Lombardi, M. (Michele). (2009) Minimal covering set solutions. Social Choice and Welfare, Vol.32 (No.4). pp. 687-695. ISSN 0176-1714

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Abstract

We study necessary and sufficient conditions for a multi-valued solution S to be rationalized in the following sense: there exists a complete asymmetric relation T (a tournament) such that, for each feasible (finite) set, the solution set of S coincides with the minimal covering set of T restricted to that feasible set. Our characterization result relies only on properties relating S across feasible choice sets.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory Q Science > QA Mathematics
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Social choice -- Mathematical models, Choice (Psychology) -- Mathematical models, Set theory, Economics, Mathematical
Journal or Publication Title:	Social Choice and Welfare
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0176-1714
Date:	May 2009
Volume:	Vol.32
Number:	No.4
Number of Pages:	9
Page Range:	pp. 687-695
Identification Number:	10.1007/s00355-008-0361-5
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/28312

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