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Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations

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Bloch, Francis and Dutta, Bhaskar (2009) Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.66 (No.2). pp. 721-728. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.034 ISSN 0899-8256.

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.034

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Abstract

This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalition-proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games and in games with positive externalities and binary actions. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Q Science > QA Mathematics
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Game theory, Economics -- Mathematical models, Equilibrium (Economics) -- Mathematical models
Journal or Publication Title: Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher: Elsevier
ISSN: 0899-8256
Official Date: July 2009
Dates:
DateEvent
July 2009Published
Volume: Vol.66
Number: No.2
Number of Pages: 8
Page Range: pp. 721-728
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.034
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access

Data sourced from Thomson Reuters' Web of Knowledge

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