A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion
Bortolotti, Lisa and Broome, Matthew R.. (2009) A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Volume 8 (Number 2). pp. 205-224. ISSN 1568-7759Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-008-9109-z
Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the 'inserted' thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the 'inserted' thoughts. We argue that by appealing to a failure of ownership and authorship we can describe more accurately the phenomenology of thought insertion, and distinguish it from that of non-delusional beliefs that have not been deliberated about, and of other delusions of passivity. We can also start developing a more psychologically realistic account of the relation between intentionality, rationality and self knowledge in normal and abnormal cognition.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Medicine > Warwick Medical School > Health Sciences
Faculty of Medicine > Warwick Medical School
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Self-knowledge, Theory of, Philosophy of mind, Thought insertion, Practical reason, Intentionality (Philosophy), Analysis (Philosophy)|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences|
|Official Date:||June 2009|
|Number of Pages:||20|
|Page Range:||pp. 205-224|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
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