Botsari, Antonia and Meeks, Geoffrey (2008) Do acquirers manage earnings prior to a share for share bid? Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol.35 (No.5-6). pp. 633-670. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5957.2008.02091.x

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Abstract

Earnings management by acquirers ahead of share for share bids may affect whether a bid succeeds, and hence which management team controls the target's assets, as well as the distribution of gains between target and acquirer shareholders. This paper tests for such earnings management for the UK, the world's second largest takeover market, in the period 1997-2001 when M&A reached record levels and share for share deals came to account for the majority of expenditure. Using a range of approaches originating in Jones' model, the paper finds evidence consistent with earnings management ahead of share-financed bids.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HF Commerce > HF5601 Accounting H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Accounting Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Consolidation and merger of corporations, Earnings management, Liabilities (Accounting)
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
Publisher:	Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
ISSN:	0306-686X
Official Date:	June 2008
Dates:	Date Event June 2008 Published
Volume:	Vol.35
Number:	No.5-6
Number of Pages:	38
Page Range:	pp. 633-670
DOI:	10.1111/j.1468-5957.2008.02091.x
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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