We can consider the books as organised in space and time, left to right, up and down, in shelving by country or town or perhaps language... but how abstract in some particular book - for example, this one - some particular collection of books from the shelves, and organise them in a slightly more abstract space and time which has various other dimensions relating to 'subject', 'school' and so on, in such a way that these 'coordinates' present a periodic structure, with groups of books marking parallel lines of development of inquiry, and with minor steps or transitions grouped within broader 'periods' or developments, these in turn organised in a whole that reflects the overall opening and closing movement of this book itself?

The outlines of an eventual response to this question have of course already been given in sporadic hints and gestures throughout this book: but the time has come to draw these various prefigurations together, as I confront the historiography of 'The Renaissance'.

In his analysis of the transition in Italy from the mid-thirteenth century to around the opening of the sixteenth, Burckhardt posed the question of the coherence of the various different components or dimensions of 'the culture of the Renaissance in Italy' as a distinct 'period', as 'The Renaissance' - as the gradual emergence of that unitary configuration, the brief and ephemeral climax we call the 'High Renaissance', whose rise Vasari had first charted in the visual arts, and which Burckhardt's master Ranke had organised as the opening of 'modern' history:

182 RANKE, Leopold von Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Völker von 1494 bis 1514 Berlin 1824

tr Ashworth London 1846
I have already discussed periodization in the historiography of that particular dimension of cultural activity now called 'science': a periodization framed by the sequential development of successive figures of abstraction of the logical articulation of physical theory from its cultural - and a fortiori its physical - contexts. That scheme of progressive abstraction of its internal 'logic' from the various other dimensions of the 'scientific' text is oddly complemented, from the opening of the period described in Part III above, by the scheme of a 'scientific history' introduced at the beginning of the nineteenth century by Niebuhr, Ranke, and their disciples. In the latter scheme a historical action or period is reconstructed as far as possible from 'primary' sources: written material which can be given a particular place, perspective, end and so on, in the very action of which it is an account, and perhaps a component. The basic laws developed by Niebuhr in his reconstruction of the origins of roman culture are framed simply in terms of this scheme of embedding of text in the action in which its place must be determined: in a recognition of the radical concreteness of the 'primary' texts on which the supposedly 'abstracted', 'scientific' text of the historiographer himself is to be based.

One may, though, apply the methods of 'scientific' history to the texts of the scientific historiographers themselves, embedding even their developing 'science' in a broad cultural history of the 'period' since french, industrial and romantic 'revolutions'. Thus we may write a history of the historiography of 'Renaissance'...

183 FERGUSON, Wallace K The Renaissance in Historical Thought Cambridge (Mass) 1948

..one of many histories of historian's themes published around the mid-century, following Pieter Geyl's analysis of french historiography as so many versions of the figure of Napoleon, who presides over its inauguration: each historian asserts his perspective on the modern world in which he finds himself writing history, in terms of his analysis of the opening of that modern period, which frames the very situation in which he writes of it:
An analogous account of the historiography of that figure's political context, 'the French Revolution' which I take as transition from the period articulated in Part II, and that covered by Part III, takes its place in the relevant volume of

The New Cambridge Modern History 13 vols Cambridge 1957-79

which, following the general periodization determined by Acton for its model, The Cambridge Modern History (12 vols 1902-10), takes Ranke's High Renaissance as the opening of 'Modern History' (and adds to the earlier plan a thirteenth volume dealing mainly with general questions of periodization).

Niebuhr was concerned mainly with the prehistory and early history of the roman 'constitution', Ranke primarily with the interplay of external relations and internal orders of 'modern' european states; Burckhardt, over the second half of the nineteenth century, confronted the questions posed by the relations of the various dimensions of a 'culture' which constituted the broader context of formal constitution and international diplomacy - the broader context of 'political history'. Around the same time, complementing Burckhardt's 'cultural' - or rather, perhaps, 'ideological' - dynamics, Thorold Rogers was applying the 'scientific' methods of Niebuhr and Ranke to the market and fair returns that had been kept in England since the mid-thirteenth century:

A History of Agriculture and Prices in England from the Year after the first Oxford Parliament (1259) to the Commencement of the Continental War (1793) Oxford 1866-1902

The Economic Interpretation of History London 1888
..and of course Marx was taking the dynamic he found organising the economic coordinates of human activity as the primary frame (replacing, then, the 'political' frame of constitution and diplomacy whose dynamic had been analysed by Niebuhr and Ranke) which would in turn serve to organise the various other dimensions or coordinates previously analysed in abstraction, or previously not subjected to 'historical' analysis at all. At the opening of Part II, I presented the periodic or harmonic or cyclical analysis of Rogers' results (covering almost exactly - 1259-1793 - the 'period' of that second Part) given in:

188 DEWEY, Edward & DAKIN, Edwin
     Cycles: The Science of Prediction* NY 1947 (81)

which extends the initial observations made by Rogers' contemporary:

189 JUGLAR, Clement
     Des Crises Commerciales et de leur Retour Periodique Paris (1860) 1862 (facs c 1970)

..and I there made some preliminary suggestions relating to the analogy between periodic structure in the material economy of human activity, and the periodic structure in which I was organizing various other 'coordinates' of that activity, most particularly its 'theoretical' dimension(s). Briefly, I suggested a parallel between the way that a fixed economic structure is related to a sequence of steps (moves, strategies) through which the structure persists, each of which, determined from what was open at one stage, subsequently (and not, of course, independently of parallel developments in other dimensions of life) contributes to the framing of what is open in the 'next' step or development. Relative indeterminacy at each stage is at the same time constrained, if we consider the sum of steps between the opening and close of a particular structure (say, a 'mode of production' to take the structural space of Marx's broadest periodization) as constituting one of various possible 'paths' through what is open at the outset, by the need for such a 'sum' to add up (so to speak).
To revert to aristotelian language, we might talk of the relation, in such an economic 'cycle' which structures the 'life' of a particular form of economic activity, of formal and final 'cause' of the activity. And just as the figure of formal structural nesting, form within form, reflected in the subordination of finalities or ends one to another in the linear sequence of physical time, action within wider action, is present in various versions from the very beginning of the narrative (there as the harmonic articulation of pythagorean Kosmos), so we may, in closing the inquiry, return as it were to a sort of temporal mirror-image of the initial step in this broadest 'cycle'.

That is: we may apply the same kind of 'cyclical' approach not only to the various structures of question and response which articulate theoretical inquiry in various periods and sub-periods (each encompassing various parallel 'paths' of inquiry as different theorists respond differently to a common question or problem), structuring the history of theory into periods and sub-periods, each with its 'space' of parallel paths - but we may consider, in closing, a more general dynamic constrained not simply by, say, the physical symmetries which organise the physical paths of the various actors through life, or by the analogous symmetries of the material economy of activity with its primary, secondary and tertiary sectors...but constrained by the symmetries between - or 'of' - these various dimensions of our 'history' themselves.

Such symmetries, as we saw in the Introduction, cannot, like the traditional symmetries of 'modern' mathematics and the associated physical theory, be considered as a sort of abstract cultural, or indeed cosmic, 'superspace', of which empty physical space with its three dimensions would itself be one of three super-dimensions. For the global 'cosmic' symmetry of the three correlative dimensions of this book - its 'internal' logical space, its 'external' physical space and its intermediate poetic space structuring the mirroring of the two former 'spaces' - is itself mirrored, in the fact of the matter arising in this particular book, in a
complementary local and in some sense arbitrary, indeterministic play of disymmetry, difference, differentiation (without which there would be nothing to be 'symmetric': the figure is familiar not only from its initial development or unfolding in the Introduction, but from its systematic recurrence through the whole cycle of Parts I, II and III). I tried to bring out in the Introduction the 'logical' necessity of articulating global and elementary symmetries and disymmetries through their identification or marking, for the purposes of this inquiry, in this book. And we may now further see, coming at the book as it were from 'outside', as that point in this inquiry or 'history' at which the history is articulated in the manner in which it has been articulated above, in this book, that in the formal economy of a cycle of questioning or inquiry spanning two and a half thousand years, a point is reached in the nineteen-eighties where inquiry confronts the question, the openness, presented by the formal symmetry of the dynamic of inquiry with the dynamics, and the associated histories, of other dimensions coordinate with inquiry in the very books in which inquiry is carried on.

That is: in retrospect we couldn't have made 'the next move' in inquiry after, say, 'Paris around 1970' except by making the object of inquiry, inquiry itself - and we couldn't have done that by setting out from anywhere but the outset itself. An outset which, as the related cycles of inquiry and history close in this Close, is now seen explicitly in its context: my path, for example, through various libraries and books to this book.

In relation to the frame of this inquiry, this history, marking a close of the whole cycle of 'theory' as it mirrors, in the symmetry of opening and closing, question and answer, the initial steps out of pythagorean silence, we may look back and see the various paths on from Niebuhr and the hermeneutic 'question' of around 1800 to which he responded, as components in a general 'economy' of historiography, opening up further and further the radical question posed by the conception of 'history' as the
reconstruction - or construction - in the historian's text, from his 'primary' material, his primary texts, an action in which the various 'perpectives' on that action presented by the primary texts are coordinated by the historian's hypotheses of their respective places in the action to be (re)constructed. The political history of the founding fathers of such 'scientific' historiography - Niebuhr as Hegel's colleague at the new university of Berlin, dying like the latter in 1831, to be soon succeeded by his own disciple Ranke, dominating the mid-century - as application of this scheme, first to the internal constitution of one 'state', one long-range spatio-temporal unity of activity, then to the interplay of internal and external structures in a group of states - this is opened up by coupling this abstract 'political' dimension of global activity to various other dimensions of text, action, and material economy, in both global and elementary articulations, until finally the historian's text itself is seen as a primary coordinate in the historiographical construction. One might take the perspective of Dilthey, around the turn of the century, as a kind of turning-point in this history of historiography from the opening of the nineteenth century to the close of the twentieth. One might then chart the symmetry of 'opening' and 'closing' of this cycle of 'modern historiography' by comparing Burckhardt's 'cultural history', in the second half of the nineteenth century, with, say, the work carried out in the textual frame or matrix of the Warburg Library over the first half of the twentieth. Or one might coordinate the dominance of Ranke at Berlin over the middle of the nineteenth century with the part of the Annales group at Paris over the middle of the twentieth - from Febvre and Bloch to Braudel, with their ideal of an *histoire totale* that would coordinate all dimensions of life, on global, mid-range and micro-levels, to construct a certain interaction of lives associated with a given - or rather (somehow) chosen - group of texts...for example

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190 LE ROY LA DURIE, Emmanuel *Montaillou* Paris 1978

- constructed from the records of an Inquisition carried out in the village of that name between 1318 and 1325, and exhibiting activity organised on the micro-level, or
- for the 'global' perspective applied to the opening of 'Modern History', and then to the central period or longue durée extending up to the French and industrial revolutions, and the rise of modern historiography.

Such an analysis, which I will not undertake, would parallel the analyses in Part III which structured that whole third period or cycle in terms of the 'hermeneutic question' posed by the configuration of 1800, through German schools, focussed in the University of Berlin, over the mid-nineteenth century, on through the paradoxes which mark the transition from nineteenth to twentieth centuries, to the Parisian axis taken as primary coordinate for the analysis of theory as it developed over the mid-twentieth century.

I will, however, attempt to present a more general figure of the embedding or inscription of 'scientific history' as itself one component of the wider 'western history' of which I have tried to present a developing 'theoretical' dimension over the course of three major 'cycles' or periods: To suggest how the opening and closing of a certain cycle or period of 'scientific' historiography is coordinate with the opening and closing of those theoretical questions which have already been articulated in detail in Part III of this inquiry. This will then allow a certain characterisation of ('scientific') intellectual history - or rather of the relations between its 'object' (the period covered by this inquiry as a whole as 'western intellectual history') and the activity, since, say, Niebuhr's colleague Hegel's analyses, of structuring, narrating, that 'history'.

'Scientific' or 'modern' historiography becomes scientific, according to the canons of its first proponents at the University of Berlin, through its selection and treatment of the 'primary sources' - the verbal material, manuscript or printed, which can itself be assigned (or rather, at the outset, assumed to have) some 'position' in, and so perspective on, the 'action' which is to be reconstructed on this material as a 'base'. The position of the historian himself (for this sort of narrative, unlike the contemporary novel, was like the University a strictly male preserve) was, insofar as it was 'scientific', outside the action, impartially standing in the widest context of the action he was reconstructing: in the general historical 'space' and time in and on which the primary sources were partial and limited perspectives - the space and time of that Universalgeschichte, that overall drama of the West, of which Niebuhr had reconstructed the opening with Rome, and Ranke the opening of the 'modern' phase extending from Renaissance and Reformation down to the French Revolution - this latter, precisely, in the inaugural interaction of newly centralised nation-states with their roman legacy.

Now I suggested at the opening of Part III how the opening up, in say Hegel's Phenomenology, of a radically 'historical' figure of Reflection as a progressive abstraction of the logical articulation of the 'space' and time in which it is embedded, from the drama of which this process of abstraction is one dimension or component, is an essentially dynamic 'two-way' enterprise: the universal space and time of Weltgeschichte is actually extracted by Hegel from his material through the process of his systematic 'reading' of history. The author of that inquiry or 'history' actually participates, as he writes the Phenomenology, in the universal drama he narrates. The space-time of the Weltgeist is actually abstracted from his material as he writes his book; the universal coordinates of the historical dynamic are organised precisely as the results, as the narrative proceeds, of setting consecutive figures of universal coordination (of 'philosophy'), in their respective positions in, and perspectives on, the process. Similarly, Ranke's frame of 'Universal History' is itself
constructed as he sets his 'primary sources' in the action (the opening of what he calls 'Modern History') on which they are so many variant perspectives. The frame elaborated in 1824 then serves to structure that series of readings of various major components of European history from around 1500 to 1800 presented in his publications over the mid-century (histories of the papacy and of the major nations over the period of Reformation and Counter-Reformation, then over the 'second half' of the period, down to the French Revolution), until he retires from Berlin in 1871 to work on the integration of these primary components in a unitary 'universal' history of the period as a whole. If Ranke's presentations are less 'dramatic' than the Phenomenology, this may be attributed perhaps to the fact that he has worked right through his vast material before sitting down to cast it in the final form of a book, a story, and that he himself stands rather further 'outside' the action than Hegel in his first book. Nevertheless, if his dramatic interaction with his characters does not involve him so personally as Hegel with his, the essentially 'hermeneutic' interaction of the historian and his sources still articulates the progress of the narrative in the detailed 'working through' of those sources in the processes both of initial research, and final exposition. 'Scientific' history remains essentially a new method, a new sense of the 'direction' in which the historian should proceed in reconstructing action from verbal 'material', constantly considering the question of other possible reconstructions or interpretations, which his scientific colleagues are sure to raise unless his construction is faultless, apodictic, allowing no other embedding of source in action, and so demonstrating the very historical 'facts' themselves: wie es eigentlich geschehen ist.

I presented the 'hermeneutic' question posed by the recognition of the 'logical' or theoretical order as itself radically, logically, embedded in its relations with other dimensions of action, as a question which could itself be taken as organising a wider configuration of questions opening up in the period around 1800 marked by French, Industrial, and Romantic 'revolutions' in politics, material life, and ideas. I borrowed the term 'hermeneutic' itself from Schleiermacher's confrontation of such questions in relation to the Book(s) par excellence of the western tradition,
the 'Bible', and in my exposition of this general 'Romantic' configuration of ideas or (another contemporary term) 'ideology' around 1800, I took as my central reference the figure of Novalis, in his friend's library of material relating to the 'middle' ages, working on his ideal Roman set in the thirteenth century, and on the eve of the new century composing his public address to Europe, finding in the thirteenth century and the transition into the nineteenth 'ähnliche Zeitpunkte', and proposing a new vision of a unitary Europe, reflecting the unity of thirteenth-century Christendom in a world reconstructed from the fragments of the Reformation.

ähnliche Zeitpunkten: around 1250 and around 1800, the ideal unity retrospectively projected onto the thirteenth century by the Counter-Reformation fragmented in that configuration of emergent centralised nation-states and germanic 'nation' around 1500, soon to be taken by Ranke as the opening configuration of a 'Modern History' closing with the French Revolution.

1250 and 1800: roughly marking the opening-up of a new organisation of theory turning upon the focal figure of the individual and his choice (notably with Thomas Aquinas), and the opening-up of a more radical inquiry which attempts to evolve a logic of the embedding of logic and theory in a 'historical' coupling of logical, material and 'poetic' dimensions of the new world opened up by ideological, economic and political 'revolutions'. 1800, then, roughly marking the close of a long 'working-through' of the thirteenth century figure of the focal part of the 'individual'. A long working-through traced, for example, by Burckhardt from the latter part of the thirteenth century down to that configuration of around 1500 taken by his master Ranke as the opening of 'modern' rather than 'medieval' history.

I have attempted to trace only a certain 'economy' or dynamic of 'western' theory (theory, indeed, there taken to be precisely the specifically 'western' dimension of literature that from the pythagoreans on seeks to coordinate the various dimensions
of its 'context' with the internal logic of a certain kind of text: a text organised by the economy or dynamic of 'abstraction' of that 'internal' order from its confusion with supposedly extrinsic factors). But as the inquiry developed this involved introducing successive figures of the 'internal' logical coupling 'in' a text of that internal 'logical' order with what was 'internally' presented in texts of a given period as its 'external' context. The presentation of 'theory' as essentially embedded in a history was, then, taken to mark the opening of the third of three major phases of western 'theory' - and indeed to mark a new, if incomplete, coupling of its 'internal' logic with other dimensions of a text - other dimensions corresponding to other dimensions of 'western history', considered to involve parallel 'workings through' of other dimensions of those material books through which the 'theoretical' dynamic was traced.

'Book', indeed, rather than the 'text' of the nineteen-sixties and 'seventies, in relation to which 'theory' was seen to be a variety of literature, one genre among others within the more general order of spoken or written or printed text, this in turn set in a wider context whose various dimensions were themselves to be considered as so many parallel kinds of 'language' or textuality. I suggested at the close of Part III how this theoretical characterisation of theory as 'text' was a sort of residual abstraction of its 'logic' from the 'dramatic' character of book as 'script' in a dramatic 'context' that could not be satisfactorily coordinated with the internal order of a book 'in' that order. I suggested that 'structuralist' attempts to provide a textual coordination of text and context - say, Derrida's attempt in De la Grammatologie to articulate in his text the 'grammatology' of interaction of text and life in the case of Rousseau - invited a still more 'radical' questioning which would 'deconstruct' the millenial abstraction of the verbal order of theory from its dramatic coupling, as 'script', to other dimensions of the activity in which the production of that book - that script for part of the activity, the 'history' - was itself, also, a component.
Now if we are to finally inscribe the closing steps of this inquiry, this 'history', this book, as a 'working-through' of what is open, not simply in the formal, 'textual', symmetry of text and context(s), but rather what is open in the dramatic configuration of book and world, script and action as coupled orders or economies of 'working through' what is open textually, materially and culturally — where the verbal presentation of what is open is itself only one path open to me among others — we, or rather I, must work 'out' of this book in and through this close, by setting the book as a sort of question-mark in an Action into which one might move in response to this question. This rather as the 'scientific' historian moves from books and other documents into the action of which they are so many indices (but the historian does this in a book).

A 'question-mark' which itself participates in a closing of western 'history' towards the close of its twenty-fifth century, by mirroring in the order of closing, conclusion, not only the opening in the first decades of the last century of a sort of third 'Act' (its characters Niebuhr, Hegel and a hundred million or so others), but also the opening of the 'First Act', described at the opening of Part I of this 'version', in the first seventy or so years of the fifth century 'BC': the period from the first expulsion of the pythagoreans from Croton around 500, and the outbreak of the pelopponesian war, the emergence of Socrates at Athens, and the 'publication' of pythagorean theory by Philolaus.

Three 'acts': or perhaps the standard five, if we count the passage into the drama, the Introduction, and the passage out, this Close, as first and fifth. Three or five 'acts' or periods, cycles, circuits, within the book as a whole, in the opening and closing of its major sections, each corresponding to the 'working through', in the book and in the reconstruction of the Action or Drama in which it partakes, of a certain relation of three, or rather six, dimensions of theory, coupled with the other dimensions
of 'context' of which the components other than the logical are the 'theories'.

The 'scientific historian' reconstructs an action in his text by coordinating various different perspectives on the action as various components of the action as seen from various different positions in the action. A character in that particular form of action or acting which we call 'drama', 'acting', plays out that 'part' in the action of framing his activity within his developing understanding of a developing interaction with other 'parts' represented by other components of 'script' - situating these other dimensions or parts of the script within his developing understanding of the different positions in, and perspectives on, the action, of those other 'parts' or personae, characters. His perception of the ongoing action - which last is, then, nothing other than the ongoing interaction of different perceptions of the ongoing interaction (from different 'positions' in it, to once again extend the spatial metaphor from the 'physical' space of interaction to the relation of the physical and other dimensions of the interaction).

The historian must, then, stand outside an action he narrates, rather as the aristotelian spectator eventually comes, according to Aristotle, to stand outside the 'play' of identifications with actors on the artificial stage of 'theatre'. Just as a novelist sets the 'script' of his or her characters' interactions within the verbal space of his or her narrative, rather than in the physical space of the stage implicit in the dramatist's script, so the historian must set the documents through which his actors 'speak' in his verbal narration of the action of which those documents are the 'script' or transcript. As a rankean 'scientific' historian, he must so embed his documents as script in the action as he reconstructs it, that colleagues cannot successfully question his 'interpretation' of the sources. This involves abstracting enough elements from the material as a whole, so that when
those words (some of which may be numbers, dates, and so on) are set in the verbal dynamic of his narrative, the whole unfolds from opening coordinates of the action - historical 'space', time, and documents to be embedded in (so articulating) that historical unity - to conclusion, in such a way that:

A: the historical space and time abstracted from the sources through the process of working-through the mass of material is coherent, and not itself questionable as the author's own partial perspective

B: the action set in this space and time of the historiographical narrative is not contradicted by elements in the sources not directly incorporated in the narrative, when those elements are transposed into the narration or action according to their position in the action as already determined by elements directly incorporated

C: any components and relations in the narration or action are determined or supported by deduction from the structure of its space and time, or by derivation from a cited document.

Schematically, then, one may suppose historiography to consist in 'looking around' in a certain range of material with some vague idea of an organising 'question' or 'problem' attaching to some vaguely determined 'space' and 'time' - something opening up in some relation of individuals, institutions, ideas, economic developments and so on, at some 'point' in 'history' in relation to which one may work through and eventually present a sort of evolving dynamic or economy of responses, more or less on the theatrical analogy (with various figures, themes and so on substituted for individual characters, perhaps) - then slowly getting a clearer idea of the 'question' as one slowly narrows down the range of sources to be used...then, with the range of sources more or less determined, structuring coherently in 'thought' rather than reading the abstract scheme of the action in which citation of sources is to be embedded (a sort of review or reading of one's own readings of the sources over the period of preparatory research)...then working through the linear presentation of the action in the words of one's own text, in the economy of questions that arise from sentence to sentence, and from citation to citation, the whole economy structured by the formal organisation of interaction within
wider episode within the action as a whole: writing at last. Then, perhaps, submitting the draft to colleagues for criticism, incorporating criticisms and suggestions by local restructuring, further corroborative citation, elimination of unnecessary 'passages', and so on, before final publication.

It is of course only too evident that in writing out, working through, the thousand-and-a-half pages of this 'inquiry', I have departed somewhat from this ideal model of scientific research and careful publication of results... but then I have already suggested that this is not so much a unitary presentation of the results of earlier research, but itself a sort of direct linear writing-out of the second stage of research just described: after having 'looked around' for rather a long time (seven or so years, with various attempts to 'begin writing' that eventually seemed unsatisfactory), I finally began to prepare what was in effect a transcript of a written inquiry into the writing of that (this) inquiry itself (while still largely under the impression, at the outset, that I was writing a more traditional 'book', a coherent 'thesis', rather than an often rather incoherent questioning). This over-long (for a book) transcript might in principle then have served (or might be thought perhaps to be able to serve) as the initial 'reading' of a chosen range of sources, that might be recast, rewritten, into a coherent presentation about a third of the length of this original. One of the 'examiners' of the transcript, when submitted at the close of 1984 with skeleton conclusion and bibliography (of sources actually cited in the text) - David Krell - did in fact suggest such rewriting before acceptance of the 'thesis' on the title-page of his copy of the first volume. But he also asked, during his formal questioning at my 'defence' of the volumes as constituting a record of research, containing certain results, whether those sections of the Introduction involving indexical reference to the act of writing, had been rewritten at any point. The difficulty of casting this inquiry into the shorter form of a standard 'thesis' is that the very questioning which structures the inquiry requires that the narrative be a direct transcript of the process of writing, the process of 'transcription' of a textual tradition into this text... into which the text itself is an inquiry.
The book here, then, is the primary instrument or apparatus of research. And one might well argue that the form of the book is always the primary instrument of research, whether in history or physics or 'philosophy', but that the process of reading, writing and rewriting outlined above serves usually to 'abstract' a more or less coherent unitary 'text', of which the eventual 'book' may be considered the extrinsic material embodiment. Once again, this might be seen as a sort of reiteration of the 'deconstructive' questioning which led Derrida to restructure various historical 'theories' as textual structures of apparent abstraction of its 'internal' logic from a given text: rather than embed the textual symmetry of 'internal' logic and 'external' material embodiment in the textual dynamic of the interface of these in the 'sign' - in the textual symmetry of signs for 'internal' and 'external' - we may open up a more radical inquiry by embedding this textual symmetry itself in a dramatic symmetry of the textual dynamic and the material economy of production of that text at, say, Paris in 1967 - these 'internal' and 'external' orders of articulation of the relation of internal and external orders of the book (De la Grammatologie, say) themselves symmetric with what I have called the 'poetic' order of their symmetry: the poetic order analysed over the course of this inquiry by working through various textual figures of that order - notably those found in Aristotle's Poetics, Alberti's De Pictura - to, say, Godard's Vent d'Est, roughly contemporary with Derrida's book.

Book as primary instrument, organon, of research: for just as the historian must frame the dynamic interplay of word and action in which a given text is produced - one particular act, writing, among others open in principle in a given situation, and which might be chosen for all sorts of reasons, deception or misrepresentation of various degrees prominent among them - so the historian's own activity of writing history is itself in principle open to a similar questioning - with the added practical or 'moral' dimension attaching to the part of such questioning, and his writing, in an unfinished action over whose continuation he, a participant has some control and responsibility.
To carry on with this writing then... whether it be
my moral response to my situation as a thinking Englishman in the
nineteen-eighties (or a component in such a response) or, as some
will surely see it, a pathological obsession...

If the books which embody the results of more or less
'scientific' inquiry, theory, are themselves inscribed here in the
wide frame of a 'history' of European (mainly) thought (thought, then,
insofar as it purports to partake of unitary theory rather than the
incoherent, passing reflections of every day)... then one may see the
linear progress of the historian's narrative or 'argument' through
the words of his book as the working-out of the interaction which
opens up with the opening of his book (the book proper rather than
'Act One', the introductory setting of the scene), on the 'lowest'
textual level of the sentence, the elementary questions attaching to
his embedding of verbal sources in his narrative: questions attaching
to the symmetry of the elementary terms, words, in the syntagmatic
and paradigmatic axes of possible substitutions.

Thus, just as in principle a 'total history' which carried
to its 'logical' conclusion the ideal of the Annales school would have
to take as universal frame (longest durée) not only the textual matrix
of all possible texts over recorded 'history', but the wider 'dramatic'
matrix of all possible coordinations of possible texts with possible
actions, in all possible circumstances - the ideal global 'superspace'
of coordination of physical, cultural and logical 'spaces' of things,
actions and words - so the totally 'scientific' historian would have
to set and articulate in this total historical space his own activity
of writing its history.

... But this limiting formal circularity of the absolute
historian (in effect indistinguishable from the Author of Creation)
actually presents us, at last, with a figure which will resolve the
abstract question posed at the outset of this closing 'bibliography'
by the far more limited activity of an actual historian writing an
actual book of 'history'. The limiting global 'superspace' of cosmic
history, analogous in many respects to the initial pythagorean
Kosmos, whose dramatic history turned upon the part of the
'philosopher' who marked in Kosmos that universal frame,
as the theoretical christian story of the thirteenth century would
turn on an integration of this figure with the parallel jewish
figure of the cosmic turning-point embodied in Moses' writing of
the Law of Creation (and the part of this writing in that Creation),
can itself be regarded as a limiting form of the now familiar fig-
ure of abstraction in a book from the actual presentation of the
abstract global space in that book. The earliest paper in Derrida's
collection of 1967 criticises, or rather brings 'into question',
deconstructs, the husserlian picture, transmitted by Merleau-
Ponty to Paris in the 'fifties, of the limiting phenomenological
project of analysing in 'transcendental' space (or subjectivity)
the language used to pursue that very analysis. One may reiterate
this questioning by questioning the dynamic of the intellectual life
of Paris (and Cerisy) around 1960 in which Derrida presented his
epochal text: a text written by a historian or philosopher is con-
strained by the matrix of substitutions by which it is one possible
production open to a human being in France around 1960 - by its
'syntax' so to speak as one component of human activity, if we ex-
tend this time an analogy from the linguistic 'dimension' of histori-
cal space to the coordination of that dimension with the other two
correlative dimensions (cultural and material: the global 'physical'
symmetry of 'space' in the restricted sense being a sort of formal
limit of the latter, as the formal symmetry of 'logical' space is
a limiting abstraction à la Husserl, or à la Tractatus from linguistic
'space') of human, 'dramatic', space. Not even the great collective
texts of the Bollandists (the Acta Sanctorum, in process of compi-
lation by up to six jesuits at a time, begun in 1643) or Monumentists
(Monumenta Germaniae Historica, begun in 1826) constitute more than
a preliminary scratch at anything like a strictly comprehensive
'history' of catholic saints, or medieval germany - and despite
their continuous editorial tradition down to the nineteen-eighties
(and presumably beyond) they can hardly be considered as 'a book'
(the life of Saint George, for example, has been simply excised
from the former publication by its twentieth-century editors).
If, then, one considers the dramatic 'syntax' of writing books, or giving papers at symposia, one arrives at a figure of 'writing', of the part of the production of a book in a historian or philosopher or physicist's life, which coordinates the various 'scales' of elementary questions (sentences and the matrix of paradigmatic and syntagmatic orders that can be unfolded from each one—a lexicon would constitute the limiting case of a book constructed simply as the embedding of every recorded term of a given language in the matrix of all those terms it constituted, by associating a paragraph or so with each term, as its initial embedding in the book or matrix), their embedding in paragraph, group of paragraphs, chapter, group of chapters, then book, with the embedding of the book itself in the various possible substitutions of analogous matrices of activity, this within the unity of the author's life as a whole. One may then coordinate the production of that book as one component 'in' the author's life, with the embedding of that life itself in his or her 'culture', and so in an overall 'history' of this our planet. It is just such a sort of embedding of pythagorean 'theory' in greek culture, as that theory may be supposed to have embedded that culture in wider Kosmos, with which this narrative opened, after the book as a whole had opened with the question posed by the asking of a question, in a book, at the outset (at the entrance 'into' the book).

I tried to show, as the 'first step' of this narrative, how Parmenides abstracted from the embedding of pythagorean 'theory', or rather from the internal discourse of the externally silent group with which he was breaking by breaking that silence, in the pythagorean Kosmos of which such 'esoteric' discourse was (the) 'theory'. I tried then to understand how successive 'steps' of 'western' theory (corresponding, more or less, to the cultural space physically mapped as 'Europe') could be read as successive 'abstractions' from previous 'theory', through the bringing of that earlier theory 'into question' by embedding it in the actual dramatic space of interaction of text and context, of which each succeeding theory was a new 'version, itself, in its turn, to be brought into question by a succeeding 'critic', by a reader who found himself 'outside' the text, and refused to
assent to the earlier theorist's 'abstraction' of the internal logic of his text (presented as logic of the Kosmos of which his text and its logic was one term or component) from the context in which the critic 'found himself', and in which the critic in his turn produced his text, his book.

Now this 'reading' of 'the western tradition' has a strong analogy to the characterisation of 'philosophy' developed by Cassirer, from his initial (doctoral) reading of Descartes Kritik der mathematischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis in 1899, through his reading of Leibniz System (1902) as a critique of Descartes, on to a general consideration of the 'space' of such reading (Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft, der neueren Zeit, 1906-7), then back through Kants Leben und Lehre (1918-21) as the primary frame of coordination of reading of pre-kantian philosophy since Kant with its object (interface, then, of the texts to be set in the abstract 'neokantian' space of the Marburg school, and the 'scientific' coordinates of that analytic space - configuration of text in action (Kant's intellectual life: his life was dominated by the discipline of intellectual, 'critical', work) which would supply the primary 'hermeneutic' frame which would organise the interplay of pre-kantian text and neokantian 'scientific' intellectual history as post-kantian and post-rankean 'philosophy' (a Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen, 1923-25)...and eventually back beyond Descartes to Ranke's opening of 'Modern History', and to a rewriting of Burckhardt which would trace the theoretical development of the new 'renaissance' picture of Individuum und Kosmos, where Burckhardt had seen only the fragmentary residues of medieval systems lagging behind the dramatic developments in practical life and aesthetic culture.

And this is where we left 'the Renaissance' some pages ago, with Cassirer and his central figure Cusanus, defining, so to speak, that transition out of what were (according to Cassirer) first called an intervening 'middle' ages in an italian's funeral oration for Cusanus.
Burckhardt's 'discovery of the World and of Man'; Cassirer's self-discovery of the Individual in the historical dialectic of problems, traced through their verbal presentation in the order of articulate questions, systematically organised as theory, as the individual's dramatic identification of his part, in the new cultural space of which central perspective provides the visual frame, of framing himself framing that rational mathematical world. And this Cassirer's framing of the opening of the drama of 'Modern History' presented as the reading of a collection of texts organised as so many responses to the central texts of Cusanus: the sections of his book on the Renaissance are headed:

I Introduction
II Cusanus
III Cusanus and Italy
IV Freedom and Necessity in Renaissance Philosophy
V The Subject-Object Problem in Renaissance Philosophy

He reads a group of 'renaissance' texts as so many readings of Cusanus, and readings of readings of Cusanus; the renaissance texts are articulated between the texts written by his central figure over the middle of the fifteenth century, and his own text, his writing of his reading of readings of Cusanus. He can thus identify the unity of 'the Renaissance', in the unitary scheme of his text, as the economy of readings of Cusanus: as the articulation not of propositions so much as of different and parallel posings of the question articulated over the middle of the fifteenth century by Cusanus' inscription of his text in a mathematical symmetry of heavenly implicatio and terrestrial explicatio, the text - like the picture for which it provides a 'script' in De Visione Dei - set in the middle of that newly unitary frame of which, precisely through its position in the frame, it articulates the coordinates. The text itself, then, a sort of picture, a mirror like the limit quadro constructed in albertine perspective, in which Cusanus' heirs can see themselves for the first time in western history as the moving foci of a new mathematical World.
Now in the treatment of 'Renaissance' in Part II above, I set Cusanus alongside his contemporary Alberti, and took the texts of the latter, rather than those of the former as 'central' to my reading:

193 ALBERTI, Leon Battista

De Pictura (composed 1435)
De Statua (c 1440)
both in Grayson, ed & tr: Leon Battista
Alberti on Painting and Sculpture
London 1972

194 De Re Aedificatoria (c 1452) Florence 1485, divided into ten books: Paris 1512; tr as
The Architecture by Leoni from the Italian version of Bartoli: London 1726

(the editio princeps and the Paris edition are, oddly, the only ones in Alberti's original Latin)

195 Della Famiglia (c 1433-4)
De Amicitia (c about 1440)
De Iciarchia (c 1469-70)
all in Opere Volgari (ed Grayson) Bari 1960-73

Readings of Alberti coordinating his texts with accounts of him in contemporary texts, and with later readings or interpretations:

196 GADOL, J

Leon Battista Alberti: Universal Man of the Early Renaissance
Chicago/London 1969

- who takes as organising question of his inquiry the unity of the many dimensions of the archetypal 'renaissance man', which he finds in the theme of 'measure', the very harmony of the whole, then taking this albertine unity as itself the central focus in relation to which he organises his picture of 'Renaissance';

197 WESTFALL, C W

In this most perfect Paradise: Alberti, Nicholas V, and the Invention of conscious Urban Planning in Rome, 1447-1455
Philadelphia/London 1974

- working through the congruence of Nicholas V's Testament (1455:
recorded by his secretary Manetti in *Vita e Atti Nicolai V*) as documenting their joint activity, and Alberti's scheme in *De Re Aedificatoria* as theoretical frame of this action or episode.

In relation to this Albertine frame, and to Alberti at its Albertine 'focus' or centre, I suggested a dynamic of parallel and coupled unfolding of verbal and visual orders down from what I took to be the first steps of Thomas, Cimabue and Jean de Meung:

198 **GUILLAUME de LORIS & JEAN de MEUNG**  
*Le Roman de la Rose* (1245/1275) ed Paris 197

(taken as organising the tradition of medieval Romance in:

199 **LEWIS, C S**  
*The Allegory of Love* London 1936)

through the parallel *catenae* of Vasari (for the visual arts) and the proto-renaissance canons in literature:

200 **DANTE ALIGHIERI**  
*La Vita Nuova* (c 1293) tr Rossetti London (1861) 18  
*La Divina Commedia* (c 1308-21) ed with tr Butler London 1900

201 **PETRARCH**  
*Rime* ed

202 **BOCCACCIO**  
*Il Decamerone* (c 1348-53) tr Rigg London (1903) 1960

science:

203 **ORESAME, Nicolas**  
*Le Livre du Ciel et du Monde* (tr & comm on Aristotle's *De Coelo*; 1377 ) ed with tr Menut Wisconsin 1969

(and the relevant texts already noted in the discussion of 'history of science' above)

mystical theology:

204 **CATHARINE of Sienna**  
*Lettere* Venice (1500) 1574  
205 *Dialogi* (1377-8)
HÜGEL, Friedrich von The Mystical Element in Religion London 1908

Teutsche Theologie (about 1350) first printed (ed Luther) Wittenberg 1516, with pref, 1518) tr Winkworth London 1854

- a devotional manual of the Gottesfreunde, prominent among whom was:

TAULER, Johann Sermons ed & tr with Life, Winkworth London 1857

the disciple of:

ECKHAP of HOCHHEIM Selected Treatises and Sermons ed & tr Clark 

.. and associate in the Gottesfreunde with the merchant

MERSWIN, Rulman Mystical Writings ed & tr Kelper Philadelphia 1960

.. echoed in England by:

Cloud of Unknowing tr (with 2 other treatises) Wolters Harmondsworth 1961

JULIANA of Norwich Revelations of Divine Love tr Wolters Harmondsworth (1966) 1973

where

CHAUCER, Geoffrey The Canterbury Tales (1390s) ed & abgd Skeat Oxford 1874; tr Coghill Harmondsworth 1952

was translating Boccaccio, the Roman de la Rose, and writing (in the Canon's Yeoman's Tale) about alchemy in a manner continued by

NORTON, Thomas The Ordinall of Alchimie (c 1477) ptd Ashmole in Theatrum Chemicum Britannicum (L. 1652) facs

In the previous generation the Bishop of Durham,

RICHARD de BURY Philobiblon (c 1344) tr Thomas London 1888

who had studied at Oxford and Paris at the beginning of the century, and amassed what was for his age a remarkable library (of about 1500
books) as well as founding the first secular library at Oxford (in Durham College), describes in his book the value of books, the intellectual life of Oxford and Paris, and his own activity of framing, so to speak, a freer intellectual space for contemporary education by supplementing the traditional lectio ex cathedra with the scholars' own lectiones in a library. - This by employing those in his extensive episcopal service throughout Europe in the acquisition of rare volumes, just as Italian merchants in the next century would use their agents in distant cities to acquire valuable manuscripts, as well as valuable contracts.

One might trace the changing face of libraries, and the changing figure of lectio through from the typical thirteenth-century 'readings' of, and commentaries on, the Sentences of Peter Lombard, organising a fairly limited range of canonical authorities in the more or less unitary 'space' of scholastic disputation, down to Bessarion's reorganisation of the Vatican Library (contemporary with Alberti's reorganisation of Nicholas V's city) and to that idealised meeting of Lorenzo's Platonic Academy at his villa at Camaldula near Florence over four days in 1468, recreated around 1480 by one of the members of the group:

215 LANDINO, Cristoforo Quaestiones Camaldulenses (Florence ?1480) ed & abgd Garin in Filòsofi Italiani del XIV Florence 1942

in which Ficino, Alberti, Lorenzo, Landino and others debate in platonic manner the relative merits of an active, and a contemplative life. I tried, more generally, to trace convergent or parallel 'unfoldings' of the individual as 'focus' in verbal and visual orders, down through Alberti's town-planning understood in relation to central perspective and Cusanus' 'script' transcribing into its cosmic frame the way the gaze of its subject in the panel he sent with his script follows the viewer as he moves around in the linear time of narration, to the 'dramatic' integration of visual and verbal orders around 1500: in...


or prefigured by:
Même notre pensée la plus 'profonde' est contenue dans les conditions invincibles qui font que toute pensée est 'superficielle'. On ne pénètre que dans un forêt de transpositions; ou bien c'est un palais fermé de miroirs que féconde une lampe solitaire qu'ils enfantent à l'infini...(1)

Even our most 'deep' thought is confined by inescapable conditions which make all thought 'superficial'. We penetrate only a forest of transpositions, or rather a closed palace of mirrors given life by a sole lamp which they reproduce to infinity...

- Such is Valéry's image of the figural space in which Leonardo found himself, as human focus (one image of the focal light) of all the real and figurative 'mirrors' which present the ideal case of visual surface constructed in albertine perspective:

...even that 'depth' of reflection articulated in the verbal line of our most theoretical texts, is itself only a superficial image of abstraction from the visual order. Leonardo in his notebooks explores the interplay of that verbal time with the visual space in which it is embedded, and which is in turn embedded in the development of his reflection, word and image each an illustration of the other...and out of this interplay are born the more structured texts 'on' painting:

1: (218): Note et Digression in Variété (1924) p199; one might compare M. Teste's 'Je suis étant, et me voyant; me voyant me voir, et ainsi de suite..' (Pleiade ed, below, II.25)
I tried to characterise the configuration of reflection and its various contexts around 1500 in terms of a 'focal' question posed by the figure of renascent drama: the mise-en-scene of reflection may be traced from the visio Dei of 1453 - or more generally, say, from Nicholas V, Alberti, Cusanus, Bessarion and others in Rome around 1450, through Landino's laurentian Academy of 1468, Alberti's own last dialogue (1469) set in Florence Cathedral, the funeral oration for Cusanus of that same year, Botticelli's association with the Academy at that time, Ficino's own transcription of Plato into the scholarly language of his time - most particularly of that Symposium which provided the frame not only physical, but intellectual of the Academy's debates, and the reading of, or Commentary on, which, framed Ficino's neoplatonic 'system':

220 PLATO Opera (tr & comm Ficino - finished 1469)
Florence 1484 (cf no. 86 above)

221 FICINO, Marsilio Opera ed Petri Basel 1576 (facs: 19 )inc.
tr of Corpus Hermeticum & various neoplatonic writings, with De Vita Triplica &c

..a system that in turn presents a primary coordinate in the theatrical scripts of Pico, like Botticelli in transition from the world of Lorenzo-and Marsilio to that of Savonarola:

222 PICO della MIRANDOLA De Omni Re Scibili (1486)
De Hominis Dignitate Oratio (1486)
Apologia (1487)
all in Operæ ed Garin Florence 1942-

A coupling, then, in the transition from one to the other of the two great 'renaissance men', uomini universali, Alberti and Leonardo, over the second half of the quattrocento, of visual and verbal orders or dimensions as they had developed down from the thirteenth century. Burckhardt had dramatised the transition from thirteenth to fifteenth century in Italy, and had seen in Savonarola a prefiguration of the wider crisis that would soon disrupt the transient
unity of the High Renaissance, ushering in Ranke's 'Modern history' as northern Europe swept into Italy, and the Reformation swept across northern Europe. His student Wölfflin would trace through this crisis the development of a visual syntax (so to speak) whose dynamic could be articulated 'internally', within the visual order of the picture surface itself, from 'linear' Renaissance to 'painterly' Baroque - whereas I attempted to sketch how the disruption of linear perspective over the latter half of the fifteenth century was coordinate with the coupling of image and implicit narrative, eventually leading to the dramatic distortions of 'Mannerism' which engage the spectator in the action organised by the picture-surface as it disrupts the static perspectival space in which precise albertine composition had been set, and breaks out to organise an emotional configuration in space and time that distantly prefigures the complete breakdown of perspective that, four centuries later, gives birth to what we call 'modern' painting.

Now if Wölfflin's 'internalist' art-history, with its characterisation of various successive periods in terms of a formal unity of 'style', abstracts both from the implicit verbal dimension emphasised by the Warburg historians, as from the wider social frame:

223 HAUSER, Arnold
Sozialgeschichte der Kunst und Literatur
(Munich 19 )tr Hauser & Godman London 1951

224 FRANCASTEL, Pierre
Etudes de Sociologie de l'Art
Paris 1970
(essays 1951-70, on quattrocento)

...from contemporary theories of art:

225 A Documentary History of Art selected & ed Holt Princeton 1957-66

and more generally from the wealth of perspective embodied in:

226 (Enciclopedia Universale dell'Arte ed Pallottino & alia; Rome 1958; english version:) Encyclopedia of World Art NY 1959

...so perhaps we might see a sort of parallel 'internalism' in Cassirer's dynamics of the verbal order of 'Renaissance Philosophy'. Thus in:

227 SCHILPP, Paul Arthur, ed The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer
Evanston 1949
John Hermann Randall (1) criticises:

I The absence of any embedding of the history of ideas in any context external to purely textual relations

II The schematic unity of his perspective - brought out most clearly in his use of the term 'medieval'

III The coordination or complicity of these two abstractions in an abstract finality of autonomous Reason

...while the 'institutional' frame and dynamic of 'renaissance thought' has been analysed, notably, by:

228 KRISTELLER, Paul Otto Renaissance Thought NY 1961-5

who embeds his chosen texts in the figure of a developing 'Humanism'.

I suggested how Cassirer's own developing reading of Philosophy as a kind of reading or interpretation, in which earlier texts are set in a dynamic, a textual interaction, a history of ideas, as the later text (the writing of such reading) frames by hermeneutic abstraction the rational space and time of that interaction, itself turned about his reading of Kant - Kant's texts as the primary historical interface of earlier texts embedded in the finality of progress towards Kant, and later post-kantian framings of the general intellectual 'space' of this development. Kant's writing, then, articulating or coordinating the complementary movements (as the philosopher as historian of philosophy writes his reading) of embedding of pre-kantian texts in the finality of Reason's self-discovery, and abstracting in this coordination of earlier views to the post-kantian space of coordination.

We might embed Cassirer himself in that post-kantian space and time of Philosophy, by marking his position around 1930 in terms of the confrontation of his reading of Kant with Heidegger's at the celebrated Davos conference which might be taken as a sort of ritual enactment of the transition from neokantian dominance in german philosophy into a new phase that would be dominated by Cassirer's adversary. I have already 'embedded' Heidegger's position 'around 1930' - from Sein und Zeit in 1927 to the Rectoral

1: 'Cassirer's Theory of History as illustrated in his treatment of Renaissance Thought' (pp 689-728)
Address of 1933 — in the 'reading' of the period 1800-1970 (roughly) pursued in Part III above. One might plot Cassirer's position around that time in relation to his book on the Renaissance (1927) and that on the Enlightenment (1932: noted below), and his leaving Germany in the great diaspora of 1933. Cassirer seeing in Kant the embedding of previous reflection in the rational mathematical space and time of newtonian mechanics, by critically questioning the various earlier configurations (wolffian dogmatism and humean scepticism in particular) of a pre-critical reflection 'abstracted' from this rational space through its turning in concrete imagery of its relation to, embedding in, its World. In Kant philosophy at last becomes 'scientific', as reflection first becomes fully reflexive, radically 'critical'. For Heidegger, of course, this turns Kant more or less inside-out or upside-down or back-to-front. It is analogous to the contemporary 'positivist' embedding of philosophy, as mathematical logic, as one component in the ever-more systematic Gestell of 'technical' questions that abstract our experience further and further from the most radical question of Being. Kant is not the logician of Laplace's System of the World; rather does he pose the Question of Being in relation to the radical reflexivity of Da-Sein. He does not finally pose the frame of all legitimate questions by systematically abstracting from the noumenal frame of traditional metaphysics, from misplaced meta-physical imagery: rather does he take up once more the single traditional Question which is posed in Aristotle's Metaphysics and at the close of Heidegger's book on Kant — the question of the meaning of Being — and articulate the results of philosophy since Descartes in terms of that Question: and this is clearer in the first edition of the first Critique, where the Question expresses itself 'at work' so to speak in Kant's reflexion, rather in the more symmetrical form of the 1787 edition (where, for Cassirer, the last vestiges of 'metaphysical' imagery have been recognised as such, and abstracted from).

That is: Cassirer's own perspective of a historical hermeneutic of Reason, of questioning which with Kant actually recognises itself for what it is, and poses the World as the a priori frame of such questioning of the World, is itself abstracted from
various dimensions of its context: material, ontical, institutional, visual ("art-historical"), and so on. Yet precisely in the more or less 'canonical' systematicity of this abstraction of the history of abstraction from its various contexts, its various historical 'coordinates' outside the internal coordination of terms marking those coordinates in texts, Cassirer's intellectual historiography has served to structure subsequent intellectual historiography, most emphatically that of an 'Enlightenment' leading from 'Scientific Revolution' down to Critical Philosophy. - This by structuring a new historical 'space' and time of intellectual history, or rather of questions the historian must confront, coordinate with his (the later historian's) embedding of Cassirer's own general 'coordinates' in a wider 'space' opened up by bringing them into question, by posing the question of Cassirer's abstraction (as it structures his text), and with it the abstraction of the textual relations of, say, 'Enlightenment' thinkers, from a wider matrix in which the texts selected by Cassirer must be embedded. Thus the question of the abstract (schematic, ideal, too-narrowly 'scientific') nature of the frame of relations abstracted by Cassirer from his chosen texts (from his historical 'data'), leads into a wider historical matrix of relations in which the textual relations articulated as a 'History of Thought' over a particular period by Cassirer must be considered inscribed.

This relation of questioning the frame of a historian's account or text and the questions or problems thereby posed for 'rewriting' the history articulated in that text, is of course itself directly analogous to Cassirer's own adaptation of Windelband's 'problematic' approach to the history of Philosophy - to his own response to Burckhardt and Windelband (among others) in writing 'Renaissance Philosophy' as the Italian reading of Cusanus. Italian reading or re-writing that might be taken as a model for, say, Burckhardt's rewriting of the Introduction of Ranke's first book, Cassirer's rewriting of Burckhardt's dismissal of the theme of an authentically 'renaissance' Philosophy, and also Italian rewriting of Cassirer's reading of earlier Italian rewriting of Cusanus (by, say, Garin).
Back then to 'around' 1500 and the opening of 'modern' history, which I attempted to mark in terms of a variety of 'parallel' or analogous responses to what I took as questions opened up around 1500 by, among other things, the coupling of visual and verbal orders in a 'dramatic' figure: a figure seen as narrative line is coupled with the moving human (rather than static formal) focus of Albertine perspective, whether in the emergent 'mannerism' of High Renaissance painting, in Machiavelli's 'theatre' properly speaking:

229 MACHIAVELLI, Niccolò  

La Mandragola (1518) in Medio ed Bonini Turin 1979

...or in the wider play of 'perspectives' in the wider theatre of political (rather than sexual) diplomacy, whose drama or action is played out on the wider stage of the City and State (the frame of Alberti's theory of Architecture rather than (wall-)Painting) 'focused' or centralised over the mid-fifteenth century by Nicholas V, as by various ruling families in the other Italian City-States, and by national monarchs in France, Spain and England..

230 MACHIAVELLI, Niccolò  

Il Principe (1513; printed Rome 1532)  
tr Bull Marmondsworth 1961

Other 'primary' sources I read were:

231 LUTHER, Martin  

Acta of the Diet of Worms* (1521): variorum editions of Latin and German versions, with other material in Werke VII, Weimar 1897

232 COPERNICUS, Nicholas  

De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium* (completed 1530, printed Nuremberg 1543) ed Zeller & Zeller Munich 1949

233 AGRIPPA, Heinrich Cornelius  

De Occulta Philosophia (about 1509) printed Antwerp 1531-33; tr French London 1651  
De Incertitudine et Vanitate Scientiarum et Artium (about 1527, ptd Antwerp 1531) tr Sandford London (1569) 1573

234 ERASMUS, Desiderius  

Moriae Encomium (1509, p. Paris 1512)  
tr Radice Harmondsworth 1971
Hier steh' Ich, und kann nicht anders

.. a narration so often taking the form of Luther's or Henry's self-assertion, or complementary erasmian or morian satire or scepticism: generally, indeed, combining both, satire on one's opponents (other contradictory 'positions') and assertion of one's own position. The most famous satire of the period was perhaps the Epistola Obscurorum Virorum of Reuchlin and others, directed against the scholastic academic establishment of Germany in the Humanists' great 'Battle of the Books' against institutional conservatism north of the Alps; and the Reuchlin texts cited above present another figure of embedding of Book in World - the hebrew Cabbala or Qabala he was introduced to in Florence by Pico in his epochal first visit south of that divide, and which he in turn would introduce as primary frame of 'esoteric' science down to the Enlightenment:

.. this Jewish neoplatonism or neopythagoreanism in turn directly echoing Luther's framing of his world by reading in the Book par excellence its embedding in the universal drama it describes.
Assertion, scepticism, qabala, 'biblical' religion, fierce controversy carried on in the new medium of print; dramatic scripts like the Mandragola, the Prince's use of diplomacy (leaving those voluminous diplomatic documents on which Ranke built the new 'scientific' history which locates the position of the document in the action it frames)...printed letters, new theories ranged against the old in printed ciceronian 'dialogues'..a new philology questioning the historical transmission of classical texts, and a new latinity regulated by the dialogues, letters and speeches of the practical theorist and theoretical pragmatist Cicero. A whole new wealth of texts; let me cite, to fix as it were an extreme pole, the most 'obscure' philosophical text of the period, that I have read:

240 HUNACIUS, Albertus

Orationes duae in Laudem Sancti Thomae Aquinatis (1504,6) Venice 1507

- the only recorded text of a student at the University of Padua in 1504-6, who was chosen to read his formal oratio before the Faculty of Arts on the birthday of Thomas in those two years. The copy I read is now in the British Library, previously only the incomplete remains of another copy of the short pamphlet were recorded, at Yale. Dr Rhodes of the British Library, perhaps the leading specialist in Italian books of that period, could find no reference to the author in any other printed material in the Library. Which is to say, in effect, that the history of the philosophical debates at Padua in the time of Cajetano, Pomponazzi, Accchillini and the others mentioned in the side-notes of the pamphlet, might just as well be written with no reference to the pamphlet, as they have been until now. My only reference to these three, at any rate, was to Cajetan's revival of thomism restructured in the figure of Analogy (another variant of embedding of the logical order of discourse in the wider frame of action or actuality), and his subsequent role as the first man appointed by the Pope to attempt to quench the controversy opened by Luther.

I attempted to articulate a transition from these initial textual responses to the 'dramatic' relation of text and context opening up around 1500, down to what I presented as the systematic coordination of those various 'dimensions' of response and controversy in the figure of Experientia around 1650, by taking various
parallel developments typified by the texts cited above, down to 'around 1530' (say, to the Diet of Augsburg of that year when the first 'protestant' - the name first appears at the Diet of Speyer in 1529 - confession of faith was drawn up) as together constituting a first step or phase which as it were defines the 'scale' of the subsequent economy of their interaction, as so many further 'steps' down to 'around 1650' (say, the end of the Thirty-Years War, the death of Descartes, the execution of Charles I, and so on).

'Economy': I there first presented the figure of an overall 'finality' of the transition from around 1500 to around 1650 in terms of the structural unity of the 'action' (or interaction between various texts in their various contexts over the period) as a whole: the embedding of the various symmetries of the various lines of development (in theology, physical science, other dimensions of 'theory', together with the parallel unfolding of various dimensions of context) within the historical space and time 'outwardly' defined (more or less) by the physical boundaries of Europe over that period (in which 'physical' dimension or space the action is 'physically' embedded, and constrained by a physical dynamic of which the physical theories of the time are so many conflicting and competing versions).

'Overall finality': I presented the various nested symmetries of this historical 'space' and time not as coordinates in a unitary global scheme that might in principle (like ideal laplacian mechanics) determine (if one 'worked down' far enough from unitary whole to subordinate detail) exactly every smallest detail of texts and contexts. I presented the part of these abstract symmetries in that overall development as a sort of figural or formal dynamic at work in the more general dynamics of interplay of text and context - inclining, one might say, without necessitating - or rather, non-deterministic in that they framed only a system of formal constraints constituting only one 'side' (the unitary side) of what was going on, formally unable to determine for example the actual sequence of words in any text, but only a structure of 'text' organising various scales or levels of question and assertion, 'down' from some degree of unity of the whole as 'a text', through
chapters (or 'books' as they were then called), paragraphs and sentences to determinate words themselves. Such textual structure itself is of course not a self-subsistent unity, but coordinate with other dimensions of the activity of its production, cultural and material, which disturb the formal unity of argument or inquiry by embedding production or writing in the play of sometimes conflicting finalities, as they introduce 'arbitrary' elements into the sequence of words, paragraphs and chapters. That conflicting finality may itself be taken as the price (so to speak) of any meaning or content, any interplay of word, action and thing, in books at all. We may radicalise Derrida's analysis of the formal interplay in a text of the two sides (ideal and empirical) of the 'sign', to the interplay of textual, cultural and material economies in the material production of a book of philosophy, as this reflects, on various levels or scales of production (book, section, chapter, group of paragraphs, paragraph, sentence, word) the 'arbitrary' sequence into which the presentation must fall, if the abstract 'ideas' organising the 'higher' levels of chapter and book are to be presented at all.

Yet this interplay of global unitary symmetry and more or less arbitrary individual words, coordinate with the 'horizontal' symmetry and disymmetry of 'inside' and 'outside' of the text (word and thing, book and world it frames, Thought and Nature, mental and physical) does allow a more or less unitary construction of an abstract dynamic of theoretical development, precisely through the circumstance (I must here make a virtue of necessity) that this book itself partakes in the same conflicts, tensions, arbitrary sequences, selections and so on. The analysis it pursues ('it' being precisely what is unitary in this sometimes rather arbitrary account) has its literary finality on the most abstract level of 'the most abstract level' - the coordinates of textual abstraction itself, 'theory' as such; and it pursues a dynamic associated with the limiting symmetry of this limiting 'cosmic' frame through the organising question marked by the inquiry itself - rather than through any primary 'position' or thesis. If it tries to 'posit' anything, it is just what it attempts to mark, 'pose' as something
open. This rather as Parmenides used his book to point back to the closed realm of silent unitary Being disrupted - or rather, apparently disrupted - by his description of just that disruption. The parmenidean analogy goes a long way: right back, and right forwards in the symmetry of that opening disruption, and this closing of my inquiry as a whole. But the analogy ultimately breaks down in the same radical disymmetry which organises the sequential play of question and answer in Parmenides poem, just as it organises the longer sequence of questions and answers, a western theoretical tradition, which is in a large measure the readings of readings of that initial poem. The disymmetry of opening and closing of this wider sequence may be seen in different attitudes to the abstract configuration of sequential text and the unitary 'cosmic' symmetry which it must disrupt to present: What this book marks - as ultimately a question-mark, '?' - is not the parmenidean closure of unitary symmetric Being, 'well-rounded truth', as it 'withdraws' or abstracts itself in heideggerian manner from its very presentation as this abstraction, in this movement back from the text...but rather what is open to us as writer or reader (are you there?) as we confront this text which marks the symmetry and disymmetry of unitary symmetry and the radical unavoidable dis-symmetry of its sequential presentation in this text: it marks what is open in the configuration it presents of its embedding in the unitary global 'side' of the tradition of writing and rewriting Theory. This 'abstraction' of the text, which coordinates its structure as theory, inquiry, as verbal, textual, analysis of what is open in the symmetry of text and context as marked in a text, with the abstract unitary space of 'text' rather than 'book', in which theory has been carried on since Parmenides, 'closes' that long development by articulating it in a unitary manner 'within' the limiting question posed by the symmetry of this abstract dynamic with coordinate (material, institutional..) dynamics of its various 'contexts'.

Thus the fact that what theorists have always tried to write, that the perennial finality of 'theory', has always been
a more or less unitary text, rather than a kind of theoretical diary, a mere writing of reading, such as this has become (despite beginning by sometimes presenting itself as a unitary text, timelessly referring to its close in its opening passages, as if it were already lying complete, perfectly revised, before you the reader), is borne out by the observation that criticism taking the form of cavils about 'mere details' is itself disposed of as a merely rhetorical device adopted by a critic who cannot make any criticisms of 'substance'. No text of the tradition is 'perfect', except (on some accounts) the Text, Book, Scripture itself (whose apparent incoherence must then be seen, with Origen, as a coherent system by which the Text points to a 'higher' level of reading beyond the literal).

Criticism, then, insofar as it renounces the rhetorical device of dismissing another text or writer from serious attention because of 'fundamental' incoherence, must ignore accidents or infelicities of detailed construction, and deal with 'issues', however badly they have been presented. The dynamic of 'theory' here analysed only presents itself as a (sometimes rather poor) dynamic of such 'theory' in abstraction from other questions that may be raised in relation to the particular texts or books through which this global dynamic is traced: this just as various relatively autonomous 'theories' of the various different dimensions of text and context have traditionally pursued various structures considered 'in abstraction'.

The texts considered in Parts I to III are all more or less 'major': they correspond to 'nodal' points in the general dynamic of writing and reading and rewriting Theory, Abstraction, whose nodality or 'major' significance is reflected, among other ways, by the mere frequency of their citation as coordinates of argument ('positions') within a much wider range of texts. Here 'major' authors, texts and 'schools' are coordinated within the widest textual framework opening in the Introduction with the question of this questioning itself. Just as each 'major' text may be read as a response to a range of contemporary and earlier books, through whose dynamic of writing and rewriting the very terms of the text in question have been developed, so those major
texts are, in their turn, embedded in the paragraphs and chapters of this book - the very lack of originality in choice of 'major' texts being a principal virtue of this inquiry, since it must be argued that their traditional importance or nodality is a reflection of their embedding at nodal points of the abstract frame organised simply by the initial question of the embedding of this book in the context it shares with its subject-matter: intellectual history has, in some sense, the structure of a book.

That is: this book is itself articulated by setting in the most abstract level of coordination of book and context (unfolded from the initial question posed by this book itself as an 'inquiry') the most abstract 'higher-level' thematic structures (often found precisely in structures of opening and closing of the books of which it is the reading) of a sequence of 'major' works abstracted from the in principle unreadable wealth of 'all theoretical texts' precisely in relation to the possibility of setting them, as so many 'positions', in the general dynamic of 'western theory'.

Thus the 'importance' of Pythagoras or Parmenides or Cicero or Aquinas or Descartes or Kant or Hegel or Nietzsche is here associated with their focal positions as opening up - marking - or making an initial seminal response to the 'nodal' questions which organises the 'highest level' of scansion of this inquiry, and of the Inquiry it reads or traces, into three Parts: nodes 'around' 500BC, '0', 1250, 1650, 1800 and 1900. The dynamic or matrix of reading and writing which they organise as so many primary 'references' for the hundreds of thousands of other theorists not mentioned here (represented now by the utterly obscure Albertus Hunacius) presents a very direct analogy with Cassirer's framing of historical 'space' and time in terms of 'periods' defined by the working-through of some fundamental question, divided or punctuated by the various major phases of the parallel working-through of the major subordinate themes or questions - whose interplay through these phases in turn defines the 'fundamental' question and the structure of 'period'.

The structure of this inquiry, like the structure of readings of the intellectual dimension of Modern History after Cassirer's, may of course itself be seen as a reading of Cassirer 'among others'. Its position in the textual and contextual matrix (or matrices or matricity) of western theory may be marked in relation to Cassirer's developing position of the first decades of this century. For if Cassirer's position may be seen as a transposition of the rankean hermeneutic of embedding documents in the action they document, according them positions in what they document in order to interpret them as so many perspectives in a common space of their interaction, into the 'intellectual' dimension where the 'action' is a long debate, then one might mark the position of this text in terms of its embedding of Cassirer's abstraction of the 'logical space' of that debate from the other coordinates of the history in which the logical activity of debate is embedded. The question of such an embedding of the primary axis of theological debate or controversy, in the period now in question (when it was in turn the primary axis of debate in general), in a wider cultural space, was itself posed at the turn of the century:

241 WEBER, Max Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus (1904-5) tr Parsons London (1930) intr Giddens 1976

- posed not simply by Weber's ('seminal') working-through the interplay of theological and material economies of Calvinism as they combined to generate the axial institutions of Modern History, but by the embedding of the rational economy of this historical inquiry in the wider drama of Weber working his way out of the personal crisis framed by the tension between calvinist mother and capitalist father (which had him 'institutionalised' over the turn of the century), and so generating the institution of german sociology, in its varicus ('seminal') relations with theoretical and practical dimensions of twentieth-century german history.

Such a turn-of-the-century configuration provides another
range of coordinates, to add to those already provided by Heidegger and Randall, in which to embed Cassirer's reading; and it in turn provides a figure in which we might, for example, inscribe Lukacs' mid-century criticism of Heidegger, or the tension between Heidegger's 'school' and the 'Frankfurt School' down from the mid-century. One might take Horkheimer and Adorno's criticism of 'Enlightenment' at mid-century as a practical objection, framed in terms of weberian 'rationalisation' to Cassirer's stance. And Randall's rewriting of 'modern' intellectual history:

242 RANDALL, John Hermann Jr The Career of Philosophy from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment NY/London 1962

while it avoids the abstract finality the author criticised in Cassirer's construction, by starting from the question posed by Gilson's thomist reading of Descartes (by the possibility of reading the tradition backwards, so to speak, rather than, with Cassirer, forwards), faces a whole range of criticisms as it mirrors the structure of that transition from Aquinas to Descartes we call 'Renaissance Philosophy' by finding its own position (or rather hiding it) in a pragmatic playing with various figures found in the secondary literature, hoping to introduce no preconceptions about the nature of philosophy at the outset, but to discover 'who she is' by meeting her at work in his in many respects arbitrary personal reading. That is: Randall's finding of the 'Philosophy' that organises his reading as one term among others 'in play' in his selected texts (with no bibliography or any attempt to articulate a general survey of the material available, a la Ueberweg, or coordinate his texts systematically in a manner whose limiting form is perhaps seen in the Index Scholastico-Cartesien) is open to precisely the kind of charge of circularity that might be levelled at the impassioned controversialists of the sixteenth century - or at Randall's mentor Dewey - or at Richard Rorty reading both of these in constructing 'the story I am telling (which is borrowed from the Gilson-Randall historiographical tradition)'.(1) If Randall admits at the outset to presenting only a personal view from a mid-century american perspective indebted to Dewey, distancing himself from Windelband's systematic dynamic of questions (standing behind Cassirer) as from

1: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (see below) p 51n
in the latter's self-effacing abstraction from his story (the rise of nineteenth-century British empiricism, turning about the Kantian transformation of Hume's scepticism, and converging towards Herbert Spencer's integration of the initial responses to that transformation to be found in Comte and the younger Mill) 

... then he must still explain why he resigns himself to a 'personal' perspective rather than confronting the wider question of reasons for his presentation of that perspective, rather than an attempt to describe the shared historical community and space in which his position is identifiable as 'a perspective from Columbia in 1962'. His renunciation of questions attaching to the symmetry and disymmetry of perspectives in that wider space of perspectives is indeed arguable, and will indeed be argued by Rorty: perhaps Randall recognises that all Philosophy is a matter of personal readings of a set of personal readings of sets of personal readings of..., and he is just presenting his point of view in the ongoing conversation which is Philosophy. Rorty, at least, disclaims any 'authority' for his historical views by avowing that they're just a personal version of Randall's 'personal version of Gilson and others - or rather, a personal 'borrowing' - and yet the argument, say, for Randall's explicit omission of any discussion of 'Philosophy' from his initial framing of her 'career', is all the while implicit as he careers through the centuries, and is implicitly framed in the very abstractions he purports to renounce, as they articulate his text (and afterwards Rorty's) in its traditional abstraction from the question of the symmetry of text and context, and the practical or pragmatic justification for treating the relations of abstract texts in abstraction from their contexts, and in abstraction from all but a perfunctory nod to the context of that abstract treatment.

A different solution of these structural questions, which may, however, be seen as a sort of permutation of the variables at play in Randall's response to Cassirer's 'abstraction', might be construed in:
which is a reading of successive readings of Sextus Empiricus from 1500-1650, precisely the period now in question. In his preface Popkin presents his history as an 'essay' within a wider historical frame which would trace the polarity of 'scepticism' and 'fideism' throughout the whole development of Philosophy. Here we are back to a structure of inquiry which begins with a general question - which I take to correspond to the question I took to open up around 1500 with the figure of a text which dramatically frames its 'justification' by inscribing itself in the scheme it presents, or critically abstracts from all such figures (of 'fideism') by inscribing them all in the complementary circularity of a radical questioning ('scepticism' or 'pyrrhonism') - and traces the unfolding of an economy or interplay of subordinate questions over several phases and then the various phases of convergence of parallel questionings, until the account concludes with the integration of these various lines of inquiry in the systematic doubt of Descartes. Popkin's more or less structured history of scepticism may itself, then, be seen as paralleling Randall's scepticism about structured history. And Popkin's critical reconstruction of a dynamic of readings and readings of readings of a single writer, over a period defined by a figure of criticism, critical reading (the first phase turning about Erasmus' critical reading of Luther's 'fideist' reading of the Book's self-inscription in the closed deterministic world it thus frames), may in turn be set against Frances Yates very uncritical reconstructions of various 'fideist' dramas of the period, based on arbitrary selections from various 'hermetically' closed circular arguments of the period, arranged as circular arguments for a unitary tradition of that extreme figure of fideism which is so closed, occluded, occult, it takes the decoding activity of the Warburg iconographer to reveal it:

244 POPKIN, Richard H. The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes Assen 1960

245 YATES, Frances A Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition London 1964
246 Theatre of the World London 1969
247 The Rosicrucian Enlightenment London 1972
The conflict of Popkin's 'sceptical' unity of questions, and Yates' attempt to give a picture of a necessarily hidden unity of the closed, occult, hermetic language or symbolism most clearly expressed in renaissance iconography may be focussed in their different construal of the career of the central 'occult' philosopher of the first phase of their, and my, stories (say, 1500-1530). As I have already noted, Agrippa's 'hermeticist' De Occulta Philosophia, and 'sceptical' De Incertitudine et Vanitate Scientiarum et Artium were both published in Antwerp in 1531-3, after Agrippa's dismissal from his post of historiographer to Charles V in 1530. Yates construes the sceptical De Incertitudine as a sort of prefiguration of systematic cartesian doubt, which clears the ground for Agrippa's radical self-assertion as magically operating in the occult or hermetic circuit of a qabalistic 'spell' which by its inscription in the figure of a Word which frames the relation of Word and World, is self-confirming. Yet Trithemius relates how Agrippa was lecturing on Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico in 1509, and this is corroborated by those early accounts of the wandering magician which make of Agrippa in the first years of the century the primary source of the Faust story; furthermore, other accounts connect the developing scepticism of Charles V's historiographer with his dismissal from the imperial service. Popkin's dynamic of questions is supported by the traditional view of Agrippa, and in attempting to fit Agrippa into a complementary 'hermetic' dynamic, Frances Yates must select and contort her sources in just the sort of way scorned by the sixteenth-century historiographer in his sceptical mood or phase. Indeed the historical sequence from De Verbo Mirifico and De Occulta Philosophia is directly suggested by the subtitle of De Incertudine: atque excellentia Verbi Dei Declamatio - the closed circuit of the earlier 'occult' philosophy is inscribed in the wider circuit of a rather erasmian inscription of Book in World, as primary frame of questions and answers, with hermetic spells giving way to a more stoical participation in the Word of God by its declamatio...hardly the thing
to go down well with His Most Catholic and Imperial Majesty defending papal authority against Luther after the Diet of Augsburg.

Frances Yates' own 'position' may be fixed in relation to various other positions already sketched: in 1949 she was invited to assist Panofsky, Saxl and Klibansky in the revision of the Warburg study of the iconography of the figure of the Artist himself in the Renaissance - organising the material accrued in response to Panofsky and Saxl's initial study of Dürrer's most celebrated engraving, the Melancholia of 1514, first published in the same year as Idea and Perspective as 'Symbolic Form' (1923). The engraving is the third of a group of three (the 'Master Engravings'), the first presenting the Knight or man of action, the second St. Jerome or the contemplative life: it presents the tension of action and critical detachment - 'fideism' and 'scepticism' so to speak - in its focal coordination, in the visual frame of the quadro, of the various cultural contexts of that visual order, and in its symbolic order focuses the question that Dürrer was at the time experiencing as a radical personal crisis, from which the figure of the artist as genius, free creativity inscribing itself as such in the scheme it framed, would emerge as the aesthetic parallel of that interaction of northern culture with Italian Renaissance we call the Reformation: the Melancholia or rather the sequence of three engravings it concludes, are the Wittenberg Theses of Dürrer's reform of Art. Now, against Wölflin's 'internalist' approach, Panofsky's iconography coordinates the complex symbolism of the Dürrer engraving with the literary 'space' in which the quadro is embedded, and which serves to organise the image in a manner complementary to its geometrical embedding, through the 'symbolic form' of Perspective, in outward physical 'space'. In the Melancholia its is precisely the drama of the artist's self-discovery at the 'focus' of these various spaces, in the wider intellectual, physical, political, cultural World in which the engraving is produced, which is organised by his image: its embedding in, and organisation or structuring of the various dimensions of its context, presents the 'existential' question posed by the confrontation of Renaissance Italy and 'gothic' North. If one rewrote Ranke's first work by tracing the iconography of the transition from 1494 to 1514, rather than its diplomatic history, one might conclude with this engraving, as a new phase is about to open with the artist's self-recognition.
as the actor whose part it is to visually present the existential question of one's 'part' on the contemporary stage torn, like Hamlet, between action and reflection, belief and doubt.

Panofsky had traced one continuity of the aesthetic tradition from Antiquity down to the time of Descartes through the theme or figure of Idea: the literary art-theoretical inscription of the quadro and its visual order in its wider context, mirroring Above in Below, Inner and Outer, and the first axis in the second. Klibansky had traced the platonic axis of the Idea, 'the continuity of the platonic tradition' through a group of texts - the Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi - transmitting the platonism and neoplatonism of Antiquity down to the Renaissance, and parallelling the aristotelian tradition dominating those accounts which, from Pletho down, saw 'modern' thought as a reaction to a unitary scholastic Aristotle. In her lectures and essays of the 'fifties Yates developed a combination of these various figures, substituting the Corpus Hermeticum (to translate which Ficino interrupted his work on Plato) for the wider Corpus Platonicum, and tracing the continuity of 'the hermetic tradition' as a sort of verbal palimpsest articulating the continuity of visual symbolism already elaborated in relation to the Melancolia. The 'code', so to speak, for revealing in the verbal order the continuity of the 'hermetic' symbolism of Above and Below, was to be found in an Ars Memoriae (to take the title of the 1952 Warburg lecture which det the direction of her subsequent inquiry) which organised a mass of verbal information by articulating it in imagination in the architectural frame of a building, a spatial map.

Difficulties begin to arise when the continuity of visual 'space', culturally articulated as a 'symbolic' order, is extended through the 'hermetic' symmetry of Above-Below and Inner-Outer, to organise a textual continuity of transmission of hermetic texts (from the 'literal' order of which the visual space of the quadro is abstracted through the symbolic polyvalence analysed by, say, Lacan in terms of 'condensation' and 'displacement' in the verbal matrix), and then a sort of dramatic continuity in the interplay of groups and agents (or actors) involved in this occult or occluded transmission (or, as it quickly becomes, occult mission)...these groups symbolically presenting their mission in visual symbolism.
The dramas thus framed that Yates substitutes for the more traditional stories of, say, 'Enlightenment' articulated in Cassirer's textual continuity of questions, slowly abstracting from precisely the kind of 'mythical thinking' abstracted from rational questioning by the play of images, present a paradoxical symmetry, much appreciated by 'alternative' historians of Science following Kuhn, to the old story of rational Progress. For her coordination of parallel verbal, visual, political, social and other dimensions of history, or her story, in the symbolic unity of a limited stage and conspiratorial plot or mission, is indeed only a sort of inversion of a 'whiggish' history that frames cultural and material development within the 'rational' dynamics of theory, translating the logical dynamic of questions into a moral or practical dynamic of cultural 'progress'. Those who suspect the political implications of 'The Whig Interpretation of History' (to take the title of Butterfield's criticism, transposed by Rorty to characterise a linear model of theoretical development), but do not question its implicit abstraction of one dimension from the interplay of parallel logical, cultural and material dynamics, in which that interplay is then embedded, may find in Frances Yates' embedding of theory in the poetic order organising the continuity of an aesthetic tradition, an equally valid argument (for it is formally equivalent) for reducing the linear development of theoretical inquiry to a mere 'myth' - the western myth of Science, of the scientific distinction of science from myth.

I discussed the 'circular' argument by which an ideal rational space is textually abstracted from the embedding of that text in a 'historical' matrix of texts and other things, to frame the justification of that very abstraction in terms of its embedding in the ideal finality which is the time associated with that 'logical space', in relation to Derrida's 1959 lecture Genese et Structure, where such a circuit is found in Husserl's textual constitution of the space and time in which that text's own 'constitution' is to be analysed (justifying, then, the initially supposed terms of exposition). I noted Derrida's expansion of this thesis in his long
preface to a French translation of Husserl's essay on The Origin of Geometry in 1962, and its generalisation in his Grammatology where 'the text' is embedded in a wider matrix or textuality of its context, and Rousseau's texts taken to articulate the very substitution of (those) texts for the wider texture in which they are themselves inscribed - Rousseau's texts, then, themselves articulated in a Life which is itself a text, around a little, central, text on the figure of Text in Life, the essay on Language. - A calling 'into question', then of a Greek abstraction of ideal unitary abstract Space from the historical textual spaces in which it was presented; a calling into question of the whole Western tradition of deferral of a complete analysis of the very 'text' in which that ideal unitary Space and its unitary temporal finality is presented: yet these readings, textual 'deconstructions' of earlier theoretical texts, if they close a long tradition of positing or supposing such a frame of theory, still continue a slightly longer tradition of questioning, inquiry. Derrida's texts, as readings of earlier texts as they are embedded in a questioning articulated in the symmetry of text, and the textuality of its embedding in context, continue a long Western tradition of critical reading, in relation to which the bankruptcy of a certain sort of account or position or supposition is only the prefiguration of a close of systematic inquiry, Theory. To take theory as an essentially 'positive' activity, and while implicitly acknowledging a more radical finality of criticism in one's very looking back, to pose a 'post-modern' era somehow beyond systematic theory, is radically premature, indeed it is one more figure of that premature identification of the End of History (or Philosophy, or Theory, or the West...) which itself might be taken to define a long closing phase of that History (which I tried to trace from Romanticism up to the particular figure of the End now in question, in Part III).

Lytard's 'postmodernism' may, then, be questioned as a premature theoretical positing of the End of Theory, of the debunking of the Myth of Science, unaware of its own paradoxical abstraction, framed as it is in a textual articulation of the embedding of texts in the contexts they frame. It is hardly accidental that the characterisation of this sort of text as 'post-modern'
is borrowed from an architecture that conceives architectural space as essentially theatrical, for here we are confronting one more version of Yates' substitution of the poetic for the logical as 'alternative' frame of History, or rather, histories.

The fact that the substitution does not actually 'work', in the sense that Agrippa's literary career cannot be modelled on Dürer's reform of Art, is associated precisely with the circumstance that one can with Cassirer and Popkin and historians of mathematics construct a linear embedding of question within question within the limiting question of 'question' itself. The fact that it works, formally, just as well as the 'whiggish' articulation of the whole history of its production within a unitary cultural finality embedded in a 'scientific' physical Space and Time which is just the formal converse of the 'logical space' of questions, reflects the abstraction of that global perspective from the more radical question posed by Derrida's embedding of text in context. When inquiry itself comes into question, this does not mean that we remain within the order of text and simply deny the unitary finality of criticism which leads us to question it; it means rather that we now find ourselves involved in a wider (formally) but narrower (actually) configuration of text and context, in which the unitary finality of the critical text is itself only one component of the configuration or situation, and in which the textual pursuit of questioning, of standing back from the situation, abstracting from it as we frame it in wider terms, writing, reading, discussing it, is only one of various lines open to us in the situation of book, readers, writers, and others. The formal questioning of the symmetry of questioning and its linear dynamic and finality, in a text, is effectively the marking in the text of what is open in the actual configuration of the various textual and contextual dimensions of that mark - in the situation of that text. One thing open, in general, is to frame that situation in the text that is one component of it; and in general various other things besides writing are open too.

Here we are, of course, simply back at the configuration of text and context faced by the historian in reconstructing a general history of Theory. Yet I have already noted that Cassirer - our primary writer for the moment - embeds his dynamic of theory
in a logical space of questions slowly leading towards the re-
cognition of that space as its domain in the Critical Philosophy. 
One text embeds others in a space of questions which they have 
not confronted, from which they abstract in their more limited 
perspectives, in which space the text is the writer's response to 
a group of earlier and contemporary texts - his writing of his 
reading, as this organises his developing 'position' or perspective 
(which will in turn be criticised by contemporaries and successors), 
and as the finality of integrating his responses in coherent posi-
tion organises his reading, his inscription of others' positions 
in the space of a projected text. Yet although the figures or 
configurations articulated in this textual dynamic relate to a 
World in which the text is but one element, Cassirer traces his 
dynamic of reading in abstraction from the embedding of text in 
World which the successive theories of their World or worlds must 
in principle imply.

So what? Why shouldn't Cassirer trace relations be-
tween readers and writers of theory in abstraction from the em-
bedding of theory in world implied by those theories? Well, those 
theorists might themselves be considered to present a range of 
different responses to such a question, and after 1933, unable as 
a jew to continue teaching at Hamburg, Cassirer himself would be-
gin to frame a response to that irrational interruption of his in-
quiries. The questions, theoretical and practical, posed by the 
embedding of theory in action, and action in theory, confronted by 
Dürer in 1514, are implicit in our opening questioning of that 
opening questioning, and must be confronted as we close. For the 
moment we may simply pursue the finality invited by Cassirer's 
text itself, to bring that text 'into question'.

The terms in which that may be done are now at hand: 
we may inscribe or embed Cassirer's reading of 'Modern Philosophy' 
in a Story from which Heidegger, Randall, Yates, Derrida and others 
make their various abstractions, as they read nineteenth and twenti-
eth century 'histories' of the thought of the period, together 
with texts of the period themselves. Thus Yates articulates
'philosophical' texts of the period in terms of the continuity or
dynamic of a symbolic or poetic order, reflected in the verbal
order as the continuity of a 'hermetic tradition': but this is at
once to subordinate the critical order of reflection and question
to what I have called the 'poetic' symmetry of verbal and material
orders seen in the 'symbolic' order of the quadro, of architecture,
and the 'stage' in the limited sense, and at the same time to articu-
late that symbolic order in terms of the transmission of a verbal
text, to frame the drama within the order of a script, rather than
seeing that textual embedding of text in context as a very singular
'action' abstracted to that very special stage of activity we call
a 'stage'. Even on that very special stage the 'classical' drama
defined by a written script, reborn in Machiavelli and others, would
after around 1530 be overtaken in Italy by its marriage with the
guild traditions in commedia dell'arte, unscripted, its dialogue
improvised in the interaction of 'stock' symbolic figures.

...For even though we can describe an action in a text,'in'
words, the 'symbolic' or poetic order whose dynamic we thus
transcribe - say, in setting the verbal dimension of the action,
dialogues and documents, in a verbal framing of its non-verbal con-
text, as in a novel or history - has an essentially 'dramatic' dy-
namic which abstracts from the literal order of words, through the
literary matrix by which we frame an action in words, to the symmet-
ries articulating dreams, desires, emotions, sensibility, verbally
reflected in the polvalent symbolism or analogy by which we recog-
nise the impact of the 'poetic' on the verbal - in the verbal -
order.

That is: we may verbally approach, with, say, Lacan, the
poetic order 'between' language and things, through finding the
space and time of what we may call 'desires' as the negative or
obverse of the 'literal' order, as its matrix is itself embedded
in the matrix of action, in which language is itself a substitution,
or rather, words, sentences, sequences of sentences, exchanges of
speech or writing, are themselves only some components of activity
open 'among others'. - Or we might pursue Derrida's analogous
figuration of the wider texture in which the text 'strictly speak-
ing' is considered embedded, organising, through its substitution of
the verbal order of substitution, for something 'other', Rousseau's activity of writing, as seen in his writing of that activity in the Confessions.

Yet I suggested at the close of Part III, that Derrida's or Lacan's or Barthes' or Foucault's, or other parisian 'structuralist' characterisations of the dynamic of inscription of text or discourse in action, were themselves controlled around 1970 by an articulation of that embedding in texts, whose frames were themselves 'substituted for' the frame of action, rather than explicitly articulating their limited part in the cultural order in which they were components, and internally articulated in relation to this parisian drama. I further suggested that this 'structuralist' substitution of what one might call 'textual space' for the earlier space of 'transcendental subjectivity' - Husserl's logical or psychological space - itself comes into question around 1970: first of all through the recognition that if the textual 'constitution' of a unitary ideal space and unitary ideal finality be posed as a question 'in' which that unitary space and time be embedded in the texts in which it is or was presented, then this analysis cannot itself be carried out in some abstract unitary 'language' or 'textuality', but must itself be organised, so to speak, in the 'margins' of particular finite texts, in a new figure of the familiar hermeneutics of 'reading'. (I just happen here to be reading rather a lot of books at once, including this one).

I take that transition around 1970 to mark the opening of a sort of iteration of the questioning by which unitary transcendental 'internal' space was inscribed 'in' a textual dynamic of deferral, as the question begins to develop of inscribing the text in the matrix of an action it frames; and I have already suggested that Lyotard's supposed complete abstraction from the formal unity and finality of the 'critical' dynamic, by simply proposing to embed any discourse in its self-justifying assertion as one component of the action or situation it frames lies open to the fundamental criticism associated with the very dynamic of questioning itself (even if one accepts his converse criticisms of the abstraction of
Habermas' problematic from the configuration of its assertion).

Drama, then: but not the abstract hermetic theatre of Yates' conspiracy theory, its frame abstracted from the open interplay of verbal, cultural and material orders on a direct analogy with instituted 'theatre' itself, the 'action' in each case framed by a written script, whether the Emerald Table or The Tempest.

A 'drama', then, the question of which is posed by the need to embed Cassirer's critical dynamic of inquiry in a wider dynamic, as we embed his textual 'material' in the figures of the (modern) 'world' which they themselves frame, by taking just this circularity of an element of the world 'in' which that world is framed (a book of philosophy) as the configuration of their common (since this abstract figure remains invariant through the period now in question) abstraction from the activity, the drama, of their writing and reading.

Once more, then, as so often in the last phase of this story, beginning around 1800, 'philosophy' becomes 'history'. And this time it must indeed be 'histoire totale' in that the embedding of Cassirer's material in the 'activity' or drama in question must also be the embedding of this that embedding in the same drama. One, I, we, can only do both at once - or neither.

If a question is a verbal marking of something open, a verbal answer is only one of the kinds of response open; and what is open, furthermore, need not be verbally marked before we respond. Cassirer abstracts from the theatricality of theory, the 'poetic' matrix of what is open in the symmetry of textual logic and the physical dynamics of context, and abstracts logic from the complementary 'space' of what is physically, materially open to his writers, precisely by articulating the logic of his text, his reading and its writing, within an abstract figure of
the symmetry of logical and physical in a dynamic of 'symbolic forms'. Theory is always articulated in its texts within the abstract circuit of an implicit or explicit theory of theory, in the abstraction of theory from the wider matrix in which it is only one option, through the embedding of the text in a verbal matrix, the theorist's vocabulary, in which theory - or some other name or names for what he or she is doing in their text - is one term. That is: the constitution or institution of a certain sort of writing as 'theory' organises a 'logical' dynamic in the words of the theorist and of the linguistic community in which he more or less shares them, just as the 'analogical' symmetry identified by Jakobson in the syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes of possible substitutions in the linguistic matrix embeds every text in a 'poetic' dynamic whose primary expression we may verbally identify as 'non-verbal' - or, at least, 'non-literal'.

'Theory'; 'logic': we have words for various symmetries, possible sorts of substitution, in language, in our languages; and, in 'question', a word marking the linguistic marking of something open. Thus by starting from this word 'question' we may articulate the linguistic matrix - or rather a linguistic matrix, since it is not unitary except in the notional but in practice unattainable limit of this systematic articulation - in terms of symmetries of formal substitutability: a systematic saussurian 'syntax' (forgive the distracting alliteration, and then this distracting parenthesis). Thus we may see 'logic' as something going on 'in' language, as language is used to talk or write about itself, rather than as a purely formal analysis of the symmetries and associated dynamic of implication associated with an abstract 'Language' or system of marks in general.

We may then characterise Cassirer's 'reading' of 'post-medieval' theory (not 'thought', because that takes place, in general on 'higher levels' of discursive syntax abstracted from the linear verbal base of written theory, and in this abstraction coupled with the figurative order of non-verbal imagery), in terms of the tension between 'logical' and 'figurative' (or poetic, or symbolic) dynamics of various european languages over the period in question.
Thus we may see the 'logical syntax' of Cassirer's own text framing a textual dynamic in which successive (and parallel) abstractions of a logical syntax or articulation of 'the World', through a textual dynamic of questions, frame a range of earlier, and opposing texts as so many figures or figurations embedded in the new text as it abstracts from the symmetry of those figures; from their collective figural, to its unitary logical, syntax.

- This dynamic converging to the point - in the first Critique - where the logical articulation of the various terms presenting in that text the configuration of its World, is recognised at last as simply the (three-fold-by-four-fold) 'categorial' symmetry of possible types of question, or judgement, itself.

...Yet we may question, if engaged in the textual pursuit of questioning 'as far as possible', the very figure of Cassirer's reading, his response to the situation in which he finds himself in Hamburg towards 1933, confronting books of theory among many other things, and articulating his response to his situation by tracing a logical dynamic of formal questions abstracted from the character of the texts he studies as themselves responses to their earlier authors' situations in worlds of books and other things, in which writing theory is one thing open to them, among others...and in which the writing might be interrupted at just about any point in the composition by other activities - eating, sleeping, buying, selling, ordering a household or other institution, conversation, reflection - to be taken up again at another point in this routine, but the same point in the text.

That is: the dynamic of 'abstraction', of logical coordination, is itself also a 'figure' among others in the figural dynamic analysed by Freud and others through the use of language to probe the symbolic order of 'personality' and desire...and the personality organised around the theoretical subject or 'I', its assertion and integration complementary to the formal symmetry of 'the question' in language, corresponds to a very particular sort of 'character'.
By posing this question of character in a theoretical text, I am necessarily attempting to embed this text in a wider dynamic, most directly exemplified, perhaps, by the theatrical 'script'. I earlier took the transition from the 'abstract' poetics of theory, as found in Aristotle's theory of theatre, to the practical theory of a disintegrating global stage seen in third-century stoicism and epicureanism, as 'characterised' by a questioning of the poetic or 'figural' dynamic of 'logical' abstraction. I might then, but did not, take

249 THEOPHRASTUS  Characters ed Knox London/NY 1929

as marking such a transition, which I then linked, rather, with the figure or 'character' central to the Poetics: Sophocles' Oedipus, in the drama which turns on his discovery that his questioning, itself until then itself unquestioned, is an essentially tragic figure, is itself the prime motor in the drama it thought to analyse rationally 'from outside'. In the period now in question we might find the figural dynamic of inquiry theatrically expressed, in a sort of transition from Sophocles and Aristotle and Theophrastus and Zeno and Epicurus and Cicero and Paul and Augustine and... and Dürer... to Goethe (in Wilhelm Meister, particularly) and... and Freud (and so on)... by Hamlet:

250 SHAKESPEARE, William  Works ed Singer London 1826 (77-8)

251 RIGHTER, Anne  Shakespeare and the Idea of the Play (78)  London 1962

252 TILLYARD, Eustace M W  The Elizabethan World-Picture  London 1943

Anne Righter traces the development of the 'play' as an autonomous unitary frame, in England, from the ritual 'mystery' where the action is embedded in the global drama of Creation, Fall and Redemption, down through the symmetry of stage and world in 'morals', to the point before the closing of the theatres in 1642 when the stage had become the mere scene for the courtly ritual of masquerade, embedded in the life of the masked courtiers, acting the actor. In 1600, in Hamlet, lies that focus, through Shakespeare's script, of near-perfect but unstable equilibrium, where the play within the
play mirrors the figure of the play itself in the 'elizabethan world-picture'. Hamlet, caught like Melecolia between reflection and action, discovers (like Dürer) his part in a revelation of the interplay between the logic of his melancholy quest or questioning, and the figural dynamic of emotion in 'the play'. His questioning leads, over the second Act, to the question of the relation of logical and figural, analytic and poetic, and in response to this figure he can begin to act, to assert himself: not in the imaginary action of the play but in framing, rewriting the action so as to focus at last the wider action in the play-scene about which turns the third Act. - The wider action until then turning in the abstract polyvalence of appearances through which Claudius 'directs' their interplay - his power lying, through his part as Gertrude's consort, in the playing of his deception, his falseness, with Hamlet's abstract conjecture, imagination.

The false king a mere actor, hypocrite, dissembling the role of the true king he has deposed - his falseness occluding this very deposition itself. Hamlet confronting the question posed by his missing father, a ghostly presence in his very absence; the play a contest then between Hamlet confronting the question posed by that 'place' in the matrix of action of unitary regal assertion in thought word and deed, and Claudius playing, to all appearances, that very part, occupying that place, of which Hamlet himself has necessarily had no experience, no direct knowledge.

The play, Hamlet, then, articulating that dynamic of mimesis, of 'substitution of one action for another action' - to return to Aristotle's characterisation of 'drama', acting in the restricted sense of acting a certain part on a certain stage - in and around the play's own substitution of an imaginary world, for a few hours, for the 'real' Globe. And this as the logical dynamic of theory rather than theatre is articulated as the substitution of words for action (or the choice of thought or language rather than outward action), turning on that general space of possible substitution of one word or group of words for another that we call, in English, 'question'.

Hamlet, then, the melancholy prince, until his analysis of the action, and his part, leads to the question of the figural dynamic of human interaction, and his own 'deposition' of Claudius' control
through the latter's loss of self-control, as he begins to assume his father's place of true king, this assumption consummated in the closing lines by Fortinbras, true successor of his father who was killed in battle by Hamlet's.

An 'oedipal' conflict in that ruling or Royal Family, which is the constant frame of Shakespeare's tragedy: the family as minimal matrix of the emotional, figural, symbolic dynamic articulating what I have called - after Aristotle - the 'poetic' order. And the family as focal matrix of the individual's entrance onto this wider stage in which I write and you read.

The family: articulated around that ternary order of generation and generations of individual lives; and articulating in its wider epic matrix the ternary dynamic of three masked personae on the stage of classic Greek tragedy down to Euripides' intellectual return to its inaugural bacchic figuration. Royal family, because the abstraction of the action from its embedding in the real context of the theatre reflects the abstraction of rule from any but divine constraints, and implicit embedding of the action in the logical and physical constraints of all action - the constraint of verisimilitude. And in the classic period verisimilitude forbade even divine intervention from 'outside' the unity of the action.

What, then, of the interplay of the abstract logical dynamic of questions, and the equally abstract dynamic of poetic 'fiction' - the former abstracted from its characterisation as one 'part' or figure among others, and the latter from the logic of embedding each action and stage within a wider stage of 'world' - in their common physical space and time?

I suggested long ago that human groups might be considered inscribed in the 'primitive' circuit of the pale, on this wider sphere or Globe, set in three-dimensional 'Space'. The primitive agri-cultural group or village presents a family of families, united through lineal descent of heads of families over many generations, and linked to neighbouring villages through the economy of marital exchange so well studied by twentieth-century anthropology.
When the 'economy' of agricultural production reaches a certain stage of development, a 'family' or group of villages interacts through the linkage of their economies through the dynamics of substitution for one product for another at a central market, one of the villages that has become a 'town'. Eventually the economies of such groups of villages are linked by the wider economy of easily transferrable marks of substitutability, possible exchange, we call 'money' - whether this be cowries, gold, or marks on paper, papyrus or clay - and this money economy is often associated with the dominance of one 'capital' town or city over the others - the whole group of towns and villages linked now by a general economy of the 'mark' which coordinates the physical mark of the pale, the gold 'mark' which is money, and the linguistic economy of substitution of marks for things. 'Logic is the money of the mind' wrote Marx in 1843. And Hermes has long puzzled scholars by his rule over markets, boundaries, and signs, those various aspects of the 'mark'.

At two extremes, beyond these poles of family and 'nation' (the latter as a sort of maximal unity of activity, coordinated by one rule and one language - the rule at least of a council or of council, a community of communication, in principle, rather than uncomprehending physical force breaking down the physical pale like the barbarian) we may set the individual and an 'international' World of nations. For the purposes of this inquiry that World may itself be limited to Europe, or to the European family of nations (linked for most of the story, like villages, by the intermarriage of 'royal families'), the particular part of the story now in question being associated with the breakdown of the medieval order of the Italian towns, confronting newly integrated 'nations' to the North - the 'economy' of theory evolving in the interplay of that binary relation of North and South with the associated binary relation of Latin and teutonic areas of 'barbarian' settlement (France and Germany), as fragmented Italy faces Latin France, teutonic Empire, and hybrid Britain asserting itself in the 'balance' between France, Empire, and 'international' papacy.

If a text as script gives unity to an abstract theatrical 'performance' on the limited space of a 'scene' abstracted from the wider auditorium and still wider theatre of town and nation beyond,
so the book or books - 'accounts' - of a single enterprise, with more or less unitary direction and economy or strategy, define perhaps the affairs of those great families of Medici and Fugger.

Or we might perhaps define the economic 'unit' in terms of the limited stage of material production and exchange (in the present period both of these generally carried on in the same space in a town) called a 'shop'. Or we might better see these units of 'tertiary' and 'secondary' sectors - analogues in the material economy of the units of verbal and cultural orders - as representing those orders of the material economy, as perhaps secondary and tertiary 'fields' of activity, as the agri-cultural 'field' in the stricter sense represents primary production.

Following a sort of reverse order, we might note the analogy, a certain symmetry, between master and apprentice of some trade in the master's shop, and master and pupil in the master's school-room or lecture-hall, as the magister artium, like the maestro dell'arte, inducts the pupil into his mastery of his text by his commentary, reading, lectio (also, in general, the pupil's writing of the text).

Three orders of substitution, then, each in its internal articulation analogous to the external system of the whole, internal symmetry in each reflecting external symmetry. So that the verbal text, for example, interacts with the figural order of human interaction - the order of the 'role' or part or character - through the symmetry of its embedding in the matrix of other texts, and in the formal unity of the linguistic order of substitution as a whole (framed in the logical or literal side of analytic inquiry), with the embedding of this wider 'intertextuality' in the wider matrix of text, part, and material context.

The formal unity of the linguistic order as a whole: but this does not mean that the interaction is determined by the global symmetry of that limiting 'logical' space in which language has often been supposed actually embedded, with 'global' physical space
(in which the actual material economy of the interaction might in turn be supposed embedded), the two coordinated in some total cosmic matrix. For the logical order must be considered as simply 'at work' in the verbal order, as, so to speak, one 'side', in dynamic tension with the 'figural' side, through which the logical texts of theory are themselves embedded in the poetic order of culture - this tension at work as a single writer finds a linear sequence of words among those open to him or her, in their 'vocabulary' of perhaps a few thousand words. A few thousand words which frame the writer's intratextual matrix within the wider intertextual matrix of all he or she has ever written or read or heard or spoken.

If we move from monologue to dialogue we pass from one text embedded in the verbal matrix of one life to speech embedded in a human interaction; if we further abstract an embedding of dialogue within the figural order of interaction, we arrive at the complexity of a theatrical performance whose embedding in the wider cultural order is analogous to the embedding of a theoretical text in its writer's life. Indeed an individual life might be taken as a sort of limiting case of such a wider cultural configuration, reflecting as a sort of complementary limit the complexity of the embedding of that life in all human lives at one particular 'moment'; and these might be taken as two poles of the more or less 'canonical' scale in cultural or historical 'space' and 'time' of human interaction seen in the 'drama'. - The drama or theatrical performance abstracted in its formal articulation in the figural or poetic dynamic of the theatre, just as the theoretical text is abstracted in or to the logical dynamic of that verbal symmetry of substitution which frames 'questions'. Just as we are, for a couple of hours at the theatre or the cinema drawn into a fiction, outside which the 'real' context is forgotten (otherwise the theatrical dynamic of interaction on the stage doesn't work), so we may, for a few hours at a time, be drawn into the logical dynamic of writing or reading theory; or the two aspects may so to speak 'intersect' in the theatrical frame of school or lecture-hall...or in the private theatre of 'imagination' - writing in a figural rather than a logical mode - as one of us composes a play-script, or composes a novel by embedding the imaginary dialogue in a verbal narration rather than an imaginary stage that could be mimicked in a playhouse.
Now the 'figural' dynamic of a 'play', as marked by the playwright in a script, comprises the linear working-through on the 'base' level of words of the poetic matrix in which the whole is abstracted, as an 'imaginary' unity of action, from a wider context. That is: the script is so to say the transcript of the verbal dimension of a poetic economy of action, abstracted from the larger scale of an imaginary 'life' of any of the characters through that 'double mirroring' of logical in physical and global in elementary already familiar from the discussion of the more limited 'theatre' of the static painted image or quadro. A play, therefore, may be taken as an 'image' of Kosmos reflected in a human life, if by 'Kosmos' we understand just that formal abstraction, through the human lives or micro-cosms in which they are embedded, of a sort of 'continued proportion' running play-life-Kosmos or book-life-Kosmos, a 'reified' coordination of reified abstractions from the embedding of question in text, of what is open to us in human interaction and its actual physical situation. And a play or a book may be taken as marking that intermediate scale between split-second (say the just-visible flickering of early cinema, at the limit of discrete and continuous perception - the same frequency of the limit or meeting-point of continuous and discrete sound, about a sixteenth of a second, governing the structure of musical 'harmony' since the seventeenth century, as defined by Mersenne) and our life as a whole, as the scale in which we live and act, abstracting on such a scale from the rest of our lives, just as we can abstract through theatre or book to a 'fiction', forgetting the context in which we do so.

The play's the thing: in relation to this strange abstraction of an 'action' from its context, we may now analyse the dramatic economy of this text, this book. I have suggested the interplay between Hamlet's melancholy logic and Claudius' false rule, mediated by the part of Gertrude. This provides, I suggested, an axis of the play as a whole. The scene is set in the first Act, the second Act closes with Hamlet's rewriting of the play-within-the-play, his assertion focussed in the closing verse: The play's the thing, wherein to catch the conscience of the King. The third Act turns about The Murder of Gonzago,
'directed' from Ophelia's lap by Hamlet, and closes with the killing of Polonius 'in place of' Claudius, in Gertrude's room, and the reappearance of the Ghost. Hamlet is absent from Elsinore in Act IV; having 'rewritten' Claudius' script for his murder in England, to compass the murder of further agents of Claudius (Rosenkranz and Guildernstern), he meets Fortinbras outside Elsinore, and sends Claudius the 'script' of his own return; the Act closes with Claudius inducing Polonius' son Laertes to be his new and decisive agent. The closing Act focusses Hamlet's comical detachment in the grave, a comedy within the tragedy, another play within the play, turning on the figural dynamic of mere wordplay... until Laertes' grief, and his own as he recognises the grave as that of Ophelia, induces that struggle of brother and lover in the grave which echoes the contest between the elder Hamlet and Claudius which led to the former's death, and prefigures the final scene into which it leads, the latter closing, as already noted, with the true heir, Fortinbras', recognition in Hamlet's death of the true king, which he himself has replaced or succeeded as king of Denmark in Hamlet's dying breath.

Now, if we are to recognise Shakespeare's play in this abstract play of substitutions - of figural 'symmetries' in which the 'global' or unitary dynamic of 'character' may be supposed articulated - one must embed the large-scale dynamic of 'types' associated with that symmetry of substitution in the 'lower' levels of the verbal economy - ultimately in the linear sequence of its twenty-five thousand (or so) words. Thus Barthes, for example, in his 'classic' reading of Balzac's Sarrasine, structures the dynamic of symmetry or substitution between the 'global' structure of the text as a whole (with its two axes or five codes: Hermeneutic
Semantic - Symbolic - Cultural (1) ), and the 'elementary' phonetic
Prosaic emic matrix in which the substitution of its second 'S' for the 'natural' 'Z' in Balzac's title gives him the converse 'title' of his reading - expressing the symbolic unity of the text as a sort of converse or conversion of the literal unity organised by Balzac's title.

1: cf III.461-2 above
Barthes in 1970, in S/Z, dramatises the interaction of reader and text by writing his reading of the symbolic dynamic of 'desire' organising Balzac's text. Balzac's text-within-a-text, then, as a sort of interface between the analogical articulation of desire at the 'heart' of Barthes' reading itself, and the 'theoretical' logic of that reading - as interface also of the visual dimension of the cultural dynamic analysed three years before, and the 'direct' writing of reading three years later (Système de la Mode, 1967; Le Plaisir du Texte, 1973). The economy articulated between 'S/Z' and Balzac's text as a whole, in Barthes' writing of his reading, is traced through 93 intermediate structures, ranging from parts of sentences to groups of sentences, the focal phonemic substitution of 'S' for 'Z' discovered exactly midway, in lexème 47.

Now Hamlet consists of one play, five acts, twenty scenes, and about a hundred 'interactions' corresponding to the sequence of about a hundred 'sub-scenes' divided from one another within the wider scale of the scene by entrances or exits of characters or groups of characters from the group 'on stage'. I have already suggested that Claudius' reaction to the play may reasonably be taken as central to Hamlet as a whole: the analogy between Claudius' deposition of the elder Hamlet, and the player's murder of Gonzago, within the wider frame of the play as a whole as 'substituted' for the action at Elsinore (rather than London) it 'mimics', Claudius himself substituted by an actor (at the Globe), the player (in the play-within-the-play) substituted for 'the murder of Gonzago', Claudius as himself a dissembler, hypocrite, 'actor' in Hamlet, Polonius, Rosencranz-and-Guildenstern and Laertes as Claudius' agents, Claudius in the rightful 'place' of the melancholy prince, and so on. And, simply in terms of the linear sequence of words, Claudius' departure from the play-scene, at the end of the second of four scenes of the third of five acts, is more or less literally the 'central point'.

A hundred 'sub-scenes' or interactions - about a hundred different groups of actors on the stage, each character, in general, taking part in many different such groupings, interactions. In the 'fullest' version of the play (represented by the 'good quarto' of
1604, rather than the 'bad quarto' of the previous year, scarcely more than half the length) there are nearly 4000 'lines' (the actual number being in a sense arbitrary, since some passages are in prose), presenting in all approaching 2000 sentences (varying in length from part of a line to a few lines); the 'scale' of the sub-scene is thus around 40 lines, but there is of course very wide variation around this rough average. One might further break down the twenty-five thousand words of this rather long play into something in excess of a hundred thousand 'elementary' phonemes.

Such a matrix leaves, to say the least, a broad scope for different constructions à la Barthes. As a framework in which to coordinate different readings of Hamlet (rather than attempt any impossible 'definitive' reading) it is still of fairly daunting complexity. Yet it may serve as a frame for several questions.

In the first place, the question of the relation between the overall 'unitary' dynamic associated with the symmetry Hamlet-Claudius-Gertrude, organised around that 'place' of the King, marked by the Ghost (who is also 'Hamlett') — we may add the further triad Polonius-Laertes-Ophelia, and perhaps Horatio as the mirror or echo or foil of Hamlet's reflections:

```
Claudius    Gertrude    Polonius
  |       |       |
Ghost       Ghost       Ghost

Horatio    Hamlet    Ophelia    Laertes
```

...and the linear dynamic of the dialogue itself. I have already noted that abstract unitary symmetry should not be considered as a structure that hierarchically determines a systematic unity of a book as a whole, and which might in principle be finally articulated in a kind of definitive total analysis which would explain (as in some qabalistic exegesis of words in the Jewish Law) or determine each of a hundred thousand phonemes and their order. I suggested that it articulates only one 'side', the 'unitary' side,
of a text, and that at each 'level' of what Cusanus calls \textit{explication}, unfolding by division, of this unitary symmetry, it is complemented by an increasing 'autonomy' of the elementary level of 'arbitrary' differences, reflected in, say, the inability of the formula 'a sequence of different positive integers adding up to six' to decide between 123, 132, 213, 231, 312, 321 - the inability to decide whether the first term will be 1, 2 or 3, although when the first two terms are decided the third term is thereby determined by the formula, and if one of the terms is decided, that constrains the choice of the remaining two (and so on).

Barthes had shown in 1963 how solar imagery, the solar theme, organised a unitary dynamic in Racine's tragedy; and unitary construction within the two primary figural axes of power and sexuality had itself been an ideal of French 'classical' tragedy since its prescription by Richelieu in the late 1630s; Racine, moreover, in the years around 1670, came closest than any other, before or since, to this ideal, reflecting indeed the actual political role of his solar patron himself. Voltaire in the 1730's was the first in France to question the relations between the 'regularity' of Racine, the classic ideal propounded by Boileau and more or less dominant by then throughout Europe, and the 'irregularity' of wild Shakespeare (he would later reject him as that 'histrion barbare' as he threatened French regularity through Ducis' all-too-regular adaptation of Hamlet in 1770). The German, British, and eventually (in 1827) French Romantics - notably August Wilhelm Schlegel and Coleridge - argued against the formal symmetry of the classic ideal that the 'irregularity' of Shakespeare, and of Hamlet in particular, was actually a more perfect form than one-sided classic symmetry. And their nineteenth-century successors in their turn made Shakespeare the classic of perfectly regular irregularity, finding in the interplay of unitary symmetry and arbitrary 'wild' irregularity a new one-sided symmetry articulating the 'irregular' whole as a sort of poetic incarnation of more or less divine genius.

If, though, we are to understand the organisation of, say, Hamlet, between the complementary poles of absolute classic symmetry, and arbitrary rambling dictated by the free play of 'fancy', 'free association' in words, we cannot simply see the play as a
perfect mirror or microcosm of unitary Creation articulated in the
divine symmetry of symmetric divine unity and disymmetric fragmented
Matter organised in the overall unitary Economy of universal possi-
bility. We cannot in 1600 or in the nineteen-eighties imagine the
script of Hamlet (indeed there is no such thing as 'the' script, only
several widely variant extant texts more or less arbitrarily selected,
one supposes, from widely varying player's scripts for various dif-
ferent productions mounted by Shakespeare himself) as the perfect
Text mirroring or focussing a thomist Creation in the frame of
William Shakespeare's life. We might just as well consider that
the full text is rarely mounted on the stage, that various irregular
sub-structures - indeed the whole dimension of plot turning around
Rosenkranz and Guildenstern - have generally been excised in actual
production to reduce the scheme to more manageable proportions...and
that this shows a radically arbitrary or rambling 'side'.

What we may now do, though, is proceed to a rather less
'regular' embedding of Hamlet in the wider economy of texts and
contexts around 1600: organise around it succeeding 'acts' and
'scenes' of Renaissance and Reform leading on from around 1530
where we left the story many paragraphs ago to around 1650, where
we are 'headed', as we embed this interplay or economy of texts and
contexts over about a century and a half in the wider interplay
covering two and a half millenia.

In writing Part II I divided the period from 1500 to 1650
into six 'phases', the first, already reviewed here, stretching down
to the Diet of Augsburg in 1530, the fourth closing around the time
of the opening of the Globe Theatre (1599 or 1600), the first per-
formance of Hamlet (1600 or 1601), the 'War of the Theatres'(reach-
ing its peak in 1600), the first italian attempt to restore classical
greek theatre as 'music drama' (Euridice, 1600; Orfeo, 1601: although
this is a bibliography, I will not cite operatic libretti among
printed 'sources', consigning them with films, buildings, and other
'works of Art, to elements of 'context' noted in passing). As else-
where, I tended to subdivide these 'phases', articulating the 'economy'
of the phase 1630-1650, for example, into three steps, the first closing with, say, Corneille's *Le Cid* - the epochal first 'classic' French tragedy, systematically articulated throughout by the conflict of Family and Love, those two primary axes: of the figural or poetic dynamic of language, framing the verbal interplay between reflection and passion, a dialectic which makes of the royal court a court of moral law (Corneille was himself a royal law officer). *Le Cid*, 1637: and Descartes' *Discours de la Méthode* with its appendices - a still more 'dramatic' script. I generally considered a year 'either way' as constituting an order of indeterminacy, an essential 'arbitrariness' which I did not attempt to account for: thus I grouped Galileo's parallel 'revolution' in physical science, the *Discorsi* of 1638 (whose publication was in fact delayed by the necessity of printing, like Descartes, in liberal Holland) with the *Discours*, and took the *Principia* of 1687 as a unitary response to these two books, and itself paralleling political developments in France and England that mark the transition from around 1670 to around 1700 (say the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession for the latter date, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the associated breakdown of James II's attempt at 'solar' monarchy around 1685).

That is: I found in the scale of two or three years a wider historical analogue of the linear scale of the sentence in a text. - A scale that I have already seen, at the beginning of Part II, as that of the 'primary' agri-cultural inscription or embedding of Culture in Nature - the 'base' level of a material economy whose primary, secondary and tertiary 'sectors' or levels each 'internally' reflect the 'external' relations of the three levels or sectors - these three levels, in their turn, reflecting the three political levels of Nation, County, and Parish (or agricultural village, community, family of families). That 'political' order of the group typified by the family, has now been related to the verbal order in terms of the 'figural' dynamic by which the verbal order is embedded or inscribed in the visual axis of theatrical 'spectacle': the limiting case of an 'action' or drama
whose 'stage' is a ritually delimited physical space, a special kind of 'room' (generally) with one wall removed, and where the participants are divided into two rigidly delimited groups, the 'actors' who physically play out identification with their 'parts' or characters, and the 'spectators' who identify with the characters in imagination, all playing in the auditorium the single or common part of silent abstraction from any physical intervention.

The logical symmetry and dynamic of theory has, finally, been discovered at work in the verbal or linguistic order of symmetry or substitution, and 'logical space' as an abstraction from the interplay of logical and figural dynamics or 'sides' of the verbal order (or rather, orders, particular spoken and written languages) is mirrored in the complementary 'space' of physical theory.

In the Introduction, the initial questioning of what was going on in that initial questioning was gradually unfolded or opened up to the point of articulating a 'space' of questions with their parallel or symmetric 'logics', which finally allowed a transition into Part I through the question of the inscription or embedding of that 'logic' in the coordinates or coordination of Kosmos which it identified as its context, logically irreducible to any 'internal' formal logical 'space'. Thus, for example, an 'ontical' dimension revealed itself 'in' the logic of the text as 'outside' that logic, even if one could logically articulate this 'outside-ness' in an 'ontology'. More generally, one could logically embed the logic of such 'embedding' or 'inscription' in the coordinate 'working' or actuality of a Kosmos in which logic identified itself logically as one among several other dimensions. The 'transcendental' logic of that inscription was first systematically seen in Aristotle's "system", framing a canonical circuit from an initial presentation of the Categories of word and thing, through the logical structure of any theory, then down through a corresponding physical 'outer' space in which any thing of which there might be a theory must have its place (for to be is to be somehow 'in' that outer correlate of inner logical space), to Earth and
the interaction on its surface of global dynamics articulated in stellar harmony and the elementary dynamics of divided matter in sublunary life subject to generation and degeneration. On then to the circuit of human Culture on this surface, and to the institutions of Education and, finally, Theatre: I took the Poetics as bringing full-circle the initial abstract 'positing' or logical distinction of logical and physical orders of \( \Theta \rho \iota \alpha \chi \nu \) in the discussion of signs that opens the Organon.

This aristotelian circuit and the 'system' of abstraction of theory from context it framed, I read as a response to the configuration of theory and context around the time of Plato's death in 349 BC - that configuration marking the close of the first of three phases of similar 'scale' unfolding from the initial question of the pythagoreans (that 'mystery' through which I passed from Introduction to Part I) down to that question posed in the configuration of theory and context around the beginning of our 'era', to which I took Philo's writing of his reading of the jewish 'Law' to be a primary theoretical response, coordinate with the primary 'poetic' response in the figure of Jesus as the jewish Anointed (Messiah, Christ). I made another symmetric division of a series or system of responses to this inaugural 'question' of our Era down to around 500AD, the whole symmetric with the system of responses to pythagorean 'theory' in its context of around 500BC, down to the beginning of this Era. - Symmetric, at least, within the dynamics of a logic abstracted from the poetics of that abstraction, but as response to the wider cultural configuration of theory in its context that system of 'pagan' theory down to Damascius' impasse and the closing of the Schools by Justinian is symmetric (symmetric, then, within the frame of the wider interaction of theory and context) rather with the development down from Aristotle to the 'question' posed at the beginning of our Era (and in response to which we still formally define a formal focus of that question in the figure of Christ's 'incarnation' as 'the beginning of our Era'). In that wider frame of question and response it is rather the theology of the thirteenth century in its european context which brings to a close the first of three
overall phases of 'theory' unfolding from its pythagorean in-
ception.

Taking the interplay of 'theory' and context, then, as a drama played out in so many books - so many verbal, 'theoretical' responses to the configurations of text and context in which theorists have successively found themselves - this book is my response to my situation in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury of 'our Era'.

My response was focussed at the close of 1979, as I have already noted, as I wrote a letter asking why I was writing that letter; that sexual dimension of my writing, my script, led into the reorganisation of my earlier reading of the formal symmetry of various contemporary theories (logical, physical, poetical, ontical, psychoanalytic and so on), and of their histories down from the 'pre-socratic' inception of theory, in the 'dramatic' figure of embedding of theories and their development in the interplay of theory and the various dimensions of context of which it is the theory or theories. Over the next two years I worked back from the formal dynamics of Theory that I had elaborated in my reading and writing of the 'seventies, to the wider 'dramatic' interaction of figures of theory and figures of context, from which the earlier abstract 'internal' dynamics of Theory was an abstraction. - An abstraction framing my own dynamic of inquiry up to that point where, as I was about to write down the results of that inquiry, the more radical question posed by the symmetry of that 'internal' order and the various dimensions of its context itself came 'into question'. Over the years 1980 and 1981, then, I reorganised my materials, my 'readings' of a fairly wide range of texts, in the figure of a 'dramatisation' of that reading itself, opening out of the initial question posed by 'inquiry', 'questioning', itself.

At the close of Part III this organising question of 'question' itself, may be seen as a 'natural' response to the sym-
metry there articulated (in relation to parisien reflection around 1970 as primary landmark or coordinate) of different 'fields' within Theory, different theories, approaches in these fields, and the dif-
ferent contexts of those different 'positions' in the general
cultural 'space' framed by those different languages in which reflection was written and discussed in the different cultures associated with the different places or countries which give (in each language) the different languages their different names - 'English', 'French', 'German', 'American' (as the French call the 'English' spoken by those brought up in the United States, and those whose culture is dominated by them), Mathematics...

That is: the different positions at Paris around 1970 of Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, Barthes, Kristeva, Deleuze and others, may be embedded in an inquiry opening out of the question of its opening - in that radical 'reflexion' - as so many symmetric and coordinate abstractions from the question of the particularly 'french' character of their common abstraction from the 'dramatic' configuration of their writing - from the question of 'inquiry' itself. 'French' abstraction, also, from the question posed by the symmetry of that abstraction, that theory, and the parallel and interacting theories, traditions, schools, framed by german or british or american abstraction. One might mark, once more in France, a significant response to just these questions in Derrida's quitting of his job as 'repetiteur' at the Ecole Normale Superieure in 1985, his assumption of the 'direction' of a 'College International de Philosophie' and of a chair in 'Les Institutions Philosophiques' at EHESS, and his lectures, readings, in his first year in the latter chair (still physically set at the Rue d'Ulm, but now in the theatre rather than the Salle Cavailles) in, on, of, Tocqueville's 'cartesian' account of the american institutions and institution of reflection. Of this more later.

Tocqueville's 'cartesian' reading and writing of american institutions: there is a direct analogy between Descartes' initial published script for the systematic reform of inquiry, his 'discourse on method', and this inquiry directed by the opening question of 'what is going on' in that opening questioning. Working back to a sure initial 'position' or positing, as he questioned any assumptions still lurking in the manner of questioning the assumptions of his previous step, he eventually found that he could not, at
least, question his very questioning, his doubt itself. In a repetition of Aristotle's foundation of the systematic method and Organon that Descartes was hereby radically questioning, that limiting configuration of inquiry, of interplay of question and response, from which he could now work back to methodically reconstruct his World, was found in the affirmation of doubt itself. One may of course question the equivalence of this radical question and response and Descartes' positing of a formal unitary 'I', a formal conversion of the place of substitution in language marked by the word 'question' into a unitary 'I' which responds, formally marks the locus of response, and which Descartes identifies (in the private logical theatre of his reflection) with himself. Kant and Husserl would differentiate 'transcendental' and 'empirical' instances of this 'I'. But Descartes' symmetry of formal question and formal assertion, in the 'dubito', marks in its mid-seventeenth century European context a midpoint or turning-point for this inquiry as a whole, as the play-scene marks the midpoint of Hamlet half-a-century before (and that 'European' context includes the institution of education around midcentury in that reconstruction of the mid-seventeenth century European cultural order within the frame of the New England villages set in virgin Nature, which opens the drama of a specifically 'American' interplay of theory and its context).

Descartes' 'New World' a midpoint of this inquiry as a whole - or rather, the midcentury response to the questions of 1530, of 1500, and before, marked by Descartes' 'focal' response, as turning-point - 'midpoint' of Part II, of a series of responses to thirteenth-century scholasticism whose close is marked by Kant towards 1800, midpoint of a transition from that 'Reform' in various dimensions of theory and culture I marked as a question around 1500, down to various parallel 'enlightenments' - Lumières, Aufklärung, Enlightenment - beginning to be recognised as such around 1730 in France, Germany and Britain. And midpoint of a drama opening with the Pythagorean 'question' or mystery around 500BC and closing in the wider configuration of this Close, towards 2000.
500BC, 350BC, '0', 500, 1250, 1500, 1650, 1730, 1800, 1900, 2000: a lot of rather 'round' numbers, more like a formal mathematical progression than a series of 'turning-points' in western theory subject, one supposes, to all sorts of more or less incalculable arbitrary factors - weather, plagues, assassinations, what Descartes had for breakfast one day, a particular kind of large german fireplace, and so on.

And that old pythagorean obsession with the number ten, that surely we just happen to use as the base of our everyday enumeration because we just happen (most of us) to have five fingers on each of our two hands?

And yet that division of phases, episodes, scenes, in the overall drama is here associated with the embedding of the most abstract figures of the relation of logical and physical dimensions of questions in the symmetric physics of clocks, circuits round the sun, seedtime and harvest, 'the business cycle', the life cycle, and so on. It is associated, more precisely, with the dynamics of the abstraction of the most general theory (successive theories of 'everything') from its most general 'physical' or material context, through precisely the pythagorean theory of the symmetry of logical and physical orders of 'theory'. - A symmetry the pythagoreans framed in terms of the embedding of the familiar physical symmetry of three dimensions of physical 'space' and one of 'time', in a ten-dimensional coordination of this 'space' with a wider space of which it was itself a 'dimension'. A 'dimension' of that wider 'space' of coordination of the physical order and other orders physically nested, one within the other, in the widest physical order...and also an image, in the coordination of its own three dimensions in time, of the coordination of that physical order of dimension or difference, with two other symmetric and equally radical 'dimensions' of Kosmos.

Leaving behind the actual details of early pythagorean 'working-out' of the various orders of symmetry of 'position', abstract positing, we may associate various pythagorean figures of
the general matrix of symmetry they called Kosmos with their
twentieth-century analogues in various theories of symmetries,
matrices, substitutions, signs and so on. Thus Einstein's theory
that the 'physical' is simply what is invariant under or behind
different descriptions may be presented simply as a sort of limit-
ing case of that rankean hermeneutic 'relativity' of document or
perspective on an action to its position in the action, which de-
fines in principle the 'objectivity' of the 'facts' as eventually
reconstructed from the coordination of the various perspectives
embodied in the documents. Einstein applies the same principle,
as it were, to the widest external 'space' of action, the widest
frame, which is simply the external correlate of logical 'positing'
or position itself - this abstract symmetry theoretically expressed
in the 'formal' language of substitution or symmetry we call, after
the pythagoreans, 'mathematics'.

Einstein begins with the familiar three spatial and one
temporal coordinate of 'physical' objects; he articulates what the
'object' must be in order simply to be an object (I have discussed
the analogies of 'modern' physics with contemporary developments in
parallel fields after 1900 extensively in Part III); by considering
the structure of 'invariance' under different descriptions of the
'position' of the object from different 'positions' in the same
space and time, in terms of the symmetry of different descriptions
of the various different positions from the different positions,
one finds the primary physical invariant in a symmetrical expression
of the difference of position and orientation in space and time it-
self. In the most general case the structure of this symmetric
physical difference of 'points' in space and time at any point or
coordinates in space-time is given by the metric tensor:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
G_{11} & G_{12} & G_{13} & G_{14} \\
G_{21} & G_{22} & G_{23} & G_{24} \\
G_{31} & G_{32} & G_{33} & G_{34} \\
G_{41} & G_{42} & G_{43} & G_{44}
\end{pmatrix}
\]

which, being itself symmetric in the sense that \(G_{ij} = G_{ji}\), embeds
that very physical difference 'between' different bits of 'matter', and its spatiotemporal structure (the physical interactions of solid matter as earlier systematised for the familiar world of billiard balls by Newton) in an abstract ten-dimensional 'space' of 'spacelike' symmetries of different perspectives ('spacelike' in that their difference or separation cannot be covered in a 'timelike' manner by any physical object; they cannot be different perspectives from the same object at 'different times').

Ten, then, appears as the dimensionality of the embedding of four-dimensional 'physical' space-time in the abstract symmetry of different 'points' in space and time (or, more generally, since this embedding coordinates measurements of spatial and temporal separation as essentially correlative) which actually constrains the movement of a 'physical object' in space and time, simply in virtue of it being a 'physical object' independent of whether one sees it from one perspective in the physical interaction in which 'seeing it' itself takes place, or from another. - And this 'ten' simply because the symmetric component of the 4-by-4 matrix of symmetries of different 'points of view' has ten independently varying components. Any 4-by-4 matrix can be separated into symmetric and 'anti-symmetric' components:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  a_{11} & a_{12} & a_{13} & a_{14} \\
  a_{21} & a_{22} & a_{23} & a_{24} \\
  a_{31} & a_{32} & a_{33} & a_{34} \\
  a_{41} & a_{42} & a_{43} & a_{44}
\end{pmatrix}
= \begin{pmatrix}
  b_{11} & b_{12} & b_{13} & b_{14} \\
  b_{11} & b_{22} & b_{24} & b_{24} \\
  b_{13} & b_{24} & b_{33} & b_{34} \\
  b_{14} & b_{24} & b_{34} & b_{44}
\end{pmatrix}
+ \begin{pmatrix}
  0 & c_{12} & c_{13} & c_{14} \\
  -c_{12} & 0 & c_{23} & c_{24} \\
  -c_{13} & -c_{23} & 0 & c_{34} \\
  -c_{14} & -c_{24} & -c_{34} & 0
\end{pmatrix}
\]

since for \( i = 1,2,3,4 \) \( j = 1,\ldots,4 \)

\[
\begin{align*}
  a_{ij} &= b_{ij} + c_{ij} \\
  a_{ji} &= b_{ji} + c_{ji} = b_{ij} - c_{ij} \\
  (\text{since } b_{ij} = b_{ji} \text{ and } c_{ij} = -c_{ji})
\end{align*}
\]

so \( 2b_{ij} = a_{ij} + a_{ji} \)

\( 2c_{ij} = a_{ij} - a_{ji} \) or: \( b_{ij} = \frac{1}{2}(a_{ij} + a_{ji}) \)

\( c_{ij} = \frac{1}{2}(a_{ij} - a_{ji}) \)
...and this ten-dimensional 'space' in which physical 'space' and 'time' (the separable space and time of everyday life, the 'human scale') is mathematically embedded to organise the internal physical 'syntax' (so to speak) of our world may in turn be regarded as a formal abstraction from the wider 'syntax' or matrix in which physical space and time together constitute only one 'side' or 'dimension'. For we saw in relation to the 'Tetractys of the Decad' of the pythagoreans, and its later systematic elaboration by neo- pythagoreans such as Theon of Smyrna, and then by Proclus, how the threefold symmetry of 'physical' space itself reflects in the physical order of difference the difference of such 'physical' difference from the 'logical' order of differentiation of that logical difference from the physical terms in which the difference is 'marked': how it reflects in physical difference the differentiation of physical difference, logical difference, and the further difference 'between them', and in this reflection constitutes the very matrix of physical identity, the 'space' of physical objects which may be substituted one for another in that space, just as logical 'objects' marked by logical terms may be substituted one for another in the logical matrix of language.

To recapitulate: the 'physical' side of things, and with it the 'ontical' dimension articulating actuality within the space and time of what is physically open, is 'by definition' what, in some description, is independent of 'point of view' or 'perspective'. The physical and ontical 'abstract' from different points of view what is 'invariant', what is the same, 'in' different perceptions, descriptions, perspectives - and this simply by coordinating differences of description with what, in each description, appears as a different 'position', 'point' of view. The limiting frame of this 'relativism' first introduced by Galileo, is then what is the same in different descriptions of their difference 'in space and time' from two different points in space and time - the 'relativistic' or perspectival frame of spatiotemporal difference itself. And the 'objective' physical 'space' of such difference between points in space and time (points or positions which, from a different perspective, may be moving, turning, accelerating) is then just what is 'symmetric' in the two descriptions of the 'other' point from 'this' one. And this symmetric
'reversible' difference or distance may be specified in terms of ten independently varying coordinates - these themselves definable by 'abstraction' from the four spatiotemporal coordinates of the 'other' point as it moves in space and time 'relative' to 'this' one. The irreversible 'antisymmetric' temporal separation may be relativistically or 'invariantly' described in terms of six 'timelike' coordinates, the total set of sixteen parameters of coordination of two four-dimensional frames together, then, expressing a system of physical constraints on what appears, from each point in the relativistic 'space-time', as the movement of the 'other' point in space and time - expressing, in fact, just Newton's 'laws' of movement of a point(-mass), in the limiting case where the mechanically constrained motion is infinitesimal in relation to the primary 'interaction' of perception, 'observation', of that motion (whose own 'mechanics' appear as the purely 'timelike' interaction of the two points or frames of reference in the six 'timelike' dimensions of the electro-magnetic field at any point in space-time).

One may extend the analysis one step further back: from the ten-dimensions in which the three dimensions of 'everyday' physical space are embedded, to the symmetry and antisymmetry of the difference of 'logical' and 'physical' difference (distinction and distance) which is itself embedded in the three 'space-like' dimensions of articulation of this difference which embeds the physical 'object' coordinate with the elementary figure of abstraction of logical and physical 'terms' from their symmetry, in the three dimensions of 'physical space':

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
a_{11} & a_{12} \\
a_{21} & a_{22}
\end{pmatrix}
= \begin{pmatrix}
b_{11} & b_{12} \\
b_{21} & b_{22}
\end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix}
0 & c_{12} \\
-c_{12} & 0
\end{pmatrix}
\]

- This gives a simple figure of the coordination of logical difference, physical difference and the symmetric 'poetic' difference 'between' them as framed 'in' physical space of three dimensions, and the everyday time of one 'irreversible' direction. Again, this merely repeats an earlier pythagorean figure of relations between 'one', 'two', 'three', in the 'square' symmetry of Justice, 'four'.
This symmetry then coordinates the 'internal' embedding of each of the three primary dimensions of what is 'open' in the other two, with the external coordination of these three systems of embedding - coordinates, for example, the physical articulation of logical distinction, and through it of the psychological order, in the physical 'side' of things, with the logical and psychological articulation of the relations of 'inner' and 'outer' worlds. In particular, the 'external' symmetry of physical 3-space and 10-space is reflected in the 'internal' symmetries of elementary physical 'objects' corresponding to points in space-time ('particles'), a logical structure in physical 'space', the internal and external 'spaces' dynamically coordinated in time, this coordination allowing the articulation of physical time in the logical 'time' of deduction, as 'physical theory', and conversely embedding this logic in the dynamics of physical space and time.

Going one last stage 'further back' in terms of symmetry, we arrive at formal timeless identity, abstracted from (or conversely, embedded in) the elementary aspects or 'dimensions' of difference:

\[
a_{11} = b_{11} + 0 (= c_{11} = -c_{11})
\]

Now the Qabala introduced by Reuchlin around 1500 elaborated the cosmic drama in the systematic dynamics of symmetry and difference; but the drama traced in this inquiry corresponds only to the coordination, in the 'dramatic' interaction of logical, poetic, and physical 'spaces' of theory, of a particular figure of abstraction of logic from its language, with the historical context of this abstraction. Thus, for example, the physical 'context' of 'space-time' in which the drama of western theory might be supposed enacted, here appears as only one 'side' of the material 'economy' of theorising: a space in which the drama is embedded by successive theorists according to successive inscriptions of human culture on a terrestrial surface set in a wider 'heaven'.

If one considers, further, the configuration of inscription or embedding of stage-drama in such human culture, it presents
another abstraction of a four-dimensional space and time of (an) action or interaction of personae from a wider 'space' of coordination of logical, poetic and physical 'spaces' - an abstraction 'symmetric' with the abstraction of the physical space of the stage and theatre from the matrix of relativistic 'space-time', and relatively independent of that abstraction insofar as the material economy of the imaginary action played out on the stage is not embeddable in the 'real' material economy of the theatre and performance.

The cultural or institutional space of such a drama, then, may in turn be coordinated with the abstract logical space in which the script may be supposed embedded, and just as the internal articulation of physical space reflects the embedding of that space in a wider coordination with other dimensions of an action, so the interplay of reflection, institution, and situation on the stage reflects the embedding of that stage, that institution, in its wider coordination with the material economy in which it is embedded, and the dynamic of reflection in which the spectator can step back or distance himself or herself from identification with any of the 'parts' in the play.

More generally, the individual person's self-assertion, his or her assertion of their 'position' in the space of language (of which logical 'space' may be taken as one 'side', as a sort of limiting case of abstraction from the 'theatrical' or dramatic order of embedding of language in action) may be seen as a focus of an action in space and time (embedded in human culture on earth), just as the albertine viewer is the 'focus' of a static two-dimensional perspectival composition, quadro. A particular human interaction will be 'abstracted' from the wider 'global' coordination of its material economy and its script or dialogue (its language) rather as the theatrical stage is abstracted from the wider context of the theatre, but unlike a theatrical action will be embedded in a wider dynamic in which each individual is involved in various different scales of action, one action leading into another (theatrical action is of course, in a way, just a limiting case of this embedding, being inscribed in wider contexts precisely as 'theatre').
I suggested that one might analyse a theatrical drama as an economy of interaction of a few principle characters (say, Hamlet, Claudius, Gertrude and the Ghost), beginning in the first Act with an induction into the action through setting out characters and situation, then working through three central Acts or subordinate economies towards the closing Act, with each Act broken into interactions on a smaller scale, down through those of scene, group, exchange, speech, to the 'basic' linear sequence of the words of the script themselves. I suggested a complementarity between the abstraction from the wider verbal dynamic of language in its interaction with context, of theatrical action, scene, stage, part (abstraction to a dynamic unity in the 'cultural' order of power, sexuality and so on), and theoretical discourse (book of theory articulated in a logical dynamic of theoretical questions). The structural complexity built on the base of individual words, on the one hand abstracts from language to a formal space of questions in which it in turn appears as abstracted from the wider range of all possible questions, and on the other hand abstracts to an embedding of script in the figural dynamics of an action, which is itself a unity abstracted from its possible embeddings in wider actions - in what is 'open' in that figural or cultural dynamic 'as a whole'. I suggested that this complementarity of abstracted unities of argument and of action should in principle provide a configuration of embedding of a book of theory in the wider relations between language, the 'cultural' dynamic of 'parts' (roles, character, institutions), and the material economy or economies of language and action. Working 'in the other direction', from abstract physical dynamic (the abstraction of a unitary global Space or Space-Time itself to be ultimately understood as coordinate with a physical theory abstracted from the book and language in which it is 'worked out') through material economy of a 'culture' articulated within a terrestrial pale, we may consider a 'global' scale of interaction of material economy, institutions ('parts', roles) of activity, and language, which embeds the abstract cycles of the money economy already discussed - the large-scale 'wave' of 2.3^3 years - in a wider 'space' of ten dimensions in which the three dimensions or 'sectors' of the material economy are themselves components - just
as the three dimensions of familiar physical 'space' are embedded in a ten-dimensional space of their symmetry from different 'points of view': material economy, institutions, and the 'ideology' articulated as language are themselves so many versions of what one might call historical space - and we may embed the cycles of the market, the general 'space-time' of material organisation of human activity, in a wider space and time with which we may associate a 'cycle' or scale of $2 \cdot 10^3$ or 2000 'years' or elementary agricultural cycles. And we may compare the historical complexity of such a global historical economy of ideology (or language), 'culture' and material economy with the verbal complexity of a 'script' in which documentation of the theoretical dimension of such an historical 'drama' might be coordinate with various figures or structures of material and institutional dimensions on various 'levels' of the overall drama. The construction can be extremely 'regular' in its dramatic frame, precisely because this coordination of the various 'dimensions' in relation to a time-scale of 2000 years is framed simply in terms of the formal symmetry of a logical or theoretical space and time of 'questions' abstracted from the language in which they are posed or confronted, and a complementary figure of inscription of the cultures in which these questions arise in the 'physical' circuit of the agricultural pale: that economy of sowing and reaping, that economy of subordinating natural growth to the ends of a human group, which abstracts human culture from, while it sets it directly in, Nature: in the ecological unity of life on Earth, linked with the physical inscription of Earth in the more or less newtonian dynamics of the solar system, of 'the heavens'.

The difficulty of this apparently simplistic approach lies in the uncoupling of the various dimensions of human activity coordinate with abstract theory itself: if the 'drama' of writing theory is considered in the abstracted practical unity of the daily life of the individual theorist, that unity is open to so many different inscriptions in wider scales of theoretical schools, communities of daily life, political interactions, material eventualities, and so on, that the idea of adding all these irregular
components up to make of their sum something of quite abstract regularity seems preposterous. Yet within the 'material' dimension considered in abstraction from other linked dimensions of activity - including that linguistic activity which is writing and reading 'theory' - or in the physical 'side' of that material dimension, in vast systems of locally irregular movements, the figure of a whole far more 'regular' or symmetric than its individual components is thoroughly familiar. We individuals seem to confuse self-expression in the relatively 'arbitrary' freedom of sequential elaboration of detail, and global constraints on the way the details 'add up' as a fairly unitary 'tradition' of theory; we confuse ourselves writing and reading theory with the formal cartesian 'I', and feel that formal constraints on that formal figure of assertion are contradicted by the relative autonomy we sense in our own thinking.

Theory, then, as that abstract theatre in which writer and reader in turn play the formal instance of assertion and question in language-- 'I' - entering into the millenial drama or tradition by entering a book as we might lose ourselves in imagination in an action, in the 'parts', the 'roles', played out on a more concrete stage. And this drama of theory, enacted so to speak in 'abstraction' from any particular part on the wider stage of its extra-textual context, constitutes a kind of converse or obverse of our passing loss of ourselves in identification with a play of roles on a material stage: complementary abstractions from the wider 'drama' in which from day to day and hour to hour we pass from one 'part' in some activity to another, from time to time taking on for a while Hamlet's part of reflection, of questioning, standing back from, our part.

If a stage-play may be considered, insofar as it is 'regular', unitary, as the working-through on the level of words and actions and passions of what is 'open' or in question in the initial exposition or situation - this in an 'economy' of interaction where individual's elementary 'moves' associated with single sentences are 'nested' within exchanges, groups of exchanges, scenes
and acts, within the single 'play' of the whole... then the 'novel' or romance may be understood as the embedding of dialogue, of the 'script' of an action, in the imaginary scenery of verbal narration: as an abstraction of the verbal order of a 'drama' from the material space and time of theatrical performance. The story-teller, like the historian (as the names themselves attest, variants on the same part), must construct his or her narrative so as to exhibit the 'dramatic' or poetic dynamics of interaction of characters and groups as the interaction of different reflections, perceptions, feelings, outward actions corresponding to different positions or 'parts' in the interplay of those same parts - one might note the parallel questionings at the beginning of the twentieth century of unitary 'space' in physics, painting, novels, theatre, historiography, and so on.

I have attempted to organise a 'history' of theory, of abstraction from book to the logical space-time which might be seen as one 'side' of books (the 'inside', the internal space of words abstracted from their actual embedding in human lives), articulated in the symmetry of various dimensions or coordinates of text and context. In a sense the chief characters are variants on Hamlet, Claudius and Getrude: Reflection, Power and the matrix of their interaction in the physical world - but the individual parts of various theorists are here on the scale of an individual sentence, or perhaps a brief exchange, however critical, in the drama of the whole. For stage-drama, I suggested, should properly be understood as a limiting case of the cultural interaction of groups, where one group, the mute spectators or audience, identify with the various 'parts' played out before them, and these 'parts', in their abstract interaction are themselves personifications of forces associated with various groups in the wider cultural context - this rather as the 'political' dramas played out by the ruling groups which form the subject-matter of classical tragedy may in turn be seen as 'representative' abstractions from the larger-scale social interactions which they seem to rule. Thus the theatrical dynamic of power and sexuality played out traditionally in the frame of the 'royal family', and reflecting the dynamics of the numerous families that constitute as it were the elementary or base level of social structure, may be linked through, say, the primitive germ of larger structures in the extended family or tribe (gena) with the large-scale cultural mechanics of class, gender, nation, age-group and so on.
Within the large group of those who have pursued theory, the 'part' of more or less instituted reflection, over two and a half thousand years down from the time of Heraclitus and the first pythagoreans in Ionia and South Italy - the time also of institution at Athens of stage-drama - I have selected not three or ten or twenty actors, but several hundred: they enter rather into something like the sub-groups into which an analogue in the whole story of a dramatic 'scene' is subdivided in this analysis. Thus within the 'act' covered in Part II above, one might take the periods 1250-1500 and 1500-1650 as the first two 'scenes', to be followed perhaps by two further scenes, 1650-1730 and 1730-1800, the last corresponding roughly to 'Enlightenment'. Then the first phase of transition from the 'question' or parallel questions opening up (as I understand it) around 1500, might be seen in the 'responses' of Luther, Erasmus, Machiavelli, Copernicus, Paracelsus, linked with the parts of Medici popes, Fuggers, Charles V, Francois I, of Dürer perhaps. One might add a few others - Agrippa, Reuchlin, Zwingli, Melancthon, More, but I marked their 'positions' rather in relation to those above; one might substitute Agrippa for Paracelsus, Reuchlin or More for Erasmus (or More for Machiavelli, or More and Reuchlin and Agrippa for Erasmus and Machiavelli)...but there is something 'focal' about Luther or Erasmus - or Charles V - which reduces the possibility of variation; their 'positions', parts, correspond to the global structure of division of the story or drama of Reflection as a whole into Act and Scene and Group. Their 'responses' as reflected in their texts and contexts are themselves articulated directly as response to a configuration of embedding of 'scene' and constituent groups in the wider question posed at the beginning of Part I by the pythagorean mystery - itself a response, as it were, to the configuration of text and context elaborated in the Introduction or induction into the history as a whole. Thus, in the play, Hamlet and Claudius are more 'focal' characters than two of the anonymous courtiers, and more focal, to take a less extreme contrast, than Horatio or Laertes. I suggested that their two parts, in the context of Ghost and Gertrude, define the global question which gives the play its unity between opening and close: the unity coordinating the economy of interaction of further characters as the initial situation opens up by a sort of unfolding or division into a range of detailed questions, and groups of responses to groups of responses to these details as they unfold, converge towards a close.
The focal character of Luther at the opening of the phase 1500-1650 may be associated with his celebrated 'stance' at Worms - his position in the various scales of cosmic and European and imperial and ecclesiastical drama defined simply in terms of the Book, Scripture, as 'script' for the World - in which the reader may find his part by finding in the script the script of its own acting-out, implementation: by identifying at the outset with the part of addressee of the Word, Reader, Hearer. The focal character of Descartes at the close (up to his death in 1650) may be seen in the cartesian figure of a formal conversion of questioning, scepticism, the mutual criticisms of assertive reformers over the previous century and a half, into the frame of systematic theoretical assertion. If with Popkin one emphasises the sceptical aspect, one may trace an unfolding of various dimensions of questioning from Erasmus' questioning of Luther's Augustinian identification with a predetermined 'part' in the divine scheme, down to cartesian doubt; if one emphasises the 'positive' aspect of the cartesian system one might associate the fixed point beyond which Descartes could not retreat, with Luther's irrevocable stance - or associate his mathematical frame of such 'position' with Reuchlin's Qabala... and so on. Conversely, one might trace the transmission of Luther's stance not only through to Descartes, but down to many figures whose positions towards 1650 parallel that of Descartes. I presented a fairly regular scheme of this transition from 1500 to 1650 - this 'scene' in the theatre of reflection - in Part II. That dynamic of various groups, schools, dimensions of theory in their various contexts was necessarily a reading of various secondary sources already noticed, together with a reading of a range of primary texts including some of the 'focal' books presented as such in my exposition, some books of considerable significance within the period, but not 'focal' in the sense of presenting one coordinate in the overall division of the western tradition of theory, inquiry, correlative with the division of this particular period into six phases between 1500 and 1650... and some relatively minor works which would probably not have been discussed even if the scale of treatment had been expanded to present the transition as six successive 'scenes', rather than a single scene in the wider 'act' covered in Part II as a whole.
The reading of selected 'focal' texts in a wider contemporary matrix represented by lesser but relatively important, and minor or relatively unimportant works provides a constraint on reconstructions or readings of the dynamic of writing and reading marked by the corpus of a period as a whole, which complements the reading of 'secondary' sources as so many abstractions from that whole which, as abstractions, must themselves be embedded in their later context (as, then, 'relatively important' or 'minor' primary sources in their own right). Leaving aside a similar number of 'relatively unimportant' works (henceforth represented by the exemplary unimportance of Albertus Hunacius), here then is my 'sample' of 'focal' and of relatively important 'primary' coordinates for my reading of the central ideological and controversial axis of the period from the Diet of Augsburg down to the Peace of Westphalia, which may serve to organise the coupling of theoretical and contextual dimensions of reflection from Luther down to Descartes and his contemporaries:

<p>| 253 | BRENTZ, Johann            | In D. Iohannis Evangelion Exegesis                  |
|     |                            | Frankfurt (1527) revised 1542                       |
| 254 | In Epistolam Pauli ad Philemon, et in |
|     | Historiam Esther Commentarioli |
|     | Schwäbisch Hall 1543       |
| 255 | CALVIN, Jean               | Christianae Religionis Institutio (Basel            |
|     |                             | 1536, rev 1559) fr tr by Calvin                    |
| 256 | FRANCK, Sebastian          | Die Gulden Arch (Augsburg 1538) Bern 1569           |
| 257 | NAUSEA, Friedrich          | Catholicus Catechismus Cologne 1543                |
| 258 | LOYOLA, Ignatius           | Exercitia Spiritualia (Rome 1548) many eds         |
| 259 | JEWEL, John                | Ecclesiae Anglicanae Defensio London 1562          |
| 260 | ANDREAE, Jakob             | Collatio Catholicae et Orthodoxae Fidæi             |
|     |                             | de Persona Christi &amp; Sacra eius Coena               |
|     |                             | Neustadt 1582                                       |</p>
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Book</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>262</td>
<td>JAMES I of England</td>
<td>An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance</td>
<td>London 1607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>263</td>
<td>SARPI, Paolo</td>
<td>Istoria del Concilio Tridentino</td>
<td>London 1619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>264</td>
<td>CHILLINGWORTH, William</td>
<td>The Religion of Protestants a safe Way to Salvation</td>
<td>Oxford 1638</td>
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I have noted Cajetan's 'reform' or restruccturing of Thomas in the figure of Analogy, and the subsequent 'neothomist' system of inscription of Bible in Kosmos promulgated at the Council of Trent, where the Summa Theologiae stood as definitive commentary, with that Book on the altar, while the Council was in session. Such a 'counter' to Calvin's system is doubled by Loyola's 'script' for the dramatisations of the relation of individual to this order of analogy, this very 'element' so to speak of the cosmic drama. Then one limiting 'pole' or coordinate of the period of 'counter-reformation' might be found in the association of the Doctor of the Roman Catholic church whose 'mystical theology' is taken as the definitive elaboration of that dramatic dimension of Christian experience, in the 'reform' of the Spanish Carmelites, from 1568, with the nun whose spiritual director he became in 1572:

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<tr>
<th>Book</th>
<th>Author</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>265</td>
<td>TERESA de Avila</td>
<td>El Castillo Interior ('Las Moradas': 1577, ptd Salamanca 1588)</td>
<td>(77:80-1)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>El Camino de Perfeccion (1565- , ptd Evora 1583)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Vida (autobiography, ptd 1611)</td>
<td>(80-1)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>all ed &amp; tr Peers in Works London 1946</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>266</td>
<td></td>
<td>Letters ed &amp; tr Peers London 1951</td>
<td>(77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267</td>
<td>JUAN de la Cruz</td>
<td>Cantico Espiritual (15 ptd Brussels 1627)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Noche Oscura del Alma (1577-8 ptd (80-1)</td>
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<td>Subsida del Monte Carmelo (1578-83, p Alcala 1618)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Noche Oscura del Alma (1579 p Alcala 1618)</td>
<td>(80-1)</td>
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'Interior Castle': the symmetric crystal architecture of that stage, or rather those stages on the 'way of perfection', through which the individual 'I' approaches and is approached by 'I' himself, Himself. Art of Memory, anamnesis; that 'infinite hall of mirrors given life by a solitary lamp' which I took as a formal limit of the albertine architecture organised around wall-decoration in central perspective. Teresa was encouraged in the transcription of her experience, her mapping of this poetic order of symmetry and communication of finite and infinite 'I', that it might serve to help her spiritual sisters in this dangerous terrain. Her director himself recorded the 'scripts' of his own encounters on the same stony path up Mount Carmel, in the same hall of mirrors, in the figural order of poetry, the verbal dimension of the mystical drama, the 'mystery' outwardly presented in the mass. And he himself embedded his poems, his scripts set in the 'dark night' in which the literal order of reflection and sense are left behind (as we leave behind our own everyday part in the 'literal' familiar world in the dark auditorium of the secular theatre, lost in an 'image of an image'), in a verbal order of commentary (270, 271), a verbal interface of theoretical 'theological' logic and analogical figurations of actuality.

One of the most striking things in the Life or autobiography of Teresa, as in the life of John of the Cross, is their unquestioning attitude to manifestly 'worldly' figures placed in spiritual authority over them and their attempt to reform their monastic order. Charles V had himself eventually 'abstracted' himself from the world he nominally ruled to end his life in spiritual exercises in a remote Spanish monastery. Luther finds his 'part' in the divine Script, and in this sees that many of those set in authority over him are merely 'playing parts', playing out the
part, in truth, of the 'actor', 'hypocrite', most hypocritical in
that they base their authority on the very Scripture which condemns
more strongly than any other fault priestly hypocrisy. Böehme articu-
lated the symmetric poetics of his world around the outwardly arbitrary
chance of light glancing on a piece of metal in his cobbler's shop
in 1600, reconstructing a sort of symmetrical global stage or Globe
Theatre by a kind of transcription or translation of the analogical
order of inscription of Book in World through the paracelsian figu-
ration of macrocosm and microcosm; by analogy, indeed, the microcosm
becomes the humble cobbler's 'book' of study, on which he writes his
commentaries from 1612 onwards:

273 BOEHME, Jakob  The Works of Jacob Behmen (revision of the
initial trs, 1644-62, under the impulse of
William Law) London 1762-84

...And in a parallel development the nephew of the Jakob Andreae (260)
who had tried to reintegrate a fragmented Reform in the 1580's, himself,
around the time of publication of Boehme's first book Aurora (1612)
produced a script for the integration of all the various dimensions
of reform - in chemistry, religion, astronomy, politics, and so on -
unfolding from the 'dramatic' configuration of around 1500:

274 ANDREAE, Johann Valentin  Allgemeine und General-Reformation der ganzen
weiten Welt beneben der Fama Fratermitatis des
Blichen Ordens des Rosenkreuzes (Cassell 1614)

followed by:

275 Fama Fratermitatis beneben der Confession oder
Bekennnis der Fraternit (Cassell 1615) tr & int Vaughan
L.1652

276 Chymische Hochzeit Christiani Rosenkreutz
Anno 1459 (Strasburg 1616) tr Foxcroft
London 1690 (facsimile, nd, c 1970)

(an extensive commentary on the latter:

277 SILBERER, Herbert  Probleme der Mystik und ihrer Symbolik (19)
tr Jellife as Hidden Symbolism of Alchemy
and the Occult Arts NY(1917)1971

278 WAITE, Arthur Edward  The Real History of the Rosicrucians founded
on their own Manifestoes and on Facts and
Documents. London 1887
In her book, already noted, Frances Yates attempts to reconstruct the 'hidden' drama behind the pamphlet war opened up by Andreae's 'manifestoes' - linking various political, scientific, editorial, religious and other parts in the symbolic order of a contemporary iconography which occasionally reflects the verbal order of the 'rosicrucian' tracts. I have already reflected on such reconstruction; it is open to the same sort of scepticism as the uncontrolled play (the highly irregular play...) of analogy in the standard epitome of paracelsian doctrine:

CROLL, Oswald
Basilica Chimica (Frankfurt 1609) fr tr 
(Lyon 1627) Paris 1631 (80-1)

...and indeed the 'hermetic romance' of the rosicrucians (as Foxcroft called the third of Andreae's manifestoes) was criticised in a pamphlet sometimes appended to the second edition of the first book of 'sceptical chemistry':

LIBAVIUS, Andreas
Alchymia Frankfurt (1606) 1615
Analysis Confessionis Fraternitatis de Rosea Crute Frankfurt 1615

To set Croll in context, one might note the model of many sixteenth-century 'Books of Secrets':

ALEXIS of Piedmont
De Secreti (Venice 1557-9)
tr Ward London 1560-2

which sets alchemical and magical 'recipes' amongst more or less random practical advice on a wide range of subjects (the translator went on to become professor of Physic at Cambridge and physician to Elizabeth and James).

I characterised the sixteenth century as a period of 'practical' reorganisation and 'reform' of the old 'medieval' terms and their relations, in various fields:

AGRICOLA, Rudolph
De Re Metallica (Basel 1556) tr Hoover NY 1912

VESALIUS, Andreas
De Humani Corporis Fabrica (Basel 1543) 
(epitome of 1543:) Amsterdam 1642
The interplay of different partial constructions and reconstructions against the medieval aristotelian background, and the dominance of the 'figural' order of analogy over systematic logical sequence was particularly suited to the dramatic frame of the humanist dialogue:

285 Melzia, Pedro

Los Dialogos (Zaragossa 1547)

it tr Ulloa Venice 1557; fr tr (from it) 1567-71

Here 'Florio' the philosopher represents Aristotle against proponents of 'the astrologers', of rustic folk-knowledge, and of simple common sense. The form of exposition is very common in Italy, especially, from the fifteenth century down to the time of Galileo:

286 Galilei, Galileo

Dialogo dei massimi Sistemi del Mondo, Tol-emaico e Copernicano (1630) (Florence 1632)

tr Drake NY (1953) 1967

287 Discorsi e Dimostrazioni matematiche, intorno a due nuove Scienze attenenti alla Mecanica & i movimenti locali* (1636) (Leyden 1638) tr tr Crew & De Salvio NY (1914) 1970

The other works of Galileo I cited were in the equally dramatic form of the open or personal letter:

288 Sidereus Nuncius (Venice 1610) tr Carlos London 1880

289 Il Saggiatore* (Rome 1623) in The Controversy on the Comets of 1618: tr Drake & O'Malley NY 1960

all of the above, and personal letters reprinted in:

290 Opere Edizionii Nazionali (Favaro) Rome (1890-1909) rptd 1929-39

The humanist letter:

291 Lettere Volgari di diversi nobilissimi Huomini et Eccelentissimi Ingegni, scritte in diverse Materie ed Manuzio Venice 1545-64
292 Epistole di G. Plinio, di M. Franc. Petrarca, del S. Pico della Mirandola et d'altri ed & tr Dolce
Venice 1548

293 GUEVARA, Antonio de
Epistolas Familiares (Valladolid 1539-41)
tr Hellowes (in part 1574) London 1575

(Guevara was, like Mexia and (for a short period) Agrippa, secretary and historiographer to Charles V).

..and the lectio:

294 MURET, Marc-Antoine
Variarum Lectionum libri XV Antwerp 1580

These last two books illustrate the great question, in this period, of style: of the structural interplay on the very level of vocabulary and syntax of figural and logical, literal 'sides' of language. The 'star' French humanist struck a great blow against the 'ciceronian' purists by using at a lecture in Rome several words not recorded in the concordances to Cicero, thereby causing a scandal - only to turn the scandal back on the formalists by presenting the obscure loci in their model which had been overlooked by the linguistic legislators. Guevara, meanwhile, was developing the model for the courtly gongorism or euphuism which transposed the formal cult of linguistic propriety into highly figurative vernaculars across Europe. On the level of structure which constructs as 'epistolae familiares' a play of courtier's reflections, one might compare them with the form perfected by Montaigne:

295 MONTAIGNE, Michel
Essais (Bordeaux 1580-8) ed
tr Florio London 1603

...from which one might look back to Rabelais' medley of humanist learning and 'sceptical' satire in:

296 RABELAIS, François
Pantagruel (Lyon 1533); Gargantua (Lyon 1534); Le Tiers Livre de Pantagruel (Lyon 1546) all ed Jourda Paris 1962
..or forward to Burton's expansion of the figure of 'Melancholy'
from the part of Reflection in a stage-play or in Dürer's engraving,
to the play of his reflection in the wider theatre of the whole
world:

297 BURTON, Robert

The Anatomy of Melancholy (Oxford 1621)
final revision London 1652 (31)

The 'play' of reading in an essentially analogical or figural dy-
namic of narrative - the embedding of reflection and learning in
an implicit 'theatre' - as primary figure of 'theory' in this period
is perhaps attested by the positions of the books of Mexia, Guevara,
Rabelais, Montaigne, Burton among the great bestsellers of the age.
And that this is no simple reflection of vulgar distaste for recon-
dite argument is certainly exemplified by the astonishing range of
books whose reading - in the library of Christ Church or the new
Bodleian - Burton incorporated into his text.

The breakdown of the autonomy of the theatrical scene in
England over the turn of the century - that transition towards the
masque often seen in Shakespeare's farewell to the stage (the Tempest)
for example - may also be seen in the extension of the theatrical
typology of character to a rewriting of Theophrastus as:

298 EARLE, John

Micro-cosmographie: or, A Peece of the
World discovered, in Essayes and Characters.
(Oxford 1628) ed West London 1951

..the form of 'Essaye' had already been introduced by a lawyer a
few years before Florio's influential transcription of the french
model:

299 BACON, Francis

Essayes (London 1597, enlgd 1621, 1625)in(300)

...a lawyer who Frances Yates' precursors in the nineteenth century
found cryptically and cryptogrammatically present in the various
levels of figuration of 'Shakepeare's' plays: a sort of embedding
of the plays in a hidden drama where the ill-educated Stratford man
outwardly 'took the place' of the illustrious true author. One
might extend the dynamic of substitution already found in Hamlet
to an interesting analysis of that scenario.
Bacon's part may more sensibly be found in a sort of converse of such occult drama: in the lawyer's gradual extension of the practical embedding of forensic argument in court-room drama, into the practical organisation of its logic which would similarly set theory in the wider world of natural 'law':

300 Twoo Bookes... of the Proficience and Advancement of Learning Divine and Humane London (1605) ed (with 299,302)Jones NY 1937
301 Instauratio Magna (London 1620) Amst 1652
302 New Atlantis (1624, p London 1627) in (300)

In all these schemes one finds again and again the 'dramatic' inscription of theory and its logic in a 'figural' or poetic order of drama coordinating 'script' and activity in the primary 'analogy' or proportion or mirroring of microcosm and macro-cosm. In many ways Robert Fludd is a thoroughly 'characteristic' figure:

303 FLUDD, Robert Utriusque Cosmi..metaphysica, physica etque technica Historia Oppenheim & Frankfurt 1617-21
304 Monochordon Mundi Symphoniacum Frankfurt 1622

..trained as a physician, his primary references the books of Paracelsus, Moses, microcosm and physical macrocosm..and the 'rosicrucian' manifestoes or 'scripts' for the General Reformation of the Whole Wide World. His first publication was a defence of 'the rosicrucians' against Libavius in 1616; his subsequent productions were all 'controversial' in every sense: (304) is a reply to Kepler's criticism of (303) in an appendix to (305) below. In 1621 he introduced the theatrical metaphor or analogy (Veritatis Proscenium..), and followed up (304) and Burton's Anatomy in 1623 with an Anatomiae Amphitheatrum.., an 'anatomy' (extending the analogy with the microcosm) of the complementary material and spiritual theatres of Earth and Heaven, those two 'octaves' in the cosmic 'monochord' articulating the whole system in the 'musical' mathematics of harmony, fitting-together according to analogia, 'proportion', symmetry.
The dissolution of that autonomy of the limited theatrical stage which framed the drama of *Hamlet* at the 'Globe' Theatre in a continued proportion (a musical 'harmony' or analogy) between play-within-the-play, play itself, and wider World ('All the World's a Stage' reflects Jacques in *As You Like it*, probably from the same year) which on the one hand leads the courtly masquers to cross the boundary from audience onto stage, on the other allows the figural dynamic of the theatre to break out from its confines onto the wider stage of the whole 'globe'. Andreae writes a sort of 'script' for the General Reform of the World which itself, like the Book or Bible, frames its own efficacy in framing the interplay of a new theory of the World-Stage (organised throughout by 'analogy') with other dimensions of the action it forecasts and purports to introduce or induce. In their various initially unlinked responses to this scenario various eminent men of science either found themselves entering through their writing (like Fludd) into the scenario and into its hermetic or mystical dynamic or (like Libavius) organised a further step in the rising 'scientific' scepticism by questioning the essential circularity (Popkin's 'fideism') of those elements in the scenario which abstracted it from strict logical argument in plays of analogy and allegory.

305 KEPLER, Johann

*Mysterium Cosmographicum* Tübingen 1596

Astronomia Nova Prague 1609

307 Dioptrica Vienna 1611

308 Harmonices Mundi Linz 1619 (78)

309 CASPAR, Max

Johannes Kepler (Stuttgart 1958) tr Hellman NY 1959

310 PAULI, Wolfgang

in *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche* (with Carl Jung: Eranos Jahrbuch, Zürich 1952) tr Silz NY 1955

Kepler and Fludd may thus be seen as complementary figures: each claims to reconstruct the 'musical' order of mathematical pythagorean Kosmos, but while Fludd's 'monochord' of the Scala Naturae is coordinated with the components it supposedly organises in terms of 'scientifically' arbitrary selection from that range of analogical and allegorical figuration, Kepler constructs his 'harmonics'
of Kosmos by systematic abstraction of its mathematical frame from the optical order of appearance, observation, deceptive figuration which, in that order is our access to it. His coor-
dination of optics, mechanics, and the relativity of observation (he invented the theory of refraction or dioptrics to abstract his astro-
nomical data from distortion in the intervening medium) would be soon lost, only to reappear with Hamilton and Einstein; the primacy he accorded to mathematical symmetry would reappear in the quantum mechanics of Einstein and Pauli, and eventually in the question of the relation, exemplified in the 'mechanics' of light, of global relativistic symmetry, and local 'internal' symmetries of elementary particles. Such considerations are linked with Galileo's converse extension of the local dynamics of material particles to the global frame by a progressive Jesuit critic of the latter:

311 SCHEINER, Christopher

Oculus, hoc est Fundamentum Opticum (Rome 1619)
London 1652

..while apart from his father's work on the reconstitution of 'greek' music-drama at Florence around 1600, Galileo's own 'poetics' may be glimpsed in a sketch of the 1590s:

312 GALILEI, Galileo

Considerazioni al Tasso Rome 1793

To return once more to the 'dramatic' symmetry of various extensions of the dynamics of 'theatre' to the mathematical frame of appearance, of experience and experiment, Experientia, we might note an analogy with Fludd's rosicrucian 'Invisible College' operating from no limited material stage or rooms, which was to give its name to the collegium or colleagues meeting with a view to the reform of the sciences at Oxford in Wallis' room, and the 'invisible' European academy organised by meetings at, and correspondence organised through Father Mersenne's cell at his convent in Paris from 1620 until his death in 1648. Fludd's exchanges with Kepler in the early 1620s were followed by exchanges with Mersenne in the late 1620s, until Mersenne's part was taken over by a regular visitor to his cell, Gassendi, in 1630.

313 MERSENNE, Marin

Harmonicorum libri Paris 1636

314 Cogitata Physico-Mathematica Paris 1644
Mersenne framing from his friar's cell in Paris a european network of scientific communication, a european scientific community: an international clearing-house for inquiries and inquiry. Mersenne coordinating a multitude of different perspectives in a newly developing 'theatre' of european reflection. Along with Gassendi, Pascal and Hobbes among regular visitors to discussions there was the inventor of a radically new 'projective geometry' based on the coordination of measurements associated with different 'perspectives' on the same figure through the 'harmonic' proportion at the base of Mersenne's new unitary system of music. A Traité de la Section Perspective appearing in the same year as Mersenne's linear harmonics of musical 'scale' was, like Kepler's analogous correlation of optics and spatial 'harmonics', submerged by other developments for two centuries, until questions eventually arising from that parallel and quickly dominant line of inquiry finally reproduced the symmetries of 'analytic' and 'synthetic' approaches from which the dominant line had been abstracted in the 1630s;

Finally, then, we come to the focus of all these different 'perspectives' coordinated in his european space and time of Inquiry by Père Mersenne, in his erstwhile schoolfellow at La Flèche, whose european 'agent' he became in the 1620s, when the young soldier returned from his revelation near Ulm of 10/11 November 1619, and from his vain attempt to find the invisible rosicrucians over the following year of european travel. He arrived back in Paris at the height of rosicrucian excitement there. Rosicrucian announcements were fly-posted by night across the city; Descartes, known as a solitary recluse absorbed in abstruse questions of some new universal
science, who had been travelling about in connection with the Invisible College over the previous year was 'faussement soupconné de magie'. The young Naudé launched against rosicrucian mania his first sceptical work in 1623, followed by a more general survey,

319 NAUDE, Gabriel  

Apologie pour tous les grands Personnages faussement soupconnés de Magie Paris (1625)  
final revision 1652

320 Naudeana et Patini ana ed Bayle 1701

The two paths would cross again at Stockholm in Descartes' last year: Naudé had fled from his work of assembling a vast library for Mazarin during the Fronde, and was temporarily engaged in the library where Descartes taught the young queen philosophy at five every morning. Naudé's tracts on the bibliography of Politics (prefiguring his political absence from Paris as the library he had assembled was being dispersed, to be reassembled over the short period between his return and his death in 1653) and on the right method in 'liberal studies', had been printed by Descartes' and Galileo's Dutch printer along with twenty-two other 'discourses on method' by Erasmus, Campanella, Grotius and others a few years before:

321 Dissertationes de Studiis Instituendis ed & ptd Louis Elzevier Amsterdam 1645

Naudé defines his 'method' in political theory through a critical focus outside all the books he surveys, that play of perspectives in the most worldly of theories. Naudé framing a universal library for the man at the political centre of France, and of Europe, around 1650. Descartes stands at another pole: his Dissertatio de Methodo contains all the politics of his 'system', and all the drama, in its opening account, in a short intellectual autobiography, of the historical process of his abstraction from books of men to the Book of Nature, and of himself, on the one hand, and from the stormy and uncertain world at the beginning of the Thirty Years War on the other:

322 DESCARTES, Rene  

Essais Philosophiques (Leyden 1637)  
lat tr rev Descartes (without Geometry) (Leyden 1647) includes:
Descartes had sent his manuscript large-scale reworking of the first of the 'Essais'—the metaphysical introduction to and frame of the system—to Mersenne, soliciting responses to which he would in turn respond. Hobbes and Gassendi gave British and French 'materialist' readings, Arnauld questioned the practical—religious and moral—implications of such logic and ontology; Mersenne framed his own queries. But Descartes' focal perspective remained his own, and the play of objection and response merely prefigured the reiteration of this 'point of view' in the symmetry of the whole system:

Descartes as 'focus' of European theory at his death in 1650: as marking the convergence in his radical questioning, and in the
converse movement of apodictic assertion it frames as unitary, 'regular' system, simply by conversion of the formal symmetry of what is 'open' in the symmetry of language as 'question' into a closed system of assertion, through the focal assertion 'I' as response to the place of 'question' simply as such.

Focus, then, from which diverge the primary perspectives of all subsequent European theory, by calling into question this identification of the focal 'I' which is a formal conversion of the open play of 'question' simply as such, with the writer René Descartes, or with his critical readers: the axes of symmetry of this abstract function of 'question', the space of substitution in language, reflecting the substitution of language for other correlative dimensions of experience, are the primary axes of the reading of Descartes, and the reading of reading of Descartes, which may almost be identified with the subsequent history of theory. As I noted in Part II, Descartes is himself ambiguous or confused about the question of primacy of the 'I' in which his understanding assents, and the divine infinite I AM which articulates the interplay of finite mind and finite matter: Malebranche and Spinoza would substitute the infinite 'I' as primary focus; Leibniz would begin from a complementary space and time of elementary self-assertion, perception, identity, being. Hobbes and Gassendi would similarly invert the axes of the cartesian system, according primacy to physical or material 'atoms' that, in purely formal terms, are equivalent instances of self-assertion or conatus. And, in some ways more radically, his female royal students, the Princess Elizabeth and Queen Christina, would draw him back into the 'dramatic' order of the Passions, in their correspondence and the treatise elaborated from it, at the end of his intellectual career, as he had abstracted himself from that worldly play at its outset.
Two formal axes of questions, Descartes 'in theory' at their french focus in an 'I' asserting itself as instance of assertion, having worked back through the complementary assertion and question of 'fideism' and 'scepticism' to the radical symmetry of the space of questions itself, and its logical time. Reconstructing the world from which he has thus abstracted the formal instance of 'I', and the experience of his psychical actuality, by working back through the order of questions, articulating its symmetry in the complementary axes of finite and infinite, inner and outer: a symmetry Spinoza would articulate in the mathematical frame which Descartes had himself inscribed as its formal skeleton in his 'system'.

Descartes, then, may be taken as the primary representative, as focus of Mersenne's european frame of theoretical inquiry, of the mid-seventeenth century 'turning point' - the close of the second scene of the third act, the mid-point of the economy of Part II - of this book, this inquiry, as a whole: this through the symmetry of embedding of the theoretical axes of his 'system' of symmetry, in the corresponding dimensions of the historical context from which they, so to speak, canonically abstract. And the Discours de la Methode frames both the autobiographical drama of abstraction from the disordered world of early seventeenth-century continental Europe, and the induction into an ordered system of assertion through the limiting formal part of response to the form of 'question' itself. The induction or introduction to the systematic reconstruction of the World in that 'roman philosophique' he began to write after framing the rules of construction in 1630, as 'Le Monde'. The systematic reconstruction of The World, Kosmos, by the man who had forsaken the play of reading and writing, fideism and scepticism, that had ravaged theory and World in partial attempts at Reformation...in the purified internal space of books abstracted from Naudé's 'political library'. 'These are my books' he told a visitor to his retreat in Holland, showing around his dissecting-room. He had read the Book of the World, and was writing his reading in the internal cartesian space whose formal skeleton was the symbolism of his 'cartesian' geometry, a direct correlation of the formal structure of linguistic substitution or symmetry, and the 'external' symmetry of 'physical' space. And the external dynamic of that physical World was the sym-
metric correlate of the logical space-time of deduction. Mathematics, constructed within the space and time of language, articulating in that practical language its symmetrical skeleton, 'would allow a simple direct translation, transcription, of inner logic into outer physics. In their different ways, Spinoza's 'geometrical' Ethics, and Leibniz' Universal Character, might make the whole system fully symmetric, its language itself 'symmetrically', mathematically, inscribed in its World.

Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, Newton, Locke: so many perspectives on, readings of, Descartes; so many more or less 'symmetric' responses to Descartes' texts and their mid-century context, in the sixteen-seventies, eighties, nineties. And a European 'enlightenment': so many readings of these parallel responses, from the seventeen-thirties on to the revolutionary seventeen-nineties, when it could be said, by Enfield adapting Brucker, in the first critical history of philosophy in English:

The system of Des Cartes...had so much subtlety, ingenuity, and originality, that it not only engaged the universal attention of the learned, but long continued...to be publicly taught in the schools, throughout all Europe. Till at length, when...the fabrications of romantic theories gave way to the experimental study of nature, and the system of Des Cartes, like "the baseless fabric of an air-vision", has disappeared, and has scarcely "left a wreck behind". (1)

...The most 'classical' of constructions, Descartes' Roman du Monde, vanished with the beginnings of Romanticism, like Prospero's play within Shakespeare's last play:

...These our actors,
As I foretold you, were all spirits, and
Are melted into air, into thin air:
And, like the baseless fabric of this vision,
The cloud cap'ed towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,

1: History of Philosophy (London 1791) II.555
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve,
And, like this insubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff
As dreams are made on...(1)

..this speech prefiguring the Epilogue to the play as a whole, with its 'play' (in the fifteen instances of 'I' and its inflections, in the twenty lines) between identities of Prospero, his writer, and the actor, traditionally seen as Shakespeare's formal exit from the stage.

Yet the 'romantic' return from formal unities, from the 'classic' legacy of Descartes and Corneille to Shakespeare and rosicrucian mystery, to play-within-play within the wider theatre of the world, to a complex play of 'I's behind cartesian identity - whether in Wilhelm Meister or the Wissenschaftslehre, those twin foci of the New World projected by Friedrich Schlegel - is also the passage into a new reading of Descartes, and of readings of readings...and of reading of readings of readings:


- Sebba's library opens with an annotated list of earlier bibliographies: his reading of readings of readings of Descartes; and passing through colloquia, editions, biographies, introductions, he reaches his analysis of around fifty 'Fundamental Interpretations', the primary coordinates in this textual space of reading of the textual and contextual space of Descartes' writing. Further sections address various 'dimensions' of this textual space of reading Descartes: monographs on particular themes, studies of cartesian 'science', of Descartes' influence (the last, then, a study of studies of the historical structure of readings, and readings of readings). So much for the first Part; the second lists all those entries in the uniform linear alphabetical order of title; the third is a sort of structural analysis of the textual space projected onto that alphabetical base: a 'systematic index' first, which is itself a unitary coordination of the themes alphabetically listed in the 1: The Tempest, Act IV (first & only scene)
'analytical index' which finally closes this exemplary book about books about Descartes' books.

What an irony, that Descartes' books, in which he thought to abstract in their inner logic the mathematical frame of inscription of that logic in the spatial extension of the physical World, and of inscription of the mathematical dynamics of that world in logical space and time, from the politics of reading and writing, from the 'bibliography' which cited scholastic 'authorities' rather than the authority of independent reason itself...that these books should be embedded in Sebba's coordinates of reading and writing about this principal 'authority' of 'modern philosophy', as he organises the modern textual space and time of theory......and that, above all, this textual space in which cartesian space is embedded, should itself turn about Gilson's identification of Descartes' 'scientific revolution' as itself framed in, and determined by, the textual dynamic of the very scholastic 'space' of reading and writing, in whose very terms the revolutionary thought to abstract himself from that space and its terms, its coordinates (cf above, 158,160).

Descartes, who thought he was abstracting himself from his Jesuit education, but who was in fact continuing its dynamic beyond the walls of La Flèche. Descartes who thought to leave books behind, but who could not leave behind those sole two books which stood upon the altar at Trent: there were few books with him as he moved from village to Dutch village, but he always brought with him the Book, and Thomas' summation of possible readings of that Book.

But that figure of abstraction which Gilson at first saw as a deepening and continuation of Christian philosophy, the philosophy of The Book and The World, he began to see after the 'break' with Descartes in 1930, as the opening of the disastrous dream of self-sufficient humanity, finitude...

332 MARITAIN, Jacques Le Songe de Descartes Paris 1932

Ce que M. Gilson écrivait récemment à propos du cogito peut
s’appliquer d’une façon générale à cette expérience tragique qu’a été le rationalisme classique...

...Les hommes de ce temps ont le fort instructif privilège d’assister à la faillite historique de trois siècles de rationalisme... (1)

What M. Gilson wrote recently of the cogito may be applied more generally to that tragic experiment which was classic rationalism...

...Men of our day have the very instructive privilege of being present at the historic failure of three centuries of rationalism.

Descartes’ dream: the abstract stage set in the textual space of his identification with 'I', with the formal converse of the very form of question itself; the stage onto which he entered, on which he found himself, over the course of the Eve of St Martin, the formal entry into the first day of Winter, the first campaign of the Thirty Years War...over the course of a night punctuated by three visionary dreams (cf Poulet's study of the poetics of induction into formal cartesian space and time through these three dreams, in ( ) below, and:

333 WAHL, Jean

Du Rôle de l'Idée de l'Instant dans la Philosophie de Descartes
Paris 1953

Descartes' dream: Prospero's masque prefigures the dissolution of the boundary between stage and world, and Andreae's script in the new Globe as Theatre for an imaginary Invisible College into which Descartes wished to gain admission prefigures a radically new imaginary theatre played out in the space of thought set in the symmetric logical skeleton of language - that 'rack' (in one reading of Prospero's speech) which Descartes leaves behind.

By around 1950, at the close of Sebba's reading of principle readings, coordinates,

The three-cornered conflict between Kemp Smith, Gueroult, Alquie reflects the unhealable cleavages in contemporary Descartes

1: work cited, introduction
scholarship, stemming from fundamental disagreement on the nature of philosophical interpretation and on the structure of Descartes' thought (1)

Alquié had read Descartes' inquiry in terms of the correlative discovery in the latter's response to the dubito, of those symmetrical coordinates of Man and Being already noted - as 'la decouverte metaphysique de l'homme chez Descartes' ('chez' Descartes, indeed...).

Kemp Smith had carefully reconstructed the play of questions which led Descartes into 'terra incognita'; Guéroult had imposed a unitary logical finality on this process. Writing in England I add:

334 KENNY, Anthony Descartes London 1968

merely to reiterate, by extending the earlier parallel with Gilson(2) the abstraction of the 'history of philosophy' I found on my syllabus and reading-lists at Oxford in the early 'seventies from Kemp Smith's 'history of ideas': just as Kenny, co-editor of the Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, abstracts that 'medieval philosophy' from its historical and in particular its theological context, by presenting a transcription of certain 'medieval' questions (this quite avowedly) into the dynamic of 1960s 'analytic' (Oxford) philosophy, so the questions found in Descartes' text, and their system, are determined by the grammar of that same ana-chronistic transcription - the 'context', then, appearing in a transcription of Gilson's minute research into a schematic relation between some of the transcriptions later appearing in the Cambridge History, and the transcription of cartesian questions which frames the book 'on Descartes' (Kenny apparently left the catholic priesthood after doubts had arisen about the possibility of convincingly transcribing Thomas' Five Ways into a satisfactory equivalent in the then contemporary language of 'Oxford Philosophy'; how would God or Thomas or Gilson judge that resolution of the question of the relations of Faith, Reason and History? Augustine replied to the question 'What was God doing before the Creation?': 'Thinking of suitable torments for those who pose over-subtle questions').

1: sn 193 2: p clxviii above
Readings of Descartes: Hegel in the first three decades of the nineteenth century; Cassirer's first book (his doctoral thesis) in 1899 (Descartes Kritik der mathematischen und naturwissenschaften Erkenntnis); Gilson's reading over the first three decades of the twentieth century, leading to the 'break' in 1930; Husserl's lectures of 1929 in Paris (listed below); Heidegger's position over the same period (of the 'Kehre') in relation to which Descartes opens that space, pale, Lichung of 'modern' ontotheology, closed by Nietzsche's assertion of Assertion, Will, Will to Will. Then Sartre's postwar assertion of Descartes' existential break with essentialist scholasticism, in a collective volume on Descartes marking French cultural reassertion - 'la liberté cartésienne' in the year after liberation from occupying Germany, and the year of Heidegger's repudiation of existential 'humanism'.

Inscription, then, of Descartes' texts, and the coordinates of the cartesian logical space and time they frame in the French and Latin languages, in a wider textual space and time of changing perspectives on Descartes' texts - chief amongst them, Gilson's texts which embed the cartesian inquiry in a scholastic textual space in whose 'terms' the revolutionary thinks to (dreams to) abstract himself...and then mid-century readings of Gilson presenting incommensurable perspectives (in Sebba's eyes), 'unhealable cleavages', between different readings of Descartes, different ways of embedding Descartes' texts in the text of a reading: 'fundamental disagreement on the nature of philosophical interpretation and on the structure of Descartes' thought'.

Perhaps one needs a new perspective, a new focus, to coordinate these different readings... I have suggested that the symmetrical unfolding of cartesian 'space and time', logical, physical, physiological, metaphysical, from the textual 'space' of possible substitutions, and its temporal dynamic in the logical axis of inquiry, theory, may itself be understood in terms of the substitution of text for World - as cartesian 'Roman du Monde', to use the author's own defensive characterisation, made to preempt any questions arising from conflicts between his unpublished summa of the early 'thirties, Le Monde (the fragments appearing in 1664), and that unquestionably true (in whatever the true sense of 'true'
might be) histoire presented by the Book, the Author's own Script of his World, his cosmic drama.

Reflection, then, and its dynamic 'substituted for' action, and passion, 'in' the World. Passions arising only in the early passion for mathematics as the path away from conflicting appearances in the dramatic order of imagination and passion, and in his dealings with women: in the death of the daughter by his servant, in the closing years, in his correspondence on that subject with Princess, and Queen. Perhaps in his rather intemperate rejection of criticism.

... But here we are in the realm of 'biography' - that section of cartesian bibliography. Texts which frame Descartes' texts in their 'historical' interaction with their context; and here once more we seem to be caught in the 'unhealable cleavage' between 'philosophical' readings of the texts, and various other sorts of reading, whose own textual frames in which Descartes' philosophy is inscribed may be themselves considered in principle open to 'philosophical' criticism: 'psychologisms', 'historicisms', 'materialisms', and so on, in their essentially ungrounded or groundless abstraction from precisely that radical questioning of presuppositions upon which the cartesian texts, and 'philosophy' thereafter must, surely, insist? Unhealable cleavage, in particular, between the iconography and thematics of the 'historian of ideas', and the logical analysis of the 'philosopher'. Texts in the World and its cultural dynamic, or 'The World' in a text. Logical space or historical space, with 'intellectual biography' caught precariously somewhere in-between.

... And the dynamic I have attempted to pursue has always been precariously 'in between' logic and history: always presenting a reading of, a response to, a text or set of texts, as a response to a wider 'question' posed by text-in-context, expressed in another text, in writing. A response indeed, which, insofar as it is perceived as the response to a question, has already framed the relations of earlier text and context in the verbal order of question, rather than something 'open', to express whose openness in language as a 'question' is itself only one among other paths 'open'.
Insofar as I have expressed such a dynamic of reading and writing theory in this text, ‘in’ this book, these words, I have necessarily marked the context in which any text poses a ‘question’ or questions, as ‘text’. And it has been a constant principle in this book or text, to present the configuration of text and context at any ‘point’, ‘in the terms of’ texts already inscribed in this text, this reading (including, of course, the progressive reading of this text itself, as it is written), or those texts in process of inscription, ‘reading’ (rather, in process of ‘being read’... the relation of what is active and what passive in reading is perhaps best characterised by the play of question and response in dialogue).

Thus I presented the ‘responses’ to Descartes of Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibniz, Newton, Locke, in terms of their symmetry as textual responses to the symmetry of cartesian text and context which frames Descartes’ ‘abstraction’ from context to text. That they may also appear in Cassirer’s logical dynamic as symmetric responses to the questions posed by the symmetry of Descartes’ abstraction with other theoretical abstractions from, perspectives on, a shared mid-century context, may be associated with the embedding of ‘argument’, logical or impassioned (or, more generally, both at the same time) in the cultural coupling of self-assertion with differentiation from one’s peers, one’s intellectual, cultural, community. Most particularly, this process of identification and assertion through differentiation in the play of perspectives, may be associated with those different national ‘schools’ of theory in which that process of reading which is traditional education is embedded in (from the end of the Thirty Years War at least) more or less unitary, integrated, national activity. And since, in theory, such differentiation of ‘parts’ in argument must take place within the shared space of ‘terms’, more or less shared ‘terms of reference’ (however differently ‘understood’ by the disputants), the symmetry, and indeed the number and configuration of ‘primary’ or ‘fundamental’ readings or responses, will be correlative with the configuration of theories in context to which they are responses. Their symmetry, in turn, associated with their common embedding in a common context from which they abstract, and in which they share that figure of abstraction, ‘theory’ in relation to which argument proceeds.
In general, then: Theory is verbally embedded or inscribed in a 'historical' dynamic of activity of which language (including the speaking and writing of theory) is one 'dimension' among others. Speaking and writing theory 'in' language, words, is thus further embedded in a dynamic of spatial and linguistic differentiation of European activity, over the 'middle' ages, into more or less integrated 'national' systems of geographical borders, central control within them, and more and more uniform use of the developing vernaculars in the central coordination of 'national' activity within national 'borders'. Niebuhr had postulated the contuity of a Roman oral tradition to give unity to his reconstruction of early Latin culture; Ranke would frame the dynamics of 'Modern' Europe in terms of the interaction of Southern 'Latin' and Northern 'Germanic' nations, with national systems of power and verbal communication instituted from around 1500 in France, Spain and England, their analogues in Italian 'city-states' (whose autonomy was compromised precisely at the point where the larger nation-states became internally integrated)... and a correlate of that new system of systems in what one might call the 'German question' confronted by Maximilian's heir, and by Luther.

The interplay of national integration and international differentiation (and international 'political differences' so often leading to physical confrontation in the 'war' where one nation crosses physically into another to impose its order of activity within foreign borders) presents one extreme of the embedding of verbally articulated theories in the various dimensions of the 'mark'. And the interplay of different 'national' orders of coupling of verbal and material 'dimensions' of activity presents a limiting case of symmetric (more or less 'translatable') orders of verbal abstraction from different sets of written or spoken marks (words) framing a common space of argument and diplomacy within the physical space in which the different languages are 'at home', within the 'symmetry' of a European system of two-sided national 'borders'. This limiting coordination of the verbal order of document and physical order of material economy frames that drama of interaction traced by Ranke through international diplomacy - through the dramatic interplay of different national 'views' or framings of that difference of view, interest and so on.
From a 'cartesian' perspective, though, this 'global' frame of modern European history and so of its 'theoretical' dimension, is itself 'theoretically' embedded in the wider, indeed 'universal' space and time in which the formal 'logic' of substitution of one mark for another (algebra) is coupled (through a substitution of formal linguistic mark for formal physical mark (point) in Descartes' geometry) with the substitution of one point for another in physical space. The formal symmetry of substitution for a 'variable' (a marking of a place in which the mark for a physical point is to be substituted) in the logical 'space' of marks and time of their discursive transformation, with the physical space and time of movement of 'points' and their 'atomic' figurations, the whole divinely controlled by the assertion of the 'I' which articulates this symmetry of logical and physical in logical space (in the pure language of cartesian mathematics), this wider universal space and time 'theoretically' frames, and in this, one must suppose, orders in historical space and time, the human activity involved in this theorising, as also the wider human activities which provide the theorist with food, shelter, paper, books, relative civic peace or order in which to organise his work, and so on.

...But I have suggested that such a universal 'Space' and 'Time' of theory should itself be seen as the 'substitution' of the formal, internal, logical symmetry of marks in a book of theory, for the concrete 'dramatic' space and time of theorising in which this move of abstraction, substitution of 'Roman du Monde' for Monde (the equivocation focussed in the 'title' of the book, as itself marking the translation or transition from World to Book), is itself one moment or component. - Not that the symmetries of logical and physical 'space' do not constrain this 'dramatic' order: rather do they impose constraints on what is open in the configuration of Descartes' books and their contexts, which are 'in' physical space both physically and logically, but not thereby 'in' any 'absolute' geometrical Universe and universal cosmic Time. The 'universal' of these 'spaces' and 'times' lie rather in the relativistic invariants coordinating, say, Descartes' space and time with Spinoza's and Leibniz' and Newton's and Locke's and mine and yours, and Pythagoras' and the Moon's and the Sun's.
That is, this spatiotemporal symmetry which Descartes identifies in his books with the physical 'space' in which the production of its description in that book might in principle be (and is by God in fact) deduced, determined, is rather a symmetry which constrains the relations of that book with other things in its 'context'. And such a symmetry does not thereby 'determine' such relations, in a way that would allow a sequence of determinations to be nested, one within the other, within a unitary 'block universe', static (like a perfect timeless description, a complete script) in fixed divine Eternity. It simply leaves some things open and not others, just as the constraint that two positive integers must add up to 3 does not determine whether the first will be 1 or 2, but excludes the possibility that it be 4 (or anything but 1 or 2), and determines that the second must be 2 or 1, once the first had been chosen as 1 or 2 respectively. Physical space, in this sense, is precisely what is 'open' as 'space' for our activity, rather than what is already determined, foreclosed so to speak.

Complementing such abstraction of coordinate 'logical' and 'physical' symmetries or 'spaces' of possible action, and further constraining that activity, is that 'poetic' space of human interaction, logically framed in terms of the formal mathematical 'harmonics' of musical space, cycle within subcycle, which so engaged the attention of the young Descartes, of Kepler, Mersenne, Fludd, the elder Galilei and many others at the opening of the seventeenth century. I have already suggested the complementarity of 'logical' space of questions as one 'side' of language, and 'analogical' space of figural language as the 'other side', 'unconscious', so to speak, articulated by a dynamics of desire (notably, of power and sexuality) reflected in language as it organizes structures of substitution in Jakobson's 'two axes of language' associated with the analogies called metonymy and metaphor. Just as we do not embed the text of its proposition in unitary cartesian (or husserlian) Space and Time of universal geometry, but rather see such an abstraction 'brought into' the figure of question, itself, by Derrida in the 'sixties, so we should not (the moral imperative of our logic here), either, allow the dynamics of desire in which our writing is itself something we choose (or, at least, could choose not to do), to be inscribed, and
'one-sidedly' determined in the symmetries of metaphor and metonymy (or a 'logique du supplement') 'in' language. The 'm-themes' elaborated by Lacan must be regarded simply as non-deterministic constraints on the 'phantasmatic' dynamics of our activity, leaving a structured open-ness that is 'wanting' in us, rather than 'mathematically' determining the inscription of our self-consciousness in a linguistic Unconscious articulated around a unitary Other that is our 'place' in Language, a sort of conversion or inversion of the unitary cartesian 'I'.

Thus we may look in Hamlet rather than in Lacan for the 'poetic' dynamics of power and sexuality: look at the play of substitution of 'parts' in the frame of Aristotle's 'substitution of one action for another action', rather than simply in terms of substitution in a unitary Language articulated around or in 'le lieu de l'Autre' which presents rather, abstract symmetries of script, of only that linguistic side, or dimension of the 'action', from which the symmetric 'play' of parts abstracts, as it abstracts from various other 'parts' that the actor, as the dramatic 'place' where parts are substituted or substitutable one for another, might 'play'.

We may then, in turn, see that 'poetic' order of 'passions' from which Aristotle and Descartes, in their different ways, abstract their theory, as itself an 'abstract' order of constraints, of the 'harmonics' or fitting-together of circuits of assertion and reassertion (in response to responses to one's initial assertion) of 'groups' of parts defined, like the limiting 'national' groups of 'parts' from which, in the case of Fortinbras, a 'part' may be metonymically abstracted as 'representative'), in terms of symmetric mutual differentiation. Constraints of which the stage-play presents only one instance or 'presentation', intermediate in social 'scale' between the elementary theatre of house and family, and the global theatre of politics - with all three scales meeting, in appearance, in the 'royal families' of classic tragedy.

I have called 'linguistic' order the interface in language of the 'logical' dynamic, the 'inner' space and time of questions, and the 'analogical' or figural side of embedding of language in
the poetics of action, part, will, desire, motivation, emotion, passion, sense, appearance and so on, with its two primary axes of sexual difference and the order of potere etymologically cognate with paternal rule in the minimal 'cell' of this poetic order, the family, instituted in the architectural 'cell' of its home. Power: what is open to one to determine, to effect, to do; the range of possible action; pater patriae, the metonymic transference of the figure of the cultural cell to the cultural whole; 'will to power': assertion in action as self-expression, as actualisation; the end of action the extension of the range of action; action the self-expression of self-expression. Knowledge is Power; Power is Money; the more one knows, the more ways to more ends one knows; money is the medium of translation of one action into another, and so for money any action may be substituted, bought; and money used to accumulate more money, is power used to accumulate more power.

Theatre as action substituted for another action, its actors the 'places' where one part may be substituted for another, like an 'I' which may be mine, yours, his or hers. Economy as the dynamic of substitution of one action for another action in the 'physical', material order - or rather, within the constraints of physical 'laws' of change. Thinking: playing the part of 'I' in imaginary variation of components of one's situation: itself one part open in a variety of situations. Culture: the interplay of 'parts' or 'roles', and the institutional frame of substitution of one part for another; in particular, the substitution of different people in the same part.

In all, various orders of substitution, linguistic, cultural, material, with their 'aides', logical, poetic, physical: various 'dimensions' of what is open in a situation, which last one might define or characterise as what is open, what 'presents itself' to individual or group somehow identified. Consider, then, our 'situation' as readers or writer of this book. We 'communicate' materially through the physical transposition, somehow or other, from my writing to your reading, of these words; in them we communicate verbally in this logical 'space' of the words in which
may itself be seen as a sort of 'global' converse of the local abstraction from its cultural situation (from the wider 'stage' of the Globe) of a single 'play'. Single stage-play and abstract 'global' tradition of theory, are complementary or converse abstractions from the intermediate order of the situations of theorist, actor, and spectator. But whereas the stage-play has a radical 'irregularity' associated with its actual embedding in such a situation, the 'drama of western theory' is of extraordinary 'regularity', precisely through its constant principle of abstraction from the particular situation of each theorist as he (the fact that one can write 'he', rather than 'he or she' is a mark of that regularity) substitutes himself for 'I' in the theoretical text he constructs through just this substitution in the actual configuration of language and culture in which he finds himself theorising.

That is: there is, as it were, only one 'part' in the whole drama of Theory: that imaginary part of 'I' which is the formal conversion of the place, in some language, of 'question'. And if Descartes is such an obvious choice for 'central' character in the tragicomedy which is the story of attempts to play such an imaginary part, this is simply because he identifies his part precisely in terms of systematic global doubt, and correspondingly systematic global assertion. And if, here, Descartes is taken rather as focal 'version' of the 'midpoint' of the whole drama around 1650, that is because each 'part' in the story is identified not simply in terms of an imaginary 'internal' space of corresponding 'theoretical' writing, but rather in terms of a symmetric configuration of inside and outside of each theorist's texts, which frames each attempt to play 'I', to impersonate Theory. Thus I...do not take Descartes 'on his own terms', as the 'I' he plays defining itself in the global space and time whose very abstraction from 'ene Descartes it frames, but rather do I frame this cartesian abstraction as itself one 'version' of a space of abstraction more generally associated with that 'Scientific Revolution' which appears as a collective european assertion of 'Theory' as precisely 'Inquiry', as 'experimental' Science. Descartes is the most representative figure only because of the extreme 'singularity' of his version of this new 'Method', framed at a focus
of the wider frame of Science in which I have already emphasised the 'coordinating' role or part of Mersenne (whose own major achievement was to frame for the first time a unitary harmonic musical 'space', associated with that geometry of 'perspective' developed by Descartes and Pascal, from which Descartes abstracts his unitary analytic 'space').

Now the millenial theoretical 'poetics' of theory I have tried to trace down from pythagorean mystery, through Scientific Revolution to the close of this twentieth century of our era, is no more 'deterministic' in relation to any of the texts through which various parallel 'lines' of development have been traced, than the wider 'physical' space and time in which the poetic embeds the production of those texts. Like 'physical' and 'logical' spaces, it merely presents symmetries - of logical, cultural and physical dynamics in that production of theory - in which any text is necessarily inscribed, which do not extend 'far enough' to fully determine any 'level' of any text. Most particularly, it no more determines any mechanical reconstruction of any theoretical text, than it determines the precise grammar and vocabulary of those historical languages in which the various theories are variously produced. Rather does it only constitute one among other constraints in which theoretical questions are historically coordinate with what was 'open' to any theorist in that wider context where writing theory was one thing open among others. - One thing 'open' in the writer's situation among books, paper, other men and women, institutions, material economy, and so on: something open in the relation between the figure of 'question' as verbal expression of something open, and book as verbal structure in which a questioning, an inquiry, might be pursued through a complex structure of questions within questions, and a corresponding sequence of thousands of responses to the questions of an imaginary critic corresponding to each move through the lowest level of the text - each sentence.

I have marked parallel and successive theoretical books as so many responses, on their 'highest' levels, where they may be taken as more or less unitary responses to a question posed by a range of previous texts in the context of the writer's situation.
as he writes, responds. When I have cited structures on the lower levels of paragraph and sentence, this has usually been structures of opening or closing of books, where the various major subordinate themes or questions come into relation on the lower levels, or citations from 'nodal' points in the text, where a group of questions or themes are as it were 'focussed' in the verbal configuration of a question or assertion which leads from one section of the text as a whole to another. And, within the 'western tradition' as a whole, I have in general only introduced textual citation at the global analogue of such 'nodal' points in the tradition as a whole. Thus I have cited fairly extensively 'presocratics' and twentieth-century writers, as well as Cicero, Paul, the 'Oracles', Augustine and Boethius, Novalis, Hegel, and Nietzsche, and have cited, less extensively, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, LXX, Philo, the Corpus Hermeticum, various greek mathematicians, Tertullian, Al Ghazzali, Rumi, Alberti, Luther, Copernicus, Galileo, Friedrich Schlegel, Mill, Helmholtz, Lange, William and Henry James, Marx. It would of course have been more satisfactory to have organised a wider play of citation and commentary, but distance from libraries and unmanageability of earlier notes materially impeded such a desirable proceeding, and I have had to rely far more than I liked or like on my conjunction of themes, rather than verbal expressions of such coordination in my primary sources. In any case, it would only have been practicable to considerably extend the range of citation within a more selective range of reference, and this would itself have presumed rather heavily, at particular stages of the inquiry, upon the structures only fully worked out at later stages.

Thus, if the dynamic of theoretical criticism down from the pythagoreans, through 'middle' ages, Scientific Revolution, and Romanticism, down to the close of this twentieth century, is to be understood as a 'global' analogue of the 'local' theatrical abstraction from its embedding in its situation of a stage 'drama', a couple of thousand books must here take the place of a couple of thousand speeches in a play. And just as those 'lines' are organised into exchanges, groups, scenes and acts, so the relations of the 'theories' propounded as successive theorists impersonate Theory, may be organised into subordinate orders or levels, of question and response within
two and a half thousand years of Theory as a whole. Or we may, con-
versely, coordinate the more abstract dynamic of 'questions' which
run through 'the book', and through hundreds of thousands of 'minor'
 attempts at theory, with the regular scansion of two and a half
 thousand 'years', as the whole circuit constrained overall by the
question of 'question', to which Theory may be taken as Response, is
coordinated, in the various symmetric orders of abstraction from
the particular situations of thousands of writers, with the 'base
level' in the material economy of the agricultural cycle by which
books are 'dated' at beginning or end.

On the level of the 'scene' in the history of western theory,
I suggested an analogy with the 'central' impersonation of 'I' by
Descartes - at 'the end of the second of four scenes of the third
act', towards 1650 - and the analogously critical part of Claudius
at the end of the second of four scenes in the third Act of Hamlet.
Whereas the 'local' interaction of a group of characters on a theatrical
stage reflects the interplay of various dimensions of experience (and
various dimensions of character reflecting the dominance in particular
characters of one of those 'dimensions' of their interaction) 'in terms
of' the 'atomic' level of a small number of individuals, theory, on
its millenial scale, is 'analogous' rather 'in terms of' various 'di-
mensions' of question reflecting various dimensions of verbal and non-
verbal context (unless we try to represent the dynamic of theory as
so many revisions of an underlying contest between Plato and Aristotle,
or Stoa, Academy, and epicurean Garden). The 'scansion' of reading
and writing of theory I have tried to articulate over a couple of
millenia, reflects the inscription of question within question, within
the overall question of 'question' itself, whose symmetry governs or
constrains the dynamic as a whole, as various parallel lines of 'work-
ing through' subordinate questions (in subordinate traditions or
'schools') are sequentially elaborated in more or less common contexts
(the limiting 'material' context of 'european' or 'western' culture
reflecting the limiting question of abstraction, theory, question,
itsel).

Thus I suggested that the transition from third to final
'scene' in the 'third act', around 1730, might be associated with various parallel readings of the various late-seventeenth century readings of Descartes and his contemporaries (readings 'of 1650', of the transition from second to third scene, associated politically with Fronde, Commonwealth, Peace of Westphalia) - various readings over the seventeen-twenties and thirties of Newton, Spinoza, Leibniz, Malebranche, Locke...by Voltaire, Montesquieu, Condillac...and so on. Readings, always, 'in context', even if the similarity of couplings of theoretical and other dimensions of a theorist's situation from one scene to the next often makes it all too easy to abstract this dynamic of reading, with Cassirer, from the parallel development of 'contexts', from the character of questions, however 'theoretical', as always only one dimension of what is 'open' in the situation of the theorist sitting at his desk, reading and writing.

Thus the dynamic of interaction of 'internal' and 'external' coordinates of 'the theoretical text' as linguistic interface of theory and its figural embedding in an institutional matrix (in its turn the interface of language, or rather, the language structured as 'ideology' of a text, book, and the material economy of production of the book) is traced through Parts I to III above, in terms of the 'symmetry' or mirroring of 'internal' space of theory, articulated within the 'logical' constraints attaching to abstract question and assertion, and 'external' space in which theory is only one activity 'open' among others in a writer's or reader's situation confronting books, and in which the coupling of questioning and the other things open to writer or reader is constrained by symmetries which theory expresses, 'reflects' internally as 'theories' of its various internal and external 'dimensions'. Different 'perspectives' in theory reflect different perspectives on theory; the internal dynamic of argument and criticism reflects the external dynamic of institutions and material economy in which any theory, as text, book, verbal exchange, is inscribed.

Furthermore, the embedding of 'theories' in the dynamic of interplay of 'internal' and 'external' dimensions of theoretical
through the inscription of books in the developing configurations of texts and contexts traced through Parts I to III - through their inscription 'in' this book - is at the same time a developing inscription of this book, this inquiry, this 'theory', in the configurations of embedding of text in contexts identified at successive points 'in' this book. Thus the elaboration in the narrative above of successive figures of Book and World, successive figures of embedding of 'the World' as presented in some book, in the World of that book, through the coordination of the various 'internal' dimensions of theory presented in contemporary books, with the external configuration which theoretical differences 'reflect' - but also to some extent constrain, through the symmetry or coupling of the 'logical' dimension of a situation with its other dimensions - is also the embedding of this book in the unfolding dimensions of the 'History' which it traces through a sequence of books. If successive theoretical assertions, 'pictures' of Theory and World, are 'literally' contradictory, still the symmetries of the 'question' as 'interpreted' in contradictory manner in successive assertions and confutations are, simply as structures of what is open to theorist confronting books, merely revisions or conversions, in figural terms, of a constant figure of 'Kosmos' as world structured through a reflection which identifies itself as one dimension of that figure. In purely 'figural' terms, as transpositions from one context to another different but related context, of a structure of what is 'open' coordinate with the 'question' as verbal marking of something open in the configuration of question and context, successive or competing theories are only 'contradictory' insofar as they are 'positive' conversions of a common configuration of openness in different figures of assertion, response. In purely figural terms, the poetics of the question presented by theory as one dimension of activity among others at any time, are the same for Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Sophocles, Shakespeare, and ourselves. The 'drama' of confrontation of Theory with the theorist's life, the part of 'I' as formal response to the logical structure of any language, confronting the individual human actor to whom this is one among many 'parts' open, remains in this minimal configuration a constant throughout the millenial history of Theory: and the 'mystical' self-discovery of any theorist as 'actor' in a global Theatre of
developing theories is as 'timeless' as the embedding of the 'internal' time of a theatrical script in the time, 'external' to the script, of actual performance - of actor and spectator. At any point in the 'internal' dynamic of the play, the actor or spectator can as it were 'step back' and see himself or herself as actor or spectator, and, as actor or spectator choose, for example, to disrupt the internal time of space of the action or drama. Thus in the 'internal' time of the drama of Theory, I marked the 'midpoint' of Part I in relation to the figure of the actor who insists that the 'earthly' theatre of birth, life and death is articulated by its inscription in a still wider drama, and who dramatically demonstrates this 'message' from outside the earthly scene by disrupting the dynamic of identification with a 'part' in the earthly tragicomedy, in getting up again three days after having been 'killed', and leaving the stage. Credemus quia absurdum. The 'logical' difficulties with framing 'in earthly terms' just what happened to 'the Christ' in the first third of our first 'Christian' century mark, like the riddles of Heraclitus, the more radical embedding of that logical order of difficulties in a wider dynamic.

At the 'midpoint' of Part II which we have now reached once more, tracing through a limited group of books which physically embed certain configurations of theory and context in different but related contexts of late-twentieth-century libraries and other bookshelves, we can 'transpose' Descartes' theory as expressed in his books, into another figure of embedding of this book in its contexts: this by embedding both Descartes' books and this book in a common configuration of relations of question and context, but 'abstracting' from Descartes' own textual elaboration of a response to the possibilities of Theory in his mid-century confrontation with books, as certain relations of figures in those books and in their context are inscribed in this book as _questions_: abstracted, by consideration of 'higher-level' structures in those books, and their analogies with similar structures in contemporary books, as in their political and economic contexts, _as marking questions_; this by abstraction from the cartesian 'conversion' of the formal place in language and its context of the 'question', into cartesian assertion, positive 'theory'.
The construction of this book 'within' the initial questioning of that initial questioning, allows, then, a coordination of various mid-seventeenth-century figures or configurations of theory-in-context as so many symmetric responses to so many symmetric 'parts' of theorist in a more or less common European context, confronting more or less the same range of earlier books, and the same range (bar themselves) of contemporary theorists. Mersenne's various correspondents, for example, share through or in that network or community a mid-seventeenth-century embedding of their discussions in the physical dynamics of their 'communications'. Expressed 'positively' their various different responses to the same situation, the same 'correspondence' of views, are literally incompatible; taken, conversely, as various expressions of what is 'open' in that configuration of theory and context, they present so many bibliographical 'coordinates' of embedding of this inquiry in an 'external' contextual space which is the transposition of the symmetric 'contextual' relations of those seventeenth-century theorists into the context of the late twentieth-century. Each book in this 'bibliography' presents, through its inscription in this book, an inscription of this book in some abstract coordination of its 'internal' and 'external' dimensions, 'text' and 'context'. And just as later seventeenth-century books respond to what is open in the symmetry of mid-seventeenth-century 'positions' or perspectives, so the inscription of each of them in this text in turn coordinates the various figures of inscription of this text in its context associated with the earlier books.

Let us then embed Descartes' symmetry of internal 'logical' space of theory and logically articulated external context, in a coordination of theory and context in an interplay of 'internal' and 'external' spaces of mid-seventeenth-century books, where books are themselves taken as primary 'coordinates' - where cartesian coordinates are themselves embedded in the 'external' relations of Descartes' books. I will not rehearse in any detail all the relations of internal and external spaces of seventeenth-century theory already worked through in Part II, but only interject brief allusions:
Most modern studies of Hobbes may be divided into two classes: those which do not assert that the pieces fit together, and those which (do). — Warrender's does: Hobbes' moves into theory as a response to the political context of Charles II's England, and, working through the question of embedding of political theory in a wider universal theory, eventually finds a political logic adapted to the eventual consequences of a parallel 'political' working-through of questions posed by the Stuart monarchy, in its Restoration.

'Externally' Hobbes' position is related to Descartes directly through Mersenne, and his Objections to the Meditations; indirectly they are related through the differences and parallels of British and French 'schools' or traditions of theory, associated with different embeddings of theoretical activity within a wider national order of activity on the two sides of the English Channel or Manche. As representative of that institutional difference:

Gauden's tragic apology for his imprisoned King, ascribed at the time to Charles himself, underlines the hubris of Filmer's British 'patriarch' at the outbreak of the civil war, whereas in France Richelieu's legacy
to Louis XIII stands in direct line with Louis XIV's model of autocracy intended for his son. In England 1642 marks the closing of the theatres; I have noted the associations of Corneille with Richelieu and Racine with Louis XIV; in Mazarin's interregnum Molière holds up a mirror to the middle classes - in particular to the inauguration in Clerelier's 'seminar' on the new cartesian system of that parian tradition of femmes savantes, salons, and intellectual fashion, that runs down through the Enlightenment to Cousin, to Bergson, Breton, Kojève, Sartre and Lacan.

Salon, University, Mersenne's cell, Wilkins' room at Oxford in the 1640s, then Académie Royale, Royal Society of the Restoration, and all their progeny: institutions of inquiry.

343 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society ed Oldenburg London 1665-
344 The Philosophical Transactions and Collections to the End of the Year 1700, abridged and disposed under general heads, by John Lowthorp London 1705 (78;83)
345 SPRAT, Thomas The History of the Royal Society of London, established for the Improvement of Natural Knowledge London (1667) 1728
346 GLANVILL, Joseph The Vanity of Dogmatizing or, Confess Ignorance, the Way to Science..With a Reply to..Thomas Albius 1665

Glanvill writes the Apology of Inquiry, Science, in terms of a general economy of questions, set in the practical context of experience and experiment; Knowledge is Power, and a power for good. Sprat replies to Gassendi's sole 'disciple', Sorbière, who had criticised the principles of the british Society, and Oldenburg sent copies of Sprat's manifesto to the 'scientists' (rather 'philosophers' and 'geometers') of Europe. Glanvill also attacked Hobbes' setting of 'science' in a solely material economy of Nature, its 'logic' a reflection of the physical dynamics of matter in the Second Nature of Culture.

If Gassendi and Sorbière opposed to cartesian assertion of cogito
the physical conatus of epicurean atoms, and if the other 'materialist' critic of the Meditations took as primary question natural right and political authority, then we may add another related set of coordinates elaborated over the period of Civil War and Commonwealth not with Hooke, Wallis, Glanvill and others at Oxford, but in the relative detachment of Cambridge, where More attracted another group around him at Christ's College, initially sympathetic to Descartes, but breaking with him in 1648-9, setting the moral order of earthly society not with Hobbes in a primary Nature, but rather as a global but limited stage in a wider heavenly theatre:

347 MORE, Henry Philosophical Poems (with extensive comm) London 1647
348 CUDWORTH, Ralph The True Intellectual System of the Universe London 1678
349 WHICHCOTE, Benjamin Several Discourses London 1701
350 SMITH, John Select Discourses ed, with Life, Worthington funeral sermon by Patrick London 1660
351 RUST, George A Discourse of Truth (c 1655) (London 1677, ed & ann More in (352) )
352 GLANVILL, Joseph Lux Orientalis London (1662) ed & ann More, with (351), and More's long reply to Baxter London 1682

Glanvill was long associated with More in attempts to 'experimentally' demonstrate the setting of the earthly stage in a wider dynamic:

353 Sadducismus Triumphatus (with More's collaboration) London 1681

...while More's first prose works in 1650-1 were his part in a controversy with another Oxford 'experimental' parapsychologist (as it were), already noted as translator of rosicrucian manifestoes and Agrippa's Occult Philosophy:

354 VAUGHAN, Thomas Magical Writings ed & tr Waite London 1888
355 Lumen de Lumine London 1652, ed Waite 1910
356 Works ed & tr Waite London 1919
Returning from prose, however figural, to poetry, Thomas' brother provides an Oxford parallel to the More of the 1640s:

357 VAUGHAN, Henry

Poems (London 1646)
Silex Scintillans (London 1650)
Olor Iscanus (London 1651) all in:
Works ed Martin Oxford (1914) 1957

I will not list the Cambridge poets, Herbert and Milton, or Herbert's mentor Donne, letting More and Vaughan indicate the figural expression of figural cosmology, but might in passing note some miltonic prose:

358 MILTON, John

EIKANOASTHE London 1650 (reply to (341))
Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio London 1651

Glanvill's figural neoplatonism in Lux Orientalis may in turn be paralleled by another 'Oxford' discovery of the platonic scheme in 'eastern' antecedents:

360 GALE, Theophilus

The Court of the Gentiles Oxford 1669-Lond 1678

..and finally Hobbes and the platonists of Cambridge and Oxford, and poetry and the Royal Society may be brought together...

361 STANLEY, Thomas

The History of Philosophy London (1655-62) 1687

..where rather than Gale's unitary tradition we find a poet adapting Diogenes Laertius to produce the first English 'history of philosophy', interpolating and appending translations from Aristophanes (Clouds), Sextus Empiricus (Hypotyposeis), the Oracles, Pletho, Psellus, Pico and Reuchlin, and the last six books of Gassendi's Vita et Moribus Epicuri: in all a mirroring of the chief concerns of 'modern' philosophy at midcentury - scepticism, atomism, and a cabalistic neoplatonism - in 'ancient' models. Wotton called this fellow of the Royal Society 'the glory and adornment of his time', and himself posed the question, implicit in the poet's eclectic backward perspective, of the relations of 'Ancient and Modern':

362 WOTTON, William

Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning London 1694, with Bentley's appendix, 1697
In literature - in the timeless figural order of poetry - the 'Ancients' attained timeless perfection, and must be our models; but in 'Science', which is progressive, Newton and Boyle have surpassed Aristotle and Archimedes and Ptolemy... and in 'scientific' philology Bentley has surpassed Sir William Temple, who had attempted to show that a late forgery (made in late Antiquity when antiquity was become a guarantee of value and authenticity), the 'Epistles of Phalaris' demonstrated how learning had declined from the earlier stage of antiquity itself:

363 TEMPLE, Sir William  
*Miscellanies* London 1680-1692 (with the essay 'On Ancient and Modern Learning') 1701 (ed Swift)

Temple was defended from this harsh irony in the satire of his secretary:

364 SWIFT, Jonathan  
*A Tale of a Tub* London 1704 - with 'A full and true Account of the Battell fought last Friday between the Ancient and the Modern Books in St. James' Library' (written 1697)

365 Gulliver's Travels (Travels into several Remote Nations..) London (1726) ed Aitken 1896

(the Academy of Laputa is a parody of the Royal Society)

Vaughan had already been parodied as the alchemist in:

366 BUTLER, Samuel  
*Hudibras* London 1663-78

Temple in his turn was only bringing into prominence in England the quarrel of 'Ancients and Moderns' that had broken out at Paris in the 'seventies..

367 BOILEAU-DESPREAUX, Nicolas  
*L'Art Poétique & Traité du Sublime* Paris 1674

368 RAPIN, René  
*Réflexions sur la Philosophie Ancienne et Moderne* Paris 1676

Rapin (tr 1678) and Wotton both take a via media, and each presents the textual matrix confronted by their contemporaries after mid-century in terms that distantly prefigure Gilson's setting of Descartes'
'break' in its scholastic context; indeed Habermas sees in that question of 'Ancients and Moderns' a prefiguration of the late-twentieth century questioning of the 'modernity' and 'Enlightenment' which, early in the eighteenth century, asserts itself in response to that question(1).

'Modern Philosophy': 'As Bacon, Boyle, Descartes, Hobbes, Van Helmont, Gassendus, Galileus, Harvey, Paracelsus, Mersennus, Digby, &c' (to cite the titlepage of the English version of Rapin's essay - Paracelsus is in fact out of place: Rapin brackets him with Cardano, Agrippa 'et quelques autres cabalistes' standing ambiguously between Ancients and Moderns)... and once the ancient and modern texts could be organised in such a scheme, a new order of question could be developed in the University, 'moderns' schematically continuing the scholastic systems:

369 DU HAMEL, Jean-Baptiste Philosophia Vetus et Nova Paris 1678
370 JOHNSON, Thomas Quaestiones Philosophicae Cambridge 1734

The latter defining in pocket-book form the undergraduate syllabus in natural and moral philosophy (Physics and Ethics) at Oxford and Cambridge in the early eighteenth century down to the end; Logic might be defined by...

371 ALDRICH, Henry Artis Logicae Compendium Oxford (1691) many eds down to 1850

...recognising 'modern' logicians such as Descartes, and superseding say,

372 SETON, John Dialectica London (1545); many later eds

...which did not. More advanced Logic might be studied at Oxford in:

373 BREREWOOD, Edward De Praedicabilibus et Praedicamentis ed Sixsmith Oxford 1628

...and Rhetoric in

374 STRADA, Famianus Prolusiones Amsterdam 1638

...while the distance of worldly Oxford from detached Cambridge may be read in the rhetorical exercise which was the first

1: ( ) below
publication of one of Charles II's worldly bishops:

375 PARKER, Samuel  
A Free and Impartial Censure of the Platonick Philosophy  
Oxford 1666

Another political bishop (latterly among the liberal opposition to the Stuarts).

376 BURNET, Gilbert (d1715)  
History of His Own Time  
London 1723-34

..and religious politician:

377 HALE, Sir Matthew  
The Life and Death of Sir Matthew Hale  
London 1682

378 Contemplations Moral and Divine  
London 1676-7

379 A Discourse of our Knowledge of God and of ourselves  
London 1688

.. can represent the interplay of religion and politics in the last years of the Stuarts, best seen in the thousands of controversial pamphlets produced by all varieties of politicians and churchmen in the 1680s. I will pass over the Sherlocks and Tillotsons and Calamys and Colliers and Barclays and Foxes, as over the diarists, Evelyn and Pepys, who recorded the daily life of a member of the Royal Society during the Restoration: Sprat and Evelyn, with Dryden and Waller, formed the Society's committee, from 1664 'for the improvement of the English Language', to make it a more practical tool 'for the improvement of Natural Knowledge'; Pepys was an early President.

Wilkins was the first secretary; he had the grander design of constructing a new and universal 'philosophical language':

380 WILKINS, John  
An Essay towards a real Character and a Philosophical Language  
London 1668

(this following his perilous career as chief parliamentary cryptographer in the Civil War, and his adaptations of the 'language' of mathematics:

381 Mercury, or the Secret and Swift Messenger  
London 1641

382 Mathematical Magick, or the Wonders that may be performed by Mechanical Geometry  
London 1648)
Wilkins died as Bishop of Chester in 1672; his posthumously published sermons and:

On the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion ed & intr Tillotson London 1678

may serve to remind one, if it were necessary in our age of secular Science, that Natural Knowledge, like Natural Politics, Law, Rights, Morality, were still radically structured by the christian figure of a Book which inscribes itself as one component of the universal frame it recounts. Just as Descartes had to frame his epistemology, the symmetry of subjective and objective, internal and external, in terms of the global integration of subjective-objective (subject-object) relations as nested symmetries within the focus of that divine 'I' whose relations with Descartes' 'I', cogito, presents the fundamental ambiguity and difficulty of his 'system' (to be confronted in their different ways by Pascal, Malebranche, Spinoza and Leibniz), so 'Cambridge Platonism' presents over the mid-century a 'heaven-sided' development of a configuration analogous to the cartesian relations of Subject, Object, God and elementary Atom...

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{God} \\
\text{Subject \quad (Society) \quad Object} \\
\text{Atom}
\end{array}
\]

...in terms, not of an internal french focus in the cartesian Subject, but rather in a british (and dutch) centrality of the theme of the relation of Subject and Object - 'Truth' (focussed by the Platonists in God, by Hobbes in the materialist dynamics of Gassendi's atoms):

384 HERBERT, Edward, Lord De Veritate (Paris 1624) ed & tr Carre London 1937

385 BROOKE, Robert Greville, Lord Of the Nature of Truth London 1640 (facs 1970)

386 INGE, William Ralph The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought London 1926

387 MUIRHEAD, John Henry The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy London 1931

388 GROTIUS, Hugo De Veritate Religions Christianae tr Clarke London 1711
Wilkins was chaplain to the deposed Elector Palatine (reinstated at the Peace of Westphalia: Wilkins travelled to Heidelberg in 1649); he married Cromwell's widowed sister in 1654; he taught Sprat and Parker at Wadham, which college he left to become Master of Trinity Cambridge in 1659; he was replaced there at the Restoration, and joining old Oxford associates - Boyle, Hooke, Wallis, Wren and others, together with other 'invisibles' who had been meeting at Gresham College in London (where Brerewood had been first professor of Astronomy) while the main nucleus was at Oxford, he reorganised around himself a 'Philosophical College' at the end of 1660, becoming first secretary in the Institute for Inquiry formally organised as organ for national scientific research within the wider national sphere of activity by Charles II's charter of 1662. By delving further into the 'primary' seventeenth-century sources enumerated here, and into the various personal, institutional, bibliographical, geographical, political, religious, and all sorts of other relations discoverable among writers and readers, one despairs of ever 'closing the circle' of relations, and confronts the thoroughly unmanageable idea of some 'total history' of seventeenth-century theory. One may abstract from this notional totality or total matrix associated with, say, all seventeenth-century 'theoretical' texts, to give, say, a translation of mathematical developments in the language of Bourbaki, or an arrangement of a limited number of parts in some sort of hidden agenda a la Yates. I have already rejected these 'logical' and 'figural' abstractions from the play of text and context, and have myself 'abstracted' from most of the 'primary' sources given here, to an 'abstract' dynamic of configurations of question associated with developing texts and contexts, directed by the primary question of embedding of this inquiry itself in its context. The abstract configurations of text and context traced from the initial embedding of this inquiry in a 'cosmic' context, or coordinates common to it and to pythagorean 'theory', at the opening of the 'historical narrative in Part I, do not, of course, reproduce or reconstruct the situation of any of the writers noted confronting their texts. The questions I find in the relations of certain figures in those books with certain figures in their 'contexts' are not the questions that those writers and their readers would have accepted that they were addressing: and now, in this Close, I am attempting to relate the situation of this book in its contexts to those situations of
earlier 'theory' from which the books which embodied and embody it are themselves in some sort temporally 'abstracted' as they stand on those library shelves which are one context of this book.

In a way my procedure may be seen, against the background of 'postmodernist' relativism in the 1980s, as a sort of extension of the 'physical' relativity of situations, frames of experience, articulated in theory by Einstein and others in the first decades of this century, to a still more 'general' relativity of theory itself, as it frames the 'world', physical, cultural, psychological, in which it is produced. Descartes' frame, or the wider frame of 'The New Philosophy' which he preeminently represents, is critical in my presentation, because it identifies the generalised symmetry of logical, cultural and physical 'dimensions' of theoretical space ('internal' and 'external' to the texts in which it is framed) simply in relation to the figure of 'question' itself (whether in terms of Descartes' systematic doubt, or Glanvill's *scepsis scientifica*). This mid-seventeenth-century coordination of 'the world' around the symmetry of question and response mirrors the initial figure of 'theory' identified by pythagoreans (as itself one symmetric component of the Kosmos it symmetrically frames, allowing the self-recognition of an embodied 'soul' as pure psychical actuality lost in identification with a body on the earthly stage) in this eventual identification of the question of 'question' in terms of the radical symmetry of which the original and the 'new' Philosophy present two (highly symmetrical) versions. What appears around 500 BC as an instituted 'mystery', and around 1650 as what we now call 'Science', appears towards 2000 as a structure of what is 'open' in any situation in which the question of what is open can arise: what is open in relation to 'question' as a question - as 'philosophical', 'theoretical' question, posed by questioning that pose 'as such'.

Within this text which opens out of such a paradoxical openness, marked at the outset by marking the outset as a question, ' ?', successive 'internal' coordinates of Theory are set in a slowly cristallising range of 'external' coordinates of context.
As Descartes' abstraction of the 'internal' space of his textual 'World' comes into question in that World - as different critics with different perspectives on cartesian texts set in cartesian coordinates of their context make theoretical responses to their situation, we can slowly move towards a coordination of internal and external 'coordinates' of this text, with those of the range of books in which it is now being set, as on a library shelf.

I have noted the 'immediate' mid-century responses elicited at Descartes' own bidding by Mersenne, and suggested that this present so many correlative abstractions from a common mid-century 'space' of theory, associated with so many 'positions' and perspectives 'externally' differentiated by the contextual relations of their authors. I have suggested that the question of the 'abstraction' of Descartes' logical reconstruction of the World is most directly apparent in the tension between psychological and theological 'I' - between cartesian subject and cartesian God. Thus the objection to which Descartes has nothing like a convincing reply is that his psychological certainty may be a delusion, a mere appearance controlled by a 'demon' who, like Claudius usurping the place of King, usurps the formal 'place' of God in the symmetry of the cartesian scheme. Truth may itself be a play of fictions, appearances.

Various lines of response convert this difficulty into the demonstration that Descartes' 'I' is itself the fiction, whether this be through comic parody which brings out the distance between cartesian subject and Rene Descartes or reader:

389 DANIEL, Gabriel
Voyage au Monde de Monsieur Descartes Paris 1691
(by setting Descartes' version of Descartes in his version of 'Le Monde' and drawing out some of the bizarre situations that could in principle arise)...or through out-doubting Descartes by bringing into question the temporal structure of the cogito, and through this analysis questioning the whole system in a development that parallels the unfolding of Descartes' deductions from the cogito in an unfolding
of this question:

390 HUET, Pierre Daniel  
*Censura Philosophiae Cartesianaec* Paris 1689  
rev 1694

..To fill out the complementarity of this setting of cartesian 'response' (cogito ergo sum) to Descartes' supposedly radical doubt, in a deeper play of questions, one might note that Huet was generally regarded (by his frequent correspondent Leibniz among others) as the most learned and well-read scholar of his century - as against Descartes who had repudiated books of the past... and that one display of that learning was a

391 Traité sur l'Origine des Romains (prefixed to Mme de Lafayette's Zayde) Paris 1670

So much for cartesian fiction. I have already analysed the relation of internal and external 'coordinates' of primary responses to Descartes' abstraction from the symmetry of the two chief axes (subject-object, God-atom) of his 'World' to cartesian subject-responses, then, equally, to the various symmetric 'Worlds' opposed at mid-century to Descartes' version - in Part II:

392 VARENIUS, Bernhard  
*Geographia Generalis* (Amsterdam 1650)  
ed Newton Cambridge (1672) 1681

393 NEWTON, Isaac  
*Principia Mathematica Philosophiae Naturalis*  
London (1687) ed Pemberton 1728  tr Motte (1729) Chicago 1955

394 Opticks  London 1704, rev 1718

395 PEMBERTON, Henry  
*A View of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy*  
London 1728

396 MACLAURIN, Colin  
*An Account of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophical Discoveries* London 1748

397 BREWSTER, Sir David  
*The Life of Sir Isaac Newton* London 1831 (78)

An intermediary between More and the Scholium Generale:

398 RAPHSON, Joseph  
*De Spatio Reali: appx to Analysis Aequationum Universalis* London 1697
The 'underlabourer' of the Royal Society:

401  Locke, John  Two Treatises of Government  London (1690) 1714

402  Locke, John  An Essay concerning Humane Understanding  London (1690) final version 1706 (74)

403  Locke, John  The Reasonableness of Christianity  London 1695

404  Locke, John  A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St Paul (with) An Essay for the Understanding of St Paul's Epistles, by consulting St Paul himself.  London 1705-6

405  Yolton, John  Posthumous Works  London 1706

406  Yolton, John  Some Familiar Letters  London 1708

407  Christopheren, H  A Bibliographical Introduction to the Study of Locke  Oslo 1930

408  Stillingsfleet, Benjamin  The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr Locke's First Letter...Second Letter  London (1697-8) in Works 1714

409  Yolton, John  Locke and the Way of Ideas  Oxford 1956

Contemporary reactions:

410  Norris, John  Cursory Reflections on a Book called An Essay... appx to Christian Blessedness  London 1690

411  Sergeant, John  Solid Philosophy Asserted, against the Fancies of the Ideists  London 1697

412  Stillingfleet, Benjamin  The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr Locke's First Letter...Second Letter  London (1697-8) in Works 1714

413  Edwards, John  Socinianism Unmask'd  London 1696
Sequels...Locke's two literary executors:

414 COLLINS, Anthony  
A Discourse of Free-Thinking  London 1713

415 SHAFTESBURY, Anthony  
Characteristicks (London 1711) Birmingham 1773
Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl

...and a sequel to the latter:

416 HUTCHESON, Francis  
An Essay on the Nature and the Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations of the Moral Sense  London 1728

...meanwhile a sequel to (403) and precursor of (414):

417 TOLAND, John  
Christianity not Mysterious  London (1696)  
1702 (with Apology (1697) & new preface)

Toland's 'natural religion' opens that controversy which, extending over the first three decades of the eighteenth century, defines the principal 'ideological' axis of interaction of theory and culture over the rest of the century - down to Gibbon, Paine, Watson, Franklin, Jefferson, Necker, Robespierre, Kant, and the French Revolution. Toland, Shaftesbury and Collins are made the initial prophets of the 'Deism' retrospectively fostered on Lord Herbert of Cherbury (as the 'New Philosophy' was retrospectively fostered on Copernicus and Bacon, or 'Structuralism' on Saussure), and transmitted to France and Germany - the ideological frame, indeed, of the more general transmission that inaugurates European 'Enlightenment' - by Voltaire and others in the 1730s. 'Deism', 'freethinking', 'libertinage' has an 'ideological' rather than 'theoretical' coherence: the diverse positions grouped under that banner for better or for worse are only analogous (like so many later 'structuralisms' disavowed as such by their authors differentiating theory from journalism), and indeed the very figure of Analogy effectively closes the theoretical phase of the controversy in England:

418 BUTLER, Joseph  
The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature. To which are added Two brief Dissertations: I. Of Personal Identity; II. Of the Nature of Virtue  London 1736

...a reply to the 'deist' summa (Christianity as old as the Creation) published by Tindal in 1730, and properly belonging to the next 'scene'
of the present Close. The ideological coherence of the issue, as focussing in the eighteenth century the contest of ‘fideism’ and ‘scepticism’ in terms of the responses to Descartes and his contemporaries now under discussion. In brief, the emerging coherence of a rationally reconstructed world, experimentally elaborated in the dynamics of the cartesian symmetry of subject, object, God and atom or monad, allows systematic abstraction from the circularity of fideist inscription of Book in the World it frames as mere analogical prefiguration of rational religion, with those points at which the analogy breaks down understood in the historical dynamic of unenlightened superstition manipulated more or less cynically by a politically motivated priesthood. Over the course of the century the religious dimension of the controversy becomes more and more eclipsed in France by the emerging political contest between more or less atheistic rationalist radicals and apologists of the Ancien Régime whose religious conservatism appears more and more clearly to be politically motivated. By around 1900 are organising the new science of ‘sociology’ around the question posed by this elision of the religious order of the social dynamic, and the relations between theory and social organisation, that they saw as the prime legacy of Enlightenment – an elision that Maritain, cited above, could more or less personally blame on Descartes.

Now this axis of ‘Enlightenment’, the question of the ‘natural light’ of individual reason confronting irrational anomalies in the individual theorist’s situation which embodied the superstitious or interested inertia of old institutions, may be brought into relation with the primary responses to the ‘mid-seventeenth century’ to which I have suggested it may be read as a response, by considering the churchman who, though no great original theorist, yet stands at the focus of british theory between Locke’s death in 1704, and his own in 1729:

419. ROHAULT, Jacques  
La Physique (Paris 1671) lat tr & ann  
Clarke London 1697

420 CLARKE, Samuel  
A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, more particularly in Answer to Mr.
Hobbes, Spinoza, and their followers
(London 1705)

A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation
London (1706): with above 1708; exchange with Butler appended 1714 &c

A Collection of Papers which passed between the late learned Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke, in the years 1715 and 1716, relating to the Principles of Natural Philosophy and Religion
London 1717 (with reply to Collins)
ed Alexander Manchester 1965

Rohault was Clerselier's son-in-law, and his successor as chief exponent of the fashionable cartesianism which he arranged as unitary 'scholastic' system. The young Clarke introduced Newton to their university, where a poor translation of the unrevised original edition of Rohault was already the 'text' for the school of Natural Philosophy, by producing a better translation of a later edition, and systematically adding critical annotation which was in effect a presentation of the newtonian system running parallel, through his notes, to the supposedly primary text. Clarke's version was still the 'text' which was 'read' at Cambridge around 1730; in 1706 it was joined by his latin translation of the Opticks which contained Newton's first set of 'queries': another system, in effect, presented under the guise of questions.

The two series of lectures given at St Paul's in the annual lectureship founded and endowed by Boyle for the defence of Christianity against its religious and philosophical rivals (Newton had collaborated on Bentley's inaugural series of 1692) are set against the 'atheism' of Hobbes and Spinoza - the two being generally grouped together, to us rather incongruously, until the Pantheismusstreit through which Lessing's Spinoza became the retrospective father of romantic theology, Novalis' man drunk with God...
Clarke became a royal chaplain, and rector of St James under Anne in 1709. Of James I's daughter's remarkable offspring, brought up at the Hague, the Princess Elizabeth had engaged in philosophy under the tutelage of Descartes, the eventually restored Elector Charles had Wilkins as chaplain, and went to some lengths trying to persuade Spinoza to join him at Heidelberg, as professor of Philosophy...and the Electress Sophia of Hanover associated closely throughout the latter part of her long life with her librarian, historiographer, secretary and ambassador Leibniz. When her son became, largely through her and Leibniz' efforts, King of England (she died, like Queen Anne, in 1714), the Princess of Wales, to whom (in Leibniz' own terms) the librarian was left 'as a legacy' (Sophia's philosopher and grandson - the future George II - were equally estranged from the new King, and princess and philosopher had been close when both were staying with Sophia's daughter the Electress of Brandenburg, at Berlin), joined with her new philosophical chaplain to bring together the two great rivals in Natural Philosophy, the philosophers of England and Hanover, Newton and Leibniz, whose disciples had been quarrelling over their masters' competing claims for priority in the invention of 'fluxional analysis' or 'differential calculus' since 1705. Newton characteristically played
his part 'behind the scene', letting another (as before in Bentley's Boyle Lectures, or the mathematical controversy) 'take his place'. He hated to be 'drawn into' any drama and had, indeed, fallen out with Locke in the 1690s, mistakenly believing the latter to be planning for him a different sort of 'match'. In relation to the same mathematical symmetry that Newton and Leibniz each found in their reading of Descartes, one may see the two different expressions of 'fluxional analysis' and 'differential calculus' (and their complementary 'inverse method' and 'integral calculus'), and the different embeddings of this frame in their corresponding Worlds, as presenting the complementary personalities of the two great 'philosophers', differently 'embroiled' (Newton's expression) in their controversy: the self-effacing Newton abstracting himself from the formal 'place' of observer in his mathematical Universe, and from 'outside' ensuring that whoever took his place (Bentley, (a different) Collins, Clarke) played their part correctly in the drama of controversy; Leibniz, on the other hand, playing every part - mathematician, natural philosopher, librarian, ambassador, councillor, confidant, theologian, lawyer, historian and so on - himself, as he tried to integrate all these different perspectives in a mathematical embedding of theory and its logic in a universal drama which, logically, such mathematics must frame. It is this ideal integration which articulates the various parallel trajectories of his manifold 'parts' over the turn of the century as their common ideal end, as he battled through reams of paper in his library, seeking in endless reading and writing (cut short by death) to find the ideal mathematical expression of the symmetry and dynamic of God, Subject, Object, infinitesimal Monad, Society, and the Language in which he pursued both his political duties in that Society, and the theoretical attempt to articulate the perfect mathematical language of which it was a temporary and muddled image. While Spinoza around 1670 had expressed the symmetry of those dimensions in a 'euclidean' demonstration of Christ as the mirror of finite and infinite 'I', through which the cartesian Subject/Body could be reduced to a reflection of infinite God (Mind/Nature) in the Nothing of his formal negation (omnis determinatio est negatio he wrote to Oldenburg), Leibniz was setting out on the dynamic coordination of those various terms, that would eventually be formally rounded off in the 'geometrical' form of the Ethics by Wolff, as frame of german Enlightenment:
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title and Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>430</td>
<td>Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von</td>
<td>Philosophical Papers and Letters ed &amp; tr, intr Loemker. Chicago 1956</td>
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<td>431</td>
<td></td>
<td>Logical Papers tr &amp; ed Parkinson Oxford 1966</td>
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<td>432</td>
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<td>Discours de Métaphysique ed Lestienne Paris (1907) 1952 - with (434)</td>
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<td>433</td>
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<td>Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain (1696-1703) ptd in Oeuvres Philosophiques ed Raspe Amsterdam 1765; ed Boutroux Paris 1886</td>
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<td>434</td>
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<td>La Monadologie (1714) tr Lucas &amp; Grint (with (432) Manchester (1953) 1961</td>
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<td>435</td>
<td>Russell, Bertrand</td>
<td>A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz Cambridge (1900) 1975</td>
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<td>436</td>
<td>Couturat, Louis</td>
<td>La Logique de Leibniz d'après documents inédits Paris 1901</td>
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<td>437</td>
<td>Parkinson, George</td>
<td>Logic and Reality in Leibniz' Metaphysics Oxford 1965</td>
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<td>438</td>
<td>Rescher, Nicholas</td>
<td>The Philosophy of Leibniz London 1967</td>
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<td>439</td>
<td>Serres, Michel</td>
<td>Le Système de Leibniz et ses Modèles Mathématiques Paris 1968</td>
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<td>440</td>
<td>CNRS, Paris</td>
<td>Monado 74: G W Leibniz, Discours de Métaphysique et Monadologie (Philosophie &amp; Informatique, dir Robinet, nos 1,2) Paris 1974</td>
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On the bicentenary of Leibniz' inauguration (as President) of the Berlin Academy, that institution embarked on a joint project with the Paris Institut, led by an international team of scholars including Couturat, to publish the reams of paper left by Leibniz in the library at Hanover. After two centuries Leibniz' question of a combinatorial analysis of language as the frame of embedding of logic in World(s), and frame, conversely, of a universal theory of that World, was reappearing in a new convergence of mathematical and logical questions that had diverged since Leibniz' unpublished investigations of the late seventeenth century - rather as Desargues' 'projective' geometry had returned two centuries after the composition of the Brouillon Projet. Russell divined an analogy between a mathematical 'system'
in Leibniz, organised symmetrically around its logical dimension, and the questions he was himself facing in his reading of Frege's combinatorial analysis of mathematical and non-mathematical language. Couturat almost immediately was able to publish an analysis of until then unknown manuscripts in which precisely such a combinatorial framework, which Russell had inferred as implicit in the published material, was explicitly presented by Leibniz himself. In 1902 Cassirer made the transition from Descartes to Leibniz, on his way back (so to speak) to Kant, from the two sides of Scientific Revolution (on the one hand) and 'Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit' (on the other). Around 1970 André Robinet launched a programme at the CNRS, 'Philosophie et Informatique', with a computer analysis of the combinatorial 'matrix' structure of two short texts of the first proponent of such analysis, as (with Pascal) of its mechanical prosecution. Serres had already characterised Leibniz' 'system' as a textual 'space' of various symmetric dimensions, and with no privileged point of entry - so that, in principle it allows (indeed, is the very systematicity of) an open multiplicity of possible narrations, versions, depending upon one's starting-point, one's perspective. Serres' own version, then, is of just such a system of versions, a dynamic structured precisely by the question of its structure.

In many respects, Serres' reading of Leibniz, which I didn't actually discover until I had begun this reading of the western tradition of Theory down from the pythagoreans, is the closest analogue to my own inquiry in 'Paris 1970'; ironically I was originally supposed to be studying with Serres in Paris from 1974, but Jean-Marie Benoist eventually set me under the formal tutelage of Jean-Toussaint Desanti, whose background lay in the pure theoretical space of Phenomenology coupled with his part as ideologist of the French Communist Party in the 1950s - the theorist of the embedding of Theory in its material economy of production. Serres' poetics of theory lay rather in the tradition of Bachelard - the literature of science and the science of literature. Yet Serres' combinatorics of the theoretical text, and his reading structured in the figural dynamic of analogy, framed in the mathematical play of formal substitution and symmetry,
is, in common with the various 'primary' versions of the parisiang dynamics of the text around 1968 which I presented at the close of Part III (in terms of that ideological analogy 'structuralism' so depreciated by its theoretical exponents), and to which Serres' text-uality is itself analogous, abstracted from the dramatic dynamic, ironically typified by the 'Events' of that year, in which textual space is but one dimension of a wider yet narrower space and time of text and 'practical' context (which cannot be 'substituted' by any textual presentation of embedding of that substitution in what the textual order of substitution necessarily frames as more 'universal' textuality, rather than dramatic context of that presentation: 'Il n'y a pas de hors-texte'). Thus the frame of various possible readings of the leibnizian matrix of symmetric versions of their symmetry, appears in Serres' book as a static textual space, a unitary system of possible reading, rather than a 1968 response to the drama of Leibniz' attempts, beginning three centuries earlier, to integrate the verbal or linguistic order of his activities within a mathematical Kosmos which his philosophy framed from the unitary global 'side', and in which his work for the hanoverian dynasty might be seen as adapting a historic social order, previously framed in imperfect conceptions of the universal scheme, to the perfected mathematical conception. That is to say: Serres abstracts 'the' leibnizian text from the cultural dynamics of its production, from the time and space of context, from the extra-textual 'boundary conditions' of the question presented by the symmetry, and difference, of his situation and that of Leibniz.

These considerations may be underlined by reference to 'the' pascalian text as response to Descartes, before passing through Port-Royal, Arnauld's antagonism to Malebranche, and on to Berkeley, back to Clarke, and beyond this transitional dawn to 'Enlightenment' proper:

441 PASCAL, Blaise

Les Provinciales (Cologne 1656-7, as Lettre escritte de Louis de Montalte à un Provincial de ses Amis; Deuxième Lettre...&c) in(445)

442 Pensées...sur la Religion et sur quelques autres Sujets, Paris (1670; Port-Royal ed, pref Périer; 1678 with Discours of La Chaise; with sister's Life, 1687) many subsequent reprints
The 'text' of the *Pensées* may be compared with Leibniz' hanoverian Nachlass as the documentation of a project that can be considered as a 'response' to Descartes; it may be compared also with Nietzsche's Nachlass of the 1880s which a committee around his sister arranged, through omission, alteration, addition, separation and combination of fragments, into the unitary whole of his 'magnum opus' – indeed it was precisely such a process, conducted by Pascal's sister Jacqueline Périer, her husband, and their associates at Port Royal which led to the presentation of the pascalian fragments as unitary *Apologie* for the faith of Port Royal. Thus Pascal's dramatic questioning, as he worked towards his apology for his faith, of the cartesian abstraction from World to rationally ordered book, through the conversion of the formal place of the question in language to a system of theoretical assertion – Pascal's confrontation of that Roman du Monde (1) with the Book which frames its part in the cosmic drama in terms of the question it poses to whoever physically, emotionally, logically, confronts its assertion, its 'message', a divine assertion in which the questioner may find his response by participating in that assertion (the figure of Grace) – is in 1669/70 itself presented as part of a unitary argument, a rational book to set against Descartes' response to a less radical doubt, a prefiguration of Huet's out-doubting the sceptic to frame a formal theology which responds to the formal questioning of rational inquiry (the latter merely one dimension of our finite embodied soul).

Yet as Condorcet and Voltaire showed, by going back to the manuscript fragments, one may equally well assemble from them a converse system of pascalian scepticism where the assertion of

1: cf (445) p xii
a formal unitary faith is systematically embedded in a more radical
dynamic of questioning - one may use the *Pensées* to ironically bring
into question any system of 'catholic' dogma, jansenist or jesuit,
just as Pascal had undermined jesuit casuistry as he defended Arnauld
and Port Royal in the *Provinciales*.

Cousin in 1842 posed the question presented by the hope-
less contradiction of the orthodox and heterodox 'reconstructions'
of the *Pensées* of 1670 and 1776; Faugère two years later published,
at last, the 'true' text of the manuscripts themselves, together with
a great part of the collateral *inédits* (Chevalier, editing the Pléiade
edition, makes as it were an 'orthodox' response to the question posed
by the manuscripts by reconstructing the whole along the lines orig-
inally proposed by La Chaise, but set aside in favour of the Périer
version - but at least, since Faugère, one has to stick to the whole
text and nothing but the text).

...But what if the 'unity' of the 'text' were to be looked
for in the developing spiritual 'drama' of Pascal's confrontation of
the Book with the *Roman du Monde*? In the dramatic interplay in his
life at Port Royal of the rational cartesian inscription of the re-
lations of book and World in book (reason and World in reason: the
figure of abstraction, reflection, itself), and the 'biblical' and
'experimental' poetic of inscription of its Script, Scripture, in the
universal Drama? The project of Pascal, then, prefiguring in a way
that of Leibniz, would have been the elaboration of a book in the
interface of cartesian fable of Reason, and dramatic truth of Creation:
at once a matrix of embedding of cartesian reason in divine Creation,
and rational understanding of the limits of reason in this embedding,
the classical figure of wisdom, *sapiens*.

That is: what if we find, reading Pascal's *Life*, that
the question into which he brought Descartes' abstract mathematical
reason of the embedding of that reason in a mathematical world,
through his family association with those Jansenists who are the
reflection in gallican catholicism of the protestant Reformation,
was not primarily a 'textual' question? What if we find Pascal
bringing into question precisely such a substitution of the textual
dimension of 'creation' for the Whole? What if the fragments do not primarily form a 'book', but rather document the project of reconciling the internal logical space of books of philosophy with the 'religious' or scriptural coordination of that verbal order of the script with complementary dimensions of the universal drama? What if each fragment marks a point in his personal drama where Pascal, in what was open to him in the confrontation of cartesian and biblical texts and contexts, moved 'into' the verbal order of this drama to mark something open as a question, or conversely to mark some biblical figure of inscription of such a question in the drama, and so respond to that question, as one component of an eventual projected response to the question presented by the script, with its two 'sides', logical and poetic, philosophical and religious, as such?

Then one would have to attempt to 'edit', articulate, the fragmentary questions and responses which constitute his 'thoughts' over his last few years, not simply as a textual unity, but rather as a textual record of a dynamic that runs through the developing situation of Pascal's confrontation with the scriptural character of logic in his last few years. Of course the only record we have of that developing situation lies in the textual order of a few biographical documents...and in the text of the 'Pensées' themselves; yet the very - pascalian - question of the interplay of 'internal' logical dynamic of the text, and the poetic order of its figural embedding in the silent language of the heart, allows at once a different 'balance' of recurrent pascalian terms, than that which would support a merely 'internal' logical or 'dogmatic' theological construction.

The question, then, of Pascal's textual response to Descartes, considered as a response to the dramatic situation of the young Pascal in a world of head and heart and body, confronting the Book and Le Monde de M. Descartes, may serve to bring into question a 'historian of ideas' characterisation of theoretical responses to Descartes and the mid-century in merely textual terms (not to say an intellectual historian, like Cassirer's, articulation of such a textual tradition as successive abstraction of the logical from
the figural 'side' of the theoretical text). Forgetting the question posed by Pascal's text, of the embedding of the logical question of relation of logical and figural sides of text, in the figural, dramatic 'reason of the heart' which articulates the emotional order of action and interaction in which rational thought must itself find its place, one might abstract the 'logic' of textual response to an earlier text from its embedding in the figural dimension of the drama of developing Theory, since each unitary response to an earlier unitary text may appear to be merely a response to the textual presentation in the earlier book of the coordination of various elements of 'internal' and 'external' 'space' of the book. 'Il n'y a pas de hors-texte': for if one is engaging in debate, rather than, say, inarticulate violence - say, book-burning or philosopher-burning - then every configuration of response to text-in-context is doubled by its character of mere response to text: for in general the configuration of text-in-context will itself be 'represented' in the verbal order of text, as the text 'internally' organises the various terms substituted in the text, for corresponding components of context...and a criticism of the 'abstraction' of an earlier text from the questions posed by the mirroring of those components 'inside' and 'outside' the text, can generally be posed in the terms of the earlier text - with perhaps a few new terms introduced to mark a new focus of questioning. And generally, such a textual response to an earlier book may itself be understood by the critic himself as belonging to a purely textual - belonging, indeed, to a purely rational 'logical' order of activity. Thus Parmenides gives us our clearest idea of pythagorean 'theory' by questioning the abstraction of that theory from its Kosmos, presented more or less in pythagorean 'terms' (terms found in variant relations in later, often contradictory, 'versions' of early pythagoreanism). The terms, other than the new focus of questioning marked by 'Being', τὸ Ἰόν, provide a more or less common textual marking of the early fifth-century configuration of text and context; a 'critical' stance 'outside' the earlier theory and the community it defined, is so to speak only a new 'position' in the same matrix of text and context earlier marked by pythagorean narrations of the cosmic drama. The new position generates, when marked in words, a new verbal organisation of the old terms in a new text, with the critical distance or difference itself marked by a new
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term, or an old term (at least an old term of the 'everyday' language shared outside theory by old and new theorists) given a new sense by the new theory in its new text.

Thus we can coordinate 'textually' with Descartes' logic, the cartesian 'method', various symmetric - and by their symmetry, related - 'theories': we can suggest how the adolescent Pascal's 'textual' approach to the rational textual World of Descartes through the projective or harmonic geometry of Desargues, rather than through the analytic algebra of cartesian coordinates, unfolds into a questioning of the nominal poetics of that World articulated in the formal order of symbolic substitution which is the abstract language of cartesian geometry. We can note Leibniz' interest in Pascal's geometry of projection and in his calculating machine of 1645-52 (which performed by a mechanical system of wheels-within-wheels or gears addition and subtraction; the development Leibniz demonstrated before the Royal Society in 1673 could also perform multiplication, division, and extraction of square roots); or Huyghens, linked to Descartes through his polymath father and through his mathematics teacher Van Schooten - with Fermat the main proponent of cartesian 'analysis' at mid-century - Pascal's dutch correspondent who appended to his master's textbook of the new mathematics his own systematisation of the questions discussed in the Pascal-Fermat correspondence of 1654:

446 VAN SCHOOTEN, Franciscus: Exercitationum Mathematicarum; Tractatus de
& HUYGHENS, Christiaan Ratiociniis in Aleae Ludo Leiden 1657

..or we can note relations between the Port-Royal editing of the Pensées and Port-Royal logic:

447 ARNAULD, Antoine & NICOLE, Pierre La Logique ou l'Art de Penser Paris (1662)
many eds; ed & intr Foucault 196

-with which one might compare the standard 'dissenters' logic in England:

448 WATTS, Isaac Logick, or the Right Use of Reason in the Enquiry after Truth (late 1690s) London 1725 &c
..whose title itself echoes those of Arnauld and Malebranche (the Recherche de la Vérite of 1674-5 was translated as 'An Enquiry after Truth')... who were engaged in fierce controversy over the years 1683-5, after Arnauld's disciple Quesnel had questioned Malebranche's version of Grace. The controversy may be read as conflicting readings of Descartes - Malebranche’s transference of the focus of the 'system' to the infinite from the finite 'I', and corresponding conversion of subjective methode into recherche - and links Pascal and the 'jansenist' controversy opening with the Sorbonne's condemnation of Arnauld in 1649, with the great conflict between Bossuet and his erstwhile pupil Fénelon in 1697-9, the condemnation of Quesnel's teaching in 1713-17, and the final incorporation of the condematory Bull Unigenitus into French law in 1730, in the midst of the last 'convulsions' or convulsionaries of Jansenism at Saint-Germain des Prés in 1728-32...

449 MALEBRANCHE, Nicolas
Entretiens sur la Métaphysique et la Religion Rotterdam 1688

450 BOSSUET, Jacques Benigne
Instruction sur les Estats d'Oraison Paris 1697, rev 1697

451 FÉNELON, François Salignac de la Mothe
Dialogues des Morts (169-1712) Paris 1712

452 Lettres sur la Religion et la Métaphysique (1) Paris 1718

453 Dialogues sur l'Eloquence...avec une Lettre écrite à l'Académie Française (1686 & 1714) Paris 1716

454 RAMSAY, Andrew
Histoire de la Vie de...Fénelon The Hague 1723

454 Les Voyages de Cyrus Paris 1727, rev London 1730; tr Hooke London 1730

..Bossuet had induced Fénelon to refute Malebranche; the latter had to publicly reject charges of the 'molinist' quietism defended by Fénelon against Bossuet, for whom Jansenism and Quietism were two extremes of Enthusiasm impeding the unity of the gallican church and its independence of Rome, as the reintegration of Catholicity and Reform which he had pursued with Leibniz (as representative of Reform). Bossuet like Jansen and Arnauld took as his
Model Augustine; Pascal and Fénelon are the two great representatives of the heart, the sentimental, of l'amour, leading out of cartesian rationalism, and beyond Voltaire, through Rousseau to Romanticism; yet Molinists and Jansenists found themselves at two extremes, censured equally by Bossuet and the Louis XIV that had emerged after Madame de Maintenon's arrival in 1685. Les extrêmes se touchent, perhaps, but in this complex play of analogies of textual responses to Descartes, coherence only begins to emerge when the texts are organised 'externally' in the institutional axis of a 'political' gallican church dominated by Bossuet over the period which turns about the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, as well as 'internally' as so many readings of the great recluse whose death more or less marks the opening of the fight which leads from Arnauld's condemnation in 1649 through to the final royal ratification of Quesnel's condemnation in 1730. And Watts' importation, as tutor to dissenters barred from anglican university, of french reactions to Descartes, can no more be understood in its combination of the mutually controverting positions of Arnauld and Malebranche, as a merely textual response, than can Berkeley's reading of Malebranche and Locke. The possibly apocryphal story that Malebranche died of an inflammation of the lungs after heated exchanges during Berkeley's visit to Paris in the eventful year 1715 marks, like the stories of Thales falling down the well, or Heraclitus fighting off dropsy in fermenting dung, however ironically, the material inscription of immaterialism in words, breath, human 'converse'...
equally enthusiastic about plain cold water as universal panacea.

Jansenism must be understood not merely in its texts from 1649 to 1730, but in the poetics of its difficulties over those years to which its texts are the response, the poetics reflected in the 'scripts' of its two greatest students - Pascal who passed through adolescence into the community of Port-Royal des Champs near Versailles (Arnauld’s alternative court, so to speak), and Racine who left the community for Paris, then Versailles, after his childhood there, finally rejecting the worldly stage, like Pascal before him. Jansenism may even serve, in its difficulties, to 'punctuate' the transition from 1650 to 1730 and its dynamic - the first crisis of 1649, the Provinciales of 1656-7, Pascal's death and Arnauld's Logic in 1662, the temporary peace from 1669 (and the publication of the Pensées... and Racine's Britannicus) Arnauld's departure in 1679 for Holland (Racine's farewell to the stage, Phèdre, 1677), Madame de Maintenon and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and Quesnel's flight to join Arnauld in 1685; the new crises in 1701, 1713-17, 1730. And I have suggested that the focal part of Clarke in England over the first three decades of the eighteenth century cannot be understood simply in 'textual' terms - for we now more or less ignore the influential chaplain, whom his own initial mentor Whiston castigated for his equivocation in 1710, in favour of Berkeley as the principal link in the retrospective catena leading from Locke to Hume and Kant. - Berkeley who, with Whiston, pressed Clarke to respond publicly to the Principles in 1710, but was declined; Berkeley who was invited to join in the twice-weekly meetings of Caroline's intellectual salon, presided over by Clarke, in the 1720s, as he prepared to leave on his mission of transplanting such culture into the New World. Clarke who is so often referred to by Voltaire, whose presence in London coincided largely with Berkeley's, who is hardly mentioned; Clarke who attacked Toland, Collins, Dodwell for their 'deism', was attacked by Bolingbroke and his associate Pope for his
lack of it, and by Waterland for his preponderance of it; Clarke who corresponded with Butler, Hutcheson and Kames.

Now the 'ideological' coupling of theory and the cultural dynamic of institutions, in a jansenist controversy, for example, where Pascal projects a book that would be constructed in the interface of cartesian theory and biblical religion, or in a 'deist' controversy which is the axis of Clarke's theoretical equivocations, is not articulated in abstract 'textual' space whose formal dynamic is modelled on the logical dynamic which it represents, in the 'structuralist' ideology of the parisian 1960s, as merely one 'side' of 'texts' of philosophy (or indeed, texts of literature in general). 'Ideology' is, rather, the articulation of a particular range of words in a particular place at a particular time, the dynamic of a language such as English, French or German as a language, culturally coupled in activity to the material economy of a more or less physically circumscribed group of people in England, France, or the old german Empire. - Coupled in an activity that is more or less politically integrated as a unity, a common course, often enough opposed, whether diplomatically, or physically (in war) to the common course of another contiguous group. If 'theory' is coupled through language to institutional and material dimensions of the theorist's activity, his life, then just as we embed the textual interaction of various responses to Descartes and his contemporaries in their ideological and institutional or 'practical' matrix, so we must consider the influence, say, of Malebranche on Berkeley, as part of a structure of 'transposition' of the former's french culture into the latter's british culture, reflected in the linguistic transposition from the terms of one 'ideology' to another, the limiting case of which we mark in English simply by the physical image of 'translation'.

Under this heading, let me quickly list, in passing, some 'primary sources' for this period of 1650-1730 which have not yet been listed:

462 LA BRUYERE, Jean de

Les Caractères de Theophraste...avec les Caractères ou Moeurs de ce Siècle
Paris (1688-94) Amsterdam 1701
which is both translation and transposition,

463 ABBADIE, Jacques

L'Art de se connaître soi-même Rotterdam 1692

..which is transposition (from France to Holland after the Revocation, and from Holland to Britain with William III) without translation, representative of the 'huguenot' diaspora after 1685,

464 WOLLASTON, William

The Religion of Nature delineated London 1722

fr tr & comm Gasset The Hague 1726

..which was printed by the young Benjamin Franklin in his seminal visit to the Old World, and whose translation is properly speaking a mere pre-text for a transposition of this systematisation of Clarke's ethics from the 'deist' side into France, via huguenot Holland,

465 SIDNEY, Algernon

Discourses concerning Government (1680) London 1698

..which reply to Filmer was more influential in France, where the author exiled himself from Commonwealth and Stuarts in turn, than in the country in whose language it was written; the French translation was republished, along with Le Contrat Social, under the Jacobin dictatorship of the great rationalist and deist who briefly attempted to actually reconstruct the social order according to philosophical principles of natural law and natural religion, while the 'ideologues' worked at the reconstruction of a natural language or 'ideographie' at the Institut.

466 BURNET, Thomas

Telluris Theoria Sacra London 1681-9, rev & tr by the author 1684-90

..a translation of the global frame of biblical history into a 'natural' history deduced from the researches of the Royal Society, which the author himself adapted from his initial draft in the language of the vulgate, to the natural language of England,

467 BOERHAAVE, Herman

Aphorismi de Cognoscendis et Curandis Morbis (Leiden 1709) fr tr La Mettrie Rennes 1738

468 STAHL, Georg Ernst

Fundamenta Chymiae (Halle 1723) tr Shaw London 1730

..translations which also mark transpositions...and, finally:
Anne Finch, daughter of the Speaker of the House of Commons, introduced to Henry More through her brother John at Christ's College, becoming the former's 'heroine pupil' between whom at her country house and his Cambridge students More divided his time; suffering from headaches and fits from adolescence, treated by Valentine Greatrakes and her personal physician the younger Van Helmont (on whose information his friend Leibniz made the attribution of the odd book), becoming a Quakeress and associating with Fox, Penn and Barclay, dying in 1679. Her little book covers the whole of Philosophy in a cabalistic frame borrowed from her mentor More, as a simple matrix that doubles in form, say, the Oxford pocket compendium of Logic from the same period, noted above. As a transposition of the male domain of Metaphysics into a very singular converse feminine pole, it may be left as an exception which marks an almost ubiquitous rule: Juliana of Norwich or Catherine of Sienna or Teresa of Avila might transcribe their visions of the cosmic order, and the Duchess of Newcastle or Madame du Chatelet might engage with a few other Femmes Savantes in expositions of the new mechanics of Nature...but More's heroine pupil singularly combines the singular mystic and the singular bluestocking.
Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung

The 'bibliography' of my own journey around the 'primary' and 'secondary' sources for the period from around 1730 until around 1800, marks the reading of readings (and of readings of readings) of a few 'principal' readings of Descartes and his contemporaries. I organised an initial reaction to those 'principal' or primary readings (whose 'external' situations in a common late-seventeenth-century european context I took to reflect, and to be reflected in, their 'internal' relations as texts, as Text) in relation to the 'ideological' centrality of Samuel Clarke and the 'deist' question in England, to emphasise that a purely 'textual' catena fails sometimes to capture even the actual textual relations of, say, Locke and Hume, if these be traced through, say, Berkeley, rather than the 'matrix' of intra- and inter-textuality focussed for three decades after Locke's death in the figure of Clarke...

470 BENNETT, Jonathan G  Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes  Oxford 1971

...was the standard 'text' for 'History of Modern Philosophy' at Oxford in the early 1970s (as Clarke's Rohault, for example, was the 'text' read in the School of Natural Philosophy at Cambridge over the first three decades of the eighteenth century). Bennett's translation or transposition of the questions confronted by his three nominal authors into the language of 'Oxford Philosophy' around 1970 parallels other examples of Oxford and Cambridge 'History of Philosophy' already noted. The questions and answers of these three constituents of the schematic canon which dominates the 'historical' paper or syllabus for 'Modern Philosophy' are abstracted not only, à la Cassirer, from the question of extra-textual components or dimensions of the historical dynamic, but also, so to speak within that initial abstraction, from their very embedding in the authors' texts themselves - from the very language of 'Locke', 'Berkeley' and 'Hume'. Various figures in their texts - among those amenable to such a process - are transposed or translated into Bennett's text, and his philosophical 'language' of Oxford around 1970. These figures then provide object lessons in the kinds of 'mistakes' from whose recognition 'linguistic' philosophy arose
at the beginning of the twentieth century (in response to that formal analysis of 'language' associated with the birth of 'modern' logic), and at the same time point beyond 1970, as adumbrations of questions for that linguistic philosophy, couched in an earlier attempt at (to quote Wilkins) 'a philosophical language'. This relation of the language of linguistic philosophy around 1970, to the language of British philosophy over (roughly) the first half of the eighteenth century, then defines the historical relation of Locke, Berkeley and Hume to one another, as it defines the relation of a text written 'in' a philosophy that has come to recognise that philosophy is always 'a question of language', to the language of the earlier philosophy that thought it was about thought and things. The 'structure' of the earlier philosophy is understood by embedding the earlier texts - or those parts of them which can be so embedded - in the language of 1970, analysing the textual relations among those earlier texts in terms of the dynamic of questions attaching to the language of 1970 in which they have been embedded, and then presenting the overall structure - once more in terms of the language of 1970 - in terms of the relations of 'central themes' corresponding to the 'global', 'unitary' or 'higher-level' structures of Bennett's text, by which it is set as more or less integrated text, book, within the dynamic of philosophical language and context associated with that institution which was the 'British school' of philosophy (and of theory, more generally) around 1970. The 'space' of questions, of philosophical discussion, supposed in Bennett's questioning of his distant precursors in the 'British school' is, as I suggested towards the close of Part III, itself a British dimension of a wider space of Theory around 1970, analogous to, say, the global linguistic space of 'classical' 1960s 'structuralism', which was just beginning to be questioned in France as perhaps, in its unitary character, an undeconstructed residue of the unitary character associated with the mythical space of transcendental subjectivity whose working as myth had been analysed (deconstructed) in terms of its linguistic dynamic. And the various dimensions of 'linguistic' theory around 1970, in various European and American schools themselves parallel the unitary cultural space organised by rational, structural, functional 'modern' - indeed specifically 'sixties' - architecture in the 'international
'style'. It is characteristic of the parallellism and convergence of different schools' versions of the questioning of abstract unitary 'language' in terms of the 'pragmatics' of coupling of discursive and contextual orders, after 1970, that this analogy should itself be expressed through an analogy of architectural questioning of the unitary space of 'modernism' - that it should be expressed in terms of a unitary or common figure of the analogical dimension of embedding of language in the poetic order of 'Art'... even though, ironically, what marks global convergence in theory of the various primary historical western schools, is precisely their common questioning of what were in fact different forms of a unitary ideal of language, of language structuring from within the text the embedding of text in context, and the articulation of this unitary context around its analysis in a text. The distance still to be covered in the 1980s is marked by different 'positive' versions of this questioning of Modernism, notably the distance between Lyotard's residual cartesianism in framing his questioning in terms of an abstract textual assertion of assertion as text which posits its own embedding in the pragmatics of its context and the associated dynamics of 'transmission', and Habermas' residual leibnizianism (so to speak) in seeing the unity of the questioning of unitary 'modern' space as somehow a higher unity to be posited, rather than a unitary textual marking of the specific questions facing particular readers and writers in situations of confronting such limiting or liminal texts. "Ähnliche Zeitpunkten, indeed: a return to the configuration of the later seventeenth century, towards the close of the twentieth, as responses to responses to....to responses to the initial symmetry of 'Science' in its mid-seventeenth century 'revolutionary' context, finally confront the very figure of textually 'posing' a response, which articulates the principal late-seventeenth century 'positions' as responses to Descartes coordinate with different place (or positions) in the cultural and material context of response. We stand in the nineteen-eighties at the close of a 'cycle' of Science, of the 'Modern', insofar as we confront the symmetry of 'internal' and 'external' configurations of textual response to 'the New Science' of Descartes and his contemporaries as the last question of Science, arising as a response to 1970 'positions' which respond to the questions posed by 1950 positions
which respond to the symmetry of 1930 texts and contexts which... which respond to 1685 positions taken up in response to the questions posed by - or opened up by - the symmetry of mid-century texts in, and with, their context of 'Scientific Revolution'.

Bennett reads a sequence of textual response to an earlier text as articulated in a 'theoretical' space of argument or debate and its logic abstracted not only from the figural dynamic of the various texts - the 'play', so to speak, of words, which remains only as a sort of dustbin of history into which the misleading figurative incrustations and imagery left over from his refining of the earlier questions may be discharged - but also, a fortiori, abstracted from the embedding of the texts in the poetics of their contexts, organised in the common figural dynamic of text and context, and from the embedding of this order of social interaction, of personality, biography, and so on, in the material dynamic of the culture in which the theoretical text was produced and sold, vying in the market with all sorts of non-textual fare.

Derrida has analysed the textual space and temporality of the western project or projection which might justify such reading in terms of some embedding 'in principle' of the informal, practical, language in which the reading is read and written, in the Characteristic of the young Leibniz, the abstract marking of pure mathematical symmetry which was the ideal of the young Wittgenstein - in a unitary formal language in which one might consider informal language embedded, as enlightened radicals considered positive religion and law to be either embeddable in 'natural' religion and law or an irrational imposition. Cassirer had already 'taken seriously' the play of figure in its interplay with the progressive abstraction of logical space and time, albeit framing this interplay 'logically', and hence retrospectively as a convergence of various lines of critical abstraction towards Kant:

471 CASSIRER, Ernst

Die Philosophie der Aufklärung Tübingen 1932
tr Pettegrove & Koellen Princeton 1951
This book, focussing the Enlightenment in a convergence of parallel lines of progressive emancipation of critical from mythical, itself serves as focus for the wider History of Philosophy and Philosophy of History, covered historically and methodologically in Cassirer's other works - and this quite explicitly: the only 'secondary' literature adduced here are Cassirer's own studies of Renaissance, Descartes, Cambridge Platonism, Leibniz and Kant, since properly speaking these are to be considered fragments of an ideal whole. Kant focusses the whole at the close of this study, as his texts present the interface of the critical space and time in which the prehistory of that critical frame is dynamically articulated in various lines of convergence to this focus, with its historical embedding in that dynamic of emancipation of Reason.

And just as Cassirer's perspective is focussed in Kant, so this critical setting of critical thought in the history of its self-discovery as autonomous Reason, is the most seminal of his works in intellectual history, as other studies of 'Enlightenment' can be framed in relation to it - as 'reading' of Cassirer with his primary sources - directly in terms of the questioning of Cassirer's coupling of critical space and textual space and historical time, rather than indirectly, say through a reading of his study of 'Renaissance', since that here appears explicitly as, with the Scientific Revolution, the groundwork, in its development of figures of autonomous individual and his 'ideas', for the eventual self-discovery of autonomous Reason presented here: presented in a sort of categorial history of 'Reason in History' as the basic dimensions or coordinates of Reason in History which present the themes of the 'parallel' chapters - Mind, Nature, Psychology, Epistemology, Religion, History, Law-State-Society, Aesthetics, are conjointly freed from their several embeddings in figural, 'mythical' imagery, and eventually presented precisely as the rational coordinates of Reason-in-History.

472 GAY, Peter

The Enlightenment: An Interpretation
I The Rise of Modern Paganism NY 1966
II The Science of Freedom NY 1969
If Derrida in the early sixties raised the question of the essentially figural character of the 'logical' distinction of logical and figural dimensions of the philosophical text, and with it the question of the historical time of the perennial western project of a logically conclusive - rather than awkwardly provisional - figure of abstraction of logic from figure, so we may see an American parallel of his questioning in these 'rewritings' of Cassirer's Enlightenment...

My greatest debt is to the writings of Ernst Cassirer both in philosophy and intellectual history. His central distinction between critical and mythical thinking lies at the heart of my interpretation. Much of Cassirer's work is an elaboration of this distinction...(1)

...but Gay's 'interpretation' is constructed in the ambiguous interplay of logical and figural dynamic of the texts he discusses: in the religious tension of rising 'modern paganism', slowly transformed into the cultural tension between Reason and its figural embedding in a social dynamic which defines the project of 'Enlightenment' as 'the science of freedom'.

Unlike his master, Gay (in the bibliographical essays appended to his own reading of the period) discusses the 'secondary' sources which are the textual context of his text at considerable length; rather than Cassirer's logical axis he articulates an axis of interplay of logical and figural, theoretical and practical, which does not present a unitary convergence of 'critical thinking' so much as a play of retrospect and prospect, Ancient and Modern, medieval faith rooted in a Graeco-Roman past, and the questioning of that faith, rational progress, which proceeds by moving back, in Renaissance and afterwards, to the figures of Antiquity. He agrees with many of Cassirer's critics that his master works back

1: 1.423
from his master Kant in too orderly and 'dialectical' a manner - forcing, in particular, a distortion of those components of European Enlightenment associated with Hume's British scepticism and French materialism, from which Kant's solution is rather too unilateral an abstraction. A materialism which presents the converse of transcendental idealism, and a deeper scepticism than that which appears in Kant's transposition of Hume into his own terms, and which reappears in the question posed by the symmetry of Criticism and its 'materialist' converse (the latter articulated primarily in the practical terms of a critical stance in relation to the Ancien Régime).

Thus Crocker, whose thematic articulation of his readings of that French axis explicitly parallels Cassirer's reading, yet concludes his organisation of sources in relation to the moral axis of human interaction and its figural dynamic or poetics (textually presented: this is still a history of texts rather than contexts), not in the Second Critique, or Cassirer's coordination of First and Third, but in the fiction of the Marquis de Sade: in the erotic imperative which organises its figural form as writing, as also the interplay of figures of sexuality and power which constitute the content of Sade's (im)moral tales. One may see a deeper symmetry of logical and figural 'sides' of the Enlightenment text, from which Cassirer's and Kant's logic of the symmetry of logical and other dimensions of the World categorically abstract, in the mirroring of that logic in, say, Sade's imagery (one supposes more or less unperformable - like Seneca's tragedies - except in the privacy of the individual's imagination) dramatisation of 'Philosophy in the Bedroom'. In the social frame of human interaction, which appears in Kant's theoretical analysis theoretically embedded in the global logic of the categorial symmetry of logical and other dimensions of Experience, the single room which is the scene of sadistic or sadist 'philosophy' reflects in its - more or less literal - combinatorics of individual and highly incarnate actors the complementary abstraction of the lone philosopher of Königsberg in his austere study, entering the fray of Revolution with a pamphlet on perpetual peace in the symmetric relations of nations, while philosophy enters the boudoir in the form of a manifesto of philosophical libertinism, of pure free individual self-expression as natural desiring man or woman, which for
a few pages interrupts what it meanwhile justifies, sets in the wider context of 1794 and the extremes of jacobin experiment, and finally invites to reassert itself with redoubled force.

While Derrida questioned the unilateral logical determination of the relations of logical and figurative in the early sixties, Lacan, in his (rejected) introduction to Sade's variation of the primal scene (La Philosophie dans le Boudoir) brought out in his figural logic the symmetry of 'Kant avec Sade'. Sade's fiction and Kant's theory are two sides of the same revolutionary text which closes logical and figural axes of Enlightenment - or rather, prefigurations at its two extreme poles of 'World' and 'Individual' of that 'romantic' philosophy which takes its very name from the 'literary' side of the text, and which I tried to mark in relation to the critical project of Novalis' unfinished 'philosophical novel' Heinrich von Ofterdingen. ...But that 'romantic revolution' focussed in the group associated with the Athenäum in Germany was, as Friedrich Schlegel so clearly saw, but one dimension of a wider european transformation whose political axis passed through the Paris of the divine Marquis. If with Crocker one takes the struggle for power on the primal scene of sadean sexuality, abstracted from the wider cultural scene like its author in the Bastille until 1789, and in Charenton from 1801, only free for the ten free years between absolute monarchy and absolute napoleonic rule which turn about the Bedroom of 1794-5, as textual focus of the ethical axis of Enlightenment, then the question presents itself of the political focus of european revolution in that Terror whose political imperatives in the Absolute Freedom corresponding to the symmetric frame of human interaction understood by Kant in terms of categorical imperative and by Sade as erotic imperative (of self-expression through violence in the mirror of sexuality) were identified by Hegel in the great philosophical novel which is his Phenomenology.

A Terror justified by Robespierre's defence of the Revolution at all costs, within and without the french borders; a Terror that may be seen, formally, as the political analogue of kantian and sadean freedom: as maintenance of the political symmetry of 'liberty
and equality' taken for the radical self-assertion of political freedom itself in the face of a European conspiracy of internal and external reaction.

...And Reaction, conversely, makes the Terror the climax of the great Oedipal tragedy of abstract Reason unaware of its true part in the stable symmetry not of free and equivalent abstract individual 'citizens', but of a divinely regulated social mechanism where the external relations of the various different parts reflect each individual's consciousness of his limited and preordained role within the incomprehensible whole. Blind Reason, like Oedipus and Hamlet, dethrones and kills the image of divinity in the king, taking the image for imposture, as it takes its own natural light, which is only an image of true Enlightenment, for the true vision which belongs rather to blind Tiresias, the priest. Blind to its own blindness 'Enlightenment' like Oedipus, fails to recognise the tragic equivalence between its critical attempt to inscribe the Old Order within a Nature that is the formal converse of Reason, and the practical dissolution of the sole and constant figure of social unity presided over by monarch and priest. Or worse: the part of the 'philosopher' belongs to a conspiracy of irreligious and envious men whose semblance of a critical stance 'outside' what they present as an arbitrary social order - which they formally bring into question by setting it in a mechanical Nature which is the mere reflection of their formal reason, formally asserting themselves in a speciously 'wider' natural order of society which will naturally assert itself as the narrow old order dissolves - this is truly the unworkable imposture by which they hope to usurp the twin rule of God's deputies on Earth, displacing their real and workable authority with the imaginary authority of an abstract game of logical assertion. One can dispose of them in a few lines: first of all their theoretical frame of criticism is itself in many respects theoretically questionable, and secondly this vertiginous theoretical criticism of criticism only reflects the essential impracticality of the critical frame, and its true inscription and true work as practical reason within the moral order governed by an ordained secular and religious hierarchy.
I have already noted the ecclesiastical denunciation of Descartes around 1930 as the 'revolutionary' who opened the breach to the tragic self-assertion leading through the French Revolution to an impending self-destruction of finite man blind to the infinite frame of that finitude. More generally one may note a line of criticism of attempts to reconstruct a disrupted social order 'from outside', according to a model of social interaction between symmetrical, 'equal', individuals set in an abstract Nature which is merely the 'external' conversion of abstract Reason, which runs parallel, or rather, runs counter to, the 'progressive' impact of rational criticism on the society in which it is formulated. Discours sur l'Inégalité and Contrat Social lead to the Terror presided over by a rousseauiste Robespierre, Kapital leads to the Gulag; against 'whig interpretations of history' we can set

475 TALMON, J  The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy London 1952

or Becker's seminal irony..

476 BECKER, Carl Lotus  The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers New Haven 1932

I shall attempt to show that the Philosophes demolished the Heavenly City of Augustine only to rebuild it with more up-to-date materials (1)

'The underlying conceptions of the eighteenth century were still essentially the same as those of the thirteenth': the figure of setting the disintegrating social order in which it was framed within a rational order coordinate with the logic of its elaboration, into which the disintegration was the transition - an essentially 'religious' figure - whose dynamic is structurally equivalent, whether it lead into the medieval order against which the Enlightenment reacted, or the nineteenth-century order against which the first 'revolutionary' reaction came in 1917 - this figure is essentially constant. The shock of 1789 became the orthodoxy of the nineteenth century; won't

1: Lecture I, close (p 31)
state planning become the orthodoxy of the twentieth? Becker studied under Turner and Robinson over the course of the 1890s at Wisconsin and Columbia. One might see these Yale Law School lectures of 1931 as an appraisal of 'the significance of the intellectual frontier' in history, in the light of Robinson's pragmatic 'New History' with its insistence on the place of the historian in the social dynamic: Becker's place is to trace the social history of the place of historians in the tradition of Augustine, thinking to stand 'outside' the social order in which they write. The 'New' History, and the new society in which it plays its part, leaves behind revolutionary dislocation which gradually solidifies into a new conservative inertia (to be displaced in turn by a new variation on the old revolutionary theme) to enter into a stable critical interplay with other elements in the fluid social interaction of which it is itself recognised as an essential component. A quarter of a century later, with planning, indeed, the post-war orthodoxy, beginning in the New Deal and developed under the imperatives of a war economy, Becker's own revolutionary projection of an 'end of ideology' could frame, in fairly orthodox manner, the interplay of perspectives on its own history in an academic symposium:

'Romanticism' and its sequels, as reaction to the 'classical' Enlightenment project of reconstructing the World 'from outside', within the abstract framework of emancipated Reason coordinating in unitary rational Nature the interplay of Reason and Nature in a rational Culture, a free interplay of symmetric 'equal' individuals within rational 'natural' law, presents an ambiguous interplay of 'conservative' and 'progressive' faces. The questioning presented by a 'poetics' which articulates the interplay of 'revolutionary' logic - which takes the breakdown of an Old Order as practical correlate of its critical questioning of its own culture through its inscription in a rational Nature - as one dimension of activity in that Old Order, is at once a further radicalisation of the critical stance of that old revolutionary logic, and also the reassertion of figures of embedding of Thought in the social order which had been mobilised by the old reactionaries to rhetorically discredit their 'enlightened'
critics. At the close of 1799 Novalis presents Europe with the figure of the thirteenth-century unitary Christendom, progressively dismantled as European culture while critical reason 'deconstructed' its poetics in the wider frame of rational unitary Nature, as itself constituting the frame for asserting a new unitary European poetic as the autonomy of critical logic itself comes under its own critical scrutiny. At the same time, in France, Napoleon reasserts central autocratic rule, soon ratified as a new Christian European Empire, after the political impasse encountered by radical Jacobin attempts to reconstruct French society 'from outside', while the actual context of reconstruction was a hostile European culture which naturally construed Jacobin logic very differently from the Committee of Public Safety. Robespierre and Trotsky suffered the same fate for their utopian oedipal hubris; Stalin like Napoleon before him secured their revolutions by integrating what of the transformation could be so preserved within what the idealists saw as merely a reassertion of the old politics they had thought to have definitively demolished or deconstructed, to rationally reassemble the components of culture in the symmetric ideal space and time of Nature and its logical dynamic. Significantly, Robespierre has slowly been freed from partisan rhetoric over the twentieth century to become the focus of that transition over the 1790s from questioning of the old order and its practical dismantling, to questioning of that radical project in terms drawn from the old order, which we call 'The French Revolution' (1). Similarly Sade, playing his part in that Revolution in the interregnum between the fall of the Bastille and his new confinement under Napoleon (according to the latter's explicit personal directions), eventually comes to be seen as a 'logical' culmination of 'philosophical' Enlightenment, slowly introduced into 'rational' debate by ever more respectable readers, Apollinaire, Bataille, Blanchot, Lacan, Barthes and so on.

Pascal already stands, in his response to the initial project of 'Scientific Revolution' and its Cartesian logic, as both precursor of the eventual systematic reaction against Enlightenment which is the romantic revolution, and as prefiguring in a way that papal denunciation of 'modernism' at the opening of the twentieth

1: cf the survey article already noted: (185) vol VIII
century which prepares the reassertion of 'thomism' by Maritain and Gilson - the Vatican Council had returned to the tridentine return to the thirteenth century. Is Pascal progressive or reactionary? Do we read his brother-in-law's edition of the Pensées or Condorcet's? That seminal revolutionary Marx turned Hegel's classical 'reaction' to the revolutions of his youth on its head, precisely by going back to an ancient model of going forward by going back - defining his relation to Hegel by going back to Epicurus' definition of his relation to Aristotle by going back to Leucippus. Logical questioning of the presuppositions of an earlier order of questions, insofar as it poses the symmetry of earlier logic and its contextual dimensions logically in terms of questions, even if it be formally asserted as 'materialism', necessarily involves a still greater degree of logical abstraction from the figural embedding of text in context, than the texts it would criticise for their 'abstraction'. Merely to maintain an equal degree of practical embedding of theory in the figural dynamic of its cultural context, the new theory or questioning must be accompanied with a correlatively more complex frame of practical coupling of theory and practice. Otherwise theoretical materialism, for example, becomes merely an abstract academic posture, coordinate with the elementary conservative reaction which, faced with the question of the symmetry of an old logic with the figural organisation of its institutional context, merely takes theory and old institution as somehow alternatives, and resolves the new question by abstracting from the coupling of old questioning and its old institution, by a practical reassertion of a sort of idealised retrojection of the old institution, divorced from even the old order of questions, which are taken as merely the warning signs of the disruption experienced in present institutions, and associated with the theoretical proponents of still greater disruption. In the 1980s, as the project of Science and Enlightenment comes, so to speak, into its own range of critical questioning, the question of inquiry, of question and assertion, debate, is posed in the academy in terms of, say, the complementary positions of Habermas and Lyotard: posed in terms of equally abstract assertions of the rhetorical embedding of all argument within the poetics of its context (by Lyotard), or of a transcendental or categorical frame for a 'universal pragmatics' determined in relation to the bare form of linguistic interaction in the speech community. The abstract symmetry
of these ideologically dominant reference points for the theory of theory in the 1980s (one might add Rorty's revision of Becker's and parallel 'pragmatist' schemes to supply an anglo-american dimension) reflects their common abstraction, in the verbal interplay of academic debate, from the practical question of the place of this theoretical inverse in what is open in its coordination with various non-verbal coordinates of the debate. Habermas may, for example, criticise the politics of Lyotard's 'neoconservatism', and Lyotard may attempt to theoretically coordinate his position as expressed in verbal texts with visual spatiotemporal 'exposition' at the Pompidou Centre; meanwhile rhetorically dismissing Habermas' critique as superannuated whiggery. But the converse positions are all the while mapped out on paper, in papers, abstracted from the still more radical question of what one might call the mise en scène of european theory towards the close of the second millenium. In response to the question formally posed, as here, of the symmetry and coordination of questions with contexts, Lyotard does indeed take the line of theoretical reaction and conservatism, seeing the question in theoretical terms as a sort of alternative between logic and myth (Cassirer's 'critical' and 'mythical' thinking), and theoretically argues, or rather gestures towards, the untenability of an abstract global logical determination of the coordination of logical and other dimensions of question and assertion, and he asserts, in a continuation of the very abstraction he thinks to dismiss, a rhetorical inscription of discourse on the relation of argument and context in its situation, its essentially local and specific context of production. Yet his position, while he maintains its abstract academic dynamic, even in an abstract determination of this institutional context in his part as Director of an institution nominally directed toward the questioning of the institutions of questioning (CIPH:...1, rue Descartes...), remains an abstract theoretical determination of the non-theoretical embedding of theory in situation of enunciation. Habermas, conversely, maintains an academic projection of a critical embedding of the social order of criticism, whose actual embedding in the german dynamics of academic abstraction is not itself posed as a theoretical question, but 'merely' as a practical matter of more or less private biography. The converse positions
share in their abstraction from the non-verbal context of the 'post-modern debate', share in the institutional norms and dynamic, which allow the constitution of their difference over the relations between debate and context as ideologically central academic debate. My questioning of their common academic conservatism, their maintenance of an unquestioned verbal space of debate in which to articulate converse 'positions' in regard to the relations between verbal and other dimensions of human interaction, my attempt to mark here at the margin of the Academy what is open in the coordination of such questions with their cultural embedding in the institutional dynamic of theory in Germany, France, America and Britain...this is necessarily still more 'abstract' a position than those of Habermas and Lyotard, each well engaged in the transatlantic market of theoretical production; but at the same time it belongs to a quixotic attempt, activity, project, of articulating what is practically open in the cultural configuration of their 'postmodern debate', by marking here, in a sort of anti-thesis, a deeper question rooted in the symmetry of verbal order of theoretical questioning, with other orders and dynamics in which the marking is inscribed and embedded, from which a merely verbal dynamic - albeit, in Lyotard's case with various non-verbal 'illustrations' - abstracts. In heideggerian terms the complementarity of the increasing abstraction of successive criticisms of the abstraction of presuppositions of previous theories from the questions posed by the logical symmetry of what the earlier theory textually determines as textual and contextual coordinates of its World, with the correlative complexity of the human embedding of each successive theory in its World, eventually leads to a sort of Final Question for Man, posed in practice by the nearly completed technical system of global Gestell. For Derrida and his associates in GREPH the question became, over the course of the 1970s, the practical matter of maintaining the millenial tradition of academic philosophy, threatened with imminent elision in a neoconservative technocracy with its ideological apologists those 'new philosophers' without academic positions who were drawing out the complicity of abstract utopian projects with political Terror - re-enacting in the aftermath of 1968 the familiar conservative reaction to the series of French revolutions beginning in 1789.
Revolution: british and french monarchs instituting Natural Philosophy, 'Science', as group activity framing the coupling of theoretical and social progress...'Philosophes' blamed for the execution of the french monarch in 1792 and the Terror of 1793-4, through the social impact of their counter-religion of a natural law setting rational social order in rational Nature. The 'ideology' of the National Institute with which the Revolution replaced the royal academies, looked back to Condillac's version of Locke, Voltaire's importation of Newton, Locke and England upon his return in 1729, Montesquieu's importation of Locke and England upon his return in 1731; the various elements were coordinated in Diderot's transformation of Chambers' Cyclopedia into the living organ in french society of this transposition of british coordinates of Theory, Society and Nature into another language and another context...where radicals were beginning to dress, even, à l'anglais. Yet it would be the british 'progressive' who had abhorred the reactionary royal policy which led to american revolt and secession who would damn most severely a french Republic framed in the attempt to dismantle and reconstruct the social order of human interaction according to the theoretical model apparently imported from England, and who would see in the Terror the necessary consequence of such ideas.

Theory explicitly organised as a group activity, as the revolutionary project of Science, was prefigured by Mersenne's correspondence and first given its verbal organ in the Transactions of the Royal Society...

478 DUHAMEL, Jean- Baptiste Historiae Academiae Scientiarum Paris 1698 (survey 1666-96)

479 Mémoires de l'Académie des Sciences Paris 1720-1793

480 Mémoires de l'Institut: I Classe des Sciences Mathématiques et Physiques II Classe des Sciences Morales et Politiques (78) Paris 1756- (proceedings from 1795, latter class closed by Napoleon, 1800)

481 Bulletin des Sciences (Société Philomathique de Paris) Paris 1792-1826
Miscellanea Curiosa (Academia Natura Curiosorum) Leipzig 1670-

Commentarii Academiae Scientiarum Imperialis Petropolitanae (1726-)
St Petersburg 1728-

Miscellanea Taurinensi Turin 1760-6

Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society (1769-)
Philadelphia 1771-

Asiatick Researches (Royal Society of Bengal) (1785-)
Calcutta 1786-

..these may serve to represent similar material after 1800, read in relation to Part III. The early journals of the various early 'philosophical' societies published, along with communications, 'papers', occasional short notices of books bearing on the investigations presented in papers; a parallel line may be traced from 1665 through a complementary variety of publication, attached to no particular Society, and chiefly concerned with the systematic review of literature rather than the publishing of original research:

Journal des Scavans Paris 1665-

Bayle's Nouvelles de la République des Lettres followed from Rotterdam in 1684; as the Journal des Scavans had an official monopoly in its field in France (being actually taken over by the government in 1702), the jesuit counter-weight to the 'freethinking' Nouvelles were published from a tiny independent principality near Lyons:

Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire des Sciences et des Beaux-Arts
Trévoux 1701-31, Paris 1731-62

By the time of the suppression of their order in 1762, the jesuits' 'Journal de Trévoux' had become the principal organ of ideological reaction to the growing 'philosophic' party. Just as it ceased publication, the more general literary magazine run by the government, which had begun its career as light entertainment in 1672, was being coopted to the latter cause in the person of Marmontel:

Le Mercure de France Paris 1728-92 (begun as Mercure Galant, 1672)
Meanwhile Baron Grimm, assisted by Diderot, was composing every month a literary 'journal'—reviews of new books, plays, paintings, set in their context of Parisian cultural life—debates, scandals, intrigues, the personal lives of writers, actors and actresses, artists, and their associates on the cultural scene—of which manuscript copies were sent to aristocratic subscribers at the small German courts, as well as Catherine at St Petersburg and Stanislas at Lunéville, giving a continuing perspective on the Paris of the philosophes to those separated by their duties from the cultural focus they sought to emulate at home:

Correspondance Littéraire, Philosophique et Critique, adressée à un Souverain d'Allemagne (1753-90, edited from 1773 by Grimm's secretary Meister) ed Suard
Paris 1812-14

One might typify Diderot's contribution by what starts in the October 1770 'issue' as a review of a new edition of a pamphlet, Garrick, translated from the English the previous year—catering for a market in cultural fashions corresponding in this instance to 'the Shakespeare question' focussed in the battle over Ducis' adaptation of Hamlet in 1769 and Voltaire's attempt to have British 'wildness' officially suppressed in the French theatre, where it had been encouraged by Garrick's recent Parisian visits. Diderot immediately wanders away from his pretext (so to speak) by insisting, first, that such a translation is per se a nonsense, since its reflections cannot apply to English and French theatre, which are 'diametrically opposed' institutions. The very fact of translation evinces a confusion of the stage with its wider context, in the confusion of French and British 'stages' of culture in general, in which the very different 'theatres' are set. As his reflections pass on to the question presented by this initial reflection, and on, indeed, into the November issue, a general moral, the celebrated 'Paradoxe sur le Comédien' (under which title the reflections were eventually published—or rather, printed—separately, like several other pieces of the Correspondance by Diderot) is developed. People think the great actor plays naturally, investing his or
her part with their own passions and reactions: the truth is exactly the opposite. In the great actor or actress there has been effected a complete separation of a thoroughly neutral 'place' for which a part in the action may be substituted and constructed simply in terms of the internal structure of the drama, and the actual part of the human actor or actress in the drama of their own lives 'off the stage'.

Diderot's poetics of theatre in 1770, in the Correspondance, may in their turn be set in their context, in a sort of final iteration of Diderot's reflection which presents his 'part' as central 'actor' on the parisian stage of 'Enlightenment' between about 1750 and 1770 - say from the Prospectus for..

491 Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des Sciences, des Arts et des Métiers, par Une Société des Gens de Lettres Paris 1751-65(text)-72(plates)

.. up to the date of these reflections and the end of his work on his great monument, which 'n'était pas un livre, mais une action'. Thus one may see in Diderot an actor who became as it were the organising 'place' which coordinated in his person critical questioning with the other dimensions of the wider french stage described by Diderot as participant in the Correspondance Littéraire, mirrored in his 'bourgeois drama' which revolutionised the french stage in that same direction of 'naturalism' (within the form of theatrical unity, abstraction from the context of the stage, presenting the same dynamic which moved that context, society at large), seen in his coupling of visual and discursive dimensions both in his reflections on the visual art of the annual Salons (his notices appearing in the Correspondance), and in his personal redaction of the analyses of Arts et Métiers coordinated with the depiction of the processes described in the text visually in the eleven volumes of plates. A place which, in his 'theoretical' texts from the Lettre sur les Aveugles onwards, generates an odd meandering through themes as each question suggests another in a sort of script of his musing. A place which belongs specifically to the french cultural stage, even if England has provided an initial model, such as Shaftesbury or Chambers in the 1740s. A place initially coordinate in the
critical project it organised with D'Alembert's mathematical frame of scientific coordination of logical and other dimensions of theoretical questions, and with Rousseau's musical framework and radical political focus, but breaking with these as they broke with each other over the question, precisely, of theatre and its relations with its social context in 1758.

492 MORERI, Louis
Le Grand Dictionnaire Historique ou le Mélange curieux de l'Histoire Sacrée et Profane (Lyons 1674) ed Le Clerc Amsterdam 1691 (lost ed: Paris 1759)

493 BAYLE, Pierre
Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, Rotterdam (1695-7) 1702, ed Des Maiseaux Basel 1741

494 CHAMBERS, Ephraim
Cyclopaedia, or an Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences London 1728; 1738 &c

If Mersenne had prefigured Diderot's activity by coordinating around his 'part' or place the correspondents whose 'scientific revolution' was focussed in Descartes' correspondence of abstract place of 'questions' and doubt in language and thought - whereas Diderot coordinates around his part in the 'philosophical' theatre of the Lumière a critical activity articulated in the intervening coupling of abstract cartesian questions with the 'irrational' context dominated by State and Church under the Ancien Régime - then Moréri's response to that mid-sixteenth century order of questioning may be seen as a 'reactionary' reassertion of the old ecclesiatical and political order in the poetic frame of 'sacred and profane' biography (by which his 'encyclopedia' is dominated) reflected in Bossuet's reassertion of augustinian Universal (Sacred and Profane) History in 1681. In response to this reaction or reassertion of the old poetics of superstition, soon focussed in the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, Bayle presents in his 'critical' annotation of Moréri (rather like Clarke annotating Rohault, contemporaneously) a system of questions which together add up to a general questioning of the old poetic, just as Moréri's analogous system of analogous lives, together organised a reassertion of the old figural order of the sacred drama of Creation (presented as unitary narrative by Bossuet).
Chambers' *Cyclopedia*, on the other hand, is rather a systematisation of the material that had been appearing since 1665 in scientific and technical books and journals: unlike Moréri and Bayle it has no articles of theology, biography or topography, whereas these dimensions of the drama of Universal History occupy the French writers to the exclusion of most other matter. Chambers follows Harris' *Lexicon Technicum* of 1704, and the initial attempt in 1705 to range systematically the results collected in the Royal Society Transactions and Collections, in trying to cast into a unitary frame the impersonal mechanics of the 'natural' frame of Universal History. 'Papers' contributed to the new journals are occupied with a detached experience or experiment, a particular sequence of questions and answers abstracted from the universal frame of question and answer as such which was the Cartesian 'system', 'Le Monde de Mr. Descartes', that great fictional Universal History; they begin and end leaving other questions attaching to their embedding as experientiae in Experience as a whole unresolved. Particular authors may attempt more systematic and wider-ranging systems of question and answer in books rather than periodical contributions, and these may be ranged in their turn in the ongoing questioning to which they are unsystematically subjected in the journals devoted principally to literary reviews. The question then arises of constructing a truly universal 'dictionary' which will supplant the abstract personal system of Descartes' World, by somehow combining the dramatis personae of Moréri and Bayle with the general 'natural' frame of Chambers, to produce that great project of coordination of questions and theories in the institution directed by Diderot, whose axis will then necessarily be, precisely, a critical questioning of those institutions (of which it is itself an instance) which frame individual's lives within the newly scientific World. The institution of this systematisation of critical inquiry will necessarily take on the character of a project for transforming the World, as the focal figure of Diderot coordinates in relation to his great collaborative script - increasingly threatening that older Scripture - the dramatic relations of text, plates, the systematisation of the World they project, and the reaction to this project in the actual World in which it must take place.
Thus one may see in Diderot's part, as precisely just the 'place' of coordination of questions and World in his strange conflation of periodical journal (as successive volumes of alphabetically ordered essays appear over the years) and 'encyclopedie', where the other contributors present compromises between the central 'actor' Diderot quite subordinated to his script, and personal perspectives that might better be incorporated in their 'own' books, a new version of a focal figure in the tradition of Mersenne and Descartes - finding and defining his part in the project of Science or Philosophy as he suggests the great actor should do on a narrower stage. Diderot's stage is precisely the interface between the narrow theatre for which he writes dramas, and the widest theatre which the project sets out to organise in relation to the text and illustrations of an Encyclopédie. The critical steps in the transition from Descartes' part to those of Diderot and his collaborators in 1750 - among them Voltaire, Montesquieu, Condillac, Rousseau, D'Alembert, Euler, Buffon, Raynal, Marmontel, Quesnay, Turgot, Holbach...and so on - may be traced along the narrower line of encyclopedias, 1674, 1697, 1728, or within the wider sphere of questions in their institutional and indeed natural contexts in general. I have suggested that a certain figure of 'Enlightenment' in its various national guises may be identified around, say, the time of publication of Chambers' Encyclopedia, and Voltaire's and Montesquieu's formative stays in England around 1730 - and that this figure may be taken as the reading of the 'principal' European reactions to Descartes over the intervening period turning around the 1680s. In the French case, the introduction by Voltaire, most notably, of English 'figures' of theory (Locke and Newton) and its institutional context (religion, politics, economy..literature, theatre) is no more simple 'translation' than the fruits of Montesquieu's visit in his analyses of the coupling of the various principal dimensions of a society and its historical dynamic. One must rather speak of a transposition of theory mediated by a couple of years' experience of the 'working' of the native version of the theories in question in their native context of (in this case) English language and life. As Diderot insisted in his review of Garrick, the truth of an English account of 'theatre' cannot be simply transcribed or translated, word for
word, into a different language - any more than - as Montesquieu insisted, institutions can simply be transferred to serve some identical abstract function from one place and one climate to another. Locke and Newton in England, and Leibniz in Germany, had responded to Descartes' Latin or Latin translations of his French; the *Principia* were eventually translated from Latin into English, then, one might say, following Voltaire's French synopsis, transposed into the French of D'Alembert and the Latin and French of Euler; shortly thereafter the *Opticks* were published in English and translated into Latin by Clarke, who had adapted Rohault's French. Leibniz complicates the picture by writing his metaphysics in French, the language of German courts after the mid-seventeenth century and down to the close of the eighteenth, but Thomasius was writing in German, and Wolff would initiate a specifically German Enlightenment in his native language. When Voltaire in the late 1720s was being introduced to the British response to Descartes in the late seventeenth century through his friend Bolingbroke's Deistic amalgam, while the latter was temporarily in his native country between two long exiles in France - and forming in Pope the verse apologist of the diluted Deism that would become in French translation its standard image on the continent - he was thereby encountering ready-made a theoretical version of the embedding of Cartesian logic in the poetics of experience and experiment which could be applied on his return to France to the transposition of the French criticism of that focal figure and his logic into the new key of a questioning of the French ideology itself, which coupled abstract Cartesian logic and its political analogue in abstracted autocracy and associated priestly hierarchy, French theories and their French contexts. It is not that England was being simply presented as an alternative solution of the same cultural questions - after all, Voltaire had gone there unwillingly in the first place, and was keen to return to abstract and tyrannical France and his mother tongue - it is rather that in France the texts of a British theory that theoretically inscribed itself in the pragmatic order of experience and activity could be set against French texts with their rational systematic deductions on the Cartesian model, and a new order of French text produced which questioned fairly systematically the theory and context of a theory that began with abstract thought and proceeded to think the relation of Thought and World, rather than with the experience of thinking in the world in which one found oneself, and
the passions which thinking about that irrational context inspired. In the question presented by the confrontation of French theory and its French institutional context with British theory in its British context, the ideological dynamic of French Enlightenment 'philosophy' unfolds quite as systematically in the verbal order of questions first discovered in the relations of logical and figural/poetic/cultural 'sides' of that linguistic dimension, as the Cartesian system had unfolded on the abstract logical side. Voltaire does not translate Newton, but transposes his figures of the embedding of theory in experience and experiment into a theoretical questioning of Cartesian abstraction of an abstract logic from that poetics; nor does Montesquieu translate Locke or imitate a British view of the British 'constitution' unknown to those the philosophes suppose governed by that 'system' of government; nor does Condillac translate Locke, but rather organise figures drawn from Locke in a French system of 'sensationalism' whose structure is determined systematically by the questioning of Cartesian system; nor does Diderot merely adapt the translation of Chambers' Cyclopedia in the hands of his publisher already (the version of Mills, never published, though the rights were the subject of convoluted intrigue) in the early 1740s - he begins by sending out copies of the various articles to his team, inviting annotation and emendation, but quite soon sees that a separate system is involved in the questions raised by these texts in the context of France and French theory, and by 1751 the Discours Préliminaire is systematically setting out the frame of the new enterprise, and marking the distance from its British prototype.

Pascal opened the questioning of Cartesian abstraction, but, as Voltaire so bitterly complained in the last letter added to the Amsterdam edition of the Lettres sur les Anglais (becoming, thereby, the more general 'Lettres Philosophiques') he responded to the question of Descartes questioning, Descartes' logic by (at least in the Port-Royal version of the Pensées) a reactionary assertion of a faith which Descartes had already brought into question. Nor could Bayle make anything coherent of the question of the relations of questioning and faith. Only by the transposition of figures central to the British theoretical tradition, but elided by the Cartesian tradition of abstract system, could a new order and dynamic of questions be opened up from around 1730, which, as it unfolded with accelerating urgency over the rest of the century
would come to be associated not so much with a system of logical and ideological questions attaching to the decaying old order, but rather with the conversion of an ever more integrated system of French questions into the complementary German physical dynamic of Holbach's *System of Nature* (1770), in which the Ancien Régime might be seen to be physically disintegrating. With the parts of Voltaire importing 'England' after 1730, Diderot taking the central coordinating 'place' in the critical project around 1750, Holbach the éminence grise of the radical then revolutionary vanguard after 1770, and Sade closing the project in an extreme limiting expression reflecting the political impasse of the Terror — and with all the other parts organised around these figures in the ideological axis of French Enlightenment, one may see the whole development, focussed in Diderot 'the actor', as the convergence from Voltaire's initial importation (his own word) or transposition of British 'poetics' of theory, of the European and indeed 'Atlantic' response to the first phase of reading of Descartes and his contemporaries lasting from about 1650 to 1730.

The symmetric organisation of the various 'parts' of philosophe around that of Diderot, if one follows his conception of the smaller stage, transposing it onto the larger theatre of the Lumières as a whole — or at least to that 'action' of which the Encyclopédie may be considered the 'script' — allow an organisation of the 'intellectual history' of 1730-1800 in terms of the symmetry of that script with coordinate cultural and economic figurations of the 'philosophic' movement. The 'dramatic' figure allows an articulation of 'Enlightenment' in a textual dynamic of questions which substitutes for and abstracts from the wider historical question of the interplay of linguistic dimension of questions with cultural and economic dimensions of what was 'open' to the philosophes and their contemporaries, in a sort of iteration of Voltaire's transposition of the dominant axis of French 'theory' or 'philosophy' from the logical dynamic of Cartesian abstraction to an equally French order of 'ideological' questions articulated in the symmetry of logical and figural orders. Not only does one thus follow
Gay in questioning Cassirer's logical determination of the dynamic of abstraction over the century of logical from figural dimensions of theory, and Crocker in substituting a primary figural dynamic of morality through the texts of the French Lumières: one further inscribes these questionings of Cassirer's abstraction from the Enlightenment criticism of abstraction in the still broader question of the coordination of the symmetric logical and figural sides of Enlightenment texts, or rather books, with the converse order of symmetry of figural and physical sides of their material economy of production, reading, and so on. Gay notes that Cassirer abstracts his account rather too well from French materialism and British scepticism; one might underline the criticism most succintly, perhaps, by noting that Adam Smith is not once mentioned in Cassirer's book.

If I emphasise so often the 'poetic' symmetry of verbal and material orders in the dynamics of theory — characterising each book of theory as verbal response to the author's situation materially confronting earlier texts in their material context, even if the response is theoretically posed by its author in the 'terms' of an earlier theoretical or verbal determination of the inscription of the verbal order of that determination in the context whose coordinates it determines 'in theory' — then this tendency might itself be compared to Voltaire's borrowing of figures through which he questions the abstraction of French theory from its context (and parallel structures in that context) from British theory in its context. The 'poetic' order of symmetry of logical and physical dimensions, and of linguistic and economic dimensions of which logical and physical are each, respectively 'sides', serves to present questions attaching to that questioning which is theory, from which that questioning abstracts. In particular, it allows one to pose, in the global 'limit' of coordination of logical, poetic and physical dimensions of theory, the question of the global 'poetic' symmetry of that historical drama called Theory as a whole, insofar as it is a whole. It is by posing this simple question that one discovers simple global relations between the physical order of years and the general 'harmonics' of global dynamics of the material economy of the 'Globe', and the general harmonics of questioning in which theory falls, 'globally', into fairly simple and symmetric cycles or phases of question — 1650, 1730, 1800 and so on, associated
with successive configurations of questioning of the abstraction of a previous order of question from the symmetry of theory and context, even if this symmetry of coupling be questioned, theoretically, in the verbal order of text, rather than 'in terms' of the coupling of that question itself with its practical context of being asked in a certain way, in a certain situation (and so on) by a (the) particular questioner, critic.

It is in relation to this 'dramatic' questioning of theory, also (and correlatively), that one confronts the question of the 'theorist' as an actor who has competed with others to 'play' one of a limited number of 'star' parts - like Diderot's part of theoretical actor (so to speak) - corresponding to so many nodes in the general matrix of symmetry of orders of question and context in which 'seminal' texts must be constructed (on the basis of, or as implicitly readings of, earlier 'key' texts, and in opposition to the principal alternative positions of the other 'leading thinkers'). Very crudely, one may say that a 'seminal' text is seminal inasmuch as it presents a question attaching to earlier seminal texts which frames subsequent positions in relation to those earlier texts; since the question presented by the configuration of earlier texts in the current context in which they are historically embedded, and associated with symmetries of the general matrix of such embedding, is generally associated with the new critic's assertion of his position in response to that question by which his 'references' are set in their contexts by being set in the later author's text in its context... then the new 'seminal' text will, in association with parallel or symmetric other 'seminal' readings of earlier seminal texts, itself provide the primary range of reference for the next generation of texts (either explicitly or implicitly).

In a crude way, as a sort of first approximation to a global structure of questions over a fairly long period (bearing in mind that 'seminality' can lie more or less dormant for quite a long time, as in the case of Copernicus in the period from 1500-1650, or, say, Vico over the period now under discussion) one may relate the simple statistics of publishing history to the question of seminal or nodality of a particular text in 'the history of theory' as represented by the sum of extant texts in, say, some large range of libraries. If one is attempting to trace a sort of structural dynamic of theoretical questions, albeit embedded as one variety of literature in a more general order of 'text'
then one must abstract from the statistical 'weighting' of different theoretical texts in the more general dynamic of the various parallel textual and non-textual responses to configurations of theoretical texts in their non-theoretical contexts, to the weighting attaching to those texts in the order of theoretical responses alone. A first step in this direction would be to attempt a relative weighting of earlier theoretical texts in the textual space of theory at a particular time, by, say, comparing the number of references to cartesian texts in theoretical texts over the period 1650-1700 or 1650-1800, thereby abstracting the 'theoretical' response to Descartes from more general questions of parisian intellectual fashions, for example, which might 'distort' the theoretical impact of his theory if we considered only the publishing history of his texts, through large numbers of copies of his books bought by those whose purchases marked a cultural order of response (the act of buying and having in one's library the 'right' books) more or less divorced from any theoretical response (embodied in a new theoretical text). Such a refinement of the 'crudest' statistical approach of merely counting extant copies (an intermediate approach might take into account booksellers' and publishers' records, sale catalogues of old private libraries, and so on) is in turn only an approximation of an ideal global analysis of theoretical intertextuality over a given period, where explicit citation of authors and their texts must be regarded as only one register of 'influence', at a sort of limit of the more general case of thematic configurations linking an earlier text with a later one. One might envisage a sort of idealised version of Cassirer's analysis of theoretical 'Enlightenment' through the transference of all extant theoretical texts up to around 1800 into a huge electronic data-bank, to which one would apply more sophisticated versions of the techniques applied at the CNRS to Leibniz' two short essays. By analogy with current approaches on the complementary material 'side' of historical analysis, one might call such a project an idealised 'quantitative intellectual history' or, perhaps, 'cliometric philosophy'.

Fortunately, even the crudest statistical approach in terms of, say, the occurrence of theoretical texts in a small range
of small libraries, is, as we already more or less knew, rapidly 'convergent' towards fairly familiar textual 'profiles' of influence over specific periods - and it is relatively easy by examining a fairly small number of the theoretical texts indicated by such a crude preliminary survey, to discount the distortions of cultural fashions in book-buying, censorship, and so on. By that point in the analysis one can easily see that the thematic organisation of, say, Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, relates directly and strongly to his compatriot Sir James Steuart's *Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy* published nine years previously, even though Smith does not so much as refer to his predecessor's work. Consulting the extant catalogue of Smith's library we can set Steuart in his context there, and ask the question why Smith conceals his debt, rather than whether Steuart has any historical importance in economic theory. On the other hand, we may coordinate Cassirer's selection of sources in his 'profile' of the emancipation of theory from its figural embedding in *Culture* and its material economy over the eighteenth century, with Cassirer's own 'position' in an analogous profile of theory at the opening of the twentieth century, and mark the characteristic 'abstraction' of his account by the absence from his text of Adam Smith. We might even derive our profile of 'nodal' texts of the Enlightenment from a collection of complementary twentieth-century readings or profiles, leaving behind the 'primary' sources entirely - but it is far easier to combine primary and secondary 'data', allowing one to control the other, than to attempt a systematic 'discounting' of a distortion that may be common to, say, the twentieth century as a whole, rather as, say, the exclusion of Sade from nineteenth-century intellectual history might be taken as a systematic 'reactionary' distortion characteristic of that century as a whole.

I have already - indeed throughout my 'reading' of the eighteenth as of other centuries of theory - suggested that this rapid 'convergence' in the determination of a 'representative' range of sources for a reading of a 'dynamic' of theory down from the pythagoreans, may be associated with the character of theory
at any point in that dynamic of 'tradition' as textual response to a range of earlier texts in the historical context common to them and to the new theoretical text as 'reading' of them, and writing of such reading. Insofar as any theory is necessarily a theory, a more or less unitary dynamic of questions and answers, of various or all of its own textual and contextual 'dimensions', it may be considered as a textual response, in the mode or genre of systematic questioning and answer (or at least the former) to a general configuration presented by the possibility of writing a 'new' text of theory in a context of theoretical-texts-and-their-contexts, of theory (as marked by texts read and text being written) in its context. If we limit consideration to those 'philosophical' theories which present the configuration of theory and its context or World as a whole, through a series of questions and answers opening and closing with opening and closing words of the book in which such theories are presented in their widest cultural context of anonymous critical reader in the World supposedly shared by the writer and this reader-in-general, then I have suggested that we may consider Cassirer's 'internal' textual tradition of theory as a transposition or mapping into the internal textual space, with its 'logical' and 'figural' sides, of the analogous wider historical space and time which each of the sequence of texts theoretically 'presents', 'in' its text, and that we may consider Cassirer's hermeneutic dynamic as the transposition into that textual dimension of Ranke's hermeneutic of 'scientific history'. That is, one may consider Cassirer's dynamic of questions which through various parallel sequences over the eighteenth century open up those questions from which a range of earlier texts may be seen as complementary abstractions, embedded in the figural short-circuiting of questioning characteristic of what I have called the 'poetic' order of 'myth' (but also of the 'part'), as the transposition from the political to the logical (or cultural to textual) dimension of a common 'history', of a common figure of hermeneutic embedding of text in a space and time and dynamic on which each of those texts or sources are themselves so many (perhaps fragmentary) perspectives coordinate with particular 'positions' in the overall action or structure that must be inferred from them by a kind of 'relativistic' coordination of positions with different perspectives on the difference of perspective from the different positions.
If we understand successive theoretical 'positions' as writing of reading of earlier, and opposed, 'positions', then the 'nodality' of seminal texts may be taken to correspond simply to authorial positions which present to readers (in their own positions relative to theory and context, which induce them at some point to follow what is open to them through the argument of a theoretical writing) the simplest figures of such 'relativistic' embedding of their 'reference' or (implicit or explicit) 'primary source' in an action, a global space and time, on which it is or was itself a view, a perspective. Insofar as the 'action' in question is articulated in the verbal dimension of argument, and its logical dynamic of bringing into question earlier figural abstractions from the space of questions implicit in the linguistic matrix of possible concatenations of words in question and assertion, one may reconstruct a logical dynamic à la Cassirer which successively embeds opposed perspectives and their various common themes at one point in the development, in the 'next' configuration which is a common questioning of the common abstraction of the common logic of the earlier oppositions, giving rise to various symmetrically opposed and complementary positions in response to the new questioning...which themselves then come jointly into question until we eventually reach Cassirer's own transposition of the hegelian response to Kant into this dialectic of logic and 'myth'...which we can then, in turn, 'relativistically' set in the historical dynamic of the first three decades of twentieth-century Germany.

Now in relation to 'Enlightenment', the primary 'global' frame of embedding of Cassirer's 'logical' dynamic of the theoretical text in a cultural dynamic from which he (and most of his texts) abstracts (by transposing the response to texts-and-contexts as presented by a new text-in-context, into the single dimension of textual presentation of coordinate dimensions of text and contexts) corresponds, of course, to Ranke's dynamic of 'political' interaction of the three cultural orders which articulate action in the coupling of the three parallel dimensions of 'language' (the three 'languages') specific to those geographical boundaries which define 'Britain', 'France' and 'Germany', with their complementary material economies of activity in those three geographical domains.
Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung: I have frequently argued for the coupling of certain orders and dynamics of theory or questioning and assertion, with those physical spaces of France, Britain and Germany, in the cultural order of national 'schools' of reading and writing theory, predominantly instituted physically in those national physical spaces - just as corresponding languages in which the various schools of theory are carried on are themselves predominantly coupled with a more or less politically integrated national order within the physical domain of activity 'governed' by such policy ('more or less integrated': rather less in Germany, where from Luther to Fichte german unity organises 'national' activity rather as a dominant question, than in terms of coordinated political assertion - yet this question itself defines the unity of a specifically german political disunity).

Lumières: I suggested that the ideological space and dynamic of french Enlightenment is opened up by Voltaire and Montesquieu around 1730, upon their return from Bolingbroke's England, through the 'relativistic' embedding of french theory and society in a wider space and dynamic in which the centralised logic of France and the pragmatic poetics of England present two complementary traditions: and that their 'theoretical' references or sources, Locke and Newton, themselves present the figure of an embedding of cartesian logic in a british poetics of experience and experiment (drawing in their turn upon Galileo, Kepler, Bacon and so on). Diderot's position in the Prospectus of 1750 is thus a 'relativistic' embedding of the complementary transpositions of England into France by Voltaire and Montesquieu, through the more general figure of transposition of the whole 'cycle' of british theory around 1730 (Chambers' Cyclopaedia, 1728) into a new dynamic projected for french theory as a whole, in its changing institutional context.

Thus the historical dynamic of an 'Enlightenment' whose central axis through Paris and Diderot is instituted by the transposition of british reaction to Descartes into the latter's own culture around 1730, presents a 'global' relativistic frame of successive theories as textual response to earlier texts in their most general cultural context, which cannot easily be convincingly
presented within an 'internal' textual dynamic abstracted from the coupling of that dynamic to its contexts through the embedding of theory in the different languages which are in turn to be seen as dimensions of different nationally instituted activity coordinate with the overall global or geographical space of different national 'economies' of that activity. Within this general frame the opening of french Enlightenment may be signalled or marked in relation to the *Lettres sur les Anglais*, or Montesquieu's initial sketch of the dynamic in Antiquity of interplay of the different 'dimensions' of 'culture', published the same year, and prefiguring the general frame there exemplified, in 1748. In turn the 'parts' of 'leading' figures such as Voltaire, Montesquieu, Diderot, D'Alembert, Rousseau, may be organised within the 'relativistic' dynamic of a more or less *french* Enlightenment, just as the general figure of that *french* strand or school - whose 'primary' references are to *its* leading figures, or to the stock foreigners *as* imported by them - may be coordinated with british and german 'Enlightenment' within the wider dynamic of the whole that eventually leads into a similarly multivalent european Romanticism.

As each of the theoretical texts noted in the main body of this text was being at once embedded or textually inscribed in a dynamic of questions opening in the *Introduction* with the question posed by the symmetry of the 'internal' textual stricture of this inquiry with its 'external' contextual coordinates (as the 'theory' of this symmetry was being unfolded through questions attaching to the 'internal' mapping of those external coordinates into their respective 'theories' or orders of questioning, in this text), so this text was thereby being inscribed in the 'historical' configuration and dynamic of an 'action' defined by the working-through in its 'external' space and time, from the institution of the pythagorean mystery in *Magna Graecia* onward, of the figure of successive theories as the writing of the reading of earlier theory, the critical questioning of earlier theoretical texts through the opening up of questions posed (generally in textual terms) by the symmetry of text in the context it framed with coordinate dimensions of that context from which it abstracted through the perennial figure
of articulating the relations of internal and external components of the theory of those components and their relations, in the internal logical dynamic of the theoretical text.

The coordination of the various words which mark in this book the embedding of the logical dynamic of this text in an historical dynamic of inscription of earlier theoretical texts in earlier configurations of a common global context over 2,500 years, necessarily abstracts from the 'complete' specificity of the many books it formally inscribes in a structural 'history' of theory or questioning, and only confronts the question of the relation between, say, the Lettres sur les Anglais as one term in this text, and as, say, the physical copy which I have read - the complete text (of the London edition, at any rate) physically set in the historical dynamic which connects Voltaire's pen with my typewriter - indirectly through the inscription of Voltaire in this text where the question of physical embedding of text in context is posed in, or through, this case. Thus the 'global' abstract coordination of a dynamic of questions articulated in the coordination of different terms in this text with different (often non-verbal) terms in its context (Voltaire, say) abstracts through its displacement into the case of this text in its context, from the question of the 'actual' relation of earlier writings to the partly abstracted configuration of their inscription in their context through their inscription in this text and its inscription, 'physically', in its context or contexts. So the questions posed by the writing of the Lettres Anglaises for Voltaire, are, naturally enough, not the same as their transcription into the wider historical dynamic here. My experience of that text is not Voltaire's...but I pose the question of such a difference in terms of my experience, which I can mark here, rather than Voltaire's which, since I am not Voltaire writing 250 years ago, I cannot. And yet...in a strong sense the experience of the figure of embedding of Voltaire's logic in correlative dimensions of its context, as transcribed above, which through the inscription of the figure into this narrative embeds this narrative itself in just such a configuration, is the very same.
That figure of what was 'open' to Voltaire confronting the paper on which he wrote, in English and in French, in England and in France, his reading of Locke and Newton and others, is also one figure of what is open to reader or writer of this text; in its context - and the context of this text and Voltaire's is that far the same, just as, by a complementary abstraction, the copy of his book I read is the same as it was in 1734, or more generally, what is physically the same thing is just what is invariant in different perspectives, spatial, temporal, sensorial, emotional, theoretical. On 'it': that is what, in our language 'it' as physical object 'is', even if it be something different 'to' me and to you and to Voltaire.

That is: the 'poetic' symmetry of logical dimension of questions, and physical space and time ('dimension') in which the questioning occurs, constitutes a figural dimension in which the logic of this text may be coordinated with the logic of an earlier text in the physical space and time of a common history. This text must then close by presenting to its reader a configuration or partial coordination of what is open to him or her as reader of this book, in the physical confrontation with the book in which what is thus open is marked in the textual order simply as question-mark: the question of what is open in the symmetry of the 'internal' logical order of this titular marking, with other coordinate dimensions of the mark, as coordinated 'in' the book with that internal order of logical coordination. 'Internally' the book merely poses 'formally' what is open in the context of its reading; the book as 'a physical object' poses the 'same' question from another side...and the conjunction in the activity of reading, as part of one's wider activity - of your wider activity - of these two 'sides', presents to the 'part' of reader in you, what is open to you in relation to that part.

My part then, as far as this book goes, is just to present to a very small number (0?, 1 - hello David?, ... ) of people (other than myself, but by this point in this version of the project that's all I can count...on; it may be enough...hello diary?) what is open 'in' that part. The 'part', then, is the formal figure 'in' this text of the embedding of this text in context: 'Who am I?...in the Globe Theatre marked by '?' as a minimal script.
This book, then, marks the 'place' of its reader in a matrix or configuration of text and context, through marking component figures in terms of a range of other texts set in 'historical' contexts; set in the time and space of a dynamic in which they have 'physically' come down to us in libraries, through the marking of that contextual dynamic within the internal dynamic of the narrative above. Within the primary figure of this actual confrontation with this book, the figures marked by other books listed here and standing on physical shelving near this book or far removed from it (wherever this copy may be) or perhaps, at least, fairly easily accessible, in its 'context' along with very many other books not even mentioned here, are coordinated inside and outside this text relative to this primary figure of 'the reader' - usually also a writer. That is: each text and coordinate figure of text-in-context, is so to speak 'nested' in this text and context in terms of a tradition of critical reading. Each text-in-context is framed as a bringing into its questioning (as frame of its self-assertion) a group of earlier or more-or-less contemporary texts, through their 'relativistic' or hermeneutic coordination as so many perspectives on the general or universal figure of Text-in-Context, which are themselves coordinated as so many positions in that common figure, in a historical dynamic (very often presented in the texts in question in terms of the textual space and logical dynamic of linguistic terms 'representing' the wider coordination of linguistic and non-linguistic terms) of inquiry. The logic of this inquiry, this reading, and its writing, is coordinate with an abstract 'poetic' symmetry and dynamic of such critical reading, as within symmetric parallel strands of theory, a new group presents more or less symmetric and complementary versions of a frame of questioning and assertion opened up as new questions are posed by the symmetry or complementarity of earlier versions of theory and theories. I have suggested that in the most general perspective, new theories should be inscribed in the broadest symmetry and dynamic of text-in-context as textual response (itself coordinate in the writer's life with non-textual dimensions of that life) not simply to the formal textual symmetry of earlier theories in 'textual space' and its logical time, but to the wider symmetry of this logical matrix of 'positions' with the complementary contextual configuration of historical inscription of those 'theoretical positions' in their writers' lives and their
institutional and material contexts. My own position, as I have already noted, can thus be read as my British response to the 'personal' question posed by the symmetry of inquiry and its dramatic context in other coordinate dimensions of my life, as this eventually opened up through my reading of British and French philosophy, and of other texts in that context, from around 1970.

I wondered if the symmetry of the various different theories of what I considered as symmetric dimensions of theory and context, were coordinate with a common abstraction of all as equally 'theory' articulated in the abstract internal logic of a text divorced from its inscription in the dramatic interplay of text or script and context in the activity of theoretical production.

When French, German, British and American 'schools' or many-stranded institutions of universal theory or 'philosophy' are thus coordinated with their linguistic embedding in the material interplay of corresponding national cultures, and when this common abstraction is coordinated with the rather more international schools of theory relating to specific dimensions of that international textual and contextual order, one can inscribe and coordinate various components of 'theory' or inquiry around 1970 with various components of its global context, in terms of the question posed by the symmetry of all these components which can be coordinated with what is open in the global situation of the textual marking of such symmetry.

That is: inquiry as a whole (and thus far it is indeed, 'by definition' a 'whole') can be articulated in its late twentieth-century context 'in' the question, addressed in the opening of this inquiry into itself as inquiry, of 'the question', of 'inquiry' - the question posed textually by the formal symmetry of the logical order of questions and answers, and their articulation as systematic theory, with coordinate dimensions whose theories are articulated within the internal textual logic of inquiry and theory.

I have frequently suggested that this configuration of 'question' mirrors the pythagorean theory of symmetry with which the inscription of this text in a dynamically articulated historical context begins, and that the mid-seventeenth century configuration of theory in its mid-seventeenth-century context, marked by Descartes'
articulation of theory directly within the linguistic symmetry of question and answer and its formal cartesian mathematics, may be taken as a mid-point in transition from pythagorean theory to inquiry or theory, relative to the general figure of textual logic within physical dynamic, whose abstract 'mathematical' harmonics serves to organise the general frame of presentation of the overall dynamical context of all theory, in terms of more or less symmetric historical cycles of inquiry, marked in terms of the 'nodality' of key texts as more or less direct presentations of questionings of a whole cycle of earlier theory, in terms of its common 'abstraction' from the newly presented order of questioning and argument.

Whereas Cassirer abstracts his logic of abstraction from its figural embedding in the 'poetic' order of inscription of theoretical text in material economy through the cultural dynamic of figure (of which instituted stage-drama presents a limiting figure, rather as logic presents a complementary limit of the verbal order of text, and the physical economy or dynamic of matter and radiation in space and time a limit of the material economy of interaction), the logic of critical theoretical response to earlier theories in a later context traced through the linear 'logic' of this text, is here (I hope) coordinate as the text proceeds, with the elaboration of a complementary figural articulation of embedding of the successive components of such a 'logic' in the historical context of this text. Thus we do not as it were throw successive figures of inscription of theory in context 'into the dustbin of history', but, from the figure of the pythagorean 'mystery' outward (rather than 'downward', since the figural order, as was recognised in the 'Quarrel of Ancients and Moderns' is in principle neutral with regard to forward logical 'progress' and contrary natural decline or decadence, decomposition, entropy), Cassirer's 'mythical' dimension presents us, as a neoplatonic writer observed, with 'stories of what never was, but always is'. Plato's 'ideas', or Descartes', are as real or actual as figures of reality or actuality now, as they were for Plato or Descartes. Subsequent logic has only embedded them in a more complex configuration of questions-in-context, rather than simply rejected them out of hand as mistaken frames for global Theory or Philosophy (although those
who, in the interim, have wished, as perhaps Plato and Descartes did also, to present a final positive frame have thus rejected platonic or cartesian theory as positive frame, only to have their own theoretical hubris rejected by hubristic successors in their turn).

My logic here, then, proceeds by following the historical marking in successive texts of a questioning of earlier theory, through a global historical matrix of symmetry of inquiry and context, from an initial pythagorean figure of 'theory' itself in its context of instituted mystery, down to the question presented by the symmetry of various different theories, as coordinate with their common abstraction from the question of this symmetry, as inscribed in the question of the symmetry of question and context in the situation where this question arises. The 'logical' dynamic of the narrative is coordinate, as it unfolds in historical space and time, with a poetic symmetry coordinating various historical parts of questioning and theory with the material economy of production of theory 'as a whole', in the institutional drama of 'theoretical interaction', or criticism and debate, writing one's reading of earlier or current theories, as one articulates one's 'own' position in the logical 'space' in which one has brought those alternatives 'into question'.

Thus 'around' Diderot's part of organising the question posed in the interface of french cultural and logical orders by the transposition into the french language of a british 'universal dictionary of arts and sciences' dating from the initial presentation of principles of such transposition by Voltaire and Montesquieu around 1730 - around this part from the Prospectus of 1750 down to its radicalisation in the Système de la Nature (on which he apparently collaborated) in 1770 - one can organise an embedding of a matrix of other 'parts', 'positions' coordinate with the focal part of the editor Diderot, in a wider historical matrix of texts and contexts organised by the global symmetry and dynamic of inquiry and its eighteenth-century contexts.
Cassirer's 'position' and perspective in and on a 'kosmos' coordinating the various symmetrical dimensions and dynamics of his narration of eighteenth-century theory, around the radical frame of what is or was open to him in the symmetry focussed as he wrote, in the part of writer, there and then - as he responded to what was open to him by framing this theoretically in a book, as theory developing in the logical narration or critical reading of earlier theory - this position and perspective in and on the historical dynamic of theory, I have attempted to co-ordinate with other historical positions by articulating a long dynamic of writing and reading of theory within the dynamic unfolding of my own position as response to the question posed by the symmetry of this questioning with other 'coordinate' terms or dimensions of its contexts. I have attempted to sketch how Cassirer's own narration of the abstraction of eighteenth-century logic from its textual embedding in a figurative order of 'myth' itself belongs to a specific figure of german abstraction of theory from its own figural embedding in a poetic order of symmetry of theory and its material production at the beginning of the twentieth century. If, then, one is to embed a dynamic of eighteenth-century theory and context within the wider dynamic articulating the temporal symmetry associated with initial 'positive' pythagorean version of the symmetry of theory and context as 'Kosmos', and closing question posed by the symmetry of question and context - in the 'global' spatiotemporal frame of this inquiry as an 'action' or 'drama' of western theory as a certain order of script... then one may do this, as I attempted in Part II, through coordinating in the wider frame the reading of Cassirer in his context with readings of a more or less random sample of eighteenth-century theoretical texts themselves. For in conjunction primary and secondary sources each 'control' the embedding of the other in a common millenial frame. One cannot simply reconstruct the embedding of eighteenth-century texts in their dramatic contexts as a mere formal corollary to the embedding of Cassirer's text in the poetics of theory from which it itself, in its very framing of that poetics 'transposed' into a textual thematic order abstracts, although as I have already noted the question of this embedding...
of Cassirer's logic of eighteenth-century theory in a global history of theory is as if it were simply the 'other side' - or another side - of the question of embedding any one of his themes or authors in the same wide dynamic. The difficulty lies in the fact that both Cassirer and his authors construct their theories precisely by abstraction from the very configuration of symmetry of theory and context in this abstraction - so that, for example, reconstructing the embedding of eighteenth-century theory in its contexts as a mere reflection of the embedding of Cassirer's reconstruction in its twentieth-century contexts, will not magically generate from Cassirer's text Adam Smith, who was lost, symptomatically, in the transposition from cultural to textual 'logic'. On the other hand, as we embed Cassirer's reconstruction in its context, we do, as a sort of corollary to the recognition of the 'abstraction' of his logic from its material context, look towards someone who, among his authors, presents an eighteenth-century theory of the material dynamics of culture - and as a first attempt to analyse the figure of his (Cassirer's) abstraction we look for the canonically primary 'economics' text of the period, to see how Cassirer attempts to embed the eighteenth-century logic of that material dynamic which is a direct converse of his own logical or ideological dynamic, in his reading...only to find that The Wealth of Nations appears so to speak between the lines as a nagging question, but does not figure in Cassirer's text at all.

My reading proceeds, in fact, between the two poles of Cassirer and Adam Smith - or, perhaps, the Marquis de Sade - by coordinating as I follow through the initial question posed for me in the late seventies, of embedding a 1960s and 1970s abstraction of the theoretical 'text' from a dynamic which opens up from the coordination of theory and context in pythagorean silence, a group of 'secondary' texts - readings of Cassirer in the light of the primary sources and a secondary relation to Cassirer himself, together with political, cultural and economic 'histories' of the period...and so on - with a complementary group of 'primary' texts, chosen more or less 'randomly' from those books of theory, by the buying and selling of which I have materially survived while writing this reading, together with more modern editions selected from library and bookshop shelves, in response
to what seemed a 'gap' in my reading (although many gaps, of course remain - let these be represented by Hazard's 

*Crise de la Conscience Européenne, 1690-1715*, which I have never got around to examining).

A fairly random eighteenth-century French matrix of inter- and intra-textuality, then, with a few later perspectives on specific components:

495 BONNET, Charles

_Considérations sur les Corps Organisés_

Amsterdam 1762

496 BOUGÈNES, Guillaume

_Hyacinthe_

_Amusement Philosophique sur le Langage des Bêtes_

Paris 1739 tr Hildrop 3 eds 1743-50

497 BUFFON, Georges Louis

_Leclerc de_

_Histoire Naturelle Générale et Particulière_


498 CONDILLAC, Etienne

_Bonnot de_

_Essai sur l'Origine des Connaissances Humaines_

Amsterdam 1746, intr Derrida Paris 1973

499 DELOLME, Jean-Louis

_Constitution de l'Angleterre_

Amsterdam 1771, rev & tr London 1775, rev Amsterdam 1778

500 DIDEROT, Denis

_Lettre sur les Aveugles à l'Usage de ceux qui voient_

Paris 1749 ed & intr Niklaus Geneva 1951

501 HELVETIUS, Claude-Adrien

_François_

_De L'Esprit_

Paris 1758, Amsterdam 1759

502 SMITH, 

_Helvétius_

London 1965
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<td>505</td>
<td>HOLBACH, Paul Heinrich Dietrich von</td>
<td>Système de la Nature 'Amsterdam (1770)1781</td>
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<td>507</td>
<td>LEFRANC DE POMPIGNAN, Jean-Georges</td>
<td>La Religion vengée de L'Incrédulite par l'Incrédulite elle-même Paris 1772</td>
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<td>508</td>
<td>CAMUSET, Joseph-Nicolas</td>
<td>Principes contre l'Incrédulité, À l'Ocassion du Système de la Nature Paris 1771</td>
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<td>509</td>
<td>'HELVETIUS'</td>
<td>Le Vrai Sens du Système de la Nature Paris 1774</td>
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<td>510</td>
<td>Marechal, Pierre Sylvain</td>
<td>Le Lucrèce Français Paris ('A Athéopolis, l'An Premier du règne de la Raison') 1781 &amp;c</td>
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<td>PEYRAUD, François</td>
<td>De la Nature et de ses Lois Paris 1793</td>
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<td>512</td>
<td>HOLBACH, Paul Heinrich Dietrich von</td>
<td>Histoire Critique de Jésus-Christ Amsterdam 1770</td>
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<td>513</td>
<td>Mably, Gabriel Bonnot de</td>
<td>Des Principes des Négociations The Hague 1757</td>
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<td>514</td>
<td>Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de</td>
<td>Considérations sur les Causes de la Grandeur des Romains, et de leur Décadence Amsterdam 1734,5;1748</td>
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<td>Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de</td>
<td>De l'Esprit des Lois Geneva 1748, 1750</td>
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<td>Apologie de l'Esprit des Lois Paris 1751</td>
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<td>DEBONNAIRE, Louis</td>
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<td>NECKER, Jacques</td>
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<td>Sur l'Importance des Idées Religieuses Paris 1788</td>
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<td>RAYNAL, Guillaume de</td>
<td>Histoire Philosophique &amp; Politique des Établissements &amp; du Commerce des Européens dans les Deux Indes Amsterdam 1770</td>
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<td>Rousseau, Jean-Jacques</td>
<td>Le Devin du Village Paris 17</td>
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<td>525</td>
<td>Rousseau, Jean-Jacques</td>
<td>Discours sur l'Origine et les Fondements de l'Inégalité parmi les Hommes Amsterdam 1755</td>
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<td>DUFOUR, Theophile</td>
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<td>(Principes du Droit Politique) Du Contrat Social</td>
<td>Amsterdam (1762) intr Rousseau 1762</td>
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<td>Jean-Jacques Rousseau. à Christophe de Beaumont</td>
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<td>STAROBINSKI, Jean</td>
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<td>SADE, Donatien Adrien François, Marquis de</td>
<td>Les Infortunes de la Vertu, Justine ou les Malheurs de la Vertu</td>
<td>Paris (1791) 1797</td>
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<td>STANISLAUS I of POLAND</td>
<td>Observations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne</td>
<td>(Lunéville 1749) Paris 1759</td>
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<td>543</td>
<td>VERNET, Jacob</td>
<td>Lettres Critiques</td>
<td>Geneva 1766</td>
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<td>(more or less official genevan reaction to the local and visiting philosophes...and chiefly to their father-figure, the Patriarch just across the border:)</td>
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<td>VOLTAIRE, François Marie Arouet, called</td>
<td>Lettres écrites de Londres sur les Anglais et autres Sujets</td>
<td>London 1734, tr Lockman 1733</td>
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<td>Traité de Métaphysique (1734) pKehl1765</td>
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<td>Le Siècle de Louis XIV (1732-1751)</td>
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<td>Geneva 1764,1770 &amp;c</td>
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<td>Voltaire: Bibliographie de ses Oeuvres</td>
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If Cassirer and Adam Smith, or Sade, present an interesting couple, so too, but in a sort of converse mode, do Voltaire and Besterman: in the first case a complementary pole of theory is quite abstracted from, in the second the two writers are more or less identified, as
Besterman impersonates his hero. Cassirer cites little secondary material not written by himself; Besterman (elsewhere the indefatigable compiler of a World Bibliography of Bibliographies) here cites almost nothing not written by himself, or edited by him in:

Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century ed Besterman
Oxford/Les Delices 1955-

...except to cite the Cambridge Modern History ('though unfortunately the new edition is not as good as the old'); Cassirer, Crocker, Gay ('pretentious, but unsound and humourless') and The Age of Enlightenment: Studies presented to Theodore Besterman as 'the chief works on the Enlightenment', with only the dismissal of Gay in the way of discussion (none are mentioned in the text - they figure in a concluding note)...and previous biographies of Voltaire and his family, together with three brief essays on eighteenth-century Europe.

Besterman's tone throughout is adulatory and proprietorial in relation to Voltaire, never critical either of his 'great man' or in his own approach, but always rhetorically dismissive of any of the other dramatis personae in his narrative who allowed themselves a critical distance from the 'sage'. At first the contrast between the editor, twice over, of 20,000 letters, minutely noting variants and documenting allusions and references through seventy thick scholarly volumes, and the lack of anything in the way of theoretical or critical perspective in his account of their writer seems astonishing; but then one realises that the 600-page biography is so to speak the figural frame of an identification with the most prominent character on the eighteenth-century literary scene or stage, which has at once organised, and been organised by, the untiring working-through of that very script of Voltaire's life which is his enormous Correspondence...and that this labour of identification in the figural order abstracted from logical and theoretical structures in eighteenth-century thought as in its presentation, is a sort of extreme British corollary to Cassirer's global logic of that stage on which Voltaire is set. If Diderot organises around his part that play of critical questioning, the tension between which and its fragmenting institutional context I have taken as an axis of French Enlightenment, and so indirectly of European Enlightenment in
general, Voltaire's 'part' may be considered in relation to this axial part of coordinator of questions, as analogous to Descartes part in relation to Mersenne in the previous century; but whereas Descartes constitutes a sort of formal theoretical focus in the interplay of theoretical perspectives that would eventually be instituted by Louis XIV in his Académie des Sciences, Voltaire focusses in himself that ideological space framed by the Encyclopédie, in his self-assertion as Critic, and through all those often questionable machinations in which he attempts to frame behind the scenes that public persona, and elide any other part of criticising his own playing of the Critic, the Philosopher, bridging the tension between Old Order and New (1).

I will close this set of texts with the initial script for the transition from Old to new - the Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme as theoretical preamble of 1789, and the first european formal 'constitution', almost exactly contemporaneous with that of the old british colonies across the Atlantic, and drawn up in consultation with Paine, Jefferson and Franklin, by the Assemblée Constituante:

558 Constitution décrétée par l'Assemblée Nationale Constituante Paris 1791

"...Since the elements in this script regulating its own emendation almost immediately proved to be unworkable, Condorcet was ordered by the legislative body it had itself defined to draw up a - constitutionally invalid - revision (1793), in its turn overthrown in the Terror in which Condorcet died, to be thereafter replaced by the Constitution of 1795, itself overthrown by Napoleon's coup d'état.

1: An exemplary case is that of the publication of Candide, and Voltaire's complex activity 'behind the scenes' leaves as its legacy a fertile ground for variant reconstructions, not only of the context of publication, but (reciprocally, so to speak), of the 'true' text itself. Thus

559 WADE, Ira Voltaire and Candide Princeton 1959

opens up a new space of controversy which after several dozen variant mappings by defenders and critics, may never, it seems, be definitively charted.
The British institutions first expressed as unitary 'constitution' in French by Montesquieu and Delolme, have never been formally codified in any definitive text, book, codex, which as verbally framing such unitary national activity would thereby frame its own determinant part in it, regulating the activity of its own interpretation, like the Quran. It was precisely against that limiting version of the French 'philosophic' programme which set out to frame within a theory of natural right, rational social unity, the script which would logically frame its own directive role in the national unity it framed, that Burke fulminated so violently in defense of the pragmatism of English revolution exactly a century before. As Louis progressively made formal abdication of his sovereign right, by conferring to the États-Généraux the power to define this formal role themselves, having been formally constituted a Constituent Assembly, the logic of the new 'constitutional monarchy' was set out in the Declaration of the Rights of Man - but the British Bill of Rights of 1689 which established the model of a constitutional monarchy was not framed as a theoretical system of political logic, as basic principles from which the elaboration of those principles into a complete social system might be derived according to the principles themselves; rather did it merely constitute a set of constraints upon an otherwise open relation between sovereign executive and legislative assembly, monarch and subject, in the tradition coming down from Magna Carta and the first parliaments of the thirteenth century. What the 'anglomaniacs' of France had seen as the British system of government, preferable to the centralised French system, was preferable precisely because it was not a 'system', but a pragmatic tradition in which the force of legislation resided in its character as textual intervention in institutions of interpretation of such texts, 'constitutional' or more specific. The 'meaning' of legislation, its interpretation, was determined over time by the courtroom drama of pragmatic choice by the judiciary between the various courses of action consistent with the textual constraints imposed by statutes according to their interpretation thus far. Any attempt to reduce this historical dynamic of interplay of the three branches of government to a definitive set of principles embodied in some theoretical text would necessarily lead to just that sort of tension between absolute authority and
its theoretical textual definition, in the practical sphere, which Descartes had discovered between that Author of Nature (of which the Grand Monarque might have been supposed the earthly image) whose Law he framed in his texts, and Descartes himself as author of his book. As religious reaction had been quick to see the instability of the role of Author in that scheme, so the new reaction immediately saw the instability of executive authority when cartesian logic was applied to a text that would define the 'law' or constitution of human society within the wider laws of Nature. And as the initial reaction to Descartes set the frame for the eighteenth-century ideological contest between progressive theory of natural society in a wider scientific Nature, and reactionary protest at the practical disruption of the harmony of traditional roles in the human drama, associated with this role of the philosophe, so that typically English conservative progressive Burke could welcome progressive criticism of regal policy toward America in the 1770s, and abhor a converse absolutism founded theoretically on the natural rights of the subject in the 1790s. As ideological reaction to Descartes had foreseen the threat to the stability of a divine harmony of different parts in the social hierarchy as a threat to the priestly part of defining that order, so the reaction to his ideological descendants of the 1790s could see in the part of theoretically framing the social order rather than pragmatically framing theory, the very epitome of criminal conspiracy against established Church and State, the very seed of social disorder, the scapegoat philosophe of royalist emigres, or ideologue banished from the Institut by Napoleon after Brumaire.

When, then, we look for the charting of the ideological contest over 'Enlightenment' in a British text rather than, say, Cassirer's rational system of abstraction of rational system from its 'mythical' figuration, it is characteristic that the historiographical tradition in which we must look opens with a narration that sets the British tradition down from the first reactions to Descartes to the period of the French Revolution in a literary context and its dynamic which sets 'thought' in the moral order of society, and is articulated between progressive critical questioning and conservative reaction to the complementarity of faith
and reason which dismisses theoretical reason as the wrong alter-
native, as practically disastrous - articulated in the narrative
order of an interplay of progressive logic and conservative faiths:

560 STEPHEN, Leslie

English Thought in the Eighteenth Century
London 1876

561

The Science of Ethics London 1882

562

English Thought and Society in the Eighteenth Century.

Stephen, resigning from his Cambridge fellowship in 1862 because he
could no longer uphold the clerical position it implied, applied the
traditions of his eminent family of lawyers to the examination of
the eighteenth-century 'precedents' for the resolution of that con-
flict of victorian faith and reason signalled by the publication in
1859 of the Origin of Species. Like legal texts, the judgements of
the Eighteenth Century upon the relation of criticism, Book, and
morality, must be considered as practical responses of the critics
and other judges to the theoretical positions that lay open to them,
determined ultimately by common participation in a non-textual tra-
dition or institution of textual interpretation. And like a legal
judgement based on those precedents, Stephen's own account must it-
self be considered as a textual intervention 'on the critical side'
of Progress, in the situation in which he found himself - as literary
critic, soon to become the editor of the canonical judgements on
the earlier actors or parts on the stage of british History (DNB),
in the same year that he gave an independent systematic presentation
of the Ethics he had deduced from his sources, and defined in relat-
ton to the more general dynamic of Progress illuminated by Darwin.

Stephen's texts, then, pose - whether intellectual
history, literary biography and criticism, ethical theory, the
canon of british History (to which he contributed 387 articles
from 1882, covering inter alia most of the major theorists of
Enlightenment, as well as Carlyle, the Mills, and so on) - the
question of what is practically open in the moral order of activity
in relation to the textual or literary interface whose two poles are a dogmatic assertion framed by the Book that asserts its own inscription in the drama it frames, and a converse humean questioning, a scepticism that cannot even be coherently framed. In his daughter's *To the Lighthouse* 'Mr Ramsay's' abstract questionings of the existence of the table on which he writes is set as one component in the play of questions organised around the question of a trip to the lighthouse; Stephen's critical writing was, though, defined by himself as what he called an 'agnostic' working-through of the configuration of what is open, so to speak, with a book, in the play of its logical and figural sides, within the wider sphere of what is open to readers and writers and others in their social interaction. In his daughter's book the critic is coordinated in his literary abstraction with the others in the feminine matrix of what is open in Mrs Ramsay's household. One is tempted to extend this converse inscription of Leslie Stephen the critic in the figural dynamic of his daughter's fiction focussed in his wife, into a sort of double inscription of the intellectual historian in both the 'theoretical' dynamic that runs from Arnold and himself down to the 'practical criticism' that dominates mid-twentieth century British literary criticism, and the domestic drama that runs from his succeeding his father-in-law Thackeray as editor of the *Cornhill* to producing in his daughter Virginia the beginnings of a literature on which the criticism he in part engendered would be exercised. Indeed one might complicate the interplay of Leslie Stephen and Mr Ramsay further by introducing into the dramatic interplay of anglophone 'theory' and 'fiction' over the turn of the century that James family already discussed in Part III. But let me now, rather, list some of those 'precedents' of Stephen and myself, by the inscription of which-in the dynamic of the literary interface of logical criticism and figural myth or faith, I may in my turn call into question Stephen's own such inscription, by at the same time inscribing, as I do here, his own survey, which is one of my precedents now being cited, in my 'construction' upon our common sources or predecessors - by inscribing his construction, and some of his references, in a radicalisation of his figure of criticism or questioning, in which his writing, for example, finds itself inscribed not just in a theoretical literary interface of fiction and theory, but in the figural order of his daughter's fiction itself.
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<td>563</td>
<td>BEATTIE, James</td>
<td>Essays Edinburgh 1778</td>
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<td>564</td>
<td>BEDDOES, Thomas</td>
<td>Dissertations Moral and Critical London 1783</td>
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<td>565</td>
<td>BOLINGBROKE, Henry</td>
<td>Observations on the Nature of Demonstrative Evidence London 1793</td>
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<td>566</td>
<td></td>
<td>Philosophical Works ed Mallet London 1754</td>
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<td>567</td>
<td>BURKE, Edmund</td>
<td>A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful London (1756)</td>
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<td>568</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reflections on the Revolution in France London 1790</td>
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<td>569</td>
<td>CHESTERFIELD, Philip</td>
<td>Letters to his Son London (1774) ed Dormer Stanhope, Earl of</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Oeconomy of Human Life London 1751</td>
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<td>570</td>
<td>DARWIN, Erasmus</td>
<td>The Botanic Garden London 1792</td>
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<td>571</td>
<td>DODSLEY, Robert</td>
<td>The Oeconomy of Human Life London 1751</td>
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<td>572</td>
<td>GIBBON, Edward</td>
<td>The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire London 1776-88</td>
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<td>573</td>
<td></td>
<td>Miscellaneous Works..with Memoirs London 1796</td>
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<td>574</td>
<td>HARRIS, James</td>
<td>Three Treatises (London 1744) in ( )</td>
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<td>575</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hermes, or a Philosophical Inquiry concerning Universal Grammar London 1751</td>
<td>(translated into french by order of the Directory in 1796)</td>
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<td>576</td>
<td></td>
<td>Philosophical Arrangements (London 1775) in ( )</td>
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<td>577</td>
<td></td>
<td>Works ed Berry London 1801</td>
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<td>579</td>
<td></td>
<td>An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (London, 1748,1758) ed Mossner NY 1963</td>
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</table>
The History of England  London 1754-62

(here I may as well insert a single representative of that characteristic eighteenth-century French genre of epitome usually appearing as L'Esprit de..., Le Génie de..., ...ana, and so on:

581  Le Génie de M. Hume  Paris 1770

...which amounts to a system of thematic extracts from various other writings of Hume, considered as preliminary studies of the several dimensions or coordinates of the History in abstraction from their eventual concrete assembly there, and introducing sections of the latter thus construed as a philosophical history of England a la Montesquieu or Voltaire)

582  Letters ed Greig  Oxford 1932

Hume is set in the textual and institutional matrix of 'the Scottish school' by:


..which sets out to exhaustively chart that specific system of textuality over the two centuries of its more or less specific coherence. Thus he notes:

585  McCosh, James  The Scottish Philosophy - biographical, expository, critical, from Hutcheson to Hamilton  London 1875

'I have tried to make my work a contribution to what may be regarded as a new department of science, the history of thought, which is quite as important as the history of wars, of commerce, of literature, or of civilisation'(1)

..In fact this is a series of biographical notices which provide a 'common-sense' history of thought by embedding it in the practical poetics of common-sense life, rather as Hume's poetics of a wider history responds to his abstract scepticism, and the common sense assertion of Common Sense with Reid responds to the question posed by the complementarity of sceptical logic and the poetics of faith in an essentially conservative choice of pragmatic

1: Preface
faith. With McCosh, who followed in the tradition of members of the 'Scottish school' who became President of Princeton (1868-88) and thereby also professor of philosophy there (a job tied to that of President), may be taken as a common-sense corollary of Leslie Stephen's almost exactly contemporaneous narration, constructed in response to precisely the same interplay of faith and reason which mirrored the moral concerns of 1875-6 in the initial opening-up of the 'deist' question in the early eighteenth century - yet Stephen's broader survey is balanced in the literary interface of progressive logic and conservative faith, and in the inscription of this literary tension in the moral axis of the wider social dynamic; McCosh abstracts through Reid's answer to Hume, to a common-sense biography, which might in turn be taken to reflect Hume's own response to scepticism in conservative history.

Now Leslie Stephen's own perspective is said to be given its most perfectly balanced expression in his study of Johnson, which inaugurated the 'English Men of Letters' series to which his final contribution was the Hobbes (noted above) published a year after his death (this is said, for example, in the article on Stephen by his successor as editor of DNB). I will not dwell, though, on the analogies between Johnson and his Dictionary and Diderot with the Encyclopédie, as coordinating foci in Britain and France, or the wider system that might be explored in the coordination of the parts of Johnson, Stephen, and the range of philosophers and other writers from Hobbes down to Stephen's own day covered in his own articles contributed to the later 'dictionary' (of biography;...

586 JOHNSON, Samuel

Plan of a Dictionary of the English Language (London 1747; in 1786 ed of ( ))

587

The Rambler London 1750-2

588

A Dictionary of the English Language London 1755 (fac: NY 1967) ed Harrison 1786

589

Political Tracts (1770-5) London 1775

590

Sermons ed Hagstrum & Gray New Haven 1978

591 GRAY, James

Johnson's Sermons: A Study Oxford 1972
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<td>592</td>
<td>BOSWELL, James</td>
<td>The Life of Samuel Johnson</td>
<td>London 1791</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>ed Hill (1887)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>rev Powell Oxford-1934-66</td>
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<td>593</td>
<td>CLIFORD, James C</td>
<td>Young Samuel Johnson</td>
<td>London 1955</td>
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<td>594</td>
<td>GREENE, Donald J</td>
<td>The Politics of Samuel Johnson</td>
<td>New Haven 1960</td>
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<td>595</td>
<td>(FRANCIS, Sir Philip?)</td>
<td>Letters of Junius</td>
<td>London (1768-72) 1772</td>
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<td>596</td>
<td>MACKINTOSH, Sir James</td>
<td>Vindiciae Gallicaee</td>
<td>London 1791</td>
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<td>597</td>
<td>MIDDLETON, Conyers</td>
<td>A Free Inquiry into the Miraculous Powers which are supposed to have existed in the Christian Church through several successive Ages</td>
<td>London 1748</td>
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<td>598</td>
<td>OSWALD, James</td>
<td>An Appeal to Common Sense on behalf of Religion</td>
<td>Edinburgh 1768-72</td>
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<td>599</td>
<td>PAINE, Thomas</td>
<td>The Rights of Man</td>
<td>London 1791-2</td>
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<td>The Trial of Thomas Paine (for above)</td>
<td>London 1792</td>
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<td>601</td>
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<td>The Age of Reason</td>
<td>London 1794-5</td>
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<td>602</td>
<td>WATSON, Richard</td>
<td>An Apology for the Bible in a series of Letters addressed to Thomas Paine</td>
<td>London 1796</td>
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<td>603</td>
<td>POPE, Alexander</td>
<td>An Essay on Criticism</td>
<td>London (1711)</td>
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<td>604</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Dunciad</td>
<td>London 1728 ('verirum')1729</td>
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<td>605</td>
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<td>An Essay on Man</td>
<td>London 1733-4</td>
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<td>ed Warburton 1743</td>
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<td>606</td>
<td>AUDRA, E</td>
<td>Les Traductions Francaises de Pope</td>
<td>Paris 1931</td>
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<td>(there were many editions of nine different translations of the Essay on Man between 1736 and 1800, eight translations of the first Essay... Pope was the first british literary figure writing in English to be generally known in France)</td>
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<td>607</td>
<td>PRIESTLEY, Joseph</td>
<td>An Examination of Reid's Inquiry..Beattie's Essay..and Oswald's Appeal</td>
<td>London 1774</td>
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<td>608</td>
<td>PRICE, Richard</td>
<td>Four Dissertations</td>
<td>London 177</td>
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<td>No.</td>
<td>Author</td>
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<td>609</td>
<td>Ferguson, Adam</td>
<td>Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government, and the Justice and Policy of the War with America</td>
<td>London 1776</td>
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<td>610</td>
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<td>Additional Observations..</td>
<td>London 1777</td>
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<td>611</td>
<td>FERGUSON, Adam</td>
<td>Remarks on a Pamphlet by Dr Price..</td>
<td>London 1776</td>
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<td>612</td>
<td>Reid, Thomas</td>
<td>Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man</td>
<td>London 1785</td>
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<td>613</td>
<td>Reynolds, Sir Joshua</td>
<td>Seven Discourses</td>
<td>London 1778</td>
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<td>614</td>
<td>Hilles, F W</td>
<td>The Literary Career of Sir Joshua Reynolds</td>
<td>London 1933</td>
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<td>616</td>
<td>Stewart, Sir James</td>
<td>An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy (London 1767) in</td>
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<td>617</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Works, Political, Metaphysical and Chronological ed (with Life) Steuart London 1805 (also includes Observations on Beattie's Essay (1775); Critical Remarks on the System of Nature (1779))</td>
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<td>618</td>
<td>Stewart, Dugald</td>
<td>Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind</td>
<td>London (1792-1814) 1814</td>
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<td>619</td>
<td>Thompson, Benjamin</td>
<td>Essays Political, Economical, Philosophical</td>
<td>London 1796-1802</td>
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<td>620</td>
<td>Walpole, Horace</td>
<td>Letters ed Toynbee</td>
<td>Oxford 1903</td>
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<td></td>
<td>'This World is a comedy to those who think, a tragedy to those who feel' (to Mann, 1772)</td>
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<tr>
<td>621</td>
<td>Tyerman,</td>
<td>The Life and Times of Wesley</td>
<td>London</td>
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Having already taken Albertus Hunacius as my representative of the 'minor writer' in all ages, I pass over here as elsewhere, a range of 'precedents', sources, references, that appear to be covered well enough, as far as my questioning here goes, by the writers of, so to speak first and second rank here listed. Albertus is enough to pose the question of the relation of first and second to third rank, the question of the embedding of the 'seminal' writers who in a book or series of books bring a whole range of earlier theory into a common question to which they respond, in the widest 'tertiary' matrix which presents the myriad details of multiple intersections of those broad 'seminal' questions, in the personal situations of a hundred thousand minor theorists whose books fill many many miles of library shelves around the world, but are seldom quoted, even in german histories of theory, being of merely 'antiquarian' interest. And since I am tracing a certain 'bibliography' of theory in this book, rather than of fiction or theatre or painting (or....), I list only very occasionally 'non-theoretical' books - and then only those which mark primary coordinates of the literary inscription of theory in literary and social contexts.

Some idea of the question of the scale and structure of the abstraction here of a mere handful of primary and secondary texts in whose relations the questions of their common embedding in a millenial dynamic of text and context may be posed, from the wider 'literary' matrix may be presented by:


..where the third volume, covering the years 1660-1800 groups around a hundred titles on each of about 2000 pages. The entries in various sections and subsections supersede those in the earlier version (ed Bateson 1940-57) which were in turn expansions of the bibliographies relating to sections of the

623 Cambridge History of English Literature  ed Ward & Weller Cambridge 1906-16

planned as a literary survey analogous to the Cambridge Modern History.
Allowing for repetitions of the same title under different heads there are listed in the third volume of (622) something like 100,000 primary and secondary 'sources'. If around half are books of around 250 pages, and half articles of about the same length as a chapter, then if one read 30 pages an hour, eight hours a day, five days a week, for fifty years (say from the age of twenty to that of seventy), one could get through about 12,500 of the books, or all of the articles and about 7,500 books, in such a lifetime devoted almost entirely to reading. That is: a whole life would only be enough time for one 'critic' to carefully read about a quarter of a representative selection of the primary and secondary sources for the history of English Literature between 1660 and 1800.

So I make a virtue of necessity and trust to a fairly cursory examination of parts of the CHEL, (623), itself based on a group of scholars' often cursory reading of a representative selection of primary and secondary (up to around 1910) sources relating to their specific subsection within the wider history of a literature in this one among many languages - each of those literatures only a minuscule fraction of the wider non-literary use of what is in turn only one dimension of each linguistic group's activities. I will let french 'literature' be represented here as a whole by:

624 LANSON, Gustave

Histoire de la Littérature Française
Paris (1894)

.. and the eighteenth century by:

625 La France Littéraire ed Hébrail & Laporte Paris 1769

(an early attempt at a bibliography of all living and recently deceased authors, together with a survey of all contemporary literary institutions).

Germany:

626 ROBERTSON, J G

A History of German Literature London (1902)
(rev Purdie 1959) rev Reich 1970

and I will represent two poles outside english (including american, of which more below), french and german 'literatures' over the period of Enlightenment by:
Back for the last time to Cassirer's book: within the textual matrices just noted, we can embed the textual matrix of Cassirer's Enlightenment: 226 titles by 93 authors, 52 authors represented by only one book, 17 by two books.

3 books: Baumgarten, Berkeley, Bodmer, Condorcet, Descartes, s'Gravesande, Mendelssohn, Montesquieu, Shaftesbury

4 books: D'Alembert, Goethe, Holbach, La Mettrie, Lessing

5 books: Bayle, Herder, Hume, Maupertuis

6 books: Condillac

7 books: Leibniz

8 books: Kant, Rousseau

18 Diderot

28 Voltaire

...but this statistical profile is distorted by how much the various writers published, and how much they published under each title: one cannot put one of Voltaire's thousand-plus titles into the same scale as, say, Newton's *Principia*, and imagine they will as it were balance. We might do better to consider the number of pages of Cassirer's own book on which each author figures - or, say, the number of lines of page-references for each author in Cassirer's index:
This table might be taken to give a closer picture of a sort of textual space and time in which the texts of the Enlightenment are set as a matrix of reading or 'criticism' within the wider matrix of the western tradition of theory down to 'Criticism', as a whole. Thus to take the most prominent 'parts' in that spatio-temporal matrix of substitution which is Cassirer's text, we may see a transition between the two poles of Descartes and Kant through primary nodes of an initial reaction - Locke-and-Newton in England and Leibniz on the Continent - and then through the french axis dominated by Voltaire and Diderot and the parallel british and german axes dominated by Hume and Wolff. In purely statistical terms one might note the weight given to the 'aesthetic' theory that runs in France from Boileau through Dubos to Diderot, and in Germany from Jodmer's initial reaction to Boileau, taken up at Halle by Baumgarten, through Lessing to Goethe and the third Critique - not to speak of the 'transcendental' aesthetics of the first.
Having already presented my own selection of 'primary' material for Enlightenment in Britain and Lumieres in France, let me present in a more cursory fashion a couple of 'nodal' figures for, first, Lumieres in Germany:

629 FRIEDRICH II of PRUSSIA  Oeuvres Posthumes  Berlin 1788

and the Aufklärung over which he presided in its prussian focus, having recalled Wolff as Chancellor of Halle in 1732, revoking the banishment imposed by his father in 1723 and occasioned by the content at the new university between wolffian Reason and pietist Faith which parallels the deist contest in England:

630 WOLFF, Christian (Anfangsgründe aller mathematischen Wissens- schaften  Halle 1710) rev in lat tr as Elementa Matheseos Universae  (1713-15) &c

631 De Differentia Nexus Rerum Sapientis et Fatalis Necessitatis, necnon Systematis Harmoniae Prae- stabilitae et Hypothesium Spinosae luculenta  Commentatio  Halle (1723)1737

632 Monitum ad Commentationem  Halle (1723)1737

634 Horae Subsecivae Marburgensis (lectures at Mar- burg 1729-31) Frankfurt/Leipzig 1729-41

Rather than listing the various long books arranged on the 'geometrical' plan of Spinoza's Ethics in which Wolff elaborated his systematisation of his earlier mentor Leibniz' 'perspective' or perspectivism, I will note only the 'official' Halle 'contraction' to two bulky volumes, which served as epitome and analytic index to the larger corpus itself:

635 STIEBRITZ, Johann Friedrich  Philosophiae Wolfianae Contractae  (intr Wolff):  
I Logica, Ontologia & Cosmologia Generalis II Psychologia Empirica & Rationalis, & Theologia Naturalis  Halle 1744-5

The six-fold symmetry of the wolffian 'system', it might be noted, differs from my six 'dimensions' coordinate with the logical dimension of theory itself as unfolded in the Introduction to this
I make moves, sentence by sentence, paragraph by paragraph (apologies for the gross irregularity in higher-level structures; this is, after all, a writing of a reading, and those structures are rather more evident in the books of which this writing is a reading, than in this writing itself). As I make each move, I prepare the next, as my response to an imaginary questioning of the previous move, working through what is open in the initial situation of me, imaginary book, and imaginary range of 'you', critical readers.

This part of writing this inquiry into itself, is a part in which I still find myself, as, at nine o'clock in the evening on the 23rd February 1987, in this house by the old Cambridge road out of the City of London, I take up again the sequence of questions interrupted at the close of the last paragraph a few days ago - having taken up the Close at page clxxiv after a much longer interruption, between the 4th May 1985 and the first days of January 1987, corresponding to my displacement from the Herefordshire fields where I had been writing until May 1985. I have already outlined above Joughin's development from mid-century up to the mid-eighties: a sequence from birth through school and university to Paris in the mid-seventies, then out into the British fields where, in cultural isolation or abstraction from the everyday dynamic of urban life and university 'campus', I pursued the line of this inquiry through the abstract space of these words. That - indeed this - line, opens and closes with the dramatic inscription of the 'internal' space of these words, and with them, the inquiry as a whole, in a wider questioning where the symmetry of that 'internal' dynamic of questions, and the other dimensions of what is open in the situation in which I write (and you read), itself presents itself, putting this questioning itself 'in question'. Within that frame of opening Introduction and final Close, and so 'within' that limiting question posed by this questioning itself - within, as it were, the 'narrower' space of what is open, not in relation to the 'abstract' figure of 'inquiry', 'as such', but in relation to this 'actual' inquiry - I have articulated a dynamic of successive questionings of earlier questionings, successive critical 'readings' of previous critical readings of still earlier inquiries, 'theories'. 
Thus the 'content' of the three central Parts or sections or phases of this book as a whole, have been articulated 'in abstraction' from the radical question of what is open to us when inquiry itself comes 'into question': that question has been throughout the 'end' of the inquiry, and has directed the dynamic of reading 'in the meantime', constantly deferred, from one figure to another of embedding of 'historical' theories in configurations of context to which succeeding theories have been read as responses - read as provisional embeddings of inquiry in context, themselves coming into question, as each time the figure by which some theory is here set in context, in its turn is revealed as just the theoretical configuration of a succeeding theory, which must then be brought into question itself...until Part III closes, and the Close opens, with this book itself once more in question - but now in a complex configuration of 'context' unfolded from reactions to the pythagorean 'mystery' which opened Part I.

The 'internal' space of the inquiry, then, may finally be recognised as organised in the figure of 'abstraction' of a supposedly 'internal' logic from the configuration of text and context which presented my opening question. A 'history of theory' here traces successive 'substitutions' of book for world, abstract textual space for the analogous 'space' and time of its embedding (as book) in its 'contexts', 'within' the 'global' figure of a common abstraction from the opening question of this inquiry. The constant transposition from criticism of an earlier writer or theorist, to criticism of that criticism, and so on, corresponds to a constant figure and associated 'tradition' of western abstraction from around 500 BC until the end of the second millennium 'AD'. That a certain 'theoretical' development defined by this millenial abstraction from the radical question of the symmetry of question and context, may be symmetrically traced in a book which opens with that very question, can be seen as a simple converse of, say, a parallel tradition of western 'theatre' organised in the substitution of 'action for action', rather than of words for World. That is to say: the whole 'tradition' of theory passing through texts, each of which is 'argued' in a logical abstraction mirroring the 'poetic' abstraction of a stage 'action', drama,
inquiry itself, only in the matter of 'aesthetics' or rather my 'poetics' - which I took as one side (complementing the 'mystical' dimension logically systematised in the western tradition as 'theology') of that practical or 'ethical' dimension which the Stoa had made coordinate with Logic and Physics in their threefold division (found for example in Duhamel's systematisation of Descartes noted above). 'Empirical Psychology' here presents the frame of what Baumgarten would elaborate under Wolff at Halle as 'Aesthetik', and Wolff himself would go on to complete the whole system with his Jus Gentium and Jurisprudentia Naturalis at mid-century. It is particularly characteristic of the German university from the eighteenth century onward that Halle, then Berlin, would provide so to speak a focus of orthodoxy, a system, whether it be that of Wolff or, later, of Hegel, on which the view from the chairs of Philosophy in the other politically subordinate states may be seen as so many reflections. Thus Wolff's perspectivism, providing a scholastic framework for all philosophical inquiry throughout Germany by mid-century, can be coordinated with the various 'local' wolffianisms outside Prussia: the perspectives of, say, Bilfinger, Boehmer, Darjes, Heinecke, Holmann, and so on, which I will not note separately, but represent by their place in the relevant section of Ueberweg or:

> BECK, Lewis White
> Early German Philosophy: Kant and his predecessors
> Cambridge Mass 1969

...which opens with the question 'A National History of Philosophy?' itself. In his article on German Philosophy in Edwards' Encyclopedia Beck notes that, from Kant’s immediate successors onward, one may at least claim that this question of 'national' schools or types of thinking - the question of the relation of questioning or inquiry to its cultural context in the State or linguistic community - is itself characteristically german, even if it be objected that the question is itself questionable (and this, usually, on the moral grounds of the complicity of such a question in German self-assertion from Fichte on down to Rosenberg as self-assertive Germany).

Now Cassirer, although he notes the emergence of this theme of the cultural specificity of literature in that inauguration of the first phase of Romanticism around 1770 prepared by Lessing...
and theoretically defined by Herder — Lessing and Herder learning from Rousseau, Montesquieu and Diderot as it were, to question the applicability of French models to their geographically and historically separate tradition — still understands this in a thematic dynamic of textual traditions of a textually articulated logic freeing itself from the 'mythical' order of figuration in the text and its context, moving towards the consummation of this process in Kant's logic of the relations of the logical order of theory and the figural 'aesthetic' of experience in general, and 'art' in particular. Thus the 'figural' embedding of Enlightenment 'logic' of theory in a residual dynamic of 'myth' is presented not in terms of, say, the parallels between 'theory' and 'art' over the eighteenth century, but rather in terms of the developing theory of art which is given such a prominent place in Cassirer's dynamic of 'Enlightenment'. Conversely, so to say, Cassirer's texts in which he logically abstracts from the embedding of logic in the poetics of figure, can no longer be composed in his native Germany after 1933, since the institutional order of the 'school' to which his textual production had until then belonged, was made in the year of Heidegger's Rectoral Address a component in the ideological dynamic of Rosenberg's diametrically opposed myth 'of the twentieth century'.

1770 once again: in the standard history of German literature cited above, the 'pre-romantic' Geniezeit latterly named after Klinger's play, Sturm und Drang, of that year is presented under the figure of an 'ellipse', whose extremities are marked by Herder's Fragmente of 1767, and Don Carlos in 1787, and whose 'poles' are taken as Götz von Berlichingen (1773) and Die Rauber (1781). I broke a cycle of questions extending from 1769 (Herder's 'sea-change' and Kant's waking from dogmatic slumbers) to 1799 (say, the Athenaeum and, more particularly, Novalis' 'address to Bonaparte, and to the new century' after the 18 Brumaire) into two symmetrical sub-cycles, the first of which closed around 1784-6 — with the Pantheismusstreit, Herder's Ideen and his break with Kant, Goethe's departure for Italy (generally taken in literary histories to signal the 'classical' poise now attained by the axial figure of the whole romantic 'revolution' in literature extending from around 1770 to around 1830), and so on. Robertson's history finds in Rousseau the presiding
genius of the Geniezeit: Rousseau in his radically ambivalent stance in relation to French 'Enlightenment', bringing into question from 1749 onward (the first Discours) that 'enlightened' perception of a universal history inscribed within the universal dynamic of linear logical progress of critical inquiry, which had slowly triumphed over the earlier model of a general decadence of earthly life since Fall and expulsion from Paradise — and in this questioning itself carrying 'Enlightenment' itself to its consummation in a radical self-questioning (to which Cassirer takes Kantian Criticism to be the focal response). Rousseau, like Pascal before him in that development of the figural order of 'sentiment' which all the while parallels enlightened Reason (seen in Wesley over the Channel and Pietism over the Rhine), by rationally confronting reason and sentiment, looks at once back to lost paradise and forward to its restoration in response to the moral configuration of this confrontation. La coeur a ses raisons, que la raison ne connaît pas.

Now Cassirer himself confronts the ambivalence of Rousseau in relation to 'reason' and 'progress', but in emphasising the questioning of abstract 'enlightenment' as the logical framing of the question of the relations of logical Reason and figural Sense, he inscribes the confrontation in the logical order of theory itself, as the transition from dogmatic scepticism, doctrinaire criticism, to Kant's logical framing of the categorial space and time of all Experience, all Reason and Sense, in which theory eventually asserts itself as 'critical' in responding directly to the question of the relation of rational questioning and assertion to its sensory content in the poetic or 'aesthetic' of Experience.

Yet here, as in the analogous case of Hume, a deeper question attaches to Cassirer's own logical or theoretical inscription of Rousseau's stance in a textual dynamic of Enlightenment theory, rather than in a 'romantic' nostalgia for lost paradise, a political dynamic of social disintegration and revolution, or indeed in the interplay of these various dimensions in Rousseau's
very life itself... and his writing (in the Confessions, Réveries, and so on) of it.

If Lessing, the translator and admirer of Diderot, whom he called the first original theorist of drama since Aristotle, is taken as a parallel figure in Germany to Diderot in France over the period 1750-1770, then it is to Herder's visionary extension of his master's 'criticism' over the period of his journey to and return from France (1769-70), and the impact of this vision on the young Goethe upon Herder's arrival in Stuttgart (1770), that we should look for the framing of the deeper question directly in terms of German 'Romanticism'. This I have implicitly done in the characterisation of that 'literary' revolution as marking one dimension of a transition from Part II to Part III, which is paralleled in the political revolution dominated by France, and an 'industrial revolution' dominated by Britain - and by taking the radically ambivalent framing by Novalis in 1799 of that transition, in terms of the 'analogy' between opening and close of a broad cultural cycle extending from thirteenth century to 1800, which, like Rousseau's prehistorical and posthistorical paradises looks, Janus-faced, both forward and backward at once, as 'focal'. As focal, and, indeed, as marking in the injunction cited at the head of this section of this Close, an analogous inscription of 1800 as opening of Part III, and 2000 as corresponding to the question attaching to the configuration of 'theory' around 1970, in Novalis' historical scheme of ähnliche Zeitpunkten:

I direct you to History: Look in its instructive coherence for similar points in time, and learn to use the magic wand of analogy.

'Similar points in time': the categorial systematisation by Scotus of Thomas' transcendental Analogy of Being (the reading of which framed Heidegger's entry into the textual and institutional space and time of Theory), and the Kantian rediscovery of this
logic of abstraction of logical 'space' from coordinate dimensions of its cosmic context, in the 'critical' question of inscription of the logical order of questions in the poetics or aesthetic of their empirical and transcendental context, which closes a cycle of theory opened up by Scotus' new logic five centuries before. Kant himself, in the consummation of 'Enlightenment' questioning goes back to an initial scholastic figure of the logical 'poetic' of logic in its cosmic context...

637 MARTIN, Gottfried Immanuel Kant. Ontologie und Wissenschaftslehre (Cologne 1951) tr Lucas Manchester (1975) 1974

just as Martin, in closing his book, goes back to Heidegger's closing citation from Aristotle in his Kantbuch, which has in turn gone back from Scotus to Aristotle, in going forward from Scotus (in the dissertation) to Kant:

638 HEIDEGGER, Martin Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (Bonn 1929) tr Churchill Bloomington (1962) 1972

This was my first acquaintance with Heidegger - in my final year at Oxford...and having perversely asked to study Spinoza, Leibniz and Kant as well as the standard Locke/ Berkeley and Hume (or rather, Bennett) in preparation for the 'History of Philosophy' paper, I underlined my perversity by writing examination essays on Descartes as seen by Spinoza and Kant as seen by Heidegger. My anonymous examiner responded to this gross insult to precedent by rewarding all my labours with a particularly low mark. I had effectively asked for such a mark by making a Descartes question a 'pretext' for my reading of Spinoza, and a Kant question a 'pretext' for my reading of Heidegger's book. I would have better pleased my examiner by making Descartes a pre-text for Kenny, and Kant a pre-text for Strawson and Bennett, in the precedent set most effectively by the latter, and already discussed...

639 STRAWSON, Peter Frederick The Bounds of Sense London 1966

640 BENNETT, Jonathan G Kant's Analytic Cambridge 1966

Körner's penguin I found no use at all, when making my acquaintance with Kant under the tutelage of:
...this in the series of bibliographies issued since my departure by the Philosophy sub-faculty, and covering the range of material for one of the final examinations - as in the previous case, it consists mainly in papers contributed to 'current' debates in English-language periodicals. Walker notes in his preface that a comprehensive index, to supplant Eisler's Kantlexikon (1930) is in preparation as the database of all Kant's texts is assembled on electronic media at Bonn, in conjunction with the ongoing publication of the Werke by the Prussian Academy. Since it is almost as true to say of Kant that all philosophy after about 1830 is the writing of reading of writings of readings...of Kant, as to say of Descartes that all philosophy from about 1700 is so related or indebted to him, one might see in the eventual electronic matrix of Kant's 'text' a frame in whose textual dynamic one might hope to articulate the dynamic of western theory from, say, 1830 to 1970. At least, one might imagine a sort of ideal space of theory a la Cassirer, turning about the theoretical question posed around 1800 of the complementarity of the abstract kantian framework of 'any possible experience', and the figural dynamic of Herder's universal history, with the latter inscribed 'in theory' in its universal 'critical' frame. But I, noting in passing the 571 pages and then indices, already taken up by Adickes' survey 'of writings by and about Kant which have appeared in Germany up to the end of 1887' (1893-6), will content myself with 'secondary' literature already noted, together with a selection of Kant's own texts, having already questioned the image or conception of an implicit embedding of this inquiry in any such 'global' textuality, except 'potentially' - except insofar as, say, Adickes' book itself marks a range of possible questions that might be opened up from any of the questions and responses elicited here by the inscription of some of Kant's texts in mine:

642 KANT, Immanuel
Kant's Cosmogony ed & tr Hastie Glasgow
1900

643 Pre-Critical Writings ed & tr Kerford
& Walford Manchester 1968
Kant's preeminence in that universal frame of all questioning or judgement which is Philosophy parallels Goethe's literary centrality...

641 Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Riga 1781, rev 1787)
ed Schmidt (Leipzig 1926)
tr Kemp Smith London (1929) 19 (76)

642 Prolegomena.. (Riga 1783) tr Lucas
Manchester 1953

643 .. (with:) Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (Riga 1786)
both tr, with biography, Bax London 1883

644 Was heisst: Sich im Denken orientieren
(1786) tr in (645); fr tr Paris 197

645 Critik der praktischen Vernunft (Riga 1788)
tr Beck (Chicago 1949) NY 1956

646 Critik der Urteilskraft (Berlin 1790 rev 1793)
tr Meredith Oxford (1911-28) 1952 (78)

647 Opus Posthumum fr tr & ann Marty Paris 197

647A Kant on History (1784-98) ed Beck, tr Beck & al Indianapolis 1967

648 GOETHE, Johann Wolfgang von

Die Leiden des jungen Werthers (Leipzig 1774; rev 1786) ed Stahl Oxford 1942 (78)

649 Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre (first draft: Wilhelm Meisters Theatralische Sendung c 1785)
(in Neue Schriften: 1795-6) tr Carlyle
London (1824) &c (79-80)

Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre (1821-9) abgd & tr Carlyle London (1827) &c

650 Faust (begun 1775, Faust, ein Fragment p 1790; Erster Theil 1808; Zweyter Theil 1832 (II.iii, Helena, p 1827) ed
tr Latham London (1882-6) 1908
Wilhelm Meister is a novel in every sense, the first of its kind, called by its admirers the only delineation of modern society, - as if other novels, those of Scott, for example, dealt with costume and condition, this with the spirit of life. It is a book over which some veil is still drawn. It is read by very intelligent persons with wonder and delight. It is preferred by some such to Hamlet, as a work of genius. I suppose no book of this century can compare with it....A very provoking book to young men of genius...

... 'The ardent and holy Novalis'...favourite reading to the end of his life'(2): by chance I had brought with me to Devon in October 1979 a collection of Emerson's essays, which included his portraits of 'representative men', Plato; or the Philosopher, Swedenborg; or the Mystic, Montaigne; or the Sceptic, Shakspere; or the Poet, Napoleon; or the Man of the World, Goethe; or the Writer - the transcendentalist's 'characters' or 'microcosmography', presented as a lecture series introducing the Concord School to the English on his visit in 1847 - and this mid-nineteenth century american epitome of 'the human drama' - a reading of Carlyle, and Carlyle the 'reading' of his master Goethe - constitutes one textual dimension of the situation in which I found myself writing a questioning of that very writing in a letter to France. I was 26 years old - the same age as Friedrich Schlegel writing in the Athenium that Meister, the French Revolution, and the Wissenschaftslehre were the three great forces of the age. Had I been born in 1769 or 1770 I might have read the first 'modern' novel as it appeared in 1795-6, at the age of twenty-six; then in 1789 I would, like Wordsworth and Beethoven and Hölderlin and Hegel and Napoleon and Wellington, have been nineteen; like the generation that was so affected by Wilhelm Meister in their 'twenties, I would have come of age with the French Revolution,
like Wilhelm himself (born, so to speak, under Herder's protection as Götz in 1771, growing up as Werther in the 'seventies, and discovering his 'theatrical mission' over the 'eighties).

It is peculiarly characteristic of that 'ideological' revolution, 'Romanticism', that it should be so closely tied in the context of all those outward transformations which are its political, cultural, material contexts, to the biographical axis that runs through the complementary theory and fiction of a generation born around 1770: a generation coming of age with the deposition and execution of the French King — that impersonation of central or focal authority par excellence — a generation together playing Hamlet, as it were, to that Claudius... and in so many cases to pay for their part in the drama in an early destruction.

Biography: Wilhelm's, and his readers', in the literary interface of abstract theoretical truth and the figural dynamic of stormy sentiment, fiction, drama, morality, 'art', culture — that interface (to borrow its characterisation from the autobiography of the generation's 'representative' master, father) of Wahrheit and Dichtung, logical and figural, initially defined by the interplay of criticism and drama in Diderot and Lessing, and running thence, on the theoretical side through Kant and Fichte, on the 'figural' side through the art of Goethe and Schiller, and between these complementary lines of development, from the autobiography and personality of Herder from around 1770, through that convergence of logical and figural aspects already seen in Fichte and Schiller, to that focal fusion or confusion around 1800 played out by Novalis, from which a neokantian logic of the relation of logical and figural components must appear as a one-sided 'theoretical' abstraction.

Kant, 1724; Lessing, 1729; Herder, 1744; Goethe, 1749; Schiller, 1759; Fichte, 1762... and then, on the face of it, their fairly random impact on my biography through those copies of the writings of Goethe and Kant already listed — some given dates of reading, if they particularly engaged my study at some period — and copies of writings by the others in the following editions:
...On the slim basis of such a range of texts, set in the textual matrix represented by other books listed above and below in the closing section of this text, and through the embedding of this text itself in the extra-textual coordinates marked in it, as marked also in the texts listed here (in it again - but only as titles marking my confrontation, 'reading' of those books outside this one, 'in' my life leading up to this writing)...a symmetric dynamic of textual questioning, inquiry, theory is abstracted - or rather concreted in the various 'dimensions' of this inquiry, 'textual' and 'extratextual' - so that each of these texts appears ranged in Parts I to III above as a textual perspective on that
spatiotemporal dynamic of theory and context over two and a half
millenia, from some particular position in such a 'history' as
narrated here.

Cassirer's dynamic of abstraction of questioning, of
'Reason', from its historical embedding in or subjection to the
figural dynamic of poetry, myth, the dramatic interplay of person-
alties and so on - until 'Reason' finally recognises itself in
this very figure of abstraction, framing its own coordination with
figural sensibility and the external objects to which different
sensations are referred - corresponds indeed to one 'moment' or
component or dimension of the more general dynamic of interplay of
'logical', 'figural' and 'material' dynamics: and the abstraction of
that 'logical' moment from the dynamics of its embedding in the
ideological order of the German language, the institutions of German
theory, the German economy of production of theory, and so on, over
the first three decades of this century, itself corresponds - as
Cassirer's contemporaries at Frankfurt around 1930 might have in-
sisted - to Cassirer's particular 'position' in that wider dynamic.
Indeed Cassirer's 'neokantianism' is just that: the dominant version
towards 1930 of that 'return to Kant' beginning around 1870 at Marburg
which reacted against the Romantic legacy of Universalpoesie, just
as the central progenitor of that 'poetisation of the World', Herder,
had instituted a romantic 'Movement' around 1770 by reacting against
abstract 'Reason', returning to the rousseauiste 'origin of language',
and unfolding the figural axis of his Universal History from that
radical configuration of sensibility, Gefühl, which Lessing had
suggested, but failed to free altogether from an abstract reason
supposed prior to its historical embedding in History: a reason
which could frame its reflections on drama in terms of separate
analyses of the spatial (plastic) and temporal (verbal) dimensions
of sense, coordinated in a common spatiotemporal Nature in relation
to a common rational reason or end of Art - rather than seeing its
own rationality itself radically engaged in action, in an organising
sensibility in which language and Nature are complementary sides,
separating in ever more complex configurations as the dynamic of
human Culture unfolds in History.

Kant in 1770 extended Lessing's rationale of aesthetics to
the unitary spatiotemporal frame of all experience, eventually
coordinated in the 1780s in relation to the categorial scheme of 3-times-4 orders of question corresponding to 3-times-4 dimensions of the Kantian Kosmos coordinate with the logical dimension of questions, abstract Reason and the concrete dynamic of Understanding, itself. In the 1780s Kant and his former pupil Herder fell out as the former criticised the latter for the uncritical figuration of his 'ideas' of Universal History, and Herder moved towards that 'metacritique' of Criticism which brought into question the poetics of his master's logic of the relations of logical and figural dimensions. Rousseau's impact upon a sensibility and reason prepared by Lessing provokes those complementary 'logical' and 'poetic' responses to the radicalisation of Enlightenment bringing the abstraction of its own Reason into question, which come into open conflict in the 1780s: a logic which coordinates the various dimensions of its embedding in a universal Space and Time, and a poetic of human experience which coordinates the whole of spatiotemporal human experience or History in relation to the universal context of the text which eventually frames the universal dynamic in which it identifies its author's own german perspective at the close of the eighteenth century. Schiller and Fichte at Jena in the 1790s each respond, from their different 'sides', poet and philosopher, to the complementarity of these two responses to Lessing (and others), and the generation of 1770 in their turn respond as the group around the Athenaeum to their masters Fichte and Schiller, and through them to Goethe, Herder, and Kant:

662 Athenaeum* ed A-W & F Schlegel Berlin 1798-1800 (facsimile, Munich 1924 (77-8;83)
Similar points in time: 1800 and 1250; 1800 and 2000, 2000 and 500BC; 500BC, 1650 and 2000; 1830 and 1970, 1800-1830 and 1970-2000... and so on: Kant embedding the logic that had freed itself from the figural order of Thomas' Analogy through Scotus' 'Kategorienlehre' and 'transcendental analysis' at the close of the thirteenth century (and that had been reinscribed in that figure of Analogy in the 'neothomism' of Luther's adversary Cajetan around 1500), back in a categorial scheme of questions corresponding to the various extra-logical dimensions of questions, Understanding, Reason. Novalis posing an idealised unitary thirteenth-century Christian Europe as the figure of what had at last become open in the context around 1800 of the critical dynamic that had worked through Reformation, Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment, until it finally confronted the question of its own end, the 'why?' of its 'Why?'. Hölderlin posing instituted Christendom as itself a breakdown, declension, of his idealised fifth-century Greece.

...Hegel between 1800 and 1830 abstracting an encyclopaedic system of Science, logically articulated in the historical coordination of the various contextual dimensions of the concrete historical logic of Philosophy itself, as he reasserts kantian categorial system in the 'Romantic' confusion of Herder, Goethe, Fichte and Schiller, the 'ideal of youth', and of the youths he joined in Jena in 1800...Marx going back to Epicurus' going-back from Aristotle to Democritus, in order to find the figure of a 'dialectical materialism' which will go beyond Hegel, as Epicurus went beyond Aristotle - by reasserting the figural embedding in its context from which the logic of Aristotle and Hegel abstracts, in order to bring that abstraction itself into question, in the figural order of practicality, of the dramatic configuration of human interaction in Nature, where theory must recognise itself as only one rather peculiar option open to us.

Only one option: in particular, only one dimension of a 'Romantic' literature whose elementary 'fragments', combinations of theoretical, literal, poetic themes, may themselves be organised
on the wider scale of a book into, say, Wissenschaftslehre, Bildungsroman or history of the Thirty Years War, or of the French Revolution.

Herder had combined all three dimensions in his journal of the sea-voyage to France in 1769 which fixed his literary orientation for the rest of his life; the typical 'Enlightenment' man of letters - Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot - had theorised, narrated, and created or feigned in novels and for the stage: had written 'philosophical novels', 'philosophical history'...and narrated philosophy like a conte; what is characteristic of the 'Romantics' is that theory, history, and fiction become explicitly three coordinate dimensions of literary response to the confrontation with that textual order in the context of French Revolution. Novalis, in particular, organises his life as writer around the theoretical projection of a historical novel, set in the real thirteenth century, which in narrating the protagonist's induction into the 'mystery' of Minnegesang will itself induct the reader into the mystery of Universalpoesie....

663 HARDENBERG, Friedrich Heinrich von ("NOVALIS")
von ('NOVALIS')
Heinrich von Ofterdingen (179 -)
Die Lehrlinge zu Sals (179
Fragmente (179 - ;
all in Werke ed Schlegel & Tieck Berlin 1802,

664
Hymnen an die Nacht (Athenaeum III.2)

665
Die Christenheit oder Europa (1799, p 1826)
in (666)

666
Schriften ed Kluckhohn & Samuel Leipzig
1929 enlgd Stuttgart 1960-75
(includes far more Fragmenta than 1802 ed)

667 SCHULZ, Gerhard
Novalis Hamburg 1969

Now the projected ideal Roman left unfinished by this my 'representative' Romantic is itself a response to Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre, Goethe's framing in a novel of his adolescent protagonist's
self-discovery in the wider theatre of Life through discovering the 'universal poetic' in detaching himself from those images of himself, of others, of things and their connection, whose primary image is itself theatrical identification with a part on the narrower stage. The 'classic' Romantic novel organises its impact on its young readers in a progression or 'continued proportion' from the image of the stage, with which it opens, through the play within the play in that representative drama Hamlet, through Hamlet itself set as turning-point in the novel, to the final presentation of Art in Life which sets the novel itself in the context of the 1790s so closely described in the action the Bildungsroman narrates. Proportion: 'analogy', a dynamic of induction into a 'poetisation' or 'theatralisation' of the context of this critical text which mirrors that thirteenth century Analogy which framed the Christian Kosmos as a universal drama articulated in the context of the Book, whose logic was formally articulated in the 'analogical' embedding of the logical order of theoretical text in analogous orders of context. And a further 'proportion' might be found in the passage from Goethe's entry onto the literary scene in 1771, aged 21, in the 'storm and stress' of identification with the young rebel against false authority Götz, through the dramatisation of his own 'detachment' from an unhappy romance in his own life through the fiction of Werther, and from Schiller's 'entry onto the scene' in 1781, aged 21, in the person of another rebel or Hamlet-figure, Karl Moor the robber-chief, through the association of Goethe and Schiller at Weimar and Jena in their 'classical' detachment which breaks with 'storm and stress' over the mid-eighties, down to the final publication of Wilhelm Meister urged by his younger associate on Goethe in the mid-nineties, and the eventual self-assertion of its young readers in the turn-of-the-century 'Romanticism' proper of the Jena group, as Goethe's own 'classic' detachment gives way to a textuality which asserts directly its 'symbolic' dynamic as poetic reconstruction of the context into which, as text, it is incribed.

Thus Novalis becomes the focal figure in his association with the Schlegels, Schleirmacher and Tieck, through his friends' embedding of the theoretical, historical and poetic dimensions of his literary ideal and the production it fuelled in the biographical axis of his short life - notably in the Life which introduces the
collection made by Schlegel and Tieck in 1802, or the notice
added by Schleiermacher to the second edition of the Reden.

668 HAYM, Rudolf

Die Romantische Schule: Ein Beitrag zur Ge-
schichte des deutschen Geistes Berlin 1870

669 SIDGWICK, Mrs A

Caroline Schlegel and her Friends London 1899

670 SCHLEIERMACHER, Fried-
rich Ernst Daniel

Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums
Berlin 1811) tr, with life by Lücke, Farrer
Edinburgh 1850

671

Die Christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen
der evangelischen Kirche Berlin 1821-2

672 SCHLEGEL, August-
Wilhelm

Vorlesungen Uber dramatische Kunst und Lit-
eratur (Heidelberg 1809-11) tr Black
London (1815) 1850

To continue further our proportion or 'analogy', we may consider
a rather wider Jena group, including the young Schelling - all the
more impetuous and assertive in the 'romantic ideal' for his three
years less than Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, five less than Hegel,
seven less than Schleiermacher, eight less than the staid August-
Wilhelm...whose wife Caroline, the 'mother-figure' of the school,
four years older still than August-Wilhelm (the same age as Jean-
Paul, a year younger than Fichte, and twelve years in all older than
the young man who deposed Fichte and August-Wilhelm), he married
after her divorce in 1803 - and the Hegel whose rise after 1800,
turning the 'ideal of youth' into a System, marked the fall of that
young Prometheus, or rather Hamlet, or rather perhaps Oedipus, de-
posing Fichte and August-Wilhelm, and marrying so to speak his mother.
Or let us cast the net wider still, to include Hegel's classmate at
Tübingen, Hölderlin, the progenitors of 'Romanticism' in England
and France, the central 'romantic' figure of Universal History
around 1800, and his exact contemporary whose rise in later life
marked the fall of 'the World-Spirit on horseback'. The generation,
then, of 1800:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Person/Work</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1762</td>
<td>Fichte</td>
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<tr>
<td>1763</td>
<td>Jean-Paul Friedrich Richter, Caroline Schlegel</td>
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<td>1764</td>
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<td>1765</td>
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<td>1766</td>
<td>Madame de Staël</td>
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<td>1767</td>
<td>August-Wilhelm Schlegel</td>
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<td>1768</td>
<td>Schleiermacher, Chateaubriand</td>
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<td>1769</td>
<td>(Napoleon, Wellington)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1770</td>
<td>Hegel, Hölderlin, Wordsworth (Beethoven)</td>
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<td>1771</td>
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<tr>
<td>1772</td>
<td>Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis, Coleridge</td>
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<td>1773</td>
<td>Tieck</td>
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<td>1774</td>
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<td>1775</td>
<td>Schelling</td>
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<tr>
<td>673</td>
<td>SCHELLING, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>System der transcendentalen Idealismus</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tübingen 1800</td>
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<td>674</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik</td>
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<td>Jena 1800-1; facs</td>
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After his peers of the 1790s had died, gone mad or lapsed into unproductive obscurity, Hegel embarked - through that dramatisation of Reason's self-discovery at work in World-History, and in his narration of it which is the Bildungsrroman of the World-Spirit - in a systematic abstraction of its 'logic' from the romantic co-ordination or confusion of 1800. Haym (1821-1901), beginning as a 'young hegelian' in Ruge's circle at Halle in the 1840s, set out in answer to his master's closing summons to 'seize the spirit of the times', to assert himself in the political interface of unitary hegelian system of 1830 and its fragmentary reflection in the contingencies of its own historical context; sitting in the Frankfurt Assembly which followed the Revolution of 1848, until its dissolution in the Reaction of 1850, he charted the actual progress of that 'ideal of youth', then to spend his retirement in the succeeding reaction to come to terms with the failure of an abstract philosophical framing of the political context of hegelian philosophy, through reorganising the relations of hegelian thought and its 'contingent' context in the biographical axis of
Hegel in seiner Zeit (1857). By 1870 he had worked back from this embedding of the hegelian logic in its cultural context, in the narrative axis of literary biography, to that primary 'Romantic' coordination of theory and its cultural theatre typified by Bildungsroman and romantic biography - and the coordination of the two in the life of Novalis in particular - worked back to the romantic dynamic in its axis of literary history and group biography, from which Hegel's abstract logic might now itself be seen as a one-sided abstraction.

Now this development over mid-century parallels that response to Hegel already seen in the unfolding of Zeller's perspective, and might in turn be seen as a parallel to Dilthey's analogous relation to that other 'classic' romantic, Hegel's colleague at Berlin from whom Zeller's father-in-law Baur drew as much as from Hegel to develop the dialectical hermeneutics of the Tübingen school, Schleiermacher - the professor of theology whose eventual system of 1830-1 may be taken as an exact parallel, in a religious development from the Romanticism of 1800, to the professor of philosophy's Enzyklopädie. Thus Haym's setting of hegelian text in context parallels Dilthey's presentation (1858-63) of Schleiermachers Leben in Briefen: Schleiermacher who had insisted that to understand a text which, say, formulates the religious experience of a group or 'church' at some time and place, we should neither dogmatically transpose its literal sense into the non-textual configuration of a different context, or conversely subject the dogmatic circuit by which it framed its own assertion or legitimacy in the original situation to the more abstract and developed logic of a later context, but rather follow Herder in looking in the text for the expression of a timeless religious feeling, Gefühl, in a particular context. Our access to our own world through this religious feeling at once allows us to work out from that constant figure to the historical coordinates of text and context preserved in an earlier formulation of Religion, and, conversely, allows an illumination through our own formulations of structures of relation of text and context, discovered in earlier texts. Dilthey applies this 'hermeneutic' figure to the texts of Schleiermacher himself, and combines the abstract
scheme of access to earlier texts through the historically invariant symmetry of text and context in religious 'feeling' with Ranke's system of reconstruction of an action by associating each document 'of' the action with a place in the action, to set Schleiermacher's own formulation of hermeneutics in the biographical axis of that 'action' which was his life (Leben Schleiermachers 'part I' to 1804: Dilthey's first book, characteristically left incomplete). One may draw a parallel between this book of 1870 and Haym's, and suggest another 'continued proportion' so to speak, in the manner by which Dilthey progresses from Schleiermacher's letters to his Life, then so to speak to a 'relativisation' of Schleiermacher's version of access to the 'structure' of a different period through its texts, by situating his own texts in his life, and so by applying Schleiermacher's principles to his own formulation of them frame an access or Einleitung to the general principles of analysis of those various dimensions of individual and group biography which are the 'Geisteswissenschaften' in 1883 (also unfinished). This access would be formulated in 1894 as Verstehen, and Schleiermacher's community of religious 'feeling' in all times and places (mediating in Schleiermacher between the implicatio of a platonic heaven and explicatio of earthly life, with man, the microcosm, radically limited 'in' space and time to an essentially incomplete vision) could be 'understood' as that understanding of understanding which could be formulated in the first three decades of the century. The last three decades, then, could eventually suggest, in 1900, an 'understanding' of Hegel's Jugendgeschichte up to 1800 (presented 1907) as framing the biographical articulation of that 'ideal of youth' in which the abstraction towards a 'system' from 1800 might, following Haym, be Inscribed.

Now this 'understanding' of Hegel through the embedding of his logic in the narrative dynamic of biography, of a 'history' constructed in a later text which accedes to the hegelian texts through the common embedding of earlier and later texts in a 'historical' context.
whose different identifications in the two sets of texts can be coordinated in the later text with the very 'historical' distance between earlier and later formulations, may itself be seen as a return or regression from Hegel's abstract system or systematic abstraction to a Romantic questioning of the abstraction of rational Enlightenment: may be seen as an embedding of Hegel in the Romantic 'confusion' or fusion of logical, biographical, figural, political and other dimensions of text and context, through a reiteration of the 'Romantics' own embedding of Reason in a figural or poetic dynamic of coupling of text and context. Rousseau had sketched the Culture in which rational Science was one, textual, component, as a progressive Fall from that supposed initial harmonious state of Nature from which it becomes further and further 'abstracted': the progress of abstraction from Nature, and the progressive abstraction of Reason seen in the forward logical elaboration through successive questioning of 'scientific' Truth and its system which is its very epitome and motor, is directly coupled to moral decadence, as the finalities of individual human lives from which the abstract finality of Reason abstracts become more and more detached from their natural consummation in the efficient causality of Nature. Culture itself is a progressive perversion of Nature and the individual's natural ends and natural satisfaction of those ends. Logical progress is natural decay: but the genevan puritan is no more a simple conservative in his review than Pascal or their common model Augustine. The dynamic of universal history unfolds from Fall through a turning-point in the overall plan where that dynamic of the Fall is revealed to those until then unconsciously caught in it, framing a converse movement in the choice thereby presented, of universal Redemption, and a consummation of History in a restoration of Paradise. Rousseau's questioning of the mindless 'progress' of abstraction of Culture from Nature is at once a further step in that questioning, and its inscription in a moral order of the ends of action, from which, if we are to believe this lonely exile from his own culture, it has become progressively decoupled from the first institution of that order of the 'mark' (boundary, money, representation in its various forms, and so on) which frames Society.
With Augustine, Pascal, Rousseau, Herder looks, Janus-faced - like that presiding spirit of doors and journeys, or like two-faced Hermes, god of the various orders of the 'mark' looking both back and forth on the 'herms' or boundary-stones of Antiquity - forward to a revolution in human Culture announced by his 1769 vision of coupling of Reason and Sense or Faith, Science and Myth, logical and 'figural'; and backward to the earliest figure of such coupling, the 'origin of language' in the mythical order of marking or expression of the various linguistic and non-linguistic co-ordinates of expression, and their dynamic. A dynamic which itself framed and frames that movement of abstraction of logical system from language in which 'Enlightenment' thought to finally free itself from Myth; but myth now appears rather as the closest we can come in language to that expression of the relations of expression and its various coordinates which is poetic Truth. Herder, presiding over that transposition around 1770 of Rousseau's questioning of French Enlightenment into German questioning of the French poetic that had dominated German literature (while in France the German Holbach signals the passage from abstract critique into a movement of concrete political revolution in that Nature which is the outward contextual correlate of philosophic reason), questions a questioning insensible to the figuration, the poetics, of its image of abstraction from earlier images of thought, from an earlier logic caught in the 'irrational' play of images of things, and of its relation to images and things.

Heidegger would, with Hölderlin, halt the regression into a primitive configuration of λόγος in fifth-century Greece, in an expression dramatically articulated in the working or 'actuality' of the various coordinates or dimensions of expression in their expression - and trace the Fall down from that classic coordination of language and world; but whereas Heidegger's primary figure is found in the 'logic' instituted by Parmenides as he critically abstracts from Pythagorean 'vision' or theory articulated in the Tetractys' marking of the coordination of the various orders of the mark, and from the circuit of silence sealed by that Symbol, to organise his λόγος in an abstract order of questions and answers corresponding to a position 'outside' the mystery and its silence, Hölderlin would return in 1797-9 to Empedocles' reassertion of the figuration of the Pythagorean mystery into which both he and...
Parmenides had been 'initiated', in response to the question posed by the coupling of Parmenides' 'logic' abstracted from embedding in pythagorean 'stories', with the figural embedding of such abstract deduction in the dramatic situation of its enunciation. In the three successive versions of his attempt to generate his own cultural revolution towards 1800, through a return to an initial figure of attic drama contemporaneous with the inauguration of 'philosophy', in which Empedocles presents the part of 'redeeming' man's fall to earth in a prefiguration of Christ's death (I have already listed Der Tod des Empedokles at (57) above), Hölderlin returns to a figural dynamic which is itself a return to that pythagorean order of 'vision' through a story which identifies its own dramatic part in the cosmic drama it frames - the part of 'redeeming' the initiate's 'fall' from Heaven to Earth - in response to Parmenides' inaugural abstraction of the 'logical' dimension of Kosmos from figural embedding in drama. Parmenides institutes abstract 'logic' in his epochal abstraction from pythagorean 'stories' of Kosmos as the narration of a cosmic dynamic organised in the symmetry of the various coordinates of the stories, framed by the limiting symmetry embodied in the Tetractys as marking of coordinates of the mark 'simply as such' - an abstraction, also, from the figural circuit of Heraclitus' inscription of its expression in the cyclical dynamic of Empedocles dramatically responds to the parmenidean text in his mid-fifth-century context by bringing into question the abstraction of Parmenides' logic from the symmetry of the logical, figural, and material dimensions of the world articulated 'in' that logic, the world 'in' which a logical deduction is Parmenides' response to his position 'in' words outside pythagorean silence and the coordinated pythagorean activity it outwardly frames. Around the time (430BC) of the outbreak of the pelopponesian war, Socrates reiterates the parmenidean dynamic of abstraction, but now in the dramatic context of unwritten dialogue, while Philolaus at last publishes 'official' written accounts of pythagorean 'theory'. We may ourselves inscribe Hegel's 'version' or logic of this 'pre-socratic' abstraction of 'dialectic' in his 'dialectic' of interplay of theory and cultural context, as a reiteration of the parmenidean moment of abstraction, in the dynamic of 'Romanticism' opening around 1770 with the transposition of Rousseau's radicalisation of critical
questioning through a questioning of abstract reason itself, onto German soil and into German texts. This in terms of the question presented by the 'dramatic' symmetry between the biographies of Hölderlin and his Tübingen classmate. Both born in 1770, and together at Tübingen in the opening years of the French Revolution (1788-1793), their paths diverge as around 1800 a Hegelian logic begins to free or abstract itself from its embedding in the figural dynamic of that wide drama we call the Romantic Movement - passing out of the figural order through a sort of Bildungsroman in which Reason discovers itself in its movement of self-distinction from any particular figure 'in' the Story or History which begins with elementary self-consciousness in the 'natural' distinction of the germ of rational distinction from the Nature in which it discovers itself - rather as the fiction of Wilhelm Meister had led into the Jena Romanticism of around 1800. The figural dynamic of Hölderlin's poetry, on the other hand, and the transformation of its cultural context attempted in Der Tod des Empedokles towards 1800, leads after 1800 into progressive abstraction of the figural order of the poetry, and the biographical drama it organises, from the 'rational' movement of self-assertion of unitary self-consciousness distinguishing itself from its identification with some component of a poem, its 'subjective' focus. And each poem, in turn, breaks into a play of different 'versions' of this embedding of subjectivity or our identification with its subjective focus, in the figural pattern of the poem as merely one component figuration among other coordinate figures (the dissolution of a reason 'external' to the figuration of the poem seen, for example, in the versions of 'Patmos' written between 1801 and 1803). In 1807, with Hegel's eventual systematisation of his abstraction of Reason from some particular figure of Reason in History, dramatised in the Phenomenology, comes that final complete breakdown of continuity of Hölderlin's 'rational' unitary self-consciousness outside the play of figure, which we call his 'madness' of the years at Tübingen (1807-43)....

676 Hölderlin, (Johann Christian) Friedrich Hyperion, oder der Eremit in Griechenland (Frankfurt 1797-9) with Gedichte ed Munich 1966

677 Poems and Fragments ed with tr & intr Hamburger London 1966
Tübingen: Der junge Hegel, Hölderlin, and the young prodigy Schelling caught between the diverging paths of his older contemporaries there: Schelling at first dominating the scene around 1800 in his literary self-assertion in a fusion of Logic and Art, Figure - but never able to turn 'the ideal of youth' into the projected System of 'positive philosophy' that would answer Hegel's abstraction of his 'system' from the common ideal of 1800. That Hegel who, even at Tübingen, was called 'the old man'. Tübingen: where Baur and his 'Tübingen School' would in their turn embed the hegelian dialectic in the 'dramatic' enterprise of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, as it were drawing together once more logical, narrative or historical and figural or mythical orders in a new form of inquiry, after these several dimensions had diverged from Herder's coordination of 1769, through the various lines marked in the biographies of the three Tübingen students.

Tübingen: where Nohl would respond to Dilthey's project of 1900 by following up the latter's embedding of Hegel in just such a biographical order of 'The Romantic Movement' first charted by Haym in 1870, by publishing the textual indices of his initial struggles toward a logic and a corresponding identity in the early interplay of philosophy, history, and religion:

678 HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Theologische Jugendschriften ed Nohl Tübingen 1907; tr Knox & Kroner Chicago 1946

679 HARRIS, H S
Hegel's Development: Towards the Sunlight, 1770-1801 Oxford 1972

Further indices - the letters from before 1800 - were published by Hoffmeister in the first of the four volumes of Briefe (1952-60) in the never-completed edition of the Werke begun by Lasson at Leipzig in response to the reawakened interest in Hegel fired in large part by Dilthey...

680 Werke ed Lasson & Hoffmeister Leipzig 1905-

...but I generally referred to Glockner's reprinting of the texts assembled after his death by his students, to trace the progress of abstraction from Romanticism to System, from the Systembrief of 1800 to Schelling, down to the third edition of the Encyklopädie in 1830:
681 Werke general ed Michelet (Berlin 1832-45)
reed with intrs Glockner Stuttgart 1927-33,
with Hegel-Lexikon (Glockner) 1935-9; reed
Moldenhauer & Michel Frankfurt 1971-9
De Orbitis Planetarum (Jena 1801)

682 Differenz der Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen
Systems der Philosophie (Jena 1801)

683 Zeitschrift für Kritische Philosophie ed Hegel
& Schelling (Jena 1802-3; arts by Hegel)

684 Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Bamberg 1807)
fr tr & comm Hyppolite Paris 1939-41
tr Baillie London (19 , rev NY 1931) 19

685 Wissenschaft der Logik (Nuremburg 1812-16)
fr tr
tr Johnston & Struthers NY 1929

686 Grundlegung einer Philosophie des Rechts* (Berlin 1821) tr Knox Oxford 1942

687 Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften
im Grundriss* (Heidelberg 1817; Berlin 1827;1830)
I Logik tr Wallace Oxford (1874) 19
II Philosophie der Natur tr Miller
Oxford 1970
III Philosophie des Geistes tr Wallace
Oxford (1894)

689 Vorlesungen Uber die Philosophie der Religion
ed Marheineke (1832) tr Spiers & Sanderson
London 1895

690 Vorlesungen Uber die Geschichte der Philosophie*
ed Michelet (1833)
tr Haldane London 1892-5

691 Vorlesungen Uber die Philosophie der Geschichte
ed Gans (1837) tr Sibree London 1894
I will not clutter this close further with the various fragments, rectoral addresses, and so on, in which I attempted, playfully thumbing through Glockner's massive *Lexikon*, to trace a complementarity of the 'internal' logic traced by Hegel through the elements of that linguistic matrix of the 'System' and its development assembled by his latterday editor, and the 'external' figuration of embedding of successive texts, or rather that matrix of hegelian textuality and its logic, in the concrete situations of theoretical exposition. I tried to suggest a configuration of hegelian text set as a 'logic' in the symmetrical dimensions of a context which that logic itself articulated at last in the final symmetry of 1830: a logic in whose symmetry with the various dimensions of its context 'internally' articulated in that logical order as encyclopedic 'system' of questions and answers, the next generation would bring the abstraction of that logic from the situation of its exposition dramatically into question - 'in its own terms', but not, so to say, on its own ground. I suggested how one might frame the 'drama' of the elaboration of the final System, the closing of the final circuit of symmetrical *Encyklopädie*, in terms of openings (in prefaces and introductions) and closings (in conclusions, farewells to the audience...) of the various texts listed above, as these organised the embedding of the various subordinate circuits of opening and closing of lines of question within the whole - as they frame the dynamic of inquiry in which one order of questions opens out of another, and various lines or dimensions of questioning converge towards the close of a text or lecture-series. I suggested that the overall circuit in which Hegel reiterated the aristotelian figure of an initial abstraction finally legitimated as it is itself inscribed in the symmetric system of question and determination it frames as logical text comes into question when, in the next generation Hegel's unquestioned entry into the logical dynamic framed by this circuit of abstraction appears; in the symmetry it itself formally establishes between internal logic and external context, as practically questionable, and as theoretically questionable - in a reiteration of 'Romantic' questioning of Enlightenment: Kierkegaard's *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* opens with a section 'Attributable to Lessing' - in terms of opening and closing of philosophy books and their 'arguments' as only one 'line' of
response open to philosophers, their readers, and others, in their common human predicament, materially embodied among books, fellow humans, and so on.

I tried in opening Part III above to trace the progress over the first thirty years of the nineteenth century of that passage from 'Ideal of Youth' to 'System' announced by Hegel in the celebrated letter of 1800 to Schelling: a working-out from the interplay of questions, figures, situations and so on which had been opened up in the biographical order of what we call the 'Romantic Movement', towards an abstract coordination of all the elements there brought 'into play' or into interplay, which is organised over those three decades precisely by the axis along which a progressively more unitary logic is abstracted from its 'confused' embedding in the figural order of individual and collective activity. The Phenomenology presents an initial figure of this abstraction of a logic from its embedding in the biographical order of interplay of thought and human interaction, and is followed by an abstract Science of Logic articulated ab initio within the logical order that is the result of the earlier work of abstraction. Eventually the System can reconstruct 'within' the frame of this Logic the historical and institutional coordinates of its own abstraction, together with their rational dynamic in the universal Time of unitary World-History: the System can be set within a Time which is simply the diachronic dimension of the contextual 'space' logically coordinate with the Logic of the hegelian texts in terms of the symmetry in the linguistic order of abstract questions (the formal matrix of language) of 'logical' and other questions - of 'internal' and 'external' coordinates of the 'System'. I then suggested how, over the mid-century, the 'System' came 'into question' through various identifications of the beginnings and ends, so to speak, of questioning, 'outside' the formal matrix of substitution in language inherited from Descartes - how, say, in Kierkegaard, the primary synchrony and diachrony of the philosophical text, its 'centre of gravity' so to speak, and organising dynamic axis, shifts to the pascalian interface of logic and a religious poetic of the figural order in an individual's biography - or how, in Marx, the abstract dynamic of philosophical questioning is inscribed within that primary diachrony of the material economy from which a whole
system of 'German Ideology' has abstracted - this abstraction itself, then, being brought into question in the diachrony of that cultural order in which the abstract dynamic of philosophical or logical questioning is symmetric with, 'reflects' the material dynamic that Hegel had thought to logically articulate as one dimension in his system: by 'turning Hegel on his head', one eventually inverts this subordination of material to logical by inscribing hegelian logic within a german ideology within a cultural or political order that is itself organised within a material economy of human life in earthly Nature. Yet once again we may trace the biographical order of 'the young Marx's' passage from hegelian logic, through the questions arising from the symmetry of logical and physical orders of hegelian texts and contexts, to the inscription of that 'cultural' order of question in an inquiry into the dynamics of the material economy of Culture, where 'philosophical' and cultural questions are reduced to mere parentheses and footnotes, philosophy no more being evaluated on its own short-circuited terms, but finally reduced to its true appreciation as a mere footnote to History...while an implicit moral and practical axis now organises Marx' cultural embedding of his text which frames the primary material dynamic of its context, in that context (as his contribution to the figural dynamic of a dramatic revolutionary opening-up of a new organisation of 'economic' questions, prefigured by their textual posing in an anterior mode of production).

Interest in the 'young Hegel' was followed in the 1920s by interest in Kierkegaard and the 'young Marx': if one framed one's questioning and understanding of the hegelian 'system' by returning to the biographical configuration of the 'young Hegel's' reflections, as giving the interplay of questions and context of which a later questioning of the systematic symmetry of System and logically articulated context presents only an abstract version (prefigured, then, by a stage in the development of the 'Ideal' before its transformation, along the axis of 'abstraction', into 'System'), then not only might one apply a similar questioning to the one-sided systematic marxist 'materialism' after the revolution of 1848 (or to Kierkegaard's less 'existential' or ambiguous relation to Faith after mid-century), in response to Weber's questioning of the
interplay of ideology and material economy... but one would further set the young Marx of the 1840s in the intellectual context, not simply of hegelian 'System', but rather in that textual interface of systematic reflection and its embedding in the drama of its historical elaboration, most clearly seen in the construction of the *Phenomenology*, as dramatic transition from the Romantic drama seen by Friedrich Schlegel in the interplay of French Revolution and German literature (theoretical in Fichte, poetic in *Wilhelm Meister*) to its Logic and System...

692 KOJEVE, Alexandre

Introduction à la Lecture de Hegel (lectures at EPHE 1933-9) ed Queneau Paris 1947

I have already discussed at some length the part of Kojeve and Hyppolite...

693 HYPPOLITE, Jean

*Genèse et Structure de la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit* Paris 1946

...in the 'hegelian' component of the transition from around 1930 to around 1970 in French intellectual culture - I might just underline those observations by noting that the question of 'Genèse et Structure', the question of the interplay in a text of the synchronic space of a logical 'system' and the historical drama of the diachrony in which it is elaborated and expressed, was the theme of the Royaumont colloquium of 1959 at which Hyppolite's young doctoral student Jacques Derrida read his first published paper, *Genèse et Structure*, in which I attempted to identify the opening of that line of questioning which would gradually find its own axis, organisation, 'centre of gravity' as inquiry or questioning elaborated in the symmetry of logical and figural 'sides' and dynamics of literary texts - over the 1960s and 1970s. One might also note Lukacs' reassertion of an 'orthodox' materialism in the historical dialectic of the inception of 'dialectics', after (with Mannheim) opening up the question of the relations of the two 'dialectics' in the 'twenties - this most particularly in the aftermath of Nazi reassertion of 'Romantic' Myth:

694 LUKACS, Georg

Der junge Hegel: Über die Beziehungen von Dialektik und Oekonomie (Zurich & Vienna 1948) rev as Der junge Hegel und die Probleme der kapitalistische Gesellschaft Berlin 1954
Anglo-American response to the Hegelian System presents analogous figures: Charles Taylor, for example, begins by identifying the initial point from which the System is abstracted in 'the young Hegel's' 'Romantic' axis of questioning of the relation of autonomous individual and the cultural poetic or figural dynamic of the group in which he acts his part; the unfolding System is then transcribed into Taylor's narration of its abstraction in relation to this central organizing axis, until we confront the question posed by the relations of the 'political' dimension in the System, and the System as one component in its 'external' political context: this question leads into the broader question posed by the further embedding of the mature System in those primary Hegelian dimensions of its cultural context - Art and Religion - from which the older Hegel has abstracted to an 'internal' logical version, and in the context of other contemporary philosophical responses to the initial Romantic question posed by the relations of Philosophy, Art, Religion, Politics. The reading of Hegel, then, confronts us today, in the historical development of this interplay of their philosophical framing with the various primary dimensions of its Culture that Philosophy frames, with a formal and historical configuration of questions attaching to our position 'outside' Hegel's texts and their immediate context, yet posed by the relation of that internal framing of its wider historical context to the 'external' dynamics of the various historical coordinates logically structured in the System. If we cannot begin 'in' the internal logical space and time of the mature System, nor can we then simply, began from some characterization of our position 'outside' the System framed from within the System — or from any analogous 'logical' framing of our position 'outside' such an abstract logic. Our problem, according to Taylor, with which the Hegelian text presents us as we bring into question its abstract formal starting-point from a point 'outside' its logic which is yet encumbered, in its identification, with deceptive residues of that logic, is 'to situate subjectivity': and we might begin to reorganize the coordinates, textual and contextual, of this latter-day resumption of the Romantic figure from which Hegel himself had abstracted his logic, by considering the complementarity of
Hegel's abstraction of the logical instance of question and assertion from its 'existential' engagement in the dramatic configurations of individuals' 'situated subjectivity', and his fellow student Hölderlin's inscription of this subjective instance as one component figure within the closed figural circuit of a poetry that finally abstracts from even the separate logical instance of the author's 'reason' outside the figural play of the poetry. And the coordinates of response to Hegel and Hölderlin's parallel responses to the shared Romanticism of the 1790s might, Taylor suggests, be further defined in response to that 'existential analytic of Dasein', that heideggerian response to the husserlian 'system' of abstraction (whose rise and institutional development from the opening of the twentieth century recalls the hegelianism of the nineteenth), which led its author back to the prefiguration he read in the Analytic of the first Critique and then back from its complementary sequels diverging from the Tubingen years, to their common root in that dramatic configuration of Αἰσχος in fifth-century Greece which marks out in its inception the terms of all western Thought...

Hegel, Heidegger: the very epitome in 1966, according to Passmore ( ), of 'Continental excess and rankness'; 'professional philosophers, for the most part, dismiss it with a contemptuous shrug', 'most British philosophers are convinced that Continental metaphysics is arbitrary, pretentious, and mind-destroying'...and yet almost exactly a hundred years before british philosophers had discovered 'the secret of Hegel' which would provide the key to a theoretical response to the rising tide of positivism outside the University, and dominate academic philosophy in Britain and America until the generation of Caird, Bradley, Green, Bosanquet, McTaggart, Royce and the Journal of Speculative Philosophy finally made way in the 1920s and 1930s for the students of Russell, Moore, Schiller, James and Dewey...just as a 'Hegel Renaissance' was beginning in France and Germany after the long neokantian and positivist reaction which had displaced the authority of Hegel there just as
he was being discovered in England...

Collingwood might rave against his Oxford colleagues abstraction of rediscovered positivism (continental rankness in the Oxford of the last decades of the nineteenth century) from the historical context and dynamic of all 'ideas of Nature', the odd lonely figure might continue to publish books that served no purpose in the historical dynamic of Oxford education - introducing Hegel, say, through the back door of a systematic comparison of his System and Method with the classicists' Aristotle...

...or issue apologies, fighting against the mid-century reaction in its own language, from the distance of a far-flung northern chair:

..and eventually, after his book was published in 1975, the canadian go-between Taylor could be tentatively offered an Oxford chair...in Political Science, soon vacated after fruitless attempts to generate the philosophical dialogue proposed by Findlay in 1958. I remember the prelude in a daring Hegel 'class' instituted in the Summer of 1974: Michael Inman laboriously tried to make out what Hegel meant by a few pages more or less randomly taken from the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion; my question as to the presuppositions of such a naive approach, which seemed to me and one american student present to constitute a particularly hegelian question were met by a familiar blank stare: one was not interested in such abstract systematic questions (even if such were the questions specifically designated by Hegel as framing the entry to the System) but rather in the empirical examination of this particular bit of text which one had as it were stumbled across while making a chance detour from that broad highway of Oxford philosophy marked out by the texts defining examination syllabi.
Across the Atlantic the tradition inaugurated by the German exiles at St Louis in the nineteenth century maintained a certain strength from various new influxes from continental Europe, most notably in the 1930s with the transfer of the Institut für Sozialforschung to Columbia, and so on - this even if the dominant strand in the American recombination of European traditions, represented by chairs of Philosophy in the most prominent universities, was determined by the continuing dialogue with the European school which had given the old colony both her most prominent universities and the English language of the discussion. But at least Hegel was on the syllabus, even if this textual strand was only beginning to be interwoven with the Anglo-American strands of the Quine-Strawson and Davidson-Dummett mainstream around the time of Taylor's trip to Oxford.

The broad long-term European and transatlantic tradition is, in the twentieth century, readings of readings of Hegel - even if the readings read be those of apostates such as Russell and Moore - just as it is the reading of readings of Kant and Descartes (Kant being in a sense primarily a reading of Descartes and Hegel, as Fischer and his readers retorted to neokantianism, a reading of Kant...
in terms of 'external' configurations and axes of that symmetry of System and the various dimensions of its Context whose internal logical elaboration is 'the mature System'. One may articulate the mid-century development from Hegel in the first three decades of the nineteenth century to Nietzsche, Zeller, Haym, Dilthey...Lange Cohen, Mach and so on in the last three more or less 'dialectically' in terms of the gradual emancipation of various 'external' or contextual axes of criticism of the abstract internal logic of the System from their early domination by the hegelian syntax of the terms in which that System and syntax was questioned, and the converse progressive coordination of such 'lines' or axes of questioning, posed 'outside' the system in the symmetries of systematic Text and Context which Hegel had articulated in the logical axis of abstraction from the figural embedding of his logic in his own biography, towards Dilthey's focussing of this question of hegelian biography, and its organisation of the drama of abstraction of the hegelian System from the Romanticism of 1800, in 1900 - this itself being, by now, only an isolated index of that wider coordination of the various orders of questioning arising over mid-century in terms of Nietzsche's dramatic attempt to pose for european Culture as a whole what was opened up, and what at stake, as the abstract axis of questioning, inquiry, simply as such, finally came into the scope of its own questioning as simply one option among others in the interaction of people and groups of people - an activity directed by that 'value of Truth' which competes to frame the relations and practical dynamic of questioning with other orders of activity, in direct opposition to, say, political and material ends: an opposition of dynamics, forces, associated with various figures of the relation of those figures - various forces expressing themselves in the coordination of themselves with other forces, in the various dimensions of textual, political, physical and other orders of confrontation. The Future lay in the figure of that value presented by Nietzsche in the image of Eternal Recurrence - the 'external' physical image or correlate of that circular assertion of Assertion from which the force of all other historical figures could be seen to derive - or rather the figure in which all other competing figures could be coordinated, and the figure whose force would derive precisely from this trans-
the figure whose force derived precisely by this transcription, transformation, subversion of all opposing forces into the force to which they felt themselves opposed. Löwith's framing of the transition from Hegel's logic to Nietzsche's poetic might just as well, perhaps, have traced a dialectic 'from Hülterlin to Nietzsche', since the nietzschean emancipation of the poetic axis of his dramatic inquiry from the initial logic of the interplay of logic and context in the 'Diogenes Laertius Question' and the Birth of Tragedy down to Ecce Homo, closes in the 1890s with the dissolution of that figure of 'rational' differentiation of player from part, logical axis of questioning 'outside' its inscription as one figure in the figural dynamic of poem and drama, which directly reflects Hülterlin's passage into 'madness' in the first decade of the century...

LÖWITH, Karl

Von Hegel zu Nietzsche: Der Revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts
Zurich 1941; tr Green (NY 1964) London 1965

Hegel and Nietzsche: two 'poles' of nineteenth-century thought; and the exile from Marburg, in his preface dated Sendai, Japan, 1939, questions the legacy of Nietzsche in the circular affirmation of Will that has driven him from Germany, in terms of an analogy with the questioning of the hegelian logical circuit of an internal logical framing of the symmetry of the logical order of questions with their 'external' coordinates as mapped into the System, which defines the 'revolutionary Break' as both theoretical and practical transition from primary logical to primary practical axis of questioning around the time of the Year of Revolutions: 'the nietzscheans of yesterday correspond to the hegelians of the 1840s'. The completion of the hegelian System at the time of the July Revolution passes through that revolutionary break from logic into action, logically determined as 'revolutionary break', 'leap of faith', in 'the exclusive choices of Kierkegaard and Marx', at mid-century, towards the coordination of those two mid-century orders of question in the birth of Nietzsche's 'tragic perspective' around the time of the Franco-Prussian War and german unification.
Löwith's articles of the 'thirties, then, on which his book was based, constitute a response to the 'nietzschean' circularity of Rosenberg's 'self-affirming Myth', by restoring a logical instance of critical detachment whose elision in the genealogy of Nietzsche's final abstraction from circular hegelian 'Science of Logic' to logic and its 'Value of Truth' as merely one circuit inscribed within the poetic circle of circles which is Will to Power and its Eternal Recurrence, he sets in a textual matrix, and in an interplay of logic and figure in the various dimensions of his critical narration, which, he might hope, would play a part in opening up a new cultural space of texts and contexts in which a transition might be made out of the circuits of Nationalist Socialist mythology and its power, as the mid-nineteenth century marked a transition out of the political order of which Hegel had, in some measure, provided the 'logical' ideology, the 'logic' of prussian power finally subordinated and subverted in a nietzschean Myth (a 'nietzschean' myth sealed by Bäumer's myth of Nietzsche).

Now I tried to 'coordinate' the textual response to the 'Revolution' of around 1800 in relation to Hegel's abstraction of its german logic as primary coordinate or reference. Similarly I took Nietzsche's questioning of european Culture from around 1870 down to his 'breakdown' as a primary index marking the logical or theoretical recognition around the beginning of the twentieth century that the 'logic' of the symmetry and corresponding coupling of logical and other dimensions of theory must itself be discovered in that interplay, rather than being elaborated from some point nominally 'outside' it - a recognition whose own coupling with the 'Second Industrial Revolution' and the political transformation over the turn of the century leading into the Great War may be taken, I suggested, to define that twentieth-century Modernity whose theoretical dimensions we call 'modern physics', 'modern logic', 'modern mathematics', 'modernist' theology, 'modern' experimental psychology and psychoanalysis; the theories of 'modern art' and the 'modern novel', 'modern music', 'modern architecture', and so on.
I have already suggested that Glockner's Hegel-Lexikon might be taken as the linguistic matrix marking the synchrony of linguistic and other 'external' coordinates, in which the dynamic of abstraction of a mature System in which all those terms are supposed articulated in the logical matrix of formal substitutions of one term for another, might be supposed diachronically articulated in various 'external' axes running historically parallel to the 'internal' elaboration of System. One might extend the image from such an embedding of Hegel's own texts within a dynamic of which they present only the developing 'internal' logical order, to an embedding of nineteenth and twentieth-century responses to Hegel in the symmetry or synchrony and dynamic or diachrony of the various orders of question posed by the symmetry in the System of the logical and other, external, dimensions or coordinates of the System. If textual responses to Hegel are necessarily, formally at least, definable as mappings into the textual order of question and answer of dynamics articulated in the various symmetries of 'internal' and 'external' coordinates of the hegelian texts themselves, then we might suppose Glockner's verbal matrix itself embedded, as an 'abstraction' of the coordinates of their abstraction, from the wider historic matrix of coordinates of reading Hegel set out in:

702 STEINHAUER, Kurt Background Material on the International Reception of Hegel within the Context of the History of Philosophy...Keyword Index by Gitta Harsh Munich/NY/London/Paris 1980

...which covers 12,032 entries from Hegel's own texts (797 editions) down to 1975: books, dissertations, and articles from about 1,500 different periodicals, covering 29 languages; the 'keyword index' with about 8000 entries is here compiled from the 12,032 titles only, while Glockner's Lexikon is compiled from texts; yet the terms in which the responses are thus 'defined' by their authors may be said to present the matrix of questions defining the response to Hegel's inquiry or theory in its nineteenth and twentieth-century context, the terms of 'external' embedding of the hegelian text in the questions attaching to its abstraction from context.
I structured my 'Part III' above by considering the wider 'space' and time - the symmetry or synchrony, and the diachronic 'dynamics' - of various 'lines' of elaboration of theory in response to various questions posed by the symmetry of Hegelian abstraction and context from which the Hegelian 'System' systematically abstracted, in their synchrony or parallel with various other lines of questioning defined more directly in relation to other textual traditions parallel from around 1800 with Hegel's developing System in Germany, as this general synchronic 'space' European and transatlantic theory was itself coupld to various still 'external' coordinates of its developing contexts. Very few of Steinhauer's responses to Hegel, even; still fewer, proportionately, of the wider range of texts not directly framed in relation to those of Hegel, were marked as textual coordinates of that overall dynamic of response to the 'Revolution' or revolutions that mark various dimensions of transition from eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. Yet the necessity of excluding all but a minute fraction of extant nineteenth and twentieth-century theoretical texts from the terms coordinated in Part III, and the fact that many of the textual coordinates actually marked there were embedded in the overall 'space' and 'time' of theory only at 'second-hand' through the embedding of another text in which they were discussed (which latter 'secondary' source might not even have been explicitly set in the eventual narration of my reading which is Part III) is a kind of virtue, in that it presents one directly with the circumstance that one doesn't in fact begin, as a critic of Hegel's 'abstraction' from some abstract 'point' in some supposed unitary space of 'all questions' constituted by the formal embedding of Hegelian texts in a nineteenth-century 'context' of all the terms externally coordinate with their abstract images of representations in the abstract logical dynamic of Hegelian textuality (together with many other terms from which the space symptomatically abstracts altogether, like Cassirer's Enlightenment from eighteenth-century material economy and its eighteenth-century theory). Such a 'complete' image is itself an index of residual Hegelian abstraction in one's very image of that abstraction. Our 'problem', suggests Taylor, is 'to situate subjectivity' outside its formal representation in the residually cartesian 'I' of abstract Reason, organising around itself, or in the web of substitutions for such a
term in the logical dynamic of question or inquiry which is the 'internal' axis of hegelian textuality, abstract hegelian System systematically set in the Universe of which it is the System, the systematic mapping into a hegelian logic of the relations of that logic to its 'external' coordinates, the coordinates of logical 'externality' — in the first instance the physical Space and Time from which that spatial image of 'internal' and 'external' is borrowed ('borrowed' indeed: a figural debt which is never properly repayed, 'redeemed'). But we do not start 'outside' the 'I' of hegelian Reason and its System in the 'internal' version of abstract 'externality', but rather from a particular self in a particular situation, dramatically engaged in questioning hegelian abstraction within the relatively autonomous dynamic 'outside' the system whose axis can only be formally identified in the system in terms of a symmetry of System and Context, a feuerbachian or kierkegaardian or marxian axis whose actual unfolding outside some image of that unfolding in the System practically demonstrates the falsity of its representation in the system, and so of the System itself. If Hegel's critics initially mark their criticism of systematic misrepresentation in the terms of that misrepresentation — Nature, the 'concrete', material, subjective, and so on, this presents only the familiar figure of a questioning of a previous axis of inquiry and theory which begins by finding itself 'in' the external coordinates which the earlier theory adapted to its framing of the world in which it identified itself as the locus of framing, at a different locus of framing world and locus of framing. As the new axis of inquiry begins to organise itself as an autonomous 'theory' or at least 'textuality', its terms become more or less emancipated from the ambiguity between a syntax 'internal' to the old theory in whose criticism they first began to take on a new implication, and a new syntax which need no longer refer directly to the older theoretical context from which the redefined term was initially borrowed.

'Borrowed': one may trace a whole theoretical economy based on questionable credit down from Hegel through generations of critics and critics of critics, to, say, Derrida's 'thematisation' of such an economy of deferral in the 1960s. I suggested
that the years around 1970 in Paris were marked by various parallel attempts by the major 'structuralists' of the 1960s to emancipate their questioning of earlier theories from the unitary image of Language in which 'classic' structuralism had inscribed and 'deconstructed' the figural dynamic or poetics of such theory, as that unitary image of Language itself came into question as a residual theoretical abstraction from the development of theories not in abstract 'Language', but in the languages of particular textual constructions, particular 'discourses', of which the discourse that presented 'language' as a unitary synchronic space of differences on the formalist model derived from Saussure and Hjelmslev belonged to the old theoretical order it had at first been used to bring 'into question'. A coach becomes a 'horseless carriage' before becoming a 'car'.

If, then, at the outset of this line of questioning, itself taking shape in large measure as a direct response to the parisian 'structuralism' of around 1970 - as 'represented' by Lacan and Derrida in particular - I opened 'my' questioning by questioning that 'opening', 'questioning', 'my', and so on - questioning the very 'terms' of their common questioning, one in terms of the others - this may be seen as my attempt to bring 'into question' the residual abstraction of a range of theories around 1970 that elide the questioning of their questioning, remaining in a residual 'internal' order of language marked in their language by its own framing in 'text' or 'discourse' as precisely 'text' or 'discourse' rather than book: 'text' or 'discourse whose abstract logical or hermeneutic axis is still articulated in abstraction from the more 'radical' question posed by, or dramatically in, the ambiguously textual and extratextual symmetry of text and context in the activity of writing and reading a 'book' (whatever that might 'be'). And this 'book' I opened this book by bringing 'into question' was not, then, some 'abstraction' supposed defined in the abstract 'internal' textual matrix of the 'logical' axis of this inquiry, any more than it was simply my, or your, physical 'copy' of this book - this copy - identified as such rather in the 'external', contextual, space and time
whose various elements or coordinates the various terms in the 'book' might be taken to mark, through the actual inscription of this textual matrix in the wider matrix, the coordination of whose various terms allowed the verbal definition of this verbal component of the situation precisely as 'book' physically embedded as one element in the activity of my writing and your reading. The 'opening' of this book and its inquiry marked, rather than simply an initial configuration of an 'internal' dynamic of questioning (although it often enough slipped into just that), the opening of a questioning whose internal logical 'dimension' was organised precisely in the logical question of the symmetry of the 'internal' logical matrix and syntax of 'book', 'question' and so on, and the 'external' physical matrix of words and their questions, from which the image of a 'logical' or internal distinction of 'internal' and 'external' dimensions of the questioning was taken — or rather in which this image was found, and in which it was expressly left, as the inquiry proceeded 'through' it in physical space and time, organising its logical dynamic in the symmetry of logical and physical configurations of its questioning of such symmetry.

The 'books', then, which are coordinated 'through' this book with their 'external' embedding in the external coordinates of this book, are not 'all books of theory' externally corresponding, say, to the words in this text 'nineteenth and twentieth-century books of theory', but rather books which I have physically confronted as their configuration in the external space of libraries, bookshops, and so on, marked out my own approach to, and eventual production of, this book. The 'symmetry' in whose terms the various coordinates of the inquiry are set out 'in' the words of the inquiry, which last 'words' themselves constitute merely one dimension itself 'symmetric with 'non-verbal' dimensions, is itself directly coordinate with the term 'question', a symmetry corresponding to the failure of some verbal configuration, for example, to differentiate between two or more possible substitutions for one or more of its terms in its textual and extra-textual context, which indeterminacy or indifference may be marked as something open, and
in this marking call for or induce a response from someone, marked as an instance of 'I' (itself symmetric between all of 'us') who is not indifferent to various different substitutions, responses, answers. The 'logic' of what can be decided 'in language' simply in terms of linguistic substitutions of one group of terms for another allows us to elaborate the internal 'logical' symmetry of logical and physical determination which itself allows us, for example, to use a physical difference to mark a logical difference (and the difference between 'physical' and 'logical', 'external' and 'internal' orders of language in particular) and a physical configuration, 'symmetry' - indecidability as to which of various marks a certain marking of physical difference or distance from some other mark refers to or defines - to mark the logical symmetry of logical and physical orders of marking. Thus one can, in response to the residual abstraction of 'structuralism' around 1970 from the question - or what may be marked as a question - of the symmetry of linguistic and other orders of inquiry, attempt, as I have attempted in writing this 'book' of inquiry, to pursue the articulation of an axis of questioning which works through the symmetry of 'internal' and 'external' symmetries of its own activity, in a sort of reiteration of Nietzsche's questioning of questioning - of the organisation of inquiry as if this were carried on simply in the logical axis of its language rather than in the dramatic interplay of logical and other orders of what is open to the inquirer as a man caught between 'words and things'. Such a 'dramatic' axis appears to me to be gradually emerging from the various orders of theory and their contexts around 1970, as the linguistic axis of 'classic' structuralist questioning of a midcentury coupling of phenomenological theory and an 'existential' activism echoing the mid-nineteenth-century reactions to hegelian abstraction itself confronts the question of the dramatic - existential, indeed - coupling of its linguistic axis to other axes of its production and consumption as theory. I have already hinted at a late 1970s configuration whose most striking parisian index called itself a 'new philosophy', as marking a transition from the questions of 1970 to the questions and contexts of the mid-eighties of which I take the production of this book itself as an index. I now present this index of coupling of theory and its various contexts in the 1980s as itself marking a broader transition
from the questions and contexts of 1970, to what will be opening up around the close of this century in which I write: a 'dramatization' of theory in the explicit coupling of linkage of the various dimensions of its production which directly echoes mid-century 'activism' in the theoretical impasse marked in Paris by the failed 'revolution' of 1968 and by the passage from 'Language' to 'discourse' (and on to the 'postmodernist' stories of the early 1980s), which echoes across that mid-century the opening of specifically 'modern' questioning with the opening of the twentieth century; which echoes in turn, as though finally restoring the Romantic axis from which it systematically abstracted, the inception of hegelian System around 1800 - this in a sort of inversion or conversion of the hegelian movement of abstraction from the interplay of logic, biography, drama, politics, material economy, and the physical confrontation of nations in Nature (as he moved out of Schlegel's turn-of the century marking of the convergence of Fichte's theoretical biography of the Absolute Ego, and Goethe's fictional or poetic biography of Wilhelm Meister, in the outward context of the French Revolution). — In a sort of working-back from the analogy of the systematic symmetry of the linguistic axis of theory around 1970 with the mature hegelian System of 1830, to a symmetric coordination of various lines of questioning of hegelian and parallel developments of the first three decades of the nineteenth century, over the last three decades of the twentieth: in a sort of inversion of the dynamic of Hegel's abstraction, and its various correlates in other domains of german theory and society from 1800 to 1830, and in other european and transatlantic societies and their schools of theory over the same period, through an unfolding question posed by the emerging symmetry of questioning and its extra-logical coordinates, whose posing as question is itself coordinate with specific extra-logical dynamics associated with its various extra-logical coordinates, from around 1970 to around 2000.

In the light of this symmetry over two centuries, of hegelian abstraction from the revolutionary interplay of various dimensions of 'history' around 1800, and a converse systematic
questioning which returns through each step of abstraction, from the 'I' of abstract Reason's self-assertion in self-distinction from each particular figure of its assertion, back through Logic and Phenomenology to the young Hegel of 1800 himself, and the eventual recognition toward the close of the twentieth century of the elementary external 'physical' image of the symmetry of the logical axis and dynamic of abstract questioning and theory, and the complementary physical dynamic of the material order in which such abstract questioning is materially conducted, in, for example, the temporal articulation in an elementary cyclical 'harmonics' of circuits-within-circuits of questioning, within circuits-within-circuits of years-within-decades-within-centuries (that most elementary symmetry of internal and external dimensions of theory, from whose elementary embedding in the physical symmetries of space and time a residual theoretical instance of an autonomous 'I' which we think thinks in us, turns in elementary derision or horror, as from the last index of its abstraction)...in the light of this final question of the elementary symmetry of the logical articulation of the symmetry of the various coordinates of questioning, and symmetric extralogical articulations of those coordinates in 'parallel' dynamics or axes (physical and other), the 'elementary' frame of the whole dynamic of inquiry over two and a half millennia, narrated through Parts I to III, may be simply reconsidered in terms of the elementary symmetries over that period of a few fairly simple configurations of a logically progressive questioning, as it is organised by pythagoreans, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Stoa, Academy, Epicureans, Cicero, Philo, Origen, Plotinus, Augustine, Proclus, Damascius...Thomas, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche simply in their various textual responses to the question, successively posed in relation to new texts and contexts, by the symmetry of the various orders or coordinates of 'question' itself. Thus I have suggested elementary relations or symmetries between Nietzsche's circuit of assertion of Assertion, and Hegel's abstraction of Abstraction, between Kant's 'categorial' scheme and Scotus', between Descartes' logic of formal substitution in the matrix of language, and of that mathematical frame of language for the various linguistically determined coordinates of that language and logic or thought, and Thomas' logic, or Kant's. Kant's and Scotus'
categories, of course, reflecting in language the structure of inscription of language and the thought it articulates, in its wider 'context' - or rather, reflecting the categorial structure of the different sorts of question - different forms of substitution for that radical locus of substitution in language which is 'question' - in the structure of substitution of language for its various extralinguistic (and indeed linguistic) contextual coordinates - these 'categories' directly, indeed in that very term, language, echo Aristotle's elementary frame of questions, of inquiry, of theory, of World. Proclus' symmetric coordination of all the questions of classical pagan Antiquity, so closely prefiguring the symmetry of the mature System of his admirer Hegel, together with Damascius' consequent impasse, explicitly reflects or echoes, in its coordination of platonic mystery and aristotelian economy five hundred years after the opening of our 'era', that pythagorean marking of the symmetry of various orders or dimensions of the Mark, which I take as the opening of 'theory' five hundred years before the beginning of our era.

Finally, I find in the symmetry of an overall dynamic of unfolding of theoretical questioning from that initial marking of the symmetry of the various coordinates of elementary mark, 'point', in the pythagorean Tetractys, and of converse convergence toward a coordination of the various dimensions of theories and contexts at the close of this second millenium (in terms of the symmetry of the various coordinates of question, 'internal' and 'external', in the logic of an inquiry framed or opened by the question posed by the symmetry of its internal and external dimensions, a logic which 'logically' identifies itself as the reflection or mirroring of the inquiry's physical embedding in the external economy of its production in physical space and time) a limiting configuration of inscription of logical in physical 'time', transmitted throughout an intervening 'tradition' of theory through the constancy of the figure of logical inscription of 'external' physical time in the internal textual time of deduction - a configuration whose constancy over two and a half millenia presents 'theory' precisely as a unitary textual tradition of inquiry, of questioning.
If I try and characterise the subordinate symmetry within this wider millenial tradition, which relates the abstraction of hegelian System as an initial index of the unfolding of theory from 1800 towards 2000, to the concretisation of inquiry leading from Paris, 1970, through this inquiry into itself, toward the convergence of various lines of theoretical and contextual development toward a configuration around 2000 which the symmetry marked in this inquiry, and by it, is taken to prefigure - this in terms of the complementarity of hegelian abstraction towards a logic organised by the formal assertion of 'I' abstracted from any identification with some particular 'I' (such as me or you or Hegel or Kierkegaard or...), and a questioning which begins, precisely, by questioning the instance of its assertion or questioning marked by this word 'I', organising around it groups of terms and questions from whose symmetry the hegelian 'I' one-sidedly abstracts - then I might coordinate the final circuit of 'Encyclopedia' in 1830 with a parisian questioning around 1970 of the figuration of Hegel's logic of abstraction of logic from figure, and the emergence in the early 1970s of Nietzsche as the presiding spirit of 'post-structuralism'. If one takes Dilthey's question of 'the young Hegel', as presenting the question, in 1900, of the embedding of the hegelian abstraction from the initial proposal of 1800 to the final System of the 1820s in the biographical and historical axis of a Romanticism which confuses the logic of Fichte's Absolute 'I' and the fictional identification of a whole range of adolescents with Wilhelm Meister's part in the dramatic configuration of French Revolution - which passes around 1800 through the literary confusion of absolute 'I', particular individuals, and fictional part in the narrower symmetry and dynamic of poem, novel, drama - and if one considers the questions of 1970 as at once a radicalisation of Dilthey's question, but also a residual abstraction of the more radical version of the question of the relations of logical and figural 'sides' of language and text or discourse from its 'hermeneutic' embedding, along with the young Hegel, in the dramatic, practical, order of its posing in Paris around 1970...then one, or rather I, may begin to arrange textual coordinates of this drama in which we are 'hermeneutically' engaged in a cultural space and historical time of reading and writing along with Hegel and the Romantics and Dilthey and structuralists and all the others.
And since this inquiry and text, embodied in this and other copies, opens out from a questioning unfolding specifically in the relations of the internal matrix of its words in which 'text', 'book', and so on occur, and the external matrix in which one thing may be substituted for another - something or nothing for this copy of this book, say, in the space or place where it presently (as these words are read) finds itself, or this book for something or nothing on a shelf from which it has been taken, and so on - it may be embedded, not in some abstract space and formal historical time logically 'outside' the internal axis of its theoretical inquiry, nor in abstract coordination of 'text' and its internal syntax in some particular 'structuralist' text or book, with an apparently more or less arbitrary range of 'texts' taken, abstracted, from some shelf or other 'outside' the text 'in' which they are read; abstracted from their physical position on shelves and tables in schools and libraries, which sets them in an external economy of reading, writing, buying, selling, shelving and so on....but embedded, rather, in the concrete co-ordination in this text, through the physical embedding of this text as books in what is 'logically' outside determination in the internal textual matrix of words, with a material 'history' of production and transmission, writing and reading, outside both this 'text' and their own.

This coordination of figurations of theoretical 'text' as verbally set in this book, through the identification of the place of that figuration of theory-of-World, theory and its World, in this book as characterising the common setting of this book and that earlier book in a common figuration of their World identified in this book as first identified in that book, began with a sort of limit-text in the pythagorean silence marked in a common space and time of this book and that silence, which space and time appeared, precisely, as what was marked by the Tetractys as external image of mirroring of internal and external 'dimensions' of 'theory', image of Kosmos, articulated in the question posed by pythagorean 'mystery' marked by Tetractys and silence. Here, in the convergence of various coordinate dimensions of Kosmos in that passage from
hegelian System and its contemporary parallels in theory, through various lines of questioning over nineteenth and twentieth centuries, whose dynamic mirrors across Enlightenment, Scientific Revolution and Renaissance the dynamic traced in Part I (500 BC to 1250), to this questioning of its questioning, we finally pass through a group of texts, composed mainly in English, French, and German, gradually leading back through the 'external' space and time of Kosmos to this book which itself emerges in the interplay of 'internal' and 'external' coordinates of those texts or books in my life of reading and writing and travelling between England and France, and loving and all the rest, to finally mark the focusing of the symmetry of internal and external dimensions of the particular texts already noted, and about to be listed, in its own opening question, in the question-mark to which my and your opening was a response.

That is: looking back now to the trajectory of Part III, from the question posed at its close in relation to the coordinate abstraction of inquiries and contexts around 1970 from the question of this coordination, this symmetry of 'internal' and 'external' coordinates of 'question' which I have in the 1980s tried to mark and pose as a question, so to open up a new axis of theory and activity in the dramatic coupling of theory and other dimensions of activity... I can present the dynamic traced from 1800 to 1970 as the coordination of 'internal' and 'external' dimensions not of abstract 'theory' or 'text', but of a particular set of actual books whose 'internal' and 'external' dimensions are at once correlated through the inscription of the opening of this book in its 'context', and in turn respond to the inquiry there opened by presenting their 'own' figures of a 'World' or context in which they and we are together, in this reading of them, discovered.

Let me now, then, 'retrospectively' present the 'period' of theory from 1800 to 1970, not as the symmetric inscription of a range of texts produced over that period 'in' what is represented
in this 'text' as a space and time 'outside' it in which it and they are nominally set, but rather as simply one side of, and in a way physically 'in', a set of books which I mark now 'in' this book, itself set physically among them and others not listed here because they do not belong to that mirroring of insides and outsides of this and those books which is my reading and writing so far.

I will set these books, in this book which is set on a shelf among them, in a sort of imaginary alternative shelving; on shelves whose sequence of books, and wider pattern of shelving, reflects various coordinates of the inquiry already correlated in Part III above.