Oliveira, Fernando. (2008) The value of information in electricity investment games. Energy Policy, Vol.36 (No.7). pp. 2364-2375. ISSN 0301-4215

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Abstract

In this paper we look at the assumptions behind a Cournot model of investment in electricity markets. We analyze how information influences investment, looking at the way common knowledge of marginal costs, expectations on the competitors' marginal costs, expectations on the level and duration of demand, and conjectures on the others' behavior, influence,the value of a project. We expose how the results are highly dependent on the assumptions used, and how the investment Nash-Cournot game with perfect and complete information implies such a degree of coordination between players that the outcome of the game would be classified by any regulation law as collusive behavior. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of Nash Value of Complete Information. As an example we use a stylized model of investment in liberalized electricity markets. (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	T Technology > TJ Mechanical engineering and machinery G Geography. Anthropology. Recreation > GE Environmental Sciences
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Journal or Publication Title:	Energy Policy
Publisher:	Elsevier Ltd.
ISSN:	0301-4215
Date:	July 2008
Volume:	Vol.36
Number:	No.7
Number of Pages:	12
Page Range:	pp. 2364-2375
Identification Number:	10.1016/j.enpol.2008.01.005
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/29679

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