Kar, Anirban and Kibris, Oezguer. (2008) Allocating multiple estates among agents with single-peaked preferences. Social Choice and Welfare, Vol.31 (No.4). pp. 641-666. ISSN 0176-1714

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Abstract

We consider the problem of allocating multiple social endowments (estates) of a perfectly divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences when each agent's share can come from at most one estate. We inquire if well-known single-estate rules, such as the Uniform rule, the Proportional rule or the fixed-path rules can be coupled with a matching rule so as to achieve efficiency in the multi-estate level. On the class of problems where all agents have symmetric preferences, any efficient single-estate rule can be extended to an efficient multi-estate rule. If we allow asymmetric preferences however, this is no more the case. For nondictatorial single-estate rules that satisfy efficiency, strategy proof-ness, consistency, and resource monotonicity, an efficient extension to multiple estates is impossible. A similar impossibility also holds for single-estate rules that satisfy efficiency, peak-only, and a weak fairness property.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Administration of estates -- Mathematical models, Equality -- Economic aspects, Asset allocation -- Mathematical models
Journal or Publication Title:	Social Choice and Welfare
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0176-1714
Date:	December 2008
Volume:	Vol.31
Number:	No.4
Number of Pages:	26
Page Range:	pp. 641-666
Identification Number:	10.1007/s00355-008-0301-4
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/29207

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