This paper originally appeared as University of Warwick Department of Economics Working Paper #639 (2002). The
paper was presented at the Athens General Equilibrium Conference, May 2002; PET 2002, June 2002; Social Choice and
Welfare, July 2002; ESEM August, 2002, the Illinois Economic Theory Workshop, April 2003, the University of Chicago
in 2005 and Oxford in 2006.

• Related item in WRAP

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