Allouch, Nizar and Wooders, Myrna Holtz. (2008) Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.140 (No.1). pp. 246-278. ISSN 0022-0531

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Abstract

We model an economy with clubs (or jurisdictions) where individuals may belong to multiple clubs and where clubs sizes are arbitrary-clubs may be restricted to consist of only one or two persons, or as large as the entire economy, or anything in-between. Notions of price-taking equilibrium and the core, both with communication costs, are introduced. These notions take into account that there is a small communication cost of deviating from a given outcome. We demonstrate that, given communication costs, for all sufficiently large economies the core is nonempty and the set of price-taking equilibrium outcomes is equivalent to the core. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Pricing, Equilibrium (Economics) -- Mathematical models, Social networks, Edgeworth expansions, Clubs -- Accounting, Public goods -- Pricing -- Mathematical models
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal of Economic Theory
Publisher:	Academic Press
ISSN:	0022-0531
Date:	May 2008
Volume:	Vol.140
Number:	No.1
Number of Pages:	33
Page Range:	pp. 246-278
Identification Number:	10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.006
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Description:	This paper originally appeared as University of Warwick Department of Economics Working Paper #639 (2002). The paper was presented at the Athens General Equilibrium Conference, May 2002; PET 2002, June 2002; Social Choice and Welfare, July 2002; ESEM August, 2002, the Illinois Economic Theory Workshop, April 2003, the University of Chicago in 2005 and Oxford in 2006.
Version or Related Resource:	Allouch, N. and Wooders, M.H. (2002). Competitive pricing in socially networked economies. [Coventry] : University of Warwick, Economics Department. (Warwick economic research papers, no.639). http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1551
Related URLs:	Related item in WRAP
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/29904

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