HOME GUARD SOCIALISM:
A Vision of a People's Army

by

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The cover flags are: front, the Union Flag and the International Brigades' Flag; back, the anarcho-syndicalists' flag.
The cover of Tom Wintringham's famous 'Penguin Special', *New Ways of War* (1940), which encapsulated this former International Brigade officer's military and political thinking about the People's War against nazism.
1. INTRODUCTION.

With the fall of France in the summer of 1940, Britain was faced with the prospect of invasion and occupation. Britain’s comparatively small army was overstretched, and in dire need of expansion and re-equipment, having abandoned most of its modern equipment at Dunkirk. In these circumstances, the creation of the Local Defence Volunteers, later called the Home Guard, was a symbol of the country’s will to resist Nazi Germany. But the Home Guard lacked equipment, weapons, and training. To a large degree, it was up to these civilian volunteers to organise matters for themselves. It was in this context that a group of veterans of the recently ended Spanish Civil War stepped forward to make a significant contribution to the training of the Home Guard. These men, who had fought with the International Brigades and the revolutionary militias, saw in the Home Guard the beginnings of a ‘People’s Army’. This little booklet attempts to outline the Home Guard socialists’ vision, and looks, in detail, at their writing and their concept of the Home Guard as Britain’s People’s Army.
Volunteers for Spain

Seventy years after the failed military coup of July 1936 which began the Spanish Civil War, the conflict still arouses fierce passions. On the left, Trotskyists, anarchists, and communists argue about events and interpretations¹, while the books of mainstream historians, most notably Paul Preston and Anthony Beevor², are popular with the reading public. The continued interest in the Spanish Civil War is, nonetheless, a faint echo of the contemporary passions aroused around the world in 1936-39.

Although the causes of the Spanish conflict lay deep within Spanish history and society, the wider context of the 1930s meant that many non-Spaniards saw in the war issues of international importance. For many democrats, and for those on the left, the military rebellion, soon to be led by General Franco, seemed to be yet another example of the advance of the authoritarian right in Europe. The rebels were supported by conservative political parties, most of the Catholic Church (with the notable exception of the church in the nationalist Basque Country), key elements of the army (especially that based in Spanish Morocco), monarchists, traditionalist Spaniards, and the small Spanish fascist movement, the Falange. For those on the right,
however, the legally elected government of Spain seemed to represent another assault on the principles of private property, patriotism, and religion. Anarchists, various varieties of Stalinist and anti-Stalinist Marxists, atheists and socialists, as well as middle of the road democrats, all opposed the military rebellion. And, to add even greater confusion to the picture, the great powers of Europe - democratic France and Britain, nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and Stalin's USSR - all saw the Spanish conflict through the lens of great power politics.

All these factors meant that there was little chance that the war would remain a purely Spanish affair. From the outset, foreign intervention in Spain was notable. Franco himself was flown from a remote army outpost in the Canary Islands to the seat of the rebellion in Spanish Morocco by an English pilot, Captain Bebb, hired, with his Dragon Rapide aircraft, from Croydon airport. The military rebellion was greatly aided in its opening days, by Italian and German transport aircraft, and both Mussolini and Hitler quickly promised and delivered more military aid to the rebels. Aid to the government came at first from France, Mexico, then, more importantly, from the Soviet Union. But, thousands of individuals were soon to make their way to Spain to fight on behalf of the nationalists or the Republic.

On the left, the communist parties affiliated to the Soviet revolution, organised and controlled by the Comintern, created the International
Brigades (IB). These were not the first international volunteers to fight the rebels, or the 'fascists', as at the time of the rebellion, anti-fascist athletes had been in Barcelona for the Workers' Olympiad (to have been held in opposition to the official Berlin Olympics of 1936). Many of these athletes, and other international volunteers, had already seen action defending the Republic by the time the first International Brigade, the 11th, was formed. Eventually, some 30-40,000 people joined the IB, including exiles from nazi Germany and fascist Italy. The British contribution to the IB came in the shape of 2,300 men, of whom 526 were killed, and around 1,200 wounded; casualty rates which graphically represented the ferocity of the fighting they were involved in. Most, but not all, of these fighters were communists, while many others were from different left-wing backgrounds, and some were simply anti-fascist. Similarly, thousands went to Spain to fight against the Republic, with volunteers, of one sort and another, from Ireland, France, Portugal, Italy, and Germany being the most notable.

The Italian, German and Soviet militaries all tested new equipment and methods in Spain, and learnt, or so they thought, new lessons for a wider, world war they believed was coming. Tanks, area bombing (most infamously by the Condor Legion in the Basque Country), and the political mobilisation of the people all figured in Spain. In addition, people became accustomed to the idea of irregular warfare. The nationalist rebels boasted of their 'Fifth Column' inside
Madrid - urban fighters conducting assassinations, spying and sabotage to aid besieging conventional forces. On the Republican side, irregular, militia forces belonging to various anarchist, trade unionist, socialist and Marxist groups, played a decisive part in defeating the rebels in the early days of the war, from 1936 to the spring of 1937. These militias, the non-military background of most of the international volunteers in the IB, and the widespread belief that saboteurs and spies were everywhere behind the lines on both sides, seemed to put a good deal of the Spanish Civil War in the tradition of modern irregular warfare.

**Unconventional warfare 1914-1939**

Unconventional warfare was not new in Europe, with, for example, Napoleon's occupation of the Spanish peninsular being fiercely resisted by guerrillas but, from the First World War on famous examples of unconventional forces fighting traditional armies seized the popular imagination. In the First World War, two practitioners of unconventional warfare had become famous - the British T.E.Lawrence fighting with Arab irregulars against the Ottoman Empire, and the German Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck fighting the Allies in German East Africa, holding the armies of the British Empire, South Africa, Belgium and Portugal at bay for four years. The Russian Civil War also had its masters of unconventional fighting, most famously the army of the charismatic anarchist
leader, Nestor Makhno\textsuperscript{7}; while, much closer at home for the British, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), under the ill-fated Michael Collins, waged an eventually successful guerrilla war against the British Army, the Royal Irish Constabulary, and various British irregular forces\textsuperscript{8}. The IRA then went on to split over the treaty they had signed with Britain, and a civil war ensued in which irregular tactics again played a large part. What was of interest in the Irish case was that an irregular force fought both urban and rural war against mobile, conventionally organised armies in a western European context. Irregular war also characterised the emergence of the successor states, for example, Poland, Finland and the Baltic states, in the post First World War struggles. In addition, political militias helped create the conditions for Mussolini’s fascist take-over of Italy\textsuperscript{9}, and characterised the failed Bolshevik risings in Germany and Hungary. Further afield, in China, both nationalist and communist forces, not to mention a host of warlords, also resorted to unconventional warfare\textsuperscript{10}. It seemed, therefore, even before the Spanish Civil War, that irregular, often politically motivated, troops had a key role to play in modern warfare.
3. The Second World War and Britain in 1940.

In April 1940 German forces invaded Norway, pre-empting an Allied occupation of that strategically important country. As a result, Neville Chamberlain's government was replaced by Winston Churchill's wartime coalition. Churchill primarily concerned himself with issues of strategy and foreign policy, while domestic British politics was largely in the hands of the Labour Party, which worked closely with the trades union movement. The war came to be known as 'The People's War'. The Home Guard was a key part of the People's War, as were other paramilitary, volunteer organisations, like the Royal Observer Corps (ROC), and Air Raid Precautions (ARP). The ROC, for example, was an integral part of Britain's air defences, spotting attacking enemy aircraft, and reporting their movements to the Royal Air Force's fighter controllers. By 1941, there were over 30,000 men and women in the ROC, largely part-time volunteers. The ARP, the Red Cross, and other organisations, like the Auxiliary Fire Service and the Air Cadets, were all essential elements in the mass mobilisation of the British people.

The Home Guard was created in May, 1940, following a radio appeal by Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for War, for male volunteers, aged between 15 and 55, to defend local areas in Britain against German paratroopers, potential
British Fifth Columnists, and saboteurs. The response was overwhelming, with 400,000 men volunteering within two weeks for the new force - called, at first, the Local Defence Volunteers (LDV). Among these men were active left-wingers, who saw in this mass organisation the beginnings of a People’s Army, something akin to the Republican and anarchist militias which had fought the nationalist rebels in Spain in the early part of the Spanish Civil War. These men, often veterans of the Spanish war themselves, or influenced by it and other irregular campaigns in the inter-war years, felt that they could create a new type of military force in Britain. Such a force might contain within it the seeds of a People’s Army. It was not only left-wing activists who believed that such a project was possible, for, at times, both the army and MI5 thought that the Home Guard might go that way.

The Home Guard’s creation followed the rapid collapse of Norway, Denmark, and Holland under the German blitzkrieg in the spring of 1940. Each of these campaigns seemed to contemporaries to possess new, and frightening, military and political characteristics. For many British commentators, German forces had not triumphed by conventional military means alone. In Norway, for example, the presence of Vidkun Quisling, and his collaborationist Nasjonal Samling (NS), seemed to indicate that native fascist support for the Germans was a key factor explaining the invaders' success - and the fear of unconventional, politicised warfare loomed large in Britain. The unconventional nature of this
perceived threat led to the desire for an area defence force which could contain any surprise attack and combat politically motivated Fifth Column activity until the regular army arrived. It was the stress on the unconventional and political nature of the threat that gave hope to the People’s Army enthusiasts in the Home Guard.

By the end of June 1940, there were over one million men (and many 'unofficial' women\textsuperscript{14}) in the Home Guard. There was little to equip them with, either in terms of uniforms or weapons, and little in the way of formal training available. These weaknesses gave the volunteers an opportunity to take matters into their own hands, and they seized that opportunity, bringing a sense of initiative and enthusiasm to the force that characterised it throughout its life. By the autumn of 1940, the Home Guard was largely uniformed, and was fairly well equipped, with 800,000 Springfield rifles from the USA, American Thompson sub-machine guns, Lewis machine guns, and simple anti-tank weapons. The Home Guard also manned anti-aircraft guns (140,000 Home Guard gunners by 1944), and coastal defence artillery. In addition, a secret underground guerrilla force - the Auxunits\textsuperscript{15} - had been established, largely composed of Home Guards. The Home Guard was, therefore, a large force, and the Army had clear views on how it should be used, views that were not often shared by the Home Guards themselves, and certainly not by the People’s Army enthusiasts among them.

A time of flux

The mobilisation of the people, the rapid expansion of a wide range of auxiliary units, and the feeling that many of the politicians who had led Britain into war were, at best, incompetent, and, at worst, nazi sympathisers, created a sense of the need for a rapid reassessment of social, economic, political, and military norms. When Guilty Men, a polemic against appeasement, was published in July, 1940 (selling over 220,000 copies, and being reprinted 12 times that July alone), it looked as if a new, patriotic, anti-nazi and socialist discourse was going to dominate the political landscape of Britain under siege. To contemporary commentators, British political and social life was in flux, and the feeling among many was that there was scope for radical change within Britain. For some, particularly on the left, Britain was not only faced with the probability of invasion but also by the possibility of social revolution. Yet, by the winter of 1941, writing in the American Partisan Review, George Orwell offered a damning analysis of the failure of much of the left to capitalise on the situation, in particular to capitalise on the creation of the Home Guard:

'The personnel of the Home Guard is not quite the same now as it was in the
beginning. The men who flocked into the ranks in the first few days were almost all of them men who had fought in the last war and were too old for this one. The weapons that were distributed, therefore, went into the hands of people who were more or less anti-Fascist but politically uneducated. The only leavening was a few class-conscious factory-workers and a handful of men who had fought in the Spanish Civil War. The Left as usual failed to see its opportunity - the Labour Party could have made the Home Guard into its own organization if it had acted vigorously in the first few days - and in left-wing circles it was fashionable to describe the Home Guard as a Fascist organization.\textsuperscript{17}

Orwell went on to note that the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) forbade its members from joining the Home Guard, in keeping with its opposition to the war, which would continue until Hitler broke his pact with Stalin with the invasion of the USSR in June, 1941. However, Orwell did identify, for his American audience, two key members of a small, but very active group of ex-communists and Spanish Civil War veterans who had seen both military and political potential in this mass organisation:

'The chief educative force within the movement [the LDV/Home Guard] has been the training school which was started by Tom Wintringham, Hugh Slater
and others [...] Their teaching was purely military, but with its insistence on guerrilla methods it had revolutionary implications which were perfectly well grasped by many of the men who listened to it.\textsuperscript{18}

Orwell was correct in identifying Tom Wintringham and Hugh Slater as key players in the training of the Home Guard in 1940, particularly at the Home Guard training school at Osterley Park, but he was inaccurate in his assessment that they restricted themselves to 'purely military' teaching. For such men also saw in the Home Guard the potential for the force to make a significant contribution to the radicalisation of British political and social life.

\textbf{The Home Guard socialists}

Both Tom Wintringham and Hugh Slater were Spanish Civil War veterans, as were other members of a loose grouping associated with Wintringham, who had been the commanding officer of the British battalion of the International Brigades in February 1937, before being wounded. Other figures with a background in the International Brigades included F.O. Miksche, and Bert 'Yank' Levy, who both worked with Wintringham on Home Guard training. In addition, there were other Home Guard educators and publicists on the left concerned with the military and political implications of the organisation. These included the \textit{Sunday Pictorial} journalist and columnist, Major John
Langdon-Davies who had covered both the Spanish Civil War, and the 'Winter War' between Finland and the USSR, and described himself as 'an anti-Fascist journalist'. Another journalist, novelist, and a veteran of the Great War, was John Brophy, who was a close friend of the famous First World War memoirist, Vera Brittain. Langdon-Davies wrote the standard handbooks, *The Home Guard Training Manual* (1940), and *The Home Guard Fieldcraft Manual* (1942), while John Brophy authored *A Home Guard Drill Book and Field Service Manual* (1940). Brophy also wrote a best-selling tribute to the Home Guard, *Britain's Home Guard; a character study* (1945). This very popular account of the movement was illustrated by the war artist Eric Kennington (famous for his portrait illustrations in T.E.Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*). Kennington's colour illustrations of Home Guardsmen complemented Brophy's text by showing Home Guardsmen in their wider civilian context. Portraits showed, for example, 'Sergeant Stokes, Huntingdonshire Home Guard' in his farmworker's clothes\(^{19}\), while two facing portraits showed 'Melvin Jones, miner', and 'Corporal Melvin Jones, Monmouthshire Home Guard'\(^{20}\). Kennington's illustrations were a very graphic portrayal of the idea of the Home Guard as a citizens' army. All the Home Guard enthusiasts, like Wintringham, Slater, Miksche, Brophy, Langdon-Davies, and Levy, played an important part in the popularising of a left-wing analysis of the military and political significance of the Home Guard. Their contribution to the training of that organisation was notable,
especially in the 1940-1941 period, and their widely read books, pamphlets and articles on the role and character of the Home Guard were unique in that they postulated an active, political significance to this military movement.

The historiography of left-wing involvement in the Home Guard is limited, and largely focused on the life and writings of Tom Wintringham. David Fernbach, in the early 1980s, put Wintringham's contribution to the Home Guard in the context of his Marxism, his Spanish experience, and, interestingly, in attempts by the left in the 1980s to develop a credible, non-nuclear defence policy for the UK. Fernbach's 'Tom Wintringham and socialist defense strategy' remains the most detailed consideration of Wintringham's ideas. Hugh Purcell, in his recent, ground-breaking biography of Wintringham, *The Last English Revolutionary* (2004), produced a very readable life of a remarkable man, rightly characterised by Purcell as being an 'English revolutionary'. Finally, S.P. MacKenzie in his, *The Home Guard* (1995), devoted some space to the involvement of a range of left wing figures with the Home Guard, thereby putting Wintringham's efforts into a wider context. MacKenzie's chapter, 'A People's Militia? 1940-1', focuses primarily on Wintringham's struggles with the War Office and the Army, as they sought to minimise the impact of the Osterley Park group of socialists, but says less about the specific ideas of those activists. What characterised Wintringham and the other socialist enthusiasts for the Home Guard was the combination of practical involvement in Home
Guard training, allied to the development in lectures, newspapers, books, and pamphlets of a specifically socialist analysis of contemporary military imperatives. In the period 1940-1941, these enthusiasts developed an approach to the defence and transformation of Britain that can usefully be termed Home Guard socialism.

**An alliance of the progressive classes**

The idea of the Popular Front dominated Home Guard socialism. For the CPGB, as with other communist parties that took their line from the Comintern, the Popular Front had been one more tactic in a roll-call of tactics that had marked the evolution of Moscow-led communism since the early 1920s. In 1935, the Comintern instructed Moscow-affiliated communist parties to abandon their previous sectarian policy, 'class against class'. Reacting to the failure of the German Communist Party in the face of nazism, the Comintern instructed its followers 'to overcome, in the shortest time possible, the survivals of sectarian traditions which have hindered them in finding a way of approach to the Social-Democratic workers'\(^\text{22}\). No longer was the British Labour Party to be dismissed as 'social fascist', instead the CPGB strove to create a 'united front' with the Labour movement - something that the Labour Party studiously ignored. Nonetheless, the Comintern's *volte face* enabled British communists to emerge from the isolation of 'class against class' and reach out to a wider audience than they had for the previous
seven years. For the leadership of the CPGB this move was, above all else, merely a tactical move, but for many of their followers, the 'united front', or Popular Front period, was also driven by the desire to create an effective alliance of anti-fascists from among the progressive classes.

For the Home Guard socialists, men like Tom Wintringham who had been a very early member of the CPGB, the Popular Front had real meaning. Wintringham himself was from a long-established bourgeois family, had been privately educated, and, after service in the Royal Flying Corps in the Great War, had taken a shortened war service degree at Balliol College, Oxford. Similarly, Hugh Slater, another of the key Home Guard socialists, an International Brigades’ commissar, and the commander of the British battalion’s anti-tank gun unit in Spain, was educated at Tonbridge School and the University of London. For communists like these, the Popular Front had a direct appeal, and seemed to take shape in Spain, when a small but vocal minority of bourgeois communists and anti-fascists volunteered to fight with the International Brigades, alongside the workers who formed the majority of the international combatants. Yet there were notable class tensions among the British volunteers, as James Hopkins pointed out in his detailed study of the British in the Spanish Civil War. Hopkins noted that the fifth commanding officer of the British battalion, Fred Copeman, grouped most of the young students, graduates, and educated workers together in the
anti-tank gun unit, as a deliberate act of class segregation aimed at reducing class tensions in the battalion. Although Slater, who commanded the unit, was regarded by most as being a very effective soldier, Hopkins argued that Slater's:

'ability to understand and gain the cooperation of his working class subordinates was severely limited. A Durham miner who had been with the battalion from the start, and was described as a "good proletarian type" was forced to leave the Anti-Tanks "because of differences with Slater". Another comrade in the Anti-Tanks, Jim Brewer, despised the young officer'.

There was a feeling among many of the working class volunteers who came in contact with Slater, that he made no 'effort to disguise his contempt for working men'.

If the day to day reality of campaigning with the International Brigades was not as free of class tension as might have been hoped, it was in Spain that some of the British volunteers for the Republic came to feel that the realities of the Comintern's tactics were much worse than tensions between individuals. Foremost among these was George Orwell, whose experiences fighting with the POUM (Partido Obero de Unificación Marxista - a revolutionary, anti-Stalinist communist party), and his witnessing of the Barcelona 'May events' in 1937, led him to the conclusion that the communist idea of the
'Popular Front' was nothing more than a betrayal of the revolution in Catalonia, and the implementation of fascism by another name. Orwell later referred to the Popular Front in Spain as being like 'a pig with two heads or some other Barnum & Bailey monstrosity'. Interestingly, other anti-fascists in Spain who later formed the core of the Home Guard socialists took the communist line that the crushing of the POUM and the anarchists in Republican Spain by the socialists and communists was merely the crushing of an attempted 'Trotsky-fascist' coup. As a leading member of the International Brigades, and a member of the CPGB, Tom Wintringham accepted this line. Another of the Home Guard socialists of 1940-1941, John Langdon-Davies, also followed the communist view in his reporting for the News Chronicle, alleging that the anarchists and the POUM were the tools of fascist agents provocateurs. Writing about the 'May Days' in Barcelona for the News Chronicle, Langdon-Davies commented:

'This has not been an Anarchist uprising. It is a frustrated putsch of the Trotskyist POUM, working through their controlled organisations, "Friends of Durruti" and Libertarian Youth...The tragedy began on Monday afternoon when the Government sent armed police into the Telephone Building, to disarm the workers there, mostly CNT men. Grave irregularities in the service had been a scandal for some time [...] By Wednesday evening,
however, it began to be clear who was behind the revolt. All the walls had been plastered with an inflammatory poster calling for an immediate revolution and for the shooting of Republican and Socialist leaders. It was signed by the "Friends of Durruti". On Thursday morning the Anarchist daily denied all knowledge or sympathy with it, but *La Batalla*, the POUM paper, reprinted the document with the highest praise. Barcelona, the first city of Spain, was plunged into bloodshed by agents provocateurs using this subversive organisation.\textsuperscript{126}

Yet, despite their differing interpretations of the reality of the Popular Front in the late 1930s, the key Home Guard socialists believed that a successful defence of Britain had to lie in an alliance of the progressive classes. Further, following the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the CPGB had performed yet another volte face, and abandoned the idea of a Popular Front. But by then, none of the Home Guard socialists were members of the CPGB, most having been expelled from the party, in Wintringham's case because he refused to end his relationship with the American anti-fascist, Kitty Bowler, whom the CPGB regarded as a Trotskyist spy.
**A patriotic, anti-nazi defence**

The Home Guard socialists stressed that victory over nazism would be a result of the efforts of the entire British people. Their appeals were made to all those who wished to engage in a patriotic, anti-nazi defence of Britain. That defence, to be effective, was to be built upon a socialist programme, one that would be of benefit to all patriots, including what Orwell characterised as 'the great mass of middling people, the £6 a week to £2,000 a year class who will defeat Hitler if class privilege is wiped out and socialism brought in'\(^{27}\). This was the class that Wintringham saw as being the 'meritocratic class', the technicians that ran modern industry, and had strong anti-Nazi sympathies\(^ {28}\). The obstacles to the successful defence of Britain and the ultimate defeat of nazism by the progressive classes, were seen to come from pro-nazi sympathisers in high places, and those who put the interests of private capital before those of Britain, the British people, and the war effort. In his best-selling Penguin Special, *New Ways of War* (July, 1940), Tom Wintringham argued for the expansion of the Home Guard to four million men, creating a people in arms, which was, he claimed, both a revolutionary idea, and a patriotic and quintessentially British idea. Those who opposed such an idea were, he implied, incompetent, or worse:

'There are those who say that the idea of arming the people is a revolutionary idea.'
It certainly is. And after what we have seen of the efficiency and patriotism of those who ruled us until recently, most of us can find plenty of room in this country for some sort of revolution, for a change that will sweep away the muck of the past. But arming the people is also completely part of the tradition of the British."²⁹

George Orwell, a sergeant in the Home Guard, complained about the class structure of the movement, but also noted that its character was, 'in the lower ranks [...] extremely democratic and comradely.'³⁰ Further, the events of 1940, at home and abroad, contributed to a new, essentially left-wing, political outlook that crossed classes:

'The political discussions that one hears in [Home Guard] canteens and guard rooms are much more intelligent than they were, and the social shake-up among men of all classes who have now been forced into close intimacy for a considerable time has done a lot of good.'³¹

For these socialists, the Home Guard was both an instrument, and the concrete expression of, a real 'Popular Front', one built upon patriotic, progressive, anti-nazism.

The Home Guard socialists argued that the movement was an essentially British
phenomenon, and that such a people's militia had a long and distinguished pedigree in British history. This was a common theme - a popular account of the defence of Britain through time, published in 1945, after the Home Guard had been 'stood down', summed up the view of its author, John Radnor, that *It All Happened Before*: 'there is nothing more typically and historically English than the large army of spare-time soldiers now called the Home Guard.'

However, from the Home Guard socialists' standpoint, previous manifestations of the popular defence of Britain were important not just because they attested to the enduring patriotism of the population, but also because those manifestations could be fitted neatly into their narrative of a popular, people's movement. Bert 'Yank' Levy, a Canadian who fought with the British battalion at Jarama, was another of Wintringham's comrades at the Osterley Park training school. Levy had served with Royal Fusiliers in the Near East during the First World War, and then, by his own account, had been involved in the Sandinista revolt in Nicaragua in the 1920s. He was captured on the second day of the British battalion's action at Jarama, and a photograph exists of Levy with other captured British machine gunners being guarded by Nationalist Guardia Civil. He taught classes in 'unconventional warfare', which formed the basis of his Penguin Special, *Guerrilla Warfare* (1941, with an introduction, and, it appears, some input from Wintringham himself).
In *Guerrilla Warfare*, Levy referred to a range of precursors to a projected Home Guard guerrilla defence of Britain. He made a direct connection between the 'heavily armoured forces' of William the Conqueror and those of Hitler, holding up Hereward the Wake as a model of resistance to the Home Guard, albeit one, as Levy admitted, who failed to defeat the invader. Similarly,
Wintringham drew upon the Anglo-Saxon *fyrd*, and the raising of volunteers throughout British history to underpin his argument that the people should be armed:

'It is in fact part of the British Constitution, and the *fyrd* of Anglo-Saxon times, the militia or volunteers of latter periods, have often been called "the Constitutional Force", because it is part of the fundamental law of this country that each able-bodied citizen can and should have arms for training for defence.'

By basing their argument that the people should be armed in their reading of British history, the Home Guard socialists were attempting to strengthen their call for an organisation that they imagined had the potential to become a force like the militias in the Spanish Civil War. At the height of the invasion fear in June 1940, Orwell wrote, in a letter to *Time and Tide*, that, 'at such a time our slogan should be ARM THE PEOPLE.' Many socialists saw this as being the key to creating a revolutionary situation, or, at least, to helping to shift the balance of power from the state to the people. As Orwell put it in the *Evening Standard*: 'That rifle hanging on the wall of the working class flat or labourer's cottage is the symbol of democracy.' And one of the common complaints that the Home Guard socialists had in 1940, as the force became better equipped, was that its members were, at first, forbidden to take their weapons home with them. This, they argued, made no sense
militarily; nor, they might have added, politically, but it ignored the fact even by Autumn of 1940, at least 740,000 out of nearly 1,700,000 Home Guard were without personal weapons of any sort, and ammunition was in short supply for all weapons\textsuperscript{37}.

\textit{Models of resistance}

The Home Guard socialists were also able to draw upon a wide range of contemporary, and near contemporary, examples of the sort of organisations and types of warfare that they felt the Home Guard could emulate. All these proselytisers drew upon the examples of T.E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt, the Irish war of independence, the Spanish Civil War, aspects of the Sino-Japanese War, the Winter War between Finland and the USSR, and, later, partisan activity on the Eastern Front. Such conflicts provided examples of militia, irregular, and guerrilla warfare. John Langdon-Davies in his lecture, 'Why the Home Guard?', drew upon his experience of the Winter War, and upon some slightly more exotic examples of the sort of warfare that he felt the Home Guard was capable of:

'\textquote{There is another kind of war - "Small War" or "Guerrilla", and here everything is very different. This is the kind of war which the Spaniard has fought for centuries amid his mountains - the Finn amid his frozen lakes and forests. This in}
a way is the kind of war the Chicago gangsters and G-men fight incessantly in the suburbs of that great city [...] this is the kind of war which was waged in the marshes of the Chaco Canyon in South America.\textsuperscript{38}

‘Yank’ Levy, in \textit{Guerrilla Warfare}, made particular reference to the Irish war of independence, noting that 'the Irish were the first guerrillas to fight against an army that largely manoeuvred by vehicle', something that was of direct relevance to a Home Guard faced by a potential invasion by what was thought of as being a highly mechanised army\textsuperscript{39}. Levy also made extensive reference to the Arab Revolt, and Orde Wingate's role in organising 'Jewish irregulars in Palestine'. Levy's advice to the Home Guard was to read fictional accounts of the campaigns in Ireland, Spain and China, namely O'Malley's \textit{On Another Man's Wound}, Hemingway's \textit{For Whom the Bell Tolls}, and Edgar Snow's \textit{Scorched Earth}.

Guerrilla warfare was not the only focus of the Home Guard socialists. They also developed an analysis of the operation of blitzkrieg, and offered a wide variety of military methods to combat the tactic. These military methods were closely related to a political analysis of the implication of armoured and mechanised warfare, and, in turn, were tied to their arguments for socialism and a people in arms. In \textit{New Ways of War}, Tom Wintringham took as his starting point an analysis of blitzkrieg, and offered his response to
that strikingly successful method of waging war. But it was a book by a former officer in the Czechoslovak army, the International Brigades and the regular Republican Army, F.O. Miksche, *Blitzkrieg* (1941), that provided the most thorough analysis and critique of the tactic. Wintringham was involved in the translation and provided an introduction to *Blitzkrieg*, in which Miksche gave a detailed account of German tactics that had brought such stunning success in Poland, western Europe, and at the time of publication, on the Eastern Front. He then proposed both defensive and offensive tactics with which to combat the blitzkrieg method. Where his analysis was most pertinent to the Home Guard enthusiasts was in relation to his theory of 'web defence'. This proposed that blitzkrieg could be successfully met by defence in great depth, built around 'islands of resistance', that were, in effect, all-arms defensive positions, interlinked, and possessing the capacity to take operational initiative without reference to a higher chain of command. This type of defence against the German concept of blitzkrieg had been adopted, with local success, by the French in the latter stages of the Battle of France, but too late to make any difference to the outcome in the summer of 1940.
Nonetheless, Miksche's analysis had a particular attraction for the Home Guard enthusiasts, and Wintringham, in his introduction, highlighted this element of the book. Whatever this type of
defence was called - total defence, 'web defence', defence in depth - it gave a key role to the Home Guard. As Orwell noted in late 1941:

'The strategic idea of the Home Guard is static defence in complete depth, i.e. from one coast of England to the other. The tactical idea is not so much to defeat an invader as to hold him up till the regular troops can get at him.'

**Military roles for the Home Guard**

Over time the role of the Home Guard changed, both in the views of the government, the army, and the Home Guard socialists. The army was, throughout the Home Guard's existence, keen that it fulfilled two main functions, that of local reconnaissance and the defence of local areas. But many Home Guard wanted to have more active roles, aiming to increase their own mobility, or prepare for guerrilla warfare should their local areas be occupied. Writing at the end of 1941, Orwell commented on changing perceptions of the Home Guard's role. He identified six different roles: in 1940, the key roles had been to combat sabotage and the Fifth Column, while guarding against airborne assault. This was followed, once the summer invasion scare was over, by a move towards making the Home Guard into ordinary infantry. In 1941 the emphasis changed again, as events in North Africa and Crete suggested that the Home Guard should concentrate on anti-tank warfare, and,
once more, on countering paratroopers. Then, with the emergence of Soviet Partisans in the areas of the Soviet Union rapidly overrun by the Germans, Home Guard volunteers seemed to have a potential role as guerrillas\textsuperscript{41}. Whatever the precise function of the Home Guard, one constant for the socialists was that it should have an active, central role in the defence of Britain, providing aspects of defence that only an armed population could provide.

Writing in 1945, John Brophy, in his "Britain's Home Guard," outlined the events of 1940 that led to the spontaneous organisation of men into self-defence groups, followed quickly by Anthony Eden's appeal for men for the Local Defence Volunteers. For the Home Guard socialists the fact that groups of men had come together prior to Eden's broadcast, especially groups of trade unionists who began to organise factory-based defence, was yet another example of the way in which patriotic, anti-Nazi workers were ahead of the government in the struggle to defend Britain. Brophy explained the particular fears of the summer of 1940:

'The Home Guard came into being in May 1940, before Dunkirk. At that time Norway had been overrun, and Denmark annexed in a single casual gesture. Rotterdam had been blasted into submission by air bombardment, and parachute troops, disguised or in their proper uniforms, were paralysing the communication centres of Dutch
resistance, in co-operation with the "fifth column". These were the enemies the Home Guard was designed first and foremost to meet and overcome - the parachutist and the fifth column.42

Langdon-Davies, in his lectures of the winter of 1940, also laid great emphasis on these two elements, arguing, inaccurately, that the fall of Norway was almost entirely due to Quisling and his fifth column, while paratroopers and airborne troops were, more accurately, blamed for the fall of Holland. The fifth column threat loomed large in 1940, and led to the internment of 'enemy aliens' (often refugees from nazi Germany, or long-time residents of the UK), IRA men, and around 800 leading members of the British Union of Fascists. The paratroops fear lasted much longer, being given a further boost with the fall of Crete to German airborne forces in May 1941. The Home Guard enthusiasts were quick to point out that whether it was fifth columnists, paratroopers, or armoured and mechanised assault, the Home Guard had a role, as it could provide constant, if limited, coverage, across the whole territory of Britain, against any of these threats, something that regular forces could not. Further, the Home Guard socialists believed that the movement contained within it a large number of men who wanted social change, and that their effectiveness as a defensive force was tied to that radicalism. John Brophy, who had been an underaged volunteer in 1914, and had written two best-selling novels about the Great War, The Bitter End (1928) and The World Went Mad
(1934), referred to the fact that the overwhelming majority of the initial LDV volunteers had been men from the Great War, who had maintained an idealistic desire for social change:

'This [...] hope for a radical impetus to social, economic, and political improvement survived the disillusionments of the battle-field, the parade-ground, and the field hospital [of the First War] better than the poetic and youthful idealism of selfless patriotism.'

This was a reflection, perhaps, of Edith Cavell's view that 'patriotism was not enough', and it was certainly the view of the socialists that patriotism met anti-nazism, and a desire for social change, in the Home Guard.

Social radicalism and the people's defence

Defence against saboteurs, paratroopers, or armoured assault, all required, in the socialists' view, a different mindset in the Home Guard than in other, more traditional, military formations. Wintringham repeatedly argued that the unit of command had been steadily reduced by historical developments in warfare. In the face of modern war, characterised by the disruption of the chain of command, widely dispersed encounters on a huge, non-linear front, and by a host of unorthodox tactics, soldiers had to be able to be their own leaders. Writing about his experiences in Spain, Wintringham commented:
'I drew the conclusion that in defence as well as in attack the initiative of the subordinate commander and of the ordinary soldier is the most vital quality to be cultivated.'

Further, the Home Guard socialists envisaged the Home Guard being involved in guerrilla war should Britain be invaded and partly occupied. In all these cases, they argued, it would be important for Home Guard soldiers to be trained to operate on their own initiative. For this to happen, however, the Home Guard had to be fully imbued with a sense of democracy and the desire for social progress. This linkage of military effectiveness with social radicalism was at the heart of the Home Guard socialists' message. 'Yank' Levy argued that effective guerrilla resistance could only emerge from among people who benefited from a democratic political culture. His view was that, for guerrillas to be effective, they had to be imbued with independence of action and a freedom to use their initiative which arose most effectively under democratic systems. He contrasted this with what he felt was the inability of fascist or nazi systems to produce effective guerrilla movements:

'We in Britain can go much farther than can the Germans, when it comes to the development and utilization of guerrilla methods, for both attack and defence. There are ways open to us which are
closed to the Nazis. For we are men of democratic tradition, fighting for freedom, and guerrilla warfare is essentially the weapon of free men - a guerrilla band functioning efficiently under compulsion is inconceivable. Fascism or Nazism - and they are fundamentally the same - set out to destroy in men the very qualities which are most prized in guerrilla fighting. Free men, hating oppression, with freedom of initiative and arms in their hands - these make the ideal guerrillas. Therefore in the democratic countries there is far larger scope for the development of regular warfare along lines derived from guerrilla warfare. There are new ways of war which in this country and in Europe we can adopt, if we will - ways of war which the Nazis cannot and dare not use.  

Levy foresaw guerrilla warfare in Britain in fairly stark terms, and clearly felt that there were few among the population who should not be involved in this type of warfare. For example, in addition to talking about the killing of Quislings and prisoners, he also mentioned, approvingly, an article from *Soviet War News*, which covered the exploits of two Soviet Young Pioneers, whom Levy called 'Boy Scouts', aged 12 and 14, who had killed numerous German motorcyclists with wire stretched across roads. In an interesting aside, Levy noted, 'the British Boy Scouts who demonstrated how this should be done at Osterley, when we had not enough older instructors, were about the same age'. The
point was, for Levy and the other Home Guard socialists, that the Home Guard represented the entire British people in arms, as Hugh Slater argued:

'The Home Guard is itself half civilian. It is a people's army. How useful it can be in the military sense depends wholly on the extent to which it reflects the needs, the desires, and the aspirations of the ordinary British people. Its purpose is a democratic one - to win the war against Fascism. The Home Guard must, therefore, be thoroughly permeated with democratic ideas, methods and attitudes.'

Probably unknown to any of the Home Guard socialists, the government did, in fact, put in place a guerrilla army, designed to harass occupying forces. This stay-behind force was the Auxiliary Units, or Auxunits, made up of a mixture of some regular soldiers, and Home Guard. Secret bases, known as Operational Bases (OBs), were set up in 1940 and stocked with arms and equipment. Young men with good local knowledge of their home areas formed the core of the Auxunits. They prepared in secrecy for the German invasion, and formed a unique guerrilla force in waiting. The Auxunits were a reasonably substantial force with, for example, 300 men in Somerset serving in 44 Auxunits using 50 OBs. However, they were not, as men like Levy would have wanted, a large, people's guerrilla force."
The final chapter in Wintringham's *New Ways of War* was quite explicit about the nature of these democratic ideas stating, 'what we need, in order to be strong, is a planned use of men, machines, and factories: in other words what we need is socialism.' Further, he went on to state, 'that since we need socialist measures for victory, these measures will be best be carried out by socialists.' This socialist programme was to be protected by a four million strong Home Guard (in fact, the Home Guard's peak membership was around 1,700,000) that would be largely responsible for the defence of Britain, while the regular armed forces were deployed overseas. In addition, just as the Home Guard socialists proposed that socialists should be running the war at a macro level, they also stressed the role that ordinary Home Guardsmen could have in strengthening socialism, and the link between the Home Guard and socialists, at the local level. In preparing the defence of local areas, Hugh Slater argued, it was not sufficient for Home Guard units to be fully familiar with the geography and topography of their home area, they also had to be familiar with key people in that area. One of the fundamental duties of the platoon commander was that, 'he must know, and work in co-operation with, the Police and A.R.P. services, Post Office, *Trade Unions*, *Shop Stewards*, and, of course, the regular army command in the neighbourhood' (emphasis added).
In the summer of 1940, the Home Guard socialists had a direct influence on the training of the force. Its rapid creation, and the need for training, enabled Tom Wintringham and his comrades, backed by Edward Hutton and *Picture Post*, who funded the enterprise, and the Earl of Jersey, who owned Osterley Park and its grounds, to create the innovative Home Guard training school at Osterley Park. This was, in S.P. MacKenzie's view, 'an instant success, and news of it rapidly spread through word-of-mouth and the press'⁵². Five thousand Home Guards passed through Wintringham's training school on three day courses⁵³. The school became a model for others, and although the War Office and the Army eventually managed, by May 1941, to wrest control of Osterley Park from the Home Guard socialists, their message continued to be read by the huge audience for their books, pamphlets and newspaper articles. For these enthusiasts, the Home Guard was a Popular Front in arms, patriotic, radical, anti-nazi, and capable of advancing the British people's cause on the Home Front. As Wintringham wrote in the *Picture Post*, 17th May, 1941:
'The Home Guard Can Fight', the cover of the issue of Picture Post which featured the Osterley Park Home Guard training school. The article was by Tom Wintringham.

'The future of the Home Guard is to be recognised as democracy's answer, and an effective answer, to the Nazi technique of aggression. If we choose only to copy totalitarian methods we shall never catch up or surpass the Nazis. But if we set free and mobilise the initiative of
our people in a democratic way, in a way similar to that in which this defensive army of volunteers was raised and trained, I believe we shall find and develop ways of taking the offensive also, new methods of war, which the Nazis are doomed by their ideas and their organisation never to be able to understand or copy.'

For the British, the period from the German invasion of Holland in May 1940, to their assault upon their erstwhile allies, the Soviet Union, in June 1941, was a period dominated by the expectation of nazi invasion. Out of that expectation emerged the Home Guard, a force created so rapidly that it presented a notable group of revolutionary, patriotic, anti-nazis with the chance to strengthen the defence of Britain, and, they hoped, enhance the radicalism of a large part of the British people. For these Home Guard socialists the threat of invasion, and the need for a democratic, socialist, patriotic, and anti-nazi analysis of military and political imperatives was an opening for their unique contribution to Britain's war effort. In their extensive involvement in the practical and theoretical training of the Home Guard, Britain’s 'People's Army', the Home Guard socialists created a fascinating, and, perhaps, influential, theory of a British Popular Front in arms.
5. Epilogue, gone but not forgotten.

The Home Guard socialists were not, in the end, successful in their attempts to foster a four million strong People's Army, as the government and the army outflanked men like Tom Wintringham\textsuperscript{55}, but the Home Guard socialists were, in 1940-41, a notable aspect of Britain at war. It is difficult to assess the impact of the Home Guard socialists on the political culture of Britain during and after the Second World War. It is true, however, that this small group of veterans of the Spanish Civil War provided training, along with military and political education for tens, if not hundreds of thousands, of Home Guard. Through the Osterley Park training camp and their widely read publications, the Home Guard socialists sought to bring a form of politically radical military training to the British people, something that had not, perhaps, been attempted since Cromwell's New Model Army. The Home Guard socialists filled a yawning gap in Britain's defence preparations, particularly in the crucial time between the fall of France in the summer of 1940, and the German invasion of the USSR a year later. How far the radical political message of the Home Guard socialists permeated the mindset of the civilians in Home Guard uniform is hard to say, but it is not unlikely that they helped shift the political culture of Britain to the left, and towards the victory of Clement Attlee's Labour Party in the 1945 general election.
All that is a long time ago now, and the dominant discourse of British politics has changed beyond anything that the Home Guard socialists could probably have imagined. But neither the Home Guard, nor the international volunteers of the Spanish Civil War have been forgotten. Not only does academic interest in both continue to grow, but among that satisfyingly British pastime of 'Living History', or 'Historical Re-enactment', both Home Guard and international volunteers for Spain groups are flourishing. Groups like *La Columna* and *Men of Britain* continue to bring the history of the Spanish Civil War and the Home Guard to the compatriots and descendants of the Home Guard socialists.
End notes.

1 Left wing arguments about the true nature of the war, especially on the Republican side, are very much live issues. Anarchists, like the late Vernon Richards, in his *Lessons of the Spanish Revolution* (London, 1983), and José Peirats, in *Anarchists in the Spanish Revolution* (London, 1990), have clearly stated the anarchist case, which, in essence, is very similar to that made by George Orwell in his *Homage to Catalonia*, (London, 1938). Similarly, Trotskyists continue their verbal battles with unreconstructed communists; arguments over Ken Loach's film, *Land and Freedom*, are particularly bitter. For example, the ex-general secretary of the Transport & General Workers Union (TGWU), Jack Jones (a veteran of the IB) has been particularly keen to attack Loach's position, which is, itself, that of the Socialist Workers Party.

2 Paul Preston has established a major reputation with his many books on the war; one of his most recent (and most interesting) being, *Doves of War, four women of Spain*, (London, 2002). The renowned military historian, Antony Beevor published a revised edition of his military history of the war in time for the 70th anniversary of the conflict, *Battle for Spain; the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939*, (London, 2006).


4 Some right wing volunteers were, in fact, regular military personnel. This was particularly the case with the German Condor Legion, and regular Italian forces, however, others, like General O'Duffy's Irish Catholics, the Romanian Iron Guardists, and French fascists, not to mention the odd Briton, were really volunteers. See, Jurado, C., & Bujeiro, R., *The Condor Legion; German troops in the Spanish Civil War* (Oxford, 2006), Getty, T., *Long Live Death;*
international volunteers for Franco in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39, (2005), and Thomas, F., Brother Against Brother; experiences of a British volunteer in the Spanish Civil War, (Stroud, 1998).

5 See Orwell, Homage to Catalonia, Hall, Revolutionary Warfare, and Peirats, Anarchists in the Spanish Revolution.


7 See, in particular, Arshinov, P., History of the Makhnovist Movement (1918-1921), (Detroit and Chicago, 1974), and the pamphlet, Tsebry, O., Memories of a Makhnovist Partisan, (London, 1993).

8 See, Younger, C., Ireland's Civil War, (London, 1982), and Litton, H., The Irish Civil War; an illustrated history, (Dublin, 1995).


10 See, for example, André Malraux's Days of Hope (London, 1938). Malraux was also a Spanish veteran; he organised the 'Escuadra Españ' to provide early air support for the Spanish government.


13 The situation in Norway in 1940 was very confused, and despite Quisling's attempts to offer the Germans help before their invasion, they were surprised by his attempted seizure of power when they did invade. Ironically, the loss
of the German battleship, *The Blucher* (complete with the Gestapo team intended for occupation duties) as it attempted to sail into Oslo harbour was due to the actions of a *Nasjonal Samling* torpedo crewman in one of Oslo's forts.

14 The role of women in the Home Guard has received very little attention indeed. However, at the time of writing (September, 2006), Penny Summerfield and Corinna Peniston-Bird's, *Contesting Home Defence; men, women and the Home Guard in the Second World War*, is in preparation for Manchester University Press, (forthcoming, 2007).


19 Portrait in pastels, by Eric Kennington, facing p.13 of John Brophy, *Britain's Home Guard; a Character Study* (London, 1945)

20 Brophy, *Britain's Home Guard*, portraits between pp.44 and 45.


23 James K Hopkins, *Into the Heart of the Fire; the British in the Spanish Civil War* (Stanford, 1998)


28 Purcell, *The Last English Revolutionary*, p.173.
29 Tom Wintringham, *New Ways of War* (Harmondsworth, 1940), pp.77-8.
33 Author's note in 'Yank' Levy, *Guerrilla Warfare* (Harmondsworth, 1941). At the time of writing (September 2006), an American, Todd Winer, is currently researching 'Yank' Levy's biography, which promises to be fascinating reading, with Levy as a latter day Stephen Crane or Jack London.
34 Wintringham, *New Ways of War*, p.78.
36 Quoted in Purcell, *The Last English Revolutionary*, p.179.
41 Orwell, *Collected Essays*, p.178
42 Brophy, *Britain's Home Guard*, pp.15-6
43 Brophy, *Britain's Home Guard*, pp.24-5.
50 Wintringham, *New Ways of War*, p.119.
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