Fiscal decentralization : a political economy perspective
Lockwood, Ben (2005) Fiscal decentralization : a political economy perspective. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.721).
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Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resear...
This paper surveys recent contributions to the study of fiscal decentralization which adopt a political economy approach. It is argued that this approach can capture,
in a variety of formal models, the plausible and influential ideas (increasingly, supported by empirical evidence) that fiscal decentralization can lead to improved
preference-matching and accountability of government. In particular, recent work on centralized provision of public good provision via bargaining in a legislature shows how centralization reduces preference-matching, and recent work using "electoral agency" models formalizes the accountability argument. These models also provide insights into when decentralization may fail to deliver these benefits.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Decentralization in government, Economics, Public goods|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||January 2005|
|Number of Pages:||35|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Version or Related Resource:||Lockwood, B. (forthcoming). Fiscal decentralization: a political economy perspective. In: E.Ahamad and G.Brosio (eds). Handbook of Fiscal Federalism. Edward Elgar.|
Alesina, Angeloni and Etro(2001), "The Political Economy of International Unions", unpublished
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