Spiekermann, Kai P.. (2009) Sort out your neighbourhood: public good games on dynamic networks. Synthese, Vol.168 (No.2). pp. 273-294. ISSN 0039-7857

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Abstract

Axelrod (The evolution of cooperation, 1984) and others explain how cooperation can emerge in repeated 2-person prisoner's dilemmas. But in public good games with anonymous contributions, we expect a breakdown of cooperation because direct reciprocity fails. However, if agents are situated in a social network determining which agents interact, and if they can influence the network, then cooperation can be a viable strategy. Social networks are modelled as graphs. Agents play public good games with their neighbours. After each game, they can terminate connections to others, and new connections are created. Cooperative agents do well because they manage to cluster with cooperators and avoid defectors. Computer simulations demonstrate that group formation and exclusion are powerful mechanisms to promote cooperation in dilemma situations. This explains why social dilemmas can often be solved if agents can choose with whom they interact.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	Q Science
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Journal or Publication Title:	Synthese
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0039-7857
Date:	May 2009
Volume:	Vol.168
Number:	No.2
Number of Pages:	22
Page Range:	pp. 273-294
Identification Number:	10.1007/s11229-008-9424-5
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/28140

Data sourced from Thomson Reuters' Web of Knowledge

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