Chatterji, Shurojit and Ghosal, Sayantan (2009) Technology, unilateral commitments and cumulative emissions reduction. In: CESifo Summer Institute Workshop on Europe and Global Environmental Negotiation, Venice, Italy, July 14-15, 2008. Published in: CESifo Economic Studies, Vol.55 (No.2). pp. 286-305.

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Abstract

In this article, we argue that weak property rights over transnational pollution and the limited threat of retaliatory punishments blunts the effectiveness of a broad-based multilateral agreement to deliver the emission reductions required to mitigate climate change. Instead, we propose a policy framework that builds on unilateral commitments, endogenous innovation and technology transfer that could lead to cumulative emissions reduction by altering the participation constraints of nations over time. (JEL codes: 054, F53, C50)

Item Type:	Conference Item (Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Journal or Publication Title:	CESifo Economic Studies
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
ISSN:	1610-241X
Date:	June 2009
Volume:	Vol.55
Number:	No.2
Number of Pages:	20
Page Range:	pp. 286-305
Identification Number:	10.1093/cesifo/ifp009
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Conference Paper Type:	Paper
Title of Event:	CESifo Summer Institute Workshop on Europe and Global Environmental Negotiation
Type of Event:	Conference
Location of Event:	Venice, Italy
Date(s) of Event:	July 14-15, 2008
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/27618

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