On being stuck in time
Hoerl, Christoph. (2008) On being stuck in time. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Vol.7 (No.4). pp. 485-500. ISSN 1568-7759Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-008-9089-z
It is sometimes claimed that non-human animals (and perhaps also young children) live their lives entirely in the present and are cognitively 'stuck in time'. Adult humans, by contrast, are said to be able to engage in 'mental time travel'. One possible way of making sense of this distinction is in terms of the idea that animals and young children cannot engage in tensed thought, which might seem a preposterous idea in the light of certain findings in comparative and developmental psychology. I try to make this idea less preposterous by looking into some of the cognitive requirements for tensed thought. In particular, I suggest that tensed thought requires a specific form of causal understanding, which animals and young children may not possess.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Memory, Causation, Time -- Psychological aspects, Time -- Philosophy|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences|
|Official Date:||December 2008|
|Number of Pages:||16|
|Page Range:||pp. 485-500|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
Aristotle (1930). On memory and reminiscence. In W. D. Ross (Ed.) The works of Aristotle (vol. 3).
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