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A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion

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Bortolotti, Lisa and Broome, Matthew R. (2009) A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Volume 8 (Number 2). pp. 205-224. doi:10.1007/s11097-008-9109-z ISSN 1568-7759.

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-008-9109-z

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Abstract

Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the 'inserted' thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the 'inserted' thoughts. We argue that by appealing to a failure of ownership and authorship we can describe more accurately the phenomenology of thought insertion, and distinguish it from that of non-delusional beliefs that have not been deliberated about, and of other delusions of passivity. We can also start developing a more psychologically realistic account of the relation between intentionality, rationality and self knowledge in normal and abnormal cognition.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Science, Engineering and Medicine > Medicine > Warwick Medical School > Health Sciences
Faculty of Science, Engineering and Medicine > Medicine > Warwick Medical School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Self-knowledge, Theory of, Philosophy of mind, Thought insertion, Practical reason, Intentionality (Philosophy), Analysis (Philosophy)
Journal or Publication Title: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Publisher: Springer
ISSN: 1568-7759
Official Date: June 2009
Dates:
DateEvent
June 2009Published
Volume: Volume 8
Number: Number 2
Number of Pages: 20
Page Range: pp. 205-224
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-008-9109-z
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access

Data sourced from Thomson Reuters' Web of Knowledge

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