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Showtime:
The Phenomenology of Film Consciousness

by

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

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Showtime:
The Phenomenology of Film Consciousness

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The thesis argues that the notion of film consciousness deepens a
wide-range of philosophical issues in ways which are only accessible
through film experience. These issues, directly related to the continental
tradition, deal with consciousness, experience, intentionality and
meaning. We look to the implications of the initial acts of film
reproduction as it creates 'images' of the world which reconceptualise
vision in terms of space, time and dimension. We move from ontology to
experience and examine an aesthetic form with radical implications for
spectator consciousness.

These issues are explored from two philosophical positions. Firstly,
phenomenology, especially Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty. Secondly, the work of Gilles Deleuze who presents the most
penetrating insights to date into film consciousness and its
repercussions for thought and affectivity.

The focus of this study is to draw together these two philosophical
positions, showing their fundamental differences but also similarities
where they exist. This approach is rarely attempted but the belief
running through this thesis is that film is one arena which is invaluable
for making such comparisons. It is argued philosophically that film
writes large key phenomenological concepts on intentionality, time-
consciousness and the relation of the lifeworld to the predicative. In
terms of Deleuze, film is shown as a unique artform which in allowing
us to think otherwise casts light on Deleuze's own complex system of
thought.

Chapters 1-3 are concerned with phenomenology and detail the role
of film in terms of the lifeworld, intentionality, reduction and the
transcendental in a way which has not been attempted elsewhere. The
linking chapter on time (4) is used to introduce the work of Henri
Bergson and its influence both on phenomenology's inner time-
consciousness and Deleuze's fundamental categories of film,
movement and time imagery. The final two chapters look at the way film
is reconfigured through montage and the implications of this for film's
unique expression of movement and time.

The conclusion is that film consciousness is a vital and barely
understood concept. Provocatively developed by Deleuze, in many
ways its self-contained 'inside' rests more comfortably with
phenomenology. The Appendix, which lies outside main theoretical
discussions, shows how in practical criticism the strands of our
argument can be drawn together.
For many years I have been tormented by the certainty that the most extraordinary discoveries awaits us in the sphere of time.

-----Andrey Tarkovsky, The Diaries.

The core notion which runs through this study is film consciousness but the precise understanding of its significance only emerges after an analysis of the components of film ontology and film experience. The breakdown of these components is the 'showtime', the understanding of film in terms of spatial appearance and temporal ordering. In a wider context, it is understanding the world of film and the filmed world. It will become apparent that film is an artform which has created a new reality and a consciousness which has created a new way of thinking. This claim is made in the context of an aesthetic experience which is as valid and as substantial as any other mode of consciousness. The first chapters of this study look at the aesthetic mode of consciousness grounded on primary intentionality. This is followed by an examination of temporality and film narrative in terms of phenomenological interpretation or hermeneutics. The concluding section looks at the major contribution of Deleuze, under the influence of Bergson, and the implications of this for a broadened notion of film consciousness and thought.

The dialectic at work here demands an evolving understanding of the way film imagery speaks, contextualised from within the frame or dialectic
'boundary' which is always, in one form or other, being surpassed. The frame relates to the world as given, unfigured, radiating out from a positioned zero point in terms of sensuous matter. The tension of the dialectic process manifests as an antithesis which pressurises enframing. Originary primal impression is tautly stretched to the limits of the frame, contents decompose and threaten to lose meaning without necessary structuration. Fragmentation occurs and in this disruption a negated (or inverted) world emerges comprised of shadows and doubles. Out of the tension and struggle to 'make' meaningful markers, primary phenomenological positions are assessed and centred subjectivity modified through temporal structuration. The synthesis of film's dialectic will be shown as a genuine 'aufgeheben'. A synthetic return to the lifeworld of imagery but on a higher level of consciousness. That level is only attainable through the specification, discussion, self-knowledge and putting in relief of film imagery which stretch the frame to breaking point and beyond. Analysis of film tends to focus on isolated aspects of the dialectic and thereby misses the way the essence of film, its temporality and its noetic correlates (modes of consciousness in whatever form they take), develop and evolve from the primordial lifeworld to the diegesis of the filmed world. By failing to examine presuppositions, the metaphysic of film, its truth value and multi-perspectivity are either lost or obfuscated and result in primitive, unsophisticated readings of film which in most cases ignore film's philosophic importance.

An apt starting point for the understanding of film consciousness comes with film's 'reality-effect'. The realist effect of film is powerful, vivid and encompassing. A large part of film's realism is due to its verisimilitude, the likeness in film to the imagery and perception we experience in everyday life. Yet the experience of watching a film is not real life though it seems based in real life. We do not move round the screen or choose our vantage points. Rather film directs and places the spectator within perceptual sites of its own making. These perceptual sites approximate real life to be convincing but they are fabrication. Yet, in their similarity to real life experience, they naturally encourage a comparison between the represented world and film as re-presentational. The correlation between the real and the reel world runs through any analysis of film ontology because of film's unique link or bond with the real world and raw materiality.

Both in the created imagery the spectator experiences in the finished artwork and in the mechanics behind the creation of that imagery, film has a
sensuous force comparable to that of nature. Notwithstanding this inexorable bond, we can still take the final filmwork as an aesthetic experience of a particular kind just as we do with any other artistic medium. In this way the 'truth' of the film work lies within the presence of the work itself, in a way which makes truthful revelation more accessible than in the turmoil of everyday life. In fact, it is necessary that film exerts its magic so that perception can relegate to the background that which ordinary perception places in the foreground: "The aesthetic object carries the world which it reveals within itself. Rather than referring to the world outside itself as things do...the aesthetic object refers to itself alone and is for itself its own light."1 The aesthetic object never 'merely' reproduces the real, if it did it would be redundant, the real anyway can never be reproduced, it would be a failure as an impression or a copy. Rather, realist film expresses the real, discovers it and gives it meaning in a way which goes beyond documentation or reproduction. However, it behooves to clarify the notion of the 'real' in terms of realist film and with it the difference between film as fact and film as fiction, since it has a bearing on the 'manufacture' of final imagery and the mode of consciousness by which it is accessed.

Film consciousness, like human consciousness, has both a passive and an active condition. Passive presence in its primordiality corresponds to a changing, passive ego. It carries through the laws of its consciousness as they are reflected in camera qualities, depth of field, focus and film format. It mirrors the viewing-view of the human perspective in its camera eye. This gives the parameters for the structure of what turns out to be reproduced, enabling specifications for perceptual reading after editing. The transcendental presence, that is the totality of what is produced, is the overall vision of automatic recording, the pictured world-view. At the same time, filtered through the transcendental viewpoint of film, there is an active 'I'(je) which is not a passive subjectivity but a machinic, serialised, consciousness. In the phase of film reconfiguration, memory and virtuality become paramount in the intentional act that comprises the film experience when projected vision and spectator vision come together. The spectator acts as the catalyst for the embedded virtuality of film to crystallise as temporalised, split imagery. Film consciousness, through the show of time, comprises the spectator taking up a subject position that is constantly changing (fracturing) under a reading which is generated by a productive 'I'. Film's own transcendent position ensures the pure form of this constant change in time as a resource of pure recollection. This is the return of
Bergsonian memory, where ontological unconscious and film's spiritual automaton coincide to manifest indeterminate and non causal situations. Here there is constant fluctuation, the brain is like a filter which lets emotions through to thoughts and the past collective into present instances:

"If feelings are the ages of the world, thought is the non-chronological time which corresponds to them. If feelings are sheets of past, thought, the brain, is the set of non-localisable relations between all these sheets, the continuity which rolls them up and unrolls them like so many lobes, preventing them from halting and becoming fixed in a death position."\(^2\)

**Phenomenological grounding**

In this study, phenomenology is a key tool of analysis and it will be its application to film rather than its standing as a wide-ranging philosophy which concerns us. Nonetheless, it is necessary to grasp certain basic phenomenological notions and I will deal with some of these in this introduction. In addition to the major thinkers who figure in the phenomenological movement, such as Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, other theorists will be mentioned in the course of this study such as, Gabriel Marcel and Jean-Paul Sartre who would better be considered existentialists and Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze who would not be considered phenomenologists at all. These thinkers have relevant concepts we can apply to film consciousness though few of them specifically deal with film in their own work.

The intention of phenomenology is to use the scientifically based approach to challenge a world-view itself based on science. The intent is not to discard rational laws of nature and behaviour but rather to use rationality to understand behaviour in a fuller, more human way. Science furthers our knowledge of the world but at the same time 'mathematises' it from a desire to predict and ultimately control action. This is equally apparent in Bergson's critique of abstraction, the aversion to dividing up movement into artificial segments as something which goes beyond the human experience of space and time. For Husserl, the transcendent and the transcendental are mutually dependent and the basis of activity in the lifeworld as a source of knowledge is always primal:
"Life-world and objective-scientific world...are related to each other. The knowledge of the objective-scientific world is 'grounded' in the self-evidence of the life-world. The latter is pre-given to the scientific worker (and) what is built is something new, something different. If we cease being immersed in our scientific thinking, we become aware that we scientists are, after all, human beings and as such are among the components of the lifeworld which always exists for us, ever pre-given."

Any phenomenological starting point must come with Husserl's theory of intentionality. Film presents object imagery in the same widely diverse way the mind experiences objects. In real life we experience aspects of a situation, state of affairs or objects from a particular perspective and in a particular mode of consciousness. Film also reproduces objects from particular perspectives and leaves the mental faculties the task of filling out what is lacking. The various modes of consciousness we use in our everyday life such as dreams, daydreams, recollections, wish-fulfillment, are used constantly in film as part of its narrative armoury. At its primary level, film mechanically carries out an enactment of what the mind carries out intentionally. Each particular enactment is a particularised expression where the moment of recording shows state of affairs under a particular aspect. However, the relation of the subject to the particular state of affairs differs in film to everyday life. Whereas in life the 'quality' of the act is determined by a whole range of human emotions to do with imagining, doubting and wishing, in film the quality of intentionality is determined by the 'as-if', a suspension of disbelief. We accept we are watching the fiction of film's reproduction but we lay aside that knowledge in order to experience the film as-if it were real. Naturally, this state of mind is nuanced by whether we believe we are watching a documentary or pure fiction film, but it will be suggested that these generic divisions are not crucial to understanding the mechanics of how we experience film and how consciousness and spatio-temporal awareness in film are engendered.

For Husserl, the analysis of the way mental states are structured in relation to the intentional object centre around the complex notion of the noema, ideal meaning. This is clearly relevant to film since meaning is an ideal entity not dependent on actual existence. It is also relevant because of the importance placed on perception. Of the several interpretations of noema, one, that of Aron Gurwitsch, focuses on the gestalt structure of perception
where the perceptual noema is directly given in sense experience and where sensuous aspects constantly refer to others as hidden aspects.\textsuperscript{4} In that film is both a direct, visceral experience as well as a motor to thought thinking itself, intentionality will reflect the possibility for logical reflection. We can experience and we can reflect on the experience and, likewise, film is a constant show of experience as well as, through its consciousness, a metacritique of that experience.

On one level of intentional analysis, the object which is intended coincides with the actual object in reality. If this is not an argument for the reality of the object, it is at least an argument for the possibility for the repeated perspectival views of such an object, not unlike the re-running of a film. As Husserl puts it:

"It need only be said to be acknowledged that the intentional object of a presentation is the same as its actual object...and that it is absurd to distinguish between them...If the intentional object exists, the intention, the reference, does not exist alone, but the thing refers to exists also."\textsuperscript{5}

It is this phenomenological position that Alan Casebier picks up on in his film realist account of Husserl, where film reveals concrete reality in itself, in accord with the specific mental state which film brings about. This is a mental state which avoids a juggling act of comparison and referentiality between film re-presentation and the represented world, which would be to resurrect a dualism. It also avoids, or sidesteps, the linguistic objections to intentionality where, say, believing, hoping or fearing are objects as-intended rather than the object as-it-is. Intentionality through the show of film removes experience from these solely mental contents to deal with those aspects of intentionality which are directly concerned with seeing and perceiving. It also removes the discussion of the objective existence of objects or their illusory status, since in film all images are seen to be 'real' illusory presentations.

Noema belong in an abstract way to the sphere of meaning but in order to ground Husserl's phenomenology of perception Gurwitsch points out that the internal organisation of that which is perceived, the perceptual gestalt, brings about its self-presentation, or as Marion points out, its 'intuitive sense'. There is a sensuous givenness here which Casebier emphasises in film, one which denigrates idealistic tendencies or semiotic readings which
detour from the sensuously given. The spectator is guided by hyletic data, the sensa, the lines, patterns, size and shape relationships, the camera movement, camera placement, editing forms, sound textures...experiencing these features are hyletic data."6 These sensa are apprehended or passed through (apperceived) to form the realisation of what is meant. There is a directness of intuition here where the givenness of the object in its sensuous appearance (through hyletic data) has an incarnate meaning for bodily presence. Understanding is still in the end an intentional act but one which is initially dependent on a gestalt arrangement of part and whole, foreground and background, aspect and totality.

As with a camera placed in the lifeworld, the body is a unified field of activity which, in its primary mode, is non self-aware but from which rays of attention are emitted. This pre-reflective awareness, basically a primordial sense of presence, finds its film correlation in the concrete encapsulation of the camera eye through perceptual sweep and depth-of-field. It is also a part of the passive-active emplacement Husserl describes most fully in his later works as part of the prepredicative, pre-intentional lifeworld which is nonetheless inexorably implicated in intentionality. In this sense, passivity of the initial act of film reproduction, filming as automatic duplication, corresponds to the originary involvement of phenomenological experience. But this is passivity in a special sense. One which is not a lower form of activity, or an inactivity, but a particular kind of activity in-itself. Passivity of the phenomenological experience is nascent, unexpressed thought, in film it is recording which has not yet been configured: "Passivity is that very experience of the birth of thought before it has been crystallised in a word...the very potentiality of thinking"7

Passivity's openness and potentiality characterises its quality. It avoids coming under the tutelage of conceptual completion since as passivity it is hardly concretised, "it is synonymous with a non-actuality that may be actualised at any moment."8 In film this actualisation is predictably a part of the final, configured artwork but the potential for reformulation can be seen as a 'plasticity' and an unlimited scope for reconfiguration, one which "remains opposed to any fusional coincidence."9 The observer status of passivity in the film spectator is never negative but, on the contrary, denotes a heightened state of awareness, sensitivity, and a fractured identity which reunites at various points in the experience, "being passive means being able to be completely open towards the other, to welcome him in full
awareness...the pre-eminent power of a non-activity which is...a real activity engaged in observing itself at the very moment the act is being performed."\textsuperscript{10} This passively-active state of spectatorship is crucial for understanding the various faces of film consciousness.

**Making meaning**

In our concern with intentionality we are ultimately involved with ascertaining meaning. Casebier, in an attempt to refute the nominalist position of potential anarchy, co-opts Husserl's notion of universals and transcendence, "in transcendence, the objects reached out to (in their existence) are indifferent to mental acts involved in their apprehension; accordingly, they exist, in an important way, in-themselves."\textsuperscript{11} In my study I make a further attempt to broaden this strategy for achieving understanding by way of Merleau-Ponty and hermeneutics. Meaning is what opens up the hermeneutic field. The meaning of an object distinguished from the object as such. The perceived as such, from the thing perceived or the object as it is intended from the object that is intended. Husserl's comprehensive research into intentional structure and mental operations applies equally to the film experience in the way in which spectators react to unfolding narrative. Levels of expectation are built up and then met or broken based on the spectator's pre-knowledge and horizontal predelineation. It is here that we move from the descriptive to the interpretive, a way of experiencing affairs and objects within an already interpretive mode.

"The intentional object for Husserl is always something interpreted...The whole point of his many detailed investigations into intentional life was precisely to show that experience takes place only under a subtle structuring and rendering on the part of consciousness which weaves the world into a unity of meaning...sensate raw material is not perceived at all...it is a certain component of the psychical process in which an object is apprehended."\textsuperscript{12}

Intentional perception, then, is a meaningful way of coming to terms with pure flux and primeval chaos. As we find with hermeneutics, the horizontal structure, the indeterminate predelineations we bring to any experience, are a key to understanding experiences and integrating them into inner time-consciousness. The impasse we come up against as the limit of predication
and the structured knowledge associated with noema is eased by Gurwitsch's notion of incarnate form and deepened by Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger in terms of embodiment and Dasein. This, too, is incorporated into film ontology as we move into the nature of automated reproduction as a being-in-the-world and the communication of the introceptively sensed body. A noema has an unchanging and identical nucleus of meaning that can withstand numerous perspectival variations. But because our experience is constrained by prenoetic factors of history, body, language and tradition, intentionality is not simply consciousness of something but always consciousness of something as something - so that as well as having an identical nucleus noema is always part of a burgeoning or expanding interpretive act. Background perspectives provide a predelineated pattern that sets up expectation. All intentional experience involves a projection of meaning, future expectation and, in film, a narrative framework. On the other side, the object is always incomplete, it can never include all horizons that would constitute its complete sense. The interpretive process as part of noematic sense and occurring on primitive levels of perception and higher levels of acts of judgment remains open ended and in process as a constant search for meaning.

As Ricoeur points out, if the lifeworld is to be a phenomenological reference point, the immediacy and affectivity of everyday life must "be construed as designating the reservoir of meaning, the surplus of sense in living experience, which renders the objectifying and explanatory attitude possible." By strictly adhering to its presuppositionless stance and the search for essence, it could be said that phenomenology reaches its limit in a negative way, by not dealing with the ontological condition of understanding. In this respect, phenomenological hermeneutics completes the task by looking to understanding in terms of primordial belonging in the world, "the first declaration of hermeneutics is to say that the problematic of objectivity presupposes a prior relation of inclusion which encompasses the allegedly autonomous subject and allegedly adverse object. This inclusive or encompassing relation is what I call belonging." Here there is no pretext about being able to escape from being-in-the-world. This leads to the concomitant realisation that the person doing the questioning shares in the very thing about which is being questioned.

This hermeneutic circle is part of the understanding a spectator would bring to film and the underlying world the film text presents, which the spectator is
naturally a part of. There is a commonality of understanding which cannot be broken. A commonality which belongs both to the spectator and the artistic mind behind the work. This points to the admission that no matter how much personal sensibilities "may recede into the past...(they) still form the background against which the prevailing thoughts of the author take on thematic significance."\(^{15}\) There is a mutual commutability of voices and viewpoints which open up into wider notions of intersubjectivity and historical interconnectedness. There will never be direct transparency with any given artwork but rather multiple interpretations, proposals, counter-proposals and tentative agreements.

The phenomenological and phenomenological hermeneutic approach acknowledge spectator participation in the film experience brings about diverse changes of attitude. As we will see these attitudes cover a wide spectrum of spectator contribution and state of mind, ranging from distraction to alienation and from jouissance to shock. Phenomenology's own contribution to this expansion through hermeneutics is a shift which incorporates the transcendental with a return to the lifeworld. Hermeneutics stays with the difficulties of life setting out to describe, 'open up' and question, "to work from below. It makes no claim to have won a transcendental high ground."\(^{16}\) The crucial hermeneutic moments arise in the gaps between identity and distance, living in the represented world and beyond it, resting-within while seeing-through, allowing oneself to be unfolded and yet implicated in the filmed world. We look at the explication of being-in-the-world, the horizons of life displayed by the text so that what is to be interpreted in the text is a proposed world which is inhabitable, one in which personal potentialities can be explored through Husserlian, imaginative variations.

In placing the meaning of a text in the lifeworld, we displace the notion of subjectivity but do not disperse it as Deleuze does. Emphasis is no longer on an idealistic subjectivity seen as radical origin but a detoured refiguration of the self offering greater self-understanding and ethical responsibility. It is apparent that the admitted use of fiction, even if based on half-truths, will give greater narrative scope than where events can be verified in objective time, "the fictionalizing act outstrips the determinacy of the real"\(^{17}\) and adventurous, affective and intellectual journeys can begin. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, "expression is like a step in the fog - no one can say where, if anywhere, it will lead."\(^{18}\) Working out from this premise discloses the film
work to be a springboard into the unknown and the 'uncontrolled', "the meaning of the work...cannot be stated except by the work itself: neither the thought which created it nor the thought which receives it is completely its own master."\textsuperscript{19} Whatever artistic signifier is used there will always be excess in meaning and rightly so, since it is in excess that the work's life continues to thrive, embracing a wider configuration of the real and the possible than the immediately intended.

The hermeneutic shift which takes place broadens the phenomenological project without abandoning it. Indeed, it is apparent that both phenomenology and hermeneutics are mutually dependent, "\textit{phenomenology remains the unsurpassable presupposition of hermeneutics.} On the other hand, phenomenology cannot constitute itself without a hermeneutical presupposition."\textsuperscript{20} Many worlds are conveyed and opened up by the film world, worlds which the spectator appropriates and inhabits, and through which meaning is generated and self-understanding increased. We recognise in intentional horizons the existence of indeterminations which in the lifeworld take the form of historical horizons. It is important to remember that there is a recasting of emphasis in phenomenological description away from the inherently static to the more open hermeneutic and genetic phenomenology of the lifeworld. The discrete moments of film, resource to the prepredicative world, understanding through intentionality and temporal unfolding, all continue to support the integrity of the film text. At the same time, the narrative world and the historical world are embedded in the film text waiting to be recovered.

Any understanding of the meaning of objects and situations in life, or in narratives, will always be conjoined by historical horizons. Historical reality, if it is to be recognized at all, or presented through an understandable narrative exposition, will be an indicator of constitutive achievement. In film, images can be questioned and probed and avenues of concretisation extensively explored in terms of the lifeworld and self-temporalisation, no matter how ambiguous or dense they may be. According to Husserl: "[W]e also have, and know that we have, the capacity of complete freedom to transform, in thought and fantasy, our human historical existence and what is there exposed as its lifeworld."\textsuperscript{21} This telos involves the constant breaking up of the ego as well as the present into what it is not yet, into the possibility for transcendence. An \textit{identity in formation}, a process heading towards its goal, like the unfolding film flux as its state is moulded by noetic structure
and organic narrative form, yet still in an awareness which resists absolute closure. Awareness, in the shape of previsional protention and expectation, is always extended and transcended by indeterminations which in the lifeworld take the form of historical horizons and intentional perspectives. Film shows the presence of life without being locked into succession. Consciousness viewing itself, picks up on the past, resonates in the cultural milieu it reflects and includes pronoetic dispositions within a recognisable lifeworld. By regressive temporal searching combined with personal temporal comprehension, we form an opening into the film world's textuality.

Restating the dynamic nature of hermeneutics in terms of phenomenology underlines its practical foundation. It makes for the integrity of the text and the self-appropriation of subjectivity through personal and interpersonal projection. It is not the function of film to resolve opposing tendencies of static and descriptive phenomenology with the more generative, dynamic hermeneutic of diverse indication and interpretation. Since film is entrenched in both camps it reflects both tendencies. The film spectator has the capacity and freedom to transform experiences and create possibilities in a phenomenological activity of free variation: "And precisely in this activity of free variation, and in running through the conceivable possibilities for the lifeworld, there arises... an essentially general set of elements... as the essence constantly implied in the flowing, vital horizon."22 This involves the constant breaking up of the ego and of the present into what it is not yet, an identity in the process of formation in keeping with the unfolding of film flux. There is give and take here which is part of the creative discoveries which make phenomenology not static and predictable but dynamic and experimental. Husserl, in a challenging pose, acknowledges misunderstanding and prejudice in communication as a prerequisite for resituating textual experience back into the cultural world:

"Thus the courses of perception, in which partial breaches of agreement occur... must be systematically described in respect of all its essential constituents, noetic and noematic: the changes in the mode of apprehension, the peculiar thetic occurrences, the transvaluings and disvaluings of the previously apprehended as 'illusion' or 'deception'; the transition into conflict... for a phenomenology of 'true reality', the phenomenology of 'vain illusion' is wholly indispensable."23

12
Hermeneutics enables this because it recognizes that "the subject of which it speaks is always open to the efficacy of history."24 Past experiences, as Gadamer shows, continue to influence our intentional experience, including those which transcend the individual in history and culture, it being "a pre-understanding that happens behind my back."25 The various meanings of a film emanate from the film itself into areas which may be unintended by the author (auteur) and unpredicted by the viewer. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, the artwork:

"[C]onstitutes an organ of the mind having an analogy with every philosophical and political idea if the latter is productive; the work contains, even better than ideas, matrices of ideas furnishing symbols whose meaning we can never exhaust. It is precisely because it is installed and installs us in a world whose significance is foreign to us and gives food for thought as no analytical work can."26

Giving the experience priority rather than searching for objective explanations remains paramount: "To understand is not to explain causally, but is, rather to transport oneself onto an alien or distant life experience, as this experience objectifies itself in documents, texts...and other traces of inner life experiences and world views."27 In that films materially express the expressions of materiality, reference to the lifeworld is inescapable. The represented world is itself one of change, ungraspable and mysterious, and no matter how well-ordered the aesthetic counters of harmony and symmetry are arranged, the film work will dialectically reflect its less than ordered roots. For Merleau-Ponty, "instead of an intelligible world there are radiant nebulae separated by expanses of darkness. The world of culture is as discontinuous as the other world, and it too has its mutations."28

It may well be that principles of harmony and order work best to express feelings of disharmony and disorder but the onus is on the spectator to appreciate in perception the given work and expand its act of creative communication. Hermeneutic horizons are opened which transform not only the text but self-identity. In consciousness terms, the meaning of the artwork cannot be solely self-contained in the work. As Iser puts it in ways which echo the aparelletic (interfusion) of mechanical and human mind which comprises film consciousness, "significance of the work...does not lie in the meaning sealed within the text, but in the fact that meaning brings out what had previously been sealed within us."29
If there were an ideal meaning to an artwork, if it were infinitely repeatable, it would never be recoverable. There is always excess, there is, for Ricoeur, always an overabundance of meaning which outstrips any attempt to understand it. Every dialogue is incomplete and within this excess lies the sort of world that is opened up by hermeneutic interrogation. In the critical moment of understanding there is also a distancing of self from self. This process is writ large in film by the divergent subjective placements within narrative which demand that something of the self is abandoned in order to fill the place of the camera eye throughout the process of understanding. There is a willingness to allow the work to open up its world in the same way as the film interrogates the spectator by posing its own questions through complex states of subjective displacements.

Ricoeur’s notion of 'appropriation' involves a theory of subjectivity in relation to a text which expansively opens up horizons: "To understand is not to project oneself into the text; it is to receive an enlarged self from the apprehension of proposed worlds which are the genuine object of interpretation." The standing of personal identity is questioned and experienced in way which is disruptive of the sense of stability we attempt to erect in the face of a complex, mysterious world. In other words, surrendering is a prelude to thought. For the meaning of a film text to 'open up' something of the self must be given up, boundaries between the inner and outer lowered and temporal consciousness transformed. The importance of narration for our purposes lies not with a completed act of story-telling but rather with its dynamic process, implicating the spectator into a narrative act of understanding and re-telling of the self. In this way, film could be said to not only 'refer' to reality but to remake it. Narrative fiction is an irreducible dimension of self-understanding so that experience is a virtual narrativity which contributes towards a (narrative) identity, a self-identity which is culturally proposed.

This procedure of retaining self while conjoining with another world and other selves along a shifting perspectival spectrum amounts to alternatively relinquishing and retaining the sense of self. In fact, in terms of the appresented world of the narrative, empathy and contrastive pairing come close to restating the hermeneutic position of gaining meaning through appropriation. Film viewing is a way of living in the film’s universe and its narratives allows for an appropriation of a world which unfolds the world
horizon implicit in it, including the actions, characters and events of the story told. The fictive nature of projected worlds and alien regions in no way encumbers the potential for genuine insight and personal growth. On the contrary, the fictive quality aestheticises the experience and allows for personal indulgence:

"The more imagination deviates from that which is called reality in ordinary language and vision the more it approaches the heart of the reality which is no longer the world of manipulable objects, but the world...we try to orient ourselves by projecting our innermost possibilities upon it, in order that we dwell there."31

In several respects Gadamer echoes these viewpoints but with an emphasis on mimesis and the performative rather than the imitative and constative. Gadamer's own use of 'mimetic imitation' plays on the fact that the work is not designed to be "believed" but to be understood as imitation"32 This would make the filmwork not a false showing but a genuine "show": Imitation, not to be seen representatively as a copy of an original, but as a showing-in-appearance, something which supersedes reality: "What is shown is, so to speak, elicited from the flux of manifold reality. Only what is shown is intended and nothing else."33 Film cannot be taken as the substitute dream-world in which we can forget ourselves. On the contrary, the play of art is a mirror that through the centuries constantly arises anew and in which we catch sight of ourselves in a way that is frequently unexpected or unfamiliar. Life becomes meaningful when it is transformed into a figure that can be understood. "Understanding is not the control of what is other and objective; it is an enactment of commonality that is an event of truth."34

Unlike Ricoeur's mediation, reflection and narrative practises, Gadamer claims authentic understanding can be reached only if insistence on method in traditional hermeneutics is dropped. Gadamer tends to reject the principle which says text must be understood in its own context and thereby diminishes standards of confirmation and falsification for finding methodological truth. His concern is rather with process and a gestalt part-whole relationship consistently emphasising the prenoetic approach to Husserl's intentionality within historical horizons:
"For there is such a thing as givenness that is not itself the object of intentional acts. Every experience has implicit horizons of before and after, and finally merges with the continuum of the experiences present in the before and after to form the one flow of experience."\(^{35}\)

The flow of experience has the character of a universal horizon consciousness, out of which only particulars are truly given as experiences."\(^{36}\) Intentionality of meaning becomes transitional within the continuity of the whole. Horizons are non-stable, not rigid frontiers but the absent-present unity of the flow of experience. Above all, to experience a work mimaetically is to live with and through the work as if in a 'Spiel', the element of play:

"What is immediately clear is that the turn to Spiel as a basic ontological concept breaks the imitative universe of mirrors, and it does so by accenting, not the static correspondence of artifact or world to 'idea', but the self-disclosure of the world."\(^{37}\)

Here we can see the self-disclosure of the film world achieved not by an imitative or reflected image of a given state of affairs, a representation of an objective reality, but by the same involved immediacy of a play of movement we will find with Bergson, "the movement of play as such has, as it were, no substrate...the play is the performance of the movement as such."\(^{38}\) Most playing is 'medial'. We say "something is playing somewhere"\(^{39}\) as with film, something is 'playing' or 'going on' so that in film the spectator will join 'in media res' and become a part of the play going on, where authority is not personal subjectivity but the Spiel itself. Spiel is tantalisingly easy to conjoin, in fact it invites such a process and though effort may be required for understanding, there is still an ease of participation which is epitomised by film, "the ease of play which naturally does not mean that there is any real absence of effort, but phenomenologically refers only to the absence of strain...structure of play absorbs the player into itself."\(^{40}\)

This is not to say that the Spiel is indifferent to the spectator, on the contrary. When film 'becomes' the game, rather than say a ritual, it becomes "open to the side of the spectator, in whom it achieves its whole significance...it is experienced properly by...one who is not acting in the play, but is watching. In him the game is raised, as it were, to its perfection."\(^{41}\) Thus the presentative character of film would be realised through spectator
contribution as he/she fulfills and transforms the work with a certain constraint of not being lost within it. Gadamer theorises about the transformation resulting from human play into the artwork which is designed to incorporate reception and sees it as a permanence within transience:

"There cannot here be any transition of gradual change...the transformation into a structure means that what existed previously no longer exists. But also that what now exists, what represents itself in the play of art, is what is lasting and true."42

The artwork takes on a life of its own, in no way imitating or representing reality but gaining a truth value. Spiel is self-realising movement and brings from Being something into presentation. For Gadamer, Spiel is the mode of being of the artwork and particularly important for film is his description of the way Spiel relates to the free movement of self-presentation. There is a force of movement here, an irrepressible dynamic which we also find with Bergson, as speaking the very lifeforce:

"This movement must have the form of self-movement. Self-movement is the basic character of living being...What is living has the force of movement in itself; it is self-movement. Spiel appears only as self-movement which through its movement strives for neither purpose nor aim but rather movement as movement...which means the self-presentation of the being of life."43

Presentation of the self is precisely in accord with film's temporal unfolding and depends on this dynamic of movement and time. The fragmentation of subject identity and position comprises film's narrative mode as we are paced, placed, and switched around according to camera perspective and point-of-view through separate character identities and the omniscient voice of the implied author. With Ricoeur identity will come together, re-form in a mediated fashion through levels of interpretation. With Gadamer, identity splits and re-emerges through the performative acts of mimesis. We have the to-and-fro movement of those involved in the Spiel as the exchange of positions, where inter-reaction of spectator and film communes with, and negotiates for, various sites of understanding.

In comparing film to festival we find a similar experiential mode of a completed timelessness and a reconstituted freshness. Celebration in the
festival involves an uneasy confrontation between celebration as repetitive essence and the need for it to always be performed differently as times change and our perspectives naturally shift:

"For the essence of the festival its historical connections are secondary...it is its own original essence always to be something different...An entity that exists only by always being something different is temporal in a more radical sense than everything that belongs to history."\(^{44}\)

Even though film is a complete entity and unfolds unerring between the start and end reel, its re-presentational ideal is likewise constantly challenged by the singularity of its experience. The phenomenological experience of effective horizon will always ensure such particularity. Thus the play of Gadamer and its expression in celebration exemplify the constant interaction of the filmed world and the world as film. This engenders a tension by virtue of the fact that though the film is a completion its meaning and interaction with the lifeworld are not, since time itself and the lifeworld of experience is always in flux and unstable.

**Merging consciousness**

We have mentioned the interfusion of consciousness which is involved in the film experience and this is a theme which will be unraveled through this study. But, as a preliminary, we can look at Merleau-Ponty's notion of non-individuated consciousness, in so far as it is trans-personal, where communication raises no problem precisely because it is this:

"In so far as I am a consciousness, that is, in so far as something has meaning for me, I am neither here nor there, neither Peter nor Paul; I am in no way distinguishable from an 'other' consciousness, since we are immediately in touch with the world and since the world is, by definition, unique, being the system in which all truths cohere."\(^{45}\)

Using Merleau-Ponty to find equivalence between human and film consciousness is further encouraged by his treatment of the human cogito in terms of self-awareness, or its lack thereof. The registration of vision is usually taken as emanating from a particular site of consciousness. Bodily
vision is a site of consciousness and film's mechanical vision is a registration of perceptual consciousness through the camera eye (I). Both imply a (return) journey comprising a kind of visitation to where Being appears and a completion which involves absence and displacement before any return to the self: "Vision is not a certain mode of thought or presence to self; it is the means given me for being absent from myself, for being present at the fission of being from the inside - the fission at whose termination, and not before, I come back to myself."46

This departure and return must be seen as impersonal since it is in both human and film terms a vision and consciousness relating to the sensibility of dehiscence in Being. Film vision is not only at home here, it has no other 'place' to go and this may explain why Merleau-Ponty was one of the first philosophers to see the general relevance of film to philosophy. As with the primordial film condition of recording without reflexivity there is here an attack on the cogito where Merleau-Ponty "seeks to exclude the possibility of an act of reflection in which the subject would achieve complete self-transparency."47 With embodiment, self-presence finds expression not exclusively in the mind but in the prior bodily experience with concrete reality which is a fundamental change of emphasis from the Cartesian position. A prior giving of oneself to self via vision supersedes the transcendental vision of reflection on self and is rather recognised as a pre-reflective tacit cogito. As a tacit cogito which exists as a general sensibility of the self, however, it is "precarious" in that as soon as it finds linguistic expression it loses its character as non-reflective identity: "Behind the spoken cogito, the one which is converted into discourse and into essential truth, there lies a tacit cogito, myself experienced by myself. But this subjectivity, albeit imperious, has upon itself and upon the world only a precarious hold."48

With the notion of the tacit cogito "Merleau-Ponty retains a kind of pure interiority, pure immanence, behind experience", something which in fact he wanted to "abolish."49 That is, Merleau-Ponty's intent is to place consciousness in embodiment in the outer life-world and the sense of an introceptive, tacit cogito apparently mitigates this. As a non-conscious 'reflection', the tacit cogito is an almost dis-abled consciousness which approximates the noesis without its noemata, a kind of lacuna in pure immanence. Without becoming something it itself is not, it becomes redundant, since if it is to be 'formed' or understood as more than an empty
subjectivity language is needed: "It is by the combination of words...that I form the transcendental attitude, that I constitute the constitutive consciousness."\textsuperscript{50} As a result, what we see in later works with Merleau-Ponty is an awareness of self expressed in terms of a movement of transcendence which comes to be the chiasmic intertwining with the world "behind which there remains no subjective retreat of non-being."\textsuperscript{51} All of which ties in with film's own sense of self which has the same trajectory of veering away from implicit and introceptive subjectivity. Film has no reflexivity other than where we experience it in its configured stage when explicitly drawn attention to in the form of a self-reflexive manoeuvre. Film is thus able to make brute being approachable, to allow silence to speak in its own way unencumbered by subjective agendas.

We also find that Merleau-Ponty's discussion of self consciousness as a representation of self to self is particularly appropriate to film in its usage of images of reflections and mirrors. Merleau-Ponty begins by discussing the pre-self in the form of preconscious or incarnate subjectivity. Any reflectivity within the subject incarnate is primordially preparadictive, lived through the flesh in its adherence to the world. By touching oneself one expresses both an objectivity and subjectivity and this is a form of reflection, as touched and touching is an active-reactive echo of parts, rather than pure reaction. The body is a perceiving subject-object. In the child, before the specular mirror stage, there is an oceanic state experienced as undifferentiation where the sense of self has not yet broken away from a condition of oneness. This is a non-reflective, primordially automatic condition which only comes into figuration when retroactively the child considers the barely controlled sense of being as a fragmented and dependent state. Film lacks this retroactive self-capability and has to make do with 'showing' its initial phase. It can suggest the process, however, by its surface use of changing perspectives and dynamic dialogue with the spectator, "both film and the spectator are engaged in the act of seeing a world as visible, and both inhabit their vision from within it - as the intrapersonal relation between "myself, my psyche and my introceptive image."\textsuperscript{52}

Sartre has also looked at the non thetic consciousness of the self in terms of a prereflective cogito. When accessed through reflection, the prereflective cogito is seen to contain no 'I', it is egoless,
"[A]ll the nonreflective memories of unreflected consciousness (the past) show me a consciousness without a me, and since, on the other hand, theoretical considerations concerning consciousness which are based on intuition have constrained us to recognize that the 'I' cannot be a part of the internal structure of Erlebnisse, we must conclude there is no 'I' on the unreflected level."

In general, Sartre's notion of negation lays emphasis on self-effacement and this can be compared to the openness of the camera field, one which is less discriminatory and reductive than the human, phenomenal field. For Sartre, a major component of consciousness is the relationship of consciousness to that which it is not. What we are directly conscious of is that which has come to givenness out of the ground and transcendence of all Being. And Sartre defines the 'pour soi' as a nothingness, in terms of a tacit ego whose reflexivity is based on the fact that it realises it is not the 'en soi' and is 'constituted' by a nothingness against the fullness of the 'en soi', which it is not. Were the camera eye to have a tacit cogito and become self-conscious it might reflect on its status as a recording instrument and acknowledge that its reason for being is to be totally open to recording the 'en soi'.

Sartre's radical ontological dualism picks up on film's primal self-effacement. Its originary duplication is where the oneness of signifier and signification can be couched in terms of an unreflective negation in pure visibility. For Sartre, there is being not because consciousness gives rise to being but because it supplies the 'there is'. Sartre's 'pour soi' is a being such that in its being, its being is in question, "what is present to me is what is not me." Insofar as this being is essentially a certain way of not-being-a-being, there must be a founding negation, "if this negation were not given first and if it were not the a priori foundation of all experience." The concrete reality filming duplicates is other than its own corporeality but it is offered up as the total result of its visual capacity because its own being is apparently effaced whenever it picks up on objectivities or sentient beings. The source of vision, in this case the camera eye, is not self apprehensible but owes its viewing-view to what brings that view about. In return, that which has been visually reproduced owes its existence to the acts of film without which it would have remained undisclosed.
Primordial camera consciousness as based on recording something which it 
is not and making its viewing-view available to others can be couched in 
similar ways to Sartre's definition of the human:

"The being which I am not represents the absolute plenitude of the in-itself. 
And I, on the contrary, am the nothingness, the absence which determines 
itself in existence from the standpoint of this fullness...The knower...is 
nothing other than that which brings it about that there is a being-there on 
the part of the known, a presence...this presence of the known is presence to 
nothing, since the knower is the pure reflection of a non-being."56

The presence of the camera eye as emanating from a pure reflection of a 
non-being is perhaps even easier to accept in terms of a mechanical 'non-
being' than it is from the presence of the human "I", "the visible has to be 
described as something that is realized through man, but which is nowise 
anthropology."57 To a degree, it will carry out and enable the visual coming-
to-presence of the 'en soi' without intrusion or interference. In the "total 
indistinction of being, there is nothing but a negation which does not even 
exist but which has to be...Being in-itself gives itself and raises itself in relief 
on the ground of this nothing."58 This is one version of the gestalt which 
Merleau-Ponty examines as figures becoming determinate but now based 
on a founding and negated 'pour soi'. Film's visible imagery is nothing other 
than what the camera is not, though it is the condition for the 'en soi' to be 
visible in the film work. A film consciousness is possible here because it 
does not rely on a substantial ego for self confirmation but rather on an 
absolute presence, the otherly condition of plenitude which formalises 
figures out of undifferentiation. Sartre's presence of the materiality of being 
is immanent, though with transcendental repercussions. In the initial phase 
of film recording it is this total immanence which counts, it is the object as it 
appears to consciousness and materiality as it appears to film recording. For 
Merleau-Ponty there is still a sense of agency, not a causal one but one 
which is made up of a fluid and shifting force, not unlike that of Deleuze. The 
whole is made up of configurations which are " 'sensitive' to what happens 
in all the others, and 'knows them dynamically'.59 As a direct rejoinder to 
Sartre, "the subject of sensation...need not be a pure nothingness" but is 
rather a part of individual history with sedimented natural powers not, "in 
Hegel's phrase, a 'hole in being', but a hollow, a fold which has been made 
and can be unmade."60
Film is not conscious of itself being conscious as something other than the noemata of consciousness. Crucially, unlike the 'pour soi', film does not realise its-self being the obverse to materiality, in fact, as mechanical embodiment, it is itself part of materiality as an 'en soi', even as it is a consciousness which realises the 'en soi'. There is no self-deceptive belief by film consciousness that it has an essence, as Sartre would have it. More precisely, film can be seen as a return to Merleau-Ponty's notion of perception as prepersonal power where perception of worldly things is not viewed as the action of my body in response to the demands of a world from which I am separated, but as the moment of revelation of the flesh of the world where an essential 'pour soi' would simply be redundant. As a fold in being whose being touches itself through me "one can say that we perceive things in themselves, that we are the world that thinks itself."

The Deleuze connection

These phenomenological remarks on the relation of the real to the reel and intentionality to consciousness begin a trajectory which can only be completed by Deleuze. But it is not the intention of this study to set up the Deleuzean position as one of opposition. What transpires will rather be, if not a conciliation between the two camps, then a mutual support for understanding the notion of film consciousness in all its nuanced aspects. Areas within phenomenology, such as the relation of the immanent to the transcendental and the centrality of subjectivity need to be understood in terms of flux and time. The result is a position not so distant from Deleuze as one might initially assume. Deleuze's own position regarding cinema is fluid and complex and covers a wide range of film makers and theorists. In criticising the sensory motor schema and its accompanying organic regime, Deleuze presents such a comprehensive account that there is already a convincing argument for film consciousness before we even deal with the modern time-image. Thus, even though Eisenstein's model for thought is described as powerful it is locked within an organic whole which supposedly fails to allow for the emergence of fissures and the dissociative forces of time-image narratives. Philosophically for Deleuze, Eisenstein is closer to Hegel than Bergson. In the movement-image Deleuze emphasises the indirect projection of time, a duration in movement which is a synthetic achievement, a product of image and mind, a Hegelian unity of a higher
order. Relating this to Hegel is to insist on the intellectualisation of montage, 'thought-montage', since it is only with the dialectics of the aggrandisement of self-consciousness that the concept of the whole, film as consciousness, is thought. Yet when Deleuze shows the crucial contribution of Eisenstein's sensuous thought relating mind to nature and emotion this is enabled by similar shocks and disjunctures of thought which Deleuze feels to be the kernel of the modern time-image. We find that though we are relating shock to an Hegelian dialectic, its import carries over to the time-image. The interrelation of feeling and thought is an unbreakable bond. But in being aligned to Hegel it carries with it all the critique Deleuze has mounted against the Hegelian system.

Both phenomenology and Deleuze are needed to define film consciousness as a view-of-the-world or a view-to-the-world (the analysis of Resnais' "Last year at Marienbad" shows their similarity). But Deleuze's analysis is seen as comparable only up to that point where the movement-image and time-image separate. This is a move in which Deleuze describes a natural qualitative difference, one which reflects an historical, evolutionary shift away from organic, or Hegelian, oneness into a dispersed, Nietzschean multiplicity. Deleuze wants to oppose any description of the subject as an unfree, reactive, manufactured construct generated by slave mentality (through a feat of envious transvaluation) and self-denial, in favour of an autonomous, self-generating agency at home in the openness of matter. This is self-generation as opposed to the desire of negation which attempts to seek out the Other and incorporate that which is different. We need the will to power and a non-dialectic multiplicity of impulses to burst out of Hegelian desire. We need to oppose assimilation into identity and enjoy alterity and difference as an intensification of the play of forces. There is abundance rather than scarcity, joy rather than fear. For Deleuze, any consciousness which insists repetition be seen in terms of a preconceived identity amounts to limiting understanding, explaining it with reference to the form of identity in the concept. For Deleuze there cannot be such referentiality, there can be no underlying realm of immutability.

Briefly, Deleuze searches for change as causal negation, an intrinsic change which does not come from similar identity and Hegel is reproached for couching difference, and the extreme of contradiction, within the ground of identity:
"Hegelian contradiction does not deny identity or non-contradiction: on the contrary it consists in inscribing the double negation of non-contradiction within the existent in such a way that identity, under that condition or on that basis, is sufficient to think the existent as such. Those formulae according to which 'the object denies what it is not'...are logical monsters...difference is already placed on a path or along a thread laid out by identity...Difference is the ground for...the demonstration of the identical."63

This emphasises that for Deleuze we have not yet reached difference-in-itself. Fundamentally, Deleuze's difference is nondialectical, Hegel's vision is recuperative, Deleuze's is not:

"The dialectical negation is always directed toward the miracle of resurrection: It is a negation 'which supersedes in such a way as to preserve and maintain what is superseded, and constantly survives its own supersession'. (Phenomenology of Spirit, §188) Nondialectical negation is more simple and more absolute. With no faith in the beyond, in the eventual resurrection, negation becomes an extreme moment of nihilism...Nondialectical negation is absolute not in the sense that everything present is negated but in that what is negated is attacked with full unrestrained force."64

There is no room in the dialectic for the out-of-control, any sign of excess comes under what Deleuze disparagingly describes as "the insipid monocentricity of the circles in the Hegelian dialectic."65 The move here away from the negative inclusivity of Hegel's dialectic seems decisive. Deleuze would resist Hegel's initial presentation of the opposition between being and nothingness in the "Science of Logic". The essence of determinateness is its negation, its move away from inertia is sparked by contradiction, that which it is-not. But this is an external impulsion related to determinate being, whereas for Deleuze emphasis is on indeterminate becoming which is closer to Bergson's notion of intuition. In the process, the being of being takes a back seat to the more fundamental being of difference. As Hardt succinctly puts it:

"For being to be necessary, the fundamental ontological cause must be internal to its effect. This internal cause is the efficient cause...it is only the efficient cause, precisely because of its internal nature, that can sustain being as substance, 'causa sui'. In the Bergsonian context, then, we might
say that efficient difference is the difference that is the internal motor of being."\textsuperscript{66}

For Bergson the thing differs with itself immediately and first whereas in Hegel the thing differs with itself because it first differs with all that it is not. For Bergson, the combination of synthesis and antithesis are abstract and cannot be concrete and real. An effect cannot contain more reality or perfection than its cause, so the dialectical synthesis must remain contingent and abstract. In fact Bergson's indeterminacy and virtuality has little to do with Hegel's immanence, inspired rather by the unforeseeable. Dialectic movement is seen as a false movement. As Deleuze comments: "The concrete will never be attained by combining the inadequacy of one concept with the inadequacy of its opposite. The singular will never be attained by correcting a generality with another generality."\textsuperscript{67}

In this way, film as referential, or as an unveiling of truth picked up mirror fashion from the recorded world, is anathema. Discovering referentially and recovering the already pre-formed is not the 'truth' but rather a confirmation of the already known, "truth cannot be said to be the product of a prior disposition or schema, but is the result of a tremendous violence in thought... One will never find truth, one will never philosophize, if one knows in advance what one is looking for."\textsuperscript{68} Thinking only comes into play when it encounters the unthinkable. The simulacrum, for example, is contradictory, it jolts thought into action with novelty and originality. It is a part of becoming rather than the being of a state of affairs. The lack of substance in film, unlike a piece of sculpture, a painting or even a photograph, lends itself to the transitoriness of the simulacrum. Film is invisible and has no being until projected and on completion exists nowhere. It is not 'on show' until shown. Intrinsically it has no chronos of being.

For Deleuze multiplicity is a task to be carried out, we must always make connections.\textsuperscript{69} To connect is to work with Other possibilities. The multitude of connecting possibilities in film makes it a prime example of this. The connection between connecting modalities is made after the event in film through montage imagery. Yet this only supports or reinforces the already split nature of time we come to see in crystal imagery (thus not a mirror of, but a mirror within). Film is so appropriate here for showing time, showing time-in-action as a mobile mirror, the perpetual foundation of time as Cronos rather than Chronos.

26
At the same time, however, there is a lingering sense of unease in the rejection of organic representation that we find in the ultimate time-image. Film has its (dialectic) duplications, re-presentation, intentional framework between recording and recorded, the real and the real, the frame and the beyond-the-frame, identity and difference, part and whole, all of which seem 'comfortable' with Hegelian negation and organic movement. Which is not to say that film 'should' be so, only that there are elements intrinsic to film ontology which prevent it acceding completely to the way of thinking Deleuze argues for the time-image.

From this conclusion it may well be that the circularity of Hegel, where Spirit's self-actualization is the process of its own becoming, is more applicable to the inclusiveness and unwrapping of a self-contained film work. A process which carries with it its own becoming-other. Deleuze's actuality as an expressed potential is rather a step removed from the dormant world of possibility closer to filmed structuration. A structuration which in its primordial phase is a mediation which passes over into an aesthetic antithesis through a sublation which both retains and negates the original lifeworld. Film is, after all, on a very basic level if not a system of representation then a system of mediation. Involved in film's mediated system is an internal integration of the re-presented world as a natural force of immanence. The result of this is an entity which contains multiplicity but encourages coherence and self-referentiality. Moreover, in terms of the sets and systems we find in film, the lifeworld itself has a dialectic need for film as a way to become other to itself, in order to know itself. Even though there is qualitative difference in the images of film based on concrete reality, it is a difference that strives for identity in difference rather than difference in difference.

There is a sense, then, in a move which is anti-Deleuzean, where the act of filming is a way by which the represented world comes outside itself to know itself and return to itself through a hermeneutic circle. The otherness that exists in the film work, even in those which are anti-narrative and radically disruptive of spatio-temporal reality, is an otherness which is inevitably co-opted by the organic structure of film and the desire of the spectator to 'write in' a comprehensive whole. The idea of telos, in whatever form it takes, is an inherent part of the film experience as an anticipated and realisable condition. Thus, Frank Kermode's notion of 'concorde fictions' point out we can never provide solutions to life's mysteries and temporal aporias, but we
repeatedly show those aporias in art in different contexts and under different guises:

"We create fictions because we do not know what happens after death. In short, we try to improve upon the fictions created by philosophy and religion which ascribe portentous meaning to life and assume for existence a significance which is entirely hypothetical."\textsuperscript{70}

Conclusions will be justified and endings, no matter how unlikely, provided. Hegel's dialectic does not lead to stultification and closure but a certain satisfaction which if 'out-of-time' in a Deleuzean sense may be so because film itself is out-of-time in a phenomenological sense. Film's ontology would need to be other if it were to entirely satisfy Deleuze's requirements. Deleuze may rather be laying the groundwork for future media, video productions, virtual reality and cyborg digitalising with subjectivities which are fluid and interactively negotiable. Here there is not a finished or completed artwork at all waiting for projection, or a power struggle for transcendence and assimilation, but rather a will to power which expresses internal differentiation naturally and unencumbered through creative mappings of pathways which affirm the generativeness of life and possibilities for connective exploration.

In short, film enters into flux as a capture of movement, at the point of emergence from non-visibility to visibility, from the undeveloped to the developed, from the intricate to the extricate, from impression to expression. And when interaction takes place between spectator and film, formal deconstruction allows for a return to the hyle and sensation of unformed matter. Through segmentation of formalised materiality we tap into the virtual and contact the reality of what has been, that which was always a past, which has 'prematurely' been perceived and fixed, to regenerate and rejuvenate whatever productive, utopic potential lies in waiting. The subjectivity that enables this capture is couched in the intentionality of noesis to noema but becomes with Bergson, out of duration, the subjectivity that escapes us in pure past. And with Merleau-Ponty, consciousness is the result of the dehiscence or opening up of being into the sensing-sensible chiasm and film is a presence at that place where Being's interior lights up. Being manifests its own meaning, a meaning which is a configuration which occurs as being differentiates itself from itself. Filming does not make the presence of the world, it finds it there as a process in action and by visioning
it, it envisions itself as the visibility of seeing, as both a catalyst and witness to Beings upsurge.

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49Sallis, ibid., p. 66.
51Ibid.
55Ibid., p. 174.
56 Ibid., p. 177.
57 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 274.
58 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 179.
60 Ibid.
62 See Appendix
65 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 263.
66 Hardt, ibid., p. 5.
Film and Phenomenology

The camouflaged parrot
he flutters from fear
when something he doesn't know about
suddenly appears,
what cannot be imitated perfect
must die,
farewell Angelina, the sky's flooding over
I must go to where it's dry.
-----Bob Dylan, Farewell Angelina

A phenomenology of film consciousness must account for the way film relates to concrete reality and explore the spectator's mode of consciousness to a film world which is rooted in the upsurge of being. The complexity of film imagery makes for the complexity of film experience, comprising as it does a unique admixture of the 'show place', as a Merleau-Pontian visualising-vision, and a 'time-zone', the unique duration of a temporal artform. Film ontology is the unique fusion of the initial phase of film recording in the lifeworld with the secondary phase of projected viewing. A first phase embodiment predicatively implicated by a spatial and temporal re-ordering. The effort to describe a film consciousness as an understanding of the world is no sleight-of-hand, no perfunctory anthropomorphism. On the contrary, the viewer's fascination with film and film's fascinating power of viewing comprise an enterprise of exchange and reciprocity, submission and control, a buffer world between two similar sensibilities in which film, as somehow inscribed in the world, speaks to human agency, as somehow inscribed in film. The exchange is worldly, yet intimate, intimately private yet publicly projected, all-encompassing yet artistically distancing.
At the very moment film penetrates the world with its effluent sensibility, it simultaneously hides from view everything that lies beyond its encompassing frame as off-screen space. The probing eye of the film camera produces a disclosed reality which relays back to a spectator who becomes an active co-participator in a visual-sound discourse. Whether the contact of images with filmed matter, as in a contact print, 'truly' demystifies or merely serves to reinforce an already ungraspable and evasive lifeworld remains to be explored. If this journey to understand film consciousness is circuitous this is an 'intended' circle, its trajectory is overtly acknowledged as both an enticing departure and a familiar return.

The fact that few theorists have attempted to incorporate phenomenology and film, whether it be the embodiment of Merleau-Ponty or the transcendentalism of Husserl, is surprising because of the inbuilt similarity between the two areas.¹ Film carries within it a double intentional act of perception. The primordial recording of the concrete world by the camera is both a view of the world and a temporal recording of it. And the projection of the final film is a re-view of this world, configured into a noetic, thetic mode ready for an aesthetic consciousness which looks for meaning. In order to complete a full series of noematic acts which will, in an all-encompassing manifold, disclose the full object or activity, an unveiling and unfolding process comes into play which is filmically comparable to concrete world experience. That is to say, the interpretation of film imagery and the interpretation of concrete, perceptual imagery have a close but distinct correspondence. The different modes of consciousness that come into play in the film experience, the direct perception of the film image, imagination, fantasy projection and narrative interpretation, emanate from a film object which is directly related to the concrete world and the phenomenal lifeworld. This is a natural consequence of the fact that perceptual understanding as described by phenomenological intentionality is a complex process centering around a precise correlation between the mode of consciousness, noesis, and the object as intended, noema. Included in this, however, is a series of imbrications which stretch the margins or borders of the intentional act into the non-present, introducing an extended notion of the primal present and a relativity of primordial presence.

The implications this brings about for exploring 'Being' through the regional ontology of film aesthetics are far-ranging. Film cannot be categorised into a neatly sealed envelope of experience because unlike the plastic arts, the
camera begins from lifeworld embodiment as an already-involved constituent of the real, part and parcel of the flux of experience. So even though it seems the work of art as such is a world for-itself, what is experienced filmically cannot be removed from its connections with actuality. Any analysis of film must find a more focused position to bring to light the significance of a unique ontology.

The classical gap between formalism, which concentrates on film's unique expressive qualities as an aesthetic language and realism, which minimises this expressive signification in favour of film's revelatory capabilities for depicting nature and the lifeworld, can be bridged. Indeed, the phenomenological approach is an account of the way the bridge is built. A phenomenological film analysis is a direct confrontation with theories of film spectatorship which set up the film experience as a separation between a viewing subject and an object viewed. In contradistinction to any dualism, phenomenology's immanent correlation of consciousness makes the experience reciprocally alive and evanescent, eliding fixity. Film's phenomenological aesthetic experience and hermeneutic understanding take shape as a metacritique, as an intricate dialectic of a consciousness of consciousness and a perception of perception.

This means spectator and film correlation are both objects and subjects, rather than exclusively either subject or object. They switch back and forth as a fusing and fading mirror, comprising a Janus-face alternation between the subjective and objective correlates of spatio-temporal awareness and spatio-temporal perspectives. The spectator rides the waves of film motion, the tempo, duration and vacillating points of view within the diegetic film world while still retaining a personal, identifying (rather than identical) mindset. Traditional ways of describing film spectatorship, such as escapist identification or voyeurism, are not radical enough. To understand spectatorship in a presuppositionless way one must relate to the basic spatio-temporal structures upon which film movement is constructed as we read and are addressed by the movement and time of film's unfolding. Phenomenologically, film spectatorship allows for an elaboration of a more fluid structure of coincidences and differences, oneness and diversity, centred perspective and multidirectional viewpoint. As the interactive process of give and take comes into play, areas of lacunae open up to be complemented, filled and questioned by the spectator's own intentional horizons and expectations. In film, two corresponding intentionalities vie
with each other. The original intentionality of the filmmaker which is configured through the instrumentality of the camera eye, and the intentionality of the spectator who interacts with this original perception as it is manifested as original expression in the projected film.

Filming and the experience of what is filmed inevitably includes intentionality and an experience from the inside-out rather than the outside-in. In fact, a recurrent theme is the effort to unveil surfaces by depth penetration and exploration, even though film seems most concerned with surface appearance. As a study of the essence of the film experience, it is important to bear in mind that description applies to all film types and genres. Even though there is an apparent rejection of style in so-called works of realism, "the rejection of style inherent in phenomenological realism is surely the expression of a determination to find a place outside the field of art"^2, we are nonetheless still dealing with an aesthetic experience and not praxis in the lifeworld. The effect of verisimilitude is one which itself demands subtle and perspicacious artistic choices.

Accessing the reel

The high ascetic requirements to achieve genuinely realistic films ultimately become a self-conscious 'style' of its own and at most results in an ambiguity between the concrete and film world which only apparently "does not tamper with events, nor permeate them artificially with ideas and emotions."^3 What is important to understand is how the 'reel' relates to the 'real' and how, if there is ambiguity, this finds expression in both realistic, non-obtrusive films and non-realistic, overtly manipulative ones. In both cases, there is a role for hermeneutic interpretation and a phenomenological analysis of the transcendent as it relates to the transcendental. What is crucial in all film genres is to acknowledge film in its primary mode of givenness as an act and a way of intentionally perceiving the world:

"The act of seeing also suggests that the source of its activity shares a material equivalence with that which appears to it in the world it presents. Whether the much maligned 'classical' or 'bourgeois' Hollywood cinema, a Bugs Bunny cartoon with its explicit and 'impossible' transformations, a
computer-generated short, a cinema vérité documentary, or a structural-materialist film, all film presents not only the seen but also the seeing."\(^4\)

Film accommodates a wide range of productions none of which change the initial conditions of its formation. Its itinerary is wide, a vista which moves from 'neutral' news reportage with minimal manipulative treatment and a sense of propriety towards the real, to a formalised and intentionally abstracted montage of avant-garde. Film's initial primordial phase is to be considered as a phase which looks exclusively at 'filming' as a theoretical premise. Indeed, this phase does not argue in favour of a particular style or genre nor of cinema as a social institution. It rather looks in a presuppositionless way at what it means to record filmically in order for it to be subsequently viewed cinematically. Implied in this phase, therefore, is a film experience which has first to be characterised in terms of embodiment which cannot shake off its ontological roots. We will see that Husserl's general description of artistic representation gives a foundation for understanding both the ontology of film as a depiction of real life, the focus of realist film theory, as well as a way of understanding the role of the film spectator in terms of an active constructor of the film text.

For realist film theorists we directly understand concrete reality through the image rather than at a distance through a series of coded messages. Husserl's example is of Durer's engraving, "The Knight, Death, and the Devil":

"We distinguish...the perceptive consciousness in which, within the black, colourless lines, there appear to us the figures of the 'knight on his horse', 'death' and the 'devil'. We do not turn our attention to these in aesthetic contemplation as objects. We rather turn our attention to the realities presented in the picture - more precisely stated, to the 'depicted' realities, to the flesh and blood knight, etc."\(^5\)

In realist film terms there is a direct route to that which is represented, which has an independent existence of its own, something which film both creatively reproduces but also mechanically confirms. Reality here is both a 'product' of human perception and an expression of the re-presented world. The core component is the way of 'apperceptively' experiencing this reality as a given, of passing through various qualities of the image to depicted reality and beyond that to the symbolic. In terms of the artistic representation
of the Durer painting "it is relationship between experiences of certain sorts that is the source for the representation...in the act of grasping what the engraving depicts, (perceivers) live through or pass through the sensa in order to grasp what the engraving represents, the real knight...who exists independently of the engraving."6

For Husserl, art presents a special case of perception. Film, for example, is contrived and the status of its particularity will be contextual and generically specific. Here the nature of apprehension can be the focus of attention. This allows for an exploration of the noetic structure and the positing experience. The picture, for Husserl, has a consciousness in the mode of a neutrality-modification of perception "[t]his depicting picture-object stands before us neither as non-being, nor in any other positional modality; or rather we are aware of it as having its being, though only a quasi-being, in the neutrality-modification of Being."7 Husserl's position here encompasses a broad spectrum of film theory. It accommodates the initial phase of film recording as an embodiment in the life flux as well as the transcendental position of artistic creation and omniscient expression. It crucially allows for the exploration of the relation of the immanent noemata to concrete reality, a reality which will be understood in its broadened interpretive capacity. The experiential situation will be pivotal in judging the contribution of spectator activity as a co-determinator and participator in the construction of meaning through time awareness, phenomenology's inner time-consciousness.

The raw materiality of film can be seen as the first stage of a unique dialectic. A dialectic considered in terms of an impasse, or limit point, which leads to the ineluctable need for a restructuring of film imagery through the deconstruction of space and time. In general, such a dialectic is ignored by film theorists with their impassioned agendas for locking film into systems of ideology, psychoanalysis or semiotics.8 These approaches should not be underestimated. Indeed, the semiotic system of signs, psychoanalytic identification, and ideological appellation have all aided in the understanding of the film experience. But each approach takes for granted what phenomenology insists must be thematised in an effort to formulate a genuine presuppositionless grounding for the film experience. Objects and situations can be seen for what they are and the perceiver is no longer locked into one, specific world-view. It can be claimed that through the correlation of intentionality, the blinkers of preconceived value systems can be removed "now that ideology has disintegrated, material objects are
divested of their wraps and veils so that we may appreciate them in their own right." Only after film is positioned as a grounded participant in the lifeworld and as an involved observer of mobile imagery, can we proceed to focus on the limit point of sublated expression which emerges through reflective levels of conscious understanding.

The dialectic of film as show-time grounds the initial phase of recording as an irreducible, natural, and positive component of ontology prior to the processes of montage and postproduction. In other words, rather than dichotomise two kinds of film approaches into the classical realist and idealist camps, the one emphasising the inviolable world-outside, the other formal aesthetic shaping, show-time sees profound involvement in the lifeworld as a prerequisite for transition into complex montage and disjunctive temporal modalities. Indeed, the dialectic circuit cannot begin without it. To ignore this two-phased schematic, which is reciprocally inclusive rather than mutually exclusive, is also to undermine the significance of the important phenomenological discussion between the concrete ego and the transcendental ego, as well as the singularity of the film event and its universal implication in aesthetic consciousness. What emerges is an inexorable relation between the two positions rather than the exclusion of one in favour of the other. Transcendental phenomenology together with existential embodiment aid in assessing film both in terms of placement in the lifeworld and dis-placement in the aesthetic world. It is only for the sake of argument and expositional clarity that a division is set up between a primordial phase of recording within a removed space for viewing and a secondary phase of duplication with disjunctive zones of temporality. In practise, both phases merge, just as time and space, to comprise aspects of the same expression.

The ontological bridge between the real world and the reel world is phenomenology's intentionality. Primal intentionality as described by Husserl and developed by Merleau-Ponty describes phenomena as experienced directly as a givenness through the subject-object correlation. Following from this, film intentionality can be considered as duplicated through an experience which recaptures original primal impression and then offers up that primal impression in a derived aesthetic experience which itself becomes primal on an elevated remove. Originary experience in the lifeworld is discriminatory, fueled by a natural perception designed to facilitate practical functioning in the everyday world. Filmed imagery, on the
other hand, unencumbered by everyday rigour, incorporates the possibility of excess even in primordial perception because it combines the indifference of the mechanical eye with the human agency of the filmmaker's 'I'.

The truth of the film work, or aesthetic film object, demands not only formal realisation but also, in terms of content, a certain relation to the real. The assumption being that the real is readily given to reflective and scientific understanding. There is an expectation that what is found in the real world will somehow be carried over into the reel film world, the only contention being the manner of the transference rather than its eventuation. In fact, if the truth of being is merely an objective given, film's proclivity for reproduction would be the ideal tool for a scientific mirroring of the real. In phenomenological terms, however, such objectivity is anathema. Husserl's peculiar 'scientific' project revolves around a dynamic construction, discovery, constitution and the efforts of intentionality. If the film work is to be considered in this context, even with film imagery's insistent verisimilitude, mere resemblance cannot be accredited with objective proof. Rather, what is represented, or reproduced, is the experience of reality through the experience of the artwork, an experience which is at the same time singularly unique and universally meaningful, an experience which is saturated with the familiar yet visited by the strange.

The movement of film as movement-imagery allows the most thoroughgoing explorations of spatio-temporal reality. Again, this turns out not to be an objective reproduction but a lived experience in-depth. The intimate yet public projection of multifaceted visual perspectives rests in the real world but simultaneously transcends it. Filmed space is a lived space which is both distantly viewed and bodily implicated, a vision which is temporally measured yet disjunctively fragmented. As much as the real is a reference point, film itself is also a self-referential world. As filming attempts to encompass the gamut from chronicling facts in the empirical world to the most abstract avant-garde film, it can only succeed with that intention by refusing to imitate concrete reality and artistically encapsulate what is the real of reality. In doing so, film discovers and uncovers an aesthetic meaning rather than an artistic mirror, a meaning which resonates through unexpected visions and dislocated spaces.
The lived world seems infinitely open and horizontally expansive whereas the filmed world is internally cohesive and locked-off from concrete activity. However, being locked-off does not distance the two worldly experiences. On the contrary, what film mirrors in the objective world is its potentially diverse structures and myriad behaviours, none of which are tied down to anything which is really fixed or finitely frameable. Both film and concrete reality reflect infinite potentiality, expanding horizons and shifting molecular systems which constitute the ungraspable totality of the real, contributing towards phenomenological abundance, ineffable sensibilities and aesthetic overdetermination:

"The real itself is never present except in terms of the various a priori of presence which structure it and confer meaning on it by structuring it in accordance with a vital subjectivity...the real as such does not yet have the shape of a world. The overflowing character which it assumes is not yet a characteristic of a world, and we cannot enumerate or unify singular worlds within it. This overflowing character is like an inexhaustible reservoir of the given, but only because it holds nothing in reserve. It is an inexhaustible matrix of signification, but only because it has no signification of its own."10

The intaglio of the real world is raised into a selected, discriminated number of worlds with recognisable, intentionally-given significations. The expressive artwork is a realisation of one such possibility from the infinite possibilities to be experienced in brute reality "the real is lived as the field of possibilities"11 and within this field each aesthetic world en-lightens the real. Within the objective real world lie a multitude of readily given structures which enchant and seduce, evoking memories and subjective reactions. These are close to the "found stories" discerned by Siegfried Kracauer in the plenitude of the natural world with its bank of potential situations and ready-made stories, and here "we feel at one with the real, and it seems as if the real seeks to find in us all its amplitude and its resonance...the real needs us."12 These natural interactions with the regions of concrete reality which include us 'as-if' part of an ongoing narrative can be evoked in the affectivity of film's aesthetic attitude. Creatively designed stories concomitant to the spontaneously artless ones.

The real world is a world that demands attention and action as we focus on the immediately given and concretise multiple, absent indeterminacies which constitute the existential world within the cosmological. The aesthetic
world may not demand similar praxis but it does penetrate this other-worldly reality casting fresh light on it through resemblance and presentation. In this way "art is true because it helps us to know the real." Thus, the film work becomes a distillation of the real world through similar structures of experience and indeed, for Gadamer, art is exemplary:

"The aesthetic experience is not just one kind of experience among others, but represents the essence of experience itself...In the experience of art there is present a fullness which belongs not only to this particular content or object but rather stands for the meaningful whole of life."  

We need to understand what these similar structures of experience are if film is to be either a mirror of, or window into, concrete reality. Whereas most aesthetic works are characterised by distance and the artifact of otherness, film ontology is peculiarly noteworthy for reducing the gap between the expression and the expressed, the signifier and the signified, establishing entry points in tandem with intentional experiences. This presents an immediate challenge to accepted artistic norms of representation and the articulation of lifeworld recognition.

**Film encounters**

As a philosophy of intentionality and conscious experience phenomenology is ideal for describing a film experience which is the conjoining of two consciousness, film's and the spectator's. Phenomenological description helps map out components of the film experience and its relation to film ontology, especially film's existential body as a pregiven encounter in the lifeworld. With Husserl the implications of intentionality need to be drawn out both immanently and transcendentally from the prepredicative act of filming to the projected act of spectatorship. Film's recording is a recording of something just as essentially phenomenological consciousness is a consciousness of, both activities implicating a correlative relationship. Lived experience implies a proof of the actual encountered world similar to photographic proof where the phenomenality of the appearing object is caught and attested to by the flux of consciousness on a 'plate' of consciousness. Phenomena are made present not by representation but by the presence of consciousness in direct grasp, in permanent presence, in
immediate evidence. This is a self-givenness in person, absolute presence and givenness which is also the condition of film as a reduced, purified object, totally present with its choice of adumbrations pre-empted by what is actually shot at a given moment. Film is a total intuition.

In its first ontological phase, as part of a primary phenomenal field, the camera eye immediately situates itself as an instrumental presence. Its machine body mechanically records in an impersonal fashion all that comes before it. At the same time it produces imagery as a formed 'consciousness', later embroiled in an aesthetic experience subject to intentionality, which becomes a reciprocal relation of subject consciousness to film consciousness. As originally signified, the film world does not yet carry out any rational clarifications of eternal truths. Such a transcendental move is only introduced in the second phase of film as a configuration. Rather, its originary condition is non-rational, non-reflective and a particularised confirmation of the concrete world:

"This more radical conception is that of pure affective pregivenness, of a passive belief in being, in which there is nothing yet of cognitive achievement: the mere 'stimulus' which proceeds from an existent in the environing world."15

The most appropriate description of the way film directly appropriates the materiality of the prepredicative realm is by way of 'encounter'. Film awareness captured in the prepredicative realm is one of direct encounter as the primary establishment of the "being-for-us" of objects in their objective sense in an openness prior to judgment. This is a region of presence where we encounter the other before crystallising conceptual sense by 'countering' it. "Original substrates are therefore individuals, individual objects, and every thinkable judgment ultimately refers to individual objects, no matter how mediated in a variety of ways."16

Livingness predominates because any thingness given in person can also not be, but no lived experience given in person cannot be, because being 'in person' is exactly what comprises it. The constraint of presence is absolute. Here film is the originary presence which is not, as such, related to a self but which a self makes possible. A presence which sets off, or ignites a cleavage. An explosive disruption in undifferentiation, a process which takes place over time, a time and place where I come to be, though

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still 'in absentio'. Film is a presence which visually and aurally records, bringing sight and sound. A witness which does not instigate dehiscence but still presents the presence of dual splitting. A presence at the place and time where the invisible subsumes the visible and where film records the showing without itself being shown.

Here, film's image-making facility re-presents the givenness of reality, its thereness and nowness, in a way which is aesthetically unique. Film inserts itself into the prepredicative encounter between the perceiver and the demands of the perceived "this element of encounter - the self-communication of the object to my receptivity and its insistence on itself even while in my perceptive hold." Film picks up on the facticity of materiality, not only the conveying of an essential or formalistic image but its here and nowness. The qualitative data of external objects are felt to be "thrust upon the percipient" just as they 'reach out' to the camera eye and "convey the affective presence of the objects themselves." The experience is of the reality of the object as co-existing at the time of mechanical recording and the filmmaker's artistic direction. Ultimately some abstraction is needed in encounter for actions to be taken and blind instinct overcome:

"The element of encounter is balanced by one of abstraction, without which sensation would not rise to perception...Some sort of disengagement from the causality of the encounter provides the neutral freedom for letting the 'other' appear for itself."19

This is the beginning of the move from immanence to the transcendental but still as minimal suggestion. The letting appear for-itself is the instrumental expression of film's intrusion and inclusion. There is a marking of a disengagement within engagement, the decision to record has been consciously taken and the affective hold of reality temporally broken, though once recording is intentionally and mechanically set-in-motion, it substantiates itself as being of the lifeworld.

The roots of film recording in the pregiven world are in accord with being situated as both a passive receiver and an active producer in a world of valid givenness. It is "[t]he beginning of an act of perception with its turning-toward...already a consciousness of being next to the object itself...the object in its living...present."20 For Husserl, perceptive contemplation of the pregiven sensuous substrate is already an activity, but one on the lowest
possible level. The object is merely in view, unattended, an affirmation and confirmation as an existent. Here, the ego and camera eye, 'consent' to what is coming in, what protrudes, without emitting premeditated configuring rays of attention to discriminate, order and re-assemble. Conscious activities which comprise the exercising of practical decisions in the lifeworld and creative decisions in the aesthetic realm are, as yet, relatively absent. Yet even though the materiality of the pregiven field of absolute flux is not yet discriminated or discerned by attentive consciousness, it is still crucially acknowledged as the dynamic which fuels the lifeworld. Not as the mere impression of surroundings, not film as a purely 'impressed' plate or neutral mould, but rather a minimal level activity, "receptivity must be regarded as the lowest level of activity."21

Film can be correlated on this level with passive doxa, where doxa is the common sense of primary experience and episteme the constituted realm. Primordial filming is revealed to be an activity of pre-cognition by virtue of its worldly emplacement and 'exposure' to the pregiven and affective stimuli. Physical proximity of the placed camera eye within the lifeworld is integral to this passive synthesis. Automated consciousness as yet unselfconsciously interlaced with noesis is already, by its sheer presencing, registering the world as passively yet primevally active and alive, on the cusp of redirection, on the verge of diversion:

"[U]nder the term 'perception'...we distinguish, on the one hand, the simple having-in-consciousness of the original appearance (those which present objects in their original embodiment)...in pure passivity, and, on the other hand, active perception, the active apprehension of objects which come to prominence within a field of perception which extends beyond them."22

We are in the realm of objects where no judgments have yet been made. The area of the origin of sense. Objects of the world stimulate later cognition and any other modalities of consciousness which are the source for our thought and action. What Husserl calls 'preliminary presences' are the constituent elements of all that enter into the background of our field of consciousness. It is this background that is to be equated with primordial film recording, a presence which is part and parcel of a general environment making up the world of all pregiven objects. It is a world which fills the presuppositionless condition of film by capturing 'raw materiality', a
notion which Siegfried Kracauer directly picks up on to describe the unformed condition of the lifeworld.

In this way, the pregivenness of experience, the unreflective bedrock, is captured by film on its primordial recording level. Most crucially, this first level as characterised by the realm of pregiven objects of experience contributes to film's 'reality-effect' because it is one we believe undoubtedly to exist "[o]bjects are always present to us, pregiven in simple certainty, before we engage in any act of cognition. At its beginning, every cognitive activity presupposes these objects. They are for us in simple certainty."23

Husserl continually calls primordiality a world of passive pregivenness because our attention is not yet turned specifically towards such an environment, though it is this environment which includes and encapsulates everything. Film informs this 'worldly' environment and grasps it for us.

In its primary recording mode film marks a receptivity which melds into passive apprehension of moving unities of identity which are recognisable as entities. Connections in the pregiven field of perception do not yet involve an active ego and thus, ontologically, this state is on the cusp of basic gestalt configurations and associations:

"Directly apprehending a plurality of objects by running through them successively only involves taking more and more objects together while those previously apprehended still remain in grasp...the consciousness of a plurality of objects run through is realised - but, for all that, nothing is apprehended of a relation which the one object may have to the others."24

This is to ad-here to camera emplacement, a situated camera eye which does not yet connect related similarities but denotes an array of disconnected movements coming into frame, waiting for the completion of intentional directedness. This awaiting for completion runs through from the preconfigured to the configured as an element of openness. This is a lack of closure which resists wholeness by virtue of temporal flux which inherently has no end and it is a quality of filming that survives through modernism and experimentation. In fact, this condition is endemic to mechanical consciousness, a relation of intentional noema to the real of concrete reality without the fulfillment of completed identity, something more easily achievable by the disinterested, mechanical eye than the immersed and concerned human "I".
The commutation between existence and essence in the film experience as a transcendental of filming and encounter with the concrete makes for a complex, multidimensional experience. As with sense perception and vision, "there is this paradox to sense perception: the felt affectiveness of its data...necessary for the experience of the 'reality' of the real...must in part be canceled out again in order to permit the apprehension of its 'objectivity'." Encounter and abstraction, intuition and intention, vie with each other within an involved duplication and more distanced signification. Disengagement from the real world is replaced by another kind of empathetic engagement in the reel world. And pointedly for the visuality of film:

"Vision, of all senses, most conspicuously realises in its normal performance this double feat of 'abstraction': setting off the self-contained object from the affective condition of sensing, and upholding its identity and unity across the whole range of its possible transformations of appearance..."26

For film to attend to the pregiven in this way is tantamount to existing in the natural attitude, to go to the purely affective pregiven of the passive belief in being. Only later is the film world testament to the belief in the world delivered up as an as-if, a re-viewed quasi-reality which is given a kiss of life in subsequent projection.

Sheer presence as it becomes the act of a viewing view that is a perspective on the world eventually comes to be intersubjectively shared. It becomes a primordial realisation, in film's case a duplication of the earliest conscious murmuring of dynamic perception. This pure state of experience has a sensuousness which has, as yet, been untreated by cognitive faculties. Yet it is itself a field of sense with a spatio-temporal flux, a field of sense which already has unities of identity which appear in multiform manner. The appearance of things in their givenness as a testimony to the presence of film recording takes place in the actuality of a present-that-was. Just as phenomenologically "my consciousness in general is, in the capacity of a flowing present, given originarily and absolutely, not only according to essence, but also according to existence."27 This unity, moreover, already in the pregiven and already in duration and flux, is
specifically designated by Husserl as constituted by a time which film, more than other artforms, directly participates in:

"[T]he essential characteristic of all 'appearances'...namely that they are time-giving...all perceived, all perceptible, individuals have the common form of time. It is the first and fundamental form, the form of all forms, the presupposition of all other connections capable of establishing unity. Temporality as duration, as coexistence..."\(^{28}\)  

We avoid the idealism of representation which creates representational images dependent on consciousness in favour of concrete givenness in the form of a pregiven beforehand. In phenomenological terms, film is a confirmation of the givenness of life, "if the striving for knowledge is directed toward the existent, if it is the effort to formulate in a judgment what and how the existent is, then the existent must already have been given beforehand."\(^{29}\) The world revealed is the peculiarity of the particularised world perceived as such. In its generative inception and spectatorial reception, the film world is always given together with horizons of the lifeworld. Crucially for film, which is so reliant on movement for its reality-effect, there is an embedded sense of depth which confirms its existence as a substantial being-there in attendance.

Husserl also makes a point of explaining that in the prepredicative one can speak of the constitution of understanding, predicative functions by which we comprehend objectivity and objects of receptivity with a natural affiliation. The link or connection between the pregiven condition of objects passively received and those which come to be predicatively understood is complex and largely corresponds to the two phases of film ontology. What is understood is that every active apprehension of an object presupposes that it is pregiven where even "[t]he objects of receptivity are pregiven in an original passivity with their structures of association, affection, etc."\(^{30}\) From the point of view of noesis, the difference between this primordial experience and the predicative realm of understanding is that they are not preconstituted in pure passivity but rather in "productive spontaneity."\(^{31}\) That is to say, the similarities between the mix of voluntary and involuntary constitutions carried out largely by kinaesthetic movements in the prepredicative is very different to the productive spontaneity of the predicative, indeed, as different as the primordial mode of film recording is to its subsequent configuration. In understanding and judgment we do not
have the same level of passive receptivity or pure recording as it eases into productive creativity.

For Husserl, once we turn towards the object, or have it as an intentional object, the processes of appearance passively combine into unities in an endless process of formations:

"[F]or every sensuous object, static or in process, its being apprehended is nonessential. The 'behaviour' of the ego which motivates the procession of the multiplicities of sense data can be completely involuntary, the processes of appearance passively combine into unities in just the same way whether or not the ego turns toward what appears in them in receptive apprehension."32

As Marion points out, already implicated in Husserl's notion of intuition is a "broadening", a new notion that is freed from the usual sensuous notion of intuition. This broadened capacity is "revolutionary" so that we get an unavoidable burgeoning of the originally sense-turned concepts of intuition, one which owes allegiance to the priority of givenness as absolute appearing:

"Intuition can be broadened only by broadening its fulfillment, and therefore by depending on the meant spaces to be fulfilled. If intuition must give, it is therefore already and especially necessary that significations be released, and therefore that they be already given, without intuition and in full autonomy."33

With this fullness intuition and perception permit us to speak of the categorical and in particular of universal intuition. This likewise broader notion of intuition is what carries over film from its embedded situation in the lifeworld into the 'as-if' reel world and the universal. For Husserl, the universal is appearance in the singular not outside it, the categories as intuitively given. Objectivity explodes. This is to say that as film reproduces so-called objectivity by capturing appearance, it encompasses states of affairs and properties with real forms, and dependent categoricals as ideas become included in 'objectity', the broadest notion of reality. It is 'objectity' rather than objectivity that is reproduced in film, just as intuition is broadened beyond the sensible. Both objectity and broadened intuition lead to the same, the categorical horizon. So broad objectity includes
categorical forms. The universal is given in person. When we intend, the intuition fulfills this with the unique particular object, but in doing so it also goes beyond it to the universal— all houses, all impossible or possible houses as well as this particular house here. Two intuitions from the one intentionality.\textsuperscript{34} Thus, we are directly apprehending ideal objects as they truly exist as evidently certain categorical truths relating to ideal objects.

The implication of broadened intuition for film is considerable. The consciousness that we perceive and perceives us, as the consciousness of a mechanical eye, which is both the show of vision and the vision of show, denotes intuition in this extended sense. In precisely the same manner as we need the universal to recognise the particular so we need the real world of concrete reality to recognise the reel world of film. The categorical requires the givenness in person of phenomena just as film intuition requires 'contact' and knowledge acquired through worldly phenomena.

\textbf{Kracauer's redemption of reality}

Already with realist film theorists we see phenomenology at work; intentionality, the attitude to the real, the attempt to understand time as a flux and the role of the transcendental. Siegfried Kracauer is a prime example, resting on the cutting edge of the tensions involved in phenomenological film theory. Kracauer is probably the film theorist most clearly influenced by the German phenomenological school, speaking of humanity in the flow of material life as being under threat, the same threat Husserl describes in, "The Crisis of European Sciences", as the long battle with the scientific rendering of the lifeworld. A phenomenological presence which focuses on phenomena themselves must compete with scientific abstraction: "Due to the exaltation of theoretical thinking we have moved away from reality to a horrifying degree, a reality which is filled with incarnate things and people and therefore demands to be seen concretely."\textsuperscript{35} Spatio-temporal reality and continuity is broken up and re-examined by scientific dissection and artificial construction. Once science gets its hands on 'reality' it applies abstract laws and reasoning to redefine the empirical world and structure it according to its own precepts. Kracauer sees film as an opportune intervention for reclaiming the humanised perception of the lifeworld:
"The truly decisive reason for the elusiveness of physical reality is the habit of abstract thinking we have acquired under the reign of science and technology...were it not for the intervention of the film camera, it would cost us an enormous effort to surmount the barriers which separate... (us)... from our everyday surroundings."36

Kracauer, however, was not averse to using scientific terminology to describe film techniques in terms of experiment and observation, mechanical eyes beyond the capacity of any one individual, probing reality, microscopically delving into the amorphous, palpitating life force to uncover the insistent minutiae of the everyday. Film penetrates the particularity and elusiveness of surface reality as in a gateway leading to the fleeting nature of the lifeworld, "the ripple of leaves stirred by the wind" where nature is "caught in the act."37 Film images do not merely encapsulate raw materiality but actually intend it in a fresh way. Only the film eye can raise high enough to embrace a vista which far exceeds human vision or contract small enough to see the minute movements of natural phenomena in action. For Kracauer, science and even the non-mechanical traditional art of painting and sculpture, work from distance and abstraction. They work downwards from a broad sweep to the concrete. Film has the great advantage of working in the opposite direction, upwards from imaging materiality, rescuing the thing itself, by reinstating raw materiality from the specificity of the lifeworld, by keeping us literally in touch with the world. This rawness is meant to convey both a purity and an unrefined expressivity which mirrors the randomness of material life. As with Fellini, "a good picture should not aim at the autonomy of a work of art but have mistakes in it like life, like people."38

Kracauer was interested in a kind of spectatorship he coined "distraction" and this was not to be identified with a vicarious pleasure encouraging lack of involvement or withdrawal from reality. Nor was spectator construction taken as the traditional, individualist, bourgeois-centred one. Kracauer's social film ontology was more primitive than this. Not a personal voyeurism but a de-personalized, collective pleasure, a force of the mass who, in a state of 'distraction', tuned to the show of modern entertainment. Images of chaos, disorder or triviality could be presented to a spectator prepared with a mindset capable of experiencing such imagery, even though that imagery be confusing, overdetermined and at times shocking:
"Illusion has aesthetic significance not as a veil of truth but in the uncovering of a reality which lacks any true coherence. Distraction goes beyond the mere cultivation of superficial glamour; it presents what is incoherent and chaotic as such...distraction sharpens the senses for an antagonistic reality."  

The mode of attentiveness here had a broad appeal, anti-elitist and centering on surface flow, materiality and sensory stimuli: 

"Audiences act truthfully when they increasingly shun these art events...preferring instead the surface glamour of the stars, films, revues and spectacular shows. Here, in pure externality, the audience encounters itself: its own reality is revealed in the fragmented sequence of splendid sense impressions...its disclosure in distraction is therefore of moral significance."  

Kracauer was convinced that in this distracted state repressed wishes survived in an alienated form and far from being negatively inconsequential or supportive of the status quo, film's distracted consciousness could pave the way to change, "the fact that these shows convey in a precise and undisguised manner to thousands of eyes and ears the disorder of society - this is precisely what enables such shows to evoke and maintain that tension which must precede the inevitable and radical change."  

Kracauer's initial focus was on Husserl's notion of the lifeworld. For film this assumed that the self-effacing camera, as if camouflaged, could latch onto transient or fleeting impressions, seemingly in tune with a quantum physical world where the substantiality of particles submit to the insubstantiality of waves. Kracauer wanted film ontology to reflect things-in-themselves, remain true to the prepredicative world, with its infinite nuances, shifts of direction, overdetermination, randomness and openness, "everyday experience as materially constituted by the incalculable accumulation of events and situations precipitated by human praxis." The lifeworld "is full of intrinsic contingencies which obstruct its calculability, it subsumption under the deterministic principle...historical reality is virtually endless, issuing from a dark which is increasingly receding and extending into an open-ended future...it is indeterminate as to meaning."  

Thus, if the lifeworld is itself incapable of being containable and resists universal, macro ideologies its inclusion in film and description in history
will reflect this. Sense and order can nonetheless be made through a correlative, mimetic relation, "this relation is not one of unmediated expressivity. Rather history and photography render the Lebenswelt intelligible through their structural correspondences or affinities with it."44 Both history and film relate to the already-given and accepted traditions of a society in a way which is both fleeting and ungraspable but also ensconsed within natural laws, capable of being colligated and described:

"[S]ociety is full of events which defy control because they happen to occur in the dimly lit region where mental intensity is reduced to zero... (yet) the social universe... would seem to fall under the rule of nature... it is possible and legitimate, to break down the phenomena that make up this universe into repeatable elements and analyse their interrelationships and interactions for regularities."45

Kracauer equated the realities of film and history to each other in a shared resistance to 'systemisation and closure':

"One may define the area of historical reality, like that of photographic reality, as an anteroom area. Both realities are of a kind which does not lend itself to being dealt with in a definite way. The peculiar material in these areas eludes the grasp of a systematic thought: nor can it be shaped in the form of a work of art... I consider it my task to do for history what I have done for the photographic media... to bring out... the peculiar nature of an intermediary area which has not yet been fully recognised and valued as such."46

The anteroom corresponds to the mediated status of film as it wavers and alternates between givenness in primordiality and expressivity in configuration. The parallel between the historian's work and the photographer's is explicit. As with the classic opposing tendencies of realistic and formative film, so with history:

"One might also say that the historian follows two tendencies - the realist tendency which prompts him to get hold of all data of interest, and the formative tendency which requires him to explain the material in hand. He is both passive and active, a recorder and creator."47
In both cases there is a formalising tendency carried out by human intentionality but in the former there is a dependency on the automated penetration of the camera eye as it is aided by the filmmaker's designing intention. One can appreciate the tensions exhibited by the work of art as a tug of war between the particularised manifestation of the work and its reference to universality and meaning, between being enclosed in spatio-temporal presence while at the same time effecting an aspiration to a world of transcendence beyond. What Kracauer called the 'real person' was someone who was of the here and now but not overwhelmed by capitalism and mechanised industry. The real person related both to the shape which art gave the phenomenal but also acted as the link to the indeterminate which lies beyond the spatio-temporal, "he is always simultaneously within space and at the threshold of a supra-spatial endlessness, simultaneously within the flow of time and in the reflection of eternity; and this duality of his existence is simple, since his being is precisely the tension from out of the Here into the There."48

On a theoretical and unpragmatic level, Kracauer saw manipulation of pregiven nature unnecessary for creating drama because drama already existed there,"manipulative techniques would have worked against the form of the film whose purpose was to make visible a drama created by nature, not by filmmakers."49 The preference to leave the tacit in tact implies a confidence that when the voice becomes audible it will necessarily contain the ingredients for drama and narrative. This cannot mean a completed story in the conventional sense because that kind of symmetry and logical predictability are glib, artistic tools not the stuff of everyday realism. The 'found story' fits more closely with the mesh-like notion of 'slice of life', an observation already pointed out by Jean Epstein in film's formative years:

"On the screen, conventions are despicable. Stage effects are absurd...Presentation of the characters is pointless; life is extraordinary...The drama is as continuous as life...Life is not systemised like those nests of Chinese tea tables each begetting the next. There are no stories. There never has been stories. There are only situations, having neither head nor tail; without beginning, middle, or end, no right side or wrong side; they can be looked at from all directions."50

For Kracauer, there were stories but they were to be assimilated into the richness and multilayered levels of meaning of the prepredicative lifeworld
and thus retain their intrinsic ambiguity. By avoiding partiality or pre-empting spectator contribution, this ambiguity would be unraveled and explored by the spectator in the aesthetic film experience. Kracauer's 'found stories' were to be discovered rather than constructed - or, rather, constructed in and through acts of discovery. Emerging from the raw material of physical reality they inscribed the documentary impulses of photography and film. Documentary impulses are not necessarily documentary films. In fact, the range of documentation is a wide and paradigmatic space in which certain kinds of films can flourish. What is significant is that Kracauer's conceptualisation of the everyday world incorporated the filmmaker's intention of being neutral or non-interfering and the corresponding prepredicative state of being pre-judgmental. All along Kracauer emphasised the documentary potential of the film medium to express and disclose the unbounded and latent sensibility in the flux of the lifeworld's quotidian time. The direct connection of film to material reality by virtue of its dynamic movement brings with it a material train of associations somehow indelibly fixed to the film image. The spectator is encouraged to absorb manifold connotations over and above the denotated narrative meaning so that shots can still appeal to unstaged reality within the staged story, what Kracauer refers to as 'suggestive indeterminacy'. Shots can allude to contexts unrelated to the events which they are called upon to establish. Their cinematic quality lies precisely in their allusiveness, which enables them to yield all their 'psychological correspondences'.

As for the artist, Kracauer was unwilling to elevate the role of the individual filmmaker over and above film's own natural propensity to reveal reality by its own attributes, even though there is a clear admission of the artist's formative role. On an unconscious level, there is a spontaneous structuring of "the inflowing impressions; the simultaneous perceptions of... other senses, certain perceptual form categories inherent in (the) nervous system, and not least...organis(ing) the visual raw material in the act of seeing."51 Moreover, there is a concomitant conscious input, since it would be futile to seek 'objectivity' without selectivity "for nature is unlikely to give itself up...if the (filmmaker) does not absorb it with all his senses strained."52 Having acknowledged this, there is still the insistence that there is a distinct and perspicuous film consciousness which opens up to the fullness of life and flowing indeterminacy. For Kracauer, film is not indication, that is to say a sign of something else. It is direct, manifold, and fully expressive. The meaning-intention that Husserl prescribes to language as direct expression
adheres to the film image just as Kracauer describes it, as the directness of an inner presence:

"Film renders visible what we did not, or perhaps even could not, see before its advent. It effectively assists us in discovering the material world with its psycho-physical correspondences. We literally redeem this world from its dormant state, its state of virtual non-existence, by endeavouring to experience it through the camera... The cinema can be defined as a medium particularly equipped to promote the redemption of physical reality."\textsuperscript{53}

Kracauer's description of the transition (tension) from the immediacy of the prepredicative to deliberation in the predicative takes the form of a surrender, "[a] minimum requirement for the aesthetic success of a photo image is... its reflecting the photographer's surrender to the experience... of a natural-cultural world that is both elusive and accessible."\textsuperscript{54} In that filming penetrates the world around us to form the visible, as witnessed by a community of observers, film recording enters into the flow of what is represented not to disturb or unhinge it but to surrender to its integrity so that film leaves its raw material intact. Thus, even in the act of creating narrative and with a mind to re-creating the given, the force and hold of being immersed in the lifeworld has an innate pull and attraction which Kracauer respectfully recognises as potentially overwhelming in its palpability:

"The film artist has traits of an imaginative reader or an explorer... he is a man who sets out to tell a story but in shooting it... he ventures ever deeper into the jungle of material phenomena in which he risks becoming irretrievably lost if he does not, by virtue of great efforts, get back to the highways he left."\textsuperscript{55}

This partial surrender can be seen as a perceptual composite made up of the filmmaker’s conscious decisions and the complex perceptive-expressions of the camera’s instrumentality at the time of recording. This composite comprises a phenomenological noesis where instrumentality combines and extends human intentionality to penetrate the spatio-temporal flux. At the same time, it encapsulates the flux of time in what is for Kracauer a preservation, a means of reproducing the ineffable and the elusive of the lifeworld as it pertains both to nature and contemporary
collective reality. This is a surrender which goes towards differentiating film from other artforms:

"[D]ue to its rise from interpretable human intentions and circumstances, the meanings inherent in it (traditional work of art), can virtually be ascertained, whereas those of the photograph are necessarily indeterminate because the latter is bound to convey unshaped nature itself, nature in its inscrutability."

The process of making sense of reality begins with Husserl's constitutionality, always exceeding the individual at any one moment, but it ultimately takes a different turn for Kracauer. For Husserl, the task is one of completion, where the reception of the matter of perception is a stage in the perception of identity through categorical structures. The sensuous intuition of the perspectival act is united with categorical intuition and there is a making-visible and making-present through a series of perspectival adumbrations which lead to essential insight. For Kracauer, however, any formalism which suggests completion or totalised insight would be rejected. In keeping with his predilection for anti-systemisation and the randomness of materiality, specific concreteness must be allowed the freedom to become explicit and history and film are the ideal vehicles for carrying this out. "historiography and photography have privileged access to the concrete. The image is to the redemption of the world of things what the evocation of things is to the collections and stories of the historiographer."

The problem the historian is faced with is how to understand the different historical eras of bygone ages which Kracauer discusses under the "present-interest theory" where the historian is seen as a child of his era, fettered by contemporary influences. Kracauer disagrees with this notion of Zeitgeist for the simple reason that for him there is no such identifiable homogeneity in any such period. The historian's world is rather a "precarious conglomerate" of "unconnected events" a non homogeneous structure. This twofold tendency within history and film to conjoin with the given and the seen, yet not really to be capable of totally grasping it, centres around the schism between historicism and the historical idea. Historicism, as giving a structure and logical coherence to the series of chronological historical events, was rejected by Kracauer. Any such periodisation in history was seen as vulgar historicism, "the typical period is not so much a unified entity with a spirit of its own...(if) the period is a unit at all, it is a
diffuse, fluid, and essentially intangible unit." Historical explanations are not to be based on universal laws of development but seen in terms of unique encounters with opaque entities, centering around ambiguities which intransigently resist closure. The historical 'idea' "falls short of philosophical knowing, it nonetheless achieves a level of generality able to articulate the disparate and indeterminate elements of history...without reducing them to a punctual moment or a single common force or cause." Kracauer saw a correspondence between the vision of history as a series of enclosed segmentations which fragment any continuous flow, the historical idea, and film which, in similar fashion, segmentises the lifeworld at a particular time and place. In a similar way to Benjamin's optical images and unlike Eisenstein's compositional montage, nodal points take shape. Here the concrete and the abstract become one, there is an arresting of the flow of indeterminate historical events: "All that is then exposed to view is seen in the light of an image or conception which takes it out of the transient flow to relate it to one or another of the momentous problems and questions that are forever staring at us." Film segmentation, which extrapolates from quotidian flux, combines a plethora of cinematic techniques to bring such nodal points to attention.

Kracauer's description of film consciousness moves towards that which emerges in our later analysis with Merleau-Ponty, and even Bergson and Deleuze. Film's materialist capability:

"[N]ot only undercuts the sovereign subject of bourgeois ideology but with it a large anthropocentric worldview that presumes to impose meaning and control upon a world that increasingly defies traditional distinctions between the human and the nonhuman, the living and the mechanical, the unique (integrated, inner-directed) individual and the mass subject, civilisation and barbarism."" The result is not a reproduction of the perception of nature or the experience of history as subjectively interpreted. But a highly powerful consciousness where the remnants of nature are "not presented to perception by a meaning-producing subjectivity" but through reproduced images which "reveal a presence of humanity which is not realised by history." Instead, it is realised by film materiality. It is not surprising, then, that we find in these early works an appeal to the same fractured subject we find in later, modern developments. A similar recognition that subjectivity is
not ready-formed but a process in formation, carried along as a mobile self by film's own 'mobilising framework' which shocks the spectator out of any attempts to form an 'integrated self'.

Kracauer's insistence on physical reality in his later work was an expression of his experience, and reaction to, the events of the 1940's in similar fashion to Deleuze's film theory. Kracauer emphasised that film was uniquely placed to mirror a world which had experienced unthinkable horror. Film's plasticity, its visualising facility, was compared to the 'Head of Medusa' myth with Athena's advise to Perseus not to look at the destructiveness of the Medusa face directly but only at its reflection in the polished shield. In the "Theory of Film" Kracauer astutely uses this analogy to make such horror reflectively viewable in film and also as a way to overcome our associated fears:

"Now of all the existing media the cinema alone holds up a mirror to nature. Hence our dependence on it for the reflection of happenings which would petrify us were we to encounter them in real life...in the films made of the concentration camps, we redeem horror from its invisibility behind the veils of panic and imagination. And this experience is liberating in as much as it removes a most powerful taboo."

This is a kind of inverted return of the gaze in Benjamin's auratic sense. A way of holding and sustaining truth which in one way is veiled and in another can only be disclosed indirectly. The liberation comes about through the deep affinity film technology has with material reality. Kracauer was insistent that film is still the "alienating intervention" of an apparatus, bringing about a "technically mediated gaze", a gaze which no doubt allowed for an exploration of the psychophysical correspondences and a visualisation of the unbearable.

**André Bazin's ontology**

For French film theorist, André Bazin, we begin with the same pregiven world described by Husserl. Bazin saw film as intimately engaging the raw materiality of life where the primary and primitive powers of the bare image as well as film's automation convey the direct sense of the world. For Bazin,
film reality concretises facts, through its events and situations, which are not abstracted or withdrawn from the lifeworld in which they take place but retained within the housing of originary primordial flux. Bazin ontologically supports his claim in terms of the index, "an indexical sign is such by some existential connection between a specific referent and the signifier, the latter will always provide the subject with irrefutable testimony as to the real existence of the referent." Involved here is a respect for primordial reality of the represented world and a desire, on some level, to access and penetrate that world which is indexically and existentially connected. The means to realise this is to capture the unformed lifeworld by a sensibility which reflects Husserl's description of the encounter as a noesis which deals with givenness as it comes to appearance in a partially active and partially passive stance.

Bazin clearly indicates that luminous impressions of light form a mould on film which create more than resemblance, rather an identity card which is unique to film because it is necessarily and mechanically linked to the reality it reproduces. One can see this belief as a demand for making film in a particular way, one which retains spatial continuity and the direct connection with the flux of concrete reality. However, Bazin's purpose is more profound than this. It searches to extract from the lifeworld, and particularly nature, its own embedded truth. Some Italian films of the 1940's fulfilled this demand:

"The Italian cinema has replaced a "realism" deriving in point of content from the naturalism of novels...with what...we shall call 'phenomenological' realism which never 'adjusts' reality to meet the needs imposed by psychology or drama."68

The documentary style in fiction film utilising long-takes, authentic locations, minimal montage and naturalistic acting sets out to convey the irrevocable bond between the image and reality. For Bazin, as for Deleuze, Neorealism is this translucent ideal:

"The Neorealist film has a meaning, but it is a posteriori, to the extent that it permits our awareness to move from one fact to another, from one fragment of reality to the next, whereas in the classical artistic composition the meaning is established a priori, the house is already there in the brick."69
Dramatic realism retains a visual, ongoing reciprocity and density between actor and environment, foreground and background. Psychologically, this brings the spectator more authentically to the real conditions of perception, a perception which can never be completely determined a priori. Thus, in Fellini's, "La Strada", "it is not a film that is called "La Strada"; it is "La Strada" that is called a film...I am not saying that the camera has photographed the caravan in a very plain manner...but rather that the camera has simply shown the caravan to us, or even better, has enabled us to see it."70 Fellini, for all his flamboyant reflexivity, is faithful, if not to a preconceived notion of what the real is, then to a conviction that action must somehow be allowed to speak for itself, "nothing Fellini shows us owes any supplementary meaning to the manner in which it is shown...the cinema achieves fruition as the art of the real, Fellini is a great director...who does not cheat on reality."71

Emphasis is placed on the lifeworld experience of the spectator to introduce a personal positioning. This allows for variability and the spectator's creative scope, an empowerment which unleashes the potential for a plenitude of interpretations. The spectator perceives the ontological ambivalence of reality directly, in the very structure of its appearances and the camera is refused intervention to come to our assistance. In the same way as Husserl describes the move from passive receptivity with its structures of association to more deliberate productive spontaneity, so Bazin sees a concomitant process:

"A fragment of concrete reality in itself multiple and full of ambiguity, whose meaning emerges only after the fact, thanks to other imposed facts between which the mind establishes certain relationships."72

The re-ordering that takes place comes afterwards through spectator construction but the possibility for this is made and encouraged through an equivalent montage of discrimination which takes place on-screen rather than in postproduction. This accounts for Bazin's predilection for deep focus, the use of wide-angle lenses which reproduce an image of depth which allows characters to move along dimensional planes in a long take without the need to edit. There is a 'découpage in depth' which uses mise-en-scene to convey segmentation-in-action. Realism is sustained by restoring to the object and environment their existential density, the weight of their presence, a continuity-in-depth. This is also a return to the
Quattrocento two-dimensional illusion of a third dimension (depth) brought about by the "gradation in size of the objects represented (diminishing as they are presumed to be further away)" and aided by on-screen lighting effects to enhance relief.

Bazin would attempt to minimise any ideological bias inherent in the cinematic apparatus, insisting rather on it giving freedom to explore and extrapolate meaning from within phenomenological intentionality. Thus, the importance of deep focus and depth of field is "not just a stock-in-trade of the cameraman...it is a capital gain in the field of direction - a dialectical step forward in the history of film language." This is no mere, empty formalistic tool, it rather "affects the relationships of the minds of the spectators to the image, and in consequence it influences the interpretation of the spectacle." Deep focus attempt to restore conditions of perception in the lifeworld, it also retains what Bazin insists is most important about the nature of the reality it intends to depict, its ambiguity. By not making decisions through editing for the spectator in advance, there is a conviction that deep focus allows ambiguity to survive. With ambiguity is introduced the same realist tensions we find in Kracauer, the same tensions derived from phenomenology itself as the propriety of respecting the ready-given lifeworld whilst at the same time reaching out to the transcendental. Bazin's insistence on ambiguity demonstrates his debt to the French phenomenological school, in particular Gabriel Marcel, who similarly reflected the tension of nature and the mystery of the transcendent. The lifeworld is described as a mysterious 'encounter', an ambiguous realm:

"Here I am in the presence of a mystery... I who inquire into the meaning and the possibility of this meeting, I cannot place myself outside it or before it; I am engaged in this encounter, I depend on it, I am inside it in a certain sense, it envelops me and it comprehends me - even if it is not comprehended by me."76

The film image and the real world establish a presence, one which can be re-lived in all its richness and depth aided by techniques which encourage continuous movements, where the mystery of reality seeps through surface manifestations like pores breathing through skin. Long takes and an attempt at sustaining continuity are the figurative manifestations of a Marcelian desire to remain in the 'presence' of being as its mystery and spiritual influence makes itself felt. This presence is crucial if egocentric, selfish.
preoccupation is to be broken and the soul allowed to open out into a
compassion for others and a higher spiritual reality. Bazin wanted this
sense of presence to be retained in film and the kind of shared interaction
he envisaged is echoed in Marcel’s notion of "influx", the breakdown of
Cartesianism into a closer intentional relation with the other:

"I am unable to treat him as if he were merely placed in front of me...he is
not only before me, he is also within me...influx conveys...the kind of interior
accretion from within, which comes into being as soon as presence is
effective."77

Bazin sees the substance of reality somehow hatching out through surface
appearance and in glutinous fashion adhering to manifest content, be it
documentary or fictional film. Thus, the link between film and reality
assumed indexically as if by a physical cord will set up an amalgam of
sensuous and cognitive experience, fusing aesthetic sensibility with a
revelatory epiphany. In Von Stroheim films, for example:

"The camera cannot see everything at once but it makes sure not to lose
any part of what it chooses to see...In his films reality lays itself bare like a
suspect confessing under the relentless examination of the commissioner of
police...Take a close look at the world, keep on doing so, and in the end it
will lay bare for all its cruelty and its ugliness."78

There is a commitment to subjective experience implicated in
phenomenological consciousness which Marcel likens to the openness and
receptivity of 'creative fidelity' which "consists in maintaining ourselves
actively in a permeable state...there is a mysterious interchange between
this free act and the gift granted in response to it."79 With Bazin, the
transcendent, if not the transcendental, is clearly spelt out in nature:
"Photography affects us like a phenomenon in nature, like a flower or a
snowflake whose vegetable or earthly origins are an inseparable part of
their beauty."80 Bazin’s transcendent tendency is achieved through nature.
He repeatedly claims that photography possesses a power to transfer not
only reproduced physical traces but also a spiritual and transcendent
inheritance carried within the fabric of nature. For a thinker such as Sartre,
manipulation and the creative hand of genius are indispensable for the
communication of spiritual significance but for Bazin the film apparatus is
sufficient and the creative hand of the genius is one that works with this fact
in order to nurture it. Consciousness must attain an attunement to the ambiguity we call the world. A great artist would be characterised as someone who listens to the world and discloses it. For Bazin, the sense of intensity and focus derived from the filming of a situation becomes sufficient in itself for a transcendent revelation.

It must be understood that this is far more than the duplication of surface phenomenon, more penetrating than the gloss of appearance. Bazin insisted on upholding the integrity of man within the lifeworld and refused to separate out the subject from it. Likewise, there is a refusal to extract the elements of space from its temporal matrix. Within this holistic context there is an agenda for sustaining the spiritual presence in all things and an appreciation that the mechanical reproduction of reality in film adds significant transcendental and metaphysical dimensions to the aesthetic experience. As Marcel argues, to exist is to manifest oneself, or equally, to be manifested, it is really irrelevant whether we say "I experience (Ich erleben) or it lives in me (Es Erlebt in mir)." Both express man's fundamental presence in the world, a presence without which the fact of existing would not have the density it has for me. Man is by nature expressive but objects and things also express through him and it is this that Bazin believed film reflected.

By being open to ambiguity rather than eliminating it we can positively react to it. Indeed, Bazin's stylistic of film encouraged the spectator to take an active stance, even if it is, as Marcel explains, only the intention or inspiration to do so: "I aspire to participate in this being, in this reality - and perhaps this aspiration is already a degree of participation, however rudimentary." When Bazin recognises the usefulness of montage on certain occasions but discourages its use on others he does so because there is an inherent assumption that any postproduction re-ordering brings about a specific vision. Some re-ordering is inevitable but when it occurs it means a reversal of priorities. Reality becomes an object of thought and knowledge when instead it is, as with Merleau-Ponty, the primacy of being that should hold sway, "knowledge is environed by being." It is only by being involved within being that one begins to genuinely live with its mystery and ambiguity. For Bazin, the world interprets itself, inspired as it is by the sense of God with film allowing reality to speak itself.
To relate to reality we must reveal it and art can relate to the 'deeper' realities that occasionally flash into our marginal consciousness. Mystification does not centre around the unknown but emerges from the uneasy alliance between the stark materiality of social convention and the transcendent. A coming together of a communal experience in a communal setting with universal truths. As with Marcel, mystery is not seen as something to be overcome but as a permanent state of the world which is to be enjoyed and continuously lived with. Marcel specifically turned to the impact of film, finding that it could be a reminder within life's routine not to forget or become blind to our surroundings, to our relation to this earth, to our 'habitat'. Marcel saw film could be ensconsed within the lifeworld yet at the same time transcend its link: "The best means we have at our disposal today in order to bring man into the presence of a certain image of himself, an image which ought to surpass the limits of purely anecdotal realism."84 Marcel described primordiality as a mix of Husserlian direct encounter and Merleau-Pontian ambiguity:

"Here I am in the presence of a mystery... I who inquire into the meaning and the possibility of this meeting. I cannot place myself outside it or before it; I am engaged in this encounter, I depend on it, I am inside it in a certain sense, it envelops me and it comprehends me - even if it is not comprehended by me."85

And for Bazin film was the best testament to the miracle of creation where "a spiritual sensitivity and its enablement through film" show how we are "obligated to God, to honour God's universe by using film to render the reality of the universe and, through its reality, its mystery-cum-musicality."86 Bazin's reluctance to artificially fragment the perceptions of life through unnecessary montage now appears not as a mere stylistic presence to uphold a reality-effect but as a way of striving to maintain flux in the mysterious natural order. Bazin's reluctance to leave the natural context behind has the same excess, promise, and revelatory implications as for Marcel:

"But I would point out that no revelation is, after all, conceivable unless it is addressed to a being who is involved... Supernatural life must... find a hold in the natural... there is in the depth of Nature, as of reason which is governed by it, a fundamental principle of inadequacy to itself which is, as it were, a restless anticipation of a different order."87
Taking film as documentation and preservation, the possibility for recollective function is not the photographic effigy of a frozen moment of time but a capture through dynamic movement and contextuality of humankind within an environment. Only in this way can Bazin's insistence on organic movement and integrated action make any sense.

The presence established by the particularity of the reel image and the real world eke out life's mystery without a prior agenda or conscious theoretical stance. On the one hand, Bazin wanted to ensure film reflected the continuity of the spatio-temporal continuum and denote the authenticity of lived experience, the multifarious plenitude of daily problems and the mystery of spiritual presence. On the other, Bazin saw film had a unique ability to embalm events and thereby extract them from this integrated flux for re-view. By doing this, not only the events but the transcendent mystery associated with them could be reproduced and extracted. There results, therefore, an interplay between the two tendencies of insisting on contextual incorporation and accepting segmented detachment. It is film's automated facility that can add dimensional distance to one's otherwise implicated proximity.

References

1. With the exception of full length studies, Allan Casebier's "Film and Phenomenology" based on Husserl's theory of representation, Vivian Sobchack's "Address of the Eye" based on Merleau-Ponty's theory of Perception, and Stanley Cavall, "The World Viewed" which borrows from Wittgenstein, most material is in article form and only mentions phenomenology in passing. The better articles draw attention to film as a phenomenological experience but rarely offer theoretical justification, relying on generalities, "a phenomenological film theory...proposes a mutually constitutive relationship between the viewer's life-world and the reality of the filmic world". "Everyday experience and filmic experience, although ontologically different, are mutually conditioned."p.44.Harald A. Stadler, "Film as Experience", in Quarterly Review of Film and Video. Special Edition on Phenomenology. vol 12, no 3. Harwood Academic Publishers. 1990, p.
41. Stadler's article was in a special edition of Quarterly Review of Film and Video devoted to phenomenology and included most writers who have attempted to theorise and apply phenomenological principles to film, including the editor, Frank Tomasulo. Other major phenomenologists such as Roman Ingarden in his phenomenological aesthetics have an indirect bearing on film but little direct contact. Ingarden posits a direct ontological pluralism which avoids stiff definitions and also allows for an Husserlian analysis, "what matters in this practical making of phenomenological aesthetics, is the realm of objects to be grasped, not the logical concepts formally structured in smooth axioms and definitions." (P. J. McCormick. Modernity, Aesthetics, and the Bounds of Art (Cornell University, 1990), p. 277.). Among Ingarden's four modes of being, the absolute, ideal, real and intentional, film fits the intentional category, which would make it for Ingarden heteronomous, derived and non-actual. (Roman Ingarden. Time and Modes of Being (Springfield, Ill.: Thomas, 1964), trans. R. Micheda. Ingarden acknowledges that the essence of film is not removed from its materiality in the form of a purely mental experience, nor is it a being totally dependent on its materiality. As with Husserl, intentionality makes it possible to see film as a sign possessing intersubjective meaning on both a physical and psychic plane. Ingarden's approach precludes a division into subjective and objective investigations because film reinforces the futility of considering solely an object in itself existing independently of perception. As 'brought into life' by the conscious acts of filmmakers and viewers, for Ingarden, photography has a mediating function. "If it is a work of art, represented objectivities appear, not as real, but only as quasi-real; they appear only in the 'habitus of reality'...the objects which were photographed are, so to speak not simply real objects. They perform here a function of reproduction and representation; they play a "role". "The Cinematographic Drama" in The Literary Work of Art, trans. George Grabowicz (Northwestern University, 1973), p. 327.

3Ibid., p. 187.
6Ibid., Casebier, pp. 11, 13.
7Husserl, Ideas, p. 287.
8Even though these disciplines are kept separate in their application to film, there are clear connections between them as well as with phenomenology. Christian Metz's early work was phenomenological and linguistic, in Film Language (Oxford University Press, 1974) and later moved to semiotics and psychoanalysis, The Imaginary Signifier (Indiana University, 1982).
10Dufrenne, Aesthetic Experience, p. 531.

Note: Dufrenne is concerned with the direct experience of an affective a priori. This is the affectivity of a work which entirely permeates it, "affective quality is the soul of the expressed world." p. 446. Dufrenne's a priori does not relate to a Kantian impersonal subject "who sustains a priori which are themselves impersonal and thus
objects of rational knowledge." p. 447. But they are specific and personal, emanating and subtending particular works and singular to the creative mind of the artist. "The a priori is fundamentally the irreducible factor by means of which a concrete subject is constituted." p.448. Dufrenne's description of experiencing the a priori in the work of art is close to this thesis. Dynamic, filtered through the body, mind and emotion, it gives an active role to the spectator and artist alike.

11Ibid., p. 532.
12Ibid., p. 534. (my emphasis).
13Ibid., p. 543.

18Ibid.
19Ibid.
20Husserl, Experience and Judgment, P. 82.
21Ibid., p. 79.
22Ibid.
23Husserl, Experience and Judgment, p. 29.
24Ibid., p. 152.
25Jonas, ibid., p. 168.
26Ibid.
28Ibid.
29Ibid., Experience and Judgment, pp.164-65.
30Ibid., p.19.
31Ibid., p. 250. (my emphasis)
32Ibid., p. 251.
33Ibid.
34Marion, ibid., p. 34.
37Ibid., Theory of Film, p. 299.
38Ibid., p. 31.
39Ibid., p. 302.

39Schlupmann, ibid., p. 102. (my emphasis)
40Kracauer, Mass Ornament, p. 226.
41Ibid., p. 94. c/f Schlupmann, ibid., p. 101. Kracauer's optimism for change via film 'distraction' was radically dented by Fascism and the political upheaval of Nazism as they harnessed the emerging lower
middle class with mass spectacles, parades, rituals and false impression of participation. Thus, by the time of Kracauer's later works, notably, "Theory of Film", the liberating potential of mass ornaments had dissipated. The hope which lay with rationality as a way of expanding and transforming abstracted capitalist Ratio had faded. It was no longer possible to expect the phenomenological state of distraction to win through. The thetic element of noesis as a reflection on the mode of consciousness, in this case the mass empathy of film identification, had been swamped by political events and a reassessment of film was necessary to match the new social conditions, "film can no longer rely on the audience's addictive thirst for distracted entertainment as constituting a force that will break up ossified social conditions."


44 Ibid., p. 119.
48 Kracauer, Mass Ornament, p. 69.
51 Kracauer, Theory of Film, p. 15.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 300.
54 Barnouw, Critical Realism, p. 114.
56 Ibid., p. 20, c/f, Barnouw, ibid., p. 117.
60 Rodowick, ibid., p. 127.
61 Kracauer, History, p. 191.
63 Schlupmann, ibid., p. 112.
64 Hansen, ibid., p. xxviii.
65 Kracauer, Theory of Film, pp. 305-6.
66 Hansen, ibid., p. xxix.
69 Ibid., p. 99.
71 Ibid. (my emphasis)
75 Ibid.
77 Marcel, ibid., p. 38.
78 Bazin, Vol 1, p. 27.
79 Marcel, ibid., p. 38.
80 Bazin, Vol 1, p. 13.
82 Marcel, Philosophy of Existentialism, p. 14.
83 Ibid., p. 18. (my emphasis)
85 Marcel, Philosophy of Existentialism, pp. 21- 22. (my emphasis)
86 Bazin, Introduction to Selected Writings, p. xi.
87 Marcel, Philosophy of Existentialism, p. 46.
On Embodiment and the Transcendental

You will know that I love shadow as much as I love light. For there to be beauty of face, clarity of speech, benevolence and firmness of character, shadow is as needful as light. They are not opponents: they stand, rather, lovingly, hand in hand, and when light disappears, shadow slips away after it.

-----Nietzsche, The Wanderer and His Shadow.

The mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible.

-----Oscar Wilde

Film at the origin

Film is total visibility in that unlike the human experience film experience reflectively shows the unreflective prepredicative condition. Vision echoes the intentional structure of being-in-the-world in the way it follows Merleau-Ponty's explication of phenomenology as materiality and the perceptual relatedness of self to others. As subjects in the world we all perceive and view, and as subjects for other subjects in the world we are seen by others to perceive and view. In response to Husserl's discussion of intersubjectivity in the 5th Cartesian Meditation, Merleau-Ponty describes the body as the key way to empathise with the existence of others. Film replicates this process in a sophisticated way. Viewing through the body and being seen to do so by others is a common material link for intersubjectivity yet one which retains its limit point of unique positionality.
The body is not only the field in which perceptive powers are localised but also the field in which the powers are seen to be exercised and expressed by others and, in the case of the film body, identified with the camera eye/I. Thus, film body emplacement becomes part of the circuitry of intersubjective perception and 'looking', not only by being within the flux of concrete reality or because it replicates perceptual looking as the human condition, but also by the integration of these looks and mannerisms into its content as part of its hyletic (sensa) data. Film's powerful aesthetic mechanically embodies the whole array of perceptual schema as it is enfolded in the lifeworld, in a phenomenological field. Mechanical in origin, when moving pictures reproduce parts of the objective world they are taken to be an intentionality within the aesthetic world, one which has had meaning endowing powers in the lifeworld. Film presents and re-presents, resembles and re-assembles, it is both a vision of the world and the world visualising.

With this approach to film embodiment, in a similar way to Husserl's intentionality, there is an attempt to hold consciousness as intended to phenomena. Attention, like filming, attends to its material. The experience of attention is what picks up on figures from flux, that which crystallises emerging configurations, that which makes explicit what remains otherwise tacit. As a mechanically placed body amongst other materialities, film works through visual duplication, presentifying not only what is viewed but the perspective on the perspectives of viewing, that is, a viewing in action. This opens up the possibility for considering film as one of the beings with which other beings can empathise and communicate. A consciousness of consciousness. The crucial difference being that whereas humans use body communication as part of the primordial sense of being-in-the-world, an immediately perceptive-expressive signification which has an affinity with like-minded beings, film has no such outer shell to direct intentionality. Film maintains its body invisibility to create a visualising through divisibility (the stages of its configuration and re-viewing).

Film experience cannot be understood without acknowledging film's viewing consciousness as the projected, visible side of camera intentionality originally wrought through the body. This is why Merleau-
Ponty's shift in emphasis from Husserl's reduction to an operative intentionality is helpful for film. Acts here are experiential and non-reflective and as such can be seen to coincide with the body consciousness of film which, in similar manner, is directly grounded as embroiled within the lifeworld. It is the body's material presence that gives intentionality existential form as a concrete activity. Film's unique form of recorded aesthetic expression is partly due to picking up on existential intentionality because it is an emplaced technical instrument which captures consciousness as movement and direction. Both film and human corporeality explore the world according to their particular materiality and it is this which characterises their own particular intentional projects. In one case human embodiment, which Merleau-Ponty extends into the notion of flesh and, in the other, a mechanical site which becomes the expressive film world as a film consciousness.

For Merleau-Ponty the work of art is not a directly transparent 'look' onto concrete reality but an entity which allows the world to appear. Film carries out this project to the letter by allowing appearance to appear and ad-here to film. When Merleau-Ponty describes the vision of the painter's world as one which is both held at a distance and also fused with the object of vision we are moving from the Cartesian to the dialectic notion of a self-sustaining vision at work:

"The painter's world is a visible world, nothing but visible: a world almost demented because it is complete when it is yet only partial. Painting awakens and carries to its highest pitch a delirium which is vision itself, for to see is to have at a distance; painting spreads this strange possession to all aspects of Being...the same thing is both out there in the world and here in the heart of vision."¹

Visually the world is held at a distance but at the same time incorporated within visualisation. This intimacy is also a penetration, painting is the inside of the outside, the essence we discover within the thing. In quite a different way film, too, has intimate access and 'contact' with the world but through other processes of expression. This is a mechanical contact which is denied the intimacy of painting's transubstantiation but has an
ontological intimacy which directly imbibes, reflects and refracts identical sources of light. Though Merleau-Ponty speaks in personal terms of the painter's individual manipulation, there is a strong prepersonal sense in which the anonymity of the pregiven world does the inspiring for the artist, working in a conjunction which is not unlike the presence of the film body, an anonymously mechanical presence picking up and recording the very breath of Being,

"We speak of 'inspiration', and the word should be taken literally. There really is inspiration and expiration of Being, action and passion so slightly discernible that it becomes impossible to distinguish between what sees and what is seen, what paints and what is painted."²

What painting does for Merleau-Ponty is to express the birth of being, the "emerging order of an object in the act of appearing, organizing itself before our eyes."³ This is like the first appearances in the world because "nature here is that which corresponds to and is a correlate of naked vision", reminiscent of a primeval state, even archaic "which penetrates right to the root of things beneath the imposed order of humanity."⁴ It is clear film has similarly to do with acts appearing before our eyes but it cannot reproduce the archaic process of nature's birth which has to be expressed rather than perceived as product. Film's primordiality depicts being in its raw materiality as product, Cézanne's paintings, because of the creation of an inspired artist enveloped by Being's 'expiration', have recourse to a natural precondition which is resistant and invisible to film:

"We live in the midst of man-made objects, among tools, in houses, streets, cities and most of the time we see them only through the human actions which put them to use...Cézanne's painting suspends these habits of thought and reveals the base of human nature upon which man has installed himself. This is why Cézanne's people are strange. Nature itself is stripped...no wind in the landscape...frozen objects hesitate as at the beginning of the world."⁵

This is the felt-birth that inculcates the very fibres of artistic intention and inspires an artistic creativity which film must match primordially. Perhaps
only Deleuze has argued that film can do the same. This is a pictorial phenomenology in which Cézanne wanted "to portray the world, to change it completely into a spectacle, to make visible how the world touches us."\(^6\) This touching is the synaesthesia of perception which includes all the senses under an intentionality of vision, where subject and object are locked in reciprocation. On the other hand, the film as body can implicate itself into the emergent rather than emerging visibility of life as an unseen but all-seeing eye/I. Even more than in painting one could claim that film as temporal observer will reflect most faithfully the upsurge within Being when such an upsurge is described in terms of a natural drive to visibility as a process through time.

**From expression to meaning**

Following Merleau-Ponty, Vivian Sobchack suggests that the key crossover point between the film body and the lived body comes in the area where perception becomes expression. Confluence arises not because of any self-conscious act of deliberation but because, for both viewer and camera alike, perception is-already expression:

"Film...comes into being (becomes) as an ongoing and unified ...situation of perception and expression that coheres in relation to the world of which it is a material part...It is this mutuality of embodied existence and the dynamic movement of its perceptual and expressive relations with and in the world that provide the common denominator of cinematic communication."\(^7\)

It is apparent that Merleau-Ponty's work on body as foundation for experience particularly suits a way of looking at the film experience, as one which is also founded on the mechanical body-camera-eye. This is to insist that the body is not to be taken as a mere container or as a simple marker of presence. The body cannot be objectified, to do so would separate it from mind, nor can it be pigeon-holed as a mere encasement. The mind and body work as one, in fact the mind expresses the body. The body-as-
mind-expressed makes possible the world for us, it catalyses and acts as
ground for all phenomenal objects in the world as a precondition for the
way objects come to be objects. The body is the unperceived given
perspective that is the ground for all phenomenal objects in the world, it
allows things to happen, initiates experience and manifests phenomena.
The camera eye and film body are equally the situated precondition for
film, an unperceived, perceptual presence which brings about a view of the
world. Moreover, as part of the intentional experience within the aesthetic
work, the camera eye serves to create images which subsequently become
the spectator's temporary habitation as virtual body.

By concentrating on the significance of the body as a unified sensibility of
incarnate consciousness, Merleau-Ponty shows that mental experience
which seems to be internal and hermetically sealed is in fact always
externally expressed in bodily behaviour and directed pathways. Inner
perceptions immediately become outer expressions as an accomplishment
of the body. The field of sense is a plane, a plateau in which anything
within it which is dissimilar will come into prominence by drawing attention
to itself. This relation to the pregiven field of sense data has already been
described in terms of Husserl's encounter where the camera recording of
an open field of sense data is on a low level of activity. Merleau-Ponty
attempts to clarify the processes in pregiven existence by describing a
reciprocity in terms of the enworlded body: "Neither body nor existence
can be regarded as the original of the human being, since they
presuppose each other, and because the body is solidified or generalised
existence, and existence a perpetual incarnation."^8

This clearly comes out when Merleau-Ponty directly relates film to what he
calls the "new psychology", a reference to the patterning role of gestalt
perception. Visual data is not seen as a mosaic of sensations which need
subjective reasoning to make intelligibility. In gestalt the relation of the
organism to its surroundings is not explained by the causal action of
external stimuli upon the organism because, phenomenologically, the
subject is reacting in a milieu that has no purely objective existence
outside consciousness. Gestalt directly relates to what is sensed. The
meaning of the concrete world is, it is not a mediated creation but an
involved proximity, "I do not think the world in the act of perception: it *organises itself* in front of me."\textsuperscript{10}

This originary commerce with the world, an already-presence, a natural being-in-the-world, has to be rediscovered. To understand behaviour in the concrete world we look at the expressions of that behaviour. In existential terms, film accommodates the expression of inner feelings and emotions precisely because they are behaviourally observable. For inner states to be realised, indeed to meaningfully say they exist, they must be expressed through behavioural and observable patterns through the body. Emotions and attitudes take shape as physical manifestations. They are not locked away in the psychic recesses of the mind but become significant when they are expressed in the lifeworld and, as such, are intersubjectively exchanged and manifestly open to film. It is the immediacy of expression through body action which film's movement imagery picks up on. The expression of emotion in manifest behaviour and gesture is part of the overall structure which defines individuals as in a complete gestalt, an overall style of being-in-the-world.

Merleau-Ponty repeatedly points out, within primordial, embodied perception there is always already meaning "because we are in the world, we are *condemned to meaning*, and we cannot do or say anything without its acquiring a name in history."\textsuperscript{11} From its initial ground zero point, film is bodily positioned in a world to view things and bring them to life "*significance* is revealed only if we look at them from a certain point of view, from a certain distance and in a certain *direction*(sens)...our collusion with the world."\textsuperscript{12} Yet this is a view which, of necessity, becomes liberated in time and transcendence, "thus we are always brought back to a conception of the subject ek-stase, and to a relationship of active transcendence between the subject and the world."\textsuperscript{13} In film terms this is naturally aided by the fact film communicates visually in an extremely direct manner. The spoken word is not needed, though it is present, but above all film language responds to the dual commensurability of the film body and human corporeality sharing an incarnate engagement in the world which is immediately expressive:
"The moving picture, too, perceives and expresses itself wildly and pervasively *before* it articulates its meanings... as a significant cinematic trope or figure, a specific set of generic configurations, a specific syntactical convention...a film makes sense by virtue of its very *ontology*."¹⁴

The world already means and film corporeality reflects this. Acts of perception and bodily expression work through and out of a signifying embodied existence. The lack of selfconscious deliberation allows an equivalence to be drawn between the primordiality of human perception and the mechanically functional, unselfconscious roots of film. In other words, as reel film duplicates the real world it does not only mirror or reflect back a given state of affairs but gives expression to them, in spite of it being unable to make self-conscious deliberation in its recording stage. Film is put on a comparable conscious pedestal by virtue of it having a comparable consciousness platform, the body-in-the-world as perceptive expression. This existential viewing platform has "the capacity to localise and unify (or 'centre') the invisible, intrasubjective commutation of perception and expression and make it visible and intersubjectively available to others."¹⁵

This is where film differentiates itself by being an act of seeing that makes itself seen, an act of hearing that makes itself heard, and an act of physical movement that makes itself reflexively felt and understood. So, unlike individual human communication, the filmed artwork concretises its perceptive-communicative facility by public projection. But it initiates significance in the same way as the human body by providing a fulcrum for subsequent sense-making. Its primordial presence is sufficient to extend expressivity in its encompassing gaze, an exploratory 'tracking' view which accompanies motion.

Where film and philosophy come together, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, is in the very spelling out of the process whereby perception becomes expression, where the activity of perception as intrinsic to activity in the lifeworld becomes visible in terms of what is perceived and in terms of how it is perceived to become meaning. The fact that film recognisably shows and expresses the same viewed concrete reality as human perception, as
well as the intentional process which shapes that view, allows for the aesthetic film work to function as a unique space for both film and spectator. Perception is part of a work-in-progress, where body and senses already have a natural, primeval familiarity with the world, born of habit and cognisable through sedimented knowledge. Film plays on and explores this implicit knowledge and familiarity of experience. At the moment film receives the sense data of phenomena it relays them back in a mechanically perceptive way which is immediately expressive, understandable and focused. Even though it is consciously set in motion by the filmmaker, film automatically sets in motion its own active-receptive perceptions, both as a conduit for, and as a purveyor of, meaning. The mechanised sensibility the film body has for automatically and unselfconsciously picking up on the lifeworld is little different from the same 'automatic' human one:

"It is true that knowledge teaches me that sensation would not occur unless my body were in some way adapted to it, for example, that there would be no specific contact unless I moved my hand. But this activity takes place on the periphery of my being. I am no more aware of being the true subject of my sensation than of my birth or my death...If I wanted to render precisely the perceptual experience, I ought to say that one perceives in me, and not that I perceive."16

For Merleau-Ponty, in perceiving the lifeworld the real is experienced as already-meaning, as a direct expression. And it is the direct, operative level of perception which realist film theorists are referring to when they claim that 'reality' in its brute existence can be employed by film without manipulation in a way which is both immediate and meaningful. The assumption is that the viewer, too, understands the 'natural' language of film as a pre-linguistic tacit structure which is founded on the lifeworld with its own structures of experience. But these structures of experience are hardly simplistic. They are complicated, shifting areas of fluctuation, at all times reaching out to exceed themselves. Unfixable and uncontainable, they still come to be framed. The ontology of film is as dynamic and vibrant as the lifeworld in which it originates. Film as a living embodiment is
significant because it is simultaneously a sense receiving and sense performing subject as its 'feelers' infiltrate a vital realm of indeterminacy.

Filming could be said to reflect back the excess significance of objects and situations belonging to the expansive phenomenal force field of life. This is the world of phenomena taken as both a field and a force overflowing with potential meaning. Film is synchronized mechanically at a rate to be in tact with this force field, like the power to synchronize the unfurling processes of phenomenal life itself. This force field as-process is hidden, it is withheld, but is nonetheless the condition for the givenness of phenomena. Thus, it would be a mistake to describe film in similar terms to a neutral sense organ bombarded from the outside by a series of atomistic sensa. It is equally a mistake to subscribe to film as having an immanentistic function of making sense of the world, likewise rejected by Merleau-Ponty for the human condition. There is no process in film which registers messages from determinate or irreducible elements in an objective world. Nor is there any mechanism for a subsequent synthesis which could decode or process irreducible atoms as they are originally found. Rather, like human perception, film through its movement imagery explores the chimeric quality of the phenomenal field, visually and aurally remodeling its environment as it establishes an interlocking system of matrices and contexts. In a similar way to Bergson, all perceptual themes are indeterminate, part of the constantly reinvented moment. Meaning only takes shape within an ever renewed and disseminated context which undermines any claims for closure in the objective world:

"Thus it seems we are led to a contradiction: belief in the thing and the world must entail the presumption of a completed synthesis - and yet this completion is made impossible by the very nature of the perspectives which have to be inter-related...to other perspectives, and so on, indefinitely."17

This 'openness' of meaning is similarly covered by Merleau-Ponty's notion of "wild meaning", where expression makes sense before the use of discrete symbolic systems. For Merleau-Ponty, wild meaning is the undifferentiated significance of existence as it is lived rather than reflected
upon, where body, action and language come together as direct expression, an area which directly reflects film ontology in its relatedness to raw materiality through movement and visualisation: "The word, 'sleet', when it is known to me, is not an object which I recognise through any identificatory synthesis, but a certain use made of my phonatory equipment, a certain modulation of my body as a being in the world."\(^{18}\)

Film as mechanical embodiment, functioning as an emplaced recording of modulation, is language in this wild, undifferentiated sense because film's directness and automated duplication move and are moved by an already implicated, direct level of experience:

"With symbolic forms, a conduct appears, which expresses the stimulus for itself, which is open to truth and to the proper value of things, which tends to the adequation of the signifying and the signified, of the intention and that which it intends. Here behaviour no longer has only one signification, it is itself signification."\(^{19}\)

As Lanigan puts it "the sign is always a sign in use, if you will the sign is a gesture."\(^{20}\) As such the sign is understandable contextually and in terms of other signs. Meaning as present in signs is not a referential factor but meaning is the signs, "signs are the perceived-perceiving, the speech-speaking, the thought-thinking, in short, the phenomenal existence which is man."\(^{21}\) With Merleau-Ponty the sign is the synoptic result of immanence and transcendence. This is not synthetic, because there is no finality of meaning in any given perception, nor stasis. But rather a transcendence in immanence where the sign is its own meaning because "it is an essential manifestation of an existent that is in constant modification and constitution."\(^{22}\) The sign is primordial meaning as gesture and as context, not a relation between thought and object. For Merleau-Ponty, as with Bergson's matter as image, in the phenomenal field everything already speaks to everything else and we intercede or break into this dialogue among things as embodied perceivers, in the same way as the receptive camera body, "[t]he fact was overlooked that, in order to express it the body must in the last analysis become the thought or intention that it signifies for us. It is the body that points out, and which speaks."\(^{23}\)
From these observations on the conversion of perception into expression, we can see that just as speaking is the very surfacing of experience, equivalent in the phenomenal field to the birth of vision, so film is the very surfacing of visuality. When speaking-as-expression takes place there is no solidifying of moments, no abstractions, no turning back into oneself but a primeval surfacing of the what-is and the who-is. For film this would mean that what makes it alive and dynamic is a creative existential speaking in a Merleau-Pontian sense with signs whose signification are self-possessed:

"[O]ne might draw a distinction between a speaking word (parole parlante) and a spoken word (parole parlée). The former is the one in which the significant intention is at the stage of coming into being. Here existence is polarised into a certain 'significance' which cannot be defined in terms of any natural object...Speech is the surplus of our existence over natural being."24

This coming-into-expression is a spontaneous act of perception which is seen to take shape because it is that which lays the ground for communication's interconnectedness "we know simply that, if it is to remain dialectical, speech can no-longer be statement, Satz, it must be thinking speech...speaking (parole) and not language (langage)."25 This is the presence of film going beyond what was hitherto possible, at least in aesthetic terms, by "visual impressions that seem to challenge language beyond its capabilities...the ineluctably visible, eye-and mind-boggling world. This image is there before words, even as words strain to create new images"26 This is a "milieu of communication", an "intersubjective diacritical system"27 which is communally shared though uniquely experienced from each individual place. Film expressions are received in this perceptual way, immediately reacted to and drawn from the sedimented pool of cultural meaning by which the psyche of others, as well as the perception of film's psyche, is read, "the semiotic of speaking is the semiotic of perceiving."28 Here, through film consciousness, a perceiving process speaks through materially externalised signs in a direct form of thinking with its own signification, without the means of reflection as an act of retrieval. Just as speech comes out of the silence of primordiality so film
comes out of the closure of the dark into the light of appearance as primordial signification.

At the same time, this speaking or communicative dialogue is not necessarily audible in the accepted sense, indeed the perceptual world can be mute. Film relates to the mute sense of the perceptual world, reflecting it as a brute being which is silent yet expressive. Even our thoughts are dependent on expression for completion and film's thought is directly familiar with bringing expression to our mute contact with things. Film lets muteness 'speak' by directly contacting it in a shared corporeality and concrete setting. Film brings expression to the world from the depth of silence by delicately expressing the inherently pre-linguistic in its own visual, tripartite semiotic of index, icon and symbol.

Roger Munier elaborates film's unique transition from perception to expression. Filming is the imaging of the world already expressed within it, an opening into the world and a catalyst for the upsurge of world's Being. Unlike the transmutation of the original that takes place in painting which is "an appropriation of the substance of the world" and an "exercise of power"29 film, on the other hand, is a "submission", a total effacement before the world as it negates itself in Sartrean fashion "to coincide with objectivity."30 Film can visually speak this language of the world because it carries through the specificity of the phenomenal world and the web-like horizontal situations that are opened up. This is film's primordial condition which is in-different to the autonomy of the world, other than the world, yet by its instrumentality, interpenetrated by it. It produces the utterance of an image which "makes possible the paradox that the world unveils itself as it is in itself, pro-nounces itself...prior to all human language."31 Munier insists that this submission to the lifeworld allows the world itself to become language in the same mute sense of perception described by Merleau-Ponty as an uttered silence:

"All this leads towards silence where the only word pronounced would be that of the world, mute, unprecedented inaudible...the tree expresses itself only with treelike means. The street recounts the street, but no one knows exactly what it says or how it says it. This 'hitherness' does not yield itself
precisely because it irreducibly remains a 'hitherness' for us... The real bespeaks no more than itself. For us, no word is spoken."

This is the 'fascinating image', a world where we seem to be excluded as the 'en soi' speaks, yet in which we are still magically engulfed in the midst of things. We are trans-fixed and 'enthralled' by a fascinating image, a complex of the imaginary and real. In these terms, film is presentation without mediation with an 'immediate' logos and direct language. The imaginary, the realm of the human spirit as pure logos, becomes that of the 'alogos', without man. This is the sheer presence of nature and 'en soi' which film indefinitely captures and is shown to repeat that capture. This is accompanied by a specific mode of reception, compared by Brakhage to "a pursuit of knowledge foreign to language and founded upon visual communication, demanding a development of the optical mind, and dependent upon perception in the original and deepest sense of the word."

From within nascent raw materiality the film body manifests the condition of the prepredicative. Implicated in this is the age old problem of separating out reflective theoria from all forms of spontaneous praxis which in terms of film make consciously formalised acts of structuration amenable to inherent perceptive-expressive capabilities. As in the alternating schema of gestalt's figure and ground, perception and expression work off of each other, they do not take additional, detached acts to speak from experience in order to be explicit. This view is supported by the equally reciprocal notion of 'fundierung', or the founded and founding relation which Merleau-Ponty explains is established in an ambiguous, mutually dependent way:

"The relation of reason to fact, or eternity to time, like that of reflection to the unreflective, of thought to language or of thought to perception is this two-way relationship that phenomenology has called Fundierung: the founding term...is presented as a determinate or explicit form of the originator, which prevents the latter from reabsorbing the former, and yet the originator is not primary in the empiricist sense and the originated is not simply derived from it, since it is through the originated that the originator is made manifest."
This is also a way of looking at the priority of the perceptual over the conceptual while at the same time acknowledging a being which must have knowledge of itself. It is a way of looking at the pregivenness of nature and the necessity of accepting that the pregiven matters because it is matter for a sentient body which becomes the source of deliberation. This same mutual dependency has been explicated earlier in Husserl's notion of corporeality, in "Ideas I", as described by Landgrebe.

"What shows itself here is a reciprocal relation between the constitution of material thinghood and material nature, on the one hand, and the constitution of the kinaesthetic body functioning in it as a living body on the other hand...the relation of corporeality and material nature has been presented in such a way that both constitute themselves in one another and indivisibly from one another."36

Expressive perception and perceptive expression co-exist in this mutual way as a chiasmus or reversibility, the notion which encapsulates Merleau-Ponty's thinking on expression and experience, sense and sensing, existential speaking and sedimented speech.

**Vision of consciousness**

How then does this commutability relate to the notion of film consciousness? At first it resides dormant in existing things without reflection as an abeyance subsumed under concrete structures not yet converted into expressed significance. This is a luminosity which film lights up and brings to nascent ex-position. As a body among other bodies, the film body records presence marked by a reciprocal mode of non-recognition with other objects until given recognition by sentient beings. Here subject and object are barely distinguishable until demarcated by conscious perception recognising and configurating within the activities of the lifeworld. The correlation between the lifeworld and film no longer remains one of strict intentional correspondence but one of Being in the
form of the sensible interlacing of film’s own spatio-temporality. The subject is part of the same flesh as the sensible, within the same web. There is a pervasive vision in general, a coming-into-appearance of phenomena implicating all differentiation. This consciousness of life’s sensibility within the concrete opens itself up to perceptual consciousness and film alike “by starting with the visible and vision one replaces intentionality and acquires a whole new idea of subjectivity.” 37

At this stage, film consciousness is a perceptive-receptive sensibility, an automated perceiver which unselfconsciously mirrors and feeds back the flesh of the world, “the visibility of the world, is admittedly not self sensing as my flesh but it is sensible.” 38 This is a sensibility which throws back an active picture of surface behaviour and which picks up on the invisible and undisclosed as it becomes activated, not by reordering or self-awareness but by its emplacement within the circuitry of flesh. For Merleau-Ponty, perception reaches its object because perception is the flesh touching and seeing itself. There is no re-presentation at the level of perception, there is only flesh in touch with itself. Thus, the being of a tree is a quasi-perception of me, its being pays testament to the fact that I am visible from the standpoint of the tree as we are both flesh of the world. There is an adjustment here from earlier description in terms of consciousness to one of flesh which becomes an immediate and visible experience.

From this perspective, film consciousness is broad vision. It takes shape and takes place in the rough and tumble of visible exteriority, in the perceptual realm of textures and expression. For Merleau-Ponty "there is a circle of the visible and the seeing, the seeing is not without visible existence," 39 and film explores every nuance of what this visibility in the act of seeing is. Coming-to-attention as a coming-into-view is underscored by film as it plays and conjugates different levels of subject positions in a circuitry of flesh. The subject viewing film that is viewing a represented scene in which there are viewing subjects being visible subject-objects for each other. The way the spectator is included in the field-of-vision is comparable to the immersion of sentient beings in the phenomenal field. Field is the crucial notion here and the inference is one of opacity rather than transparency. The field in which understanding takes place is one of
dissemination, discovery and linkage, especially conducive to the work of art. Occurring within a field, it is a creative process which is never totally graspable and only partially realisable.

In this way, the film experience is characterised less by the fixity of an object given to vision than it is by the experience of process. The viewing subject recognises the invisible presence and embodied agency of its eyes and as a situated mode of being it discovers a self in the world. Each film image is received in a motion which dislodges stable states and relates to a corporeality which is not invariable but mobile according to successive perspectives. In terms of excess, we exceed the specific incarnate 'frame' of reference to include further perspectives in an ever-widening phenomenal field. The reception of visual data is clearly determined within the phenomenal field by an interplay of horizons or visual levels of presence and absence:

"[T]he visible is itself a correlation, not a fixed object and this makes it a web, binding together the interior and exterior horizons. In turn, horizons do not remain fixed but are rather horizons of possibility so that each visible is prevented from being an object and from acquiring the self identical positivity that defines the object. Intentionality is at work here but without founding consistent identity."\textsuperscript{40}

When we view film we also bring latent horizons which are related to the depth of our body, a body density which cannot be removed simply because we appear immobile in the viewing condition. The dynamic of visibility and invisibility in film orientates around the shifting gestalt between figure and ground as that which comes to attention or fades out of focus in diffusion. This structure of 'pulling-focus' onto what is attended is reflected in the activity of phenomenological consciousness which can attend to the noematic correlate or, in thetic fashion, to noesis as existential awareness. For Merleau-Ponty, it is part of the operative and deliberative and for Husserl the prepredicative and predicative. The role of vision in both cases is twofold, passively reflective and actively inflective, relating both to doxa and theoria.
Though absent from the visible field, the invisible is not excluded from the system of access to the world that comprises vision. Merleau-Ponty couches his observations in terms of mystery where objects accumulate presence not as a transcendental invariable which putatively establishes identity but in terms of relativity and perpetual elusiveness:

"The ipseity is, of course, never reached; each aspect of the thing which falls to our perception is still only an invitation to perceive beyond it, still only a momentary halt in the perceptual process. If the thing itself were reached, it would be from that moment arrayed before us and stripped of its mystery...What makes the 'reality' of the thing is therefore precisely what snatches it from our grasp."\(^{41}\)

The invisible is transcendent in that it exceeds the visible but is not unapproachable or unattainable, rather a constant task to be realised. The visible has that which is proper to it as a surface but a surface with an "inexhaustible depth" which makes it "able to be open to visions other than our own."\(^{42}\) Bearing in mind film's own initial embodiment it will likewise absorb within its visual vista the invisibility that subtends the visible. It enacts this in the same way human intentionality perceives and expresses lifeworld experience as it senses and makes sense of the world, "the invisible thus provides the grounds for the visible and is not only a condition but also a content of the act of seeing."\(^{43}\) We see the unthought and the unsaid extrapolated from its lifeworld emplacement, out in the light, denuded for an instant, electrically charged, taking on shape in a diffuse after-glow. In this manner, film duplication becomes not reproduction but invisible induction. Setting off an expression of the world through the unseen. An act of creation is required not simply to impose expression on duplication but to give that expression already embedded in duplication and induction the possibility to realise its potential and become manifest as a coming-to-visibility. As a revelation of its being, vision is film's ontological strength. Merleau-Ponty asserts the strong faith in vision as akin to an immediate, unquestioned condition of knowing in certitude:

"It is therefore the greatest degree of belief that our vision goes to the things themselves. Perhaps this experience teaches us better than any
other what the perceptual presence of the world is...it is our experience, prior to every opinion, of inhabiting the world by our body, of inhabiting the truth by our whole selves, without there being need to choose nor even to distinguish between the assurance of seeing and the assurance of seeing the true, because in principle they are one and the same thing."44

In filming, the initial act of vision is launched through the conscious intentions of the filmmaker and the mechanically anonymous instrumentality of the film camera. The manner of intentionality and the insights which may surprisingly emerge from the film text are invisibly founded by the technology at work "all instruments have differently shaped 'intentionalities' which expose precisely those aspects of the world which have hitherto either been overlooked, not known at all, or even totally unexpected."45 Technology gives film a "material instrumentality for its perceptive and expressive intention...exist(ing) invisibly behind the film's perceptive and expressive activity as the film's ground."46 Yet, notwithstanding all claims for technical neutrality as an invisible force, instrumentalities cannot be taken as transparent. They have a peculiarly 'instrumental intentionality' which brings about a knowledge which can be described as a "non-neutral difference."47 This is a difference exacted from direct perception in concrete reality and mediated perception via instrumentality. Essentially this helps explain how mediated objects are taken as 'real' in the aesthetic experience even though they are visioned in a sensorily reduced way, for example, seeing two dimensional image in a lifelike three dimension. It is the image that becomes the intentional noema for the spectator not its ground within the projector/screen, just as for the filmmaker it is the image-through-camera which counts as the result of an instrument-enabled perception. At the conjoined moment of visual creation the situation that comes into view is limited and finitely bounded by the vision of interested bodies. But as film becomes its own being, consciousness unfolds an elevated vision. The interiorised condition of the first moments of filming go on within the registration of the camera eye to be intersubjectively shared during projection in an interplay of latent invisibility and manifest visuality. Internal perceptions are expressed externally in imagery precisely as human vision in the extended synaesthetic sense Merleau-Ponty gives to vision. As with human vision,
film 'sees' within finite and contextualised situations in order to **transcend** perspectival limitations into efflorescent disclosures of the world.

**Transcendental vision**

The elevation of vision and the transcendence implied by this demands an examination of the role of the transcendental, fundamental to Husserl's position. In his debate with Husserl, Merleau-Ponty tries to bridge the 'gap' between the transcendental and the immanent insisting that upon reflection we discover not a transparency but a disunity, a gap discernible within the temporal flux which we try reflectively to grasp. Phenomenological reduction is still a purity of experience but the emphasis shifts from privileging consciousness to recognising the unmotivated upsurge of the world, piercing the core of surface rather than the persona of self. Yet Merleau-Ponty recognises that Husserl lays the ground for these approaches in his own development, where there is a similar 'wonder' and 'paradox' in the face of the world:

"The best formulation of the reduction is probably that given by Eugen Fink, Husserl's assistant, when he spoke of 'wonder' in the face of the world. Reflection... steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire; it slackens the intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus bring them to our notice; it alone is consciousness of the world because it reveals that world as strange and paradoxical."\(^{48}\)

In its primordial phase film's search for meaning cannot be a conceptual rationalisation as an 'a posteriori' to the reduction. It rather centripetally avoids thematic discourse and illumines facts prior to transcendental thematisation. Nonetheless, Merleau-Ponty's insistence that the subject is always part of an embodied flux of visibility does not mean that transcendence evaporates but that perception continues to be related to transcendence as being subsumed by the invisible. The essence, or invisible meaning, is not something to be intuited as if above and removed from facts, making such facts mere examples. Rather, invisible and
transcendent are always attached to the visible as its precondition though never seen for themselves. We see that the kind of evidence proper to the perceived, the appearance of something, requires both presence and absence "[n]ot transcendental and beyond existence, the invisible is a transcendence of immanence in immanence. It is directly experienced by us as that which cannot directly experience wholly or merely through sight."

By accepting a dialectic where film re-presents the interface between both primary and non-originary consciousness we establish a notion of transcendental subjectivity not as a removal from the lifeworld but as an involvement within it. Intentionality will be seen as that whereby conscious actions accord with the object both immanently in the natural attitude and reflectively in the transcendental. The materialisation of transcendence is important for the understanding of the way the film world begins it embodied journey in concretised reality to go on and assume a transcendental status. Even though within the recognisable materiality of the real world, film's constructed representation configures the invisible in the visible constituting its unique spatio-temporal disjunction.

For Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenal field is non-reflectively lived and envisioned and doubts creep into this certainty only when reflection comes on the scene, when we abstract from direct and immediate involvement and 'realise' our perspectivalism. For Merleau-Ponty, we have no need for a removed notion of the transcendental because within the experienced, intuited profile we already have the essence as given, as worked through, and this would apply equally to the film image. Moreover, film mitigates the aporia of overcoming the seemingly solipsist condition of a perception which is intimately enclosed:

"The thing is inseparable from a person perceiving it, and can never be actually in itself because its articulations are those of our very existence, and because it stands at the other end of our gaze or at the terminus of a sensory exploration which invests it with humanity."
Crucially, film manifests and allows for the exploration of this tendency by virtue of its shared, materialised projection of what an introceptive experience looks like. Put in another way, Merleau-Ponty's transcendental within immanence may be used as a way of approaching film's 'self consciousness' on various levels of reflection. By film's capacity to bring to notice levels of making visible the visible via the invisible, it can draw attention to upsurges in Being in a way which overrides the pressures of the influence of human self-consciousness. That is, self-consciousness, with its striving after identity and its inherent difficulty in knowing others is by-passed by film consciousness which has no need for being in 'touch' with itself, either emotionally or tactiley. Film's own consciousness comes alive for both spectator and camera because it offers up a vision which allows for reflection on self-consciousness as a reflection-in-action, even though it is not itself its own reflection. Through reflection upon the pre-reflective activity of vision and pre-egological immediate interaction with the lifeworld, film's reflection on non-reflection takes manifest shape. Reflection can take many distancing forms; turning back on consciousness, suggestive penumbra, mirror reflections and repetition. In all cases they "transcend the immanence of their immediate bodily experience...using their lived-bodies and concrete situation in the world to imaginatively prospect the horizon for future projects and possible situations."51

This is the 'address of the eye', a visual address housed in a situated personalised body experience yet always able to extend itself to where that body is not, either human or mechanised. Reflectively, as with time-consciousness, the body connects with its own future and past situations, as well as the body situations of others. Visual address is re-directed and transcended from the immanently actual to the actively possible. The control over self-projection expresses the freedom for self-creation by means of conscious manipulation. This power of re-direction and visual refocusing can also be seen as a transcendence as it extends the lived-body's existential experience beyond material boundaries as a "vision no longer bounded by the material existence of the body that originates its address and sets the limits of its ability to exceed that body's concrete situation."52
Though I have argued that the emphasis on embodiment challenges without eliminating the transcendental, this is still not Husserl's transcendental position of an eidetic science affording intuitive essences. Where, for example, does the transcendental ego figure in the film experience? The tendency for film theorists is to discern an overly idealist and ahistorical bracketing of the natural standpoint "[t]he problem is that transcendental phenomenology describes only the irreducible ground...the static 'sameness' of consciousness ...invariant relation"\(^{53}\) when what we instead need to understand is the dynamic and change involved in the act of viewing. Considering the implications of using Merleau-Ponty's theories for arguing for a cinematic apparatus which is primordially based in the lifeworld, it may seem disingenuous to insist on the importance of the transcendental. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty was overtly critical of Husserl's position. Merleau-Ponty argued that phenomena in the sphere of immanence risk losing their primordiality through the transcendental brought about by the epoche. In Merleau-Ponty's critique of Husserl's early position, taken up in the preface to the "Phenomenology of Perception", he appears to reject the epoche on the basis that one cannot neutralise our cultural antecedents. Transcendental idealism would signify the non-empirical.

The reduction, as a move from fact to essence, is an attitudinal change which Merleau-Ponty sees as superfluous. The belief in a transcendental world accessible through eidetic reduction or the shift from regarding things as realities and actualities to seeing them as instances of idealities and pure possibilities is rejected. Apodicity and transparency conflict with Merleau-Ponty's own emphasis on reversibility and ambiguity. For Merleau-Ponty, the unmotivated upsurge of the world consists in an ever-renewed experience of its own beginning. There is no foundation, no originary base on which it would be possible to coincide with the presence of meaning. There is also a refusal here to seek permanence in flux and transcendent entry into the categorical, where the noesis realises timeless mean. On this basis, some have claimed that the very notion of the transcendental subject is redundant: "The whole correlation is the noema for the transcendental ego, ("I")...But if the correlation is itself the ultimate structural feature of human experience, then this transcendental move is
questionable...the transcendental ego is actually only a modification of the ordinary ego("I"). 54 A connection between the concrete and transcendental is admitted but the transcendental ego is felt to be an unnecessary condition for the reflective and reflexive moment and movement of consciousness that locates its basic origins in an enabling subject of embodied experience.

Yet, phenomenologically, film cannot remain in the immediacy of its unreflective mechanised duplication. There must be a condition of the transcendental both within the originary phase as an awareness through the camera and filmmakers 'I', as well as in the aesthetically reduced (purified) viewing condition. Aspects of the transcendental are not only necessary in film but are themselves reinforced when considered within the film aesthetic rather than lifeworld situation. The result is a completion of the film experience by enriching it rather than distorting its primary impact. Moreover, for Husserl, the transcendental recognises embodiment and the natural attitude in artistic expression:

"In Husserlian terms, traditional aesthetics has been carried on in the natural attitude...Art itself is created by artists, displayed by collectors...appreciated by the public, studied by art historians, and criticized by critics, all in the realm of the natural attitude. Husserl does not hold this realm to be inferior to the realm of the transcendental attitude. On the contrary, the transcendental attitude, reflective in the phenomenological sense, exists solely to make possible the understanding of the subjectivity that functions anonymously in the natural attitude, presenting a world." 55

There must be an acknowledgment that film is initiated in the natural attitude but also that transformation takes place which makes it amenable to the transcendental attitude. This is not to exclusively connect, in an overriding fashion, with the creative artist to constitute a communion of minds between the creator and the receiver of the work, thereby abnegating material significance. This position is held up as a straw dog which existential theorists insist on the need to refute. What is meant by the transcendental position in the film work is to freely examine how the work
means and subsequently, in the hermeneutic turn, what that meaning is. The work itself does not disappear in a communion of minds but becomes a world in which understanding slides along a Mobius strip of one moment's opacity to another moment's transparency.

The transcendental attitude in film must incorporate both Husserl's position as one which demands the introduction of the epoché as well as Merleau-Ponty's position which, under Husserl's influence, places the transcendental within the immanent. For Husserl, to understand the 'place' of the transcendental it is necessary to enact the epoché and the reduction as a "universal depriving of acceptance...of all existential positions." With epoché we put into brackets the real world of objects, values and people by laying them aside and by doing so philosophise in a state of abstention. The epoché allows one to reach being as-such, as absolutely given to the pure intuition of the transcendental gaze. This is a radical move which signifies the putting-out-of-operation of the belief in Being, ontology as the being of the world out-there, in favour of givenness as experience. Only experience makes a world. What is important is that though the natural attitude is suspended in order to experience transcendental subjectivity it is then reinstated and reconstituted through consciousness in the reduction. Thus, where epoché is a kind of negative rejection in order to focus upon a pure realm of conscious experience, the reduction must be seen as a positive honing in upon the experience itself. By reduction, all objectivities are regarded as intentional objects and here we find the positive approach to essences for which epoché has laid the ground. Reduction is the gradual penetration into purified essence:

"It is important to recall that reduction is a disclosive doing, an engaged performance of consciousness in and through which the world is both "lost" and "regained". Its aim is to recover as well as to discover a primordial posture of the experiencing consciousness".

Regarding this recovery as a return is crucial in applying Husserl to film as it perfectly describes the circuit which film itself maps as first connected and then disconnected phases make the return to the lifeworld possible. By introducing epoché and reduction neither the significance of the lived
immediacy of experience nor its reflected meaning is lost, but rather both are deepened. In the absence of the one, the presence of the other is always felt. The notion of a phenomenological residuum suggests the same conclusion:

"It is this which remains over as the 'phenomenological residuum' we were in quest of: remains over, we say, although we have 'Suspended' the whole world...We have literally lost nothing, but we have won the whole Absolute Being, which, properly understood, conceals in itself, all transcendencies..."58

Even though film cannot enact its own reduction, it still takes place circuitously. Film cannot think its own change of attitude or shift in imagination yet in film recording such reduction has already taken place, inbuilt, so to speak. In other words, film is a non selfconscious reduction of the empirical world at the moment it records the world. By bringing the world to expression through recording it is transformed into a sign thereby introducing the transcendental reduction as the arena where meaning takes-its-place in-place-of concealed meaning. Indeed, for both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, film would not allude to a meaning elsewhere which it mirrors objectively but would rather bring its own derived meaning to emergence.

The already completed reduction only becomes apparent as the process of film ontology unfolds through the dialectic of particularised situation to universalised meaning, from the reality of recorded raw materiality to the hermeneutic of configured narration. By virtue of its mechanical consciousness, film enshrouds and preserves particularity and surfaces through its aesthetic contours to end in the inclusiveness of the eidetic. Just as the root of pure consciousness has to somewhere find its ground in the empirical ego, so the light of contingent natural attitude must somehow infiltrate and enlighten the world of the transcendental artwork with all its essential formalism. What film accomplishes is not the erasure or exclusion of one domain for another but an accentuation of the movement between those domains, a reverberating echo effect manifested as a chiasmic exchange, or reciprocal presupposition. If epoché does take place and
essential insight is reached transcendentally it is not film which automatically carries out the procedure but it is film which paves the way for making this condition possible. The mark of the epoché is there, the ground has been laid, but it has not been consummated within the lifeworld. A partial intentionality inheres to an experience which intends the categorical but ends up with the particular. As Tamineaux explains, the transcendental experience is an originary presentability (one which in film is given a presentable face). Its reduced modality of experience takes place in a field which is a "pure fiction" which is everything but life as it is led in the lifeworld. From film's perspective, the repeatability of the film reel and its own non-human testimony comprise this same 'unworldly' ideal. Its neutral, even in-different 'presence', though originating in originary primordiality is the reduction which leads from the enworlded to a sense of transcendence which includes a mutuality of shared experiences. Here we will be presented in a 'singular' mental glance with a displaced yet encased, realised yet aestheticised, world view available for exploration.

Switching egos

To believe in the film world, a suspension of disbelief is needed which is a direct correspondence to the suspension of belief in the naive and natural attitude of the lifeworld enacted by the epoché. Clearly, a change of attitude is the core characteristic of both suspensions in which reality is nonetheless taken as foundational. The natural attitude is not the attitude of reduction nor is it the attitude of film. But the natural attitude is encapsulated by the transcendental ego not divorced from it. The transcendental subject as pure ego is the field which includes the natural attitude and natural experience but now accessible through meditation and other forms of conscious states, including film:

"The concrete ego himself is the universal theme of the description. Or stated more distinctly: I, the meditating phenomenologist, set myself the all-embracing task of uncovering myself, in my full concreteness...the parallel to this transcendental uncovering is the psychological uncovering of myself, i.e., my purely psychic being ...appercieved in the natural manner,
namely as a component of my psychophysical (animal) reality and thus as a component of the world I naturally accept."60

In phenomenological reflection, the transcendental ego is the unity which constantly maintains itself throughout all of its constitutive acts as a constitutive identity. That is to say, the transcendental ego is made universal and available to any existence. The transcendental ego never goes away in phenomenology, it is always co-present, though it is anonymous before the epoché and transcendental reduction and thus must also be the presupposition for film consciousness. Its omni-presence becomes apparent through the attitudinal shift which emerges at its realisation. For Husserl, transcendental subjectivity proves to be the ground for structure and form as such. It cannot be grasped as something objective, rather it is the presupposition for that which comes to be viewed as something particular and existent. The sense of phenomenology is to accept only what shows itself from itself. Here the genuine 'thing' is transcendental because it is only in this way that noemata are not bound to something existing but can exist in themselves as non-relativised and non-dependent on determinate horizons. It is a being-in-immanence where the being of existents become evident in full certainty and it is a being with apodicticity, which is the full certainty of its being as a being which can never be a non-being.61 To understand an individual-one, we need to grasp its essence, so that only through the pure possibilities of variation can the factually constituted world be intelligible with its horizons and limits.

What sustains growth and change is that though transcendental noemata are ahistorical, the ego as constituted through self-constituting unity is historical, indeed, it is everyday consciousness. The psychological ego as experiencing in the pregiven lifeworld and as depicted in film as naturally involved in action is in no way divorced from the transcendental ego, rather it is a counter-part. The psychological as concrete ego and the transcendental are "allied with each other in a peculiar and inseparable way...in virtue of the alliance of difference and identity."62 This, even though the transcendental dimension is initially hidden to the concrete ego:
"I am blind to the immense transcendental dimension of problems. This dimension is in a hidden realm of anonymity. In truth, of course, I am a transcendental ego, but I am not conscious of this; being in a particular attitude, the natural attitude...I can, however, carry out the transcendental reorientation - in which transcendental universality opens itself up - and then I understand the one-sided, closed, natural attitude as a particular transcendental attitude, as one of a certain habitual one-sidedness of the whole life interest...In this reorientation our tasks are exclusively transcendental; all natural data and accomplishments acquire a transcendental meaning..."63

It is precisely this reorientation which realist film theorists try to grasp though without ever quite resolving. Some theorists believe film imagery contains within it a natural, transcendent factor while others see that if transcendence is to be elicited it demands an overly burdensome, manipulative and artificial intervention.

In these terms it is wrong to solely foreground the cognitive experience of transcendence as a stepping back or distancing manoeuvre. We should rather apply to the aesthetic experience Ricoeur's broad definition of phenomenology as a philosophy of the senses. Phenomenology is a philosophy of sense, a "philosophy of 'sense'-giving the term in the broadest possible extension...including perceived sense, imagined sense, willed sense, sense affectively experienced, sense judged and told, and logical sense."64 Film's spatio-temporal configuration and its unique play upon meta-consciousness mean that it covers this whole gamut of sense experience as well as being the arena for imaginative variations. As these variations unfold so we move from the facticity and contingency of the lifeworld to the essential meaning of the transcendental. There is no justification, then, especially in film, to make Merleau-Ponty's position and Husserl's mutually exclusive and theories which do so are a distortion, especially considering Merleau-Ponty's early and Husserl's later works. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty's account of phenomenology corresponds with Husserl's later work, with a similar emphasis on the primacy of perception as "the initial basis and genetic origin of all operations of consciousness."65
Specifically in film theory there has been little understanding of the nuances of these positions. Jean-Louis Baudry makes an important contribution to the debate by describing the way the cinematic apparatus instantiates a transparent, unclouded vision of the object by constituting the transcendental subject with a seemingly unmediated grasp of reality or the referent. Baudry's work was important for film as it was one of the first to couch the film experience in terms of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Unfortunately, by failing to clarify precisely the differences between the concrete and the transcendental ego and by adding the influence of the ideological on subject formation, his text is overly dense. Casebier finds it outrightly untenable as an accurate depiction of Husserl's position. Baudry's "reading of Husserl is...mistaken with ramifications for the fruitfulness of his conceptualisations of the nature of cinematic representation."

Baudry's major problem is not that he figures in the transcendental as constituting subjectivity but that he shows the spectator to be an entirely malleable, acquiescent receiver of ideological messages reinforced by film form. This competing battle of egos arises because the transcendental somehow disassociates itself entirely from the concretised ego both in the lifeworld and in the viewing situation. What should otherwise turn out to be an all-perceiving and absolutely constituting "I" becomes a distorted or only half-formed concretised "I" unable to withstand the pressures of identification or uphold a sense of identity. Film thus becomes both insidious and doctrinaire. When Baudry characterises the camera's position, it is in the form of an oppressive presence, "an alien and monstrous objectified apparatus...the film's lived-body as it is visible from
its alien and alienating form of materiality." This is a bias and denies the
dialogical structure of the film experience, "[i]f we reflect upon our own
experience as spectators and listeners engaged in viewing and hearing
films, we can hardly describe moviegoers as "motionless," "vacant," and
"silent." For Baudry, the only way to overcome this tyranny is by the well-
worn tactic of making film self-reflexive, drawing attention to its production
and narrative strategies by inscribing its own modes of expression.

Even though Baudry's phenomenological position has an ideological
agenda, it is nevertheless suggestive for bringing out the implications of
phenomenological reduction for the film experience:

"The world offers up an object implied by and implying the action of the
"subject" which sights it. At the same time, the world's transfer as image
seems to accomplish this phenomenological reduction, this putting into
parenthesis of its real existence (a suspension necessary...to the formation
of the impression of reality)."

'Transfer' is an appropriate term here, both in the sense of a spatio-
temporal imprint through one surface pressing through to another surface
and in the sense of a shift from one 'framework' to another. Film objectively
makes available its images to any existence, not an exclusively particular
one. Images can be run and re-run to any viewer who troubles to watch, so
film "Sinn" will be invariant and universal, notwithstanding the multiplicity of
meanings and interpretations that will be offered up. Film consciousness
emerges as fluid and multiperspectival, a zone where the eye of the
camera and the human "I" build a relationship within a transcendental
stream of consciousness:

"And if the eye which moves is no longer fettered by a body, by the laws of
matter and time, if there are no more assignable limits to its displacement -
conditions assigned by the possibilities of shooting and film - the world will
not only be constituted by this eye but for it."73

It is its movement through time which the camera picks up and "fulfills the
most favourable conditions for the manifestation of the transcendental
subject." For Baudry, what the spectator becomes a part of is the world as imaged through a transcendental eye. Just as Husserl's transcendental reduction looks to the universality of an experience, so the filmed version of concrete reality becomes a corresponding transcendental image of this very project. Experience loses the specificity it had in the real, embodied world and is treated by film to become universal, an other-than (or more than) it was in the lifeworld. Baudry, however, seems to assume this is all that film is and this makes for only a partial and inadequate ontology, a deficiency that becomes apparent when we factor in temporality. Husserl makes it clear that real objects are directly amenable to perception, where physical things themselves are reached, gainsaying interpretations of Husserl which place him within an idealist position, "[t]he lifeworld is a realm of original self-evidences. That which is self-evidently given is, in perception, experienced as 'the thing itself'..." This directness and intended immediacy still applies to a transcendental consciousness 'in general' and is experienced in a transparent and unmediated way.

Fink has pointed out that reduction in the prepredicative phase is unmotivated in the natural attitude. Only in transcendence is there a transcendental motivation, the same step film takes when it lays aside the world it depicts. This is the conceit of film. An impersonated impersonality, a false verisimilitude, a tantalising deception yet, nonetheless, a persuasion of truth. The shift that takes place centres around the elsewhere which becomes, in Deleuzean terms, any-place-whatever. The implications of setting aside are significant for the overall film experience in that the understanding of a film world is constituted against a backdrop of the unthought, and invisibly conditioned, real world. The essential meanings arrived at intentionally in the real world become the horizon of possibility for understanding events in the film world. Film visualises the facticity pertaining to the transcendental by figures, characterisations and actions in a film dialectic which engenders metaphysical insight. In Husserl's later genetic constitution of the world, transcendental subjectivity dwells in the unconscious, the hidden recesses behind all empirically given conscious performances.
In short, what gets eliminated by synopsising transcendental and existential subjectivity is the tension and interplay engendered by, and between, both perspectives. It should be evident that it is at this point of tension, where the flow of film spectatorship and engagement can best be disrupted and re-directed that one can aesthetically effectuate the fractious potential between universality and singularity, or omniscience and particularisation. Here spectator subject position can directly negotiate the path between experiencing concrete embodiment and direct eidetic intuition. Film is extricated from the lifeworld in order to maximise all the playfulness and experimentation of exploring those boundaries between the lifeworld and the aesthetic world, the existential particular and transcendental universal. The transcendental shift from the spontaneity of the prepredicative to judgments of the predicative is a finely tuned act of experience which is phased into aesthetic experience by film consciousness. This must be acknowledged if the structure of film experience is to be specifically meaningful and have a diacritical value. Without the tension between lifeworld and film world, film itself would not exist. There would be transparency. Yet the perceptive and expressive arsenals of spectator activity which make film experience dialectic and dynamic are reliant upon resistance and friction. The nature of these different spectator activities must be examined to reveal in what way they navigate the transposition from the real to the reel by actualising the realm of duration. There is an exploration of the many senses of difference here, centering around our 'frame of mind', the difference between real and reel, the dynamic and static, states of being and becoming. All of which relate to the fluidity and temporally constituted flux of the transcendental film world. It is to this temporal flux we must now turn.
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Temporal objectivities

Consciousness is characterised by time, it is the experience of time. To fully appreciate either phenomenology's contribution to the understanding of film consciousness or the consequences of Bergson's duration, we need to grasp how time 'makes-sense' in film terms. As a temporal art form, film both expresses time and is expressed by time. Film shows time but not as such. Though Deleuze argues the time-image directly expresses time, phenomenologically, time is not substantially showable as a self-standing entity manifesting itself. It is indirectly expressed by action and the movement of film's changing imagery: "The inner flow of consciousness is always accompanied by something it is an awareness of. We never have the naked form of time; inner time-consciousness is inner experiencing."¹ Any investigation into film as a phenomenological experience holds time as a priority for the way we understand imagery, the way time constitutes us as the totality of our awareness and the way time permeates the temporal work of art, which film is. The stream of time which comprises temporal phases of the past, present and future is not an empty structure, or a skeletal facade. The experience of intentional correlates is what phenomenologically subsumes all our experience, giving us a sense of time, unity, continuity and identity. In this way, time is felt, without having to be objectified, just as it is unnecessary to objectify self to retain a sense of identity. Our sense of

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T. S. Eliot, Burnt Norton.
immanence and consciousness is intrinsically bound up with the continuity of objects in experience, "the constitution of immanent objects and experience of these objects is the same process."²

As a presentational form, film avoids the descriptive techniques of literature in favour of images which 'speak' themselves. In its prepredicative mode, film recording as temporal reproduction is immanent to temporal objects. Film's imagery is located within the lifeworld so that the same perceptual manoeuvres we implement in the lifeworld are carried over to the film world. We live through film imagery and instantaneously react to that imagery as it unfolds in a recognisable spatio-temporal continuum. As we will see, the correspondence between the temporal unfolding of film imagery in its derived, predicative phase and the temporal unfolding of inner time-consciousness by which we understand that imagery form an intricate dialectic, to the extent that one could claim that film experience is a prime example of phenomenological time consciousness. Even where film experience diverges from the Husserl's classical description, the understanding of that difference comes into clearer relief when judged against Husserl's original standards.

The comparison of film experience to phenomenological time-consciousness takes place not via a content analysis but in keeping with the experience of time's basic structural features. At this stage, it is not the content of imagery that is of immediate concern but rather the structural relation of film to experienced temporal reality. The transfer of concrete materiality through film imagery is a transformation rather than a reproduction and the vehicle for this transformation is the temporal markers of film expression through diverse styles of film narrative. The experience of film imagery is generally taken to be in the present tense, the spectator apparently experiences action as it happens. However, isolating the instant of the now is an elusive task as that moment is experienced only as part of a complex process of 'running-off'. Nonetheless, the nature of the present is still determinable. It has position within temporal flux as extension and though elusive can be described even as an absence comprising an absent-present dialectic. The present is 'incessantly' on the verge of being replaced by the immediately future (protentive) oncoming image. It is also the intuited present before 'becoming' the (retentional) just-having-been. Crucially, the actual status of self-presence to the duration of the now image is more noteworthy for being a unity of affective-understanding than a
scientifically measurable, chronological event. When extending the moment from Husserl to Bergson, its dynamism and resistance to chronology becomes even more apparent.

We have already compared spatial aspects of the transcendental eye/l in terms of human consciousness and film embodiment. But it is especially the role of time phenomenology uses to explain the transcendental as an origin. Here comparisons between film and human consciousness are striking. The unifying stream of time which constitutes the unfurling of the film work is similar to Husserl's description of the absolute self-identical ego. A stream of consciousness binding itself together into one stream of experience. A succession of acts and coalescing of phases which comprise a unified, temporal, self-manifestation. Film and the identical ego is, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, not a succession of psychic acts "but one single experience inseparable from itself, one single 'living cohesion', one single temporality which is engaged, from birth, in making itself progressively explicit."³

For Husserl, the pole of transcendental subjective ego is a primordial timelessness, a vantage point from which time unfolds through concrete actualisations expressed through the now points of intentionality. This is not unlike the camera eye in the prepredicative which is a 'timeless' mechanical registration of effects which perdures as a fixed identity through primordial impressions in flux. In film, the registration of primal impression is permanent, antecedent to its unfolding flux and viewer intentionality. Just as the experience of self is first accessed through embodiment to reach the predicative, so film automatically records the flow before itself being the catalyst for a complex and unified viewing experience: "The process of temporality in the living present is prior to the developed personal self. Husserl sometimes calls it anonymous, prepersonal and automatic. As identities within the life of consciousness, we owe ourselves to it."⁴

As a presence to origin, film recording is a permanent source of time, a spatio-temporal activity. All appearances, whether real or illusory, are time-giving and film recording of objectivities in the prepredicative is also a record of time which is the form of all intuition. But film can never show time outside of the relationship of phenomenological consciousness. The non-being of past and future and equally the 'presence' of this non-being in time-consciousness, are intrinsic to a complex notion of time which records
sedimented history but speaks through subjectivities or points of resistance. Time recorded by film has to do with the movement of subjectivity in the world because subjectivity is the visualisation of time as self-production. Whereas the objective world itself "is too much of a plenum for there to be time...If we separate the objective world from the finite perspectives which open up on it...we find everywhere in it only so many instances of 'now'. These...have no temporal character and could not occur in sequence."5

Being-in-itself is plenitude, it simply is what it is. There is no intended deviation in film's recording of this. To re-order there must first be flow, to configure there must be pre-configuration. At this primal level there are no filmic temporal changes because film captures the flow of flux, paralleling it in represented time. There is no discrepancy, an event which takes place prior to another event retains that chronological position of order as does its speed of occurrence. The temporal flow of inner time-consciousness can only be what it is in opposition to this as an incorporation of past, present and future, "the past...is not past, nor the future future. It exists only when a subjectivity is there to disrupt the plenitude of being-in-itself."6 As such, film's plenitude in its initial phase is disrupted when intended by the temporal non-being of past and future. The experience of the film work, like subjectivity, is not the imposition of a synthesis onto an unfolding series of images but rather a dynamic opening into a differentiated, phased temporality.

At the prepredicative stage, temporal form underpins perception and relationships. There is a connection between different individuals and objects in primordial sensuousness which Husserl claims to be a unity based on temporal form. This would see film at a stage of involvement higher then mere reproduction of objective time in the plenitude of being-in-itself. On this level of reproduction film is already a recording of time in-process, albeit on a primeval level. That is to say, the field of passive data is never pure chaos, as such. It is rather a "field of determinate structure, one of prominencies and articulated particularities field of sense."7 Sensuous data on the passive pregiven level is reflected in film as unities of identity. To live this field of passive data, for it to be registered either by human or film consciousness, there are already products of internal time-consciousness: "[T]he sensuous data...are...already the product of a constitutive synthesis, which, at the lowest level, presupposes the operations of the synthesis in internal time-consciousness...Time-
consciousness is the original seat of the constitution of the unity of identity in general." As Husserl points out, this is purely formalistic and revolves around synthetic understanding, succession and co-existence. At root, this is a radical recognisability, an associative genesis, a temporal act where similarity is recalled from previous experience not unlike the instigation of habit we find with Bergson. If there is primordial chaos it never appears as such to the mechanical eye. In this way unity of identity emerges out from objectivities as a force of inner time-consciousness but out of matter, not subjectivity. Film’s re-presented imagery picks up on pregiven associative genesis relating to the field of sense in concrete reality, making it prominent, discernible and meaningful. At this level, the film eye presents intimations of the all-embracing connectedness of phenomenal objectivities as they come to prominence for the embodied 'I'. The unity based on connecting temporal form forces us to acknowledge the symphystic role of objective time:

"(T)he time by which objects are united is not the subjective time of perceptual lived experience but the objective time conjointly belonging to the objective sense of this experience...the objectivities intended...as actually being are also intended as objectively and simultaneously enduring."  

Husserl necessarily finds objective time unavoidable, seeing it inevitable for understanding shared experiences in the lifeworld. Such communal, intersubjective vision makes film vision readily assimilable, "reference to objective time...is unavoidable here...(it) already leads beyond this domain of being-only-for-me. Objective time, objective being, and all determinations of existents as objective certainty designate a being not only for me but also for others." Every new datum presented, or every objectivity that comes into frame, brings with it its own duration, its own microcosmic system, its own time within ever present worldly time. Not yet related as a 'complex state of affairs', real objectivities cohere with their temporal horizons interlaced, part of the universal flow of time, a world time filmically storable.  

Husserl's analysis of primal apprehension cements time-consciousness as foundational. There is permeation here, at times difficult to grasp, of objectivities coming to prominence within constituting absolute flux. Time-consciousness is understood as self constituting, an amorphous
constitutive flux which cannot be described or pinpointed in the same way as constituted objects. Husserl describes the experience of inner time-consciousness as an intentionality which entails the auto-constitution of ego and subsequent transcendental ego awareness. In constituting the temporal unity of immanent objects, primal flux simultaneously constitutes its own unity through an oblique awareness of itself. Absolute flux relates to consciousness just as immanent time relates to temporal objects expressed within it, including film. This is akin to the camera eye which has an unreflective but pervasive vision of the life force. Just as the atemporal pure ego is neither created nor passes away but is closest to a process-in-action so mechanical recording registers the origin of primal consciousness in embodied space 'in medias res'.

The capture by film of the living present and primal phenomena does what is otherwise a problematic phenomenological procedure. It reflects the primal present in a way which the human ego cannot. It maintains the reflected world as a subject because it is mirroring that subject as anonymously present while still being itself a temporal form in movement. It passes through the same concomitant temporal phases without itself being a part of those phases, unlike the ego's involvement in the lifeworld which embodies an active-passive hinge. Film's unique correlation avoids artificially objectifying the primal present because it can show time in action and mechanically epitomise the ideal of the transcendental subject, "transcendental subjectivity is not only there unnoticed, but it is nonthematic and absolutely anonymous to itself."12 The transcendental reality of the film camera has the capacity to bear and express all temporalisations and times, all identities of being and all worlds. Thus, the timeless consciousness discovered by Husserl in deep intellectual intuition as the basis of the constitution of all that is temporal, must likewise be seen as the element of film recording which holds transcendence in immanence and expansively incorporates more than the present into an infinity of horizons:

"As it is with the world in its ordered being as a spatial present... so likewise is it with the world in respect to its ordered being in the succession of time. This world now present to me, and in every waking now obviously so, has its temporal horizon, infinite in both direction, its known and unknown, its intimately alive and its unalive past and future."13
There must be nonthematic consciousness prior to thematic consciousness for the transcendental to act, as well as both primary impression and retentional consciousness for recollection to occur. This is what we mean when we say reflective consciousness can never thematise its own constituting life because it is by nature unreflective but involved in a reflective thematising act. The only access to the primal source is provided by the interplay and oscillation of the originally anonymous and subsequently thematic consciousness. The flux that underpins the human condition also subsumes film's ontology. The source of film experience as an exposition of temporal unfolding and a showing of time relates to the primal flux of human condition, indeed it resonates with it. The appearance of the flux is self-generating, "the self-appearance of the flux does not require a second flux, but qua phenomenon it is constituted in itself" and it becomes apparent in the awareness we have of being able to reflect on our act of constitution, the noetic structure of intentionality in its constituting mode.

The transcendental film eye as related to primal flux is an absent presence in immanent time. An absence which is in touch with the timeless flux of transcendence and a presence which is in touch with the rhythms of daily vicissitudes. The locus of transcendental viewing is neither within the world as a concretely emplaced camera nor outside it as omniscient vision but accords to unique temporal interactions derived from immanent temporality. The transcendental film eye compares to "that unique but verifiable space provided by the reflective structure of consciousness. As the space for the presencing of all objects, it is not contained within the horizon of objective presence. Hence it cannot appear to an empirical point of view." The oblique area of unthematisable, primal flux is the gateway to meaning and to film narrative comprehension since, on the one hand, 'touched' by passive synthesis it "safeguards against speculative excess" and, on the other, touched by chaos it opens up to reflection pathways to explore the unexpected and wholly uncontainable. Though lacking in persistence, there is something about the flux which 'abides', "what is abiding, above all, is the formal structure of the flux, the form of the flux. That is, the flowing is not just flowing in general; rather each phase is one and the same form." This 'form of flux' becomes clearer in the way internal time-consciousness structures the 'present' of film experience and this must be broken down to constituent parts.
Inner time-consciousness

The relationship of the real and fictive world weaves its way through the continuum of primal memory and impression, mirrored, duplicated and continually running-off. Film is a recording of the past, not a live production, but 'takes its place' in the present. Everything that happens within the 'frame' of perceptive life takes place in an apparently enduring, persistent present. But this is only made possible by intentionality: "It is certainly evident that the perception of a temporal object itself has temporality, that the perception of duration itself presupposes the duration of perception, that the perception of any temporal form itself has its temporal form."18 If we only experienced the momentary presents of film the essence of film as movement and temporal unfolding would elude us in either a series of moments, or the perpetually present. As we bring consciousness to objective reality we perceive movement in objects and situations in a shared immediacy, "the present is the immanence of causes and effects, that is, the state of existing perpetuating itself by changing; it is time passing, unconscious that it is passing, but which is. And which is everything it could be at every moment of itself."19 The starting point, then, must indeed be the immediate existence of the presence as only that which is actual and the way in which consciousness makes out of the physical reality we are conscious of a meaningful and dynamic flow of change. Mitry's acknowledgment of this is the important starting point for film's temporal phenomenology, though it is also brings out the naive acceptance of being over movement,

"This reality, whether or not it is perceived, whether or not it can be perceived, only exists in the here and now, since the fact of existing is only justified by and predicated on 'present existence'- otherwise it does not exist or exists no longer."20

What must be considered is that the sense of past and intimations of future are what human consciousness brings to the immediacy of the present. Film plays on these factors by reflecting the sense of presence in the present while dislodging this certitude with a variety of disruptive techniques. The strategies that are used in film to connote temporal movement, as well as its inbuilt flux, differentiates spectator time from represented time. It could be no other way. If we merely moved in parallel fashion to film's presentational images the power of their presence would
overcome the perception of duration, we would live without perspective through the images, in tandem with them. But film's great advantage over other artforms is a dynamic which allows it to visualise time displacement, to concretise action in movement as the present unfurls and evolves towards an ek-static future within a recognisable time continuum. All of which is added to the facticity of film imagery being images-in-movement. What we see on the screen is a presentation but as a seismic plate of time zones "in the process of taking place."\textsuperscript{21}

Spectator consciousness experiences imagery through a present duration which is noetically structured. This can be clarified in terms of William James' specious present which has obvious affinities to Husserl's inner time-consciousness, "the practically cognised present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time."\textsuperscript{22} The 'vaguely vanishing backward and forward fringes' resemble Husserl's retention and protention. But there are significant differences of emphasis between the two analyses, though the specious present seems to constitute something of what Husserl is describing. For James, for two successive events to be experienced in the present they must be simultaneously represented and this involves a paradox "namely, that to be aware of successive objects consciousness needs to compare the earlier and later objects in an operation that makes the earlier and later simultaneous\textsuperscript{23} thereby conflating the past and present. The simultaneity of succession is accepted by James and, moreover, the experience of now moments is taken to be a momentary one, or a "durationless act of consciousness."\textsuperscript{24} Yet, James' overall position is inadequate for fully capturing film's temporal experience in that it involves a "structureless immediate intuition of duration"\textsuperscript{25} and it is precisely an account of such structure that Husserl provides. Husserl's 'backward fringe' is the structure of retentional consciousness which makes possible the understanding of primal impression throughout the intuited duration of process. Husserl's version of the specious present comprises not a retentional moment but a retentional \textit{consciousness} so that retention is always present in consciousness and the memory aspect of the past image in the present is not one of re-presentation. We need to understand immediate consciousness not as momentary but as a structured experience which accounts for temporality as extended duration. The way Husserl includes the past in the present is not through a direct simultaneity of succession, a grasping of the present and past in a total moment as James
but as continuum. In terms of a melody, for example, "since a new now is always presenting itself, each now is changed into a past, and thus the entire continuity of the running-off of the parts of the preceding points move uniformly 'downward' into the depth of the past." Thus as each note passes, and equally as each film sequence unfolds, the momentary experience of the present is united with a continuum of past phases so that "any subsequent moment will have the previous moment with its attached continuum as one of its own phases." What was once a primal impression and apprehended as such becomes, with a retained identity, part of retentional consciousness, no longer immanent but an absent presence nonetheless. Both primal impression and retentional memory are directly and immediately experienced in the span of the durational present.

"If we call perception the act in which all "origination" lies, which constitutes originally, then primary remembrance is perception. For only in primary remembrance do we see what is past; only in it is the past constituted, i.e. not in a representative but in a presentative way." This is also film's presentational mode where the spectator is relating to the sensation of film as a duality of concrete reality and intuited image. Nonthematic retention 'immediately' becomes a significatory latency in the experience of new moments not unlike film's latency of the prepredicative as it surfaces in the aesthetic experience of film. As film unfolds, not only the retentional structure of comprehending new images come into play but also the content structure which carries a familiar echo effect of lifeworld reality onto each new now-image. The effect of meaning-bestowal is made possible by the 'presence' of the retentive fading of an elapsed presence and the present absence of a 'once' recorded lifeworld. Meaning is paramount as an experience which belongs not to the lifeworld but to a particularised aesthetic: "The retentional performance of consciousness allows it to carry within itself an intentional sense or meaning of the past but not a real sensation of it." This is a direct meaning-bestowing intuition of the past rather than memory images of it. For Husserl "perception automatically retains the past without the need for a full-blown act of recollection." The retentive function built into perception deals with primary presence but as the significance of previous immediacy not as a present in itself:
"The just-past tone as far as it falls into the present time...is still intended, but not in the sense that it is actually being really and immanently 'sensed', not in the sense that it is there in the manner of a now-tone...what pertains...is...an echo of the sensation, a modification that is no longer a primary content in the sense of something actually present."31

Thus, retentional consciousness brings with it thematic, intentional status. Past experience does not have the status of a sensed sensation though it is intended meaning. The presence of retention is not a repeated apprehension of primal impression, apprehension as related to new now moments, but rather the fading echo as just-present, a primary memory as the past-of-present indivisibly connected. It is time which ensures flux as constant change, an assimilation of every renewable present aligned with ever-receding retentions:

"With regard to the running-off phenomenon, we know that it is a continuity of constant transformations which form an inseparable unity, not severable into parts which could be by themselves nor divisible into phases, points of the continuity which could be by themselves."32

In this way meaning is conserved and preserved through the running-off of the film series. It is this continuity, constancy and indivisibility which also figures in Bergson's duration. However, we will find this play of phases and contribution to the continuum re-figured by montage and organic film narrative. In addition, the status of sensation as an intentionalised significance will be expanded and redirected, opening up possibilities for exploring film on prelinguistic and physiological levels.

The way film shows the past in the present is literally a 'keeping' the past in mind. Ignoring the past is to deprive it of its present repercussions and its inherent fulfilled or unfulfilled protentions. As Edward Casey points out, memory is derived from 'memor' which means being mindful, more than mere recollection.33 Casey's description of the keep is useful for film memory as a concrete showing of place. Memory as mindful "exceeds the simple apprehension which lies at the core of retention, recollection, and being reminded. Its main action is one of remaining or staying with what we come to be mindful of."34 Being mindful allows the memory to linger, fill the present with its presence in a way which is more than mere just-grasping. The past is a 'kept' presence with the possibility of exhibition or projection.
Film images visualise the past, bringing its 'keep' with it as a temporal place, an active/passive dialectic of memory which is both "receptive and spontaneous."\textsuperscript{35} The dialectic at work here is between the space of containment in which memory is housed and the pressure of time on the past through inner time-consciousness. Whereas "mind and memory exfoliate in place...place's own activity is that of closing in or down...Time 'disperses subsistence'...(in) its dispersing movement...Place offers protection against this very dispersal."\textsuperscript{36} Keeping the past in mind takes on a non-personalised, unconscious ontology, a singular quality which characterises the basis for memory as duration.

The presence of the just-having-been in immediacy, however, is only one aspect of inner time-consciousness. The about-to-happen is a mirror reflection of the just-past. When we first experience a present image, its 'protentive' image is inherent in it but is not yet primary. It is still not-yet present. The expectation of that not-yet present image, however, is present in consciousness as we tend towards a certain fulfillment. Fulfillment may be completed or, equally, the anticipated course may be frustrated. Yet the once future image having passed through the present will then have a different status in recollection. It will have been that image which had fulfilled expectation or that image which frustrated original expectation. Either way, it will henceforth be seen differently to when it was 'mere' protention and future possibility: "(E)very act of memory contains intentions of expectation whose fulfillment leads to the present. Every primordial constitutive process is animated by protentions which voidly constitute and intercept what is coming, in order to bring it to fulfillment."\textsuperscript{37} The attitudes we associate with original protentions are not based on perception but potential, though their confirmation is perceptual. Protention is as much a part of the present as retention but with the major difference that the future is foremostly unfulfilled, "an unfulfilled intentioning of an immediate but indeterminate future."\textsuperscript{38} Protention sets up future parameters, "protention is the name for the way the adventure of the future - its fundamental openness - is closed off by anticipation."\textsuperscript{39} Clearly there can be no protentional continuum but there is protentional horizon, or 'forward fringe'. For Husserl, the protentional future is intentionally meaningful in the specious present and equally (pre)visional expectation is integral to the dynamic course of film, more so than in the spatial arts.
Forestructures lie within the context of film images themselves, the groundwork that is temporally laid by film's time structures and spectator inner time-consciousness. Protention speaks to image traces through meaning, "intentionality is possible only to the extent that the object is adequately foreshadowed, traced in advance... anticipatory preparation for the actual appearance of the object." The process is one of completing horizons in accord with a 'frame' of expectations. The basic mode of appearance of an object or situation has an outlying zone of apprehension consisting of marginal co-data, "a more or less vague indeterminacy. And the meaning of this indeterminacy is once again foreshadowed by the general meaning of the thing perceived as such." This indeterminacy is the source for more complete meaning but as 'indeterminate' suggests, it is a meaning which is unclear. There are rather motivated possibilities residing in the essential type, a prior understanding of being: "This prior projection...is drawn from and motivated by the actual course of experience and it is furthermore subject to ongoing temporal revision as former horizons are filled and new ones opened up." In film narration, it is the perception of events in terms of incomplete contexts and indeterminate horizontal structures which give it a telos and dynamic. There are many possibilities for discovery and the spectator projects towards possibilities in the film work which may or may not be fulfilled. Husserl makes it clear that we are entitled, indeed, under the guise of protentional expectation we would be required to question and explore in what way horizons are played out. Husserl attempts to fix temporal flux through constitution which brings with it organisation of temporal horizons as anticipatory movement: "Everything in Husserlian constitution turns on a certain anticipatory movement, a gesture of regularizing the flow by means of anticipating its regularities...the flux organises itself into patterns which build up expectations".

The time of the lifeworld and that of inner time-consciousness coalesce so that film time 'takes off' between the threaded parameters of recorded time and projected time. Once within this technological compound, film begins to mean and gain in signification through narrative and the workings of temporal perspectives. This dynamic makes the film work contingent upon chimeric horizons and spectator reconfiguration, highlighting the flux and interaction of all the modalities at work. Thus, Merleau-Ponty, while fully utilising Husserl's weave of temporal intentionalities also relocates noetic, structural presence to preconscious, lived embodiment, warning at the
same time against both totalisation and abstraction brought about by reflection:

"It is of the essence of time to be in process of self-production, and not to be; never that is to be completely constituted... Constituted time, the series of possible relations in terms of before and after, is not time itself, but the ultimate recording of time."\(^{44}\)

One could add that the recording of time by film is not only not time itself or its finalised constitution, but rather the vision of its passage.

**Bergson: movement and intermediate imagery**

It is Deleuze who brings out the importance of Bergson for film, even though Bergson seems an unlikely cinematic ally. For Bergson, neither cinema nor natural perception can capture his own form of vitalism or philosophic intuition. He argued that rather than uniting the artificiality of phases into a whole as extended duration or transcending immobile components into constant flux, both cinema and natural perception were based on the abstracted snapshot:

"Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as these are characteristics of reality, we have only to string them on a becoming abstract, uniform and invisible, situated at the back of the apparatus of knowledge... Perception, intellection, language so proceed in general... we hardly do anything else than set going a kind of cinematographic inside of us... the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographic kind."\(^{45}\)

As a reply to this Deleuze defends the phenomenological position which is not that of natural perception or the snapshot of reality. "Phenomenology instead saw the cinema as breaking with the condition of natural perception... phenomenology is right in assuming that natural perception and cinematographic perception are qualitatively different. In short, cinema
does not give us an image to which movement is added, it immediately gives us a movement-image."46

Admittedly, we now lay aside the important notions of the transcendental and the époque in favour of the virtual and actualisation through perception. We also find a challenge to the centrality of subjectivity through identity and unity. But these terms in themselves are open to interpretation even in phenomenology, according to which period of Husserl we look at and as to whether we hold Merleau-Ponty, Sartre or later thinkers to be the spokesmen for phenomenological development. Nonetheless, with temporality in particular, we see a similarity between Bergson's durational flow and Husserl's flux of inner time-consciousness. Likewise, we see Bergson's incorporation of the forces of matter with the forces of mind to be comparable to Husserlian intentionality if we remember that Husserl's position is in no way idealistically Cartesian but aimed at opposing such dualism, just as Bergson.

Both Husserl and Bergson agree that our experience of life is constituted through time to the extent that either an absolute flux or an incessant duration defines what we are. Both thinkers oppose the tendency to abstraction and systemisation we find in non-humanistic science. Husserl's search for the eidetic, however, is not the same as Bergson. For Bergson, intellect has led to dissolution and fragmentation instead of the process of becoming. The intellect artificially cuts up progress into phases and is a move away from a continuous whole into discontinuous parts. There is a fall where the mind falls away from the unity of action into a myopic, creative inertia. Abstraction cannot represent movement in progress:

"Much of Bergson's writing is devoted to conveying a sense of the indivisible unity of movement...Movement gives the appearance of conscious order when it is seen in its completeness - a complex structuring of elements. But the process of its completion is an undivided whole."47

Bergsonian movement is distinct from space. The space that is covered is past and divisible, but movement itself is present and indivisible. To reproduce movement it is necessary to use movements, not differentiated, divisible units of space or time. This would mean opposing film as a description of images simply conjoined to tell a story and instead seeing it as a continuous flux, uniting the artificiality of phases into a whole which
transcends immobile components. Similarly, tying film perspective down to a fixed point of observation with steadfast vantage points would also ignore the implication of movement which encourages shifting centres of perceptual positions.

Reflecting on the philosophical mindset based on intuitive insight, Bergson postulates an intermediary stage between the "simplicity of the concrete intuition and the complexity of the abstractions which translate it, a receding and vanishing image..."48 This is the vanishing thoughts which haunt the philosopher's mind and which, though elusive, come closer in imagery than any linguistic attempt to communicate insights. The essential insight of primary intuition is an image. This image is free from being locked within a specific time and place and elicits the same expansive potential and flexibility we see emerge with the reordering and experimental juxtaposition of film montage.

From its first moments, the intermediary image as expressive of philosophic intuition is negating, not to accept the ready-given, nor any representation of it. An acknowledgment that thought, just as the lifeworld itself, cannot be pinned down or compartmentalised because it relates to something in movement:

"[T]he meaning, which is less a thing thought than a movement of thought, less a movement than a direction. And just as the impulsion given to the embryonic life determines the division of an original cell...so the characteristic movement of each act of thought leads to this thought, by an increasing sub-division of itself to spread out more and more over the successive planes of the mind..."49

The intermediary image emits a uniqueness of vision which demands an appreciation of novelty to penetrate beyond ordered predictability. The originary image does not reside anywhere as such, but is itself process, formed as idea, subsisting in matter and conjoined with the power of wills from emerging source points or areas of indeterminacy. The difference between an intuitive insight of a philosopher and the visual trace of a film image lies merely in the material accessibility of the latter, not its appropriation. The intermediary image, which is the core of film consciousness, haunts original intuition like a shadow, allowing us to reach its soul:
"We shall get closer to it (the intuition), if we can reach the mediating image... an image which is almost matter in that it still allows itself to be seen, and almost mind in that it no longer allows itself to be touched – a phantom which haunts us."50

This is a phantom which also comes to haunt itself. From the originary force of the idea, in film the self-imaging of the image, division and sub-divisions ensue as a springing impulse51 which comes to disseminate and reconfigure the idea. There then results a re-contraction to the origin of idea, or primordial film impression, but now enriched, diversified and otherly. The discrimination and perspectival preferences carried out by the two orders of 'automata', human perception and film's mechanical recording, can be seen to manifest the core upon which mechanical consciousness and intuitive insight are based. We begin with a contraction and reduction before arriving at qualitative changes which result in multiplicity and discovery.

Initially, film has a reproductive role which encapsulates temporal unfolding, one which cannot dissolve the manifest or delve deep into the roots of atomic centres and imperceptible vortices. At this stage film plays upon the luminosity and tangibility of surface phenomena. But whereas the human eye is defined by its very partiality and utilitarian needs, the camera eye exposes its reflective duplicity off surface phenomena giving, at least, the illusion of film neutrality. The potency of the intermediary image is this twofold status, emerging from within the surface materiality of formulated content while still hovering around a spiritual maelstrom or intuitive force field. Bergson chose not to equate this with film, unlike Deleuze who prioritised it by initially linking it to an open totality and ultimately to paradoxical indiscernability.

The intermediate image and concurrence of matter and mind make even more sense when we peruse Bergson's definition of the circuitry of the brain. There is here only a question of difference of degree between reflex actions and voluntary actions:

"[A]s soon as we compare the structure of the spinal cord with that of the brain, we are bound to infer that there is merely a difference of
complication, and not a difference of kind, between the functions of the brain and the reflex activity of the medullary system."\(^{52}\)

The brain receives external stimulation "first" and allows the stimulation received to reach *at will* this or that motor mechanism of the spinal cord, and so to *choose* its effect."\(^{53}\) The result is a multitude of possible paths or choices that can be taken which lead Bergson to describe the brain as a kind of central telephonic exchange which like a sorting house directs excitations to their most appropriate motor mechanisms and analyses input with regards to subsequent action through virtual circuits.

On the primordial level, Bergson's description of human perception is immediate, functional and mechanical. As objects normally play off of each other, the interminable movement of change continues unhalted, unstoppable. When spontaneous perception intercedes, however, something virtual is inevitably manifested. By no means a totality, by no stretch a disclosure, it is a momentary break within the aleatory network. At the moment some-thing comes to light, its inner impulsion to extend and continue itself by becoming more than its momentary surfacing means it has already lost what it was within the flux of time to become other. Perception becomes the immediate expression of body image amongst the aggregate of all these images. It results in actions, setting up a series of connections in the world of immanent flux as an outgrowth of the will. When fixity takes place out of virtuality, it is as a reduction (only partly in the phenomenological sense), a honing down of matter as an incursion into the movement of matter. To make the virtual an actual is not a question of expanding or releasing something, but rather a *curtailment*, a subtraction to obscure aspects so that what is perceived becomes the picture of the extensive thing. Our representation of matter is the measure of our possible action upon bodies and is reliant on this contractual form of actualisation to make this possible.\(^{54}\)

This is a removal of things from their virtual, flux state by separation, in a similar way to the interposition of the camera into the flow of the lifeworld as an intercession into the prepredicative. A film camera in its initial recording mode is like the activity of subjectivity making perceptible, of actualising the virtual flux into a momentary assemblage. The only way non-perceived memory images in the ontological unconscious can become actualised is via human sensory motor activities just as the film body registers and brings
phenomena to appearance. There is also a rejection of any premise that holds the process of sensation to be a projected exteriorisation of internal states. Bergson, precisely as Merleau-Ponty, sees the cut-off point for affection and perception to be the externality of the lived body. Affection is the return of the real within the body and perception the condition for action:

"Everything then will happen as if...the external images were reflected by our body into surrounding space and the real actions attested by it within itself. And that is why its surface (the body) the common limit of the external and the internal, is the only portion of space which is both perceived and felt."55

In this way perception and body lie outside subjectivity, with the body as an image among other images, amongst the totality of what Bergson calls the aggregate of all images. For Bergson, everything is image. External images affect inner images, including body, by transmission and the bringing of movement; afferent nerves transmitting disturbances to nerve centres stimulated from outside, efferent nerves conducting disturbances from nerve centres to the periphery as the body in motion. Images as body, images as mind. All function without ever producing a single representation of the material universe. The body image responds by bringing back movement effects to outside object-images. So materiality is recast in terms of images, matrices, meeting points of senses, actions and reactions.

Significantly, Bergson fills his perceptual language with visual and pictorial references. A remainder which detaches itself from virtuality 'as a picture' with 'rays of light' passing from one medium to the other 'reflecting' on each other to erupt in a concretisation. The practical demands of a sentient, perceptual body meet the virtuality of matter and diminish it into a perceptual-given, frustrating the pulsating 'rays of luminous refraction'. Out of virtuality we get actualisations in movement. The images of material objects are never in the world as isolated objects but are always multilayered and part of a burgeoning, contextual schema which is the existence of all other objects which come before and after, and the actions and reactions of myriad objective forces. To fail to acknowledge this is to artificially conceptualise the stream of existence (temporal duration) "[t]o transform its existence (the material object) into representation, it would be enough to suppress what follows it, what precedes it, and also all that fills it, and to retain only its external crust, its superficial skin."56

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Film is inherently pure perception while human perception is limited to reacting to human needs, practical in its diligence at discarding the unfocused and unnecessary. The reaction to stimulation will always be less than the fullness of the virtuality of matter, so that consciousness loses its flux and totality in the cause of 'self' interest. What is perceived is only a slice of life, a portion cut out of the totality. Within the stage of primal, motor sensory activity all kinds of sorting takes place which accords with practical choice-making. Yet, film's emplacement within an aggregate of images, one which interacts with the areas of indeterminacy which coagulate into perceptual form, is as legitimate as is the human body image. Both are immersed and involved in the heart of the lifeworld as bodily situated. But whereas those primal film images resulting from the film body become available for artistic formulation and expression, human perceptual imagery becomes the yardstick upon which action is based in the world of objects and things. What is crucial, however, is that both film and human consciousness feed off the presence of (absent) virtuality, mirror imagery and the ontological unconscious (pure memory). The important point being that what is set up is a circuit, just as film is a circuit between the operative lifeworld and the disengaged but meaning-seeking aesthetic world. The circuit for Bergson is the interaction of the perception-image and the recollective-image, not a series of progressively removed associations but rather a circuit of immanent, mutual tension as in an "electrical circuit", "a solidarity between the mind and its object" which "must always find its way back to the object from where it proceeds."

Reelising memory

Whatever sense we make of present perception relies on interpretation from the point of view of memory images selected by the reflection of attentive perception, which for Bergson is literally a projection "outside ourselves, of an actively created image." Sensation is a circuit transmitted from objects to the perception of living beings and continues through consciousness memory back to the object, thereby expanding duration. Bergson is clear that perceptual sensation is accompanied by a concomitant (and filmic) 'after-image' where memories follow "immediately upon the perception of which they are but the echo" so that "any memory-
image that is capable of interpreting our actual perception inserts itself so thoroughly into it that we are no longer able to discern what is perception and what is memory."

The defining characteristic of the relation between past and present is not one based on present existence as opposed to the past's non-existence but rather the way in which perception draws on the past to contribute towards present action. The link to the past is never broken because the past is distinct from the present, its quality is never effaced and when expressed in the present it is as part of the virtual-actual relationship cemented at origin. The reasons for this are clear with Bergson since there can be no associative disruption eventuated by piece-meal imagery. Connections to the past cannot be disembodied ideas or free-floating sensations but are inexorably linked to contextual and situational materiality, regions of duration. To experience the past we must place ourselves within it and follow its path to the present, always as process never as representation.

Individuals tend to concentrate on present moments to fulfill actions under the weight of a material world which far surpasses the capability of their innate purview. Preference is given to visible divisibility over the unperceived. The present is taken to be the real and unexpected memory images are unwelcome apparitions in need of rational explanation. Yet, for Bergson, the past and memory images are as real as the worldly objects we take to exist, even though we may not actually perceive them. What happens is not that the past ceases to exist when the present has become past but rather it ceases to be useful in a utilitarian fashion:

"We misunderstand the past in seeing it separated from the present by the divide which separates non-existent from existent. The distinction between past, present and future are to be understood...not in terms of different relations to existence, but in terms of different relations to action." 

Thus, individuals tend to seek order and predictability as a reassurance of identity. When associated memory images spring up in an involuntary fashion 'out of' the past, the chain of order is apparently broken and control felt to slip. This is an unnecessary reaction, since, like the causal chains of the concrete world:
"[O]ur memories form a chain of the same kind, and...our character, always present in all our decisions, is indeed the actual synthesis of all our past states. In this epitomised form our previous psychical life exists for us even more than the external world, of which we never perceive more than a very small part, whereas, on the contrary, we use the whole of our lived experience."61

Though Bergson seems to challenge the immediacy of Husserl's primal impressions, we are in fact encouraged to think more of Husserl's example of the melody as being precisely what Bergson is suggesting. For Husserl, there is no stasis, no one-to-one correlation between specific notes and consciousness. Notes only make sense within the flux of melody, the retentional consciousness of holding the just-past still 'in the present' and the sense-giving wholeness that the overall melody brings to the understanding of each note. In like manner, Bergson is concerned with movement and change themselves not a series of mobiles which change position in space. Movement is time as process. Indeed, Bergson uses Husserl's example to illustrate the flow:

"Let us listen to a melody, allowing ourselves to be lulled by it; do we not have the clear perception of a movement which is not attached to a mobile, of a change without anything changing? This change is enough, it is the thing itself...indivisible...There are changes, but there are underneath the change no things as such which change...movement does not imply a mobile."62

Bergson's notion of perception not only applies to contraction as a filming and placing of action in the interval but also as a way of accounting for spectator experience as a process of incorporating the past in the present and the power of memory recollection. As a temporal art form, film is already a part of the temporal reality of the objective world. It essentially marks time and is marked by time, markers which are both in the armature of temporal being and in the structured activity which is expressed through the filmwork. When film enters the perceptual mêlée of the lifeworld as an already sentient consciousness, it not only records time through modulating movement but opens the possibility for relating the present and past in a sphere of recorded memory and spectator recollection just as Husserl's inner time-consciousness suggests. Film alone cannot do this by simple mechanical recording but as an artwork film is open to Bergsonian intuition
which is conducive to imagination and the exploration of the past. Spectator consciousness conjoins with the sphere of memory to explore sheets of the past as a way of understanding narrative and its impact on spectator experience. Here, too, film narrative, whether fiction or documentary, allows for the flux of time to be experienced as felt duration, as a way by which human beings can discover themselves in the depth of memory.

As a region, however, the being of memory is not within us, but rather we are within it. Film creates an analogous sense of ontological memory, one which similarly does not belong to any one individual but which the singular individual draws upon. Thus, in terms of Bergson's memory-consciousness, it is we who move in a being-memory, "recollections do not have to be preserved anywhere other than 'in' duration. Recollection therefore is preserved in itself...we have no interest in presupposing a preservation of the past elsewhere than in itself, for example, in the brain."63 It is the past which is being in-itself, whereas the present is a becoming-past into the future. Bergson insists on the real contribution of memory in making sense of the world where there are no individual instants but continuous flow:

"These two acts, perception and recollection, always interpenetrate each other, are always exchanging something of their substance as by a process of endosmosis...in fact, there is for us nothing that is instantaneous. In all that goes by that name there is already some work of our memory, and consequently, of our consciousness, which prolongs into each other, so as to grasp them in one relatively simple intuition."64

As Deleuze explains it, for Bergson the past is simultaneous to the present it has been, "then all of the past coexists with the new present in relation to which it is now past... the Bergsonian idea that each present present is only the entire past in its most contracted state."65 It is this observation which explains the thorny subject of just how it is that the present passes. Memory is the condition of the passage of every particular present in the movement from temporal expansion to contraction in present duration. Ontological memory, which is drawn open, contracts and is actualised from virtuality to have psychological existence. Pure recollection is the in-active and unconscious in a non-psychological sense. By being non-psychological it can function as the catalyst for creativity, including film spectatorship: "Strictly speaking, the psychological is the present. Only the present is
'psychological'; but the past is pure ontology, pure recollection has only ontological signification. The act of entering into the past in general, the exploratory field for potential creativity, is a 'leap into ontology' which only later becomes psychological in the sense of being actualised from the virtual.

Bergson does, however, define the present instant as 'present reality' and like Husserl this is in contradistinction to the ideal present or 'mathematical instant' of science and chronology. For both thinkers it is the experience of the present that counts and here the present is acknowledged to occupy a duration which has "one foot in my past and another in my future". We also get an indication of Bergson's emphasis on the future rather than immersion in the present: "[C]ould I fix this indivisible present, this infinitesimal element of the curve of time, it is the direction of the future that it would indicate." Bergson proceeds to clarify the affinity of perception with sensation, again similar to Husserl, but now emphasising even more retention as sensation. Protention and the future is already concerned not with sensation but action, as expressive movement to futurity. These two states are intricately bound together, however, and go towards the definition of the moment as action in the interval which Deleuze focuses on to describe film's movement-image: "I conclude that my present consists in a joint system of sensations and movements. My present is, in its essence, sensori-motor." The condition, however, is a complex one. In theoretical terms, we can speak of an extended co-existence between the past and present but in actual terms of consciousness Bergson makes it clear that fundamentally there is no present as-such:

"When we think this present as going to be, it exists not yet, and when we think it as existing, it is already past...Your perception, however instantaneous, consists in an incalculable multitude of remembered elements; in truth, every perception is already memory. Practically, we perceive only the past, the pure present being the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future."

Or, as Deleuze puts it, "the present is not; rather it is pure becoming, always outside itself. It is not, but it acts. Its proper element is not being, but the active or useful. But it has not ceased to be." Significantly, and in keeping with Bergson's insistence on continuity, when we recollect from the past we do so in the way Husserl describes as an act of consciousness, for
Bergson opposes the breaking up of the undivided unity of becoming as a fragmentation of duration, seeing it as a scattering of the self in which our past, which had been gathered together into an indivisible impulsion to action, is broken into externally related recollections. As these recollections lose their interpenetration and become 'fixed', there is a "spatialised fragmentation of consciousness", a "scattering of the self" as our personality "descends in the direction of space."74 Contrary to this, "any self, any 'I', is the flow of duration as well as of the past, wholly brought along in the infinite levels of ontological memory."75 Seen in this way, there is a merging and interpenetration between all levels of consciousness and all levels of being including concrete reality, something which adds to the power of film's visual imagery and penetrative powers, "our human accounts of phenomena must carefully consider that the objects and beings of the world have a history and a temporality that connects with our own and with the cosmos as a whole."76

Deleuze directly borrows from this to describe filmic memory and like Bergson insists on the past's virtuality. To receive the past as virtuality we have to change attitude and it is attitude and belief which Deleuze develops through film spectatorship as a way of understanding the time-image. The important point to bear in mind here, and one of the reasons Deleuze favours the attitude of the modern time-image, is that recollective consciousness is process, a living-through as duration, not an abstraction. Bergson's descriptions of imagery are replete with process activity. A slow focusing of the camera from the diffuse to the clear: "Little by little it comes into view like a condensing cloud; from the virtual state it passes into the actual; and as its outlines become more distinct...it tends to imitate perception."77

The implication of Bergsonian movement is that rather than favour any fixed 'site' of observation, there is a contrary move to diverse centres, vacillatory balance of forces and shifting centres of perception. Bergson's description of the emergence of personal subjectivity is as a centre of indetermination, the system by which perception in the form of contracting imagery takes
place. There can be no abstraction from the perpetual interaction of atoms and centres of force which comprise the material world, a world which is always already there as a virtuality, as movement-imagery. For Bergson "the model would be rather a state of things which would constantly change, a flowing-matter in which no point of anchorage nor centre of reference would be assignable."78 This has repercussions for phenomenological intentionality based on natural perception, the sense of self in terms of thetic and prethetic consciousness and for film, in terms of the movement-image and identity through narrative construction. The sense of anchorage one may find in a transcendental position, or even the focus of a fixed point-of-view offered through a sequence of film shots, is toppled by indivisibility, qualitative heterogeneity, constant change and a fluidity which no sooner than collecting around a nexus moves on to another collecting point. Through movement and the primacy of difference, the circuit will be a decentred one: "Difference is at the centre and the Same is only on the periphery: it is a constantly decentred, continually tortuous circle which revolves only around the unequal."79 In opposition to the abstraction and superficial solidity of representational imagery, we move to a multiplicity which is a multicentred vision of life:

"Representation fails to capture the affirmed world of difference. Representation has only a single centre, a unique and receding perspective, and in consequence a false depth. It...mobilises and moves nothing. Movement, for its part, implies a plurality of centres, a superposition of perspectives, a tangle of points of view, a coexistence of moments..."80

For Deleuze, the limitations of natural perception and the self referential ego are superseded by the possibility in film to jump to an aleatory, intuitive apprehension:

"[T]he cinema...has a great advantage: just because it lacks a centre of anchorage and of horizon, the sections which it makes would not prevent it from going back up the path that natural perception comes down. Instead of going from the acentred state of things to centred perception, it could go back up towards the acentred state of things, and get closer to it."81
Bridging gaps

For Deleuze and for our own exposition of film consciousness, Bergson's theories are pivotal. However, they are a supplement rather than a replacement to phenomenology. Phenomenology is equally concerned with flux and change, albeit as a force of opposition. Even with Husserl, the power of primeval flux asserts itself: "The flux is at once the raw material of phenomenology and its constant opposite."

There will be moments of confusion and consternation when the subject is robbed of intentional thrust into the world and 'exposed' to the flux. Even though passive synthesis cushions chaotic barrage when there is 'seepage' through the cracks of predelineation further inspiration is possible. With Husserl the hiatus is minimal since intentionality's forward thrust is all encompassing and self-fulfilling:

"[A]n intentionality that produces what it intends...a driving intentionality directed towards temporalisation, one that has as its 'goal' moments...that do not yet exist. It is an intentionality that fulfills itself by bringing into existence and retaining in existence new moments...the very being of the present moment is one with an intentional drive that propels it to appropriate the future moment and bring it to present existence."

Faced with the rawness of the flux, subjectivity responds through various time perspectives as a way of structuring this shifting bed of sand. Here subjectivity is not couched in the self but rather as a perpetuation and "genesis of sense and meaning" so that consciousness tries to keep one step ahead of the flux. This resistance against the flux, standing so-to-speak 'outside it', is counteracted by Merleau-Ponty as a greater openness, playing elusiveness and self-difference off against the realisation of protentions: "One of the central theses of phenomenological interpretation...is that the object of understanding...is ever in the process of becoming and thus...never fully is." Here we find the link needed to appropriate a more open, postmodern turn to phenomenological determinacy and the potentially creative roots embedded in phenomenology's origin. The film body is the 'place' of combat, passively placed to record and actively dis-placed to be lost in the maelstrom:
"The cinematic apparatus responds...to...the demand for the affirmation of transience, for the 'apotheosis' of that which is perishable. It opens the door to a 'base materialism defined as 'the direct interpretation, excluding all idealism, of raw phenomena...Cinema invites me, or forces me, to stay with the orbit of senses. I am confronted and assaulted by a flux of sensations..."86

Admittedly, there are clear points of contention between phenomenology and Bergson, though in general Merleau-Ponty is close to Bergson. For Merleau-Ponty, Bergson perfectly defined the 'metaphysical approach' when he intercedes at that point before science systemises reality and acknowledges the inseparable link or 'spontaneous convergence' between science and philosophy. Bergson is the inspiration for the possible revision of "the classical distinction between induction and reflection and (the urge) to ask ourselves if two kinds of knowing are really involved or if there is not rather one single way of knowing, with different degrees of naiveté or explicitness."87 On the other hand, as a philosophy of immanence, Bergson's version of the body is not Merleau-Ponty's who sees it as too 'objective' and the difference between sensation and movement as too inadequately delineated.88 Bergson's approach to historical epochs is too general and without content: "For Bergson, the 'historical inscription' has no value peculiar to it....There is only an heroic appeal from individual to individual"89 which Merleau-Ponty believes is "too optimistic about the individual and his power to regain sources, and too pessimistic in respect to social life."90

However, Bergson's description of duration is neatly in accord with Merleau-Ponty's own interlacing, a contact with myself which is only 'partial coincidence', "absolute knowledge is not detachment; it is inherence...to present as the basis of philosophy not an I think and its immanent thoughts but a Being-self whose self-cohesion is also a tearing away from self."91 And, ultimately, an admiration of a description of brute Being similar to his own: "Never before had anyone established this circuit between being and myself which is such that being exists 'for me', the spectator, but which is also such that the spectator exists 'for being'. Never had the brute being of the perceived world been so described."92

Olkowski, however, sees a marked shift in emphasis between the two thinkers. Merleau-Ponty's embodiment takes for granted the spatial
perception Bergson insists is in need of constant revision as well as taking for granted perceptual norms of normalcy and deviance. Most importantly, Merleau-Ponty looks to the realisation of possibilities whereas for Bergson "living beings and the actions of living beings are not a matter of realising one of several possibilities." Possibility for Bergson cannot precede its reality whereas phenomenologically possibilities inherent in a situation as actionable precede existence, they can be before coming to be. But for Bergson the possible is not 'a less', an existence which is realised from a passed state of waiting. It is the reverse. Once something is realised, we see the possible as real with "something added, the possible is the combined effect of reality once it has appeared and of a condition which throws it back in time." In other words, only when something is real does it retroactively become possible, its reality must come first, the possible "remains the shadow of the real." Seeing possibilities as pre-existing are acts of the intellect, divisive, anti-process and linked to the sensory motor mechanism of representation. Reality is rather created "as unforeseen and absolutely new such that one can never speak of the actualisation of possibilities but only of the actualisation through differentiation of the virtual, that is the real but unactualised multiplicity."

However, Merleau-Ponty's position cannot be seen as essentially reductive. We have already seen the importance of signification and expression for perception. Moreover, rather than advocating a subjective, logocentric ontology, consciousness emerges from the mediation of worlds where the subject is present to and knows itself only through the mediation of the body, a presence which is always mediated. Even more, Merleau-Ponty's inherent ambiguity is directly relevant to Deleuze's later argumentation for the ambiguity of the time-image. The perceiving subject exists in an ambiguous mode, neither exclusively a thing nor exclusively consciousness and as a result "calls into question the traditional distinction of subject and object...and one of the central foundational principles of philosophy, the so-called law of excluded middle (a thing must be either this or that)." In addition, rather than artificially suppress the temporal flow (as Olkowski argues) Merleau-Ponty reconfigures that flow in a similar way to Bergson. To such a degree that one could argue that Merleau-Ponty's spatio-temporal description of the primacy of perception and the chiasmus of the flesh comprise the crucial intermediate link between Phenomenology and Deleuze, as well as an affiliation with Bergson. Merleau-Ponty's modification of Husserl puts into relief the fluidity of
subjectivity without supporting recent claims for 'the death of man'. As Mazis points out, Merleau-Ponty's temporality while 'inspired' by Bergson went on to surpass the 'master's' own work, a temporality 'functioning according to the barbaric principle':

"It is a question of finding in the present, the flesh of the world (and not in the past) an 'ever new and an 'always the same'- A sort of time of sleep (which is Bergson's nascent duration, ever new and always the same). The sensible, Nature, transcend the past present distinction, realise from within a passage from one into the other."

Merleau-Ponty's temporality is a shift away from Husserl internal time-consciousness, or more precisely the inner time continuum and running-off of phases. We have a temporality of 'reversibility', where "the past keeps becoming itself through unfoldings which transform it." Time itself is characterised by 'chiasmic reversals' and upsurges, away from "Husserl's analysis of progressive time to one 'without fictitious support in the psyche', to a time lodged within the world in its savage or brute being. As we will see in Deleuze's analysis of the film image, Merleau-Ponty's description of time in terms of 'lateralising flashes of reversals', 'jolting' institutions of new meaning and 'chiasmatic leaps' is in accord with an understanding of spatio-temporal depth amenable to film. As a "bursting of the world in tufts outside the realm of intentionalities and acts" the materiality of film consciousness is given free rein to speak.

References

4Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations, p. 162. (my emphasis)
5Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 412.
6Ibid., p. 421.
7Husserl, Experience and Judgment, p. 72.
8Ibid., p. 73.
9Ibid., p. 158.
10Ibid., p. 159.
11Ibid., p. 259.
12Landgrebe, Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, p. 107.
13Husserl, Ideas, p. 92.
16Ibid.
20Ibid.
21Ibid., p. 53.
22Shaun Gallagher, The Inordinance of Time (Northwestern University, 1998), p. 18. c/f. William James, The Principles of Psychology (1890, Dover Press repr. 1950), p. 609. Gallagher also points out Husserl's description of noema and noesis can be compared to the psychologist, William Stern's distinction between 'zeitstrecke' and 'präsenzzeit', where the former is close to the specious present, the temporally extended segment of content, and the latter to the noetic structure of consciousness, "despite Husserl's study of James, he seems to have learned more about time-consciousness from another student of Stumpf, namely William Stern: W. Stern. "Psychische Präsenzzeit". Zeitschrift für Psychologie 13. 1897. Gallagher, ibid., p. 33.
23Ibid., p. 21.
24Ibid., p. 22.
25Ibid., p. 28.
27Ibid.
28Ibid., p. 64.
30Ibid., p. 41.
32Husserl, Internal Time Consciousness, p. 48.
33Edward S. Casey, "Keeping the Past in Mind", in Descriptions. ed. Don Ihde and Hugh Silverman (State University of New York, 1985)
34Ibid. p. 41.
35Ibid., p. 42.
36Ibid., p. 52. Casey's observations are especially relevant to film. But Wood's rejoinder makes the general point that place is not essential for memory conservation. Time has its own non-spatial procedures, that may be equal or stronger, "is it not memory that preserves the place rather than the place memory....time exhibits structures of repetition, of rhythm, of ordering, of sequential intelligibility of
many sorts that are essential to the preservation that memory requires...in the structure of the repeated event, we have a paradigm of a temporal gathering on which place memory, often, but not always, depends."p. 61-2 David Wood, "From another Past", ibid., Ihde and Silverman. As opposed to originary experience and primary memory, a reproduced continuum will offer greater freedom and flexibility for interpretation. But there is also the possibility of mistakes, "it is entirely possible not only that the individual steps of the occurrence made present through memory deviate from those of the actual past event, but also that the real order of succession was other than the order of succession as recollected."(Husserl, Internal Time Consciousness, p. 72.) As a fixed work, film would ensure this does not happen even though the spectator's recapitulation may be faulty.

37Husserl, Internal Time Consciousness, p.76.
38Gallagher, Inordinance of Time, p. 52.
39Wood, Deconstruction of Time, p. 89.
40John Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, p.41. This discussion is elaborated in hermeneutic terms in my Introduction.
41Husserl, Ideas, pp. 124-25.
42Caputo, ibid., p. 45.
43ibid., p.37.
44Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 415.
49ibid., p. 121.
50ibid., p. 118.
51ibid., p. 120.
53ibid., p. 30.
54ibid., pp. 36 - 38.
55ibid., p. 57. (my emphasis)
56ibid., p. 36.
57ibid., p. 104.
58ibid., p. 102.
59ibid., p. 103.
60Lloyd, Being in Time, p. 102.
61Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 146.
62Bergson, Creative Mind, p. 147.
63Deleuze, Bergsonism, p. 54.
64Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 67, p. 69.
65Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 81-82.
66Deleuze, Bergsonism, p. 56.
67ibid.p. 57.
68Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 138.
69ibid.
If you want the truth - I know I presume - you must look into the technology of these matters. Even into the heart as of certain molecules - it is they after all which dictate temperatures, pressures, rates of flow, costs, profits, the shape of towers...
You must ask two questions. First, what is the real nature of synthesis? And then: what is the real nature of control?

--- Thomas Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow.

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**Representation and the Whole**

Deleuze's work on cinema is instructive for understanding narrative and representation in terms of Bergson's description of virtuality and perception. Both Deleuze and Bergson would see the phenomenological and hermeneutic approach to film consciousness in need of a re-working, especially with regard to an anchored or constituted subjectivity and its relation to representation. Deleuze's analysis of the movement-image, which is constructed around Bergson's notion of duration, is crucial for understanding montage and spectator modes of consciousness as they contribute towards an understanding of film consciousness. The gap between the movement-image as an indirect experience of time based on the sensory motor schema and the time-image, as a direct experience of time based on a 'hesitation' in the flow of movement in the interval, cannot be entirely resolved phenomenologically.

The freedom that 'possibility' demands as an act of creation takes place in the interval (the relation between a received movement, excitation and an executed movement, response). It is in the interval that creation emanates but the interval is foremost concerned with the 'enactment' of the classical narrative that Deleuze wants to overthrow. Thus, even though the movement-image lies at the heart of film, that aspect of it which connects to
resemblance is anti-Deleuzean. Movement-imagery depicts a resemblance to a pre-existing reality based on a mechanistic picture of the world. In film terms, organic descriptions presume the independence of their objects, that is, a profilmic space which stands for a reality that pre-exists its description by the camera. In this approach, judgments require a transcendent system that protects thought from error by isolating it from life and a commensurate narrative would erect a transcendent whole opposed to the open-endedness of life. Thus, the assumption that goes with organic narration, and not with the narration of the time-image, is that there exists a correspondence between film imagery and the existence of a world which has an identity and extraneous image of truth. In Nietzschean terms one could say:

"The will to power of organic narration seeks to confirm itself in an image of Truth as the selfsame, or repetition as resolution rather than differentiation...The truth-seeker wants to 'correct' life by making it conform to an atemporal, systematic and transcendent image of thought..."¹

Here, the organic movement-image projects through rational, sensory motor divisions a notion of truth in relation to totality. Its pre-given affinity to extraneous images of truth attempt to:

"[E]ncompass and subsume the world as image and to make life conform to the 'laws' of the open totality: differentiation and integration...the open totality in movement aspires to the creation of an ideal world, one that overcomes and transcends life and against which life must be judged."²

Organic representation, then, has elements within it which offer transparent intelligibility, coherence, perfect vision and an idealisation of the real. It is in the effort to overcome this ideal that Deleuze conceptualises the time-image in an anti-Hegelian way and also, as we will see, one which ultimately diminishes the dialectics upon which Eisenstein based his organic film montage.

Having asserted this, however, it must be pointed out that Deleuze acknowledges that conceptualising the whole in terms of the movement-
image still brings forth attributes which go towards capturing the quintessence of film. We must first accept that the whole is accessible through the 'shock' of imagery and with it a concomitant power to think: "The Whole can only be thought, because it is the indirect representation of time which follows from movement." And still in a positive vein, with intellectual cinema and the dialectic, thinking the Whole is not a one-dimensional resolution but a productive complex of images and metaphor. Specific images, either in montage juxtaposition or from their own intrinsic, compositional power of expression, elicit specific meaning as well as overall theme, isolated expression as well as universal emotion, situational dilemma as well as "abstract social judgment." This is a wide, encompassing circuit which does not reject the Whole but respects its domain, its vitality, inclusiveness and mutual referentiality:

"A circuit which includes simultaneously the author, the film and the viewer is elaborated. The complete circuit thus includes the sensory shock which raises us from the image to conscious thought, then the thinking in figures which takes us back to the images and gives us an affective shock again...The whole is constantly open (the spiral)...The whole forms a knowledge, in the Hegelian fashion, which brings together the image and the concept as two movements each of which goes towards each other." 

These are substantial claims and the reason they are insufficient for Deleuze lies not within the ontology of film (which would make their rejection more acceptable) but rather because of social circumstance: "Cinema is dying...from its quantitative mediocrity", "the mass art...has degenerated into state propaganda and manipulation, into a kind of fascism which brought together Hitler and Hollywood, Hollywood and Hitler. The spiritual automaton became fascist man." However, Deleuze's opposition to the whole and preference for the time-image (as exemplified by Artaud) must show how we can justify the "absolute opposition between Artaud's project and a conception such as Eisenstein's. It is indeed a matter, as Artaud puts it, of bringing cinema together with the innermost reality of the brain, but this innermost reality is not the Whole, but on the contrary, a fissure or crack." Before we can understand such a conclusion it is necessary to further elaborate the characteristics of the movement-
action and affectivity in the interval

Action-images take place in the interval and fulfill what is, in film terms, realism. For Deleuze, this is a wide-based category including films of expressionism, fiction and dream, predominantly characterised by the melodramatic and heroic. At all times there is a pre-determined rationale and a moral underpinning to plot and characterisation which usually leads to a maintenance of the norms of the status quo. What constitutes realism for Deleuze is "milieux and modes of behaviour, milieux which actualise and modes of behaviour which embody...The action-image is the relation between the two and all the varieties of this relation." Character actions and reactions within the milieu are classical developments of growth, crisis and final triumphs where situations are overcome and we find resolution. We recognise this through the formula 'SAS' - from the situation to the transformed situation via the intermediary of the action. This is above all a cinema of representation where:

"The sensory motor link must be very strong, behaviour must be truly structured...not only be composed but engendered...the situation must permeate the character deeply and continuously...and...the character who is thus permeated must burst into action at discontinuous intervals." Deleuze picks up on Bergson's notion of the interval here finding three major expressive forces 'occupying' it and relating it to what was formerly described as subjectivity:

"All things considered, movement-images divide into three sorts of images when they are related to a centre of indetermination as to a special image: perception-images, action-images and affection-images. And each one of us...is nothing but an assemblage of three images." The interval offers the possibility for enactment of action but also the
tenuous potential for thinking otherwise. The interval of the movement-image incorporates succession and the making of rational process, whilst the interval of the direct time-image relates to the 'outside', indiscernability and irrational process. Most importantly, as Olkowski summarises it:

"The interval in movement expressed through the moment offers the freedom to choose and the temporal disjunction between perception and memory informs the freedom to think. This makes the interval the moment of creativity at the interface between matter and memory."  

Already in the interval associated with the sensory motor schema we find the beginning for that creativity. It comes with the third category of image, the affective-image, related as it is to the importance of emotion in intuition. In the choice-making role of the contraction of duration through perception, it is the body, especially the face, which is the fulcrum and here the affective-image finds expression. Deleuze's focus on the face suggests the non-fulfillment of action. If action was fulfilled as in succession, if pure qualities were carried over to the spatio-temporal state of things, they would become 'the quale' of an object and affectivity would be lost. With the face, however, we have an immobile surface which supports the emission of micro-movements emitting expression: "The face is this organ-carrying plate of nerves which has sacrificed most of its global mobility and which gathers or expresses in a free way all kinds of tiny local movements."  

Close-ups, frequently associated with the face, are images with a life of their own, with the power to halt action by a focus on the purely optical, "it puts forward a peak of attention, a clarifying instant of insight, a detached moment of defamiliarisation."  

Close-up brings about absolute rather than relative changes: "By absolute change, we must understand that the qualitative leap is as much formal as material - an absolute change, that is the 'squaring' of the image."  

The close-up encapsulates the investigation and exploration of the momentary in what Epstein also calls 'magnified' space, an elongated present, a centripetal regulation of spectator attention where the close-up is the soul of cinema. Blowing up image size 'engulfs sight' and through sight cognition...
increases. By bringing things close "pain is within reach. If I stretch out my arm I touch you, and that is intimacy....Never before has a face turned to mine in that way...I consume it." 17

Deleuze extends the effect of the face in close-up to a general 'envisaged' condition, one which applies to any part of the body, or indeed any object. Clearly the gamut of expressions that can be read off of an envisaged object is broad and wide-ranging. What is most significant is that it is a 'pure quality' that is expressed by the envisaged, a purity of quality not tied down by spatio-temporal limits but simply an expression of quality, its embodiment. As Epstein also put it, "this face of a fleeting coward, as soon as we see it in close-up, we see cowardice in person, the 'feeling thing', the entity." 18 Though the affective-image is apparently individually centred, the affect is impersonal, non-individualised and free from the constraints of spatio-temporal succession. Affectivities can only be known through concrete singularities and can never be exhaustively shown. Each state will be a particularised expression of an emotion, as read on the face, body, or objects, a non personalised singularity. The self-consistency and independence of affectivity is unlike the precise and personalised expression of emotions.

"[T]he affect is impersonal and is distinct from every individualised state of things; it is nonetheless singular, and can enter into singular combinations or conjunctions with other affects...The affect is independent of all determinate space and time;" 19

For Deleuze, within the affective-image we are not locked in the pre-established variety of moods or qualities with which we are familiar. Deleuze dismantles affectivity to reconfigure it as its own montage construction. Bergson has already established that this is a construction which consciousness tells us demands something new rather than an inevitable or logical progression from that which has preceded. A new affectivity which is a conscious act rather than automatic repetition:

"I interrogate my consciousness as to the part which it plays in affection: consciousness replies that it is present indeed, in the form of feeling or
sensation, at all the steps in which I believe I take the initiative, and that it fades and disappears as soon as my activity, by becoming automatic, shows that consciousness is no longer needed...the act in which the affective state issues is not one of those which might be rigorously deduced from antecedent phenomena, as a movement from a movement; and hence it really adds something new to the universe and to its history."20

There is constant scope for change and 'newness', creating a possibility for expression but within a definable context, one which is appropriate to artistic creativity, "the affect...is...created in a history which produces it as the expressed and the expression of a space or a time, of an epoch or a milieu (this is why the affect of the 'new' and new affects are ceaselessly created, notably by the work of art )."21 Affective-images and their potentiality, mirror that part of film consciousness not yet tied down by action and therefore form the bedrock for the time-image. Film consciousness captures the quality in and for itself in the objectivity of the film camera, the non-subjective aspect of affectivity. Deleuze notes that emotion appears in the interval, and when it is tied to representation or mobilised by society to carry through 'story-telling functions' it is impure. On the other hand, pure emotion as affectivity is potential, expression rather than actualisation, it "precedes all representation, itself generating new ideas...an essence that spreads itself over various objects, animals, plants and the whole of nature."22

Deleuze best expresses this notion of affective-image by the power quality presented in 'any-space-whatever'. His original definition of the envisaged becomes the icon and its extension into any-space-whatever becomes the qualisign: "Space itself has left behind its own coordinates and its metric relations...no longer a particular determined space, it has become any-space-whatever, to use Pascal Augé's term."23 Any-space-whatever begins with a certain open specificity which can be infinitely linked with other specificities as potential linkages, the same independence of the affection-image which transcends succession and chronology as in the time-image. This is a space of singularity, relating to the virtual, the 'pure locus of the possible' with an openness for myriad links with other spaces
or times, or no space at all, in contradistinction to the flow of materiality in exterior, successive space. Thus, with the 'impression of rain':

"Rain is not a determined, concrete rain which has fallen somewhere. These visual impressions are not unified by spatial or temporal representations. What is perceived here with the most delicate sensibility, is not what rain really is, but the way in which it appears when, silent and continuous, it drips from leaf to leaf, when the mirror of the pool has goose-pimples, when the solitary drop hesitatingly seeks its pathway on the window-pane, when the life of the city is reflected on the wet asphalt."24

We have object, place, person appearing in a multitude of guises and situations, in an ineffable way. Taken further, we have any-space-whatever which is a void, or better, devoid of any human 'coordinates'. This is a further advancement in understanding the affective-image, a move on from the close up and envisaged to a more diffuse (and penetrating) system of emotions which can be elicited from an infinite compound of potential layers or strata of meaning taken from different time zones. The substantiality of shadows comes into its own here, shadows which are the very texture of film. The Gothic, chiaroscuro, Expressionsim, make space "something unlimited."25 Shadow, light and darkness play around any-space-whatever to present metaphysical struggles for survival, oppositions of good and evil, the struggle between mankind and nature. It is by being precisely placed in a milieu 'created in a history which produces it', and also being disconnected from homogeneous links, that the depths of these struggles can be visually connoted. Most interestingly, what changes in these experiences of images of the any-space-whatever is the mode of consciousness, a process of realisation that one can choose; choosing to make the choice. Making the choice creates the experience and opens up the depth of situation as an attainment of the mind. Through the space and shadows of Expressionism (Lang) to lyrical abstraction (Sternberg) we arrive at a spiritual space:

"[F]rom one space to the other, from physical space to spiritual space...Darkness and the struggle of the spirit, white and the alternative of the spirit, are the first two procedures by which space becomes any-space-
whatever and is raised to the spiritual power of the luminous."²⁶

In Deleuze's description of affectivity we find links to phenomenological modes of consciousness: "Each sheet of past, each age calls up all the mental functions simultaneously: recollection, but equally forgetting, false recollection, imagination, planning, judgment...What is loaded with all these functions, each time, is feeling."²⁷ Characters and situations come to epitomise these modes of consciousness tinged with varied emotional states. Feelings take on a life of their own in their qualitative singularity by breaking the resistance of being tied to the past and locked down in a threateningly irretrievable unconscious. Film consciousness shows thought in action by visualising the breakthrough of feelings through sheets of the past to the present. In this localised, unfreezing of past strata, we are utilising mechanical reproduction as automated consciousness just as we are converting feelings to thoughts within a 'cerebral mechanism'.

In short, we have a potentiality considered for itself which moves on the action of the movement-image but is moved by the affectivity of the time-image. At one end of the affective spectrum, emotions move around a centre of indetermination, the auto-affection of the subject experiencing itself from the inside, a sensual awareness which occupies the interval, a motor effort on an immobilised receptive plane. At the other, we have the void and affectivity in any-space-whatever, auto-affection as the multi'face'ted expression of affectivity as singularities. It is in the space-between that we may conjoin contributions made by phenomenological theorists with sensual and affective modes of consciousness experienced as the event of mind. A movement within indetermination which does not complete a trajectory but moves in any-space-whatever as a feat of exploration.

**Eisenstein montage**

In these descriptions of movement the importance of Eisenstein has been established as a transitional figure from the movement to time-image. We
find a close reading of Eisenstein in Deleuze's second Cinema volume concerned with the time-image, even though Eisenstein has been exemplary for the movement-image of the first volume. Deleuze begins with Eisenstein because it is with montage that we take up the original challenge film was given in its formative years, to move away from the static photogram and create dynamic assemblages. Primitive film recording was seen as too photographic and rigid with a need to be released from its immobile straightjacket and express "through montage, the mobile camera and the emancipation of the viewpoint." Montage, as the technique of diverse forms of film editing, raises the level of film expression through flexible perspectives. These are choices of combination and discrimination in postproduction but also dependent upon what is chosen in the first place:

"Montage, it must be said, was already everywhere...It precedes the filming, in the choice of material, that is, the portions of matter which are to enter into interaction, sometimes very distant or far apart (life as it is). It enters into the filming, in the intervals occupied by the camera-eye (the cameraman who follows, runs, enters, exits; in short, life in the film)."

Time is implicated in all forms of montage, from the Griffith school of classical editing to the Soviet school of dialectical montage. As the vital act of cinema, montage expresses the totality of a film through a series of continuities and false continuities. The journey to reach an overall or dominant theme in film is a process of film's unfolding. An interaction of parts and whole where meaning is an evolving result of what is already implicitly presupposed in the parts. Even though the kind of films Deleuze includes under the rubric of montage differ vastly in style and content, montage techniques are similar in that they include relations of parts to the whole, juxtaposition, alternating rhythms and convergent actions. Though all film narrative has a continuity of discontinuity the techniques of classical film narrative have their own forms of continuity which are not identical to Eisenstein's montage with its discontinuous armature. The temporality of the movement-image which incorporates classical and montage editing includes an expanding arche and telos, the universal, temporal spiral that extends into the past and future, as well as the contracting interval, the
For the purpose of trying to pin down the notion of film consciousness, Eisenstein's theoretical work in film form has radical consequences, even though, for Deleuze, it will not adequately fulfill the demands of direct time. Eisenstein makes it clear that his strategy of montage is one calculated to oppose conventional editing techniques. Editing would reproduce the way an ideal observer perceived events, maintaining a naturalistic and seemingly uninterrupted flow, a seamlessness perpetuating an intended reality-effect, allowing nature to speak by sustaining the indexical link between reproduction and reality in both spiritual and universal contexts. This basically undialectic view is to be contrasted with Eisenstein's dialectical montage which 'sets up' the actual along with its meaning.

Using the language of the dialectic, Eisenstein fragments and deconstructs in order to fabricate and reconstruct the actual. Shots come into collision with each other through conflict, which for Eisenstein was a characteristic of all effective art. The precision of the exercise does not go unnoticed. Eisenstein worked with fragments in order to be scientific and ease the predictability of calculations: "It is clear that if one wants to calculate efficacy, (even class efficacy), it is better to be dealing with material composed of discrete, commutable elements...with a material that is actually measurable." Such calculations came with Eisenstein's five methods of montage, metric, rhythmic, tonal, overtonal and intellectual as an hierarchy of affective responses. The lower four levels worked on a kind of Pavlovian reflexology but the fifth level, intellectual montage, did not. Intellectual montage juxtaposed two concrete images to bring about an abstract concept not contained fully in either of two images. The intent was to bring the spectator into consonance with the historical meaning of reality. This had to be accomplished by minimising the spectator's own creative unconscious by bringing recognisable images from concrete reality into play in a defamiliarised and unexpected context. For Eisenstein "the artist does not create meanings 'ex nihilo', but produces them from a nature that is nonindifferent" which is a nature already infused with dialectic
movement, as well as a unique, emotional landscape. For Eisenstein the dialectic principle of dynamics is embodied in conflict as the fundamental principle of every artwork and can be brought to conscious reproduction.

The montage of 'attraction' sets up a direct correlation between film and human response and, in 1924, Eisenstein saw both theatre and film as artforms which could work through a calculated pressure on the psyche. Time is deeply implicated here but a time which is indirectly read off of movement-images as they are reassembled to create a whole. Eisenstein played with this fact to reconfigure the possibilities of film experience. In his montage of attraction he introduced special images, directly or indirectly associated with the main action, to bring about a calculated effect in the audience by means of juxtaposition. Involved in this montage is a play upon associations linked by the audience to particular phenomena. Separate effects did come under the rubric of a thematic whole but integration in this early form of montage was not yet concerned with overall, organic unity.33

In practice, all of Eisenstein films employed visual contradiction and vertical montage as the incorporation of images from different systems into the film flow. Most significantly, the concern is with a total, all-embracing perspective. There was continuous, progression from the physiological to the emotional and, ultimately, to the cognitive:

"The gradational quality is determined by the fact that there is no difference in principle between the motion of a man rocking under the influence of elementary metric montage and the intellectual process within it, for the intellectual process is the same agitation, but in the dominion of the higher nerve-centres."34

This physiological correlation of thought and emotion is carried through to Eisenstein's later theories which developed a more organic character where the goal was rather "fusion than friction, synthesis rather than analysis."35 As Eisenstein put it, the sense of unity came to predominate over fragmentation, where a single norm pervades the whole and each of the parts: "To realise in a work of art that principle of unity in variety...that
connects all the variety of phenomena in general among themselves."\(^{36}\)

At the same time, from these montage experiments, Eisenstein had to walk a thin line between the inculcation of ideas as the creative expression of the filmmaker and the interaction of spectator writerability which Deleuze would insist on to insure an unlimited range of spectator response, sense of meaning and thought exploration. The problem comes with the movement-image's insistent relation to identity and representation through the action of indirect time which resists Deleuze's requisite 'difference'. Eisenstein's analytic mind clearly saw the pressures of the completed whole and the vexed problems of how to construct parts in relation to it:

"The error lay in placing the main emphasis on the possibilities of juxtaposition and in paying less attention...to the elements of juxtaposition...We should have turned our attention to the fundamental element which determines both the internal content of each sequence and the juxtaposition of the material; in other words, the content of the whole, the general unifying principle....to achieve this primary interest...We should have turned our attention to...where the final result, the whole, has been anticipated, and has even pre-determined the individual elements."\(^{37}\)

For Eisenstein, the correlate to intellectual cinema as concept formation was 'sensory thought', or 'emotional intelligence', an orbit which encompassed organic pathos with the deepest subconscious. This is an itinerary which thinks the concept and also indulges in a 'drunken monologue'. We have spoken of the presence of emotion and affectivity. Here affectivity accompanies thought, "emotions can themselves be rational or irrational...emotion can be rational because it has the ability to guide reason, to make salient what needs attending to in a specific situation, and to initiate a response."\(^{38}\) Though emotions may 'lead astray', the basic thought in film intent is that they are containable, effective and aligned with reason. As Platinga points out in a cognitive approach to the spectator, "spectator affective experience relates to theme, narrative information, story structure, character - all film elements which the spectator must perceive, think about, and evaluate."\(^{39}\)
The connection of intellectual cinema to emotional intelligence encapsulates the pathetic. In fact, we already find with Deleuze points of rupture within organic totality that open up the path to the time-image: "The highest form of consciousness in the work of art has as its correlate the deepest form of the subconscious, following a 'double process' or two coexisting moments...we no longer go from the movement-image to the clear thinking of the whole."40 There is now more of a free flowing, meandering disruption, images "constitute a malleable mass, 'mixed-up images'.

"The whole is no longer the logos that unifies the parts but the drunkenness, the pathos which bathes them and spreads out in them....This is a primitive language or thought, or rather an internal monologue, working through figures, metonymies, synecdoches, metaphors, inversions, attraction."41

Here we already have the essence of film consciousness as it unfolds in hermeneutic understanding and the time-image. A malleable mass of imagery open to potential creativity and appealing on an affective (but ordered) level, Bergson's philosophical intuition. We move on from the whole as 'idea', pure intellectual montage inspired physiologically, to one in which we find the psychological machinations of the thought process itself, imbued as it is with the affectivity of thought. Circuits are established between affectivity and intellect, between the highest degree of consciousness and the deepest level of the unconscious, between the individual and the collective. For Eisenstein, the interpenetration of these dualities and the tension they produce are what constitutes film consciousness "apart from this there are no true art-works."42 There is an holism here where the contemplator as part of organic nature, feels herself organically bound to the film work, united, co-mingling with it, in exactly the same way as with surrounding, organic milieu and nature.

For Eisenstein, the prelogical thinking connected to this dialectic movement of interrelated imagery and concepts finds its expression both as a personal, private language and as a universal, collective one. Eisenstein's notion of 'inner speech', less particularised and personalised
than the 'inner monologue', is still concerned with flow and prelogical structures. Unlike uttered speech, and without its logical formation, inner speech is:

"[T]he flow and sequence of thinking unformulated into the logical constructions in which uttered, formulated thoughts are expressed...a special structure of its own...a quite distinct series of laws...which lie at the foundation...of the form and composition of artworks."\(^43\)

Whereas "logic requires that concepts and categories be differentiated", sensuous thought "springs from a more holistic sort of perception."\(^44\) There is a predilection towards the undifferentiated flow where "the artist must fuse the appeals of "primitive thought" with fully self-conscious artistic method."\(^45\) Inner speech is universal with a mythic language base common to all users. The images that speak through the concepts are part of the social condition, a wider collective which constantly relates nature to man and man to nature "to achieve a dialectic practise and theory."\(^46\) Eisenstein's notion of inner speech sees language as imagistic, primitive, sensuous and alogical. The image as human creation and the object in nature coincide with the dialectic of human intervention in nature. And film was particularly suited to prelogical thought, as direct and non symbolic where interpretation was intrinsically connected to the meaning evoked by image: "This imagistic communication inherent in the dialectical use of film was an automatic, unambiguous communication."\(^47\)

With 'inner monologue' we reach the apex of montage structure in its transposition and reconstruction of the course of thought as if in a stream of consciousness. This method of exposition began with literature but "finds full expression...only in the cinema...to listen to one's own train of thought...to catch yourself, looking at and listening to your mind."\(^48\) The combination is of visual images, synchronised and non-synchronised sound, disconnected speech, dispassionate intellectualising and a kaleidoscope of shapes. All of this is in a psyche of nature, breaking the distinction between subject and object, absorbing outer action into inner monologue. There is a pronounced move away from the ascetic abstraction of purely intellectual montage towards a cashing out of what
Eisenstein meant by sensuous thought.

Important here is *process*, where "through modulated repetition" form encourages the spectator to create a synthetic image and unlike everyday life the "work of art directs all the subtlety of its methods towards the *process.*" Film images direct us towards the process of perception and associative understanding by filling out imagery through sensuous thought. Experiencing this dynamic is essentially cinematic. Whereas theatre was seen by Eisenstein as a reconstruction of the actions and deeds of man as a *social being*, with cinema "there is not one specific feature of cinematic phenomenon or method that does not *correspond* to the specific form of the process of *human psychic activity*." With Eisenstein's theories of montage we see a correspondence to both of Deleuze's film categories. The movement-image as it relates organically to narrative structure has montage as the principle for constructing and thinking an open totality in movement. In the early works we find the somewhat limiting reflexology and strict physiological reaction aimed at the spectator and intended to further dominant themes. On the other hand, with inner dialogue and inner speech as the primitive language of thought, an equality of multiplicities arise "where 'lines' do not bounce off of a central tone but instead maintain a 'co-existence...on the basis of equality, a system of plurality, 'an independent compositional course'." All of which form a basis for the experience of direct time in the time-image, as assemblage and further expansion of film consciousness.

Eisenstein argued that rather than reflect natural perception, film created a unique, filmic fourth dimension which too is reminiscent of Bergson. The 'felt' experience of the filmic fourth dimension resulted from the merging of the physiological and the psychic, in that the physiological is merely an other form of the psychic, "'psychic' in perception...is merely the physiological process of a *higher nervous activity*." The physiological becomes the felt vibrations of the stimuli at work within the shot and between shots, arranged according to dominant themes and directly affecting the cortex of the brain as a gestalt whole. The way this emerges is purely in a fourth dimensional temporal zone where sound and vision become physiological sensations of affect working off each other in a non
synchronised manner. In a far more sophisticated way than the early Kuleshov experiments, Eisenstein explained there was no one to one correlation, or single theme, between a dominant stimulus and the thought 'intended' to accompany it. Both the film experience and thought were complex and nuanced and by acknowledging that visual stimuli comprise a whole range of dominant, subordinate and accompanying variables, thought itself was enriched and expanded, even if 'programmed'.

Eisenstein's intended to break positive realism and prevent realist illusion by attempting to place spectator consciousness into a new mode of receptivity. In the composition of the famous Odessa steps sequence, for example, Eisenstein described:

"The caesurae in the action, 'leaping over' or 'transferring' to a new quality that was, in each case, the maximum of all availables, and was, each time, a leap in to opposition...showing us a fundamental ecstatic formula. The leap 'out of oneself' invariably becomes a leap to a new quality, and most often of all achieves the diaspason of a leap into opposition."53

As with change in general, there was not only evolution but a leap through revolution, a move into the opposite. The dialectical changes in nature do not occur gradually but "in leaps and bounds", suggestive of the collision and friction with which Eisenstein characterised film montage. Eisenstein's notion of pathos was in accord with this extremity of action and reaction yet within the parameters of an organic narrative, unlike the avant-garde. For Eisenstein, pathos was by no means self-indulgent or escapist but firmly fixed within a practical, political setting. The impetus of the work of art working through pathos was to let concrete reality speak itself but via the transfigurations of film, "the work of art takes control of the viewer's perceptive functions (physiological and, hopefully, intellective) until that spectator begins to act in consonance with the logic of objective reality."54 Specificity is overcome in favour of involvement in a larger process. Pathos is "what forces the viewer from his place...to clap, cry out. It is what forces his eyes to gleam with ecstasy before tears of ecstasy appear in them. In word, it is everything that forces the viewer to be "beside himself."55 Thus, the condition is not a gentle transition but rather a transformation, a shift
into an opposite state, a projection of self, a leap beside oneself engendering a new quality of disposition.

**Shock effect**

With shots-in-conflict, the film work comes to manifest the contradictions of being which are intended to resonate in the consciousness of the spectator. All the artistic interceptions Eisenstein sees as appropriate for this are founded on a correct balance between existing forms of nature and the mind, a rhythmic correspondence between organic nature and creative reason. In true dialectic fashion existing conditions are given a dynamic which plays on contradiction and conflict, resulting in a vitalisation of spectator perception. Yet, more than anything else, it is the shock effect of imagery which lights the fuse. For Eisenstein, the shock of film consciousness lay in the images themselves, between dominant and subdominant themes and stimuli, between movement within the frame and between the shots, so that shock is the very form of communication of movement in images.

Epstein's 'Photogenie' also made this clear, paying little attention to linear continuity. Displacement and flux were the core of a film experience elevated to one of change and transience. Epstein allied film to instability. For Epstein, the defamiliarising moment came at the intersection of mechanical reproduction and the external world as repetition with difference: "In the reiteration of the object, its soul and essence float to the surface and accost our jaded perceptions."56 Space and time were dynamically 'yoked' together and we have again the hiatus and recoil of the interval:

"Even more beautiful than a laugh is the face preparing for it. I must interrupt, I love the mouth which is about to speak and holds back, the gesture which hesitates between right and left, the recoil before the leap, and the movement before landing, the hesitation, the taut spring, the prelude, and even more than all these, the piano being tuned before the
overture. Photogenie is conjugated in the future and in the imperative. It does not allow for stasis."\textsuperscript{57}

This is a world in movement, a duration where "there are no inactive feelings that is, not displacing themselves in space, there are no invariable feelings, that is, not displacing themselves in time - only the mobile...aspects of things, beings, and souls can be photogenie."\textsuperscript{58} Only certain images, elusive and irrational, could create emotional, sublime and 

\textit{shocking reactions} in the spectator. Deleuze concurs, "you can't escape the shock that arouses the thinker in you."\textsuperscript{59} Being shocked into a process of thinking, the 'nooshock' activating thought, is the same shock by which film images 'think' themselves in Eisenstein's dialectical method. "Montage is in thought...that which under the shock, thinks the shock."\textsuperscript{60} The dialectical method decomposes the nooshock, the imperative to think, into "well-determined moments" where we move from the "image to thought" and from the "percept to the concept"\textsuperscript{61}, a trajectory developed by Deleuze into a temporal move from the outside to the inside. Within diverse film movements, through avant-garde to surrealism, the shock-effect was used to disrupt the passively accepted, submissively contained drift of everyday experience. Experiences of epiphantic moments and revelatory, instant insights were moments of awareness within an otherwise unaware state "these momentary sparks occupy a symbiotic relationship to the drift with which they coexist: momentary instants can be recognised only in contrast to the more undifferentiated drift that surrounds and contains them."\textsuperscript{62} The avant-gardists took the shock-effect to an intrusive extreme with the aim not of predelineating an intended meaning to accompany de-composed fragments but to question the very notion of meaning itself. This made the activity one which "initially consists in nothing other than killing the 'life' of the material...tearing it out of its functional context that gives it meaning."\textsuperscript{63} In this way:

"The refusal to provide meaning is experienced as shock by the recipient...withdrawal of meaning will direct the reader's attention to the fact that the conduct of one's life is questionable...Shock is aimed for as a stimulus to change one's conduct of life."\textsuperscript{64}
For Walter Benjamin, too, with film on the cutting edge of contemporary experience, unexpected shock effects were important for their effect on consciousness. The masses parried these shocks in a way which was mirrored by film's technological automation:

"Thus technology has subjected the human sensorium to a complex kind of training. There came a day when a new and urgent need for stimuli was met by the film. In a film, perception in the form of shocks was established as a formal principle. That which determines the rhythm of production on a conveyor belt is the basis of the rhythm of reception in the film."65

The shock, then, is a disruptive factor but also energising and constructive. Deleuze directly acknowledges the link between movement in general and shock in particular by incorporating it into film's automated movement. It is only when movement becomes automatic that the artistic essence of the image is realised producing a shock to thought, communicating vibrations to the cortex, touching the nervous and cerebral system directly. Deleuze avers, "the shock wave or the nervous vibration...means that we can no longer say 'I see, I hear', but I FEEL...it is this set of harmonics acting on the cortex which gives rise to thought, the cinematographic I THINK."66 This echoes Eisenstein's combination of hearing and seeing: "For the musical overtone (a throb) it is not strictly fitting to say: 'I hear.' Nor for the visual overtone: 'I see.' For both, a new formula must enter our vocabulary: 'I feel.'"67 Indeed, feeling, affects and passion are the "principle characters of the brain-world" which is also the film world.68 The film image must have a shock effect on thought and force thought to think itself, as much as thinking the whole.

Vertov and the machinic

Extensive as Eisenstein's influence is on the development of indirect to direct time, another Russian montage theorist, Dziga Vertov, carries even greater weight. Deleuze compares Vertov's system in his 'cine-eye' to
Bergson's own universal variation, 'the world before man', where all images vary and interact without privileging the human eye("I"):

"Vertov himself defined the cine-eye: it is that which couples together any point whatsoever of the universe in any temporal order whatsoever...The materialist Vertov realises the materialist programme of the first chapter of "Matter and Memory" through the cinema, the in-itself of the image."69

Put in perspective, Vertov was part of the early film period in France from Méliès onwards, including Abel Gance, who believed in the experimentally expressive camera eye's magical powers, its "mechanical imagination", "automatic subjectivity", "lens with personal vision", machine with a "subjective language" and commitment through "biased, active qualities."70 A conventional reading of Vertov sees a mimetic relation between the mechanical eye and the human eye, technology and the human being, with revelatory powers lying with technology. Beginning with an alternative to the human, the 'kino-eye' challenges the human eye's visual representation of the world with its own visuality resulting in a less corrupted and more genuine experience of life: "The machine makes us ashamed of man's inability to control himself, but what are we to do if electricity's unerring ways are more exciting to us than the disorderly haste of active men and the corrupting inertia of passive ones?"71

On a structural level, however, Vertov is not claiming for film the same power of instrumentality in terms of an intimate immanence but rather a power of transcendence: "The kino-eye...gathers and records impressions in a manner wholly different from that of the human eye...the camera...since it is perfected...perceives more and better."72 This becomes tantamount to extending the camera's 'magical powers' into a fetish, an object of "reverence" far more powerful than we are, as if "enchanted", as if possessed of a "power independent of us."73 The human and machinic body were originally drawn together by late nineteenth century thinking which espoused the 'authority of the natural sciences', especially the "new energeticist conception of the human body" fixing an identity between the human, mechanical and natural forces, "considered to be systems of production subject to the same objective and universal law of energy

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conversion and conservation measurable by science." This 're-enchantment of technology', 'kinship between man and technology and harmonised expansion of production was intended politically to lead to the "perfection and ultimate salvation of humankind." Turvey concludes that Vertov's paean to the mechanical eye manages to elevate the mechanical world in general to a Kantian aesthetic, a kinship between human beings and machines even when "human beings are entirely absent" from the scene. Objects with a purposiveness without purpose derive their status from their harmonising with the cognitive powers of the mind. Yet such a description of Vertov's cine-eye and theory of montage of the interval can only partially account for his significance to film consciousness. Deleuze would find seeking harmony over tension and the contribution of the common sense of the faculties to be insufficient. For Deleuze, Vertov rather brings to light objects beyond perception, exceeding the limitation of human subjectivity into a realm of the transcendental empirical.

With Vertov, the liberation of imagery into any-point-whatsoever and the circuit of decomposition between subjectivity and objectivity is at its most pronounced. If we are to approximate Bergson's objective perception where all images vary in relation one to another, we need to consider the perspectively singular. We find this in Vertov's version of experimental montage which does not seek harmony or similitude: "Kino-Eye uses every possible means in montage, comparing and linking all points of the universe in any temporal order, breaking when necessary, all the laws and conventions of film construction." Deleuze asks, how is it possible to speak of images in themselves which are not for anyone and are not addressed to anyone? "How is it possible to speak of an Appearing, since there is not even an eye?" With image-in-movement, an image is that which has become, out of the gaseous. The plane of immanence comprises light in the form of diffusion which spreads out and transmits. In the movement-image there are not yet bodies or rigid lines, but only lines or figures of light. Blocks of space-time are such figures. If we take perception to be an awakening, an en-lightening, a
recognition of being, then the most primitive state is light imagery as blocks of space-time. This flow of light is already a photograph, already a vision, already an eye, but not an "I". Light and the eye come from matter, they are imagery, illumined from within rather than as a subjectivity which illuminates from without. From Deleuze we see a shift away from an exterior, phenomenological ray of attention being emplaced or projected to enlighten from the outside. Phenomenology is underplayed as the exteriority of light, where luminosity is a reaction to the conjoining of object and subject within the traditional object-subject correlation. Light emerges from this correlation whereas for Bergson matter already has illumination:

"The whole difficulty of the problem (representing matter) that occupies us comes from the fact that we imagine perception to be a kind of photographic view of things, taken from a fixed point by that special apparatus which is called an organ of perception...But is it not obvious that the photograph, if photograph there be, is already taken, already developed in the very heart of things and at all the points of space?" 79

Deleuze makes clear that the propagation of light so fundamental to film cannot be resolved without seeing a radical opposition between Bergson and phenomenology. This, even though we have earlier described the phenomena of phenomenology as phenomena-coming to-light through intuition or, as Marion put it: "The phenomenon gives itself by itself and on the basis of its own visibility, far from being reduced to presence for a consciousness (there is)...an initiative of the phenomenon to enter into visibility." 80 For Bergson, things are inherently luminous, and consciousness is "diffused everywhere and yet does not reveal its source: it is indeed a photo which has already been taken and shot in all things and for all points, but which is 'translucent'." 81 According to Bergson's account even though, as with intentional consciousness, there is an inseparability of mind and object consciousness, those moments or centres of indetermination which emerge are not source points but rather blockages or backdrops to the flux. What is lacking "behind the plate (is) the black screen on which the image could be shown. Our zones of indetermination play in some sort the part of the screen. They add nothing to what is there." 82
Vertov's materialist montage of the interval, a physical formalism, is an expression of this Bergsonian acentred universe and lies at the transition point where movement-image becomes time-image. Shots are juxtaposed according to the direction of movement within the frame. Scale, volume, depth, graphic design and lighting cumulatively go towards forming the quantity of intervals which determine the pressure of tension. As Deleuze explains it, the originality of the Vertovian theory of the interval is that it no longer marks the abeyance which will come to be filled by an area of indetermination as a reduction of light. With Vertov the interval is returned to matter, a projection of dissemination, carving out distance between two consecutive images but then filling that distance as if matter itself has usurped human choice by making the impossible choice.

Whereas "Eisenstein used intervals to intensify montage structure, Vertov considered them elements of the art of movement and contributed to poetic impact a constructivist attitude...drawing attention to film's own techniques - baring the device." Vertov superimposed the camera or the cameraman over other images. The human eye and the mechanical eye became one as a literalisation of Bergson's intermediate image "a unification of the human eye with the 'machine eye' in order to create a more substantial, more dynamic and more revealing version of reality." Vertov wanted to reshape spectator's perception and thus participate in exploring the external world through the penetration of its internal structure. More so than Eisenstein, Vertov was interested in film's mechanics, the phi-effect, the stroboscopic nature of cinematic projection where forms are transformed by the alternative projection of images, and hypnotic effects induced subliminally. Vertov cut the intervals between otherwise adjacent shots, creating collision movement, conflicting graphic forms, antagonistic angles, and inserted subversive shots into sequences which thematically were the antithesis of their general meaning. Literally shooting life unawares in documentary fashion, the kinoks fostered an undramatised cinematic presentation of reality but it was restructured through montage, images interactively conscious as matter, emerging from the friction of collision as if sparking a relay of perspectives on the world beyond the delimiting condition of human perspective. It is this view that is re-viewed.
or re-cycled by the spectator and reconstituted as an-other force of vision. This is a force that revolves around movement:

"The orchestration of movement is complex to the point that it is difficult to determine where one movement begins and another leaves off. Each movement is inscribed and defined within the context of another, so that a constant flux is created. The analysis of movement as central to cinematic production is also the analysis of social production as labour and as ideology."86

**Liquid subjectivity**

As an evolution of consciousness, we are now at the first stage of fluidity. This is a crucial first stage, however, since it is characterised by an 'orchestration of movement' which is the purity of the flow of aesthetic consciousness, a non-thetic phenomenological experience, direct and unreflective. Included at this level is a reflection but it is not yet the reflection of film consciousness but rather that of camera consciousness. Here we find the presence of camera consciousness in the form of a 'mitsein'. Deleuze points to the mitsein of camera consciousness through the work of Pasolini and Mitry's film theory also attests to its presence. Deleuze establishes in film how an objective sense of subjectivity is established in the spiritual automaton of film.

Already with the basic shot we find that it "acts like a consciousness...the sole cinematographic consciousness is not us, the spectator, nor the hero, it is the camera - sometimes human, sometimes inhuman, or superhuman."87 Camera consciousness is not the consciousness of any one person, nor the viewpoint of a centred subjectivity, nor the transcendental expression of an ultimate truth. But rather a consciousness which is found in all of these and in none. A consciousness which is a being-with, an accompaniment, the flux and transformation of an ever-evolving temporal art work which assimilates all centres, and incorporates them into its moving, indivisible flow. Camera consciousness is the first
stage of film consciousness and most closely aligned with the
director/artist's vision, though it will be an assumed version of this vision.
The emergence of camera consciousness expressed independently of
particularised subjectivities is likened by Mitry to a 'semi-subjective' image
and by Pasolini to a 'free indirect discourse', in either case there is no
equivalent in natural perception:

"[T]his being-with of the camera; it no longer mingles with the character,
nor is it outside: it is with him. It is a kind of cinematic mitsein...the
anonymous viewpoint of someone unidentified amongst the characters."88

And in Pasolini's notion of 'free indirect subjectivity' we have the viewpoint
of a character on screen and simultaneously the camera that sees him,
another vision in which the first is transformed and reflected, one which
sees the character's world from another point of view which thinks and
transforms the viewpoint of the character. Elements are introduced of
which the character is unaware to give a burgeoning perspective. For
Pasolini there are stylistic procedures which illustrate a cinematographic
cogito so that a free indirect point of view corresponds to an interior
monologue expressed through images.89 Or with Deleuze's dicisign "'The
dicisign refers to a perception of perception, and usually appears in
cinema when the camera 'sees' a character who is seeing; it implies a firm
frame, and so constitutes a kind of solid state of perception."90 This
stretches the vision of human perceptual activity to the limit and beyond, a
non-human mitsein, a shadowy accompaniment to concrete reality which
reflects it, refracts it and ultimately haunts it.

The second evolutionary stage comes with the vitalisation of the interval, at
one time affective, at another machinic. Ultimately, Vertov has shown the
shifting vibrations of pure matter and the more the centre becomes a vortex
of movement, the more aparallelitic and interactive it becomes with the
objective pole: "[W]hat can be closer to a materiality made up of luminous
wave and molecular interaction?"91 It is an ultimate fluidity and a supra
human vision that marks the expression of film consciousness, a
consciousness which exceeds the limitations of the camera eye (thus
exceeding the earlier stage of camera consciousness). The manner by

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which Vertov brings together the upsurge of matter and correlates the
realisation of matter's perception into film consciousness is 'gaseous', an
even more fluid state than the 'liquidity' Deleuze uses to describe the
French school of Expressionism. Starting from liquidity the 'reume-image',
associated with movements of water, depicts more-than-human
consciousness, unfettered to perceptual moments of the interval but
expressive of the vibration of pure, spiritual matter. Movement plus
analysis are apposite here. The penetration of internal structure takes
place on all levels, not merely the breakdown of the everyday but the
internal structure of time, movement, montage editing and film itself.
Nothing escapes the act of reflexivity. We attain a pure perception (matter
to matter) "to the point to which molecular interactions extend."\textsuperscript{92} Vertov's
compositions and use of the camera eye take liquidity beyond human
spirituality to a machinic equivalence of material energy. It is through the
level of machinic expression that consciousness takes form and 'man' is
capable of entering into, and being entered by, all levels of the life-flow
(élan vital).

This qualitative move achieves its quintessence when it goes beyond
perception into the molecular condition Deleuze describes as genetic, "to
reach 'another' perception, which is also the genetic element of all
perception."\textsuperscript{93} This is a complete dismantling of process into what
constitutes process, a meta-reflexivity which in returning to constituents or
components becomes the apprehension of creativity in action, the sign of
film's genesis through a gaseous state "defined by the free movement of
each molecule...the particle of matter or gaseous perception."\textsuperscript{94} By taking
the photogramme as the photographic unit we are not freezing time, film's
freeze frame as part of narrative construction, nor simply dismantling
materiality and perception. This would be too static and inert. Rather, as we
delve deeper into the gaseous beyond perception, into the 'energetic
element of movement', we find units of montage and the photogramme
turned inside out, showing their entrails as the pulsation of their life force:
"[F]lickering montage; extraction of the photogramme beyond the
intermediate stage...vibration beyond movement...re-filming or re-recording
and extraction of a particle of matter."\textsuperscript{95}
Put together "all these procedures act to form the cinema as machine assemblages of matter-images." This breaking down of image and perception in the sense of unraveling their constituent parts bears testament to the intractability of the image, a defiant indomitability which proves we cannot escape the image no matter what level we penetrate to. Like Antonioni's "Blow Up", the image resists closure and the definitive: "The image is not a symptom of lack, but an...excessive residue of being that subsists when all should be lacking. It is not the index of something that is missing, but the insistence of something that refuses to disappear." Without essence, the film image still makes sense, or is seen to be making sense, on the molecular level of non rational linkages. Image in movement and the movement of matter coalesce in the realm of life. How deeply we delve into the constituents of the machinic life force is unclear. The various expressions and diverse nature of the film image set the ground rules for what series of series are established between the moving machine and the psychological automaton

Machinic sensation

There is a segue here from Vertov's experimental, machinic assemblage to the present day malleability of the technological image, involved as it is in setting up images with little reference to an observer in a real optically perceived world. As well as opening up new perspectives on film, advances in digital technology expose film's limitations compared to video or virtual reality. One is reminded of Bergson's original antipathy towards film based on what he saw to be its inherent rigidity and immobility. Deleuze's remark that this was an "overhasty critique of the cinema" may not have done Bergson justice. There was, after all, a plethora of experimentation in film's formative years and Bergson also had ample opportunity to reassess his views on the cinema before his death in 1941. Bergson's tepid reception to cinema may have been the result of an insight that for him film was too locked into the representational schema, or the model of realism based on the physical traces of reality, all of which failed to accommodate the flux of creative intuition.
From this point of view one could conjecture on Bergson's reaction to the advent of the electronic media as an alternative to film. The electronic creation of imagery which dis-embodies the first phase of film ontology by dissolving the substantiality of the lived body.99 At the same time, electronic imagery constitutes a unique "alternative and absolute world" incorporating the spectator in a "spatially decentred, weakly temporalised and quasi-disembodied state."100 There is a liberation from embodiment to a free-flow, or free-fall, focusing on the intensity of the impersonal rather than the emotion of the personal. There is also, with virtual reality, a liberation to create, to democratically make one's own way, in one's own 'film' and make one's own choices:

"The materiality of the electronic digitalises durée and situation so that narrative, history, and a centred (and central) investment in the lived body become atomised and dispersed across a system that constitutes temporality not as a flow of conscious experience but as the transmission of random information."101

It is especially the phenomenon of morphing which is of interest here. Morphing is a prime example of Bergson's image interaction but also a phenomenon which effaces difference. Morphing depicts body shapes which coalesce into other bodies as well as into inanimate objects. We see before us the process of change and transmutation as shapes and identities generatively and incorporatively mutate. Bergson's own language prefigures morphing when "he describes the true self as one 'in which succeeding each other means melting into one another and forming an organic whole'."102 As we watch the visual impossibility of time lapses which break through surface intractability to the dynamic of the molecular, we identify not with narrative figures but with the 'figuration of corporeal process':

"My own body quickens to its effortless transformations at some deep molecular level...I feel 'myself' in constant flux and become aware that I am never self-identical (and possibly not even self-contained)."103
With film there is an insistence of a "certain temporal necessity, a certain phenomenological sense of time's irrevocable gravity" which remains as it "unreels before us." Omissions and hiatus are the gaps 'within' the norms of temporality and are irregularities against which the existential flow of change is measured. This temporal sense of non reversibility and inevitability in film is challenged by the digital morph where temporal reversibility "seems not only common but also strangely 'natural'." We have here Bergson's and Deleuze's fluid states between perception and recollection. The 'endosmosis' which is "defined as 'the passage of a fluid 'inwards'...to mix with another fluid on the inside of it", as with the morph, "wherein elements of one picture mix with those of another." Morphing visualises image variation as images play off of each other in a continuity of mutability, where the systems of perceptual matter and the system of centres of indetermination come together or interpenetrate in a way which exceeds perception in the interval.

This can be seen at its most vivid with examples of crises of memory "where memory endosmotically pushes itself out to morph the physical world into alignment with its own 'substance'." Marcel, in Proust's "Remembrance of Things Past" describes a separation of self from the objects of the world where memory fails and where insomnia, dream and day dream states disrupt continuity. This is not the same distinction between past and present we find in Bergson, but rather an assimilation as the past becomes perceptual reality. For Marcel, human body and material room morph each other as the room achieves a perceptual independence slipping the anchorage of subjective dominance:

"I would ...open my eyes to stare at the shifting kaleidoscope of the darkness, to savour, in a momentary glimmer of consciousness, the sleep which lay heavy upon the furniture, the room, the whole of which I formed but an insignificant part and whose insensibility I would very soon return to share...(with) only the most rudimentary sense of existence." Here the literal transformation of physical reality goes on to recoil back onto original emotions affecting memory and the constituted self: "In today's cyber-world of digitally produced and stored multiple realities, the
mere fact of physical existence no longer guarantees the persistence of a
fixed self."\textsuperscript{109} The fact that morphing as a dis-solving and re-solving of
corporeality and identity reveals a process which is already incessantly at
work on a cellular level makes it a disturbing visual presentation of the
search for stable and self assuring identity.

As a figure of change and transformation, the morph is a "self-similar" and
"unitary figure" which "operates to superficially simulate change as, on a
deeper level, it assimilates not merely 'difference' but also 'otherness'."\textsuperscript{110}
Thus, by obviating the dissimilar into the same, the visual morph
interrogates the nature of identity and otherness by showing them to be
unstable and evanescent. The sense here is of the self always being
continually "self-different" so that the "morph's primary mode is to assert
not only sameness \textit{across} difference but also the very sameness \textit{of}
difference."\textsuperscript{111} Clearly this is not the Deleuzean difference of difference,
where things differ from themselves first and immediately. The only
movement over time that takes place in the digital morph is not film's
disjunction or transversality but a 'marking of time' in the present,
sequences which fluidly develop "with neither a significant beginning nor
an end" which can be "followed in one direction as easily as in the
other."\textsuperscript{112} All of which amounts to an elimination of difference in favour of
absorption into similitude.

The sameness, elimination of otherness and marking of time in the
presence of the present brings up issues discussed by Deleuze regarding
Michel Tournier's "Friday."\textsuperscript{113} By the end of Tournier's novel, with the
disappearance of the other, Robinson is no longer a 'man':

"Robinson eventually becomes something other than 'human'...There is no
form, substance, essence or subject 'underlying' Robinson which 'causes'
his humanity...The process through which Robinson becomes 'elemental'
may be seen as the gradual unfolding and undoing of all his habituated
affects."\textsuperscript{114}

Robinson ultimately gives up on trying to make the island a 'simulacrum of
what is familiar' and in doing so carries out the equivalent of a morph, "[h]is
relations with various bodies which populate Speranza have recomposed his body...Robinson is now part of a very different assemblage." Here we have constituted a form of absolute presence, each 'bit' of information a circuited being-in-itself, an electronic instant going nowhere in self-coincidental playing. In Robinson the structure-Other is absent and this means the 'temporal distinction' between object and consciousness also disappears: "Before the appearance of the Other, there was...a reassuring world from which my consciousness could not be distinguished. The Other then makes its appearance, expressing the possibility of a frightening world which cannot be developed without the one preceding it passing away." 

Robinson’s metamorphosis is due to this perceptual field, the structure Other being absent. Without the Other, due to absence or assimilation, "consciousness coincides with its object in an eternal present" leading to a reliving of the same day. The resultant de-structuration in which both (subject and object) dissolve into other elements is read by Deleuze as a positive turn, "where things affirm their own worth and desire ceases to be 'personal' where "the pure phosphorescence of things in themselves" may be possible." Without the Other who is 'the expression of a possible world' and with it the 'reality of the self', the 'necessary' in brutal fashion triumphs. This thought experiment neatly allows Deleuze to establish two series which illustrate his arguments and reinforce Bergson's, "the structure of the possible, sustaining the reality of the self...Self and Other are here deployed along the axis of the possible, the contingent, or the axis of the play of mirrors. The second subseries, the one of the liberated elements...is called virtual. It is the series of the simulacrum in the process of becoming-phantasm. It is the imaginary and phantasmatic series." This produces an effect of appreciating the existing, 'things affirm their own worth' where desire is impersonal, thus negating the negating properties of Sartre's Other. If the reduction of the Other and with it subjectivity "does not cause the world to fritter away into nothingness" (in other words, making it a founded relationship) then we can think beyond this 'set-up'. Without the Other, there is a vulnerability but also a 'liberation' and 'volatility' and a un-Freudian desire which finds 'completeness in itself.'
A phenomenological reading, however, would not so readily agree. In phenomenological terms of digital assimilation, this would be given a negative spin. The "liberation from the older anomie of the centred subject may also mean, not merely a liberation from anxiety, but a liberation from every other kind of feeling as well, since there is no longer a self present to do the feeling....such feelings - which it might be better and more accurate to call 'intensities'- are now free-floating and impersonal, and tend to be dominated by a peculiar kind of euphoria."121 Sobchack concludes from this that the inherent danger of ultimate fluidity is a lack of investment in the groundedness of human body and 'enworlded action', threatening a dislocated "saturation with the present instant that could well cost us all a future."122

Deleuze recognises such pitfalls but sets them aside. Technological innovation is seen in terms of the automaton, digitally as an automaton of computation, amassing 'bits' of information, reflected not only in content but also as a 'mutation of form' with informational 'feedbacks' not temporal flashbacks, with data and information not nature. New images, lacking outside (out-of-field) as well as any internalisation within the whole, rather "have a right side and a reverse, reversible (non-superimposable) like a power to turn back on themselves."123 For Deleuze this cannot mean we abandon the time-image, but rather discover its 'unknown aspects', broaden its parameters to meet the challenge of the new technology. The innovative speech-act as story-telling can replace the vacuity of information and the films of Godard, Duras and Syberberg 'use cinematographic methods, instead of calling on new technologies' because imagery, ultimately, depends on the aesthetic rather than the technological: "Redemption, art beyond knowledge, is also creation beyond information."124

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Where would I go, if I could go?
Who would I be, if I could be?
What would I say, if I had a voice?
Who says this, saying it's me?
-----Samuel Beckett, Texts for Nothing

Direct time-image

It is with the direct show of time, the time-image, that Deleuze believes film consciousness reaches the state which is conducive to thinking 'otherwise'. To think otherwise certain attitudes must be in place which derive from a different kind of narrative and other kinds of montage. In modern cinema we narrate otherwise and, most importantly, need to think otherwise. Though Deleuze takes the Second World War and the horrors of holocaust to be the cut-off point for a different kind of imagery, it is worth emphasising that it was directions in cinema's earlier years which laid the foundation for the changes. As we have shown, Deleuze recognises that the montage experiments of Eisenstein, surrealism, avant-garde and the experimental documentary work of Vertov were all groundbreaking developments in the evolution of film consciousness in its modern form.

The suggestion is that we follow aberrant time which subordinates movement in favour of multiplicity and invention through the direct time-image: "One must be capable of thinking the production of the new, that is, of the remarkable and the singular...this is a complete conversion of philosophy...cinema...has a role to play in the birth and formation of this new thought, this new way of thinking...the organ for perfecting the new reality." Deleuze interprets new structures in terms of modern narratives
showing they comprise images which no longer refer to a globalising or synthetic situation but rather to one which is dispersive:

"The cinema is always narrative, and more and more narrative, but it is dysnarrative in so far as narration is affected by repetitions, permutations and transformations which are explicable in detail by the new structure...The diversity of narrations cannot be explained by the avatars of the signifier...It relates only to perceptible forms of images and to corresponding sensory signs which presuppose no narration but from which derives one narration rather than another."2

The fibre of the universe which prolonged events into one another has been broken. Sensory motor actions are replaced by wanderings and return journeys. The adversary is 'cliché', the floating image which circulates in the external world penetrating the thoughts of each one of us. Finding oneself gridlocked in a tunneled vision of limited perspective, or reading the chronicle of facts from only a single bias, constitute cliché. We discriminate in favour of what is functional, instrumental and self-fulfilling and choose to ignore what plays no part in our taken-for-granted value system. The cliché has been refined down to meet perceptual demand as to what is in our interest in terms of contingency: "A cliché is a sensory-motor image of the thing...what we are interested in perceiving."3 When, however, we experience modes of consciousness such as shock effects and distraction we find possibility in defamiliarisation for deviation and diversity, the sensory motor schemata jams allowing a different type of image to appear, a pure-optical sound image. This is not unlike the move from Heidegger's present-to-hand to ready-at-hand, the shift from the formulaic to a new vision and, especially for Deleuze, the release of object-situation into a multilayered structure of meaning.

There is a need to return to sedimented knowledge before instrumentality sets in and discover truths which reside in the naked imagery of the prepredicative. The cliché image in many ways is Husserl's fulfilled image, one which has had its details completed, which has been finalised, constituted and slotted into a series of constitutionalised profiles. But the time-image effectuates density by encouraging openness from a multiplicity of viewpoints. The optical image is diffuse, caught in suspension, endlessly referring to other descriptions. In film terms this is a liberated image, unconstrained, a correlate freed of encoded meanings, away from story
continuity and open to diverse, 'mindful' modes of consciousness. These images are neutral in the sense that they appeal to a fractured (film) consciousness which lets in pure recollection.

The structured system of film narration we are concerned with here is marked by difference. As Bergson's open totality suggests, difference exists within systems and also exists between systems, sustaining openness. But now we are dealing with difference in-itself. What makes systems communicate and be meaningful in themselves and to each other through an immanent dynamic are forces and intensities. This is a series about multiplicity and perpetual change of the now, with its various time synthesizes of past in present, retention and protention, and the alternating virtual and actual-image. The concomitant expression of difference in film imagery is through connecting linkages which are not in the successive formulations of movement-imagery but direct and without mediation. We need for difference to be articulated:

"[D]ifference must be articulation and connection in itself; it must relate different to different without any mediation whatsoever by the identical, the similar, the analogous or the opposed...the difference is gathered all at once rather than represented on a prior resemblance."  

What we have is two systems vying with each other, difference and representation, and the conflict between them is characterised by subterfuge, sophistry and deception. Difference in-itself is hidden by the system of representation from which it must be released, "it is under the same conditions that the in-itself of difference is hidden, and that the difference falls into the categories of representation."  

But how this is to come about is complex. The means is a combination of what lies within series themselves and subjectivities, or areas of indetermination, through which these systems are expressed. Priority for Deleuze lies not in the originary idea and the particulars that relate to that universal but to originary difference which only gives the 'impression' of similarity after the event. The dynamics and tensions of heterogeneous systems are to be sustained, combining 'passive selves' and 'larval subjects' which are the genuine movers of systems:

"[I]t is not even clear that thought, in so far as it constitutes the dynamism peculiar to philosophical systems, may be related to a substantial,
completed and well-constituted subject, such as the Cartesian Cogito: thought is, rather, one of those terrible movements which can be sustained only under the conditions of a larval subject."

Differences in a system relate to each other but they cannot do so by a conscious effort of comparison. They rather do so under the 'impulse of a force', which is brought about by a 'differenciator', the result being an internal resonance within the system and an external coupling between systems. There will never be a guiding hand or privileged point which places and relates such systems under an overarching concept. This would be to introduce dualism which Deleuze consistently rebuts. Nor do we have absolute difference since systems consistently do link up or couple, but the force that does the linking is not a centred subjectivity or an inbuilt centrifuge that drags everything into a common likeness. The force is rather varied and has many 'hidden' faces:

"Thunderbolts explode between different intensities, but they are preceded by an invisible dark precursor, which determines their path in advance, but in reverse, as though, intagliated. Likewise, every system contains its dark precursor which ensures the communication of peripheral series...this is fulfilled by quite diverse determinations."7

There is no in-itself similarity which propels the dark precursor. Put in phenomenological terms, it comes neither from its noetic correlate, since it is without continuity of identity, nor from its noematic correlate, since there is no identity of similarity throughout its acts of constitution. On the contrary, the only consistency is a retroactive one. The precursor recognises its own 'fictionality' and the series to which it relates has only the illusion of 'retrospective resemblance'. To enable this, the differenciator, in Lacanian terms, is where it is not, it is "the self-different which relates different to different by itself."8 Again, like Lacan, it lacks its own identity but there is no mirror image for it to deceptively fill any absence. We cannot, then, presuppose any identity of the agent which brings together these heterogeneous systems since to do so would make it foundational and carry over functions of comparison, analogy and likeness. All of which, as Bergson has pointed out, would be to replace qualitative difference by quantity and measurement. Differences cannot be calculated in this way, both because this is not the way of difference and because there is no identity to do the calculating. Rather, the way difference will emerge (it is
temporal) will be according to its 'possibility for 'fractionation', according to the disguises of the differenciator and forces of coupling and resonance.

The film spectator as a centre of indeterminacy and part of indeterminate imagery is sucked into this maelstrom to keep the system dynamic and vital, preventing sedimentation and habitus. Systems are meaningfully structured while simultaneously transmuted and fluid, the precursor presages what is to come like a kinetic charge but does not specify details, only momentum. If the dark precursor lingers in the wings, a shadowy presence which alertly negates itself for the sake of systematic renewal and difference, centres of indeterminacy as subjectivity must 'speak' these changes. They must be competent enough, affectively vulnerable and openly vital to explore singularities such as the time-images found within dysnarrative contexts.

Here we must reintroduce the notion of the whole already discussed in the movement-image but now in terms of the resistance within the whole to closure, "the whole is not a closed set, but on the contrary that by virtue of which the set is never absolutely closed, never completely sheltered, that which keeps it open somewhere as if by the finest thread which attaches it to the rest of the universe." This is the precursor seen as "a thread which traverses sets and gives each one the possibility, which is necessarily realised, of communicating with another to infinity." Film sets are related to each other as units but they are infiltrated by the whole as the promise of its expansion because the whole, qualitatively, is of a different kind. It is spiritual, mental, durational and built upon the relationship of parts rather than dependent on their substantiality. It is also indicative of difference itself which is sustained as openness.

For Deleuze the vision of the whole cannot be apprehended but its presence is forever at work ensuring the movement of duration, a guarantee for change as the basis for movement-images. Deleuze has already described the propulsion of movement as a force which runs through all life disrupting immobility and preventing closure:

"[T]he movement (the facet of movement) which is established between the parts of each system and between one system and another, which crosses them all, stirs them all up together and subjects them all to the condition which prevents them from being absolutely closed."
This power of change deters the conscious prioritising of any one system over another. It is repetition but the clothed repetition of disguises and masks which retains difference. However, film and the work of art is even more than this since, in addition to levels of repetition which move away from representation to difference, there is a constant 'ungrounding' process which is underscored by the time-image. This finds its expression in Deleuze's third synthesis which has frequent recourse to Nietzsche's philosophic position of *ontological* repetition: "Beyond the grounded and grounding repetitions, a repetition of *ungrounding* on which depend both that which enchains and that which liberates, that which dies and that which lives within repetition."\(^{12}\) It is especially in art we find all forms of repetitions but above all a simulation which prevents closure and sustains a resonance between the extreme forms of repetition:

"Each art has its interrelated techniques or repetitions, the critical and revolutionary power of which may attain the highest degree and lead us from the sad repetitions of habit to the profound repetitions of memory, and then to the ultimate repetitions of death in which our freedom is played out."\(^{13}\)

By making difference in life apparent, art is part of the life force. Film's own series which are constituted by sets, assemblages and sections and the series that is life, are part and parcel of the same repetitious, singular return of the same as difference. Without a referential origin there is no talk of primacy but only types of repetitions with their own vital procedures. The dark precursor is the invisible upholder and guardian of difference and change. The interaction between systems, driven by the shadow force, sheds light on each as a marking which settles and then moves on.

It is these differences that come to form the character of film's time-image, now ordered and perceived in another way. Here organic representation is finally overcome and with it specific difference in the identity of the concept. The process has been sealed by Nietzsche, where the death drive merges with the movement of life itself, overflowing all series, opening them up eternally to 'chance and chaos'. Nietzsche has already rejected received notions of representational and transcendent truth implicit in classical narrative, "the self-contained infinity of God is thus replaced by the open infinity of human interpretation."\(^{14}\) His work permeates Deleuze's analysis of
the time-image and is incorporated into the less than veiled criticism of the ontology of the movement-image. With Nietzsche, vital ideas and their inspirational attraction can exist in an endlessly relational and mobile way:

"If one now goes on to consider that, not only a book, but every action performed by a human being, becomes in some way the cause of other actions, decisions, thoughts, that everything that happens is inextricably knotted to everything that will happen, one comes to recognise the existence of an actual immortality, that of motion."15

The challenge to the symmetry of organic completion is infused by Nietzsche's eternal return with its insistence on movement, change and difference:

"The idea of eternal recurrence shakes us from thinking of the ideal of eternity in terms of something remaining always the same, in favour of a new focus on transience - a delight in what passes...eternity itself is to be thought of in terms of movement."16

Reference to the eternal recurrence here helps us fix the elusiveness of the present by thinking of the present in the mode of the past. By suffusing it with the ontological pastness that it already is, the present can be 'articulated'. On the other hand, the ontological pastness that suffuses the present is itself opened up and made less determinate by the thought of the eternal return. Movement has become the perspective of time and "in thinking of the eternal return, we break down the barriers between past and present, thinking each in the mode of the other" as a way of affirming diversity and becoming.17 Moreover, as Deleuze points out, in terms of a 'memory of the future' the eternal return, contra Plato, retains the theory of becoming:

"The eternal return is a force of affirmation, but it affirms everything of the multiple...of the different...of chance...If there is an essential relation with the future, it is because the future is the deployment and explication of the multiple, of the different and of the fortuitous, for themselves and 'for all times.' It concerns...excessive systems which link the different with the different, the multiple with the multiple, the fortuitous with the fortuitous, in a complex of affirmations always coextensive with the questions posed and the decisions taken."18
Aberrance and problem ideas

When the past is not reducible to a former present, and when the future comprises an eternal recurrence of change, we are in the realm of what Deleuze calls in film 'crystalline' time and we begin to look at 'the questions posed and the decisions taken'. This allows for connections and constructions which are not based on any coherent narrative in life since there is none. The combination of linkage and connection with perpetual movement means formed connections retain an openness, a lack of teleology, whether they relate to events of external moments or personal (self) histories. This narrative model frequently shows protagonists themselves impelled by chance rather than through motivating actions:

"This declining belief in totalising or organic ideologies and global situations throws into question the narrative foundations and logic of the action-image. Indeed, the aimless wanderings of modern cinema's protagonists is itself a deterritorialising figure...Protagonists no longer act, they rather wander and observe."19

It is with the sense of aberrant movement that time comes to express the fact that we finally have time-images which are beyond movement itself. 'Opsigns' and 'sonsigns' subordinate movement to "a purely optical and sound situation (which) does not extend into action, any more than it is induced by an action...It is a matter of something...which henceforth outstrips our sensory motor capacities."20 There is a force of dispersal, a "void that is no longer a motor-part of the image...but is the radical calling into question of the image...False continuity becomes the law."21

The idea of continuity in classical editing has not merely involved the movement-image but also the way it is contextualised with reference to the real world and the out-of-field. Implicit in every visual image is the continuity of the unseen and the unheard giving perspective to the seen and heard and acting as its invisible foundation. But now there is inclusiveness, no more out-of-field: "The outside of the image is replaced by the interstice between the two frames in the image."22 We are no longer concerned with the association of images but, on the contrary, the interstice between. As
Deleuze explains it, film is no longer images in a chain but the method of "between two images, the method of 'and', this 'and' then that." With this new conception of cinema montage, movement changes its form from being perceptually sequential to mentally simultaneous as an affirmation of the coexistence of the past, present and future we have discussed in time-consciousness.

The change in modern montage is a new version of montage's vertical shifts, no longer simply from one series to another but also revolving round the single shot. No longer montage but "montrage", not how images are linked but what images show. Deleuze's characterisation of the time-image involves an interpretation of situation, a far greater fine-tuning of the exploration of the stratified moment than the movement-image. Reminiscent of both Benjamin's flaneur and Kracauer's anteroom, the modern behaviour mode manifests within a specific kind of space and with a particular kind of attitude:

"A state of strolling, of sauntering or of rambling...the determinate locations blurred, letting any-space-whatever rise up where the modern affects of fear, detachment, but also freshness, extreme speed and interminable waiting were developing."25

Deleuze's analysis of post Second World War film is not the dialectical montage Eisenstein used to engender shock effects. In later films, lack of meaning itself as a conscious strategy constitutes the requisite shock to sensibility. Moreover, the same techniques favourably referred to by Bazin as alternatives to Eisenstein, deep focus and depth-of-field, are praised by Deleuze for bringing out the thinking of imagery and the possibility for moving in time rather than space, "depth of field...opened up a new direction for the cinema...it makes the unrolling of the film a theorem rather than an association of images, it makes thought immanent to the image."26 There is movement as the movement of formally linked thought, 'deductive' and 'automatic' and what breathes life into this movement comes from the 'outside'. Visual imagery as the catalyst of thought which seems unmotivated, unexplained and irrational.

Deleuze questions any simplistic and correlative approach to hermeneutic questioning which is trapped within a representational impasse. For Deleuze, subjectivity should posit objects as they are by recognizing they
are multiple and differential with an inherent reciprocal relationship to other determinations. These posited determinations are informed by a complex propositional experience. Answers are returned to propositions from the posited objectivities and problems-ideas and they relate to the attitude that emanates from the context of situations which question them in the first place. Positings are characterised by multiplicity and difference and the affirmations that are returned will also be constituted by multiplicity and difference. The process becomes the dynamic for understanding perceptual awareness and attitudinal shifts and becomes an alternative to being locked within representational facticity. There is a provocation of thought through question and disjuncture.

The interchange between the posited questions and positing answers is one of non-correspondence and ultimately an emancipation from organic representation and the hermeneutic circle. For Deleuze spectator relationship to film is characterised more by these non-equivalencies of problem-ideas than it is by pursuing phenomenological predelineations and horizons already immanent in a representational work. In terms of film imagery there should be freedom to explore a perceptual rediscovery of problems-ideas. That which ignites the actual from the virtual is based on a circuitry but it is not the circular movement of a negative dialectic. What is significant here is that problems-ideas are objectively characterised and by nature unconscious in keeping with virtuality and duration, further challenging the status of the subjectivity that posits. Thus, that which is posited is activated by unconscious propositions which will not match up subsequent affirmations:

"For problems-ideas are by nature unconscious: they are extra-propositional and sub-representative, and do not resemble the propositions which represent the affirmations to which they give rise. If we attempt to reconstitute problems in the image of or as resembling conscious propositions, then the illusion takes shape, the shadow awakens and appears to acquire a life of its own."27

As with the unexpected entrances and exits and the meandering movements within the uncut depth-of-field, there is dispersal and labyrinthine explorations which 'take time' to resolve. Ultimately, thought coincides with the relation of nonrelation. With the new time montage there is disruption and decentred areas of indetermination which open up the
show of time. The way of looking at things in natural perception, the equilibrium of forces, and the existence of centres, are all overturned. But Deleuze rightly avers that basically the movement-image was itself aberrant and abnormal to begin with. We find this echoed in Epstein’s comments in the 1920’s, spectators experienced non-rational, “slowed down and reversed sequences...the non-distancing of the moving body...constant change in scale and proportion...and false continuities of movement.”28 Later, Jean-Louis Schefer also noted that the movement-image does not reproduce a world but constitutes an autonomous world which has no centre and is observed by a spectator “who is in himself no longer centre of his own perception.”29 Clearly, the dark precursor was already at work on the movement-image from the outset:

"It took the Modern Cinema to re-read the whole of cinema as already made up of aberrant movements...The direct time-image is the phantom which has always haunted the cinema but it took modern cinema to give a body to this phantom."30

Forks of time

The time-image is drawn out by its crystalline character, an image that is indiscernible, read through the understanding of memory, the perceptively actual and the subjectively virtual. Bergson’s actuality and virtuality in the time-image are conveyed by a film image which is in a state of constant fracturing. As a break up of sequential or logical action, the time-image is mental, reliant on the acts of recollection-imagery as an entrance into the past which splits the past (already constituted as a split). However, the actual-virtual, organic-aberrant, action-description and physical-mental are not incompatible aspects. They feed off of each other as in a crystal, reflecting each other and ultimately become each other in their particular (dis)guises. At one and the same time the actual is always present but a present marked by an absence that changes it.

The present image is both present and past, still present and already passing. The fact that the past coexists with the present means there is a
persistent duplication of matter and mind, of present perception and virtual memory as with primal impression and retentional consciousness. The virtual, after being expressed in whatever form available through actualisation will differ from the source point, the original point (phenomenology's primal impression) where real and virtual images reflect each other producing an ever widening circuit, like a labyrinthine hall of mirrors. It is a circuit which has its roots in the prepredicative which still contains the sedimentation of alternative significance to the instrumentality of the one 'actually' adopted. Such circuits will be soldered over so that the retention of the just-having-been may be referring to the circuit of virtual imagery or, just as feasibly, to the immediacy of the actual image. The integrity of each circuit cannot be secured because splitting takes the form of specularity, a mirror image, an inevitable, unpredictable parting of the way.

Thus, when 'bringing' the virtual into actualisation we are not repeating the same process as the creation of virtuality since that takes place automatically, through durational unfolding as part of perpetual flux, the complex process of image-matter as the perpetually open. This creation of virtuality is a deeper memory, a memory of the world directly exploring time. We reach into the past to wrest that which conceals itself from memory. This bank of memory in the form of layers of the past, sheets of the past, originary and non-psychological, becomes apparent in diverse manner according to the way fulfillment of the interval takes place. It also serves as a phenomenological descriptive tool for understanding the workings of the time-image. Each time a virtual image is called up in relation to an actual description, the object is deformed and created anew, widening and deepening the mental picture it inspires. An expansive circuit is created. The process is one based on a multidimensional circuitry with layers which criss-cross each other. The time-image entices the spectator into constituting new meaning by combining sedimented action with a fresh sense of context in a chosen region of the past. This justifies an intricate hermeneutic which pushes the envelope of its phenomenological roots as an interpretive act, risking the very time line which the past is meant to elucidate.

Deleuze describes the choices made from within the complex of the time-image as a series of 'forks', places in time, a junction box which leads to further routes, splitting and establishing tiered levels of actions. Events
come together, some more significant or noticeable than others, causing repercussions which open up questions, or re-route the significance of the past, or emit a whole series of shock waves which reverberate through the present. This is living at the limit. Images in the present that shatter and fork. There is a certain confluence around the vortex of the present, an evasiveness expressed through the potentiality of forked meanings. Film images here take shape around time itself rather than emerge from another space (place), the outside as mere exteriority. The crystal-image presents "the most fundamental operation of time...the vanishing limit between the immediate past which is already no longer and the immediate future which is not yet...mobile mirror which endlessly reflects perception into recollection."31

The switching exchange between the actual and virtual of the crystal is categorised by Deleuze as 'limpid' and 'opaque', images with an inherent reversibility, a lightness and a darkness, indicative of their uncertainty. The result can only lead to paradox that breaks the faculties, "paradox displays the element which cannot be totalised within a common element, along with the difference which cannot be equalised or cancelled at the direction of a good sense."32

Only the present is psychological, the past is pure ontology and its only access is by a genuine "leap" into its being. Once the leap is taken we find that the contraction of perception can be seen in the 'light' of potential expansion, as intuition in phenomenology and multiplicity in duration. In this connection, Benjamin's discussion of mémoire involontaire is apposite.33 The optical unconscious implicates unconscious forces at work which are conducive to film being revelatory. As emanating from the lifeworld and narratively constructed through concrete materiality, film reflects both individual and collective mores and behaviour. The lowered state of motor activity and the heightened state of consciousness allow the viewer to get in touch with unconscious data accessible only through mémoire involontaire. Benjamin is clear that 'genuine' experience is where memory events of the individual and the collective meet: "Where there is experience in the strict sense of the word, certain contents of the individual past combine with material of the collective past."34 Recording via mechanical reproduction and its substitution for human memory can be a crucial factor in the psychic process of becoming conscious of oneself.
through phenomena and events. Referring to Freud's "Beyond the Pleasure Principle", Benjamin concludes:

"[B]ecoming conscious and leaving behind a memory trace are processes incompatible with each other within one and the same system. Rather, memory fragments are often most powerful and most enduring when the incident which left them behind was one that never entered into consciousness."35

Consciousness does not leave memory traces, rather memory fragments are most powerful and most enduring when the incident which left them behind was one that never entered into consciousness. In a similar way to Bergson's description of perception as a filtering and contracting process, consciousness is here described as a means to parry the bombardment of shocks by setting up a "screen against stimuli"36 and the more efficiently it does so, the less do these impressions enter experience.

Benjamin's relation to the unconscious can be traced through his comments on film surrealism and its use of dream imagery. This is a wide area but for our purposes we can briefly note that Benjamin wanted to dispel the dream and awaken people from the illusory state of mass existence. The collective were, so to speak, already living in an 'unconscious' dream state and, as with Marx: "The reform of consciousness consists only therein, that one wakes the world...out of its dream of itself."37 Dialectical images were intended to draw dream images into an awakened state and this was tantamount to an increased historical knowledge. On the other hand, awakening from the dream could be interpreted as awakening to the dream, since dream and awakening, dark and light, are inexorably part of the same spectrum: "[T]here is no moment of enlightenment or awakening that is not also a moment of darkness or sleep."38. We have a dreaming collective which is an unconscious consciousness expressing both society and childhood's dreams, awaiting the moment of collective, historical awakening:

"This moment is one of waiting. The dream waits secretly for the awakening; the sleeper gives himself over to death only until recalled; he waits for the second in which he wrests himself from capture with cunning. So it is too with the dreaming collective for whom its children become the fortunate occasion for its own awakening."39
However, the consciousness under consideration also includes a "spectrum of awakening which has no beginning or end" so that "awakening no longer implies our being awake." Thus, there is no move from one state to another but an archaic reliance, a rediscovery of wholeness and an understanding that "this awakening has structure of a dream. The dream that remains as the signature of modernity is in fact...the 'dream that one is awake'." What is emphasised here is process, the transition itself into awakening rather than any facile or simplistic notion of what it is to be awake. This is an affirmation of the non presence to presence we have discussed in the retentional consciousness of Husserl and the virtuality of Bergson, the gap in self-presence "the spacing that prevents the now from being awake to itself."

Echoing Deleuze's observations on the gradations of dream states, Benjamin mentions that "the antithetical contrast of sleeping and waking has no validity for the empirical forms of human consciousness, rather it yields to an infinite variety of concrete states of consciousness, that are conditioned by all conceivable gradations of awakened-being." Deleuze's own comments on the gradations of dream states links them to movement-imagery. Even with "states of reverie, of waking dreams, of strangeness or enchantment" we still maintain the link to the sensory motor schema. These modified dream states, or 'implied dreams', differ from the full dream in that decisions in the interval emanate from the world-itself which, so to speak, usurp the choice-making procedure in our state of immobilisation: "There takes place a kind of worldising or societising, a depersonalising...of the...blocked movement...The world takes responsibility for the movement that the subject can no longer or cannot make." But clearly, and in keeping with his general psychoanalytic critique, Deleuze was most concerned not with the dream work but with the unconscious within thought. The spiritual automaton that as thought process speaking through subjectivity is "very different from the dream, which brings together a censure or repression with an unconscious made up of impulses."

For Benjamin, the only way to bring out, or resurrect, experiences lost to conscious memory or consciousness itself, is through constellations and dialectical imagery, something which the imagery of film can play a part in as an actualisation of virtual memory. Here the role of such imagery is not
spatial but temporally dependent. Benjamin's understanding of the historical image is to bring it to a standstill, in a constellation which, like the time-image, has ambiguity as its character and is a combination of the actualised past as potentiality and the present as an immanent force of thought:

"A historical materialist cannot do without the notion of a present which is not a transition, but in which time stands still and has come to a stop...historical materialism supplies a unique experience with the past...Thinking involves not only the flow of thoughts, but their arrest as well. Where thinking suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant with tensions, it gives the configuration a shock, by which it crystallises into a monad."48

What is significant here for film consciousness is that its world imbibes the tension and antagonism of the move from representation to difference. The ontology of film takes effect through the powers of a reconstituted spatio-temporal reality with a marked shift of perspectives, centres of dispersion and shapeless distortions giving a positive meaning to difference. In that shift, the role of spectator moves from an extraneous centre of projection and identification to an immanent cog in the unfolding realisation of film consciousness.

The split self

The approach to cinema where film consciousness achieves the 'independence' to think otherwise is entirely the result of seeing the world as image, image as movement, and time as being shown. Deleuze's philosophy of difference combined with Bergson's creative intuition are not dissimilar to phenomenological description which includes a fractured 'I' and self-thinking thought. We see this echoed in George Poulet's phenomenological comments on literary consciousness.

"Whatever I think is a part of my mental world. And yet here I am thinking a thought which manifestly belongs to another mental world which is being thought in me just as though I did not exist...this thought which is alien to me and yet in me, must also have in me a subject which is alien to me."49
The 'as-if' conceit of film may suggest a schizophrenic condition in the spectator but it is more a question of a release of an other consciousness in itself, what we have referred to as thinking imagery. This includes and transcends artist, work and spectator, going on to become a consciousness channel, "a work of literature becomes...a sort of human being, that it is a mind conscious of itself and constituting itself in me as the subject of its own objects." If there is a problem here phenomenologically it would be that if there is a birth of consciousness, in terms of evolutionary growth, ("it may be that cinema had to go through a slow evolution before attaining self-consciousness") we need to ask of what it is a consciousness of, since consciousness cannot be empty in an intentional sense. Here Deleuze's position and the phenomenological differ. Theoretically we see the sustaining of a 'relation' in phenomenology's intentional correlate but there is no intended sense of mediation in Deleuze, nor a dialectic resolution, even though, in practical application, the two views near each other.

Phenomenologically, the experiencing subject is the concrete self and the transcendental observer, thinker and thinker of the thinker enmeshed in an intricate web of spectator interpretation and autonomous vision. Being involved within a situation as protagonist and being seen from the outside as if from matter as pure perception correlate to inclusive positions of reflective thought and passive ego:

"[T]wo different egos one of which, conscious of its freedom, sets itself up as an independent spectator of a scene which the other would play in a mechanical fashion. But this dividing in two never goes to the limit. It is rather an oscillation of the person between two points of view on himself, a hither-and-thither of the spirit."

For Deleuze, "the essence of cinema - which is not the majority of films - has thought as its higher purpose, nothing but thought and its functioning." Film consciousness as the route to thought thinking itself, or better, thinking the unthought, starts in the same way as reflexive films, by frustrating identification. The same move towards negating objective meaning and organicity means a fracturing of the subject and challenge to identity. Identification in the movement-image is strong, vicarious experiences, dream-imagery, escapism and voyeurism have all been charted in film through psychoanalytic film theory. Moreover, the sense of
organicity tends to recoup or co-opt dispersed spectator identification, albeit in a complex manner. The time-image, however, frustrates such co-option using an array of strategies. Contrary to Eisenstein's movement-images, which are also intended to make thought visible, the thought of the time-image provokes a suspension of the world. The kind of imagery we are concerned with here is an image based on the indiscernible, one which is a reminder of the fact that we are not yet thinking, that imagistic power is somehow beyond thought. What is 'suspended' in the world is the present-at-hand, as well as the return of the transcendental to the prepredicative, a return which is itself disturbed with a reminder that there is always difference in self-thinking thought. If thought is incoherent and disjointed then indiscernible and uncertain imagery will be its appropriate avatar.

In an intolerable world full of cliché and banality thought can no longer think a world or think itself. By making the unthought in thought the motor for a 'return' to the world, we can in a Nietzschean fashion remake ourselves, create the 'false' and be at one with a world which can do thought justice. This return to the world, a belief that we are inherently linked to it, da-sein cannot be otherwise, is exemplified by the characteristics of the signs of the time-image, the descriptions that constitute opsigns and sonsigns, and the interpretations attainable through 'lectosigns' as the way film images can be read. Reading is an apposite term, classically hermeneutic, creative reading centres around films with aberrant movement, non-sequentiality and decentring which become issues in themselves. In the lectosign powers of interpretation are brought to bear and images read (but not linguistically) as well as seen, "readable as well as visible, it is the 'literalness of the perceptible world which constitutes it like a book." Reference and movement is subordinated to depth interpretations which rely on difference rather than identity. Again Merleau-Ponty's presence is felt. Depth interpretation comes through image and body im-pli-cated in the world, enfolded and interlaced. Both speaking and reading being part of a directional sense (meaning) which only makes 'sense' through the body's directedness. As we will see with the notion of the 'outside' the readability of images in the time-image regime is not based on a fresh cohesiveness, semiotic referentiality or bodily self-containment but rather on a unique visual-sound, present-past disjunction, a dehiscence denoting a higher 'evolution' of film consciousness.
The theoretical base for these observations lie with Kant's notion of subjectivity and his description of imagination and the sublime. This is an analysis only briefly referred to in the cinema work but it pervades Deleuze's thinking on the nature of time-image narration characterised as it is by splits, disconnected places and de-chronologised moments. The sublime was a starting point in Eisenstein's dialectics, based on the shock effect and the eventual overcoming of opposition to think the whole. With intellectual montage there is a second movement infusing the interval with affectivity so that it goes from the concept to the affect, as what returns from thought to the image. This is related to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" which related the ego to the 'I' in a relationship which was still regulated by the order of time. It is a matter of giving 'emotional fullness' or 'passion' back to the intellectual process. But this is only a precursor to the later development of the sublime "in which the sensible is valid in itself...a Pathos which leaves (the Ego and I) to evolve freely...to form strange combinations as sources of time." What Deleuze explains in modern cinema is a time-image which does not relate the transcendental to the metaphysical but to time:

"But in modern cinema...the time-image is no longer empirical, nor metaphysical; it is transcendental in the sense that Kant gives this word; time is out of joint and presents itself in its pure state." The process of confronting the unthinkable in thought is philosophically arrived at through the split self, "the presence to infinity of another thinker who shatters every monologue of a thinking self." According to Deleuze, beginning with Kant the question is, what is it that determines the undetermined 'I am'. How can the determinable I think determine what is undeterminable, 'I am'. In one's sense of self, "nothing in myself is thereby given for thought." Kant makes the link, establishes a determinable between thinking and being through difference, but not by a difference which separates thinking and being, which would be "an empirical difference between two determinations" but "in the form of an internal Difference which establishes an a priori relation between thought and being. Kant's answer is well known: the form under which undetermined existence is determinable by the 'I think' is that of time." We begin to think in time, that is, in the fracture of the split "I". If thought 'is' anywhere it is with the determinable as a force between the determining and the determined, within time. Thus, when film finally 'shows time' it is showing thought of a
kind which becomes discernible, as visible within indiscernibility, in the
interval, as a force emanating (from) temporality. The characteristic of this
visibility cannot be pinpointed, it takes different shapes and guises but will
appear as both mirror imagery and disturbance, as it disunifies and
fragments the pretensions of representation as a determinable agency.

The sense of self only takes on substantial form in the flow of time, as the
existence of a phenomenon which appears as passive and receptive. This
makes what seems to be the active self making spontaneous thought in fact a
passive subject, the 'I think' is 'exercised' in it and upon it, but not by it.
Thus, according to Deleuze, the I think and the I am, thought and Being, are
discovered by Kant to be a transcendental but inner difference (not reliant
on God). For Deleuze, thinking about thinking can never be transparent,
that is, achievable through reflection, though there is a temptation
phenomenologically to equate these observations with intentionality. That
is, relating the heightened state of awareness to thinking and the nature of
the time-image in the interstice to the noema. Deleuze would resist this in
keeping with an anti-dualistic and anti-transparent approach. When
Deleuze asserts that I am separated from myself by the form of time he is
arguing that the ego cannot constitute itself as a unique and active subject.
The subject is split because thinking takes place only when the passive
ego feels the effect of an active thinking. This is how the mind qualifies itself
as the affectivity of a passive ego - not as the activity of an active agent:

"[T]he spontaneity of which I am conscious in the 'I' think cannot be
understood as the attribute of a substantial and spontaneous being, but
only as the affection of a passive self which experiences its own
thought...being exercised in it and upon it but not by it."62

This fundamental difference between the 'I' and ego is as different as
sequential and serialised time, not the movement of a spiral coursing in on
itself but the 'and plus and', the 'thread of a straight line.' "The 'I' and the
Ego are thus separated by the line of time which relates them to each other,
but under the condition of a fundamental difference."63 Deleuze's main
criticism of Kant is that after setting up a revolutionary turn in thought he did
not go far enough. By following through in the 'Critique of Pure Reason' the
fracture of the 'I' and the disappearance of rational theology and
psychology as a result of the speculative death of God, Kant "did not pursue
this initiative" but "resurrected God and the I."64 The fractured 'I' is filled by a
new identity with the passive self remaining receptive without power of synthesis. Kant maintained variable models of recognition applicable in the form of a harmony between the faculties. Indeed, Kant ends up in the opposite camp: "It is impossible to maintain the Kantian distribution, which amounts to a supreme effort to save the world of representation." Yet Kant's influence through to the time-image survives in Bergson and Proust:

"Bergson is much closer to Kant than he himself thinks...Kant defined time as the form of interiority, in the sense that we are internal to time. It is Proust who says that time is not internal to us, but that we are internal to time, which divides itself in two, which loses itself and discovers itself in itself, which makes the present pass and the past be preserved."66

The process of fracturing is somewhat transformed in film consciousness as a consciousness which is conscious but does not rationalise its consciousness but rather shows it. In the confluence of the intermediate image where film and spectator consciousness merge, the relation of the two automata in the film experience can lead to the unthought in thought without destroying it in reflection but sustaining it in sensation. But split subjectivity is still a force since it comprises part of spectator consciousness. As I contemplate thought it changes to the matter of my contemplation not what I was thinking. Thus, thought's central contradiction is a Heisenbergian impossibility to think itself without changing itself, an essentially quantum theory of life. To reach film's time-image, realist film theory and the relation of raw materiality to filmed representation must be transcended by the interiority of time so that 'time moves in the subject', an immutable form of constant change which keeps the subject split through infinite modulation.

For Artaud, thought is not yet thinking, it is still 'impowered'. Artaud is exemplary for film even though he was suspicious of its efficacy. He believed the harmonics and 'vibrations' of film imagery harboured the "hidden birth of thought" and "resembled and allied itself with the mechanics of a dream without really being itself a dream."67 For Artaud, the point is not transparency but the occasion of thought, its functioning as a coming to be: "Thought has no reason to function than its own birth, always the repetition of its own birth, secret and profound."68 What is characteristically film consciousness, the bringing of imagery to thought and the combination of conscious thought and the unconsciousness within
it, attaches itself to various models of expression. The spiritual automaton that 'becomes the Mummy', 'paralysed', 'petrified', 'frozen', heros who cannot think, like incapacitated and passive spectators seeing a parade of images of 'frozen instances'. These images which come to haunt us are not the images of surrealist dreams that lie buried in the inaccessible unconscious but rather belong to the waking world as the unconscious within consciousness. When film comes to thought it forces thought to think the thought it is not yet thinking. This reverses Eisenstein's shock which sets trains of thought in motion within an ongoing inner monologue. For Artaud, on the contrary, there is 'another thinker who shatters every monologue of a thinking self', no singular, internal monologue to latch on to but vying, recalcitrant voices in the shape of internal dialogues.

The goal here is not to restore omnipotence to thought but on the contrary to recognise its condition of impasse and aporia and work with it to seek alternatives, other worldly existences within life, to return to it through whatever access points open up. The instinct of thought is to exercise all encompassing powers to overcome intuition and dissipate ineffable imagery by appealing to logic and totality. Film's time-image puts us in touch with thought that is outside of this, not dictated by egocentricity or moulded by habitual norms and rationalisation. They make us rouse up, kindle the passion to think through the contingent, the stark encounter, the contradictory and difference-in-itself. We see the time-image questioning its foundations in much the same way as phenomenology begins with a dissolution of all assumptions and foundations to explore presuppositions. Like phenomenology, the time-image questions the natural basis of perception and then brackets it in order to relive the process by which phenomena come-to-appearance in the first place. An appearance which is not the merely visible but, as with Merleau-Ponty, a multisensorial, chiasmic complex. This takes place both 'thoughtfully' and emotionally through sensations and hyletic sensa. However, just how these access points open up is less clear. Phenomenologically the terrain has been mapped out. The prepredicative and predicative have established the domains between, on the one hand, coming-to-visibility as the being of raw experience and, on the other, the giving of meaning through significations of intentionality. When Deleuze analyses the time-image and artists such as Resnais and Antonioni, however, he finds these phenomenological categories to be insufficient.
Film events

There will always be becoming as change. Ontologically, making of chance a necessity is the only way Deleuze sees to assure the affirmation of creation, multiplicity and a concomitant mode of thinking thought outside itself. The innermost reality of the brain must be an exteriority of thought otherwise there could be no opposition to the conformity and rigidity of 'truthful' images of thought which go back to Plato. Thoughts must be related to the outside and they must be 'nomadic', since we are not yet thinking:

"Every thought is already a tribe...this form of exteriority of thought is not at all symmetrical to the form of interiority...It is rather a force that destroys both the image and its copies, every possibility of subordinating thought to a model of the True, the Just, or the Right."\(^70\)

The time-image serves as the perfect conduit for provoking thought by disrupting certainty. This theme which runs through Nietzsche and Deleuze counteracts the taken-for-granted, pre-given truths, the laziness of bland acceptance and insipid, dispassionate doubting. There must first be a violence perpetuated on thought, "the claws of a strangeness or an enmity which alone would awaken thought from its natural stupor...Do not count upon thought to ensure the relative necessity of what it thinks. Rather, count upon the contingency of the encounter with that which forces thought to raise up and educate the absolute necessity of an act of thought or a passion to think."\(^71\) In film this is engendered above all else by the irrational cut since, in breaking sensory motor co-ordinates, we raise the interval to an independence allowing it to form part of the disabling-enabling circuitry of the 'beyond thought'. Irrational cuts or 'incommensurables' play no part in linking shots or sequences sequentially but form the series as part of a connecting 'and'. This means that the irrational cut is the platform which liberates the interval and in doing so allows for exploration and the birth of thought.

In questioning its own foundations, time itself comes into relief in a paradoxical fashion. The time-image seems to 'end up' as dead time, a strange mean-while of the yet-to-come and the 'unique experience' of the
past(s). Time goes no-where, revolving around itself as we experience a temporal depth perception, a dead-heat of time zones where no priority is gained as the 'genetic' element (photogramme) of film perception is forefronted. These film images of the interstice are similar to aspects of the 'event' as becoming, being 'in medias res', without beginning or end: "The event is the virtual that has become consistent: 'it neither begins nor ends but has gained or kept the infinite movement to which it gives consistency'. Such film 'events' are full of promise but come to exhaust themselves in their own time, in the interstice, in simultaneity, "where nothing takes place, an infinite awaiting that is already infinitely past, awaiting and reserve." Yet within these seemingly idle periods, not only is nothing not taking place but there is a profundity of excess and an embracing 'invisible' presence. Everything is taking place because we are no longer in the sensory motor schema but the power-house of affectivity, where thetic positing examines itself, where dream and recollection merge, where ego poles decompose and where the objectively determined is subjectively permeated.

The transmission of film 'events' and the singularities which convey them are part of the time-image series. The series takes its dynamic by chance, the first throw of the dice, while the second throw, operating under conditions that are "partially determined by the first, as in a Markov chain, where we have a succession of partial relinkings." This is the irrational cut, a 'hazard' linkage, the throw of the dice, but not 'haphazard', a differentiation but not association. As with Godard's linkages: "For, in Godard's method it is not question of association. Given one image, another image has to be chosen which will induce an interstice between the two...given one potential, another one has to be chosen, not any whatever, but in such a way that a difference of potential is established between the two, which will be productive of a third or of something new." By first isolating and then linking images in such a series we retain the singularity which is peculiar to them while at the same time allowing them to be iterative, "a singularity is not something unique or 'sui generis', but, on the contrary, something that can be understood only through the ways it comes to be repeated." The space that is carved out in the curvature of space is the outside of thought. In the interstice where the film 'event' 'takes its place' is thought that pushes the two incommensurables, seeing as the self-evident, non-discursive and saying as the articulate, discursive practise, to their limit points.
Deleuze shows that the time-images of Welles, Resnais, Godard, Antonioni, among others, express the film 'event' in their own specific way. We can take Antonioni's masterpiece "The Passenger" (1975), as a prime example. On one level "The Passenger" is a meta-critique of the cliché, an insistence on the outside of film breaking the illusory barrier of filmed representation. The doubling of realities, the doppelganger of identity, the simulacra of imagery, the duality of actor and role, stillness within movement: "The theme of doubling penetrates Antonioni's shooting technique. In order to record the dead moment, temps mort, he likes to extend filming beyond the end of the scene when the actor has just stopped acting his/her character role in the film, but not quite returned to his/her own identity."78 In Antonioni temps mort wins out over temps vivant. 79 As Pascal Bonitzer points out, Antonioni's initial impact is the throw of the dice, "a fascination with chance, and, on the screen, the effects of chance, erratic traces, unclear trajectories, vague gestures, which are inscribed, as by a lapse, a falling asleep of the camera, on the lens, the film, the screen, the retina."80 Above all, Antonioni's filmed 'event' has affinities with Deleuze's, a happening which cannot be fixed yet which somehow contains the uncontrollable within immanence. "The Passenger" creates a journey of the doppelganger, fractured identity, existentialism and death.

The main character, journalist David Locke, takes the place of his look-alike, gun runner David Robertson because he is tired of life and is attracted to taking on another persona. But his ennui cannot be shaken even in disguised repetition. Locke takes up Robertson's 'passage' through life and is also a passenger through Antonioni's familiar landscape of disconnected, abstract spaces which absorb characters and actions, spaces which are at one moment barren and dehumanised at other moments areas of transience; terminals, roads and airports we pass through, leaving only momentary 'traces.'81 But the film is itself an examination not only of the jaded Locke but also the jaded clichés of film. A gesture towards another kind of film making which is not yet with us, a report on the status of film imagery which shows it to be coded and 'locked' within the world of representation. But as with any such inbuilt critique, Antonioni's own films show the way out of the impasse into a new film experience. Any pretense at escapism through identification is dissipated. As Locke's experience shows, taking on another identity in the search of fulfillment is no escape, it only leads to more of the same in film and in life.
The memorable culmination of "The Passenger" shows death and change to be inexorably bound to each other, as change is a kind of death from one state to another, from the individual to the generic. As Locke decomposes physically and figuratively:

"[H]e reveals the generic human hunger for transcendence and meaning... parallel with the pilgrim or saint whose assumption is a literal elevation out of and beyond himself in an ecstasy which means not joy but a loss of self, passage into a larger life... We must adapt or die, even when the adaptation means dying out of oneself, dying into change."82

We are in a world of "uncertain doubles" and "partial deaths"83 death within life and the multiplicity of particular deaths as change. Deleuze sees more in Antonioni's films than simply themes of solitude and incommunicability. Tied down by 'tired' colours of the world and ponderous body, they carry the weight of the past and modern neurosis. But there is a belief in renewal, a cinema of the brain which reveals the creativity of the world, its colours rejuvenated by a new space-time.84 In "The Passenger" Locke is pulled back by the desert and the burden of the past as past. In a similar fashion to Resnais, time is conflated and confused. We enter into flashbacks but it is unclear to whom they belong. They appear as objective events or, equally, the vision of several characters. Notably they belong to no one other than 'mitsein', Antonioni's point of view standing alongside the character.

Only in the final scene of death does a lightness of spirituality make its presence felt. Indeed, this final seven minute scene is a landmark in film and shows how Antonioni opens up to film consciousness, a "lived reality in a cinematic manner that cannot be expressed in words."85 In "The Passenger" Locke has to die, as a fulfillment of the persona he has taken over, whose life is already endangered. The complex climactic tracking shot away from the doomed Locke into the courtyard and the final return to his now dead, assassinated body shows the release of the soul as visual continuity, "an unbroken glide through time and space."86 This is a metaphysical change not a mystical one suggesting:

"[D]eath as a transformation into other elements, ultimately into energy... the enduring organism is simply one that is consistent with its environment... consistent motion... this transformation of food and air into the pattern of the organism, is what we call existence... Nonbeing fulfills being;
it does not negate being, just as space does not negate what is solid. Each is a condition for the reality of the other."87

As a release Locke's death is not necessarily his own. (Contrary to Arrowsmith, "Locke dies his own death...In dying he comes upon himself, becomes himself."88) Rather than his own death, Locke is already dis-embodied from himself. He has turned over in bed, turned his back to the window and the 'outside'. This is the death that never happens to us as an event. Death is seen in relation to being, what comes after death as life. Locke has been killed and no amount of reorganisation or technological control can change this. But film can show the invisible coming to visibility, the murmuring of being. The inadequacy of the event as a some-thing which takes place is transcended by film consciousness as a part of becoming, as an expression of the Real (Lacan) rather than the control of the symbolic, as the passage of the soul into the light.

**Outside of film**

Thought, inspired by the outside, at the "eventful opening point of the closed" is an elucidation of the labyrinth of the 'finest thread' which links objects to the universe, and "it is in following this thread, like Ariadne that thought can elucidate the labyrinth, whose portal is the dire disjunction or the (apparently) incurable fracture of all truth by the nonrelation of objects."89 Formal linkages of thought which are automatic and deductive are like theorems, a depth of field which makes the unrolling of film a theorem. But 'problems' come to 'live' in theorems, give them life and open their interiority introducing the *leitmotif of a film*. This is more than the film of the open totality which still retains its organicity where false continuities existed but were merely 'anomalies' of movement. With the direct time-image the *whole* has to do with the aberrant, the interstice between images "a spacing which means that each image is plucked from the void and falls back into it."90 We now pass from "a simple disjunctive logic of exteriority to a *topology of the outside* as the locus of the inscription of forces."91

If we unravel this we see that once thought emerges in films of the time-image through aberrant movement and indiscernibility, it is an automaton, an automaton of the outside where there is no subject thinking the outside
but the singular 'thought-outside'. Thought is drained of its inside and is now expressed through its outside as automaton:

"Far from restoring knowledge, or the internal certainty that it lacks, to thought, the problematic deduction puts the unthought into thought, because it takes away all its interiority to excavate an outside in it, an irreducible reverse-side which consumes its substance."\(^ {92}\)

To ask what composes forms of the outside is to search for what animates it, just as what animates thought 'outside-thought' : "Let us call this 'element' of the outside 'force'", so that the outside is "only manifest as the imposition of a force."\(^ {93}\) The outside becomes an independence of force, thought in turmoil that does not yet think until it exerts its force of relation in the modulations rippling through the folds and foldings of an inside. The inside does not achieve independence as a result of this but becomes the inside of the outside made possible by the acts of folding. In this light the relation of the doppelganger in "The Passenger" becomes even more pertinent. As Deleuze points out, the theme of the double has always "haunted Foucault" so that "the double is never a projection of the interior; on the contrary, it is an interiorisation of the outside, It is not a doubling of the One, but a redoubling of the Other. It is not a reproduction of the Same, but a repetition of the Different. It is not the emanation of an 'I', but something that places in immanence an always other or a Non-self."\(^ {94}\) This is what allows for the fluidity of areas of indetermination. Their 'place' as a site of change, subjectivation as a process of rebirth and points of resistance as potential for reformation (and reformulation).

What film shows is a third dimension of imagery, not that of depth but that of force. Transcending content and expression, beyond that which is filmed or sculptured within time (Tarkovsky), we find the force of the outside. This is a force which sets into motion the other incommensurable yet mutually reliant elements of sight and sound, or statements and visibilities. As a force it is not filmable but it is what lies beneath the filmed as the Being of film, as a shift in emphasis from knowledge to power. Time too has changed from the showing of time zones in their chambers to the indiscernibility of time not merely shorn of succession but even of simultaneity. What remains is an absolute memory, a potential of power, or a 'series of powers'. Though unfilmable as power, what is visible is exteriority, the twin elements of light and language, seeing and speaking. As an independence of force the
Outside is always 'present, 'remaining distinct from the history of forms'. As a force and non-relation the Outside allows for thinking in the interstice at the point of disjunction between seeing and speaking. Here we return to the irrational film cut between the non-linked but always relinked images:

"The absolute contact between non-totalisable, asymmetrical outside and inside. We move with ease from one to the other, because the outside and the inside are two sides of the limits as irrational cut, and because the latter....appears as an autonomous outside which necessarily provides itself with an inside."95

In this folding and chiasm a 'worlding' is (re)produced redolent of the aesthetic world of phenomenological consciousness. A force to think which is insisting and unrelenting yet strangely self-contained or impacted. For the forms of exteriority to exert their force, a possibility which film accentuates by its mechanical reproduction, a new framing must be created which acknowledges the demise of the out-of-field and any representational connotations, "the visual image ceases to extend beyond its own frame" and the sound image too cannot be relative or explanatory of the visual but must assert its independence, "the sound image is itself framed" and this disjunction "must not be surmounted."96 In expressing its independence the sound image is now the voice, achieving Foucault's priority of statement, extracting the pure speech act which now in film becomes "an act of myth, or story-telling which creates the event."97 The event will emerge but as an event will subside, go deeper than any interiority. It will no longer be visible but like Antonioni's tensions which subsume visible traces 'as an underground fire, always covered over': But there will always be contact, "a complementarity of the sound-image, the speech act as creative story-telling, and the visual image, stratigraphic or archaeological burying."98

Deleuze describes film's spiritual automaton as an intruder, a theft of thought. Here the phenomenon of a schizophrenic stealing of thought is referred to in a positive way as a precursor for the other of thought. There is a powerlessness in thought which prevents it being what it is and the potential power of film consciousness is to unleash a spiritual automaton, a logic of thought, which is not the ego's thought but its otherness. In this way film images becomes part of the intricate folds which comprise the membranes which course through the 'space' between the thought and the
unthought, comprising perhaps the unique imagery of auto-affection which would otherwise be interminably distant or overwhelmingly near. Representation and the relation to the real is replaced by outside space and its relation to inside space:

"This auto-affection, this conversion of far and near, will assume more and more importance by constructing an inside-space that will be completely co-present with the outside-space on the line of the fold."99

We remember that this inside-space is not the internalised integration of self-awareness we find in the changing whole of the movement-image. This is rather the inside deeper than any internal world since its profundity is independent of distance, imbricated rather into the time of virtuality, "far from showing up in space, (it) frees a time that condenses the past in the inside, brings about the future in the outside, and brings the two into confrontation at the limit of the living present."100

Any base from which to think out from, or any relation between the inside and outside is exceeded. That which is outside is not localisable and that which is internal could not be said to relate to any foundational, self-awareness but an unthinkable or unthought, deeper than any internal world. This hiatus cannot be bridged by 'traditional' forms of recouperation, integration or differentiation which works out of identity, in other words, nothing dialectic. There is rather only a confrontation of an outside and an inside independent of distance. This absolute contact between the 'asymmetrical' outside and inside is the irrational cut writ large. Between the two points we have absolute contact as we move from the one to the other. The irrational cut is the arena for this oscillation.

Deleuze, cites novelist and critic Georges Duhamel whose antipathy for film was based on the fact that "I can no longer think what I want, the moving images are substituted for my own thoughts."101 Where for Benjamin, who originally cited Duhamel, the inability to think one's own thoughts was described as an overcoming of the spectator's freedom for association102 for Deleuze this constitutes "the dark glory and profundity of cinema."103 Film consciousness is a thought which is a theft of thought, so that thought is both its own agent and its own 'victim'. We have moved some way from our phenomenological world of art which we 'inhabit' to one which is "less the incarnation of a lifeworld than a strange construct we inhabit only
through transmutation or self-experimentation, or from which we emerge refreshed as if endowed with a new optic or nervous system." As long as film is a distraction to thinking or a dream-like escape it will be banal but as soon as it reveals the powerlessness to think at the heart of thought, as it can for Deleuze, it comes into its own as an expression replete with the power of transformation.

References

1Deleuze, Movement-Image, pp. 8-9.
2Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 137.
3Ibid., p. 20.
4Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 117.
5Ibid.
6Ibid., p. 118.
7Ibid., p. 119.
8Ibid.
9Deleuze, Movement-Image, p. 10.
10Ibid., pp. 16-17.
11Ibid., p. 59.
12Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 292-93.
13Ibid.
16Lloyd, Being in Time, p. 120. (my emphasis)
17Ibid., p. 121. c/f Joan Stambaugh, Nietzsche's Thought of Eternal Return (Washington University Press of America, 1988)
18Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 115.
19Rodowick, Time Machine, p. 76.
20Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 18.
21Ibid. (my emphasis)
22Ibid., p. 181. (my emphasis)
23Ibid., p. 180. (my emphasis)
24Ibid., p. 41. The term is Robert Lapoujade's. Deleuze note 23. p. 288
25Deleuze, Movement-Image, pp. 120-21.
26Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 173.
27Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 267.
28Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 36.
29Ibid., p. 37.
30Ibid., p. 41.
31Ibid., p. 81.
32 Ibid., p. 227.
34 Ibid., p. 156.
36 Ibid., p. 159.
40 Cadava, Words of Light, p. 68.
41 Ibid., p. 69.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
45 Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 59.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., p. 165.
48 Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in Illuminations, ibid., p. 254.
50 Ibid., p. 59.
51 Deleuze, Movement-Image, pp. 74-75.
52 Ibid.
53 Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 168.
54 Ibid., p. 22.
55 Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 158.
57 Ibid.
58 Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 271.
59 Ibid., p. 168.
60 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 85-86.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., p. 86.
63 Gilles Deleuze, Kant's Critical Philosophy, p.viii.
64 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 87.
65 Ibid.
66 Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 82.
68 Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 165.
69 Ibid., pp. 166-67.

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 139. (my emphasis)

John Marks, "Underworld: The People are Missing", in Deleuze and Literature, ed. Ian Buchanan and John Marks (Edinburgh University Press, 2000), p. 93.


Marks, ibid., Deleuze and Guattari, ibid., p. 158.


Deleuze, Time-Image, pp. 179-180.

Rajchman, Deleuze Connections, p. 57.


Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 5.


Deleuze, Foucault, p. 121.

Deleuze, Time-image, pp. 204-205.

Pallasmaa, ibid, p. 121. It is of interest to consider this in terms of a story, recounted by Antonioni, which took place in Nice during his wartime travels. It is the story of a bather who had drowned. The sky was white, the sea front deserted, a bathing attendant sat, the sun struggled to emerge from the mist. The only activity was the rocking of the dead body in the sea, the only sound the lapping of waves. When the bather is seen to be dead all commotion breaks loose, the attendant tries artificial respiration, two children 'sadistically' comment on the swollen, drooling figure about to turn blue. A policeman arrives and eventually things return to normal. For Antonioni to show this event as a series of happenings would somehow be a diminution, to distract from its import. What is included in the event, but not shown, are the tensions within Antonioni's own life which bring their own colour to the scene, life in the nearby city, the duration of Being as our existential condition, the friction of the moment and the open future. To film this Antonioni "would try to remove the actual event from the scene and leave only...that white sea-front, that lonely figure, that silence, there seems to me to be an extraordinary strength of impact. The event here adds nothing: it is superfluous...The dead man acts as a distraction to a state of tension." Michelangelo Antonioni, "The Event and the Image", Sight and Sound, no.33 (1963/4), p. 14.

Chatman, ibid., p. 189.


Arrowsmith, ibid., p. 168.
89 Badiou, ibid., p. 85.
90 Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 179.
91 Badiou, Clamor of Being, p. 86.
92 Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 175.
93 Badiou, Clamor of Being, p. 85.
94 Deleuze, Foucault, p. 98.
95 Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 278.
96 Ibid., p. 279.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Badiou, ibid., p. 128. c/f. Deleuze, Foucault, p. 119.
100 Ibid.
101 Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 166.
102 Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction", in Illuminations, ibid., p. 231.
103 Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 166.
104 Rajchman, ibid., p. 135.
There's something about that movie,
I just can't get it out of my head,
well, I can't remember why I was in it,
or what part I was supposed to play.
All I remember about it was Gregory Peck
and the way the people moved
and a lot of them seemed to be looking my way...
-----Bob Dylan & Sam Shepard, Brownsville Girl.

An effective illustration of the way Deleuze's analysis of film consciousness through the time-image and phenomenology's description of film ontology through intentionality supplement each other comes with Resnais' "Last Year at Marienbad" (1961). It can be shown that even with differences regarding subjectivity and interpretation there are broad areas of overlap in the 'images of thought' emerging from the two approaches.

Both phenomenology and Deleuze would agree that the sensory motor model breaks down in the film and that description through classical Hollywood narrative is inappropriate. Some theorists have found phenomenological interpretation not only relevant but indispensable for understanding "Marienbad":

"If a text can be said to determine its own reading then Alain Resnais' "Last Year at Marienbad"...is a paradigmatic instance of a phenomenological film. Not only does it posit such a reading, but its very structuration can be seen as a meta-cinematic essay on the phenomenological systems of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty."¹
Phenomenologically, we could look at the film in terms of artistic intent. Artistic intent comes over as a sense in which the substantiality of the work is overrided, making it transparent, so we "place the locus of art, not in the object or work itself, but in the coincidence of the reader/critic's consciousness and that of the artist as manifest in the work...the phenomenologists define criticism as "consciousness of consciousness." This somewhat idealist critical position which risks ignoring the minutiae of the work itself is compensated by other factors common to both phenomenology and Deleuze as the interpenetration of consciousness by consciousness. Images of the film work must be interactively brought to life, for Deleuze the image is a lectosign and the spectator participates in eliciting meanings which are not definitive. In addition, we have seen that Husserl's description of inner time consciousness cannot coincide with linear succession but is a complex of tenses within the moment of present duration and a continuity of disparate temporal phases.

Though the classical phenomenological position is cast in terms of object and subject there is clear fusion in "Marienbad", varied realities created out of personal visions which rather than impose any one world view become enmeshed in a battleground of multi perspectival visions, including the inanimate as a "calcification of spatio/temporal Bewusstsein." There is no idealism here, never under the imposed auspices of a particular, subjective consciousness. But there is a 'fullness' of intentionality working through the eclecticism of material drawn upon by film consciousness. Lines of departure and lines of flight writ large through Ariadne's thread: "The measured cadence of the opening narration, the romantic and passionate musical score, and the controlled camera motility create a labyrinthine effect approximating the involved movements of the mind, yet they also present an ontological reality." This is not the reality but a reality as defined by the topology of 'objective perception' and subjective materiality, or the reality of externalised thought, its 'problematised' limit points through mute vision and blind word.

From the outset, an epoche has taken place where the rules and the chronology of the everyday, set within history and culture, have been laid aside. Spectator consciousness no longer intends the world, but intends meanings and signification directly, without the benefit of mediating signs. The semblance of mediating signs is already destroyed from the opening scenes through the hotel when the narrator, 'X', comments on images.
which do not correspond to what we see. Tomasulo sees that images in "Marienbad" reconstruct the subjective perceptual experiences of two, perhaps three characters. Objects in the world literally display their objecthood by being brought into relief, disconnected from their utilitarian functionalism to become, contrary to movement-imagery, objects-for-consciousness through intentionality: "Subjectivity is represented in terms of the phenomenal world, rather than through the conventional action and motivation offered by classical narrative cinema." ⁵

The difference between the two philosophical positions comes at exactly the point where a multiple view of several consciousness is 'replaced' by a view of no determinate consciousness. Rather than present particular views on the world from narrative centres, Deleuze's interpretation of the forks and splitting of unfurling images show that "the characters themselves are attributes in a logic of memory presented by the film's overall strategy" which moves by leaps and disjunctive perspectives. ⁶ If the images are to be read through a logic of memory we are no longer in the realm of the subjective at all but rather on a molecular level of process. This is the formation of realities and objects through assemblages which include and absorb the brain and body within the indiscernibility of matter and memory.

But this also has a strong phenomenological resonance. The ontological difference and the split between pure consciousness and recollective consciousness has been established both ethnomethodologically and in Deleuze: "[T]he indiscernibility of the real and the imaginary, or of the present and past, of the actual and the virtual, is definitely not produced in the head or the mind, it is the objective characteristic of certain existing images which are by nature double." ⁷ But this condition is reified phenomenologically through the three consciousnesses in the film, a personification of the split in anchorage through objectified action. A position which corresponds to the three characters being one psyche, or rather a human consciousness which is insubstantial and impersonal (multipersonal). This is a phenomenological consciousness unaware of itself, non-transparent. Three aspects of a consciousness, 'X', 'M' and 'A', which confound and confuse themselves through a veiled sense of truth and objectivity. A consciousness which is present to being but only through a Sartrean annihilation. A non constituting power of consciousness, given to itself out of Merleau-Ponty's polymorphous flesh.
The three consciousnesses of "Marienbad" can be taken as three embodiments of the fractured self, attempting to catch the unreflected but frustrated by the intentional act of explanation. They seem impenetrable to each other yet as one consciousness they cover the same ground, the same terrain, the same 'events' but in an opaque manner. They meet at cross roads and talk at cross purposes. And when they meet there is an interval with thickness; they meet in a time lodged within the world not in themselves. When there is meeting in the interval there is an enfoldedness for both Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze. If ultimately we are dealing with one consciousness then aspects merge making for auto-affection. But Resnais steps back from this "final figure" where thought "affects itself by discovering the outside to be its own unthought element". Rather "Marienbad" plays around the interstice, which Robbe-Grillet calls in his literary work the 'hole':

"[E]verything is told before the 'hole' then again after the 'hole,' and there is an effort to bring together the two edges to eliminate this trouble-some emptiness; but the opposite occurs, the hole engulfs everything."

The impact of "Marienbad" is prelinguistic, appealing to the directness of Deleuzean thought imagery: "Resnais has explicitly said that the 'monologue intérieur' is not on the soundtrack, but in the image." If we take movement as the defining essence of film, the image-movements of "Marienbad", for both Deleuze and phenomenology, are through images expressed as material mind, "movements of the mind and of consciousness are represented through the ocular manifestations of perceptual experience." The material upsurge of being is seen through seemingly inanimate objects and configurations the film opens with, vivified by consciousness but indeterminate as to whose (or what) it is the consciousness of, in indeterminate and fractured centres of consciousness. This is in keeping with Deleuze's insistence, developed through Vertov's montage, that the eye of matter lies within in it, within the stream of materiality.

This comes through in the role of the ubiquitous statues in "Marienbad" which populate the landscape. The statues mirror the characters in fixed, immobile poses. The statues of frozen poses in no way guarantee fixed meaning or an ability to contextualise an event once and for all. Statues are used by characters as reference points because they seem to supply objective markers, etching truth in stone, but in fact the statues lend
themselves to different interpretation by the particular consciousness which
counters them. There is a hermeneutic conflict between accepting the
ready given facts of history as past and their interpretation and relevance to
the present through effective horizons. At one point a group of statues
sparks in 'X' a narrative association of remembered dialogue and action.
For 'M', on the other hand, who is the most elusive of the aspects, we get an
historical account of the statues representing an 'objectivity' of historical
facts, a chronicle presented in a manner suggesting objective truth. For
Resnais, the statues are pivotal:

"One can think of "Marienbad" as a documentary about a statue: with
'interpretive glimpses of gestures as they endure, 'frozen' by the
sculpture...Imagine a documentary which centred on a statue with two
people, and succeeded in combining a series of shots, taken from different
angles and by various camera-movements, so as to tell a complete story.
And in the end we realise that we have returned to our starting point, the
statue itself."13

Resnais shoots the statues in documentary manner with "flowing tracking
and crane shots similar to early studies of Van Gogh, Picasso and
Gaugin...the camera cranes up the back of the statue...this animates the
figures of the statue. It makes the viewer adopt the perspective of the
statues as they act out the inventions of 'X' and 'A'."14 By adopting the
consciousness of statues we are entering into a level of mind, or a function
of the mind corresponding to the way of handling the past as significant for
the present as well as generating emotion in the present. Resnais'
predilection for structurally creating a series of lived objects which
expresses mind is presented by means of leitmotifs and interior
duplications, or 'en abime'. The statues, for example, are seen to hang on a
poster in a corridor, one of the numerous "transpositions from one medium
to another"15 from sculpture to dramatic art. The film is replete with repeated
poses and geometrically figured mirror images of objects and characters,
games within games, acts within acts:

"[T]here are many structures 'en abime'..The domino game, which a
number of the guests play at a larger table, produces a labyrinth structure.
This labyrinth seems to suggest the corridors of the chateau, the
convolutions in memories, or even the complexities of the temporal
sequences in the film."16
All this confirms Deleuze's argument that for Resnais film does not represent reality but is "the best way of approaching the way the mind functions." Human subjectivity becomes molecular, centres of determination are spread out into the material world to become mental functions or 'neuronic messengers'. If there is a character in Resnais' work it is thought and its machinations. Thought, moreover, is not haphazard but has its defined pathways contradicting the suggestion that "Marienbad" is a loose and confused construction of anti-narrative. Deleuze has emphasised that dysnarrative is not no narrative and Resnais has claimed that the final result of "Marienbad", its final version of constructed montage, was the only version it could have been. This is meticulous planning, precise (mental) cartographies within sheets of the past and transitional subjectivities. On the level of the chaos theory, where minor changes have far-reaching repercussions, each shot carries with it the power to subtly change meaning on seemingly unconnected levels and to shock sensibility through elaborate trompe-l'oeil.

In this meticulous construction both phenomenological order and Deleuzean dis-order come together. By treading the delicate balance between representation and becoming, the molar and molecular, we are also reflexively examining phenomenology's own demarcating boundaries. Without effacing subjectivities, "Marienbad" sets up a phenomenological communication system "wherein the film text is seen as a quasi-Subject, a translucent Consciousness of an Other, a Sartrean For-Itself. Viewed this way "Last Year at Marienbad" articulates the essential logic of human consciousness." But even more so, "Marienbad" examines consciousness as it surfaces at various coagulating points striving for self understanding. On one level this is the triadic id, ego, super ego, but on another 'A', 'X' and 'M' embody the three temporal dimensions. The impediments that have to be broached to self-awareness are, to all intents and purposes, exclusively temporal. Thus each temporal phase is distanced from itself and anthropomorphised. If there is difference here for Deleuze there is nothingness for Sartre. Consciousness separated from itself as an internal differentiation. And this is temporal:

"[T]he nothing that separates consciousness from itself is at the root of time...Consciousness exists in the diasporatic form of temporality. Spread out in all three temporal dimensions, it is always existing at a distance from
itself, its self-presence is always permeated by absence, and this unique mode of being cannot be grasped through the category of an irrelational, non ecstatic self-presence."19

The shift in time zones between past and present means that one character intends a situation lived by another character in a different time zone in an otherly constructed narrative perspective. Intentionality itself is questioned and put into relief:

"Narration will consist of the distribution of different presents to different characters, so that each forms a combination that is plausible and possible in itself but where all of them together are 'incompossible'...when what "X' lives in a present of past 'A' lives in a present of future...so that the difference...assumes a present of present (the third, the husband) all implicated in each other."20

Both Resnais and Robbe-Grillet in combination bring out the essence of what Deleuze tries to convey with the time-image:

"With Resnais and Robbe-Grillet, an understanding occurs, all the stronger for being based on two opposed conceptions of time which crashed into each other. The coexistence of sheets of virtual past, and the simultaneity of peaks of de-actualised present, are the two direct signs of time itself."21

Robbe-Grillet's model plants us within the point of the present where the past-present and present-future coalesce, as that point of the inverted cone which Deleuze uses to adapt Leibnitz to Bergson. The best world of God in Leibnitz, at the apex of the cone, is now the point of the present where all the past is contracted and where all incompossible worlds can virtually (potentially) flourish. Film can show this in its show time as we follow incompossibilities developing and fading in the brain-mind of film consciousness. When the still bonded pure recollection is actualised we experience it as the double-faced crystal image. The present is this splitting, it is not, it is a heteronomous splitting. In this crystal imagery we have the mirror-like effects of this splitting of time which is the directness of time itself. The crystal of time is the janus face of a process which looks into the past as it rolls on into the future with us in tow, time is the only subjectivity and it is we who are internal to time.
The serialised effect of "Marienbad" opens up a unique trajectory revolving around dialogue accounts, impassive, statuesque behaviour, emotional outbursts and a breakdown of all narrative order. But this reading also figures in a phenomenological account which likewise rejects conventional dramatic structure, focuses on a series of unconnected singularities and spins around the vortex of a confluence of inner time consciousness. In this sense Robbe-Grillet sees the artist confirming the fact that the film cannot 'go anywhere' or reach any clear cut conclusion other than a return:

"[I]t is impossible for the author to reassure a spectator concerned about the fate of the hero after the words 'The End'. After the words 'The End' nothing at all happens, by definition. The only future which the work can accept is a new identical performance: by putting the reels back in the projection camera."\(^{22}\)

Deleuze, too, sees such static imagery as both an investigation into objective validity, "for Resnais, there is always something real which persists, and notably spatio-temporal co-ordinates maintain(ing) their reality"\(^{23}\) and a confirmation of the breakdown of the movement-image, "wanderings, immobilisations, petrifications and repetitions are a constant evidence of a general dissolution of the action-image."\(^{24}\)

Where Robbe-Grillet and Resnais differ is not regarding the indiscernibility of the image and the way the imaginary and real interpenetrate each other but with regard to a phenomenological emphasis on temporal dimension. From Resnais we get a temporal armature and reference points between the present and past. A temporal 'architecture' comprising the co-existence of sheets or regions of the past. Resnais' approach explores happenings through an examination of the way the mind functions in terms of configurations and 'mappings' in time. From Robbe-Grillet we get, not so much an exploration of sheets of the past, which are the natural machinations of a questioning mind, but what Deleuze calls peaks or 'points of the present', the somewhat 'artistic' exploration of timeless time, locked into the presence of the interval, a perpetual present cut off from its temporality, a structure seemingly stripped of time yet still time-full in the sense that being is time (duration) and the eternal return. A re-play of the already-given but as new-identity. A desire for recurrence which plays against the wandering characters in their uprooted anomie in favour of a preferred repetition for a future of the same.

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Events that skim the surface in "Marienbad" are channeled through different sentient consciousnesses at different times, sometimes in the form of objective accounts, other times as rambling monologues to the extent that a strictly phenomenological reading of the film elicits the inherent struggle of phenomenological subjectivity to rid itself of the shackles of idealism:

"The unconventional opening establishes the fact that nothing in the film has autonomous existence apart from the perceiving consciousness. The reflective quality of the dialogue suggests that consciousness (where self and other coexist) may be at every moment creating "other" in the image of self."25

It is this sense of entrapment and the inexorable circular structure of consciousness which reflexively (and critically) mirrors phenomenology itself. Self-reflexivity, stories within stories and the questioning of the very foundation of the tools one uses for questioning, all reflect off which philosophical approach one uses to 'make meaning'. We are especially involved in acts of persuasion, open to artistic license and philosophical arguments as to what is appropriate and what is, or is not, edifying. We see this on a micro level through the vulnerability of a character to the persuasive arguments of another character and, on a wider level, to the general philosophical insights we bring to understanding the film and its metaphysical relevance. "Marienbad" itself is an exercise in the persuasive effort:

"If last year at Marienbad did not happen, then A's uncertainty and vulnerability imply that she has a weak hold on her own experience and is susceptible to entrapment in his consciousness. Robbe-Grillet sees the film in this way: 'The whole film, as a matter of fact, is the story of a persuasion: it deals with a reality which the hero creates of his own vision, out of his own words'."26

With Husserl's emphasis on present primal impression and Bergson's on the duration of past as virtuality, we find Poulet's phenomenological position having wide applicability:

"[E]ach instant appears as the instant of a choice, that is to say of an act; and the root of this act is a creative decision...The mind...must recognise in
its act of creation an act of annihilation, it must create its very nothingness in order to give itself a being."\(^{27}\)

This corresponds to Bergson's argument that if the mind wishes to understand itself as creator it must recognise in that act of creation an act of annihilation, creation through the death of time. Moreover, both interpretive approaches contravene the identification 'model' of classical film theory. Robbe-Grillet rather looks to the surface of materiality: "to describe things, as a matter of fact, is deliberately to place oneself outside them, confronting them...no longer a matter of appropriating them to oneself, or projecting anything on to them."\(^{28}\)

What Resnais is concerned with is the past, but a past that has to be released from its pastness if it is to become a dynamic past-as-present through pure recollection. The emergence of this dynamic is affectively known. Though "Marienbad" seems cold and clinical, it is in fact emotively charged but in a particular way. Robbe-Grillet sees emotionality as expressed through 'X''s obsession with a passionate love affair to be at the core of the film:

"'X' is "the least neutral, the least impartial of men: always engaged on the contrary, in an emotional adventure of the most obsessive kind, to the point of often distorting his vision and of producing imaginings close to delirium."\(^{29}\)

The film conveys this emotionality not in the conventional way of extremes of expression but through the visualisation of perception, the presence of imagery which conveys altered states, erratic behaviour and broken objects. For 'A' "objects become contaminated analogues for the breaking down of her emotional control and resistance to 'X''s pressure."\(^{30}\) The stilted and defamiliarising behaviour of "Marienbad" characters accentuate affectivity surfacing as latent potentiality, multifaceted and non-subjective, with a pureness of quality not tied down by place, time or specific subjectivity. Robbe-Grillet acknowledges that to access these feelings the film spectator must intuitively open up to film consciousness on an other level than traditional, dualistic, psychological identification:

"[E]ither the spectator will try to reconstitute some 'Cartesian schema - the most linear, the most rational...or else...allow himself to be carried along by
the extraordinary images in front of him, by the actor's voices, by the sound
track, by the music, by the rhythm of the cutting, by the passion of the
characters... and to this spectator the film will seem... 'easiest'... a film
addressed exclusively to his sensibilities, to his faculties of sight, hearing,
feeling."31

Observations in the way Resnais releases feelings to become part of a
transversal continuity help us understand more clearly the way film
consciousness comprises the realm of presubjective, visual fascination as
objective perception. This is film's expression of the intermediary image, the
imbrication of the mental and physical, the machinic and human, concrete
reality and simulacra, centred perspective and dispersed every-where. In
"Marienbad" feelings are seen to take on a life of their own because they
are so understated in particular characters, emerging only at shock points,
hinted at in shapes, to be read off of objects like floating signifiers. The
fractured "I" comes to read 'it-self' in its own bifurcated way, through
disembodied feeling, personal yet at a remove, reflected in objects and
repeated through analogical configurations. All is a becoming-conscious, a
search for understanding, but along a way fraught with inevitable
resistances which comprise temporary, indeterminate centres.

The layering nature of time as simultaneous, de-actualised peaks of the
present combined with the more direct search into sheets of the past
emerges in the narrative as contradiction and paradox:

"[A]n accident is about to happen, it happens, it has happened... Betrayal
happens, it never happened, and yet has happened and will happen,
sometimes one betraying the other and sometimes the other betraying the
first - all at the same time."32

There is no shared or common world here but zones which come into
contact with each other, find a transitory common ground, (appearing to be
the same space), take part in a dialogue (usually at cross purposes) and
then split up, much in the same way Deleuze describes the 'event' as
meaning. What we register in sight is that which has already gone in the
instant of sensation, in film's after-image. In "Marienbad" we physically see
the past as well as mentally experience it. Each image is replaced and
experienced as an after-glow of continuity, an after-the-event which is the
incorporeality of the event. This is the tension of the event and state of
affairs, the happening as a being and the concept as a virtual becoming, the presence of the image contra its sensed 'presencing', a 'way' of being rather than an actual being. Forced from the substantiality of the state of affairs, the present is only an instant that re-presents its mirror image, its own past as a counter-actualisation. The event emerges from virtuality, manifested in impressionistic guises without ever reaching an essence because in transcendental empiricism there is no such origin.

In this way, the eternal search for love and truth, struggle for recognition, conflict of relationships and the presence of Other, indeed, the event of "Marienbad", can be compared to Deleuze's example of battle in, "The Logic of Sense", as a means of sustaining surface-effect and indifferent anonymity of characters:

"A battle may be viewed exclusively in terms of bodies - those of the combatants, of their weapons, their cries, their wounds - but there is also a sense on which the 'battle' itself is an incorporeal surface effect produced by the bodies, a kind of floating entity which is everywhere apparent and yet nowhere localisable. The battle, as incorporeal event, is indifferent to the individuals involved and to the outcome of the fight, an impassive anonymous process with no clear beginning and no clear end, never present, always future or past, a pure simulacrum....the battle is a vital entity with a life of its own, an aggregate of metastable states, a structure of loci of potential energy, of possibilities of development."^33

The potential of this is the endless permutations and possibilities of events in any-space-whatever which have hardly begun and have yet to take place. Going nowhere, the event covers everywhere. It is the fulness of being which slips instantaneously into becoming but compromisingly lets its 'cover' slip, thereby exposing itself and losing its camouflage to a luminous glare. "Marienbad" manages to capture the event in its evanescence but also in its catalytic mystery. This is disappearance in death, not in a Freudian sense of finality and undifferentiated identity, but rather in terms 'once more' of the eternal return. For Freud, there is a regression to return to the inanimate state of matter, a need to repeat, to return to undifferentiation which nature has forced mankind to abandon. The death drive is to get back to retrogressive stasis. With Deleuze, however, what returns is infinite multiplicity, future unfolding, and power of metamorphosis or a death which, though grounded in the 'I', bears no relation to 'I'. Every
event is like death, double and impersonal in its double. There is an affirmation of the future in that to will the event is to will non-fixity and non-actualisation. In "Marienbad" we see visualised conundrums which point to the eternal return as the time of the event and to the impossibility of transparent truth, completion or finality. Rather, a finality that is endlessly becoming.

This eternal return is put into relief by the proliferation of games in "Marienbad". Gambling, matchstick games, parlour games and a transcendent 'cerebral game' that is the artwork itself. The game of Nim in the film is a game 'M' always wins and 'X' loses, but this is a conceit adapted by Robbe-Grillet. The point of the game is defeated and 'X' cannot move on since the game is controlled and he remains locked into the memory of the past and the loss (irretrievably) of 'A'. The spatial game is that we lose ourselves in a well-mapped labyrinth. We seem to find the exit but details of the scene have been changed and within this re-mapping we once again get lost.

Temporally the game and the film is of chance and return. On one level an entrapment, on another a freedom, "the game is emblematic of the whole film and its central situation...as if suggesting that in the world of "Marienbad" life is a game involving control, risk..."34 The cerebral game is concrete because we see it projected through action. Yet, with enough perspectives, a mosaic forms which elevates vision to something-other, another dimension, a time-image mechanically constructed yet humanly understood. The stages of the cerebral game are the stages of film consciousness unfolding, striving towards an improbable self-consciousness.

Appendix

References

3 Tomasulo, Marienbad, pp. 62-63.
4 Ibid., p. 59.
5 Ibid., p. 60.
6 Rodowick, Time Machine, p. 102.
7 Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 69.
8 Deleuze, Foucault, p. 118.
10 Tomasulo, Marienbad, p. 59.
11 Ibid.
12 Houston & Kinder, Self and Cinema, p. 248.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., p. 41.
17 Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 121.
18 Tomasulo, Marienbad, p. 69.
21 Ibid., p. 105.
23 Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 103.
24 Ibid.
26 Ibid., pp. 252-53.
28 Robbe-Grillet, New Novel, p. 70.
29 Ibid., p. 138.
30 Houston & Kinder, Self and Cinema, p. 259.
31 Tomasulo, Marienbad, p. 64, quoted from Alain Robbe-Grillet, Last Year at Marienbad, (Grove Press, 1962)
32 Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 100.
34 Houston & Kinder, Self and Cinema, p. 252.
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