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Auctions in which losers set the price
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Mezzetti, Claudio and Tsetlin, Ilia (2009) Auctions in which losers set the price. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.66 (No.2). pp. 855-864. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.006 ISSN 0899-8256.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.006
Abstract
We Study auctions of a single asset among symmetric bidders with affiliated values. We show that the second-price auction minimizes revenue among all efficient auction mechanisms in which only the winner pays, and the price only depends oil the losers' bids. In particular, we show that the kth price auction generates higher revenue than the second-price auction. for all k > 2. If rationing is allowed, with shares of the asset rationed among the t highest bidders, then the (t + 1)st price auction yields the lowest revenue among all auctions with rationing in which only the winners pay and the unit price only depends oil the losers' bids. Finally, we Compute bidding functions and revenue of the kth price auction, with and without rationing. for an illustrative example much used in the experimental literature to Study first-price, second-price and English auctions. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Games and Economic Behavior | ||||
Publisher: | Elsevier | ||||
ISSN: | 0899-8256 | ||||
Official Date: | July 2009 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | Vol.66 | ||||
Number: | No.2 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 10 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 855-864 | ||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.006 | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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