Volovik, D., Mobilia, M. and Redner, S.. (2009) Dynamics of strategic three-choice voting. Europhysics Letters, Vol.85 (No.4). Article: 48003. ISSN 0295-5075

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Abstract

In certain parliamentary democracies, there are two major parties that move in and out of power every few elections, and a third minority party that essentially never governs. We present a simple model to account for this phenomenon, in which minority party supporters sometimes vote ideologically (for their party) and sometimes strategically (against the party they like the least). The competition between these disparate tendencies reproduces the empirical observation of two parties that frequently exchange majority status and a third party that is almost always in the minority. Copyright (C) EPLA, 2009

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Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	Q Science > QC Physics
Divisions:	Faculty of Science > Centre for Complexity Science Faculty of Science > Mathematics
Journal or Publication Title:	Europhysics Letters
Publisher:	EDP Sciences
ISSN:	0295-5075
Date:	February 2009
Volume:	Vol.85
Number:	No.4
Number of Pages:	6
Page Range:	Article: 48003
Identification Number:	10.1209/0295-5075/85/48003
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Funder:	National Science Foundation (U.S.) (NSF), Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung [Swiss National Science Foundation] (SNSF)
Grant number:	DMR0535503, PA002-119487
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/27942

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