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<th>No.</th>
<th>Author</th>
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<th>Edition Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>703</td>
<td>WORDSWORTH, William &amp;</td>
<td>Lyrical Ballads</td>
<td>London (1798; enlgd, with Preface 1800) ed Brett &amp; Jones 1963</td>
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<td>COLERIDGE, Samuel Taylor</td>
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<td>705</td>
<td>COLERIDGE, Samuel Taylor</td>
<td>Biographia Literaria: or Sketches of my Literary Life and Opinions</td>
<td>London (1817) ed Hartley &amp; Sara Coleridge 1847</td>
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<td>706</td>
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<td>Aids to Reflection</td>
<td>London (1825) rev 1830</td>
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<td>707</td>
<td>BYRON, George Gordon</td>
<td>Letters and Journals</td>
<td>ed Moore London 1830; ed Prothero 1898-1904</td>
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<td>Noel, Baron</td>
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<td>708</td>
<td>SHELLEY, Percy Bysshe</td>
<td>Essays, Letters from Abroad, Translations and Fragments</td>
<td>ed Mary Shelley London 1840</td>
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<td>709</td>
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<td>A Philosophical View of Reform (1819)</td>
<td>ed &amp; intr Rolleston London 1920</td>
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<td>710</td>
<td>BRAILSFORD, Henry Noel</td>
<td>Shelley, Godwin, and their Circle</td>
<td>London 1913</td>
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Wordsworth in France, 1790, 1791-3, 1802; Wordsworth and Coleridge together 1797-1803, in Germany together 1798-9: parallel shelves above and below mark parallel national or cultural space and times.

Hmm... should I here romantically mix theory, letters, lives, poetry, and add the poems to the prose... along with Blake and Scott and a few others? Is the Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, or the Biographia of which it is in a sense the first draft,
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Text cut off in original
really prose poetry or theory... what would Harold Bloom do here, if poems are really the 'truest' response to or comprehension or apprehension or misapprehension of poetry - always attempting to repeat an earlier poem in a new context (like Schleiermacher's historical reformulations of 'religion', religious feeling), and so always failing, but not, at least, like theoretical prose criticism, mistaking the very genre of the attempt...

... But I didn't list the Night Thoughts or Fingal or The Castle of Otranto among my eighteenth-century pre-romantic 'texts', assigning them rather to the textual context, the 'literary context' of the eighteenth-century theory which I marked out in the textual, bibliographical, coordinates of my reading 'in' that century... true, I listed Candide and Werther and Meister and Hölderlin's poems, and found Romantic theory elaborated in the Romantic symmetry, the theoretical symmetry, indeed, of theory and poetry... and various other coordenstes or dimensions as well:

712 STAËL, Anne-Louise Germaine de
De la Littérature considérée dans ses Rapports avec les Institutions Sociales
Paris 1800; rev with new Preface & ann 1800; ed van Tieghem Geneva 1959

713 De l'Allemagne (Paris 1810) London 1813

714 Réflexions sur le Suicide London 1813

715 Considérations sur les Principaux Événemens de la Révolution Française London 1818

716 HEROLD, J C
Mistress to an Age: A Life of Madame de Staël London 1958

717 CHATEAUBRIAND, François René de
De Bonaparte, des Bourbons Paris 1814

I will, I think, pass over a shelf or so of relatively 'minor' books...
II Responses to the first responses, in England, France and Germany, from around 1830 to around the end of the century

In Part III I traced parallels in England and France to the German theoretical scene dominated by Hegel and Berlin, then suggested that a new phase from around 1830 (say, beginning 1827-33) might be considered as reactions in those three countries to the intellectual, political and material revolutions of the previous half-century or so, taken now in their European unity. Thus Madame de Staël, during her association with the elder Schlegel had introduced German Romance into France - or rather had attempted this in 1810: Napoleon ordered the destruction of the whole French edition of 1810 before publication, and it was first published, along with her other writings after that date, in England, where it was read by the young Carlyle in 1817. He then moved toward his own importation of Germany into England - his Scottish version of Madame de Staël's French project, so to speak. I have noticed his Life of Schiller and translation of Meister in 1823-4; the Wanderjahre actually appeared in 1827 as two of the four volumes of:

718 German Romance... with biographical and critical notices (trs of Jean-Paul, Tieck, Hoffmann, Fouque, Musnus, Goethe, with intrs) London (1827)

Perhaps these translations and appreciations should be shelved with the Athenaeum; but in the essays, many on German Romanticism, beginning in the same year, it is the dominant 'man of letters' of the mid-century who starts to take his own British shape...

719 Carlyle, Thomas
Critical and Miscellaneous Essays (1827-38) (Boston 1838) London 1869 (in Works)

720 Sartor Resartus - London (1833-4; ed with pref Emerson Boston 1836)-ed Wood 1902

721 The French Revolution. A History London 1837

722 On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in (lects 1840) London (1841) ed Parr 1910
Man of letters...is Carlyle's **French Revolution** theory...or history (if it were, why the need to underline the fact in the title?)...or fiction, a novel, 'romance', Leavis' 'dramatic poem in prose'? Hmm, genre again. Hayden White thinks all nineteenth-century 'history' is properly a sub-genre within narrative fiction. I suggested in Part III that the predominantly *occasional* frame of Carlyle's writing reflected its fundamental *dramatic* axis. Into this drama, then, enters his younger friend Mill, somehow losing the manuscript of the first version of *The French Revolution* in 1835.

723 MILL, John Stuart *Autobiography* London 1873

I traced in that book Mill's dramatisation or narration of, and reflections on, the 'nervous breakdown' of 1827 which marked the passage from the one-sided 'analysis' for which his father had educated him, to its coupling with the Romantic 'feeling' of Wordsworth and Coleridge...

724 MILL, James *An Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind* London (1829) ed, intr, ann John Stuart Mill 1869

725 MILL, John Stuart *A System of Logic* London (1843) many revs to 1872

Mill, theoretically defining the relations of theory and feeling, keeping autobiography and theory at a greater distance than Carlyle, and dominating theory outside the University over the mid-century as Carlyle's fellow scot dominated within...

726 HAMILTON, Sir William *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic* ed Mansell & Veitch Edinburgh 1859-60

...rather as Mill's friend Comte dominated theory outside the University in France (or rather, Paris), and Cousin within - Cousin providing the educational model for Europe and for Arnold who with Ruskin so to speak takes over as critic of literature and Society (and with Ruskin, Society and Art generally), while Spencer takes over from Comte and Mill, and the 'hegelians' from all these, in the University...
ARNOLD, Matthew

Culture and Anarchy (London 1869) ed with selems from:
Schools and Universities on the Continent (1868)
Essays in Criticism (1865; 1889) ed Keating
Harmondsworth 1970.

RUSKIN, John

Frondes Agrestes (from Modern Painters, 1843-60)
(Orpington 1875) London 1900

Sesame and Lilies (lects 1864) London (1865)
1900 (fr tr by Proust in 1906...)

SPENCER, Herbert

A System of Synthetic Philosophy London 1860-96

BRADLEY, Francis

Appearance and Reality (London 1893)

WOLLHEIM, Richard

F.H. Bradley Harmondsworth 1959

...and to close the century, as it were coming full-circle...

HOPKINS, Gerard Manley (d 1889)

Poems and Prose sel & ed Gardner from
Poems ed Bridges 1918; Letters ed Bridges
1935; Notebooks & Papers ed Bridges 1937
Harmondsworth (1953) 1963 (78-9)

...then passing on to Germany...

WALLACE, William

Lectures and Essays ed with Life Caird
Oxford 1898

ELLIS, Havelock

Affirmations London 1898

(containing two of the earliest british responses to Nietzsche,
written 1895-6; the translator and propounder of Hegel was at work
on a book on Nietzsche when he lost control of his bicycle and died;
Caird gives the opening section)

WALLACE, William

The Life of Arthur Schopenhauer London 1890

Hegel, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer...Will as alternative to Reason, and
Schopenhauer eclipsed in his period by setting himself up quite
literally as the 'alternative' to Hegel (like Deleuze holding his
seminar at exactly the same time and day as Lacan), whose volumes
have so to speak pushed his onto these shelves with Wallace, naturally finding in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche resonances of the primary ethical, 'practical' axis of British reflection confronting Hegel, and echoing even in the detail of a biographical framing of Schopenhauer's reasoning on the will, that questioning of the abstract 'internal' image of the practical implications of the System in the outward context of the History it framed, already noticed in Haym, in the generation after 1848, and taken up by the young Nietzsche around 1870... that questioning of the rational projections of the politicised hegelianism, whether of left, right or centre, which induced the posthumous response to Schopenhauer after mid-century, that he had so desperately sought in his lifetime...

737 SCHOPENHAUER, Arthur

Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (Leipzig 1818) tr Haldane & Kemp (London 1883-6) NY 19

738

Parerga und Paralipomena (Berlin 1851) tr(part) Saunders London 1889; tr

...And since we have come to biography and alternatives, and alternatives to Hegel at Berlin in particular, I will somewhat illicitly borrow a bit of shelving for Denmark, beginning with Kierkegaard's half-fictional attempt to repeat the visit to Berlin to hear the old Schelling who had eventually revenged himself on his former fellow student, where Schopenhauer had failed, after cholera had disposed of Hegel, and Friedrich Wilhelm IV had called in the replacement...

739 KIERKEGAARD, Søren

(Repetition) (Copenhagen 1843) tr Lowrie Princeton 1942

740 (Philosophical Fragments) (Copenhagen 1844) tr Swenson Princeton (1936) 1962

741 (Stages on Life's Way) Copenhagen 1845 tr Lowrie Princeton 1940

742 (Concluding Unscientific Postscript) (Copenhagen 1846) tr Swenson & Lowrie Princeton (1941) 1968

743 (Purity of Heart: Is to Will one Thing) (Copenhagen 1847) tr

744 (Journals 1835-55) ed & tr Dru Oxford 1938
Perhaps this is the right place for Hilarius Bookbinder and Johannes Climacus, anyway... and I can't help feeling that there's a bit of a gap... at the beginning... and rather a brusque transition to Løwith's other, alternative, alternative, next...

The very singular divided individual Kierkegaard, and then MEGA, become the canonical text for the culture of millions for which it is the theoretical authority (in various senses), the theoretical, and textual, embedding of half of the World, in post-hegelian Nature, which by a sort of reflex supports in that half of the World a great philological industry of commentators, editors, state publishing houses and printers... which one feels quite physically engaged in, as one takes one of these volumes from the shelf. Books that say: this is about what's going on all around you, inside, but especially outside, this library. And I glance uneasily towards the books back on the left, there through the solitary devotion of David Swenson, and I feel... Is this me seeing my social being in the material dialectic of Nature reflected in the regular volumes of the Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe? And I wonder who I am, caught between the alternative alternatives of these two sets of scripts for my physical confrontation with them there on the shelf. And I suddenly begin to feel... What am I doing here...

MARX, Karl

Differenz der Demokratischen und Epikurischen Naturphilosophie (1840-1): (95) above, (745) I.1

OEconomische-philosophische Manuskripte (1843-4)
(745: pt I vol 2; first ptd 1927-32)
tr Bottomore Moscow/L 1959

MARX, Karl, & ENGELS, Friedrich

Die Heilige Familie, oder Kritik der kritischen Kritik (Frankfurt 1845) tr Dixon Moscow/L 1956

Die Deutsche Ideologie (1845-6, ptd 1932) tr (pts I, II abgd) with (751) Arthur Moscow/L 1970

Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei London (1848) tr Moore (1886) intr Taylor Hswth 1967
Dialectics of Nature: I remember Pierre Macherey, early one Saturday morning (I felt that he held his seminar at 9 am on Saturdays to as it were confront the jeunesse dorée of the Sorbonne with an image of the fundamental fact of life that most people are alienated by having to turn up at another sort of institution at 9 am every other morning of the working week) remonstrating with one of the students at his seminar on Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, who had referred to 'La Philosophie de la Nature d'Engels'. To confuse Hegel's and Engels' titles was to miss at the outset the very axis of Engels' critique of the abstraction common to both idealist logic, and the non-dialectical academic 'materialism' which carried over into the 'external' Nature in which it embedded its scientific logic of experience just that unitary internal determination of 'external' Nature which reflected the abstraction of Hegel's logic from the real conflict or contradiction of forces in the real Nature from which the logical determination of the relations of logic and Nature abstracted, in abstracting from the ideological, political and economic embedding of academic logic - whether idealist or materialist - in their material context. Logic is the Money of the Mind, its operation regulating academic debate is set as an image, a reflection, in the wider material economy regulated by Capital,
in which the professors, idealist or materialist, play their parts by transposing real, practical contradictions and questions into an abstract image in the economy of logical Theory, in which a solution or resolution can then be deduced - relative to an initial presupposition of the maintenance, precisely, of that transposition into a theory, which both supports and is supported by the abstract, alienated 'logic' or dynamic of Capital, apparently presenting the optimal material inscription of human Culture in the unitary mechanical Nature whose teleology of progress it reflects. Philosophers have only interpreted the World: the point is, to change it. So suddenly the books on the shelf mark the place of the shelves, and the library, in an interplay of inside and outside the building, and the institution of clam reading, dispassionate critical reflection and debate, in a dramatic or practical order in which the ideological economy of language is coupled with the material economy of production of books and other commodities, globally, 'in the last instance', inscribed in the latter. Kojeve in the thirties had dramatically focussed parisian intellectual life, setting the Phenomenology in a drama of material confrontation with, reading of, the text, on the podium of his lecture-hall, 'amphitheatre', which reflected the embedding of that text at once in the Romantic drama from which the young Hegel was, in its composition, dramatically abstracting himself toward his hermetic Science of Logic, and also in the wider 'marxist' coupling of hegelian Logic and the practical order of Society from which it abstracted to give a logical image in a nominally 'external' Nature. Reading Marx in the 1960s, then, at the other side of the mid-twentieth century, one could trace a converse process to that read in the Phenomenology, as Marx over the mid-nineteenth century passed back, through the practical question of the abstraction of hegelian Logic and Nature from the practical order of real social questions, and an 'epistemological break' a la Bachelard or Kuhn from the logic of embedding of the logical in the practical order, to the practice of theory, toward a materialist dialectic in which 'theoretical practice' would articulate in language the material economy as frame of social interaction in Nature, framing
in the capitalist mode of production the question posed by theoretical inscription of capitalist economy in the true socialist frame of optimal production, as abstract alienated logic could be in the language it thought to frame as a sort of historic short-circuit, whose other side in language was the figural dynamic of interaction elaborated by Lacan. Thus in the practical political order of transformation of French society, through organising the transformation of the mode of production in a 'revolutionary break' that is prefigured by Marx' 'epistemological break', Althusser's general framing of what is open, and theoretical analysis of the optimal course towards social transformation, is coordinated with other components of that practical business within the bureau politique of the French Communist Party.

754 Lire le Capital - essays by Althusser, Balibar, Macherey, Ranciere Establet Paris 1965
755 ALTHUSSER, Louis Pour Marx Paris 1966

...But where in all this is me, reading Marx or Althusser in the library? The symmetric system of embedding theory in language in human interaction in the material economy of the capitalist mode of production in that piece of Nature we call north-western Europe, with its unitary Language, its instituted Direction, by the Party, itself remains a system of abstractions, brought into question as the students of 1968 play out their personal dramas of 'Revolution', Althusser suddenly absents himself from the scene (to reappear in comic parody in Godard's Vent d'Est, charting the Revolution in perceptions)...reappearing when the students, by now 'alienated' from the Party, discover that their own Revolution has itself only been a dream, a Parisian spectacle. Back with his students a few years later, Althusser struck me forcibly by the exaggerated irony in which he played out his role of 'reading' the political philosophy texts on the Agregation syllabus; a few years later still, as I sat in Jacques-Alain Miller's seminar-room at the Hopital Sainte-Anne, Louis Althusser was incarcerated somewhere else in the complex, the domestic drama having quite overtaken the wider social drama in which it had
been nominally embedded or inscribed.

If we're going to stand where we are, 'outside' old Hegel's logic, we can't simply start at some point marked 'outside' in his logic, and make our 'epistemological break' out to there, once we've set up a new axis of coupling of logic and World through that new point - whether it be Kierkegaard's subjectivity or Marx's material economy of Culture in Nature... or Helmholtz' Science...

756 HELMHOLZ, Hermann von Vorträge und Reden* Berlin 1865

...or some generalisation from it...

757 BÜCHNER, Ludwig Kraft und Stoff (Tübingen 1855) tr Collingwood London 1864

758 LOTZE, Hermann Mikrokosmos (Leipzig 1856-64) tr Hamilton & Jones Edinburgh 1885-6

...or some abstract coordination of Kant's 'scientific' frame of individual experience in universal Nature, with that spatiotemporal interface of these two poles of human Culture and History from which Kant abstracted...

759 LANGE, Albert Geschichte der Materialismus* (Lpzg 1866) Berlin 1873

760 DUSSORT, Henri L'Ecole de Marbourg Paris 1963 (76)

...we can't just try logically inscribing our logic in its material economy, and end up blocked with Althusser in a tragic emotional impasse; if we're going to come to terms with the questions posed by Hegel's abstraction, and by the residual abstraction of all these nominal positions 'outside' its logic, we have to work from the question of what we're doing in the library with these books, not from travelling in imagination, as we read through the 'internal'
space of their arguments, through some sort of frame external to the words, in which they themselves must, implicitly, be supposed to be found - but rather from the confrontation with their questioning and assertion as we find ourselves standing or sitting 'outside' the authorial instance of assertion in the words, as that worked and still works through them as the writer's response to what he or she found open, confronting a mass of earlier books, and with an adequate supply of blank paper, time, and so on, at his or her disposal.

Each of these books is in a sense a 'script' for our confrontation with them in the library or elsewhere, which presents us in response to our opening of them, with a certain 'part' in the context they frame as a World - of atoms, planets, societies, people, books, libraries, and so on. Thus Marx and Kierkegaard, in bringing the logical axis of questions evolved from an initial abstract positing of Being (as nominal correlate of the mere empty form of position itself) in hegelian logic into a more 'radical' questioning framed in the logical symmetry of logical and 'external' coordinates of hegelian System, each open up a moral or practical matrix or axis of assertion in which the textual order of its marking is only one dimension or coordinate. The texts invite us into a figure of assertion in the practical matrix or space coordinate with the marking of this possibility in the textual order as the questioning of an earlier abstract line of questioning in which we were invited to mimic the part of the abstract instance of rational assertion, Reason, itself - and the several texts of Marx and Kierkegaard in the early 1840s present, in Kierkegaard's figure, so many 'stages' of their writers' passages into the 'part' which eventually becomes more or less fixed after mid-century, in a sort of inversion of the earlier hegelian abstraction from a particular biographical drama to the abstract part of 'I' in the universal frame of cosmic History. Thus the articulation of the
circuit or circulation of Capital in a practical space of human activity opened up initially by a 'logical' passage out of the coordinate logical short-circuit of Hegelian abstraction (and the 'holy family's abstract versions of such emancipation), eventually frames the writer's and his readers' parts in the egalitarian symmetry of a social interaction and activity emancipated from the 'alienated' parts played out by the various coordinate players in Capitalism's abstraction from the radical order of what is open to men together producing their livelihood in material Nature - this rather as the marking in the Ancien Regime of a 'system of Nature' in which it was in principle inscribed was coordinate with a questioning of the old abstract theology of different roles in the divine plan, identified by the philosophes with its particular political function in restricting certain lines of questioning, and certain associated lines of otherwise possible social development. Kierkegaard's part, on the other hand, becomes after mid-century fixed in a questioning of the institutional church as 'hypocritically' identifying the radical subjectivity whose axis is just the part of questioning identification with any part, with a part in some fixed, closed hierarchy mediating the interplay of this radical question or part of subjectivity, and infinite divine response to the dramatic configuration of this question or part in its social context.

In each case, a series of texts in the 1840s effect a transposition of the Hegelian axis of questions coordinate in the mature System with the formal instance of Reason as response to the formal matrix of questions in language, into a practical axis which, in the 'mature' Kierkegaard and Marx, is consolidated around the extra-linguistic matrix of questions and assertions around the figure of a new 'part', valid in a way for the writer and any emancipated reader, even if, with Kierkegaard this is the part, precisely, of questioning any identification with a particular part or role in the narrow theatre framed in the limit by the institutional Church's short-circuiting of what is open to God and men (and women) in the radical part of always choosing one's part, and its consequences, while never simply assenting to, say, the role of Regine's husband, or Danish minister of religion, or whatever.
In principle, then, any individual reader can accede to the parts worked out in practice by Marx or Kierkegaard over the mid-nineteenth century - can become either 'objective' about their class role in the capitalist mode of production, or 'subjectively' experience their true self as, precisely, a subjectivity that, in a sort of finitary analogy with Hegelian Reason, distinguishes itself from any role that has not been positively chosen, chooses choice rather than what Christ calls 'acting', hypocrisy, and Sartre mauvaise foi, the part of pretending that one is not free to choose, because one is stuck in a part one has not chosen, which precludes certain - or uncertain - lines of action.

Books, then, 'for everyone and for no-one', since the readers to whom they are addressed are the actors, indeed the actor, behind the interchangeable masks or roles of class or some other unquestioned part in the human drama. But what if, simply by finding oneself in the part of reader of Marx or Kierkegaard, or the part, indeed of Marx, or of Kierkegaard, himself, one is thereby radically marked off by one's biography, or destiny, or whatever, from the otherwise uniform part of subjectivity or objectivity to which one accedes through the part of writer or his reader? And what if, as reader of both, one finds oneself thrown back into, say, the biographical dynamic which results in two such different readings of Hegel, as Marx and Kierkegaard slowly 'find themselves' or 'become whom they are' in the passage out of identification with unitary Reason and its world-historic drama, into parts in the practical order which initially beckons in the logical question attaching to the symmetry of logical and other dimensions of their biography or situation? The socialist 'herd' are through their very biographical rooting in the evolution of human types, bound to react as they do to Zarathustra's part of singular self-distinction from the symmetric parts of that uniform passive mass of humanity, and Zarathustra is constitutionally opposed to the dyspeptic pessimism of Schopenhauer and angst of Kierkegaard. He doesn't address the crowd, except, indirectly, to speak to a select few who respond by themselves distancing themselves, with Zarathustra, from the crowd: the uniform crowd cannot, in principle,
in that part of uniformity, join the singular Zarathustra. Indeed nobody can join completely with Zarathustra except Zarathustra himself in lonely retreat, for otherwise they would simply have to be Zarathustra. And this radical selectivity of address itself confirms the contents of the various addresses: the crowd must continue to assert their parts of uniform indifference, of crowd, or the singular parts of the noble actors who stand apart from the crowd would themselves dissolve into insipid indifference, having nothing to differ from, and no dramatic frame for their singular self-assertion as, precisely, 'who they are', as the part they choose, the noble part of choosing and asserting what one has been chosen by one's destiny to be. Thus the addressees of the 'mature' Nietzsche's writing, down to the final crowned heads of Europe, and Ariadne/Cosima herself, are more and more marked out in his texts as Nietzsche himself approaches that axis of his 'destiny' in which his self-assertion will eventually be quite lost in the self-assertion of cosmic Will, Assertion, itself. And here I am, gazing in imagination upon a row of books on my imaginary bookshelves, remembering how this madman supplied the scripts for my adolescent self-assertion as I discovered just how much one, I, could question, delighting in a perverse irony whereby I would arbitrarily change or distance myself from some part which I felt was normal, expected, in some situation, thereby to assert my young nietzschean self in the more open play of parts I hoped to precipitate. Of course this generally appeared as mere perversity, and rather closed down the possibilities of interaction, than opened up new ones. I tended to mistake my audience, or sometimes simply to feel that this habitual irony was a usefully direct way to single out from the timid crowd those few who would play my nietzschean game.

I had seen, at fifteen, a television adaptation of Alasdair Gray's *Fall of Kelvin Walker* (London 196) - or was it rather a television drama from which the book was evolved? - in which the young protagonist discovers Nietzsche in the library of his obscure scottish home town, and finds a new world of possibilities opened up in the self-assertion he finds in himself.
responding to the radical questioning that Nietzsche organises in the questioning of all previous values – answers, ideals – to which the will to Will, assertion of Assertion, is the response of those who have the strength to respond, rather than fall into passive nihilism. My response was to borrow from the local library, and then acquire for myself, a translation of...

761 NIETZSCHE, Friedrich

Also Sprach Zarathustra. Ein buch für Jeder und Keiner (Chemnitz 1883-4 (I-III), 1885, Leipzig 1891 (IV) – in Werke below) tr Common London 1 ; tr Hollingdale Harmondsworth 1961

...followed by...

762

GötzenDämmerung (Leipzig 1889) tr Hollingdale, with (763) Harmondsworth 1968

763

Der Antichrist (1888; ptd Weimar 1895)

and later, when I had learnt some German,

764

Morgenröthe (Chemnitz 1881) Munich 19

765 WURZBACH, Friedrich

(ed, ann & intr)

Nietzsche: Sein Leben in Selbstzeugnissen, Briefen und Berichten Munich 1968

then at Oxford,

766

Jenseits von Gut und Böse (Leipzig 1886) tr Hollingdale Harmondsworth 1973

767

Die Wille zur Macht (188 – ) ed Fürster-Nietzsche & Gast Leipzig , rev 19 &c tr Kaufmann & Hollingdale NY 1968

and at Paris,

768

Die Geburt der Tragödie (Leipzig 1872) tr Kaufmann NY(1967) with (769) 19

769

Zur Genealogie der Moral (Leipzig 1887)
then in Yorkshire, in the Autumn of 1979, I borrowed most of
the initial English translations from the local library (preferring
them to Hollingdale's and Kaufmann's).

I already had Schlecta's three-volume compendium:

and subsequently acquired the "Taschenausgabe",

along with a set of the French translations

and a range of contemporary reactions that I won't list individually,
all from the dispersal of the bequest of an early English 'nietzschean',
Arthur Hughes, to (oddly enough) the Beccles Working-Mens Cooperative
Association. I also used the 'Grossoktav' and Kroner editions...

...So I will have all these on the imaginary bookshelf we are
currently considering, along with Andler's book, already noted
(and the Basel pamphlet De Fontibus L.D.) and:
Heidegger's book, and various early writings of Nietzsche's, dominated Derrida's *aggregation* seminar of 1975-6 (I will shelve his contemporaneous rewriting of his Cerisy paper, *Eperons*, with 'Derrida') 'La Vie - La Mort' (the subject, as always, being determined by the aggregation *programme*, which figure was itself thematised over the course of the seminar). Derrida's reading of Heidegger's book on Nietzsche opened with the reflection that it was in the first place very singular for a major philosopher to write a very long book about one of his historical peers (although a lot of exceptions come to mind), and proceeded to question the opening of Heidegger's reading with the latter's brushing aside of his subject's own life in a few words, as irrelevant to the elucidation of the single thought whose unity, abstracted from any contingencies attaching to its textual presentation, was what in Nietzsche's, as in all other cases, made him, precisely, a singularly great figure. Nietzsche, closing the history of ontotheology, in his limiting identification of Being with a being: Will, Life - the 'biologism' of Nietzsche's assertion of Assertion, in response to the perennial Question of Being. Nietzsche and Heidegger, then, and a nietzschean criticism of Heidegger's abstraction of 'the' nietzschean text and its single thought, from the biographical coupling of abstract thought (even if articulated in the axis of the question of the question to which Being responds, the question as the radically reflexive movement of Thinking in Being) and the dramatic axis of that particular part (of Nietzsche, not Da-Sein interchangeably non-interchangeable between particular individuals) which is a movement from relatively autonomous
logic or philology into that self-assertion of Life, Will, in which Nietzsche's logic logically asserts its inscription, finally quite losing, like Hölderlin, any autonomous separate assertion, in the circuit of inscription of its script in the drama.

In Yorkshire, in the autumn of 1979, I spent a great part of my time reading Ecce Homo, and the earliest texts of 1870-2 from which, in his 'autobiography' Nietzsche traced his philosophical 'destiny', together with the fragments of Heraclitus and Parmenides whose reading marks Nietzsche's passage from Diogenes Laertius to the birth of tragedy contemporaneous with the 'origin of philosophy'. - This in an attempt to focus in these various circuits of opening and closing, the question to which I might begin to (re)write my response. When I 'went mad' in Devon in November, writing my writing within the drama it framed, taken over by the coupling of text and action in the affective axis of my relations with Julia, of which I was only the scribe, I knew I was entering the play of forces from which Nietzsche never returned to the world in which he had lived, however singularly, until 1889, and which had been my only home, too, for as long as I could remember before 1979. In Paris in early January 1980, I found a french translation of Podach's book, and naturally enough brought a copy back to Hereford on my return.

Nietzsche, I discovered, or felt, had strayed through the same invisible passage leading into the coupling of script and drama, by which I had unwittingly passed or been drawn, but had done so, as he himself had earlier prophesied, a century too soon, and could not, stuck in the 1890s, find the way back. I could identify with all the apparently bizarre logic of his part, charted by his family, friends, and first psychiatrists, in the passage from 1888 to 1889, but he was stuck in the progressive integration of that logic in a dramatic axis, between which and the exoteric logic of the 1870s and 1880s through which he had come there was no possible communication, since the question of the order of script through which he had passed, simply could not be logically
posed, marked, in the thought — or language — of his time. Taking on, in his last telegrams, the part of 'The Crucified', he had thought his destiny had finally focussed in him the Second Coming, the millenial transformation in which all through him would discover their parts of Actor behind the masks each took for himself or herself. But like Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor they locked him up in their reason, crucified him again.

Hölderlin, Nietzsche, Mill, Comte...

780 COMTE, Auguste  Cours de Philosophie Positive  Paris 1830-42; ed Littré 18

781 LEWES, George Henry  Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences  London 1853

I have just been reading Martineau's account of that 'nervous breakdown' which, in conjunction with his brief year with Clotilde de Vaux before her death in 1846, prepares Comte's transition from the logic of the Cours, to the reorganisation of the whole system and Universe around the practical axis of a positivist 'Religion de l'Humanité' around 1850 (in Types of Ethical Theory) — an epistemological and revolutionary 'break' from the earlier abstract critique of abstract theory, to the inscription of the logic of the critique in a primary frame of Action, which parallels, as I noted in Part III, the 'breaks' of Marx and Kierkegaard around the same time, and both parallels a similar transition from logical to social theory in his friend Mill, while echoing the 'nervous breakdown' towards 1830 through which Mill himself broke out of the logical straightjacket of his father's 'analysis', into the emotional axis of Romantic 'feeling', in association with Harriet Taylor. Nietzsche's radical questioning of questioning itself left him, like Hölderlin, with no residue of separate logical identity after the 'breakdown', or break-out from logic to the universal poetic in which abstraction from the play of figures and forces had become just one figure lost among the others in their disordered play. Comte's breakdown led through his self-discovery in the new part of Apostle of Humanity (or pope of
Positivism) to a kind of instituted 'madness' in which he and those of his earlier adherents who were not alienated by the new turn from Science back to Myth, together with various new adherents who had not been engaged by the Science, but who found a part in the Myth, organised the dogmas, rituals and roles of the new Religion along the practical 'axis' whose 'logic' was defined by the questioning of the logic of 1830, in the sociological frame of 1842. If the Year of Revolutions constituted as it were the Second Coming, the Societe Positiviste by the time of the Commune were posting broadsheet proclamations of the new Kingdom in the streets. I found one of these tucked into a translation of a positivist account of the transformation into Positivist Society taking place in Paris...

782 (anonymous) Political Notes on the Present Situation of France and Paris tr Beasley London 1871

...In the 'abstract' Comte's theology of practical Positivism may seem - and did to many - quite laughable; yet in its direct analogy with and mimicry of Roman Catholic theology as inscribed in the universal Drama or Comédie Divine whose Script(ure) was to be found in the books of Moses and their sequels, rather than the Cours and theirs, the transposition of the initial logic into a system of 'parts' in the transformation of Society or Humanity, organised around the part of Comte himself (and Clotilde, now dead, as presiding Spirit, with a ceremony at her grave each Wednesday), might easily be adapted not only to a millenial familiarity of the underlying dynamic of the new sect, but also to a more or less working interplay with all the other 'parts' in a society that had itself grown up such a dynamic, and incorporated it throughout its perceptions and institutions. Thus Comte, like the literary dictator of France over the mid-century, Victor Hugo...

783 HUGO, Victor Cromwell Paris (1827)

...presents us with what is on the one hand patently a 'mad' delusion, but a delusion or illusory 'part' or identity, defined in relation to his 'scripts', which, through its commanding role in that interplay of roles which is its social context, works as well towards its ends, if not better, than the 'sane' practical
roles from which it stands out: 'Victor Hugo etait un fou qui se prenait pour Victor Hugo' - Victor Hugo presenting in the preface to *Cromwell* his revolutionary polemic against the abstract artificiality of the French 'classical' poetic, and becoming by the time of the Franco-Prussian War and the deposition of his great rival Napoleon III (or not so great, indeed: 'Napoleon le Petit' according to his great rival Hugo), the focus of a Romantic formalism as rigid and abstract as the classicism it had displaced. Cousin, even, as dictator of French 'academic' philosophy and the whole educational system of which it was the nominal focus over the same period characterised in other spheres by Comte and Hugo (I have more than once drawn the analogy between these three and counterparts in England, and suggested the associated dynamic of interaction seen in the close relations of Comte and Mill, Hugo and England, Arnold and Cousin's institution, and so on), might be taken as the very epitome of that French institution of a French 'subject' or instance of 'I', who organises around him the reformulation, for each new period, of the cartesian focus of French Theory, in terms of some new version of that 'I', which he embeds in the contemporary culture of France and Europe through practically focussing the intellectual life, the salons, seminars or whatever, of Paris - and in this we might even find Cousin to be the maddest of all three: at least Comte and Hugo were conscious that they were engaged in the setting-up of a new Religion.

784 COUSIN, Victor  
*Cours d'Introduction à l'Histoire de la Philosophie* (lects 1830-1; Paris 1831) 
Brussels 1834

785  
*Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien*  
Paris (1851) 18

And then there's Renan, nominally reformulating the old one...

786 RENAN, Ernest  
*Vie de Jésus*  
(Paris 1863) tr London 1864
And then...Science...all the 'scientists' as Whewell first called his colleagues at a meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1835, apparently making any Religion obsolete, as they follow the young Comte of 1830 in embedding all questions 'in principle' within the limiting mathematical frame of laplacean determinism: 'Je n'ai pas besoin de cette hypothèse' said Laplace in reply to Napoleon's question as to the place of the Creator in his Systeme du Monde, as the author presented the new ruler of France with the first two volumes of the full system in 1800...

787 LAPLACE, Pierre Simon de Traité de Mécanique: Céleste Paris 1799-1825

All 'questions': for such is the character of every detail to be in principle determined within the mathematical embedding of its logic in the physical Universe...logically defined by the embedding of 'the physical' in its logical determination in language, as universal external frame, universal mathematically ordered Context of the mathematical texts of laplacean and hamiltonian and helmholzian Mechanics. The mathematicians; astronomers, geophysicists, biologists, 'scientific' sociologists, political theorists, linguists, logicians, working back from universal Context to the texts of its exposition, treating various components of the scheme from the various aspects and in the various styles of the developing language of their various national schools, all abstracting from the converse movement out from the Text taken over by Dilthey from the hermeneutics of the Book, the Script - and from the supposedly 'doctrinaire' social analysis of such as Marx, who would make the question of the 'scientists' engagement as producers of 'Science' in the social interface of Text and universal Context primary - and subordinating local perspective to the international elaboration of the great collective enterprise...leaving the 'philosophers' with whom they once belonged back in the previous century...
Thus the 'mechanics' of the British engineers is brought back into the European context of the theoretical mathematical mechanics with which it had parted company a century earlier, after the great row between Newtonians and Leibnizians - this through the translation (in which the young Carlyle helped) of Legendre's textbook, and its eventual introduction as text at Cambridge through the efforts of the Analytical Society.

788 PEACOCK, D M
A Comparative View of the Principles of the Fluxional and Differential Calculus. Addressed to the University of Cambridge.
Cambridge 1819

(this is in fact a reactionary sounding of the alarm)

Contributions came, indeed, even from Central Asia (Lobatchewski in Kasan - 1829) and obscure towns in Hungary.

789 BOLYAI, Janos
Tentamen Juventutem Studiosam in Elementa Matheseos Purae, Scientiam Spatii Absolute Veram exhibens (Maros Vasarhelyini 1833)
Vienna 1900

...so I will mix all the Science together on a new imaginary shelf, irrespective of country and school, rather as I earlier found histories of 'Science' on separate shelves from 'Philosophy', before moving between the two sections of the imaginary library via their common references to the philology of Diels, the 'presocratic' fragments dedicated at the opening of the twentieth century to Dilthey.

790 HAMILTON, William Rowan
The Theory of Conjugate Functions...with a Preliminary...Essay on Algebra as the Science of Pure Time (papers 1833-5) (79)

791 Lectures on Quaternions Dublin 1853

791A Elements of Quaternions London 1866

792 TAIT, Peter Guthrie
An Elementary Treatise on Quaternions London (1867) rev 1873

793 Scientific Papers ed with memoir Cambridge 1898-1900
...And here we are at the half-way stage from the mathematical physics of its universal external context, back to the embedding of that physics in the formal and informal language of its mathematical texts. Halfway, where we meet Man and Culture, not to say Darwin and his disciples..

...and one might set this embedding of Geisteswissenschaften in Naturwissenschaften, final in efficient causality ('means' of natural selection remaining strangely equivocal), Culture in Science, History in Nature (Natural History), in the 'history of science', by marking the points where, first, it is put into mathematical form, in a retrospective survey of Natural Selection a la Mach:
| 805 | MONOD, Jacques | Le Hasard et la Necessité Paris 1969 |

...and then, second, where it becomes, itself, a model for the 'universal' frame of mathematical physics in which it has been biochemically inscribed over the mid-century:

Back, now, to nineteenth-century Culture:

| 806 | LYELL, Charles | The Antiquity of Man London 1863 |

...well, there's the natural history of Tylor's 'primitive culture' from the outside...and we can become 'scientific' again as we follow the path set out by Sir William Jones at the close of the eighteenth century, and by Friedrich Schlegel after him, through the structural analysis of mythical and grammatical dimensions of different languages 'inward' to the logical frame of any grammar, and its emerging mathematical formulation over the course of the century...

| 807 | FRAZER, James George | The Golden Bough London 1890-1915 abgd by Frazer 1922 (79) |
| 808 | BRUGMANN, DELBRÜCK, | Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen Berlin 1886-1916 |
| 809 | SKEAT, Walter W | An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language Oxford (1879-82) rev 1909 (77-8) |
| 810 | LOCKWOOD, W B | Indo-European Philology, Historical and Comparative London 1969 (77-8) |
| 811 | WHATELY, Richard | Elements of Logic London (1826)1848 |
| 812 | DE MORGAN, Augustus | Formal Logic London 1847 |
| 813 | BOLZANO, Bernard | Paradoxien des Unendlichen Berlin 1851 |
We become more and more 'scientific' as we work in either direction 'in' or 'out' from the social interface of mathematical logic and the physical world in a human Culture of which the production of mathematical analysis of logic or physics is a component - the more we
rather, these writers) 'abstract' from the order of human activity and interaction, of which the writing of its theory, its 'science', is itself a component. It was the eighteenth-century poet of Reason who claimed 'the proper study of Mankind is Man', and it was the political 'radical', the revolutionary, who claimed(1)

\[ \text{Radikal sein ist die Sache an der Wurzel fassen. Die Wurzel für den Menschen ist aber der Mensch selbst.} \]

...And Comte, in his mid-century 'epistemological break' from abstract unitary Science into the dramatic axis of his new Religion of Humanity, breaks the formal circuit from the mathematics of the limiting external frame of physical Space and Time, back through Heaven, Earth, its geology, chemistry, life, culture, institutions, theory, to the cartesian mathematical frame of that theory, precisely where he thought initially to close it, in the social order of human interaction - rather as Helmholtz inscribed the interface of mathematically articulated external Nature, and the logical processes of the Mind that so framed its external context, in his mathematical analysis of those tonal or harmonic structures which frame our auditory sense, the aural dimension of the sensory interface of Mind and Nature.

Circle of Science, of the sciences: les extrêmes se touchent, as over the century the symmetric hamiltonian frame of external Space and Time reappears in Frege's analysis as simply the formal structure of substitution in, the bare matrix of, language itself - coordinate, through Bolzano's system of analogies of reflexive structures of Thought on the one hand (which Gedankenwelt includes itself as one element in it) and the physical continuum analysed later by Dedekind and Cantor on the other. In its limiting form the reflexive structure of Bolzano's paradox reappears fifty years later simply in terms of those 'sets' he bequeathed to Dedekind, Cantor and Frege which were to organise 'logical space' (and its time of deduction) as a direct mirror of physical space with its familiar 'inclusion' and 'exclusion'; but the vicious circle to which this elementary mathematical circuit coordinating logical and physical space gives rise at the end of the century.
is only a sort of epitome of a more general breakdown of the
whole wide circuit leading from the mathematical physics of
physical Space and Time as universal external frame of activity
on the one hand, through a whole series of nested sciences a la
(jeune) Comte to the complementary extreme of the internal space
of the individual scientist's thought of that external frame on
the other. Thus Haeckel, as I noted, was able to extend his ini-
tial darwinist coordination of efficient physical causality and
logical finality from the natural history of Man, by 1899, to
not so much a positivist system of Science articulated within an
initial mathematical correlation of logical and physical sides of
a unitary Universe in the bare form of 'thesis', position, positing,
the 'mark', point, but rather a converse system of questions,
paradoxes, 'riddles', together constituting the whole Universe as
precisely the universal riddle, Weltrhftsel:

823 HAECKEL, Ernst

 Die Weltrhftsel (Bonn 1899) tr McCabe
 London 1900

The whole world of Science has become, at the end of the
century, a system of questions, a scientific Universe structured
by the logical embedding of the logical order of theory as one
side of experiment, experience, and activity as answer to the
questions posed in experience, whose other side is the limiting
physical context of all experience. A new unitary logic of Science
has finally quite emancipated itself from abstract metaphysical
theories, through restructuring the axis of elaboration of theory
in a logical embedding of logic in the World of which it produces
the theory. The 'practical' frame of this new world of Science,
scientifically organising activity as the rational resolution of
'questions' had already been set out in 1851:

824 Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations. Catalogue
(Special Issue of Journal of Design and Manufactures London 1851) facs

...And yet while the nineteenth-century 'scientist' might embed
human activity in his mechanical Universe through a logical framing
of the 'experimental' axis of activity as resolution of questions
or problems, in which his logic itself was to be organised as one
component dimension, in empirical interplay with a complementary 'external' physical order of the experimenter's situation, nineteenth-century literature was enmeshed in a converse movement, in the Romantic legacy of dramatic — indeed melodramatic — engagement in 'irrational' fictional identification with a part in the closed circuit of a fiction, a fictional action. Science and literature present two contrary sides of a nineteenth-century persona evolved through two converse movements of questioning previous 'abstract' Reason: the 'scientist' articulates a new axis of questions within the symmetry of an older abstract logic and the 'real', external, physical context from which that old logic abstracted to give an 'internal' metaphysical representation or picture of the World in which the picture was set; the writer or artist finds the tragic optimism of the rationality, the axial questioning of both old and new logic, compromised by the darker side of our persona or identity, which cannot be presented simply as the rational transposition of questioning from the old abstract axis, to the new practical axis, as the old axis as a whole falls prey to its own inquiry. We cannot simply move from old metaphysical Reason to new empirical rationality, by rationally transposing the axis of our questions from the internal symmetry of an abstract picture of the World in which that picture is one component, to the 'external' symmetry of that picturing and other dimensions of its World. Old optimistic Reason is not the point from which to frame the transition to the new primacy of action: rather does the impasse of abstract progressive rationality throw us back into a dark prior engagement in a physical bodily identity earlier than Reason, from which superficial Enlightenment thought to abstract, and which holds us in its play of parts and feelings — epitomised by the irrational emotional dynamic of Art — in which the part of rational distinction of a scientifically detached 'I' from its engagement in World and Flesh, corruption and decadence, decay, is the superficial reactive illusion of an imagination too weak to confront the truths of Art, a bland optimism good through lack of imagination...

825 PRAZ, Mario
La Carne, la Morte e il Diavolo nella Letteratura Romantica (Milan 1930) tr
The Romantic Agony Oxford (1933)
Literature, Science, Philosophy. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche philosophers caught, at either end of their century, between Science and Art; criticising an abstract embedding of the old logic and reason in the context from which it abstracted to give the abstract picture of a World in which it is now, in turn, to be inscribed as in its 'real' external frame. Yet the very grammar of such 'real externality' has been elaborated 'in' abstraction from real externality. And, indeed, the schopenhauerian deposition of Reason, and transposition of cosmic axis from Reason to Will, and of the instance or locus of question and quest from abstract universal 'I' to tragically incarnate individual, itself maintains the rational abstraction of a universal axis, even as this is transposed from the abstract Reason which frames the fiction of its abstract universal Context, to the specific, localised, temporary individual, through which absolute cosmic Will is nominally determined to pass.

Other transpositions, emancipations, in their turn retain residues of the Reason which they frame in a new practical theatre of reflection, precisely through their framing of the new loci and terms, variables, of question and action, through an initial formal inscription of earlier abstraction in the abstract picture of World which it had framed. Jules de Gaultier, a French nietzscheean at the turn of the century, presents a limiting figure of such a logic of inscription of logic in World.

..in which Science, Philosophy and Art coincide...in theory. The individual becomes, precisely, the locus of an identification chosen freely in the radical symmetry of logic and World as pure
self-assertion in what, until it is practically assumed and acted out, is logically speaking 'imaginary'. Corresponding to Haeckel's universal system of questions to which unitary actuality - the very existence of the Universe - is the single trans-logical response, the frenchman asserts the primacy of free subjective self-assertion in a universal system of 'idées-forces' framed by the logical inscription of their logical system in the symmetry of logic and the various dimensions of its actual practical context which frames Haeckel's 'scientific' play of questions.

...But just as Haeckel and Gaultier are framing a logical transposition from the abstract internal logic of substitutions in language, to the substitution for that abstract axis of questions and assertion, of the practical, empirical, mathematical, dramatic (and so on) axis of symmetry of internal logic and external physics in experience and experiment, Russell is finding in Frege's abstract frame of such inscription of logic in mathematics - the mathematics itself framed logically by this transposition - a radical 'paradox' attaching to the very starting-point of such a 'universal' transposition: a paradox rooted in the abstract definition of the starting-point in a logic that is then supposed to frame its transposition into a supposedly primary interface of internal logic and external world, through an initial supposition of a universal abstract distinction of logical 'inclusion' and 'exclusion', coordinate with the abstraction of the 'logic' of the whole programme as an 'internal' order of distinctions to which the 'extrinsic' contingencies of externally marking, say, the logical distinction of logical from physical distinction or difference, is quite 'external', and may be so to speak bracketed at the outset. That is: over the turn of the century all sorts of books in all sorts of different 'fields' of theory mark the recognition that one cannot assume a 'logical' starting-point in the old order of 'metaphysical' abstraction from embedding of logic in context, in order to mark the 'real' starting-point - logically - in the interface of old 'internal' logical order, and what it had until then determined 'internally' through the logical opposition of internal logic and 'external' order in which such opposition must actually be marked.
We might here close the shelving for 'Nineteenth-Century Europe' with another coincidence of Science, Literature and Philosophy...

828 DODGSON, Charles Lutwidge ('Lewis Carroll')

Alice's Adventures in Wonderland London (1865)
Through the Looking-Glass London (1871)
both, ann Gardner

...where another english mathematician explores a transposition of the abstract 'logical' order of substitution in language, into a complementary fictional order of substitutions, which is as it were mathematically or formally equivalent as system of substitutions, and in this mediates between the bachelor mathematician's fantasy in which Alice Liddell becomes Alice-in-Wonderland, and the logical or rational distancing from such an emotional engagement through comic detachment from the evidently unreal inversion or conversion of extra-fictional sobriety in the looking-glass of methodical madness - this rational distancing from engagement in fantasy, in its turn, being itself constantly drawn into the teasing play of the author's seductive fiction....

...And finally mark the embedding of one-dimensional verbal strings of marks, and library shelves, and abstract linear logic, in a configuration of coordinate dimensions of the drama in which logic plays its part, but which its unilinear deduction cannot contain...

829 ABBOTT, Edwin

By a Square (London 1884) facs Oxford 197
De te fabula narratur

Nous savons aussi, par Menjot, que 'feu M. Pascal appelait la philosophie cartesienne le roman de la nature semblable a peu pres a l'Histoire de Don Quichot': ce qui, au surplus, n'etait pas trahir le vrai visage de celui dont la devise etait: 'Mundus est fabula'. (1)

Shelves of nineteenth-century books, then, marking various 'parts' of theory in the external context of the questioning and assertion pursued by their writers through the inner logic of their printed words...and a couple of odd volumes almost falling off the end of the last shelf, marking comic detachment from all those competing logical identifications of the part of theorist, inquirer, revolutionary, positivist, superman, as still caught in theological transposition from the abstract instance of cartesian rationality in the internal symmetries of substitution in a text, to a new part whose initial marking and grammar 'outside' the old abstraction from radical symmetry of text and context, has itself been deduced from an 'internal' iteration of the old line of inquiry, as the latter confronts, textually, the question posed by the actual inscription of its logic 'in' the contextual symmetry or correlation of logic and other dimensions of the 'World' which that logic had framed.

1: Chevalier, Preface to (445), p xii. The quotation from Menjot (Opuscules Posthumes, 1697, I.115) is borrowed from Lafuma; Descartes' motto is attested by 'le portrait de Descartes par Weenix ou l'on voit Descartes tenant un livre ouvert avec cette devise - cf notre Descartes (rev Paris 1942) p 355'(notes to passage cited, p 1362)
Nineteenth-century writers, then, marking their distance from various versions of the 'part' of Philosophy or Science in the World in which they find themselves, as, standing 'outside' both the axis of question and assertion in a text of which they are critical readers rather than writer, and, in the 'real' outside of that residually abstract 'internal' textual order of the writer's inquiry and argument, asserting themselves in the difference they experience between themselves and the part in which the writer would have them find themselves ("in" the outside of the old order that he frames - as he stands outside its old abstract logic - in his text)...

In this work I have to examine the capitalist mode of production, and the conditions of production and exchange corresponding to that mode. Up to the present time, their classic ground is England. That is the reason why England is used as the chief illustration in the development of my theoretical ideas. If, however, the German reader shrugs his shoulders... I must plainly tell him, "De te fabula narratur". Karl Marx. London, July 25, 1867 (1)

The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society impress themselves upon the practical bourgeois most strikingly in the changes of the periodic cycle, through which modern industry runs, and whose crowning point is the universal crisis. That crisis is once again approaching, although as yet but in its preliminary stage; and by the universality of its theatre and the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new, holy Prusso-German empire. Karl Marx. London, January 24, 1873. (2)

The working of the industrial system of this country is coming to a dead stop. Free trade has exhausted its resources; even Manchester doubts this its quondam economic gospel... The decennial cycle of stagnation, prosperity, over-production and crisis, ever recurrent from 1825 to 1867, seems indeed to have run its

course; but only to land us in the slough of despond of a permanent and chronic depression. The sighed-for period of prosperity will not come...England is the only country where the inevitable social revolution might be effected entirely by peaceful and legal means. (Marx) certainly never forgot to add that he hardly expected the English ruling classes to submit, without a 'pro-slavery rebellion' to this peaceful and legal revolution. Frederick Engels. November 5, 1886. (1)

...But how, then, is one to act when the cycle from the hegelian dialectic of the 1820s, to the recognition over the mid-century's successive phases of material and theoretical development of the material dialectic operative where the 'ideal' aspirations of 1848 have broken down, does not, in fact, meekly submit to Marx' and Engels' scenario, but returns through renewed trade (Juglar) cycles after the Crash of the early 1870s, to climb back from the turn of the new century in a new broad cycle of expansion led by Germany and America, a Second Industrial Revolution?

830 TOLSTOY, Lyov N (Life tr Hapgood London 1889)
(My Confession & The Spirit of Christ's Teaching, tr)

832 ULYANOV, Vladimir Ilyich ('Lenin') (What is to be Done Stuttgart 1902) tr

833 (Materialism and Empirio-Criticism Moscow 1909) tr

'These slaves are the great radical livers-out of their theories' wrote William to Henry James. I tried to draw a parallel between the theatre of leninist 'activism' to the East of Europe at the turn of the century, and the play of american 'pragmatism' to the West. Marx took over the abstract 'internal' or idealist

1: Engels' Preface to the english translation of Capital, ad fin
dialectic of Hegel's System, and transposed its axis from the internal logic of that abstraction to the complementary material axis - logically symmetric with the logical axis in Hegel's logical articulation of the Universe in his texts - of social life in Nature, in which the production of theory finally appears in mere footnote and parenthesis, in the mature theory of the system of material production set out in *Kapital*. Lenin in his turn takes over Marx's coordinates of the 'universal theatre' of capitalist crisis, emancipating them from the rigid systematic axis of European capitalism as framed by Marx, as he discovers his own part of framing political options as itself a political act which enters as one component into what is practically open in the interplay of social coordinates first discovered theoretically by Marx in the social configuration of mature European capitalism: a political activism, of which Marx's own global framing of the material dialectic of human society within a social order abstracted by a system of expropriation and alienation from what he discovered to be materially open to the individuals he found suffering under that constraining order, provides so to speak the limit case, hardly recognised by Marx himself in its primary character of political intervention in the interplay of the various components of his situation (material, theoretical, political, ideological, and so on). Against the passive deterministic evolutionism of his political rivals on the left, Lenin, borrowing a title ("What is to be Done?") and a dramatic figure of the posing of this question, not as some theoretical quandary, but as an 'existential' confrontation with the question of one's part in the Russian theatre both behind, and yet potentially ahead of Western Europe, from another 'great liver-out of his theory', Tolstoy, questions the part of abstraction to a 'theoretical' line of questioning and framing what is open, which sets the social dynamic in a correspondingly abstract 'natural' development, in terms of its essentially reactionary character as political response to the actual situation in Russia. The axis of questions, as framing of what is open, is set squarely as merely one dimension in the radical political order of what is open to each player within the Russian theatre. Any theory of Russian society and its dynamic is to be judged according to the part it plays, regressive or progressive, in the revolutionary transformation of the frame of Russian activity of which it is a theory.
...echoed by the Soviet hagiographies and western demonologies that jostle on western library-shelves next to books written by Lenin himself, as by the new autocracy and its new theology instituted by Stalin around 1930, which still organises editing, commentary and publication and export of the texts of the Marxist-Leninist canon, and the part of writers in Soviet society, and the official vetting of all scripts, and proscription of any writer who dissent from participation in the Russian theatre as directed by Politburo and Party.

Turn of the century Russian 'Marxism', then, may be seen as a theoretical marking of the transition from one closed Russian theatre of activity whose theology and politics and economy were breaking down as effective social system in the wider global theatre recovering from the Crash of the early 1870s, towards a mid-twentieth century reintegration of the Russian theatre's various dimensions within the new play of forces opened up by the complete breakdown of the old order over the period of the Great War - an integration which I marked by Stalin's 'definitive' response to the mid-century question of the part of its very language in the theatre of Soviet activity which it was the new czar's or autocrat's own part to frame as unitary action, to direct:

On the other side of Europe I marked a theoretical transition from around 1870 to around 1930 in terms of the 'parts' of James and Dewey in the international theatre - the part, together, of framing over the turn of the century an avowedly 'American' perspective on theoretical debate, bringing as it were to explicit...
self-consciousness a tradition growing out of the transplantation of European intellectual culture, along with other coordinate elements of European society, into the New England frame of reconstruction or reorganisation of those elements, themselves evolved from classical Antiquity through Middle Ages and Renaissance and Reform in continuous and materially embodied institutions of a vastly different scale, within the radically new (and yet radically old) order of an agricultural pale set in virgin Nature — this transplantation formally instituted at 'Cambridge' Massachusetts in 1636: at precisely the period, then, then I take to mark the turning-point in the overall theoretical transition from thirteenth-century Scholasticism to the Romanticism of around 1800. If one takes Berkeley's ultimately unsuccessful project of establishing an ideal educational institution in the Bahamas, and his two-year stay (1729-31) in Rhode Island, writing Alciphron, as marking a subordinate turning-point across the Atlantic from Europe in an American parallel to the European transition from around 1650, 'Scientific Revolution', to around 1800, then here is a sequence in my reading leading down from that point to the Pragmatism of 1870-1930, which latter might itself be taken to turn about William James' epochal lecture, at the close of the century, at the new university whose very name proclaims the model of transposition from East to West to be the eighteenth-century project of the man who wrote 'Westward the course of Empire takes its way': Berkeley.

836 EDWARDS, Jonathan
The Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the Spirit of God (Boston 1741) ed & intr Wesley London 1742

837
A Careful and Strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of that Freedom of the Will... Boston 1754

838 FRANKLIN, Benjamin
Works (incl Autobiography) London 1793

839 JEFFERSON, Thomas & others
The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America (Philadelphia: In Congress, July 4, 1776) facs
840 BUCHANAN, Joseph
   The Philosophy of Human Nature Richmond, Kentucky 1812

841 POE, Edgar Allan
   Works (1827-48) ed Quinn & O'Neill 1946

842 EMERSON, Ralph Waldo

843 EMERSON, Ralph Waldo
   Essays (from The Dial Boston 1840-4)
      Boston (1841-4)

844 THOREAU, Henry David
   Representative Men (lects in London 1847)
      London 1850

845 THOREAU, Henry David
   On the Duty of Civil Disobedience (Boston 1849)

846 WALDEN, or Life in the Woods (Boston 1854)
   London 18 ; with (845) ed

847 WHITMAN, Walt
   Leaves of Grass (Brooklyn 1855)

848 WHITMAN, Walt
   Specimen Days in America

849 JAMES, Henry Snr
   Lectures and Miscellanies NY 1852

850 JAMES, Henry Snr
   The Nature of Evil NY 1855

851 JAMES, Henry Snr
   Literary Remains ed with Life, William James
      Boston 1884

852 SARGENT, Mary Elizabeth & others
   Sketches and Reminiscences of the Radical Club of Chestnut Street, Boston
      Boston 1880

853 JAMES, William
   Principles of Psychology NY 1890

854 JAMES, William
   The Will to Believe and other Essays
      (18 - )

855 JAMES, William
   The Varieties of Religious Experience
      (lects 1901-2) London 1903
856  Pragmatism (lects 1907)
857  Letters* ed Henry James London 1920
858  JAMES, Henry Notes of a Son and Brother* London 1914
859  PEIRCE, Charles Sanders Collected Papers ed Hartshorne, Weiss & Burks Cambridge Mass 1931-58
860  GALLIE, W B Peirce and Pragmatism Harmondsworth 1952
861  ROYCE, Josiah The World and the Individual (Gifford Lects 1899-1900) NY 1900
862  SANTAYANA, George Egotism in German Philosophy* NY/London 1919; rev 1939
863  WHITEHEAD, Alfred North The Concept of Nature Cambridge 1920
864  Symbolism - Its Meaning and Effect NY 1927
865  Process and Reality Cambridge 1929
866  Adventures of Ideas Cambridge 1933
867  LEWIS, Clarence Irving A Survey of Symbolic Logic (Berkeley 1918) NY 1927
868  Mind and the World Order NY(1929) 19
869  MEAD, George Herbert Mind, Self and Society (lects) ed Morris Chicago 1934
870  DEWEY, John How we Think NY 1910
871  Reconstruction in Philosophy NY 1920
872  SCHNEIDER, Herbert A History of American Philosophy NY/London (1946) 1963

As for context, a few more texts:

873  HOFSADTDER, Richard The American Political Tradition NY (1948)
874  CARROLL, Peter & NOBLE, David The Free and the Unfree* NY 1977
875  WRIGHT, Esmond Washington and the American Revolution London 1957
'Pragmatism': a new name for some...very...old ways of thinking; a thinking about 'how we think'...which recognises itself in standing-back from, questioning, the part of actor and thinker abstractly projected in all the old European books of 'theory' from a logic which works through the 'internal' space of the words and books of exposition, theory, 'thinking', purporting in this progress, to be working through the question posed by the symmetry of that verbal space of framing The World, and The World, there framed, in which this exposition takes place. In fact, of course, this presents us in each case with a logical identification of the locus of the inquiry pursued through the words, in their supposedly unitary external 'context, 'the World'. Yet the unitary structure of this 'World' is itself a mere correlate of our starting from an abstract logic, in order to transpose its axis of question and assertion into what is in that abstraction framed as 'outside' it. The fact that each thinker takes a fair time to reorganise his new axis of questions and answers - his 'new theory' - around the new starting-point initially marked in relation to the old theory - marked indeed in the frame of the old theory as the new axis about which theory is to be reorganised - reflects the circumstance that the practical dynamic from which the old theory had abstracted to an 'internal' abstract image within its formal structure of substitutions in language purporting to be a perfect substitute for the wider order of substitutions of which the substitution of sign for thing is only one dimension or variety, actually 'works' differently from its image in the old space and time of abstraction.

The 'pragmatist', now, finds himself not in some 'part' which has been projected from some previous 'internal' logic of theory out into 'the World' as theatre of substitutions for that basic part (subjectivity, producer or whatever), through the initial identification of the new locus of question, assertion, action and so on as the focus of symmetry of old theory and old World which the old 'abstract' theory framed 'in theory' as its context, whose new 'grammar' will be emancipated from the embedding of the new focus in the matrix of the old theory in a sort of practical 'break' out from abstraction which cannot be understood merely 'in theory': he finds himself, rather, precisely 'at work' in the practical
business of differentiating himself, others, and the objects and institutions of the 'real World' outside theory and its abstract 'fictional' logic of substitutions of its terms and their 'theoretical' grammar in the theory, from the theoretical pictures of all these things which are so to speak coordinate with each logic of embedding of logic in some new theatre with some new practical dynamic, each theory of transposition of theory into 'context'. And this new 'part' of the theorist, the systematic thinker, evolves towards the turn of the century, in America, in or on the scene of 'psychological laboratory' and 'laboratory school': in a very theatre of playing with various formulations of the radically 'practical' dynamic of our actual thinking as we 'internally' frame situations in which we are involved 'in our head', in thought, in response to new developments which go beyond our earlier picture or model or identifications of the various parts and things and workings in which we are involved, and the 'grammar' so to speak, or empirical syntax, of all the various elements in our situation. In the 'laboratory' we can actually control the number of such elements or variables, and work through particular configurations, 'theatres' indeed, 'plays' perhaps, actions and interactions, rather as the writer of theory had earlier worked through the interplay of various elements and their abstract logical syntax or grammar, in the internal space of his theoretical text, working at the same time, perhaps, through the imaginary theatre constituted by the imagined interplay of the various elements of the 'external world' identified with the various theoretical terms, as the writing charts a passage in imagination through that 'real' theatre in which the various terms are asserted to truly belong, framed by the initial configuration of embedding of logic in World arrived at through bringing the abstraction of an earlier starting-point and image of 'the World', 'into question': into a question which is at once an iteration of the movement of questioning which had articulated earlier theory, and at the same time the opening of a new frame and axis of questioning, with a new identification of the theorist's part in his new World as locus of the new questioning.

The 'part' of thinking, then, whether framing 'artificial' experiments in thinking, or in that 'educational' process which is the 'artificial' theatre of eduction of a working social identity
or part, through systematic differentiation of self and things from partial, confused, unworkable, un-worked-out images, in that theatre of imaginary constructions and their bringing-into-question in relation to real or imagined experience and its working (which so often refutes and confounds the imaginary working which we project in thought) - the classroom of discussion and experimentation - or the part of thinking, indeed, as it frames this configuration of psychology and education in a provisional formulation in the 'pragmatist's' reflections, papers, lecture-series, books, seminars, reading and so on - all this last being just his or her part which one may call that of 'theorist' by a limited analogy with earlier systematic reflection carried out in abstraction from its cultural context - this part, these parts, of thinking, may all be considered, provisionally, as so many 'workings' of what we mark by the term 'thought', in so many different but interacting situations: the common figure, in Peirce's formulation, of the activity one is thrown into, or finds oneself engaged in, when an unquestioned habit or expectation suddenly encounters something counter to expectation - when the scenario we had been as it were unconsciously engaged in suddenly gives way to the scenario of something differentiating itself from its part (perhaps absence) in the initial scenario.

Now in relation to earlier theory, this assertion of theory, science, as simply systematic thinking, which comes to self-consciousness, theory of theory, 'philosophy' and logic, when it eventually begins just to question 'thinking' as one component of the world or situation it is systematically investigating - a component in which, like World, Life and so on, it has of course been unconsciously engaged all along - this makes all earlier 'philosophy', or system of 'everything' formally organized as system of answers by an initial fiction of the locus of theory itself as being in some identification with a term that properly only marks an ongoing function of differentiation from some identification with some 'part' - this makes
all those almost countless books of theory so much fiction, so many stories spun out within a millenial dynamic of a verbal logic that works through its texts, as it works in imagination through an imaginary theatre substituted for its actual context, whose elements are identified by the various abstract terms of the theory or story, their relations determined by the abstract grammar of fregian substitutions at various points in the verbal chains of sentence, paragraph, chapter, book, with the whole determined by the abstract substitution of book for World, and locus of question and answer in that verbal matrix substituted for the actual locus of action - including the writing of theory - in the real context which, through the millenial tradition, constantly distinguishes itself from 'theories', while no theory takes any practical notice of this one constant factor, this one constant character of its nominal 'object', to differ from its framing in a book.

In particular, the very image of a unitary 'World' which could in principle be framed 'in' a theory, is - following ironically the etymological equivalence of 'fiction' and 'creation' itself pure fiction, coordinate with the circular path from a particular situation to a theory and logic which abstracts from its embedding in its time and place and circumstances, only then to theoretically set its abstracted line of pure theoretical questioning and its formal matrix of purely logical substitution as universal armature of 'any language', through the question posed by the symmetry of that logical dimension and its formally coordinate dimensions of 'context', 'back' in the sum of this related abstract dimensions as its 'World', in which the situation of theoretical deuction of such an abstract universal frame is then itself to be supposed embedded and understood. Mundum est fabula.

De te fabula narratur: and a 'religious' story or universal scenario rooted in the part of finding one's part in the story or cosmic drama, may work just as well, in principle, as, say, the converse undramatic 'scientific' picture articulated about the part of distinction from any such identification, the part of unlimited questioning and its finality of imaginary Truth
abstracted from the question of the consequences of such a part in the specific situations in which it is adopted. In many nodal cases, nineteenth-century 'theory' passed through the sort of crisis, breakdown, conversion scenario that James discusses in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*: in particular, his own 'part' of turn-of-the-century 'pragmatist' emerged, as he narrates there in a fictional displacement to his 'french correspondent', through just such a transition from abstract questioning to a part opened up as this questioning, and the previous identity of the theorist's 'I' implicated in, organised by, and organising it, comes in nietzschean manner to confront itself, and call itself into question and both theoretical and personal, dramatic, impasse.

I suggested a complementarity between turn-of-the-century russian 'activism' to the East of the millenial theatre of european theory, and american 'pragmatism' to the West: to the East a passage from the old 'closed' culture of tzarist autocracy, through political revolution, to a new 'theoretical' autocracy framed by the emergence of a superior or more successful scenario of unitary national or post-imperial soviet culture organised in terms of the part of defining or assuming one's part in the transition from old byzantine Russia and its pre-capitalist system of feudal circuits of power, ideology, identity, part, through the focussing of the machinery of transition in emergent industrialisation and its relatively more open circuits of 'alienation', to one's natural, 'scientific' part in the circuit of rationally organised culture as collective provision of life in material Nature. The 'part' of each in this new religion of rationally planned culture was simply to find his or her part as this was progressively defined in the various scenes and levels of interaction with others engaged in the same self-discovery or self-definition in the evolution or revolution of the global, or at least soviet russian, organic sum of parts.

What William James' brother surveyed as 'The American Scene' at the turn of the century, on the other hand, might be
characterised by a converse figure of practical restructuring of various strands of European theory and its institutional contexts, within the tradition which leads down from the seventeenth century village community transplanted from Europe to an isolated forest clearing on the North-American coast, rather than down from seventeenth-century importation of European culture into the tradition of a single Slavonic 'Rus' or 'space' of action converging towards the European tradition through medieval absorption of the closed Byzantine model of culture which remained throughout those 'Middle Ages' as a sort of static mirror of the point of emergence of distinctly western, Latin, Europe, with the close of Classical Antiquity. The American part taken on by William James and then John Dewey, lies in an 'open' dynamic of progressively re-framing scenario and part in it, up to the point at the close of the nineteenth century when Turner could define American history in terms of the dynamic axis of such constant reframing of the scene as village pales coalesced into broader communities, towns and trade emerged, states with indeterminate western boundaries, new states to the west within a broader confederation, then a western seabord and a conflict of North and South, and finally reconstruction and integration as the whole finally took on the character of a unitary organism growing with the strength of this dynamic tradition, moving onto the global stage, having fulfilled the condition set out by Hegel at the beginning of the century: the 'Land of the Future' could only enter into World History once it became a unity of activity 'within a fixed frontier'. - Up to the point where American 'pragmatism' could find the part of America in theory, and theory in America, precisely in the part of questioning formulations of things, parts, processes, institutions and all the rest, by testing such formulation within the radical scenario of an 'experience' in which things differentiated themselves from our characterisations and expectations of them, and we distinguished ourselves from various images of ourselves - and in particular from images of what our theory and thinking might mean - and discovered the 'working' of theory and thinking, and the radical locus at last of our self-assertion as judging inquirer, in our differing from abstract theories of this part of theory whose working we found in this differentiation within our own
experience of ourselves.

This figure of the theorist, and this scenario of theory around the turn of the century, focussed in the part of William James' self-discovery in such a part, evolving from the crisis in the years around 1870, to the assumption of Peirce's label of 'pragmatism' around the turn of the century, may be taken as a sort of transitional focus or node of the various lines of development of 'partial' questionings of hegelian abstraction, developed in various european schools of 'philosophy' and 'science' over the course of the century. The recognition of the locus of theory in the part of distinguishing oneself from some part or image of this locus in an abstract scenario which is so to speak a 'fictional' projection 'back' into 'the World' from an abstract image of the locus of questioning and theory typified by Hegel's Reason progressively distinguishing itself from any particular part in the universal context of the Logic it organises around this abstraction - this may itself be taken as a radical conversion of the hegelian movement from Romantic confusion of 1800 to the mature system of the 1820s organised by the abstraction of Reason and the Idea from the young Hegel himself, against the background of the 'hegelian' dominance in american 'philosophy over the last decades of the century. I tried to coordinate this part of William James, itself elaborated over the first three decades of the twentieth century into Dewey's systematic pragmatism of the 1920s, with various analogues or correlates within what emerge over the turn of the century as so many dimensions of a Modernity no longer confined to the old european theatre: in 'theory' I identified 'modern' logic, physics, psychology, aesthetics, theology and ontology in terms of the final programmatic relinquishing of the attempt to define the transposition from the old 'abstract' axes of deduction in these theories to a new order of questions 'in terms of' the old abstract starting-point. The situation is epitomised by the various 'crises of foundations' typified by paradoxes in the new 'set theory' developed by Dedekind, Frege, Cantor and others: by the loss of the old 'fictions' of those primary abstractions - immediate self-consciousness; self-identical and autonomous 'object' behind its empirical 'phenomenology'; unitary 'perspective' in painting, literature, theatre, music (rather than a dynamic of assertion and differentiation in a play of perspectives);
universal 'absolute' Space and Time independent of our being in it, and definite physical quantities and properties independent of their measurement, observation...determination; abstract logic of inscription of Book in determinate universal cosmic History or Drama coordinate with that universal Script.

James', Dewey's, Peirce's, Mead's 'pragmatism' - or rather, making a pluralistic virtue out of the vice attributed by Lovejoy to the label: 'pragmatism' - present(s) both a common model for each of these more specific analogues in particular 'dimensions' of turn-of-the-century 'theory' finding its previous logic an abstraction from a dynamic of questions rooted in action and interaction (particular 'modern' phases of the various theories or sciences or whatever one now calls them); and at the same time confronts each of these more specific domains or dimensions of explicitly 'modern' or 'modernist' inquiry with the question posed now by the very abstraction of each as nominally separate theory of one particular component of what each implicitly determines as a radically primary coordination of the various dimensions of the common 'modern' World of which they are the respective 'theories'. For once we relinquish in each 'domain' the analogue of a 'pure' logical space of logical inclusion and exclusion, which logically 'excludes' from its dynamic of deduction the 'external' configuration of its actual marking or framing, and with this 'space' relinquish also the elementary 'points' or indivisible terms of that particular domain, we are in this so to speak already halfway back to the everyday confusion and interplay of various dimensions and terms, elements, of our non-theoretical or pre-theoretical experience in which the new 'logic' of pragmatism finds the primary dynamic of questions of which any theory must be seen as simply a more or less systematic elaboration or architecture developed (for reasons relating to the institutional context of the theory) in some particular direction: a primary an ineluctable embedding in everyday activity and everyday questions from which the old logics and theories were - as it now turns out illicitly or illogically - abstracted. Abstracted from the 'pragmatic' question of their embedding as system of questions and answers in the practical business of life, of human interaction in Nature, as all, together,
belonging to merely one dimension of that drama, which they had been thought to set as a whole within some wider, more regular, abstract 'universal', unitary, theoretical space and time.

I have already alluded (in discussing Becker's lectures on the Enlightenment as proposing just such a 'utopia' of theory, and thereby engendering a revolutionary breakdown of practical everyday life) to the 'New History' associated in America with Robinson and Beard from around the turn of the century, and directly paralleling the 'Pragmatism' of James and Dewey. One may set the 'new' history in the wider context leading in Europe, then America, from French Revolution, Romanticism, and Industrial Revolution through the dominance of the german school of Niebuhr and Ranke in the nineteenth century, to various turn-of-the-century questionings of Ranke's 'noble dream' (to cite Beard's characterisation of that 'Universalgeschichte'):

876 STERN, Fritz The Varieties of History NY (1956) enlgd London/NY 1970

...and such a history of historiography, modelled on the narrower framing by Geyl of french 'histories' of the napoleonic transition into the historical frame of that writing (already noticed) itself reflects the turn-of-the century recognition that the historian is himself always in the widest frame in which he organises his material - that Ranke's project or projection of a universal objective 'scientific' dynamic of questions, coordinated in the diplomatic interface of texts and the actions to which they relate, through the gradual association of each primary source with a definite position in the action on which it is a perspective, is, historically speaking, a dream, a 'fable', that may itself be associated with Ranke's own position in mid-nineteenth-century Prussia.

Dilthey over the turn of the century, as I have noticed, went so far as to, so to speak, 'stand Ranke on his head': to invert the 'scientific historian's' project of inscription of Geist in Natur, moral in natural sciences: one was to write history,
that primary frame of the Geisteswissenschaften - and so also of the historically evolving human theories of Nature, of that cultural activity we call Naturwissenschaften - not by systematically distancing or detaching oneself from the 'parts' in the action one was reconstructing of its principal actors, but rather through the converse process of identification with them: not setting human interaction, through the inscription, ultimately, of Culture in Nature, in that universal mathematical frame of experience and inquiry corresponding to the (fictional) part of the 'scientist' (though we may even understand this activity of science and 'scientific history' by identifying with that fictional identification) - but seeking in history rather, so to speak, the greater aristotelian truth of Poetry; understanding the working of a specific textual configuration through its progressive inscription in its extra-textual context - as this is itself unfolded in the historian's text - by working out from our primary experience of the dramatic embedding of our thought and its texts in the dynamic of interpersonal interaction, in the progressive nesting of figures of such embedding in which we know ourselves, but restructured, as it were, to end up back with, say, the young Hegel, rather than with us, where it begins. Or rather - working back and forth between the 'I' of the young Hegel, and of me - or Dilthey rather - within the overall symmetry of these two 'I's in their common figure of embedding as actors in a common dynamic of inscription of thought in script in action - History being a sort of notional limit of this process which would involve my identification with and understanding of all the actors past and present, and all the working of their collective interaction - which would effectively be my complete dissolution in History, as me.

Thus here, at the turn of the century, historiography becomes as it were a special case of the novel: of that textual embedding of the script of an action in a verbal narration of the extra-textual components of the action. Writing history - always a history, a narration of an action abstracted like a drama or novel from the notional 'wider' context (traced by Ranke through the major component strands of his projected 'universal' history) - is a sort of 'scientific' literature, in that - in Dilthey's case at any rate - the 'narrative' frame of the drama related is elaborated in the interplay, typically,
of two historically separated processes of thinking: in particular, two historically separated versions, 'theories' in some sense, of this process of understanding oneself and one's part in the world or context of the earlier texts, and one's own - two versions, then, of this 'communication' of History as radical frame of one's part in a world of texts and contexts, actions and interactions. 'History', then, becomes a universal drama, writing 'history' the most direct line of inquiry into one's part in the drama, through communication and interchange of thought about the various components of this History 'across' spatial and temporal separation, through written texts. Thinking tries to comprehend the Action in which this thinking is one component; and it does not begin in some nominal abstraction from its own position in the action, but rather begins precisely in the experience of radical engagement, inscription, embedding, incarnation, in the Action, along with others whose 'positions' or perspectives one can frame from one's own position, then by 'communication' through the common figure of framing the Action from a point in it, one may slowly begin to articulate, like different people seeing each other from different places in a common space of that seeing and its communication, a working understanding, and formulation, of such space and position. This rather as Einstein was reformulating a 'relativistic' physical Space and Time, in terms of two observer's framings of each other's framings of a common spatiotemporal separation, as each corresponding to different points in the common 'space-time'. The 'objective' or physical distance or separation, is, by definition so to speak, just what is symmetric or common in the two formulations of difference of place and time from the two different places and times. It was Berkeley's recognition of visual space as precisely a practical construct, rather than an 'immediate' perception of some frame in which we were ourselves seen to be at one particular point rather than another, which led Peirce to enrol him as the first of that american school of 'pragmatists'.

Ranke's nineteenth-century 'classic' ideal of scientific History as universal frame of resolution of all questions relating
to a 'Universal History' ending, conveniently, around 1800, from 'outside' - or at least from a neutral, objective, 'scientific' position in the universal Space and Time of historical action that had been discovered at the beginning of the nineteenth century - his picture of embedding the interaction of the various parts attested by the primary sources or script of the Action, through progressive abstraction from all those parts, as each is inscribed as one particular perspective on the Action which eventually one comes to see altogether from 'outside', from the unitary focus of a fully abstracted scientific position in the Space 'outside' the action, a position equally and symmetrically abstracted from each of the participants' parts, through a complex system of coordinate steps of abstraction from all these different views of all these different views or perspectives - this formal inscription of historiography in the nineteenth-century frame of unitary Science, is a direct complement of a 'hermeneutic' approach which frames a particular historical drama - typically the biography of a thinker or a group of thinkers - the 'Romantic' transition of around 1800 forming the ideal element of one's inquiry - in the form of a literary dynamic of identifications unfolding from the primary figure of identification itself, the elementary categorial frame, so to speak, of participation through communication in a common Action or actuality, of which questioning thought, inquiry, 'history' as we call it after Herodotus, is one radical dimension, organising the dynamic of inquiry in the question of textual embedding of that question in its context - in the 'transcendental' frame of the coordinate dimensions of question that may be asked of a questioning, an inquiry, corresponding to the various dimensions of its inscription or embedding in 'context'. A book of history, then, will be articulated as the narration of a drama - say that of the unfolding of Hegel's or Novalis', or Schleiermacher's thought or questioning - as this questioning unfolds through the historian's own text in the symmetry of earlier text or script of inquiry with the primary coordinate dimensions of its (now textually related) context. The Romantics of 1800 present the ideal subject for such historiography, precisely because their own inquiry mirrors the structure of its hermeneutic embedding in 'context', as it proceeds
through the textual exploration of the symmetry and associated interplay of 'scientific', narrative or 'historical', and dramatic, poetic, 'literary' dimensions of text - or rather of the books, scripts, in which this textual dynamic is coupled with the embedding of their books or scripts in their lives, and the confusion of Art and Life, so characteristic - in principle at least, and to a great extent in practice, this typified by Novalis who thus becomes the very type of 'Romantic' - of the more 'poetic' of the Romantic writers of around 1800.

Now the complementarity of these two 'external' and 'internal' frames of historiography - history as Ranke's scientific articulation of the global political frame of organisation of human activity in space and time, and history as literary dramatisation of the dynamic evolution of the thought of an individual or a small group within wider rankean society as a whole - itself presents a radical question for historiography at the beginning of the twentieth century: a question, indeed, which one might take as marking the very axis of development of Weber's 'scientific' sociology, caught in the tension between hermeneutic identification with the individual's experience of his part, and 'scientific' coordination of a mass of individual parts in their collective interaction with the general 'economy' of material life on Earth, as individual part and society as a whole come into relation through an intermediary dynamic of types representative of social groups or global differentiations (class, religion, sex, age... ) within the organism as a whole. At the same time that they pose this 'internal' theoretical question for historiography, they necessarily pose also the practical question, for each historian, of his writing as itself his part (or an element of it, corresponding to the part of 'historian' or group of historians) in the wider History which includes both his subject and himself or herself. Thus Beard, for example, proclaims that a historiography organised by just this question can be, and indeed should be, a primary progressive and emancipatory force in History,
opening up, like a parallel 'pragmatist' philosophy which inquires into the general frame of the particular actions which are the subject-matter of the historian, a freer play of parts in society, and a greater and more productive freedom of each individual to determine his part, to choose, from the various frames open in his particular situation. Each individual thus ideally tends towards complete democratic freedom and equality under the Constitution, there being no more social short-circuits so to speak, which confine him in principle to some particular part or range of parts, no matter what he may do. Lenin's altogether 'contemporary' history, conversely, presents the ideal of an undifferentiated mass of parts which must be coordinated so that each is assigned to a particular function so as to optimise the whole and thereby optimise the lot of each of the participants in the whole, between whom the fruits of their collective production will be equally distributed: the individual's part is precisely to fix as exactly as possible his or her part, rather than, on the American model, to become as free and socially mobile as possible.

'Contemporary' history: where traditional historians enter into the discussion of the recent past avowing great reluctance, since their account must necessarily as it approaches their own part in the Action become tinged with subjectivity and a partial perspective, Lenin writes the history of his own time avowedly in order to make history: the participation of the historian in the events he narrates is not to be reduced to an academically acceptable minimum, but its 'partiality', its rooting in a particular perspective on what it narrates, constitutes for the 'revolutionary' historian the sole value of his narration.

Barraclough considers... or at least considered...

877 BARACLOUGH, Geoffrey An Introduction to Contemporary History Harmondsworth 1964

...that the passage from nineteenth to twentieth century marks the beginning of a transition, not so much from one structure
of inquiry to another approach to the same 'object' as defined by, say, Niebuhr's latin documents, Ranke's documentation of the opening of 'Modern History' in the interplay of latin and germanic culture from around 1500, or the systemic transition from that old order to a new coupling of various dimensions of human activity around 1800, from which the nineteenth-century historiographical tradition of analysis of the broader 'western' tradition stretching from classical Antiquity down to nineteenth century itself derives - but a transition, rather to a new object, defined by a global coupling of the various dimensions of european activity to the various coordinate dimensions of their extra-european context, as the european dominance of this interplay begins to break down or 'come into question' over the turn of the century. The historiography of twentieth-century 'european', and indeed 'World' history, has structured the history of breakdown of 'internal' european dominance of the relations of Europe and World, and of the disintegration of the nineteenth-century internal coherence of Europe associated with this wider transition, in the old frame of the 'european' dynamic bequeathed by Ranke and his heirs. Rather should european history, and the history of european internal disintegration over the period of what Europe sees as 'the two World Wars', be itself inscribed in, and its dynamic reconstructed in, the wider global frame: and this, then, in large measure as the history of european failure to frame its activity in such a changing context. Twentieth-century european politicians have in large measure precipitated internal breakdown precisely by framing their self-image and political aims within an obsolete model of an autonomous european order of questions abstracted from the wider context it traditionally controls, and thus in the application of the old model to relations it no longer represents, generated a still wider divergence of traditional picture from the tragic reality which can alone explain this vicious circle of failure - as it might also explain an earlier circuit of apparent european dominance of the relations of Europe and World as rather the temporary self-confirmation of an abstract representation of the World through the success of that representation of History in the abstract picture or History it framed. The eurocentric vision
presents within the wider frame of World History the cyclical
dynamic of a myth which over the transition from nineteenth to
twentieth century passes from the rising phase of self-confirmation
to the declining phase of self-destruction, as it systematically
misinterprets, like Oedipus, the practical consequences of its
misrepresentation or misinterpretation of 'the World' and its part
in 'the World'.

Barraclough, writing in 1963, just before Kennedy's
assassination, took the latter's election in 1961 as marking the
passage into a new structure of 'contemporary history', in the
aftermath of the first true 'World War' (the 'Great War' was es-
sentially a european conflict, the breakdown, precisely, of that
closed 'World'; and on a global scale the World War was a diffuse
transition into a new post-colonial world order, not defined by
the beginning and end of formal hostilities in Europe). Kennedy
had fought in the Pacific theatre, and his perception of the new
East-West and North-South axes of world economy and geopolitics,
and of the ideological axes associated with these - Dewey and
Beard's democracy against Lenin and Stalin's world plan; decolon-
isation - presented for the first time a (north-western) focus of
framing activity in the global theatre, now first perceived as
such, emancipated from the abstract analyses, pictures, institu-
tions that, even before the great european war of 1914-18, had
ceased to 'work'.

Barraclough's sketch of 1963 is of course in many ways
premature. Kennedy was, after all, born in the most european of
all american cities, before the 'Second World War', and, insofar
as he did free himself from a european perception of 'the World',
only exchanged it for that 'northwestern' or american myth which
may itself be taken as only one axis of transition from the millen-
ial abstraction of the european 'theatre' of History into a sym-
metric global dynamics of Culture or cultures articulated as so
many less or more autonomous systems of economic, political, linguistic, ideological, theoretical abstraction of the activity of groups of rational animals, featherless bipeds, from a common terrestrial Nature, its geophysical frame set in astrophysical 'solar system', in physical 'spacetime'.

**Zeitgeschichte:** Barraclough borrows his characterisation of 'contemporary history' opening up in the transition from nineteenth to twentieth century, from the *Institut für Zeitgeschichte* established at Munich at mid-century, after the second European catastrophe of the twentieth century: as archive of primary material for analysis of, and through this collective national distancing from, the tragic cultural frame of the first half of the century, dominated by an ideology of collective identification with a certain part in History:

878 CHAMBERLAIN, Houston Stewart
879 ROSENBERG, Alfred

Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts
Der Mythus des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts
Munich 1930

The history of Europe, and thus indeed of the World whose dynamic axis is just this emergent dominance of its external context by Europe, as driven by the tension of an organic integrative frame of graeco-germanic, aryen, activity, with as one of its primary components the tradition of framing the integrative drama as itself one integral part of what it frames, set against a converse parasitic force of disintegration, the semitic germs, sown in Antiquity, which organises a European Jewish tradition of abstraction from integration, framed by the coordination of scattered Jewish 'parts' in the fiction of a wider other-worldly drama. Chamberlain traced the dynamic through the breakdown of the initial greek impulse of Antiquity in the disintegration of
roman unitary Empire as its practical direction was systematically sapped by parasitic semitic mythology and its conversion of practical institutions into the machinery of their own destruction, then through germanic reassertion of order in the reintegration of the ruined structures of Antiquity in gothic revival, renaissance of Antiquity, and reform, disintegrative forces then growing again upon this healthy structure down to the period of the French Revolution. This dynamic then framed the transition into the twentieth century as marking the critical point where germanic order must recognise the tension at work and reassert itself once more, or perish in the gathering twilight. The critical part of the british wagnerian Chamberlain in the great drama was to pose this question of their part to each of the players, and thus induce the critical reassertion of the aryan frame in which its framing played throughout the maintenance of the tradition a crucial practical part: no detached abstract history this. By 1930 Rosenberg would have organised the analysis of the complementary nineteenth-century germs of jewish capitalism and communism, extending Chamberlain's history both into the wider frame of its embedding in a universal 'biology' of the two traditions, aryan organic culture and semitic germ of disintegration, in a natural history of fight to the death of Culture itself - and into the radically 'contemporary history' of the period since 1800, down to the focus of the struggle in Germany in 1930, where his history was explicitly and avowedly organised as 'myth' both practically integrated within the activity of the rising National Socialist Movement, and at the same time framing the dynamic and practical tactics of that Movement.

One may compare, as indeed I did compare in Part III, the transition from Chamberlain's turn of the century dynamics into which his framing of the dynamic itself entered as one 'critical' or revolutionary component, opening up a new order of ideological questions, to Rosenberg's systematisation of its 'Myth' as one dimension of the Nazi Movement it framed in a global narrative, with Stalin's systematisation of Lenin's Revolution, Dewey's systematisation of James' Pragmatism or Mussolini's ideology of his
'fascist' movement:

880 MUSSOLINI, Benito

"Fascismo" in Enciclopedia Italiana (vol XIV) Florence 1932

...and one may compare Rosenberg's avowal of all theory and history as fundamentally story, 'myth', whose truth lies in its practical consequences in the order of activity it serves to frame and inform, with Spengler's nominally detached biology or 'morphology' of History:

881 SPENGLER, Albert

Der Untergang des Abendlandes. Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte
Munich (1918-22) 1923 tr Atkinson NY 1926-8

...and Benda's practical attempt to raise the alarm against the impending disastrous practical consequences of European theory's rising contagion of disavowal of its traditional detachment, its abstraction from practical, and more particular political, considerations in its questioning and response:

882 BENDA, Julien

La Trahison des Clercs* Paris 1927

...and, finally, one may confront the question posed by Rosenberg's attempt at unitary 'ideological' articulation of National Socialism, in the elaboration of its global frame, inscribed as one practical component or dimension of the Movement thus framed, in its interplay with that actual political part of the actor in whom the Movement was practically focussed, which we may guage by that component of his activity which was his histrionic dictation of his part up to the Munich Putsch, while consequently imprisoned:

883 HITLER, Adolf

Mein Kampf* Munich (1925-6) 1930

together with a couple of perspectives on the part of that writing in the architect manque's biography, and the part of that biography in the Movement and its European and global context:
..and a play of different perspectives on the interplay of ideological and political dimensions of various parallel cultural dynamics or 'movements' in various different countries that are all (ideologically...) grouped together under the single word, 'fascism':

..which is framed as a coordination of questions organizing the vast mass of primary and secondary literature around the fundamental question marked by this word.

Fascism: Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, Laval - and ranged against them in the European theatre Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt, De Gaulle: so many 'national' frames of activity focussed in one leading part or role; so many political structures organised as theatrical spectacles in which all parts are coordinated in these central parts of national self-assertion. Hitler, for example, directing the various dimensions of the Movement and New Order, as arbiter between contending ministries and deputies, could coordinate Rosenberg's ideology and Goebbels propaganda, as ideologically the nominal instance of determination of the part of its ideological representation in the Movement or Order which it framed in more or less unitary global terms, this as part of the general role of coordinating the various ends of other ministries, which Goebbels could support or facilitate through suitable representations.
Hitler, then, impersonating simply the part of aryan assertion, at the focus of Rosenberg's mythical global matrix of the great struggle for Order: Hitler taking on more and more completely the direction of the struggle as framed by his 'ideologist', becoming so to speak the dramatic analogue of the instance of germanic assertion which structures Rosenberg's text of 1930, and Hitler himself acting thenceforth as the actual persona, the very embodiment of *wirklichkeit* by which the truth of the representation of his assertion in the ideologist's text may itself be judged: this attesting precisely the 'pragmatic' definition of truth there proposed - the truth about the Führer as embodiment of germanic Will, is by definition, apodictically, what the Führer himself assents to in the representation presented to him by Rosenberg.

In the more 'theoretical' terms of Bäumler as minister of Pedagogy, Hitler is the 'living reality' from which the formal place of assertion as *Dasein* is but a 'cold abstraction'. Hitler becomes towards 1940 the model for all parts in his New Order, its representative persona or personification; his book becomes a ritual script, printed now like a bible, and given to all couples on the occasion of civil matrimony. Like the european version or representation of european relations with the external world, before they began to break down over the turn of the century, the 'myth' and associated order is, until it comes into direct conflict with other versions and 'parts' which do not accept that *De te fabula narratur*, self-confirming, actually organising what it presents as the World more and more in accordance with that presentation: it 'works', and is therefore, ipso facto 'true', a theatrical spectacle whose mythic truth reveals the abstract Truth of all the jewish intellectuals of the new diaspora of 1933 as merely the most cunning part of that great semitic Lie.

The fable seems to confirm its own truth and its own version of 'truth' over the thirties, as those who frame the dynamic of their reflection in Dewey's educative self-differentiation from any fixed identification or part, physically abstract themselves from the physical scene of the hitlerian spectacle, the german Boden. A majority, including Laqueur, find themselves sooner or later, after 1933, in the America of Dewey and Roosevelt; and the experience
'from outside', from a complementary position - in Rosenberg's own terms - of 'semitic abstraction' from an unwelcome part (eventually of simple elimination) in the Nazi fable organising the 'truth' of the History it frames by, as it might first have appeared to Rosenberg and Hitler, working to organise that History in its own image, leads Laqueur, in the aftermath of the cataclysmic spectacle of Götzendämmerung, to embed the failure of the Nazi myth of racial identification and Order in a wider historical order, evincing in the lesson of National Socialism, of the part of Hitler, a Practical Reason, a moral truth, behind the European tragedy...

..the pragmatic lesson which is just the transposition to the complementarity of the American part of 'freedom' in which he now finds himself, and the Russian part of integration of individual roles in unitary Soviet activity, of the thirties' opposition of Nazi assertion in the Germanic frame of the Movement, and what Rosenberg identified as complementary Jewish abstraction from any such part, from his vital, mythical, tendency toward integration in collective self-assertion. Laqueur argues that the transition from 'thirties to 'sixties and 'seventies threatens a reiteration on the wider global scale of the historical dynamic of European Fascism in the interwar period: Europe frames its position as so to speak 'on the fence' between East and West, as if the polarity were essentially stable - but the lesson of Appeasement is that the underlying dynamic, in which the rise of Fascism simply prefigures the rise of Soviet communist imperialism in its aftermath, from its ruins, naturally tends to make the fence more and more subject to Soviet control, shifting the balance between East on one side and West on the other (or rather Russia and America), threatening through such destabilisation to precipitate a final conflict which would make the earlier Armageddon a mere theatrical prelude.
From the fence, the perspective is rather different:

1981's 'International Reporter of the Year', standing back from his day-to-day ('journalistic') perspective on the details of international 'questions', to set in a unitary survey the interrelated workings of the various components, finds that, far from programmed to grow in the complementarity of a fundamental East-West opposition of the two prime players on the global stage (which is supposed to dominate the subordinate tension between North and South), the soviet 'machine' is in fact constantly struggling merely to maintain stability within secure borders, in a global dynamic where the dominance of East-West polarity in the immediate aftermath of the World War is itself is being progressively reduced.

Laqueur, on such an analysis, is seeing in his version of soviet identity as essentially rooted in a dynamic of creeping expansion as it (like fire or aristotelian life) integrates the interface of System and World in the configuration of its System, both a false analogy with the Movement from which he fled in the nineteen-thirties, and at the same time a reflection of his own adopted american creed, which has itself maintained its 'progressive' identity in precisely such a System of subordination of interface with Context to System.

One might say that his frustration with european refusal to align with traditional postwar american geopolitics is itself a reflection of the failure of the United States to maintain its postwar hegemony, to sustain 'fifties ideology as over the 'sixties and 'seventies it proves to be less and less workable.

Eighties' journalism - or rather a journalist in the nineteen-eighties attempting to cast his daily perspective on details of a notional story or history, in which he is always, in principle 'in the middle' (a newspaper is not a book, with beginning, middle and end: it begins in the middle of the story, selling a new perspective, and ends still in the middle, when the perspective, however modified, no longer sells), into a
unitary view in a wider historical context than could be repeated as prelude, every day, to the new details which emerge day by day. The 'news' has to be precisely what is different from yesterday, so that the historical context, which remains the same, is simply elided from the 'news' - as it were deferred to the end of the story (which will never appear in a newspaper) or carried over from the previous day (when it was carried over from the days and years before, having been initially taken over from the general presuppositions of the other newspapers the day it entered the market).

In Part III I took the perspective on its global situation in a newspaper, which is itself directly embedded in the scene and dynamics on which it is a daily view (in some sense exactly the same every day, maintaining so to speak the same 'position' in relation to the various components of its context, as these develop from day to day - and, as Shaw remarked, exactly the same length every day, no matter how much or little 'happens') as characteristic of an 'ideological' dimension and associated dynamic, as interface between the 'abstract' questions of Theory, and the cultural poetics of action (the latter articulated between the 'global' scale of internal and external 'policies' of groups directing national activities insofar as they are amenable to unitary direction, 'politicians'). I suggested for example the character of 'Structuralism' as a journalist's name for something - some structure, indeed - which rendered various parisian 'theories' of the 'sixties more or less equivalent in the journalistic or ideological dynamic of language in which the journalist had to embed or present them, and their interplay with one another, and with the everyday drama of the wider culture or activity in which they were 'theoretical' components. I noted the criticism of the 'sixties old guard in their instituted academic abstraction from the embedding of their formal questioning in everyday language and culture, in response to the success 'in the media' of the so-called 'nouveaux philosophes'. And I noted a certain irony in the criticism of the embedding of 'ideas' in the native ideological dynamic of Language and discourse, mediating the interplay of 'theoretical' and 'practical' questions, coming as it did precisely from the 'structuralists' who had projected just such a reversal of the parts of Theory and discourse.
Characteristically, the academic group's repudiation of their 'image' in 'the media', repudiation of a theoretically questionable embedding of ideas in discourse and discourse in the cultural and political dynamic, itself belongs to the part of, and is defended in terms of, the old abstract 'theory' that they had thought to (theoretically) render obsolete. And I suggested that this confrontation of what the journalists saw as Old versus New Philosophy, old against new intellectual fashions, might itself be seen as one component in the iteration of the 'sixties step from Theory into Language (Language first 'theoretically' regarded as unitary matrix on the model of the transcendental space and time of subjectivity it was displacing) and the move around 1970 from unitary Language to pluralist discourse. Since I began writing this long book this 'iteration' has progressed (?) to its 'eighties focus in the question or questions of 'Postmodernism', with as chief French representative Lyotard's New Myth: 'the truth of a story lies in the pragmatics of its social transmission'. Echoes of Rosenberg, of Nazi 'ethical decisionism', oddly underlined by Lyotard's constant iteration of a rhetorical coupling of abstract Enlightenment progress and Universal History with what he supposes to be its practical impasse in the death camps of Hitler and Stalin. Lyotard's only proof that Rosenberg's avowed 'myth', framing its own truth in a version of truth curiously analogous to Lyotard's (if only less 'theoretically' inconsistent), lies in the reflection (and why even should we believe this: there are still those who argue that the death-camps were a zionist fiction) that its main retailers were physically stopped in their 'transmission' of their story by hanging at Nuremberg, suicide at Berlin, or imprisonment. That Lyotard's rhetoric is itself only a transitional iteration of a slow shifting of the axis of 'theory' from Sartre's mid-century drama of subjectivity (in its interplay of theory, journalism, and theatre) through a textual dynamic of inscription in theoretical text of a context (with 'subjectivity' as one coordinate) this inscription articulates (around 1970) towards a questioning articulated in a script in which the textual marking of what is open in the situation of marking itself comes into question as only one thing open at each point of its marking, is reflected in the
residual abstraction of his assertion from the question of its own transmission, and correlative explicit coupling to the relatively independent dynamics of non-discursive dimensions of his situation as a Parisian academic. 'On paper' his exposition of his 'ideas', his 'position(s)', on the theatrical coupling of ideas and image, space, object, dynamics of their coupling abstracted from traditional psychological subject and physical object, on one floor of that building (Beaubourg) where the primary visual axes of twentieth-century exploration into the coupling of 'subjective' and 'objective' as painting and sculpture are coordinated on two further floors, and books ranged as a library on two more... the ideas, the story, is engaging. But as theatre it was incoherent, far less engaging than, say, Sartre's wordy theatre of ideas... even though one was supposedly playing a part in the production oneself, rather than 'merely' identifying with actors on a closed separate stage. For Sartre's drama was at least written as the writer worked through both the internal linguistic space of his argument, and in imagination through the physical space and time in which it was imagined, and would in fact eventually be, spoken, enacted - and one could enter into this coupling of subjectivity and action through the action presented before one on a stage. But Lyotard's 'theatre' was still articulated in a textual or indeed theoretical dynamic, of his textual embedding of relations of text and context in a 'text', where 'action' and 'interaction' are dominated by their place in an abstract argument, rather than by the place of that argument in partly extra-textual interactions between people and things in an Art Gallery. To appreciate the 'exposition' one had to so to speak translate back from the situation in which one found oneself, to the textual or discursive position which it 'illustrated'. Once again I was different from the notional participant in the drama Lyotard had planned on paper. Another fable which didn't altogether work.
It didn't work. I was different from the notional participant in the drama Lyotard had planned on paper. Six months before I had wandered into the empty apartment in the old Ecole Polytechnique at 1, rue Descartes, seeking out the near-invisible College set up by Derrida and others under the auspices of the first socialist 'government of intellectuals' since the 'thirties, as institute for the the investigation of the social institution of Theory. Exploring the new 'space' of reflection as one might leaf through a new book - for I considered that such an institution should be the transposition from book to some new theatre, of the old axis of inquiry - I layed aside the proprieties appropriate to visiting a stranger's apartment, and having taken a solitary black lace brassiere hanging from a peg in the bathroom as confirmation of my sense of theatricality, I begun to look through papers on desks and in drawers in the various empty rooms, eventually finding a couple of large cardboard boxes of photocopied volumes of the initial dossier presented by Derrida and others to the minister responsible for examining the proposal for a new institute (Chevenement) in one of the wardrobes in the hallway. I took away a couple of copies, together with various other material assembled in my 'reading' of the new space of inquiry - my new form of research, already well known to policemen the world over in their examination of new theories bearing on the part of inquiry in the cultural order of embodied everyday life. As my search had proceeded I had become more and more self-confident in my impropriety and my appropriation of College property. Derrida had, after all, spent considerable time bringing into question the propriety of proprie in its various textual and contextual dimensions, in seminars I had attended years before, and I felt that should I be disturbed by one of the newly instituted inquirers, I could easily defend my activity as precisely the sort of 'intervention' appropriate to the new frame of debate.

I went away undetected, and having perused the results of my new form of research, was somewhat disappointed to trace the breakdown of the initial idea of setting ideas in a new dynamic of questioning, as this fed through to a merely formal division of the new space into so many 'sections' of the programme which would be covered by academic seminars dotted around the refurbished
Polytechnique, and other perfectly traditional institutions of theory, nearly all in Paris. When I actually went along to some of these seminars, I found that they were indistinguishable in form and content from the seminars of the 'old' institution of Theory they were explicitly proposed to complement, rather than merely augment. And when in one of the seminars I proposed the theme of the theatricalité of reflection as focus for a traditionally abstract discussion, from the podium, of the relation of verbal and visual, and suggested that the abstraction from this question seemed to me to reflect the continuing abstraction of discussion in the new institute from any organisation deriving from its proposed embedding in a new coupling of ideas and cultural context, I was greeted with familiar blank incomprehension: Where did my question fit into the line of the seminar director's inquiry? My thesis, being precisely my position in the plushly redecorated little amphithéâtre at 1, rue Descartes, did not, of course, fit into the textual matrix of the script whose reading from the podium was organising the little drama. And since the various parts of reader at his table on the podium and assistants, auditeurs until the director designated the textual space for their 'intervention' in the textual order of the debate he directed, were controlled by the old dynamic of those parts carried over from the traditional 'expository' frame of parisian 'seminar' or cours magistrale, my question was simply elided as a new question was invited from the audience, and we all returned, after my brief caesura, to the original discussion and its dynamic of abstraction from context to textual reflections on the relation from text and what it designated from within the verbal matrix as the imaginary visual domain it sought to coordinate with equally imaginary verbal domain - in some other time, place and drama from that in which such relations were actually being dissected and, unwittingly, exemplified. As for the new institution being philosophically proposed as a new space in which the traditional boundaries and subordinations between 'Philosophy', 'Sciences' and 'Arts' would no longer persist, the extent to which this was just an idea about the embedding or inscription of ideas in Culture, was well reflected in the near-exclusive predominance in the new seminars of philosophical discussion directed by professional academics and aspiring academics who could not have 'their own seminar' elsewhere, which was constructed and
organised in the old elision of precisely the question that nominally informed the dynamic of the 'new' institution. I thought of film I had seen of the heady days of May 1968, when the Student Revolution became focussed in the spectacle at the Odeon, whose dialogue turned irresolubly in discussions about how the discussion should be structured, with chronic disruptions of direction from the leaders on the stage of the old theatre across from the Sorbonne, by interventions from the floor attempting to question the power relations implicit in direction of discussion from the Stage.

It didn't work. My part as passive auditeur at 1, rue Descartes, which was in fact just my part of passive auditeur at countless parisian seminars varying across the spectrum from the formal taking-down by the majority of the (mainly upper-middle-class female) students at Paris IV (Sorbonne) of what the professeur read and commented upon from his raised table at the front of the amphithéâtre, to Deleuze's circus at Vincennes (Paris VIII) dominated by the interplay of interruptions from (often literally) the floor, new arrivals climbing in from the first floor window of the room next door, dogs barking in frustration of their owners' overlong stay in the crowded room, lights going on and off as the crush by the door pushed against the switches, people leaving to return with north-african spiced sausages from the bazaar which had taken over the ground floor of the building...

There I was, then, in these various theatres of parisién theory, differing, feeling different, distinct, from the various parts assigned by the various directors' scripts of the relations in which their assertion of such relations were implicitly set. Who then is this 'I', marked here in this script as differing from its part as recognised in those parisién scripts of seventies and eighties?
Well, I suppose its me, writing; writing this, about to write this, having written this, and having at the outset of this long script marked in the script a difference between me, Martin Joughin, writing, you, whoever you are, reading, and the 'I' which I tried to share at the outset, as it stood, more or less indifferently at the 'opening' of this book, at the entrance into the unfolding of this attempted embedding of the textual matrix of embedding of this text in a context - in which I am writing, and wrote, it, and you will and have read it, and are reading it.

I suppose it's me here relating my difference from a part coordinate with the authorial instance of 'I' in various parisian texts whose titles are inscribed here, as this book through its various titles is inscribed with them in the common context of my life, me writing or reading them. Me marking or describing or asserting myself here as an embodied instance of 'I' that recognises myself, in part, in differing from various parts marked in other writers' books (and parisian monologues) in which I do not altogether recognise myself - but which I recognise as all 'books' in relation to which as a set of (about a thousand) books, I may mark myself in this book ('my' book) as whatever differs in the way here marked from the parts as here marked that it finds in those books, as they are set in the common context of my reading then Ind writing that reading. That's me; and I communicate with you, here, through common elements of our two parts of 'I' differing from one another in the different writers from whom we differ, as in different differings from, and partial identifications with, the various parts of 'I' in the books that we have both perused, and in the contexts in which each of those textual instances of question and assertion are correlative with some more or less imaginary part.

The part of 'reader' and critic is, I suppose, to frame the questions to which the writer responds in articulating his or her 'theoretical' text as argument: the instance of an 'I' that differs systematically, in the verbal matrix of the writer's assertion, from each instance of that progressive assertion. To the extent that a real reader, formally marked in the verbal matrix as
actually and unpredictably differing from the formal or imaginary instance of critical questioning 'in' the text, 'agrees' with the instance of critical questioning articulated in the book he or she is reading, they may agree also with the writer's self-assertion in a common 'I' as it responds identically to such an implicit questioning. At some point, though, between the two poles of each being in some sense 'I', sharing that common instance of question and assertion in (I suppose, if there actually is reading rather than mere scanning of foreign marks) a more or less common language, and each being either the physical author of the marks, the instance of 'I' that chose them, or not, they must differ, although a great deal of theoretical writing assumes that such a difference is essentially extrinsic to the abstract dynamic of theoretical argument, as it articulates various components or component configurations of a common language in the formal 'logical' and psychological axis of cartesian formal assertion in a fregean and saussurian matrix of verbal substitutions.

But... theory is not as yet marked by any such ideal universal agreement... and I suggested that one may still, towards the close of the twentieth century, articulate a dynamic of interplay of different 'theories', in terms of different writers' extra-textual or extra-logical, 'contextual', embodiment in, above all, different times and places, where their configurations of theoretical assertion or theory - their playing the part of abstract 'I', so to speak - have evolved from birth in different languages and different couplings of language, culture and material economy of life in those cultures, as attested by different groups of books through whose reading and criticism the education or eduction or induction of this their theoretical persona has unfolded.

Thus a 'pragmatist' framing of the logic of that framing in a cultural order it articulates, in terms of Dewey's educational dynamic of abstraction from parts in which one finds
oneself more or less unworkably engaged as one develops in youth (then, through university, in some cases, to the abstracted part of framing this whole process as teacher), towards a sort of ideal free democracy in which each mature educated citizen symmetrically shares the common integrated personality as locus of an 'I' that can freely, impartially, choose between the various parts open to it in any particular situation — this, I suggested, could itself be coordinated with Dewey's part of 'national philosopher' of the United States (Morris Cohen's characterisation) as it evolved from his own postgraduate work at Chicago around the beginning of the century, toward the unitary ideal frame eventually coordinated around that part in the twenties. Rorty's part in the nineteen-eighties as international ambassador, or representative in various different European traditions, of Dewey's frame, reasserted now after the mid-century dominance of scientific 'naturalism' (another strong American tradition) following naturally enough upon Dewey's systematisation of 'Experience and Nature' (this, most particularly with the 'thirties influx from Germany and Eastern Europe) — this in its time or its turn reiterates the instance of theoretical assertion that has itself, in its coupling with extra-theoretical dimensions of the American democratic tradition, shaped the educational dynamic in which Rorty elaborated his own 'position' from his schooldays in the nineteen-thirties onward. Similar considerations apply to Habermas' evolution in a Germany reconstructing its cultural tradition in the aftermath of the impasse of a New Order of parts in the national whole represented by Hitler. I attempted to articulate the context of theory in postwar France in rather more detail in the latter part of Part III, since my own part as writer here evolved from the mid-seventies onward primarily as the definition of a critical position in relation to the various Parisian 'theoretical positions' I encountered in seminars, periodicals, books, in the context of my life as a postgraduate student in Paris in 1974-6 — a position I retired to define after 1976 in three years of 'abstraction' from most British, French or other culture in the English countryside, occasionally revisiting Paris to attend further seminars, acquire further books and periodicals, examine the shelves in FNAC, PUF, La Hune and a few other bookshops, eat well, see films, exhibitions, speak French, and so on.
Seminars, books...and finally, at last, my own bookshelves, rather than an imaginary library:

Collège de France

Let me list the seminars I attended and books written by their 'professors' in the order of the dates of formal canonisation, so to speak, of the various positions, by the granting of a chair:

First, Merleau-Ponty's successor:

VUILLEMIN, Jacques: I came to feel that Derrida should really have succeeded to this chair, but Merleau-Ponty died prematurely; I never read anything by Vuillemin, and never worked out just who the couple of dozen old people at his seminar were. Perhaps he was too far ahead of his time, lecturing on the american philosophy of language and of science of the fifties. Canonical isolation, anyway; I don't remember any reference to him in other seminars or reading.

Then, to begin again, opening the 'structuralist' canon with its first 'official' representative:

LEVI-STRAUSS, Claude

891 Les Structures Élémentaires de la Parenté 1949
892 La Pensée Sauvage 1962
893 Mythologiques 1964(I)-71(IV)
894 LEACH, Edmund Lévi-Strauss London 1970

Since nearly all french books are published at Paris, I will only note places of publication different from the metropolitan centre. By the time I arrived to study in Paris Lévi-Strauss had been deserted by the french young and (or) fashionable, and had already achieved the symbolic or historic status conferred by a predominance of americans in his audience that I would see overtake Derrida in the late 'seventies. Not many japanese, smartly dressed with businesslike attache-cases, listening to the mythical ancestor of sixties structuralism though. I saw their numbers slowly growing elsewhere from a couple in the front row at Kristeva's seminar in 1974, to a whole tribe taking over the front rows at Derrida's seminar, after he had moved, nominally, to the Ecole Pratique (still holding his seminar at the Rue d'Ulm, but now in the theatre rather than the
smaller, traditional, Salle Cavailles upstairs, next to his old office.

FOUCAULT, Michel: Histoire des Systèmes de Pensée (1970)

895 Histoire de la Folie à l'Age Classique 1961
896 Les Mots et les Choses: une Archéologie des Sciences Humaines 1966
897 L'Archéologie du Savoir 1969
898 L'Ordre du Discours (Leçon Inaugurale, 1970) 1971
899 Surveiller et Punir: Naissance de la Prison 1975
900 Histoire de la Sexualité: I La Volonté de Savoir 1976

Three hundred people, a hundred on the floor around the long podium at the front of the hall and down the aisles or standing in a crush at the four entrances to the room; the large table on the podium covered with tape-recorders and microphones, microphones hanging from various protuberances on walls and windows around the room. Only fifty or a hundred people in the second room across the rear courtyard of the College, linked by speakers. Foucault arrives at 5pm, an hour after the first people had claimed their seats, slowly picks his way through the bodies around the podium, then through those along behind his table, to his chair; others pick their way forward to switch on their tape-recorders. Foucault sits down, arranges his papers, adjusts the microphone, and begins. January 1975; my first experience of this sort of parisian theatre; and down to the right of the podium, sitting in a space provided by a window-sill, is a girl who looks just like the French girl I met on the lake behind the Aswan dam the previous summer, and who seems to occasionally glimpse over to the window-sill in which I'm crouched halfway up the other side of the sloping room.

BARTHES, Roland: Semiotique Litteraire (1977)

901 Le Degre Zéro de l'Ecriture 1953
902 Mythologies 1957
903 Sur Racine 1963
904 Eléments de Sémiologie (1965) 1965
Critique et Vérité 1966 - reply to:

PICARD, Raymond Nouvelle Critique ou Nouvelle Imposture 1966

S/Z 1970

Le Plaisir du Texte 1973

Roland Barthes par lui-même 1975

Leçon Inaugurale (Collège de France) 1977

Le Chambre Clair: Note sur la Photographie 1980

Same two rooms, same number of people, of tape-recorders. And something almost gastronomic (I've just remembered his introduction to Brillat-Savarin's Physiologie du Goût) in his sympathetic delectation over and digestion of his texts. I would notice the grain in the wooden seats, the texture of women's clothes, the play of glances in the audience, echoing as it were the sensual tone of Barthes' discourse... and as I try to echo those echoes in these words, they become almost an imitation: I see that 'the sensual tone of his discourse' has a dual sense... the tonus as he would have said, playing on the ambivalence between French and Latin in the word, as both defining a sort of thematic key of the text, and as resonant with the very timbre of the voice that breathes the words. And this convolution seems indeed to echo the very play of figuration, the music, fugue even, which renders the very personal tone of a sense, sensuality, sensibility, that was constantly poised between the formal matrix of a text and the bodily relation of Roland Barthes to the members of his audience, for which any text might provide the script, the pretext. And I begin to sense in this play of words and memories the figuration of Eros which for some reason I associate most particularly with the books I never opened, Système de la Mode, Fragments d'un Discours Amoureux - even though the detail from Botticelli's Primavera that clothes the latter book seems to have become for me a kind of image of Barthes' vision after 1977. Is this Roland Barthes writing, or me? Or Echo?

BOULEZ, Pierre:

Penser la Musique Aujourd'hui Mayence 1963

Hmm. This seems to be the other side of Barthes' play in the verbal fabric of his script: a theoretical discourse on the abstract 'musical' space and time of embedding of ambiguous voice and tone in the harmonic
interface of psychological and physical, inner and outer, space and time: a 'harmonics' of musical space and time that echoes Helmholtz' construction of classical diatonic music in his epochal treatise of the Sensations of Tone, in a reconstruction from first principles, so to speak, of a universal musical dynamic that unfolds its language and notation from the elementary geometry of physical 'space' itself. I felt that Boulez' seminar at the College de France was essentially a sort of secondary reflection of the practical work going on down at IRCAM in the second floor underground at Beaubourg, where the complementary, but closed, technical seminar was held. Indeed the room at the Collège de France where he gave his seminar was on the other side of the main courtyard from the rooms where Foucault and Barthes used to give their seminars, in the section given over to the 'exact' sciences..

'Music': down to the time of Mersenne a branch of mathematics, along with arithmetic, geometry and astronomy; I have already reflected on the subordination of the Renaissance harmonics which culminate in Kepler's Harmonice Mundi and Fludd's rival Monochordon, and in Mersenne's mathematics of diatonic 'space' and the projective geometry of Desargues and Pascal, to the 'analytic' approach of Descartes and his successors from the mid-seventeenth century, and upon the gradual re-emergence of 'harmonic' structures from around 1800 — culminating in the first three decades of the twentieth century in the reconstruction of mathematical physics in a 'harmonics' of action from which the 'classical' poles of unitary cartesian Space and its infinitesimal arithmetical division are seen to be unworkable abstractions, coordinate with the complementary abstraction from the physicist (observer, measurer) in the Nature he investigates, to the formal pole of cartesian Subject. And I suggested an analogy between this harmonics of physical interaction, systematised from the turn-of-the-century questioning of the abstract classical poles of absolute Space and infinitesimally divisible Action (associated with Einstein and Planck), and the systematic reconstruction by the 'Second Viennese School' (Schoenberg, Berg, Webern) of musical 'space' and its dynamics between about 1900 and 1930, to which
Boulez explicitly frames his systematic analysis of musical synchrony and diachrony - 'syntax' - from around 1950 as a direct response.

'Philosophy in a new key': the analogy between the space-time of 'modern' music and of 'modern' physics after 1900 itself belongs, as I tried to show in Part III, to a far wider 'synchrony' of various different dimensions of 'modern' theory, and to a synchrony of such 'modern' theory with various dimensions of its ideological, cultural, material, and indeed physical, contexts. And one might regard this 'musical' harmony and dynamics of twentieth-century 'theory' and context as a sort of closing recapitulation of the initial pythagorean figure of a 'musical' embedding of 'theory' or cosmic vision in the universal 'harmony' of which it is the vision - or silent 'hearing' - within the wider harmonics and dynamic of the whole intervening western tradition of 'theory'. In fact I sketched 'musical' theory down from the pythagoreans only as far as Euclid's contemporary Aristoxenus, whose musical system is a direct parallel to Euclid's systematic abstraction of geometry and arithmetic from their initial fifth-century subordination to pythagorean harmonics. I had in fact attempted to pursue the unfolding of harmonic musical 'space' and rhythmic musical 'time', as complementary dimensions of melodic 'line', down from Aristoxenus and through the seventeenth-century systematisation of diatonic 'space' and its associated dynamics to the breakdown of diatonic space around 1900 that parallels the contemporary breakdown of central perspective (analogous to 'central' tonality) in 'modern' painting:

914 BOYDEN, David An Introduction to Music (NY 1956) London (1959)1971 (78-9)

915 BLOM, Eric Mozart London

916 SCOTT, Marion Beethoven London

...but as the mass of other material swelled to unmanageable proportions, I found myself treating the various 'dimensions' of poetic space and time (pictorial, sculptural and architectural space, narrative line, theatrical and cinematic space-time) as
so many questions of detail within the correlation of poetic and other dimensions of theory and context as a whole - so that the 'musical' or melodic treatment of line, for example, in Botticelli's composition, did not explicitly figure as a component in the wider transition from Albertine perspectival space to Leonardo's 'dramatic' coupling of pictorial space and narrative line, over the second half of the fifteenth century. Botticelli drops out again.

Meanwhile, before leaving the Collège de France, I should note a short-lived interdisciplinary seminar in the summer of 1976, which must I think have begun as a collaboration between the Collège and the Ecole Pratique. Barthes' presentation at the opening séance of what he called a 'dossier' on a certain theme (I forget what) was a sort of rehearsal for the Leçon Inaugural six months later; and this and the following séance, when Charles Morazé, one of the two founders of the sixième section of the Ecole Pratique, and the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme on the Boulevard Raspail, was the only occasion on which I saw the writer who had become a sort of constant background reference ever since I set out from England to work with him in 1974:

917 SERRES, Michel

Hermes I La Communication 1969
II L'Interférence 1972
III La Traduction 1974
IV La Distribution 1977

...In fact this interdisciplinary seminar (as I felt), just as I was about to leave Paris after two years, was where I should have come in. But that merely meant it was time to leave. I have since discovered that one knows when some writing or a painting is finished, by the recognition, at last, of how one should have begun. That is always the time to begin something else. Time I finished this writing.
Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes

Morazé and Duménil: the sixième section, that odd 'floating' institution based at the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, whose several hundred 'seminars' scattered all over Paris have been the invisible centre of 'structuralism', that floating signifier covering indiscriminately so many analogous fields of floating signifiers, focussed since he transferred to the Ecole Pratique, and transferred his seminar under its auspices to the rue d'Ulm, and a new audience, in the man who stood in, over the years around 1970, for that focal 'shifter' or indexical sign, 'I':

LACAN, Jacques

918 De la Psychose Paranoïaque dans ses Rapports avec la Personnalité
919 Ecrits* (1936-66) 1966 (1932)1975
920 Le Séminaire: Livre XI. Les Quatre Concepts Fondamentaux de la Psychanalyse (1964: opening seminar at rue d'Ulm)1973
921 Livre XX. Encore (1972) 1975
922 (Livre XXI. L'Amour 1973) piracy nd (1976?)
923 Télévision (TV interviews 1973) 1974
924 WILDEN, Anthony The Language of the Self (tr of 'Discours de Rome', 1953, with intr essay & notes) Baltimore 1968
925 'French Freud': Yale French Studies no 48 New Haven 1976
926 TÜRKLE, Sherry

I will not list here uncollected pieces in anthologies listed elsewhere, and periodicals (Scilicet, Ornicar, L'Ane in particular)

By the time I arrived in Paris the seminar had been transferred to the largest amphitheatre in Paris, at the Faculté de Droit, between the Sorbonne and the Pantheon. At 12 noon, every second and third Wednesday of every month between December and May each year, Lacan would arrive at the front entrance to the building: the Fiat 500 pulled up, his secretary would get
out of the back seat beside him, and hold open the door. Lacan, in his grey fur overcoat, smoking a bent cigar (I found a shop where one could buy these: two freshly rolled cigars were twisted together by their roller, and when dry were separated to give the symbolically appropriate shape), would walk through the entrance hall, and up the left aisle of the vast auditorium, making his way through the bodies on the floor to the long table on the podium in front of over a thousand acolytes. To the left of the table was always the same long-haired male, with female make-up and effeminate clothing, sitting on a chair on the podium. The secretary cleaned the blackboard, and attached to one section of it some diagram of a complex multicoloured 'knot', which people all around me at once began to copy down into their notebooks, having been waiting with the page open and the date marked for the best part of an hour already. Eventually the Master would begin to speak - in slow motion, as it were, at half the normal speed, distinguishing the mallarmean matrix of lalangue into which he was entering, from communicative prose. Taperecorders along the walls of the huge hangar, along the rows of desks, along the table on the podium would begin to register the day's text, as the greater part of the audience took it down verbatim. In the foyer here, and on notice-boards in other facultés, in bookshops, and elsewhere in Paris, one read advertisements for tapes of the Séminaire for such and such years, or of photocopied typescripts, going back to the 'fifties sometimes. Lacan would refer in passing to some rather obscure theorem in algebraic topology, that I happened to have come across in the distant past, and I would notice an opulent and very soignée bourgeoise beside me, perhaps in her forties, dutifully attempting to note down exactly what he said, but evidently in her mis-spelling and misconstrual of the reference, being as far from making anything literally comprehensible of it, as her predecessor of three hundred years before of some arcane Latin theological allusion in one of Bourdaloue's sermons (which were equally well attended in his day by dévotes d'un certain âge). Lacan would move to the blackboard and begin to make rather gestural connections between the topological figures or 'bits of string' that he copied from a piece of paper in his hand. And the lady beside me would begin valiant efforts to transfer some semblance
of what was happening on the blackboard to her notebook, before it was erased or transformed into something else. Perhaps, like a few hundred of the people there, including most of Lacan's school of analysts, she was in lacanian analysis, and this was all a necessary part of the ritual. Perhaps, like the not dissimilar landlady of one of my friends, she just went along because it was the current fashion, and she would return with a few new terms to mingle in her half-digested analyses of the sexual problems of her friends' husbands...

Down the road at Notre Dame every Sunday there was the Archbishop of Paris; but here every second and third Wednesday at lunchtime, was the Pope himself - 'standing-in' as it were for, 'in (the) place of' l'Autre himself (or itself, or herself): standing at the place in the matrix of lalangue, where one asserted oneself in response to the radical open-ness organised around this place or function 'I', rather as, Descartes had earlier identified himself with the same function and, at Paris, the femmes savantes parodied by Moliere, had heard Clerselier 'stand in' at Paris for the seventeenth-century maitre-penseur, focus of french thought and intellectual fashion for a while. Midday Wednesday: french seminars are every year at the same time as the year before. As there are so many different institutions and seminars, the only way to assure that times do not clash, is to maintain the times already set by perennial tradition, and tailor the time of any new seminar in relation to those already established, thenceforth to keep precisely to that time until one retires. The place, even the institution may change, but the time is fixed. It's rather like parisian driving in a way: none of the british interplay of parts or rights and duties according to unwritten rules; each driver sees what those who have already decided what to do are doing, and asserts himself in what remains open to him, with no regard for anyone else involved in the same system who has not yet had a chance to assert themselves. The similarity goes further: non of the intellectual leaders (except Kristeva, but she is a lady driver) make direct references to each other in their seminars, and hardly at all in their publications. Each simply asserts himself in the space of terms and themes left open by the others, trying to define his position, and the nearest one comes to the british symmetry or interplay of debate is the
indirect interplay of different configurations of more or less common or analogous themes and terms, as each of the analogous positions are constantly redefined or reasserted in the shifting interplay mediated by journalists or Julia Kristeva (the latterday mistress of the salon whose organ is *Tel Quel*) or Catherine Clément (but she's essentially a journalist posing as a philosophy teacher). Thus I suggested that one could map a primary 'space' and associated dynamic of parisian theory around 1970, in terms of a system of substitutions, in a common synchronic space of questions attaching to the textual inscription of text in context, for the 'focal' lacanian marking of 'the place of the Other' as the place in language, and in the theatrical dynamic of the wider 'space' (with its time of desire) in which language situates itself as 'language' (as system, precisely, of substitutions), at which or in which I assert myself by responding to what is open to me in this configuration (the fundamental thing which is open being just 'me'). One can fix, for example, the contrary pole of this parisian space of around 1970, by noting that Deleuze at Vincennes sets the time of his seminar at...midday every Wednesday, playing Schopenhauer to Lacan's Hegel, Rousseau in his parisian version of being (just) 'outside' the parisian theatre and its false play of parts, to Lacan's Voltaire. There had been a tradition at Vincennes that various joke candidates would be enrolled for Deleuze's seminar and duly, after two terms, receive their course credit (valueless, because there was no monitoring of attendance, or examinations, both being as ideologically unsound as an entrance requirement for the department as a whole - of which, of course, there were none either). Deleuze was eventually drawn to refer to some of the imaginary people who were getting credits on his course: 'I don't mind Arkle (the racehorse), but I really must draw the line at this Jacques Lacan'.

Descartes, Bourdaloue, Voltaire...Cousin, Bergson, Breton, Sartre...so many incarnations of the parisian Subject (and so french subjectivity) par excellence. I had read Boris Vian's satire on the cult of Sartre (below) at school, and was astonished by the similarity between that role around 1950, and Lacan's around 1970. At the rite every second and third Wednesday at the Faculté de Droit, Jacques
Lacan spoke 'in place of' l'Autre, the axis of his slow monologue articulated as response to that question posed by the place of 'I' in the linguistic matrix which named its own place in the theatrical matrix of the Séminaire, as 'lalangue'. He just happened to be at the right place (in French, in Paris) at the right time (after Freud and Saussure...and Sartre) to play the part of what he himself determined as the phallic function of paternal assertion or authority, the Father, the father-figure of Parisian intellectual life around 1970. On my birthday, 5 January 1980 he arrived as usual at the Séminaire, and in front of a stunned audience at last carried out the threat that he had presented at the close of each seminar for many years before: he was closing the Séminaire and dissolving the Ecole Freudienne de Paris which he had instituted in the move to the rue d'Ulm in 1964, and in which he had, in terms of his own theory, absolute unquestionable control, its infallible Pope, speaking ex cathedra: for if anyone questioned this function of authority, they would ipso facto be at variance with the fundamental articles of faith which defined their membership of the Ecole. This assertion of authority came in response to the crisis that was developing in the Ecole over the question of the 'succession': Lacan was nearly 80, and the épigoni had for a few years been dividing into pro- and anti-Miller factions, contesting the imminent succession to focal authority of the designated heir, Lacan's son-in-law Jacques-Alain Miller, who had, as I noted in Part III, been developing the lacanian 'mathém-atique' into a unitary symmetrical system of inscription of his Fregean analysis of Language in the theoretical and institutional context which it framed. Lacan played his trump card: he was now going to play the absolute Analyst, becoming silent in the face of all those who had come to confuse him for l'Autre, breaking the transference which had kept the Séminaire going since 1964 in this form, and requiring the contending parties in the generalised oedipal frame of contest for the succession to 'the place of the Other', to define their positions - in writing to him - as direct response to the Other, whose place he left open by his own silence, prefiguring the manner in which it would be definitively opened up by his approaching physical disappearance:
L'Autre manque. Ça me fait drôle à moi aussi. Je tiens le coup pourtant, ce qui vous épaté, mais je ne le fais pas pour cela... S'il arrive que je m'en aille, dites-vous que c'est afin d'être Autre enfin.

Lacan finally asserts himself to be other than the identification with the Other for which he has for so long, as 'father-figure' been taken, 'understood': 'Jacques Lacan est entré au Panthéon de son vivant' wrote the journalist in the article in Le Monde the next day in which I first read of the 'affaire Lacan' that was to dominate the journalistic representation of the Parisian intellectual theatre for several months. Apotheosis in life, like Nero, or Caligula's horse.

I, meanwhile, was at Vincennes, meeting Julia, and was the next day both shocked to have missed this formal theatrical end of an intellectual era, at which I would have been present were it not for the appointment at Vincennes, and at the same time reassured in my own paranoid scenario, in which the epochal break with the sixties and seventies at the 'pantheon' (for so was the Law Faculty named, after its entrance on the Place du Panthéon) was a sort of direct symmetrical correlate of my own 'crisis in my mental life' (to borrow John Stuart Mill's characterisation of the 'breakdown' I took, with all the other intellectual and spiritual crises already noticed - Descartes, Pascal, Carlyle, Comte, Nietzsche... Augustine, Rousseau and so on), through which I had broken or was breaking out from the representation in language of the theatrical embedding of language in context, into the working reality of a 'theatre' or divine comedy in which the Hamlet-like impotence of a melancholy imprisonment in representations of the passage from representation into action, now appeared precisely in its real theatrical dynamic, rather than caught in the circle of its own abstract representation of that dynamic of passage from script into action.
For, if since about 1975 I had begun to see Lacan's linguistic embedding of its 'script' in the abstract dynamic of an oedipal scenario which it presented - presenting itself, then as 'Ecrits', scripts, scripture, but always transcripts of Lacan's part in some specific situation - he published no 'books' after his thesis in 1932 - as simply the most direct of a group of complementary parisian abstractions from the question of their theoretical analogy or symmetry ('structuralism'), the dramatic context of my reading had been, although I had hardly understood the relation until the winter of 1979-80, articulated in the extra-textual sexual axis of my emotional and practical relations with Julia in France and Debbie in England - the relations with Julia being, especially after I left Paris in 1976, almost entirely 'textual'. It was only as I began in November 1979 to attempt to write down the framing of the 'symmetry' of the various 'structuralist' positions - and their symmetry as a whole with contemporary theory in England and America, and such 'philosophy' as a whole with a more international 'physics', 'mathematics' and so on - that I suddenly found the question posed by the framing of this abstract symmetry of various dimensions of 'theoretical' questions, as the radical question and response in terms of which, alone, the symmetry could be brought 'into question' and expressed.

And, as I have already related in the opening section of this Close, this radical figure of writing as 'script' for the situation and theatrical dynamics of writing, was revealed, not through some abstract theoretical question of the locus of questioning the symmetry of various analogous orders of questioning (for I had not, before starting to write, confronted the question posed by the symmetries of an abstract mathematical 'space' of questions, and other extra-textual dimensions of questioning-as-an-activity), but rather through the writing of a letter to Julia, which opened with the question of why I was once more writing to her.

I have already sketched the first phase of the madness which overwhelmed me as I found myself to be merely the actor writing the script of my discovery as engaged in and through the writing in the 'theatrical' dynamic of a real sexual symmetry
which seemed to be now organising its own description in a letter, rather than being, as I had always somehow imagined before, simply one of the dimensions of the familiar world which I had since childhood learnt to frame in language. Of course the various figures or scenarios of my part, and Julia's, and those of others to whom I wrote in the same inspiration or trance, were constantly being revealed as only partial identifications, masks, personae, which as it were 'half' worked, but which were constantly being changed as the closed frame of one inscription of its script in one particular situation of writing was again and again broken open as time, place, and characters moved on to a new scene or act. In particular, having spent four years attempting to write the theoretical Script of what I came to call this 'Globe Theatre' in which this script, this book, would identify itself simply as the writing of its writing through the questioning of its questioning, opening up, I hoped, a new scenario for human interaction on this Globe - after four years in rural abstraction, I wrote once more to Julia who, of course, was at the same time writing to ask me if she could come and visit me in England, having reached an impasse in her relations with the man who had been the primary male (apart perhaps from her father) in her world since her return from Africa where we had first met in 1974, ten years before. The first year she spent (May 1984-5) in the triangle of myself, herself and Christian (or quadrilateral: the impasse in Paris had corresponded to a liaison between Christian and one of her old friends who had engaged Christian in her catholic mysticism) seemed to involve, among other things, a transformation from my earlier very abstract framing of my supposed part of global scriptwriter (the abstraction dominated by the fact that I was still writing about the inscription of writing in action, rather than playing a more active part on the global stage) towards a more practical coupling of this part with the World, through the practical interactions of life with Julia in rural England and in Paris. Then in the second week of May 1985 I suddenly had to leave the old watermill where I had lived, written, and sold books for five years, and in the space of a few days my parents decided to get divorced, Julia became pregnant by Christian, and I was arrested in London. From then onward (which is to say from page clxxiii above) the scenario of the past five years slowly seemed to fall apart. A
year later, in mid-1986, Julia eventually gave up trying to make it work (the pregnancy had not gone very far, but together with the various other breakdowns in my social identity it marked a turning-point between the workable and the unworkable), and with the beginning of 1987 I began to write again - from page clxxiii - after a break of a year and a half, echoing various breaks for similar periods in earlier years when I could not write.

Back to Lacan: I had been astonished in the second half of the seventies that the theory I was working on in Paris and then on my return to England, was actually working on me - or rather, seemed actually to work in my relations with Debbie, which I had earlier acted out according to what, as any young man, I learnt or failed to learn altogether untheoretically as days, weeks, nights, years followed one upon another. De nobis fabula narrabatur; sometimes, and up to a point, anyway. It certainly didn't work past the point where a theoretical approach, simply as such, was emotionally unacceptable or inappropriate. And it didn't seem, on the whole, to be doing much good to a couple of women friends in Paris who were 'in' lacanian analysis. And it didn't do much good to poor old Louis Althusser, whose murder of his wife followed upon his response to his old analyst's dissolution of the School in 1980 - his public denunciation of this stalinist revisionism. Nor, more generally did it 'work' for the long succession of analysts who had first of all expelled Lacan from their various professional organisations, and then those who were in turn expelled from Lacan's successive versions of the extended analytic family or fraternity, or who voluntarily left that their earlier home. Of course it did 'work' for all these people, as their behaviour was 'analysed' by Lacan himself, and those who remained faithful, those who still believed in or identified with their part in the lacanian scenario. Freud as prophet of the Unconscious, Lacan as gallican antipope, 'leader of the faithful' - Ecole Freudienne de Paris or Eglise Freudienne de Paris? - as the brother of one of my friends in analysis said to her, after she had sold her car to pay for the extension from two to three séances each week, 'Wouldn't it be cheaper to see a priest?'. 
Sherry Turkle frames her critique of Lacanian theory by embedding it in the narrative frame of its institutional dynamic, its abstraction from which to the formal stage of abstract triangular Family, primal scene, oedipal contest and so on, may itself be seen to organise – symptomatically – its own institutional pathology: and this, even, in various figures theoretically defined in that pathological abstraction itself. Derrida had already, by 1975, made the unusual step of reading Lacan’s reading of Poe, so as to bring 'into question' the closed circuit of a Lacanian position that so to speak 'forecloses' radical criticism by inscribing itself as one term in the frame it poses or asserts: I attempted in Part III to suggest a transposition of the relations of Sartre's extramural coupling of theatre, journalism, and theory as so many dimensions of 'engaged writing' and Merleau Ponty's increasingly distanced 'academic' questioning over the years around 1950, into the relations of Lacan and Derrida twenty years later. These ähnliche Zeitpunkten, in Novalis' expression, I take to mark a certain figure of 'continuity' in French theory, which I traced further back from midcentury to Breton as 'Pope of Surrealism' in the context of the Ecole de Paris around 1930, when the young Lacan entered surrealist circles. I suggested a 'synchrony' in the matrix of institutional embedding of French theory in Parisian intellectual life and intellectuals' lives, which remains constant in the dinchrony or dynamic which leads from Sartre 'in place of' French 'I' around 1950 to Lacan defining his place in lalangue and in the theatrical context focused in the Séminaire where lalangue frames its own place as one term in the configuration of terms which constitutes its dramatic context (Lacan's transcripts being the verbal record of the dramatic working-through in words of this embedding of the terms 'standing for' the various elements of their context, in that context). Derrida's complementary articulation of questions, the abstraction from any fixed identification to the textual configuration of textual embedding of terms in a contextual configuration they textually mark, on the face of it abstracts also from any place 'in' the specifically Parisian theatre of reflection where Lacan like Sartre or Cousin or Voltaire or Descartes (even if physically 'outside' the theatre) before him actually, personally, dramatically, works through the focal coupling of French theory and its cultural context. Thus Derrida 'travels' (as one says of a
french wine) better than Lacan. But the transcription of
derridean text into, say, an american or british context, may
itself be analysed in relation to the parallel elision of com-
plementary lacanian textuality, in terms of the 'theatrical'
coupling of french text and french and international 'context'.
Thus a text by Derrida which in Paris works to present philoso-
phical questions arising from the embedding of a 'philosophical'
text in a more radical 'literary' interface of abstract theore-
etical space and empirical context (this move opening up natur-
ally enough from Merleau-Ponty's confrontation in language with
the question of the complementarity of theoretical embedding of
empirical intersubjectivity in transcendental subjectivity, and
empirical embedding of what language marks as 'transcendental
subjectivity' in the practical dynamic in which this question
actually arises or can only arise), works in New Haven to open
up a theoretical space for the critical analysis or 'deconstruct-
ton' of literary texts, as one method among others seeking favour
among the students and faculty of the Yale School of Modern Lan-
guages - this rather as the 'transcendental' axis of Wittgenstein's
later 'investigations' becomes in postwar England the missing point
of a new game used to sharpen the wits of prospective civil ser-
vants.

When Alan Montefiore and Jonathan Culler organised an
introductory 'structuralist' seminar at Oxford in 1977, Lacan
did not rear his muddled gallic head; nor did he appear in the
book commissioned from Vincent Descombes (below) to present to
an anglophone audience 'forty-five years of French philosophy';
nor indeed did he enter the debate in the earlier Wolfson College
lectures on Structuralism (transcripts below), until some French
members of the audience in the last event of the series, 'Discussion',
asked rather bemusedly why the most prominent 'structural-
ist' of Paris was not included in the British representation
or presentation of this new account of representation. Was it...
symptomatic? A lacanien, of course, could explain such forclusion
or elision only too well. And I have already noticed Lacan's
relief to be back from America among those who misunderstood him
comprehensibly, constructively. When at the close of that 1976 seminar the unheard-of occurred, and someone had the temerity to address Lacan from the audience, the Master's derisory analysis of the interruption (rather than the point of the question) was but an echo for his audience of the American accent and loud checked shirt of the barbarian intruder. Imagine someone asking the Archbishop a question from the congregation, at the close of his sermon down at Notre Dame.

Master and slaves - or slavish listeners, collectively the Other to which Lacan's monologue was each week the canonical response, in response to which, in their turn, the members of the audience could reassert or redefine their theoretical and emotional personae. Only when the Pope dissolved his church on 5 January 1980 did the anti-Miller faction of the priesthood vocally revolt, eventually bringing a legal case against Lacan on the grounds that under French law, he did not have the authority to dissolve a professional organisation without a majority vote from its members. But then anyone who would imagine that the Law of the Father could be made subject to the formal French law which was merely its echo or image in the French language, had already thereby excluded themselves from Lacan's 'school', by then already renamed La Cause Freudienne.

Crisis: the very word had permeated from an initial crise du pétrole in the wake of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, into every stratum of language and activity by the time of the affaire Lacan of 1980, and the contemporary rapid acceleration of inflation heralding the bank crashes and Debt Crisis of 1982, and the global Depression coming in its aftermath. A group of ex-normaliens who had attended Lacan's and Althusser's seminars at the rue d'Ulm, and had seen at first in the Events of May 1968 a
revolutionary crisis or break out of the twin circuits of capitalism and ideological repression of personality, out of their historical complicity, would by the second half of the 'seventies have come to regard the 'marcusian' space of the Possible, of social Imagination, into which they thought they were breaking, as, precisely, imaginary - an abstract theoretical fiction, which must be judged not on or in its own circular terms, but rather practically or pragmatically, by the same 'experience', in its collective coherence, in which their individual moral responses, recognised as what informs individual judgement, had slowly and separately led each to see their personal seduction in May 1968 as opening a long passage through a failed theoretical dream or fable.

Slowly through their individual writing, discussions, experiences - so the story goes - these old maoist normaliens of 1968 had shifted from the academy into journalism (none were professional academics) and from the abstract political theatre of 1968 (whose two complementary sides had been presented in terms of lacanian psychoanalysis and its outward reflection in althusserion marxism) into a narrative order which coupled abstract theory and the autobiographical drama of disillusion in a sort of gestural pathology of abstract theoretical framing of Universal History and the individual's part in it. Gestural: narratives of situations whose constant moral was always simply the moral order of individual freedom and choice informed by the empirical operation of personal 'conscience' in its radically dual french sense, coupling thought and action, theoretical and practical.

In this coupling, then, the pathology of the theoretical determinations of the moral or practical order from 'outside', 'in theory', could itself be narrated in the journalistic axis of pointing the practical moral of a representative situation - whether the personal experience of disillusion over the years around 1970, or marxist theoretical justification of soviet repression of 'dissident' questioning of the 'theoretically' framed social order of activity. The wide stage of this new parisian theatre of reflection, well adapted to displace in 'the
"media" the old structuralist theatre framed in difficult theoretical texts, was set in 1976 by Guy Lardreau and Christian Jambet's best-selling *règlement de compte* with 'the only ones who count: Hegel, Marx, Lacan'. For in the journalistic frame of pointing morals of representative situations, Lacan's might be taken as the 'representative' presentation of various analogous theories of a dynamic of substitution (rather than representation) articulated by setting Language as system of substitutions in a wider system of those elements of context for which terms in language may be substituted. In the argument against Lacan all the others were covered in principle simply by a system of substitutions which carried one theory over into another of the same abstract 'structuralist' form. In the ideological order in which Foucault implicitly set 'structuralism' as corresponding to a 'lacune de vocabulaire', the various different theoretical dimensions of articulating its cultural context through the textual working-through of the symmetries of text and context were all 'practically' equivalent, but Lacan's position was 'representative' since it was simply the assertion of theoretical assertion itself in the general 'structuralist' frame of linguistic framing of the theoretical configuration of abstract *discours* and the abstract theatre of social interaction it framed, and in which it framed itself and, in circular manner, justified its own abstraction... and justified the practical subordination of individual parts in the social dynamic to some theoretical image. Lacan, like Hegel and Marx before him, presented the figure of the maître menseur who cast his theoretical analysis of the dialectic of Master and Slave in a form which implicitly carried over into the relation of theorist of human interaction and individual 'objects' of his study, just the asymmetric relations, the circular authority of the Master - the 'Dictator' even - that they thought to be bringing into question. Hegel, the young Marx, Kojève, Sartre, Lacan, had all presented textual analyses of the abstract dialectic of power working through that initial disruption of the radical symmetry of two 'I's, in which Rousseau had found the origin of human society: hegelian subjectivity, first discovering itself as what, in 'external' Nature can yet as *Dasein* frame its difference from that externality in the 'internal' differentiation of inside and outside of some body which is elementary self-consciousness,
in one fell swoop in a free space of Imagination in which one would find oneself, once the twin circuits of economic and ideological repression and alienation were seen for what they were (or indeed just seen, for they operated by excluding or eliding the perception of their own operation) and in this revolutionary vision immediately, automatically, dissolved, along with all their illusory (but while the illusion prevailed, utterly concrete) force.

By 1985 Derrida had been succeeded by Lyotard in the part of 'Director' of CIPH: his insistence upon always articulating the ideological interface of theoretical questioning and the practical assertion of such theory as a question, as constantly questionable (where a majority of his colleagues in GREPH saw this interface rather as the locus of assertion of their conception of the part of the theorist in society - notably the part of a certain academic tenure, salary and so on), replaced by the more assertive narration of theory as one genre of narration within the 'rhetorical' dynamic of coupling of narration with other dimensions of social activity - a dynamic of competing assertions or narrations of the competition of narratives, of which dynamic the nouveaux philosophes' unitary 'moral' assertion of moral consensus in a social harmony of parts might be seen as a transitional prefiguration. Political manoeuvres by Ricoeur and others had failed to realise the promise of a chair for Derrida at Nanterre, and so France's leading philosopher finally exchanged the humble part in which for twenty years his reflection had been organised as commentary upon the texts set for the agrégation each year for a newly instituted post at the École Pratique where at last he could select texts in relation to which to define the axis of his reflection, rather than adapting the axis of questioning to each year's syllabus, while on the other hand questioning in GREPH or CIPH such an 'institution' of philosophy.

Like Comte preparing students for Polytechnique examinations in the 1830s and 1840s, Derrida had glossed the agrégation syllabus in weekly lectiones before normaliens in a Salle.
Cavaillé at the rue d'Ulm, filling up over the years with Germans, Americans and then Japanese. After 1984, in his new part as instituted theorist of the 'Institution of Philosophy' he could choose his own texts and define his own axis of inquiry in relation to them - even if this outwardly perpetuated the same old form of careful reading of a few texts before an international audience at the rue d'Ulm.

Foucault had gone through a crisis associated with his journey to Iran to cover the Iranian revolution of 1979-80 as a journalist, and become something of a recluse until his death in 1984; Barthes had died in 1980 three years after leaving the École Pratique for the Collège de France; Lacan had died in 1981, not long after dissolving the École Freudienne de Paris; Derrida's old superior at the rue d'Ulm, Althusser, had been in a psychiatric hospital since 1981. Derrida himself was seriously ill over the winter of 1984-5, and had to interrupt his seminar on 'Philosophy and Nationality' after a few weeks reading of the section on Philosophy in America in De Tocqueville's De la Démocratie en Amérique. Braudel, the director of the École Pratique, died at the close of 1985...so many crises closing the great 'structuralist' period of the sixties and seventies, whose main home had been the École Pratique which Derrida was at last joining.

...And yet as the foreigners began to outnumber the French in his audience, and his questioning of the institution of philosophy itself became instituted in the question of the primary institution of Philosophy in a national tradition or school, and as the number of places open in the agrégation concours in Philosophy fell towards only one percent of the number of candidates each year, the post of humble répétiteur, 'rehearsing' (literally) normaliens for the examination which was the hub of that circular 'reproduction' of theory that Bourdieu had analysed in the dynamic of French education, no longer corresponded to Derrida's axis of questioning.

One percent: yet still determining in classes supérieures of the lycée, preparing students for the entrance concours to ENS, as in the University where normaliens would join students who had
come up through the University premier cycle and licence, in
the deuxième cycle preparing a maitrise which was a necessary
qualification for competing in the agrégation, then in ENS and
University classes 'rehearsing' the examination that would recruit
teachers to prepare the next generation of students in these vari-
ous institutions for the same examination - still determining,
then, in lycée, University and grande école, through a central
choice (at the Ministry of Education) of each year's set texts
and central coordination by the Jury of the standards of critical
exposition which would justify appointment to a post teaching such
exposition to further candidates - still determining the central
axis of 'Philosophy' as instituted in France.

The Ecole Pratique, on the other hand, trained not the
superintendents of this national tradition of critical reading and
exposition of texts, but 'practical' researchers - and its diplomas
were of no use in obtaining access to the main circuit of educat-
'ional 'reproduction'. On the other hand, foreign nationals could
not compete in the agrégation, so the 'structuralist' seminars of
the Ecole Pratique could proceed unencumbered by the constraints
of agregation syllabus and Jury, while giving foreign research
students qualifications that might serve them in more open systems
of social reproduction of theory at home. At the same time there
was a sort of lesser circulation at the Ecole Pratique and also in
the Universities, where certain posts were open to 'internal' can-
didates who continued from maitrise through a 'troisième cycle'
of DEA and Doctorat de Troisième Cycle - candidates who might
then compete with agrégés for higher posts by preparing a Doctorat
d'État. Last of all there was the CAPES whose preparation was
modelled on that for the agrégation, generally being taken by
those who either had failed after several attempts at the agré-
gation, or who felt there was no hope of passing the more diffi-
cult concours in the first place, and which recruited teachers
to assist the agrégés in the lower classes of lycées.

Derrida's move, then, may be taken as an index both
of a temporal transition from the 'structuralism' of 1970 through
the various 'crises' of late seventies and early eighties to a
new configuration of parisiian theory represented, say, by Lyotard
at CIPH in 1985, and of the more or less constant synchronic 'space' of the various parisian institutions of theory - the space of 'institution of Philosophy' in Paris in the second half of the twentieth century, through which the various strands of transition from around 1970 to around 1985 might be traced. Within such a 'space' and time of late-twentieth-century parisian theory, for example, Todorov, arriving like Kristeva as a research student in the sixties to study parisian developments of the 'formalist' analysis of literary texts as linguistic systems, whose prewar roots were in eastern Europe, himself exemplifies the relatively autonomous and relatively international circulation and 'reproduction' of 'structuralist' theory at the Ecole Pratique, more or less independent of the primary axis of reproduction of french writing-of-reading which is the agrégation.

TODOROV, Tzvetan

927 Introduction à la Littérature Fantastique 1970
928 Théories du Symbole 1977

Todorov is noticed below as editor of Poétique, presenter of 'structuralism in poetics' in the collective Qu'est-ce que le Structuralisme, and of russian formalism in french translation. This 'straightforward' relation of 'presenter' to text always struck me as rather odd among all the complex french texts dealing with the working-through in texts of their embedding in a textually framed context. The engagingly 'simple' Todorov would follow in the steps of earlier eastern european formalists, extending Saussure's 'differential' analysis of linguistic synchrony and diachrony from the elementary level of phoneme in langue to the various levels - word, phrase, sentence, section - of a complete text; and in the seminar of 1975-6 (resulting in (928)) would apply the same 'differential' or structural approach to theoretical texts about 'the literary texts', organising a range of german Romantic theories of symbolism as so many 'positions' in a synchronic con-textual or meta-textual space defined by a range of parameters analogous to the 'distinctive features' of Jakobson and Halle's phonetics: this synchronic space of embedding of text in language could then be set in a wider historical dynamic or diachrony
of literary theory, articulated in Todorov's own textual account (928), so that the classic 'structuralist' poles of differential analysis - global langue and elementary 'distinctive feature' - would appear as two extreme limits of a central axis of linguistic synchrony and diachrony traceable through the interface of 'internal' and 'external' differential systems in the primary order of text. It was at this seminar that I first met with the poetics of Novalis, about which so much of my reflection would turn, back in England the next year. And the apparent 'untheoretical' simplicity of Todorov's expository style, his 'failure' to approach his texts in terms of some textual 'system' of his own, or to refer to the 'systems' or theories of his parisian contemporaries - to explicitly engage 'theoretical' questions, 'philosophy' - to organise the frame of his exposition, for example, in terms of its implications for the traditional abstract space and time of 'subjectivity', in relation to which Lacan, Derrida, Foucault and the others took their various positions; and his failure to define his position in relation to those various versions of the 'death of the Subject' - this belied the implicit definition of his position in relation to all those subtle french theories, as organising the symmetries or synchronic 'space' of differentiation 'inside' and 'outside' the text, in which space the various french theorists abstracted to their various 'critical' positions in their theoretical texts. His 'formal' coordination of 'internal' and 'critical' space and time in relation to texts as the primary unit of analysis, doubled by his female compatriot's explicit coordination of the various parisian theories of 'the text', of 'semiotics' - their critical intertextuality informing her analysis of the intratextual revolution accomplished by Mallarme towards the beginning of the century - provided two complementary models - male and female, so to speak - of a space of analogy, of homology, of different theories of homology or 'structure'. And it was at Todorov's seminar that I first heard of a complementary approach to the interface of text and context, as a german student from the University of Konstanz 'exposed' various german versions of a Rezeptionästhetik which set the differential system of 'the text' not as a more radical interface of traditional 'subject' and the 'other' side of the text coordinating desire, intersubjective group, linguistic sign and
so on; but rather in the German 'hermeneutic' frame of coordinating different readings of a text through the interactions of different groups within the wider natural economy of social relations in Nature, and the 'diachrony' of this social space of 'intersubjectivity'. But it was only after leaving Paris that I began to explore the general 'synchrony' of British, French, German and American traditions or schools of theoretical embedding of theoretical text in theoretical context, as so many symmetric abstractions from the question of 'theory' as systematic questioning, and came to recognize in the collaboration of Jean Bollack and Heinz Wismann on the text of Heraclitus and its tradition (77) an interplay of French and German traditions that echoed my own British attempt to articulate the Pythagorean tradition of 'theory' in a general synchrony and associated diachrony or dynamic of theoretical text and 'symmetric' coordinates of the 'context' of which the text in question was 'the theory': the tradition, then, of a 'philosophy' which was just the most general theory of coordination of theory with the widest, 'universal' context or Universe, of which the theory was the theory, the 'vision'.

WISMANN, Heinz: Philologie et Histoire

Over my first year in Paris Heinz Wismann was embroiled in a controversy over the non-renewal of his research post at the CNRS. I remember Jacques Bouveresse deploring this 'scandalous' patent discrimination against a German on the part of the French 'theoretical' establishment which he (Bouveresse) had apparently (so I heard indirectly from a student of Jacques-Alain Miller's) been deploring ever since his days at the rue d'Ulm in the early sixties (the Canadian girl had been working on Wittgenstein with both Bouveresse and Miller, and reported the latter saying of his old classmate 'Oh, he's always complaining). By 1975-6 Wismann was, like Todorov, holding an École Pratique seminar at the rue d'Ulm. A few years later, in the early 1980s, I was rather surprised to find, collaborating on Wismann's seminar on Heraclitus at ENS another colleague from the Ecole Pratique who was already teaching Lacanian psychoanalysis at Paris VIII, doubling his EHESS seminar with Julia Kristeva's department's troisième cycle course structure, and playing an active part in René Thom's development of 'catastrophe theory' down at IHES twenty miles south of Paris:
WHAT ARE YOU DOING HERE? I ASKED; AND HE SEEMED RATHER AFRONTED THAT I SHOULD IMAGINE HIS POLYMATY STOPPED SHORT OF PHILOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE HERACLITEAN TRADITION. DOWN AT THE MAISON DES SCIENCES DE L'HOMME HE WAS ALSO COLLABORATING WITH GREIMAS AND IN TWO OTHER SEMINARS, APART FROM CONTINUING THE WEDNESDAY SEMINAR ON 'APPLICATIONS DE LA THEORIE DES CATASTROPHES EN SEMIOLINGUISTIQUE' WHICH I HAD ATTENDED IN 1975-6. I HAD ALREADY BEEN RATHER ASTONISHED THEN THAT THIS FORMER POLYTECHNICIEN SHOULD HAVE COMBINED THE 'TWO CULTURES' OF ADVANCED MATHEMATICAL PHYSICS AND THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF PARISIAN SEMIOTICS IN SUCH A VERY UNFRENCH MANNER, AND I WOULD OFTEN STAY AND CHAT AFTER THE SEMINAR, AS HE WAS THE ONLY PERSON IN PARIS WHO SPOKE BOTH THE LANGUAGES IN WHICH I WAS WORKING. THOM'S 'CATASTROPE THEOREY' AMOUNTED EFFECTIVELY TO A PROGRAMME TO RECAST THE WHOLE OF MATHEMATICAL PHYSICS, AND VARIOUS OTHER STRUCTURES SUCH AS MOLECULAR BIOLOGY, LINGUISTICS, AND SO ON, IN TERMS OF HOMOLOGY, OR A MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF 'STRUCTURE', THAT PETITOT WAS EFFECTIVELY TAKING AS THE ABSTRACT FORMAL FRAMEWORK OF WHICH THE VARIOUS 'STRUCTURALISMS' WERE SO MANY ANALOGOUS OR HOMOLOGOUS EXEMPLIFICATIONS DEFINED IN RELATION TO INFORMAL LANGUAGE - SO MANY DIFFERENT 'DIMENSIONS', THEN, OF EMBEDDING OF ACTUAL PLACES OF THEORETICAL ASSERTION (IN INFORMAL LANGUAGE, FRENCH) IN THE GENERAL FORMAL FRAME OF A MATHEMATICAL INSCRIPTION OF A SYSTEM OF FORMAL SUBSTITUTION AND (OR) SYMMETRY IN THE GENERAL PHYSICAL CONTEXT OF SUBSTITUTION OF A MATHEMATICAL SYMBOL FOR A 'TERM' OR ITEM OF ITS CONTEXT. OR RATHER, SO MANY CORRELATIVE DIMENSIONS OF EMBEDDING OF THEIR COMMON ABSTRACT FORM (AS STRUCTURES OF SUBSTITUTION) IN THE 'ORDINARY' INFORMAL LANGUAGE THAT WAS THE PRIMARY CONTEXT OF THE MATHEMATICAL SYMBOLISM. THE MATHEMATICS OF SUBSTITUTION - A SORT OF IDEALISED MODEL OF SAUSSURIAN 'LANGUAGE' AS MATRIX OF POSSIBLE SUBSTITUTIONS AT DIFFERENT POINTS IN CHAINS OF SIGNIFIERS - GAVE THE ABSTRACT 'MEANINGLESS' STRUCTURE COMMON TO THE 'LOGIC' OF EACH 'STRUCTURALIST' THEORY OR INQUIRY, AND TO THE COMPLEMENTARY MATRIX OF ANALOGY WHICH THE VARIOUS THEORIES IN THEIR VARIOUS WAYS IDENTIFIED AS THE LINGUISTIC FRAME OF EMBEDDING OF NARRATIVE OR DISCOURS (AS INTERFACE OF LOGICAL AND ANALOGICAL OR FIGURAL) IN CONTEXT. IN A SORT OF CARTESIAN LIMIT...
where muddled informal language had been completely unfolded, unpacked, analysed, into a pure formal space of clear and distinct ideas articulated about the abstract figure of cartesian assertion itself - in the goal of the cartesian project of rational reconstruction of the World, where language would become simply the mathematically precise system of signs that could exactly model the inscription of that system in the physical space of substitution of one body for another (which it would also perfectly model) - one might hope to do a sort of lacanian revision of Comte's universal theory, by taking a universal Culture organised in a complete analysis of human relations into the elementary symmetries of all the different 'parts', interacting in a mathematically precise metaphoric space and metonymic time of desire or will, as the universal interface of the completed cartesian logic, and a complementary completed mathematical physics of 'external' physical space and time. Yet such an ideal global mathematical 'structuralism', in which various 'structuralisms' might be seen as so many correlative dimensions of embedding of unitary absolute langue as 'complete' system of differences, in the different 'absolute' dimensions (physical, sociological, psychoanalytic and so on) of unitary absolute context (unitary Universe), is from the first (although it took the best part of a decade, the sixties, to see this) radically compromised precisely by the 'deconstruction' of unitary cartesian 'internal' space of theory - and its analogues in unitary langue, culture, physical Universe and so on - as itself the projection in a particular order of finitary 'informal' discourse, specific to a particular time, place and culture, of a figure of inscription of that discourse in an abstraction from the imperfect play of substitutions among its words, whose historical dynamic or 'mechanism' within informal language and specific discursive formations can be convincingly demonstrated in just such 'ordinary' language. Indeed it was just the breakdown of the millenial project of framing in hegelian manner a unitary Kosmos coordinate with the abstract theoretical space in which it was supposed framed (as system of symmetric coordinates of the context of that unitary logic), which expressed itself at the beginning of the twentieth century in 'modern' or 'modernist' models of the various dimensions of theory and context. After around 1900 one could no longer naively begin from a logic that was itself abstracted from
the practical context of the process of abstraction— from an 'internal' order of substitutions in language and associated dynamic of questions—in order to frame the process of abstraction; indeed one could no longer even begin, after about 1900, from a merely 'logical' determination of the axis of inquiry, of one's starting-point, defined as 'external' to the earlier logical space and time in terms of, terms 'borrowed' from, that earlier space of inquiry, theory. One had to begin from where one actually was, even if the determination of that starting-point was always radically questionable: one had to begin by questioning the starting-point, and organise one's inquiry in the axis or dynamic associated with that incompletely determined question.

So Jean Petitot was not engaged in framing the formal unitary mathematical space of 'structuralism' in which the various structuralisms might be embedded through the formal inscription of the 'short-circuit' of informal language in some complete analysis of elementary differences and their unitary global syntax. Different theories of the complementarity in actual informal language of the theoretical dynamic of substitutions in and symmetries of the linguistic chain of signifiers, and the 'analogic' space of metaphor and metonymy identified by Jakobson, were associated with different axes of inquiry corresponding to the different 'positions' of the various theorists 'in' a more or less common French language, and in the French cultural context of that shared language. There was no comprehensive total theory, because that would imply that the theorist was not some real Parisian theorist in some particular institution, working with a finitary and still largely informal discursive 'apparatus', but the old cartesian 'I', organising a logically reconstructed unitary language around his nominal place in its total matrix. The primary axis was Lacan's converse trajectory of unfolding in French his, and indirectly our, difference from that classical Subject, and the dynamics of this difference as expressed in 'working through' it in the coupling of textual expression of this 'working-through', and components of the context of that discourse marked in the discourse, through what was marked in the discourse as the 'analogical' space and time of desire.
Jean Petitot himself, in an extraordinarily wide range of coupled institutional 'positions' or personae, was working through the mathematical coordination of various components of the various 'structuralist' discourses - in his 'own' seminar in 1975-6 slowly 'working through' a Mallarmé poem. A poem that was Mallarmé's 'script' of the writing of the poem itself: the closed hermetic matrix of words which dramatically framed itself as one component in the situation or scene of composition and its dynamic of evocation or invocation. The articulation of this poem in the abstract mathematical space of substitutions that expressed the analogy or 'ana-logic' of the various 'structuralist' versions of inscription of the various elements named in the 'informal' language of the poem in various complementary dynamics of metaphor or figure, in which we - or parts of us - and the poet, and the theorists were actually implicated (as we are implicated in various structures of informal language concretely, rather than 'abstractly' in formal systems of substitution indifferent between the various concrete dynamics that may be modelled, substituted, by them), opened up a sort of analogical space and time of 'interaction' or coupling of the various structuralist discourses brought into play in reading the poem. The drama of Mallarmé's poem, mapped by a formal system of substitutions and an associated formal dynamic, served to coordinate various different structuralist positions in the Paris all around us in a sort of dramatic logic that Petitot regarded as a 'mathematical poetics'. This is not the version he gave of his 'mathematical poetics'; none of us really knew what was going on in the seminar, except that we were reading Mallarmé's poem, each (it was the most 'interactive' of all the seminars I attended) applying different 'structuralist' figures to the relations of these various figures, and somehow organising an interplay of different theories of analogy and language in the metaphorical space and time of the poem - with an abstruse mathematical structure that had itself only been rather metaphorically sketched (Petitot was the only one present who actually understood the details of differential topology involved) as a sort of currency in which all this circulation of figures and themes was carried on.
Petitot used to drive me and a German student from his seminar (who had also studied mathematics) down to Thom's Saturday seminar at IHES in the picturesque setting of the village of Bures-sur-Yvette south of Paris — a sort of French version of the mathematical section of the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study, where mathematicians are left to get on with collaboration on advanced research, with no distractions in the way of students or teaching:

Institut des Hautes Etudes Scientifiques

THOM, René

929 Stabilité Structurelle et Morphogenèse: Essai d'une Théorie Générale des Modèles Reading, Mass 1972

930 Modèles Mathématiques de la Morphogenèse (papers 19 - ) 197

Now Thom's programme of a 'general morphology' had as its axis a complex mathematical framing of the elementary dynamics of separation of 'name' and 'thing' — a correlative unfolding of Language and World from an 'originary' kernel of that mathematical poetics on which Petitot was working — so that the theory would come full-circle, be 'bootstrapped' as one says of physical theories that frame the part of 'observer' in the Kosmos of which he is providing the physical theory, when one could eventually model the mathematical language in which the theory was framed, in the theory it framed. I felt that this was another example of the 'horseless carriage' on the way to becoming a car: the complex mathematical theory supposed at the outset would actually have to look rather different in the eventually reconstructed poetics of correlative unfolding of Language and World, from the way it appeared in a mathematics based on an essentially cartesian unitary external 'space' and time of abstract indivisible point-instants. I felt that the extreme mathematical complexity of Thom's theory, brought in to model or describe the elementary relations and dynamics of 'marking', 'pointing', was a reflection of the complex circuit from initial configuration of term and thing, through the limiting abstract frame of point-instant in unitary mathematical Space and Time, back to the implicit starting point which was in fact much simpler in its principles than
the formal theory being used to reconstruct it. I felt that what one should be trying to reconstruct was not the limiting circuit from word through abstract elementary mark, geometrical 'point', back to the framing of that 'point' as extreme abstraction from the cartesian coupling of language as matrix of substitutions and 'external World' as space and time of substitution of one physical 'thing' for another - with language itself determining its own character as system of substitution of words (or rather 'ideas') for the wider universal System in which language (or thought) was only one among several dimensions; in which words were themselves only one kind of thing (the kind of thing we call 'word')....I felt that one should be trying to construct a narrower, but more radical circuit, of marking in pythagorean manner the 'syntax' or general poetic 'space' and time of marking, of which the abstract mathematical circuit through 'pure' Space and Time with its infinitesimal point-instants was a sort of imaginary limit correlative with the abstract starting-point of cartesian 'point', rather than the language whose matrix of substitutions, substituted as a whole for the general 'space' of which language was but one dimension, itself determined this imaginary 'point'.

Now Thom's colleague at IHES, Alexandre Grothendieck, had elaborated in his IHES seminar on Algebraic Geometry over the sixties (which I never attended in the seventies), a coordination of the 'algebraic' syntax of marking or naming 'points', and 'geometric' structures 'in' various 'spaces', but 'relativistically' invariant between different systems of framing or marking them, which may be taken as the mathematical analogue of Derrida's 'structuralist' presentation of a pure unitary 'inner' space of transcendental subjectivity as itself an abstraction from the linguistic 'space' and time in which it was nominally defined, and in which the dynamics of this 'positing' could be analysed 'deconstructed' in terms of a more radical space and time of 'grammatology'. Grothendieck's theory of 'topoi' deconstructed, so to speak, classical cartesian space - a global unitary space of indivisible point(-instant)s - and presented it in terms of a more radical dynamic of coordinating different mappings or frames within a new mapping, where the different initial partial mappings or frames could each be associated with a particular point or perspective in the new frame. The 'theory of topoi' had itself been initially developed in a cartesian system of classical
geometric 'analysis', but by around 1970, as I noted in Part III, Lawvere had shifted the axis of the theory, so to speak, by framing the cartesian space in which topoi were first of all investigated as itself one particular case of a more general 'topos'. This marks an eventual 'structuralist' deconstruction of the abstract cartesian coupling of 'pure' algebraic mark, coordinate with a purified and symmetric linguistic matrix articulated around the logic of abstract cartesian 'I' asserting its instance of assertion in response to the place of the question in the linguistic matrix of substitutions, and elementary cartesian 'point' represented by such a pure mark, through the cartesian symmetry of pure 'internal' space of unitary logical analysis, and equally unitary and 'analytic' external space, pure 'extension'. Thom's dynamics of coupling of mark and thing was, I felt, in need of mathematical 'deconstruction', paralleling in the formal language of mathematical substitution (and the physical order of substitution of one thing for another which it traditionally modelled) what Derrida had undertaken in informal 'ordinary' language for the correlative cartesian 'subject' and its associated space and time of theory - the unitary cartesian space of framing the embedding of that pure internality in a coordinate Universe, which had been reasserted, for example, by Husserl in his Paris lectures of 1930.

In my lectures on Wittgenstein - my 'exposition' of the transition from Tractatus to the posthumously published reflections On Certainty - I had attempted a preliminary sketch of a possible reconstruction of the global mirroring of logical and physical space of the first work in terms of a correlation of 'internal' topology of the subject (borrowed largely from Lacan) and 'external' topography of the World (which I took to be questions addressed by Wittgenstein in On Certainty and the Investigations respectively). This I planned to develop from considerations of 'internal' and 'external', logical and physical, spaces correlative unfolding in a common time, out of a radical figure of 'internal' and 'external' sides of the distinction or difference of 'internal' and 'external'. I suggested that 'logic' and 'physics' were correlative framings, from the two sides of their difference, of their difference or distinction. One could not begin 'in' either side, with the supposition of resolution of the radical duality or two-
sidedness of this complementarity of 'internal' and 'external' sides of two-sidedness: one must rather attempt to map this radical duality and its dynamics in an intermediate 'poetic' order of symmetry of the two sides, logic and physics, deduction and causation, which articulated the mutual embedding of each dynamic of inscription of the relation of the two sides in one side, one in the other, in the primary temporal symmetry of two directions in time (final and efficient causality, logical and physical time) - rather as a book or story might be considered to be articulated in this symmetry of opening and closing, of interplay of intentions or intentionality of its various characters, with the 'outward' physical dynamic of the situation in which the action or interaction 'took place'.

Physical and logical, 'inside' and 'outside', as two sides of their two-sidedness; and their two dynamics then just the dynamics on each side of embedding the relations of the two sides in one side or the other respectively - with the 'poetic' order of human interaction in Nature or rather Culture as the primary model or matrix of coupling of the two dynamics - or rather of the two dimensions of a deeper fundamental dynamic. I renamed the book I was preparing to write 'Time and Duality', changing from 'Le Signe et le Temps' with which I had arrived in Paris.

At this point the book or thesis was to be constructed simply as the symmetric logical dynamic of unfolding within the mathematical frame of their analogy, of theories of the 'internal' and 'external' dynamics of Psyche and Physics, down from the initial pythagorean marking of these coordinate sides of the 'mark' or boundary, $\Theta S$, and a coordinate heraclitean dynamic of 'separation' (in Wismann and Bollack's expression) of 'internal' $\Lambda S$ and 'external' $\Pi S$, to the point at which I felt theory had arrived around 1970, when each of the separate dimensions of 'logical' theory, theories of the various primary dimensions of embedding of Theory in Context or Kosmos, must at last confront the question posed for each of them by their 'mathematical' symmetry. Each separate 'domain' of theory, I felt, logic, physics, psychology, poetics and so on, had reached an impasse where the
abstraction of each dimension from the symmetry of the various coordinate dimensions of embedding of logical theory in physical World and cosmic Context (of which logical and physical were but two dimensions) was reflected in analogous 'symptomatic' paradoxes in each domain of 'theory'. I would bring the theoretical story opening with the pythagoreans and Heraclitus full-circle, and close it, by finding in the theory of topos a mathematical model of marking the relations of the various dimensions of the mark, from which each of the various theories of around 1970 would appear as an abstraction or concretion instituted in their coordinate or correlative 'breakings' of the radical mathematical symmetry of different 'sides' or 'dimensions' of the mark or sign. I would thus present a sort of circular interplay of questions, which could not itself be questioned, since it would already have 'relativised' any thematic in terms of which it might be brought 'into question' to some particular axis or dynamic within the whole it coordinated. By the summer of 1979, on a lonely welsh hilltop overlooking the coast where I had picked it up, the image or model of the book I was trying to write lay on the windowsill in front of my typewriter: a small smooth stone.

As for my radical 'topos', I was by then working on the elementary algebraic geometry of the 'trinity knot' which appears as a model of the symmetry of physical and logical space halfway through the Introduction above. This had evolved fairly naturally from Lacan's various 'mathemes' with which I had been playing since 1975, trying to find a much simpler figure of the poetic or analogical coupling of logical and physical 'spaces' than Petitot's Catastrophe Theory. It was a matter of finding a spatial structure that was a spatial model of the way that the three-by-two dimensions of space-time were themselves only one coordinate dimension or side of the coordination they modelled— for which they might be 'substituted', just as the simple algebra
of elementary symbols (a, b, c, ab, a\(^{-1}\), abc\(^{-1}\) and so on) which modelled the topological structure of the space 'divided' in various coordinate ways by the knot presented an elementary matrix of substitutions which was itself a substitute for or model of the relations of itself and other correlative 'dimensions' - the 'spatial' or external dimensionality of the knot in particular.

This then was the 'problematic' or axis of my questioning in mid-seventies Paris until the winter of 1979-80. I was trying to focus the symmetries of various 'structuralist' theories of ana-logical embedding of language (and with it the psychological 'subject') in linguistically articulated context (contextual or coordinate dimensions) in a sort of elementary and 'categorial' marking of the symmetry and (symmetrical) asymmetry of various primary 'sides' or dimensions of the 'mark' as such, as 'mark', öęęęę. - This through a 'mathematics' for which Lacan (with Petitot and Miller) provided an initial model, and which would link the parian Geisteswissenschaften of structuralist sixties and seventies with a more international Naturwissenschaft, and at the same time with an anglo-american philosophical tradition then turning about, precisely, the relations of formal and informal language as complementary frames of modelling a World of which each was itself a component or dimension.

IHES, like EHESS (as the VIe Section of the Ecole Pratique was redefined in 1975) had a decidedly international character: the central figure in the sixties, Grothendieck was born in Berlin of a russian father, in 1928, escaping to France in 1941 when his father was killed by the Nazis) Thom is a protestant from the Jura near Basel; his chief collaborator, Christopher Zeeman, was so to speak the only link between Warwick and Paris during my stay there in the mid-seventies. And Thom also collaborated with Maurice Loi and Jean Dieudonné in a decidedly international seminar devoted to Philosophy and Mathematics held once or twice a week at the rue d'Ulm, where the papers were generally given by eminent visiting mathematicians, logicians, physicists or historians of science, and usually generated a long debate among the eminent french and foreign scholars in the audience;
Ecole Normale Supérieure (Rue d'Ulm)

Séminaire de Philosophie et Mathématique (Loi, Thom, Dieudonné)

Here I would try and pick up, in the dynamics, so to speak, of the discussion, the analogies or (informally speaking) homologies that directed the patterns of exchange between speaker and various members of the audience. For if 'modern' mathematics is definable as the attempt to formulate structures that appear in different guises within different theories within mathematics as a whole, in terms independent of the different instances or representations of those 'structures' - as tending, then, towards Whitehead's 'Universal Algebra' of around 1900, or Eilenberg and MacLane's Category Theory of mid-century (proposed as 'foundational' or primitive mathematical structure and language by Lawvere around 1970) - then the prefiguration of new theorems and theories in 'modern mathematics' may generally be found in the analogies of different theories with which mathematicians play in their 'informal' discussion, or in the silent personal reflections or jottings which belong to the same order of interplay of unformalised suggestion and conjecture.

I wanted a formulation of just this radically analogical dynamic of mathematical theory itself - a more or less formal matrix of terms which would present a sort of kernel from which mathematics as formal theory of analogy or homology might be unfolded: this projection itself in direct line from the turn-of-the-century attempts to find mathematical and logical formulations of the analogy between logical and mathematical 'syntax' - between say, subject-and-predicate and variable-and-function, or between the mathematics of logical 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' and of physical, geometrical, space - in a direct line from the logic of Frege and Russell and Hilbert and Poincare, as from their mathematics; a direct line from the first International Congress of Mathematicians in the Paris of 1900, to the more informal seminar at the rue d'Ulm in the seventies.

What in fact I got, was the dynamic in my own inquiries, that I have already typified in describing the dynamic of Petitot's seminar: a finality of reflection apparently tending towards the articulation of the informal thematics of various analogous 'theories'
within a formal matrix of substitutions within which their informal language might be supposed formally organised in local configurations of abstraction of matrices of words - like mallarmean poems - from the wider formal space...while the terms of that formal matrix were themselves still partly embedded in just such 'poetic' configurations from which they were supposedly in process of being abstracted. And it was not until late in 1979, when I sat down to eventually frame the millenial circuit of such a dynamic of theoretical finality, that I discovered that the 'poetic' configuration of a Mallarmé poem or its various historical analogues, was not something that could 'in general' or in principle be formally embedded as simply the circuit of abstraction or concretion of 'informal' language and its unmathematical words, within the formal matrix of some abstract system of substitutions which defined itself as a substitution for the wider 'cosmic' system of which it was but one side or dimension: rather now did I see, or practically discover, that the theory or thought dramatised in a Mallarmé poem as one component in the situation of conception or composition of the poem - the drama or dramatic situation of which the written or printed poem was script ('Prose') or transcript - must itself be inscribed as it is written in a dramatic order of substitutions or variable components in an action, in which any writing of theory, as one action among others possible, must, like the words of a Mallarmé poem, inscribe itself as script.

This, then, was the starting-point, defining the axis of a questioning, and of its transcription into this long record of inquiry, not in the closed hermetic symmetry of a narration of the 'internal' dynamic of theory down from the pythagoreans, disappearing in its close into the symmetry of Symmetry and Asymmetry, like the identity of Identity and Difference, or the heavenly Sphere of parmenidean Being; but rather in the progressive marking or transcription at (indeed, as) each stage of the written questioning, of the question posed or opened up by the symmetry of the previous question and its marking, with
various extra-textual configurations, dimensions, of that marking.

I finally came at the close of 1979 to attempt to systematically frame the symmetry over time, in 'theoretical' space, of the unfolding of its logical and other dimensions towards a structure or pure matrix of substitution, and with it of all questions and theories, which recapitulated the opening pythagorean framing of theory in the marking (as Tetractys) of the symmetry of the various dimensions or aspects of 'the mark'. The symmetry of opening and closing markings of the symmetry of various dimensions of 'the mark' simply as such (a mark, then, substituted for, indifferently representing, any particular mark or sign that might be substituted for, or represent, something more specific) would itself articulate the elementary differences of which historical theories were seen to be the theories, in the radical difference between opening and closing of the whole otherwise perfectly symmetrical structure, in time.

But how, then, open the presentation or representation of this radical symmetry of theory over 2,500 years, which latter was itself a sort of frame, in its turn, of the wider cosmic dynamic in which it as historical theory was embedded, and of which it was the unfolding theory? For the terms in which the opening pythagorean 'theory' was framed, as framed in the marking of the symmetry of the various dimensions of their marking, must themselves be supposed organised and articulated within the limiting matrix finally defined simply as the marking of its marking which organises a general space and time of questions, in which the whole account of unfolding of theory from pythagoreans to 1970 is nominally to be supposed inscribed. But this would in principle require a working back from the end of the presentation to the beginning, unfolding from the absolute symmetry of the conclusion or close a converse embedding of the informal language of the text in a formal coupling with symmetric dimensions of context, governing the working forward from the informality of the opening of or movement into the presentation, towards its final embedding in the cosmic symmetry at which it eventually arrived.
Now it was just 'at this point' in my inquiry - but not 'in' the inquiry as I then conceived it - that I found myself writing to Julia, asking why I was still writing, writing that questioning of its very writing. And as I wrote I began to recognise in the dramatic coupling of the writing and the other symmetric components of the action of which it was the writing, the action of writing the questioning of this writing, as it set itself in a configuration of terms in which it identified itself as one among others...I began to recognise the true space and time of questioning and theory, in which I must open up the question of the coupling of different dimensions of theory over time. Not some limit of absolute symmetry from which the space and time in which this symmetry was marked would mysteriously unfold in parmenidean manner from the mere fact of there being a mark, and a question posed by the difference of this principle of differentiation, from absolute symmetry which abstracted itself from even this difference: rather a space of questioning embedded in the coupling of theory and its logic with the 'external' physical order, the questioning of which itself unfolded into a theory of that space and time in which its theory was embedded; a 'space' of questioning opening up from the marking of the various dimensions of questioning of that their marking as the inquiry opened in language, and in physical space, in a certain culture - in the book into which the inquiry which made up the book would be the inquiry.

For how else could one frame in a book a 'space' and time of questioning, and of questioning of earlier spaces of questioning in particular, as they were embedded in the space of the inquiry, the book: to frame a matrix of substitutions of marks one for another, and all for the focal mark 'mark' or 'sign', 'positively', in the opening of a 'traditional' book of theory, would be to abstract the matrix of terms in which this their central term was to be considered posed, from the radical question posed for each by that central term, itself marking the question posed by the substitution of linguistic for non-linguistic components of the inquiry.
Indeed traditional books of theory, and the theory of which they were the writing, might all be coordinated in a common 'tradition' of theory precisely through the inaugural abstraction in each case of their discursive 'space' and time from the question posed in their very opening by the passage 'through' that opening from context into text, as itself considered as one variable in the action of writing theory. Even in the rare case where this transition, and the character of 'theory' as 'practice' is not elided, it traditionally appears articulated theoretically in a textual matrix of terms 'substituted' in the book of theory for the practical matrix of writing a particular book, while the wider matrix of the questions in whose theoretical dynamic this question of relations of text and context is inscribed does not itself appear articulated in the radical symmetry of the linguistic matrix of its questioning, and the practical or poetic matrix in which that order of transcription of symmetry into textual 'question' is itself one subordinate term. My directing question would be, then, the question posed by the very marking of the symmetry of inquiry and action as a question, this presentation of the symmetry of the various orders or dimensions of my questioning in my questioning, as so many orders of symmetric questions, as itself posing the next question, whose marking would pose the following question, and so on.

Thus Derrida's inscription of the dynamic of theoretical questioning in earlier books, in the linguistic order of substitution of the theoretical matrix of questions for the linguistic matrix of substitution that was traditionally considered to be theoretically inscribed in the 'pure' internal space of the theoretical questions - this image of theory itself, then, subject to a converse ana-logic of figuration, a poetics of abstraction - this symmetry of theoretical and figural in which his own discourse on the poetics of theory was articulated as both theory and literature at once, might itself be in its turn inscribed in a more radical 'poetics' of substitution of its textual or linguistic presentation, for the 'practical' matrix of this substitution itself:
Me and Jacques Derrida

DERRIDA, Jacques

931  *L'Écriture et La Différence* (1959-67) 1967 (74-5)

932  *L'Origine de la Géométrie* (tr of Husserl's 1936 study, with very long introductory essay) 1962 (74)

933  *La Voix et le Phénomène* 1967 (74)

934  *De la Grammatologie* 1967 (74-5)

935  *Positions* (interviews 1967-71) 1972

936  *La Dissemination* (1967-72) 1972

937  *Marges - De la Philosophie* 1972

938  *Eperons, Les Styles de Nietzsche* (Cerisy 1972: in (779); rev, with intr Agosti, ill Loubrieu Venice 1976) 1978

939  *Glas* 1974

940  *La Carte Postale de Socrate à Freud et au-delà* (1975-9)

Me and Jacques Derrida - or rather Jacques Derrida and I. I first encountered him 'en chair et en os' (a phrase which recurred rather often in his seminar) rather than in his books, a couple of weeks after my arrival to study in Paris in late 1974. A syrian student I had met had introduced me to Ricoeur's seminar (he was preparing a thesis on 'Le Transcendental' at CNRS with Ricoeur), and in return I was standing outside a door on the first floor of ENS with him, about to introduce him to Derrida's seminar, by taking him along with my verbal letter of introduction (so to speak - in effect just the name Alan Montefiore and my relation to it). On the beige door was a little tin holder for a card and the occupant's name. It was empty, but someone had written a just legible 'Jackie' in pencil in place of the card and name. Derrida was also teaching at Yale, in the long french academic vacation between the agrégation in May and the rentrée in mid-November. I knocked, and we entered. Jacques
Derrida was speaking on the phone, and signalled us to sit down. I tapped the ash from my cigarette into the ashtray on his table and found a chair.

'Mais...C'est mon texte' were the first words I remember, the voice rising to a characteristic high pitch of exclamation which I later came to know as a specifically derridean modulation, marking phonetically something like a verbal 'pointing' (in various senses) with no direct correlate in his writing. 'Ma chère...comment peux-tu me demander si je suis sûr qu'il n'y ait pas une erreur: c'est mon texte!' The telephone conversation concluded, we briefly explained our research to Derrida, and were invited to a short series of 'internal' ENS classes on the relation between psychology and phenomenology in Husserl, before the opening of the seminar proper, devoted to the reading, lectio, of a group of texts around the thematic 'La Vie-La Mort', Derrida's transposition of the year's agregation theme, 'La Vie et La Mort'. The seminar opened, and its axis was set, in that marginal suppression of copulation: '-' for 'et'; and the reading turned about Freud's Jenseits des Lustprinzips, as Derrida notes at the opening of the revision of that section of his script for the seminar, which appears as 'Spéculer - sur 'Freud' ', in La Carte Postale. Not so much S/Z as -/et...so to speak (though how would one speak that: -/et / S/Z ?).

I only discovered La Carte Postale during my last stay with Julia in Paris. She was living in a flat just off the Jardin de Luxembourg. I was spending most of my time wandering around Julia, the flat, and Paris with a borrowed camera, taking a hundred and fifty photographs in an attempt to organise what I thought of as a sort of visual 'syntax' or grammar of the city, with a mechanical eye substituted for 'I'. I could photograph Julia Kristeva's bathroom, its open windows giving onto the inner cour two floors below: there was one flat on each floor, hers on the third, Julia's (?) on the fifth. I would meet her son fairly often on the stairs, remembering how he
had made his silent 'intervention' over the course of Kristeva's seminars when I was first in Paris - first as a slowly changing ...profile...of both Julia Kristeva and her séminaire de 3\textsuperscript{e} cycle, then as an explicit reference, contrasted with Winnicott's reading of the neonatal state.

I had heard vaguely that there was a reference to an exchange I had with Derrida in 1977 in the book - an exchange on the lawn at Balliol that I have already referred to (before encountering \textit{La Carte Postale}) towards the close of Part III above. Derrida was in Oxford, giving a paper that would become \textit{Limited Inc., a, b, c}, (Baltimore 1977), and I was visiting Oxford from my Cotswold hilltop thirty miles away to witness his performance in this new, but old, scene. But I was no more prepared for the symmetry of the trajectory opening from that encounter, and passing through Derrida's encounter with 'la carte postale' and the two-year 'correspondence' with an unnamed woman, of which it became the visual or visible medium...and my own trajectory from that meeting to another encounter at the beginning of December 1979, than was Derrida for the encounter with the Carte Postale.....

...For his encounter with an image in which the 'parts' of Socrates and Plato are reversed, inverted as in a strange mirror: an image of the converse dynamics of the Image, from which the 'socratic' scripts are the dramatic inaugural abstraction to a millenial image of reflection and its transmission, communication, its destiny - beginning with Plato's fiction of being Socrates' scribe, and reaching its destination (a message 'geschichte' over 2,500 years or so) as Jacques Derrida suddenly finds his own 'reflection' or speculation reflected in this image, and concluded so to speak in the final inversion or conversion which transforms that residual platonic reflection on the reflection of Derrida's reflection in an image, into the mere reception of the message transmitted by Socrates through this thirteenth-century postcard.
This image, this postcard, then - the following day - becomes the medium of a writing of an inquiry into the 'correspondence' through that medium of Derrida, its scribe, and 'sa' femme: a transposition into a more symmetric exchange, correspondence, intercourse, of, say, the earlier more formal inscription of his writing (and reading at Cérisy) of a reflection on the writing of reflection in 'la question du style' focussed in what the pen, the stylus, tries to pin down as femme. The earlier metaphoric space of verbal imagery becomes articulated in an image - literally, rather than as mere verbal metaphor for metaphor - and in a transference for whose verbal content the image supplies the material support, between Derrida writing and a woman en chair et en os, a 'literal' transfer of a sequence of transports of reflection, a μεταφορά which provides another image of verbal imagery, 'metaphor'.

I had begun my 'correspondence' with Julia - or Brigitte as she then was - a few weeks before on the reverse of a photograph by Ralph Gibson: a profile of a woman's head and shoulders against a landscape, taken from her left side, her right hand over her right eye as her left eye gazed beyond the left-hand margin of the image; and Derrida closed his sequence on the 17th November 1979, just as my 'correspondence' with Julia was dramatically transforming my reflection. Furthermore, the first postcard of the derridean sequence was a photograph of the large quadrangle in Balliol, setting the scene, so to speak (3 June 1977):

Apres la séance, les échanges se sont poursuivis sur la pelouse de Balliol. Tu devines en haut, au fond et à gauche, le petit appartement du collège dans lequel j'ai dormi.

On 4 June Derrida, now writing on the reverse of the reversed image of the inauguration of a millenial reflection on the image, resté comme le négatif d'une photographie à développer depuis vingt-cinq siècles - en moi bien sur...,
describes his encounter with the postcard (in the entrance-hall of the Old Bodleian) sometime before the seminar the previous day. On the 6 June he returns to the *changements sur la pelouse*, where I find myself transcribed into the logic of exchange, the economy, of the whole sequence - my questions, as I remember them, transposed into a new pattern or sequence of themes - or rather, Derrida's replies to two different questions within the sequence recombined in his transcription ('si je me souviens bien') of a reply to one of them: why he didn't kill himself. I had suggested that this would be 'un très beau texte', acting, as I put it, the *advocatus diaboli*, trying to question what I took to be, in my British manner, a practical instance of its assertion in Derrida's purportedly open play of questions, which could not simply be identified with some term 'in' the play, if there were to be, as there was, any finite, 'closed' text, rather than chaos or absolute textual relativity. I had begun by simply interjecting into the conversation in which I had until then remained silent the question 'Qui êtes-vous?', and Derrida had replied 'Je ne sais pas'. 'What do you say if you were stopped by the police, then?'..."Ah, but that's different"... 

That was a practical question...one didn't pose theoretical questions to policemen in response to such a question; one knew the role of 'policeman' and the different consequences of different responses to the assertion of a uniformed man in that role...

Yet Derrida had just been questioning, in the seminar beforehand, Searle's attempt to frame linguistic exchanges - and so questions and, implicitly, theories - in the practical matrix of just such action or interaction in various roles, as inscribed in its turn 'in' theory, in a theory of 'speech acts'...just as he had earlier questioned Lacan's inscription of the 'practical' dynamic of our assertion of will or desire 'in theory' by his psychoanalytic theory which embedded the complementary 'analogical' matrix of metaphor and metonymy, the 'play' of analogical substitution, in the 'theoretical' matrix of questions. And in formulating in 1972...
'the question of style', Derrida had inscribed his inscription of Nietzsche's writing in the metaphorical play of 'style', in the same radically open play of language in the metaphorical space which is, so to speak, the converse side in language to the theoretical space and time which traditionally has thought to metaphorically abstract from that open play - to, say, a theory of the embedding of theory in the play of metaphor. That is: the apparently resoluble question posed by different possible constructions of 'J'ai oublié mon parapluie', depending on different restitutions of a 'missing' context, serves to close Derrida's own quest by providing an analogy for the radical absence or unavailability - ever - of any 'total' definitive context for any text, including that his own text 'on' this absence.

And yet Jacques Derrida does 'close' his text in the carefully structured circuit of just this question of its openness, the openness of that particular sequence of words and other typographical marks - and he, Jacques Derrida, does practically decide 'definitively' the inscription of his theoretical text in a wider context:

Ma chère... comment peux-tu me demander si je suis sur qu'il n'y ait pas une erreur: c'est mon texte!

...For what he determines theoretically, 'in' the order of theoretical questions articulated by the logic of substitutions in language, as the theoretical contradiction of supposing any adequate theoretical inscription of the converse analogical or 'figural' order of substitution in 'its logic', corresponds in the practical order of constructing a finite text to express this aporia, to the practical indifference for this purpose of the whole open matrix of further theoretical questions that might in principal have been, or which might in fact subsequently be, elaborated 'from' or indeed 'in' the finite text as we have it from Derrida. What appears 'in theory' as an irreducible matrix of metaphorical substitution, complementary, even, to its own theoretical investigation, and 'directing' even that theoretical
questioning of the 'direction' which cannot be properly determined 'in' theory - this infinite irreducible matrix or play of analogy is 'practically' just the theoretical reflection of the way that, in practice, some term may mark one variable of an action, and its relation or interaction with various other 'terms' or components of the action whose 'logic' or analogic is 'indifferent' to various inapplicable aspects or connotations of the term which might prove no longer 'indifferent', and indeed inappropriate to the same component considered in the context of another, different, activity or interaction - or 'theoretically' considered as 'defined' by that only partly appropriate term, as if its use to mark some component of some particular activity were taken to also imply the theoretical inscription of that activity - and in those terms - in the wider matrix of all possible activities into which it might enter, in many of which the wider working of that term appropriate in the first case, might be quite inappropriate.

'Qui êtes vous?'...'Je ne sais pas': Je ne sais pas - and yet this 'je' asserts itself in response to my question, albeit by questioning 'in theory' the instance of response which responds to a question by marking itself as questioning that its mark. Back to Descartes: how can the instance of questioning question, at least, that it is questioning? Yet Derrida's maximal supposition was, rather that he was, at least 'un corps materiel', the conversion into mere physical self-assertion, of the locus of the logical order of questioning. I later wrote a very short letter to Derrida, beginning 'Chair anonyme' (which I never got round to posting).

And yet the question attaching to the instance of assertion as 'I' cannot be constantly 'deferred', disseminated through the matrices of texts; 'I' am not 'indifferent' to the question, any more than to the various possible instances of assertion in the construction of a text from what is open to 'me' in the practical confrontation with language and writing materials (or speech). 'Why do you write such good books?' I asked, turning into a personal question the heading of the chapter in Ecce Homo often cited by
Derrida; 'Why are you good rather than evil?'... 'How do you know I am, in private?' he replied. 'Well, why don't you kill yourself, for example?' The separation of public and private would break down there. 'Anyway, that would be a remarkable text, perfectly expressing your position, closing your overall 'text' perfectly'...

In place of arguing, of a renvoi to another text, Derrida replies in a 'pirouette', a renvoi of the question as the question of a shared plaisir in the question itself... which must endlessly defer suicide to prolong the pleasure of its contemplation. In Derrida's account, the privacy of his private wickedness becomes the privacy of an ultimately imaginary (since it does not become public in an inanimate corps matériel); and I only eventually find myself reading this account of our dialogue because, two years later, the tradition of keeping one's private life out of one's theory has itself become a theoretical question - or a question at least - for Derrida, who publishes a text not (one supposes) directly written for 'publication' or public delivery before a correspondingly partly anonymous audience, in conjunction with other texts in which he has publicly questioned the inscription of theory in the sexual axis of an intercourse part of which must (one imagines) remain as private as the parts involved in it... and the failure of any attempt (such as Lacan's) to reinscribe this relation and its dynamic of corps matériel and plaisir 'in theory'.

Corps matériel, plaisir, amour; lettres d'amour taking their place in the derridean... corpus; derridean theory inscribed in the dramatic order of a sexual relation, while sexual relations...
are theoretically considered as the primary axis of the metaphorical matrix (in every sense..) which doubles theory and its dynamic of logical substitutions, in the 'other side' (the other's side) of language, of every text, theoretical or other-wise.

I had been questioning the closure of any text as a theoretical question, considering Derrida's questioning to inhabit an unquestioned practical or ethical dimension with its own finality of judgement, which I then still thought of as providing a sort of transcendental categorial scheme 'in' theory, without which any theoretical text would itself be unthinkable. I felt that Derrida's questioning of any theoretical embedding of theory in the metaphorical doublure of the text, through, say, a lacanian capitonnage (a quilt, so to speak, rather than an umbrella), was simply symmetric as a textual order of questions articulated in the text itself as primary question (always, though, 'the' text rather than this text in any of its singular thisness), to Lacan's circular assertion of the locus of its framing in his (by comparison) 'positive' theory. I felt that GREPH's radically unquestioning assertion of the absolute value of questioning was questionable precisely as a non-theoretical assertion of theory in its practical context - a coupling of supposedly free disinterested questioning and the 'positive' activity such questioning actually 'constituted'. When Derrida came back to Oxford just after concluding (in an envoi of the whole that doubles, on its back the image of Socrates and Plato on the front of the book) his Carte Postale, and presented to a bemused audience of literary theorists the practical parameters of the battle to save philosophy teaching posts in the face of Giscard's pragmatic reforms, I asked from the audience 'Why shouldn't Philosophy die?'. Derrida stared at me for a while, and then replied 'Didn't you ask me to kill myself two years ago?'. The audience was moved by laughter. 'C'est la même question' I replied.

By then I had just come to inscribe my own questioning in a cosmic dynamic whose axis ran through the radical sexual symmetry of my relations with Julia, transcribing all the terms I had earlier
organised symmetrically 'in' the theoretical space and time of questions, into an embedding of this theoretical space and time in the symmetry of the various dimensions (including itself) of which it attempted to frame 'abstract' theories, through the configuration of writing to Julia that my writing to Julia.

Transcription: writing in a trance, as if I were merely a spectator in that strange theatre where Martin was writing to Julia, just playing a 'part' before me, who was passively watching the drama unfold. Transcription: writing then to Alan Montefiore and David Wood in the same configuration of Script which framed itself dramatically as the writing of its writing, but now writing the transcript of my response to the 'philosophical' possibility of reorganising all my earlier theoretical questions and their theoretical symmetries, within the 'dramatic' question posed by the symmetry of that theoretical space and time with the various dimensions of its context of which it provided 'abstract' theories - a symmetry organised now in or around the actual situation of its writing, through the questioning of that the questioning, through the question posed by the symmetry of the various dimensions of that very 'question'.

Derrida, I felt, encountering his book in 1985, as I was organising around a borrowed camera a visual syntax of Paris, articulated like my writing in the relation of Martin and Julia, had travelled over those two years, 1977-9, on a parallel path to my own - but he had chosen Living on - Survivre - Sopravivere in response to my questioning of questioning, rather than the death and transfiguration of theory into a pythagorean vision that was the discovery of both philia and sophia, philosophy as a drama, a mystery: He who would save his life must first lose it.

But what was this symmetry, then, of Me and Jacques Derrida in two sets of lettres d'amour - two writings of the inscription of that writing in its sexual mirror - leading from my inscription in his side (so to speak) in the opening of his sequence of letters, to his closing envoi of the whole sequence, while I in Devon closed a
whole sequence of my writing, then back in Oxford a few days later repeated my question which figures in the opening of La Carte Postale, but now in terms, not of his 'end', but that of Philosophy in France?

I have often suggested that the matrix of possible substitutions of one word or phrase (or paragraph or chapter or book, for another which is syntactic 'language' might be considered to have two complementary 'sides' - a 'theoretical' side in which a 'classical' programme of Philosophy as total unitary theory (at least since Descartes) had projected to systematically articulate around the pure space of substitution as complete system of questions and answers (the dynamic of questioning organised by Descartes around the self-assertion of the instance of assertion, 'I', as radically primary response to the place of substitution, questioning, doubt, 'itself') - and this 'theoretical' side doubled by a 'figural' side whose axis is organised in the 'metaphorical' dynamic of desire of which Lacan and Derrida give their (so to speak) complementary 'positive' and 'negative' versions or pictures, in terms of an 'ana-logical' substitution which is, in fact, present throughout the very institution or constitution of the 'classical' project of a 'pure' logic, directing all the while a certain vouloir of its dire.

I have suggested that the latter 'metaphorical', analogical, figural side of words articulates the embedding of language in the 'dramatic' or poetic dynamics of human interaction, where words, phrases, and so on, themselves appear as variables of an action, substitutable by or for various other non-verbal components. In this light the derriéran insistence that, say, there can be no 'theory' of metaphor or sexuality, no definitive inscription in the cartesian space and time of unitary questioning and answer of the 'other side' of language (whose metaphorical dynamic can be shown to organise even such a classical attempt at 'theoretical abstraction' from the figural 'colour' of everyday language), is so to speak the converse of (and convertible with) the insistence upon an irreducibly practical or pragmatic embedding of the elaboration of any 'theory' in that implication of its terms in actions (variously construed as 'speech-acts', 'language-games' and so on in the anglophone tradition)
which is reflected in the 'metaphorical' or 'analogical' substitutability of different words in the same linguistic component of some action, where the relations of the limited range of variables of that action is 'indifferent' to the difference between the structures of substitution, the syntax, of the different terms, when embedded in some other action whose working is not indifferent to the substitution. In a restricted picture, for example, a theory of 'currents', pressure, volume of flow, and so on, may be indifferently applied to water in pipes or electricity in wires - and yet at some point water and electricity are different, and this difference is reflected in a sort of divergence within the thus far common syntax governing the analogous theories of water and what was at first called 'the electrical fluid'.

A 'theory' of the embedding of theory in action, then, can in principle be no more articulated within a primary 'abstraction' to some global and unitary pure logical syntax of language, than can a theory of metaphor be a 'pure' theory, or a husserlian theory of language constructed in a 'reduced' space of pure subjectivity itself practically constituted 'in' the language it would theoretically reconstitute. For just as Derrida has articulated the organisation of such projects by the analogical dynamic of substitution from which they would 'abstract' to a 'pure' space untramelled by the obscurities of, say, spatial metaphors, so conversely can one argue - theoretically even - for the contradiction of supposing the substitutability of various variables of an action (and a fortiori of 'action' in general) definitively modelled 'in' some purified space of unitary cartesian question and answer, 'in' language abstracted from its own pragmatics, or 'in' thought abstracted from both language and its 'pragmatics'.

In this light the unlimited domain of metaphorical dissemination and play which sometimes seems to be merely formally posited by Derrida as a sort of 'alternative' to the 'reduction' of metaphorical substitutions to some 'theory', may be seen, rather, to be an unacknowledged index of the practical or 'dramatic' character of Derrida's questioning of theory, of a traditional unitary 'abstract' space and time of inquiry, as itself embedded in the activity, the human interactions, in which Derrida, in his literary
production, plays his part. 'Sometimes when I'm very tired', he replied to another of my questions 'I don't try and think of an answer to a question, but just imagine what 'Jacques Derrida' would say'.

That is: the unlimited free play of relativistic metaphoricity may itself be considered as an abstraction from the limited and relatively definite range of substitutions for the various components of the action (say, a philosophy seminar) in which the irreducibility of the figural to the logical is marked. It may be seen as an abstraction to a linguistic 'space' and time of substitution from the practical indifference in the 'syntax' of some action, to the exchange of one term for another, in a dramatic configuration of which language is only one dimension; and the verbal complexity of embedding its 'theoretical' or discursive characterisation in a web of metaphor abstracted from the limited configurations of practical context (a metaphorical matrix which is remarkably like, in effect, a unitary frame of all action, substituted for the old unitary frame of 'pure' theory which has been rejected) may be taken as a sort of subtle transposition or transcription of the earlier complexities of abstracting 'theory' and the logical matrix of questions, from that metaphorical doublure in language. A subtle complexity for which one can find fairly simple images, in the abstraction from the literal 'image' of common sensation, to verbal imagery of which that literal order provides, in practice, a primary 'image'.

Image, 'appearance': a limited version of one's situation that might be further embedded in a wider action, if one could get 'behind' the limitations of what is actually present - the various terms or components more or less working according to one's framing of them, including oneself - and trace back beyond the limited metaphorical working of one's terms for the elements of one's situation to a complete, definitive, identification of its components, a complete understanding of their 'working', their dramatic syntax, so to say, in all possible extensions of present experience.
But, of course, as Husserl, Peirce and others in their various ways presented our canonical 'situation' or experience at the turn of the century, we have only a partial 'image' of the 'objects' we encounter (including ourselves and our fellows), and the very constitutive 'essence' of these 'objects' is to differ, sooner or later, from our image of them - to differ, indeed, all the time, insofar as this difference constitutes the 'intentional' directedness of our experience, predicating any appearance to some object 'behind' it as its appearance. And that the various orders or dimensions of such being and appearance cannot be definitively inscribed simply in one - say the logical or psychological - dimension of the actual space and time and dynamic of experience, but must themselves be set in the working of a radical Analogy of Being - into which one enters not simply 'logically' but practically, in the passage from logical analysis into \textit{esse} - this logical recognition of the final limit of a 'theory' that in the end, and as its end, must be inscribed or discovered as one dimension among others in the symmetry of actual Kosmos (rather than the whole working of itself and its contextual dimensions being definitively articulated 'in' theory) is of course as old as Aquinas and Aristotle in its explicit discursive formulation.

Given, then, a working of various terms in our situation and in the substitution of term for thing that is one dimension of our situation, we may consider a 'question', for example, as the activity of marking the inscription of a present configuration of elements and terms in a wider frame, which demands a response in the reassertion of our common activity in the new frame, which goes beyond the limited working of the previous configuration before it was opened up by, say, one of its components differentiating itself from some limited aspect. Given some configuration of action (so that 'appearance' now has more the character of a theatrical configuration on a stage - 'an action standing for another action' - than some nominal elementary 'sensum' or whatever) we might express this dynamic of orientation of the participants in the unfolding of their activity in terms of 'all possible embeddings' of the present configuration in a wider one - like 'all possible actions' in which one might embody the momentary image of photograph or painting, all possible narrations of the action
a moment of which is depicted in abstraction from its temporal
dynamic. Emotional or dispositional orientation in a situation
of which we have a limited perception might then be seen to belong
to the 'analogical' order of coordination or syntax of a variety
of elements which we are only able to characterise 'up to a point'.
The web of metaphor then appears as a linguistic model of the dyn-
amic - the 'poetic' dynamic - of orientation in a configuration
that might turn out, develop, in all sorts of different ways. Our
orientation or disposition to action in such a situation must be
'indifferent' to the various different unfoldings between which the
situation does not allow us to decide - except insofar as these
various unfoldings are all subject to the 'ontological' constraints
of 'the form of 'object' in general' (as what differentiates itself
from any image or framing of it, and various other 'transcendental'
figures of actuality (our character as actors who can formulate a
choice among developments otherwise undetermined being included).

Motive, emotive, dynamics of 'analogy': and in the limit
we discover, then, in the emotional or dispositional dynamics of
our situation, a poetic axis of which a derridean 'logique du sup-
plément' or complementary lacanian metonymy of desire and 'logique
du fantasme' presents an 'abstract' linguistic version - a dynamic
of a two-sided matrix of words, figurally embedded in the activity
directed by desire, but abstracted from the doubling in the practical
or poetic order of activity, of this linguistic 'side' of activity
as a whole, from the complementary material economy in which it is
ineluctably 'embodied', set. A material economy which itself, in
its two 'sides' of abstract unitary physical space and time, and
the same 'figural' order of the 'image', 'appearance', already en-
countered as the other side of physical and other theories 'in'
language, itself reflects the two-sided linguistic economy of
logical and figural - in the 'mirror' so to speak of the Image
which is their interface, the surface of things.

...For in the minimal formal limit of the 'poetic'
order of actions (rather than the linguistic order of texts or
the material order of economy or process) different actors are
'emotionally' or emotionally or dispositionally embedded in that
limiting metonymy which coordinates the 'universal' term which
marks the place in language of any of its instances indifferently,
and its particular instances, and that 'sympathy' which directs
our interaction in a collective assertion or activity 'indifferent'
to the differences between the different instances of 'I' emotionally
coordinated in this radical 'identification'. In lacanian terms
this metonymic identification with the place of question and assert-
ton - of 'I' - in language, is understood as the original indifference
of affective orientation of infant and mother; and correlative oed-
ipal Strife appears in the competition of two symmetric instances
of assertion to assert themselves 'in' this place, this place of the
Other. In sartrian terms we are back in the dialectic of first,
second, and third person; for Kojève this is the dialectic of Master
and Slave. More generally, in terms simply of experience and ac-
tivity as matrix of substitutions of terms, of which words are only
one variety or dimension, we may recognise a simple 'poetic' symmetry
and associated dynamic, for which all these are, along with many
other pictures back down to Empedocles' Love and Strife, so many
'metaphors' or images in language.

_Lettre d'amour_, then: a writing which organises the text-
ual and contextual variables in which the writer finds (in the cases
now in question) himself around an axis of questions and responses
symmetric between the 'I's of, or in the 'I' of, writer and (imagined)
reader. Writing entered into in the empathy or sympathy of a dis-
position or emotion in which the two instances of 'I' are identified
in this most radical 'analogy': 'love' as the emotion or disposition
organised in this analogy and symmetry of persons. An 'intersubject-
ivity' or community of emotion, empathy, sympathy, around which as
primary axis the complex dialectic of Love and Strife unfolds in the
play of sympathies and antipathies, identifications and assertions
of difference. For my self asserts its 'selfishness' in a consti-
tutive self-distinction from some analogous self, from some common
image of various selves analogously situated in the matrix of their
common activity, just as the very 'essence' of an 'object' as well
as such 'subjects' is to differentiate themselves from some partial
inscription in and reduction to the 'poetic' order of image, sense,
emotion and so on.
'In the limit' (once more) two 'I's differ in their physical embodiment as things in external space; and yet simply as bodies 'I' and 'you' are utterly symmetrical: there is no 'objective' ground for 'my' consciousness and body being my mine rather than your mine. Similarly, in the other extreme, we share symmetrically a nominal locus of questioning and assertion in the impossible limit of 'pure' thinking or theory, cartesian self-consciousness, pure transcendental subjectivity or whatever other version one chooses. If in collective activity I cannot 'see' my next move, and mark this impasse with a question, you may be able to decide between various lines of action open in my situation by responding to the analogy of our positions, helping me direct my assertion or action to the common good. Habermas' ideal dialogue tends towards the realisation of an ideal community whose activity is perfectly coordinated towards a recasting of Kant's transcendental Good, itself earlier framed precisely in terms of the symmetry of all actors or agents, 'I's. Rorty simply argues for the resolution of conflicting orientations through the discursive resolution of their transcriptions into the discursive space and time of debate, as being pragmatically the optimal orientation. Lyotard enters the three-cornered debate with his polemic in favour of irresoluble polemic. ...And yet this debate about the coupling of discourse, and theory as one variety of discourse, with other dimensions of the activity it constitutes is itself conducted 'in' theory, in a purely textual dynamic of 'argument' over the 'correct' discourse on the radical embedding of discourse in action, in human interaction: in the internal textual drama whose dynamic is as a whole organised in the shared abstraction of each of the three participants in the 'debate' from its extratextual components, a common substitution of the linguistic space and time of question and answer, of that order of substitution, for a wider 'space' of activity in which that shared substitution itself comes 'into question'. The question, for example, of differing institutions or constitutions of the supposedly shared discursive 'space' of the argument in France, Germany and the United States - in french, german and...english (or is it american english, or simply american...?)...
Now Derrida's departure from ENS in 1985, and his institution of a new axis of his questioning in EHESS, the old VIe Section of the Ecole Pratique, as 'Les Institutions Philosophiques', itself marks a break with his previous part of induction of agrégation students into that mastery of the textual space of 'philosophy', which, under examination, will in some cases guarantee their own transposition into the place of formal authority in that 'space' as instituted in France. Philosophy as questioning taken to its limit: but if one questions the abstraction of a textual 'space' of argument and philosophy from its coupling in the French institution of 'Philosophy' with various contextual dimensions as part of French activity as a whole, then one may find that the sort of 'philosophical' text one produces in response to this more 'radical' questioning proves so to speak 'politically' unacceptable to the agrégation Jury appointed by the Minister of Education to recruit new philosophy teachers for the various institutions of secondary and tertiary education - for whose contribution to national activity as a whole he is responsible to an elected government and so, ultimately to the possibly unphilosophical mass of electors within the widest institution of France itself.

Derrida's agrégation seminar, until his move to EHESS, might be seen as a limiting version of that model of 'philosophy' reproduced since the foundation of the ENS in the 1790s in the circuit from lycées learning to paraphrase 'classic' texts according to the models presented in his (or her) textbooks and by the teacher in front of the class, through licence or classes supérieures, maîtrise, and agrégation or CAPES prepared in University or Grande Ecole, back to the lycée - but now as teacher able to 'expose' or present any text or catena of texts in the western philosophical tradition within a unitary space of reading, of questions and answers and questioning of earlier questions, of which he has at last mastered, as it were, the philosophical grammar, rather than as the pupil which he once was, beginning to learn this special language, like those now before him. A textual space of question and answer in which, or into which, any previous questioning or theory can in principle be mapped...
simply by that bringing-into-question of its questioning which is critical reading, finally brought by each teacher into a unitary articulation through that authority which is his or her discovery, consolidation, and assertion of their own critical instance of questioning and theorising - that instance of 'I' as locus of question and response equally 'outside' all the texts of the tradition or syllabus, and so uniformly coordinating their inscription and correlation within the new 'space' of questions it organises around itself, in a constant recasting of the cartesian tradition. Derrida takes this tradition to a historical limit by embedding the whole tradition and its dynamic simply in its language or textuality 'as such', rather than in some more abstract traditional 'space' of philosophical reading - whose own textual dynamic of its abstraction from 'mere' textuality or language he has critically 'read' to define - or pose the question of - his own 'position'.

One might compare this french tradition or 'school' of instituted Philosophy - the primary axis of 'philosophical' questioning and theory in France since the Revolution - with the analogous american institution as represented - indeed as largely instituted - by Dewey. In the former case the operation is directed by the identification with an instance of 'I' in the textual 'space' of the western philosophical tradition, which allows one to 'expose' or transcribe or represent any given philosophical text, and the textual dynamics of its various relations to earlier and later texts, into the textual space systematically articulated 'around' that identification with an instance of critical questioning and assertion. The philosophy 'teacher' serves both as model with which pupils may identify and so imitate, and as sympathetic critic who opens up questions in the nascent teachers' expositions, helping them to organise their response to the texts of the syllabus in the direction of systematic self-assertion and the adoption of a systematic critical position of their own. Dewey's ideal of the School, on the other hand, is to generate critical mastery of the social, rather than the textual matrix - the pupil's identification, so to speak, in the grammar of action rather than in the abstract textual space of reflection.
When French students from lycées, University, and grandes écoles read Marcuse in 1968 and for a few short months lived out the fantasme of self-assertion in a sort of wider social text in which the old politics of educational induction into alienated parts in the various coupled components of the 'spectacle' of French society were thought to have been finally themselves 'brought into question' and relegated to History, this precipitated an eventual reorganisation of the University of Paris into a range of various 'spaces' of exposition into which teaching staff in Philosophy and other disciplines grouped themselves, those of similar positions or dispositions constituting so many separate 'universities' within the old buildings (and some rapidly constructed new ones, such as the isolated site in the Bois de Vincennes outside the périphérique to which the most radical teachers migrated) among which prospective students could now freely choose as frame of their studies.

Progressive philosophy teachers congregated in Paris I:

DESANTI, Jean-Toussaint

941 *Les Idéalités Mathématiques* 1968

942 *La Philosophie Silencieuse* 1975

BOUVERESSE, Jacques

943 *Une Parole Malheureuse* 1971

BACHELARD, Suzanne

JANKELEVITCH, Vladimir

BELAVAL, Yvon

KOFFMANN, Sarah

MACHEREY, Pierre....

...while traditionalists grouped themselves in Paris IV, which alone maintained the title 'Sorbonne', and where alone the more conservative offspring of the Parisian bourgeoisie would venture:
...and while the opening towards the mathematical logic represented by Desanti, Bachelard and Bouveresse at Paris I could only find an isolated institutional base in Roger Martin's seminar at Paris V ('University' of Mathematics and Information Sciences) - which he effectively shared with Bouveresse.

Meanwhile Kristeva's embedding of texts in the 'scientific' matrix of structural linguistics, and an equally 'scientific' psychoanalytic dynamics theoretically posited by Lacan as (so to speak) the 'other side' of that linguistic matrix from the pure cartesian consciousness of traditional theory or 'science', found its place amongst the more traditional 'scientific' laboratories, lecture halls, computing installations and so on in the huge new Jussieu complex of the 'Science' University, Paris VI-VII, rather like a little image in the University as a whole of the Ecole Pratique, with which many of its seminars shared dual status:

Paris VII - Departement des Sciences des Textes et des Documents (STD)

KRISTEVA, Julia

946 Exprimer: Recherches pour une Sémanalyse (papers 196 - ) 1969
947 La Révolution du Langage Poétique 1974

948

If la femme does not exist 'in theory' - whether in the theoretical dynamic of Eperons or in lacanian theory of the 1970s (rather than that of 1955 criticised by Derrida in 1975) where 'lafemme n'ex-siste pas' - then, one is tempted to add, Julia Kristeva is that woman, organising the various theoretical axes of the various 'structuralisms' in the analogical or poetic space articulated around her place of femme. A space instituted at Paris VII in seminars dominated by french women and immaculate japanese men with attache cases.
A space of Japanese men and French women focused in *la chinoise* (in the jargon of 1968) with whom, at the centre of the editorial space and assuring the practical or political direction of that primary textual axis of 'structuralism', Tel Quel, Derrida broke after 1968 — publishing his critique of Lacan in 1975 in the more neutral space of Todorov's *Poétique*. And just as *la femme*, formally marked in his text of 1972 as 'outside' any theoretical determination in the textual matrix of 'inside' and 'outside', concretises over the late seventies as a particular woman who in the common context of Derrida's texts coordinates their 'direction' in the figural dynamic of desire and love, so does Kristeva's coordination of Parisian and other theory around the primary Lacanian figure of (m)other and nascent identity of the child become practically embedded in her assumption of the position of mother and analyst.

The central 'woman' of Parisian theory, organising around her the poetic space, the intertextuality, of 'structuralism', as so many analogous 'positions' coordinated with that of the 'father-figure' Lacan — organising in relation to some poem, say, the theoretical dynamic of interpretation in the symmetry of all those male responses to the fundamental question posed by the poem (this then analogous to Petitot's mathematical frame, itself doubling as STD and EHESS seminar) — may serve as a sort of middle term between the various more or less 'orthodox' positions and teaching spaces in Paris proper (within the périphérique or the old line of fortifications it follows) and that Rousseauistic opposition which is a Parisian version of being 'outside' Parisian theoretical space in the woods of Vincennes over the 1970s:

**Paris VIII**

Département de Philosophie

DELEUZE, Gilles

949 *Empirisme et Subjectivité* 1953

950 *Différence et Répétition* 1968

951 *Logique du Sens* 1969
Rhizome echoes the wandering or rambling of the seminar of 1974-5; Cinéma the seminar from 1975 until the early eighties: an 'empirical' wandering around in the analogical space of the various 'orthodox' theories - latterly the space of the moving image - moved only by what may in passing be marked by various terms practically adapted to the 'agencement' of such 'délires' in the particular 'territoire' in which it happens to find itself. I remember a student suggesting that the seminar should transfer itself to the woods outside: the participants would carry on their reflections from exchange to exchange as the various separate paths crossed and recrossed, in a sort of mobile capitonnage. This suggestion was ruled out by Deleuze on practical grounds: there had to be a certain degree of spatial liaison if the enterprise was to retain any character of inquiry, any coherent space; the délires could not be completely déliés. And yet the space in which the participants were being trained to find themselves and orient themselves within by the 'nouveau cartographe' (in the phrase of what the cartographe called 'un nouvel archiviste') was still not acceptable to the French government as a new version of the classical textual space still elaborated at the 'Sorbonne', into which a philosophy teacher might be paid to induct the nation's young. Course credits, whether for Arkle, Lacan, or real students, were of no value in that dominant an-nomadic agencement of centralised government of hospitals for schizophrenics, stock-exchanges, and state schools, which yet nominally recognized the bouc émissaire or pharmacy sent out to Vincennes after 1968 as part of the reconstituted University. ...And, indeed, on a deep level of analogy the process agencé rather chaotically around the crumpled figure of Deleuze at his desk in the crowded room among the trees, was the same process of induction into a French textual space as that practised throughout the University 'proper' in Paris itself... an analogy underlined in thoroughly derridean manner by the formal status of
Deleuze' and Lyotard's Philosophy Department as only one half
of the Département de Philosophie et Psychanalyse, the chair al-
ternating between Châtelet and Miller, whose colleagues presided
over the strict exposition of the lacanian canon in the (usually
locked) rooms diametrically across from the Philosophy Department
on the same floor of the same building: Another department 'outside'
orthodox academic space, and diametrically opposed both physically
and metaphorically to deleuzian delirium, in its closed circuit of
inscription of textual space within the analogical matrix of 'the
Unconscious' organised around 'the place of the Other' in language,
as this 'other' side of language was theoretically framed in the
canonical lacanian texts whose authority was assured by their
normative self-inscription in the analytic dynamic of fantasme
and transfert they prescribed - an authority maintained by the
strict discipline of 'the School', determining the place of the
nominally academic department in the formation of its hierophants,
much to the outrage of the early students who thought that mere
passage through the formal business of credits and degrees out in
the woods would allow them to set themselves up as lacanian ana-
lysts in town...

LYOTARD, Jean-François

955 Economie Libidinale 1974
956 Instructions PaKennes 1977
957 La Condition Postmoderne 1979
958 Le Différend 1984

(I remember the mot d'ordre thrown out with a definitive flourish
in a seminar of 1977: 'Le problème pour nous autres postmodernes,
ce n'est plus de capter le flux du capital, mais de maximiser la
performance')

Département de Psychanalyse

MILLER, Jacques-Alain

With Lacan's death and the move of Paris VIII from Vincennes to
'Vincennes à St Denis' (interesting for the cartographer, whose
seminar was transferred from a room overlooked by trees in a wood
to a Nissen hut beside a busy dual carriageway in the industrial
suburb) the heir moved his own seminar into town, to the Ecole des Arts et Métiers.

Finally, further out still, to Paris XII at Nanterre, where the radicals who ended up at Vincennes heralded the Evenements of 1968 towards the close of 1967...and back to Ricoeur's seminar, which I mentioned in opening the reflections on Derrida's. Nanterre: so far out that Ricoeur actually held his seminar at one of the research centres of the CNRS in Paris; and so far out that it didn't seem to be part of parisian intellectual space at all, caught rather somewhere between Eastern Europe and North America, with a wide variety of students still continuing the international Phenomenological Movement in the various countries from which they came to study, and a steady procession of visiting colleagues from Louvain, Warsaw, Prague, Canada, the United States and so on...

Paris XII

RICOEUR, Paul

959 De l'Interpretation: Essai sur Freud 1965

960 La Métaphore Vive 1975

...In the midst of a deconstruction of subjectivity and consciousness in a linguistic space whose theory theoretically embedded itself in the primacy of the 'other' side of the verbal matrix, the dynamic of 'the Unconscious' is 'reduced' à la Merleau-Ponty to a conscience ambiguë - and in the seminar over the mid-seventies this was coupled with the study of the complementary anglo-american version of that 'other' side of the verbal matrix, as the practical embedding of language in action. Photocopies of papers from anglophone philosophical journals would arrive efficiently a few days before the seminar, through the post, and 'exposition' would follow a few days later at CNRS. I never quite understood the point of this attempt to transpose the anglo-american debate into a parisian textual space; it seemed like the worst of both worlds, though in retrospect the questions implicit in this collation of french
'space' of 'reading philosophy', and anglophone pragmatics of language seem to suggest some radical pregnancy (to borrow an old term from Phenomenology), echoed in my reflection on the 'pragmatics' of Derrida's theory, or rather of its theoretical and practical embedding or inscription in the 'analogical' dynamics of human interaction. At the time I was most struck by the arrival at the seminar one week of Anna-Maria Tymieniecka (once a student of Roman Ingarden) whose book Why is there Something rather than Nothing? (the dedication is 'To my mother, Countess..., of whom my earliest memory is of her reading Bergson to me on her knee' or something like that) I had bought and treasured at Oxford as a sort of largely incomprehensible symbol of an almost comic echo from the 'other side' of Philosophy from that taught there. I was deputed to take her back to her hotel on the Metro - she was famous for losing her way, apparently - and had, in the context, a transcendentally comic discussion about the Phenomenological Movement on the way.

So much for the physical and institutional space, scene, in which I found myself critically reading the various 'structuralist' and 'post-structuralist' texts upon the embedding of the theoretical axis of their questioning in the in some sense extra-theoretical dynamics of context. Context - but never precisely that actual dramatic context: always a textual framing of some abstract configuration of 'context' in general, in the substitution of the space of the text for the space and time in which that text practically came 'into question' as one variable coordinating intra-textual and extra-textual variables in the scene or drama of its very production. Derrida had indeed, as I realised in 1985, organised his questioning of writing between 1977 and 1979 in the literary dynamic of a one-sided roman épistolaire philosophique, in the symmetry of the theoretical axis of reflection or speculation and the figural order of an image which was both the mirror of that reflection, and the medium in the spatiotemporal matrix of human interaction of a certain
'correspondence' à travers le miroir, organising the 'direction' of the writing and reflection in the sexual axis of that amour in which 'I' responds to the identification, the analogical identity of my 'I' and yours...

Qui écrit? A qui? Et pour envoyer, destiner, expédier quoi? A quelle adresse? Sans aucun désir de surprendre, et par là de capter l'attention à force d'obscurité, je dois à ce qui me reste d'honnêteté de dire que finalement je ne le sais pas. Surtout je n'aurais pas accordé le moindre intérêt à cette correspondance et à ce découpage, je veux dire à leur publication, si quelque certitude m'avait à ce sujet satisfait.

This contextual frame of his 'theoretical' writing in the rest of the volume remains essentially a question for Derrida, coordinate with the questions organised in the institutional space of ENS seminar and elsewhere 'in public', but the publicly instituted reflection on writing and reading, and the private axis, here published (with the privacy, and la femme remaining here in the internal gaps excised in the letters, rather than in the so to speak 'external' gap around 'J'ai oublié mon parapluie' or Eperons as a whole) constituting so to speak the 'other side' of the public persona and its theoretical direction, are not coordinated in some more radical question of philo-sophia, the drama of inquiry into inquiry, any more than they are directly coordinated with Derrida's political response to the french institution of Philosophy as 'practically' brought into question by Giscard's 'pragmatic' proposals for educational reform:

961 GREPH Qui a Peur de la Philosophie? Paris 1977
962 Les Etats Généraux de la Philosophie Paris 1979

The institution itself, perhaps, militates against the coordination in a single axis of questioning, a single 'space' and time of an inquiry framed in the symmetry of internal and external dimensions or coordinates of the inquiry itself (its 'matrix', then), of the 'internal' space of an agrégation seminar, the sexual axis of its embedding in the wider context of human interaction in France (and abroad), and the political axis of that complementary 'public' space of human interaction articulated in the generic symmetries of one's various 'parts' (class, race, gender and so on) one plays
in 'institutionalised' social interaction, abstracted from the private singularity which is one self. With Giscard replaced by Mitterand and Haby by Chevènement, the two 'public' components, 'internal' and 'external', of the classic space of academic French Philosophy, may be coupled in the question or possibility of a new institution of Philosophy whose axis would be precisely that coupling...

Collège International de Philosophie: Sciences, Intersciences, Arts
Rapport présenté à M. Jean-Pierre Chevènement
..par François Châtelet, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Pierre Faye, Dominique Lecourt
(Paris 30 September 1982)

...but I have already described the manner in which the old 'space' of exposition and reading 'philosophy' texts has been simply carried over into the new institution - as into Derrida's EHESS seminars back at the rue d'Ulm: Derrida may well inquire into the primary institutional frame of the national School of inquiry, within the overall axis of inquiry at EHESS defined by the question of 'Les Institutions Philosophiques'; but the personal trajectory which led from his questioning of his part inducting ENS students into the mastery of the textual space of the western philosophical tradition, as in GREPH, Etats Généraux, and CIPH that part and space began to come into question in a sort of reiteration of the 1960s move from abstract theory into its textual dynamic (a move from text, now, towards the wider or more radical space in which it appears as one variable in the private and public dynamics of context) is still not directly coupled to the academic exposition of say, Tocqueville's exposition of 'Philosophy in America' in the essentially verbal space of his seminar, with its traditional scenario of monological reflection on a text before a passive audience, for whom the very institution of that space of the seminar is not, 'in' the seminar, 'in question'. The only way the institution of Derrida's questioning of the institution of systematic questioning is in question for these students, is in the silent personal alternative of, say, attending the seminar this week or not, continuing to seek a EHESS diploma or not. The private life of student and teacher is institutionally abstracted from, to the singular part of teacher and the plural part of silent audience of this one-dimensional theatre,
which here, as at CIPH, and in all other state institutions, governs the public dynamic of parts in abstraction from the more radical question of the relation of the various players to their parts.

In an iteration of the 'sixties move from the abstract matrix of traditional 'theoretical' questions into a linguistic or textual matrix in which that dynamic is inscribed as one 'side' doubled by its 'other' analogical side, and its dynamic (in lacanian terms, the side and dynamic of the Other), the 'institutional' dynamic of the academic 'space' and time of reading theory (a space of which the 'sixties matrix and dynamic of 'textuality' appears as a sort of extreme or limiting version) can no more be articulated 'in' such a space of the seminar, abstracted from the poetic or practical dynamics of movement of teacher and students 'into' and 'out of' the ritual of the classic seminar, than, say, the converse 'analogical' side of its linguistic framing or constitution can be adequately mapped into the side of a 'theory' abstracted from its own such constitution in language. — This no more than the aristotelian topology of logical 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' could adequately frame the inclusion of that millenial 'logical space' itself in the cosmic context constituted by other coordinate dimensions with their own topologies and associated dynamics — their own, different modes of a radically equivocal or analogical 'being-in'. The aristotelian logic of inscription of its logical or theoretical dimension or topology 'in' the wider coordination of different modes of 'being-in' it formally mapped in language, closed not with a logical or theoretical framing of the inscription of that its framing in a cosmic coordination of theoretical text and its coordinate contexts, but rather in the radically analogical matrix of a 'wisdom' or σοφία logically 'beyond' or 'outside' logic, in the practical axis of 'love', φιλία. The limiting attempt to reiterate the move from theory to text or language, through the linguistic embedding of the textual order of theory in a practical, 'institutional' coupling of text and social context in a socio-logical dynamic of roles or parts in social interaction of 'groups' (defined by a range or group of individuals' symmetric participation in or playing of a common part), practically confronts a radical impasse which is the analogue in the practical order of coupling of text (or
'script') and action or interaction, of the earlier attempt (criticised by Derrida in Husserl's version) to map the analogical 'side' of its linguistic constitution into the abstract 'theoretical' space constituted in 'impure' ordinary language.

Bourdieu, at the Ecole Pratique, over the 'sixties and 'seventies, was inquiring into the group dynamics exemplified in the French educational institutions in which this very research was itself instituted. In 1984 he published, on the one hand a series of responses (in interviews, colloquia, and so on) to questions which arose in relation to this questioning or inquiry in the extra-textual dynamics of the specific contexts of such relatively 'informal' exchange (with reporters, students and so on):

964 BOURDIEU, Pierre Questions de Sociologie (1972-80) 1984

...and on the other hand a systematic summary of his investigations from the late sixties onwards, into the French academic world in which those investigations had themselves been pursued, closing with a detailed application of his 'results' to the sociological analysis of that 'crisis' in the French academic world which was 1968, but opening with a direct confrontation with the radically 'dramatic' configuration of his attempt to systematically question the institutional frame and dynamics of that questioning:

965 Homo Academicus 1984

En prenant pour objet un monde social dans lequel on est pris, on s'oblige à rencontrer, sous une forme que l'on peut dire dramatisée, un certain nombre de problèmes épistémologiques fondamentaux, tous liés à la question de la différence entre la connaissance pratique et la connaissance savante, et notamment à la difficulté particulière et de la rupture avec l'expérience indigène et de la restitution de la connaissance obtenue au prix de cette rupture.

The opening sentence of the presentation of the results of this inquiry into the institutional frame of this inquiry, thus locates the radically dramatic axis of the whole enterprise as residing in the interface of 'everyday' unscientific experience 'outside' the institutional part of the theorist (in the Lebenswelt, so to speak), and the instituted theoretical space (in which the 'part' of sociologist constitutes around it a 'scientific' matrix
of questions and answers) into which the theorist passes from 'la connaissance pratique' - and this practically, or as one move 'in' his Lebenswelt - and from which he must return with his theory of the interaction of theory and practice, in setting his theoretical elaboration as text in the dynamic of which it is an analysis.

Bourdieu the individual sociologist thus tries to map out the practical interactions of 'theorists' as a group of individuals symmetric insofar as they are 'theorists', with various other groups in the historical dynamic of the social configuration in which they play this part, in which they produce 'theory': and this without reducing the variety of the individual players of this part in French society around 1970 to some uniform theoretically defined 'part' or stereotype, but taking as axial in the analysis just that interface of this part of 'abstraction' from individual characteristics to something like a theoretical 'I' as instance of scientific question and assertion, with the various other parts and interactions and associated institutions whose multifarious correlations with the part of 'theorist' must be empirically discovered in the whole range of individual French academics, or at least in (theoretically) significant samples.

Thus, even 'theoretically', the logical extension from the embedding of logic in textuality or language, to the embedding of the linguistic order of theoretical seminar, debate, text, and so on in the practical order of interaction of this part of 'theorist' with other parts in various other institutions interacting with the institution of Theory in the cultural context of the French Nation (as more or less maximal institution, coordinate with the French language of the theory, the economy of teaching-posts, the more or less unitary hierarchical coordination of French institutions of theory under the Ministry of Education, and so on)... even 'logically' this implies the passage (in and) out of the abstract linguistic space and time of exposition or analysis of the configuration of such analysis, into a practical or dramatic order formally corresponding to the 'analogical' side of language (by which the language of theory is so to speak practically embedded in the concrete situations of production of theory). The configuration of each move into the theoretical or textual space of inquiry into the coupling
of this space and its dynamic with the institutional dynamics of its various contexts, can no longer itself be considered as 'theoretically' neutral, any more than the various traditional analogies in whose terms classical theory abstracted itself from the figural order of analogy, can be so considered after the de-ridean 'deconstruction' of this millenial dynamic of Abstraction.

Bourdieu's own part in French academic life was so to speak canonised in 1982 by his move from the Ecole Pratique to a chair at the Collège de France. I did not list either of the books just cited along with those by various colleagues at either of these two institutions of inquiry, as I never made the transition from the Parisian Lebenswelt into the theoretical, institutional and physical space of Bourdieu's seminar or cours - working as I was from a more abstract theoretical side of inquiry into the coupling of Theory and the contexts of which it framed theories. Let me then complete the lists of the books that mark so many textual and contextual coordinates of my encounter with the Parisian theory of around 1970 and since, by adding those which I confronted in abstraction from practical experience of the institutional spaces of their elaboration, but grouping them, nevertheless, within the same pattern of institution of theory which served to range those listed already:

Ecole Pratique (EHESS)

BRAUDEL, LE ROY LADURIE - already noted

966 GENETTE, Gérard

   Figures I 19
   II 19

IHES

967 Séminaire de Géométrie Algébrique, 1964: Théorie des Topos et Cohomologie étale des Schémas: (GROTHENDIECK, ARTIN, VERDIER) Berlin 1972

Paris XII

968 BAUDRILLARD, Jean

   Le Système des Objets (1968) 1972

969

   L'Effet Beaubourg 1977

970

   L'Amérique 1986
Bourdieu, as it were the exemplary representative of French sociology, at the Collège de France, articulates in that institutional space the 'exposition' of its own embedding in the practical order of interaction of parts in France - the interaction in which that very space of its own analysis is both theoretically and practically 'constituted', defined: this theoretical space of embedding of French theoretical space in the practical interaction of parts which is 'France' itself explicitly 'entered into' at the outset of the exposition as merely one 'side' so to speak of an essentially 'dramatic' interface of theoretical and practical 'space' and time. Derrida meanwhile (1985) constructs in the instituted theoretical space of reading which is his EHESS seminar held at ENS, a reading of Tocqueville's French reading of 'American thought', 'Philosophy in America' in the context (the opening of the second half) of 'Democracy in America', the context of that American democratic symmetry of parts - or 'freedom' of any individual to accede, in principle, to any part - together with its 'analogical' dynamic of universal suffrage (for white males, at any rate) under an egalitarian 'constitution', which organises the activity of the Nation as a whole in this symmetry. Tocqueville seeks in 'cartesian' French manner to frame an abstract 'sociology' of America; and in defining its moving principle systematically in terms of a symmetry of 'I's or individuals ('equality', 'freedom', 'democracy') otherwise unconstrained in virgin Nature separated by thousands of miles of sea from any civilised neighbours, he at once determines the context of American thought 'within' the cartesian principle of systematic framing of its global context within the textual articulation of a 'logical' space of questions and theories around the abstracted function of cartesian doubt and responding assertion.... and at the same time presents what he thus defines, as itself bringing radically into question the abstract space of systematic thought in which it has been defined, just as it brings into question the whole European social order of well-defined parts abstracted from the fundamental democratic symmetry or identity of free individuals, in which this traditional part of sophisticated European Philosophy is itself one component. Brings the coordinated abstractions from radical democratic symmetry of parts into question, by presenting America as a
sort of 'laboratory of the future', in which those forces which towards the middle of the nineteenth century are appearing in the fragmentary characters they assume in reaction to the old fixed order of abstraction of hierarchical parts from symmetric democratic freedoms in Europe, may be scientifically, philosophically analysed with a view to organising the inevitable transition from the old order into Liberty and Equality in the Old World, with the minimal amount of that terrible dislocation and destruction which was first seen, in France, in the bloody transition from eighteenth to nineteenth century.

Bourdieu presents his theory of the embedding of theory in the social matrix of activity as explicitly 'one side' of the interface of 'theory' and 'practice' which I have suggested corresponds to the theoretical and practical, or logical and analogical 'sides' of language - this rather as Derrida presents the theoretical 'space' of Épervons as embedded by the openness of the linguistic matrix around it, like the space of possible constructions around 'J'ai oublié mon parapluie', in the metaphorical dynamic of desire which cannot, in principle, itself be definitively embedded 'in' theory. I suggested that the 'analogical' side of language itself reflects the practical character of linguistic terms in the particular limited configurations of verbal and non-verbal 'variables' in particular 'situations' into which language enters as one dimension (which cannot then be definitively abstracted from its coupling with the other dimensions of such situations, to frame some unitary logical or linguistic 'space' in which the situation might itself be logically inscribed). Thus one might re-read Épervons in this light in terms of the theatrical dynamics of the Cérisy scenario of its initial delivery: the abstract textual formulation of the irreducible embedding of that abstract formulation in an analogical dynamic of what one might mark (but not hope to theoretically 'define') as 'desire', might then appear as a somewhat questionable narcissistic flirtation of the theoretical dandy with his mixed audience. One might perhaps, recast the script as...'Derrida's Prick', and question just what or who it was poking at: the Envois of the Carte Postale...
are repeatedly explicit on this score: the audience thought he was talking to them about metaphor or whatever, but 'they', the anonymous plural third person, was blind to the real destination of his talk, which is always the same as the destination of his postcards - not some abstract 'femme' formally marking what the pen...would pin down, and whose constant elusion draws the pen constantly forward over the paper, making that string of marks we call writing - but rather a particular woman en chair et en os absent from the lecture-hall...and that non-verbal matrix traced by Loubrieu's pen between Derrida's pages of words.

Bourdieu theoretically framing the embedding of his theory, its institutional space or matrix, in the practical order of interactions which is French 'society', and underlining the practical side of his own theoretical enterprise, theoretically. Derrida questioning the paradoxical character of Tocqueville's framing of symmetric society and institutions in the asymmetric abstraction of the cartesian theoretical space as instituted in France, which is itself supposedly brought into question by the social dynamic it frames - brought into question as one component in the various linked coordinates of the old European order which must pass away in a future whose image is America. And Derrida, in this, echoing that same paradox in the French theoretical 'space' of reading abstracted from the dramatic order signalled by Bourdieu, as I, at least, in his audience felt that the primary scene of the questions he was addressing before those Japanese and American and French students was the very ENS Theatre in which he pursued his lectio behind a table on the stage. And Baudrillard, meanwhile, in America, rewriting De Tocqueville in his travelling diary, doubling Bourdieu's explicit abstraction from the complementarity of theoretical and 'practical' dynamics of writing 'sociology', by a theoretically motivated embedding of his 'observations' in the actual 'moving' or travelling practical space and time of the various American situations in which these observations on 'the American scene' were made. Again and again there recurs the observation that 'no sociology can properly compete with the experience of...'. Once again, as in Tocqueville, America is the image of Europe's, and now of the Globe's future...even if the Americans
themselves are blind to this image, even if the whole drama is Baudrillard's fantasy of America; for it is just this very space of fantasy coordinate with the European's theoretical identification in America of the symmetry of parts which finally dissolves the millenial abstraction of the theoretical 'I' itself in the perfect mirror of the American TV screen organising the whole simulacrum of The World around it....it is just this order of appearance or experience in which there are no longer separate subjects and objects and subjectivities and objectivities, which is the Future that Baudrillard maps out for Europe and for the New World in which the separate identity of Europe is dissolving.

If the 'space' of traditional systematic questioning or 'philosophy', instituted in book or seminar (or various correlative scenarios of dialogue abstracted from the question of their own theatricality), itself comes 'into question', in an 'eighties iteration of the 'structuralist' moves of the 'sixties from abstract matrix of 'thought' to the embedding and dynamic of this in the very language in which that abstraction is constituted or instituted...then any attempt to frame, and respond to, this question, and to articulate around such question and response a new 'space' of Philosophy (in which the textual space of the 'sixties and 'seventies appears as merely one component dimension), cannot be simply framed 'in' the old institutions of text and seminar abstracted from the question textually marked by Bourdieu as the 'rupture' or break into and out of such 'spaces' of questions. What appears 'formally' in such spaces as an order of questioning posed by their embedding or inscription in the 'pragmatics' of philosophical texts (written or spoken) themselves, can no more be 'resolved' within such a space abstracted from the dynamics of its coupling to its various contextual dimensions, than could the husserlian question of the linguistic constitution of transcendental subjectivity be resolved 'in' the space and time of that abstracted subjectivity. Thus Bourdieu's Homo Academicus as 'theoretical' model of the interplay of theory and its dramatics or pragmatics, Baudrillard's dramatisation of a theoretically motivated inscription of the
sociologist 'in' the American symmetry of parts which dissolves the millenial abstraction or transcendence of autonomous theoretical 'I', Lyotard's discourse on the embedding of any discourse in its 'pragmatics', and Derrida's questioning of a French philosophical space which frames its own scarcely tenable abstraction from Tocqueville's and Baudrillard's American drama, by framing that drama within its abstract cartesian coordinates...all these may be read, or seen, as so many textual coordinates of a transition from the abstract verbal space of structural and 'post-structural' analysis, into what is only formally determined 'in' that space of questions and corresponding theories, as a dramatic context in which no configuration of transition from such interaction (of which the verbal is only one dimension coordinate with others) into some verbal framing of that transition, can any more be considered 'neutral' (any more than the various analogies which frame the abstraction of an older 'theoretical' space from the figural order of analogy).

One cannot iterate the 'structuralist' move from theory to text, from an earlier 'logic' into the complementarity of logical and figural or analogical 'sides' of language, within a textual order abstracted from the configuration of its own embedding in a practical or dramatic order of 'entry' into the text, which a 'post-structuralist' text defines theoretically simply as the 'other' (or Other's) side of the theoretical dynamic of this logical opposition of logical and analogical. Textuality is embedded as one variable or dimension 'in' a poetic order whose autonomy cannot be adequately modelled or recuperated by that textual order - any more than Derrida's "femme" or "J'ai oublié mon parapluié" can be definitively pinned or penned down 'in' phallogocentric theoretical space.

And Bourdieu, Baudrillard, Lyotard and Derrida in the mid-eighties each in their different way frame textual responses to this continuation of the millenial dynamic of 'philosophical' questioning of the 'premisses' of previous questioning, in their various residual abstractions from a radical 'dramatisation' of their textual framings of embedding or inscription of that textual
framing in the configuration of coupling of text and context it nominally frames. For a new 'axis' of philosophical inquiry which responds or corresponds to an iteration in relation to the embedding of language in human interaction, to the 'structuralist' inscription of earlier theory in the complementarity and dynamic interaction of logical and figural 'sides' of language (from which the earlier theory had been 'figuratively' abstracted), can be 'formally' marked in the textual order of 'post-structuralism', but the question of this marking of the new axis as itself subject to the radical question of the linguistic order of marking as itself one variable in the question it purports to mark, cannot in principle find any satisfactory response outside the 'practice' of coupling marking and question, text and context, in the writing of the question of that writing of the question itself.

That is: the axis of questioning here in question must (we can go this far 'formally', just as, twenty years ago, one could 'logically' show that the analogical 'side' of language could not be definitively mapped into that logic - and so that the demonstration itself must actually exemplify somehow an analogical dynamic it could not in principle 'define') pass through, and articulate itself around (with our irreducible 'participation') what I tried, experimentally, to mark at the outset of this inquiry by opening simply with a 'question-mark', with the question of the marking of that question itself. I have attempted to 'experimentally' map this new axis of 'philosophy' by allowing it to direct this inquiry 'into itself', this questioning framed in the symmetry of its text and context, and the dynamic of transcription of that 'symmetry' into its textual order of questions. Each 'move' in the text is itself 'brought into question', transcribed into the textual order of questions, by the next move, and this simple question of the textual elaboration of the inquiry as itself a variable component in the unfolding configuration of text and context, 'constitutes' the philosophical axis of the inquiry as a whole, as a text, as a book, as an activity recorded, transcribed, over the course of writing the inquiry.
That is: any attempted response to the question textually posed by the formal symmetry of various dimensions of 'theoretical' text and context (a 'theoretical' text being considered as organised around an axis of questions) which abstracts in its institution or constitution from the question of its constitution as theory, as questioning - which abstracts from the character of textual response to a situation in which there are, among other things, paper, typewriter or pen, and so on, and in which the elaboration of a sequence of questions in the form of a theoretical text is only one activity open among others - which abstracts from the question of the 'question' as the marking of this open-ness as one thing open among others 'in' it - any such response abstracts in some degree from the open coupling of textual and contextual dimensions of the situation of its writing, to an unquestioned textual framing of what then appears not as 'this' text, but as generic 'text' in generic 'context', in the abstract verbal dynamic organised around the cartesian residue of a merely nominal 'I' as instance of question and assertion in the text, with which the writer identifies in the construction of the text, inviting the reader either to identify with him (or it), or to frame in his turn a more radical textual space of questions, in which the initial text may be brought 'into question' and inscribed.

I suggested at the close of Part III that various European and American 'schools' of theory around 1970 could be coordinated in the 'space' of questions unfolded from the opening question here of this inquiry itself, by correlating their various 'internal' textual orders with various contextual dimensions of a common geographical context, in relation to a common figure of abstraction of all these theories from the more radical question of the 'dramatic' coupling of text and context, and of text to text through a common context. I have suggested that various theoretical 'positions' elaborated in France since around 1970 as the abstract linguistic frame of 'structuralism' comes into question, may be considered as 'transitional', marking so many dimensions or coordinates of the passage from the textual axis of French theory around 1970, into a dramatic posing of the dramatic 'frame' of any questioning as a more radical axis of 'philosophy', and of more 'local' theories also, as coherent 'response' to various residually formal attempts to textually frame
the articulation of 'text' or 'discourse' as sequential configuration of verbal components or variables in the situation of composition, in which the construction of a text is only one activity 'open' among others - rather as the selection of one word or phrase rather than another at some point in the constitution of the said text is itself a variable, one space or dimension of possible substitution, in the text itself, allowing the linguistic mapping of the wider order of substitution of writing for other possible activities, into the narrower linguistic order of substitutions (through, for example, the word 'writing').

I have verbally inscribed various 'transitional' French texts of the nineteen-eighties in the 'space' of substitutions coordinate with the matrix of possible substitutions which is this text itself: this by bringing them into its space of questions, which is the textual marking of the coordination of this textual dimension of this situation of our writing or reading, with correlative contextual dimensions. Just as Derrida brought various apparently disparate 'texts' into a common space of language or textuality, and a common question of their abstraction as 'theories' from the figural dynamic of 'abstraction' from the figural 'side' of language - this in an iteration of the traditional reconstruction in each succeeding generation of a 'wider' critical space in which previous philosophical texts and their 'spaces' and times could be inscribed; and this also in a more or less constant French 'institution' of 'philosophy' leading down from Revolution, Empire, Restoration and Cousin, to Derrida himself - so now various different institutions of questioning may be coordinated through the different figures of their common abstraction from the 'dramatic' order of their composition. Thus Lyotard, Habermas, and Rorty, for example, may be read or seen to be vainly competing to conclusively inscribe the others' theoretical or discursive 'spaces' and times within their own, the transatlantic dynamic of the 'debate' about that embedding of theory in the contextual symmetry of parts in human interaction for which Tocqueville and Baudrillard take Rorty's America as model, itself driven by different national institutions of such theory (of which the discourses of Habermas, Lyotard and Rorty are 'representative' exemplars) and different identifications with the textual instance of question and assertion ('I', 'Je', 'Ich') which the disputants,
in their common abstraction from their different 'dramatic' instances of self-assertion in language (or rather, in their different languages) implicitly assume to be just an abstract function of question and assertion as such, in principle equivalent, subject to mere 'translation' or transposition from one language and national culture to the others. In their common abstraction from the actual drama of the debate in its transatlantic context, to argument over abstract models of inscription of text in dynamics of context (rather than discussing the actual drama of interaction of their different texts, scripts, parts, in the actual context of confrontation), they suppose that they are meeting in a common space of argument, a common textuality whose embedding in context is under debate - whereas what they actually share is a common abstraction to identification of a theoretical instance of question and assertion in their respective languages, which is differently instituted in the different national contexts of their respective texts, and which cannot be resolved into a single unitary definitive (victor's) space abstracted from its actual embedding in different contexts, but only resolved when the different 'versions' of the same abstraction from actual texts to textual models of 'text in context', all come into the same question of their abstraction.

In a specific situation of human interaction one might speak of questions 'arising' when an unquestioned 'working' of the situation so to speak breaks down - say, for example, one of the components of the situation deviates or differentiates itself from some 'analogy' that was working up to that point, and in which the part of one of the participants was engaged as itself one component of the situation. In some situations the breakdown of 'appearances' may constitute an impasse for a participant, who marks as a question the embedding of some configuration of the situation in a new configuration in which he or she can reassert themself: the breakdown of the previous configuration 'at some point' opens up a range of formally possible embeddings of the configuration 'up to that point' in the matrix of various possible 'extensions' so to speak of the configuration, and this range may be marked as a question addressed either to the participant himself (in 'thought') or to another participant who appears to be in a position, to encompass the part,
of resolving the impasse. Philosophy might be taken as an extreme case of such 'questioning' of one's situation, which proceeds by questioning each successive instance of its questioning, until it can frame the widest possible 'context' of the situation of questioning in relation to the mere function of 'question' itself, 'abstracting' from any specific 'part' of the philosopher in any specific situation to the mere instance of question and assertion, 'I', and the mere instance of its 'object' as what differentiates itself from its 'appearance' or 'appearances', as these are coordinated within the overall linguistic matrix abstracted from the practical business of marking various possible variations or substitutions in concrete situations in questions and answers to practical questions arising in specific situations.

Just as the passive 'spectator' of a 'play', 'theatre', can 'abstract' from his own fixed part among the other analogous fixed parts in the dark and silent auditorium, in the analogical dynamic of 'emotional' or 'sympathetic' identification with the 'actors' interacting in the poetic symmetry of their various 'parts' in the common action, so can the passive audience at a philosophy lecture identify with the teacher's own identification with the abstract textual 'I' that in reading or questioning his text stands back from its own instance of abstracted 'I' or thought, and inscribes it in a wider space or matrix of theoretical questions. And of course a member of the audience may in turn 'stand back' from the teacher's 'playing' of the part of reflection, and articulate his own reflection in a still 'wider' space - or perhaps in a personal space of reflection that is wider than some particular configuration of the teacher's space (and that of the teacher's own 'text') abstracted from the wider matrix in which that particular configuration is itself embodied in the teacher's thought. The part of thought is, so to speak, to stand back, abstract, or differentiate itself from any particular part - to question.

One might follow Freud or Piaget or various others in trying to trace the dynamic evolution of personality or that particular dimension around the part of conscious 'I' we call thought,
from its inception in the newborn baby through various more and more complex configurations over the course of a life constituted by a multitude of successive situations of interaction with others. We may abstract from this multitude as a whole to consider various 'structural' features of the sequence as a whole. Thus, for example, I might try and elaborate the sketch I have already given of the development of my own reflection, its 'space', from infancy through adolescence, Oxford, Paris, and the british countryside, through the successive configurations of books, institutions, sexual relations and so on: discovering 'philosophy' books at 13 or 14, leaving Oxford for Paris, and meeting both Debbie and Julia at 20 and 21, discovering myself in a new axis of response to questioning itself 'in question' at 27, finishing this marking of that new position finally at 34 - throughout it all a personality dominated by questioning and abstraction, and theoretically and practically finding that process finally coming full-circle when coming into its own instance of questioning in a 'space' of coordination of inquiry and context, whose so to speak homeostatic symmetry organising the male temporal axis of the quest, was ultimately found to be articulated about a particular woman (even ·if, as in so many other analogous cases - Dante, Hölderlin, Valéry and so on - the particular woman did not altogether recognise herself in the verbal narration of the drama).

I might then, retrospectively, see various components or dimensions of my questions and their context (as indeed I did, approaching 27) as 'unconsciously' converging, as through successive questions I tried to find a coherent 'position', framing my situation, and my part of framing in it, through questioning earlier philosophical texts, and the positions of various anglophone and french theorists whose reflections I witnessed in Oxford and Paris, while this 'abstract' line of inquiry was practically or dramatically coupled, all the while, with all the interactions which constituted its 'place' in european culture in the second half of the twentieth century.
Such a convergence of textual and contextual components of my life towards a coupling in a 'dramatic' response to the configuration of my textual attempt to articulate all theoretical questions in the symmetry of the internal 'space' of theories of the various internal and external dimensions of theory - a convergence towards the question posed by the symmetry in a particular situation of writing of such symmetry, between textual and contextual dimensions, the textual 'representation' of which was itself but one so to speak 'asymmetric' version of, and component in, the situation - this embodies, indeed partakes in, a wider convergence of various nationally instituted 'spaces' of reflection (theory, systematic questioning). A convergence of various verbal spaces of theory instituted in various languages - French, English, German (and American?) - towards a coupling one with another, through the coupling of each with various components of coupled contexts: for the 'dramatic' configuration of response to a French 'textual' space of theory of around 1970, 'coming into the question' posed by the radical asymmetry of a merely textual presentation of embedding of textuality in context, is the same space and time of dramatic coupling of text and context, as one enters by, say, extending the Anglo-American inquiry into the relations of a unitary formal 'logical' space in which 'ordinary' informal language is to be embedded, and the informality of the language in which that Quinean or Davidsonian project is itself constituted, to the question of the status of the very texts of the debate over (their) language, and the 'pragmatics' of the debate itself. One arrives, so to speak at the same 'point' (I arrive here, for example, in the dramatic axis of an inquiry into this inquiry itself) 'in' the coupling of theoretical text and context, whether one has extended the French question of inscription of theory in its textuality to that of embedding of textuality in context (which cannot be a merely 'textual' operation), or the Anglo-American questions relating to the interplay of syntax, semantics and pragmatics of formal and informal languages, to the coordination of these in the texts of the various component controversies themselves.
If the textual spaces of Lyotard, Rorty and Habermas remain so to speak incommensurable, in the interplay of respective mappings of the 'debate' on embedding of text in context into each of the contending spaces, this is itself a reflection of the residual abstraction of each of the writers' representative 'national' positions from the radical symmetry of the textual and contextual components of the debate itself, from which the apparently conflicting textual presentations of relations of 'text' and 'context' or 'pragmatics' differently abstract, this difference so to speak marking the different constitutions of 'theoretical space' in the writers' different languages, and marking also the common implicit assumption of the neutrality of the different authors' accessions to an apparently common 'space' of debate as untenable.

I have marked my position 'in' the coupling of the Parisian theory of around 1970 to its Parisian context in terms of an iteration of the 'sixties French move from 'abstract' phenomenological space and time to the space and time of language or textuality, which eventually leads to the impasse of any merely textual attempt to frame the 'dramatic' axis of coupling of text and contexts, which I have tried to mark by raising the question of the marking of what is open in the symmetry of textual and contextual dimensions of the situation of marking as itself only one 'line' open in the situation. The mapping of the situation of a mapping of what is open into the linguistic space of questions and of theoretical texts in particular is itself only one thing open in that situation, and no more 'neutral' in relation to what it marks or maps as the 'question' of questioning, than some figure of 'abstraction' of the logical from the figural 'side' of language in the constitution of an older 'theoretical space' is neutral in relation to the theoretical 'time' and 'space' so constituted. A certain order of text, even though it may bring into question the dynamics of the latter abstraction, may itself be brought into an analogous question (which may be marked, but not resolved, simply in the textual order of marking questions) as itself abstracted from the dynamics of its practical or dramatic institution and constitution as a questioning of 'the institution of philosophy'. The question of 'les institutions philosophiques' which may be marked and further elaborated 'in' a textual order of reflection on the embedding of text in pragmatics or context,
cannot find any satisfactory response in an institution of 'dramatisation' of theory (traditional parisian 'academic' space) which is itself constituted, along with its dynamic of inquiry, in a configuration of abstraction from the individual part in the drama to instituted parts of teacher and students or audience - constituted in abstraction from the biographical dynamics of accession to this 'space' which no more permits the opening-up of the seminar in this dynamic, than an earlier theoretical text permitted a 'deconstruction' of its 'theoretical space' in the more radical dynamics of interplay of logical and analogical 'sides' of the language of the text. Language is only one 'side' of the philosophical dynamic of questioning, and the philosophical text of book or seminar cannot be brought into question and resolved in that textual dimension alone, any more than the relations of logical and figural sides of the text can be definitively inscribed in the logical matrix of a theoretical text figuratively abstracted from the metaphorical dynamic of that inscription. The persistence of a transatlantic 'postmodern debate' is itself a mark of the persistence in the institutions of that debate of a traditional theatricality or scenario of 'philosophy' which appears equally in the mute 'following' by his audience of the teacher's part of critically reading his chosen text before them, 'acting' the 'I' of reflection, thought, and in the merely textual space of different and contending identifications of Lyotard, Habermas and Rorty (for example) with the function of question and assertion trying to organise the question of the relations of text and context 'around' it 'in' a text. In the textual order of questions developed from around 1970 in France, Germany and America there is no underlying function of question and assertion, of 'I' which any of these contending national parts of theorist could definitively assume, but the debate is rather directed by the analogical interplay of the three 'I's in the 'pragmatics' of the international debate itself, framed by their common abstraction from the parts of Jean-François Lyotard, Jurgen Habermas or Richard Rorty to different textual functions of questioning and assertion differently instituted in analogous abstractions of French, German and American 'institutions' of philosophy from a common dramatic axis of response to the various different posings in these different spaces of the question of their common abstraction.
Analogous, but different, orders of questions 'in' the various institutions or instituted spaces and times of 'philosophy' in different countries and languages from around 1970, then, all lead so to speak, through the recognition that the posing of the questions is itself a part of the question, to the same axis of response from which the different axes of posing questions in different schools, and of posing the question of this difference, have been differently abstracted.

Thus the oxonian frame of posing and resolving all questions in terms of the pragmatics of natural language, abstracted from the question of the pragmatics of such 'philosophy' itself (abstracted from the order of text and its cultural and historical context to the order of elementary components of text or language and culture or human interaction) allowed me to organise a critical position in relation to various parisian theories of around 1970 through a more or less mathematical framing of their various 'logics' of analogy (or of the relation of logical and analogical) as themselves formally analogous and differentiated and coordinated in the 'informal' frame of, say, a poem (rather than the 'poetics' of language framed in terms of 'language-games' or 'speech-acts'). At the same time the parisian primacy of the text as frame of philosophical inquiry allowed me to 'stand outside' or take a systematic critical position in relation to the texts of the anglo-american debates on language abstracted from the textual dynamic of the debate. And the inscription of both french and anglo-american axes of 'philosophy' around 1970 as complementary abstractions from the questioning of inquiry itself as dramatically articulated in the coupling of texts and contexts, allowed a fairly schematic working back from the analogy of these two institutions of abstraction, to an analogous german axis plotted on the basis of critical reading of far fewer texts - and no direct 'experience' of german teaching of philosophy apart from odd encounters at Oxford and Paris with visiting or displaced german philosophers.

The 'internal' development of questions within these various axes, institutions, national schools, languages, cultures, itself leads - that is - to the recognition in different posings
of the question of the embedding of theory in context, of the
'same' question: the question of different posings of the quest-
on of this difference; different textual orders of framing the
question of inscription of texts in the dynamics of their coupling
with their contexts - the question of this difference not being
adequately posable 'in' any abstract textual order, let alone
resoluble in the terms of such a space.

Just as the 'nouveaux philosophes' could group all the
abstract 'structuralisms' together as so many variants or dimen-
sions of that common ideological position or place of 'standing-
back' from the moral order of parts (Cicero's 'offices') in the
human drama, nominally bringing the whole existing social order
'into question', into the textual space of their systematic quest-
ioning - while Foucault could identify such a place of analogical
substitution of different theories one for another as a 'lacune de
gotabulaire' - and borrow from Lacan himself as 'representative'
structuralist the characterisation of his instance of assertion of
a 'structuralist' theory as primary 'marker' of such a place of
questioning or theory, its 'father-figure' organising in the text-
ual space of such theories the abstract textual dynamic of various
substitutions or attempted substitutions of other figures or instances
of assertion of theory in that place (Derrida's organisation around
this place of questions complementing Lacan's theoretical assertion,
for example, or Kristeva's 'feminine' or 'feminist' version which
may in turn be marked in the derridean version as the analogical
coordination of different theories around the place of femme,
theoretically 'outside' theory) - so one may class the 'nouveaux
philosophes' themselves as so many complementary variations on a
common ideological position (unlike the 'structuralists' they posi-
tively assumed the common 'moral' direction or orientation coord-
inate with such an analogy - and this is itself perhaps the funda-
mental analogy between their 'positions' or parts); and one may
further class 'structuralists' and 'nouveaux philosophes' together
as complementary 'positions' or groups of positions within a com-
mon french space of theoretical criticism of ideology and ideolog-
ical criticism of abstract theory, between about 1970 and about
1985, the 'interaction' or interplay of the parts of theory and
ideology turning about the sudden eruption of the question pre-
sentated by this confrontation in the parisian press and french
'media' (directed from Paris) in 1977. More generally still, one may correlate such a 'french' axis of embedding of theory in the ideological interface of abstract 'academic' space (of 'structuralism(s)') and 'practical' space of human interaction in Paris (ideologically framed in the 'media' by the 'new philosophers' as the 'moral' - and sometimes theological - space of a normative harmony of individual parts, hierarchically organised in a unitary symmetry of ideal democratic consensus over democratic consensus) with analogous axes of the 'institution' of theory in Germany, America and Britain, the relatively autonomous 'political' spaces of activity in those geographical and linguistic domains reflecting a continuing relative autonomy of those various orders of systematic questioning or theory instituted as one 'side' of each of those national orders of activity as so many national 'schools' - with the 'national' character of the various schools best typified by that most radical frame of questioning and theory, 'philosophy', rather than the various more 'local' domains of science or theory, in which different national components can be coordinated in a more international 'practical' orientation of questioning, relatively autonomous in each country from its various notional inscriptions in the theoretically 'wider' space of the specialists' 'philosophies'. This question, confronted by Derrida in 1985, of 'Philosophy and Nationality', and posed in analogous ways within the french institution of theory by Derrida, Bourdieu and Baudrillard, finds so to speak its canonical formulation in the opening section of the second half of Tocqueville's Democratie en Amerique: for what appears formally in relation to what I have characterised (along with Tocqueville, Derrida and other frenchmen) as the 'cartesian' tradition of organising philosophy around the 'subjective' coordinate of questioning, appears 'practically' in question in the american attitude towards questions as simply coordinates in the practical order of activity whose 'cartesian' (so to speak) or 'archimedean' point of unquestioned root, axis, orientation of questioning, is akin to the nouveaux philosophes' consensus over consensus (among the 'moral majority' at least). A merely 'theoretical' posing of the question of the 'french' institution of systematic questioning begs the question - even if Derrida
remains caught in a characteristically French theoretical elaboration of this impasse of theory, this paradox of the very posing of the paradox. Nor can specifically American theory theoretically confront the 'consequences of pragmatism', frame the theoretical consequences for theory of that analogical approach to different European theories which simply combines figures from different theories, in abstraction from their European embedding in various theoretical differences, and theoretically marks the practical axis of this interplay as a 'pragmatism' whose systematic ambiguity (as Lovejoy pointed out) cannot be theoretically, but only (perhaps) practically, defined. The self-confirming autonomy of these 'traditions' of systematic questioning or systems of questioning, is seen directly in the contending circular responses to the 'postmodern' questioning over the last third of the century of that 'modern' embedding of theory in context elaborated into various modern theories and modernisms in theory, over the first third, and characterised most simply in relation to the emergence over the turn of the century of that specifically 'American' school of theoretical and practical inscription of theory in the pragmatics of context systematised by Dewey between the turn of the century and around 1930 as 'Pragmatism'. You don't have a theory of Pragmatism - one might, and many did, object to William James - Quite so, he could reply, I have only tried to mark the radically practical axis of any theory (and this, like Dewey, and, most characteristically, Mead, in the practical situation of lecturing before a class, and teaching, inducting or educating the student into his part in the pragmatic order of American society).

The 'postmodern' question of the pragmatics of theory thus evinces, in the 'postmodern debate' that is the interaction of various abstract versions of this international interaction of different schools or 'cultures' of theory, the common abstraction of the different schools from what one might call the question of questioning, the question attaching to what is open in a situation of marking what is open textually as a question: a common abstraction from the dramatic interplay of text and context to a textual framing of text-in-context (or earlier, theory-in-world) that historically institutes in different 'nations' or national
coordinations of more or less unitary national activity (whose 'textual dimension' is just the particular national language) more or less unitary textual orders of systematic questioning or theory, 'in' none of which the question of their incommensurability as different theoretical orientations (in what translators tend to assume is some unitary space of questions) can be resolved - the presentation of this question of their difference (or some more abstract version of the 'pragmatics of theory' à la Lyotard, Rorty, Habermas) 'in' any of the contending textual framings of embedding of texts in the practical dynamics of context always 'begs the question' - for the space of any such textual frame is constituted, and academically instituted in each language and culture and national economy of activity, precisely by or through the practical dynamics of abstraction of theoretical space from the dramatic configuration of any individual's passage into and out of his or her 'part' of questioner, debater, critic, theorist, philosopher, in such a 'space'.

I have tried to textually institute here, in english, a dramatic space articulated around the axis opening out of the 'dramatic' configuration of a questioning that first questions the passage into this very textual space (rather than from the outset framing such a question 'in' a text whose 'institution' is at some point of 'rupture' with its context unquestioned). This is not simply an 'american' inscription of theory in some textually presented 'story' or fiction about that theory (or rather, always, about 'theory' in general), any more than it is an attempt at some european theory of the embedding of 'theory' (in general) in some textually marked and articulated 'context (in general). The generality of these complementary 'markings' of inscription of text in context is itself in every case an index of the decoupling of the dramatic interplay of text and context in the specific situation of opening, 'institution' of the text. One can only inscribe any 'theory' or systematic questioning in such a 'dramatic' space whose primary locus (pace Derrida) is always necessarily a 'present' situation in which writer and reader are dramatically engaged with the physical economy of production and consumption of 'text' as one component in a wider matrix of their interaction through the written or spoken words, through a radically 'indexical' characterisation 'in' the text of those various instances of 'I', 'here',
now', 'this book', 'this matrix of interaction in which the verbal order of this book is physically embodied as one dimension coordinate with these other dimensions - cultural, physical and so on - of its, this, context' and so on. This allows me, for example, to 'presume' certain characters of 'any possible reader' - you - as it were physically trapped in the space of reading this book, in the various coordinates it marks, which probably clash rather with the traditional assumption by you as reader of some absolute critical detachment 'outside' the text, in a purely abstract textual frame of questions which no given text can, in principle frame - and in which any attempt of a theoretical writer to presume any 'position' of his reader in the wider matrix of possible questions from which his or her text abstracts, betrays simply a rhetorical arrogance utterly repugnant and inadmissible 'in theory'.

I attempted to establish in relation to this concrete, 'dramatic' axis of this inquiry into this inquiry, a range of contextual coordinates, marked as such in the text through the working of the coupling of textual and contextual 'coordinates' discovered in the 'opening' or introductory section of the inquiry. Thus I characterised what might be called 'cartesian', 'leibnizian' and 'lockean' schools of Philosophy in France (or rather, french) Germany, and England (Leibniz, though wrote in french or latin: schools of theory are no more reducible to their dominant language than the use of that language is restricted to the dominant area of its use on the Earth's surface; Descartes wrote in french and latin in ... Holland...and so on) from the seventeenth century onward, and the arising self-consciousness of a specifically american 'pragmatist' school over the transition from nineteenth to twentieth century. And I characterised the 'french' school (represented in general by Descartes defining his 'position' as locus of the questioning of the presuppositions of any questioning; towards 1650, rather as various subsequent phases of the school may be 'represented' by Voltaire, Cousin, Bergson, Sartre, Lacan, and so on) as articulating the matrix of its various theories in the 'cartesian' space of framing theory within the figure of the individual subject's or theorist's assertion of his own instance of assertion as primary response to the general space or matrix of substitution in language which frames 'questions' in general. The 'german' school, I suggested,
conversely articulates its textual space of theory within the primary axis or direction of 'objective' determination of systematic theoretical response to systematic questioning, while the 'British' school frames theory in the practical coordination of these complementary continental poles of subjectivity and objectivity, and the American school arrives on the scene when, in Europe, the abstraction of any theoretical logic that might hope in the traditional manner to frame its own embedding in its World by framing that World in its own abstract 'logical space', comes within the orbit of its own questioning, comes into question, in various analogical 'crises of foundations' that issue in so many 'modernisms' systematised towards 1930, around the beginning of the twentieth century.

I have suggested that this inquiry itself marks a 'convergence' of these various different 'lines' of questioning, towards a common dynamic of theory articulated in a radical questioning of questioning sketched in this book, as each comes, between 1970 and 2000, into the common question of their difference, which cannot be resolved 'in' any of the abstract traditional spaces of questioning (become after 1970 so many spaces of 'textuality' framing their own embedding in 'pragmatic' context), but only in the 'practical' question of their interplay, dramatically articulated in the developing inquiry into the passage to and fro between the text of this inquiry and its context. The 'theory' of this dramatic 'space' and time of writing theory is itself elaborated through the 'historian's' hermeneutic working-back from various different 'theories' of the whole ('philosophy') or some part (specific 'sciences') of the context of their theoretical texts, to the frame of an 'action' which is 'The History of Philosophy' in which conflicting framings of the universal context in different texts, may be systematically coordinated with the positions or parts of the various different writers in the spatiotemporal and cultural frame of that 'action', 'drama' or history, story. Most of the work is, so to speak, done already, by the various different writers of theory (and of histories of theory) over the last two and a half millennia; my task, like Cicero's 'translating' Greek philosophy into his pragmatic
roman frame, is simply a kind of editing or rearrangement, a transposing into a new script or score. As I have often remarked, the general figure of such transposition is simply the marking in this text of a figure taken from an earlier text which sets both this and the earlier marking of that figure in what that figure itself marks or frames in a common context. Thus the 'history' evolved in parts I-III opens with a 'pythagorean' figure of Kosmos which coordinates various dimensions of the mark or marking, in coordinating the physical, logical, poetic, mystical, psychological, ontological and other characters of the marking here of that coordination, with its original marking at a 'point' framed here as 'Croton around 500BC'. The next 'figure' or configuration of what after those pythagoreans we call 'theory' or 'philosophy' in its context, appears as at once a figure of Parmenides' response to the figural abstraction of the 'fiction' of pythagorean theory, as it comes practically into question in a context whose coordinates it has itself framed (Parmenides' 'step back' from identification with a silent part in the pythagorean mystery, after the violent overthrow of its political framing of activity in Magna Graecia), and also as a response 'transposed' from Parmenides' version, to the question confronted here as the marking of the initial context as 'Kosmos' comes into the dynamic of this inquiry articulated in the axis unfolded in the opening Introduction. The question posed at each point by the previous transposition of an old figure of embedding of theory in context - by the previous marking of the 'space' of this inquiry, what is 'open' in its situation, in the textual order of this book, through a figure 'borrowed' from earlier theory which itself situates that earlier theory in the unfolding 'action' or drama of theory in a spatiotemporal Kosmos - this itself allows the identification of a further figure of embedding of this inquiry in its 'space' or context, borrowed from some historical response to the theory from which the previous figure was itself taken...and so on and on from 500BC down to 1970 and the 1980s.
Questions: the marking of a space or place in language which invites in response the selection of one of a range of otherwise equivalent or 'symmetric' possible substitutions of term or phrase (or discourse or book) 'in' that space. And 'question-mark': a linguistic marking of a particular 'space' in language as a question. So that if one is to question all previous 'theory' or systematic questioning in the pythagorean tradition, by marking the very marking of 'question' as a question, one cannot in principle derive any adequate response to such a question, and this book it frames simply 'in' the textual order of the inquiry, for this would be to abstract at the outset from the question of what is open in the situation of marking what is open (in the situation of marking) as a question - in this case by marking the whole inquiry here as the marking of a question(ing), marking the question of this marking.

One can mark what is open in the situation of marking what is open as a question: one can mark the locus of substitution of a, that, mark, for the space which it marks, and 'in' which the marking of the space is only one possible substitution. And, indeed, if the linguistic order of substitutions or 'space' were not thus embedded in this radical play of substitutions in a specific situation of marking the questioning of questions, there could not even be any question of there being 'questions': a question is marked in a situation as the 'inscription' of the configuration it marks in a wider matrix of what is open in the situation as possible embeddings of that configuration in some wider configuration. A question and its linguistic character of (partly 'open') mark or sign substitutes in a present situation for something open 'outside' or beyond or behind or absent from the situation. A complete 'abstraction' from embedding in a situation to some 'text' in which 'the question' might be supposed brought into question in a merely linguistic order of substitutions, independently of any particular situation of posing the question, constructing the text in a wider order of substitutions (in which then a text may be 'substituted' for some partly non-textual configuration) would not even amount to an 'empty' space of all possible linguistic substitutions, Language-in-itself or whatever. There would be no mark of any difference 'in' the abstract linguistic or textual space, not even of different 'points' in the space: there would be nothing open, not
even a 'space' at all. There has to be an 'external' side, so to speak, to any 'mark' or sign, which reflects its embedding in an order of substitution in which the linguistic dimension of the 'sign' is itself one among other possible substitutions: and this 'external' side of language (discussed at length by Derrida in *De la Grammatologie*, for example) cannot simply be 'represented' or marked in a discussion of questions as 'external', and used to frame a questioning of the textual order of questioning 'in' a text abstracted from its 'dramatic' constitution, simply through the 'internal' linguistic syntax (logical and analogical so to speak) of this word 'external', 'in' an inquiry into inquiry. Any radical questioning of 'the question' as embedded in a matrix of substitutions in which the linguistic order of substitution of one term for another in a text is itself a substitution for what the text frames, must, 'logically' even, be articulated in what the text of the inquiry directly marks as the 'space' of substitutions in which that very text itself is articulated, as a 'stepping back' which frames the particular situation of writing, and the text itself, in a non-textual 'context' which it marks itself merely as marking, rather than definitively inscribing or circumscribing in the text. We cannot for example just recognise that some nominal limit of abstraction of sign and question from context is radically 'empty', is indeed, simply 'nothing', and then proceed to reconstruct something like Hegel's Logic by positing something outside this Nothing, and following through the whole dialectical reconstruction of the resulting 'syntax' to the point where it frames the posing of the initial absolute abstraction in what it determines as Universal History, and comes 'full-circle'. Nor can we just turn such an 'idealist' dialectic on its head by textually framing its ideological embedding in the material economy of the physical production of the first text: for the frame of such a converse material 'side' of the idealist text is itself 'abstract' insofar as it is linguistically elaborated in a 'standing-back' from the question or situation of its own 'dramatic' constitution, which embeds that situation of writing in the 'wider' economy whose positing is a direct correlate of the 'ideal' abstraction of its textual order from the drama of producing the text. And nor do we resolve the situation
much or any better by framing in abstract terms some textual formulation of the dramatic centrality in 'the concrete situation' of the existential individual, as long as the 'concrete situation' is not actually the choice of those very words by their writer within a space or scene of their writing of which the words mark themselves as the 'script'.

And yet all these figures of inscription of reflection and its writing in a context whose textual framing is itself abstracted from the dramatic coupling of script and action in the composition of the text can themselves be 'historically' embedded in the dramatic axis and dynamic or 'dialectic' here marked by the question of marking what is open in the situation of marking in the textual order of a question. And all these figures of inscription of their textual framing in context then appear precisely as so may complementary figures of the inscription of this text in its context, so many components of a textual matrix which marks, and in this marking partly organises, a wider matrix of what is open to writer or reader as he or she physically confronts this book.

A question marks something open in the situation of its marking: this 'situation' of the question itself being defined in terms of the question as a matrix of possible substitutions of which the question presents the textual coordinates, the textual 'space' of possible embeddings of the situation marked by the question in a wider situation or frame. The question marks in a 'present' situation various possible embeddings of the textual and coordinate terms of the situation in a configuration of 'absent' determinations of those present terms, which configuration the question so to speak invokes, invoking in particular, as response from the receiver of the question (the questioner him- or herself, or one or more others) a textual framing of that wider frame. A question may arise when the figure brought 'into question' breaks down — as, say, in Propp's analysis a folk-tale (or in various other analyses the 'western' film... and so on) always begins with the disruption of an an initially stable state of affairs — or as,
in the 'practical' order of the situation a figure of various elements in the situation and their relations or interaction, is seen as only an 'analogy' for the 'real' relations 'behind' the working of the analogy, behind the 'appearances' up to the point where the analogy breaks down. I suggested that affective orientation was articulated in the analogical 'side' of language; thought or reflection might be seen as the opening up of a 'move' out of one identification or part of the 'subject', some 'I', in a situation, to reassertion in some new figure or framing of a wider or redefined situation, 'I' redefining itself as the new instance of framing its situation, and as also the constant function of reflection and consequent reassertion 'behind' the changing figure of assertion in successive situations, just as it asserts other components of the situation to be constant objects, identities behind their various 'appearances', which appearances are then the correlates of the marks or signs 'substituted' for the internal 'thoughts' referred to an 'I' which refers them to these 'objects' 'behind' these appearances, like the 'I' behind its signs, using them to frame a whole configuration 'behind' the various signs and appearances in which it verbally sets the situation of its marking.

To the verbal order of substitutions in 'linguistic space' around a particular question or response (a space unfolding so to speak from the frame of substitutions which is the question, rather than somehow fully articulate in unitary manner 'in itself' before any question is posed by being marked by some physical component or 'mark' in the situation) corresponds that other 'physical' space in which various marks and appearance may or may not be exchanged for others in the spatiotemporal 'economy' of material Nature. And complementing the 'internal' logical constraints on possible extensions of the text of a given situation to its embedding in a 'wider' text framing the 'context' (or a context) of that particular situation, are the 'material' constraints on possible substitutions of other things and other appearances for the present appearance of the situation. Or rather, to the 'logical' side of textual analysis of the situation of this textual analysis or questioning, corresponds the 'physical' dynamic of mere spatio-temporal substitution of one 'thing' for another in the situation.
(the basic 'mechanics' of the situation), while for the linguistic 'side' of the situation as a whole (with its two complementary sides of logical and analogical embedding of the situation in the 'subjective' space of a 'frame' posited 'behind' the appearances) one must set as 'objective' correlate its embedding in a material economy, of which the mere natural 'mechanics' is only one abstracted side, complemented by that affective disposition or orientation of the various 'subjects' involved in the situation, on which the analogical articulation of desire in the linguistic space of thought and imagination in which those various agents orient their self-assertion, individually and collectively, is itself one constraint, coupled in the actual dynamics of the affections (pace Lacan) with an... analogous... orientation of the embodied agent among the various appearances or images of his or her material place among other bodies, animate and inanimate (this then the 'other' material side of the economy of our bodily 'embedding' in situations, from the mere 'mechanism' logically determined as the outward spatiotemporal order mathematically mirrored in 'internal' logical space). The 'material economy' of the situation in general, then, is just the interface of such Nature and desire in the 'material' space of our bodily spatiotemporal intervention in various 'natural mechanisms' in the pursuit of our wants (rather than our questions), structured like a sort of material analogue of language where physical exchange of various goods or products of intervention, 'to the common good', replaces verbal exchange coordinating interaction towards that same end as perceived. The material 'matrix' of intersections of various processes of intervention in 'Nature' at 'points' of substitution of ranges of intermediate or 'finished' products of such interventions is as it were a reflection in 'outward' space and time of the interaction of complementary linguistic activities of framing a common situation in a wider textual space of various terms absent from or beyond a present situation of interaction. In particular, different framings of the common good in some communities' collective intervention in Nature may be discursively or otherwise coordinated in the 'political' axis of articulation of group activity; 'money' may serve to mark out a general space of substitution of goods, products of intervention in Nature; and so on.
In 'external', 'physical' space the economy of our activity appears 'in principle' simply a matter of substitutions of one thing 'in place of' another: substitution, for example, of one place we are at for another in 'space' open to us (using for example our feet in this 'locomotion'), and in the place at which we find or have brought ourselves, displacement of something, replacement of one thing by another - say with our hands, say putting something (thereby, hopefully, 'food') in that place we call our mouth, thus intervening in the mechanical maintenance of that physical system which is the digestive tube to which our physical bodies may be schematically reduced, when we are considering the basic 'mechanism' of our life. The elementary collective economy of life in a 'primitive' agricultural group appears simply, in these terms, as intervention in the reproductive mechanism of organic life by displacing all such life within the mark or pale of a certain place (a 'field') and replacing it with 'seeds' collected from 'Nature' (for example, from that field the previous 'year', or from some other) physically set in the earth of the field at a more or less specific point of the natural mechanism or cycle of the reproductive year. Such activity presents the figure of an elementary 'economy' of collective activity: the 'investment' in a present activity of clearing and sowing the field, rather than simply gathering seed or other edible matter for present consumption, is framed by 'standing back' in thought or imagination from the 'animal' part of immediate consumption, and framing the present activity of putting seeds in the earth rather than in one's mouth, within a wider activity of intervention in what is in some sense a wider order of things 'beyond' or behind the immediate present, corresponding to collective assertion in the figure of a thinking 'I' standing back, itself, from the animal dynamics of identification with the body and its needs in a present situation, as it frames the situation of sowing in a wider mechanism of aspects of present things (like the seeds) absent from that immediate 'appearance' - as it frames the situation of sowing seed within a configuration of selves 'behind' the immediate natural or animal dynamics of their bodies, and of 'natures' of seed and year and so on behind the presently visible natures, in the wider activity or situation of 'agriculture'.
'Standing back' from a situation in thought or questioning was, I suggested, always a marking in some element of the 'situation', of a configuration — of 'I' thinking behind or in the surface of its body and various 'things' thought 'behind' their present configuration or appearance — in which the 'present' configuration is thought or imagined to be physically and dramatically embedded, in a sort of 'economy' of interaction of 'I's with one another and with other things. The 'mark' is itself marked by being physically put in a 'place' in a present or current action in which it is not appropriate simply as a present physical element of the interaction current 'at that point'. The inappropriateness of the mark simply as a 'thing' in a merely material economy itself marks the breaking open of a current configuration in a question, or in a response to the question it implicitly marks in making a response. Thus the interposition between another's gaze and its current objects of a configuration that has been produced apparently with a view precisely to such interposition, for it does not have any 'place' in the current 'scene', may as visual mark or 'picture', 'image', invoke in the viewer's imagination a configuration of his 'I' and some object or objects or activity 'absent' from the scene into which it is interposed. Or a modulation in that locus we call in our various languages or tongues the 'tongue' (or langue or whatever else) may serve an analogous function of marking the embedding or inscription of 'the present' in an 'absent' configuration, these visual and verbal orders of mark each having their specific and variant economies — the sonorous modulation of physical space, filling it with a sound that serves no immediate purpose and so marks itself as marking something, may carry beyond the visible present; while a visible mark that is not simply gestural (like 'pointing', marking with a bodily movement that serves no immediate function) carries beyond the brief presence of a modulation that dies after a moment in the air.

In its minimal configuration such 'marking' marks simply the assertion of an instance of assertion, an 'I', and as such constitutes a 'place' of substitution (say the tongue) in which various modes of assertion of 'I's and other things and their relations may be articulated, framing a whole order of action in 'marks', or 'language'. I noted in passing towards the close of
Part I that the elementary configuration of Indo-European 'roots',

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
M & S & T \\
P & R \\
K(W)
\end{array}
\]

which mark a systematic syntax and semantics of 'primitive Indo-European' from which various members of the family diverge from around 2000 BC in successive waves of geographical migration from the eastern European plains, present in the analogies of the various more complex and later roots derived from them in various languages, an elementary 'topology' of action and its marking, an elementary phonetic model for the elementary configuration of action as 'breaking' open of a situation \((K(W))\), the locus of the action of breaking silence to mark this situation or action \((M)\), as model 'agent', an 'object' \((T)\), a movement 'out' \((P)\) or back \((R)\), and something like a 'verb' \((S)\). Thus in Sanskrit, for example, the three modulations or persons of the 'empty' verb 'to be' are \(\text{asmi}, \text{asi}, \text{asti}\) \((\text{SM}, \text{S(S)}, \text{ST})\) (in Latin, \(\text{sum, es, est}\)); in English the various modes of question are marked by modifications of \(\text{wh}\) (in French \(\text{ou}\)) and various responding designations by \(\text{th}\) (thus, what/that, when/then; where/there; how/why/who &c).

Now it might be supposed that this elementary form of 'intervention' in physical space, announcing oneself simply as 'actor' or agent, could, like the actions it frames in 'language' which are in their turn substitutions in what is 'open' to us in 'space' and its mechanisms or 'spaces' of intervention in various sorts of 'action', be itself 'inscribed' or embedded in that order it intervenes in space and its mechanisms to mark as 'space' and 'its mechanisms'. But the intervention in 'space' as what is physically 'open' to us (or rather, the widest frame of what is so open) can in principle ('logically') be no more definitively inscribed as its marking in what it marks, than can an abstract
'logical space' logically determine the 'logic' of marking the differences it logically articulates (then in classical philosophical manner to generate or reconstruct a logical 'Universe' by dialectically framing the physical order of what is logically 'outside' the logical space in which it is articulated, as the 'other', 'outer' side of the marks 'in' which logical space is supposed 'arbitrarily' embodied, materialised). What is open to us 'physically' is radically open: the conservation or invariance of physical symmetries is so to speak one 'dimension' of constraint upon our actions, complementary to the dimensions of symmetries I have called 'logical' and 'poetic'; none of these three dimensions of the general 'space' of our action completely constrains it, or frames or determines the remaining two - any more than to specify the movement of a body in one of the three dimensions of that physical space constrains what it may do in the remaining two. Thus current physical theory (since the turn of the century) can only be framed in terms of a relativistic 'observer' and quantum-mechanical 'measurer' who so to speak 'intervene' in the physical order in a way that cannot, in principle, be determined 'in' the physical systems 'framed' through that intervention; there cannot be a physical theory of quantum-mechanical 'measurement' for example, because that 'selection' from the probabilistic configuration-space of a physical system to one of the configurations possible, subject to quantum-mechanical symmetries (conservation of 'quantum numbers') as well as relativistic ones (spatiotemporal; the quantum numbers correspond to the symmetries of the 'internal space' of the system, itself mathematically 'symmetric with the 'external', 'physical' space proper in which the system is set with other systems), which is called 'measurement' or 'reduction of the wave-packet' (and on the basis of a group of which 'measurements' alone one can actually single out any definite 'system' as a space of what is mechanically possible, along with the various probabilities of various results of further measurement on that 'system'), cannot be itself framed as a probabilistic mechanism that could itself be 'measured'. Nor would there be any relativistic 'space-time' if there were not some asymmetric 'point' actually marked in it. As in the converse 'logical space', there could not even be an 'empty space' except as an abstraction from some particular 'dramatic' situation - the
'widest' such situation being the 'space' and time of this questioning simply as the marking of the question of this marking of this question - which must be always a 'this situation', ultimately sharing some 'space' and time of activity with this 'this situation'. The whole 'physical universe' is so to speak coordinate as one dimension of the matrix of what is open, with some marking of it which marks itself as 'this' (in some 'tongue') - and with the 'area' of that matrix in which this set of words, this book, has been 'substituted' for what might otherwise have happened (given enough correlative substitutions in its various non-verbal contexts). Physical theorists noticed around 1970 that a whole range of theoretically undetermined 'constants' of the current physical theory just 'happened' to have values within the exceedingly narrow ranges that would actually allow for the development of a planetary system around a star and a 'life-form' on it that could evolve a 'physical theory'; and some suggested inverting Copernicus' revolution and introducing the 'anthropic principle' that any adequate physical theory must take as part of the physical data upon which the theory is constructed that there be a physical theory of the 'physical Universe' (or multiverse) in that frame. But such 'bootstrap' cosmology was itself at odds with the 'metaphysics' (so to speak) of abstraction of the texts of physical theory from the dramatic 'present' of their elaboration, of which logical, textual and physical orders were just so many coordinate dimensions among others (poetic, material 'economy').

Where do we start, then, to textually frame this whole configuration or 'matrix' of 'the text'? Well, we must start, as we did, in any particular text in which we propose such a systematic philosophical 'framing' of the widest frame 'behind' or 'beyond' the text, in that (there 'this') text, and the question of marking what is 'open' in the widest context of the text in an order of questions and our responses in the text. We must start from the actual situation of a 'stepping back' in the text, in its order of marks, from the various practical situations and more limited 'workings' of those various marks, as they are all brought, so to speak, into the question or questioning of the marking of that questioning itself.
We must start, as we did start, 'here' and 'now', with a questioning of that questioning, of marking what is open in the configuration or situation of that marking in language, in this book - this, rather than with an unquestioned 'rupture' between the practical order of material construction of the book, and a textual space of questioning in which even the indexical 'this' must be determined in an abstracted syntax of questions: a questioning abstracted from the question of that questioning, as marking what is open in the situation of that marking - what is open always embracing that marking of what is open as one activity that may be considered as taking the place of some other action or assertion open, another physical set of movements rather than writing, for example, which do not constitute marking, language.

Nor is this 'marking' of what is open 'in theory' in the situation of that marking merely a generic 'marking' of the general type which as it were simply responds to what it implicitly marks as a question arising in its 'situation', in that configuration of activity in which it intervenes as 'mark' rather than part of the configuration it thereby disrupts, marking a question posed by the passage from that configuration into another, and at the same time responding to that question by marking or determining from what is open in that disruption, something 'absent' from the situation its marking disrupts, and in a manner 'presented' in its marking to constitute (if itself unquestioned) a component of a new situation.

For 'theory' like 'art' constitutes so to speak a second order or level of 'marking', 'outside' the general configuration of a 'practical' marking of transition from one configuration to another. Just as the 'mark' intervenes in a situation by marking by its immediate inappropriateness to the activity 'in hand' something 'outside' that unquestioned present, so 'Art' may be characterised as an order of 'marking' which in its turn is 'inappropriate' to the general 'practical' figure of marking as transition from a present situation to some new and analogous situation. 'Art' stands in relation to 'practical' marking rather as the latter stands to
the 'present' situations which, as mark, it disrupts to frame a new present into which the previous present so to speak opens. 'Art' is 'poetic' rather than 'practical' in that it presents 'in the place of' mark or image a mark or image that does not so to speak fit in the generalised present of constant transition from one configuration to the next, and stands as a sort of intransitive object or product, marking so to speak, questioning, the general 'situation' of transition from one configuration to another, as 'practical' language marks that transition, indeed a system of 'transitions' or 'actions' which language models, as opening out of one situation and closing in another, through the opening and closing of sentences, paragraphs, chapters, books: the opening into a space of coupled substitutions of one mark for another, a matrix, which is 'language'. Language with its openings and closings of marking question and response, transition from one 'configuration' to another, where each 'configuration' is itself a complex configuration of 'action' or transition, opening and closing, which, until questions arise, is the configuration of 'the present' with all its workings and temporal structures. Each transition, marked by language as complex of coupled responses to the various questions which open out of an 'initial' situation, is thus a transition into a structure of action and interaction in which the very 'working' of that transition is itself, until it comes 'into question' itself coupled as one component to the wider complex of workings discovered in previous transitions or 'experience'. And the 'original' configuration of 'the mark' entering into an 'unquestioned' 'radical' immediacy, in which in 'originary' manner it marks itself for the 'first time' as marking a 'transcendent' order 'behind' appearances and previously 'absent' altogether from 'experience', is just the inception of 'experience' itself in something like a 'primal scream' in which the newborn child's central nervous system begins to articulate an individual identity and consciousness, moving towards that accession to language in which the infant marks his or her newly discovered position or place or function of marking itself as the self-assertive locus of marking, 'behind' its mark as 'objects' marked by other marks substituted 'in place of' the marking of self are behind their 'marks' or appearances.
'Art', then: a 'poetic' order in which a mark brings into question the whole 'previous' dynamic of experience, by marking something 'outside' anything that might be determined in response to some opening up of some particular configuration of experience, some 'practical' use of language marking an action of transition to a 'new' situation out of the 'present' one - a poetic order which marks not only something 'outside' the present situation, but also outside any practical transition from the present situation to another: which marks, then, a 'fiction'. A 'fiction', though, in its turn redefining 'experience' or 'the practical' by practically effecting transitions to new situations through so to speak 'invoking' an order of 'transcendental' response attributable to analogues of present, visible, human embodied agents, 'invisible' and indeed in some sense 'fictional' beings who in their turn 'intervene' in experience from 'outside' its familiar practical human order, rather as humans physically intervene in Nature. A 'mythical' or mystical 'side' of the 'poetic' order, which is yet already implicit in the 'initial' order of the mark, simply as the constant possibility of simply marking the function of mark itself in a kind of recursion of the mark upon itself open from the very first.

Theatre: 'mimesis of one action by another action': and in a sense the radical frame of all 'art' insofar as even the action of setting something (sound or image or gesture) 'in place of' something else, by interposition in a situation of something that is not 'part' of, has no immediate practical part in, a present situation, is in a way always essentially an action of 'significant' intervention in such a present, to bring it 'into question' and mark some new configuration, closing what is opened up through this activity of marking in 'response'. Thus around 1950, for example, the painted image itself becomes radically 'theatrical' in 'action painting', and by around 1970 the 'art object' can even more or less drop out of art, replaced merely by some otherwise empty marking of some action or intervention in a situation as 'art': in the formal limit, for example, an attempt at 'pure' conceptual art in Keith Arnatt's attempt to do nothing as his contribution to the London exhibition 'Idea Structures' in the summer of 1970. All
art as 'performance' insofar it marks itself as 'art' through an action of intervention in, the intervention of an action in, a situation in which that action does not 'mimic' a transition into 'the next' configuration of ongoing activity, still less remain unquestioningly fixed or framed in some present activity.

The 'poetic' action, then, 'mimics' a configuration of transition abstracted from the 'practical' embedding of that action in a present situation, or in articulating transition from that situation to another situation like it, so to speak practically contiguous with or connected with it. If it be a 'poem' in the restricted sense it frames, then, some configuration of 'actuality' or actualities 'behind' the embodiment of this configuration in any particular action or transition, 'abstracts' a configuration of figures in which the figuration of the locus of enunciation or 'marking' of the poem must itself, at least implicitly, be a component. I have already noticed Mallarmé's Prose as a sort of limiting version of 'pure' poetry, which seeks to frame the radical configuration of 'essences' or actualities 'behind' the particular situation of their marking or evocation in a 'poem' - the radical actuality of marking, naming, itself, in a specific situation in which the poet tries to mark it. 'Theory', then, as itself 'vision' of the invisible actuality of Kosmos, 'hearing' the silent harmony or music of the spheres, presents simply a direct correlate, in its inception in pythagorean marking of the primary 'abstract' configuration of elementary 'empty' or simple mark or 'point', of the precisely contemporaneous inception of 'theatre' at Athens around 500BC. The original 'ritual' of invocation of Dionysus becomes systematically articulated in a marking of the general invisible frame of all human activity and transitions between birth and death, in terms of 'dramatic' bringing-into-question of the protagonist's identification with the part of framing his activity in self-assertion within the merely visible order of practical daily life - this through the abstract working in the invisible frame of the radical breakdown of hubristic frame of identification with an apparently autonomous instance of self-assertion: the working precisely in the unworkability at the point of breakdown or catastrophe of the protagonist's framing of his action within the merely 'practical' order and working of some particular 'part' with which he or she (later on) identifies, a particular configuration of the basic
identifies, a particular 'personal' configuration of apparently autonomous 'I' embodied in the visible order of appearances. The 'poetic' frame presents in an 'intransitive' configuration of mark or image an 'opening-up' of the general configuration of 'experience' up to that point where it 'intervenes' in the transitive, practical order of marking, bringing the general figure of that practical order of transition 'into question', and transposing, so to say, a figure of opening and closing, question and response, action, from 'within' the circuit of ordinary experience, to the embedding of this practical circuit of opening and closing of transition or action 'as a whole' within a wider transition from it, where it breaks down in 'art', to a 'mystical' order of response to this breakdown, which response, and the breakdown attributed to 'it', as practical transitions are attributed to 'natural' agents, thus appears as a discovery to and by man, a revelation or 'opening' to man, of the wider invisible frame of divine activity and actuality, in which the various apparently invariant functions in the practical configuration of marking and action, are inscribed, embedded. In particular, that everyday identification of self in its 'world', in the general configuration of action or transitions and their working, experience up to that point, breaks down at that point 'in' a classical tragedy where the protagonist's self-assertion from transition to transition, step by step, towards the end he has framed coordinate with this image of himself, breaks down, and with it the 'actor's' part of identification with this part and, through this, with that of 'actor', and, in its turn, the 'spectator's' identification with the part of mere spectator, identifying with the 'actor's' identification with the protagonist's identification of his part in the action. Thus in the 'catastrophe', this configuration of identification in the actor's 'empathy' with the part, and the immobile spectator's empathy with the actor and part, is broken open in that intervention of the 'invisible' divine order whose response is specified in the closing 'act', which reiterates in relation to the everyday practical order of action or transition in which we 'naturally' identify our parts, and assert ourselves in 'transitive' marking of response to natural situations as they naturally open into others, just that figure by which we ourselves visibly intervene in situations.
This model only applies, of course, to one particular figure of the 'poetic' in one particular configuration of practical activity, one 'world': to the classic greek tragedy in its transition, around 500BC from choragic ritual to the essentially secular morality of Euripides - the world, precisely of 'presocratic philosophy'. Even in this period the tragic trilogy is always followed by a comedy, re-establishing the practical frame within the wider invisible frame revealed in the tragic cycle, in the spectator's comic detachment throughout from a more or less recognisable contemporary type, who is caricatured to maintain a 'natural' gap between his part of obvious folly, predictably unworkable even in the ordinary practical order, and the spectator's self-image. The spectator bears to the comic actor's part in that practical demonstration of caricatured self-image at odds with the world around it, a relation analogous to that between the gods of tragedy and himself, just as the poetic 'abstraction' of the tragic action or drama from any direct practical contiguity with the spectator's present, which allows the embedding of that present with all its figuration in the normative moral and affective axis of a self-enclosed transition or action, whose elements are symmetrically articulated each simply in relation to the others (in an otherwise unspecified context), reflects the closed world of the comedy set 'within' the spectator's world, and perhaps borrowing its structure of abstraction in some measure from the tragedies that precede it. The tragic configuration is itself abstracted as a sort of symmetric episode or unit from earlier epic narration of the 'historical' or mythical embedding of the present world in universal time and space; the lyric explores general figures of that identification in which singer and listener are engaged through the subjective focus of the scene presented...and so on. And in each genre or mode the poetic 'recurrence' of the natural transitive order of the mark 'upon itself' so to speak, effects an analogous 'abstraction' of the scene from the 'present', which abstraction from the practical dynamics of the particular present context is coordinate with a more or less 'symmetric' structure of opening and closing of the poem whose elements are coordinated one with another simply in terms of their abstract interplay in the affective figural axis of the abstracted 'transition' from
'opening' of the whole 'practical' structure of its present experiential context, into the wider order of such symmetry, to the 'close' of the smaller yet wider 'world' of the poem, and the return to the practical, 'transitional' dynamics of that context, from which all the language, imagery, action of Art is borrowed, and in which it is set, thereby presenting a figure of the setting of this context in its context.

This schematic picture of the 'institution' of Greek tragedy around 500BC might itself serve as a primary index in a Story of Western Art which would parallel the 'History of Theory' elaborated in Parts I to III. If Aristotle opened his inquiry into the 'poetic' order of Art by considering the dramatic order of an action substituted for another action, rather than some more limited or specific dimension of 'representation', such as linear music or recitation in time, or static two- and three-dimensional spatial representation in painting or sculpture, or the 'external' spatial frame of action presented by architecture, this may be taken to reflect the coordination of these more specific dimensions of the 'poetic' in the Gesamtkunstwerk of a music-drama which employs them all within its poetic unity of 'action', 'drama'. And the theoretical primacy of tragedy over other forms of stage-drama may be considered in relation to the essential unity of the wider divine frame in which it inscribes the everyday context of the apparently narrower space and time of the stage, as against the essential plurality or diversity of comic scenarios. And if one chooses the critical transition into 'classical' tragedy around 500BC as primary index of the overall historical configuration of a poetic order in a developing cultural context in a 'Kosmos' which is there discovered precisely as the widest unitary frame of all 'transition' or action, and so itself constant in all transition, this corresponds to the exemplary unity of the three frames, drama, context, Kosmos, in this point of opening of the complex cultural drama of their interplay over the following two-and-a-half millennia, when, for example the poetic order in various successive forms becomes in its turn subordinate to a 'merely' practical function of decoration and entertainment, rather as, in Heidegger's figure, the 'thought' instituted at the same historical conjunction becomes
subordinated to a merely 'technical' function directed by unquestioned 'practical' ends.

And if the period around 500BC in the Greek world presents the complementary figures of an Art and a Theory abstracting from previous 'practical' figures of coupling of 'poetic' forms within that transitive context and 'mythical' frames without, to a limiting extension of the 'mythical' frame of that world to coordinates correlative in Pythagorean 'theory' with the elementary 'point' or 'mark' itself, defining a universal 'scientific' frame of questions by a recurrence of the figure of 'marking' upon itself analogous with the recurrence of the mark and image upon itself that has just been taken as an index of 'tragedy' and the 'poetic', then it also presents us with the institution of the coupling of these two 'sides', logical and analogical, of language and mark, in the 'historical' frame of narrating the 'practical' dynamics of this decoupling of Science and Art from Myth, and the coupling of the resulting theory and poetic in 'history'.

Pythagorean 'theory' as recurrence of the 'mark' upon itself, a marking of the configuration of marking and language in opening in a question, and closing in an answer, a transition from one 'practical' configuration to the or a next configuration: an abstraction of questions from their 'transitive' part in the practical dynamics of experience, to the universal frame of 'all possible questions', so to speak, in the questioning of this 'transitive' configuration of mark and question and answer and actions itself - which directly reflects the contemporaneous 'poetic' of 'intransitive' substitution of a 'dramatic' action for another action, marking the embedding of the cultural context in which that drama is embedded, in the widest, invisible, 'cosmic' context of universal Law. An 'abstraction' of structures of opening and closing of question and answer from their 'practical' embedding in that structure of transitions which is developing 'experience', which in its turn provides 'technical' figures subordinate to that unquestioned 'practical' order, just as drama becomes
a mere practical filling-in of time, 'entertainment', and the other arts become decorative and ornamental.

Theory: around 500BC a marking and bringing-into-quest-

ion of the configuration of practical 'transition', of everyday activity, marked by and coordinate with 'the mark' itself - the latter 'abstraction' from any more specific mark itself coordinate with this very 'opening-up' of the practical order, which must, like the parallel breaking-open of the practical order in contemp-
orary tragedy, be experienced as a 'supernatural' revelation or intervention, disclosure, in the natural order. The revelation to Pythagoras, and through him to his disciples, of the universal frame or coordinates of the 'mark', in which the practical order of our questioning in day-to-day activity itself comes 'into quest-

ion' as a whole, or in the figure of a question attaching to the general coordinates of question and mark, in a recurrence of mark and question upon itself which frames an order of 'abstraction' analogous to that of the poetic 'fiction', but corresponding to a universal frame of questions in which the actions verbally or visually presented by poetic 'fiction' or historical 'fact' are as structurally indistinguishable as their parallel etymologies themselves: fact, fiction; action, drama...

A universal frame of questions in which the practical progress of our questioning towards this 'breaking-open' of the previous practical frame of our questioning, as we stepped back further and further from our particular situation, questioning each instance of questioning the frame of the previous question, is itself at last 'revealed' by the irruption of the invisible order of cosmic divinity into our limited earthly frame, in its widest dramatic significance in the universal theatre which is Kosmos. Actors, until this irruption or disruption or revelation lost in an identification with our visible embodiment and its practical transitive working on the earthly stage, we suddenly, as in a theatrical catastrophe, discover the wider invisible frame of this earthly part we have taken on for the space of that 'natural' transition or activity we call our 'life'. And our essentially tragic identification with an earthly part, turning in the habitual circuit of its systematic reassertion from
transition to transition, suddenly appears transcendentally funny, comical: human tragedy is divine comedy.

Hoho.

Now the 'logical' axis of a theory, the opening and closing of whose questions present an axis of linguistic substitutions 'abstracted' from the particular reference the terms of the theory might have 'practically' in the situation of elaboration of the theory (the theory being 'intransitive' precisely through its questioning not marking a practical move from one configuration of present experience to another, and so bringing this structure of action or transition into question 'as a whole') must also embody a poetic or analogical inscription of the 'theory' in the 'transitive' practical situation of its enunciation which the theory 'breaks open' in its radical questioning, to embed that situation of questioning in a wider 'cosmic' configuration, constant 'beyond', yet necessarily revealing itself as so constant within, the practical order of transitions in which it is marked but cannot in principle be 'comprehended'. The complementarity of logical and poetic figures in the embedding of the 'texts' which mark the inception of theory in their greek 'situation' around 500BC - in a 'presocratic' transition from Thales around 570BC down to Socrates around 430, say - is quite direct; indeed I suggested that the opening phase mapped in Part I above, from the pythagorean group framing access to the 'text' of the theory through 'initiation' into the group who framed their activity within the cosmic drama their 'vision' revealed and from their ionian contemporary Heraclitus' construction of a text or λόγος structured by its own inscription in the universal dynamic or drama it framed, down through Parmenides' poetic 'fiction' of the breaking open of the fictional order of theory and poem in the revelation of constant Being, through Empedocles' cosmic self-dramatisation, sophistic 'logic of occasion' and its eleatic corollary at mid-fifth century, Socrates' philosophic revolution, and on to the transition from platonic dialectic to aristotelian logic and logical poetics of abstract logic around the middle of the fourth - that this whole
phase or cycle of 'theory' might be framed precisely as the
dynamic of abstraction from 500BC to 350, of abstract 'logic'
from its 'poetics' of practical embedding in the particular situ-
ation of its enunciation.

This opening 'cycle', itself comprising a 'cycle' of
theory or questioning from Pythagoras down to Socrates and from
Socrates down to the death of Plato, with each of these subordin-
ate cycles being a configuration of parallel and sequential 'steps'
from one theorist or text to another in greek cultural 'space' and
historical time, was in its turn characterised as merely an initial
phase of theory within a still broader cycle from pythagorean insti-
tuted 'mystery' around 500BC to an analogous christian institution
of mystery and its 'theory' around 1250. And that wider cycle or
phase was itself framed as an 'opening' cycle of theory, coordinate
with a transitional cycle turning about the seventeenth-century
'Scientific Revolution' which leads around 1800 into a closing
cycle, whose final configuration, towards 2000AD presents a high
degree of symmetry or 'analogy' (in Novalis' characterisation of
1799) with the opening configuration of 500BC: the relation of
these opening and closing 'ähnliche Zeitpunkten' being on the
model of opening and closing scenes of a 'drama', or, on a smaller
scale, opening and closing of sentence or chapter or book.

The opening and closing configurations of the 'history'
of theory traced out in this book over Parts I to III from the
beginning of the fifth century 'BC' until the close of the twentieth
century 'AD' frame in their 'poetic' symmetry the 'historical' in-
scription of the question traced through this book - the question
of its question, reflecting pythagorean marking of the mark or
point 'as such' - 'in' a 'cosmic' context coordinate with the sym-
metry of opening mark and closing question, and organising a wide
range of historically 'intermediate' figures of embedding of theory
and theoretical text in the wider frame of which it always is 'the
theory', which, as in the limiting case of the figure of Kosmos
itself, allows both the inscription of those intervening texts in
the drama of western theory as narrated here, and, correlative,
the inscription of this text itself in the dynamics of the same
dramatic context, presented over the course of the drama or story
in so many different figures coordinate with the place and time of framing the drama 'in terms of' these figures.

I have already suggested that the generic 'poetic' frame of 'drama' presents as it were the 'schemata' of historiography - just as the abstract and symmetric structures of opening and closing of an 'action' in the poetic abstraction of its affective axis from embedding in some 'practical' or historical transition from one present situation to the next provide so to speak the 'schemata' of 'appearance' or 'experience' in general, that particular limiting configuration of minimal transition, the 'moment' or 'specious present' being precisely a limit case, corresponding to a simple mark or thought or feeling or 'sensation' whose very characterisation as, say, primary or 'originary' configuration of marking or image in the separation of primal 'immediacy' into subjective and objective sides, itself implicitly involves a complex 'schematisation' involving all the other 'scales' of 'presence' up to the complementary limit of 'life' or 'experience' itself, just as the minimal 'quantum' of physical action involves to be just that a physical 'syntax': so to speak, or economy or context, extending to the complementary limit of 'space-time' as a whole.

If 'poetic' abstraction provides the models or structures of that story or inquiry we call 'history', then the coordination of the practical dynamic of our own and others' experience, and its documents or script, in a particular 'history' also requires an embedding of that story in the wider context of all other possible true stories unfolding, in principle, so to speak, from every configuration of its elements, concretely setting that particular story in all its 'historical context': involves, that is, a 'theoretical' inscription of the story as 'true' (rather than poetic fiction) within the wider frame of experience or history 'as a whole', within the cumulated web of actions or transitions in which both the story and its telling are both embedded - without
which common embedding there could be no 'practical' abstraction to the limited frame of some finite historical text, some opening and closing of an inquiry in which the analogical or affective axis of the questioning mirrors the present in a past, and so to speak frames an affective (political, and so on) orientation in the present by thus inscribing its terms in the wider web of human activity as a whole. The 'poetics' of history emphasised by Dilthey and the 'scientific' or theoretical embedding of a past action in a 'universal' web of History, are simply two sides of the same activity of historiography.

Now if the 'history' of Parts I to III is to allow the theoretical and dramatic embedding of this text, this book, in a 'present' configuration of activity (including its writing and reading), as marking what is open in this context or configuration, within the primary matrix of a questioning of the mapping of what it marks as open into the logical axis of text and inquiry - inquiry into the inquiry itself as a text - then I must now 'close' both this 'inquiry' and the 'history' of inquiry it textually and contextually frames and marks, by setting the whole book itself in a whole historical web or matrix of 'substitutions', in which the internal verbal matrix of this text marks, and in so marking practically coordinates (by marking its own marking in its context), a 'cosmic' frame of what is open to me as writer and you as reader: Kosmos, indeed, as precisely 'what is open' in the various couplings of the various dimensions of this book, verbal and non-verbal, in which we as writer and reader 'find ourselves'. Kosmos as what reveals itself 'at this point' in Kosmos, as the 'space' and 'time' of substitutions marked by the question-mark which opens and closes this book... just as it reveals itself here as revealing itself 2500 years ago in the greek world as the same space and time of an inquiry there marked by a pythagorean marking of 'the mark', coordinating the inquiry opening out of this marking at a particular 'point' in what it first framed as Kosmos, with other coordinates of the 'mathematical' frame articulated in relation to the
elementary symmetries of those 'numbers' which were configurations of marks, points, 'units', chief amongst them the Tetractys

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Let us consider the elementary dramatic 'scheme' of an 'action' or interaction: a group of 'actors' or agents, each of them framing their interaction in thinking and imagination 'behind' their particular actions, each framing the parts of the others as analogously framed in an 'internal' embedding of the common situation of interaction in a wider framing of 'self', 'others', 'things' and so on 'behind' their present appearances.

An action or interaction 'opens' as the working of the interplay of these different framings of the difference of these framings themselves, breaks down or open. Various different initial responses of the different actors to what thus 'opens up' in their common situation in their turn present each participant with so many 'appearances' from which he or she must (or at least, can) frame a new version of the transition or action or dynamic opening out of the initial situation as what was 'behind' its appearances expresses itself, together with a more definite conception or assertion of their own 'part', which must itself in some sense be a 'question' or something radically 'open!', not only to the others, but also to each actor him- or herself.

Thus from an initial web of possible embeddings of the opening situation in a system of 'responses' of the various different components, 'subjective' and 'objective', to the opening-up of the situation 'before' the action, before the opening of the transition from that situation to a final closing set of responses whose new 'working' in some sense restores the initial breach in
a new configuration of subjects and objects as it were 'consonant' in their appearances or presences one to another - from the initial 'question' so to speak, there opens up an 'economy' of interaction as the various participants make successive responses to the question of their 'part' in the developing situation, by making successive steps, successive moves or actions, in response to the previous set of responses to the previous set of responses ... to what was opened up at the outset.

The action opens as it were in a system of questions, or rather in a system of what is open in the web of possible substitutions in the spaces 'behind' the various components of the previous situation in the various dimensions of interaction, which one may frame textually as a system of questions. Thus this (true or false) expression of what is open, and of their response to it, by the various participants in the interaction, in language, is itself merely one dimension in the overall 'economy' of responses - the dimension in which, in principle, different actors may coordinate their responses towards a shared goal (but in which the appearance of subordinating one's own assertion to the symmetry of common action directed towards a closing resolution of what has been opened up at the outset, may itself be framed from a different self-perception and perception of one's end at odds with that appearance or deception, and directed towards the subordination of the other's action towards one's own hidden end).

A conflict of 'positions' taken in response to what 'opens up' at the outset may be resolved 'in' various dimensions of the interaction - in dialogue, where one actor 'questions' the other's apparent position, and the two positions are redefined within a common framing of a common end; through 'competition' of different frames or conflicting positions, within a mutually agreed 'constitution' of the group in which this takes place - according to various explicit or implicit 'rules' or fixed 'institutional' frames or models of interaction; or 'violently', outside that rule or law, as one 'competitor' acts to constrain
first becomes a particular individual's self-consciousness in the mirror of confrontation with an other. If Hegel first systematically framed the universal dynamic of individual interaction in this abstract symmetry and its inaugural, mythical disruption, and Marx first transformed this ideal dialectic by identifying the locus of its abstract framing as itself engaged on one side of the asymmetry it thought to symmetrically frame 'in theory', then Lacan, the Hegel of structuralism, theoretically framing human interaction in terms of an inaugural oedipal disruption of the symmetry of child and Mother in the mirror-phase - in that radical quaternary structure of 'double mirroring' in which the symmetry of two bodies is traversed by the question of my self- assertion in differing from the other - the question of the Other as locus of substitution for 'I' in language, to which my self- assertion is always a secondary response - Lacan's framing of the individual's part, and its 'marxist' corollary in Althusser's framing of the social dynamic which is the sum of these parts, presents the primary part of subordination of the moral dynamic of human interaction to formal theoretical framing, in the Paris of the 'seventies. He is the representative 'father-figure', the focal theoretical authority, with whom the generation of May 1968 must come to terms, if they are to come to terms with their new 'parts', and frame in their moral response to the part of subordinating human interaction to theory, a 'new philosophy', articulated in a new axis of questions, where the theoretical axis which articulates social questions in the mirroring of abstract theory and context is itself judged in the moral dynamic whose texts are constructed in the ideological order of 'representative' figures, substitutable one for another in a narrative order explicitly articulated through its inscription in the practical drama of moral, practical assertion.

Now, structurally, this 'new philosophy' whose own 'maître-penseurs' suddenly eclipsed the representative 'structuralists' in 'the media' in 1976-8, partakes of a familiar figure of conservative reaction that responds to the question of the abstraction of an earlier order of theory, and of the coupling of that abstraction to a breakdown of an old order of harmonious
parts in human interaction, by presenting the complementarity of an existing practical order of choice, and the old theory that systematically questioned the asymmetry or inequality of 'parts' in the old order, as a practical alternative which, thus presented, invites the practical resolution of the question in the choice of the practical order of moral alternatives, rather than the formal inscription of the coupling of theory and practice in the axis of a theoretical questioning which does not question its own disruptive force in the prevailing social harmony. In practice the heirs of 1968 aligned themselves with Giscard, as earlier Chateaubriand had aligned himself with the conservative reaction to 1789, while Derrida and his associates in GREPH attempted to make Giscard's suppression of 'abstract' theory in his 'pragmatic' conservative reform of French education into a political question: a practical assertion of 'disinterested' questioning directly coupled by the old progressives with the questioning of the 'ideological' assertion of morality as alternative to 'abstract' theory, as attaching to a specific and unquestioned political part or alignment of the 'new philosophy' with neoconservatism - the locus of this questioning being seen in those politically dominated 'media' where the rising interest in journalistic presentation of 'ideas' was linked by the majority of the participants in GREPH's Etats Généraux de Philosophie with political suppression of 'serious', abstract, academic debate. After the return of a socialist government in 1979 the political dynamic of a questioning of the coupling of questioning or theory with other orders of its institutional context, as one component in 'progressive' opening-up of social possibilities, was in its turn eventually instituted in Chevénement and Derrida's Collège International de Philosophie, before Chevénement, now Minister of Education, had in his turn to pragmatically back away from a wider educational reform in the face of a massive conservative reaction which threatened to jeopardise the government as a whole. In a sense this socialist impasse repeats in reverse the educational revolt which brought down De Gaulle in 1968 - but the shift from the dogmatism of 1968 to the pragmatism of 1984 is reflected in the substitution in a socialist CIPH of the 'marginal' dynamic of embedding the opening up of social possibility as one component of change instituted in an existing social order, for the earlier theoretical fantasy of reconstructing the whole social dynamic
what is open to another, to constrain his 'options', and this as part of his self-assertion within a wider natural frame of bodily activity beyond the constraint of a shared 'culture' that seems, perhaps, 'unworkable', and which is hereby brought in some measure 'into question'.

Now the various configurations of actors, interactions, things, institutions, indeed of 'Nature' itself, are not ranged as such 'options' for each actor within some comprehensive 'internal' space where an 'I' corresponding to abstract self-assertion freely chooses from what is thus utterly 'open' to it as its imaginary universal context of 'free' action. Rather are the various figures or 'parts' of the actor or 'subject' themselves coordinate with other figures - of others, things, institutions and so on - in the individual actor's 'experience', evolved, precisely, from the moment of birth in a particular cultural configuration (which might be variously framed or defined from various different points of view of those already engaged in that 'situation'), through successive questionings of successive 'parts' or figures of self-assertion as successive situations of activity 'open up' from birth onward. The 'actor' in any situation is rather himself or herself a space or place of substitution of various different figures, coordinate in imagination and thought with various correlative figures of others, things, and so on. And the self-image of the 'theorist' in a certain kind of 'abstract' theoretical space as free instance of self-assertion, corresponding to the questioning and affirmative instance of 'I' in his or her 'linguistic space', is itself only one figure of the 'actor', one (often unworkable) 'part' open, in the specific situations in which it arises as one option among others. More generally, 'given' a certain situation - identified or marked, say, by some question or response, as the essentially open matrix of substitutions coordinate with the 'place' of that question (as both locus of various possible verbal substitutions, and also as itself 'chosen' in enunciation as alternative to various other possible actions) - the 'places' and options of the various actors engaged in the situation amount to the configuration of a common 'present', to a 'present situation' indeed, which can only be adequately characterised or marked by a play of questions, in which verbal marking by presenting the structure of what is there
open as a range of questions must itself be taken in some sense as the primary 'question', coordinating both the 'internal' organisation in language of various subordinate questions, and coordinating this verbal dimension or mapping with non-verbal components of the 'situation' there mapped. Thus I began this inquiry into this inquiry simply by marking its locus, situation, as that of a question: this question, this questioning, this inquiry - hoping thereby to coordinate 'internal' verbal elements of the inquiry with correlative components of 'context' in a radical 'space' and time of my writing (whatever that turned out to be) and your reading (whatever you and reading turned out to be) in which a whole range of theories - indeed 'theory', 'inquiry' itself - might be brought 'into question' and set, as so many texts or rather books, in a more radical space in which, standing back, say, from identification with the various textual configurations of the instance of questioning in France, Germany, England, and America around 1970, I might mark my position as thus 'standing back' from a range of texts, in a 'space' and time of substitutions marked by my initial question-mark, in which those various books of around 1970 could be set and coordinated in a correlation of institutional and other 'contexts' - in a correlation of their cultural 'configurations' in this more 'radical' space of questions.

I suggested that this 'question-mark' marks, or may be taken to mark, a configuration of transition from various 'theories' or texts around 1970, to a configuration here projected to the close of this transition or 'present' drama of reflection, around 2000: a 'transition' or action in some sense 'turning about' this attempt to mark a space in which, say, Derrida's texts of around 1970 might be set (by being inscribed in this textual order which in turn sets itself in a largely non-textual (pace Derrida) context), rather as Derrida there sets (among other 'theories') mid-century phenomenology in the textual space articulated in and around those texts.
Now the simple 'dramatic' model of transition from 'opening' to 'close' of an action or interaction - in many ways analogous to the primitive 'scenarios' of mid-century French phenomenology, so that one might speak of a wider transition from around 1950 to around 2000 'turning about' the questions of 'textuality', 'discourse' and so on, around 1970...with the 'dramatic' figures drawn from Sartre and Merleau-Ponty contributing to a sort of 'deconstruction of deconstruction' - this must be extended from the 'theatrical' abstraction of a group of 'actors' on a 'stage', an abstract 'scene', to the wider interaction in which such a singular 'intransitive' action is itself instituted within the wider interaction we call Culture, set in a global Nature, a sort of Globe Theatre.

I have already proposed that the complementary 'intransitive' marking of 'the question', the 'action' of theory set in this book in its otherwise undetermined 'context' or situation, may be taken to mark, and in part thereby frame or organise in the co-ordination of 'internal' and 'external' variables of the 'theory', a more general order of 'action' in which it is itself substituted (by me writing, and perhaps by you reading) for various other actions open in its situation. This coordination is rooted in the circumstance that the words used 'intransitively' in 'theory' must of course themselves all be 'borrowed' from contemporary 'transitive' or 'practical' usage - just like the script of a play, which is 'abstracted' from context not through any difference of language (well, not necessarily, at any rate) but simply through what I called the 'inapplicability' of a particular formally acceptable speech or situation to 'transitive' practical interaction between actor on the stage and audience (of course once the affective dynamic of 'drama' itself becomes a practical matter of entertainment with its various roles of 'actor', 'audience' and so on, the 'intransitivity of (specifically 'modern') art may be reintroduced precisely by the now 'inappropriate' Brechtian address to the audience, from the actor as 'actor' rather than as the 'part' he or she plays - taken to its limit in Handke's play of 1966 in which the 'action' is structured around just such an address).
If, now, one considers an 'action' or transition from one 'situation' to another, not symmetrically structured in abstraction from other transitions 'into' and 'out of' the action, but rather as, so to speak, merely one 'scheme' or pattern of appearance or experience, itself 'interacting', 'in' its various elements or components as 'real' entities or identities 'behind' their limited part in some particular working, interaction, configuration, then one finds oneself back, so to speak, in the 'historical' order of 'practical' transition, of which the general 'space' of theory and the complementary opening and closing of the limited abstract frame of a 'drama' set 'intrinsively' in 'history', in cultural space and time, are two 'sides' — indeed one might speak of the 'logical' or theoretical, the 'analogical' or figural or poetic, and the narrative or 'historical' in which these complementary 'abstractions' mirror one another as three 'symmetric' dimensions of the 'linguistic space' of a particular culture, of its language. The general space of human interaction articulated in the wider frame of 'theory' theoretically (as limiting version of the questioning 'step back' from a particular configuration in which one is embedded or embodied, corresponding to the 'bringing into question' of the general configuration of 'question' and response itself) is directly analogous to the linguistic space in which it may be mapped, with the linguistic matrix theoretically articulated in structures of opening and closing of questions and inquiries, reflected in what one might call a 'dramatic matrix' articulated in structures of opening and closing of actions — the 'poetic' or affective or analogical or figural axis of language itself articulated in this dramatic order. To the abstraction of a particular interplay of individually embodied parts in the theatrical institution of the stage-play, there corresponds more generally cultural structures of integration of 'parts' which we call 'institutions', the theatre being just one among many others; and we may call the 'individual' actor or agent in a culture, and the widest group of all individuals belonging to or sharing a common identification with a part in that culture (its language, political institutions and so on) the two 'poles' of a structure whose dynamic may
framed 'sociologically' in terms of interactions of different 'groups' each corresponding to a particular 'part' in an institution of social interaction, 'abstracted' from the coincidence of a whole range of such 'parts' in any particular individual social 'actor', but coordinated one with another through the general dynamics of human interaction whose primary 'term' is the generic individual as locus of substitution of various parts open to him or her in a particular 'situation'. This sociological matrix of substitution and its systematic articulation in terms of various 'symmetries' of parts in the overall sum of individual interactions in Nature - this institutional dynamics of human interaction - is directly analogous with the linguistic structures in which it is verbally modelled; but just as that linguistic 'space' of substitutions has its two 'sides' or poles in theory and poetry, so this sociological or cultural, ethnological, matrix of social interaction, is articulated in the symmetry of a linguistic 'economy' of verbal 'exchange' in which one term marking one element of the situation of dialogue is 'exchanged' between two individuals' 'versions' of the relations of that term with others in some wider frame than present appearances, and a material economy of physical exchange of an element in the material economy of the situation from its place in one frame of material activity to a place in another. This 'replacement' of one 'product' for another (or for some more or less universal marker of its 'place', 'money'. - so many 'marks', for example, in the 'market'), structured as 'material economy', in its turn has the two 'sides' of the affective axis of desire which it shares with 'figural' language on the one hand, and the 'natural' or physical mechanics of substitution of one material thing 'in place of' another, in time, on the other.

I will not elaborate any further on this general play of different orders or dimensions of 'substitution', coordinate with the question of the question, marking the linguistic space of substitution, as itself a substitution for other possible actions in the 'situation' or general 'place' of present possible substitutions marked by the question. For the more detailed configurations
of this generalised symmetry or substitution in the particular 'situation' marked by the opening '?' of this book, this activity of inquiry of which the book is the 'transcript', have already in effect been abstracted from the thousand or so books already noticed, and those about to follow below, in the course of the inquiry, and may be considered to articulate a vast detail of this 'space' of the present inquiry, simply through their coordinated inscription as books in 'the question of this questioning', as each in its turn comes 'into question' in subsequent books, until finally the 'textual' space of 'Paris 1970' comes into this closing questioning of questioning - this precisely in the 'symmetry' of various limiting abstractions of the 'theoretical text', in various 'national schools' of instituted 'philosophy', and various more 'international' frames of more specific domains of theory (relating to various primary dimensions of the text and context of 'philosophy'), from the question of their 'dramatic' coupling with and embedding in the 'situation' of their practical production around 1970.

I have suggested that this question 'opening up' after around 1970 is at once the matter of the 'postmodern debate' between Habermas, Rorty, Lyotard and others in the mid-eighties, and also the frame of its 'transitional' dynamic of argument, as a common residual abstraction of the various texts theoretically inscribing 'text' in its cultural 'pragmatics' generates symmetric orders of theory of the embedding of theory in culture in Germany, America and France, whose difference of 'perspective' is irresolvable within an instituted frame which does not question, practically, the institution of its questioning, the supposition of a common language in which theorising and argument over the embedding of language in culture can be symmetrically carried on. The 'question' at issue cannot be resolved 'in' any of the national institutions of 'philosophy', 'in' any of the disputants' different languages and cultures, but only in a wider western cultural 'space' in which the difference of language, and the different but symmetric institutions of 'philosophy in Germany, America, and France themselves become the central 'parts', axis, of the question. This book is intended to 'mark' the common situation and dynamic of argument and theory from which these various versions of inscription of theory and argument in 'situation' are differently but analogously abstracted
in different national institutions of 'philosophy'. Thus it marks the 'difference' - in Lyotard's language the 'differend' - 'between' the different versions of their difference, 'in terms of' different national axes of 'bringing previous questioning into question': french 'subjectivism', german 'objectivism' and american 'pragmatism'; Habermas' abstract 'transcendental' coordinates of questioning as such, the widest theoretical 'context', Lyotard's complementary 'poetics' of abstraction from any universal 'theoretical' frame, Rorty's intermediate pragmatics of conflicting narrations.

In the institutional frame of an 'international' philosophical dialogue on the pragmatics of dialogue, each of these 'philosophers' is instituted as such in their 'home' culture and native language, through their 'job' of professional philosopher in a french, german or american university - in each case playing the part of educating or inducting adolescents into a part in the cultural matrix of autonomous individuality through inducing them to take a more or less coherent 'position' critically 'standing back' in reflection from a range of texts on the philosophy syllabus in their respective institutions. I have already suggested how a textual tradition of a given 'school' is reproduced as a student learns to 'stand back' or reflect upon his or her teacher's 'standing back' from some text, iterating the teacher's own critical distance and its figuration, as that model stance is itself an iteration of figures in the primary 'texts' of the syllabus... and so on. But this model of instituted dynamics of induction into a textual space (even where, in the american model, the 'textual space' is itself an abstract verbal framing of an essentially 'dramatic' space of the 'working' of certain figures, including that of the student's own questioning and self-assertion) itself comes 'into question', indeed formally into its own 'space' of questions, in texts of Bourdieu and Derrida already noted, after around 1970; and the 'international' postmodern debate might be seen as a last vain attempt to question the 'textual' institution of philosophy while remaining 'in' that institution, by institutional 'exchanges' which confront different configurations of such institution one with another, rather than directly confronting
each of these contending 'textual spaces' of theory with the contextual structures of its institution 'at home' which are reflected abroad in structures of differently instituted textual spaces. While the international debate remains structured in a common figure of instituted abstraction, the competition between different figures in the different national instances of such institution, of embedding of theory in the 'pragmatics' of institutions, social interaction, cannot be either theoretically or practically 'resolved'.

Said criticises the abstraction of Eagleton's criticism of the abstraction of Jameson's criticism of the abstraction of current 'literary criticism': in each case, at each step of the reiterated criticism of abstraction, the embedding of a text in its 'social context', is itself framed as another text within the dynamic of questions and questioning directed by a common 'academic' abstraction; another text in which an abstract textually framed set of terms mapping 'social context' and its dynamic, in which new textual space and dynamic the questions of literary criticism and the criticism of previous criticism are to be deconstructed or reconstructed. But Said's own assertion of the 'concrete' context of american literary criticism, and the critical debate, as not Jameson's abstract 'political space' or 'political unconscious' and its social dynamic, but rather 'Reagan's America' in which he and Jameson actually, practically construct their texts as one instituted activity among many others on that scene, in that theatre, is itself merely a formal, abstract, move within the shared academic space of 'critical inquiry', a reiteration of the same critical dialectic it purports to bring into question, where an abstract questioning of abstraction requires a nominally concrete space in which to bring the earlier abstract criticisms of abstraction 'into question', but where this nominal critique shares in exactly the same abstract textual dynamic of question divorced from any practical coupling with their 'social context'. This impasse of a questioning which confronts the question of its own 'pragmatics' or politics or theatricality, but still remains, in posing the question, in marking it, in the very space it would 'bring into question', still remains so to speak constative rather than performative, is dramatically underlined by the fact that Said's
'performance' is so divorced in its textual structure from any 'dramatic' embedding in the coupling of text and context it nominally proposes, can appear (as 'Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies and Community') either as an article in Critical Inquiry in September 1982, as a 'contribution' to an opportunistic and very badly edited packaging of disparate 'critical' perspectives as The Anti-Aesthetic in 1983, or as Said's 'contribution' (again) to a Johns Hopkins colloquium in November 1984 ('A French-American Colloquium: The Case of the Humanities. Questionable References') with merely a changed title, 'translated' into the French language and the number of the French literary institution Critique containing the contributions to the symposium in French (May 1985: 'La Traversee de l'Atlantique', Said's text is now 'La Critique Litteraire Avancee et le Monde Exterieur'). One might suggest that the primary relevant 'context' for this constatation that criticism, questioning, should be performative rather than constative, this saying to colleagues that they should be doing something for a different audience in 'le monde exterieur', rather than just saying that they should to one another (as Said 'here' - wherever that may be - does, or rather says...or rather said) is not so much that nominally concrete abstraction, 'Reagan's America', but the marketing operation in late capitalist societies (criticised, among others, by Eagleton, whose own critiques sell pretty well as 'contributions' to the 'debate') which gives its sole editorial coherence to The Anti-Aesthetic, and which determines the repackaging of an otherwise unaltered collection as 'Postmodern Culture', in which guise it became the best-selling 'theory' (or 'anti-theory'? ) of 1985 in Britain ('In all the arts a war is being waged between modernists and postmodernists...only a smug and xenophobic state could dismiss the importance of translation and the importation of non-British, not to say non-European, political and cultural theory...Another Pluto anthology hits the chart: "in many ways...the book represents [sic] a clear [sic] attack on the 'metaphysics of presence' "'. So that's why you're all buying it.' - cover notes and reviews on the second British edition of 1985);
'Postmodernism' and 'the postmodern debate': a distinctly unitary 'ideological' grouping of a range of purportedly pluralistic pluralisms, taking on the configuration of a systematic and 'synchronic' reaction 'in all the arts' to the high modernism of the 'sixties, coming 'into question' from around 1970 on. A term introduced by an architectural critic in 1967, and brought to prominence as a new wölflinesque art-historical 'style' (the style precisely of interplay of previous styles, rather than the supposedly unitary functional space of 'modernism', recognised now as itself just one style among others rather than a universal symmetric syntax, so to speak, arising around 1930 as systematic space of symmetric human interaction, 'synchronic' with parallel 'modernisms' in painting, sculpture, music and so on, developed from the breakdown or opening-up of their various analogues of central perspective at the turn of the century) by Charles Jencks in 1977. If 'postmodern architecture' be understood in terms of a generalisation of the albertine correlation of (central) perspective organising in frescoes an imaginary doubling of the 'real' space of the building whose walls they, in imagination, replace by an imaginary space of action in which the actors in those rooms to some extent frame their interaction - a generalisation from this subordinate function of perhaps diverse frescoes in different or even identical rooms of a given (neoclassical) house to an interplay of the architectural elements of the house or building itself, which might in principle, in the conflict of different figural spaces and dynamics of action, induce or focus in the visitor or passer-by the opening-up or bringing-into question of his own role or identity as 'actor', as a 'place' where the different implicit personae reflected in the different figural 'languages' of the different styles may be substituted (rather than a more unitary 'classical persona coordinate with the focus of albertine perspective) - then one might talk of the postmodern architect as the purveyor, not so much of an albertine 'ideal city', but rather (to borrow the title of Julia's maîtrise at the Theatre Department at Vincennes) an 'urban scenography'. Of a 'theatralisation' of the primary 'space' or stage of human interaction, by setting all the different
styles and 'languages' of earlier periods, as they jostle in the streets, each dominating in more or less unitary manner their own particular architectural 'unit' or building, in a theatrical dynamic in which each actor in the overall human interaction which animates the surrounding town, can to some extent become the question or the place of all the various possible substitutions, personae, masks, roles he or she may play, corresponding to his or her more or less 'existentially' free part in the interaction of the various institutions in which those variant 'parts' take their previously unquestioned places. That is: the jostling on the walls of that quintessentially 'postmodern' architectural form, the Art Gallery, of a range of different styles with their often 'incommensurable' imaginary spaces and affective dynamics, reflects the possibility of the visitor's 'standing-back' from the play of different parts competing for his or her assumption outside. And reflects also the equally 'postmodern' part (par excellence) of a glib cynical relativism 'maximising performance' in the newly acceptable ideological stance that takes any 'wider' frame than the practical play of different forms of action, transition, 'performance', as the only illusion that one need discard - as presenting itself as a truth 'behind' appearance or illusion, as truth - and which relegates to the same limbo the moral dynamic associated with the actor as not so much his interchangeable parts, but the question which is the place of their exchange in a wider economy, along with any intransitive dynamic of 'Art' bringing the figures of parts and activity into its 'transcendental' questioning as a whole: Art becomes essentially transitive, entertaining; mere kitsch whose practical function is to deride any instance of questioning outside the practical order of being entertained, having a good time (for the moment, but there is always only the moment), acquiring and consuming 'goods'.

Like the Romanticism of two centuries (fairly precisely) before, this new anti-classicism (which is yet so often a mere neo-classicism supplanting the more recent classical order of modernism) has, in its analogous questioning of Reason in the name of Reason, questioning the myth of abstraction from myth, logic from figure, the twin faces of progress ('post' modernism, indeed) and reaction. 'Bracketing' so to speak the difference of orientation of those two symmetric faces, looking forward and back at the close of the
second millenium, one might take the 'theatrical' order of 'postmodernity', in its extension from architecture, first to the other 'arts', and then to the best-selling philosophical debate of the 'eighties, as an index of a transition 'opening up' around 1970, turning about the various figures of textual and institutional impasse already noted, over the mid-eighties, and moving towards a resolution in an essentially dramatic rather than merely textual space of theory and theorising, towards the end of the millenium. Moving towards a practical coordination of the theoretical questions that cannot, even theoretically, be resolved 'within' the textual space of theory, and the essentially theatrical dynamic of an affective (rather than logical) axis of that 'intransitive' bringing-into-question of 'activity as a whole' which we call 'Art', in a 'dramatisation of theory' that symmetrically closes a textual tradition of theory which opened 2500 years before with the pythagorean conjunction of 'theatre' and 'theory' in the mystery of the mark which 'intransitively' marks itself to dramatically 'point' beyond the practical earthly order of pointing and marking, to invoke the working of a wider 'cosmic' dynamic of our earthly part, in which alone the question of our questioning itself can find its response.

Opening, closing: this questioning of its own 'marking' or writing marks a 'space' and time of substitution, a sort of general cultural economy, in which writers and readers can begin to frame a 'dramatic' axis of 'theory' in response to this or some other marking of what is 'opening up' around the year 2000. If the 'present situation' of this writing is primarily what the writing identifies as the transition from around 1970 ('opening as the unitary space of 'language' comes into question along with that of, say, modern architecture), through 1977 (nouveaux philosophes, Jencks' Language of Post-Modern Architecture, and so on), the mid-eighties, early nineties, to around 2000 ('closing' that transition with something like the 'institution' of a new axis of theory as a kind of Globe Theatre), then this primary 'context', historically 'symmetrical' as
closing phase or cycle of theory to a complementary abstraction of 'logic' from 'theatre' between about 500BC and 350BC (more or less the first third of the first half of Part I, and the last third of the second half of Part III, or Part III 'completed' by this Close) has its 'nested' historical contexts as a subordinate 'cycle' of opening and closing of a particular figure of questioning - notably that context evinced by the very name 'postmodernism' itself: a twentieth-century context in which it echoes in a sort of inverted form that systematisation of the various 'crises of foundations' of around 1900, by around 1930, that became 'modernism'. Lyotard sees the 'modernity' to which postmodernity is the limiting response as opening (usually, as one might say of a story that exists in a variety of versions) with the French Revolution; but then he also relates it to the far wider cycle (corresponding roughly to the range of this story as a whole) leading from the socratic, platonic and aristotelian criticism and logic of 'sophistic' argumentation, down to his restoration of the 'logic of occasion' and identification of 'logic' itself as a rhetorical form; or from the initial greek abstraction of theory from mythical narrative (before this pythagorean break into abstraction the mythical story was always, necessarily, tied to the specific theatre of particular occasions of narration and application, specified in the mythic interplay of stories) to his narration of abstraction as itself a myth.

Opening, closing: I briefly characterised Hamlet in terms of a linguistic structure of various nested levels of action or transition between single sentence and play as a whole; and more recently I characterised the 'economy' of a dramatic transition from the 'opening up' of an 'initial' situation in the breakdown of some configuration of interaction, to a closing restoration of a configuration of responses to the 'questions' arising at the outset, in terms of the interplay of synchronic lines of individual and group response to previous such responses. One may call such a structure in the dramatic 'space' opened up by the breakdown of the 'initial' configuration an 'economy', insofar as the various lines of response to successive responses to what is opened up at the outset, all as it were share that same 'space' of possible
embeddings of the initial situation in the actual interplay of the various components of the action slowly emerging and defining themselves from, so to speak, 'behind' the appearances (or indeed absences) of the opening situation. At each step in the action the same figure of action or transition presides: each step is a response to what is opened up by the sum of previous steps, or rather the way that the sum of previous steps still leave the initial question or situation open or unresolved; each step resolves some component of what is 'open' in the dramatic 'space' as a whole.

Dramatic space 'as a whole': a 'mathematics' of the 'elementary' mark, point, 'sign' (σην) symmetrically organises, from the pythagoreans down to the close of the twentieth century, a 'universal' space and time of marking 'as such' whose general economy is constrained only, and thus defined, by the radical 'symmetry' of logical, poetic and physical dimensions or spaces of 'the mark', the point. Each of these three dimensions or spaces of what is 'open' in the situation of marking the function of mark, marking as it were the 'initial' radical separation or differentiation of the three dimensions whose interplay itself constitutes the mark a 'mark', is precisely, and indeed only, the 'internal' reflection (as 'logical!', 'poetic', 'physical' 'space') of the 'external' relations of those 'spaces' as three coordinate 'dimensions' of the wider space of 'Kosmos'. Each of the three dimensions of what is 'open' in the situation of marking the function of marking is just the reflection or image of the 'cosmic' symmetry or coupling of those three dimensions themselves. Yet such absolute symmetry of the mark, such an absolute dynamic - of which the physical dynamic of physical or 'external' 'space' and time is a sort of partial, if canonical 'image' - is itself merely a formal constraint on the variations over time of different substitutions for the coupled elements or components of the situation in which any 'mathematics' must be practically framed. Kosmos is always the theoretical contextual configuration of some - and every and any - specific 'present' situation, some action, rather than some abstract self-subsisting 'absolute' space and time of its coordinates in which situations, and the situation of marking this 'Kosmos' in particular, might be 'theoretically' supposed to be mathematically inscribed and so as it were constituted, brought into being and
consciousness and actuality - brought into Kosmos so to speak, from 'outside'. There is no such 'outside'; the 'dimensions' of Kosmos, theoretically articulated in the symmetry of their terms supposed in principle 'abstracted' from their figural embedding in the practical matter of specifying such abstraction in a particular largely 'informal' situation, are theoretical abstractions from the situations of their specification, their elaboration as so many analogous symmetric 'theories'; and to as it were suppose these complementary abstractions recombined in an empty universal space in which the situation of their abstraction might be supposed reconstituted (like a 'transcendental' constitution of the informal language used to specify that 'transcendental' space and time of constitution in the first place) is to invert the 'actual' relation of Kosmos and situation. Kosmos 'exists' only as a set of coordinate abstract constraints, as the abstract constraint upon possible embeddings in a wider 'context' of a particular present configuration in which it may be marked. Kosmos is so to speak the presence in any situation of what is absent, the frame of possible 'extensions' into past, future, elsewhere, and so on. Kosmos is the 'same' in any situation, like the subordinate physical 'space' or space-time which frames in any 'physical' situation the correlation or coordination of that situation with any other, what is physically 'open' and what not in any given situation. It is the essentially open matrix or web of possibility in which we always are, always have been, and always will be: it is nothing outside the situation of my writing here or your reading, and anything 'in' it is necessarily connected in the frame of mathematical symmetry with my writing and your reading. The fact that every situation 'in' Kosmos is equally open or incomplete is as it were a mark of the fact that Kosmos is embodied in every situation, rather than any rigid 'spatial' totality of situations in which every situation must be considered, in principle, definitively embedded or inscribed.

In some practical situation of 'marking' this systematic frame or symmetry of Kosmos, we must 'already' be engaged, not in some abstract mathematical symmetry, merely, but in a specific situation in which various variations or substitutions are open in a huge configuration of components, all of which could be 'otherwise', each embodying their substitution for a range of what might have been in that situation - each being so to speak
marked by other situations (or marking other situations in that situation), where each of these 'other situations' is so to speak altogether symmetric with the given situation in its radical openness or incompleteness, and its radical specificity or concreteness, embedded in an open play of connected situations, in which many of the formally possible substitutions are already 'decided', 'contingently', rather than theoretically derivable from the more abstract constraints of the general symmetries of the various orders of substitution they embody or exemplify.

In Parts I to III I set this inquiry itself, as something 'open' to construction in the situation in which I found myself at its outset, in a wide spatiotemporal economy of 'theory', systematic questioning, organised, as far as possible, simply in the 'symmetry' of the 'space' marked by the marking of this questioning, the textual elaboration of this inquiry, as one thing 'open' in the situation of this elaboration. A 'question' is always the marking of something 'symmetric' in the situation in which the questioner finds himself, and I organised the dynamic of the inquiry in the symmetry marked in its situation by bringing its own questioning 'into question'. At the close of Part III I suggested that the configuration of systematic questioning (various schools of questioning-in-general or philosophy, together with various more limited domains of theory articulating an inquiry into one of the primary dimensions of questioning in supposed abstraction from the others) in its global context around 1970 might be coordinated as a whole in the figure of a common abstraction of each of the parallel 'lines' of questioning from the question of that questioning itself - from the question of the 'dramatic' articulation of that questioning in the symmetry of the various orders of symmetry in various theories and in the various contextual 'dimensions' of theory of which they framed competing 'theories'. From the symmetry of the configuration opening up after 1970 with other configurations of earlier theories already 'brought into the questioning' of this inquiry, I suggested that one might frame a transition from around 1970 to around 2000, turning about (among other things) this marking of questioning as question over the mid-eighties, which is symmetric, for example, with the opening
'transition' of the twentieth century from around 1900 to around 1930 which defines various dimensions of 'modernism'. And if it is temporally symmetric, in the general 'cosmic' dynamic defined by the abstract symmetry of the various symmetric 'dimensions' of marking and questioning, with the 'modernism' elaborated between 1900 and 1930 - with that 'opening' phase of a wider transition spanning the century as a whole, and turning about the configuration of theories and contexts over mid-century - then it is, further, symmetric with that opening 'hegelian' phase of a wider transition from around 1800 to around 2000 which 'turns about' the various crises and the inception of american pragmatism and russian activism over the turn of the century, which I traced from about 1800 to about 1830. On a still wider scale, just as the Romanticism marking the transition from eighteenth to nineteenth centuries is, in Novalis' expression 'analogous' to the thirteenth-century christian 'system' (of theory, practice, society and so on) - the two as opening and closing 'points' of a transition turning about the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century - so this 'closing' situation of transition from 1970 to 2000, which is the immediate 'context' of this inquiry, is historically symmetric as closing, with the opening phase of 'abstraction' of theory from the 'drama' or theatre of questioning between about 500BC and about 350BC, the whole 'history' of abstraction over 2500 years turning about the seventeenth-century revolution marked by, among other coordinate developments, Descartes' scientific reconstruction of Kosmos in the mathematical symmetry unfolded from the empty function of theoretical assertion as apodictic response to the context-free logical space of questions in language, organised around the abstract question of question, doubt, 'standing back from a situation', itself.

1970-2000, then: a closing configuration of 'interaction' of the textual space of theory with various dimensions of its context; and the question of the marking of such a question coordinating variables of the 'internal' textual space of that marking with variables of the context there marked, in a sort of map of what is open to us, as we find ourselves 'in the context' of this mapping,
in a situation, an action or interaction with others and things, marked by this text among others. A textual order of mapping or framing the situation, which maps itself as one variable dimension of the situation in a wider dynamic where textual framing or mapping is only one option, whose substitution for other lines of action cannot in principle be itself decided, chosen, in a textual 'standing back' from other orders or dimensions of our embodiment with others, writing materials and so on, since such an 'abstract' framing of the move of abstraction as it were 'begs the question': it would itself have been chosen, determined, in a wider 'cosmic' dynamic of substitutions or assertion, in which it is symmetrically mapped and determined in the affective and material spaces or dimensions of situation and choice.

Thus I might take as an illustration of the 'economy' of this choice of 'standing-back' from the particular spaces of action in which various 'national' figures, politicians, actors, found themselves after 1970, to frame a 'global' space of common activity, a global economy of interaction of nations, the report of the Brandt Commission set up under the auspices of the UN in 1977:

972 North-South: A Programme for Survival intr Brandt London 1980

The international group of senior statesmen (and one woman) frame the global system of relations of a wide range of economic variables: they map the various contradictions implicit in short-term pursuit by each nation of local political interests, and the long-term common good of coordinated global planning toward the common good in the Global Village; yet the failure to map the strictly 'political' economy which determines such Habermas-style ideal dialogue and community as itself only one variable whose interaction with other 'non-rational' dimensions and variables of the contradictory global 'system', and to attempt the construction of a concrete international political programme in the frame of that practical question of the dynamics of 'standing back' from national and sectional parts or interests, to raise the transition from the seventies to the close of the century as a question marked in the international community of action and interaction, is echoed in the running global Debt Crisis of the nineteen-eighties, whose major outbreak in 1982 may be taken to embody, 53 years later, and on a global rather than
fragmented national scale, the same breakdown of market structures seen in previous systemic crises, in 1929, 1874 and so on, marking an underlying long or 'Kondratieff' wave which can be traced back through Thorold Rogers' data to the beginning of systematic market records in England in the thirteenth century.

The Brandt Report presents the 'North-South' axis of a global political and economic system of interdependent variables, and the contradictions resulting in this system from the process of decolonization between around 1950 and around 1970, as - to borrow Mao's terms - the primary global contradiction to which the East-West axis of ideological division is supposed subordinate. Yet the fact that this very supposition is precisely the north-western, not to say American, ideological position - that open dialogue or 'verbal exchange' between different framings of their common situation, directed toward the material framing of an equally open structure of material exchange, is the natural axis of political advance - is reflected in the absence (lamented by the Commission) of any delegates from the (north- or south-) East. In the East the North-South contradictions of decolonization are evidently regarded as subordinate to an ideological difference over the optimization of production; in particular that vast section of the south-east, China, as representative of that pole of the global order as America is of the diametrically opposed north-west, was still framing the locus of political assertion in terms of Mao's scheme of the practice of identifying the primary contradiction of forces rather than abstract political goals in any specific situation, and framing one's specific local and transitional part in the revolutionary transformation of each situation. Framing, then, a practical, local resistance to the 'northern' model of optimization of the North-South market, without which Chinese decolonization would not even have been effected in a specifically south-eastern form in the first place. Framing a model from which the Brandt Commission might themselves have learnt a more 'practical' mode of intervention in the contradictions of western decolonization:
Global system, and local configuration of intervention.
Mao, Marcuse McLuhan; back to 1968...

974 McLuhan, Marshall
The Gutenberg Galaxy Toronto 1962
975
Understanding Media NY 1964
976
The Medium is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects NY 1967
977
War and Peace in the Global Village NY 1968
978
Counterblast NY 1969

...and on to Baudrillard's generalized 'communication' whose primary or representative 'channel' is the american TV screen. System, communication, information, 'dematerialisation' of objects, dissolution of the individual subject, as we pass from the millenial european order of coupled abstractions into what opens up when that system of separate identities, subjects, objects, mind, matter, material economy of exchange, linguistic economy of exchange, itself comes systematically into its own systematic questioning. A universal, but yet fragmentary, contradictory, 'economy', into which one enters from all sorts of apparently different points in the old abstract structures, as these various points, theoretical, textual, aesthetic, material and so on dissolve into a mere configuration of originary appearance, simulacrum, with nothing 'behind' it as transcendent reference, but only other appearances.

I have already marked a distance from such heraclitean flux, and set what I take to be the essentially dramatic 'schemata' of experience (rather than pure simulacra or appearance) within a 'transcendental' space, not of fixed identities 'behind' their theatrical schematism, but rather as what may be mapped in language as a system of openness, questions, coordinate with the radical 'theoretical' question of the question itself as only one symmetric dimension of what it thus maps, open among other coordinates of what is open. A transcendental 'space' and time of Kosmos not so much 'behind' appearance, as always invariantly 'in' any situation, framing what is open in that situation as theoretical range of embeddings of that situation in the unlimited matrix of systems of substitutions for its terms, which can be partially mapped, but not determined, in language.
Given a situation 'opening up' in a breakdown of some prior configuration of parts (individual or collective), things, 'institutions' and so on, we may as 'historian' map the (or an) economy of response to the initial 'question' posed by that breakdown, as a sort of matrix or lattice of determinations of what is apparently 'open' at each point — each of these 'points' or subordinate 'questions' being dependent on a range of previous points or determinations, and itself partly determining a range of subsequent questions or 'points'. The 'question' as a whole, the mapping of the action defined at the outset in relation to an initial configuration (say one of those many late-nineteenth-century 'questions': The Eastern Question, The Social Question, The Straits Question, and so on) is closed or resolved when the whole combinatorial system of interdependent determinations or substitutions, the whole 'syntax' so to speak of the action or situation or transition, has been 'worked' right through by the various instances of determination at various points (people, groups, things and so on), until nothing of the original 'question' is left open, and a new configuration of redefined components (including perhaps some new ones, and excluding perhaps some of the original or initial ones) is 'in place'.

The 'sociologist' has as task the elaboration of such a 'syntax' of activity; and the practising historian must in general abstract from a supposed complete scientific matrix of variables (the space and time of Ranke's 'Universal History') in that organisation of the 'question' he treats or maps which is a direct complement of the practical situation and dynamics of his own asking of that question (the diltheian side of the question, so to speak). The story, history, 'inquiry' mapped in Parts I to III above presents an extreme form of this activity of historiography, insofar as the 'question' which it addresses is the historical economy or dynamic of systematic questioning itself. The opening 'configuration' is determined simply as the initial 'point' in an economy of interplay of question and context in which this inquiry or history may itself be set, itself closing as it marks the close of the order of 'inquiry' and history into which it inquires, as what is open in the context which it marks by marking itself simply as question, as question-mark.
Thus this 'history', which is just the setting of this book, this marking of systematic questioning, 'in' a questioning of questioning, presents an extreme case of 'historiography' insofar as it frames the 'diltheian' poetics of its abstraction from all the further questions which might be asked of its various terms 'scientifically' in the economy of the frame it investigates: in the general 'cosmic' economy of substitutions structured by its questioning of its questioning, its marking the 'place' in an interplay of substitutions marked by questions, of that substitution which presents its own questioning as its directing question. This circular configuration determines the 'history' as precisely the investigation of the 'economy' of systematic questioning or theory or philosophy as a peculiarly symmetric matrix of 'questions' attaching to questioning, 'opening' with the 'breakdown' of a pythagorean institution of theory in what that theory framed as the perfect harmony or symmetry of a Kosmos whose terms were all 'mathematically' coordinated with the simple mark or point as a sort of primary unitary response to the question of the question, that it implicitly posed, and from which the whole matrix of universal symmetry was unfolded as figurate Number.

The positive, figural, poetic abstraction of the pythagorean 'history' or story of Kosmos, coordinate with the point of opening of that story in the spatiotemporal coordinates it framed - the closed circuit of a theory opening with just such a 'point' itself and closing when the questions and responses opening from that initial mark finally frame the universal contextual configuration of the 'text' of theory itself - and so the systematic frame of an action into which one passes through the 'closing' of the text (an action or universal poetic in which the dynamic of questioning as the opening up or breaking out of the earthly circuit of identification with a particular embodiment or incarnation is itself first understood: a questioning of questioning which can in principle have no resolution in any specific transition in the 'practical' order of earthly transition, but only in an 'intransitive' move out of that circuit into the wider 'invisible' frame of Kosmos) - this is itself 'brought into question' by Parmenides. And the 'action'
thus opening out of the 'initial configuration' of the pythagorean 'mystery' of theory (or 'philosophy': movement towards - in the affective axis of which is the 'comprehension' of the movement of questioning itself in a dynamic which questioning cannot itself 'comprehend') has a presiding 'symmetry', articulated in the symmetry of the question of question, unlike that of any other 'history' opening out of a 'question' other than that of question itself (when there must necessarily be a 'rupture', in Bourdieu's expression, between a 'scientific' economy of the components in interaction, and the poetics of historical récit structured in the writer's 'identification' with the participants in the action).

The 'documents', the 'script' of this singular drama, are then the thousand or so books cited above and below; and the action is just the dynamic of successive framings of the 'universal' context of these various texts from those different 'points' in what each differently identifies as their common 'universal' frame, those different points which are the different books themselves. In retrospect each book is 'nested' within the question posed by this book itself, through a sequence of 'bringings-into-question' of the starting-point of that book, in subsequent books, down to those books of around 1970 which are 'brought into question' here as a system of abstractions from the question of their questioning itself.

At the same time this textual embedding of earlier 'philosophy' and more specific theories (of various primary dimensions of its context) in this text is coordinate with the successive or nested embedding of this text in the various configurations of context identified as contextual figurations of the series of abstraction from those configurations which frame successive 'logical' versions of such context.
Thus these thousand or so books present so many 'coordinates' from which the 'space' of what is open as 'context' of this book may be 'abstracted' by setting those texts at so many points in an 'historical' dynamic of questioning organised in the symmetry of the 'question' of this book of questioning. Working from a range of texts set in libraries and bookshops in the situation of this writing, and trying to 'coordinate' them in a spatiotemporal matrix of questions and contexts which explains, for example, why 'copies' now stand in those libraries and bookshops, one eventually finds this text itself set not merely in the textual dimension of words, but also in a wider dynamic in which various elements of its context other than books are correlated with it in the 'historical' matrix in which their transmission along with books down to the present situation of writing may be textually mapped, through the 'historical' economy of questions, or rather of what has been open, at various points at which books of theory were written. An economy in which the words of this book only mark, without 'comprehending', their own interplay with the various non-verbal components of their context to which they give names and descriptions. The book closes, so to speak, with the passage 'out of' the textual order of questions, into the dynamics of what they mark as open. This 'open' context is only a frame of activity coordinate with this book, in which my detour, so to speak, through a limited number of questions, itself makes some kind of sense in the order of opening and closing of the activity of writing the book. The passage 'out' of the text into other orders of activity among which the text has been 'chosen', makes sense in the space marked by the text, and this transition out of the textual mapping of what is open, into another order of activity in the 'space' thus mapped, constitutes the 'close' of the action of writing, the transition from the situation in which the textual order of questioning opened up, to that in which it has been 'practically' resolved...for a while at least. The text of inquiry is so to speak the transition from one 'space' of action into another, a sort of induction or introduction into a new space or situation in which that passage makes sense, leading out of an earlier situation which didn't make sense and naturally enough induced an activity of questioning.
Such a 'closure' of a text of theory sets the text in
an essentially 'abstract' space of activity in which the closure
makes sense; and I have suggested that the 'Kosmos' into which
as coordinates of what is open, marked by this book, this text is
framed as an 'induction' is only an abstract space of symmetries
of 'the question', organised 'around' a philosophical book as
passage into that 'space' and its time of activity. Whence the
symmetry of the various embeddings of the 'documents' supporting
this inquiry in such a 'cosmic' frame of which they are interpreted
as so many 'versions' or framings from so many different points in
what they differently frame (the difference of the versions being
correlative with their differences of position in what they variously
frame as their common context), which is not intended as any exhaus-
tive 'determination' of any of the documents or texts, but only as
an abstract correlation of various terms in the texts and components
of 'context' they mark, coordinate with the dynamic of opening and
closure of this text itself, in its own specific (or partly specified,
marked) context or situation.

In this inquiry the 'immediate' situation of its quest-
ing is thus 'abstractly' identified as a 'question' opening up
around 1970 (the time of my own introduction to 'philosophy'), spe-
cified here as the question implicitly posed for theory by the
'system' of coordinate abstractions of different national schools
of philosophy and different theories of the primary dimensions of
the 'context' of philosophy, the symmetry of which 'system' in a
general economy of substitutions constitutes for philosophy after
1970 the question of how to pose that symmetry as a question: 'In-
quiry in Question' indeed. The question of the system of abstrac-
tion of inquiry from the question of that system. I have already
noted an impasse over the 'eighties in various 'internal' textual
and institutional attempts to frame the embedding of text and in-
stitution of 'theory' in a 'postmodern' pragmatics of an essentially
theatrical context - 'theatrical' in the sense that this contextual
dimension (prefigured by the 'figural' dynamics of textuality around
1970) is framed in terms of a dynamic associated with the poetic sym-
metry of the various component dimensions of an 'action', abstracted
from the question of the textual mapping of this poetic axis of action in which 'texts' are supposed articulated: this abstraction in its turn 'symmetric' with the initial elaboration between about 1900 and 1930 of Dewey's 'pragmatist' embedding of theory in a systematic textual mapping of human interaction with others and with Nature or things, abstracted from the question of its own practical embedding in the configuration it mapped - a figure which Tocqueville characterised as that of a 'practical' abstraction from the traditional abstract universal frame of western philosophy. The French versions of this impasse may themselves be coordinated in the wider economy marked in the 'eighties by this questioning of systematic questioning: first of all in relation to that 'ideological' axis of 'analogy' of theories which organises the profile of 'theory' in 'the media' in terms of various groups or groupings corresponding to those 'lacunes de vocabulaire', 'structuralism' (disavowed by its theorists), 'nouvelle philosophie' (specifically chosen as journalistic frame of ideological questioning of 'structuralism', by the 'nouveau philosophes' in their self-assertion as a group opposed to the earlier grouping), 'postmodernism'...

979 Tel Quel ed Kristeva & Sollers (f 196)
980 SOLLE±S, Philippe Logiques 1968 (articles from Tel Quel)
981 PLEYNET, Marcelin Système de la Peinture 1977 (rev coll of articles first publd as L'Enseignement de la Peinture 1971)
982 Poétique ed Todorov (f 1970)
983 Scilicet (tu peux savoir ce que pense l'Ecole Freudienne de Paris) (f 1968)
984 Oricar? ed Miller (f 1973)
985 L'Ane (f 1981)
986 LARDREAU, Guy & JAMBET, Christian L'Ange 1976
987 HENRI-LEVY, Bernard La Barbarie À Visage Humain 1977
988 GLUCKSMANN, André Les Maîtres Penseurs 1977

Bernard Henri-Lévy and André Glucksmann still appear frequently on French radio and television; everyone from time to time appears on Bernard Pivot's Friday evening book-review television programme,
Apostrophes; and in a 1982 'special' number of:

987 Art-Press

devoted to the newly fashionable subject of L'Audiovisuel 'BHL'
characterises television, which cannot sustain the autonomous textual syntax of 'serious' argument, as 'L'Epreuve de la Vérité', a sort of lie-detector which allows the audience to judge thinkers and actions in the moral axis of theatre, rather than in the logical or ideological axis of text. The article is headed by a picture of BHL on Apostrophes: Apostrophe: a 'turning out of' the textual order of the books reviewed by Pivot and his guests into the audiovisual order of human interaction in which we ultimately organise the practical order of judgement. If the text presents a 'standing back' from its situation, to frame it in an order of marks of what is presented as 'behind' the situation, so to speak, then the audiovisual interaction of writers and critics in the affective axis of present appearances allows one to judge the 'position' in the moral dynamic of our interaction and our society from which the writer frames the embedding of that position, and his or her and our situation (watching television, for example, or appearing on it) in some proposed wider frame. The theatrical order of apostrophe, direct address to the audience, momentarily breaking (typically in comedy) the circuit of abstraction from context marks an embedding of the text in the moral and affective dynamic of its immediate context. More particularly, I was myself struck by the shift in the 'sympathetic register' of my relation to the texts of those I saw in Paris after reading their books (Althusser, Barthes, Sartre, for example), for which there was no parallel in my perspective on the writing of those I read in conjunction with attendance at their cours or séminaire (Derrida, Lacan, Foucault and so on).

To this 'audiovisual' scenario of French theory as I confronted it in Paris - theatrically structuring my 'line of development' toward the question of questioning - I should add the complementary axis of French film over the sixties and seventies, coupled, perhaps, to the 'theoretical' side of contemporary textuality by figures like Robbe-Grillet (who I also 'saw' in person) continuing in their way the sartrian tradition of complementary
theory and theatre (or cinema) - but I won't here depart from
my general rule of indicating 'poetic' components of the context
of theory, say *nouveau roman* or *nouvelle vague*, as such, rather
than specifying individual texts, films, pictures and so on (an
equally important dimension of the 'theatrical' scenario of french
theory in my 'experience of it in the seventies was that typically
parisian 'event', the major exhibition of 'modern art' that focussed
the visual perceptions of Paris for a couple of months at a time).

Back then to the 'ideological' profile of theory: to
*Art-Press* let me add:

988 *La Quinzaine Littéraire* ed Nadeau
989 *La Magazine Littéraire*

...and to *Tel Quel* the legacy of the previous phase of literature
and theory..

990 *Les Temps Modernes* f Sartre 1945
991 *Critique* f Bataille 1946

...together with a few other 'journals' of various character:

992 *L'Arc*
993 *Communications*
994 *Cahiers pour l'Analyse*

...and, lastly, let me add the two newspapers whose positions more
or less on the 'left', criticising established parts and institu-
tions in France and abroad, are coupled with regular 'coverage' of
the developing 'theoretical' positions in which various aspects of
the situations the newspapers report 'in the world' are framed in
a wider 'space';

995 *Libération* f Sartre 19
996 *Le Monde*
997 *Entretiens avec le Monde* ed Delacampagne & alia 1984-5
998 *Douze Leçons de Philosophie* ed & intr Delacampagne 1985
The opening 'leçon' (of a series of 12, published over the summer of 1982, and proceeding through the standard lycée themes, from Subject to World) by Derrida, 'Le Langage', is presented as a telephone conversation with Christian Delacampagne, in which Derrida questions the 'possibility' (in various senses) of writing an article on Language for the readers of Le Monde. It opens with the ambiguity between constative and performative senses of 'can you give us an article on language', and effectively illustrates this opening question with a performance (telephone conversation) which is closed by Delacampagne's 'constatation', 'C'est pratiquement fait, voyez, mais si, mais si...'

Language as 'performative', as a component of an action, language-game, speech-act or whatever; and as there cannot in principle be any adequate 'constatation' of the performative dimension or 'side' of language, a questioning of language must itself be structured, implicitly or explicitly, as itself a 'performance' - a questioning which stands back to question a particular situation (in this case the possibility of writing an article on Language for Le Monde), opening up what Derrida still calls the wider 'text' of the situation, and closing when that wider text has been embedded in a new configuration of questions, of what is open in the situation of questioning. Philosophy, then, as opening up a situation by finding in it a configuration of questions, of what is open in the situation of marking that open-ness as a system or economy of questions. Derrida, then, attempting a partial 'deconstruction' of Le Monde: of the wider global text or system of terms of which 'The World' (compare other newspaper titles: 'Globe', 'Times', 'Herald', 'Mercury' and so on) is an instituted 'picture' or textual mapping (still no photographs in Le Monde). Opening up a system of questions attaching to his questioning of Language in Le Monde, this parallelling in 1982 his wider project of deconstructing the institution of theory in the Collège International de Philosophie. Philosophy as the practical order of opening up in language the situation of that questioning, its practical 'text' or rather its context mapped into language as a play of questions marking what is open in the practical order of that very marking. 'Deconstruction' now framed perhaps in the wider 'text' of action, rather than in the more abstract interplay of the logical and figural, or constative and performative 'sides' or dimensions of the
narrower verbal order of 'text'. - Or should one rather take the 'constative' as the interface of logical and figural, the frame of journalism and less 'contemporary' varieties of historiography?

I have already noted the various impasses confronted by Derrida in his attempt to 'practically' deconstruct the institution of 'theoretical' (rather than 'journalistic') philosophy: the impossibility of bringing into question the agregation in a job practically directed towards getting students through that examination and into similar jobs (similar 'exchanges' of a certain amount and form of questioning for the products of other less cerebral activities - or rather for a certain amount of 'money', 'in place of' those 'products' which bodily maintain the 'philosopher' in a condition in which he can pursue that questioning); the development of CIPH into yet another set of 'academic' seminars; the instituted 'parts' of students and teacher in the EHESS 'lecture', and so on. Perhaps he should concentrate on journalism, bringing full-circle the development of french philosophy from the sartrian mid-century towards a resolution of 'the postmodern predicament' at its close.

'Deconstruction of journalism'; performative embedding of the apparently 'constative' nature of 'reporting' in the pragmatics of newspapers as themselves activities and 'products' in 'The World' they frame from day to day. Journalists from Le Monde already abstract a range of the global variables, or terms of the global 'text' or system, in an annual survey of the World organised on the scale of the year rather than the day, an 'annual' rather than a 'journal':

999 L'Etat du Monde (english adaptation, discontinued in 1985, as World View London/NY)

I hope '999' is a mere coincidence. Similar annuals presenting the 'global system', updated each year, and organised within the frame of a manageable book, which I have referred to are:
At the close of Part III, I framed a symmetric 'system' of textual and contextual coordinates of the configuration around 1970 of abstraction of theory, systematic questioning, from the 'practical' question of its own questioning: a global 'system' of which a language might be taken as - for indeed it is - an image or model in one of its dimensions, in which each component is more or less coupled, interacts, 'communicates' with every other...like components in that other dimension, symmetric with the linguistic 'economy' of dialogical exchange, the material economy of bodily existence on this Globe; or moreformally like the components of that global economy as a 'physical' system whose overall dynamics are simply the preservation of linked physical symmetries of the 'system' over time (or rather, just the preservation of symmetry, since time enters into those symmetries as one component of the 'action' which is their canonical frame). In relation to the variables or parameters of text and context of theory there marked, this book itself marks a 'point' in the interaction of theory and context opening up as the abstraction of the texts of theory from their 'pragmatics' comes into question 'in theory' after about 1970, which may be considered as an index of a turning-point in the eighties, in the transition from residually abstract attempts to pose this 'question' of abstraction, towards responses to the question implicit in any attempt to mark the symmetry of textual questioning with non-textual dimensions of context, which are themselves directly constructed, like Derrida's newspaper article of 1982 as 'performance'. A transition over the 'eighties, then, from theoretical framings of the embedding of the abstraction 'theory' in some abstract textual mapping of some abstract 'context' into the theoretical text, towards 'theory' constructed not only in the logical axis of questioning, but also ('at the same time', in the same words, the same text, or rather, book or speech) directly and avowedly structured, organised, in the figural, 'poetic' axis of interaction with others and things.
I have already set this textual construction, this book, in the 'dramatic' axis of my own interaction with pariscian theory, and with Lacan and Derrida in particular, over the nineteen-seventies, and I have insisted that the same 'position' outside the residual abstraction of those texts of 'sixties 'structuralism' and 'seventies 'post-structuralism' is coordinate with a directly analogous embedding of german, british and american developments after 1970 in the same 'space' and time of the action opening up as french abstraction comes into question after 1970: an analogy directly deducible from the symmetry of different national institutions of abstract theory in (or around) 1970. The 'immediate' configuration of texts and contexts which frame as it were the 'situation' of my 'move' in constructing this inquiry as my response to my position in the 'World' of 1970-2000 is constituted by those texts or books themselves produced as 'moves' in the economy of this interaction of theory and World after around 1970, and which may be grouped by the mid-eighties as a sort of sample 'script' of the 'postmodern debate' - 'postmodernism' appearing to have superseded 'poststructuralism' as an 'ideological' analogy made between a wide range of different theoretical or anti-theoretical 'moves' after about 1970 (under which 'poststructuralism' is subsumed as a sort of opening phase, down to the late 'seventies, before the overall transition towards the pragmatics of the texts of theory becomes clear or 'takes shape'). These books or texts in their turn are framed, as their generic characterisation attests, as a transition 'out of' the 'modernism' in various dimensions of text and context which was more or less systematically elaborated as a system of linked responses to the 'crises' of around 1900, by around 1930; and this 'secondary' context of the 'postmodern question', the twentieth century as a whole, is in turn set in the wider historical configuration and dynamic of texts and contexts opening up in French, Industrial and Romantic Revolutions around the beginning of the nineteenth century - a wider frame of the present situation dominated in philosophy by Hegel in the opening phase, say, 1800-1830, and 'turning about' the breakdown of the nineteenth-century 'system' of responses to those Revolutions over the transition into the twentieth century - say, between 1870 and 1930. The 'symmetry' presiding over that transition into twentieth-century 'modernism', may be evinced in its representative political axis by the
formulation by the Nazi Schüssler of a bismarckian 'system', instituted in 1870, and edited from the Chancellor's voluminous remains as a 'political testament' applicable to Germany in the aftermath of the global economic crisis of 1929-30, and the accession to the political direction of Germany by the National Socialist Movement, dedicated to building a new german Reich, in 1933:

1002 BISMARCK, Otto von *Politisches Testament* ed Schüssler Berlin 1933

...and indeed Bismarck's accession to the central position on the european stage in 1870 has frequently been taken by historians as the opening of the 'contemporary' scene dominated in Europe by the wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45 - although I have already noted that after the mid-century this eurocentric framing of even european history in the twentieth century comes 'into question'.

In a general survey of the textual and contextual frame of 'modern thought' Biddis sees in the configuration of 1870 that opening of a growing systematic coupling of theory and context which frames the specifically modern 'mass culture' typified by a generalised participation of the individual in the interplay of all the dimensions and components of collective activity mapped for him (or latterly her) in the mass-circulation newspaper - a coupling reflected in the parallel opening up of modern historiography to questions posed by the overall interplay of many dimensions and components of collective activity ignored in the more conservative 'political' history of Ranke and his school...

1003 BIDDIS, Michael *The Age of the Masses: Ideas and Society in Europe since 1870* Harmondsworth 1977

Thus Keynes objected strongly and publicly to the impossibility of achieving a rational consensus in the Versailles discussions over the post(Great)war settlement, where he was economic advisor to the british government, since the various national representatives were hopelessly constrained by the affective dynamic relating their positions at home to the reporting in mass-circulation newspapers of their moves at the Conference, and easily predicted
the long-term consequences of the peace:

1004 KEYNES, John Maynard  The Economic Consequences of the Peace  London 1919

1005 Keynes and After  Harmondsworth 196

..yet this coupling of politics and mass 'representation' in various senses is itself coordinate with the part of (frustrated) academics like Keynes, Woodrow Wilson, Ebert in 'politics', caught in abstract ideas of the 'practical' implications of their theories, but like the Brandt Commission after them, and so many abstract framings of the resolution of present difficulties in a wider rational consensus over the middle years of the century, these academic administrators could never appreciate like, say, Goebbels, the affective axis of human interaction in which any rational approach, to be effective, must itself be practically embedded. In an irrational world it is not rational to try and sway 'the masses' by rationally setting a present situation in a wider rational economy in which they might all be supposed to agree to some common rational long-term end; besides the theorists themselves never agree upon which particular rational frame is the correct one, and the masses are perhaps right to frame their collective activity in the more familiar dynamic of appearances - judging 'policies', for example, not by critical assessment of argument, but rather in Henri-Levy's 'truth-test' applied to the dramatic interaction of proponents of contending 'parties' on, say, television, replacing 'royal families' as the theatrical frame of political direction in the late twentieth century, and finding perhaps their canonical 'representative' in Said's Reagan.

Representation: The World as Will and Representation - or in Hartmann's reformulation of 1870, as Representation and 'The Unconscious' as axis of universal Will, Life, in Appearance; The Nation as political representation and dynamic of Jameson's Political Unconscious; the Race as Rosenberg's Collective Will, germanic Will to Power. The World as a Representation, as a Globe Theatre, the scene of earthly appearance, and the drama of the Visible set in the Invisible articulated in the universal
dynamic of Jung's return from Freud to Hartmann: the Collective Unconscious.

Representation: 'representatives' of regional groups and the groupings or parties competing to frame national activity within their complementary versions of their common situation: actors playing out and organising on the narrower stage of political institutions the wider conflicts of those groups, and this political stage set in the verbal and visual theatre constituted by 'mass media', as the athenian stage was set among the whole assembled community. The national 'drama' as a whole the wider theatre in which actor, politician, audience or spectator are themselves so many parts, so many interacting institutions, groups. And 'theories' so many versions, representations, framings, of various dimensions of this theatre, themselves instituted and articulated as one particular form or component of the general theatrical dynamic of interaction of 'parts', interacting logically and textually in the academic debate of competing versions, theories of various elements and dimensions of the overall dynamic, interacting 'practically' through the 'analogical' embedding of the texts in the affective (political, unconscious, institutional, performative..) axis of the wider interaction of theorists with fellow theorists and with various other players in the wider institution of nation and community of nations.

Ideas and Society since 1870: as in a more restricted drama the opening configuration presents the participants with a configuration of questions, possibilities, worries...and in response new couplings, 'communications' between various components of drama or situation may arise...and old relations may break down. In particular, various aspects of earlier theoretical 'positions' come into question, in what amounts to a special case of the actor's earlier figure of self-assertion in framing his part as one component in the configuration in which he or she frames his or her situation 'coming into question' as an earlier working of identification of self and others and things breaks down. I framed the 'action' of theoretical development...
as a dynamic of unfolding of questions, as previous positions came into question (as practical or figural short-circuits of a more radical question, through the poetics of identification of the part or figure of assertion and questioning as one component in the correlation of theorist, others, and things which it framed) within a wider action developing as various other non-textual moves became open, and are marked as new questions.

The dynamic of the whole 'activity' or theatre of theory, opening as a whole with the pythagorean marking of the coordination of various dimensions of the mark or marking 'as such', was articulated within the 'symmetry' presented by the 'question of question', the question of the question (as marking something 'open', as such symmetric between various responses) as itself the substitution of one order of substitution (language) for others 'symmetric' with it, in the wider 'space' of action, or interaction of those primary dimensions - language, institutions (or culture), and material economy - each themselves the mapping of the symmetry of the three dimensions into one of those dimensions themselves.

Here is not the place to recapitulate the complex interplay of various components of those three dimensions, and of their interaction or coupling over 2500 years, articulated in the radical symmetry and dynamic of 'question' through Parts I to III. It remains, rather to mark the groups of theoretical 'steps' in the twentieth-century 'phase' of theory initiated by the question of 'modern' theory in various domains, and the questions of 'modernism', which marked after about 1900 what 'opened up' through the various analogous crises in various dimensions of theory and context around that date, which, as so many books of which copies have persisted down to the 'seventies and 'eighties, constitute, along with differently transmitted components of their original contexts, have entered into the 'theatrical' dynamic of my own marking of my position here. Entered by being set in the temporal context of this book, and its cultural space, as so many 'points' which allow the symmetric matrix of questions and contexts on which they are so many perspectives, to be abstracted or deduced from the question of their differences of perspective being symmetric or coordinate with their differences of position in that on which they are perspectives.
The texts or books fall into so many 'groups', corresponding to so many generic figures of questioning, correlative with a particular period (as all responses to the same configuration of questions opening up around 1900 and typified by Russell's Paradox in logic, say; or those opening up after 1930 and typified by, say, Gödel's Theorem - the latter perhaps taken as a subordinate group within a wider order of twentieth-century responses to the theoretical configuration of around 1900, or perhaps taken as responses to what opens up with the breakdown of the initial responses to the 'crises' of 1900, as first given systematic form in various fields towards 1930); or with a particular 'position' in one national school as tradition or line of questioning, rather than another; or with a particular dimension of the text and context of questioning rather than the 'philosophical' whole (physics, logic and so on). Thus one of the few secondary texts I have used for this 'period' or context of my own inquiry, treats of '45 years of french philosophy':

1006 DESCOMBES, Vincent Le Même et l'Autre: Quarante-Cinq Ans de Philosophie Française (1933-78) Paris 1979

...beginning with the questions opened up by Kojève's cours on Hegel, and closing with the 'Perspectivisme des années 70' as response to 'les Structures de 60', theirselves responses to the Phenomenology of mid-century. Kojève provides the opening question of the relation of Self and Other (as question of the embedding of traditional cartesian Subject as locus of theory in the symmetry of equal and disymmetry of unequal selves, and in its dramatic dynamic) and Descombes traces the legacy of the famous cours through Sartre and Merleau Ponty's response to this question over the mid-century, to the 'structuralists' bringing-into-question of the presuppositions attendant on the linguistic locus of assertion of the phenomenological subject as primary locus of questioning and theory, of the circularity of the mid-century frame. The seventies evince a bringing-into-question, in turn, of the global 'structural' system of language in which as a sort of new version of subjectivity the old mid-century subject, and dynamic of Self and Other framed in relation to it, had been 'deconstructed' or dissolved or whatever.
Now there are only incommensurable récits: yet another version of the constant figure, over the whole development of an old French subjectivism which goes back to Descartes and beyond. What, asks Descombes at the close, if one tried to bring into question, not successive versions of French subjectivism; but rather the primacy accorded to this subjective pole of the subject-object relation itself. What if one began from the 'relativistic' (my term) invariants of the 'space' of different perspectives, on which the different perspectives are different views, different versions of their difference?

Yet in this recasting of (effectively) eidetic variation in the language of 'postmodernism' rather than husserlian phenomenology, there is no question of setting the theatrical dynamic of interplay of subjective 'versions' of the differences of those versions of their interplay, in anything other than yet another reformulation of an abstract 'space' of theory, 'philosophy', texts and questioning of texts in other texts. No suggestion that the relativistic questioning of the traditional 'subjective' space of reflection, theory, 'versions' of theory and World, should itself be set in, say, a contextual dynamic of interaction of theoretical subject and Other or others in France over forty-five years; no suggestion that the abstract model of a city which is simply the constant or invariant in different perspectives on different perspectives 'of' that city of differences, is in fact Paris.

That, then, is my question, which sets Vincent Descombes' history-of-philosophy abstracted from philosophy-of-history (except insofar as that appears as an 'internal' theme of philosophy over this period) in the 'analogical' cultural dynamic of that group of analogous logics of the doubling of the logical axis of questions in a figural dynamic of action (desire, will, or whatever), which I attempted to deconstruct as it were, in a structural analysis of 'structuralism' as so many analogous abstractions from their own embedding in the theatrical axis of French culture in the sixties and seventies...
Structure of structuralism...with its 'mythical' embedding in the canonical textual ancestry of Levi-Strauss' correlation of complementary linguistic and material 'exchange' in the common cultural matrix prefigured in Mauss' famous essay...

SAUSSURE, Ferdinand de (d 1913) Cours de Linguistique Générale (ed from lects Geneva 1915) ed de Mauro Paris 1972

STAROBINSKI, Jean Les Mots sous les Mots: Les Anagrammes de Ferdinand de Saussure Paris 1971

HJELMSLEV, Louis Trolle (Prolegomena to a Theory of Language Copenhagen 1943) fr tr

JAKOBSON, Roman & HALLE, Morris Fundamentals of Language The Hague 1956

CHOMSKY, Noam Syntactic Structures 's-Gravenhage 1957

Cartesian Linguistics NY 1966

Language and Mind NY (1968) enlgd 1972

PROPP, Vladimir (Morphology of the Folk-Tale Moscow 19 ) fr tr
The theorist should, I have suggested, elaborate a 'philosophy' articulated in a general analogy of the narrower worlds or cultures of the ethnologist, more on the lines of Malinowski's 'participant observation', than on those of the abstract lévi-straussian frame, embedding a World in a textual frame 'outside' the embedding of that textual frame in its World. My ethnology of structuralism involved several years fieldwork or 'participant observation', coordinating my position with those of others whose texts I have already listed - and theirs with those in interaction with whom the 'positions' of sixties and 'seventies structuralism had been adopted..and so on, back to the opening of the 'modern' phase of 'french philosophy':

1027 BERGSON, Henri
Essai sur les Données Immédiates de la Conscience 1889
L'Evolution Créatrice 1907

1029 POINCARE, Jules Henri
La Science et l'Hypothèse 1903

1030 MARITAIN, Jacques
Art et Scolastique 1927

1031 GILSON, Etienne
God and Philosophy (Yale lecvs 1940)
New Haven 1941

1031 SARTRE, Jean-Paul
La Transcendance de l'Ego (1936)1965 (75)
La Nausée 1938
Le Mur 1939
L'Étre et le Néant 1943 tr Barnes NY 1957 (74)
Huis Clos 1944
Situations I-III (reptd from Temps Modernes) 1947-9
In particular, I found my position in the 'theatrical' interaction of the 'script' of dialogue about the overall action in which that 'philosophical' debate was one dimension, with other dimensions of the action, partly by reading the 'theory' of the 'poetics' or figural side of the French language, and the parallel line of textual development in French poetry itself, as two sides of the same Mallarmean coin, whose intersection, given currency...
by Valéry and Bachelard in particular, I will here chart only on the 'theoretical' side:

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<td>1057</td>
<td>RAYMOND, Marcel</td>
<td>De Baudelaire au Surréalisme. (1933) 1947</td>
<td>tr London (1957) 1970 (70)</td>
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<td>1058</td>
<td>BAUDELAIRE, Charles</td>
<td>Oeuvres Complètes ed Asselineau, intr Gautier 1868-70</td>
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<td>1059</td>
<td>RIMBAUD, Arthur</td>
<td>Oeuvres ed 1946</td>
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<td>1060</td>
<td>BLANCHOT, Maurice</td>
<td>Lautréamont et Sade 1949</td>
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<td>1061</td>
<td>MALLARMÉ, Stéphane</td>
<td>Poésies (1893; enlgd 1899) comm Mauron tr Fry (d 1934) London 1936</td>
<td>(69-71)</td>
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<td>1061</td>
<td></td>
<td>Divagations (1897) ed &amp; intr</td>
<td>(75)</td>
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<td>1062</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oeuvres ed Mondor &amp; Aubry 1945</td>
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<td>1063</td>
<td>MAURON, Charles</td>
<td>Mallarmé 1964</td>
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<td>1064</td>
<td>VALERY, Paul</td>
<td>Oeuvres ed Heytier 1957-60</td>
<td>(78-9)</td>
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<td>1065</td>
<td></td>
<td>Charmes (1917-22) comm Alain 1952</td>
<td>(78)</td>
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<td>1066</td>
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<td>Paul Valéry - Cahiers du Sud Marseilles 1946</td>
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<td>1067</td>
<td>POULET, Georges</td>
<td>Etudes sur le Temps Humain (I) Edinburgh 1949 (79)</td>
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<td>1068</td>
<td>RICHARD, Jean-Pierre</td>
<td>Poésie et Profondeur (essays 19-5) 1955</td>
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<td>1069</td>
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<td>Les Chemins actuels de la Critique (Cériay colloque 1966) ed Poulet 1968</td>
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If I now attempt to go against this current, and move back from Kojève's coures across the Rhine, setting these french positions in a wider matrix in which one may chart the transposition of nineteenth and twentieth-century german 'positions' into the textual and contextual dynamic of 'french philosophy' (Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Brentano's pupils Husserl and Freud, Heidegger: the primary references of 'french' thought after Husserl's visit to Paris in 1930, Sartre's return from Berlin and Freiburg in 1932,
Kojeve's arrival in 1933...not to mention Breton's various importations of Dada, Freud and Marx), then the simple French line of development which couples 'theoretical' and practical (or poetic, or literary, or political) 'sides' of philosophical language, in the substitution of one Parisian intellectual grouping and its ideological or 'media' profile for another, is discovered to trace its trajectory over the course of the century in a wider and more complex 'matrix' of interplay of different 'lines' of theory in various different dimensions of context...rather as the 'straightforward' art-historical canon presented by the Ecole de Paris, in relation to which as central axis the history of 'modern art' is traditionally (already) traced, is in parallel manner seen to be a questionable abstraction from a more complex international web, whose other as it were missing pole must be located in German fragmentation, or perhaps in the question of modern German art.

Thus German-language 'philosophy' over the first thirty years of the century appears as merely one dimension in which various theoretical 'steps' may be assigned more complex coordinates, as with the turn-of-the-century breakdown of the earlier model of an abstract logical embedding of the logical order of theory in the 'contextual' dynamics of its World (seen in America in the emergence of Pragmatism, and in France, perhaps, in a shifting of the axis of theory towards the literary and ideological interface of 'logical' and 'poetic' or performative sides of language), the subordination of various more 'specific' domains of theory to the universal theory of philosophy comes into question, and philosophy emerges as 'science' or 'logic' or (phenomenological or Meinongian) 'ontology' or various forms of 'psychology', or as a mere ancilla to theology or art or politics...or whatever. And the coherence of a German 'school', which is even before 1930 or 1933 'problematic' (that is to say, it constitutes, and is itself constituted by a question...just as had been Luther or Fichte's 'German Nation' for centuries before), becomes after the visits, say, of Ayer and Quine to Vienna, and the emigration of Wittgenstein in 1930 followed by the great intellectual diaspora of 1933, the dispersal of this German question, its infection of other questions, so to speak, parallel with the infection of the political questions facing other nations by a 'German question'.
Thus I will group a fairly wide range of 'german' steps in various 'dimensions' of theory and context, before and after around 1930, simply according to an often fairly random break-down of the complex interplay of various textual and contextual coordinates of these various 'steps' marked by so many books, into a few 'groups' of moves, with varying degrees of coherence. Some 'german philosophy' will appear with an 'international' group of books of 'logic' or 'physics' of 'psychology' or whatever else, some 'german' writers will be grouped in a german 'school' or in german schools (Vienna Circle, Frankf尿t School and so on) before around 1930, and in american or british 'schools' afterwards; and some residents of America over the mid-century will be taken to belong to that old german tradition of taking part in german debates and their dynamic from 'outside' the physical space of 'Germany'.

1070 HUSSERL, Edmund

Logische Untersuchungen (Halle 1900-1,1913-21) tr Findlay London 1970; fr tr

1071

Die Idee der Phbindungnologie (lect 1907) tr

1072 Vorlesungen Ubber das innere Zeitbewusstsein (1905-10) ed Heidegger (1928) tr
fr tr Dussort Paris 19

1073 Ideen zu einer reine Phbindungnologie und phbindungnologische Philosophie (1913) tr Gibson London/NY (1931) 1952

1074 Formale und Transzendente Logik (1929) tr

1075 Cartesianische Meditationen (1930 Paris lects) tr Levinas Paris 1931

1076 Der Krisis der europ sectionen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phbindungnologie (1935 Prague lects, 1970)

1077 PIVCEVIC, E

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<td>Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (Berlin 1918)</td>
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<td>1080</td>
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<td>LUKACS, Georg</td>
<td>Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (Berlin 1923) tr</td>
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<td>MANNHEIM, Karl</td>
<td>Ideologie und Utopie (bonn 1929) tr</td>
<td>Wirth &amp; Shils London 1936</td>
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<td>BÜBNER, Rudiger</td>
<td>Modern German Philosophy</td>
<td>London 197</td>
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<td>1084</td>
<td>HEIDEGGER, Martin</td>
<td>Sein und Zeit. Erste Helfte (Halle 1927,195 ) tr</td>
<td>Macquarrie &amp; Robinson London 1962</td>
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<td>Was ist Metaphysik? Tübingen (1929)1949</td>
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<td>Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (lects 1930-2) (Tübingen 1943)</td>
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<td>Der Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität (Freiburg 1934) tr</td>
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<td>Einführung in der Metaphysik (lects 1935) (Tübingen 1953) tr</td>
<td>Manheim New Haven 1959</td>
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<td>Brief Über den Humanismus (1946) Tübingen 1949</td>
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<td>Existence and Being tr of ( ), &amp; Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung (1936) with intr, Brock London 1949</td>
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1094 Nietzsche (Pfüllingen 1961) fr tr Klossowski
Paris 19

1095 The End of Philosophy: tr of of part of Nietzsche, prefatory interview with Heidegger, & notes
from 1936-46, Stambaugh NY 1973

1096 Questions III ( Paris 1966

1097 Zur Sache des Denkens (19- - ) Tübingen 1969

1098 Questions IV* (196 -7 ) ed & tr Beaufret & alia
Paris 1976

1099 & FINK, Eugen

1100 Heraklit

1101

1102 GADAMER, Hans-Georg

1103 SCHUTZ, Alfred

1104 LUCKMANN, Thomas & BERGER, Peter

1105 BENJAMIN, Walter

1106 MARCUSE, Herbert

1107 HABERMAS, Jürgen

1108 SCHUTZ, Alfred

1109 GADAMER, Hans-Georg

1110 Habermas and Modernity ed & intr Bernstein Cambridge 1985

1111 HOLUB, Robert C

1112 Reception Theory: A Critical Introduction
London/NY 1984
Reception Theory: an inscription and comprehension of the relations of text and context in a dynamics of context and a contextual rather than textual axis of a textual 'tradition'—this rather than the French figure of a textual framing of the figural embedding of text in a context which is itself understood as 'more general' textuality. And the basic context for understanding 'German thought' in the twentieth century might be taken as its own 'reception' in Europe and in American and Slav interfaces of Europe and World to the West and the East. Holub considers not only the dynamics of reception of 'Rezeptionsästhetik' in Germany itself, but also that of its assimilation to 'pragmatist' dynamics of 'reader-response' by Stanley Fish and others in America.

Twenty years earlier Herbert Spiegelberg had sought to frame the reception of 'Phenomenology'—or rather of the 'Phenomenological Movement' organized largely as European responses to or reception of Husserl—in the pragmatic dynamic of American theory...framing thereby his own American position as that adaptation of the range of European 'phenomenologies' to the analogical and 'practical' or pragmatic dynamic of the history of theory, which is both his own 'phenomenology', and also the frame of his history of phenomenology as 'phenomenology of phenomenology'. This would allow a general programme of introduction of (continental) European philosophy into the frame and dynamic of American philosophy, since as the head of the Division for Cultural Cooperation of the newly formed UN's 'cultural' section (UNESCO) reported from postwar France in 1950:

Any philosophy now seeks to accommodate itself to, and express itself in, phenomenological method...The average American student of philosophy, when he picks up a recent volume of philosophy published on the continent of Europe, must first learn the 'tricks' of the phenomenological trade and then translate as best he can the real import of what is said into the kind of analysis with which he is familiar.(1)
Spiegelberg opens his historical phenomenology of phenomenology by framing its own position in the history it reconstructs as response to the situation marked by this report.

His book...


...opens:

The present attempt to introduce the general philosophical reader to the Phenomenological Movement by way of its history itself has a history which is pertinent to its objective...

...and turning to the body of the book one can place Spiegelberg's response to the UNESCO report in the more detailed dynamic of his own trajectory in the 'Movement': born in 1904, studying under Husserl in 1924-5, a member of the Munich circle around Pfänder, until leaving for America in 1937, as he also moved further than Pfänder from 'pure' phenomenology towards a philosophical inscription of philosophy in the ethical axis of 'practical reason' and human interaction (1). A 'practical' phenomenology may itself be abstracted from coordinating historical 'appearances' of phenomenology itself, rather as 'pure' early phenomenology discovered the objective noematic correlate of a perception in an invariance in or 'behind' its various appearances, and 'essences' in the analogous Gedankenexperimenten of eidetic variation...

Phenomenology itself is given through various appearances.

In fact there is room for something like a phenomenology of phenomenology. (2)

Thus the close of the original edition finds the 'essence' of phenomenology - or rather 'The Essentials of the Method' - in a sort of circular exemplification of this frame of which the different appearances of phenomenology are so many analogues, in its self-abstraction from different versions of it by organising those as so many views on the frame of phenomenological activity, from

1: pp 194-5 2: p xxvii
particular points in that common space, or rather in the space and time of that action or activity, the 'phenomenological movement' in which they all share.

Now this passage from consciousness or perception to action as primary frame of questioning is characteristic of the mid-century as a whole, and one might see the sartrian dramatisation of consciousness in the primary affective axis of relations with others or the Other, say, and a contemporary british reduction of 'the subject' to a mere element in the script of interaction which makes perfect dramatic or practical sense without the supposition of any 'ghost', 'behind' this machinery, any more than of an identical consciousness behind the words of Hamlet as we read them on the printed page, as two poles of a common mid-century figure, whose relation may be guaged by Passmore's...phenomenology... of the affective dynamic in which the distance between british common sense interaction, and the affective hyperbole across the water it so abhors (to the point of non-communication, or - professional - non-interaction) is articulated:

Professional philosophers, for the most part dismiss Existentialism with a contemptuous shrug...it stands, to British philosophers, for Continental excess and rankness...But to give a sketch may at least bring into focus that fundamental opposition between British and Latin-Teutonic philosophy on which I have several times insisted, but in somewhat general terms...

...If most British philosophers are convinced that Continental metaphysics is arbitrary, pretentious, and mind-destroying, Continental philosophers are no less confident that empiricism is philistine, pedestrian, and soul-destroying. (1)

This sketch is added as an appendix to the second (1966) edition of the survey first published in 1957:

1113 PASSMORE, John A Hundred Years of Philosophy London (1957) 1966

1: pp 476-7
This mid-century non-communication may be seen, on the British side as the culmination of that interwar reaction against the turn of the century 'hegelian' reaction against nineteenth-century empiricism and natural science, which defines 'current' British philosophy (as opposed to the 'history' of the earlier 'empiricism' of Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Mill) as the arena of debate opened up by Russell and Moore at the beginning of the century. The transition from old empiricism to new, through turn-of-the-century 'neo-idealism' frames Metz' history:

1114 METZ, Rudolf  
Die philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart in Grossbritannien (Leipzig 1935) tr (as A Hundred Years of British Philosophy) London 1935

..structured rather according to the systematic 'continental' principles of Ueberweg, than the more 'empirical' approach of Passmore. The interwar transition may be seen taking shape in the regrouping and transformation of the dynamics of the debate marked by:


..whose second volume is dedicated to Bradley, who had refused the honour the previous year, but died in the meantime; perhaps he realised that by putting him thus at the head of the collection, his successors were putting him, so to speak, behind them.

This interwar withdrawal from the international philosophical scene may be coupled not only with an affective axis of distancing from 'the Continent', but with growing political and economic isolation on the world stage, after a dominant role in the aftermath of French and Industrial Revolutions in the nineteenth century:

1116 ROBBINS, Keith  
I have deliberately chosen to be insular...my criterion was: to what extent have the ideas of this writer entered into the public domain of philosophical discussion in England? Would the reader of *Mind* or the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* be likely to encounter his name? (1)

...And even for Passmore to attempt to frame the framework of debate in *Mind* and *PAS* as a 'history' of discussions about the standard timeless, ahistorical, apolitical, scenario of an individual's confrontation with a few other individuals and a few things or stage-properties in an otherwise unspecified situation of 'perception', 'knowledge', 'other minds', 'causation' (and a few other variants in the standard repertory of 'The N dramatic situations' of British philosophy) is perhaps rather eccentric in 1957 (but then he is an Australian). For the complementarity of the 'current' debate waged by the professional successors of Russell and Moore in 'the public domain of philosophical discussion in England', and the 'arbitrary, pretentious and mind-destroying' books of continental system (in which the elementary or amateur dramatics of everyday language is abstracted from to frame almost unheard of situations in the global frame of a text in which the writer's own position in history is itself a primary coordinate) involves the abstraction of the frame of 'current' or timeless British debate, together with that of its primal scene (Is this table really there, and is that other person really a person like me, and am I not only dreaming all this anyway) precisely from the complementary French and German manners of posing the question of the closure of a system of systematic questioning or philosophy as the radical question of the configuration of its framing in the World the philosopher frames - whether this be posed by Sartre as the question of the Subject as primary locus of assertion or response to the question of such radical circularity, or by Heidegger as the *Seinsfrage* to which Dasein can authentically respond only (in Stoic or Nietzschean manner) by asserting his own assertion to partake of the radical self-assertion of 'objective' Being. The moral of the British debate is to abstract from such an abstract systematic or global
frame of questions to the interplay of elementary 'parts' and analogous or correlative sorts of thing (impersonal variables) in the abstracted little scenario of 'speech-act' or 'language-game' - a little 'play' so to speak with its finite range of terms and corresponding finitary combinatorics of possible variations, sets of 'substitutions' within finite specifiable syntax or 'rules'. The part of 'philosopher', elucidating questions in term of the elementary dramatics of the specific situations in which they arise (reflected in the particular terms whose extrapolation from such practical dynamics generates the 'problems of philosophy'), is then implicitly or explicitly identified in a similar elementary scenario - a game, so to speak, whose rules may be discovered in the dynamics of questioning or debate, the interplay or competition of different framings of various such elementary scenarios, in the instituted textual space of Mind, PAS and the other journals...

...and so on. The abstraction of this 'scholastic' frame of debate or interaction, together with the elementary actions or interactions which provide its subject-matter, from the practical interface of the 'elementary' activity of debate on the one hand, and its practical institution in a historical and social context which is as it were the sum of interactions of the 'elementary' scenarios themselves is so to speak the british institution of 'philosophy' in a social order 'conservatively' framed as a wider interplay of coordinate 'parts', into which the study of philosophy
enters as one component in the traditional access to the theatre of government. It thus complements Dewey’s American institution, framed as access to that democracy described by Tocqueville in which each participant is, ideally, the locus of free substitution of any one part in the symmetric interplay for any other. Thus American philosophy is instituted, like its British counterpart, in a dynamic of debate in the periodical ‘literature’, but modelled on a ‘scientific’ programme in which each paper addresses some particular question within the overall project of framing in ordinary language the gradual articulation of that language within a universal formal system of questions. And it is in the complementary British and American abstractions from the ‘continental’ dynamic of books, texts, framing an individual philosopher’s ‘position’ as that point in what it frames where the whole is framed - either a British abstraction to an elementary scenario (of which the scenario of ‘philosophy’ is one particular case), or an American abstraction to a universal ‘scientific’ frame as directing ideal for coordinating the reduced components or ‘elements’ of particular situations - that the gradual emergence of an interplay of British and American ‘papers’ in the English-language philosophical journals after the war may be articulated, as I suggested in Part III. Thus Passmore’s second edition of his history has two appendices: that devoted to ‘Existentialism’ already noted, and another surveying the emerging Anglo-American debate. Furthermore, I suggested that that ‘debate’ or rather, as pursued by Strawson and Quine, then Dummett and Davidson, that dialogue des sourds between two philosophical institutions separated by a common language, could only be resolved by being addressed to the textual order of the debate itself, rather than to complementary approaches to the ‘elementary’ situations of language-use abstracted from the more complex pragmatics of a whole theory, a ‘text’ - and in particular to the theories, and their textual presentation, of what must ultimately be construed as their own ‘elementary’ textual and contextual components. I further suggested that with the transition towards discussion of more complex linguistic structures, and their ‘pragmatics’ after around 1970, one could trace also a move towards a coupling of the Anglo-American debate with the complementary Franco-German questions of ‘textual pragmatics’ - a coupling typified most obviously by Rorty’s papers and book of the ‘seventies - and that one could further construe
the interplay thus opening up in the nineteen-seventies as the initial phase of a transition into the dramatic 'space' of questioning marked by this inquiry.

The dynamic of coupling of british and american 'debates' after mid-century may be traced within the 'scholastic' or 'scientific' interplay of 'papers' through those various groupings of 'landmark' papers under the heads of various questions that constitute so many axes or dimensions of the overall exchange, which became after midcentury—the primary 'texts' for the study of philosophy as instituted in Britain—and one might head the list with Ryle's own grouping of papers which together mark the midcentury transition itself:

1127 The Revolution in Philosophy ed Ryle 1956
1128 Logic and Language ed Flew 1951-66
1129 Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing ed Swartz London 1965
1130 Minnesota Readings in the Philosophy of Science ed Tarski & Suppes (I) II: ed Feigl, Scrivem, Maxwell Minneapolis 19 ; 1972
1131 Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge ed Lakatos & Musgrave London 1970
1132 The Mind-Brain Identity Theory ed Borst London 19
1133 The Private Language Argument ed Jones London 1971
1134 Philosophy of Perception ed Warnock 1967
1135 Knowledge and Belief ed Griffiths 1967
1136 Ethics ed Foot 1967
1137 Philosophy of Logic ed Strawson 1967
The last two, the 'landmark' collections of what I have described as the opening of a new phase of 'the anglo-american debate' after around 1970, together with the Lakatos and Musgrave collection, also mark a change so to speak in the 'institution' of the debate insofar as the papers were assembled as invited contributions to the 'question' announced by the titles - addressed, then, to the whole structure of the debate, as characterised by those titles, rather than assembled a posteriori from some unforced natural evolution of questioning in 'the literature' over the years.

Let me set these more or less 'canonical' coordinates of the transition around 1970 from the mid-century 'revolution' towards my projected coordination of the two sides of the anglo-american debate with the two sides of a franco-german axis of philosophy, in the wider context of the anglo-american dynamic of questioning, taking up the British-sequence of texts where I left it around 1900, and the American-where I left it with Dewey's systematisation of 'Experience and Nature' toward 1930, preparing the reception in America for the logical and physical 'systems' of Carnap and others, as Wittgenstein and Popper - for reasons not uncorrelated with their theoretical differences with Carnap and the other refugees to America - chose England:

1144  RUSSELL, Bertrand  
An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry  
Cambridge 1897

1145  Logic and Knowledge (papers &c 1901-50)  
ed Marsh  London 1956 (75-6)
1146  The Principles of Mathematics  Cambridge (1903) 1950
1147  Mysticism and Logic (papers 19 - )London 1918
1148  The Problems of Philosophy  London 1912
1149  Roads to Freedom  London 1918
1150  Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy  London 1919
1151  The Analysis of Mind  London 1921
1152  Power  London 1938
1153  Autobiography  London 1967-9
1154  The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell  ed Schilpp  Evanston (1944)1963
1155  MOORE, George Edward  Philosophical Studies (papers - )  London 1922
1156  Principia Ethica  Cambridge (1903) 1954
1157  Philosophical Papers (192 - ) London 1959
1158  WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig  Notebooks 1914-16  ed with tr Anscombe & von Wright  Oxford 1961
1159  Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung (1918,ptd Berlin 1921)  ed with tr Ogden, intr Russell London (1922)1955; tr Pears & McGuinness 1961  fr tr Klossowski  Paris 19
1161  Zettel  ed with tr Anscombe & von Wright  Oxford 1967
1162  The Blue and Brown Books (dictated to students 1933-5)  

Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief ed Barrett
Oxford 1966


Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations (papers) ed Pitcher
London/NY 1966

Bemerkungen Über die Grundlagen der Mathematik (1937-44) ed with tr Anscombe, Rhees, von Wright Oxford 1956

Über Gewissheit (1950-1) ed with tr Anscombe & von Wright Oxford 1969

MALCOLM, Norman Wittgenstein: a Memoir (with von Wright's biographical sketch) London (1958) 1966

PEARS, David Wittgenstein London 19

KENNY, Anthony Wittgenstein London 1973

BOUVERESSE, Jacques Wittgenstein: La Rime et la Raison Paris 1973

Le Mythe de l'Intérieurité Paris 1976

COLLINGWOOD, Robin George Speculum Mentis Oxford 1924

An Autobiography London 1939

The Idea of Nature ed Knox Oxford 1945

PRICE, Harry Perception London (1932) 1954


Philosophical Essays

The Problem of Knowledge London 1956

The Concept of a Person and Other Essays (195 - ) London 1963
| 1181 | WISDOM, John | Other Minds |
| 1182 | RYLE, Gilbert | Collected Papers London 1971 |
| 1183 | | The Concept of Mind London 1949 |
| 1184 | | Dilemmas Cambridge 1954 |
| 1185 | AUSTIN, John Langshaw | Philosophical Papers Oxford 1961 |
| 1186 | | Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford lects in 1950s) ed Warnock Oxford 1962 |
| 1189 | | Introduction to Logical Theory London 1952 |
| 1190 | | Individuale London 1959 |
| 1191 | | Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar London 197 |
| 1192 | HAMPSHIRE, Stuart | Thought and Action London 1959 |
| 1193 | HARE, Richard | The Language of Morals Oxford 1952 |
| 1194 | GEACH, Peter | Mental Acts London 1957 |
| 1195 | DUMMETT, Michael | Truth and Other Enigmas (papers 1955-7-) London 1978 |
| 1196 | | Frege: Philosophy of Language London 1974 |
| 1197 | QUINTON, Anthony | The Nature of Things London 1973 |
| 1198 | MACKIE, J L | |

These last three books might be taken as indicative of the transition around 1970, or the close of a previous phase, in their common character as attempts to give a more or less systematic conspectus of the anglo-american debate around 1970.
1199 CARNAP, Rudolf
Der Logische Syntax der Sprache (Vienna 1934)
tr Smeaton London 1937

1200
Meaning and Necessity Chicago (1947) 1956

1221 MORRIS, Charles W
Foundations of the Theory of Signs Chicago 1938

1222 QUINE, Willard van
From a Logical Point of View (papers 19 - )
Cambridge Mass 1953

1223
Methods of Logic NY (1950) rev 1972

1224
Word and Object Cambridge Mass 1960

1225
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
(papers 19 - ) NY 1969

1226
Set Theory and its Logic Cambridge Mass 1969

1227 & ULLIAN, Joseph
The Web of Belief NY 19

1228 GOODMAN, Nelson
The Structure of Appearance
Cambridge Mass 1951

1229
Fact, Fiction and Forecast London 1954

1230 NAGEL, Ernst
The Structure of Science NY 1961

1231 HEMPEL, Carl
Aspects of Scientific Explanation
NY 1965

1232 SEARLE, John R
Speech Acts Cambridge 1969

1233 RAWLS, John
A Theory of Justice Cambridge Mass 1971

1234 BERNSTEIN, Richard
Praxis and Action 1971

1235 FEYERABEND, Paul
Against Method London 1975

1236 PUTNAM, Hilary
Reason, Truth and History Cambridge 1981

1237 RORTY, Richard
Consequences of Pragmatism (papers 19
Minneapolis 1982

1238
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
Princeton 1979
This leaves, I find, a small residue of texts which for one reason or another did not seem to fit very well in the main sequences. I have already noted the form taken by that British 'history of philosophy' typified by Bennett's Locke-Berkeley-and-Hume which amounts to the mere mapping of the old empiricism into the current linguistic variety, echoing as it were the abstraction of the latter from systematic and historical context, in a sort of systematic historical abstraction of the British tradition from the questions of system and history that, over the turn of the century, marked the historical transition, via Hegel, from the 'historian's' to the current 'philosopher's' empiricism. Over the mid-century a naturalised Popper defended his adopted 'context' against any embedding in a systematic textual system, any 'science' of history and society (in which the texts of philosophy, for example, might be themselves embedded as components in typically 'continental' manner), by writing a rather unscientific history of the practical consequences of trying to organise activity within such a closed procrustean frame, on the continent of Europe from which he had had to escape in order to carry on his own questioning of the converse process of opening things up, which was questioning itself, systematised as 'science'. I have noted in the main text the ironically rather closed character of the group of 'popperian's' around him at the LSE, and their BJPS (yet another instance of 'dogmatic scepticism'). One might take the two 'points' marked over the midcentury by:

1239 POPPER, Karl The Open Society and its Enemies London (1945) 1966

1240 WINCH, Peter The Idea of a Social Science London 1958

...as defining the axis of a debate which may be retrospectively linked to the dominant sequence listed above, as leading eventually into the space opened up by Putnam, Rorty and others in the 'seventies', whose links with the continental axis rejected by Popper — and with the German debate over Popper's position itself in the 'sixties — may perhaps best be marked in the England of the 'eighties by Anthony Giddens at Cambridge.
...Then Putnam appears again, now as editor of the standard collection of 'landmark' papers on the borderline between 'international' mathematical logic from the turn of the century, and the various national schools of philosophy which may be associated with the various different orientations marked by:

1241 Philosophy of Mathematics ed Benacerraf & Putnam Englewood Cliffs

...to which may be added as an appendix the only one of the four papers representing the 'principal approaches' to the 'foundations of mathematics' solicited by the editors of Erkenntnis in 1930 not here reprinted:

1242 MANNOURY, G

(The Signific Foundations of Mathematics)
fr tr

(the others being logicist (Carnap), formalist (Von Neumann) and Intuitionist (Heyting)). These papers might be supplemented further by:

1243 Readings in Philosophical Analysis ed Feigl & Sellars NY 1949

1244 BETH, Ewart W

The Foundations of Mathematics Amsterdam 1951

1245 BLACK, Max

The Nature of Mathematics London 1953

1246 LAKATOS, Imre


...so that we end up once more at the LSE with the BJPS...but this time with as it were the complementary mathematical formulation of the essential open-ness of the scientific project of specifying in informal language the meaning of the mathematical symbolism in whose frame that same informal language is to be analysed, rather than with the popperian history of the analogous project of reconstructing 'informal' open society within some global 'scientific' frame which is itself more or less informally specified within the truer and wider open dynamic it would constrain. And here we are back not only with Putnam at the opening of this short section, and at the close of the American sequence,
but also, so to speak, with Carnap and Neurath's project of Unified Science at the opening of the American sequence, with Neurath's figure, quoted by Quine as device of *Word and Object*, of that project as like that of a sailor who must take apart and reconstruct his boat at sea, and with Dummett at the close of the British sequence, with the essentially open character of mathematical construction, systematically formulated by Brouwer (for example in (1241)) and his successors, presented as frame of an equally open world — in which 'Truth' marks only an orientation or indeed many orientations of resolving, responding to, what opens up and is marked as a question, rather than some closed and complete topology of what is 'contained' in The Truth, and what excluded...just as those things 'behind' our limited information to which we refer truth and falsity are themselves in many ways essentially open or indeterminate, waiting to be further determined, rather than fully definite and defined 'in themselves'. And now we are back, even, with various 'continental' figures of the essential 'open-ness associated with the configuration of a 'theory' which in framing a 'world' necessarily frames itself as part of that world: the figure of the self, as locus of that framing, as Sartrian *trou*, as primary question supplanting Cartesian doubt in its place of evoking the primary figure of response, assertion itself, in which the very account of this configuration must itself be framed; or the complementary primacy of the Question of Being, Being as the radical Question, frame of the 'world', and our response to our situation 'here' in it; or with Derrida's question of the language in which the unitary 'transcendental' space, and its temporal orientation towards Truth, in which that language itself is to be analysed and reconstructed, is itself framed; or Lyotard's multiplicity of incommensurable orientations in language and its pragmatic embedding as one component in the configuration of action it frames; or Habermas' project of coordination of such orientations in terms of the primary coordinates of 'action' as such...

...All of which may serve to coordinate, or rather pose the question of the coordination of all of these 'philosophy' books with the historical configuration of various 'points' in 'cultural space' in the twentieth century, where a mathematical 'language'
evolved from pythagorean 'number' and its manipulation as configuration of 'points', 'marks', 'signs', 'units' (σύνοριον, σημάτων, μορίων), and set like that 'figurate number' in 'informal' coordinates of text and context, frames the 'internal' logical space of substitution, and the 'external' physical space in which that textual and contextual configuration of the mathematical frame is supposed in principle embedded:

1247 From Frege to Gödel. A Source-Book in Mathematical Logic 1879-1931
   ed Van Heijenoort Cambridge 1967

1248 The Undecidable ed Davis Hewlett NY 1965

1249 NAGEL, Ernst & NEWMAN, J R
1250 HILBERT, David

1249  Gödel's Proof NY 1958
1250  Die Grundlagen der Geometrie (Leipzig 1899)
1250  tr Chicago 1902

1251 Mathematische Probleme (presidential address to Intnl Congress of Mathematicians, Paris 1900)
1251  Berlin 1900

1252 & ACKERMANN, W

1252  Grundzüge der Theoretische Logik Berlin(1928)
1252  1949; tr NY 1950

1253 & BERNAYS, Paul

1253  Grundlagen der Mathematik Berlin 1934-9

1254 RUSSELL, Bertrand & WHITEHEAD, Alfred N.

1254  Principia Mathematica Cambridge 1910-13, rev
1254  1925-7; to *56 London 1962

1255 TARSKI, Alfred

1255  Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics (papers
1255  1923-38) tr Woodger Oxford 1956
1255  Introduction to Logic NY (1941)1965

1256 LEWIS, Clarence Irving & LANGFORD C H

1257  Symbolic Logic NY 1932
1257  Introduction to Metamathematics Princeton 1952
1258 KLEENE, S C
1259 ACKERMANN, W
1260 HEYTING, Arendt

1260  Intuitionism Amsterdam 1956
1261 CURRY, Haskell B
Amsterdam

1262 ROBINSON, Abraham
Non-Standard Analysis Amsterdam 1966

1263 HUGHES, G F &
CRESSWELL, M J
An Introduction to Modal Logic London 1968

1264 BELL, S C &
SLOMSON A B
Models and Ultraproducts London 1969

1265 SCHOENFIELD, Joseph R
Mathematical Logic Reading Mass 1967

1266 ARBIB, James A
Arrows, Structures and Functions NY 197

1267 LAWVERE, F'William
An Elementary Theory of the Category of Sets
Chicago 196

1268 Toposes, Algebraic Geometry and Logic (conference Halifax NS 1971)
ed Lawvere Berlin/NY 197

1269 Das Relativitätsprinzip. Ein Sammlung von Abhandlungen (Einstein,
Minkowski, Lorentz) ed & ann Sommerfeld, intr
Blumenthal (Leipzig 1913; enlgd 19 ) Einstein
& Minkowski papers tr Saha & Bose Calcutta
1920; all papers tr Jeffery & Perrett (London
1922) NY 19

1270 EINSTEIN, Albert
Die Relativitätstheorie Berlin 1917
enlgd, tr Lawson London 1920

1271 Äther und Relativitätstheorie Berlin 1920

1272 The Meaning of Relativity (Princeton lects 1921)
tr Adams London 1922; final enlgd ed 1953

1273 Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist ed Schilpp Evanston 1951

1274 DE SITTER, Willem
On Einstein's Theory of Gravitation and its
Astronomical Consequences London 1916-17

1275 EDDINGTON, Arthur
Report on the Relativity Theory of Gravitation
Stanley London 1918, enlgd 1920

1276 WEYL, Hermann
Raum-Zeit-Materie (Berlin 1918) tr Brose
(London 192 ) NY 19
Around the turn of the century the 'aristotelian' topology of an abstract physical 'space' of points in which the 'observer' could be subsequently set 'at' some point, and the complementary aristotelian logic of 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' in a universal abstract 'logical space' modelled on this, as 'intensional' inclusion of one concept or predicate in or under another (rather than 'extensional' inclusion of a point in a set of points) come 'into question'. By around 1970 the logical and physical symmetries 'classically' expressed in abstraction from the practical dynamic of positing the mark or point textually and contextually
'in place of' what I have called a 'transitive' locus of substitution of word or thing in text or context - allowing the elaboration of a mathematical 'theory' of logic or physics as complementary systems of universal constraints on or symmetries of 'any' textual or contextual substitution - in terms of universal 'internal' and 'external' textual and contextual 'spaces' in which all texts and contexts might be 'in principle' embedded and formally reconstructed, have been expressed 'in terms of' Grothendieck's theory of 'topoi', as rather systems of symmetries or constraints governing the essentially 'local' dynamic of embedding some specific and only partially defined configuration of terms in some wider but still specific and not fully determinate extension. Logical and physical symmetries of or constraints on the 'space' of symbolic (linguistic) and physical 'substitution' are articulated rather in the constraints on the dynamics of a questioning which arises from or opens out of a specific situation or configuration of components: constraints on the range of possible embeddings of the terms and relations that model (or are substituted for) a configuration of action or interaction of the components they model, in some wider configuration, as constraints on the structure of logical and physical axes of 'transition' from one situation to another. Yet around 1970 this embedding of the old 'classical' spaces and times of logic and physics abstracted from - so to speak 'reified' behind - the informal or practical dynamics of substitutions and questions, in the not fully specified situations in which questions arise, is still expressed as a mathematical formalism in which the older 'spaces' can be embedded as special 'limit' cases. That is to say the 'practical' embedding of mathematical systems of substitution or syntax in the informal matrix of a particular situation of questioning and determination is itself still presented in abstraction from the question of its own dynamics of presentation in, say, the particular texts listed above, and their contexts of writing and reading, production and consumption. - This rather as the 'deconstruction' of an analogous 'space' and time of transcendental subjectivity, in the presentation of the figural dynamic of its framing in language, is still presented in a textual order of exposition abstracted from the practical or dramatic dynamics of articulation of that textual 'deconstruction' in a poetic axis of which the figural dynamics of language or text is itself an abstract model.
Now the informal figural complement of 'abstract' mathematical models of logical and physical orders of substitution and their complementary dynamics (that is, their abstract framings of the constraints upon substitution and exchange of components in 'any situation' whose generality or abstraction is coordinate with the 'mathematical' substitution of an otherwise meaningless sign or mark in the informal space of the 'peripheral' language and context of the particular situation in which the mathematical text is produced) may be analysed in a parallel tradition in which mathematical physicists attempt to embed the configurations and consequences of their abstract systems of symbolic substitution 'back' in the informal language and context of their practical elaboration:

1288 EDDINGTON, Arthur The Nature of the Physical World Cambridge 1928
1289 New Pathways in Science Cambridge 1935
1290 REICHENBACH, Hans Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (Berlin 1927-8) tr M Reichenbach & Freund NY 1957
1291 JEANS, James Physics and Philosophy London 1942
1292 HEISENBERG, Werner Physics and Philosophy NY 1958
1293 WEYL, Hermann Symmetry Princeton 1952
1294 WIGNER, Eugene Symmetries and Reflections (papers 19 - ) Bloomington 1967
1295 BEAUREGARD, Costa de La Seconde Principe de la Science du Temps Paris 196
1296 WEINBERG, Steven The First Three Minutes NY 1977
1297 The Encyclopedia of Ignorance I: Physical Sciences ed Duncan & Weston-Smith Oxford 1977
'Physics and Philosophy': the question of the embedding of the 'space' of physical questions, and its systematic mathematical articulation as 'external' correlate of an analogous (and latterly, indeed, mathematically 'symmetric') logical 'space' of substitutions and associated questions, in a universal space of questioning-as-such. Eddington laboured to show how all the symmetries which constrained what is physically 'open' ('external' physical space, and the complementary 'internal' spaces or coordinates the preservation of certain configurations or relations 'in' which - the preservation of certain 'quantum numbers' - defines all physically possible transitions, or interactions) could be deduced simply from the elementary figure of 'the physical' itself, informally coordinated as 'objective' side of questions with the radical fact of there being 'objects' and 'questions' at all - a 'physical' determination of an object (in the limit, just the 'object' as 'external' object itself) being characterised 'relativistically' à la Einstein, or indeed à la Husserl, as what was invariant 'behind' its different appearances to different observers (or the same observer at different times). The symmetries and so the laws of 'the physical object' were determined in principle by the embedding of this 'physical' dimension of our situation in the more or less kantian configuration of 'any possible appearance' itself - the internal organisation of the 'physical' dimension of our experience and world precisely a reflection of, and indeed an abstraction from, the symmetric embedding of this 'external' dimension in a 'transcendental' coordination of its relations with other dimensions - most notably the psychical, of which Eddington often tended, in idealist manner, to regard the external, the physical, as a mere reflection, as in a perfect cosmic mirror, with his quaker God as the radical unity of what one might call 'inner' psychical space.

Weinberg closes his book, on the other hand, in a despondent abstraction of the physical from any embedding in any larger space of questions, following rather the physical image of the universal 'space' and time whose overall symmetries he had done much around 1970 to frame, as 'including' all other orders of question 'within' it, and so excluding, in particular, any 'psychical' order of intervention, any God or soul, outside the mechanical preservation of physical symmetry....While the last title noted
above assembles informal framings by a range of eminent physicists of what is still formally open, still a question, and still essentially an 'informal' question within their particular provinces in the larger domain of 'physical science' as a whole — for if the question could be properly posed formally, it could ipso facto be formally resolved within the formal system or as an elementary new extension of it.

Now one might extend Eddington's 'transcendental deduction' of the organising symmetries of the physical dimension of experience as simply the reflection of the abstraction of that dimension from the informal configuration of perception and language — from the 'primal scene' so to speak of a contemporary British philosophy — to a more 'radical' configuration of the textual and contextual questions and 'symmetries' coordinate with producing a textual formulation of 'physical theory' in the late twentieth century. The mathematical language of the text must necessarily be embedded in an 'informal' space of substitutions in which the mathematical order of substitution and question and symmetry which constitutes the 'formal' structure of the theory is itself construed as a 'substitution' of an order of text developed from the pythagorean manipulation of otherwise indeterminate 'marks', for various other orders of text or marking open in the situation in which it is produced — in the context of an informal language which has developed to the point where its grammar and the institutions of questioning coordinate with it, allow the move 'into theory'. More generally, any 'physical theory' must at least allow for a coordination with a complex enough configuration of substitutions to allow the marking of possible substitution 'in the place of' components of the situation, as a 'question' — without which there would not even be a 'physical' order of substitutions at all. And once one 'has' this configuration of marking and question, there is no 'physical' — but only so to speak a 'cultural' — difference between the configuration of substitutions in which a question may itself be chosen or substituted for another possible action, to 'mark' something open, and a configuration in which such questioning has been systematically elaborated into a 'physical theory', mathematically articulated in that pythagorean marking of the place of substitution or questioning or marking itself, which
becomes formally possible as soon as there is the initial function of 'marking' - as soon indeed, as there is a 'culture' articulated in the analogical coordination of various orders of 'mark': language, pale, material economy of exchange, and so on.

In particular, the system of evolution of interaction of those mark-producing physical bodies which are our own, from initial individual access to gesture, language, thought, questions, after birth, to the point where they can and do articulate a system of questions, and answers to them, as a mathematical physics, has from the turn of the century been dynamically organised through the coupling of a classical 'inner' space of thought and inquiry, to a practical, dramatic, or poetic order of 'analogical' interaction with more or less symmetrically situated others, just as the formal logical 'space' in which abstract Thought was earlier supposed embedded (and by which it was alone supposed to be driven or constrained) was around the same time brought into question, indeed brought into its own questioning, as engaged in the analogical pragmatics of questioning and theory...

1298 FREUD, Sigmund  
Aus den Anfängen der Psychoanalyse (1887-1902)  
ed Bonaparte, Anna Freud, Kris, intr Kris  
London/NY 1950; tr Mosbacher & Strachey 1954

1299 Gesammelte Werke  
ed Jones London 1942-3; tr as Standard Edition...  
ed Strachey, Anna Freud &c  
London/NY 1953-74....ia:

1300 Die Traumdeutung (Vienna 1900) (4,5)

1301 Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens  
(Berlin 1904) (6)

1302 Fünf Vorlesungen (at Johns Hopkins 1909)  
(Vienna 1910) (11)

1303 Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse  
(1915-17; Vienna 1916-17) (15,16)
1304 Jenseits des Lustprinzips (Vienna 1920) (18)
1305 Das Ich und das Es (Vienna 1923) (19)
1306 Die Frage der Laienanalyse (Vienna 1926) (20)
1307 Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse (1932; Vienna 1933) (22)

1308 WOLLHEIM, Richard
Freud London 1971

1309 ABRAHAM, Karl
Traum und Mythus Vienna 1909

1310 FERENCZI, Sandor
Studien

1311 JUNG, Carl Gustav
Psychologie und Alchimie (Zurich 1944)
tr

1312

1313 Erinnerungen, Träume, Gedanken ed Jaffé
tr R & C Winston (NY 1961) L 1963

1314 FROMM, Erich
The Fear of Freedom NY 1942

1315 FREUD, Anna
The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence

1316 WINNICOTT, Donald Woods
Playing and Reality London 1971

1317 LAING, Ronald David
Knots London 1970

1318 psychoanalysis London 19

1319 MACINTYRE, Alasdair
The Unconscious London 19

1320 KÖHLER, Wolfgang
Gestalt Psychology (NY 1929) London 1930
Turn of the century: inscription of 'consciousness' in the affective or poetic or 'dramatic' order of a 'primal scene'...as the 'theatrical' scene is in turn inscribed in a correlative 'coupling'...

...Stanislavsky at the turn of the century marking a crisis in 'theatre' parallelling all these crises in theory: the action on stage is both an actor 'acting' on a stage and a 'part' in the 'action represented by' that first action; the actor naturally 'acts' within the dynamic of the first scene, acts himself or herself, so to speak, and acts a 'part' according to the dynamics of 'playing a part' within that first order of action ('real' action) until by a laborious practical process of abstraction from the first order of action towards the intrinsic dynamics of the part as if it were embedded within the range of possible extensions of the 'imaginary' action (rather than extensions of the real action to its real context - trying to impress the audience, and so on) he or she, with the rest of the group, actually embody in their interaction on stage the figural dynamics of a closed abstracted action, another world, itself. This embedding of the dynamics of abstraction from the practical order of activity in the practical matter of 'creating a role', rather than simply assuming in an imagination whose dynamics are organised in this world (as it were)
a part in 'another' world, parallels a complementary turn-of-the-century embedding of theoretical rather than theatrical abstraction from the 'practical' order in the practical dynamics of that abstraction. Brecht and Artaud in their turn reconstruct the 'theatre' of around 1930 within complementary systems, so to speak, of poetic opening-up of the 'practical' order in which the stage is set: Brecht framing the dynamics of the spectator's access to a part in the revolutionary transition from the social order of capitalist alienation, to the 'natural' space of collective activity framed by Marx, through the breakdown of the system of identifications which reveals the actors behind their illusory roles, and the space of activity open to the spectator as his or her identification with an analogous role in the capitalist abstraction from such an open space breaks down with them; Artaud on the contrary subordinating the 'role' of spectator as one component of the figural dynamics of the 'action' as ritual induction into an affective configuration where the didactic rationality of the brechtian text (inducing the 'masses' to 'think') presents - despite its claims to 'non-aristotelian' poetics - another reiteration of the millenial framing of the poetic or affective axis of life within an abstract theoretical space (and time) whose own affective dynamic as abstraction from the affective order of its own constitution in a particular interpersonal situation is, in circular manner, elided. Brecht articulating the stage within the theoretical articulation of a wider space of social activity in material Nature, in that 'objectivist' figure already traced through other dimensions of german theory - but here the textual order itself constitutes a primary dimension of the 'context' in which the stage is set - and Artaud losing his reason in the ritual dynamics of subordination of relations of theatrical 'text' and 'wider' context to the closed figural unity of the performance...except that such subordination inverts the 'aristotelian' conception of the relations of theatrical 'text' or script, and gestural dynamics of spectacle...so that we should rather, perhaps, understand Artaud by seeing in Le Théâtre et son Double the mere pretexts of a radically 'theatrical' self-dramatisation, 'performative' utterances subordinated as scripts to the drama of his life, rather than successive 'constative' frames in which his dramas may be rationally inscribed, reconstructed, comprehended.
Grotowski's 'Laboratory Theatre' of the 1960s incorporates both of these complementary developments from Stanislavsky's 'Great Reform': the 'empty space' (in Brook's image) of substitution of 'one action for another' and the associated 'poetic' dynamic of opening up or bringing-into-question of the everyday practical system of identifications and 'experience' in which the theatrical 'action' is 'intransitively' set - of, in Grotowski's figure, stripping off the everyday masks of the spectators - is the locus of a sort of (Grotowski again) 'research institute' which opens up the interpersonal space or configuration of social activity in a manner analogous to theoretical science's opening-up of an ever-wider space of questions and possibilities in which human interaction may be organised. The Theatre at Wroclaw was a 'laboratory' in that its work was directed to the constant opening-up or bringing-into-question of the very structures of 'theatre' that allowed such opening-up. First of all, the relation of the initial 'theory' of the late 'fifties to the theatrical dynamics it notionally framed came into question, along with the analogous relation of text or script to action or play: theorisation was itself dramatically engaged in configurations of interaction which were being opened up in the experimental exploration of the 'space' of action and context, just as a parallel theoretical exploration in Paris, say, was bringing into question the narrative constitution of an abstract 'space' of questions in which that constitution was originally to be reconstituted. 'Philosophy' was bringing into question the space of an earlier theory or questioning, while theatre was bringing into question, or opening up, rather, an earlier theatrical 'space' - and, in particular, the theoretical supposition of inscription of this parallel dynamic of 'opening-up' of interaction within a theoretical transcription of this poetic space into a logical space of questions and theory: this process of transcription of something open into a question itself being recognised as merely one component in a more general dynamic of opening-up of interaction, of its poetic space.

'These Slavs are the great livers-out of their theories' wrote William James...

He runs a laboratory. He needs an audience occasionally, in small numbers. His tradition is Catholic - or anti-Catholic;
in this case the two extremes meet. He is creating a form of service. We work in another country, another language, another tradition. Our aim is not a new Mass...

...Thus Peter Brook in his introduction; and having worked through various principal nodes in the western tragic canon, various figures of that breakdown of a protagonist's identification with a particular 'part' which are so many figures of breaking open the spectator's own part of identification, inducing as radical response a new figure of identity as response to a configuration of 'questions' in which this 'self' is itself one component 'question' - or rather a response of which the marking of what is opened up as 'question', and marking of response as deriving from an 'I' which so marks itself as marking its response, is just one, verbal, dimension, discovered as theatrically or dramatically coordinate with non-verbal registers of response or action - Grotowski in 1968 moves to a 'dramatisation' of a text or script derived from that most radical node of the western theatrical tradition, the Christ acting out the breakdown of our identification with our earthly bodies and roles on the wider stage of this Globe Theatre itself, and in 1970 he transfers the main axis of his 'research' from the state Institute associated with the University of Wroclaw, to temporary groups assembled in the nearby countryside, in which the formal division of roles into those of 'actors' and 'audience' or spectators, progressively weakened over the 1960s, itself 'comes into question'.

Now Stanislavsky, whose 'revolution' over the turn of the century Grotowski saw himself in the 'sixties as simply reducing to its core principles - rather like, say, Lacan's transposition of the principles of the freudian revolution, the psychoanalytic drama, from various expressions in older terms that it itself brought into question, into an expression coordinate or coherent with the dramatic structure or dynamic it expressed - might be seen as introducing into the theatre something like an analogue of Alberti's 'scientific' construction of the picture-plane as symmetrical interface between two different spaces and times of action, just as the contemporary inaugurators of 'modern' painting were completing
the transformation begun by Alberti's successors of the High Renaissance towards the construction of the two-dimensional surface of the quadro as dramatic interface of four-dimensional spaces and times of action, rather than static mirror-like momentary visual interface of two three-dimensional spaces of 'perception'. Thus analytical cubism after 1907 assembles in the picture-plane a sort of 'schematism' of various 'appearances' of (typically) a supposedly inert object ('still' life) which together, in interaction, constitute as it were the 'intentional' syntax of a certain 'objective' identity 'behind' these aspects from different 'positions' in imagination which can only be 'really' combined for one observer in a succession of 'points in time' - just as Husserl's logical 'analysis' of the intentionality of perception and the empirical 'constitution' of the objectivity of an object or property sought over the same period to find the actuality of subjective and objective poles of experience 'behind' a supposedly momentary present appearance, in systems of possible variations in successive appearances which left some particular identity 'invariant' - and just as Einstein's contemporary redefinition of the 'physical' was framed in terms of an invariant 'objective' identity organising its different 'appearances' or observations. Furthermore, the configurations of possible variation or substitution were, like the quantum symmetries constraining not-fully-determinate or determinable parameters of elementary physical interaction, 'abstract', allowing in each element of the composition various possible embeddings or instantiations of a particular 'aspect' of the object or scene in the more determinate perceptions of 'real' physical objects - even if impressionist divisionism had already prefigured Planck's revolution in microphysics by determining the radically 'elementary' data of an essentially dynamic process of 'perception' as different from a notional indivisible point-colour-moment, so to speak, in notional spatial, temporal, and chromatic continua...and even if fin-de-siècle 'symbolism' had already organised the logic or syntax of pictorial composition in an 'abstractly' autonomous coordination of 'archetypal' components or dimensions of the analogical, figural, affective axis of the 'poetic' domain of the image. The closed autonomous poetic of coordination of various 'abstract' components of an interaction - in the simplest case, of mere perceptual interaction of a more or less indeterminate perceiver and an inanimate or 'still' object in Braque's 'conceptual'
or specifically 'french' cubism after 1907 - at once 'abstracts' from the classical 'window' between two fully determinate 'spaces' of things, 'physical realities', and so to speak 'concretises' the temporal phenomenology of the various identities of those classical 'objects' of painting, from which the older model of a universal 'space' of determinations or identities had itself 'abstracted' to a notional 'photographic' moment of perception, of interaction with things and others. And indeed the italian 'futurists' were to complain of the essentially 'static' character of the neocartesian per- cipient of the typically 'analytic' early cubism: the percipient must himself or herself enter dynamically into the construction, which then becomes essentially 'expressionistic', responding to the general question of figure of subjective artist or viewer as one variable in the dynamic scheme with a figure of commitment, self- assertion as assertive moment that, as in Papini's 'theory' or criticism, closes the circle of 'abstraction' to autonomous poetic con- figuration or mechanism, responding to the new question it implicitly marks for the viewer (and which Pirandello, for example, systematically structures as the radical open-ness of the 'part'). In italian and german 'modernisms', then, as perhaps most typically in the german 'expressionist' theatre which determined the response of Piscator and Brecht to the 'revolution' of Stanislavsky and Meyer- hold in revolutionary Russia, the 'logical' order of questions classically determined as an abstracted 'standing-back' from any particular part, in a pure cartesian space of possible assertion and schemes of universal syntax and its determinations, becomes itself 'poetically' embedded in a concrete cultural dynamic: the opening-up of the part of artist or viewer in the new figure of 'Art' as schematism of action, and the incorporation of the dynamic of artist or spectator's part, verbally marked as question and assertion, as itself merely one dimension of a wider cultural drama opened up by the new Art. Picasso in 1912, in a correlative move, begins to 'stick' physical material that 'stands for' itself on the picture plane, where the difference between such a 'real' object and the other components of the composition 'standing for' aspects which such a 'real' identity may be taken to be 'behind', thus enters into the poetic 'syntax' of coordination of terms or elements of the 'picture'. Typically it is part of a newspaper, or a playing- card - already themselves coordinate with a 'real' contextual synt- ax of signs - that is thus introduced by 'collage'...or a 'real'
piece of music added to the 'harmonic' analysis of 'man with a
guitar' typical of the 'analytic' phase it succeeds...or indeed
a painted playing-card cut out from the paper on which it has
been 'represented', or painted words, that are in turn 'stuck'
in the composition, further complicating the poetic syntax of
'appearance' and 'reality'. And finally Duchamp over the period
of the Great War focusses the questions posed by such 'modernism'
in Art by exhibiting an otherwise unaltered signed 'object', and
so directly posing 'art' itself as merely one question or variable
coordinate with those of artist/viewer, 'reality'/object, and so
on, in the poetic exploration of the constitution of these various
identities, and the dynamic interplay of the open-ness attaching to
each element thus called into play - open-nesses which may be marked
as so many questions...except that the transposition of the play
into some supposedly rational space of questions and answers is it-
self called 'into question' along with other verbal and non-verbal
coordinates of the situation in which 'the artist' intransitively,
'arbitrarily' intervenes. Intervenes in a manner which cannot, then,
in principle be rationally or otherwise 'recuperated' in terms of
the subordination of this intervention to some definite practical
configuration of 'Art' among other activities in an unquestioned
'Culture' at large, but an intervention which calls that practical
or transitive order of its cultural context as a whole 'into question',
into a configuration of questions which breach the apparently closed
circuit of such an unquestioned 'world' at various correlative key
coordinates - Art, Subject, Object, Culture, Reason, Practicality,
and so on...like a tragic breaking-open of the various correlative
identities whose interaction led to the impasse of Total War, and
the breakdown of the european cultural system in which those various
nineteenth-century identities had supported one another in a kind
of mutual unquestionability.

Questions...but not even questions, since any attempt
at a systematic transcription of this opening-up of Culture into
a verbally expressed theoretical system of questions and answers
is itself 'in question'; an interplay of questions that cannot be
converted, say, into Kandinsky's wider 'spiritual' frame of Art
and Culture whose verbal expression may frame itself as one com-
ponent among others, the transcription of what has been opened
up into that dimension we transcribe as 'language', non-verbally coordinated with what we transcribe as 'objects' and 'Nature' in that activity we transcribe as 'art'. And yet, in parallel with the systematic responses to various 'crises of foundations' in various other dimensions of theory towards 1930, 'Art' as question, or indeed not even as question since this transcription into a verbal order is itself brought into question, has been systematised by 1930 in Kandinsky's Bauhaus in Germany and as Breton's Surrealism in France: Breton seeing in the systematisation of those irrational figural 'interferences' of, say, Lautreamont's 'sewing machine and umbrellas meeting on a dissecting table' evoked by the three-dimensional collage or construction of Duchamp's readymades the experimental exploration of the freudian Unconscious, and Kandinsky elaborating the essentially 'mathematical' or musical system of abstract logic of point, line, surface, volume, colour, sound as the sensorial and affective dimensionality and logic of the universal 'design' of a coherent space of human activity: Art in 1930, then, among other of its aspects, these complementary programmes for the transformation of the pre-modern space and time of human activity, each coordinated so to speak in Duchamp's 'question' of 'Art'. In each case the classical albertine 'window' as illusory figural interface between real and imaginary space and time in the two-dimensional surface of the quadro has been extended to a 'super-real' mathematical or figural schematism in which 'the real', the old material order in which 'Art' was supposed constructed as illusion, has come to be recognised as merely one side or component itself classically 'abstracted' from a deeper poetics, in which it is always partial, incomplete, in a process of constitution by agents whose true 'space' and time is the deeper poetic order, and always radically 'in question'. And the classical privilege of figural illusion restricted to the conventional limits of the quadro, representational sculpture, and so on, has been overthrown in the recognition of a more abstract or more concrete dynamic of 'figure' coordinating the variables of spatiotemporal form and sensory content in all components of our activity, not merely in the traditional 'art-work'. The artist intervenes 'intransitively' in the practical or conventional order of unquestioned activity to explore new 'spaces' of activity, new configurations of identity of subjects and objects, opened up by a new kind of 'work' of what may be verbally transcribed as the
discovery of system of coordinate questions attaching to the 'conventional' configuration of subjects, objects, and transitive activity and experience as a whole. Thus after 1930 the Bauhaus as project of opening up a new space of social activity symbolised or modelled by the collective research of staff and students in Gropius' archetypically 'modern' building at Dessau comes into conflict or competition with the space of the New Myth proposed by the local Nazi party, transferring to Berlin in 1932, and (in part) to Chicago after Hitler's accession to power in 1933; Breton, meanwhile, frames the whole Surrealist project or Movement or Revolution as itself one component in the transition from the closed circuits of alienated identities and activities under capitalism, into the radically open space of a Nature theoretically framed as the marxist systematisation of questions attaching to that bourgeois frame of identity and interaction.

Now if 'modern art' is proposed in various manners over the first three decades of the twentieth century as a more or less coordinated project of 'opening up' a new space of identity of subjects and objects, and a new space and time of their interaction, through the intransitive configurations of questions posed in and for its specific context by a specific 'work' framed in the various traditional 'dimensions' of plastic expression, or in various new combinations of those previous conventional orders of 'artistic' activity, then it becomes in many ways complementary to the millennial project of 'theory' as equally 'intransitive' opening up of a more general systematic space of questions in the experiential context of the theoretical posing of new questions. Indeed 'theory' itself comes into the questioning of the new 'art' insofar as the latter, in many ways more radically than theoretical 'pragmatism', brings thinking and theory (as systematic thinking, rationality) into a figural dynamic of its coordination with non-theoretical, and indeed non-verbal, correlates of the theoretical text in the situation of its production and consumption. In particular the various attempts at verbal formulation of what is opened up by 'modern' art (futurism, expressionism, surrealism, constructivism and so on) as a system of questions and assertions organised in a specific context as 'manifesto' of one 'movement' towards opening-up of a
new space and time of activity, are radically ambiguous or ambivalent between a 'theory' of the new space, and a complementary poetic bringing-into-question of any such 'theory', through the figural coordination of what is open in the verbal order of reflection with other components of its essentially dramatic or 'theatrical' setting in the social order of interaction (including the traditional interactions which constitute 'theoretical' activity or 'abstract' theory) which is being brought into question or opened up as a whole, in the transition into a new, more radical, space and time...

1328 Futurist Manifestos (1909-15) ed, tr, intr Apollonio London 1973

1329 LEWIS, Wyndham Blast London 1914-15
1330 Time and Western Man London 1927

1331 BELL, Clive Art London 1914
1332 Civilisation: an Essay London 1928

1334 TZARA, Tristan Sept Manifestes Dada (Zürich 1916- ) Paris (1924) 1963

1335 RICHTER, Hans Dada: Art and Anti-Art London/NY 1966


1337 KANDINSKY, Wassily Über der Geistige in der Kunst (Munich 1912) fr tr

1338 KLEE, Paul Über die Moderne Kunst (1924 Bern 19 tr Findlay London 1948

1339 The Thinking Eye: The Notebooks of Paul Klee ed & tr London 1961

1340 NAYLOR, Gillian Bauhaus London 1968

The archetypical 'modernism' systematised as 'Bauhaus' within Gropius' and Mies van der Rohe's architectonic of architectural space-time as rational systematisation of the theatre of human
interaction in which all the other arts would (as in the traditional scheme only disrupted by transferable and collectable easel-painting, and the rise of an individualistic conception of artist and connoisseur over the period of the Scientific Revolution) find their correlative coordinates—just as the Dessau site as spatial frame of opening-up of the new architectonic frame itself presents so to speak the mathematically articulated space embedding the logical space of 'science' in scientific Nature as unitary rational Culture: a project at once reminiscent of Alberti's, and echoing as universal rational poetic the viennese project of Carnap's and Neurath's unitary logical space of Science (the author of their model, the Tractatus having himself by the late 'twenties become, according to the viennese City Directory, 'Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect'). Transplanted like the viennese project to America in the 'thirties, and there coordinated with Le Corbusier's cartesian or perhaps calvinist project of a new architectural 'language' with its corresponding modular architectural elements, in the native tradition of Sullivan and Wright, this develops into the universal space of what is there called 'The International Style'...

...Yet a 'postmodern' reaction against a 'modernism' identified with cheap, 'rational' (as rather a sort of calculated fulfilling of the need to house or organise the space of a given activity at minimal cost), 'functional' postwar building, may itself be seen as a mere-correlate—of that merely practical or technical appropriation of certain results of modern exploration in architecture
which, fulfilling a given 'function' with no regard to the specificity of site and aesthetic context (and with modular materials produced according to the necessity of which Le Corbusier tried to make a virtue at a distance from the site and with no regard for any specific use), implicitly sets the varied styles around it in an urban environment like so many stage-sets in the new technical culture of which the new building's internal space is a sort of mirror, behind its rationalised facade - or rather surrounding buildings become merely so many facades within the geometric space marked out by the new 'modernist' infill. Become, indeed, the mere facades which nineteenth century building indeed developed, as it developed the new materials and engineering techniques whose 'functional' support was hidden behind theatrical facades until the days of Sullivan and Behrens at the turn of the century.

If one turns from a postmodern image of modernism which identifies the latter with the results of economically motivated optimisation of an enterprise in which the provision of a space of activity is merely one component outlay to be set against profit, to the modernist canon itself, one finds even that archetypal 'functionalist' Le Corbusier leaving behind his initial 'cubist' premisses after 1930 (the analogue in terms of the 'dramatic' surface of analytical cubist composition, of the albertine architectural space coordinate with the wall-surface as frame of composition in central perspective) and organising the symbolic space at Ronchamp after 1950: the initial constructive or analytic 'language' rationally organising the elements of a particular architectural composition within the constraints imposed by the 'nature' of a particular site, and of the particular activity to be housed, eventually leads him to this focus of the essentially 'intransitive' configuration of the transitive logic of man practically organising his activity in irreducibly complementary Nature, which has organised, and indeed continues after Ronchamp to organise more 'practical' constructions. But Ronchamp is the locus of a stasis in which the pilgrim to the isolated chapel arrives to confront his general 'existential' situation as rationally, engaged in transitions from one more specific situation to the next, constantly facing specific constraints imposed by the 'nature' of successive situations. The 'rationale' of the space at Ronchamp is not to lead through the constraints of
one situation to those of the next, but rather to lead out of this space of transition, at the end of the 'pilgrimage', into a configuration of man confronting the practical order of Life in Nature as a whole - man confronting the constant configuration in which Nature, though specific instances may be 'rationalised' in successive situations, can never be eliminated from the practical dynamics of such rationalisation, any more than can transition, dynamic, itself.

...And when one moves to Wright at that other pole (from 'functionalism') of modern architecture which he calls 'organic', one finds the dramatic figure of the architect's rational intervention in a specific natural 'site', organising each project of provision of space for some at first only partly specified structure of activity rather in the manner of a painter once more approaching a new canvas, framed by the architect himself not in the manner of those books which Corbusier claimed contained in their abstract argument the whole of his architecture, but rather as the drama of a life as 'architect, opening up the internal constitution of his part of 'architect' along with successive configurations of the Nature in which his material constructions were organised, as the working through the interplay of these coordinates in one particular project or scene led into the next, to a new site, a new cast, new questions, new revelations.

Similarly, the painter Penrose's picture of the central 'figure' of 'Modern Art', Picasso, is constructed in the same 'organic' frame of the interplay of the identities or questions or variables opened up in the passage from one scene, and one painting, or sculpture, or drawing, or etching, or theatrical design, or pot, to the next, within the overall dynamic of the artist's life in interaction with others in situations in their turn set in the wider historical dynamic of the first half of the century as a whole:

...whereas Herbert Read sets the successive, and indeed parallel questions that are his transcription of this dynamic restricted to
the two-dimensional space of 'painting', and its formal coordinates of painter, viewer, figuration and abstraction, theme and object, within a 'history of modern painting':

1347 READ, Herbert
A Concise History of Modern Painting
London (1957, rev 1968) enlgd 1974

which is merely the verbal transcription into a more or less linear order of argument or development of successive configurations of what opens up in the wider dynamic whose theatrical or dramatic articulation is marked by the interplay of pictures and verbal illustration (so to speak) in Penrose's picture.

A history of pictorial space opening with the breakdown of the traditional abstraction of illusionistic pictorial 'representation' from its implication in a dramatic interplay of its 'internal' and external or contextual coordinates: and Read closes his account pessimistically construing the mid-century legacy of the School of Paris dominated by Picasso as an impasse from which he can see no escape. Yet as his successors, adding a last chapter to the 1974 edition remark, the apparent impasse is perhaps rather the impasse of an abstract 'internalist' model of the dynamics of pictorial space isolated from its 'external' coordinates in a wider dynamic of Art and Culture, than an impasse of 'Art' itself after mid-century, with the breakdown of the unitary axis of questions pursued in the School of Paris, and organising a formal space of 'internal' coordinates of 'Art' around 1930:

1348 READ, Herbert
Art Now London 1933

The impasse of Read's own perspective is underlined by his attempt to couple the internal coordinates of 'modern painting' with those of 'modern sculpture':

1349 A Concise History of Modern Sculpture
London 1964

...while the 'external' coordinates of the 'modern' dynamic of pictorial space in Culture might perhaps be underlined by considering the history of an analogous 'space' whose 'internal'
coordinates might be considered to be a constant, more or less 'neutral' mechanical embodiment of Alberti's central perspective from the latter part of the nineteenth century onward:

Indeed the non-neutrality of such abstract 'internal' neutrality itself structures the verbal order of Susan Sontag's rather rhetorical or theatrical reflections:

...dramatic images of the cultural dynamics of an apparently neutral mechanical eye nominally or apparently abstracting from the essentially active or dramatic schematism of perception first discovered in 'modern art', and in contemporary pragmatism, Bergsonism, 'moving pictures' and so on, a mechanical eye perfecting central perspective, the image as mirror or window or two-dimensional interface of two worlds, just as the 'truth' of this image of the image was coming into question.

Rhetorical imagery of the radical falsity of the supposedly 'literal' truth of the photograph, paralleling other post-structuralist and postmodern 'deconstructions' of the traditional imagery of abstraction from image, rhetoric, from the specific theatrical configuration of nominal abstraction from that configuration or situation. Ideas are always irreducibly images, figures, metaphors...just as (a parallel and contemporary discovery in the 'artistic' order of the image, breaking out of the traditional abstraction of 'internal', 'formal' art-history and theory) images are never simply neutral images, but always also the mark of a range of 'ideas' in the particular material situation of their production and consumption.

The 'impasse' at mid-century, after the breakdown of the School of Paris which had provided a sort of canonical axis of 'modern art' from the turn of the century, or rather from the Impressionism of around 1870, onward, is itself canonically marked by Read and others as 'abstract expressionism': index of a generalised 'existential' coupling of what may be verbally posed as the 'question' of the artist (viewer, subject) with the questions of 'object' or objects, and the question of 'Art' as a certain or
rather uncertain coupling of these questions - with the proviso that this verbal posing, and an associated assumption of some 'rational' discursive articulation of these 'questions' is itself 'in question' within the space and time of an action of which it constitutes only one, essentially 'subjective' dimension...which should perhaps rather be transcribed into the articulation of this action as 'art', rather than attempt the transcription of such a configuration into thought: words as script, one component of the dramatic configuration now 'in question', rather than transparent notation of the classical contradiction of an 'objective' rational subjectivity associated with the imaginary cartesian focus of a unitary 'world-picture'. Radicalising the cubist transition from unitary perspectival space of subjects and objects in such a classical 'world-picture' to a 'constitutive' scheme of coordination of a certain figure of the subject and a certain figure of 'object' in the dynamic of their perceptual and conceptual interaction, Pollock articulates pictorial space and time as simply the dramatic space and time of encounter of the subject as 'painter' with the canvas which is for a brief time the 'stage' of his trance-like 'automatic' response to his part in the drama. The implicit 'time' of a cubist picture underlined by Apollinaire becomes simply the time 'of the painting' which 'intransitively' presents nothing but itself and so allows the exploration of the limiting figure of the artist-subject confronting simply his confrontation with the canvas, and so with himself (rather than more specific 'transitive' configurations of action which provide the 'objects' of a cubist still-life, and whose illusory distance from the space and time of the act of painting them and of viewing the 'picture', presents artist and viewer with a particular figure of their 'being in the world' with particular objects, rather than the limiting figure of their subjectivity confronting itself in a painting which is simply a 'painting' of a surface, presenting or representing nothing but itself). Each drama of 'painting' is the confrontation with oneself and with Art and with the World, in which these coupled 'questions' which in their coupling provide the limiting frame of what is 'open' may be taken one 'stage' further towards a sort of pure actuality or absolute sartrian freedom and authenticity.
In 1937 Nelson Goodman and Robert Motherwell began work on dissertations at Harvard: Goodman had practised as an art-dealer after graduation in 1929, returning to verbally, logically articulate 'The Structure of Appearance' as a whole; Motherwell had turned from painting to theory in 1932 at Stanford, and would return from philosophy to painting at Columbia in 1941. Duchamp had arrived in America in 1915; Motherwell published his influential survey and anthology of 'The Dada Painters and Poets' in 1949. I have suggested that the complementarity of the 'structuralist' question of the figural dynamic of abstraction of 'logical space' (in some form or other) from that order of 'imagery', posed in terms of the complementarity of logical and analogical or figural 'sides' of language, and the 'modernist' aesthetic as response after the mid-century to the 'conceptual' component in 'art', may be seen to converge towards a radical interplay towards the close of the century, as the 'postmodern' question of embedding of theory in the 'pragmatic' configuration of its production and transmission confronts the question I have been trying to pose here, 'in' this book set in its late twentieth-century 'context', of the verbal transcription of what is open in the situation of this verbal transcription of what is here open, as 'question', as itself only one line of action open within the more general constraints presented by possible substitutions of this verbal for other orders (dramatic, economic, physical for example) of substitution.

Art as 'intransitive' substitution of a 'poetic' configuration in a situation where such intervention in the practical order of transition from one situation to another 'poses a question', a question attaching to the configuration of questioning as such in transition from one 'practical' situation to the next, leading 'out of' that whole order of transition in a reiteration of the figure by which a 'practical' question marks the move out of one specific practical situation into the next, without the overall structure of such transition itself coming into question: and 'modern' art characteristically develops in a 'dialectic' in which each successive 'recuperation' of the more radical questioning or opening-up of 'experience' by identifying successive figures of radicalisation of the question as (just) 'art', itself practically embedded as one social activity among others in the practical
matters of making a living, being entertained, investing money, and so on, in its turn comes into the more radical questioning of 'art' through the 'modernist' introduction of 'art' itself as one coordinate question in that configuration of questions which is the 'work of art'. - This rather as Heidegger, for example, charts the parallel 'modern' dialectic of recuperation of the 'in-transitive' questioning of the configuration of questioning as a whole (which is 'theory' or 'philosophy' in the original pythagorean sense) in the 'technical' progress of scientific systematisation of all 'practical questions', to the point where the very question of this dialectic itself appears to be on the point of absolute elision in what Marcuse calls a 'one dimensional' world.

I have already suggested how the 'dadaist' bringing-into-question of 'Art' itself as system of recuperation and elision of a more radical questioning, may in a way be considered as a limiting form of that introduction of 'real' objects into the 'art-work' which historians characterise as the passage from 'analytic' to 'synthetic' cubism around 1912. In the simplest form of 'readymade' the 'artistic' content simply drops out of the configuration of questions posed by 'the artist', leaving only a configuration of 'artist', 'art' and 'object' as questions organising a sort of unlimited 'dissemination' of questions - or rather of what may be marked as questions, this linguistic response itself also drawn into question as 'rationalisation', attempt at closed systematic abstraction from the essentially theatrical configuration of which language and questions are only one dimension, to an 'internal' space of thought which is as questionable as the pre-modern abstract, internal, illusionistic or representational 'content' of the 'art-work'. If the 'modernism' of around 1930 as new 'system' of Art may be seen as positive reassertion of the artist in a new configuration of artist, art, objects, society and so on, typified by Bauhaus and Surrealist 'movement' after Duchamp had relinquished the production of 'art-objects', and in response to the 'crisis' at the turn of the century, then Motherwell's attempt to respond to that system, having already alternated between what it opened up, and the theoretical transcription of this dynamic into a system of questions verbally articulated, may
perhaps be taken as complementary to what I have characterised as Pollock's radicalisation of cubist or futurist pictorial 'time' by theatrically responding to the coordinate 'questions' of artist, art, and object by organising the 'constitutive' time of the painting as the time of 'painting' itself, the artist's existential response to his confrontation with canvas, art, world and himself, itself (in Pollock's expression) 'in' the concretised act, action, drama, of 'the painting'. Motherwell responds to the various systematic responses to the configuration of 'questions' implicitly posed in their extreme form by Duchamp around 1915 (and by Zurich Dada from 1916) by trying to find as it were a minimal or irreducible form of the configuration of 'art' and 'questions' or theory, which can now, at mid-century, be systematically approached within the various systems of coordinates established in so many lines of response to the turn-of-the-century 'crisis' given most radical expression in 'Dada'. Thus along with many others he explores the various 'internal' and external or contextual configurations of what one may call an 'ideography' articulated in experimentation with a few black brush-strokes on a white surface. In Paris, with the American Tobey and the French writer-painter Michaux, the incorporation of elements of the Chinese and Japanese calligraphic tradition is direct and explicit, and the Zen Buddhist context of that tradition is in turn echoed by John Cage, collaborating with Rauschenberg, the dancer Merce Cunningham, and others at Black Mountain College, presided over from 1933 by Josef Albers who had taught at the Bauhaus before its dissolution and fragmentary transplantation to America. Silence: once more the absolute reduction or bracketing of aesthetic 'content' - in this case 'musical', but since there is no content, music-without-music employs in a sense the same 'medium' as, say, painting-without-painting - presents the 'audience' with an 'intransitive' configuration of 'questions' which are so to speak the direct converse of an unquestioning conventional system of practical elision of 'intransitivity' or the 'transcendental' as an 'art' (or 'music' or 'painting' or whatever) which what one thinks one understands as oneself thinks it understands as one particular activity among others, among a world of 'objects' which it also thinks it understands 'in principle'.
The 'point' of such 'art' of the mid-century is to open up the configuration of the paradoxical 'work', among whose elements are previously unquestioned 'self' (of artist or audience) 'art', 'objects' and so on. An essential dimension of this configuration is the language which itself attempts the 'recuperation' of the closed configuration of unquestioned identities it nominally brings into a coordination of questions in transcribing 'theoretically', just as an essential dimension of the various 'avant-garde' movements earlier in the century had been the verbal 'manifestos' which Motherwell was assembling and publishing as the 'Documents of Modern Art', in which series the Dada anthology appeared in 1949. In 1952 Cage organises at Black Mountain College the coordination of various elements or dimensions of 'art' as an intransitive 'action' no longer subject to the traditional aristotelian constraint of mimesis, but like Pollock's painting simply 'action'; at the close of the 'fifties the various coordinates of art as intransitive action marked by Pollock, Motherwell and Cage among others, converge in Cage's 'composition class' in New York: Rauschenberg's three-dimensional collages or 'combines', Jasper Johns' systematic recapitulation of Picasso's sticking of a painted and cut-out playing-card in a 'synthetic cubist' picture as one element, as he explores the interplay of art, object, and idea in 'paintings' of elements of various conventional sign-systems such as flags, numerals, words... and Allen Kaprow's 'action-collages', to become notorious in the 'sixties as The Happening. These last begin, as the early characterisation suggests, as three-dimensional arrangements of 'real' objects analogous with Pollock's two-dimensional encounter with paint-pots and canvas 'field'. Pollock had talked of being 'in' his paintings; Kaprow was quite literally 'in' the 'environments constructed in a room of his house, or of an art-gallery or museum. The next step, around 1960, came with the recognition of the artist constructing the 'environment', and the audience or visitors to the constructed action-collage, as themselves theatrical components of the 'work' along with the various objects - a 'work' whose time now became a limited dramatic unity in which the time of construction, and of 'viewing' were both components in the overall time of participation, radicalising one step further Pollock's own radicalisation of the implicit theatrical time of expressionist, futurist and cubist 'painting' after the turn of the century, and 'at the same
time' renewing contact with the theatrical demonstrations characteristic of futurism, dada and surrealism. By the mid-sixties the frame (so to speak) of a Kaprow 'happening' was verbally articulated as a 'script' specifying a certain number of variables and constraints, and so as it were replacing Pollock's canvas, paintpots, brushes and so on, now seen perhaps as a special case of the more general art-action, constrained by a number of unquestioned conventional coordinates of 'art' which then defined or constituted the 'painting' that Pollock was calling into question (in a sort of generalisation of the earlier cubist exploration of the dramatic constitution of bottles, guitars, and so on).

When Julian Beck and the Living Theatre arrived in Paris early in 1968, having developed in New York under the twin influences of the Happening and Grotowski's theatre-as-laboratory for opening up the space of human interaction as 'science' opens up the complementary formal coordinates of its widest space or context, they found themselves quickly caught up in the 'Events' of May, in association with associates of the European Situationist International. The architect Guy Debord, who had been the 'architect' of the International from soon after its formation in 1957, had just published a 'manifesto' systematising the framework elaborated over the previous ten years:

1352 Internationale Situationniste ed Debord Paris 1958-69
1353 DEBORD, Guy La Société du Spectacle Paris 1967

Anglo-american 'pop' art (first identified as such by the 'Independent Group' of artists and critics at the ICA founded by Read and Penrose in 1947) might be seen as a sort of inversion or conversion of the rational space of Bauhaus design in which the short-circuits of abstractions of various cultural schemes, identities and dynamics from that unitary space were to have been brought into question and slowly remodelled, transformed in a new architectonic or poetics of the human theatre, of cultural space: Motherwell's elements of ideography and the complementary explorations of the colour-field painters replace the mathematical space of colour and form of Kandinsky and Klee and De Stijl; Johns' and Rauschenberg's sign-systems of
the fifties expand into a generalised multi-media 'sign-system' explored by Warhol, by Godard, by Barthes and so many others: the project has now become that, not of forming a unitary space of 'design' into which the transition will necessarily occur more or less of itself, as people begin to work in Gropius factories, relax in Breuer chairs, and so on, but rather of presenting configurations of the present cultural 'space' and time 'intransitively' and so to progressively open up from within (or with Warhol to stand ambiguously between such opening-up and a converse recuperation of questions as 'art-business', posing perhaps a still more radical question: questioning art as questioning, 'So what?') the closed circuits of unquestioned conventions and identities.

The Situationist International was formed largely by veterans of various short-lived mid-century European groups (COBRA, Lettrisme, Movement for a Pictorial Bauhaus) whose projects prefigure Debord's generalised situationist revolution which would break open the whole contemporary popular sign-system of postwar 'culture' along with the coupled short-circuits of capitalist production and its theoretical apology. The whole is a coherent system, a theatre, a Société de Spectacle, whose component images and identities and processes are so coordinated in the action or activity of contemporary western capitalism, that they must either be broken open and transformed as a whole, or stay in place, 'recuperating' every local attempt to call particular components 'into question', to open up locally 'free' spaces of activity. May 1968, Paris, was identified as the time and place where the whole system would be broken open. The situationist posters of the Ateliers Populaires and situationist slogans filled the streets, the Living Theatre and situationist groups planned demonstrations as street theatre; Beck and Lebel organised the Theatre de l'Odeon across from the Sorbonne as dramatisation of the Great Debate over the Script for the global Happening. And then suddenly the party was over, the Situationist International split then dissolved...

1354 VAN NEIGHEM, Raoul Situationist Manifesto

1355 Leaving the Twentieth Century: The Incomplete Work of the Situationist International ed Cray London 1974
I have discussed above a parallel transition in French 'theoretical space', turning about the calling-into-question after 1968 - say in the years around 1970, 1967-73 - of a unitary space of questions, 'classic' structuralism, into which the questioning of 'the system' of signs articulating late capitalist culture had been taken to prefigure the practical transition. And just as a centralised 'cartesian' French political and theoretical order, moving so to speak en bloc from one more or less unitary formation to the next through crisis or 'revolution' (1789, 1815, 1830, 1848 and so on through to 1968) that belies in a discontinuous change of 'focus' an underlying cultural continuity (plus ça change plus c'est la même chose) has been coordinated at various points above with a more diffuse multipolar dynamic across the Rhine, so one might correlate the situationist 'poetic' of revolution and its spectacular climax in May 1968, with a more or less parallel international 'movement' or grouping originating in Germany in the early sixties: Fluxus.

Art as 'opening-up' the general framework or coordinates of experience or culture otherwise static, constant, in the unquestioned system of 'practical' transitions from one situation to the next; this through an 'intransitive' interruption of that dynamic of transition, which poses 'questions' that cannot be resolved like 'practical' questions through some transition which remains within the unquestioned general frame of transition, but find their only satisfactory response in a transition out of the whole current order of practical transition itself, 'as such' - in a configuration of what may be verbally or mentally transcribed as 'questions' attaching to primary coordinates of the otherwise constant scheme of transition as a whole: subject, object, sign, question, 'art', truth, life, desire, and so on. 'Fluxus': the coordination of these 'intransitive' questions or interruptions, openings, not within some 'positive' unitary space that might be theoretically articulated as a new 'system' into which an 'aesthetic' movement organised so many components of transition - Debord's reconstruction of socialism, say, beyond the paradox that the natural 'open' space of action beyond the current unitary system cannot be expressed 'in' that system - but rather in the 'negative dialectic' of a constant questioning or opening-up of what remained unquestioned in the previous framings.
of poetic 'opening-up' of culture, the previous 'moves' within the radically open 'movement' itself - these loosely coordinate 'moves' typically taking the form of happenings or Aktionen in which no conventional abstraction of the 'art-work' from its various supposedly 'external' or extrinsic dimensions or coordinates was to be left unquestioned. No more traditional 'paintings', then (for example); no more painting, indeed, unless it be a vehicle for bringing into question dramatically the various correlative contextual components of the conventional system of identities which had 'constituted' the previous tradition of painting, sculpture, and so on: the previous conventional identity of 'Art'. In 1972 David Mayor posed the question What is Fluxus? - by publishing a collection of about ninety responses from those more or less engaged in the otherwise undefined 'movement' to his invitation to respond to this attempt to as it were 'mark' the question 'Fluxus':

1356 Fluxshoe ed Mayor Cullompton 1972

Fluxus as question: participation in Fluxus as affirmation of what may be verbally transcribed (however questionably) as questioning as a primary orientation of one's 'intransitive' activity as 'artist' or 'anti-artist' (or whatever one called oneself in response to that question of identity or role).

Read and Penrose had set up the ICA in London in 1947 as not so much an art-gallery as 'a place for adults to play'. Play: theatre, game; and the british axis, or a british axis, of what one might call the 'dramatisation' of Art around 1970, marked by the sudden profusion in that period of short-lived 'Arts Labs', might be correlated with the dominant frame of british 'philosophical' questioning over the same period - the 'language-game' - in terms of this figure of 'play', opening up previously unquestioned configurations of identities as just so many more or less arbitrary but coordinate selections of variables from the wider space of other selections, substitutions, rules, made manifest in the games played out by a profusion of 'performance' groups such as the People Show:
..or in a wider transcription and exemplification of new variations within a cultural matrix of Britain as a whole around 1970 in the 'alternative' culture's 'comic', OZ, whose editor framed a more or less systematic picture of what had been opened up by 1970..

..and projected its consummation in the transition from the closed systems of previous identities and rules broken open by the figure of 'play' into a free space of variation. The failure of such a project might be taken as a British component of a more general tragicomic impasse around 1970, as the various wider 'spaces' of action into which various transitions were projected by situationists and others in various different traditions themselves come theoretically and practically into question as abstractions from the dramatic dynamics of the particular situations and configurations of projection, to supposed inscriptions of such particular situations in a general unitary linguistic space of 'questions' (or correlative comprehensive spaces of free action). Transcription of what is opened up in a particular 'poetic' interruption of the 'transitive' intramundane order of the 'practical', into the linguistic matrix of questions and theories itself comes 'into question' as one variable of the situation. Thus, for example, in his contribution to the Montreal colloquium 'Performance et Multidisciplinarité: Postmodernisme' in 1980...

..Lyotard reflects on Daniel Buren's installations since the mid-sixties: Buren brackets any questioning of the 'internal' configuration of the 'art-work' by reproducing precisely the same coloured stripes as identical 'content' of all his work; thus what each successive embodiment of those stripes in various different forms and contexts opens up is the dramatic interplay of various questions relating to various components or coordinates of form and context: in particular they open up the question of the theoretical axis of
response (exemplified, though not explicitly, by Lyotard's paper itself), the transcription of the various coordinate openings into the verbal order of systematic questioning, as itself dramatically coordinated with those various non-verbal dimensions of 'question' as itself only one among those 'contextual' coordinates (yet once more, Lyotard here verbally frames the inscription of the verbal order of theory in the dynamics of action, with no attempt to inscribe this 'theoretical' inscription itself in the 'concrete' interplay of the various verbal and non-verbal components of its own dramatic articulation).

Ironically, just as the 'structuralist' space of questions, Language, was coming into question after around 1970, as abstraction from the figural dynamic of closure of the 'space' and time of a limited recit or discours, a converse development in 'conceptual art' was attempting to as it were take Buren's bringing-into-question of the abstraction of the traditional 'content' of 'Art' one step further, by (as they thought) bracketing the 'object' entirely and organising their theoretical dynamic of transposition of the questions it poses into Language around the question marked by the word 'Art':

1360 Art & Language ed Atkinson & alia Coventry 1969-
1361 Art & Language (selections) ed & intr Harrison Cologne 1972
1362 Art & Language 1966-75 Oxford 1975

While the unitary linguistic 'space' of classic 'structuralism' is schematically brought into question by a residually universal or comprehensive figure of inscription of all fragmentary linguistic 'units' in the figural dynamic of their 'pragmatics', the converse traditional abstraction of a figural unity, the 'art-object', from the same linguistic interface of figural and conceptual or logical, is schematically reduced to the logical grammar of the concept 'Art'. In the first case the inscription of 'theory' (à la Lyotard) in its pragmatics remains abstractly theoretical; in the converse second case the supposed inscription of the figural in the logical
remains fundamentally figural, down to the very production of
the 'journal of conceptual art', as an object, in the 'image' of
the contemporary journals of anglo-american 'linguistic philosophy'
it apes - as is underlined by Brandon Taylor in an essay ('Textual
Art') contributed to the catalogue of an exhibition of 'Artist's
Books' in 1976:


'Artists' Books': the 'book' having become a primary com-
ponent in the generalised 'movement' around 1970 away from the tradi-
tional 'art-object' abstracted from the dramatic coordinates of its
constitution, characteristically documented in a book by Lucy Lippard:

1364 LIPPARD, Lucy Six Years: The Dematerialization of the Art-
Object 1966-72 London 1973

'Documented': the otherwise ephemeral 'actions' of the sixties
documented by words and images assembled in the form of a 'book'
from which, within the traditional coordination of 'internal' and
'external' coordinates of 'book', the original 'action' may be as
it were reconstituted within a wider 'history' which comprehends
both initial action and subsequent activity of documentation and
then reconstruction by a 'reader'. Lippard's documentation of
such documentation over the years she covers thus presents her
reader with 'the history' of the diffuse movement or development
she merely documents without attempting to reconstruct as a unitary
activity, as a question: thus far her book is itself one component
in the continuation of the 'movement' it frames, and is itself
'documented' - along with (1363) itself - in (1363) above. Yet
since its structure as book does not directly enter into the art-
cipation of the question it poses, standing so to speak 'outside'
the 'art' it documents as a mere 'representation', it cannot itself
be considered as an instance of the 'book art' that Clive Phillpot,
in his essay in (1363), identifies as a more limited form within
the wider genus of 'artist's book' or indeed 'art book' as a whole, defined (by him) as a book whose own structure (as specifically 'book', and specifically that particular construction of a book within the range of variation of components more or less determined as constituting a 'book') enters into the 'artwork' of which it is itself a component, rather than a mere conventional and unquestioned presentation or representation. One might add that Phillpot's own essay makes no attempt to exemplify the 'book art' it textually defines or constitutes: like Brandon Taylor's companion essay it remains within the form or genre of art-theory 'outside' its objects - in the latter case somewhat ironically, since the irreducible 'figuration' that Taylor recognises in the productions of the Art & Language group, vociferously repudiated by that group in their insistence that their project amounts to the theoretical articulation of the logic of figure within the conceptual matrix of an essentially immaterial space of Language, may itself, of course, be identified in the constitution of Taylor's own 'theoretical' reflections themselves.

Further developments in the form of book-art and artist's book, and their documentation, may be traced through:

1365 Das Buch als Kunstobjekt ed Schaller Cologne 1981
1366 Bookworks London 1981

...or through the shelves of 'artists' books' themselves in several 'art-galleries' (Whitechapel, Nigel Greenwood, Lisson in London). 'Documentation' of an overall 'history' of action (rather than the 'drama' constrained by various conventions such as the distinction of 'actor' and 'audience') as 'art' from mid-century until around 1970, framing Lippard's more detailed documents, I found in:

1368 HENRI, Adrian Environments and Happenings London 1974

...and Cage's own documentation of his seminal experiments over the fifties and sixties in:
The 'documentation' assembled for a 198 Beaubourg exhibition:

sets its subject's (or 'object's'? ) 'actions' from mid-century to his death in 1962 within the wider matrix, or history, activity, of his life as his primary 'artwork', in which particular 'paintings', 'sculptures', 'music', 'architecture' ('of the immaterial'), writings, and other 'actions' or 'events' are articulated within the transcendental coordinates of Le Vide, the wider space whose constant 'external' image is the ultramarine 'IKB' (International Klein Blue) of 'Space' itself, in which all these 'actions' mark so many intransitive points of transition out of the everyday practical order of transition from one situation to another, into the cosmic configuration of such transition, life, as a whole.

The critic Pierre Restany identified a grouping (in 1960) of which Klein was the most prominent member, as 'nouveaux realistes' who, like their american 'neodadaist' counterparts had taken the principle of collage to its limit in constructing their 'art' from the assemblage of 'real' elements, systematically bringing into question the conventional coordinates, abstract 'contextual' identities, which framed the social constitution of the analogously abstract conventional illusionistic 'spaces' of the various traditional genres of 'art'. I have already noted the young 'new realist' Daniel Buren's continuation of this 'movement' into the eighties, substituting his constant stripes, as it were, for Klein's constant 'monochrome' blue; and the latter limit form of the 'movement' allows of a still more simple coordination of the external or contextual space of (Buren's) 'art' around the axis of the artist's life, as what may be transcribed as each successive configuration of 'questions' posed by each successive 'work' or installation, opens in its turn out of the configuration of artist and culture.
into which the previous 'works' have led. Klein and Buren, like, say, Dali and Warhol, present a sort of one-man 'movement' in the coherence of the 'external' coordinates of their 'works' within the frame of a life...

1372 DALI, Salvador  Oui (essays and transcripts 1931-69)  Paris 197

1373  Journal d'un Génie

1374 WARHOL, Andy  From A to B and back again: The Philosophy of Andy Warhol  NY 1975

In each of these cases the script or transcript is dramatically coordinate as verbal order of 'opening up' the various correlative dimensions of an activity in which 'life' and 'art' in a sense co-incide, with non-verbal dimensions or coordinates. More generally, the coordination of a 'group' of artists' activities as a more or less definite 'movement' is naturally framed within more or less shared coordinates of transition from a present configuration of collective experience... into a new wider 'space', presented verbally as so many questions (or responses that implicitly mark them) which transcribe into the general situation correlative with a printed 'manifesto', the more or less unitary frame in which a wide variety of different 'works' present so many different markings of specific figures...or elements of transition within more specific concrete situations of execution and reception of specific 'works'. For the 'situationists' of May 1968 the transition was to be an essentially 'political' or 'cultural' revolution into a free social space in which 'everyone will be an artist'; for Klein, his actions were the marking in the France of the fifties of so many points of transition into the cosmic space already marked out by the Zen masters of Japan from within the different local configurations of their culture - so many component transitions or steps which together were simply the pattern of a life that was itself an intransitive movement out of the practical and technical transitions of the more 'limited' 'world', beginning with his birth, and ending with his death, neither of which fitted - any more than the intervening 'art' - into an otherwise apparently constant pattern of practically motivated transition from one specific situation 'in' life to the next.
Such an 'art' might perhaps just as well be called a 'religion', punctuated not so much by 'art-works' as by a developing ritual - except that since the decoupling of 'art', 'theory' and 'religion' marked by the opening configuration of theory as of theatre around 500BC, 'religion' has been articulated as a sort of converse of 'art', in the common 'transcendental' coordinates of transition into and out of the 'transitive' practical order of a whole community and its universal history, with the theatre of ritual transition 'in' life from the narrower practical order leading from one day to the next, into the wider 'cosmic' frame into which death is the definitive transition, determined as a reflection of the whole community's configuration in that universal 'space' of birth, death and mystery, rather than as an 'artwork' marking the individual 'artist's' access to that same wider order, as his own identity comes as one component into a configuration of questions opened up by the 'intransitive' interruption of the everyday order by the activity we call 'art'.

Just as a group of artists 'in' a wider community may constitute themselves as 'group' and as 'movement' in a verbal framing of the shared coordinates of the wider 'space' into which their separate 'works' mark so many detailed configurations of specific points of transition, so the wider 'religious' frame of a member of the wider community's transition in, and beyond, life into the coordinates of a wider cosmic order 'interrupting' the practical order of life with 'intransitive' birth and death, finds its primary expression in the western tradition verbally marked as the Book which frames the 'everyday' order of confrontation with it in the 'wider' space and time of 'the heavens', Klein's blue void. As in the other cultures of The Book, Islam and Judaism, there is an historic tension between the subordination of the Book as marking the inscription of its verbal order within the primary axis of a religious tradition, activity, and institutional frame, and a converse emphasis upon the constant opening-up of any fixed institutional frame of activity through the radical open-ness of questioning associated with the circular figure of a text that frames its own place as one component in the configuration it frames: conservative Tradition and progressive criticism as
complementary sides of the same circular frame of 'religious' coordination of a community's activity within its widest cosmic or 'heavenly' context.

The chief representative, - and martyr so to speak - of the turn-of-the-century 'modernist' movement in catholicism, Tyrrell, explicitly framed his criticism of the conservative reassertion of unitary tradition at the Vatican Council of 1869-70, in terms of the 'pragmatic' elaboration in particular situations of access to a transcendent frame 'behind' everyday experience, of particular figures or configurations of interaction of visible and invisible. While James on the one hand was inscribing the previously abstracted 'logical' side of language in a practical dynamics of action and judgement, 'modernists' were exploring the same radical interplay of a previously 'abstract' theological poetic and its unitary institutional frame with the logic of various 'scientific' developments over the last century. James was bringing out the dimension of 'faith' previously abstracted from in the nineteenth-century ideal of unitary global 'scientific' frame of questions, and Tyrrell and his associates were exploring the irreducible 'logical' dimension in the empirical elaboration of what a conservative and authoritarian institution of 'christian' activity was presenting as a static unitary frame of the universal christian drama. A more general 'modernism', only focussed and typified by the catholic 'movement' until its authoritarian repression by papal decree in 1908, through precisely the unitary structure of that institution which 'modernism' strictly speaking was calling into question, may be seen as a simple radicalisation of Schleiermacher's figure of all 'religion' as simply different expressions in different communities or cultures of the common 'transcendental' frame comprehending all earthly activity, predominantly expressed in the western tradition or culture after the breakdown of the pagan culture of classical Antiquity in an evolving 'christianity'. Thus one principal component of Tyrrell's 'modernism' was an emphasis on the 'mystical' experience of individual access to the invisible or transcendent 'divine' frame of all religions, which James had taken as empirical domain for his investigation of 'faith' (its 'phenomenology' in a non-technical sense) in the Gifford lectures of 1900-1, and
which Tyrrell's closest friend Von Hügel was exploring in the more limited 'catholic' manifestation of 'the mystical element of religion' in the circle of Catherine of Genoa (above); characteristically the emphasis on the common cosmic frame or mystery to which different communities found different figures of access was more influential in anglican than in catholic circles after the condemnation of Tyrrell in the same year that Von Hügel's study appeared:

1375 DE LA BEDOYERE, Michael The Life of Friedrich von Hügel London 19

1376 UNDERHILL, Evelyn Mysticism London (1911)1912

In Part III I set Barth's unfinished 9000 pages of inquiry into 'the Word of God' as expressed in the Book which frames the World and its own part in that World, and through this the living dynamic of Word, as sole index of specifically 'christian' theology over the course of the twentieth century that, in this field, it dominates:

1377 BARTH, Karl Kirkliche Dogmatik (Zürich 1932-67) tr Edinburgh 1936-69

...and just as I have attempted to trace an unfolding of a 'philosophical' frame of questioning-as-such from the beginning of the nineteenth century, through turn-of-the-century pragmatism, down to a questioning of questioning as marking what is open in the situation of that questioning in this book, and to trace a parallel opening-up of 'art' from the turn of the century down to the point around 1970 where the linguistic reflection on what is 'opened-up' in an 'artwork' itself becomes an explicit coordinate of 'art', so, I suggest, one may construe an axis of 'christian theology' that runs from Schleiermacher down to 'modernism' at the turn of this century, and on through Barth's complementary reaction against 'liberal' or 'rationalist' tendencies to subordinate the practical dynamics of the living Word to any unitary 'scientific' frame, down to this attempt to mark what is open in the situation of a book
constructed as questioning of its questioning.

I noted a distinction drawn in 1976 between 'artists' books' in general - typically a book 'presenting' an 'action' as art but itself outside the configuration of questions or rather 'openings' which as components of the action together in their interplay constitute it as 'art' (an 'intransitive' action 'in place of' another transitive action, but not in general a 'theatrical' representation of another action) - and 'book art' in which the book itself enters as one set of components of the 'poetic' configuration. And just as I criticised seventies attempts to present as 'art' a supposedly purely linguistic configuration of questions (as mapping of 'Art' and its dynamic of 'opening-up' into a logical order of questions in Language) as remaining essentially 'figural', I criticised complementary attempts to inscribe the logical order of questions within the analogical or figural poetics or pragmatics of its linguistic marking as still essentially articulated in an abstract textual logic of such inscription. This book of questioning, inquiry, as attempt to mark what is open in the situation in which it responds to what is open by electing to mark it in questions, and the questioning of those questions, may, I hope be considered to be articulated both 'logically' as sequence of questions and 'poetically' as presenting in the configuration of words and non-verbal dimensions of its marking an open-ness, a matrix of possible substitutions, in which the verbal marking of that marking of a system of substitutions in and through which it is constructed as 'theory' marks itself as only one among other lines of response open. At the same time, what is thus logically and poetically organised as a linguistic order of marks opening and closing with an object, this book, marked '?', marks a coincidence not only of 'theory' and 'art', but of both with 'religious' mystery, as marking in a general system of substitutions and constraints upon substitution organised about the question of this question-mark, the widest 'cosmic' frame of practical earthly activity, of 'intransitive' passage onto this earthly stage, into this Globe Theatre, and out of it - of birth and death, and 'theory' as 'intransitive' access to the wider 'invisible' cosmic frame from within the intervening transitions articulated as our lives here on Earth.
I opened Part I with a fairly abstract consideration of a Book in the 'external' context of this book, framing action within the universal space and time it also framed, as response to this 'circular' figure, and I opened the second 'half' of Part I by considering this book as response to the meeting around the beginning of 'our Era' of a 'logical' tradition opening out of a pythagorean organisation of 'theory' as both logic and poetics of inquiry organised around the question of simple 'mark', and a poetic or rather religious tradition developing from the systematisation of jewish culture on return from Babylonia around the time of Pythagoras (and systematically formulated in the contemporary Book of Isaiah). On roughly the same 'scale' of transition exemplified by these last five hundred years before our Era, I traced the unfolding of 'religious' questions as logically articulated in a 'theology', and the complementary institutions in which such 'theology' was organised as one activity among others, through the scholastic systems of the thirteenth century (typified by Aquinas), the 'Scientific Revolution' of the seventeenth (typified by Descartes), the Romanticism marking the transition from eighteenth to nineteenth centuries (Schleiermacher), down to the 'modernist crisis' around the beginning of the twentieth century.

Descartes and his associates, over the mid-seventeenth century, abstracted a 'scientific' frame of transcription of a universal frame of what was open into a universal logical frame of questions, from the complementary 'poetics' of questioning as 'dramatically' articulated in specific situations of breakdown of configurations of experience and activity. Cornford, in various books noted above, from around the turn of this century, articulated the pythagorean transition into a western 'theoretical' space of questions 'mathematically' organised around an otherwise indeterminate 'mark', within its dynamic as religious 'mystery', elided since the cartesian 'mathematical' revolution of the seventeenth century, but rediscovered through examination of the 'presocratic' tradition or transition from Thales to Socrates (say, 570BC-430BC) within the framework of the 'comparative religion' or 'comparative mythology' associated with the narrower 'modernism' in christian theology around the turn of the century.
As the elaboration of a 'scientific' world-picture as transcription of unitary physical Universe into a timeless logical system of questions abstracted from the specific 'poetics' of specific contributions to the universal project slowly eroded successive theological circles of argument framed as a whole by a Book which justified its stories by itself framing the loci of their enunciation within the supposed unity or literal coherence of its story or universal history as a whole, a converse move, as I have noted, began to question the imminent completion of this project of erosion, by beginning to regard biblical accounts of 'religious experience' or the interplay of 'visible' and 'invisible' as imperfect 'pragmatic' expressions of such experience within the limited coordinates of a particular historical situation and culture, just as the grand project of 'Science' itself was being recast into a precisely analogous 'pragmatics' of the specific steps whose 'scientificity' was taken to be constituted now rather by a particular 'scientific' orientation toward abstraction from specific to more general application, than by an End of unitary logical Truth already fully articulate in itself.

Now when the dynamic of one question leading to another, that 'logical' axis of 'science' itself comes 'into question' as itself one particular element of the 'Universe' it seeks to frame 'within' language or thought as system of questions and answers, we enter the essentially 'dramatic' figure of what Aristotle still calls \( \text{εἰσίτως} \). His 'science' of the Universe itself presents a configuration in which access to the 'logical' order of questions in which the Universe has been systematically framed is coupled as one 'variable' with other non-verbal components of the situation of reflection. The question, as the marking of something open (for example, the marking of this order of 'question' itself), when finally it comes itself 'into question', marks the inscription of the logical order of thought and questions as merely one dimension of a wider dynamic system, and thus marks also the possibility of the thinker's access to the interplay of his thinking with the non-verbal coordinates of thinking it has already mapped 'in' thought. Access, in particular, to the axis of motive or emotive \( \text{δύναμις} \) in which the whole 'logical' dynamic 'in' language and thought is itself recognised as ultimately the thinker's movement, in the wider coordinates of the whole Universe, 'through' the ultimately limited
dimension or domain of logic and the organisation of what is
'open' in that Universe as system of questions, towards and ul-
timately 'into' σοφία. Φιλόσοφία, 'Philosophy'; and Aristotle's
figure of the dramatic articulation of thought with other variables
of the thinker's or philosopher's universal or cosmic situation re-
fects, of course the specific and questionable starting-point of
his own logic, which has ultimately framed the configuration of
'dramatic' passage from what that logic determines as its own formal
coordination with other elements of the Universe it has articulated,
into the embodied and situated thinker's thinking of thinking, or
theatrical experience of theory: a 'vision' which is no longer
merely the verbal figure of verbal representation or transcription
of the 'Universe', and of that representation 'in' it as one com-
ponent, but which is now indeed an articulate spectacle in which he
finds himself, thinking his thinking, questioning his questioning
as merely one element dynamically coordinate with others (not just
in the 'internal' linguistic dynamics of his 'logic', but now also
in the 'external', non-verbal affective or emotive dynamic of his
action and interaction with others and material things): as 'the
wise man' materially set in a Universe in which he at last understands
his quest for understanding itself as movement towards his access to
his true identity, persona, part.

But this 'pragmatic' articulation of aristotelian theory
as access to one's true part in a universal drama is as essentially
'circular' as any 'religious' access to a similar dramatic frame,
'symbolically' rather than 'logically' organised, directly in the
'pragmatic' axis of breakdown of identification with a purely
'mental' part in the dynamics of thought decoupled from its dramatic
coordinates - a breakdown of which the transition from logic to
wisdom as 'abstract' thinking itself comes into question as only
one element in the world it organises 'in thought' may be itself
taken as merely a special case. Indeed these two orders of access
to one's 'part' in Kosmos coincide in the pythagorean frame which
marks the starting-point for a progressive divergence between the
vision or θωρία of 'science', and of the instituted 'mysteries'.
And in Aristotle's σοφία one may still see, logically articulated,
the figure of trance or (in the terms of a later psychology)
'dissociation' in which the 'normal' waking dynamic of identification with an 'I' or 'I think' which is the 'pragmatic' locus of transcription of various coordinates of a situation in which one is involved into a configuration of questions, thinking, when the figure or appearance in which one was unquestioningly involved 'breaks down' or 'breaks open', is so to speak 'short-circuited' in some particular 'mystical' figure of dramatic coordination of this instance of 'I', 'as such', with other as it were 'intransitive' coordinates of some particular figure of 'transition', practical activity, or 'experience' as a whole. As if one were sitting entranced lost in a theatrical action on a stage, in its dynamic (rather than thinking 'here I am sitting watching some people behaving as if they were other than themselves), one so to speak watches one's thought and activity within a particular figure of 'universal' coupling of thought and 'external' coordinates of transition, generally articulated in the widest figure of transition into the previously unquestioned dynamic of an apparently autonomous 'I think' as unthinkingly elaborated in the pragmatics of being associated with a particular physical body.

Each day we experience complete 'dissociation', in which no residue of thinking remains, in 'sleep', and partial dissociation in the 'dreams' which mark transition into and out of that mysterious state. While Freud was investigating the articulation of the 'visions' of his patients in hypnoid states as expressions of the emotive axis of a desire that could not be entertained in conscious thought, William James was investigating the structure of those 'spontaneous' trance-states generally experienced by his subjects in the midst of otherwise normal 'waking' or consciousness as the irruption into the normal dynamics of practical transition in waking life from one situation to the next, in which the whole 'everyday' order of experience, its generally unquestioned constant coordinates of thinking 'I', physical body and so on, came 'into question' or 'broke down' - and in which various figures of an agency 'behind' everyday visible experience, and its 'invisible' coordinates, to which the 'intransitive' irruption must be attributed (since by definition, so to speak, it was 'outside' the everyday order) were given halting imperfect expression in figures 'borrowed' from the
'natural' order which the 'supernatural' agency interrupted - in which it 'super-naturally' intervened. I have already described at some length my own experience of such an 'irruption' as I was writing a letter to Julia - questioning in the letter, precisely, why I found myself writing her this questioning.

Between the time of Mesmer towards the close of the eighteenth century, and the systematic investigations of Charcot, Freud and others towards the close of the nineteenth, the very fact of 'mesmerism', 'hypnosis', 'trance' states were questioned by many scientists. In his general survey Chertok narrates the coming of age and scientific respectability of the dissociated state precisely over the period in which the 'abstract' ego or 'I' as locus of 'Science' or cartesian scientific system of questions was being brought into question by James, Freud and others; yet as he points out that most familiar of 'experiences', the complete dissociation we call sleep (which Locke had already two hundred years before urged as a confutation of the cartesian version of the 'I'), is still late in the twentieth century as much a 'mystery' for 'science' as its complement consciousness, the locus so to speak of 'scientific' and other questioning itself...

Janet claimed that he could 'hypnotise' certain of his patients even when not physically confronting them. If one enters into 'dissociated' trance at the consummation of 'philosophy', as into a figure of coupling of thinking 'I' with other non-mental coordinates of questioning and thought; and if the figure of an autonomous abstract 'I' directing its scientific or other inquiry free of any constraints of coordination with other non-mental dimensions of its embodied 'owner's' (or perhaps it is the 'I' which owns the body - 'my' body...) activities (including thinking) is no longer 'scientifically' tenable in the twentieth century, then why should most 'scientists' be so scandalised by the suggestion
that two individual 'figures' of thinking 'I' should be either spontaneously or (as with Charcot it is claimed) by 'choice' coupled in an essentially 'poetic' (or indeed 'mystical') configuration of 'I's and other coordinates of the two individuals' common situation, in a 'sympathy' or 'telepathic' communication in an affective axis of their situation partly abstracted or 'dissociated' from the 'everyday' abstract domains of supposedly autonomous conscious 'I', and autonomous 'physical object', and the everyday practical circuit of communication of two 'I's through the intermediary of such thoroughly 'external' media? Is it perhaps that the typical 'scientist' is still involved in abstract 'scientific' inquiry (even into the untenability of an abstract autonomous domain of logic, consciousness, questioning, as of a complementary abstraction of an independent 'physical' order from relativistic 'observer' and quantum 'measurement', neither 'physically' specifiable) through identification with just the traditional 'everyday' appearance to itself of 'autonomous' waking thought?

'Modern spiritualism', or the widespread 'movement' involving literally millions of people across Europe and America in 'sittings' with an entranced 'medium' may be fairly precisely dated from the reporting of purported occurrences at the Fox Household in Hydesville in America, beginning in that eventful year 1848. I will not here enter into the 'sociology' of this inception, which would link it to political, economic, and scientific (Helmholtz' mathematical formulation of the Conservation of Energy, and so of the underlying unity or system of the 'physical' world) revolutions of that year, but simply cite the most famous 'medium's' own account of his central part in the 'movement' from mid-century:

1379 HOME, Daniel Dunglas  
Incidents in My Life intr Chambers  
London 1863

In another eventful year, 1870, the leading british scientist Sir William Crookes opened up the 'scientific' investigation of 'mediumistic phenomena' by instigating a series of
experiments with Home (and latterly with other 'mediums') under 'laboratory conditions', to try and ascertain what - if any - phenomena of the darkened 'seance room' could be demonstrated in such a manner as to 'scientifically' rule out mere theatrical deception (in which many mediums, but never Home, had been caught red-handed in the intervening years):

1380 CROOKES, William Researches in the Phenomena of Spiritualism London 1871-6

Just as 'mediumship' had attracted great interest as a demonstration or supposed demonstration of what could be regarded as the primary phenomena of 'religious' experience - communication in a trance with 'agencies' outside the everyday 'natural' order of transitions within life ('between birth and death') - just as 'science' appeared to be finally discrediting the 'literal' biblical tradition, so many victorian scientists and philosophers of considerable eminence felt both a need and a social duty to investigate whether the principles of a resolution of what Draper called 'The Conflict of Religion with Science' might be discovered by such 'scientific' investigation of that basic structure of 'religious experience', so that the religious structures of the biblical message might be recognised and investigated, while the no longer tenable 'literal' truth of the whole biblical Story or History was as it were bracketed...

1381 Journal of the Society for Psychical Research London 1883-

As masses of material was assembled, some of those involved began to try and cast it into systematic form. No-one doubted any longer the reality of the trance state. 'Modern mediumship' had begun with the figure of a once-living agency associated with the circle of living agencies around the table communicating with that circle by so to speak replacing the normal 'I' in the dissociated or entranced 'medium', or even 'physically' intervening in that configuration in manners other than so to speak direct 'impersonation' as the medium 'acted' his or her persona or part. One of the early researchers, Podmore, argued that all those phenomena which
which were beyond scientific doubt could be accounted for simply
by trance, telepathic communication to a greater or lesser degree
among those in the trance-situation, and a sort of combination of
these components in dreamlike collective hallucination or trance-
vision more or less 'telepathically' shared by members of a group,
without the need for invoking any other invisible or 'spiritual'
agencies other than the interacting 'I's of the living members of
the entranced group:

...and in his posthumously published wider survey of the whole
range of phenomena investigated or reported in the first phase of
'psychical research' down to the turn of the century (say 1870-1930,
maintaining the by-now familiar parallel with other developments in
the various 'internal' and 'external' coordinates of 'theory'),
Myers generalised this approach, borrowing like Freud and Jung
Hartmann's figure of the 'Unconscious' as interpersonal systematic
articulation of the affective axis of the Universe as a whole, into
which trance was the access:

With this systematisation the 'research' parted company
with 'spiritualism' and moved into detailed investigations of
'spontaneous' paranormal phenomena within the established structure,
and the question of correlation of this structure with the data
of comparative religion, psychoanalysis, and even the 'new' physics.
I have suggested that Aristotle's 'wisdom', taken over from less
'scientific' Pythagoreans, amounts to a passage from what I have
elsewhere called the 'formal' internal order of scientific questions
to the 'informal' dramatic or pragmatic coordination of that locus
of formal questioning with 'external' coordinates of its practical
elaboration - Hartmann's attempt to organise 'scientifically' the
motive axis of this 'pragmatic' configuration as inscription of
the informal 'question' of the science of 1870 formally within the
incomplete formal system of 'logical' questions (his 'scientific'
Unbewusstsein then, as has often been observed, just an attempt to
frame the unknown of 'Science' at a specific point in its develop-
ment, the unbewusst, within the formal structure of the science of
that time) may be seen as an analogue of Aristotle's move into a
logical version of the analogical or dramatic dynamic of ...
paralleled in England by an anonymous publication by one of the
leading physicists (whose scientific works are already noted above)
together with the second president of the Society for Psychical Re-
search:

1384 TAIT, Peter Guthrie & STEWART, Balfour
The Unseen Universe: or Physical Speculations on a Future State London 1875

(the cover bears the image of the 'trinity knot' of my introduction,
taken by Tait as the most elementary form of 'matter', a self-main-
taining 'knot' in his friend Maxwell's electromagnetic field, which
he had been investigating in the formalism of Hamilton's quaternion
field - the knot actually an image of the common symmetry of the two
different kinds of 'field').

...this updated, so to speak, by a subsequent president:

1385 LODGE, Oliver
Ether and Reality London 1925

...and the increasing structural reflection within the 'new' physics
he was helping develop of its embedding as one dimension of a 'deeper'
question or configuration of its systematic questioning pre-
sented in an address to his associates in the Society of Friends
popularly called 'quakers' from outward phenomena of the trance
that early characterised the group, formally perpetuated in the
sole quaker ritual of group Silence:

1386 EDDINGTON, Arthur Stanley
Science and the Unseen World London 1929
William McDougall participated along with his fellow Cambridge experimental psychologist Rivers in the first 'scientific' expedition to explore what Tylor in 1871 had called 'Primitive Culture', in Melanesia in 1898. Rivers went on to lay the foundations of experimental 'anthropology'; McDougall followed Tylor in seeing in the 'Animism' of the groups he encountered the common figure out of which 'advanced' Religion, Science and Philosophy had developed:

1387 MCDOUGALL, William

**Body and Mind: A History and Defence of Animism**

London 1911

Animism: pragmatic systems of interaction in experience with 'invisible' agencies behind the visible coordinates of human interaction with the 'primitive' environment, with which specific members of the group could ritually interact in trance, and with which the group as a whole could enter into a sort of wider economy of interaction in which the visible order of everyday life was framed as merely one side.

One may approach such systems in terms of what I have called the intransitive iteration of the 'sign' or 'mark' upon itself - figures of inscription of the 'natural' or transitive order of figuration of 'natural' interaction in a wider order in which the general coordinates (subject, object and so on) of the 'transitive' order are themselves figuratively, pragmatically, inscribed. Before the decoupling of 'religious', 'artistic', 'philosophical' and 'scientific' dimensions of such 'intransitivity' through the pythagorean coordination of these dimensions simply in relation to the iteration of the 'empty' function of the 'mark' ('point') upon itself (in that limiting figure of transition from 'scientific' order of questions into the trance-state of through the marking of the mark, or question of the question, or 'scientific' framing of the place of that 'scientific' framing itself as one component of the symmetric mathematical 'Kosmos' it framed), they are to be found as radically coupled and only theoretically separable elements of 'primitive' ritual and primitive 'culture' as a whole. Indeed, complementing his 'history and defence of animism', McDougall turned from the experimental psychology of individuals he and Rivers had studied in the Cambridge of the 1890s to what he called group or 'social
psychology', emphasising, as it were in complementary manner to his defence of the reality of coupling of individual minds in the primitive trance-state (or modern western 'spiritualism'), the complementarity in the individual of autonomous abstract thinking, and the interpersonal figural dynamic of organisation of the individual's affective life in the axis of what Levy-Bruhl was calling 'mentalites collectives' — this parallelling analogous figures of the complementarity of logical and figural sides of the individual psyche then under investigation by Freud, Jung Abraham and others — as also by James in his assimilation of both dimensions, 'conscious' and 'unconscious' so to speak, to the pragmatic working or breakdown of figures of interaction drawn from an essentially indeterminate pool of figures available for the interpretation of some given situation.

Ironically the social psychology of british psychologists was antipathetic to McDougall's questioning of abstract 'scientific' consciousness and its complement, a unitary mechanistic physical world of independent bodies in which the processes of individual psychology were supposed to be in principle inscribed. He therefore moved to Harvard in 1920 to take up James' old chair, and when the social psychology of his colleagues there in turn took on a hostile aspect with the rise of Watson's behaviourism in the 'twenties, he moved to Duke in 1927, where he was soon joined by his graduate students from Harvard, J B and Louisa Rhine, who carried through McDougall's long-cherished ambition of setting up an academic laboratory for 'scientific' experimental 'parapsychology', experiment-ation beginning in 1929:

1388 RHINE, J B New Frontiers of the Mind NY 1937
1389 The Reach of the Mind NY 1947

The difficulty with the vast amount of material assembled since Crookes' initial 'experiments' with Home in 1870, was the impossibility of systematising the vast array of variables that were so to speak 'in play' in the discussion, many of which had been ignored by the earliest researchers. The Rhines, under McDougall's
supervision organised a research programme specifically addressed to this problem, applying standard 'scientific' criteria to the experimental isolation of particular groups of variables, in the light of all the suggested 'hidden' factors of earlier reports of 'paranormal' phenomena urged by both hostile and sympathetic critics. In particular, the recognition at the turn of the century that the 'classic' phenomena of 'telepathy', 'clairvoyance' (information regarding a spatially distant situation not available through 'normal' sensory channels), 'precognition' were so to speak convertible hypotheses in any situation, and together convertible with the spiritualist's disembodied agencies associated with the no-longer-visibly-living, led Rhine to develop experiments (typically the guessing by a subject of a sequence of symbols on 'Zener cards' as determined by another subject's shuffling and selection of that sequence from a pack in a room isolated in relation to 'normal' sensory channels) to investigate a generalised 'Extra-Sensory Perception' while bracketing traditional questions as to the figure of 'transmission'. Such experiments were also distinguished from 'unscientific' but influential popular anecdotal approaches such as:

1390 SINCLAIR, Upton Mental Radio NY 1930
1391 DUNNE, James An Experiment with Time London 193

by the systematic recording of all results (without any unquantified bias in the selection of 'positive' material) and their statistical analysis submitted for approval to the American Institute of Mathematical Statistics.

In the forties the Rhines went on to examine 'paranormal' interaction of 'mind and matter', having exhausted to their satisfaction what could be experimentally investigated in mind-mind interactions outside the normal sensory links through 'matter'. Here the typical experiment was based on subjects attempting to 'paranormally' induce statistically significant departures from the expected average of dice-throws mechanically effected by two dice mechanically shaken in a container and mechanically dropped from the container onto an inclined plane, before coming to rest in a flat enclosure. In retrospect Rhine himself was most convinced by unexplainable patterns statistically revealed in the experimental
data in a subsequent analysis several years later, which revealed that no matter how 'successful' or 'unsuccessful' the various subjects' various attempts to influence the average throw (upward or downward) of a sequence might have been, there was a strikingly uniform curve of falling-off of statistical significance in any series of attempts carried out in one given session: a 'variable' which neither experimenters or subjects (consciously) contemplated during the actual course of earlier experimentation, and which might therefore be assumed to be independent of the various subtle bias-effects urged by critics against the initial results themselves.

This 'decline effect' may in turn be linked to another development: not only was there, before this 'effect' was noticed as a mathematically definite pattern in the vast array of data (the 'decline effect' being of a wholly new order of statistical significance compared with the 'PK' or psychokinetic effects to the investigation of which the experiments had been conducted) no account of, or pattern in, the variation of 'success' or 'failure' from one experiment involving the same, or different, subjects and experimenters at Duke to another, but other psychology laboratories attempting to 'repeat' the experiments produced widely differing sets of results, and correspondingly divergent conclusions. The difficulty of imitating the standard 'scientific' process of verifying claimed experimental conclusions by repetition of the experimental procedure by other groups in other laboratories might (as 'experimenter effect') be considered to be inherent in a 'scientific' experiment in which the mental state of the 'scientist' him- or herself must in principle be considered to be one, possibly decisive, 'variable' — rather as in quantum mechanics any 'measurement' carried out on a system is not formally independent of the results of other earlier — and later — measurements of that or other variables linked by the overall invariant spatiotemporal and internal 'symmetry' of the system. The 'decline effect' might be taken as a first 'measurement' of such a 'subjective' variable, absent in principle from the 'standard' experimental arrangement which defines the procedure for more 'normal' scientific experimentation and verification; and subsequent
'parapsychology' has attempted, along with the elaboration of new experimental configurations, to introduce the 'subjective' state purportedly 'interacting' with 'objective' physical systems as a variable of the experimental configuration - this, for example, by inducing in the subjects various degrees of hypnotic dissociation measurable by the established criteria detailed by Chertok. A general survey of the field down to 1977 is given in:

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Psi Search  San Francisco 1978

...although the survey is perhaps characteristically marked both by some degree of rhetorical bias in favour of 'positive' results and by a tendency toward sometimes rather 'unscientific' generalisations and conclusions (coupled with a recurrent insistence on the step forward marked by the 'scientific' approach of the Rhines and their heirs). This might perhaps be attributed to the same rather 'unscientific' attitude of the compilers (journalists rather than professional academics) revealed in the sloppy editing which places the Fox family in England rather than America - but it must also be considered yet another example of a short-circuiting of the critical 'scientific' questioning which, as reflection or complement of the short-circuit of dissociation and trance so central to the configuration of the whole field, is as historically inseparable from the affective axis of the whole 'debate' as clairvoyance is structurally inseparable from telepathy. And critical 'scientists' - like James Archibald Wheeler violently contesting, as President, the democratic decision to admit the parapsychologist's professional association to representation in the Academy of Sciences in 1980 - are never short of anecdotal ad hominem argumentation against the project of 'scientific' parapsychology as a whole. Then one must add that the very structure of the field of research links it inseparably with both various states of waking dissociation or short-circuiting of 'rational consciousness' that are clinically classified as 'psychosis', and with the psychotically or otherwise motivated organisation of 'appearances' so as to mislead even relatively suspicious judges, which are proudly demonstrated by the professional magicians who, as a rule, are stronger even than traditional 'scientists' in their scepticism in relation to the 'results' of parapsychology.
On the other hand, one may observe a happily uncritical exploration of the whole range of 'paranormal' phenomena charted by Myers and others in 'advanced', 'primitive' or intermediate non-western cultures, within various 'alternative' groups developing (like, say, Arts Laboratories in the 'aesthetic' domain) under a predominantly 'religious' impetus from the late sixties onward: a new wave of the importation into the West of the Yoga first popularised by Madame Blavatsky as 'theosophy' towards the close of the nineteenth century, then in more 'authentic' form by Vivekenanda and his successors from the turn of the century; all sorts of variations and combinations of the basic religious 'invariants' associated with the trance-state, 'scientifically' analysed by McDougall, Cornford, von Hügel, Jung and others in many different contexts, and typically framing a sort of group-psychology of collective dissociation in various centres in California and elsewhere, typified by, say, the Findhorn community in Scotland:

The Magic of Findhorn London 197

Now if, rather than complementary 'short-circuits' or abstractions of a 'scientific' domain of questioning which does not confront the 'question' of Science itself, and a 'religious' axis of partly 'dissociated' activity which substitutes a particular figure of 'questioning' in the wider figuration of its universal dramatic scheme for the open question of that locus (the question typically converted by the 'scientist' in cartesian manner to a definite locus of critical thinking in an impersonal 'I' or formal place of substitution in language, around which all questions can be supposed 'in principle' organised - if not yet in practice), one renews the aristotelian figure of 'Philosophy' in the iteration of the 'question' itself (rather than some definite figure of questioning) as proposed here in a questioning which takes itself as its subject or object, then one may in this renew or radicalise James' turn-of-the-century figure of faith and reason as complementary axes or dimensions of an essentially open situation, in which
various figures which may be 'pragmatically' brought into play in response to the breakdown of a previous configuration of activity are found, and found to work (for a while) or not to work in that situation itself, rather than in some abstract 'religious' or 'scientific' space or system whose own pragmatic inscription in the situation it would nominally comprehend has not come into question.

That is, one may propose a renewal of the pythagorean and aristotelian figure of 'Philosophy' as a questioning which finally, in framing itself as a coordinate in the linguistic space into which it transcribes what is open in the situation of that transcription, dramatically frames the passage into the affective axis of action through formally articulating that extra-verbal or figural coupling of the linguistic and other dimensions of what is 'open', as 'beyond', comprehending but not comprehended or comprehensible in, the 'logical' order, dimension, axis, of articulation of the situation of that 'scientific' articulation 'in' the linguistic order of its questioning, 'in' the abstract space of a text.

A questioning, now, though, and an associated 'philosophy', which does not propose any formal, closed, definitive figure of a universal drama presented (and entered) through the 'logical' circuit of inscription of that logic in a logical Kosmos it frames - a logical circuit which is thus 'practically' or pragmatically coordinate with a complementary circuit of dissociated 'trance' through the 'philosopher's identification with a particular figure of the locus of 'questioning' in the universal scheme it frames - but which appears rather as the marking here, in the specific configuration of this text, a 'dramatic' interplay of these essentially open logical and figural axes of the situation, to which I, as one component of the situation, have provisionally responded by here giving my version of what is open - or rather, a particular configuration of Kosmos as so to speak 'the open' or 'open-ness' (coupled as essentially a question in the complementary 'closure' or constraints which more or less define what is 'open'). A version which purports only to mark as a question, to which others must give other 'versions', what is open in the situation or context of that mark, '?', and of that mark as simply the minimal expression of 'Philosophy' in Britain
This simple iteration of 'question' as 'philosophy', marking an open drama in which the coupling of logical and analogical or figural dimensions of what is thus marked as open is expressed in the character of the questioning or inquiry which organises this book as local figure of transition into the open drama of this coupling - this may itself be seen as a sort of symmetrical converse, across 2500 years, of the inaugural pythagorean marking of this 'iteration' of questioning in a 'positive' marking of the mark - the whole pythagorean 'system' of the cosmic drama or spectacle, then, organised by such a 'position', rather than the converse system of questions opening out from '?' rather than '!' and

This historical 'symmetry' frames intervening 'inquiry', the dynamic of interplay of philosophical text and context, as an opening up of questioning of earlier figures of residually 'positive' questioning or 'theory', which I have attempted to articulate more or less systematically in the progress of this questioning, inquiry, 'history' itself. The historical 'symmetry' of the endpoints - around the 'halfway point' of a 'scientific revolution' as cartesian abstraction from the poetics of questioning to a universal space of 'scientific' transcription of what is open into a unitary linguistic space of logical substitution articulated around the 'place' of the cartesian subject as 'positively' marking the corresponding place of the questions to which it organises systematic answer or response - may be further suggested by the resurgence within that unitary space of 'Science' itself, not
only of a 'scientific' determination, formally at least, of 'philosophy' as concluding in a 'visionary' theoretical trance associated with typically 'pythagorean' wonders of clairvoyance, telepathy and so on, and the organisation of a 'mystery' and associated closed community sharing a similar figure of philosophical 'dissociation' around these 'paranormal' phenomena, but also by a rediscovery, albeit more or less 'informally' expressed, of the 'harmonic' structures or symmetries through which (beginning with the Tetractys) the logical order of the mark was logically coordinated with complementary dimensions (psychological, physical and so on) of pythagorean Kosmos (as embedding of the 'earthly' circuits of practical or habitual transition within a wider heavenly frame acceded to through the 'intransitive' iteration of the Mark) within the ever-more-symmetrically expressed symmetries of post-cartesian mathematical 'physics' itself:

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Heaven and Earth, coordinated in a symmetric and harmonically articulated Macrocosm: in particular the linear development of systematic questioning over two and a half thousand years may be articulated as so many phases or cycles of questioning of so many successive or reiterated figures, opening up through so many 'steps' on so many wider or narrower scales, of coming-into-question or bringing-into-question of earlier abstractions of the locus and figure of questioning, theory, itself from the dramatic unfolding of experience: abstractions to a logical 'I' such as Descartes' from which a 'pragmatic' Locke dissented, finding in the configuration of his own differentiation of himself from that part of 'I' a more radical locus of questioning and assertion... or abstractions to the 'figural' empirical image of the locus of questioning, as with Locke, coming under the criticism which, say, Cassirer traces down through the Enlightenment to Kant.
The passage 'here', 'in' this book, from Introduction to Part I, amounts to the identification of the pythagorean point or mark 'outside' the text, in the 'cosmic' space and time of its context, which couples or coordinates the identification or framing of that 'point' in the text, with an elementary figure of inscription of the text itself in that context. The questioning of this configuration 'in' the text in turn sets the text in the more 'concrete' coordinates of Parmenides' questioning or 'standing outside' the configuration of various orders of 'mark' in both pythagorean 'theory' as vision of a universal story or History of Kosmos, and in the context of that theory or story, articulated by Parmenides 'in pythagorean terms', but in relation to a different locus of framing their coordination - Parmenides' identification of his 'part', the locus of enunciation of his 'vision' or theory, outside the pythagorean 'circle' coordinate in their 'Kosmos', as a group, with the circle whereby pythagorean theory identifies itself as one component (the locus of its framing) in the Kosmos it frames. As the reflection of the 'internal' dynamic of inquiry or questioning in this text in the 'external' coordinates evolved in the historical development of 'theory' in its context unfolds, this initial configuration allows a very 'symmetrical' articulation of the identification in the book of successive coordinates of the book in its historical context, down to the close of Part III with the question of the residual abstraction of the theory of the figural embedding of theory in its context around 1970 from the radical questioning of questioning as itself, marking in language what is open in the configuration of that marking as itself only one thing, one particular response, open in that configuration. This book, as questioning of its questioning, thus closes the historical circuit opened up at the beginning of Part I by 'dramatically' inscribing itself at last as simply marking of what is open in the historical configuration of that marking towards the close of the twentieth century 'of our Era', in its, or rather a, context or configuration of terms 'external' to the text, and marked as such in the text. The locus of theory finally, then, becomes just this book, rather than some residually abstract determination of 'text' or 'book' within the internal logical matrix of a typical 'structuralist' or 'post-structuralist' 'text' which has not confronted the dramatic question, in the specific configuration of what is open to the writer writing that book,
of the coupling of the move of transcription of the coordination of internal and external figures of text and context into the linguistic order of the text, with other variables and dimensions of the activity of that 'writing'. 'That' book or 'text' is abstracted from to abstract 'text', coordinated in an 'internal' textual order of questions around a residual identification of the specific writer with an abstract logical instance of 'I' formally responding or corresponding to the formal place of question or linguistic substitution within the abstract matrix of 'text'. I, then, over the seventies, and then in the course of writing this long inquiry into this inquiry itself, have merely tried to continue one step further the critical dynamic already traced from around 500BC down to around 1970, by finding myself 'outside' an identification with that 'internal' function of abstract locus of theoretical questioning 'in' the abstract matrix of a (typically parisian) text devoted to the inscription of text in the figural or pragmatic dynamics of its context, just as Parmenides found himself 'outside' his part in the pythagorean framing of Kosmos (that is, the part of framing as itself framed along with other components of that frame), or Locke 'outside', distinguishing himself from, the cartesian 'part' of abstract instance of mere formal assertion itself. I find myself 'dramatically' engaged in the activity of marking what is open in the dramatic configuration of this activity of marking what is open - proposing this configuration as the locus of a theory which once again, but now in the historical context of the mid-nineteen-eighties, rather than 500BC or the fourth-century Athens of Plato and Aristotle 'closes' in its own self-inscription in the universal order of questions it frames - closes then in a theoretical marking of what is open in the interplay of a range of textual and contextual 'terms' it transcribes into the verbal order of this text, while at the same time marking this dynamic of transcription as itself dramatically correlative with what it transcribes as 'outside' this order of transcription. And an obvious criticism of this critical stance in relation to 'Paris 1970' is simply that it does not work very well 'dramatically', feebly confronting potential readers and respondents as two sets of four bulky volumes, atrociously arranged for the reader, sitting on the shelves of two of the libraries I have used in the practical activity of its construction. But then,
like, say, the 'unreadable' *Finnegans Wake*, or perhaps like the incomplete 9000 pages of Barth's *Kirkliche Dogmatik*, its primary function is perhaps not so much to be read in linear manner from covers to covers, but, precisely, to mark what it proposes as a transition from around 1970, to a more balanced expression of what it would mark, around 2000 - this in relation to interaction (from which I have not benefited since it does not yet exist) with other 'theorists' in a group structure in which the elaboration of this vision is articulated more and more 'theatrically'. Thus it marks for me, in particular, the question of coordination of its order of still very abstract 'script' more directly or closely with a more 'engaging' theatricality of theory, closer in form, say, to a futurist manifesto or a 'scripture' perhaps, more naturally falling into its place in a historical 'movement' in which successive verbal coordinations of 'questions' enter as merely one dimension of an activity whose 'direction' they mark, their opening and closing, and internal articulation of questions more 'symmetrically' correlated with other variables of the developing activity, as merely one component space of substitutions, one dimension of what is open.

'What is open': I have set this marking of a frame of what is open in its context - the marking marking itself merely as one rather ungainly response, proposing as question that to which it responds or corresponds - within a 'historical' frame of coordinates, evolved as the text 'internally' maps out the articulation of its historical context as an 'action' over two and a half thousand years. The 'external' coordinates of the book, then, are 'logically' coordinated as related in space and time in the structures or symmetries of a complex 'dynamic' which, more or less, frames figures of coupling of variations in one 'place' or term with those in others - what is 'open', then, being structured not simply as a 'space' of possible variation and covariance of terms, but as an interplay of schemata of possible action in an essentially spatio-temporal matrix of substitutions and general constraints on possible substitutions for a particular term in a particular situation. The fundamental 'invariant' in which all possible substitutions (or rather, any possible substitution) are in principle constrained
is simply the 'transcendental' requirement that any variation from, say, the configuration of this text in the context of its writing, must 'preserve' (as the physicists say) the form or structure of substitution itself: one must be able, that is, to get from here to there, 'there' must be in the 'space' and 'time' of variation or substitution here marked by this particular substitution of these words, and this activity of writing this book, for what I might otherwise (and perhaps more naturally or reasonably) have done in the situation they mark. One cannot, for example, simply abstract from the configuration of its marking or definition a physical 'space' of substitution, and elaborate physical 'theories' which do not allow for their own elaboration or 'marking'. The temporal projection of certain structures, for example 'back' to (what Italo Calvino called in his cosmic comedy) 'to' or the nominal focussing of all physical symmetries in a 'Big Bang', is itself coordinate with an irreducible 'observer' formally standing 'here', '10¹⁰ years later', and apparently (according to the theory) about halfway between the 'initial' point t₀, and a 'physically' indistinguishable mirror-image at the 'end' of the 'Universe' in another point (but it is theoretically identical) to which a converse contraction has led 10¹⁰ years later still.

That is to say: the 'external' physical coordinates of theory are themselves 'dramatically' coordinate with the particular cultural and historical configuration in which they are theoretically framed. And, in particular, the 'transitive' linear order of the 'earthly' dynamic of 'philosophical' or religious embeddings of this transitive order in a wider 'cosmic' frame cannot ultimately be embedded, in an 'earthly' image, in a wider linear, 'transitive' frame or economy, even though the christian story 'pragmatically' articulates its system of iteration of 'earthly' figuration or imagery, setting the transitive order in a wider transitive economy. We cannot ask, independently of any particular production of Hamlet, what time or day it is at Elsinore; and we cannot ask 'outside' the time of our parts on this wider earthly stage what time it is 'in the Universe'. 'The Universe', relativistically considered, is at no particular time or rather, what we call t₀ is just the circumference of 'the visible Universe' which, paradoxically, is not some vast furthest circuit or sphere above us, but, one must suppose,
a single point. The 'logical' axis of development of 'theory' meets a 'religious' axis, I suggested, around the beginning of our Era, the 'question' in which they meet itself formally determining that initial point as exact 'midpoint' of a symmetrically structured Christian Kosmos, taking over the 'transitive' image of embedding of the transitive earthly order of the visible in a wider transitive economy of Heaven, from the tradition of Isaiah, rather from his contemporary Pythagoras, whose limiting heavenly time was cyclical. I have already discussed at some length the Christian figure of 'prayer' in this economy as primary figure of the trance or dissociation by which one enters into the Christian 'mystery': frame a story or scenario open in the situation in which you find yourself, stick to your part in that scenario, and things will come out according to that scenario unless, in the wider scenario to which this figure is the access, that part is questionable - in which case the specific figure of breakdown of the prayer will provide the access to a truer part and truer end. A father does not give his child what will harm him or her, even if the child asks for it, and through this the child eventually learns what is good for it. The trance or mystery of prayer frames a distinction between the various parts we naturally assume in the practical or pragmatic order of transition from one situation to the next, from birth or arrival on this stage to death or relinquishing of that part of transition, and a part of the actor as it were behind that part of transition from birth to death, which we rediscover at death, if not before, just as an actor resumes his own identity on leaving the stage, even if he has been quite lost in a persona or mask throughout the action in which that persona or instance of 'I' is dramatically engaged. The Christ marks the irruption of the wider heavenly order onto the earthly stage or Globe Theatre in the particular blatant or direct form of an actor whose part is to go around saying that he's just an actor like all the rest of us - talking to the audience, meeting a couple of them on the corner of the stage, acting within the wider order of stage and heavenly auditorium and so throwing into confusion the identification with, and working of, specific 'earthly' parts within practical economies of life between birth and death abstracted from any wider order. So those whose parts are sustained and reinforced by the familiar working of the earthly
economy of ends they apparently control eventually get so fed up with the disruption that they decide to get rid of the troublemaker altogether. So they terminate his part on the stage forcibly, or throw him off the stage, or whatever. But then, changing the whole into comedy or pantomime, the actor, having lain around pretending to be dead for a couple of days, while everyone else has been returning to the old ways, gets up again from where he has been lying 'dead!', while everyone's back is turned, and proceeds to wander about, on and off the stage for a while, before saying goodbye to his friends in the cast and rejoining the audience, from where he continues to give directions to a range of the cast for the remainder of the play, which begins to turn about just this mystery of that odd part, his crazy story, and its effect on the rest of the cast, who continue for centuries to assemble garbled versions of what happened - 'pragmatic' images of the impossible, full of contradictions, even down to this business of being killed and then getting up again when nobody was looking - and attempt to fit them into some systematic story that accords once more with the transitive earthly order the garbled myth practically calls into question.

Now if the 'action' here on Earth is indeed structured as 'theatre', in a coupling of script and its logic with the figural axis of the spectacle within the external constraints of the stage and its various properties, then the actor who like blind Oedipus thinks to freely pursue a rational ordering of the whole within an abstract script he himself devises as a sort of mere spectator, is actually thereby bringing on himself and others all sorts of unforeseen or unseen consequences, trapped by his self-image as autonomously organising the whole within an abstract space of reason in which he moves freely, moved only by the rational pursuit of his inquiry. He thinks that others who constrain their parts within an illogical set of rules and restrictions attaching
to and organizing actions and consequences within some mythical scenario, some 'faith' amounting to playing out a part in some story - acting as if the story is true in order to make it true - that these fellow actors are trapped in the dogmatic short-circuit of dissociation of their 'I's from the abstract instance of critical detachment in the free 'rational', 'scientific', space organised as universal system of questions, answers, determinations around that locus of questioning, 'I', with which the rational critic identifies (in thought) the instance of his thinking and assertion of identity - an 'I', and its dynamic of thinking, correlative with the thought or image of systematic transcription 'in principle' of his and his superstitious fellows' common situation into that universal rational 'space' of thought. His fellows, on the other hand, think or imagine that their scenario and the associated 'rules', rather than constraining what would otherwise be open to them (in some imaginary 'wider' and 'freer' rational space of unfettered criticism and choice) corresponds rather to the truer wider frame of coupling of an otherwise abstract axis of questioning, (unthinking) thinking, with other axes or coordinates of the specific situations of thinking which the critic, trapped in the circuit of his identification with a fictional impersonal 'I' does not see - 'dissociated' in this identification from his actual part until, perhaps, his very faith in systematic questioning as unquestioned axis of choices and actions transcribed into 'thought' and its reason comes, as for Oedipus, to the tragic impasse of finally questioning itself as a 'blind faith' that does not even see its own character as faith, as mere 'part', identification, dramatically coordinate with other axes of the actor's developing situation in a deeper 'tragic' space and time of action and interaction organised in a figural poetic of coupling of 'inner' and 'outer' into which the apparent impasse of thought is just the dramatic access, corresponding to intervention of or interaction with 'divine' agencies which reveal his earlier unthinking identification as a mere part on an earthly stage set in a wider Kosmos: revealing the radical axis of the earthly drama as just this dynamic of access to a wider drama in which earthly identifications and impasses are just one 'stage'.

Now these complementary figures of 'scientific' Reason and 'religious' Faith appear, in relation to this book as questioning of its questioning, as complementary abstractions from a
dramatically open interplay of 'logical' and 'figural' axes of our concrete confrontation with this concrete instance of questioning, and from ourselves as so many loci of 'intersection' or coincidence of these axes in our radically open activity of writing or reading (rather than as normative 'scientific' 'I', or equally canonical 'part' in some mythical scenario). On the one hand a 'scientific' space of universal questioning abstracted from any particular, incarnate, questioner's dramatic engagement in what may be marked as the question of such questioning, such systematic marking, transcription; on the other hand a converse abstraction from 'rational' criticism, the free dynamic of questioning, through inscription or embedding of verbal 'script' and the marking of questions in some universal scenario to a part in which one accedes precisely through a figure of 'dissociation' from any instance of questioning that minimal 'part' of 'faith', some minimal positive faith or creed abstracted from the more detailed closed circuit of a 'scripture' which in framing its universal dream or scenario frames and asserts itself as unquestionable locus of its enunciation in the scenario.

These converse abstractions from our irreducibly individual engagement in the crossing of 'scientific' and 'dramatic' axes in our confrontation with a marking of the question of questioning itself as marking of what is open (confrontation, then, with the question posed by the character of questioning itself as only one thing open in the situation in which it is marked as an option, proposed) may be taken to define converse 'scientific' and (say) 'mythical' axes of the interplay of scientific, religious and other orders of figuration of the 'culture' or general activity in which we find ourselves acting, which historically converge towards a coincidence in, say, this questioning of this questioning. Thus the symmetry of the various symmetries within which the questions 'in' logic, 'physics', and other contextual axes of 'theory' may be articulated after around 1970, so that the 'internal' structure of each 'theory' is precisely a reflection of the 'external' symmetry of itself and the other primary axes of marking questions (so that, for example, a symmetrical physics, organised towards 2000 in the symmetry of 4 dimensions of an object's 'external'
relativistic spacetime mirrored in the complementary 'supersymmetry' of its 'internal' coordinates - in the super-duper-symmetry so to speak of 'TOE', 'Theory of Everything' - itself provides the 'external' image of inscription of this physical 'axis' as a whole in a yet higher hypersymmetry in which it is coordinate as a whole with the logical axis in which its theory is verb ally articulated, and a 'poetic' axis of symmetry of these logical and physical 'axes' or spaces and times of elaboration of (among other things) such physical theory or physics) allows a reiteration of, say, the aristotleian figure of κόσμος, originally framed in an earlier but strictly analogous symmetric universal system, as access through the question posed by the symmetry of the 'internal' logical axis of questioning with the other non-verbal 'external' axes transcribed into that logic as so many 'theories' or 'sciences' of the contexts of science, to one's own dramatic part or actuality in this symmetric frame of Kosmos, as locus of posing, marking, questions, of passage 'into' theory, symmetrically coordinate with other coordinates of one's activity or actuality which can be marked but not altogether 'comprehended' 'in theory': for the theoretical dynamic of transcription of other axes of the cosmic space of what is 'open' in the scientist's situation, into their 'images' or representations in a logical axis logically symmetric with the other axes of which it frames theories or sciences, cannot itself 'actually' contribute or determine the other dynamic axes (figural or effective, material) of this very activity of transcription or inquiry itself. It can only as it were logically mark a point of 'crossing out' of the verbal matrix of substitutions and determinations into some other 'space' of substitution for which the verbal theory has been substituted - διάθεσις, say.

At the same time, this questioning of questioning - of itself as questioning - may be taken as a parallel continuation of a 'conceptual art' of around 1970, to its limit in the transcript of an 'action' which marks itself as one of the primary co ordinates of that action: a 'poetic' configuration of marking something open in the situation of the artist's and audience's confrontation with that marking or 'work' which, in its turn, amounts also to the 'religious' or 'mythical' figure of a 'script' which frames a universal space and time of action, or cosmic drama,
in the closed circuit of inscribing itself as one primary component in that scenario - hereby marking this 'Earth' as merely one 'stage' - the 'visible' - in a wider action or actuality.

Furthermore, this reiteration of an earlier figure of 'Philosophy' as access to one's 'part' in a cosmic or universal drama through a questioning which finally, itself, comes into the sequence of questioning (marking an impasse 'in' the logical axis or sequence of transcription of what is open in the situation of transcription into that order of questions, and thereby marking a point of transition from 'within' that order of substitution into the wider interplay of it and other symmetric orders of substitution - for example physical substitution of one thing 'in place of' another - for which it has been temporarily substituted) may also be seen as a 'natural' further step from the abstraction of the 'language', 'discourse', 'text' of around 1970 from the dramatic or pragmatic axis of its very framing in the actual language, discourse or text of some particular book about 'language', 'discourse' or 'text', through the question of that abstraction of a certain order of questions from a wider play of substitutions for which such 'theoretical' transcription is unquestioningly substituted.

Now this convergence of Science, Art, Religion, Philosophy, towards a coincidence in a questioning of questioning, a simple iteration of question on itself, symmetrically organising various orders of substitution, and in particular the substitution of the verbal order of substitution of marks one for another, for symmetric orders ('axes' or 'spaces' within a general 'space' and time of substitution) thus 'transcribed' into the verbal order and 'theoretically' organised in its 'logic' - this is itself historically symmetrical with a converse 'positive' pythagorean marking of the mark or point. But whereas the systematic positing or assertion of the various terms of pythagorean 'theory' or vision, and their symmetrical relations organises the symmetries common to the marking of marking, and the questioning of questioning, as a symmetrical universal space and time of Kosmos coordinate with
a single initial point from which all else unfolds, symmetry within symmetry, question within question, determination within determination, tetractys within tetractys, until the whole vision comes as it were full circle with the inscription of the initiate's access to the vision in the vision to which he or she accedes - the part of the initiate in the 'mystery' corresponding for a short while with the political direction of Croton - the converse questioning of questioning rather begins where the earlier theory closes or ends, unfolding from an individual's confrontation with a question mark, into the successive coordination of orders of question or substitution marking what is open in that situation of questioning questioning. In the two cases the same symmetries or structures of substitution and corresponding questions are unfolded from two different, altogether complementary, points: in the first case from a pure formal assertion, an initial 'point' coordinating an altogether universal 'space' (and time) of determinations; in the second (that is, here) the symmetries of 'question' (rather than assertion) are unfolded rather as so many constraints upon substitutions for various components of the situation of formulating these constraints. Thus, for example, the physical symmetries of the late twentieth century, in many respects simply mirroring the symmetries of the initial Pythagorean 'physical theory' organised by the tetractys, may be seen rather as symmetries, structures of substitution, that must be 'preserved' in any transition to or from the actual situation of their formulation, defining 'physical space' then as 'where one can get to from here' by a series of transitions backwards or forwards 'in time' throughout which 'physical' symmetry, the structure of that order of a 'place' of substitution (of one physical thing for another, in place of another) is preserved - this presenting 'physical space' as a certain order of 'open-ness' to substitution in this situation, rather than some 'positive' projection of the physical symmetries which are only abstract constraints on the activity in which we find ourselves engaged, into some complete 'space' of possible substitutions 'in itself', 'out there' so to speak, before we ask just where and when the situation of its 'positing' is 'in' that 'reified' symmetry.

More generally, we may mark a 'universal' space of substitutions opening out of the questioning of this questioning
as what is left open by the limiting constraint of constancy or 'preservation' of the mere figure here marked as 'substitution' itself: the constant substitutability, in particular, of a space of 'marks' - that order of substitution - for 'physical' space, in any system or set of substitutions for various components of this writing or reading: that 'or' already marking the substitutability of 'reader' for 'writer' in the locus of the 'I' which marks the point of access to this book from its various contexts, or, conversely, the access to any 'context' from this text.

This book itself, then, may be considered as a sort of 'map' of its widest, 'universal', context, made at a particular point (Martin Joughin, England, the 1980s...) in that 'space' and time of substitutions it maps: a 'map' elaborated by coordinating various other more, or less, 'symmetrical' or substitutable books of inquiry, with the points 'in' this map at which they frame or map whole or part of, nominally, the 'same' universal context of any 'text'. The general 'space' and time of this map, this coordination of its 'internal' order of substitutions of words (and the logic of that order of 'questions') and 'external' or contextual terms of the writing and reading marked by those words, is organised in a primary temporal or 'historical' symmetry of the initial map of 'Kosmos' framed in relation to pythagorean marking of marking (the initial pythagorean 'point' 2500 'years ago'), and the converse question of question towards 'the year 2000' - this symmetry allowing the articulation of this inquiry as a 'history', or an action in which the evolution of questions in the 'internal' dynamic of questioning 'in' this book directly marks out a corresponding dynamic of questioning in the 'historical' context of the book, in which the opening question of the book itself finally appears as one term in its 'context', thus 'closing' both book and 'history' as the inquiry comes full circle, setting its own questioning in a contemporary 'space' of substitutions or variables in which it has itself been constructed as a substitution of this writing for other things I might (perhaps more reasonably: a 'good question') have done in the time allotted to, or taken by, it.

The space and time, thus structured as an 'action' of reflection unfolding in its unfolding contexts over two and a half
milleniac (two and a half thousand circuits of Sun around the tropics, or of Earth around Sun), is 'mapped' by the process of 'coherently' inscribing a thousand or so books of inquiry (including pythagorean silence and this closing book) as substitutions of so many different maps of a common context of 'Kosmos' for this, or for the pythagorean 'map', or for one another, at different 'points' in that context, corresponding to variations in the 'external' contextual terms they differently chart. Within the overall 'symmetry' of pythagorean mark and this questioning of questioning, various primary or nodal coordinates of the action correspond to so many primary symmetries of the action as a whole, subordinate only to the overall symmetry of unfolding from pythagorean mark, and converse convergence to this questioning, as a whole. Thus Descartes' mathematical map coordinated with his initial 'point' of self-affirmation in response to his attempt to doubt his very doubt, marks preeminently (among a variety of other seventeenth century books listed above) a sort of midpoint of the action of inquiry or history as a whole, so to speak mirroring the initial pythagorean symmetry of 'mark' with the closing symmetry of questions I have attempted to mark here, the latter organised around the 'question-mark' that poses my initial question of marking that initial question. Descartes' revolution, abstracting a unitary 'scientific' space of transcription of its universal context into the textual space of questions (and the mathematical 'language' of that unitary space of marks and the substitutions they mark), also marks a 'midpoint' of a 'drama' of interplay of reflection and context unfolding from, say, Aquinas' systematic 'analogical' embedding of the 'logic' of scriptural language in the universal figurual axis of a cosmic drama turning about the 'beginning of our Era', and Kant's analogous 'transcendental' embedding of the 'inner' space of questions in the categorical space of a universal context whose primary axes are marked within the linguistic order of marking and questions as a whole, by the primary 'kinds' or orders of question. Philo, then, around 'the beginning of our Era', prefigures Aquinas' systematic synthesis or coordination of logical and figurual axes of the universal dramatic context of reflection, by systematically organising a universal History around the figure of the Book which canonically marks or frames the universal structure of that Story at one critical point ('Moses' in short) in the Story it relates;
and just as Philo's embedding of his book of inquiry and its order of questions in the context it frames marks a sort of 'midpoint' of a first phase of the 'action' of developing Philosophy as a whole, symmetrically 'between' the pythagoreans and thirteenth-century Scholastic system, and as Descartes marks an equally 'symmetric' midpoint between the thirteenth century systems and the immediate heirs of the kantian revolution, so William James bringing into question of the narrative or pragmatic coupling of the logical axis of elaboration of questions and 'theory' to figural and other axes of its 'actual' contexts, may be taken to preemminently mark a sort of 'midpoint' of the development of the systematic 'mapping' of historical texts of theory in their common historical 'context', between the Romantic Revolution heralded by Kant and Herder in the seventeen-eighties, and the 'close' of the whole tradition (symmetric as a whole with its pythagorean 'opening') heralded, however ineptly, here in the nineteen-eighties.

Working so to speak 'back' from the most general 'formal' or abstract constraints on the whole system of substitutions correlating the 'internal' articulations of these and other texts with their collective 'external' articulation within the common context they differently map or frame from different 'points' in that universal frame, one may symmetrically organise the abstract 'coordinates' in its abstract 'context' of any 'book of theory' - and a 'traditional' manner of proceeding would then perhaps take this abstract configuration of (book of) 'theory', and present the total complexity of Kosmos 'in itself' as a sort of systematic reflection of the unitary constant or identity of 'substitution' itself, or absolute symmetry - the symmetry of substitution governing the substitution of the various primary axes or orders of substitution or symmetry one for another (physical, logical, and so on) - in this 'transcendentally deduced' configuration of the very expression, or possibility of expression or marking, of such unity. Abstractly, indeed, one may extend, say, Eddington's programme to the overall symmetry of such a universal categorial configuration (of book rather than kantian judgement), seeing the 'elementary' differential
components of 'physical' objects on the microphysical quantum level as simply the systematic mirroring of the global relativistic symmetry of integration of all elementary and higher-level physical systems, in the intermediate human scale of the book, and the activity of producing a 'physical theory' (along with 'observation' and 'measurement') comprehending the overall symmetry 'in' the intermediate configuration of 'book', of the converse 'elementary' and 'global' symmetries of differentiation and integration of physical systems on micro- and macro-levels respectively. The intermediate human level of books and theories, and the incarnation and life and death on this Earth of those who produce them, corresponds simply to that primary system or configuration of the 'mark', and the associated symmetries, questions, substitutions, which organizes the verbal marking of physical and other theories within the 'mark' or pale of human community on Earth; and the initial pythagorean 'point' serving here as first mark or coordinate in the 'external' context of this inquiry (the 'point' in its context where the words 'Kosmos', 'Theory', 'Philosophy', 'Mathematics' and so on, were first used to systematically mark out, and organise through the marking of that marking, a unitary context of any text or marking) allowed an identification of such a minimal configuration of 'marking' questions - a symmetric coordination of theory, community, political integration of communal activity, its material economy, all this within earthly Nature, in turn set in the symmetric space and time of a wider physical order of matter-in-general, earthly and stellar or heavenly. But I have already insisted that in this 'close' of inquiry, we can no longer start from some 'initial' altogether symmetric 'first point' of Kosmos, finally to deduce the point of its eventual identification in the universal cosmic History theoretically deduced at the latter point from the former. We must first, so to speak, get to that point of pure symmetry or substitution itself from 'here', from the configuration of 'book', 'between' absolute unity or symmetry, and the converse complexity of elementary differences, and identify it rather as one constant 'pole' of a constant configuration which constantly (so to speak) involves the converse complexity formally identified, perhaps, as Eddington's $10^{50}$ (or so) elementary independent wave-functions.
I, here, 'got' to that 'first point' of absolute symmetry, by working 'out' through the Introduction or first of the five main sections of this inquiry (Introduction, Parts I-III, Close) - first of its five 'acts', so to speak - to the symmetric configuration of the pythagorean framing of the universal context of its 'theory' as 'vision' of that frame, in which a nominal 'initial point' of that Kosmos is itself only one term (one term, then, in the more concrete configuration of this pythagorean 'first point' as a whole). Various later 'versions' or such a 'first point' of Kosmos (from which a universal history is nominally unfolded as subordinate symmetries are unfolded 'in time' from a completely symmetric dimensionless starting-point - versions right down to Lemaitre's extrapolation backwards of the Hubble 'expansion' identified in the system of galactic red-shifts, and contemporary attempts (like Weinberg's noted above) to coordinate the unfolding of all physical symmetries from a postulated 'Big Bang' - were in their turn identified as so many analogous terms in successive framings of the 'universal context' of various different 'points' of elaboration of theory within the far narrower history traced here, of such theories in the western european context of theory over two and a half thousand years down from the pythagoreans of Croton. The 'narrower' millenial european 'space' and time of framing successive versions of an 'initial point' of the physical universe was framed not simply in terms of the 'abstract' constraints amounting to successive versions of the preservation of 'physical' symmetry, but rather within the wider-yet-narrower constraints amounting to the constancy of the symmetry of such 'physical' laws, the physical frame of elaboration of theories of that physical frame, with other orders of symmetry or substitution involved in any possible elaboration of that order of 'physical' substitution. Successive 'physical' theories were considered not so much as 'in' a primary 'space' of physical symmetry, ten billion 'years' or whatever momentarily interrupted by a 'physical' life-form capable of substituting a verbal and logical order of its marking for that primary 'space' of substitution of one thing 'in place of' another - but rather was the 'physical' space of what was open to a theorist in the situation of theorising upon 'physical space', seen as merely one constraint upon what was open to the theorist and his fellows - one axis or space of marking and other activities marked out within the 'logical
Within this cultural 'space' of theory - coordinate simply with the initial 'figure' of 'theory' or iteration of mark

and question upon itself - over two and a half thousand years,

any individual theorist would be lucky enough to actually 'set to'
two different 'points in time' threescore and ten years apart -
the constancy of a theoretical 'I' being so to speak more 'abstract'
over the whole tradition and its discursive continuation than some

particular theorist's 'I' as embodied for - while in a body which,
as physical locus of his (or very occasionally her) confrontation
with earlier books, and writing materials, provides another constant
(though differently embodied) constraint on the elaboration of
'theory' over the whole period 'in question'.

I, Martin Jouhin, have here traced a complex of transitions of individual writers of theory from births to deaths, the
whole organised as story, tradition, 'drama' of theory coordinate
with a more abstract instance of 'I' as locus of questioning and
elaboration of theory, for which instance I myself, or one from
among a few hundred other theorists, has been temporarily substi-
tuted. The preservation of the symmetries or figures of substitution
coordinate with the figure of 'theory' itself, structures the
whole tradition down from pythagoreans to the close of the twentieth
century as an earthly 'drama' on a more or less constant stage,
this 'Earth'. And within the overall coupling of logical and
other textual and contextual axes or dimensions or symmetries of
this action or drama as a whole, the short lives of individual
theorists present so many figures of an analogous coupling or
drama or story, but constrained to a shorter span of time or
action by the constraints, variously framed at different points
in the tradition as a more or less common human life from indi-
vidual birth to individual death.

Yet again and again, from the pythagoreans on, 'theory'
has itself been framed as an 'intransitive' passage 'out' of the
coupling of 'mind' and 'body' the theorist so to speak works
through in all the detailed transitions between the 'birth' and
the 'death' which appear on the earthly stage of the tradition
as initial entry onto, and final departure from, the stage on which that vital conjunction we call Pythagorean or Plato or whatever else, can for a while be a locus of transcription of Kosmos as a whole into the subordinate logical order of questions as embodied in 'the theory' of Kosmos. Traditionally such 'mystical' theory frames a transition into - or at least eventually out of - that particular familiar earthly coupling of mind and body which it identifies as mere 'incarnation' of a more radical identity, by setting the coupling of psychical and material dimensions on the earthly stage within a wider 'space' and time of Kosmos associated with the various coordinate symmetries of marking these universal symmetries while incarnate on Earth, 'abstracted' from what I have insisted upon as a radical or original 'complexity' so to speak of the configuration of marking the 'theory' of such universal symmetry - a complexity which cannot as it were be 'derived' from any simpler starting-point and located as one phase or stage in a wider frame and History, but a complexity which is itself 'already' implicit in any identification, and indeed any nominal identity, of such a 'prior' point.

...On the other hand, rather than taking these 'embeddings' of the earthly stage articulated in the coupling of 'minds' and 'bodies' in a 'genetic' history or drama of earthly humanity 'literally', one may perhaps regard them as 'pragmatic', analogical, attempts to set the earthly stage in some 'wider' order, by an ultimately contradictory framing of that 'wider' history as a sort of physical extension of earthly 'history' in 'earthly' terms - just as our logic naturally leads us into ultimately contradictory attempts to frame the embedding of the logical dimension of our theory in the wider configuration of its irreducibly independent 'contextual' dimensions logically rather than analogically. For the complex symmetries and structures of the earthly transitions involved in the 'drama' of theory unfolded through Parts I to III above - the 'preservation' throughout of the complexity of book or discourse - even though they cannot be preserved in any attempted elaboration of a physical extension of the earthly order of
transitions into a merely greater order of transition, beginning
with something like a 'Big Bang' and eventually giving rise to
an earthly history in which that 'heavenly' frame can itself be
framed, are conserved in the 'intransitive' transformation of
the earthly sphere of transitions that make up our earthly lives
into what one might figuratively call its 'mirror image', of
which the traditional 'heavenly' spheres of souls above, coupled
with the 'elementary' cycles of 'matter' which they rule 'below'
the intermediate human level of structure, is a sort of canonical
natural 'image' (before the 'scientific revolution' at least):
two 'worlds', two lives, two sides of a constant Stage, visible
and invisible, and some figure of 'I' preserved in the intransit-
ive transformations from one into the other... even if a structure
of transition which fixes us here for a time in a 'life' of working-
through an 'incarnation', a coupling of psychological and physical
unfolding from its seed in another copulation at a particular time
and place on Earth is not itself preserved in the transformation,
any more than the associated 'internal' linear time of transitions
within our play or interplay on this global Stage.

If the questioning of questioning, and its circuit de-
fining this earthly 'stage' and its two sides, is of course merely
another figure of access from 'this' finitary side of a global
Stage to the other 'cofinitary' side, corresponding in its different
context to 'earlier' pythagorean and christian figures in theirs at
different points in the action, yet one might say that it marks a
beginning of the end of a certain drama, the closing of a certain
linear earthly time at a point 'in' that time, or of transition
out of it, where previously stage-bound actors can begin to act
in, accede to activity or actuality in, a coupling of 'both sides'
of this Stage, a sort of historically symmetric converse of the
opening of the particular action here framed in the mystery of a
closed pythagorean group standing at the point of transition from
'Myth' into a decoupling of 'Religion', 'Science', 'History',
'Drama'. A question-mark, rather than the points or marks of the
Tetractys, marks an opening from this historical circuit into
'A New Heaven and a New Earth'... as the cast in the final scene
see what the lunatic crucified two thousand years before was getting at: the drama of history closes in a strange actors' party in which the separate World of the Play, of their historical interplay, and the boundaries of the Stage, begin to dissolve.