Lockwood, Ben (2005) Fiscal decentralization : a political economy perspective. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.

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Abstract

This paper surveys recent contributions to the study of fiscal decentralization which adopt a political economy approach. It is argued that this approach can capture, in a variety of formal models, the plausible and influential ideas (increasingly, supported by empirical evidence) that fiscal decentralization can lead to improved preference-matching and accountability of government. In particular, recent work on centralized provision of public good provision via bargaining in a legislature shows how centralization reduces preference-matching, and recent work using "electoral agency" models formalizes the accountability argument. These models also provide insights into when decentralization may fail to deliver these benefits.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Decentralization in government, Economics, Public goods
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	January 2005
Number:	No.721
Number of Pages:	35
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Version or Related Resource:	Lockwood, B. (forthcoming). Fiscal decentralization: a political economy perspective. In: E.Ahamad and G.Brosio (eds). Handbook of Fiscal Federalism. Edward Elgar.
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/274

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