Amir, Rabah and Bloch, Francis (2009) Comparative statics in a simple class of strategic market games. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.65 (No.1). pp. 7-24. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.002 ISSN 0899-8256.

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Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of entry in two-sided markets where buyers and sellers act strategically. Applying new tools from supermodular optimization/games, Sufficient conditions for different comparative statics results are obtained. While normality of one good is Sufficient for the equilibrium price to be increasing in the number of buyers, normality of both goods is required for equilibrium bids and sellers' equilibrium utilities to be increasing in the number of buyers. When the economy is replicated, normality of both goods and gross substitutes guarantee that the equilibrium of the strategic market game converges monotonically (in quantities) to the competitive equilibrium. Simple counter-examples are provided to settle other potential conjectures of interest. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Journal or Publication Title:	Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0899-8256
Official Date:	January 2009
Dates:	Date Event January 2009 Published
Volume:	Vol.65
Number:	No.1
Number of Pages:	18
Page Range:	pp. 7-24
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.002
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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