Cassam, Quassim (2009) The basis of self-knowledge. In: Conference on First Person Authority - Its Nature, Source, Limits, and Use, Univ Duisburg Essen, Duisburg, Germany, September 10-13, 2007. Published in: Erkenntnis, Vol.71 (No.1). pp. 3-18. doi:10.1007/s10670-009-9164-z ISSN 0165-0106.

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Abstract

I discuss the claim what makes self-knowledge epistemologically distinctive is the fact that it is baseless or groundless. I draw a distinction between evidential and explanatory baselessness and argue that self-knowledge is only baseless in the first of these senses. Since evidential baselessness is a relatively widespread phenomenon the evidential baselessness of self-knowledge does not make it epistemologically distinctive and does not call for any special explanation. I do not deny that self-knowledge is epistemologically distinctive. My claim is only that talk of its evidential baselessness is insufficient to account for its epistemological distinctiveness.

Item Type:	Conference Item (Paper)
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Journal or Publication Title:	Erkenntnis
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0165-0106
Official Date:	July 2009
Dates:	Date Event July 2009 Published
Volume:	Vol.71
Number:	No.1
Number of Pages:	16
Page Range:	pp. 3-18
DOI:	10.1007/s10670-009-9164-z
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Conference Paper Type:	Paper
Title of Event:	Conference on First Person Authority - Its Nature, Source, Limits, and Use
Type of Event:	Conference
Location of Event:	Univ Duisburg Essen, Duisburg, Germany
Date(s) of Event:	September 10-13, 2007

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