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Dynamics of strategic three-choice voting
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Volovik, D., Mobilia, M. and Redner, S. (2009) Dynamics of strategic three-choice voting. Europhysics Letters, Vol.85 (No.4). Article: 48003. doi:10.1209/0295-5075/85/48003
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/85/48003
Abstract
In certain parliamentary democracies, there are two major parties that move in and out of power every few elections, and a third minority party that essentially never governs. We present a simple model to account for this phenomenon, in which minority party supporters sometimes vote ideologically (for their party) and sometimes strategically (against the party they like the least). The competition between these disparate tendencies reproduces the empirical observation of two parties that frequently exchange majority status and a third party that is almost always in the minority. Copyright (C) EPLA, 2009
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subjects: | Q Science > QC Physics | ||||
| Divisions: | Faculty of Science > Centre for Complexity Science Faculty of Science > Mathematics |
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| Journal or Publication Title: | Europhysics Letters | ||||
| Publisher: | EDP Sciences | ||||
| ISSN: | 0295-5075 | ||||
| Official Date: | February 2009 | ||||
| Dates: |
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| Volume: | Vol.85 | ||||
| Number: | No.4 | ||||
| Number of Pages: | 6 | ||||
| Page Range: | Article: 48003 | ||||
| DOI: | 10.1209/0295-5075/85/48003 | ||||
| Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
| Publication Status: | Published | ||||
| Funder: | National Science Foundation (U.S.) (NSF), Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung [Swiss National Science Foundation] (SNSF) | ||||
| Grant number: | DMR0535503, PA002-119487 |
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