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Reply to Duncan Pritchard and John Campbell

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Cassam, Quassim (2009) Reply to Duncan Pritchard and John Campbell. Analysis, Vol.69 (No.2). pp. 325-333. ISSN 0003-2638

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anp044

Abstract

An epistemological how-possible question asks how knowledge, or knowledge of some specific kind, is possible. The main contention of Duncan Pritchard‟s stimulating comments is that what I call „explanatory minimalism‟ appears to offer us just what we are seeking when we ask such a question. This looks like a problem for me given that I defend a version of explanatory anti-minimalism. Pritchard outlines a version of minimalism inspired by the writings of John McDowell and does not find it obvious that this position is lacking in any relevant respect. Nor do I. My minimalism is moderate rather than extreme but Pritchard‟s objections to anti-minimalism are objections to extreme anti-minimalism. Indeed, his comments do not seem to me to have any direct bearing on what I take to be the fundamental disagreement between minimalism and anti-minimalism.

Item Type: Journal Item
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Knowledge, Theory of
Journal or Publication Title: Analysis
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISSN: 0003-2638
Date: April 2009
Volume: Vol.69
Number: No.2
Number of Pages: 9
Page Range: pp. 325-333
Identification Number: 10.1093/analys/anp044
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
References: Allison, H. (1983), Kant‟s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense (New Haven: Yale University Press). Cassam, Q. (2007), The Possibility of Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press). McDowell, J. (1998a), „Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space‟, in Meaning, Knowledge and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). McDowell, J. (1998b), „Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality‟, Journal of Philosophy, 95. Stroud, B. (2000), „Scepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge‟, in Understanding Human Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Warren, D. (1998), „Kant and the A Priority of Space‟, Philosophical Review, 80.
URI: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/27876

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