Bloch, Francis and Dutta, Bhaskar (2009) Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.66 (No.2). pp. 721-728. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.034 ISSN 0899-8256.

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Abstract

This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalition-proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games and in games with positive externalities and binary actions. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions Q Science > QA Mathematics
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Game theory, Economics -- Mathematical models, Equilibrium (Economics) -- Mathematical models
Journal or Publication Title:	Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0899-8256
Official Date:	July 2009
Dates:	Date Event July 2009 Published
Volume:	Vol.66
Number:	No.2
Number of Pages:	8
Page Range:	pp. 721-728
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.034
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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