The Library
Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
Tools
Tools
Tools
Bloch, Francis and Dutta, Bhaskar (2009) Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.66 (No.2). pp. 721-728. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.034
Research output not available from this repository, contact author.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.034
Abstract
This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalition-proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games and in games with positive externalities and binary actions. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions Q Science > QA Mathematics |
||||
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
| Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Game theory, Economics -- Mathematical models, Equilibrium (Economics) -- Mathematical models | ||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Games and Economic Behavior | ||||
| Publisher: | Elsevier | ||||
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 | ||||
| Official Date: | July 2009 | ||||
| Dates: |
|
||||
| Volume: | Vol.66 | ||||
| Number: | No.2 | ||||
| Number of Pages: | 8 | ||||
| Page Range: | pp. 721-728 | ||||
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.034 | ||||
| Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
| Publication Status: | Published | ||||
| Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
Data sourced from Thomson Reuters' Web of Knowledge
Request changes or add full text files to a record
Repository staff actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
