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An Ethics of the Pre-individual

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Continental Philosophy

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Deleuze opposes ethics to Morality. He claims that an ethics develops immanent criteria to evaluate modes of existence, while a Morality imposes transcendent principles. This thesis explores the question of ethics, and I investigate the possibilities of an ethics of the pre-individual. Consequently, this enterprise involves the development of an alternative ontology of becoming corresponding to a philosophy of difference. By taking this trajectory, I seek to show that an anti-human humanism is possible and demonstrate how this might work.

Deleuze and Guattari always emphasise the practical and concrete nature of philosophy; therefore, in order to situate their concepts I begin the thesis with an examination of different theoretical approaches to the question of difference. However, I suggest that difference and heterogeneity cannot be simply affirmed in and of themselves since new forms of domination also affirm difference. My next chapter follows up on this idea by interrogating the allegation that philosophies of difference have made a political covenant with global capitalism. I draw on a distinction between power (potentia) and Power (Potestas) in order to explain how different modes of social organisation and domination can minimise the creative and transformational capacities of humans. By analysing a number of theoretical accounts of capitalism I demonstrate how and why it differs from other social formations. Nonetheless, I conclude that philosophy can indeed be distinguished from capitalism. Philosophy, as the art of inventing concepts, develops the conditions for real experimentation and new ways of thinking and being and existing.

By turning to Spinoza's Ethics I propose that by thinking about the human differentially, as a part of nature, we can develop an immanent ethics. I explain how Spinoza's ontology operates especially in terms of its renovated conception of the human. In generating an ontology that is not centred on the individuated individual but grasps instead the individual as both relational and a degree of power, the pre-individual and transindividual dimensions of the human are emphasised and she is opened up to her non-human becomings.

Simondon's account of metastable being explores this in greater detail. He argues that we have tended to extrapolate from the individuated individual in order to try to understand its conditions of existence. Alternatively, we have relied upon a principle of individuation that pre-exists the process of individuation. By intertwining his focus on the process of individuation with his idea that being is more than unity, more than identity and fundamentally incompatible with itself, I present Simondon's account of an ontology of becoming and his correlative conception of a pre-individual field. Residing at the core of his endeavour is a theory of difference and disparateness that understands identity to be emergent, partial, relative and derivative.

Simondon's emphasis on disparateness recurs in Deleuze's work Difference and Repetition. I mobilise this idea in order to distinguish between a created possible and a realisable possible, and to elucidate the ethico-political implications of this distinction. The concept of the 'image of thought' that rests on a series of non-philosophical pre-suppositions helps us to critique dominant modes of thinking and acting. In addition to critique, I seek to construct other ways of thinking and existing. Once again I focus upon the pre-individual and transindividual dimensions of the human when in my concluding chapter I map the different conceptions of ethics and subjectivity that emerge once we transform our understanding of ontology. An ethics of the pre-individual relies on immanent criteria for evaluating modes of existence, does not fetishise the human, and ultimately constructs the possibility of things being otherwise.
Introduction
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i. disequilibrium

The process of hominisation "takes" in us, the way a crystal undergoes a phase change and solidifies: does becoming human consist of forever unbinding so as to be elsewhere and otherwise?


We need to have a contract with the world. The incessant pollution, technological mastery, and expropriation of the resources of the earth have left a void that responsibility must fill. Such is Michel Serres' diagnosis. We need a natural contract of symbiosis and reciprocity, rather than continuing to exist parasitically; vampires upon the earth. "In fact, the Earth speaks to us in terms of forces, bonds and interactions, and that's enough to make a contract" (Serres, 1992: 39).

Economists create their models to assess resource management using models of timeless, competitive equilibrium, and forget to factor in the indeterminacy of the future (Ormerod, 1994: 75-6). They conclude all is fine with the world. Three-quarters of humanity hovers on the verge of starvation; the rest hover on the verge of humanity.1 An atmosphere of cynicism that is an 'enlightened false consciousness' (Sloterdijk, 1987: 5) pervades the domains of those who need to alter their behaviours and values. A stranglehold of exploitation shackles the rest. The system may teeter on faulty foundations but no-one will rock the boat. Serres thinks that perhaps more than even a morality, this calls for a religion to attach (refigare) us to this world, so radical and tumultuous is the necessity for the fabrication of a new series of relations with all beings, animate and inert, microcosmic and cosmic. In essence, we need a global philosophy to face global

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1 "Like the tail of a comet, throwbacks or continuations of an ancient objective necessity still linger - misery, hunger, and diseases, both new and residual, ravaging the third and fourth worlds, growing exponentially. And those who should be held accountable - those living in the brilliant head of the comet, leaving this abject misery in their wake and multiplying it - are the very ones (and I am one of them) who seek this wisdom. This is a second responsibility, a new obligation, more conditions issuing from the results of our actions - the latest blow to the collective narcissism of the wealthy nations" (Serres, 1990: 176).
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dangers.

Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, humankind has known that it holds the power to destroy itself. From that time, science has dominated other spheres of knowledge. But science knows too little of culture. Philosophy, for Serres, is a constructive enterprise; by inventing the conditions of invention (Serres and Latour, 1990: 86), it asks questions about everything. However, he is concerned that we are hurtling toward an era which is centred increasingly on domination and mastery which we ourselves cannot master.

Imperialistic thinking imposes a single method upon any problem. By employing a meta-language, it does not try to approach local and singular problems with methods that are re-cast each time. That would be an exercise in composition that gets close to the singularities that are its material. For Serres, substantives and the verb to be violently impose their presence with regularity, erasing these singularities. Their constant recurrence in different texts horrifies him. “Sterile, facile. There is nothing new under such a sun. In such a way the atomic bomb vitrifies the plain over which it explodes” (93). Diverse and multiple rolling hills appeal to him; that is pluralism (93).

A vectorial operation of thinking that does not seek to dissolve but to create relations or rapports is what Serres proposes. It seizes and sustains movement. A verb or substantive (substance) cannot effect or describe such processes of becoming, he claims, so another understanding of relations is called for. Invoking the image of a glacial river’s percolating basin, brimming with relations and networks that fluctuate and freeze, he suggests that this turbulence and fluctuation interspersed with crystallisation and the carving of corridors or passages is a more adequate manner of thinking these difficult ideas (105). Phronesis, praxis and metis, the ancient Greek combinations of improvisational action and cunning, foreshadow his example of the maritime map where every route must be invented while an absolute fragility and vulnerability traverses this space of risk.
As we know, his method of abstracting no longer relies on the substantivC or verb, such as freedom and being (104). Instead it begins with the relation, a relation in movement, like a vector or a diagonal, that is not captured at any point. Likewise, the billowing and metastability of the flame evades capture and ‘existence’ by always remaining far from equilibrium (105). A pre-position (‘toward’, ‘between’ or ‘with’, for example) resists capture, gliding, dancing and tracing relations in flux rather than fixing them. Instead of solid perception these notions operate in a realm of liquid or gaseous perception. Solidity emerges from a temporary coagulation or viscosity in this play of relations.

Bergson and Lucretius catapulted us into movement and turbulence. Different relations criss-cross, surge forth, become possible and fade away. Time throws everything out of equilibrium. We thus avoid the imposition of spatiality that a phrase like ‘network’ carries with it. “Relations spawn objects, beings and acts, not vice versa. So - stand up, run, jump, move, dance! Like the body, the mind needs movement, especially subtle and complex movement” (107).

Concepts are often used to totalise, demarcate, and obfuscate, argues Serres. He worries about philosophers taking on the role of public prosecutor, criticising, judging, tripping up and catching out. This kind of enclosure of concepts has a particular relation with law and geometry since it presupposes the permanence and stability of an outline and a fixity of values in the ascribed attributes and properties. Serres wants to create concepts in fuzziness and fluctuation. This makes them anexact but they remain rigorous. At stake is the invention of a transcendental space which opens up the conditions for possible inventions of the future (117). We are then equipped, as Serres says, to cast off.

Michel Serres expresses with evocative poetic (and scientific) imagery a number of the themes that are key to the chapters that follow. Not only does he transmit the movements of a philosophy of becoming, as opposed to a metaphysics of solids, but he demonstrates a thought of external relations that, as William James
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(1912) emphasises, remain irreducible to their terms. Serres' work differs greatly from what follows in this thesis, but as a 'shortcut', it communicates affectively some of the concepts that we will explore. His resolute status as bricoleur, gathering diverse materials to assemble and invent concepts, displays an irreverence found in Deleuze's and Guattari's works. His wandering relations and vagabond essences have echoes of Spinoza.

ii. technophobia and nature

Without history, becoming would remain indeterminate and unconditioned, but becoming is not historical.


What is it to be human in this world? Is there an ineffable essence of the human, or a human nature? Can we look to geneticists, behaviourists, psychologists for a set of human characteristics? How do abstract human rights affect concrete human existence? Can we construct an ethics without a theory of the essence of human nature? We will not forget the human; humans are at once the things most useful and most harmful to one another, as Spinoza once said. But employing an abstract category of the 'human' is a fetish and tells us very little about the possibilities of the human. Is it possible to pull the human from its anthropomorphic pedestal to return it to its place as homo naturae? This is the challenge that is set before us. Only now it has an urgency that is unsurpassed; one that Spinoza could not have imagined.

We will seek to situate the human within complex settings of relations, examining the different processes of subjectification that shape the image of what humans think they (and others) are. We will talk of a variety of ways in which humans articulate questions of difference and diversity, arguing in turn that we need to

1 In this thesis I do not examine alternative theories of the subject. Subjectivity, for Guattari, entails a process that is ontologically prior to the subject and object and is not confined within the boundaries of the subject. It is closer to Simondon's accounts of processes of individuation. This will be made clear in my conclusion.
think *before* and *beyond* the human condition in order to understand the emergence, and the potentials, of humans. Rather than delimiting a frame that would capture the essence of the human, we will develop a theory of affectivity and an ethics of singularities that displace the centrality and unity of the human by showing how this is the *effect* of a power take-over.

Nature and artifice together name the process of production of the real. A narcissistic and anthropocentric separation of humanity from nature will no longer hold water, and appeals to the sanctity and uniqueness of *human* consciousness will be challenged. Samuel Butler remarks,

>'Plants [...] show no sign of interesting themselves in human affairs. We shall never get a rose to understand that five times seven are thirty-five, and there is no use talking to an oak about fluctuations in the price of stocks. Hence we say that the oak and the rose are unintelligent, and on finding they do not understand our business conclude that they do not understand their own. But what can a creature who talks in this way know about intelligence? Which shows greater signs of intelligence? He, or the rose and oak?'


Although contemplations upon consciousness will be largely implicit in this thesis, Butler's hilariously controversial passage helps us to re-consider the presuppositions we bring to any examination of the question of subjectivity. Significantly his 'Book of the Machines' announces that Man is a machinate mammal, scattering his limbs on the earth, some near and some far away (160). Technology is not a tool but part of a machine (or assemblage) that modifies the human (which is another element of this assemblage). His witty and remarkable descriptions of prosthetic devices herald the birth of the cyborg and are suggestive of many contemporary approaches to Artificial Intelligence. He notes that as one grows older one utilises lots of 'extra-corporeal members', placing one's memory in a pocket-book and brandishing 'see-engines' (160).

With Butler, *subjectivity* undergoes a radical twist. His writings generate a strange

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1 See related to this, Deleuze and Guattari (1972a: 26-7).
idea of subjectivity and the human that no longer focuses steadfastly on inter-
human relations. Instead, we need to come up with other ideas of the human that
no longer prioritise the integrity and self-identity of the organism to the exclusion
of all else. Deleuze says in his seminars that he and Guattari never imagined that
the organism would become defunct. The point is to consider both the varied and
complex conditions that constitute certain patternings and sedimentations of
relations, and to create other forms of relationality. They reiterate that we are all
groupuscules, we are all multiplicities. Humans must no longer believe themselves to
be cut off from the world, transcendent and isolated. A new ethics must rest
upon an anti-human humanism.

iii. thinking otherwise than being

This non-human pre-personal part of subjectivity is crucial since it is from this
that its heterogenesis can develop. It would be to misjudge Deleuze and
Foucault - who emphasised the non-human part of subjectivity - to suspect
them of taking anti-humanist positions!


One always has to make a strategic decision when writing about Deleuze; his
philosophical repertoire is vast. The rhizomorphic nature of his philosophising
makes it easy to lose one's focus chasing the trails of his concepts through the
labyrinthine wanderings of both his own work, and those texts written with
Guattari. By trying to cover everything, one can end up saying very little. Deleuze
and Guattari aim to develop a practical philosophy. They think that philosophy is
the art of inventing concepts. In the spirit of their enterprise, I seek to stage
productive encounters between a number of their concepts and those of
Simondon and Spinoza; Deleuze and Guattari call this process one of
'rhizomatising' concepts, bringing different concepts together in unexpected
ways. My ultimate aim is to show how an immanent ethics of the pre-individual
might operate, and why it is necessary to think of ethics in this way. I readily
admit that other trajectories might have been taken to develop these ideas, such as
through Leibniz. Trying to negotiate between critical commentary and
constructive concrete philosophy is a precipitous path to follow, fraught with risk.

Critical commentaries have focused on Deleuze's work on Nietzsche, on the idea of a minor literature, on the concept of 'becoming-woman', and a renaissance of Bergson has also been precipitated, in part, through Deleuze's readings of Bergson. However, Deleuze's relation to the Spinoza/Simondon axis remains a severely neglected area of study (as does Simondon's own work). In fact, Deleuze’s reading of Simondon only warrants a few scattered pages in the entire secondary literature in both English and French. It is for this reason that I have concentrated on these thinkers. This focus makes this thesis a novel and original one.

The theme of the pre-individual is central to the philosophies of Deleuze, Guattari, Simondon and Spinoza. I show why addressing this theme constitutes an important critical and constructive endeavour. The idea of an ethics of the pre-individual is closely interwoven with Deleuze’s own philosophy of difference. Therefore, I begin my first chapter by discussing some contemporary approaches to the problem of difference. However, the capitalist embrace of difference and diversity highlights the fact that difference cannot be positivised in and of itself. Understanding the relation of capitalism and philosophy has to be of vital importance for anyone trying to provide a concrete philosophical account of ethics. I continue to examine this theme throughout the thesis, while providing a positive account of an immanent ethics of the pre-individual through the work of Spinoza and Simondon.

By critiquing the assumed centrality of the individuated individual that pervades many philosophical accounts, I seek to displace a conception of the human as 'an empire within an empire'. The concept of the pre-individual not only helps us to understand the embedded relationality of the individual, but also provides a systematic and rigorous account of a philosophy of becoming. The critical and transformational dimension of this ethics of the pre-individual is demonstrated in chapter 5 on the 'Image of Thought' as I explore the ideas of the 'disparate'
and the 'created possible'. If we presuppose an identity, rather than understanding it as emergent and contested, we set up what Deleuze and Guattari call an exclusive disjunction; an identity locked in on itself. An individual is never closed on itself. Its pre-individual and transindividual dimensions constitute key dimensions of its reality, opening it to diverse registers of alterity, allowing it to affirm dissensus.

"We cannot conceive of a collective recomposition of the socius, correlative to a resingularisation of subjectivity, without a new way of conceiving political and economic democracies that respect cultural differences - without multiple molecular revolutions" (Guattari, 1992a. 20-21). In certain respects Deleuze and Guattari's project reactivates Marxist problematics, especially in the context of their critique of capitalism. However, they challenge a conception of the human as 'Master of the Universe', proposing instead that the human is a part of nature. They explore the non-human becomings of the human that constitute its potential for transformation. The human is not presupposed in their accounts.

Marcuse's 'One-Dimensional Man' was symptomatic of the impasse that the Frankfurt School arrived at. Its futile turn to aesthetics in order to disrupt the capitalist movement of generalised equivalence was a forced gesture. It became difficult to see how a qualitative transformation of modes of existence might be effected. Like the Frankfurt School, Deleuze and Guattari develop an ethico-aesthetic paradigm that focuses on immanent processes of creation; however, their system is always at odds with itself, metastable, disparate and brimming with potentials. The ethical task is to produce disparities - inclusive disjunctions - that open up transversal connections. "There is no return to nature, but only a political problem of the collective soul, the connections of which a society is

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4 At those times that I use the term 'man' and 'he' to stand in for all humans in this thesis it is because I am paraphrasing the words of other philosophers. Although a critique of the ethnocentric and sexist assumptions of different authors is necessary, this would constitute a thesis in itself. I have decided to see how their concepts can be activated in the service of both critical and transformational strategies, rather than revealing their own shortcomings. This is, of course, a shortcoming in my own work, however, in order to illustrate the necessity of an ethics of the pre-individual in detail, it was a decision I was forced to make.
capable, the flows it supports, invents, leaves alone, or does away with” (Deleuze, 1993a: 52). I will continue to explore these ideas throughout the rest of this introduction.

From his earliest works, Deleuze was keen to construct a philosophy purged of transcendence. Arguing from a Spinozistic perspective, he indicates that only a philosophy of immanence can serve to put ethics on a new footing, but this requires another way of thinking about the subject, or more specifically about processes of subjectification. The reason this seems necessary to him is because of the sad passions and resentment induced by forms of social organisation and existence which serve to stifle a “logic of multiple affirmation and therefore a logic of pure affirmation and a corresponding ethic of joy” (1962: 17).

This thesis explores the difficulties engendered by this philosophy of immanence. Deleuze and Guattari have been accused of philosophical idealism and it is easy to see why this might be the case. Their philosophy rhapsodises about nomads, becoming, singularities, forces, abstract machines, haecceities; a vast array of philosophical fabulations. It also seems to operate at a level and in a domain very far removed from people’s everyday experiences and common-sense understandings of themselves. It is sometimes as though the actuality of the world has been dissolved in favour of endless fluxes, flows and forces. The solidity of the subject and the framework of a system of morality vanish vanquished, and all we are apparently left with is a play of forces and discourses. Ethics consequently appears impossible. Such readings fail to grasp the radicality of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s understanding of ethics and subjectivity. I will show the critical, concrete and constructivist nature of their philosophy in chapter 5.

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6 These kinds of readings are so wide-ranging it is impossible to indicate all the authors. They range from introductory texts on so-called ‘post-modernism’ to Judith Butler (1987: 205-217) to anything written by Terry Eagleton. This kind of interpretation appears to emerge from a particular reading of ‘desire’ in Anti-Oedipus as erotic, hedonistic, spontaneistic and primordial.
7 I do not include Keith Ansell Pearson’s and François Laruelle’s assiduous critiques in this category.
Like Serres, Deleuze strives to oust the dominance of the verb 'to be'. He thinks philosophy has remained rooted in the problem of being - IS - and wants to reflect on conjunctions and relations (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977: 56-7). By supplanting 'to be' with an ontology of becoming, alternative logics and physics of bodies and relations become possible. This philosophy, like that of Serres, is a logic of multiplicities (Deleuze 1990a: 147; Deleuze and Parnet, 1977: viii). This logic of multiplicities does not rest on a formula, or set of principles; it is not reductionist. It does not try to dissolve heterogeneity but operates through symbiosis or sympathy. Its syntheses are not unified: they gather clusters of differenciated\(^8\) relations.

This is not a philosophy of fragmentation but of fragility. Serres claims that the mechanics of materials teach us that a philosophy of fragments would be conservative (1990: 120). By shattering an object into tiny fragments you create tiny localities that are incredibly resistant. “So a philosophy of fragments is hyperdefensive; it is the result of hypercriticism, of polemics, of battle, of hatred” (120). Some of the philosophers we will draw upon have been accused of this hyper-fragmentation; a fragmentation that shatters the subject so much that ethics becomes impossible.

On the contrary I want to emphasise that terms like ‘partial objects’ do not imply division or fragmentation. Instead they develop ways of thinking about how new connections and relations can be fostered and new syntheses and symbioses emerge. A hyper-differenciation that encourages the proliferation of different groups, each appealing to an essentialist and eternal identity, will not create new connections and modes of being. A capitalist appropriation of diversity seeks to contain those differences within relative limits, valorising them in accordance with its only universal: money. We will discover how these ideas work throughout the rest of this thesis, demonstrating how they can provide a different way of thinking about ethics.

\(^8\) Deleuze’s concept of different ciation is explained on p144 of my thesis.
Deleuze's philosophy of difference rests, according to François Laruelle, upon a thought of the inclusive disjunction - the relation of the non-relation (1986: 33). This inclusive disjunction is at the core of Deleuze's claims to be at once a philosopher of immanence, a thinker of univocity, and a pluralist, empiricist and advocate of polyphony and dissensus. One of the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari express this is through the concept of the assemblage.

Sometimes this concept is interpreted as a temporary and static clustering of heterogeneous elements. It may be that Brian Massumi's (1987) translation of *agencement* as 'assemblage' has meant the dynamism and activity of this term has lost its impetus in English. It is for this reason important to emphasise that the concept of assemblage entails a way of thinking about an active relationality that is not simply the affirmation of an aggregate of distinct terms. Instead terms can only be understood in the context of how they *work*, what they *do*, in a given assemblage. This becomes especially clear in the chapter on Spinoza. The ethical problem of dual use technology has always emphasised the importance of the assemblage that the technology is to be a part of. In other words, things have to be understood in their *milieu* rather than in abstraction. And the addition of another element may entirely transform the nature of the assemblage.

To state what a 'thing' *is* is to speak of it in abstraction, as though it existed isolated, immutable and self-identical. A set of properties is thus ascribed, and possibilities of existence and transformation are delimited and ordered. Furthermore, the genesis of its being, as well as the historical and social formations and geological sedimentations of power that mould it, are ignored. (Foucault taught us that power is diffuse and operates in networks of relations of forces.)

Deleuze denounces Hegel for ridiculing pluralism as a naive consciousness saying 'this, that, here, now' (1962: 4). Every 'thing' has multiple senses depending on what relations it is caught up in and the affiliations or destructions that these
relations bring. Every ‘thing’ is a multiplicity. I explore this thought of multiplicity, a thought that is, unsurprisingly, irreducibly complex. I want to see what the implications of such a thought are for ethics and for subjectivity. The concepts I draw on are a function of this problematic.

Consequently the conjunction AND plays a key role in the theory of assemblages, just as the prefix ‘pre-’ provides us with a way of thinking about the non-human dimensions of humanity. It does this by decentering the human from the heart of its investigations, by no longer presupposing the human as the origin or telos of these investigations, in order to think all the better the potentials of humans.

A logic of multiplicities displaces the centrality and primacy of individual terms in order to grasp the reality of relations, a reality that is no longer a posteriori. It is grounded in the thought of a multiplicity in which the multiple is no longer an adjective but a substantive. With this concept of multiplicity the One is no longer opposed to the Multiple, but multiple terms enter into a symbiotic relation that resists unification or the imposition of identity (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972a: 42). By focusing on this logic of multiplicities we can explore many of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts ranging from the concept of ‘difference-in-itself’ to those of the ‘virtual’ and the ‘assemblage’. This logic of multiplicities critiques the image that thought gives to itself of what it is to think; it constructs a thought without image.

iv. activating concepts: philosophy and resistance

Thinking is always experiencing, experimenting, not interpreting but experimenting and what we experience, experiment with, is always actuality, what’s coming into being, what’s new, what’s taking shape [...] Without history the experiments would remain indeterminate [...].

Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations (1990a: 106).

Donna Haraway says that “A commitment to mobile positioning and to
passionate detachment is dependent on the impossibility of innocent ‘identity’ politics and epistemologies as strategies for seeing from the standpoints of the subjugated in order to see well” (1991: 192). This shift in perspective is evident in Deleuze’s work. He admits in his televised interviews with Claire Parnet (1994-5) that all his works have tried to discover the nature of the event, since such a concept could undermine the domination of the verb ‘to be’. I have indicated the ethico-political implications of such a move throughout this introduction. Haraway warns us that to see from below is a problem; it is not an innocent position, even though ‘subjugated’ standpoints are to be preferred (191). Even an attempt to ‘see well’ still blinds Deleuze to his own ideological position as a “first-world intellectual masquerading as the absent nonrepresenter who lets the oppressed speak for themselves”, according to Gayatri Spivak (1988: 292).

Spivak’s hostile reading of Deleuze (and Foucault) presents them as thinkers who consistently ignore both “the epistemic violence of imperialism and the international division of labour” (289). She accuses them of constructing a homogeneous Other (of third-worldism) (288-9). Because these philosophers have no truck with the concept of ideology, she feels they do not consider the relation of desire, power, subjectivity and cannot therefore articulate a theory of interests (273).

She is, of course, correct to note that Deleuze and Guattari eschew the concept of ideology (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972a: 104). They argue that when the masses act against their own interests, it is not because they are subject to an illusion but concerns rather the unconscious investments they make from the position of desire. This is not the same as speaking of a subject who desires. Their renovated relation of desire, power, subjectivity and interests operates differently to theories of ideology. It does not presuppose the identities it speaks of, but examines the conditions for the emergence of certain collective investments of desire (for example the case of fascism, which cannot be simply explained by an appeal to ideology).
Like Spinoza, they simultaneously affirm that given the series of causes that have produced any given reality it is as perfect as it can be - even if that means populations are at the lowest ebb of their activity - and strive to transform that reality through an ethics of liberation. These positions are not contradictory but rest on a Bergsonian critique of the retrospective illusion of the 'possible' (Bergson, 1889). The realisable possible extrapolates the future from a present condition. The future then seems to pre-exist as a ready-made solution to a given problem. Deleuze introduces the concept of the 'virtual' to avoid the mechanism of resemblance that we perceive in the 'possible-real' relation. The virtual is opposed to the actual but is absolutely real. In this context, the virtual operates as the real condition for the creation of new modes of existence as a created possible. These do not pre-exist their actualisation in the guise of models or plans. Their resistance to the notion of ideology stems from their idea of the virtual as a created possible as it is conjoined with the conception of pluralism and logic of multiplicities that we discussed earlier.

Creating is a form of resisting, claim Deleuze and Guattari. Their clusters and networks of concepts challenge the dominant orders of thinking. They oppose a rhizomatic thought to an arborescent thought which is hierarchical and representational. A rhizome operates in the fashion of a network without any unifying point or organisational principle. Its raison d'être is to seek connections, and to be qualitatively transformed once certain immanent thresholds have been reached. This is life as experimentation.

The arborescent image of thought (Deleuze, 1968a: 129-167) not only has a philosophical importance but describes a principle of organisation; what terms, concepts or values are privileged, what is excluded? A thought that rests upon universals and assimilates differences, reducing them to its categories, cannot grasp singularities. Everything has already been set out in advance. All that "belongs to a thought without image - nomadism, the war-machine, becomings, nuptials against nature, capture and thefts, interregnums, minor languages or stammering of language, etc. - is crushed and denounced as a nuisance" (Deleuze
and Parnet, 1977: 14). The art of creating taxonomies and classifications will not shudder to an early end if principles of universality are not made to bear down upon them, but will operate differently, finding new relations of non-subsumptive commonality.

Spinoza explains with joy the importance of composing different relations and finding the relations and activities that suit you, as well as the ways that these are expressed. His understanding of a philosophy (and ethics) of immanence as one of force (puissance/potentia) and not of properties or propositions is absolutely crucial to Deleuze's argument that Being is univocal. It also helps us to further our understanding of a logic of multiplicities. Deleuze says, "Human forces (having an understanding, a will, an imagination, and so on) have to combine with other forces: an overall form arises from this combination, but everything depends on the nature of the other forces with which the human forces become linked" (1990a: 117).

Deleuze and Guattari invent new ways of understanding processes of subjectification and singularisation. In tandem with this is the blossoming of another kind of ethics. Throughout their works they draw upon the conception of a pre-individual, pre-personal field of singularities in order to grasp a dimension of being (becoming) that is no longer individual nor personal nor universal. This is important not just to trace the genesis of the individual, a movement that has the individuated being as its telos, but to comprehend the domain of transformation that cannot be designated in energetico-spatio-temporal terms. This domain does not fulfil the criterion of being a condition of possibility for experience, but offers the conditions for the invention of the new. This transformation of the way that we think about the individual feeds into our understanding of the subject, thought and being. The kind of 'subject' that Deleuze and Guattari talk about (on the occasions they use the word) concerns processes of subjectification and singularisation that are no longer personal. Reality is dynamic, processual and creative and they create mobile concepts in accordance with this.
v. singular transformations

A singularity is a threshold point, the moment where everything is transformed. These transformations make a history but the event is the imperceptible and critical point of transformation. Deleuze quotes Péguy,

Events have critical points just as temperature has critical points - points of fusion, congelation, boiling, condensation, coagulation and crystallization. And even within the event there are states of surfeit which are precipitated, crystallized, and determined only by the introduction of a fragment of a future event.


I want to concentrate on the incorporeal, transformational and critical aspect of an event in this thesis. This is not to denigrate or dismiss history (and memory) as unimportant. This would be ludicrous (and unliveable). If to create is to resist, as Deleuze and Guattari assert, it is to create from a situation with a set of materials and limitations. They talk at length about ‘assemblages’ and ‘machines’ (the Feudal machine, the Capitalist machine...) that produce different kinds of subjectivity, power formations, modes of existence and relationality. “If you tie someone up and say to him ‘Express yourself, friend’, the most he will be able to say is that he doesn’t want to be tied up” (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977: 96). In essence, they want to tap into, and create, other ways of being and capacities of expression.

A singularity is a bifurcation point. Things are no longer as they used to be... Our language is filled with expressions speaking of these states - ‘I’m cracking up’... ‘It

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9 Deleuze writes a great deal on memory. His book Bergsonism (1966a) explored this theme in depth. His chapter on ‘Repetition’ in Difference and Repetition (1968a) explores different kinds of time and memory (and the constitution of different selves) from the passive contractile habits of the present, to the virtual memory of Bergson that makes time pass, and the Nietzschean eternal return that is a repetition of the future. In Cinema I: The Movement-Image (1983) he draws upon this Bergsonian image of the virtual whole and describes an ontological conception of memory. In Anti-Oedipus (1972a) with Guattari, he mobilises Nietzsche’s theatre of cruelty to discuss a memory embedded in the flesh that marks a collective memorisation.
has reached breaking point... 'under pressure'... 'enough is enough'. These phrases express an intolerable situation, the point where something has to give. This may take place on the grand-scale - imagine a society arrives at such a supersaturated state that a minor incident triggers a revolution (or a war). The aftermath of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a nineteen year old student illustrates this. Rigidified and routinised existence can also be utterly transformed by the addition of a new, apparently banal element to one's existence. Suddenly everything changes and possible worlds are actualised.10

Guattari spent a great deal of time figuring this out when working with schizophrenics in La Borde clinic.11 If creation is resistance, it attempts to transform concrete conditions and to create a space for other modes of valorisation and existence. If a rhizome is an anti-memory it is because it escapes dominant modes of identification and invents new connections and relations.12

vi. the engendering of the virtual

Deleuze explains how this strange ontology that we have been exploring might function by developing a difficult but revelatory theory of difference in *Difference and Repetition* (1968a). From his 1956 essay on ‘Bergson’s Conception of Difference’ Deleuze had tried to show the necessity for developing a concept of ‘difference-in-itself’. I will argue in chapter 5 that there is not just a philosophical motivation for this exercise but an ethico-political one.13

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10 This idea has resonances with contemporary researches into chaos theory that speak of the famed ‘butterfly effect’. See also Prigogine and Stengers, (1988). *Entre le temps et l’éternité*. Librairie Arthème Fayard.
11 Guattari worked at La Borde clinic with Jean Oury and François Tosquelles (who himself worked with Frantz Fanon for a long time).
12 See Keith Ansell Pearson (1999: 223-4) on history and politics in relation to the event.
13 Like Paul Gilroy, I try to hold together ethics and politics in order to set out a practical philosophy. He argues that we need to get beyond nationalism in order to reevaluate the significance of the modern nation state, and to examine closely political and economic relations in the context of the relationship of the politics of information and the practices of capitalist accumulation. He goes on to say “Its effects underpin more recognisably political changes like the growing centrality of transnational ecological movements which, through their insistence on the association of sustainability and justice, do so much to shift the moral and scientific precepts on which the modern separation of politics and ethics was built” (1993: 7). See also Paul Patton (2000) and Ian McKenzie (1997) for some ideas of how
Deleuze was fascinated with the concept of ‘becoming’. He revelled in the way that this notion eluded all Plato’s attempts to capture and contain it - Alice getting bigger (than she was) and smaller (than she will be) simultaneously. The slippery nature of such an idea resounds with the notions of intensity and singularity that we will examine in detail in chapter 4. A temperature, redness, a wind, to run, a laugh... all of these transmit his idea of becoming and intensity because they cannot be captured, identified and delimited. They are pre-personal and pre-individual.

We saw earlier the importance of symbiotic relations in Deleuze’s and Guattari’s thought. The concept of symbiosis is connected to the idea of a becoming because it gives reality to the relation between two terms in a way that does not make it simply an effect of the encounter of those terms. In that encounter there is a qualitative transformation. Butler showed us how humans are modified by their prostheses. We will see how this kind of idea relates to concepts of becoming and intensity in chapter 6.

Deleuze mobilises and ‘synaesthesises’ all of these ideas in order to articulate his conception of a pre-individual transcendental field in ‘Immanence: A Life...’ (1995). Here, he demonstrates clearly that this idea of transcendental philosophy does not signify a quest to map the conditions of possibility of experience, but is concerned with the conditions for the production of reality and the invention of the new. In this vein of thought, he remarked of the will to power that, if it constitutes a superior empiricism, this is because it is an essentially plastic principle that is no wider than what it conditions, that changes itself with the conditioned and determines itself in each case along with what it determines. The will to power is, indeed, never separable from particular determined forces, from their quantities, qualities and directions.


Deleuze’s and Guattari’s concepts might impact upon political theory and the field of political philosophy.
Earlier we looked briefly at the concept of the virtual in relation to the conditions for the production of the new. When we come to speak further of the role of the virtual in this philosophy in relation to a ‘transcendental empiricism’, the circuitous nature of a kind of ‘autocatalytic’ feedback between it and the actual must be borne in mind. There are many virtuals operating in Deleuze’s philosophy but I want to suggest a couple of points of commonality between them. The virtual never operates in a transcendent manner; it always names a space of potential or transformation, whether it be the diagonal Ariadnean thread that makes the Whole open in *Cinema 1: The Movement Image* (1983), the field of potential of *Difference and Repetition* (1968a) or the event of *What is Philosophy?* (1991a). The aspects of the virtual that I want to concentrate upon relate to my concern to show how Deleuze’s and Guattari’s philosophies of immanence work.

The virtual/actual relation so key to *Difference and Repetition* does not, as Alain Badiou (1997) would have us believe, imply a Platonism of the virtual. Instead it forces us to think of the possibilities that can be unleashed within a system, the subjective and affective relations that emerge once we rupture a dominant image of thought that subsumes difference under, or conjoins it to, identity. In effect, it exhorts us to move from a ‘common-sense’ understanding of reality, that thinks in accordance with a representational model of thought and operates in accordance with a principle of recognition, to the thought of a pre-individual field. This opens up a space for a politics of transfiguration, and an ethics premised upon immanent criteria that can invent new modes of existence.

**vii. the pre-individual as state of excess**

Gilbert Simondon haunts all of Deleuze’s work right until his final article ‘Immanence: a Life...’. His understanding of *processes* of individuation rests on the...

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14 See Keith Ansell-Pearson (forthcoming) for meditations on this theme.
15 Neither does it correspond directly with a sensible/intelligible dichotomy.
16 Gilroy (1993a: 37) takes this term from Seyla Benhabib as he asks how utopias are conceived.
initial articulation of a transcendental field harbouring pre-individual singularities. Writing just after the publication of Prigogine's groundbreaking work on dissipative systems, he is attuned to many of Prigogine's ideas. He blended physics, biology, chemistry, sociology, technology and philosophy into a fantastic concoction. This absolutely captivated Deleuze, and Simondon's theoretical apparatus would be key to Deleuze's enterprise of constructing a transcendental empiricism refreshingly and resolutely bereft of appeals to any transcendent realm.

Simondon claimed that by solely focusing on the individual or group we linger on the verges of an impoverished reality. With this observation he strikes close to the heart of Deleuze's and Guattari's philosophical adventures. He explains that we need to understand the processes of individuation and we will fail to do so if we try to explain the genesis and becoming of the individual by extrapolating from traits or characteristics of the already individuated being, or by appealing to principles of individuation such as hylomorphism or atomism. He introduces the concept of the pre-individual field in order to describe a 'zone' that cannot be explained by appeals to categories premised upon a pre-existing subject or object.

This understanding of pre-individual singularities, married with the differential ontology proposed by Deleuze and Guattari, reveals to us how these ideas are fundamental to re-thinking subjectivity and ethics. Indeed Etienne Balibar couples Simondon and Spinoza and argues that Spinoza, contrary to Hegel's claims, is only ever thinking about processes of individuation. In chapter 4, I seek to show how all these themes resonate by clarifying further the concepts of the pre-individual and transindividual that, Balibar believes, make Simondon a Spinozist.

Spinoza, like Simondon, will be revealed to be a philosopher of immanence and force. He proposed an understanding of the individual and relationality that is processual, dynamic and collective, concealing an heretical understanding of the relationships of mind and body, and individual and Nature. His theory of

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17 See Deleuze (1969: 104-5, 344 n.3) and (1968a: 246).
affectivity and philosophy of force are central to our task of re-imagining ethics (and subjectivity).

Spinoza understands the imagination to be impressionistic. It reveals the state of our body (and mind) as it is affected by other bodies (and minds). An abstract phrase or image will evoke different images depending on how a body has been shaped by the relations it has entered into. Spinoza says that a soldier who sees the tracks of a horse will think of the rider and of war, while a peasant will think of a plough and a field (II. pr.18. sch.). This is a passive and reactive mode of existence that indicates the state of our bodies rather than cultivating relations of commonality that enhance our powers of existing, helping us to discover our thresholds. Only through an ethics of experimentation can we learn what is good for us. Abstraction as generalisation erases the specificity of different bodies and minds. An essentialism that can neither cope with those specificities, nor engage with bodies in their activities and diverse formations and compositions, provides a fertile ground for reactive stereotyping and prejudice, or in-group claims to superiority.

Spinoza’s conception of essence is nothing other than such a dynamical and relational activity. He calls it conatus (III. pr.7), which relates it to his philosophy of power (potentia) (I. pr.34). In chapter 3 we will learn how Spinoza’s ethics is one of singularities, expressed both in terms of power and in terms of the ‘network’ of relations with other existing modes. This conception of reality as processual and relational calls for fluid taxonomies, no longer premised upon principles of resemblance or homology, but on the commonality of singularities. (Simondon writes some beautiful passages on the need for a new logic that grasps and comprehends differences. He calls it ‘transduction’. ) Finally, Spinoza volunteers a critique of Power (Potestas). Power strips individuals of their capacities to foster multiple affects and connections, denuding them, by imposing an abstract image

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18 I realise I am introducing some unfamiliar terms here, terms I will explain later, but I do this to draw attention to this radical re-working of the concept of the individual. It may be that such a term is no longer appropriate.
that serves to deny and block diversity and movement.

I will examine Spinoza’s *Ethics* in some detail and show how he thinks about a praxiology of liberation that rests on new forms of association. In chapter 6 I will fuse these ideas with Deleuze’s and Guattari’s complex theories of relationality and emergence. Their ethological and musical motifs lead us toward a philosophy of praxis that seeks to compose new relations and invent new possibilities of existing. By displacing the centrality of the human they accentuate the reality of a non-human nature that traverses humanity and makes ethics possible. I try to think, along with Nietzsche, beyond the human condition and to suggest other ways of thinking about subjectivity, relationality, and consequently ethics.

This pre-occupation with the question of difference led Deleuze to cultivate, in his own writings and his work with Guattari, a veritable bestiary of concepts clustering about this idea of ‘difference-in-itself’. Many of these concepts are unfamiliar, counter-intuitive (or intuitive if you are a Bergsonian) and force a radical shift in the ways we think about the emergence of subjectivity. Vincent Descombes (1991: 120) says that the penchant for critiquing the subject and subjectivity amongst French philosophers remained limited to critiquing the *concepts* of the subject and subjectivity. I want to show that Deleuze and Guattari would agree the element of critique is futile if it does not have as its correlate transformation and construction of new possibilities of thinking and being. We are swept into an atmosphere in which the subject is displaced in favour of processes of singularisation, an idea we will explore in further detail.

It is sometimes difficult to understand why Deleuze and Guattari make frequent use of monstrous concepts such as ‘assemblages’ (*agencements*), ‘abstract machines’ and ‘transversal communication’. These neologisms do not constitute a feeble desire for obscurantism but are an integral part of their understanding of what philosophy is. Philosophy does not seek to expose an underlying reality or to represent and mediate experience. It invents, and thinks in, concepts. The non-
philosophical presuppositions that shape the dominant image of thought of a society are laid bare in order to create new possibilities of thinking (and consequently of acting). Deleuze always insisted that thought and existence were restricted by the prevailing dogmatic image of thought and continued to expand on this theme until the end of his life.\textsuperscript{19}

Although Deleuze seldom speaks of ethics at length, an ethics rumbles along the cracked surface of all his writings. Moreover, despite the fact that his specific allusions to a new thought of subjectivity remain somewhat guarded and sporadic, (although this is always an implicit motivation in all of his writing) the proliferation of concepts he introduces - haecceities, singularities, desiring-machines... - are all implicated in this different understanding of the potentials of subjectivity. Guattari also develops a conception of processual subjectivity and an ethics of singularities in his own work. Again we will see how this operates in our final chapter.

viii. the appropriation of difference

We lack creation. \textit{We lack resistance to the present}. The creation of concepts in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist. Europeanization does not constitute a becoming but merely the history of capitalism, which prevents the becoming of subjected peoples.


In the meantime, however, I want to ground my theoretical apparatus. I am reticent to launch into the full flight of philosophical abstraction when Marx and Engels’ scathing remarks echo to the present day. In \textit{The German Ideology} (1932) they comment with disdain upon the way that philosophers attempt the ‘liberation’ of ‘man’ through abstract phraseology, ignoring the real struggle of real liberation in the real world. This is why I want to spend my first two chapters situating this debate concerning the question of difference, a debate that has real ethico-political implications.

\textsuperscript{19} See Deleuze (1962 and 1968a).
INTRODUCTION

The invocation of so many difficult and unfamiliar terms can only be justified if they serve to break existing habits of thought that limit possibilities of thinking and existing. These operate, like most sanctions, as an invisible and inaudible realm that springs to life in the face of transgression. The sedimentation of social, political, cultural, economic and psychological structures, or ways of being, cannot be considered without an understanding of power relations. In my first chapter I want to explore some of the ways that difference, in the broadest sense, has been silenced and also the ways that it has come to voice. I want to positivise difference, dissensus and diversity, but not in a way that ignores the specific realities of different power formations, and not in a way that appeals to essentialism in any absolutist (and particularist) manner.

I believe Deleuze and Guattari's critique and invention of concepts rests to a large extent upon an opposition to what bell hooks calls White Capitalist Patriarchy. In my first chapter I will examine some of the ways that people have articulated their thoughts, concerns and ideas about 'difference'. This is not simply to contextualise my own problematic but also serves to communicate the concrete nature of the philosophising I am engaged in.

In chapter 2, I contend that a fruitful way to grasp the radical nature of Deleuze's and Guattari's responses to these questions is to situate their work in the context of global capitalism. Although I recognise both the limited (and polemical) nature of my exposition of this area, I feel that it is clear that this was a major bone of contention for both thinkers. After all, they wrote two volumes on 'Capitalism and Schizophrenia'. In fact, Deleuze once said, "I think Félix Guattari and I have remained Marxists, in our two different ways, perhaps, but both of us. You see we think that any political philosophy must turn on the analysis of capitalism and the ways it has developed" (1990b: 171).

Guattari's final book Chiasmus (1992a) was written in explicit opposition to what he understood to be the mass-mediatisation of society and the restricted and
deformed nature of capitalist subjectivity. Subjectivity, for Guattari, is never pre-existent but is produced. Deleuze also pinpointed a shift in the machinations of societies from 'societies of discipline' to 'societies of control' (1990c); the latter signifies a mutation of capitalism into a society of communication based on immaterial labour and modulating operations of power. Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt take up this analysis of global capitalism in their book Empire (2000). My analysis of this text is primarily concerned with the processes of subjectification and the fluidity and flexibility of the 'new' capitalism that they delineate. I also examine the commodification of difference. I want to show why the capitalist appropriation of difference and diversity does not signal a death-knell for an ethics of liberation.

As I have indicated the rest of the thesis will seek to lay out a philosophical framework that emerges from these problems. I will conclude by showing how Deleuze's and Guattari's concepts opens up new ways of thinking about subjectivity, identity and ethics by showing not only the necessity for transformational praxes, but how these can be composed and, as Serres says, cast off.
Chapter One

Difference and Diversity
I.i. philosophical underpinnings

What follows is not pure philosophy. (What philosophy ever is? Contamination and symbioses are enriching.) It gravitates about two central themes - subjectivity and ethics. These are familiar, even well-worn, themes in philosophical discourse. My aim is not one of synopsis, overview or criticism of these fields. That would be hubris. Rather I engage in a positive and constructive endeavour, trying to extract the ethico-political ramifications of a certain series of philosophical concepts. My presentation of ethics may seem foreign since I will seek to show how the thought of an emergent and partial subjectivity necessitates putting aside philosophical approaches that rest on a presupposition of either subject or object (phenomenology, positivism...).

However, rather than rushing headlong into the minutiae of the strange ontology that Deleuze and Guattari elaborate, it is important to situate their problematic. If philosophy is invention, shot through with an element of the fantastical, this does not banish it to idealism. It is also a pragmatics, concerned with transformations of social practices. Such a pragmatics requires, as we will see, an understanding of the virtual, the potential of transformation.

François Laruelle believes that all of Deleuze’s work is a ‘prodigious’ variation on the one theme of a Nietzschean concept of difference (1986: 7). For Laruelle, Difference (La Dýffýren(-e) names a constellation of thinkers and a particular problematic (15) arising from nowhere to fight a battle on several fronts, including those of phenomenology and dialectical contradiction. Difference has dominated the philosophy of the twentieth century (17). It concerns a distinctive way of articulating philosophical language by expressing the autonomy of Difference from the principles of Being and Unity, raising it, in the case of Deleuze and Nietzsche, to the power of a principle (18). As a philosophical decision, not only is it a syntax, but it expresses a particular understanding of the real, and is also a certain experience of the real (16). Laruelle takes issue with the presuppositions and circularity of this mode of thinking (39), something I shall...
return to later. I think, however, that in the above insights he offers an acute diagnosis (and critique) of the symptom of difference.

The question of difference constitutes an implicit starting point for this exploration of subjectivity and ethics. A philosophy that can think ‘difference-in-itself’, rather than always situating difference in relation to “forms of representation which reduce it to the Same [...]” (Deleuze, 1968a: xix) finds itself more capable of comprehending emergence, process and the invention of new modes of existence.

l.ii. relevant or relative

Paul Patton (2000) reminds us that Deleuze does not write political philosophy but shows instead how philosophy is inherently political. Difference and Repetition is not simply a philosophical treatise on the interrelations of difference and repetition but contains the jagged beauty of untamed thought that vies with formalism in order to give birth to a possibility of thinking and being otherwise. Deleuze, as Laruelle intimates, posits difference as a principle and gives it a primacy over identity. Previously the concept of difference had been reduced to ‘merely’ a conceptual difference (difference-from).

This giddy affirmation of difference and intensities provokes a whole new way of thinking about the subject. This is a world of pre-personal singularities and non-personal individuations that is not diluted into an elusive spiritualism but is thrown instead into practice. It is an exciting doubling in philosophy that explores the interrelation of virtual and actual. The detective work of tracing these concepts takes place in a future that awaits creation.

But another question follows in these tracks that asks what the illicit pre-philosophical presuppositions that shape the understanding of what it is to think (and what can be thought) are. The dominant and dogmatic image of thought hinges upon a model of recognition that seeks to assimilate difference to the categories of identity, similarity, analogy and opposition (Deleuze, 1968a: xv).
This addresses many of the questions about representationalism and universalism that traditional political theorists refuse to acknowledge.

Deleuze’s work interrogates a philosophical concept of difference, yet it shares many of the concerns and criticisms of those thinkers whose writings we will be examining shortly. A subversive Nietzscheanism runs through Deleuze’s oeuvre that endeavours to re-evaluate all values. The upheavals that trail in the wake of his thought do not stem from a postmodern obduracy on his part, but from a refusal to submit to conventional ways of seeing and questioning.

Deleuze never tried to get rid of the concepts of identity and sameness but “was concerned with the question of how identity is constituted, and what forms it takes” (Patton, 2000: 29). He sought to escape from the mechanisms of a structure of representation, burrowing through its architectonics to create new entry points and exits. I will argue that this ambition is at the kernel of his logic of multiplicities and will show the ethico-political implications of this. This constitutes an argument with the organisations of Power that attempt to seal off thoughts and practices that fundamentally challenge their modus operandi. Otherwise variation and invention are only permitted within certain limits.

In addition, we will consider the striking situatedness of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of the political. We must read their collaborations in the context of global capitalism. They do not shrug off the challenge to critique and create escape-routes or ‘lines of flight’ from the labyrinthine interspersals of neo-archaisms and relative ‘deterritorialisations’ of capitalism(s). Uncannily, and disconcertingly for some, they summarily refuse to approach the question of the human in accordance with traditional (or even contemporary) norms as when they claim, “Human rights are axioms. They can coexist on the market with many other axioms, notably those concerning the security of property, which are unaware of or suspend them even more than they contradict them [ ... ]” (1991a: 107). Is this an indifference to the fate of humanity, satisfying their critics that all these two philosophers desired was immersion in the womb-like cocoon of their
Contrary to appearances, at stake here is not the assumption of an anti-human stance that repudiates humanity. Remarkably enough, the opposite is true. Let us take an example to show where their real concerns lie. Democracies are majorities, say Deleuze and Guattari (1991a), so we need to ask about the elements of a democracy that elude its grasp; its ‘becomings-minoritarian’. The material and incorporeal universes that strip humans of dignity create a zone of intoleration - the threshold point that we came across in our introduction - and potentially the transformation of a milieu. By discovering and inventing ‘problematics’ which result from a disparateness, a tension in a system, they construct their immanent philosophy of the political. But this philosophy is one founded in critique. As Eric Alliez stresses, their philosophy is an etho-ontology (1997: 85).

Spinoza’s Ethics rests upon at least one negative (i.e. empty) - though fundamental - proposition about human nature. We could go so far as to say that the crux of Spinoza’s ethical theory is located in the proposition that humans are nowhere born free and are everywhere in chains. Ethics for him is a ceaseless process of liberation. Liberalism, that posits a discrete or atomistic individual, and communitarianism, that abstracts a ‘common good’, are challenged by Spinoza’s complex account of individuation and relationality (though he too believes that democratic forms of organisation and association best nourish the potentials of humans).

Deleuze and Guattari radicalise these ideas, mobilising his theory of affectivity in favour of a theory of assemblages, and accounts of becomings and multiplicities. These terms are prior to form and structure, object and subject. They displace the centrality of the subject and re-imagine the question of subjectivity. An eagerness to invent a new conception of subjectivity that traverses domains from technology to poetry, quilt-making to basket-weaving and ancient mythology to ecology, reveals the extraordinarily ambitious and unusual nature of their work.
Like Michael Hardt (1993) and Paul Patton (2000), I believe Deleuze and Guattari are gesturing toward a radical democracy by proposing a concept of critical freedom. The radical nature of this democracy does not simply address the question of inclusion. It is a mutant mosaic of figures from Marx and Mill to Butler and Aristotle.

Although Deleuze and Guattari have coherent theoretical accounts of the emergence and operations of over-coding of the State, as well as a rigorous theory of capitalism, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss these elements in the detail they deserve. My work will concentrate on the ‘utopianism’ of their philosophy by trying to set out how this operates in the context of the State and capitalism. In order to articulate the radicality of their venture it is important to situate it alongside other theoretical approaches.

I.iii. theory and practice

A non-evaluative definition of democracy presents it as a “system of decision-making in which all those who are subject to the decision have equally effective power to determine the political outcome of the decision-making” (Hyland, 1995: 81). Although I can understand the concerns about ‘moral imperialism’ and ‘relativism’ that precipitate such a definition, the formalism of this account of democracy leaves something to be desired, even as it purports to include previously excluded groups. Athenian democracy is often posited as qualitatively superior to contemporary democracies despite its exclusion of much of the populace. But Aristotle had legendarily postulated that no man who needs to work for a living could be an effective citizen. Does democracy in mass capitalist societies hijack the qualitative superiority of Greek democracy to mask its own solely quantitative face? Or do we have to re-think the question of democracy altogether?

Like many feminist and post-colonial critics I want to contend that the exclusions of democracies cannot be dismissed as innocuous, unfortunate, but ultimately
incidental to the actual functioning of a democracy. The co-option of differences under the umbrella of universalism still retains a thought of difference as deviation from a norm, refusing to re-imagine democracy through diversity. As Slavoj Zizek often surmises, marginalised groups are 'included out'. Political theorists have consistently failed to interrogate the processes of normalisation of a system which has traditionally upheld as an invisible constant or standard the “average-white-heterosexual European-male-speaking a standard language” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980: 105). Humanism has an insidious underbelly of racism, classism and sexism, and has been tainted by these practices. This cannot be ignored.

Human rights say nothing about the immanent modes of existence of people provided with rights.


The final passages of Fanon’s *The Wretched of the Earth* decry the inhumanity of Europe’s humanism. He says “Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them” (1961: 311). The recklessness and hypocrisy of Europe are not to be rewarded by making Africa a new Europe. For Fanon this could be the opportunity to create a renovated humanity, one no longer shrivelled, amputated and enslaved by raciological discourse and practice. The challenge is then not to oppose the whiteness of Europe with a reinvigorated blackness of Africa, but to invent a new concept of humanity. He remarks, “When I search for Man in the technique and the style of Europe, I see only a succession of negations of man, and an avalanche of murders” (312). The terrors of modernity have been well-documented, and challenges to the universalisms it purported have been sustained. In the spirit of Fanon’s work, I seek to imagine other possibilities of the human.

Ways of understanding or constructing differences arise from specific problematics, and are therefore theorised in different ways. Some conceptions of

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difference even *require* a theoretical position of justification - the discriminatory practices of racisms, for instance (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1988: 19). By examining how difference is mobilised and articulated as a category, we will consider how difference can be mobilised as a principle and a force of transformation. Exploring texts relating to “race”, gender, ethnicity, culture and nation does not conflate these different zones but will, I hope, draw out the richness of relations and complexity between and within these domains, both in terms of critique and the constructions of new ways of being.

The very category of the human needs to be re-thought. Humanism has been consolidated and tainted through a systematic inhumanity (Gilroy, 2000: 18). All of the critical work I discuss should be read as complementary to Deleuze and Guattari’s own work, although much of it differs insofar as non-human becomings of the human constitute a major part of their particular ‘utopian’ pragmatics.22

The well-being and the progress of Europe have been built up with the sweat and the dead bodies of Negroes, Arabs and Indians, and the yellow races. We have decided not to overlook this any longer.

Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961: 96).

*Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity* maps a critical and constructive enterprise that highlights a number of the presuppositions and blindspots in the dominant constitutional traditions; i.e. nationalism, liberalism and communitarianism.23 In this book, James Tully negotiates the unstable

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21 It is for this reason that Gilroy (2000) unearths the links between raciological thinking and humanism and emphasises the necessity to construct an anti-race humanism. Although the concrete realities of raciological thinking and practices are apparent and must not be ignored, this does not mean that we should not try to “free ourselves from the bonds of all raciology in a novel and ambitious abolitionist project” (2000: 15). Fanon had long before shown the de-humanisation that accompanies raciological categorisation, for both black and white people. His rallying cry is ‘toward a new humanism’.

22 See Deleuze and Guattari (1980: 99-100) on utopia and its relation to Samuel Butler’s *Erewhon*.

23 The Lakota Sioux Elder, Luther Standing Bear says, “Did a kind, wise, helpful and benevolent conqueror bring this situation about? Can a real, true, genuinely superior social order work such havoc? Did not the native American possess human qualities of worth had
territory of conflicting claims for cultural recognition in the context of Canada. Adopting a method of historical cultural critique, he identifies those presuppositions and conventions that have informed the debate over recognition, but have not been explicitly examined. There has been an ambiguous relationship between pluralism and sameness. Diversity and pluralism are often given lip-service by liberals, who then simultaneously announce that 'we are all the same'. The assumption of a *tabula rasa*, or 'cultural neutrality', when investigating difference mirrors uncomfortably the *terra nullius* proclamation that served to 'justify' the expropriation, extermination and enforced assimilation of indigenous peoples across the world.²⁵

Difficult as many conservative thinkers in the main traditions of constitutionalism find this, an adequate means of 'grasping' difference and diversity in all their entangled crossovers and distancings is an imperative, not an option. Despite the good intentions of Rawls and Habermas, their theoretical apparatuses prove hopelessly inadequate at valorising, and even recognising cultural diversity (and embedded power differentials). Any attempt to reach universal consensus on norms, principles and justice serves to filter out difference rather than trying to invent new forms of association.

Antonio Negri believes that the entire Rawlsian system appeals to a practical, rather than metaphysical, realm of convictions, ignoring initial conflicts, antagonisms or differences. An adherence to pluralism is thus vanquished by the idea that there is one sense of justice which is grounded in the institutions of a democratic regime. Stability is valued rather than social difference, and difference is abstracted from to create a generic unity. Negri adds, “Postmodern liberal tolerance is thus based not on the inclusion but actually the exclusion of social
difference" (Hardt and Negri, 1994: 235). Trying to balance different inputs in order to concoct a stable equilibrium becomes primary, and anything that might fall into the realm of difference from this norm is a personal affair. Rawls's account, like that of Hyland's, is deontological. It does not propose any notion of the social good or teleological structure of the human subject. Feasibility takes precedence over desirability. Negri believes, with Weber, that the essential ingredient in ensuring a stable equilibrium is the police. Weber notes that "Every state is founded on force' said Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk" (Weber, 1921: 78) adding famously that the State "claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (78).

Terrorism, as a rational tool of domination and control, is a European invention and was initially applied to non-European peoples [...] Wherever Europeans and natives faced each other, terrorist practice was the colonizers' norm. It should be noted that neither the practice nor the theory which sanctioned and institutionalized it could have been sustained without the doctrine of European cultural and racial superiority - a doctrine implicitly or explicitly predicated on a view that placed Europe and the Europeans at the center of a world surrounded by backward, primitive cultures and peoples.


Deleuze (1988b) remarks that processual pluralism is replaced by a dualism that tries to separate discourse from violence, as though violence did not rest within discourse. Correspondingly James Tully argues that the historical drive of modernity toward uniformity was paralleled by horrifying systematic exterminations of the First Nations in Canada from the nineteenth century onwards. Their difference and autonomy was no longer respected as it was when the 'Two Row Wampum Treaty' was negotiated in 1664; a treaty based on the image of two boats travelling down the same river, side by side, where neither party tries to steer the other. This agreement was, at least in theory, based in peace, friendship and respect.

Paul Gilroy discusses the added virulence to racial thinking once it was formalised, scientised, nationalised and rationalised (2000: 31).
The conservative interpretations of the traditions of nationalism, liberalism and communitarianism are stunningly indifferent to these traditions of pluralism, reciprocity and respect. Tully notes that, "In each case, the demands [for cultural recognition] are seen to be a threat to the unity of a constitutional association and the solution is to assimilate, integrate or transcend, rather than recognise and affirm, cultural diversity" (1995: 44). The only remaining 'solution' left to dissenters would appear to be secession.

There are more tolerant responses that seek to permit a fair accommodation of cultural diversity, but their advocates remain unconvinced that a true recognition of diversity is possible in the constitutional domain. In the case of Canada, modern constitutionalism is pervaded with a masculine, western, individualist bias. This is not an adequate basis for creating different modes of relationality in a "culturally diverse, post-imperial" (1994: 94) country.

There are many critics of the dominant models of constitutionalism. Postmodern writers, Tully claims, tend to stress the European, male and imperial bias of constitutionalism. They seek to undermine concepts such as identity and recognition to show how these either exclude, or co-opt those who have previously been excluded, from the public sphere. By showing how identity always differs both from itself and from others, they provide a useful tool of critique. However this is also their downfall. He believes that this approach fragments society beyond recognition paradoxically creating a homogeneous culture of dissolving differences and a paralysis resembling that of conservative critics.

Cultural feminists also emphasise the masculine bias of constitutional language yet ultimately, according to Tully, they do not show how women can enter into dialogue with members of authoritarian traditions without being marginalised. Finally, intercultural citizens and writers, such as bell hooks and Iris Marion Young, criticise the homogeneous conceptions of identity and association of the main traditions and are sceptical of the liberatory possibilities of deconstructive
post-modernism. Nonetheless, despite demonstrating the necessity for various levels of self-rule, and the recognition that they are not just constituted by their cultures but thwarted by their constitutional associations, their claims - in Tully's eyes - still fall prey to unexamined norms of uniformity such as Rawls' reasonable pluralism or a uniform legal and political order (1995: 55).

Tully identifies Charles Taylor's idea of 'deep diversity' as providing a fruitful image that portrays the many ways of participating in and identifying with Canada. Unsurprisingly, actualising this image would require a constitutional upheaval to deal with pluralism and the politics of cultural recognition in an adequate manner. The propensity in modern constitutionalism is to propose a centralised and uniform legal and political system. This contrasts with the "legal pluralism and customary law of pre-modern Europe" (1994: 81). An imaginary community of the nation to which all citizens belong appeals to a homogeneous idea of the political community. The modernity of the constitutional nation-state is another requisite for modern constitutionalism. Such modernity is proposed in contradistinction to the exotic 'other'. Finally, the political identity at stake is a bounded and distinct unity. In what Tully calls a second wave of anti-imperialism, all of these inherent biases are being brought to task.

Gatens and Lloyd (1999) traverse the worlds of Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari, Negri and Tully. They do not understand Tully's work to be a quest to rehabilitate old concepts (of constitutionalism) or of reformism. Instead they see it as close to Spinoza's own attempts to demonstrate the constitutive (and productive) power of the imagination to create better social fictions than ones premised upon fear, superstition and Potestas (Power). The aim of such a move is to transform institutions and collective practices of being.

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27 Sharabi distinguishes between modernity (structure), modernisation (process) and modernism (consciousness) (1988: 20-21). "[M]odernity construed as consciousness is a model through which modern Europe recognised itself by differentiating itself from the (nonmodern) Other" (1988: 21). He argues that modernity heralded an age, no longer of cultural interchange, but of opposition between a dominant centre and subordinate periphery, and believes that neopatriarchal society in the Arab world is a result of a marriage of imperialism and patriarchy (21).
Rather than imposing a modern constitutionalism, Tully believes that a pre-modern constitutionalism is better equipped to cope with these entangled demands and shifting intercultural relations, including the role of the women’s movement. His work shows us that a majority is not necessarily a quantitative superiority, but concerns a tendency toward homogeneity and a standard measure, that is, a treatment of the variations of a society to create a constant. This is not an illusion but organises reality in particular ways. He does not engage in reformism by trying to work within the confines of majoritarian standards. Nor does he employ a quasi-transcendental ideal speech situation to harmonise the different voices. The difficulties he faces are augmented by the strangely multiplicitous nature of Canadian society.

“When a minority creates models for itself, it’s because it wants to become a majority, and probably has to, to survive or prosper (to have a state, be recognised, establish its rights, for example). But its power comes from what it’s managed to create which to some extent goes into the model, but doesn’t depend on it” (Deleuze, 1990b: 173). Wallerstein endorses this understanding of minorities by stating, “it has long been noted by analysts that minorityhood is not necessarily an arithmetically based concept; it refers to the degree of social power” (1988: 82 -83). Rather than reconciling differences through consensus, we need to affirm dissensus. We will continue to explore the dual nature of minorities, directing our discussion in later chapters toward the idea of becoming-minoritarian.

As Sharabi notes, many identities have been constructed through the antagonism of differential power relations. Only afterwards are they endowed nostalgically with the authenticity of a fictitious origin giving them greater emotive power.28

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28 I can understand why such essentialisms have emerged as strategic forms of resistance for political and historical reasons. Gilroy (2000) discusses the process of affirmation of blackness but he argues that we must move beyond racialised thinking, and criticises the multicultural industry that has been constructed on its back. Our challenge is to move beyond particularisms toward other understandings of humanity. I call this movement a commonality of singularities.
Within the Canadian context the further splintering of identities and solidification of those fragments might well lead to an exacerbated mobilisation of identities in the quest and competition for scarce resources. The task is, as Chantal Mouffe (1995) points out, to construct a ‘we’.

Tully’s understanding of the liberatory potential consonant with embracing diversity resonates with Guattari’s ethico-political concept of dissensus which he values above and against what he views as the infantilisation of thought in its drive toward consensus and uniformity. Guattari’s writing is far more explicitly militant than that of Tully, and his understanding of subjectivity gravitates toward an anti-humanism that Tully might feel uncomfortable with. (His decision to map three ecologies - psyche, socius, nature - is a provocative mutation of the age old philosophical concerns with Man, Society and Nature.) Yet their mutual enthusiasm to valorise difference and diversity conjoins them in indicating a new way of thinking about identities and subjectivity.

My efforts to emphasise concrete struggles and dilemmas is inspired in part by Sharabi’s question, “What is the point of naming the oppressed, the marginalized, the humiliated, if the enterprise stops at an abstract gesture?” (1988: 123-124).

I.iv. difference, diversity and division

The fact that must constitute the point of departure for any discourse on ethics is that there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological destiny that humans must enact or realise, because it is clear that if humans were or had to be this or that substance, this or that destiny, no ethical experience would be possible, there would be only tasks to be done.


Given the nomadic nature of the thoughts that will follow, I hesitate to celebrate ‘difference’, ‘heterogeneity’, ‘mobility’ and the myriad of related terms in abstraction. The enforced movements of refugees, the capitalist ‘discovery’ and exploitation of multiculturalism, (something well documented by both Paul Gilroy and bell hooks) as well as the insidious ‘positivisation’ of difference that is
emblematised by the differentialist racism discussed by Pierre Taguieff and Etienne Balibar, are clear indications that 'difference' is a malleable term. The commodification of otherness is revealed in the way difference is often "fabricated in the interests of social control as well as commodity innovation" (Hal Foster quoted in hooks 1992: 25).

The following excerpt from M. Nourbese Philips' poem "Discourse on the Logic of Language" encapsulates my ambivalence and reticence to simply valorise difference over identity without examining power formations, dominant symbolics and so forth. It shows how Power can be consolidated by multiplying divisions and differences.

English

is my mother tongue.
A mother tongue is not
not a foreign lan lan lang
languish
anguish
-a foreign anguish.

EDICT 1

Every owner of slaves
shall, wherever possible,
ensure that his slaves
belong to as many ethno-
linguistic groups as
possible. If they can
not speak to each other,
they cannot then foment
rebellion and revolution

M. Nourbese Philips expresses the lack of identity and sense of dislocation induced by slavery and colonisation, one described by Fanon so acutely with white-cold rage when he says that the black man has only one destiny and that is white; an impossible destiny. In her poem she relays the insidious policy of 'divide and rule' that tried to preclude communication by proliferating a Babelous

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29 "When young black people mouth 1960's black rhetoric, don Kente cloth, gold medallions, dread their hair and diss the white folks they hang out with, they expose the way meaningless commodification strips these signs of political integrity and meaning, denying the possibility that they can serve as a catalyst for concrete political action. As signs their power to ignite critical consciousness is diffused when they are commodified. Communities of resistance are replaced by communities of consumption" (hooks 1992: 33).

30 M. Nourbese Philips (1993)
multiplicity of tongues. She articulates a paradoxical state of being that, on the one hand, is at odds with the enforced majoritarian language and strives to make that language stutter, and on the other hand, perceives the necessity to find a common thread or language to articulate a common condition. We need to take this dichotomous condition seriously and examine fruitful conceptualisations of relationality premised upon difference, rather than searching for all-subsuming universals. This poem is a refusal to allow amnesia to dissolve the comprehension of the power-structures and formations that delimit possibilities of expression and existence. M. Nourbese Philips highlights the efforts of a hegemonic power to disintegrate what it perceives as ‘other’ and a threat, in order to then consolidate this ‘other’ all the better as a tool in the capitalist processes of exploitation and slavery.

It is important to recall that the consolidation and composition of identity, rather than its fragmentation, are more often than not called for. As we will see in chapter 2, the most radical heterogeneity can be re-appropriated in the era of modern capitalism. The very least that is demanded by groups who have been oppressed and subjugated is a recognition of the identity and value of their difference. But as Paul Gilroy (1993a: 2-3) and bell hooks (1991: 29) point out this can easily slide into claims for an ethnic absolutism or a priori essentialism.

Cesare Poppi comments on some of these ideas in a piece called ‘Wider Horizons with Larger Details: Subjectivity, Ethnicity and Globalization’ (1997). The multiplication of ethnicities corresponds to the waning of that ‘imagined community’ called the nation-state. Ethnicity, he states, shares in common with nationalism a presumption of the universality of its shared subjectivity (285). A tendency to stress ‘locality’ and ‘difference’ has been concomitant with an expansive globalisation, “yet ‘locality’ and ‘difference’ presuppose the very development of worldwide dynamics of institutional communication and legitimation” (285).

The fragmentation of the subject promulgated in contemporary social theory “is
celebrated to the point of becoming the new, theoretical foundation of the concept” (285). However, the emergence of new ethnicities and subjectivities cannot be understood apart from the global dynamics in which they are embedded. Criticisms of master narratives highlight the ways in which radical power relations like “race” and gender tended, in the past, to be subsumed into a discourse on class. Now, a Hegelian ‘immanent subjectivity’ is counterposed with a “celebration of subjectivity which stresses fluidity, contingency, non-identity, creativity, ‘fractal’ individuality […]” (286). Yet, problematically, this ‘New Subjectivity’ posits itself as operating “relatively unfettered by economic determinations” (287), whilst the processes of production and reproduction of capital are similarly free to follow their own internal logic, “free of constraints and impingements from the ‘superstructural’ ” (287). So what precisely is going on here?

Poppi notes that the recent trend of what he calls the New Subjectivity emphasises the subjective, culturally determined behaviour of the subject ‘qua exchanger and consumer’ (288). This kind of subjectivity seems to present itself as free-floating, oblivious to objective determinations. Production has faded from focus with the growth of the tertiary sector; it is instead an invisible dimension informing the construction of these subjectivities. Culture is a commodity. A fragmentation of societies into different movements, each claiming national, cultural, and ethnic autonomy, has now become the primary object of theorisations of the social. How does ethnicity, being as it is both local and global, sit with this New Subjectivity?

Ethnicity is a subjectively constructed phenomenon, and it is also a relational concept. Each group finds the reasons for its existence by ‘inventing’ a common history. Since the instance of production has been eschewed by theories of the New Subjectivism, “the result is that both the productive and the cultural aspects of subjectivity become reified: the former as a non-negotiable, objective constraint, the latter as a container to be filled after a pick-and-choose fashion” (290-1). This account gives a positivist, de facto understanding of ethnicity.
Ethnicity is more than a subjective choice, however.

The celebration of 'difference', as Poppi sees it, accompanies a cultural homogenisation and "historical obliteration of 'diversity' [...]" (291). A formalism or cultural codification dictates what will be accepted as the representation of the identity of an 'ethnic group'. He believes that "what is needed to explain ethnicity is a theory of articulation between hitherto diverse sociocultural systems turned into differing systems. Globalization, in turn, is the process by which the choice of 'selected traits' [...] comes to cover a wider spectrum [...]" (292). It is through their similarities that such groups can be perceived as different. This has turned cultural niches into exchange-values rather than use-values. 'Diversity' then mutates into 'difference'. Distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable cultural traits has been an exhausting process for liberals. Tolerance has been twisted into a legitimation of the propositions of a cultural racism that claims that "different' peoples should indeed be allowed 'to pursue their own cultural values' and - for that reason - should be thrown out of the country" (296). I try to address these kinds of difficulties through my conceptualisation of an immanent ethics.

In this essay, Poppi argues that it is the failure to understand that ethnic 'schismogenesis' has a relational, social nature precipitated from a shared and globalised understanding of 'the nature of difference' that has led to a 'differentialist racism', a term I will discuss shortly. Differences are understood after the manner of an idealist quasi-Platonic model of difference that organises, gradates and compares claims to difference making them commensurable. Like Plato's suitors³¹, many claimants are unsuccessful. Poppi's account discusses the implications of this comparative model, concluding that it wipes out diversity replacing it with a commensurable difference, a difference that differs from something else. It is, of course, Deleuze's contention that this tendency to understand difference in terms of an empirical (positivist) difference means that

³¹ In his discussion of the simulacrum, Deleuze (1968a) argues that Plato's real concern was to distinguish between the true and the false copy. The image of the suitor illustrates this.
we fail to grasp ‘difference-in-itself’. I discuss his account of difference and its ethico-political implications in chapter 5. In the meantime, I will simply sketch loosely some traits of his philosophical perspective, before I examine this idea of ‘differentialist racism’ in further detail.

I.v. racism and raciology

Postmodern theory that is not seeking to simply appropriate the experience of ‘Otherness’ to enhance the discourse or to be radically chic should not separate the ‘politics of difference’ from the ‘politics of racism’.


Among the advocates of ‘anti-essentialist’ postmodern identity politics, for example, one often encounters the insistence that there is no ‘woman in general’, there are only white middle-class women, black single mothers, lesbians, and so on. One should reject such ‘insights’ as banalities unworthy of being objects of thought. The problem of philosophical thought lies precisely in how the universality of ‘woman’ emerges out of this endless multitude.


Foucault once famously declared, “perhaps one day this century will be known as Deleuzian” (1970: 165). He also volunteered this observation; “a lightning storm was produced which will one day be given the name of Deleuze: new thought is possible; thought is again possible” (196). Deleuze ventured the following thoughts in response, “I don’t know what Foucault meant, I never asked him. He was a terrible joker. He may perhaps have meant that I was the most naive philosopher of our generation [...] I wasn’t better than the others, but more naive producing a kind of art brut, so to speak; not the most profound but the most innocent (the one who felt the least guilt about “doing philosophy”) ” (1990a: 88, 89).

This ‘naive’ conviction in the notions of pluralism or empiricism sustains Deleuze’s philosophical enterprises. He remarks, “the abstract does not explain but must itself be explained; and the aim is not to rediscover the eternal or the
universal but to find the conditions under which something new is produced (creativity)” (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977: vii). His condemnation of the Hegelian dismissal of pluralism as the stutterings of a naive consciousness chanting ‘this, that, here, now’ needs to be mobilised in face of Zizek’s condescension. Though Zizek rightly condemns the injunction to ‘be yourself’ as one that leads to isolation and anomie (an extreme and horrifying individualism), in his tirade against the snuggling bedfellows of capitalism and postmodernism he fails to consider other possibilities, such as an ethics of singularities.

What Zizek fails to understand is the profoundly Spinozistic gesture at the heart of the anti-essentialist endeavour. He mocks, as Hegel mocked Spinoza, those who dare propose an etho-ontology. Deleuze and Guattari advocate an ethics of singularities and a new thought of commonality. Attitudes that question hierarchies and dominant modes of organisation can catapult those organisations into a qualitatively different mode of existence as we saw with Tully.

However a number of Zizek’s comments are both provocative and insightful. Take for instance his claim that,

**Multiculturalism is a racism which empties its own position of all positive content (the multiculturalist is not a direct racist; he or she does not oppose to the Other the particular values of his or her own culture); none the less he or she retains this position as the privileged empty point of universality from which one is able to appreciate (and depreciate) other particular cultures properly - multicultural respect for the Other’s specificity is the very form of asserting one’s own superiority.**


Paul Gilroy discusses this slippery concept of multiculturalism in detail. Multiculturalism has been used as a means of interrogating the significance of

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32 Like Christine Battersby (1998) I do not want to remain caught in a position of anti-essentialism. Instead I want to rethink the question of essence. This becomes clear in chapter 3. See Battersby’s (1998) chapter on ‘Essentialisms, Feminisms and Metaphysics’ for a lucid and innovative re-working of the concept of essence. She maintains that it is necessary “to think ‘essence’ in a fluid way, so that it is not thought of as a fixed and static ‘real’ that is located in the body and merely subject to historical and cultural variation” (1998: 22-3).
DIFFERENCE AND DIVERSITY

nationality in this time of global capitalism. He adds that it may also mark an end to a European hegemony on ideas. Instead of automatically dismissing this concept, as Zizek does, he seeks to understand how it does not just refer to the pressures on the nation-state but can be both an enriching concept and an ethical principle that helps bypass dichotomising divisions. He admits, though, that corporate multiculturalism does plunder different identities. There is a great danger if an ossified notion of ethnic difference is mobilised "as a means to rationalize their own practices and judgements in a parody of pluralism which perversely endorse segregation (2000: 253). An example of such an essentialist way of thinking about identity is 'differentialist racism'.

In what was called the New Racism the meshing of biology and culture served to justify differentiation on the basis of "race". Pure difference, whether claimed by one group or attributed to another, automatically transmutes into a pure identity and a consequent intolerance of difference within, or outside, a group. "When culture is brought into contact with 'race' it is transformed into a pseudo-biological property of communal life" (Gilroy, 1993b: 24). Taguieff's work on the acculturation of the biological category of "race" shows how differentialist racism portrays itself as a defender of cultural identities.

Differentialist racism is a brand of essentialism that speaks of cultural identities as pure, differing from other (allegedly equally valid) pure cultural identities. In this way, rights of expression and existence are claimed to have been respected. However it is precisely the understanding of identity, culture, nation, "race", and so forth, as homogeneous, rather than fractured, vibrant and contested territories, that concerns me. It posits a notion of self-identity from which one assesses differences in a wholly negative fashion, despite the positive, liberal spin it endorses. Its assimilationism imposes a hegemonic order within the group and expels those who do not fit. There is no understanding of the complex and partial identities that people operate in and through. Instead a presumption predominates that individuals, groups and collectivities are already fully individuated and in possession of a distinctive, quasi-primordial series of a series
of characteristics, practices, cultural traits. Moreover, in order to retain these fundamental differences, distance and separation must exist between cultures. The bounded and unified natures of the identities in question need to be interrogated.

When cultures are presented as homogeneous they are inevitably afflicted with an exceedingly low immune system that cannot tolerate foreign bodies. These are seen as parasitical (in the pejorative sense that has none of the sophistication of Michel Serres' analysis of this subject) rather than as symbiotic creating new relations and new possibilities.

Etienne Balibar (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1988) says that the universalisms of bourgeois ideology and humanism are not incompatible with a system of hierarchies and exclusions. He thinks that racism is organised around 'the stigmata of otherness', operating oftentimes on a micrological level, rather than in the more evident oppositional and disciplinary mode that is emblematic of colonialism. Representations, practices, affects, and discourses are all suffused with the New Racism.

Balibar emphasises the practices, the social nature of racism, and the organisation of affects that occurs. These organise affects by conferring a stereotype upon their 'objects' and their 'subjects'. "It is this combination of practices, discourses and representations in a network of affective stereotypes which enables us to give an account of the formation of a racist community" (1988: 18). Racism is a social relation. Furthermore, he argues nation, ethnicity and "race" are interbound concepts and any nationalism is premised upon a racism and the notion of fictive ethnicity. Stretching this to the global scale, Balibar states that neo-colonialism is a reality grounded in the assertion that constant conflict and wars clearly indicate that three-quarters of humanity are incapable of self-governance.

In a similar fashion, by calling the killing of Iraqi citizens 'collateral damage' General Schwartzkopf dehumanised these non-Western citizens. Increasingly, military interventions conducted by the U.S. and its allies are expected to have no
casualties (of their own soldiers). However, since sanctions were imposed
thousands and thousands of Iraqi citizens have died. These are passed over
wordlessly by both the 'democratic' governments and the media (save a few
journalists like John Pilger) of the West. The AIDS epidemic in Africa gained
little coverage until the recent battle with pharmaceutical companies. It has faded
once more from the spotlight. Whether your death will be newsworthy depends
on where you are from.

Deleuze and Guattari claim that racism operates by positing the only face as that
of the "average, ordinary White Man [...]" (1980: 178). They characterise traits
that do not conform as degrees of deviance from this norm, explaining how,
sometimes these traits are allowed to subsist, sometimes they are erased. "Racism
never detects the particles of the other; it propagates waves of sameness until
those who resist identification have been wiped out [...]" (1980: 178). Racism,
they suggest, is never really concerned with alterity or difference, demarcating
instead those 'who should be the same as us' and assimilating or annihilating
them.

White intellectuals who criticise 'essentialist' notions of identity often do not
question white identity and the way in which essentialism informs representations
of whiteness. Richard Dyer notes, "[a]s long as race is something only applied to
non-white peoples, as long as white people are not racially seen and named,
they/we function as a human norm" (Dyer 1997: 1). Since white people are
unable to see their own particularity, whiteness needs to be made strange.

33 Since Deleuze and Guattari only write sporadically about racism, it would be fruitful to
link their writing on 'race' to that on taxonomies and systems of classification. Deleuze.
through Spinoza, demonstrates the often prejudicial nature of the abstract fictions that
people draw upon to classify and distinguish one another. As many writers have emphasised
racism does not have an unchanging meaning. It is important to look at the various forms it
has adopted, why certain typologies emerged, what roles did the state, capitalism and
imperialism play and how social and political structures of behaviour and classification
sedimented. Although this is not work that Deleuze and Guattari do, their critiques of
lineages and hierarchical orderings and their favouring of rhizomatic alliances is useful in
trying to think about other modes of association. This is something Paul Gilroy has picked
up on to good effect when he discusses the rhizomorphous nature of his diasporic identity.
I.vi. the essence of essentialism

Valorising difference can lead to a discourse that fetishises otherness (while retaining a sense of self-identity or 'normalcy'), and consolidates different practices of social control and domination (bell hooks, 1989: 28-34). bell hooks seeks to construct social realities that affirm difference by making marginality a site of resistance. Wary of fixating on one characteristic (of women for instance), she focuses instead upon the concrete conditions for each reality that is articulated, rather than diluting those differences. She does not deny that there is commonality but proposes a methodology and a logic that can retain both difference and commonality. This calls for a complex analysis that underlines multitudinous variables and processes of subjectification.

Gilroy’s idea of ‘diaspora’ resonates with hooks’ strategies of resistance. Like Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome, this concept does not have its roots firmly fixed in a soil and territory but skates along or beneath the surface. This kind of identity formation disrupts traditional forms of belonging; it is disperse. But rather than gathering, regulating and ordering this dispersion, its movements are affirmed. Challenging traditional organisation of kinship and lineage it seeks new alliances. It resists the coercive identity of the nation, but remains fragile and temporary, born of a webbed variety of connections. It disrupts time and transforms space when viewed in terms of its ‘ex-centric communicative circuitry’. Gilroy calls this hybridised diasporic identity the ‘changing same’ (2000: 127-9). It is continuously modulated without being reified. Despite this, culture is often “conceived along ethnically absolute lines, not as something intrinsically fluid, changing, unstable and dynamic, but as a fixed property of social groups rather than as a relational field in which they encounter one another and live out social, historical relationships” (Gilroy 1993b: 24).

Moira Gatens also seeks to avoid any understanding of essentialism as a priori rather than constructed and sedimented through different socio-historical
contexts (1996: 11). She shows how cultures and identities emerge through contestation in a political and historical context. Her work with Genevieve Lloyd emphasises the dangers of romantically wanting to be the ‘Other’s Other’ and forces the admission that one is often complicit in relations of subjugation and domination - something for which one needs to take responsibility (1999: 51).

Radical politics has remained rooted in liberalism and cannot articulate a politics and ethics of difference. By fostering collective imaginings that transform social practices and images, minds and bodies, resistance becomes the collective name of freedom. Critiques of essentialism and universality are important, but so is the possibility of constructing and inventing other modes of being and other understandings of subjectivity. With Deleuze, Guattari and Spinoza, these authors understand that we must make use of fictions and abstractions, “but only so far as is necessary to get to a plane where we go from real being to real being and advance through the construction of concepts” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991a: 207).

This entangled relation of essentialism and power is unravelled by bell hooks. It is facile, she believes, to propose an essence of ‘woman’, for example, on the basis of common putative characteristics, ignoring other factors such as “race” and class. Not all women are oppressed or exploited; many take part directly and indirectly in structures of domination and exploitative practices. She is opposed to discourses such as Gilligan’s (1982) ‘ethics of care’, or essentialist oppositions of male/female that presuppose a biologistic understanding of woman as passive/nature/dominated and so forth, emphasising that many black women view white women as extremely violent. Whiteness is often terrorising and complicit in terror, in the way that Gilroy (1993a: 73) notes the ideals of the Enlightenment reason are enthralled to terror.

bell hooks argues that White Capitalist Patriarchy is hegemonic. Rather than racism, she thinks that white supremacy is the most important term to understand. This is because it has been internalised. Frantz Fanon had showed the complicit nature of people of colour who uphold racial hierarchies.
Assimilation encourages a negation of blackness and absorption of white values. History, memory, colour and experience are then denied. For hooks the critique of essentialism must be sustained, focusing on, for example, the "multiple experiences of black identity that are the lived conditions which make diverse cultural productions possible" (hooks 1991: 29).

While my work focuses on a philosophical ethico-political level that is more micro than macro, Tully and Gatens and Lloyd (as well as, of course, all peoples appealing for the recognition of their practices and values) create the conditions for macrological and institutional change, even by virtue of thinking its possibility. It is interesting that Tully persists with the constitutional tradition, re-activating common law, as he seeks to reconcile principles of belonging and freedom. I suggest that there are other ways of composing social relations that also seek to avoid a 'rootless cosmopolitanism' and a 'purified nationalism.' Earlier we saw how Michel Serres furnished us with a philosophical series of concepts that sought to grasp difference, relationality and becoming. By encouraging us to understand processes of individuation and singularisation, Deleuze and Guattari's machinic philosophy shifts our attention from those categories understood as already constituted - individuals and groups - in order to grasp relationality in terms of pre-individual and transindividual dimensions that they call singular and transversal.

But does their espousal of difference-in-itself lead it to imprisonment in the movements of an anonymous capitalism that revels in shifting and temporary tapestries of diverse fragments of subjectivity? Does the subject become a 'spiritual automaton' in a reading of reality as creative continuum?
Chapter Two

Embracing Difference:
Capitalism and Philosophy
II.i. potentia versus Potestas

My epilogue is: be aware of the strategy that governs what you do.


Power has tended to be used by political theorists to describe a certain kind of action on others involving an element of control\(^4\). It is also often described in zero sum terms and “conceived as something which is intimately connected with authority, domination or exploitation” (Gatens, 1996: 63). This is akin to the concept of Potestas discussed in my introduction. Deleuze and Guattari take issue with the classic alternative of repression or ideology, arguing that power concerns processes of normalisation and modulation bearing on language, gestures, perception, desires, movements, and so on, proceeding by way of microassemblages (1980: 458). Power does not just constrain, but also produces different modes of acting and thinking. Operations of Power (Potestas) separate forces (puissances/potentiae) from what they can do.

In a breathtaking display of neologicistic acrobatics, Deleuze and Guattari (1980) delineate, in their Becoming plateau, the distinction between the plane of organisation and the plane of immanence. The former operates through a hidden principle, so that the plane only exists as a supplementary dimension. Just as Spinoza refused to define substance as anything other than a causa immanens or causa sui, Deleuze and Guattari are resolute when they maintain that any teleology, plan or principle creates an abstraction from this ontological conception of process, subjecting it to a transcendent power beyond it. The plane of organisation or development is not given but inferred from the forms it gives rise to. It is hidden but makes everything visible. Conversely, the plane of immanence neither implies nor involves transcendence, hidden or overt.

\(^4\) For a careful analysis of the concept of power in Deleuze’s work, see Patton (2000: 49-67). Also see Iris Marion Young for a critique of a distributionist or substantialist paradigm of power especially in the context of her efforts to reconfigure the question of justice (1990: 30-33).
Our first definition of Power as a hierarchical operation enables us to distinguish relatively easily the plane of immanence (as potentia) and the plane of organisation (as Potestas). Still, it might seem that an overtly hierarchical operation of Power that curtails a populace is a far cry from these undulating modulations of capitalism; however, the two operations are connected in at least one respect. Power/force understood as potentia describes an immanent mode of existence in which a body is defined in terms of its capacity to affect and to be affected. The operations of Potestas (Power) can be found wherever thought and existence are cut off from their powers of acting.

Nonetheless, this second understanding of Power as the immanent modulation of a system cannot be conflated with this first operation. It corresponds to what we will call a relative deterritorialisation. Rather than cultivating their potentials, it permeates bodies and minds entirely, shaping them from within. The connections and relations that can be fostered are limited as they are normalised, and it is in this way that it can be called Potestas. It prevents bodies and minds from doing and becoming all they can. Once more forces are separated from what they can do, albeit through a different operation. A most pressing question in the context of global capitalism thus involves figuring out in what sense the axiomatics of capitalism can be understood in terms of Potestas. Does the dominance of the capitalist mode of valorisation close off other modes of valorisation and hence the capacity to cultivate potentials? Or is philosophy enthralled to capitalism? Answering these questions requires an investigation of the operations of Power through both the State and capitalism. By understanding the predominant modes of organisation and thought of societies, we engender problematics that both critique these forms of organisation and open a space for other modes of existence.

But on the new plane, it is possible that the problem now concerns the one who believes in the world, and not even in the existence of the world but in its possibilities of movements and intensities, so as once again to give birth to new modes of existence, closer to animals and rocks.

Drawing on Bovillus, Hardt and Negri claim that an enriched humanity could be called “Imilohomo, humanity squared” (2000: 72). This is echoed in Spinoza’s heretical cry *Deus sive Natura* - an impassioned exhortation to chase away superstition and fear as the organising principles of society, and to question not only the existence of an anthropomorphic God but to dispel a faith in any other form of transcendence. For Spinoza, the sage’s meditation is a meditation on life and not on death. His ontology/ethics follows the movements and becomings of nature. Indeed the entire philosophical movement of the *Ethics* shies away from mechanism and finalism to develop the singular potentials of a processual ontology.

The tragic upshot of the flowering of art, science and humanity during the Renaissance was, according to Hardt and Negri, a collapse into war and a relativisation of values as a new transcendent order imposed itself. Modernity henceforth operated through command and authority. A conflict between the creative immanent forces of modernity and a transcendent order that tempers and curbs these ambitions ensued. Citing Samir Amin, they claim that at this moment a Eurocentrism was born that cultivated the belief that Europeans could impose their civilisation across the world. Rather than fostering commonality, singularity and community, the decision to dominate and expropriate other populations became some of the cruel defining traits of European modernity. Born of crisis, modernity continued to be rocked by crises.

“Subjective assemblages […] pose a vision of democracy as in an absolutely horizontal social plane on which social bodies are set loose to destroy the strictures of predetermined social forms and discover their own ends, invent their own constitution” (Hardt and Negri, 1994: 288).

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35 Deleuze and Guattari develop their concept of the apparatus of capture with the aid of Samir Amin (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980: 436-7). See Samir Amin (1976).
II.i. the disciplinary apparatus

In the context of the modern nation-state, capacities to innovate, create and resist were strictly curtailed by the operation of a 'sovereignty machine'. Rather than cultivating the creative prowess of the multitude, it orders and regulates these bodies into an aggregate or mass. In fact, Hardt and Negri go so far as to say that eventually the sovereign state produces society. Correspondingly, Etienne Balibar claims that a necessarily complicitous triad of race, nation and culture that existed at that time (and continues to exist) meant that society was produced as an imagined community on the basis of a fictive ethnicity. The production and ordering of the people gradually became a more and more important role for the State. With the shift from a transcendent ordering function, a transcendent command function emerged, according to Foucault. This social formation is called the 'society of discipline'.

Expanding on these insights, Patton (2000) notes some primary features of the State-machine. It tends to create milieux of interiority in order to rule more effectively. Gridding or stratiﬁng social space, its operations mimic that of a metrical or numerical multiplicity. It creates divisions and distinctions. Moreover it operates as an apparatus of capture, capturing all kinds of ﬂows such as money, people, commodities. Extraction from the rich ﬂows of the socius is the modus operandi of all States.

When James Tully criticised various forms of constitutional theory, he did so by indicating the uniformity they imposed on a population which displayed their utter incapacity to cope with diversity. Interestingly Patton writes in similar fashion that, “[t]he operation of capture always involves two things: the constitution of a general space of comparison and the establishment of a centre

37 See also Benedict Anderson (1983).
of appropriation" (1994: 162). This comparative method is also integral to the workings of capitalism which functions on the basis of quantifying differential fluxes.

The society of sovereignty encapsulated in the era of Absolutist Monarchy must be distinguished from the sovereignty-machine of the modern nation-state, according to Hardt and Negri. "The realisation of modern sovereignty is the birth of biopower" (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 69). The answer to the question 'How does power function?' lies in an examination of the forces of the social field. The development of Foucault's idea of a disciplinary society challenged theoretical approaches that emphasised repression and ideology.

The notion of biopower is an important one. Fanon demonstrates the operation of biopolitics and biopower in raciological and colonial practices. Although different to the colonial machine, Michel Foucault's explication of the workings of what he called a disciplinary society may prove 'illuminating'. Foucault invented the concept of the apparatus (dispositif) to show how customs, habits and productive practices were not only regulated but produced (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 23). This is comprised of "a set of techniques for the exercise of power over bodies" (Patton, 1994: 160). De Landa explains Foucault's analysis of power by focusing on three main elements "systematic spatial partitioning, ceaseless inspection, and permanent registration" (1997: 159). Individuals were thus assigned to categories and marked in terms of deviation from a norm. Societies began to be mapped systematically. However, this story does not just concern the formalisation of processes and policies but also the informal practices that spread contagiously through different institutional hosts (160).

A society of discipline names a particular exercise of Power that cuts people off,

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38 My commentary on Foucault's work is derived primarily from Deleuze's and Hardt and Negri's observations. This is because it is their understanding of the relation of capitalism, State and the social field that is at the centre of my analysis.
39 In the case of sexuality it concerns the attempt to regulate behaviours and make bodies docile.
once more, from their capacities to act. The disciplinary diagram both traverses and is an effect of the social field. Power is not substantial, it is not a property to be possessed but is exercised; it is a strategy. And it always throws up counter-strategies of resistance. Deleuze notes that this kind of society is characterised by operations of allocation, classification, composition, normalisation (1986: 28). As a technology it produces a particular kind of reality. It concerns a particular way of acting on bodies, on a multiplicity. “In brief, power is not homogeneous but can be defined only by the particular points through which it passes” (25).

Correlating to our concept of Potestas, Foucault notes that “[d]iscipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience)” (1975: 138). Instead of existing solely through spectacular displays of violence and domination, power began to operate on the body through processes of normalisation. According to De Landa, from the eighteenth century European nation-states began to digest their minorities (162). Hechter (1975) calls this ‘internal colonialism’. Government Acts that transformed the status of English into an official language can be seen as one instance of this process of normalisation, or to twist the concept significantly, a becoming-major of a language.

Different institutions are, in Foucault’s example, traversed by a disciplinary diagram (what Deleuze and Guattari call an abstract machine). This is in itself unqualified yet it connects these varying mechanisms for imposing discipline and setting up boundaries of inclusion and exclusion such as schools, asylums and prisons. There are nonetheless differences between these two concepts, specifically in relation to their understanding of power and desire.

Deleuze (and Guattari) felt ill at ease with a description of microsystems in terms of power; they prefer to talk about the assembling of desire. Rather than a negative resistance, “[s]ystems of power would thus be components of assemblages. But assemblages would also comprise points (pointes) of deterritorialisation” (Deleuze, 1994). Power would be one component or
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dimension amongst many others in a collective assemblage. Still, Patton suggests that Foucault’s concept of apparatus is akin in many respects to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the assemblage (1994: 158). Their description of desire is, however, close to the concept of *potentia* that will be developed throughout this thesis.

Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of assemblages can be read, according to Patton, as a theory of power, but only if power is treated in this very specific sense as *potentia*. Patton tells us that this is where Deleuze and Guattari remove themselves from the remit of Foucault (1994: 159).

With an approach that neither resembles structuralism (because it does not refer to a common structure or a series of analogies that would underlie these statements), nor positions one domain (the economic for instance) in a determining relation with regard to all other domains as Marxists do, Deleuze and Guattari expand upon their machinic conception of society. They invoke the idea of an abstract machine that is not qualified, but rather indicates a new way of ordering or regulating a population. Abstract machines extract, they traverse different levels and give or do not give these levels an existence (Guattari 1992a: 35). Unlike structuralism which remains rooted in an identity induced by its static relations, abstract machines hook up different registers. An abstract machine can delimit the maximum possibilities of innovation of a group and the maximum of deterritorialisation. Systems of power are understood, in this context, as a diffuse heterogeneous multiplicity of microsystems at play in the social field.40

Gradually the State became the immanent realisation of the axiomatics of capital. It functions by over-coding of the surplus fluxes of money and labour rather than regimenting and centralising a cluster of groups through over-coding their codes. Rather than normalising, power becomes ever more constitutive of different modes of subjectification.

40 In a seminar, philosopher Nick Land once asked ‘what abstract machine selected the human?’ In terms of our anti-human humanism such humility is well placed to position us better in qualifying anthropocentric assumptions.
II.iii. the end of ideology

There is no universal capitalism, there is no capitalism in itself; capitalism is at the crossroads of all kinds of formations, it is neocapitalism by nature. It invents its eastern face and western face, and reshapes them both - all for the worst.


Like an eavesdropper who catches one phrase, Gayatri Spivak launches a rather vitriolic attack on Deleuze and Foucault on the basis of a conversation between them. This attack is instructive because it asks some necessary questions about their understanding of capitalism on the global scale. Instead she asks whether the subaltern can indeed speak and know their conditions as Deleuze and Foucault would seem to imply.

Spivak criticises the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari try to re-think questions of subjectivity. She believes they dismiss the critical concept of ideology in favour of a libidinal theory of desire. Her paper entitled ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ was initially called ‘Power, Desire, Interest’ (1988: 271).

A published conversation between Deleuze and Foucault called ‘Intellectuals and Power’ (1972) constitutes her main battering ram. As I indicated in my introduction she argues that, “Western intellectual production is, in many ways, complicit with Western international economic interests” (271). It is this side of the argument (rather than her own analysis and affiliation with Derrida) that I want to focus on.

Spivak contends that the West's critical discourse on the subject preserves, beneath the surface of subject-effects, the West’s pre-eminence as subject of knowledge. Therefore what initially appears as a critique of the sovereign subject is, in fact, the birth of what she calls a ‘Subject’. In the context of conversation these activist philosophers do not cover their ideological tracks as well as they might otherwise do. She draws two main points from their conversation. Firstly,
the “networks of power/desire/interest are so heterogeneous that their reduction to a coherent narrative is counterproductive [...]” (272); instead an ongoing critique is necessary. Secondly, “intellectuals must attempt to disclose and know the discourse of society’s Other” (272). Deleuze and Foucault ignore the question of ideology and their own implication in intellectual production.

She criticises their homogenisation of categories such as Maoists and workers while they specify the names of intellectuals, and feels that Deleuze kowtows to the notion of the workers’ struggle. By referring to the workers’ struggle in such a broad manner, Spivak claims that Deleuze ignores the mechanisms of global capitalism and the core-periphery relationship, articulating the workers’ struggle in terms of desire. She states that desire is a machine producing a leftover desiring subject (273), wilfully ignoring the Spinozistic impetus for the concept of desire that Deleuze and Guattari develop. They try to understand processes of emergence and develop a pre-personal conception of desire, rather than situating themselves on one side or other of a subject/object divide. Desire is not a determining interest.

Spivak accuses them of failing to consider the relationship of desire, power and subjectivity, the result of which is, in her view, an incapacity to articulate a theory of interests. Given the above relationship constituted one of the primary focuses of Anti-Oedipus, this appears a strange conjecture to make. Admittedly, Deleuze and Guattari’s conclusion is a provocative one: they claim that there is no ideology.

What she understands to be a romanticisation of the oppressed irritates Spivak tremendously, and the suggestion that the subaltern can speak and know their conditions strikes her not only as ludicrous but as an insidious form of neo-conservatism. The provocative idea that a theory is a toolbox is not read in the spirit of militancy with which Guattari wrote that phrase, but becomes emblematic of an intellectual grubbing about for tools of manual labour so as to appear more authentic. In a telling juxtaposition of snippets, Spivak writes
(allegedly citing Deleuze) "Because ‘the person who speaks and acts...is always a multiplicity’, no “theorizing intellectual...[or] party or [...] union” can represent “those who act and struggle” ’(275). This distortion is important, not only because it indicates a deliberate act of sabotage on the part of Spivak, but because it deals with the questions of the micropolitics of grassroots organisations that concerned Deleuze and (especially) Guattari. I want to discuss the Spivak cut-up and the original text in a moment; however, let us first contextualise this debate through Deleuze’s preface to Guattari’s book *Psychanalyse et transversalité* (1972).

The intermingling and interferences of a militant and a psychoanalyst in one person is pretty unusual; such a rarity was Guattari. Instead of concerning himself with debates about the unity of the self, Guattari announced ‘we are all groupuscules’, referring both to the group and the individual. Subjugated groups are epitomised by a hierarchical and pyramidal form of organisation which prevents certain statements and whose identity is founded on the exclusion of others. It operates through stereotypes and is both cut off from the real and from subjectivity. Subject-groups, conversely, make transversal connections confounding attempts to totalise and hierarchise them. They are praxiological and create their own agendas in a pragmatic way operating horizontally rather than vertically. Such modes of organising were publicised by the feminist movement and are seen as a key democratic move for many grassroots and single-issue groups. To respond to Spivak - the point is not whether the subaltern can speak and know their fate, but how can the forms of domination that preclude effective organisations of group-subjects be challenged. This is an ethical challenge that Spivak does not rise to.

A theorising intellectual, for us, is no longer a subject, a representing or representative consciousness. Those who act and struggle are no longer represented, either by a group or a union that appropriates their right to stand as their conscience. Who speaks and acts? It is always a multiplicity, even within the person who speaks and acts. All of us are "groupuscules".


The causal connections that Spivak attributes to Deleuze have vanished. In their
place is an ethical call to reconsider modes of social organisation and activism. In my reading of *Difference and Repetition*, I will address the question of why Deleuze ‘conflates’ the two senses of representation (*vorstellen* and *darstellen*) by examining his critique of a philosophy of representation. It is a deliberate ploy on his part. Spivak argues that running these two concepts together “especially in order to say that beyond both is where oppressed subjects speak, act, and know for themselves, leads to an essentialist utopian politics” (276). Throughout this thesis I will argue that is precisely by lifting the veil of false consciousness that we can think about new forms of collective subjectivity and practices that traverse different domains. This obviously involves a change in both material and incorporeal Universes. Surely acting under the aegis of an intellectual’s ‘superior’ (though impractical) knowledge mirrors accounts of aid money being used to send Western technology experts to Africa in order to teach communities living in the middle of the Sahara desert how to be carpenters.

If, as Spivak seems to suggest, Deleuze’s (and Foucault’s) conception of ‘women’ were a monolithic one, portraying women as oppressed with an unfractured subjectivity that allows them to speak for themselves against a monolithic “same system” (278), I would agree that their ideas were impoverished and ineffectual. However it is the *specificity* of differences and power formations that they strive to articulate, as well as the idea that there is no hold-all ready-made solution for political struggles. Power and desire are not totalising (279) but evaluative concepts that do not clandestinely restore subjective essentialism. She maintains that by positioning themselves as transparent in this relay, intellectuals abnegate their responsibility to the oppressed. Furthermore, she declares that they solidify and mystify a conception of the Other as Other of Europe in a kind of intellectual imperialism. This strikes me as a far cry from Deleuze’s enthusiasm when he says that he thinks he has developed a concept of the Other - as a possible world (not a Third World). Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari centre some of their core concepts in direct critique of European ethnocentrism.

Although Spivak, as an important post-colonial and non-Western theorist, could
have an important role in pointing out the blindspots of the Western tradition, she goes about this in a negative fashion. It is difficult to find in her account any ethico-political value in terms of an impact on social practices. Spivak states "[t]he subaltern cannot speak. There is no virtue in global laundry lists with 'woman' as a pious item. Representation has not withered away. The female intellectual as intellectual has a circumscribed task which she must not disown with a flourish" (308). Deleuze and Guattari ask 'what prevents the subaltern from speaking and how can this be changed?' If this is what Spivak calls a dangerous utopianism then so be it.

II.iv. creeping capitalism and aspects of assemblages

Lewis Mumford's term 'megamachine' becomes a vital concept in Deleuze and Guattari's conceptual apparatus. Although their machinism is often read as a metaphor, this categorically is what it is not. Social machines produce subjectivity through institutions such as education and health, as well as through the mass-media. These social machines form the different constellations called Collective Equipments. (Guattari, 1992c: 104). Similarly technology and information invest human subjectivity "not only within its memory and intelligence, but within its sensibility, affects and unconscious mechanisms" (1992a: 4).

Deleuze and Guattari (in conjunction with Foucault and others) introduced this concept of 'Collective Equipment' in order to discuss different kinds of social formations. These Collective Equipments bear a special relationship to capitalism, since they are non-productive, constituting the element of anti-production in the socius. This aspect is important to make Deleuze and Guattari's conception of capitalism tenable. Although capitalism can shatter traditional identities, it also needs to produce 'docile' subjects to ensure production is placed in the service of capitalism and not revolution. It only ever operates as a relative deterritorialisation.

Deterritorialisation is a word frequently used by Deleuze and Guattari. It concerns, in this context, the destruction of old social territories, traditions,
embracing difference

identities, values and practices through the expansive movements of capitalism, literally 'leaving a territory'. However this process is always tempered by a corresponding reterritorialisation that draws up identities and traditions anew in the most artificial of manners.

decoded flows that the State is unable to contain are key to the axiomatics of capitalism. The encounter of the abstract essence of wealth combined with the abstract essence of labour creates an axiomatic of decoded flows, i.e. capitalism. This is one of generalised equivalence and constitutes a deterritorialisation that the State cannot compete with. Concerned solely with a set of formal relations, "the axiomatic deals directly with purely functional elements and relations whose nature is not specified, and which are realized in highly varied domains immediately. [...] The immanent axiomatic finds in the domains it moves through so many models, termed models of realization (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980: 454). The term 'axiomatic' is not used here as a metaphor but is introduced to distinguish the movements of capitalism from operations of coding and over-coding. Axiomatics considers relations and elements in a purely functional manner, not as qualified elements.

There is an isomorphy between States, social formations and capitalism, because capitalism is an axiomatic. Rather than a convergence toward a homogenisation of the world market, heterogeneous social formations can coexist. States cease to exist as the transcendent paradigms of an overcoding but become the immanent models of realisation for an axiomatic of decoded flows. "It is thus proper to State deterritorialization to moderate the superior deterritorialization of capital and to provide the latter with compensatory reterritorializations" (455). Because capitalism obeys its own immanent laws, we should not think that the only limits it confronts are the limits of the universe. Capitalism confronts and displaces its own limits by adding and subtracting axioms as appropriate.

Guattari argues that the State is a part of the capitalist axiomatics because it always reterritorialises. Otherwise fluxes pass a certain threshold and become
revolutionary. This axiomatics will take up any archaism and re-invent it. Reterritorialisation is a neo-territorialisation, it is not just the resurrection of old archaisms (Deleuze, 15/2/72).

II.v. managing the diverse; modulations of control

In an interview with Deleuze, Negri explores his suggestion that we examine in detail three kinds of power; “sovereign power, disciplinary power, and the control of “communication” that’s on the way to becoming hegemonic” (Negri in Deleuze, 1990b: 174). This ultimate proposition serves as the backbone for his book with Michael Hardt, Empire. To suggest that sovereignty has a new form, the form of Empire, is a contentious proposition. It is not within the scope of this thesis to assess the empirical validity of such an assertion; however, I want to investigate some of the claims they make. According to Hardt and Negri, Empire does not resemble imperialism. Although the United States has a privileged role, the movements of Empire are deterritorialising and decentralising; unlike imperialism, the accumulation of populations and territories is not a motivational force for its expansionism. Precipitated by the resistance struggles of decolonisation, this new form of sovereignty brings with it a New World Order. It designates a shift in sovereignty from the nation-state to supranational organisations which henceforth operate under a single ‘logic of rule’. For Hardt and Negri, the fundamental opposition is thus between Empire and the creative force of the multitude.

Instead of picking a path through the tricky claims about Empire that they are making, I want to concentrate on their diagnosis of global capitalism and the production of capitalist subjectivity whose mode of valorisation rotates on the axis of profit. Capitalism has become truly global. “Who is controlling the capitalist chaos today? The stock market, multinationals, and to a lesser extent, the powers of the state! For the most part decerebrated organizations!” (Guattari, 1992d: 265).

Deleuze, Guattari, Foucault, Negri and Hardt all contend that disciplinary
societies reached a point of crisis some time around the beginning of the twentieth century. The sites of confinement that typified societies of discipline, like the family and the prison, are now breaking down. What they are being replaced with is perhaps a more terrifying and all-consuming mode of organisation that no longer moulds people in a hylomorphic fashion, but infiltrates them through and through, taking life as its object. This is called modulation. The concept of modulation is taken from Simondon’s work which we will examine further in chapter 4. In this context it refers to an operation of power that is entirely diffuse pervading the interiority of the system. The arrival of interactive television will not only bring convenience and specialised programming, but it will develop a profile of our viewing and purchasing habits enabling a discrete profile of each household to be created, and a corresponding unique marketing campaign to be waged in the living room.

In disciplinary societies, the social space was striated; it was segmented and regimented. The factory is a prime example of mechanisms of enclosure. Its walls have now crumbled and been smoothed to a pulp. In this new society of control the striation and logic of the factory has spread investing the entirety of social space, but the regulations operate on a micro level of fissures. One of the ultimate disciplinary institutions, the prison, is increasingly a privatised and corporatised affair providing an abundant source of cheap, indeed practically unpaid, labour whose work is paraded as an exercise in rehabilitation. The growth of occupancy in U.S. prisons to over two million has surely not a solely peripheral relation to this phenomenon. (The young African-American man has been as disproportionately represented in prisons as on death-row.)

41 Evidently the organisation of work throughout the globe is extremely heterogeneous and I am indicating one aspect of a shift in the operations of capitalism. This does not mean other capitalisms and forms of exploitation have been supplanted. Slave and child labour are still frighteningly prevalent. In addition the enormous power of transnational corporations has created even more disciplined and ill-paid environments throughout much of the world. Nonetheless the ghettoisation and marginalisation of labour is not exclusive to the so-called Third World but rumbles under the seams of all ‘democratic’ nations, especially when the presence of these non-citizens is ignored, though exploited, by maintaining their marginal and precarious status as illegal immigrants providing a huge revenue for these economies.
Social relationships and management have changed tremendously with the introduction of new forms of technology. The worker has become a cyborg in a more pervasive manner than before. Organising and disciplining labour is no longer a main focus of capitalism. Labour is becoming self-organising.

Rather than simply regulating life from without, power invests life from within. For Hardt and Negri this alteration of the workings of capitalism names a transformation in its relation to labour. Previously labour was formally subsumed under capital, now it is really subsumed (1994: 258). As Eric Alliez explains, rather than a capitalism of production there is a capitalism of circulation and communication. Such a change means there is no longer the same relation to an enclosed workspace or product. For example, work is increasingly carried out in the home. The practice of domination is now that of “a purely immanent social control by universal marketing in continuous variation and modulation (with the 3 M’s ruling the supposed New International Order: Money, Media and Military)” (1997: 86).

Marx’s influence on Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of capitalism is a sustained affair; his reference to capitalism as an immanent system that constantly comes up against and overcomes its limits, only to come against them once more “because its fundamental limit is Capital itself” (Deleuze 1990b: 171) guides their own theory of capitalism. This is, they argue, a system that “produces a surplus by means of the axiomatic conjugation of decoded flows of labour, money, commodities and increasingly, information” (Patton 2000: 7). This axiomatic system always manages to include another axiom. For example, the force of organised labour that threatened capitalism at the beginning of the twentieth century was either crushed brutally (as in the United States) or has become a trade union movement that is, today, part of the managerial process of sustaining productivity.

Eugene Holland (1999) explains that the social organisation of capitalism (and this is the feature distinguishing it from other modes of social production) does
not operate through coding or over-coding; in other words qualitative distinctions. Capitalism works through comparisons of quantitative fluxes, such as labour, goods and money. Axiomatic organisation is meaningless; it merely conjoins flows that have been quantified. Capitalist subjectivity is produced on a grand scale. Guattari calls it a laminated, mass-mediatised and reduced subjectivity which loses its singularity (1992b: 51).

The real subsumption of society means that the State becomes immanent to the capitalist process. Keith Ansell Pearson draws our attention to the generalised machinic enslavement that occurs when capitalism moves from "'striated' capital (effected by modern state apparatuses) [to] 'smooth' capital (effected by the multinationals and globalization)" (1999: 219). Rather than lamenting a 'take-over' of the machines, Ansell Pearson explores some of the implications of this for a machinic subjectivity, remarking that within the movements of capitalist production machinic subjectivity is itself rhizomatic and unpredictable (220). He uses these insights to elucidate a 'post-human' ethics. Correctly noting that this does not involve a disappearance of the human, he explores the possibilities of the human. Importantly, Ansell Pearson argues that Deleuze's rhizomatics does not negate history and politics, but opens them to a 'creative evolution', reconfiguring these questions.42

Massumi says that the capitalist relation "[...] consists of four dense points - commodity/consumer, worker/capitalist [...]" (1992: 132). This real subsumption involves capitalism both constantly pushing against its limits and expanding geographically. "This [is] a neo-colonialist movement imposing the capitalist relation of unequal exchange on all the nations of the world [...]" (132). But colonisation does not stop there, internal colonisation of private space becomes not only fair game but constitutes the intensive expansion of capitalism. Capitalism does not burst forth ex nihilo. It effects incorporeal transformations on

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42 Ansell Pearson (1999) wedz ethology and ethics as he explains a way of thinking both before and beyond the human. His account resonates with Simondon's conceptions of the pre-individual and transindividual helping us to understand the concrete nature of this enterprise that examines the non-human becomings of the human.
bodies factoring them into a relationship of generalised equivalence. But its functioning is not as an absolute cause. It has a parasitical relation to the other institutions operative in the social field and works on these pre-existing arrangements. This relation is what Massumi calls a 'quasi-cause'.

I expressed a concern in the last chapter that postmodernism may be just a form of neo-conservatism. This concern is also articulated by Massumi and Guattari on different occasions. Postmodernity occurs, Massumi contends, once the socius has reached a saturation point with capitalism (133). The problem is that human identity has now become effectively commodified. Subcodes or subtexts of subcultures are targeted by media and marketing companies. The battles for recognition by diverse groups are configured into categories or uniformised as subjects.

Under capitalism, the “denizen of the neoconservative transnation-state” (134) can cut and paste identities and social codes as quickly as he or she can purchase the accessories. Images float through the ether plucked out by the ready and waiting consumer. Although there is something liberating about such a transformation in modes of thinking, bell hooks points out that a critical and political edge is annihilated at the very time when resistance to increasing commodification and colonisation of affects is most important. The surfaces ranged forth to be operated on by capitalism know no boundaries of endo- or exo-skeleton. What can, will. But this is not innocuous, or liberatory.

Bateson once said that there was an ecology of bad ideas just as there was an ecology of weeds. This provocative image was drawn upon by Guattari in *The Three Ecologies* (1989b) when he expressed the necessity for an ecosophy to deal with the pollutions of psyche, socius and nature. Although differences may proliferate under capitalism, it becomes increasingly difficult for this to occur in relation to any mode of valorisation bar economic values.

If, as Massumi believes, subjectivity has become isomorphic to capital, its cutting
edges or mutational capacities are co-opted. Like body-snatchers or replicants, subliminal messaging and modification prevent not the discovery of ‘who we really are’ but the proliferation of modes of valorisation outside the axiomatics of capitalism. The deterriorralisations and post-human morphings of the body are simply recuperated into the capitalist framework. An all-pervasive cynicism accompanies this real subsumption of existence by capitalism.

Lukács’ (1922) contemplations on the reification of second nature seem relevant in this context. The glaciation of the capitalist process has created a glaze that blinds people to the possibility of things being otherwise. His reading of Nature also presents a social Nature that appears immutable and ahistorical. Time and space are suspended, and a cyclical movement provides the prospect of the inevitability of more of the same. All this in spite of the dire situation that much of humanity finds itself in. Bodies are systematically excluded from a politics of experimentation. Affects are for sale. The pre-personal is a fashion item. The collective has been forgotten.

*A line can be drawn around a piece of territory, and all the things inside the line described and remembered. What happens when the territory is so big it covers the world?*


Like Deleuze and Guattari, Hardt and Negri understand capitalism to be anti-foundational and anti-essentialist. “Circulation, mobility, diversity, and mixture are its very conditions of possibility” (2000: 64) and this proliferation of difference is at the heart of capitalism. The importance of the nation-state has declined as it has increasingly become complicit in fulfilling the demands of the global marketplace and military-industrial complexes (Guattari, 1989b: 29).

Marketing seeks out Unique Selling Points in order to create a vast array of differences amongst the consumer market so that it might target them all the better. The new mode of management is ‘diversity management’. Capitalism then appears as a creative continuum caught up in an interminable quest for an eternal
production of the new. It is in this context that a celebration of difference must be tempered. Difference, hybridity, heterogeneity are not good in and of themselves. Rhizomatic connections are emblematic of the new ‘flat’ organisations that are multiplying, seeking to deal more efficiently with change: ‘To go with the flow all the more’.

Perhaps you could even say that contemporary culture is so universalized that we are all tourists in our own countries - in our own backyards - moving about our own homes, even, aspirated by prejudice and sentiment - but even so, tourists! Who has any sympathy for them? They don’t go looking for experience, they go looking to have their preconceptions confirmed. They go unprepared, because that’s the state that prejudice leaves you in. Explorers and adventurers know this and go prepared to be flexible.


Although in disciplinary societies life was taken as an object, power-relations shift in societies of control to become even more diffuse. Power is effected directly onto bodies and brains throughout daily life. Working in a call centre makes the brain-database coupling a key ingredient for a successful and smooth transmission of information. The movements of the body are observed, monitored and compared with frightening regularity. It is an assembly-line of the soul. Close circuit television cameras track the movement of the worker home, purchases by smart-card en route are noted, entrance into the house is greeted by a large pile of tailor-made direct mail customised to appeal to the nuances of her well documented personal tastes. The production of subjectivity becomes ever more intense and affective.

Deleuze worries about the multiplication of clichés in mass-mediatised society. These effect sensori-motor responses that operate in a manner similar to Spinoza’s conception of the passive imagination. They deal in stereotypes and abstractions rather than grasping the abstract and singular. Guattari once said ‘Pas de vagues; juste des vagues’ [No waves, just fashion] in dismay at this changing face of social organisation.
In this mass-mediatised era where the globe is underlaid with cables, overlaid with satellite communication and waylaid by the crackling of messages winging through the air with Blue Chip technologies and mobile communications towers, the notion of a pre-existent territory loses some of its pull. All territories are produced artificially by this capitalist machine. “From all this results the paradoxical cocktail of hyper-segregation and generalized communication” (Guattari, 1985b: 124). The lack of response and mobilisation to factors such as environmental degradation, poverty, banalisation of the media, and ongoing conflicts astounds Guattari. We are suffering from an ecological crisis, a pollution of our minds, collectivities and nature. How can we re-activate another kind of subjectivity in this context, a subjectivity Guattari calls ‘processual’ because it produces its own existence through a process of singularisation? What does it take to learn to see the world differently? What will the nature of a new political praxis be?

Hardt and Negri argue that although institutions are everywhere in crisis this only means that the entire social terrain has been divested of any difference of inside and outside. This is mirrored by the affective, qualitative, immaterial nature of labour that impacts upon both mental and corporeal realms.

II.vi. hybridity and difference; a new world order?

What we most lack is a belief in the world, we’ve quite lost the world, it’s been taken from us. If you believe in the world you precipitate events, however inconspicuous, that elude control, you engender new space-times, however small their surface or volume. It’s what you call pietas. Our ability to resist control, or our submission to it, has to be assessed at the level of our every move. We need both creativity and a people.

The struggle for subjectivity presents itself, therefore, as the right to difference, variation and metamorphosis.


*Your nationality is an idea your ancestors had, invested and reinvested for generations until it seems huge and real. Do you have roots? Are you a tree or a human? Can you carry your nation with you when you go?*


Let us examine some of the implications of this idea that capitalism now feeds off, manages, and cultivates differences in the context of our previous chapter. This focused on the oppressive manner in which differences had been contained and nullified, or conversely exaggerated to the point of contradiction. Different theorists professed a desire to positivise difference and diversity and we explored some of their strategies for doing so. We saw how these thinkers grappled with the aftermath of colonial regimes.

In *Empire*, Hardt and Negri also discuss the question of colonialism. They agree with Gilroy that “the crisis of modernity has from the beginning had an intimate relation to racial subordination and colonization” (2000: 114) and suggest that European identity was constructed on the negative foundation of its Other, not only economically but psychologically. The glamorisation and exoticisation of Otherness can find its sordid roots in this territory. Fanon explained very clearly the dialectical nature of this infernal colonial machine that created racial difference. It creates a Manichaeistic universe. It goes so far as to dehumanise the colonised.

Although “[r]eality always presents proliferating multiplicities” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 128), colonialism organises and produces a dialectical relation of reality. In other words, the categories it draws up function in a negative relation to one another. The colonial encounter is not an encounter of two segments of a dichotomous world - the European and the Other. These are categories produced through the colonial machine and are not pre-existent. (This is one of the reasons why Gilroy claims we need to move beyond racialised thinking rather than...
essentialising and positivising the category of “race”.) The segregated subject of the European coloniser identifies her/himself as essentially better than the others from whom s/he is segregated. This fixed sense of identity precludes any notion of diasporic and nomadic subjectivity.43

Hardt and Negri state that racisms have intensified and, far from waning, are on the increase. Instead of proposing a difference in kind between “races”, “races” are distinguished by difference in degree (from a norm). Racism then appears as the result of mechanisms of differential inclusion. It is in reaction to this that various claims to essentialist identities have emerged.

Still, they claim that despite enormous suffering and bloodshed, the increase in communication and intensification of movements of that era of colonialism carried within them the lingering traces of a utopianism that would carry humanity to a higher power. They still see the birth of a globalised humanity, rather than one stuck in exclusionary crevices of particularism and localism, as a birth to be nourished. Ambiguity can be found in thinkers like Las Casas, who controversially believed that “humankind is one and equal” (116) (as did Toussaint L'Ouverture and Marx). However these thinkers failed to conceive of a humankind that is one and many.

Gilroy and hooks both warned us of the commodification of difference in global capitalism. It is at this junction that Hardt and Negri’s critique becomes especially interesting. Postmodernism and postcolonialism, they announce, have quite simply got the wrong enemy. By looking backwards at old forms of domination they have failed to notice a different organisation of Power and a shift from ‘societies of discipline’ to ‘societies of control’.

It is this shift of paradigm that concerns Hardt and Negri - how Power mutated to become a rule through the “differential hierarchies of the hybrid and fragmentary subjectivities that these theorists celebrate [...]” (138) so that the

43 See Deleuze and Guattari (1972a: 103-5).
EMBRACING DIFFERENCE

strategies of resistance (to old forms of domination) “unwittingly reinforce the new strategies of rule!” (138). Positivising diversity and revealing the racism and sexism inherent in supposedly neutral systems of domination were vital tools of critique. Similarly the fragmentation of identity challenged the hierarchical nature entailed in the imposition of a sovereignty of both subject and state. These critiques centre on what Hardt and Negri call the first tradition of modernity, that of the Enlightenment. They say “[t]he affirmation of hybridities and the free play of differences across boundaries, however, is liberatory only in a context where power poses hierarchy exclusively through essential identities, binary divisions, and stable oppositions” (142). A pick n’ mix attitude toward identity buys right into the new capitalism. The strategies of liberation that are proposed are impotent in the face of this new order of rule.

The New Racism that we discussed in chapter 1 then becomes paradigmatic of this shift to what Hardt and Negri call imperial society and I call ‘societies of control’. The mutability of difference coagulates into cultural distinctions. Segregation and separation are maintained, though the hierarchies dissipate. Racism then becomes a matter of differential inclusion. It is interesting to note that Hardt and Negri do not, as Gilroy (2000: 42-3) does, investigate the innovations in biotechnology and genetics as they formulate their theory of imperial racism. He points to the new technologies of the self that have emerged through various new methods of imaging. In so doing he enriches a Foucauldian conception of reading and inscribing the body, something Foucault never examined in the context of “race”. As Gilroy points out, modernity has displayed an uncanny ability to knit together science and superstition, especially when trying to justify the active differentiation that is “race” (2000: 53). Yet it may also be that differential racism is no longer an adequate rendition of the complex refrains in population genetics that once again distinguish groups on the basis of biological difference.
II.vii. the end of history, the demise of becomings: claustrophobic capital

Capital smashes all other modes of valorisation. [...] There is an ethical choice in favour of the richness of the possible, an ethics and politics of the virtual that decorporealises and deterritorialises contingency, linear causality and the pressure of circumstances and significations which besiege us. It is a choice for processuality, irreversibility and resingularisation.


There’s no democratic state that’s not compromised to the very core by its part in generating human misery. What’s so shameful is that we’ve no sure way of maintaining becomings, or still more of arousing them, even within ourselves.


Hardt and Negri’s analysis draws heavily upon Deleuze and Guattari’s work. They praise them for undertaking an ontology of production and for their materialism, but criticise them for being “able to conceive positively only the tendencies toward continuous movement and absolute flows, and thus in their thought, too, the creative elements and radical ontology of the social remain insubstantial and impotent” (2000: 28). This philosophy of production remains as a consequence superficial and ephemeral “as a chaotic indeterminate horizon marked by the ungraspable event” (28). Deleuze and Guattari have a sophisticated understanding of capitalism that Hardt and Negri brush past in their eagerness to contend that we have entered the Age of Empire. The latters’ discussion of difficult concepts such as the virtual, singularities and event is weak. In an eagerness to remain strict materialists, Hardt and Negri may have burned their boats in advance of sailing. By refusing to take seriously the pre-individual nature of concepts like singularity, they side with history, not with becomings. They are too rooted in the actual. In addition they remain anthropocentric in their analysis; their allegiance to living labour means they cannot comprehend Deleuze and Guattari’s unnatural and rhizomorphic concepts. This is not to question the importance of living labour; it is rather to approach it in a different way: transversally.
Traditional oppositional class divisions have collapsed. The labour market is traversed by all sorts of divisions and the tertiary sector has become ever more dominant. The fragility and insecurity that permeates the mass of society is especially pronounced in the case of groups like the unemployed, the sans-papiers, contract or temporary workers, enslaved workers and the chronically marginalised. Guattari agrees that we need a minimum social guarantee (1985b: 128), but he goes further. Rather than solely focusing on living labour he develops the concept of the machine. Machines produce heterogeneous universes of references, resisting the homogenization of capitalist subjectivity.

For Guattari it is precisely through this idea of a constructed, productive and artificial desire that is pre-personal and machinic that we can create a 'way out'. He says "Desire appears to me as a process of singularity, as a point of proliferation and creation of the possible in the heart of a constituted system. These processes can pass through the stages of marginality, of becomings that are "becomings-minor" which disengage the nucleus of singularity" (1985b: 128). This event surges, imperceptible, an atmospheric mutation, changing the field of possibility, subjectivity, Life. Earlier I discussed the primacy given to the external relation in Deleuze's work; the relation has a reality of its own that does not depend on pre-existing terms. It engenders terms. This is the process that Guattari articulates.

By describing the mechanisms of societies of control, Hardt and Negri inspire both vigilance and wariness when confronted with the plea to simply affirm difference. The temptation to automatically attribute a revolutionary status to concepts such as heterogeneity or the rhizome is thwarted by the awareness that this is precisely how societies of control operate. This universal transmutation or modulation brings together arenas, such as family, school, and army that were previously separated. Capitalism is increasingly directed toward communication and information technologies. "The communications industries integrate the imaginary and the symbolic within the biopolitical fabric, not merely putting them at the service of power but actually integrating them into its very functioning"
(2000: 15). It invests life from within. But a constant reminder of the ethical failure of this system is that “capitalism still keeps three quarters of humanity in extreme poverty, too poor to have debts and too numerous to be confined: control will have to deal not only with vanishing frontiers, but with mushrooming shantytowns and ghettos” (Deleuze, 1990b: 181). There is a myth of *the* market that is universal amongst neo-liberal theorists. In fact there are many markets sustained in concordance through power formations. Other modes of valorisation are dominated by the economic mode of valorisation and production for the sake of production.

Hardt and Negri are inconclusive once they feel compelled to suggest how new modes of subjectification can be generated in the era of global capitalism. By depriving themselves of an Outside, they flounder in hope that Empire’s crises will proffer more spaces of resistance, more vacuoles in a suffocating infusion of capitalism into the entirety of the social space.

This disappearance of an Outside, the possible of the possible, makes it extremely difficult to see how Hardt and Negri’s sporadic examples can offer any resistance to Empire, or global integrated capitalism. “The modern dialectic of inside and outside has been replaced by a play of degrees and intensities, of hybridity and artificiality” (2000: 187-8). However, the radicality of a philosophy of immanence is not just centred on the notion of an immanent movement but concerns the immanence *of* immanence. Gathering the fuel of intensive discontent will not blast through the remit of capitalism in the manner they suggest. After all, if capitalism has the unnatural capacity to always include another axiom, it draws within it the point where it is challenged most. And this is what worries me the most about their account. It folds philosophy and capitalism onto one another as movements of deterritorialisation, the two becoming blurred and virtually indistinguishable. What they call the mysticism of Spinoza’s concept of beatitudo is in fact the very factor that differentiates capitalism from philosophy. Capitalism is a relative deterritorialisation, while philosophy is an absolute deterritorialisation.
There is an implicit evolutionism and ethnocentrism in Hardt and Negri's account partially because they see the progress through history as one of increasing improvements in the lot of humankind (even if these are not immediately evident), and partially because a residual Marxist teleology gives them an unwarranted faith that the contradictions of the system will resolve themselves eventually all for the best. Unlike Deleuze and Guattari they do not have a conception of metastability that, contrary to the notion of a realisable possible, develops the conception of a field of potentiality engendering a disparity in a system, opening up other possibilities that may be actualised. There was no inevitability to the path of history that led us to our present situation, and nor is a better future guaranteed. It must be constructed.

Although I agree that diversity and difference are superficially celebrated by capitalism, this is no cause to abandon a positivisation of difference. I want to reconfigure the question in order to consider not just human difference and diversity but a philosophical conception of difference that will enable us to think the pre-individual and transindividual; in other words, the non-human becomings of the human. Whilst they attempt to develop a conception of the cyborg or human/machine coupling, Hardt and Negri do not sufficiently explore this aspect of their 'anti-human humanism'. Finally I want to address one more important criticism that can be laid at the feet of Deleuze and Guattari. This comes from Alain Badiou.
II.viii. the changing whole of the face of capitalism

As converter and capturer, the State does not just relativize movement, it reimplants absolute movement. It does not just go from the smooth to the striated, it reconstitutes smooth space; it reimplants smooth in the wake of the striated. It is true that this new nomadism accompanies a worldwide war machine whose organization exceeds the State apparatuses and passes into energy, military-industrial, and multinational complexes. We say this as a reminder that smooth space and the form of exteriority do not have an irresistible revolutionary calling but change meaning drastically depending on the interactions they are a part of and the concrete conditions of their exercise or establishment [...] 


When Badiou criticises Deleuze’s ‘Bergsonian’ philosophy his underlying concern is, I believe, his suspicion of a complicitous relationship between capitalism and philosophy. Deleuze and Guattari are aware of the risks of this ethics of experimentation and show in the above quote that ‘smooth space’ (or difference, rhizomes, and heterogeneity for that matter) cannot be automatically valorised. One has to examine the specific conditions of the functioning of different assemblages. The allegation of complicity is a serious one. In chapter 1 bell hooks and Paul Gilroy warned us of the commodification of difference. Given Deleuze maintains his philosophy is practical - he touts a functionalist understanding of philosophy asking always ‘does it work?’ - are his own ideas not only captured by the movements of capitalism, but do they consolidate its potent reign?

Deleuze and Badiou both try to think the event. The event, as we know, is co-terminous with a space of transformation in Deleuze’s work. It marks a qualitative change in a system escaping from, yet paradoxically subsisting alongside, history. Badiou’s Event derives from set theory, rather than from the differential calculus Deleuze is so fond of. Like *Das Ding* it is the Unnameable or the Undecidable. It can only be made coherent in retrospect and it marks a definite rupture in a system.44 The French revolution is an event. ‘A laugh’ is certainly not. Yet, despite the apparent banality of Deleuze’s conception of the

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44 See the thoughtful article entitled ‘Stellar Void or Cosmic Animal’ by Ray Brassier on the Badiou Deleuze relation and the Badioudian concept of the event as rupture.
event, this concept can, as we will see, be put to radical work.

Badiou describes Deleuze as a philosopher of the virtual; a thinker of the One-All. The Bergson-inspired concept of virtual multiplicity recurs in different guises throughout Deleuze's and Guattari's work. In *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (1983) Deleuze develops a concept of the Whole as Relation, as the Open. "The Whole does not attempt to unify fragments, it does not totalise, "if the whole is not giveable it is because it is the Open, and because its nature is to change constantly, or to give rise to something new, in short, to endure” (1983: 9). The almost kaleidoscopic ever-changing continuum of Deleuze's philosophy appears, at first glance, to resemble the movements of capitalism. The open system of capitalism seems to replace the relatively closed system of the State where unity was imposed. But a closer examination reveals that all is not as it seems.

In the logic of sets an element is either included or it is not. A logic of virtual multiplicities makes such delineation fuzzy. A virtual multiplicity as an event or haecceity then bears a peculiar relationship to the actual; as incorporeal it is eternal and singular, yet irreversible.

Badiou seems to wonder whether Deleuze's concept of the event leaves us bereft of any possibility of rupturing the system. No event can enter like a void slicing through social reality mimicking a Lucio Fontana painting, providing an absolute end and absolute beginning all at once. Deleuze's event resembles rather Anish Kapoor's extraordinary blue void sculpture entrapping the eye, confounding space and time, seducing. In this way, Deleuze works with the concept of virtual multiplicity, a key inheritance from Bergson, to try to figure out the conditions for the production of the new. Badiou, however, would argue that this is a distortion of Deleuze, philosopher of the One-All.

Brassier's reading of the Deleuze/Badiou encounter arrives at a damning conclusion. He suggests that Deleuze's philosophising disguises a political covenant with the "transcendent global sovereignty of Capital" (2000: 20); an
allegation I made with regard to Hardt and Negri. He asks whether an ethics of amor fati, mimicking the self-affirmation of the One, can preclude resistance to the processes of deterritorialisation of global integrated capitalism? Moreover, how can a ‘relative’ deterritorialisation of Capital be distinguished from the ‘absolute’ deterritorialisation of philosophy? “Does Capital merely mime the logic of nomadic distribution or does nomadic distribution in fact mime the logic of Capital?” (Brassier, 2000: 208-9). The ascesis of the purified automaton may in fact be participating in this generalised machinic enslavement. An apologia for the status quo appears embedded in this reading of Deleuze. Equivocal plurality appears to be sacrificed on the altar of univocity.

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari describe a multiplicity as rhizomatic and flat. It is defined by deterritorialisation or a line of flight. But what marks the difference between multiplicity and capitalism? Is not capitalism the multiplicity par excellence, cross-feeding differences, spreading its tentacles and creating connections throughout the globe? Why do Deleuze and Guattari continue to resist capitalism with such ferocity given it is the very exercise of the operations of deterritorialisation that they applaud? Does Deleuze and Guattari’s work fall into the trap of fighting the wrong enemy?

Although Hardt and Negri argue that the new form of domination, corresponding to ‘societies of control’, operates in a smooth space, they do not explore the different readings of smooth space suggested by Deleuze and Guattari. Like Hardt and Negri, Deleuze and Guattari draw upon Samir Amin in order to develop their idea of an ‘ecumenical organisation’ spreading itself through a diverse set of social formations. This ecumenical organisation does not progressively homogenise, or totalise, but it takes on the consistency of the diverse. However, this movement also spawns its own marginal groups, what they call ‘war machines’.45

The objection that international capitalism tends toward a homogenisation of all

45 A concept affiliated to the idea of the nomos that I will discuss later.
embracing difference

Social formations is responded to by Deleuze and Guattari in the following manner: insofar as capitalism constitutes an axiomatic (in terms of production for the market) States and all other social formations tend to become “isomorphic in their capacity as models of realization [...]” (1980: 436). However, isomorphy is not the same as homogeneity. Capitalism always surpasses the State in terms of its sheer power to tolerate (and encourage) a process of deterritorialisation. States “in capitalism, are not cancelled out but change form and take on a new meaning: models of realization for a world-wide axiomatic that exceeds them” (454). The State moderates the deterritorialisation of capital.

Contemporary features of power direct our attention to the micro-operations that modulate and normalise language, desire, movement, and so on. The birth of ‘societies of control’ does not alleviate but aggravates the intensity of these operations of subjection and enslavement. However, because capitalism operates on the basis of an axiomatics, it does not occupy the kind of smooth space that Hardt and Negri argue it does. An axiomatics is a way of ordering and stemming lines of flight and mastering the flows of the socius; this is why Deleuze and Guattari call capitalism a ‘relative deterritorialisation’.

“Capitalism confronts its own limits and simultaneously displaces them” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980: 463). The exertion of pressure by consumer and progressive movements has led to the (at least nominal) inclusion of an ethical/environmental axiom in recent years. However the pressures of pollution, water scarcity and over-population may prove irrecuperable in the next century.

Axioms operate by containing and centralising the living flows of the socius, however these flows also escape to the periphery and present irresolvable problems for the axiomatic. This is why two battles must be fought - one at the level of the axioms as different groups look for recognition and representation, and one (the one that concerns us most in this thesis) which seeks to transform and develop qualitatively new modes of existence that do not rest on pre-existent identities. The emphasis on the second should not lead the reader to conclude
that struggles for recognition of identities are peripheral or passé. As Deleuze and Guattari would say, these are concerned with history, but the latter are concerned with becomings. However, we are only ever presented with mixtures. It is not a matter of choosing one at the expense of the other.

“Our age is becoming the age of minorities” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980: 469). A minority is not numerically less than a majority, but reveals a disparity or gap with a norm. One can envisage a situation where the numerical majority of a population could be marginalised and disenfranchised (as occurred during the South African era of apartheid) and hence be a minority. Minorities have a special relationship with the notion of becoming, because minorities promote compositions that elude the grasp of both capitalist economy and State. They refuse to be put in their place. Deleuze and Guattari reiterate that a struggle on the level of the axioms is important for women, regional economies or oppressed minorities, to name but a few examples. However, when minorities express demands that cannot be met on the level of the axioms then the disparity with a majoritarian standard becomes more taut and tense. It creates a metastability; a situation of disequilibrium. In chapter 5, we will learn how a becoming-minoritarian is bound up with a created possible. Minorities are living flows that escape the axiomatic of capital.

The conditions for a worldwide movement are to be found in the minorities everywhere. These minorities are non-denumerable; they are fuzzy multiplicities, always escaping the majoritarian standards. It is not sufficient to add axioms, although tactically this is important in terms of women’s rights, rights of asylum seekers, rights of the unemployed and so on. The challenge consists not just in opposing the majority system, but in opening up a gap, a disparity, and this occurs when people articulate and formulate their own problems (471).

Deleuze and Guattari contend that it is this disparity, this tension, that is paradoxically created by the axiomatics of capital that engender new ‘minoritarian aggregates’. It is by destroying the “dominant equilibrium of the denumerable
sets" (472) that a mass becomes revolutionary. This power of the non-
denumerable is specific to the minority. In this way the minority, regardless of
how many members it has, is always a multiplicity. The system creates its own
'outside' by multiplying the lines of flight which create transversal links between
singular problems. This is the Undecidable that forms part of every system of
axiomatics. In *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari emphasise, in a way they
had not done before, the relation between resistance and becoming (1991a: 109-
10). Here creation is understood as resistance.

They argue that the notion of minority is very complex with all sorts of
resonances such as political, musical and literary. A majority holds the standard of
measure and assumes power and domination. Majority appears twice: once in the
constant, and once in the variable from which it extracts the constant. Deleuze
and Guattari view it as an abstract standard, always Nobody, while minority is the
becoming of everybody, "everyone’s potential becoming to the extent that one
deviates from the model" (1980: 105). Specifying these distinctions further they
describe the majoritarian standard as a constant and homogeneous system (as we
saw in Tully’s work) and minorities are subsystems, whereas a becoming-
*minoritarian* is a “potential, creative and created, becoming” (106). So although
minorities may have identities and be objectively definable, “they must also be
thought of as seeds, crystals of becoming whose value is to trigger uncontrollable
movements and deterritorializations of the mean or majority” (106). Because
minorities encourage new transversal connections, they also develop a logic of
multiplicities, of *potentia*, that challenges the realm of Power and Domination.

A logic of multiplicities concerns different multiplicities, but the gathering of
heterogeneous components into an assemblage often involves a specific type of
multiplicity: the intensive or virtual multiplicity. This multiplicity cannot be
divided or add another element without changing in nature. The initial impetus
for such a philosophical construct comes, I believe, from Bergson. Although in
the context of *Time and Free Will* Bergson is, strictly speaking, concerned with
psychology when mapping this concept, it is still instructive to think about this
embracing difference

fuzzy multiplicity as he does. Emotions cannot be divided, a heated anger cannot be halved into a moderate annoyance. This is what he calls a qualitative multiplicity. It is differential, consistent and irreducible. In terms of deterritorialisation, this marks a qualitative transformation of a given situation/assemble. On the other hand, one can cut up a square of cardboard, compare parts and put it back together without changing the nature of that multiplicity. With sheer simplicity Guattari provides the comparison of a heap of stones (a numerical or quantitative multiplicity) and a dry stone wall (that as it is organised both selects and discriminates, excludes and includes) which he would qualify as a heterogeneous multiplicity hooking up with all sorts of other components (farmland, ramblers, domestic animals, weeds...).

Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy can be synopsised as a logic of multiplicities. The concepts of numerical and virtual multiplicities are scattered throughout all the corners of their works. In A Thousand Plateaus they distinguish between smooth and striated space. The gridding and division of space effected by the State is counterposed to the nomad war machine such as that of the Mongol hordes which does not divide space but distributes itself in space, cropping up as if from nowhere. Operations of standardisation and uniformisation are unravelled by becomings-minor. A dominant or official language is always beset by subterranean dialects, patois and literary innovations. This distinction between the continuous variation of a virtual multiplicity and the relative standardisation of the numerical multiplicity is then instructive ethico-politically.

Their concept of the assemblage relates to that of a virtual multiplicity since it concerns heterogeneous components held together in their difference, not as a set of elements, but through their abstract relations; their symbioses. The possibilities of different modes of association and alliance is an ethico-political question, constituting an etho-ontology. This other understanding of power as potentia compounds our capacities for existing and thinking in a relational manner.
II.ix. mechanism or machinism?

The implications of Deleuze’s machinic philosophy are serious. For Badiou, they mean we can, at no time, be the source of what we think or what we do, but everything always comes from afar, from the infinite and inhuman reservoir of the One (1997: 9-13). The Deleuzean automaton is, according to Badiou, traversed by the power of this inorganic life and the most pure choice is henceforth the most automatic one, the one where we are stripped of our individuality and humanity when faced with this Outside. We are chosen. We do not choose our fate, as in philosophies of representation (11).

This idea of the purified automaton is found, according to Badiou, in Deleuze’s second cinema book on the *Time-Image* (1985a), and in his view, this reading is much closer to Deleuze’s true perspective than the desiring machines of 1968. To think is thus no longer a personal capacity. (And ethics appears to constitute nothing other than radical passivity.) If we read the chapter entitled ‘Thought and Cinema’ carefully we discover that this idea of the spiritual automaton (inspired initially by Spinoza) is primarily concerned with the contention that thinking is a shock. Paraphrasing Heidegger, ‘we have not yet begun to think’.

This automaton is presented by Badiou as a simulacrum without any relation to others. Although cut off from the external world, a more profound ‘outside’ animates it (Badiou, 1997: 128). The principle animating the automaton is nothing other than force, this element of the outside. We are always forced to think.

Yet contrary to Badiou’s understanding of the spiritual automaton, this notion does not mean we are necessarily passive. It constructs a conception of the human that is open to its non-human becomings. The human is thus re-conceived as relational and *pars naturae*, rather than abstracted from reality, and dominatorial. This is an ethics as experimentation, that invents the potentials and becomings of humans. Foisting fuel on the fires of the critics, Deleuze repeats the notion that an ethics constitutes a kind of *amor fati* from his earliest to his latest
In the ‘Twenty-first series of the Event’, Deleuze contemplates the Stoic concept of the event in detail, arguing that this is a “question of becoming a citizen of the world” (1969: 148). Ethics means nothing other than “not to be unworthy of what happens to us” (149). If we blame someone or something else for our misfortunes and sufferings, we slip into reSentiment. Instead we need to will the event in order to release its eternal truth. We then affirm something in that which occurs. We must counter-actualise or counter-effectuate the event, making it our own.46

In his final book with Guattari, Deleuze reiterates “There is no other ethic than the amor fati of philosophy” (1991a: 159). Again ethics is equated with becoming equal to the event, and again Joe Bousquet is quoted, “my wound existed before me; I was born to embody it” (159). Extracting the virtual from a state of affairs is to counter-effectuate the event by isolating its concept.

A superficial reading of these lines would seem to deny the very possibility of ethics. An unguarded cruelty appears to persist in Deleuze’s words, as though suffering must be submitted to and affirmed, though not challenged, however such a reading is simplistic. Taking our journey through Spinoza and through Simondon and Deleuze, we find that this ethics does not entail a radical passivity, but rather an openness toward the future and a practice of constructivism. This love of fate is not an acceptance of a predetermined natural and moral order, but is concerned with cultivating the capacity to work with the materials and circumstances, distasteful as they may be, in order to create other modes of existence.

I agree that if we abstract the above lines from the overall project embarked upon by Deleuze (including his work with Guattari) it may well appear that all we can

46 For some thinkers the logical conclusion of this is that the conditions of thought are purified and sober. Personal concerns, needs and hopes can effectively be put by the wayside (at least this is the suggestion by Badiou and Eagleton amongst others).
do is accept our fate as pregiven and predestined. Our only hope would be to make contact with the impersonal Life (and impossible Death) that constitutes our being. But such a reading would be in bad faith. Amor fati entails affirming something in that which happens to us, not affirming everything that happens to us. It also involves creating the conditions for the production of the new; a repetition of the different, as Deleuze argues in Difference and Repetition.

“To believe, not in a different world, but in a link between man and the world, in love or life, to believe in this as in the impossible, the unthinkable, which none the less cannot but be thought: ‘something possible, otherwise I will suffocate’” (1985a: 170). The modern fact is, for Deleuze, that we no longer believe in this world; “it is the world which looks to us like a bad film” (171). Like Serres says, this link with the world has been broken and we need a faith to attach (religaere) us to the world once more.

The distinction between absolute and relative deterritorialisation then becomes a crucial one. It involves a conceptual difference between the ‘limit’ and the ‘threshold’. “[T]he limit designates the penultimate marking a necessary rebeginning, and the threshold the ultimate marking an inevitable change” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980: 438). Absolute deterritorialisation expresses a movement that is qualitatively different from relative movement (509). Relative deterritorialisation is a movement that is always blocked or curtailed. Deleuze and Guattari repeat that absolute deterritorialisation brings about the creation of a new earth (1980: 510, 1991a: 99), suggesting it is close to the ‘utopia’ of the Frankfurt School, and Adorno’s ‘negative dialectic’ (1991a: 99).

Since capitalism operates through an immanent axiomatic movement of deterritorialisation, and since Deleuze’s subject of ethics is a spiritual automaton affirming something in everything that happens to it, the only option might appear to be to surrender to this inevitable movement either by adopting a stance of enlightened cynicism or jubilant immersion. Yet, capitalism is always a tempered process, and it (as in Marx’s theory) inadvertently fosters the potential for
resistance because it needs to create minimal spaces of liberty and creativity to prevent it from becoming entropic. The difficulty facing us is to harness the forces of deterritorialisation of capitalism in fields such as science, technology and the media in order to develop different forms of struggle against the repressions and material bondage that accompany capitalism. This involves a revaluation of values. These resistances must be constructed - they will not spring forth ex nihilo. The qualitative transformation that accompanies passing a threshold is thus distinguished from the relative displacement of the limits of capitalism.

Spinoza wrote during a burgeoning era of capitalism in Holland, but he could not be expected to foresee the mutations of finance capitalism and the prospect of world integrated capitalism. Does his ethics of liberation inadvertently collude in this movement of relative deterritorialisation or does it indeed provide the conditions for the production of novelty and the unforeseeable? This question informs the rest of this thesis: can philosophy escape the clutches of capital? Or does it meander in a creative continuum reinforcing and affirming rather than rupturing the movements of capitalism?
Chapter Three

Spinoza: The God-Intoxicated Man
III.i. ethics and immanence

It may be that believing in this world, in this life, becomes our most difficult task, or the task of a mode of existence still to be discovered on our plane of immanence today. This is the empiricist conversion [...] 


It may come as some surprise to find the word ‘transcendence’ used in an accusatory manner in the next few pages, whilst immanence is presented as verging on having an intrinsic value. Why should this be the case? Nietzsche said, “Moral judgement has this in common with religious judgement that it believes in realities which do not exist” (1889: §1, 55). Deleuze and Guattari likewise say that we need to believe in this world, urging us to be aware of the forms of transcendence (often of theological origin) that shape our lives and thoughts. They go on to make an ontological claim concerning this idea of immanence, rather than a critical claim based upon what we can know. The ‘pure ontology’ that they delineate can also be called an ethics (Deleuze, 2/12/80).

This ethics is described as a way of evaluating (and not judging) immanent modes of existence in terms of effectuating compositions of relations that increase powers of activity (and hence joy). Morality, on the other hand, is presented in terms of an absolutism that pays no attention to the singular essences of the humans it compels to obedience.47 Spinoza’s system is not based upon a model of obedience which finds a resonance in mind/body dualism. With an anti-Cartesian flourish Spinoza asserts that the mind does not subjugate the body. The mind is but the idea of the body. The opposition between ethics and Morality explicitly and implicitly informs the next few chapters.

Obeying requires one to imagine a body more powerful than oneself. Obedience

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47 Pierre Bourdieu asks ‘who has an interest in the universal?’ (1990: 31). By explaining the genesis or emergence of forms of the universal in different fields, the universal no longer appears neutral, formal and objective. Nietzsche’s critical philosophy was dedicated to re-evaluating all values. See, for example, *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887).
thus rests upon impotence. The sovereign state is a machine to produce obedience. Drawing on Antonio Negri (1981), I want to continue to use a working distinction between potestas and potentia to illustrate the difference between this conception of an absolute immanent movement and that of an order that is superposed. The assemblages that we are a part of can diminish our capacities for acting or enhance them. This idea is key to Spinoza’s Ethics.

The hylomorphic operation transmits a sense that matter is not active, not self-organising with emergent properties, and to this extent it fits in well with our distinction between Potestas and potentia. The former case refers to the way in which a power (potentia) can be separated from its capacity to act. Spinoza differs hugely from Hobbes in this regard since he does not see the political arrangement as one of command and obedience but one, rather, of facilitation of natural rights. Differences between beings are then quantitative in terms of power, and qualitative in terms of modes of existence.

Yet, as Lloyd and Gatens remind us, we also need to create better collective imaginings of forms of social organisation that do not stifle the potentia or power of people. We saw an example of this in Tully’s work in chapter 1.

III.ii. natural right and power

Rather than idealising humans, Spinoza develops a relational conception of humans as they are becoming. He is a political realist building his philosophy from these flawed materials. But if, as Spinoza suggests, we do not even know what a body can do, how can we possibly invent (not fulfil in an Aristotelian manner)
modes of existence that increase our powers of acting, of affecting and being affected: With Spinoza, ethics regains an Aristotelian, Stoic and Epicurean resonance emphasising practices and modes of living. The principles of the good life cannot, however, be demarcated in advance.

Spinoza has read Hobbes, and he constructs his idea of natural right from the Hobbesian proposition that things are not defined by their essence or obligations, but instead by their power. Hobbes says that this means we have the right to do all that we are able to in this dog-eat-dog world (homo homini lupus est). These rights are curtailed because life under such conditions would be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. The purpose of the social contract is to temper our violent propensities.

Unlike Lee Rice, I contend that Spinoza does not fit the category of possessive individualist and nor is he a precursor of libertarianism, the harbinger of a radical individualism (1990: 274). As Nietzsche rightly points out, Spinoza is non-egoistic; moreover, he does not believe someone could want something for herself without wanting it for others.

For Spinoza, a social contract does not entail curbing natural rights but fostering them. The tint that Spinoza places upon the idea of power as conatus paints a very different picture to that of Hobbes. It is entirely stripped of the will to dominate, or a paranoiacal compulsion to conserve power. It is an expression of openness. In Spinoza’s view, man is a god for man (hominem homini Deum esse) (IV. pr.35. sch.), and nothing is more useful to man than man (homo nihil homine utilius) (IV. pr.18. sch.). Amazingly, he claims that if one is governed by reason, one desires for another what one desires for oneself. However, he warns correspondingly that nothing is more harmful to man than man. If they are subject to passions, humans neither agree with themselves nor with one another. Hatred erupts in

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51 In a thoughtful discussion on this matter, Gatens and Lloyd (1999: 20-22) also challenge an individualist reading of Spinoza. They turn to Antonio Negri and Etienne Balibar to articulate a more dynamic account of the relation of individual and collective whereby unity and multiplicity are thought of as reciprocal rather than opposed viewpoints (126).
According to Deleuze (3/5/77), the relationship between Ontology and political philosophy was key to Spinoza’s work. Moreover, for Spinoza, unlike Machiavelli and Hobbes, ethics and politics were not altogether separated. (Politics is only needed, he says, because people are not wise.) Deleuze argues that philosophies of the One tend to be emanative, imposing a hierarchy that moves from the One to Being and then to beings. A pure ontology, on the other hand, repudiates hierarchy. It is not difficult to perceive a political motivation here. This world of immanence is one in which all beings have an intrinsic value, as degrees of power.

The way Spinoza’s naturalist philosophy develops this concept of power (in terms of *potentia*) introduces a very different way of understanding the individual and the process of individuation. I will show how this operates in the context of Spinoza’s *Ethics* later in this chapter.

### III.iii. rights, duties and powers

A free man thinks of death least of all things, and his wisdom is a meditation of life and not of death.

*Homo liber de nullâ re minus, quàm de morte cogitat, et ejus sapientia non mortis, sed vitae meditatio est.*


At this juncture, I will begin to weave together a number of different problematics. First of all, in response to the criticisms of Badiou, I want to sketch some of the reasons that Deleuze is faithful to the idea of univocal being and why this is important. Deleuze is wary of any attempts to introduce a hierarchical order of Beings that would leave this world a mere degraded shadow. His understanding of univocity is a distinctive one, described in terms of difference.

His concept of difference is the difference of difference, difference before it has been subordinated to comparative categories such as resemblance and identity.
Difference is affirmation, and as the difference of difference it is relational: Deleuze calls it an intensive quantity. In the next two chapters I will explicate these concepts in greater detail, and show how they link with Spinoza's philosophy of power (*potentia*) which is also described in terms of intensive quantities.

Deleuze says, “With univocity, however, it is not the differences which are and must be: it is being which is Difference in the sense that it is said of difference” (1968a: 39). When Spinoza’s substance is read as simply self-identical and immobile, we are blinkered to its dynamic and creative nature. I want to argue, through Deleuze’s writings and seminars and the work of Pierre Macherey, that Spinoza’s philosophy is one that can account for processes of individuation and singularisation. Through Simondon, Deleuze will radicalise this project, by developing a conception of immanence that rests upon the idea of metastability, a system of disequilibrium. In this way Spinoza’s immanent cause and the relationship of *Natura Naturans* (Naturing Nature) and *Natura Naturata* (Natured Nature) (I. pr. 29) will be revitalised and linked to the idea of a transcendental empiricism.

But what has all this to do with ethics? By developing an alternative account of the individual, we also map another way of distinguishing good from bad. Centuries after Spinoza’s death, Nietzsche would proclaim excitedly in a postcard to his friend Franz Overbeck, “I am utterly amazed, utterly enchanted. I have a *precursor*, and what a precursor! I hardly knew Spinoza […] but in the five main points of his doctrine I recognise myself; this most unusual and loneliest thinker is closest to me precisely in these matters: he denies the freedom of the will, teleology, the moral world order, the unegoistic, and evil” (Letter of July 20 1891, quoted in Yovel, 1989b: 105). Spinoza’s conception of ethics in terms of *libera necessitas* is a difficult and important idea. Framing an ethics without any conception of good or evil could seem frankly nonsensical to many, but not to Nietzsche. Nonetheless, Spinoza still remains the butt of Nietzsche’s polemics. Nietzsche accuses him of keeping the ‘shadows’ of a transcendent God
Unlike Kant and Hegel, Spinoza does not feel compelled to make his philosophy human centred and anti-naturalistic (Yovel, 1989b: 7). It is for this reason that his ethics remains anomalous. Indeed Yirimiyahu Yovel argues that *amor fati* is a term invented by Nietzsche in “a polemical transformation of Spinoza’s *amor dei intellectualis* [...]]” (104). Ethical liberation is contemplated in terms of power and activity. Power is identical to essence. It is always in action and it always corresponds to an ability to be affected (*potere*).

The *Ethics* is a heretical and provocative text, one I want to explore over the course of this chapter in the context of our investigation into ethics and subjectivity. However Spinoza’s necessitarianism has led many to believe that this love of fate, or love of necessity, entails nothing other than submitting passively to whatever befalls us. As we read Spinoza we will learn that it is an ethics of joy. Conscious of the incessantly changing nature of reality, it seeks to help us to cultivate joy and minimise sadness (which is correlative with passivity). His account of sadness, together with a Hobbesian understanding of the human in terms of power (*potentia*), is repeated throughout Marx’s theory of alienation as an account of secular redemption (Yovel 1989b: 97).

When Deleuze and Guattari controversially said that human rights were just

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52 “Against Spinoza’s eminently rational, law-governed nature-God Nietzsche thus opposes a world in everlasting flux - never self-identical, never at logical rest, never attaining equilibrium (by which it would be captured and defined) or a fixed final state: a world which is neither pure being nor pure becoming but always wavering between both” (Yovel, 1989b: 123). This static reading of Spinoza fails to examine the dynamism of concepts such *Natura Naturans, conatus* and *potentia*. I will respond to this kind of reading in my own presentation of Spinoza especially through Macherey’s and Deleuze’s interpretations.

53 André Tosel thinks that recently far more credence has been set by the idea that Spinoza is concerned with processes of liberation.

54 The impact of Spinoza on Marx’s thought is more pervasive than he admits. Borges wrote a story about a real book *Don Quixote* that he considers to be imaginary, reproduced by an imaginary author. Pierre Menard, who Borges considers to be real. He says the texts are identical but Menard’s is infinitely richer (Deleuze. 1968a: xxii). In a similar fashion. Marx entitled a manuscript ‘Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise’ by Karl Heinrich Marx. Berlin 1841. This was, as Yovel (1989b: 78) emphasises, a perfect act of plagiarism since Marx had simply copied from that text and rearranged it. adding no thoughts of his own.
another axiom added to the market, they echoed a sentiment that Spinoza expresses when he tells us that formal democracy is a constitutional illusion if powerless people possess rights they cannot exercise. The right of the farmer in Malawi to demand a fair price for his/her products constitutes nothing other than baying into the wind if international finance markets set the prices for cash crops and supermarkets can head off to a cheaper supplier.

By articulating this discourse in terms of power, and immanent rather than ideal modes of existence, not only can a critical stance be taken on such questions, but a constructivist one premised upon the singularity of cases can be adopted. I do not want to introduce a debate about rights and duties, but simply want to draw attention to the way that (rightly or wrongly) Deleuze and Guattari place a premium on real, situated modes of existence and the capacity for action, thought and expression correlative with these instances, rather than speaking about the abstract (and often flawed) ideals of human rights.

Spinoza does not provide an account of ideology; ideology is necessarily comparative, measuring something that exists against something that does not exist. Just like Bergson, Spinoza has little time for a retrospective (and disempowering) illusion of the possible. He is turned toward the future.

As a diagnostician, Spinoza indicates the ways that we can engage in a critical and clinical evaluation of our modes of existence. New modes of existence must be constructed and invented, and like Deleuze and Guattari’s plane of immanence they do not pre-exist their creation. Through their combined theories of affectivity, humans are opened up to their non-human becomings. Such is Spinoza’s ethics: immanent, situated, embodied, and capable of affirming disparity and dissensus. His ethics of liberation is a constructivist one. It is no accident that Deleuze and Guattari call a plane of immanence alternatively a plane of consistency or composition.

55 See Amelia Oskenberg Rorty (1990).
But before examining this kind of ethics in further detail, I want to discuss some of the themes I have introduced by returning to an important critic of Deleuze - Alain Badiou. The issues I will address primarily concern the notion of univocity so they refer equally to Spinoza. Through this debate, I seek to indicate some of the ways in which Deleuze reconciles his status as philosopher of difference and thinker of univocity. We have already come across the idea that a degree of power is an intensive quantity; this is something we will look at in detail in the next few chapters. However I also want to demonstrate that these abstract concepts, such as univocity, must be explained concretely.

III.iv. 'bolshevik' versus 'fascist': the Badiou/Deleuze encounter

Alain Badiou did not enamour himself to readers of Deleuze when he circulated a little pamphlet entitled ‘Onze notes sur le petit deleuzien’, a leaflet that accused ‘deleuzians’ of evangelism, discipledom and a profound misunderstanding of the words of their Master. He presents himself as the only person thus far to treat Deleuze’s work in a philosophical rather than evangelical manner.

In contrast with many commentators, Badiou asserts that, like Spinoza, Deleuze is an ascetic thinker of the One-All. The questions of ontology and ethics are

56 See Futur Antérieur (no. 43, 1998, Ed. Syllepse) for the “deleuzians” defence of Deleuze in the wake of the publication of Badiou’s Deleuze: The Clamour of Being Badiou will respond to this article at a number of intervals including in his ‘Onze notes sur le petit deleuzien’ and ‘Un, multiple, multiplicités’ in Multitudes (no.1 Mars 2000).

57 This strikes me as peculiar given the importance of Nietzsche for Deleuze. Deleuze remarks, “What does the man of the ascetic ideal want? The one who repudiates life is also the one who wants a diminished life, the conservation of his type and moreover its power and triumph, the triumph and contagion of reactive forces (1962: 96). These sentiments are expressed throughout Nietzsche and Philosophy. He adds, “We have had no other ideal but the ascetic ideal. We have opposed knowledge to life in order to judge life, in order to make it something blameworthy, responsible or erroneous” (35). Similarly Spinoza is understood as a philosopher of joy and affirmation, not an ascetic philosopher.
inextricably linked in this contention. Rather than a philosopher of difference, Deleuze is presented as a Platonist of the virtual; a thinker for whom the actual is a mere effect, by implication denigrated and peripheral to the overall movement of the virtual. Can this philosopher of proliferating differences and singularities be reconciled with the advocacy of a philosophy of One-All that Badiou argues is key to the Deleuzian enterprise?

Badiou begins his short text on Deleuze in polemical vein. A degree of intimacy is established as he describes the personal and political antagonisms, and even a peculiar closeness he felt at times, between himself and Deleuze. Despite this, no real commonality was founded; even their point of convergence, Spinoza, constitutes a bone of contention. Badiou muses over his utter lack of comprehension of the Deleuzian creation. Stringing together anecdotes, Badiou (stating his maoist and bolshevik credentials) accuses Deleuze of fascism and of glorifying the philosophy of Life and the One-All (1997: 2). These accusations must not be dismissed as those of a bitter protagonist. They direct us, for instance, to the dangers of an effusive, quasi-spiritualistic notion of primordial Nature.

The points scattered through the first pages of the introduction are not unimportant. As much as the philosophical critique that follows they provide a veiled, but incisive, commentary on the ethico-political implications of Deleuze’s philosophy. Although Badiou distinguishes the political event from philosophical eternity, it is not clear that the two are as separated as he intimates. After the publication of Deleuze’s The Fold there is a rapprochement, at least from Badiou’s perspective. This is a paradoxical entente along the lines of Deleuze’s philosophy of series and divergence. A series of letters passes between them for a while; however due to a sequence of unforeseeable events, Deleuze firmly closes the discourse.

The philosophy of the multiple that informs Badiou’s ontology is written vis-à-vis Deleuze. The distinction is, as he sees it, between the vital (animal) paradigm of
multiplicities that one discovers in the trajectory from Bergson, and a theory of sets. Though both are concerned with the question of ontology, virtual Totality or chaosmosis are anathema to Badiou. These words lay bare the fundamental proposition of the ontology of the One-All informing Deleuze's philosophy. Deleuze is a metaphysician of a renovated One and it is precisely his fidelity to this particular understanding of univocity that Badiou grapples with, and challenges.

Far from being an egalitarian, Badiou claims that Deleuze is a profoundly aristocratic thinker. Thought only exists in a hierarchalised space where the individual is seized by its pre-individual determination (11-12). Although Being is neutral and equal, one must always find out whether a thing can go to the limit of its power and things are consequently considered from the point of view of their power, again according to a hierarchy (32-3). The only anarchy Deleuze wants is a crowned anarchy (anarchie couronnée).

All that matters, on Badiou's reading, is that a fundamental asceticism is imposed whereby all of the intellectual, social and sentimental factors associated with the actuality of 'states of things' and the 'lived' are renounced in favour of this power to exceed one's limit, in favour of hubris. Badiou adjudges this to be a philosophy of death, a dissipation of all that I am, of my actuality, into a purified automaton. This assessment seems bolstered by Deleuze's fondness for Maurice Blanchot's writings on death.

It is perhaps the proliferation of dualisms, combined with the inevitable qualitative privileging of one term over another, that most irks Badiou when reading Deleuze's philosophy. Constantly two terms are introduced, only for one to be made foundational and superior. For instance, difference is privileged above identity, affirmation over negation, movement over immobility (Badiou 2000: 197). Similarly, the virtual is Real while the actual (states of affairs and lived experience) is merely an effect, a simulacrum. It is this propensity to attribute an anteriority to the virtual, logically, chronologically and most especially
ontologically, that leads him to call Deleuze a ‘Platonist of the virtual’.

Badiou therefore asks why Being needs two names if it is said in one and the same sense of all beings. These names are said of the unity of the power of production and the actualisation of the multiplicity of divergent simulacra. Such a move, according to Badiou, re-introduces transcendence into this system. Moreover, it demonstrates Deleuze’s Bergsonism as he compulsively multiplies dualisms at every turn. (Deleuze will respond that it is what happens between the two that matters.) The virtual is the principal name of Being in Badiou’s view.

Ray Brassier (2000) elaborates these ideas further. He claims that, for Deleuze, Being is an inclusive disjunction that constitutes a unilateral asymmetry. Being is said of virtual and actual, so the naming of Being becomes equivocal. It is therefore transcendent. The inclusive disjunction is an excess over virtual and actual, marking a political covenant with the global sovereignty of capitalism. According to Brassier, Badiou effectively asks whether the nomadic distribution mimes the logic of capital creating an indiscernibility of capital and philosophy.

Resistance to the sovereignty of capital requires a rupture, not an ontology premised upon a creative continuum. Consequently, rather than process, Badiou stresses subtraction. The excess of the system is the Void. An emphasis on production, constructivism and process throughout this chapter must be offset against the question of whether this is another instance of philosophy bolstering the movements of capitalism. This allegation will be implicitly addressed through the dyad of Potestas and potentia.

Badiou has a further ethico-political point to raise. The impersonal One reveals Deleuze’s Stoicism by invoking what Badiou calls a purified automaton in the place of the subject. The affirmation of necessity of all that occurs treads near to an apologia for the status quo, and appears, moreover, to sacrifice novelty and plurality on the altar of univocity (Brassier, 2000: 206-9).
According to Badiou, Deleuze proposes a renewed concept of the One. While the confusion of the world resists taming by a stable classification or a direction of history, the multiplicity of the world is nonetheless subject to a qualitative subsumption by the One. Badiou argues that this manoeuvre is consistent with Deleuze’s overall project whereby a static opposition is resolved as one term effects a qualitative takeover. To consolidate his contention that Deleuze is in fact a thinker of the One, he draws our attention to statements in *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense* where Deleuze appeals to an idea of one clamour of Being for all beings. His conclusion is that Deleuze has no interest in freeing the multiple but is concerned with folding it back onto this renewed concept of the One.

There is no doubt that univocity is an important concept for Deleuze, but we must examine the way he reworks this concept, especially in relation to Spinoza and the concept of *potentia* as a *vis existendi*. Univocity is described in terms of the differences of differences in *Difference and Repetition* and is invoked in order to rally against philosophies of emanationism and eminence with the express aim of constructing a philosophy of radical immanentism.

Badiou knows that univocal Being is neither numerically one nor even unified. He tells us that the power (*puissance*) of the One is that its beings are multiple and divergent produced by a disjunctive synthesis. In the same way, substance is, for Spinoza, immediately expressed by an infinity of attributes, although there is no ontological division of Being. Individuating differences are intensities or inflexions of power and are mobile and singular.

This ‘virtual totality’ has different names such as inorganic Life and the One-All (Spinozist substance), according to Badiou. Being is thought as power (*puissance*) or as Life. Although there is no ontological distinction between Naturing Nature and Natured Nature, there is a binary distribution which either accentuates its immediate ‘matter’ or its actualisation (1997: 33). As we will discover, this distinction, according to Macherey, relates to whether a particular or a global view
of things is taken. Deleuze explains this notion further in his seminars, which we will turn to later in this chapter.

The difference of beings is thus only formal; their ontological identity is Being. Conversely, Badiou argues that what is required is a thought of the actuality of Being in terms of its 'pure dispersion-multiple'; an immanence excluding the all. Countering a logic of multiplicities, this logic of the multiple dominates Badiou's philosophical enterprise. This is because a logic of multiplicities is anachronistic and pre-Cantor (Badiou, 2000: 199). By drawing upon set theory Badiou proposes a univocal determination of the multiple-without-one (199).

In a (pre-emptive) backlash, Deleuze and Guattari themselves accuse Badiou of transcendence. They contend that his conception of the empty set or the void implies that philosophy floats in an empty transcendence, as the unconditioned concept (1991a: 152). In their view, this is why at least two multiplicities are needed because multiplicity is what happens between the two. These are back to back (and not hierarchically superposed) as in the relation of states of affairs and events.

Firmly convinced of the value of the multiple of set theory, in contradistinction to Deleuze's logic of multiplicities, Badiou does not investigate thoroughly enough the concept of the plane of immanence and the idea of the inclusive disjunction. In my view, Deleuze's work with Guattari is set to one side in what, for Badiou, is an uncustomarily weakly argued fashion. For Deleuze, univocal Being is the differences of differences communicating through their differences, and the One-All is distributive, not unifying. It is open and disparate. These themes recur in various guises in the work with Guattari. Badiou's decision to ignore this sets Deleuze's multiplicitious oeuvre on a trajectory very different to the one it would be on if the work with Guattari was included.

There are some points of agreement, however. Badiou understands that a contemporary metaphysics must be a theory of multiplicities and grasp
singularities. Of necessity this initiates a critique of insidious forms of transcendence whether they be overtly religious or cloistered. In addition, the lingering traces of religion mean that univocal Being must be posited (2000: 196). He concurs with Deleuze that every true thought is a thought of singularity, but argues that, for Deleuze, actual multiplicities are purely formal modalities. It is this necessity to appeal analogically to the intuition of the virtual that re-introduces transcendence.

In sum, for Badiou, Deleuze ends up with a virtual, ‘horizontal’ transcendence (as opposed to a ‘vertical’ transcendence of the One) that misrecognises the intrinsic resources of the multiple by presupposing a chaotic power of the One, and by making analogies of the modes of actualisation rather than grasping them in their singularity. Deleuze is a natural mystic (2000: 211).

It would be facile to deny that Deleuze makes the statements that Badiou quotes, or to claim they were anomalies, at odds with his overall philosophy of difference. Instead we need to understand in what way Deleuze is a thinker of the One-All and indeed what motivates him to take such a trajectory. In contradistinction to a ‘democracy of desire’ (1997: 10) Badiou believes Deleuze’s machinism leads to an abnegation of choice and of will because of the emphasis placed upon the impersonal concept of A Life, of the One. Our challenge, as Eric Alliez points out, is to try to grasp the complexity of the “ontological proposition of the thesis of univocal Being and the pragmatic affirmation of multiplicities” (Alliez, 2000: 192).

It is therefore acutely important to understand both the nature of the ontology of becoming that Deleuze is proposing, and how it relates to his philosophy of difference. We need to figure out why Deleuze takes issue with an image of thought that does not reflect upon its illicit pre-philosophical presuppositions. Given the discomfort felt by different philosophers with notions of an impersonal Life or Spinoza’s Naturing Nature, we must ask whether in fact the allegiance to a philosophy of force and becoming abnegates any responsibility to
actuality and to ethics. Is it as though the individual is dissolved into the indivisible substance in which all individuality lacks reality?

This kind of objection is also effectively made by Terry Eagleton in a review (2000: 9) where he argues that philosophy is still enamoured with religious fervour. He claims that the invocation of an impersonal, vitalistic Life traversing the universe is found in concepts like 'difference' and 'desire'. A privileging of an inhuman, impersonal force dissolves the reality of the actual human. A similar kind of allegation is made by Antonio Negri in reference to Part V of Spinoza's *Ethics* which, in Negri's view, slips into a thinly veiled mysticism through the introduction of the third kind of knowledge *amor dei* which Spinoza calls *beatitudo*. Moreover, for different reasons that we will discover shortly, Laruelle will call Deleuze's (and Nietzsche's) philosophy an *idealistic* one premised upon a particular conception of force.

Perhaps, on the other hand, we will be able to draw upon these attempts to think process and movement to rethink the questions of difference and relationality, and reconsider the question of ethics.

**III.v. univocity, eminence, analogy**

We need an ethic or a faith, which makes fools laugh: it is not a need to believe in something else, but a need to believe in this world, of which fools are a part.


In a seminar on 'Scholasticism and Spinoza' (14/1/74)\(^{58}\), Deleuze situates the difficulty of the question of the nature of being and distinguishes between equivocity, analogy and univocity. Equivocity, he says, is a problem of utterances; we need to know whether a table is said in the same sense as an animal, or a man in the same sense of as God. Equivocal Being\(^{59}\) means that there are several

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\(^{58}\) All quotations are taken from the seminar in discussion unless otherwise noted. These seminars are not published and are only found online, hence the lack of page numbers.

\(^{59}\) In order to distinguish 'être' and 'étant' I will retain a (Heidegger nuanced) distinction of
senses of being and that these different senses of the word Being are without common measure. Curiously, this could lead to heresy since some would prefer to say that ‘God is not’, rather than say ‘God is’ in the same way that a chair is. At least the former could be interpreted as meaning that God is superior to Being.

Deleuze and Guattari repeatedly declare an allegiance to a philosophy of immanence. This is distinguished from the stepped universe (‘univers en escalier’) that is emblematic of platonic, neo-platonic and mediaeval traditions (Deleuze, 1985b: 79). This universe was suspended from the One which operated as a transcendent principle, proceeding through “a series of emanations and hierarchical conversions” (79).

“Plotinus reproached Plato for having seen participation from its lesser side” (Deleuze, 1968b: 170). “What is participated remains in itself [and does not enter into what participates in it]; it is participated insofar as it produces, and produces insofar as it gives, but has no need to leave itself to give or produce” (170). If the One is above its products (and its gifts), this is emanation.

The effect produced does not remain in the cause, it exists by coming out from the cause, and it is this movement from an (empty) cause that determines this as an emanative movement. The One is superior, not only to its effect, but to what gives the effect. It is beyond Being and beyond substance (172). Beings are ranked hierarchically in terms of their distance from this first cause and have more or less reality, more or less being.

On the other hand, univocal Being means that “Being has only one sense and is said in one and the same sense of everything of which it is said” (Deleuze, 14/01/74). Deleuze’s famous example of this is that God is said in the same sense as a tick. “There is

Being and being. This distinction should not be read as proposing any relation between these ideas and those of Heidegger.

60 Remarkably enough Spinoza’s substance is often read in an emanationist fashion in which the modes follow from the attributes which follow from substance; this partly corresponds to Hegel’s reading. For another such reading see Paul Eisenberg (1990).
no longer a remote cause: the rock, the lily, the animal, and the human equally sing the glory of God in a kind of crowned anarchy" (1985b: 79). Like Hardt and Negri, Deleuze argues that these waves of immanence surged forth against transcendence throughout the Renaissance era (79).

Immanence is then no longer 'immanence to' and participation can no longer be thought of in terms of 'participation in'. Like an emanative cause, the immanent cause does not leave itself; however, its effects remain in the cause. There is no degradation. Pure immanence means that beings are not ranked hierarchically in distance from their cause but immediately participate in Being.

Finally, the analogical conception of Being was mapped out by St Thomas through Aristotelian philosophy. Being is said in several senses of that of which it is said. However, in this case, these are governed by analogy. Deleuze remarks that the categories, which are concepts denoting every possible object of experience, operate in an analogical fashion. Philosophies of representation work through analogical principles of mediation, something we will discover more about in chapter 5.

But are these not just pedantic, obscurantist arguments emblematic of mediaeval times, irrelevant to the present day? People were tortured and burned for saying that Being is univocal. The fear of condemnation as a heretic and pantheist meant that Duns Scotus only managed to think univocal Being and not to affirm it. The univocity of Being is a dangerous idea, expelling transcendence from the world. Not only is God said in the same sense as a tick, but in a strange way the tick is God. But in this case how can there be differences of beings, if we no longer have Aristotelian categories or differences of form? There are differences between beings because difference is thought solely on the level of degrees of power, not by form or genus or species.

Ahmed Alami suggests that although these kinds of debates appear far from concrete concerns they have huge ethical and political implications (1997: 80).
Citing Guattari's celebrated aphorism 'Before Being there is Politics', he claims that by battling against an equivocal conception of Being, Deleuze, Duns Scotus and Spinoza demonstrate that that notion implies "a political hierarchy and an imperial spatiun which operates through transcendence and verticality as it appeals to a celestial bureaucracy" (80). Univocal Being, however, implies a "political extension that advances and progresses through the immanent extension of forces of life, and through the creation of spaces of liberty immanent to singularities that are real and effective" (80).

Interpreting this in ethico-political terms, Alami argues that the Aristotelian method proceeding through mediation mirrors the political mediation that subjugates the powers of the masses. Conversely, "[t]he univocity of being is directly and immediately said of the singularities of multiple and different essences, that is of the effective and real forces of the masses" (80).

Unlike Badiou's selective reading of univocity61, Being is affirmation and not neutrality. It is becoming and not identity, difference and not resemblance. In turn, singularities are only neutral insofar as they are the potential of every possible individuation (80). By developing this understanding of univocity we shall continue to challenge the idea that philosophy has made a political covenant with global Capital.

III.vi. a degree of power

There is nothing to life that has value, except the degree of power - assuming that life itself is the will to power.

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power. (1901: §55, 37). 62

"So between a table, a little boy, a little girl, a locomotive, a cow, a god, the difference is solely one of degree of power in the realisation of one and the same

61 Citing The Logic of Sex Badiou claims that Being is neutral (1997: 53). Alami explains how univocal Being is affirmation and becoming.
62 Because these notes have been rearranged a number of times, I cite the date when the first volume is published by Nietzsche's sister in her edition of his collective works.
being” (Deleuze, 14/1/74). Beings are understood in terms of assemblages - the ways they are capable of affecting and being affected. For this reason, Deleuze will argue that a draft horse is closer to an ox than to a race horse, because it can enter into similar assemblages. This is Spinoza’s great innovation; he sees everything in terms of differences of degrees of power and to each degree of power there corresponds a capacity of being affected. Spinoza invents a new taxonomy, closer to that of ethologists than traditional classifications. Hence the ethical challenge: of what affects are you capable?

Degrees of power are called intensities and unlike the Aristotelian idea of potential, they are not separated from activity and are necessarily fulfilled. “The affect is the manner in which a degree of power is necessarily actualised as a function of the assemblages into which the individual or the thing enters” (Deleuze, 14/1/74). Spinoza’s world is a world of continuous variation. Our affects depend on the affections that we have, and if we are sad, this is because our power of acting is diminished. An example of this might be the factory worker forced to work extremely long hours in poor conditions. When multinational companies become virtual enterprises concentrating on branding, and sub-contract their manufacturing line to other firms who themselves sub-contract, workers (especially young women) find themselves drawn into an exceedingly brutal capitalist subjectivity that does not pay them enough to live, and works them to the point of exhaustion. Something that systematically curtails our power of acting we will continue, for present purposes, to call Potestas. Guattari also critiques the infantilisation and mass-mediatisation of society, giving us a different insight into the workings of Potestas. He argues that television is hypnotic inducing passivity in the viewer, and more importantly, the cultivation of a capitalist subjectivity means that other modes of valorisation are erased.

“The powers-that-be are fundamentally institutions built to affect you with sadness [...] [they] only keep hold on us by affecting us, which is to say by fulfilling our power of being affected with sad affects, and undoubtedly thousands of ways of doing this exist” (14/01/74). In order to exercise Power
these powers-that-be must inspire sad passions, and take away the capacity for acting.

This is Spinoza’s ethical and political problem. In the last chapter we came across the idea of Collective Equipments which, according to Deleuze and Guattari, were effectively machines for producing affects. In order to have Power over us, they need to diminish our capacities of acting (and this includes thinking, since thinking is, for Spinoza, an activity). Deleuze (15/2/77) argues that once there is an apparatus of power, there is an abstract machine and vice versa.

In his little book on Spinoza, Deleuze writes that Spinoza, the atheist, devalued sad passions in favour of joy (1981a: 25). His tripartite scheme describes the man saddened by the human condition (the priest), the man who exploits sad passions to establish power (the tyrant) and the man with sad passions (the slave). Denouncing transcendent values he assesses that through the imposition of an external norm, the singularity of the thing is annihilated as it is forced to submit to a comparative model that rids it of its difference.

Spinoza resembles Nietzsche greatly in his analysis of this situation since he says that there are two scourges; hatred and remorse. This sentiment echoes the Nietzschean idea of resentment and bad conscience. Deleuze calls the Powers that stunt our powers of activity the ‘powers-that-be’, and like Negri distinguishes between Power (pouvoir) and power (puissance).

No doubt inspired by Hobbes, Spinoza defines the individual in terms of power (potentia), but unlike Hobbes his idea of power is one of constitutive openness rather than self-regulation. It does not seek to dominate others to preserve its being, but is concerned with inventing new modes of association and existence.

In chapter 5, we will see how the Image of Thought operates to diminish our capacities of thinking. This runs counter to our essence as a degree of power (potentia) not insofar as it is any less perfect given the affections it has, but because
it operates near its minimal threshold of activity. Someone striving to feed herself every day will find it near impossible to cultivate other aspects of being. Simone Weil's year working in a factory is a tale of how long hours and exhaustion prevent the ability to think or to be. Her conclusion, like Deleuze's, is that sadness makes no one intelligent. We will now turn to Deleuze's and Macherey's readings of Spinoza's philosophy to further our understanding of some of these ideas concerning univocal being.

III. vii. Benedictus, Maledictus

Spinoza

The Jew's translucent hands
Shape the crystals in the twilight
And the dying evening is all fear and chill
(In the evenings, evenings are the same).
His hands and the hyacinth's space
Paling at the purview of the ghetto
Are almost inexistent for the quiet man
Dreaming a clear labyrinth
Fame does not perturb him, that reflection
Of dreams in another kind of dream,
Nor the girls' fearful love.
Free of metaphor, free of myth
He shapes a rigid crystal: the infinite
Map of the One that is All Its stars.


Ontology-Ethics: a profound coupling that resounds with the radical nature of Spinoza's philosophy of immanence. Spinoza's unspoken pledge to purge the world of transcendence saw him ridiculed, hated and feared. Calling him the prince of philosophers, Deleuze contends that no one has gone so far in thinking immanence, no one remains as misunderstood, and we have hardly begun to comprehend his bewildering philosophy. In a seminar Deleuze tells us a story about Goethe. Goethe read and re-read the *Ethics* until finally he exclaimed that each time the whole escaped him. It is this paradoxically constitutive openness of Spinoza's philosophy that will be our concern as we seek to understand how Spinoza can propose an ethics without any conception of Good and Evil and why
Spinoza’s ethics is inseparable from his ontology.

III.viii. Spinoza’s heresy

One of the primary objections to philosophies like that of Spinoza’s is that they dissolve individuality into the Whole: a kind of night where all cows are black. When Hegel remarked with a certain glee that “Spinoza died on the 21st of February, 1677, in the forty-fourth year of his age. The cause of his death was consumption, from which he had long been a sufferer; this was in harmony with his system of philosophy, according to which all particularity and individuality pass away in the one substance” (Hegel quoted in Negri, 1981: 141), he bolstered the beliefs of many who saw Spinoza’s system as immobile (das Starre), an unmoved unity.63

From Hegel’s perspective, Spinoza constituted an important moment in thinking the immanent totality of the Absolute but it was up to Hegel himself to make this Substance Subject; to make it move. For Hegel, Spinoza’s substance was abstract and undifferenciated, echoing the Orient, and he could see no necessity for this plenitudinous affirmative Being to produce its effects. Still, according to poet Heinrich Heine, “All our contemporary philosophers, perhaps without knowing it, are looking through the eyeglasses that Baruch Spinoza polished” (quoted in Yovel, 1989b: 52). Because Hegel takes Spinoza’s conception of causa sui as a definition concerning an absolute beginning, he (understandably) cannot understand this initial moment. Why would substance begin to produce the modes? Are the attributes a supplementary dimension tacked onto substance?64

63 Yirimiyahu Yovel says, in the context of a discussion of conatus as self-preservation and Spinoza’s relation to Nietzsche, that “Spinoza’s insistence on self-preservation is in accordance with his metaphysics of self-identity and permanence [...]” (1989b: 113). I take issue with both this conception of substance and understanding of conatus.

64 The role of the attributes in Spinoza have been the subject of much heated debate and disagreement. In his expressionist reading, Deleuze (1968b) (strangely given his overall theme of expression) likens them to different names (like Jacob and Israel) of the same referent. Wolfson (1934) argues for a strongly subjectivist account. Macherey emphasises that the use of percipere (rather than concipere: to conceive) means that we perceive the attributes passively, hence they are no construction of the intellect. On the other hand, Gueroult (1968a) interprets Spinoza as saying each attribute is a substance. Finally Negri
Indeed what would shake substance from such immediate ecstasy of Being?

Not only does Hegel think that Spinoza’s philosophy is immobile, he thinks that it has no relation to an Other. Consequently that which lays claim to absolute reality is entirely devoid of reality and is, in fact, entirely abstract. Since he understands substance to be self-identical, he believes it lacks the movement of negation that could make it determinate. Hegel thinks the relationship between substance, the attributes and the modes is a hierarchical and serial one. Consequently, for him, the movement from the unity of substance to diversity could only be false and abstract. But, as we will learn Spinoza’s system is a system far from equilibrium.

From the Marrano tradition, Sephardic Jews who had been initially forced to convert to Christianity and then fled Spain and Portugal escaping the tyrannous purgings that began with Ferdinand and Isabella in 1492, Spinoza was used to an atmosphere that deployed ambiguity and dissimulation in order to communicate forbidden thoughts. Undoubtedly an atheist, Spinoza masks this heresy by using the name God. But Spinoza’s God in no way resembles the God of the monotheistic faiths. If we take a close look at de Deo, part 1 of the Ethics we find a

(1981) just obliterates them, saying they were a symptom of Spinoza’s idealistic phase before he became a full blown materialist. He justifies such a reading by telling us how the Ethics was written over two periods, and the attributes are no longer mentioned once the second period of writing has commenced. This topic is a thesis in itself and a minefield I want to avoid prolonging my contact with for the present. However, I want to briefly refer to Etienne Balibar’s very interesting reading of the role of the attributes in order to situate my own problematic. He maintains that the attribute makes the ‘passage’ of substance to the modes intelligible, while still retaining the idea that substance can be comprehended in an infinity of ways. They do not appear as a mediation of substance and the modes, but as a unity of contraries that is immediately given (1990: 67).

Spinoza states that there is an infinity of attributes of which we know two, Thought and Extension. He also says that the attributes are the essence of substance. A rather simple way of grasping this would be to begin, not at the speculative level of God, but with the example of a human whose body and mind can be understood as different expressions or aspects of a single individual, rather than a composite or a union of two substances. Spinoza negotiates the camps of idealism and materialism, slotting into neither. I understand this idea of the individual in terms of a qualitative multiplicity in which any change results in a qualitative transformation of the whole.

I will refer to God as ‘he’ because this is how the Latin has been translated. I realise that on the one hand this is ironic, given the criticism of anthropomorphic images of God that follow, but it also serves to show Spinoza’s capacities to mask and dissimulate.
complex and dynamic conception of substance, a substance that is a far cry from a container or even from the unmoved unity of Being.

Throughout the *Ethics*, there is a sustained, though veiled, critique of anthropomorphic conceptions of God that rests on a vulgar conception of monarchy as *Potestas* (II. pr.3. sch.). When God is presented as a free and fickle ruler that can will anything into existence and obeys no law, Spinoza retorts that God cannot produce things in any other way or order to the way they have been produced. A free thing exists through the necessity of its own nature (I.d.7). God is *causa sui*, hence he is not constrained or determined to exist by any external thing (*ab alio*). He is rather in himself (*in se*). Nature has no fixed goal and all final causes are figments of the human imagination, since were God to act with an end in view, he would necessarily lack something (I. app.)

Elaborating on this insight, Macherey argues that we must make a distinction between *agere* and *operari* (1992: 72). God acts, exercising an infinite power (*potestia*), but God is nothing other than the nature of things. He certainly does not have the power to constrain, in the manner of an autocrat that operates (*operari*) or works on a reality that is exterior to him. Such a model would involve a supplementary dimension of reality. And such a God would be nothing other than a caricatured image of the human; God made in the image of Man.

Spinoza’s conception of God rests on a conception of *potentia*, what he can do (I. pr.34) and *potestas*, the infinity of ways he is able to be affected. The essence of God is active in that he develops his nature by producing effects in it. The logic of the *causa sui* (cause of itself) means that this process of production escapes all

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66 *Potestas* from *potere* also means ‘to be able to’ and Deleuze emphasises this capacity to be affected when *potestas* communicates. As I have done throughout this thesis, I capitalise *potestas* when using it, as Negri does (and Spinoza does occasionally) to illustrate an operation of Power that diminishes others’ capacity to affect and be affected. Spinoza, though he uses *potestas* in this way when he says that understanding God’s power in this way is likening it to vulgar monarchy, does not keep to this distinction. Deleuze’s use of the pair *puissance* *pouvoir* communicates the sense of this *potentia* *Potestas* coupling. English does not communicate this nuance so I will continue to draw upon the distinction of *power* (and sometimes ‘force’) and *Power*.  

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external determination. God is absolutely infinite, absolute affirmation and
without negativity or lack (I. pr.15. sch.), existing through the sole necessity of his
nature. This nature implies (involvere) existence (I. d.1), moreover his essence is
existence. This conception of essence means that it is neither a possible nor does
it pre-exist. It is an actus a essentia (II. pr.3. sch.) and God exists and acts
necessarily. Liberty and necessity are not opposed. Freedom consists of existing
and acting by virtue of one’s own nature. Only God is free (I. d.7 and pr.17)
because, unlike the finite modes, he is not a constrained thing.

Spinoza flattens God onto the Real in the first pages of the Ethics. God is
revealed as the immanent movement of the Real, a dynamic and tendencial
movement without teleology or design. Any external determination injects the
possible, and hence a lack, or an overdetermination, into this absolute
immanence. This implies God is somehow lacking and limited; however, for this
to occur, there would have be an external cause (I. pr.11. proof 2.). God exists
necessarily because He is infinitely infinite. To be unable to exist is impotence,
and to be able to exist is power (potentia).

In proposition 18 of De Deo Spinoza distinguishes between the immanent cause
(\(causa immanens\)) and the transitive cause (\(causa transiens\)). Gabriel Albiac suggests
that this use of Spinoza’s adoption of this distinction stemmed from the Suárizian
tradition, through the manual of Adrian Heerebord (1997: 127). According to
Macherey this is a direct refutation of creationism, because it shows how God is
immediately at one with the action that manifests his power (\(puissance\)) (1992: 82).
There is one reality, not a hierarchical gradation of realities comprised of greater
and lesser being. Free necessity (\(libera necessitas\)) is opposed to acting in terms of
free decree or external ends.\(^{67}\)

In other words, if we imagine that there is a model (a formal cause) and a goal (a
final cause), we posit an external reality independent of divine nature. Such a

\[^{67}\] See Spinoza’s letters 57 and 58 to Tschirnhaus and Schuller respectively on free
necessity.
hylomorphic conception of God's power would resemble that of kings and queens that impose their power on the populace. By attributing an arbitrary free will to God, the response of the people could only be obedience. This kind of power would be irrational.

Pierre Macherey observes that it is because we are accustomed to reasoning from the part to the whole (under the aegis of the imagination) that we find it difficult to install ourselves in this totality that the modes depend upon. The nature of Being is nothing other than the reality or nature of the things gathered to this substantial principle. The relation of substance to the modes is dominated by productivity and power (potentia). God does not come out of himself to produce and to act. God does not want but he acts. Naturing Nature is simultaneously Natured Nature and these two are perfectly adequate. To separate them would introduce a hierarchical causality flouting Spinoza’s innovation of the immanent cause.

Macherey explains how to comprehend the relation of Naturing Nature and Natured Nature. He says in the former case we look at things in terms of infinity, seizing them globally. In the latter case, we examine how things determine one another reciprocally in their particularity. In this way we can understand that this is one and the same Nature conceived from different points of view (1998: 164).

The only distinction between Naturing Nature and Natured Nature arises from our lack of knowledge (Macherey, 1992: 105). We are not free through an impossible ideal but through the constitutive and positive capacity to act that is our effective power. In his exposition of the rules of practical living, De Servitute Humanae, Spinoza explains that to be ignorant of the causes of things is servitude (servitus). The essence of humans is nothing other than their varied powers of

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68 In my view it will be Badiou’s inability to grasp the notion of the immanent cause that leads him to allege that actual and multiple lives are flooded and submerged in the impersonal flows of Life, rather than perceiving how Life is the name for the immanent, processual and inventive movement of Nature that is inseparable from its productions. I will return to this theme shortly.
activity and capacities for association. Even impotence indicates an affirmative affective movement that is a power of being.

Nonetheless, external forces can alienate this power from its capacity to act affirmatively. This is the natural state of humans according to Spinoza, since they find themselves subjected to forces whose effects they passively undergo. To be passive is a necessary part of our finitude, but to be human means that one can behave in such a way as to be the adequate cause of one’s actions (IV. pr.2. proof). By understanding the conditions of our servitude and not detaching ourselves from Nature, we can understand the means to our liberation.

Marx tells us in his early writings that an ethical problematic arises when humans are systematically curtailed and constrained from acting and thinking, when they cannot foster and invent new potentials of existing. Gatens and Lloyd argue that we need to invent better collective imaginings that can cultivate, rather than over-determine, diversity and difference.

Consequently, the notion of the individual cannot be thought of in an atomistic fashion. It is the result of a combination of bodies (II. pr.13. and pr.14). As we will learn, ethics does not involve accumulating Power over others (Potestas) but is concerned with composing relations, finding out what agrees with us, constructing new modes of association and organisation that increase our capacities to affect and be affected (potentia). This is a dynamic and concrete process that is not premised upon abstractions such as 'human nature' but on the agreement of bodies and minds. This insight is the core of Spinoza’s ethics, something we will explore in further detail throughout this chapter.
III.ix. the active essence

'[E]ssence' does not refer to a general idea of humanity, an abstract concept under which all individuals are subsumed and their differences neutralised. On the contrary it refers to the power that singularises each individual, conferring upon him a unique destiny.


Deleuze remarks (15/2/77) that he does not see that life is possible without molar wholes, that is without individuated, though complex, bodies like organisms. In no way can we postulate a world of abstract intensities (15/2/77). An intensive quantity is never abstracted from the extensive quantity it correlates to. “The question is to know if an intensity agrees with someone and he can tolerate it. An intensity is bad, really bad, if it exceeds the power of someone that undergoes it, even if it is the most beautiful of things. An intensity is always in relation with other intensities” (15/2/77).

An essence is not an abstract view on a thing; indeed Spinoza tries strenuously to avoid speaking of a human essence (or nature) (II. ax.1). An essence is the acting principle of the thing, that without which the thing cannot be or be conceived. Conversely, an essence cannot be conceived outside of the thing of which it is the essence (II. pr.10. sch.). There is no hierarchy of essence over existence, and an essence does not have the status of being a possible before it is the essence of an actually existing thing (II. d.2). It is an affirmation, not something to be subsumed under an abstract universal (II. ax.1).

Modes are not inherently passive. Once they exist they have a power of acting and a capacity to be affected. This is their *conatus*, their *actualis essentia* (actual essence) and it is an expression of God’s power (*potentia*) to exist. Insofar as they are limited and finite beings they are caused to exist by other modes and are necessarily constrained and limited, part of a complex network of relations. They exploit this power of existing operating on reality (*operari*) but their power of acting (*conatus*) means they participate in the power of God as Naturing Nature. This idea draws close to what Guattari calls processual emergent subjectivity, and
what Schérer names ‘subjectivity without a subject’.

The idea of conatus opens up ways of thinking about how things invest themselves both mentally and corporeally, and to what extent they are acting at the minimum or maximum level of their thresholds of intensity, the former relating to a pole of extreme passivity and the latter, a pole of extreme activity (Macherey, 1995: 24, and III. pr. 6, 7 and 8). All things are equal in that they are identically inhabited by the same force to persevere in their being. This refers to the way that a thing is always in action and in movement, rather than being propelled into movement by something exterior to it (Macherey, 1995: 85) and “[f]rom this perspective, ‘nature (natura) and ‘power’ (potentia) are one and the same thing” (87). God’s power is a power that is nature (potentia hoc est natura) (III. pr. 7) whose essence it is to exist and act.

If we recall the distinction between agere and operari, we can affirm that a particular thing acts in a determinate way since it is limited by other things. It does not act in this way because it is limited but instead because a positive thing ‘acts’ in it, it ‘operates’ in a determinate way in coexistence and reciprocal limitation with other things (Macherey 1992: 87). Again this emphasises the necessity to grasp the two points of view from which we can conceive of the thing, in order to grasp that the operation is a part of the action of the thing, and not an autonomous procedure. Things are both ‘in God’ (in Deo) and ‘of God’ (a Deo) (1. pr. 26). They are at once constrained and free, depending on whether we look at them from a global perspective or a particular, situated perspective.

Part IV of the Ethica is entitled De Sertivitate Humana. It examines the idea of the virtue in terms of ethical principles (especially d.8). Virtus is closely tied, even interchangeable with the idea of potentia. Virtue is power, and vice versa. Macherey is tempted to call virtue the sense of the possible that projects each individual toward existence, and coincides with its effort to realise its nature (1997b: 45). He tells us that “virtue, which is the ethical principle par excellence, is far from a submission to a transcendent rule that establishes the connection

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between absolute values that would impose themselves regardless of the nature of the individual toward which they orient their activities; it consists on the contrary in doing all that one can to be and act in conformity with one’s nature, and doing this to the maximum, finding an immanent dynamic whose orientations are fundamentally positive and affirmative” (45). To desire to be autonomous would be contrary to one’s nature and would be impotence. Given the affections we have, we are as perfect as we can be (II. d.6). But if we lack nothing at any given instant how can we speak of ethics?

III.x. confrontation and sacrilege; contesting Morality

A man as he ought to be: that sounds to us as insipid as a “tree as it ought to be”.


Let us finally consider how naive it is altogether to say: Man ought to be such and such! Reality shows us an enchanting wealth of types, the abundance of a lavish play and change of forms [...].


Spinoza’s ethics is an ethology. It is concerned with modes of Being, whereas morality implies that there is ‘something’ superior to Being. Morality, according to Deleuze, judges Being (2/12/80) since it appeals to essences and values. This idea of essence implies something that is to be realised, that has not yet been realised. Morality is a system of judgement comparing beings with an abstract essence that they are supposed to realise. One does not behave ethically through a conception of duty or universal principles, but things are judged good because we desire them.

By opposing ethics and Morality, Deleuze argues that ethics asks ‘what can we do’, while Morality asks ‘what should we do?’ Ethics asks ‘to what extent are we separated from our powers of acting?’ A typology of immanent modes of
existence operating through principles of natural right is opposed to duty-based morality that refers to transcendental values which demands adherence to them. The moral law is an imperative that makes nothing known and at worst prevents knowledge (Deleuze, 1981a: 24). Any norm is an abstract and empty figure which presents itself as temporary (V. ax.). By taking a transcendent viewpoint, movement is arrested (Deleuze, 1990a: 146). "Processes are becomings, and aren’t to be judged by some final result but by the way they proceed and their power to continue, as with animal becomings, or nonsubjective individuations [...] There are no universals, only singularities" (146).

The immoralist beyond good and evil, Spinoza does not disavow good and bad. He adopts a perspectival approach. What is good is when the relations of one’s body are composed with the relations of another body in such a way that our power of acting increases. What is bad is when the body’s relation is decomposed since the relation of the other body combines with (but does not agree with) our essence. Ethics is a practice of organizing encounters in such a way that one’s capacities for affecting and being affected are compounded, "while preserving or respecting the other’s own relations and world [...]" (Deleuze, 1981a: 126). This is a dynamic idea premised upon the notion of the composition of power. However Spinoza does not adopt an egoistic or individualistic stance, for reasons I have explained. One has to figure out how to live well with others.

In his seminars on Spinoza, Deleuze develops his idea of the individual. He does so by paralleling the three kinds of knowledge found in the Ethics (imagination, reason and the intellectual love of God) with three kinds of ideas (affection-ideas, notion-ideas and essence-ideas).

We are born into ignorance and operate through the mechanisms of the imagination. Macherey says that Spinoza defines the mind "as a machine to imagine and nothing else" (1997a: 248). The imagination is understood in terms of the traces (restigio) of images imprinted on a body, in other words the way that

69 See Deleuze (1981a) especially chapter six “Spinoza and Us”.
a body is affected by another body. The imagination conditions our relation with
the world and others. Hence the problem is how to adapt ourselves to reality in
such a way that we can maximise our powers of acting. How can we lessen the
pressure put on us by external causes which enslave us in situations and alienate
us? (212).

Every individual is complex, made of an infinity of parts. These have different
relations of speeds and slownesses. By using the term *individuum*, Spinoza
demonstrates this complexity since this is said of that which is indivisible
(Macherey, 1997a: 36-7). What Spinoza appears to be saying is that singular things
result from a dynamic assemblage of other bodies, therefore, were they to be
divided this could not occur without them changing in nature. The conclusion
Spinoza draws from this is that if the relations that constitute our body change in
such a way that our characteristic relation is destroyed, we die.

It is in the interest of humans to multiply the relations they have with their milieu
of life, maximising their powers, thresholds and capabilities. To be human is not
be isolated but to multiply relations. Deleuze elaborates a conception of an
intensive multiplicity that seeks to explore the thresholds of this ‘unity in plurality’
by cultivating transversal relations with all kinds of things. These kinds of
operations are called ‘becomings’ since they open spaces of transmutation while
retaining a consistency of their own.

The ‘self’ as multiplicity is an emergent and complex self, constituted through
relations with all kinds of other bodies and ideas, with defined thresholds of
existence. “Unity is precisely what is missing from multiplicity, just as the
subject’s what’s missing from events (‘it’s raining’)” (1990a: 146). Transcendence
is an operation that relies upon abstraction, so the ‘unity in plurality’ is
understood in the same sense as the machinic assemblage, as a grasping together
of heterogeneous components in such a way that they maintain their
independence. The individual is emergent, not primary.
Affections are the effects of the image of a thing on me. This makes no claim about the nature of the object. Increasing the affections of which we are capable increases power. Prejudging the limitations of affections decreases power, in that part of my power becomes inactive. Affections (affectio) are the dimension of instantaneity.

Each affection envelops a passage or transition that is called an affect (affectus). This is similar to Bergson’s idea of duration. It refers to a passage that is irreducible. It is an idea of an affection of the body corresponding to an increase or decrease in its power of acting. The relations which are composed or decomposed relate to affects. We either become more or less active. If we are passive this means we are cut off from our powers of acting.

Edwin Curley criticises Spinoza for a lack of normative content in his philosophy. Like Blyenbergh he asks - how can we condemn a tyrannical government or an evil act? How can we distinguish vice from virtue? The letters exchanged between Blyenbergh and Spinoza touch upon these themes. Willem van Blyenbergh first wrote to Spinoza in 1665. He was a grain merchant who presents himself as a seeker of the truth. Spinoza is of course delighted to correspond with him, saying “For I believe that such a loving friendship affords us a serenity surpassing any other boon in the whole wide world” (Ep.19: 132) and so begin the letters on Evil (Ep.18-24, Ep.27). I only want to touch on a few points in these letters as they relate to the themes in this chapter.

In the first letter, Spinoza takes issue with an anthropomorphic conception of God. He explains that the Holy Scripture tries to present things to humans in a way that they can understand. However, the command given to Adam not to eat the apple was a revelation by God that the apple was poisonous. God did not deploy a moral prohibition but revealed the natural consequences of eating the apple (Ep.19: 135). There is no evil in itself but only that which is bad for me. Having received Blyenbergh’s lengthy, detailed and furious response Spinoza realises they have little in common, but he continues to write.
He admits that he does not understand the Holy Scripture and believes that God communicates, not through the Holy Scripture, but through the natural understanding given to us. He states that God's nature is not the same as the nature of man (Ep.21). Spinoza also chastises Blyenbergh for not understanding the nature of the dependence of things on God, saying “If you had apprehended by pure intellect the meaning of dependence on God, you would certainly not think that things, in so far as they depend on God, are dead, corporeal and imperfect. (Who has ever dared to speak so basely of the supremely perfect Being?)” (Ep.21: 156).

Spinoza confesses that he is astonished at Blyenbergh’s suggestion that if God did not punish wrongdoing nothing could stop us all from leaping into a life of crime. If it is only the fear of punishment that stops us from doing such things, we do not act from love or virtue. He himself does not commit these acts because it is opposed to his particular nature, and would lead him astray from the love and knowledge of God (Ep.21: 156). Blyenbergh writes back, hurt at Spinoza’s reproofs bringing up a number of questions that might also be directed to Spinoza by critics today. They are summarised by Spinoza as follows:

1. Is murder as pleasing to God as almsgiving?
2. Is stealing, in relation to God, as good as righteousness?
3. If there were a mind to whose particular nature the pursuit of pleasure and villainy was not repugnant, but agreeable, could it have any virtuous motive that must move it to do good and avoid evil? (Ep. 23: 167)

In response to the first question, Spinoza points out that God is not a perfect man so he is not pleased by one thing or another. Neither the righteous man nor the thief can cause God pleasure or displeasure. Nonetheless men are not equally good and perfect if one murders and one gives alms. The question is whether these actions are equally perfect (though they may be in their execution).
To elucidate this point, let us take the response to question 3. This question presupposes a contradiction, says Spinoza, since you might as well ask him "whether, if it accorded better with a man's nature that he should hang himself, there would be any reason why he should not hang himself. However, suppose it possible that there could be such a nature. Then I say (whether I grant free will or not) that if anyone sees that he can live better on the gallows than at his own table, he would be very foolish not to go and hang himself" (Ep. 23: 168). Likewise if a more perfect life and better essence could be attained through villainy, a person would be foolish not to take that route. In effect, such ideas go against everything Spinoza has written about the essence of the human as conatus, as we will see.

God is the cause of everything that has essence. However evil, error and villainy do not consist in anything that expresses essence. The difference between Nero's and Orestes's matricide is that Nero was 'ungrateful, devoid of compassion and obedience', while Orestes committed an act of sacred revenge because his mother killed his father Agamemnon. Both acts were the same, both intentions were the same, however the association of the image of the action with the image of the thing was not the same.

Orestes associated his act not with the murder of his mother, Clytemnestra, but with his murdered father. There was a direct composition of relations, and an indirect decomposition of relations. Obviously abiding by the laws of sacred revenge is not appropriate in our day but in essence, what he is saying is that no action considered in itself alone is good or bad (Deleuze, 1981a: 36). Deleuze (13/1/81) summarises this saying that every action must be considered from two perspectives: the image of the act as a power of the body, what a body can do: and the image of the associated thing upon which the act bears. The relation of association is between these two.

What is bad is when an act is associated with the image of a thing whose relation
is decomposed by the act. If I raise my arm and move it downwards with force, this expresses the power of my body. If I am hitting another person, I decompose a relation and this is bad, if I am hammering a protruding nail, I compound a relation and this is good. Good and bad is not a question of what suits me, but what agrees with me (Deleuze, 1981a: 35).

This correspondence is cut off by Spinoza, most likely because he feels it would be dangerous to communicate with Blyenbergh any further, rather than due to an inability to respond to Blyenbergh’s questions.70

III.xi. the art of immersion

Composing relations is like swimming, says Deleuze (14/5/73). It is a kind of savoir-faire. If we think of it in terms of rhythms, this becomes more clear. If swimming is an art of composing relations, I need to ensure that my body enters a relation with the wave, without the wave submerging me or knocking me down and drowning me. I need to modify the movements of my body in accordance with the rhythms of the wave. This requires improvisation, experimentation and cunning and objective or theoretical knowledge is useless. It is a phronesis.

Similarly, common notions are not subject to the imagination since they deal with objects that are non-existent in nature; relations (II. pr.38). These are not just an effect of the affections of the body. The common notions are adequate ideas. They are not just opinions or the sensori-motor images that are clichés. They have no universal claim but are good in function of the usage to which they are put, concerning the relations of singular things.

Macherey (1997a: 360-1) explains that adequate knowledge involves a gradual

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70 Blyenbergh’s response was to write a short booklet on Spinoza with an extremely long title The knowledge of God and his service affirmed against the outrages of atheists. in which it is demonstrated with clear and natural reasons that God has created and revealed a religion, that God also wishes to be served in accordance with this religion, and that the Christian religion corresponds not only to the religion revealed by God, but also to our innate reason. Clearly Spinoza was correct to be cautious.
transition, rather than a rupture, from the regime of the imagination. It is like a fish in water since adequate knowledge of the infinite and eternal essence of God exists as a condition making possible movements and modes of being. Imagining is inadequate because it is a privation, cut off from reality. We develop our potentialities by incorporating more and more things, but this requires a specific mental attitude which involves understanding our relation with other things. It is in our interests that we find better ways of living together (405-6)

Having adequate ideas does not mean that the mind affirms a greater power of control over the body. It is to comprehend more things and increase a power of thinking, while also developing “a body capable of the greatest number of things” *(qui corpus ad aptum plurima habeat)* (V. pr. 39).

When I act, I do not decide everything in advance and set down a series of rules in relation to which I gauge a situation. For instance, rather than condemning Le Pen’s supporters as reactionary, xenophobic and fascist, Guattari asks why are large portions of the French population, especially workers, embracing this ideology. If we do not engage in a pragmatic response we lose all hope of ‘rhizomatising’ that component. Guattari calls this dissensus.

The individual is a singular essence, that is, a degree of power, and a characteristic relation (of the differential relations of movement and rest constituting its body) corresponds both to this essence and to a capacity for being affected. We are active if we are the source of our affections, but we are passive if we submit and react to whatever happens to us. In the former case our powers of acting are increased, and in the latter we operate at our lowest ebb. What pertains to an essence is a state or an affection insofar as it expresses an absolute quantity of reality (Deleuze, 1981a: 39).

An essence is an intensive quantity. It is inseparable from a threshold. Spinoza calls it a *pars potentiae*. This involves a quantitative conception of individuation, but this quantity is an intensity. It is not the same as an extensive part, but is a special
In a letter to Meyer (Ep. 12: 105), Spinoza describes a peculiar conception of infinity. He draws two non-concentric circles, one within the other. The sum of the inequalities of the space between these circles exceed any number, likewise the variation in the speed of matter moving in that area. This would be the case regardless of the size of the portion we took. It is infinite and limited.

There is a maximum and a minimum. There is a limit and a threshold. Similarly, a degree of power is the difference between this maximum and minimum. It is therefore, Deleuze (20/01/81) tells us, a difference in itself. As a degree of power it has a latitude. In chapter 5, I want to draw upon this idea of the unequal in order to show how the disparate is a key moment in thinking difference-in-itself. Deleuze makes a link here between the idea of intensive quantities and that of differential calculus (as he does in *Difference and Repetition*).

Things are powers for Spinoza. They do not have power but they are power, and power is a quantity of force. An intensive quantity replaces the idea of an essence. The intensive quantity defines the thing. An essence is no longer described qualitatively ('Man is a rational animal', 'Man is a featherless biped') but is understood in terms of the capacities to affect and be affected of singular things.

John Rawls does not look at these capacities when he formulates his effectively distributive model of justice. A formal definition of powers and rights can have no effects since it remains abstract. Like the Malawian farmer, formal rights must be backed up by an effective power to act, otherwise these concepts are simply lip service. We need to concentrate on this concrete aspect of this definition of power.

We find a remarkable extension of this reading of Spinoza in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Inserted in the 1730: *Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible...*  

\[71\] I will explain this distinction between intensive quantity, and extensity and quality in chapter 5, by showing how Deleuze develops his philosophy of difference.
plateau, *Memories of a Spinozist, I.* discusses the idea of longitude: the differential relations of movement and rest, speeds and slownesses that constitute the characteristic relation of the individual. The simple bodies that constitute a limit point are only distinguished in terms of movement and rest, slowness and speed. They have no form or function. These always come in greater or lesser infinities. In this way we can understand that every individual is an infinite multiplicity. Things are distinguished from one another in terms of these differential relations of speed and slowness. They call this the longitude of the individual. "It is a question not of organization but of composition [...]" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980: 255).

*Memories of a Spinozist, II.* informs us that to each relation of movement and rest, speed and slowness grouped in an infinity, there corresponds a degree of power or potential. The latitude of an individual is the degree of power that correlates to these differential relations. It is an intensive part and concerns the capacity to be affected of the individual. Deleuze and Guattari give Von Uexkull’s example of the tick. The tick has three affects; it is attracted by light so it manoeuvres onto a branch; it is sensitive to the smell of mammals and drops on a mammal that passes; it burrows into the most hairy bit of skin it can find. Until a mammal passes, the tick waits and fasts; this is its 'pessimal' threshold. When a mammal comes by, it feasts and then dies; this is its 'optimal' threshold. Its degree of power is a quantum that operates within limits. These limits are not contours, but the intensities or affects of which something is capable (257). Deleuze and Guattari say that you are an haecceity "You are longitude and latitude, a set of speeds and slownesses between unformed particles, a set of nonsubjectified affects" (262).

Etienne Balibar argues that the object of Spinozist ontology is individuation, "or the difference of activity from passivity. But this difference, which is nothing but the movement of its own production, is also an originary unity. It is immediately 'practical'" (Balibar, 1990: 58). The individual is conceived as both *essence* and effect.
The individual is thought synthetically in Spinoza. Consequently, mechanistic accounts fail to communicate his subtle account of processes of individuation. Indeed my argument with Negri, that I alluded to in the last chapter, is that Negri fails to think the process of individuation, settling for a description of the interactions of actualised and individuated beings in terms of tendencial action (Negri, 1981: 146). His ‘real’ concept of potentia as a tension internal to being is not fleshed out thoroughly (44).

III.xii. decentering the human

What we find here is still the hyperbolic naivety of man: positing himself as the meaning and measure of the value of things.

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power (1901: §12B, 14).

Finalism is an illusion for Spinoza. Nature has no ends set beyond it, as though its only purpose was to arrive at a goal. Centuries later Darwinism put paid to a human centred conception of Nature, but its legacy remains. The Appendix that the first part of the Ethics ends with is a battle-cry against such illusions.

Heretical, vibrant, scathing; this Appendix is an extraordinary read, especially when compared with the cool, systematic preceding passages. Deleuze claims that there are three Ethics; the first moves through the more geometrico, but the second is magical, full of whirlwinds and surprises (the last is part V when Spinoza’s develops his idea of beatitudo). Spinoza’s rousing attack on the anthropomorphic conception of God and the vanity of humans would appear heretical even today. Humanity is ripped from its pedestal and put in its place as a part of nature. Many of the arguments he draws upon are used today by environmentalists and progressivist activists in the face of unabated claims of the rights of humans to exploit and dominate nature (as well as one another) with abandon.

There are three illusions of consciousness according to Deleuze; the illusion of finality, the illusion of freedom and the theological illusion (1981a: 20). Such a
typical human prejudice is the attribution of final causes to things. Humans assume that since they act in terms of an end, so too do all natural things. Spinoza notes that they even think that God rules with a given end in mind, and imagine that God made humans to honour him. His response to the claim that humans have free will is well known - and so the stone rolling down the hill believes it rolls of its free accord.

People are born ignorant of the causes of things, but they all look for what is useful to them. Since they are conscious of their volitions and appetites, they believe themselves free. However they ignore the causes disposing them to such appetites. They act in terms of utility and are simply obsessed with attributing final causes to things. All around there are plenty of things that are useful to them; eyes to see, teeth to chew, plants and animals to eat..., so they think that these things have been put there for them. Things are means to their ends. And who put these things there for them? God. Responding in this manner ignores the embedded and situated relational reality that humans are a part of, as a part of nature themselves, imposing instead a grand design on Nature (and humanity). Nature has no final end prescribed to it, because it lacks nothing.

Falling prey to fear and superstition, constructs of the imagination, people search for meanings and signs of God's will in the world. Spinoza gives an example of the person who is hit and killed by a stone falling off a roof. By instigating a potentially infinitely regressive series of asking 'why?' (why did the wind blow at that moment? why did this person happen to be passing the house just then?) people arrive at the fallacious conclusion that this was God's will. This is the asylum of ignorance, and demonstrates how ignorance and stupidity can be used to argue for and maintain authority. By not understanding the nature of things, humans imagine things, and affirm nothing in things. They believe there is a created order without understanding the nature of things. This just reflects a human disposition and preference for order.

Humans have made themselves abstractions, blinkered to the complex nature of
their bodies and minds and the ways they are affected. This practical attitude of seeking out what is useful to, and hence what is good for, us has led to an instrumental attitude toward reality. This tendency to isolate things from their context as though things were predisposed to play a role as ends for humans, compounds a conception of final causes in which there is an objective reality, or teleology. Because humans are conscious of their actions, they believe themselves free and set themselves above the laws of Nature. His immanent philosophy challenges the invocation of any transcendent principles with the remarkable phrase ‘God, that is, Nature’ (Deus sive Natura).

“Our understanding of responsibility is restrained by thinking individuals as bordered territories, firmly separated from others in such a way that the issue of where responsibility lies is always in principle determinable. Spinoza’s treatment of individuality - especially that aspect of it which Balibar terms ‘transindividuality’- gives insight into the nexus between individual and collective identity” (Gatens and Lloyd, 1999: 74). All acts are inscribed within a network of pre-established relations (Macherey, 1992: 137). Responsibility, then, must be thought in terms of our embedded relationships in a collective that may be presently enjoying the comforts that derive from historically reprehensible acts.

Spinoza’s ethics is an ethics of liberation that frees us relatively from the bondage and ignorance we are born into. It is a search for commonality that does not rest upon abstract fictions and ossified essences. It is a philosophy of dynamical equilibrium that moves us toward greater powers of acting, thinking and being without abstracting ourselves from Nature. It is a philosophy that impels us to accept finitude and believes eternity is not the same as immortality. To act is perilous, putting our lives in danger, but we can do no other. His analytic is one that serves to display the mechanisms for realising ethical transition. Such an ethics does not rest on abstraction, but on trying to learn what you are capable of; what your limits are. It is life lived on the edge. Rather than overcoming affects, it is a rationality of the affects.
"Spinoza always thinks of the individual synthetically, as the result of a movement of totalisation which began before it and continues beyond its own limits" (Macherey, 1992: 121). The individual is a part of nature. This is not to say that it cannot be decomposed, that it exists tanguam imperium in imperio. Such a definition would be an analytic definition. Instead, it finds its principle of existence in the whole(s) to which it belongs and from which it can only be separated in a relative manner. Nature is not made of parts isolable one from the other. The conception of a simple body is but an abstraction, it is a limit point. Rather bodies must be thought of in terms of their differential relations, their speeds and slownesses, movements and rest.

Humans need to learn to see themselves as a part of nature (pars naturae) subject, like God, to the laws of Nature. The use of the term God is not just a practice of subterfuge and camouflage for Spinoza but concerns the difficult process of re-situating crucial philosophical problems. By thinking Spinoza as a dynamical philosopher of process we can perhaps avoid the temptation to prioritise one term (substance) above the other (the modes) and understand that Naturing Nature is a causality that invests the whole field of reality. Such a move does not close off the possibility of human liberty, but simply shows how liberation is an ongoing activity that accepts and embraces our existence as finite, complex and relational beings. It is in this way that Spinoza’s philosophy can be called an anti-human humanism.

By no longer seeing ourselves apart from nature, we can begin to understand freedom. We no longer fetishise ourselves and other things. Necessity is an essential dimension of freedom. But this does not run contrary to our nature by operating as a limitative force. It means understanding that the individual is not isolated, but embedded in a complex network of relations.

**III.xiii. transitions**

In the astonishing last part of the *Ethics*, Spinoza says that we feel and experience that we are eternal. This phrase has led some to say he has reneged on his
immanent philosophy accusing him of talking about the immortality of the soul, others see it as a lapse into mysticism. But what is this beatitudo that is the third kind of knowledge (V. pr.32. corr.) that he says is a knowledge sub specie aeternitatis (V. pr.29)? It is not an abstract thought of a never-ending duration, a long linear time but something more similar to Bergson’s concept of duration. It is a very concrete experience, based in the present, that comes from a practice that strives to see things globally. The imagination always grasps things as past and contingent, but this affirmation of necessity is a love of the present, an amor fati. We are both finite and a part of nature. Spinoza is saying that we cannot understand without loving and this moment is a synthesis of the rational and the affective.

In my next chapters, I want to explore how Deleuze takes and transforms Spinoza’s philosophy of immanence. At times, especially in the seminars, Deleuze drops tasty morsels into his narrative that seem to align Spinoza with the philosophy of difference he himself articulates. For example, he (20/1/81) says that a degree of power is always an intensive quantity, a difference of difference. Unfortunately at this point the transcript indicates that the tape ends, so I do not know how he might have expanded on this theme.

Although Spinoza’s is undoubtedly a philosophy of force, power, becoming and transformation, these ideas can be developed further in the direction of a transcendental empiricism. Through Simondon’s concept of metastability, the virtual is no longer a non-realised possible but real. This idea is intimated through the idea that potentia is a power in act; however, the reality of a tense and metastable system would have been difficult to conceive in Spinoza’s day. I draw upon a useful short piece by Etienne Balibar in which he brings together Spinoza and Simondon to examine some potential links of these thinkers.

Any system or individual, for Simondon, is more than identity and more than unity. I situate this proposition in the context of what Deleuze calls the Image of Thought. Deleuze argues here that difference has not been thought in itself and
endeavours to develop a series of concepts to do so. I argue that his concept of difference-in-itself as disparate enables us to retain a philosophy of immanence while developing a more expansive account of processes of individuation and singularisation through the notion of the pre-individual field or the problematic. This propels the notion of continuous variation into an arena where divergence can be affirmed.

**III.xiv. the disparate and the possible - toward the pre-individual**

In my next chapter I want to follow up on some of the many ideas and concepts that surround the ‘image of thought’ chapter in *Difference and Repetition*, a theme I will return to in chapter 5. Through these two chapters I shall explicate the concepts of difference-in-itself, intensity, individuation, the disparate, and pre-individual singularity. Using these concepts I will show how the idea of nomos relates to the concept of becoming, and will demonstrate, utilising the work of Etienne Balibar, the role of the pre-individual and transindividual in Spinoza’s work.

There is a link between thought and individuation. Individuation does not proceed through a determination of species. “It involves fields of fluid intensive factors which no more take the form of an I than of a Self [...] It is inseparable from a pure ground that it brings to the surface and trails with it” (1968a: 152). This field coexists with the individual though the individual is unilaterally distinguished from it ‘like lightning across a dark sky’. What relation does the Untimely have to the actual? Through the concept of a pre-individual field, I will counter Laruelle’s claim that Deleuze is a philosophical idealist, showing how his concept of difference does not betray a fidelity to immanence. Finally, I will examine further ethico-political implications of this approach.
Chapter Four

Simondon’s Crystalline Becomings
IV.i. paradox

The same terms are used to describe ice deserts as sand deserts: there is no line separating earth and sky; there is no intermediate distance, no perspective or contour; visibility is limited; and yet there is an extraordinarily fine topology that relies not on points or objects, but rather on haecceities, on sets of relations (winds, undulations of snow or sand, the song of the sand or the creaking of ice, the tactile qualities of both). It is a tactile space, or rather “haptic”, a sonorous much more than a visible space.


In an English collection of her work entitled *Power and Invention: Situating Science*, Isabelle Stengers examines the question of relevance, and the notion of a problem, in the concrete domain of science. In a piece originally written with Ilya Prigogine, she explores ‘The Reenchantment of the World’. They argue that while science is the art of manipulating nature, it also tries to understand it. It is for this reason that it occupied a territory between *episteme* and *techne* in Aristotle’s writings. “Like Aristotle’s gods, the simple machines of dynamics are only concerned with themselves. They have nothing to learn; rather they have everything to lose from any contact with the outside. They simulate an ideal that the *dynamic system* will actualize” (1979: 35). 

“The foedera fati are replaced by the foedera naturae, which, as Serres emphasizes, designate both the “laws” of nature – local, singular, historical relations between things – and an “alliance”, a contract with nature” (49). A perennial battle for law and mastery is subverted by a turbulent science that can embrace singularity. Extending this logic, we can surmise that Deleuze’s philosophy cannot be called a critical philosophy, in the Kantian sense of the term, but constitutes a kind of critical ontology which is the art of posing problems. As he says, “I make, remake and unmake my concepts along a moving horizon, from an always decentered centre, from an always displaced periphery which repeats and differentiates them

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72 These simple machines are those like the cannonball in a vacuum and the ideal pendulum (33).
The subject is no longer an active subject "endowed with projects, intentions, and will [...]" (Prigogine and Stengers, 1979: 56), but a larval self.

In the next chapter, I will suggest that Deleuze's philosophy can be understood in terms of a radicalisation of phronesis. Michel Serres, according to Prigogine and Stengers, also evoked the intelligence of peasants and seafarers in order to describe an intelligence premised upon respect for the world in which they live. As humans, we incessantly modify the world. By cultivating a ‘respect’ for nature, we also cease judging other knowledges and practices, opting instead to interbreed with them, creating novel communications and unnatural nuptials. This approach epitomises what Guattari calls a ‘meta-modelisation’ or a ‘schizo-modelisation’, which refuses the judgements of a ‘definitive’ model of thinking.

"This world that seems to have renounced the security of stable, permanent norms is clearly a dangerous and uncertain world" (58). This is the time for the new alliances. Paradox, not doxology. Our relation with the world is not, and cannot be, a pacified and harmonious one. It remains fraught with, and dependent upon, dissonance and disparity. What would reason be capable of if "liberated from the disciplinary models that normalize it [...]" (Stengers, 1989: 130)? For William James this IS pragmatism; philosophy pursuing its adventures (1907: 101). Like Michel Serres, James focuses on conjunctive relations, prepositions like ‘with’ and ‘through’, to explain this radical empiricism which he describes as a ‘mosaic philosophy’.

In Gilbert Simondon’s work we find a processual philosophy that takes issue with the propensity to abstract and isolate the individual. As a critique of a model of being, premised upon the notion of the individual, it is superb; as an exposition of another model of being as metastable, it opens up the possibility for us of showing the more-than-individual dimensions of any individual (a term we will continue to use only for the sake of convenience). Drawing out the non-human becomings of the human is part of the process of reinventing the human. Tracing a subjectivity that is not the property of the individuated subject thwart a
subject-object opposition, grasping subjectivity as a process, or a heterogenesis, that transverses different domains. The ethico-political implications of this will be made clear in the final chapter. We are no longer ourselves. Becomings are not solely esoteric conceptual inventions, but help us to understand our non-human and pre-human dimensions. It is the individual human that is an abstraction. For this reason, Simondon continues with Spinoza's enterprise of understanding the human as a part of nature.

IV.ii. thinking with the grain

Everything is obscure in the idea of creation if we think of things which are created and a thing which creates, as we habitually do.

Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution. (1911: 261).

Gilbert Simondon is a little known French philosopher of science. In fact, much of the interest in him has been sparked off through Deleuze's references to his work. His writing on technology has been the cause of renewed debate and discussion; however, it is his account of individuation I want to concentrate on. Interestingly, Simondon dedicated L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique to the memory of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Toward the end of his life Merleau-Ponty had begun to interrogate the idea of 'pre-objective being'. Perhaps Simondon here felt he had found a kindred spirit in his effort to move beyond both phenomenology and positivism.

In the posthumously published The Visible and the Invisible (Followed by Working Notes), Merleau-Ponty says that we need to revise our ontology in order to talk about conditionings that escape us or remain hidden (1964: 21). We interrogate our experience in order to learn how it opens us to that which is not ourselves (159). Seeking to avoid invoking transcendent principles, while being unwilling to remain at the level of the individuated empirical, 'Flesh' was Merleau-Ponty's way of articulating a conception of an anonymous, pre-individual being, while refusing to admit a pre-constituted world. He calls it a "pregnancy of possibles" (250).
This common knot, beyond the point of view of the subject and the object, is the modulation of being in the world.

For Merleau-Ponty too, the possible is not a simple pre-formed reservoir accompanied by a principle of choice. He argues that actualism must be eliminated (since it is not true that everything is actual), proposing in its place a being of *becoming* actual - that is, an actuality of the possible. As Henri Michaux has lyrically observed, by breaking the skin of things we learn how things become things, and the world becomes world.

Originally written as a doctoral thesis, Simondon’s two books, *L’Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique* and *L’Individuation psychique et collective*, constitute part of the same project. They endeavour to grasp the process of individuation in its very becoming, rather than re-constituting it from already individuated elements. In a footnote to *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze expresses his belief that *L’Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique* has a special importance because it presents the “first thought-out theory of impersonal and pre-individual singularities” (1969: 344, n.3) providing a new conception of the transcendental field.73

Simondon proposes an overall critique of the tools and models that we have used to approach concepts. In agreement with Bergson, he thinks the concepts we have developed only present us with snapshots of the world; we stumble before Zeno’s paradox, unsure of how to take another step. Individuals are not so many potential immobilities. *Becoming* is, for Simondon, infinitely varied; the dimension of being that opens up the possibilities of the world. Our banal and static way of viewing the world is thrown into movement. Not only is the individual grasped as part of a wider reality, a part of nature, but its own reality becomes partial, relative and brims with potentials. For these reasons, the process

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73 This idea of the transcendental field is a very important one, one which I cannot do justice to within the confines of this thesis. I have tried to show that although Deleuze develops a philosophy he calls transcendental empiricism, this does not involve transcendence. A fuller engagement directed solely toward this theme would also examine Kant and Kantian philosophy in great detail.
of individuation rather than the state of the individual is the focal point of our enquiries.

Simondon asks two fundamental questions in relation to individuation: why do we assume that individuated being is the most interesting or even the most essential reality to be explained? Why do we also imagine that individuation has a principle that is both prior to the process of individuation and which could explain the formation of the singular individual?

IV. iii. snapshots

But things and states are only views, taken by our mind, of becoming. There are no things, there are only actions.


Atomism and hylomorphism make the same mistake. They think being in accordance with the model of the one, and they presuppose the existence of the individual. According to Simondon, these have been the two primary ways of approaching the reality of an individual being. Were we to politicise these points, we could suggest that liberal individualism effectively atomises society, since it portrays it as a conglomeration of egoistic, possessive individuals that pre-exist the relations they enter into. Moreover, the pressures of a communitarian position bears down upon the singularities of a populace. The individual is made to fit the group. Simondon implores us to distinguish being as *être* from being as *individuel*. Individuation for philosophical, but also for ethico-political reasons as the second volume of his thesis testifies, needs to be thought as a process. Like Spinoza, he tries to navigate between the traditions of idealism and materialism, but he also develops a unique conception of the individual that disrupts the discourses of both communitarianism and liberal individualism. While not

*I do not continue with the Heideggerian distinction of Being and being here because the word Simondon uses throughout is ‘être’. I think this is a deliberate move because it focuses on being in terms of singular processes rather than a catch-all term Being. He will argue that subject and object emerge from pre-individual being.*

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wanting to lose the specificity or the singularity of the individual, he also wants to underscore that it is necessarily a relational being, and to develop a conception of its essence as becoming. What he calls the pre-individual and the transindividual relate to that which Deleuze and Guattari christen the non-human becomings of the human.

Substantialist atomism provides us with a classic monism. It posits being as that which consists in its unity, resisting that which it is not. Impermeable, impassive, indifferent, it is both grounded in itself and unengendered. Resonances of this approach remain within the discourse of rights-based theory; the integrity of the individual is often assumed and her relations with others are supplementary, rather than constitutive. For example, John Rawls' distributive paradigm of justice both presupposes and obscures these relations as it focuses on the individual (I.M. Young, 1990: 20). For these kinds of reasons, Henry Shue (1980) criticises this approach, appealing for a theory of rights and duties that accepts and affirms responsibility to and for the other. Hylomorphism, on the other hand, paints a slightly more dynamic encounter through which the individual emerges as the product of the meeting of form and matter. However, James Tully has shown us how the scored specificity of the individual, the very difference of the individual, can be planed and smoothed over with top-down theories that seek to assimilate differences. In addition, the dogmatic image of thought that Deleuze identifies has resonances with a hylomorphic operation, resting on a will to identity. Differences are denied in both communitarianism and possessive individualism, because of the resolute focus on the unity and identity of the individual, or of the group. Such a unity provides no real space for heterogeneity and multiplicity.

By complacently assuming that the individuated, given, and constituted being is not only the most interesting reality around, but also the one that needs to be explained (Simondon, 1964: 21), we set ourselves off on a particular trajectory. Hylomorphism and atomism both imagine that there is a principle of individuation anterior to the individuation itself, and this principle can be found in a reality
prior to the process of individuation. For this reason, they begin with the constituted individual, and try to detect from its presence the conditions of its existence. Yet if the constituted individual is given an ontological (and explanatory) privilege, then the individual is torn and abstracted from the processes of individuation and the system of reality that it is a part of. We need to develop a thought without image, a thought that can trace movements in their singular becomings without assimilating them to an identitarian model. A thought that can grasp difference.

Simondon says that if “individuation does not only produce the individual, we would not seek to move so quickly through the stage of individuation to arrive at the final reality that is the individual [...]” (22). Instead, we would try “to know the individual through individuation rather than individuation through the individual” (22). This is the challenge he sets before us. The implications of this approach are radical.

It is no longer a question of imposing a form upon a matter but of elaborating an increasingly rich and consistent material, the better to tap increasingly intense forces. What makes a material increasingly rich is the same as what holds heterogeneities together without their ceasing to be heterogeneous.


A technological approach to individuation envisages the sculptor chiselling stone, or the carpenter carving wood. The activity of these artisans is viewed as the skilled imposition of a form upon the passive matter of the materials. Yet this abstract form and matter is a far cry from the reality of artisanal fabrication. Any material is brimming with potentials and singularities; often it must be prepared in advance. If you cut a piece of expensive wood against the grain it may split and you will ruin it. Deleuze and Guattari argue that royal science is inseparable from this hylomorphic model, saying that it derives less from technology and life than from a society of governing and governed (1980: 369). "It is the idea of the law

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[75] I believe this presumption that individuated reality is the most important reality precipitates Badiou’s contention that Deleuze denigrates the actual. However, Deleuze (like Simondon) is more concerned with processes (of individuation and singularisation).
that assures the model's coherence, since laws are what submit matter to this or that form, and, conversely, realize in matter a given property deduced from the form” (408).

Simondon explains that the technological operation involves an encounter of two realities of heterogeneous domains, an encounter that institutes a mediation. Matter is actively plastic, harbouring potentials, and is not in the least passive. Take the example of moulding clay. A whole chain of factors, relations and operations come into play in this process. These include the workplace, the worker, and the microphysical chemical reactions that occur in the clay at a molecular level. (Deleuze and Guattari's term ‘assemblage’ communicates the complex operations at play that far surpass a simple form-matter dichotomy.) The form of the mould has no role but to limit and stabilise.

IV.iv. multiplicitous beings

We are no longer ourselves. Each will know his own. We have been aided, inspired, multiplied.


Traditional models of being have, according to Simondon, rested upon the conception of an ideal state of stable equilibrium. Becoming is thus presented as the becoming of an already individuated being. Being is portrayed as substance. All its potentials extinguished, such a being lays exhausted at its lowest ebb, incapable of further transformations. For this reason, individuation has not been adequately thought. A reliance upon this conception of being was understandable since only relatively recently has a conception of metastable equilibrium been developed. The incapacity to think of a system that could be more than unity and more than identity, that could be both itself and other than itself, prohibited intuitions such as those of the Ancients, from being taken further. The entire tradition of Occidental philosophy has been, in Simondon’s view, a substantialist

76 Unlike Spinoza’s substance which was, as we saw, a dynamical and active being.
one since it has never seized the real individual in its genesis. It has accepted it gratefully as a given reality (90). Deleuze’s conception of a created possible that precipitates a disparity or problematic develops some of the intuitions of transformational pragmatics. But what ontology accompanies these intuitions?

What if, however, being was no longer itself? What if being and becoming were no longer opposed, but dimensions of one system? Simondon’s name for this state of affairs is metastable being. This is a thought of being as more than unity and more than identity. Since it is both one and not-one, Simondon calls it pre-individual being. We no longer need to flail about in search of a principle of individuation, since the individuated term is neither presupposed nor privileged. In this system, becoming is a dimension of being and it corresponds to the capacity of being to be out of phase with itself and to resolve itself by moving through phases. Becoming is the dimension of being that constitutes “the mode of resolution of an initial incompatibility that is rich in potentials” (1989: 13), rather than a framework through which a being moves. Individuation is the movement through phases of being. Being is a field that is rich in potentials; these result from the incompatibility of heterogeneous dimensions. Being is only as it becomes.

We can only understand individuation if we grasp being as a supersaturated system. Such a being cannot be accessed through the principle of the excluded middle and the principle of identity, since these principles apply only to individuated being (13-14). Consequently we discover that what is commonly called being is nothing other than an impoverished abstraction; it is the individual separated from its milieu. No longer will the individual be a stranger to a world confronting it (1964: 28).

The individual known through individuation reveals itself to be a relative reality, part of a wider regime or system. “The individual is thus relative in two senses: because it is not all being, and because it results from a state of being in which it did not exist either as individual or as principle of individuation” (23). For this
reason, the term ‘individual’ does not adequately convey the complex relation of ‘individual-milieu’ that emerges. A milieu is associated with the individual through the process of individuation. This term ‘milieu’ replaces the old sense of matter, as it gestures toward a matter that is metastable like a supersaturated solution awaiting its crystalline germ. Such a system is the synthetic grouping of differing scales of reality which do not communicate prior to individuation (1989: 66).

What is this pre-individual being? Is it simply a domain relative to the individual, or does it consist in its own reality? And why is individuation understood to be “a partial and relative resolution which manifests itself in a system harbouring potentials and containing a certain incompatibility in relation to itself, an incompatibility produced by forces or tensions as well as by the impossibility of any interaction between the extreme terms of its dimensions” (12)? What kinds of ethics and politics will be adequate to this concept of pre-individual being, and the additional concept of the transindividual? A new thought of relationality is required.

IV.v. revolutionary states

Pre-individual being is described by Simondon as homogeneous, concrete and without phase. This description is misleading given the emphasis he places on disparateness (disparation). Disparateness designates a tension or incompatibility between two elements of a situation which results in the invention of a new individuation. Pre-individual being can be better understood through Deleuze’s distinction of differentiation and differenciation. The former refers to a non-actualised though absolutely real virtuality - a field of potentials or pre-individual singularities - and the latter to the processes of actualisation through individuation and differenciation of this reality. The former cannot be posited without the latter. Simondon joins Deleuze and Bergson in seeking to avoid a conception of a realisable possible. He is reluctant to import any concept that might inject a

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77 He is wary of the concept of the virtual for this reason as he thinks it involves an entelecheia and designates a possible that has yet to be realised. His use of the idea of potential is, however, very close to Deleuze’s understanding of the virtual as a dimension
teleological direction. For this reason he develops the idea of potential energy.

Potential energy is related to the capacity for transformation of a system. Deleuze calls it the energy of the pure event (1969: 103). Simondon argues that the idea of potential energy allows us to understand a system that could not be grasped through formalism or through quantification, in other words a metastable system. Through it we can trace real transformations in that system. There is a critical moment where potential energy is at its maximum; however, it is not something that exists independently. It is a part of a system and expresses the dissymmetry of that system.

In my introduction, I discussed Péguy’s conception of the event. The event involved a dissymmetry, indicating a state of affairs was ‘out of joint’. Singularities or critical points described irreversible states that sparkled and hissed. Deleuze remarks that “Singularities are turning points and points of inflection, bottlenecks, knots, foyers and centres; points of fusion, condensation and boiling: points of tears and joy, sickness and health, hope and anxiety, ‘sensitive’ points” (1969: 52). This singular or critical point is remarkable; it is a point of transformation. This point is pre-individual as it is anterior to any individuation, and it is singular, because it cannot be captured through a general law. It is ‘not-yet’ and ‘always-already’. Péguy believed that both history and event are inseparable from these singular points (53). They delineate a problematic that is irreducible to a subjective perspective indicating, rather, an objective or real state of being. It is this tension that is described at length by Simondon. These ideas of potential energy, metastability and singular points can be understood readily if we examine a supersaturated system.

A simple example of a supersaturated system is a glass of water dosed with spoonfuls of sugar. The water becomes supersaturated with sugar. Eventually it
will take only the tiniest addition of sugar to trigger a process of crystallisation which engenders a crystal. This genesis of the crystal occurs at its exterior limit and the crystal is permanently ex-centric and peripheral to itself.

Another example of a kind of metastable state might be a stand-off between riot police and protesters. A minor incident, or the misinterpretation of a movement, may lead to a transformation of that situation into a pitched battle. Metastability entails conflict and uncertainty. Simondon notes that a pre-revolutionary state is a state of supersaturation (1989: 63).

Simondon does not propose a difference in kind between physical beings and organic beings. He thinks the latter are more complex because a phase shift has enabled them to become a theatre of individuation themselves. In fact, he surmises that reality is primitively just like this supersaturated solution, and this is why it manifests itself in different ways as wave or particle, as matter or energy (24).

IV.vi. mediators

There is no love which does not begin with the revelation of a possible world as such, enwound in the other which expresses it.


Developing this idea further, Simondon argues that we need to grasp individuation as a mediation of (at least) two disparate orders of magnitude. Individuation resolves a tension that surges in a metastable system rich in potentials. Initially, however, there is no communication between these orders of magnitude. In Deleuze’s language, this is a virtual prior to the process of actualisation. A flower is the resolution of a disparity between an inframolecular order of magnitude and a cosmic order of magnitude that correspond to nutrients in the soil and the process of photosynthesis. As a living thing, a flower is never
fully individuated or it would be dead. It is not simply the result of a process of individuation but agent and theatre of individuation: “in it exists a more complete regime of internal resonance that requires permanent communication, and maintains a metastability that is the condition of life” (1964: 25). It continues to modify its relation with its milieu, but as it does so it modifies itself. In other words, it carries with it a certain level of potential that can be the source of future transformations and new individuations. This is the pre-individual nature of the individual. It is an inventive resolution. The living being is a problematic being, superior and inferior to unity (1989: 20).

For Deleuze, “Mediators are fundamental. Creation’s all about mediators. Without them nothing happens. [...] I need my mediators to express myself, and they’d never express themselves without me: you’re always working in a group, even when you seem to be on your own. And still more when it’s apparent: Félix Guattari and I are one another’s mediators” (1990a: 125). Mediators connect heterogeneous domains, they make worlds collide and they open us up to our non-human becomings by creating a zone of indetermination. We call this a pre-individual field. Incommunicability, a lack of mediators to create transversal communications, is a sure sign of a state of alienation and isolation. Intelligence is not the art of solving problems but of inventing them, creating a possible.

A pre-individual field is both pre-subject and pre-object. When Deleuze discovered a small piece by Sartre called The Transcendence of the Ego, he was thrilled. In this text Sartre endeavoured to provide an account of an impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field that bore no resemblance to empirical fields, and which could not be determined as that of a consciousness. “It does not suffice to say of the foundation that it is another matter - it is also another geography, without being another world” (Deleuze, 1969: 99). This transcendental field excludes both the form of the general and the form of the individual, developing in their place the idea of pre-individual singularities. Deleuze used Ferlinghetti’s image of the ‘fourth person singular’ to communicate this idea of a pre-individual singularity (102). Deleuze maintains that “Only when
the world, teeming with anonymous and nomadic, impersonal and pre-individual singularities, opens up, do we tread at last on the field of the transcendental" (103). This is the opening forced by Simondon.

IV.vii. difference affirmed

As a general rule, two things are simultaneously affirmed only to the extent that their difference is denied, suppressed from within [...] To be sure, the identity here is not that of indifference, but it is generally through identity that opposites are affirmed at the same time [...] We speak, on the contrary, of an operation according to which two things or two determinations are affirmed through their difference, that is to say, that they are the objects of simultaneous affirmation only insofar as their difference is itself affirmed and is itself affirmative.


Since classical logic cannot grasp pre-individual being, Simondon introduces the idea of transduction. Transduction is an operation through which an activity modulates a domain, extending in multiple directions from a centre. Think of the supersaturated water solution that reaches a bifurcation point and effectuates a crystallisation of the liquid sugar-water. This resulted from a primitive tension and incompatibility. Simondon, echoing Bergson, calls transduction ‘intuition’: a capacity to follow the movements of being as becoming.

Through transduction, Simondon wants to map out another way of thinking. Infinitesimal dissection and the search for an ultimate commonality are equally shunned by the transductive method. This method tries to comprehend the different and heterogeneous realities constituting the individual. Transduction is, in this regard, quite similar to Serres’ idea that thinking must occur vectorially or transversally, hooking up heterogeneous domains of being. It is a *phronesis*, improvisational and experimental. An image of thought tells us how we should orient ourselves in thought, in what directions we should march. It is not only a method, but a whole system of coordinates upon which we position ourselves. Fundamentally, it guides the creation of concepts (Deleuze, 1990a: 148).
Like Bergson, Simondon remarks that humans have a need to individuate objects to recognise and find themselves in things. Bergson had postulated that humans feel more at home amongst inanimate objects (especially solids) although he also remarked, "In vain, we force the living into this or that one of our moulds. All the moulds crack. They are too narrow, too rigid, for what we try to put into them" (1911: x). These two thinkers both question the privilege of natural perception and the subordination of movement to static shots of reality. "Bergson himself, who made a remarkable effort to think the individual without falling into the traps of mental habits imported from psychology by a spirit accustomed to treating other problems, remained too close to pragmatism" (Simondon, 1989: 148). Bergson concentrated too much, in Simondon's view, on intra-individual dynamism to the detriment of intra-individual structural realities.

We cannot know individuation. "We can only individuate, individuate ourselves and be individuated" (1964: 34). It is not just being but thought too that proceeds by individuations. To grasp the individuation of the real exterior to the subject we need an individuation of the knowledge of the subject (34). Another manner of thinking is required. The concepts we have may be perfectly adequate for an individuated world, but not for a pre-individual one. "A concept is neither a priori nor a posteriori but a praesenti, because it is an informative and interactive communication between that which is greater and that which is lesser than the individual" (Simondon, 1989: 66). If we classify things in an arbitrary and abstract way through species and genera, we take absolutely no account of the specificity of their genesis. We need to understand them from the perspective of a pre-individual reality that is a field of potentials. It is never a matter of studying individuation in general, but rather of examining singular individuations. Such an acentered logic means you make your own connections, invent your own communications and nothing pre-exists. Simondon is determined not to permit any transcendence as he maps out his idea of transduction: a thought that can cope with singularities. An example of this is offered by Deleuze. Explaining Guattari's idea of a groupuscule, Deleuze shows how it describes a unification.
that operates transversally, across a multiplicity, in such a way that it does not crush that multiplicity (1972: vii).

Deduction tries to impose a principle on a domain of being. Transduction, however, does not seek a principle from elsewhere in order to resolve the problems of a domain. Induction, while analysing the character of terms of reality, only conserves what is common between terms, eliminating whatever is singular (Simondon, 1964: 32). Transduction discovers the dimension of the system which make terms communicate. It does not search for terms that are identical to one another, but it looks for that which makes them disparate.

A little piece of knowledge can make an entire system metastable, and call the old way of thinking into question. When Stephen Lawrence was murdered, his parents set up a campaign appealing against racism in the Metropolitan Police force. The evidence put forward about the case called into question the machinations of that police force, identifying an institutional racism embedded in it. It created a metastable situation that had to be resolved. A gradual resolution and dissipation of tension occurred, though not necessarily one that fully addressed the implications of that initial disparity. Those are the moments when things can never be the 'same' again.

“[T]ransduction is characterised by the fact that the result of this operation is a concrete web that contains all the initial terms [...]” (32). It applies to operations that are physical, biological, mental and social (30). An operation is the conversion of one structure to another structure (28). Muriel Combes gives us a nice example of such conversions. It comes from Marx. Marx’s formula of the nature of the capitalist relation of money and goods initially delineated a market operation premised upon buying in order to sell: C-M-C (commodities-money-commodities). Two acts of purchasing and selling are bound together in this chain. Its corresponding form of selling in order to buy was M-C-M (money-commodities-money). This second formulation constitutes the becoming-capital of money (1998: 29). Simondon calls this interest in changes of states from
structure to operation, or conversely from operation to structure, 'allagmatics'.

We are accustomed to thinking in terms of common genera and specific differences, and they seem to be natural classifications for us (Simondon, 1964: 87). I will discuss this proposition in the context of Deleuze's critique of the identitarian 'image of thought' in the next chapter. Meanwhile, Simondon also wants to introduce another way of thinking. Returning to the example of the crystal, he shows how it involves an operation through which it structures itself, being both cause and consequence of the polarisation of the matter without which it would not exist. The singularity, or the germ, is the sugar crystal that makes the different orders of magnitude communicate. Hence its structure is received but this germ is not distinct from the crystal. The properties of the crystal are relational rather than substantial. This elementary discontinuity (in the growth of the crystal) means, Simondon contends, that the discontinuous is primary in relation to the continuous (94). This is close to what Laruelle called the relation of the non-relation and Deleuze named the 'inclusive disjunction'.

Relations have a real claim to being in Simondon. A relation is not just the consequence of the juxtaposition of two terms. "[I]t is an aspect of the internal resonance of a system of individuation; it is a part of the state of a system" (27). This participation involves being part of an individuation that is greater than one's own being through the charge of pre-individual reality, the potentials harboured by the individual. A relation is a modality of being. The essence of a reality cannot (as Bergson and James told us over and over) be re-composed by extrapolating a relation between pre-existent terms. All relations have a class of being and are simultaneous with regard to the terms whose existence they ensure.

Rather than adhering to the model of substance, metastable being engenders that which we call substance - individuated being. By declaring a war on the substantialist tradition, Simondon highlights the tendency to treat relations as a rapport of pre-existing terms. These terms are thought of as already substances. By understanding the individual as "a relation in being, a relation of being, [and] a
way of being [...]” (30), being is itself understood as that which becomes through creating connections. Similarly, knowledge is not a simple relation of two substances, but it needs to be conceived as “a relation between two relations, one in the domain of the object and the other in the domain of the subject” (81).

Like Spinoza, Simondon thinks that something is an object only insofar as it is capable of affecting and being affected by other objects in a system. He says that there is “a virtual reciprocity of actions between the terms of a system” (66). A relation does not link pre-existent terms, but is born by constituting terms themselves as relations (Combes, 1998: 34). Twisting Hegel’s formula, Combes says, “What is real is relational, and what is relational is real” (35). A relation does not express being, but it constitutes it (Simondon, 1964: 126). This idea of relation introduces to us the notion that being is a disjunctive diversity.

IV.viii. crystalline visions

Mine is no callous shell,
I have instant conductors all over me whether I pass or, stop,
They seize every object and lead it harmlessly through me.


Simondon’s theory of knowledge does not extrapolate from sensation but is propelled by the problematic of metastable being. In a seminar on music, Deleuze describes the crystalline lines of an assemblage, lines that do not simply designate a set of states, but trace glittering movements. Deleuze and Guattari call a refrain a prism, a “crystal of space-time” (1980: 348). It acts on that which surrounds it, extracting light and vibrations. But it also catalyses, hooking up elements without a natural affinity, creating a transversal relation between them. These crystalline lines have their own history and open up new becomings.

We need to understand the subject in a real and concrete situation, not as a unified and fully individuated being, but as a heterogeneous reality with a
The perceiving subject is part of a dynamic system that is over-determined and super-saturated and perception modifies both the subject and object. The individual is a transductive reality that is neither an element, nor a pure relation (rapport). It is the reality of a metastable relation. “[A]n intensive diversity [...] exists which makes the subject-world system comparable to a supersaturated solution” (Simondon, 1989: 91).

There are many different kinds of individuations; subject-type individuations (that’s me...that’s you...), event-type individuations that do not rely on a subject (a battle, a wind...) (Deleuze, 1990a: 115). But the subject does not have any identity. Subjectification constitutes both a personal or collective individuation (115). So we need to ask in what ways can we constitute ourselves as selves? Someone walks into a room and the atmosphere changes imperceptibly. This is because the person is, as Spinoza told us, a set of intensities. Individuations do not have to be personal. Deleuze observes, “Félix and I, and many others like us, don’t feel we are persons exactly. Our individuality is rather that of events [...]” (141).

IV.ix. an ethics of the pre-individual

The individual is an activity, condensing information, transporting it, and modulating it in a new milieu which it is instrumental in inventing. The process of individuation is an operation of communication. (Simondon, 1964: 229). For a being to be a living being, there must be a polarisation and an asymmetrical qualification through which an orientation or tendency emerges. This idea of asymmetry is explored by cosmologists seeking to explain the birth of the universe after the Big Bang, and by geneticists who have drawn our attention to the asymmetry of the DNA strand. We came across it in our example of the flower that mediates different orders of magnitude. Deleuze calls this the Unequal and, like Simondon, names it a ‘problematic’. To live is to be agent, milieu and element of individuation (Simondon, 1989: 17).

Simondon quotes Malebranche who noted once that every being has “the movement to always go further” (144). This activity is well documented by
Spinoza. When he chronicled his story of the individual as \textit{conatus}, a \textit{potentia} perpetually engaged in activities whereby it was both affected and affecting, he effectively described that pre-individual zone of beings which is the part of \textit{nature} associated with individuals. From this zone, emerges the new. We called this an asymmetrical system, comprised in part of a pre-individual charge that accompanies individuals. The future bears upon the present, informing it. Let us see why this is important for an ethics.

Ethics occurs in a network of acts, acts that resonate with each another, modulating and transforming one another. Any act is always becoming in the middle of its becoming (242). It is centred but infinite, and its value is its capacity for transductive shifts liberating new potentials and effectuating transformations. No act that is isolated, consisting only in itself, or operating with an end in view, is ethical in this sense. Cutting oneself off from or dominating others breaks off this communication. An ethical act is radiant, radiating, more than unity and more than identity, creating new relations and connections. Rather than trying to deny its becoming, it embraces it. “Ethics is that by which the subject remains a subject, refusing to become an absolute individual, a closed domain of reality, a detached singularity; it is that by which the subject remains in a perpetually tense problematic, internally and externally [...]” (245-46).

In an essay entitled ‘Spinoza: From individuality to transindividuality’, Etienne Balibar explores the eccentric nature of Spinoza’s theory of individuation. According to Gatens and Lloyd, “Balibar has offered a reading of Spinoza’s theory of individuation as a relational ontology that is opposed to both classical individualism and organicism” (1999: 121). Spinoza’s antipathy to formalism leads him, as we have seen, to counter a philosophy of attribution with one concerned with process and networks; one in which concepts and definitions cannot be employed indifferently to context and the real definition of the essence of the human is not encapsulated in any single proposition. The individual cannot be thought other than in relation and constant communication with others. Balibar takes issue with two common objections to Spinoza’s work; the first alleges that
he has no theory of subjectivity; and the second claims that the individual’s autonomy is denied, immersed in the impersonal and undifferenciated entity that is God. The conception of individuality developed by Spinoza is one that emphasizes the individual’s necessary relationality with others since singularities are interconnected in a ‘network’ or a ‘system’ (1997: 9). The ontology proposed is therefore a relational one and Balibar calls it a general theory of Communication.

It is with obvious delight that Bahbar tells us of his discovery of Simondon who, despite his pedestrian and conventional criticisms of Spinoza, is himself a true Spinozist. Bahbar argues that metastable equilibria require an elevation of potential energy in the form of a polarity of individual and environment. Adaptation to changing environments is not reactive but involves the invention of new structures and modes of existence. Neither reductionist nor vitalist, a natural philosophy prevails (11). Individuality in Spinoza operates as a transindividuality, or rather a transindividual process of individuation, that is neither individualistic nor holistic. Individuals want to avoid being decomposed so they engage in an active process of exchange with the environment and cultivate a multitude of relationships which increase their power. Freedom is the expression of the active dimension of the individual.

With regard to Simondon, Balibar asserts that, “His key idea is that any individuation remains dependent, in a metastable equilibrium, on the pre-individual potential from which the individual emerged through successive “structurings” or “distanciations from the environment”. Therefore the existence of an individual is always “problematic” or tense” (22, n.25). By creating a collectivity, a new metastable entity that is neither internal or external to individuals emerges. The pre-individual charge that is a non-individuated reality of the individual impels this movement toward others. “Spinoza’s concept of relation as immanence is best described by the term “transindividuality” [...]” (33).

Simondon’s conception of the individual as the relative and changing reality of a set of differential relations is not dissimilar to Simondon’s own understanding of the
individual. Simondon agrees that the individual must be grasped as "the singular point of an open infinity of relations" (1989: 254), adding, "the individual is not a substantial being like an element, nor is it a pure relation, but it is the reality of a metastable relation" (79-80). And like Spinoza's individual who dies slowly and gradually as it can no longer sustain so many affects, Simondon's individual "loses its plasticity bit by bit, along with its capacity to create metastable situations and to make of them problems with multiple solutions" (80). For each of these thinkers, individuation is a voyage that takes place in relation to thresholds of intensity.

Muriel Combes notes that Spinoza, like Simondon, comprehends the subject of ethics as the place of a perpetual variation in its power of acting that is its capacity to affect other subjects, and be affected, transforming itself. Ethical difference concerns a liberatory movement from servitude. Consciousness varies in relation to affective life and the forces surrounding the subject. Modifications in these result in modifications of the individual. As a result the subject is never fully constituted (1998: 54). It is both individual and other than individual.

We call this being that traverses the individual the transindividual. The excess of being that is the pre-individual nature of an individuated being is lived as a tension. The presence of a 'more-than-individual' dimension makes itself felt as a sign. A sign stems from a disparity, it reveals that which is more than individual. This sign results in a de-individuation of the individual, liberating its non-individuated potential. The transindividual emerges from that in us that is not us. It is the limit of exteriority and interiority; a fold of an outside that constitutes an inside that is not an interiority (71). Subjectivity is not contained within the limits of the individual. A collective emerges when individuals engage in a new individuation. Just as a relation is not just a rapport of pre-existent terms, the transindividual does not constitute the entry of the individual into a group that is an aggregate of other individuals. When Guattari distinguished between a subject-group (a groupuscule) and a subjigated group, he explored the idea of a group that was not simply a conglomeration or meeting of individuals. Instead, he
sought to express the possibility of a non-hierarchical group that could express and develop itself through singular ideas, actions and relations. This would be an ongoing process of invention.

If the individual enters an already constituted group, the leeway for change and innovation is limited. The culture of these groups can become ossified and rigid, unable to adapt to change, closed to the world. Ireland's Roman Catholic community is an example of a doctrinaire group that has seen its members dwindle rapidly in recent years, partially because of its own intransigence. Through the transindividual, humans are opened to their non-human becomings and potentials. “To the extent that the transindividual takes root in this zone of us that is exterior to the individual, it swells in us like an outside” (71).

Simondon begins thus to reconceive the relation of individual and society, stressing the reality of the social as a system of relations (1989: 179). The human is not an exceptional being endowed with an abstract essence and generalisable nature. Individuals enter a collective through the potentials of a real created possible. “The subjective transindividual names, therefore, the effects in a subject of the discovery of her more-than-individuality, of a zone in herself which is revealed as pre-personal and common” (Combes, 1998: 82). For this reason, Combes extracts a phrase meant for Leopardi and written by Negri which calls for “a humanism after the death of man [...]” (85). A human is an essentially incomplete being. What potentials can she have for going beyond herself?

Deleuze and Guattari call these aparallel communications ‘transversal’. We form rhizomes by deterritorialising, creating connections with others in such a way that the territoriality of the self is disrupted and opens itself to new modifications. These transformations can only be understood on the level of intensity. Appealing to this idea of transduction, they elaborate on their rhizomatic thought which they oppose to an arborescent and hierarchical image of thought. In contrast to the latter’s centred system, they develop an acentered system: individuals are only “defined only by their state at a given moment [...]” (1980: 17).
This operation is the transduction of intensive states (17). Anything that might unify it from on high is subtracted, hence the formula ‘n-1’.

The relation of being to itself is much richer than identity. Substantial being is one because it is stable consisting in itself and for itself. However, the original state of being is pre-individual, surpassing its coherence with itself. It is metastable and potentialised. Any structure rests at a stable equilibrium only within certain magnitudes and limits. It is defined within thresholds. A new interaction can liberate masked potentials leading to an abrupt change. Ontogenesis is no longer directed toward the individuated individual but designates instead the character of becoming of being, a character that is neither mechanistic nor teleological.

What is striking in this account is Simondon’s conviction that the world is not already there, structured and existing as a system of reference that is unitary and objective; in fact, it is precisely this conviction that leads him to criticise both Lamarck and Darwin. The closest philosophical account to this is Bergson in his late work *Creative Evolution*. Being is understood as a problematic that contains a number of virtual tendencies. These split and are differentiated into different paths through an inventive process of unforeseeable novelty. The actualisations of this ‘simple virtual’ constitute resolutions that are novel inventions of a problematic that did not pre-exist their invention as realisable possibles. Similarly, Spinoza’s condemnation of a teleological conception of Nature mocked the notion that we have eyes in order to see. We see because we have eyes and in Bergson’s view, sight is the resolution of a problematic.

If all the potentials in a system are already actualised it is difficult to see how transformational strategies can be cobbled together. It was for this reason that I criticised Hardt and Negri’s limited use of the virtual and their dedication to a rather rigid materialism that placed false hope in the contradictions of the system throwing up a new mode of reality. Deleuze and Guattari’s constructivism challenged this approach by always emphasising that the plane of immanence
does not pre-exist. Simondon does not explicitly align himself with a (Deleuzean) ‘created possible’ but this is implicit in his texts. It shines through in his novel thought of pre-individual and problematic being.

IV.x. flashing intensities

Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is given, that by which the given is given as diverse.

Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. (1968a: 222).

It seems to us that Gilbert Simondon’s conception can be compared to a theory of intensive quantities; because in itself each intensive quantity is difference.


Yet all is not guaranteed. We came across Deleuze’s ‘Postscript on Control Societies’ in chapter 2. In this piece, Deleuze argues that controls operate through modulation, a transmutation that changes from one moment to the next. Businesses try to create even greater competitions within the workplace. We are each in competition with ourselves. In this society, you no longer continuously start over as you move from school to factory “business, training and military service being coexisting metastable states of a single modulation, a sort of universal transmutation [déformation]” (1990b: 179). A pretence of openness and disparity is quickly co-opted in the service of business. It is a feigned and limited disparateness. The real problem, as we saw in the last chapter, is how to invent a problematic.

Alberto Gualandi thinks that Simondon’s theory of individuation played a very important role in Deleuze’s philosophy (1998: 64). In the context of the critique of conceptual difference offered by Deleuze in the last chapter, we will now develop his positive account of difference in conjunction with Simondon’s theory of individuation.

In dramatic fashion, Deleuze tells us that God made the world by calculating, but
his calculations are never exact (juste). This leads to an irreducible inequality that forms the conditions of the world. Every phenomenon is conditioned by an inequality and “[e]very phenomenon flashes in a signal-sign system” (1968a: 222). Paraphrasing Simondon, Deleuze notes that insofar as a system is constituted by at least two heterogeneous series or disparate orders capable of entering into communication, we call it a signal and “[t]he phenomenon that flashes across this system, bringing about the communication between disparate series, is a sign” (222). Every intensity is already difference in itself. It is already a coupling. Intensities comprehend the unequal or different and open onto divergent series. “We call this state of infinitely doubled difference which resonates to infinity disparity. Disparity - in other words, difference or intensity (difference of intensity) - is the sufficient reason of all phenomena, the condition of that which appears” (222). Deleuze concludes his first paragraph of chapter V “The Asymmetric Synthesis of the Sensible” by claiming that, “The reason of the sensible, the condition of that which appears, is not space and time but the Unequal in itself, disparity as it is determined and comprised in difference of intensity, in intensity as difference” (222-23).

These are difficult thoughts but we should already be familiar with a number of them through Simondon. If we recall Simondon’s own approach to individuation, it emphasised first and foremost that being is not substantial. It is at odds with itself, incompatible, more than unity and more than identity. It is this intuition that Deleuze picks up on to amplify his theme of disparate and heterogeneous orders of magnitude. Through this he develops a real and genetic account of a difference that is not subordinated to an identitarian image of thought.

In notable distinction to his earlier 1956 essay on difference, Deleuze no longer begins with a Bergsonian distinction between differences in kind or nature (quality), and differences in degree (extensity). Though this distinction remains, it is secondary. “Intensity is difference, but this difference tends to deny or to cancel itself out in extensity and underneath quality” (223). Difference and Repetition constitutes a veritable attempt to throw off the shackles of those approaches.
which remained limited to a consideration of empirical difference. Throughout this thesis, I have tried to show why this is an important endeavour: indeed, Simondon’s critique of the constituted individual provides, perhaps, the greatest impetus for this renewed theory of individuation.

If we only know difference “as already developed within an extensity, and as covered over by qualities [...]” (223) then we will strive in vain to understand the conditions or genesis of reality. The postulates that structured the image of thought are implicit and complicit in the development of a series of philosophical concepts. The old adage is transformed as we are asked to think with the grain, with the singularities of the matter.

Good sense distributes, and in this distribution it tries to banish difference, cancelling it out (224). The explication of difference is a process of identification of difference. Good sense tries to bring things back to a calm sense of stable equilibrium. Deleuze, in a moment of penmanship worthy of Marx says, “Good sense is the ideology of the middle classes who recognise themselves in equality with an abstract product. It dreams less of acting than of constituting a natural milieu [...]” (225). Instead of negating difference, it recognises it just enough to dissipate tension and ensure that difference negates itself. However, this system is created by difference of intensity as it explicates itself. We learned how this occurred in Simondon’s account of crystallisation. Still “difference has never ceased to be in itself, to be implicated in itself even while it is explicated outside itself” (228).

Common sense is defined, on the other hand, by facing a supposedly identical Self with a supposedly identical object. This static approach has nothing of the dynamism of Simondon who, according to Deleuze, maintains that “[o]bjects are divided up in and by fields of individuation, as are Selves” (1968a: 226). Thought has not gone so far as to dare think that by which the given is given.

Intensity has three characteristics, Deleuze tells us. It includes the unequal in
itself, representing a difference in quantity that cannot be cancelled in quantity. In this way it is the quality belonging to quantity. Because it is already difference in itself, it affirms difference. As difference, intensity already refers to a series of other differences that it affirms by affirming itself. This becomes clear if we remember Simondon's explanation of the incompatibility or difference of orders of magnitude that creates a state of metastability. Difference is not, however, negation. Again drawing on Simondon, Deleuze elucidates this contention. A field of forces refers to a potential energy, and opposition refers to a 'deeper' disparateness. These oppositions are resolved only insofar as disparate orders of magnitude have invented an order of communication.

Intensity can be distinguished in the following way: as a really implicated and enveloping difference, and as an implicated and enveloped distance (236). As a consequence, Deleuze claims that intensity is neither indivisible like quality, and nor is it divisible like quantity. Flourishing a formula that will be repeated at length throughout A Thousand Plateaus he states, “An intensive quantity may be divided, but not without changing its nature. In a sense, it is therefore indivisible, but only because no part exists prior to its division and no part retains the same nature after division” (237). This is, of course, his classic definition of a virtual multiplicity. Simondon and Spinoza are therefore revealed to have constructed theories of virtual multiplicities as intensive quantities, and this is due in part to their antipathy for abstraction and formalisation, and in part to their love of the singular and concrete.

The idea of the unequal or the disparate is at the heart of Deleuze’s understanding of differences. This primacy of the unequal should not be understood as a justification of hierarchy. It is more akin to an opening of the possible, a world without identity, brimming with potentials, albeit one that needs to be constructed. “The ethics of intensive quantities has only two principles: affirm even the lowest, do not explicate oneself (too much)” (244).

Simondon’s metastable state is a fine description of what Deleuze means by a
problematic. Deleuze sometimes calls this non-being, in the way that Simondon stresses it is pre-individual: both involve a conception of being that is more than unity and more than identity. The disparateness of this being is resolved by a germ, or 'dark precursor', that integrates “the elements of the disparateness into a state of coupling which ensures its internal resonance” (246). The pre-individual half of the individual is the reservoir of singularities from which new transformations can emerge. Deleuze believes that individuation is essentially intensive and that “the pre-individual field is a virtual-ideal field made up of differential relations” (246). Bergson told us that the most difficult thing is to invent good problems. Inventing or constructing a problematic forces a system into a state of disparateness.

Metastable being requires a distinction between singularity and individuality; the pre-individual field is not individuated, although “it is filled with singularities which correspond to the existence and distribution of potentials” (Deleuze, 1966b: 116). Deleuze underlines this idea that the state of the pre-individual field is singular without being individual. And what encourages him in Simondon is that this state is one of “difference, disparity, disparateness” (116). Disparity is the first moment of being, and all the other states that we commonly associate with being like opposition, integration, unification, are secondary. This idea of potential energy is a more profound idea than a field of forces (116). The problematic resolves these disparate orders of magnitude by organising a new dimension. This is not a dialectical resolution but an invention. Deleuze’s sole reservation about Simondon’s ethics that moves from the pre-individual to the transindividual through individuation is that it might restore the form of a Self that Simondon had himself banished in his theory of disparity (118). However he believes that Simondon has developed new concepts that transform the classical problems of philosophy. Throughout the next chapter we will see how Deleuze himself mobilises these ideas as he constructs a thought without image.

If thought only thinks by means of difference, it needs a revolution like the revolution that took art from representation to abstraction. “This is the aim of a
theory of thought without image” (1968a: 276). This would be a world of pre-individual singularities and non-personal individuations.

A world of dissensus, not consensus. A world of disparateness, not identity. A world where the individual is dissolved and the pre-individual celebrated. This world would be a strange world indeed. Guattari calls it ‘chaosmosis’.
Chapter Five

A Nomadic Image of Thought
V.i. the radical thought of empiricism

The character of the world in a state of becoming as incapable of formulation, as “false”, as “self-contradictory”. Knowledge and becoming exclude one another.


What dawns on philosophers last of all: they must no longer accept concepts as a gift, nor merely purify and polish them, but first *make* and *create* them, present and make them convincing.


In a letter-preface to Jean Clet Martin’s book *Variations*, Deleuze confesses he has little use for the concept of the simulacrum any longer, despite the fact that this concept recurs throughout *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*. This is perhaps because it intimates something less than real, a ‘mere effect’ as Badiou might suggest. Instead Deleuze claims he has been trying to think of philosophy as a system. This system must be a heterogenesis, something he feels has not really been tried before. There is a double turning away that installs a radical immanence. In line with his dedication to the concept of multiplicity, as revealed spectacularly in *A Thousand Plateaus* with Guattari, he seeks to explore the idea of transcendental empiricism. Throughout this chapter I will explore the nature of this ‘transcendental empiricism’.

Kant distinguished between the transcendent (which appeals to principles beyond experience) and the transcendental (which are immanent principles within the limits of possible experience). This distinction is adhered to, albeit loosely, by Deleuze. While the Kantian transcendental is concerned with the ways that we can know objects, Deleuze’s transcendental concerns the conditions for real experimentation. It resounds with the force of Adorno’s cry for ‘the possibility of things being otherwise’.

Deleuze implores Jean Clet Martin (and us) to keep returning to the concrete and
not to give one concept a primacy over all others. This effort to thwart a
totalising model or image of thought is also found in Guattari’s work on
metamodellisation. The challenge is to proliferate possibilities of being and create
networks and rhizomes to escape any given system of modelisation.

The importance of distinguishing between transcendence and immanence was
made clear in chapter 3 in relation to the thesis on univocity. Here another term is
introduced: the transcendental. It is important for Deleuze since he wants to
retain a commitment to pluralism and empiricism, while not facilely positivising
all that is. His philosophy of difference is developed in the hope of inventing a
wild or radical empiricism78 that can think becomings (relations, difference,
process...), without abstracting and extrapolating from things that already are
(individuated). We learned about this project in the last chapter when I discussed
Simondon’s motivation for his theory of processes of individuation. It is this
impetus, combined with an allegiance to an immanent ethics, that enables us to
understand why Deleuze seeks the conditions for the invention of the new.

Bergson’s Creative Evolution sought to eliminate teleology and mechanism from
evolutionary accounts by emphasising the production of radical and unforeseeable
novelty. It is this intuition that Deleuze picks up on as he seeks to reconfigure the
conception of the transcendental.

Transcendental philosophy, for Kant, sought to avoid extrapolating the
transcendental (the conditions of possibility) from the empirical; its status was
that of a faculty that could legislate a priori with regard to experience. He criticised
a tautological account of conditions that required reference to the conditioned

78 Wahl discusses the idea of a radical empiricism in relation to Whitehead (1932: 219). He
adds that the problem is between the relations (rapports) between the terms and their
relations (relations). He returns to this theme saying this empiricism is not a theory of
sensations like that of Hume (127). Deleuze praises Wahl at various intervals and it seems to
me that both he and Wahl were inspired by William James’s idea of a radical empiricism.
James distinguished ordinary empiricism from radical empiricism by exploring a relational
and empirical conception of activity. Relations are themselves a part of experience. Wahl
agrees with Whitehead and James that the task of philosophy must be to explain the abstract
- not the concrete (134), a conviction Deleuze also holds dear. However the abstract must, in
this context, be understood as a mode of generalising. Deleuze is a lover of another kind of
abstraction.
Undoubtedly Deleuze is indebted to a Kantian conception of the transcendental. He argues nonetheless that Kant fell into his own trap by extrapolating the conditions of possibility of the transcendental from the empirical itself. In response, Deleuze maintains that the transcendental must be explored on its own account and only this kind of exercise will enable us to discover multiplicities and the exercise of thought. As Daniel Smith says, the conditions of possible experience become the genetic conditions of real experience (1996: 29).

Instead of being transcendent principles of mere conditions, Deleuze develops a transcendental philosophy of internal genesis (1962: 91). He maintains that Kant failed in his project of immanent critique since his "[t]ranscendental philosophy discovers conditions which still remain external to the conditioned" (91).

Deleuze's antipathy toward the illicit invocation of transcendent principles must not be confused with a negation of transcendental principles. When Todd May takes issue with readings of Deleuze that present him as a philosopher of difference (that is, a thinker who privileges difference), he argues that difference and unity are intertwined at the surface. Without this, Deleuze's philosophy would be rendered incoherent (1994: 44). He says "The antitranscendental path that Deleuze has trodden requires him to reject the primacy of difference at the same moment that he rejects the primacy of unity" (44). May fails to comprehend that Deleuze's formulations such as 'One=Multiple' concern a specific understanding of the One, not as numerical, nor as unified, but as the inclusive disjunction of the differences of differences. Rather than examining an ontological account of difference, May contents himself with an epistemological (and critical) claim that difference is a means to contest unifying discourses (39). This waters down the radicality of this enterprise folding it back onto a Hegelianism which claims that "a thought of pure difference is not a thought at all" (46). In sum, May lightly chastises Deleuze for misunderstanding the nature of his own project and for being so naive as to try and think a thought of pure difference.
In the preface to the English edition of *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze claims that everything he has tried to do since has been connected with this text, the first one in which he ‘does’ philosophy. His problems were the concepts of difference and repetition. Difference had tended to be subordinated to identity, resemblance, opposition and analogy; repetition was also thought in this way. By “putting into question” the traditional image of thought, these themes could be re-addressed.

Deleuze suggests that the ‘image of thought’ chapter is the most important one in the book. He says “[i]t is therefore the third chapter which now seems to me the most necessary and most concrete [...]” (1994/1968a: xvii). The image of thought is not simply a question of thinking in accordance with a given method, but it rests on implicit presuppositions. These guide and determine the process of trying to think. We assume the good nature of the thinker and we take the process of recognition that forms a ‘common sense’ conjoining the faculties on a supposedly same object. These images that thought gives to itself of what it is to think imprison thought, with ramifications that spread beyond the formally philosophical stage. The development of the concept of a rhizomatic thought that is in opposition to an arborescent thought stems from this research.

**V.ii. idealism or immanence**

It seems that François Laruelle follows up on this thematic when he discusses the idea of a philosophical Decision. This concerns the presuppositions made by philosophy concerning its own character. Laruelle argues that there is a philosophical Decision that expresses an autonomy of difference. He notes that some consequences of a philosophical decision are demonstrated in the contemporary situation whereby the necessity to wage an anti-humanist struggle is conflated with a refusal to recognise a specific and positive essence of the human (1986: 10).

With *Difference*, the opposition of contraries is displaced and the thought of the
aporia, an aporia stemming from the ontico-ontological difference linking Being to being, is positivised. The aporetic nature of this thought is revealed in a series of conjunctions such as the ‘One-Multiple’. Difference is explicitly constructed in opposition to presence and identity (though Laruelle remarks that such presence and identity fill the essence of difference with a purified presence and identity).

In Deleuze’s case the *modus operandi* of this theory of mixtures is to create a zone of combat. Couplings and hierarchies are affirmed over and above the terms in combat. Differences are understood as relations of forces. The immanence celebrated is an idealist one, according to Laruelle. This idealism stems from the Diverse of distances of forces and perspectives. Scission while reconciled is not sublated. The concept of the *a priori* no longer designates a space of the possible. Instead, the *a priori* consists of relations or non-relations as Indivisibles.

The difficulties associated with the concept of the differential or problematic reveal themselves. According to Laruelle, they are not unrelated to allegations of a pervasive idealism in Deleuze’s thought. Idealism and materialism serve to indicate the prioritisation of a supplement of either idea of matter. The idealism of Deleuze’s thought could then be seen to emerge from the continuous and synthetic nature of the differential *a prioris*.

Indeed, throughout *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Spinoza and the Problem of Expression* this thematic is frequently invoked. Portrayed as the struggle of active and reactive (passive) forces, differential and multiple themselves, activity and becoming-active are valorised as the dimension constituting an ethical life. (This is not so straight-forwardly Machiavellian as it initially sounds.) In place of form is a being-able-to (*pouvoir-être*) that has at the core this concept of force. Laruelle contests the Undecidability inherent in this mode of philosophising.

Identity is not expurgated but seen as derivative. Contradiction is then the insidious underbelly of Difference viewed from the base depths. In Laruelle’s view, this is another repetition of the age-old greco-occidental question ‘how to
think duality-as-unity? that is, the unity of passage from one contrary to another. In the case of Deleuze (and Nietzsche), the pathos of distance traverses the analytic of the Will to Power. The reciprocal symmetry comprising the unstable equilibrium of passage is a continuous one. The logic of this philosophy of Difference is to simultaneously purport to think the real as all (absolute) and conversely as Other. The disjunction of difference is seen as a mode of indvision: unity in *Difference and Repetition* is thus understood as the differences of differences communicating through their differences. Being is definitively affected by the being that it conditions (1986: 31).

Laruelle calls this indivisible or inclusive disjunction that is a unifying of opposites a kind of neo-Platonism, whereby the One is a unifying unity in a transcendental rather than empirico-ideal sense. Difference is immediately as One. The One is not transcendent - there is no exterior unity governing contraries - instead the reign of the One is of division and distribution, not a transcendent model of causality. Although Deleuze would not call his conception of univocity a Neo-Platonism, Laruelle is correct in his assessment of the distributive rather than collective power of Deleuze’s ‘One-All’.

A double turning away or double articulation can be understood as follows: Difference is interpreted as a function of disparity and multiplicity and as a function of unity. We saw in chapter 3 how Badiou argued that by giving Being two names transcendence was smuggled in the back door, and the virtual thus adopted the position of unilateral superiority vis-à-vis the actual. I addressed this criticism by explicating Spinoza’s conception of the immanent cause. Laruelle, however, makes a different point. He argues that Difference draws its legitimacy from itself. Difference, even if absolute and self-determining, retains a distinction of determining and determined. This chiasm indicates what Laruelle calls “the absolute-idealist usage of Difference” (1986: 59). A continuous reciprocity and reversibility governs here. There is a co-determination of Being and being.

What then are some of the features characterising this articulation of the real
from other forms of ordering? Difference, as a philosophical decision, is not secondary but transcendental. It is neither category nor Ideal. Laruelle diagnoses the ontological proposition relating to Difference as follows, "Difference is Scission-immediately-as-Unity: a Becoming-as-Being [...] (39).

Difference operates a genesis of empirical reality but it also attempts to re-unite the concepts of Being and One. Deleuze's non (?) being or the 'problematic' operates as a concrete principle, or even a priori emotion or sensibility, positing nothingness, making it different and multiple thus allegedly (and only allegedly), says Laruelle, re-invigorating and re-vitalising philosophical thinking. This self-proclaimed jolt of Frankensteinian electricity animates what would be a dead world of structuralism or Hegelianism.

Deleuze wanted to grasp the conditions of reality (of real experimentation) since he believed that Kant's approach was too broad, inadvertently mirroring and generalising from the empirical. In turn, Laruelle levels this critique at Deleuze; the a priori elements are too abstract for Laruelle, since they are too close to that from which they seek to escape and risk falling into the facticity of the given. "But the risk lies in confusing what we must seek, their [that is, idealism and materialism] essence as a priori and material differential elements, with the relative and hence necessarily ideal structural version of this essence" (Laruelle, 1981: §27, 105). Ideality is re-introduced into the concept if the differential elements are relative to one another, or alternatively if they are reciprocally determining.

Are the relations of forces, ideal and continuous, so key to Deleuze's enterprise, simply indicative of a hidden idealism? Is that which is called the Real in Anti-Oedipus another appellation for Being, giving (as Badiou fears) a primacy of ideality over the real? Does the very relativity of the differential character of the relations of difference and their independence from their terms or entities lead to a complex intertwining of idealism and materialism, of continuity and cut, in the attempt by each to sustain itself? Laruelle's conclusion is stark and clear.
“By elevating it [Difference] in a circular fashion to the level where it becomes self-producing, that is, to the state of the *causa sui* (‘will to power’), the systems of Difference make ideality self-confirming and render any genesis of ideality or its forms impossible. From this point of view Nietzsche, Heidegger and all the systems of Difference remain incapable of founding a genuinely immanent materialism, a becoming-‘material’ of thought that is no longer a becoming-continuous, or of realising difference as a multiplicity beyond continuity itself” (1981 §27, 105)

Laruelle believes it is a transcendental illusion to claim that Difference determines the real. His own work attempts to display the presuppositions of philosophical thinking and to articulate the principles of non-philosophy, a philosophy of radical immanence in which the One is the condition of real critique, that brooks no transcendence. This One is the transcendental unreflective experience or immediate and non-thetic donation (of) itself. It is singular, autonomous and as such before any universal. The One is that which Difference does not recognise, while simultaneously requiring it (1986: 33). Laruelle sees the inflexion of Deleuze’s fold, as is found in the concept of the ‘difference of difference’ (or intensity) in *Difference and Repetition* as an instance of transcendence. His own work is a kind of ‘meta-philosophy’, questioning the presuppositions of philosophy and asking ‘what is philosophy?’, while staving off the trap of the philosophical decision.

I agree with Laruelle that one can argue that a philosophical decision in favour of difference has been made in the case of Deleuze. However, Deleuze is himself aware of the presuppositions that philosophy rests upon in order to function. He says that “there is no true beginning in philosophy, or rather that the true beginning in philosophy, Difference, is in-itself already Repetition” (1968a: 129). I want to explore this concept of difference that he develops in more detail. Indeed, I suggest that Deleuze’s philosophy (like that of Spinoza) neither adheres to a supplement of the idea or of matter. Deleuze’s primary concern is with the imposition of a particular model of thought that delimits the potentials for
thinking in advance. Unlike Laruelle, Deleuze’s philosophy always begins in the middle, *intermezzo*: Difference that is already Repetition.

A lengthy quote from Brassier synopsises Laruelle’s position. “For Laruelle, the fact that the univocity of Deleuzean immanence can be purchased only at the price of an irrecoverable excess of transcendence is neither an accidental nor an inconsistent aspect of Deleuze’s thought; it is a structurally necessary feature of all philosophical attempts to conceptualise immanence; one, moreover, that ultimately constitutes an invariant feature of the philosophical gesture *per se*. That Deleuze is obliged to think immanence transcendently, or to think multiplicity under the auspices of an uncircumventable unity, is not a question of philosophical inconsistency, Laruelle argues; on the contrary, it merely indicates the rigorous consistency of Deleuzean thought insofar as its internal coherence is regulated in accordance with the pernicious logic of the philosophical Decision” (2000: 207, n.16).

It is through the attempt to conceptualise immanence philosophically that philosophical logic becomes circular, presupposing that which it seeks to explain. While acknowledging this important criticism, Laruelle’s critique operates at a formal axiomatic level whereas Deleuze’s practical philosophy is both critical and creative; integral to the development of an immanent ethics. To create a philosophical approach one must invent a problematic that informs the concepts that one develops. In this chapter, I will focus on the problematic of a ‘thought without image’.

V.iii. the art of creating concepts

By the time of writing *What is Philosophy?*, Deleuze seems more concerned with the necessity to begin and to create concepts than with constructing a beginning that eliminates both objective and subjective presuppositions. He and Guattari say, “Planes must be constructed and problems posed, just as concepts must be created. Philosophers do the best they can, but they have too much to do to know whether it is the best, or even to bother with this question. Of course new
concepts must relate to our problems, to our history, and above all, to our becomings” (1991a: 27). The ‘image of thought’ chapter remains important because it emphasises the values underlying the image that thought gives itself of what it is to think. Deleuze may not succeed in eliminating his own presuppositions when he tries to invent a neighbourhood of concepts that might be called a ‘thought without image’, but this is not his primary goal.

The passages we will read, and the quotations cited, show us that at an early stage Deleuze, inspired by Nietzsche, is fired by the prospect of creating concepts, concepts that might prove useful for our time and our becomings. His tone is tempered by the time of writing What is Philosophy?, perhaps because rather than just getting down to the business of ‘doing philosophy’, he and Guattari try to articulate ‘what is it we have been doing all our lives?’. This contemplation does not negate their previous endeavours to ‘do philosophy’, because what they had been doing all along was nothing other than this “art of forming, inventing and fabricating concepts” (1991a: 2). They say that philosophy is not reflection, communication or contemplation (6). It is distinguished from the other (equally valid) ways of thinking: art which thinks through affects and percepts, and science which thinks through functions. Philosophy is not just a meaningless, indulgent and frivolous endeavour. However, it has been profoundly affected “by the general movement that has replaced Critique with sales promotion” (10) and the marketers and advertisers that say, “This is our concern, we are the creative ones, we are the ideas men!” (10). These inane rivals give philosophy, according to Deleuze and Guattari, a fit of the giggles which wipes away its tears. They say that the (philosophical) concept posits itself as it is created. Philosophers are friends of the concept.

Reading Difference and Repetition in light of What is Philosophy? enables us to understand why Deleuze criticises what he calls a dogmatic ‘image of thought’. This image of thought stifles the creation of concepts. However, the philosophers that he initially accuses of inventing ‘a philosophy of representation’ are portrayed
as conceptual personae in the latter text. It is subsequently no longer a matter of
deciding which one invented the best concepts - Hegel and Descartes have totally
different ideas of what it is to begin - but of seeing how their concepts resonate
with one another, and transmute depending on the problems they are a part of. If
a concept makes us aware of new variations it may be ‘better’ than a previous
one. Concepts can always be reactivated in light of new problems.

V. iv. restoring the rights of immanence

But deterritorialization is absolute when the earth passes away into the pure
immanence of a Being-thought, of a Nature-thought of infinite diagrammatic
movements. [...] Deterritorialization of such a plane does not preclude
reterritorialization but posits it as the creation of a future new earth. [...] There
is always a way in which absolute deterritorialization takes over from a relative
deterritorialization in a given field.


As What is Philosophy? continues, we perceive that Deleuze has not turned his back
on immanence. The most difficult problem remains - how to expel
transcendence? The plane of immanence is the non-thought within thought. They
surmise “Perhaps this is the supreme act of philosophy: not so much to think
THE plane of immanence as to show that it is there, unthought in every plane,
and to think it in this way as the outside and inside of thought [...] - that which
cannot be thought and yet must be thought [...] the possibility of the impossible”
(59-60).

In Book V (pr.23. sch.) of the Ethics, Spinoza wrote that we feel and experience
that we are eternal (sentimus experimurque nos aeternos esse). This third kind of
knowledge has often been presented as the thought of the pure cool geometrician
whose thought impassively comprehends the nature of God and world. It is as
though Spinoza sits on a pinnacle and gazes upon the world. Such a reading
‘forgets’ the crucial words ‘we feel and experience that we are eternal’. This
‘knowledge’ is not an abstract theoretical knowledge, but a real experience of a
present eternity, through which we understand things as necessary from the point
of view of eternity. It is a concrete experience of beatitude, irreducible to a state of spatio-temporal actuality, resembling rather what Deleuze calls the event, and Ruyer names survol (an absolute and immanent survey without beginning or end). This is why it differs from the other affects for Spinoza.

I propose that Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the plane of immanence as absolute deterritorialisation draws close to Spinoza's concept of beatitudo. It is the revolutionary liberation of thought and being from the baggage of inadequate ideas, from superstition and ignorance. The consciousness (conscio) accompanying this experience is not a personal consciousness, but is an understanding of oneself as a part of nature (pars naturae). Eternity is found on earth and not in the skies.

We cannot understand without loving. The joy felt when one operates at one's maximum threshold transforms into love. Spinoza's intellectual love of God is a love without object and without subject. "This is why it constitutes the perfect form of human liberty and happiness" (Macherey, 1994: 152). This joy has nothing to do with satisfying a personal and egoistic desire, because it "tendentially enlarges the perspective of the mind to the whole of nature" (154). In fact, Macherey claims that this love of God (amor Dei) confers upon us the feeling of an impersonal dimension existing within us.

We do not cease to love, but love with a greater intensity because we are reconciled with the nature of which we are a part (169). I am bound to other humans through a network of concrete determinations that expresses the infinite power of God. Love of God is not the love of the solitary hermit, but affirms on the contrary a solidarity with other humans. For Macherey, this constitutes the political dimension of the intellectual love of God, a love that comes from a tendentially collective practice (172). The agonistic relations that accompany the machinations of the imagination dissipate relative to this. Even the tendency toward universalisation of the common notions which explain things from a general point of view vanish. Here, this is a knowledge of singular things (cognition rerum singularum) through which we are moved (afficere). We lose our fear of death.
An ethics of liberation has thus truly commenced.

Spinoza speaks of this programme of action in clinical and diagnostic terms, explicating how we need to perfect the corporeal and mental aptitudes of the individual. Freedom liberates to the maximum the power of being of a thing (186). Virtue (virtus) is no abstract or theoretical quality, the mark of an ascetic; it corresponds to a flourishing expansive movement (a eudaemonia, no longer theoretical, and without telos). It is with respect to De Potentia Intellectus, seu de Libertate Humana, the last part of the Ethics, that Deleuze and Guattari say Spinoza knew that immanence was only immanent to itself. They add that he “produced movements of the infinite and gave infinite speeds to thought in the third kind of knowledge. There he attains incredible speeds, with such lightening compressions that one can only speak of music, of tornadoes, of wind and strings” (1991a: 48).

In his seminars, Deleuze asks us to imagine Spinoza strolling around, living existence as a continuous melodic line of variation (24/3/78). This kind of existence hovers about the threshold of an absolute deterriorialisation. It awaits its creation which always takes place in a relative milieu. The distinction made between perceiving things from a global perspective (Natura Naturans) and from a partial perspective (Natura Naturata) in chapter 3 is useful here in order to elucidate some features pertaining to this distinction of absolute and relative deterriorialisation, a theme I will return to at the close of this chapter.

V.v. the possible of the possible: a revolutionary becoming

Instead of gambling on the eternal impossibility of the revolution and on the fascist return of a war-machine in general, why not think that a new type of revolution is in the course of becoming possible, and that all kinds of mutating, living machines conduct wars, are combined and trace out a plane of consistency which undermines the plane of organization of the World and the States.

Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues. (1977: 147)[trans. modified].

In Essays Critical and Clinical, Deleuze has a piece called ‘The Exhausted’ on
Samuel Beckett (1993: 152-74). Written after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, this essay returns to the theme of the possible, a theme discussed throughout the works on Bergson and in other texts such as *Difference and Repetition*. François Zourabichvili (1998) has written a very thoughtful commentary on this text. It is called ‘Deleuze et le possible (de l’involontarisme en politique)’.

Zourabichvili reflects upon the proliferation of discourses proclaiming the death of the possible and the reign of the free-market in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Thereafter, Fukuyama declared the End of History - in other words, the end of major ideological conflicts - and a number of thinkers proclaimed that no alternatives to ‘liberal-democratic free-market capitalism’ could exist. (A wealth of single issue movements today sound together to voice a challenge to such presumptions.) Sounding like Hegel many years before, these thinkers were unable to see beyond their own horizons so convinced were they that their place and era embodied the Idea (of free-market, liberal democratic capitalism) come to fruition. Similar to evolutionary theorists of the past, they believed that this present would be the future for all societies. Such claustrophobic declarations sought to paralyse ‘the possibility of things being otherwise’. In *Dialogues*, Deleuze had sighed, echoing Kierkegaard ‘the possible, the possible, or I will suffocate’. Here he says “There is no longer any possible: a relentless (acharné) Spinozism” (1993a: 152). In light of the above discourses and Deleuze’s own affection for Spinoza, Zourabichvili finds in this assertion a hint of sarcasm (1998: 336).

Whilst Deleuze distinguishes between the exhausted and the tired, he is also saying that exhausting the possible is not at all that you think it is. “For Deleuze, two apparently opposed discourses coexist: to exhaust the possible/to create the possible” (337). Like Bergson, Deleuze contends that you have to create the possible; it is not given to you in advance and you do not have it until you have created it. This idea of creating the possible is also found in Spinoza. His ethics of liberation rests upon creating relations and compositions that do not pre-exist their creation. In addition, in *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari reiterate the constructivist dimension of their philosophy by showing how the plane of
immanence must be constructed. Rather than having a rigid, segmented ‘molar’ mode of existence in which possibilities are laid out in advance, they encourage an ethics of experimentation that seeks to explore one’s capacities for existing and thinking.

In this vein of thought, Zourabichvili adds that a revolution is not the realisation of a possible but the opening of the possible (338). This opening of the possible is elaborated upon by Deleuze and Guattari: “But the event itself is uncoupled or in rupture with causalities: it is a bifurcation, a deviation with respect to the laws, an unstable state that opens a new field of possibles” (1984: 75). While for Lacan the real is the impossible, for Deleuze and Guattari “within the real everything is possible, everything becomes possible” (1972a: 27). They say, “[t]here is only one kind of production, the production of the real” (32). How do these assertions sit with the Bergsonian critique of the retrospective illusion of the possible, and Deleuze’s own distinctions between the virtual and the actual (which do not resemble one another) and the possible and the real (where the possible resembles the real)?

Asking what this new field of possibles might be, Zourabichvili wonders if it is perhaps simply all that can be conceived, imagined, projected and hoped for in a given time. He soon demonstrates that this is not the case. When Deleuze described a mutation from a ‘society of discipline’ to a ‘society of control’ this was not, according to Zourabichvili, an opening of a field of possibles but the instigation of a new regime of domination. A field of possibles is not a “series of real and imaginary alternatives [...] It now concerns the dynamic emergence of the new. It is the bergsonian inspiration of Deleuze’s political thought” (339). There is a difference between a possible that is realised (Deleuze, 1966a: 96-7), and a possible that is created. This insight helps to show us why the axiomatics of capitalism that constitute a relative deterritorialisation remain a mode of domination. Although it tolerates (and encourages) the creation of new degrees of liberty, this is within strict limits. The emergence of a force that threatened its axioms would not be tolerated. Deleuze and Guattari profess that human rights
will not make them bless capitalism; "what social democracy has not given the order to fire when the poor come out of their territory or ghetto?" (1991a: 107). The exercise of force and erection of barbed wire barriers to surround delegates at the recent W.T.O. conferences are an example of the response to irrecuperable differences and singularities. The fact that these singular movements act in commonality, whilst eluding a definable representational umbrella that might encompass them, makes them unknown quantities. The transversal relations that unify them embrace both commonality and singularity.

The distinction between a realised possible and a created possible informs this chapter. Just as Spinoza sought to open up different possibilities of living, Deleuze mobilises this concept of the possible to try to create spaces whereby the future can act upon the present. As Zourabichvili remarks, the inventions of new possibilities of life concern new ways of being affected. This is a kind of pathos in which the possible is linked to power (puissance) and power concerns a differential distribution of affects.

A political event is a new distribution of affects, "a new circumscription of the intolerable". May 1968 expressed a moment of intolleration. It was a collective phenomenon that took the form "the possible or I will suffocate" as though society could not bear its existence any longer and cried out for change" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984: 76). But what precipitates this moment?

In chapter 3, I explained why Spinoza denies a role to the realisable possible. Rather than participating in the immanent movement of reality, this possible adds a supplementary dimension to reality. This does not mean, however, that Spinoza’s system is arid and rigid. In fact, it concentrates upon the ways of opening up different modes of existence through an ethics of liberation. It is this understanding of the possibility of things being otherwise that drives the Ethics. It does not rest upon a comparative model that measures different modes of existence against one another abstractly. Instead, it is necessary to experiment, and construct forms of association that cultivate the potentials of individuals.
This process is one of becoming-active.

By grasping the potentialities of an actual situation, we do not draw up a plan: rather, the unactualised dimension of a situation is perceived. “In concrete modes of existence, we perceive the possibilities offered to us, like so many affective possibilities: these possibilities of life are the ways in which potentialities are distributed and condensed, in a given time and social field [...] When we grasp a situation as a pure possible, or in its potentiality, we evaluate these possibilities of life [...]” (Zourabichvili, 1998: 343). This pure space of the possible was discussed in connection with Simondon’s conception of the pre-individual. This possible is the virtual. It is not given in advance. Both Bergson and Spinoza critique the idea of a possible that can be realised. Both are interested in the conditions of real experimentation. It is this insight I want to follow up on through this chapter.

The possible does not pre-exist, it is created by the event. It is a question of life. The event creates a new existence, it produces a new subjectivity (new relations with the body, time, sexuality, milieu, culture, work...) When a social mutation appears, it is not enough to draw out its consequences and effects, following lines of economic and political causality. The society must be capable of forming collective assemblages that correspond to the new subjectivity, in such a way that it wants the mutation. That is a true 'reconversion'


In a section headed ‘Clichés, or politics as only possible’, Zourabichvili argues that part of this project must be to be done with clichés. “Everything we see, say, live, even imagine and feel, is always already recognised, carrying in advance the mark of recognition, the form of ‘déjà-vu’ or ‘déjà-entendu’” (351). It is as though nothing is new, everything stays the same, nothing ever happens. The cliché, like the possible, is pre-existent. Zourabichvili returns to Kant to take issue with this conception of the possible. He claims that the transcendental is pre-formed since it maps out the conditions of possible experience, not real experience. By tracing the transcendental from the field of the empirical, novelty is evacuated from the field of thought. A real experience is an encounter that forces us to think that which cannot be thought.
V.vi. doxology and the State

- In our thought the essential feature is fitting new material into old schemas [...] making equal what is new.


The entire apparatus of knowledge is an apparatus for abstraction and simplification - directed not at knowledge but at taking possession of things [...] 


At the heart of Deleuze’s critique of the image of thought lies a concept of the disparate. Deleuze’s conception of a philosophy of immanence centres upon the immanence of immanence rather than an immanence to something. By developing a philosophical account of univocity as the differences of differences, Deleuze seeks to hold out both an allegiance to a philosophy of immanence and a conception of a system that persists in a state of tension, a tension that is not impelled by any force exterior to the system. While Badiou finds a force of transformation and rupture in the stellar void, Deleuze’s alterity is embedded within the system. For this reason Laruelle is correct when he observes that this conception of the real is both as ‘all’ and ‘other’. However, Laruelle accuses Deleuze of being a philosophical idealist because of his development of a philosophy of force. Reading Deleuze with Spinoza and Simondon, I challenge this assessment, showing how these thinkers sidestep this dualism.

Rather than figuring out if an idea is just or correct (juste), Deleuze and Parnet say we should look for a different idea so that something passes between the two (1977: 10). This is the encounter of thinking that takes one by surprise, opening new worlds. Philosophy has its own apparatuses of power, dictating how one thinks, what one can think, and whom one has to have read in order to be able to think. The State-form has provided a model for thought (13). “The exercise of thought thus conforms to the goals of the real State, to the dominant meanings
and to the requirements of the established order" (13). This contention informs the conception of the ‘image of thought’ developed in *Difference and Repetition*.

Deleuze and Guattari say if thought is not taken seriously and it is laughed at, this is all that is required. “Because the less people take thought seriously, the more they think in conformity with what the State wants” (1980: 376). The destruction of a model of thought and the unleashing of other forces of thinking is the enterprise Deleuze undertakes in *Difference and Repetition*. The classical image of thought effects a striation of the mental space and it “aspire to universality” (379). A nomad thought challenges this image and refuses to be bound by it.

Opinions or *doxa* shape what thinking is supposed to be. Differences are captured and contained through strategies of mediation. In chapter 3, I outlined the primary points concerning the univocity of being. In his admiring reviews of *The Logic of Sense* and *Difference and Repetition*, Foucault surmises that “[t]he univocity of being, its singleness of expression, is paradoxically the principle condition which permits difference to escape the domination of identity, which frees it from the law of the Same as a simple opposition within conceptual elements” (1970: 192). Difference is not organised and divided through the categories.

As we learned in the last chapter, from his 1956 essay on Bergson Deleuze tried to communicate the pressing need to develop a concept of difference-in-itself. He clarifies the impetus for this in *Difference and Repetition* by distinguishing between empirical difference and a concept that allows us to think difference. Arguing that difference is always subordinated to identity, analogy, opposition or resemblance, he concludes that these are features of a representationalist philosophy. For example, Aristotelian difference can only be thought through the principle of the excluded middle term. Deleuze says that specific difference is pure because it is formal; intrinsic because it operates in the essence; and qualitative to the extent that the genus designates essence. Difference is thus synthetic; a specification added to a genus, dividing the genus and producing species. It is a formal cause. Since Aristotle’s concept of being is distributive and hierarchical, lacking any
content, it differs greatly from Spinoza’s conception of univocal being.

The classification and division of difference is not just a matter for arch-taxonomists like Linnaeus. The ordering and subordination of differences to general concepts is, undeniably, an everyday occurrence. The question of what makes a difference is often replied to in a comparative or negative fashion that indicates the 'difference-from' a previous state or another thing. A natural order appears to operate as we collate and categorise differences. Spinoza writes rather vitriolically of the way that people extrapolate from a distinctive trait, creating a morass of superstition and ignorance. Indeed he eyes the usage of the generalising concept with some suspicion, understanding its utility as an abstract fiction and focal point for common imaginings, but wary of the insidious prejudices which can divide and destroy communities.

When Spinoza discussed the mechanisms of the imagination, he described the ways in which we fit things into categories according to principles of recognition and association. This depends on the ways in which our bodies are affected by other bodies, and the images formed reflect the nature and dispositions of our own bodies rather than the nature of other bodies. Though we may collectively cluster images into similar categories for the sake of convenience, often the images evoked are very different and depend on our own experiences. Spinoza tries to encourage a capacity to think differentially rather than through empty generalising, and stereotypes and prejudices.

Michel Foucault famously began The Order of Things with a poetic and hilarious quote from Borges’s Ficciones (1944). Borges describes the categorisation of animals in a certain Chinese encyclopaedia. In the passage that follows animals are divided into categories that tumble over one another from “a) belonging to the Emperor” to “b) embalmed” to “k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush” to “m) having just broken the water pitcher” (Foucault, 1966: xv). The disturbing oddness of the juxtapositions reveals the dissolution of a common ground where all these fantastical and real creatures might meet. No taming of these animals is
permitted as they “threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the
Same and the Other” (xv). The wildness of their being overspills any classification
within a common ground or excluded middle. Borges “does away with the site, the
mute ground upon which it is possible for entities to be juxtaposed” (xvii). For
Foucault these unravelled sites are called heterotopias “since they make it
impossible to name this and that [...]” (xviii). Through what image of thought are
things ordered?

V.vii. the State versus the nomad: counterposing multiplicities

On a superficial level at least, the distinction between the image of thought laid
out in *Difference and Repetition* and the idea of a new image of thought or a thought
without image, runs parallel to the distinction of the two multiplicities, metrical
and virtual. Reading *A Thousand Plateaus* with *Difference and Repetition* the recurrence
of this theme is striking. Throughout *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze opposes a
nomos of crowned anarchy to a representational identitarian image of thought.
Similarly, in a more politicised environment, this duality occurs in *1227: The
Treatise on Nomadology - The War Machine*.

Spinoza’s immanent philosophy countered the hierarchical Power of the State
with the power of the nomos. The State or polis divides up space, it segments,
classifies and groups people and things and for this reason it is called an apparatus
of capture, while the nomos is a distributive power since it distributes people in an
open space. They can leap up anywhere. This strategy has been adopted by a
number of intensively decentralised protest movements who use the element of
surprise when mobilising resistance. The resonance of a number of singular
groups creates an acephalous movement; one the polis finds both difficult to
control and intensely threatening.

Two types of space isomorphic with the two multiplicities (metrical and virtual)
are discussed in this plateau. These are the smooth space of the nomos and the
striated space of the State. In Proposition III of the plateau, Deleuze and Guattari
seek to distinguish between a royal science, that works through a hylomorphic
model “implying both a form that organises matter and matter prepared for the
form [...]” (1980: 369), from a nomad science. A royal science copies government
seeking to divide and organise its populace or matter. It homogenises matter in
order to treat it. Conversely, a nomad science is laden with singularities and
presupposes another organisation of the social field.

These models of science are named in the fashion of Plato’s Timaeus. The first is
called a Compars and the second is called a Dispars. The first involves extracting
constants in order to form laws. The second places variables in continuous
variation. Unlike the earlier matter-form distinction this is a matter-force
distinction. “They seize or determine singularities in the matter instead of
constituting a general form” (369). Such is the opposition of logos and nomos. The
distinction relates to the treatment of the play of forces.

In the first case, there is a treatment of forces or potentiae so that the space is
striated, ordered, homogenised and made comparable. This kind of multiplicity is
called metric, or arborescent, since it imposes its laws and dimensions
indifferently regardless of the situation. The nomos or the dispars does not
succumb to a Euclidean space; it is a hodological or haptic space. “A field, a
heterogeneous smooth space, is wedded to a very particular type of multiplicity:
nonmetric, acentered, rhizomatic multiplicities that occupy space without
“counting” it [...]” (371). This is a search for the singularities of a matter. It is
cconcerned with the pre-individual or the event of non-personal individuations.

Deleuze and Guattari suggest that these spaces or multiplicities operate as
intelligence and intuition do in Bergson, since intelligence employs a (metrically)
spatialised method to “solve formally the problems posed by intuition [...]” (374).
However, they also ask whether thought can be extricated from the State model.
Rather than being gathered into an interior form, can thought become a sling-
shot?

79 See Deleuze (1968a: 161-2) for a discussion on the way that Euclid kept geometry in line
with the principle of identity, preventing it from becoming a geometry of sufficient reason.
Does the immanent axiomatic of capitalism imply that the concept of the 'image of thought', premised as it is upon the State-form, is obsolete? At the beginning of *Dialogues*, Deleuze discusses the relationship of philosophy and Power. He argues that “thought borrows its properly philosophical image from the state as beautiful, substantial or subjective interiority” (1977: 13). The goal of becoming an official language of a Pure State means that philosophy adheres to the established order. (This is Nietzsche’s criticism of Kant.) There are mechanisms of exclusion to ensure that certain criteria are fulfilled conforming to the agreed procedures of how to have correct ideas. An example of this has been the imposition of an official language of the State that operates on a ‘higher register’ than all the dialects and minor languages scattered throughout a society. It is this image that philosophy has set up for itself, which in turn prevents it from functioning, that Deleuze takes issue with. For him, it is a question of breaking free from the repressive role of philosophy in order to invent his own approach.

So what matters with the image of thought is not whether the comparison with the State-form is legitimate, or whether there is a new image of thought accompanying the axiomatics of capitalism, but the ways in which thinking is delimited and we are forced (or succumb) to thinking in accordance with a particular model. How is thought delineated, striated and delimited? At stake is not an omniscient subject that would know everything but rather a way of thinking about thought differently or differentially. Thinking in accordance with recognised principles precludes this other thought (without image).

V.viii. the idiot

The image of thought imposes a model of thinking correctly that demands obedience. This reference is to Kant’s philosophy of legislation. “When we stop obeying God, the State, our parents, reason appears and persuade us to continue being docile because it says to us: it is you who are giving the orders” (Deleuze 1962: 92). Otherwise you are deranged or stupid: “the terrible Trinity of madness, stupidity and malevolence [...]” (1968a: 149) - those obstacles other than error.
than the dogmatic image must overcome. How can one then articulate a non-
conformist thought? How can one deny the patently obvious? “[H]ow is stupidity
(not error) possible?” (151). The new idiot, say Deleuze and Guattari, is a
conceptual persona who, unlike the old idiot, no longer strives for indubitable
truths. It is a thought that thinks against reason. “The new idiot will never accept
the truths of history” (1991a: 63). I am no longer myself. I is an Other. This is
thought as the dice-throw.

But in reality, we encounter the tyranny of good-will, the obligation to think “in
common” with others, the domination of the pedagogical model, and most
importantly, the exclusion of stupidity - the disreputable morality of thought
whose function in our society is easy to decipher. We must liberate ourselves
from these constraints; and in perverting this morality, philosophy itself is
disoriented.


Deleuze begins his chapter ‘The Image of Thought’ with a question on beginning.
He says “Where to begin in philosophy has always - rightly - been regarded as a
very delicate problem, for beginning means eliminating all presuppositions”
(1968a: 129). Although philosophers may strive to eliminate objective
presuppositions, a series of subjective implicit presuppositions shapes their
philosophy. Deleuze gives the example of Descartes’ second meditation:
Descartes did not want to define man as a rational animal since this presupposed
the concepts of rationality and animality (129). In this way he could avoid
defining humans through genera and specific differences. However Descartes’s
thought is laden with other presuppositions, that derive from opinion - “it is
presumed that everyone knows, independently of concepts, what is meant by self,
thinking, and being” (129). What appears to be a true beginning rests on
presuppositions wrested from the empirical. Rather than trying to figure out what
a true beginning might be, Deleuze takes a different trajectory, and this is what
most interests us. He asks what a subjective or implicit presupposition is.

80 See also What is Philosophy?, especially chapters 2 and 3 for this discussion of Descartes’
challenge to objective presuppositions and his correlative subjective presuppositions as he
assumes that everyone knows what thinking, being and I mean.
concluding that it comes under the surreptitious form of “Everybody knows”.

That hint of sarcasm Zourabichvili spoke of earlier disparaged the presumption that the possible can no longer be created. By making thinking function under the rule of the ‘obvious’ - “everybody knows what it means to think and to be” (130) - thought is imprisoned in a conservative world where the status quo is affirmed as a natural order, and differential thought is severed in advance. This is thought as opinion. And the consequences of this image of thought are pervasive and political. “Many people have an interest in saying that everybody knows ‘this’, that everybody recognises this, or that nobody can deny that. They triumph easily so long as no surly interlocutor appears to reply that he does not wish to be represented, and that he denies or does not recognise those who speak in his name” (131). When Spivak criticised Deleuze for conflating Vorstellung and Darstellung she did not grasp the ethico-political undercurrent of Deleuze’s critique of representation which lies precisely in critiquing all forms of mediation that deny or assimilate difference.

Thought is paralysed if everything is set out in advance. Spinoza’s quest for knowledge was kept a relative secret because he knew he would not last long if he was found to have thought ‘differently’, by questioning common sense. The most general form of representation is common sense, argues Deleuze, and this is understood as an “upright nature and good will” (131). A morality underlies the image of what it is to think. Thinking is presented as a quest for truth. Of course, Spinoza searched for true knowledge, but for him there was no model of what it is to think. The Ethics constituted a process of liberation of the activities of thinking and existing.

Be yourselves - it being understood that this self must be that of others. As if we would not remain slaves so long as we do not control the problems themselves, so long as we do not possess a right to the problems, to a participation in and management of the problems.

If 'everybody knows...' and 'no-one can deny...' are utilised as weapons against critical thinking, what happens to that person who does not know or recognise the universality of the premises of what it is to think and to be? This is why subjective presuppositions are such an insidious method of oppression: by contending that a thought is free of objective presuppositions, it appears transparent, obvious and universal. This is how philosophy can claim to begin without presuppositions. What if one thinks other than what 'everybody knows'? You used to be burned to death for it, now you can be detained or imprisoned, dismissed as insane or an agitator. By implicitly knowing what it means to think, one can mark out those who are not thinking and label them stupid, evil or mad. If through ill will a person does not know what everybody knows, this individual "is without presuppositions. Only such an individual effectively begins and effectively repeats" (130).

A series of postulates, that is, implicit and pre-philosophical propositions, underscore philosophical thinking. These are borrowed from common sense. The image of common sense claims that "thought has an affinity with the true; it formally possesses the true and materially wants the true" (131). In accordance with this image everybody 'knows' what it is to think. Deleuze calls this image of thought a "dogmatic, orthodox or moral image" (131). A philosophy without presuppositions would embark on a radical critique of this image of thought and the postulates it relies upon. Thought could only begin to think if liberated from this image and its postulates. Truth is produced. It is not just a case of designation. Thought has been conflated with recognition. Indeed people seldom think, except when forced to through a shock. Thought is a shock (echoing the disjunction of the faculties that occurs in the Kantian sublime 81).

Although Kant might have overturned the prevailing image of thought by substituting, as he did, the concept of illusion for that of error, ultimately he did not renounce the presuppositions of knowledge, morality, faith and so forth.

81 This is discussed in Cinema 2: The Time-Image. See also Deleuze’s discussion of the dissolution of the faculties (1968a: 143) and his book on Kant.
Deleuze concludes consequently that "Critique has everything - a tribunal of justices of the peace, a registration room, a register - except the power of a new politics which would overturn the image of thought" (137).82

Deleuze's battle is with an image of thought that remains upright as it follows a model of recognition. He complains, "[s]uch an orientation is a hindrance to philosophy. The supposed three levels - a naturally upright thought, an in principle natural common sense, and a transcendental model of recognition - can constitute only an ideal orthodoxy" (134). This is the figure of the Ur-doxa.

Thought for Deleuze is not about recognition, or rediscovering that which was latent. The image of that thought gives itself of what it is to think has been extrapolated from the most banal of empirical facts, Recognition. Even Kant's philosophy rests upon a psychologism which he tried to disguise (135).

The intimate link between recognition and established values was condemned by Nietzsche in 'Schopenhauer as Educator'. One of the primary problems with the image of thought is that it is disturbingly complacent. Nietzsche remarks vitriolically that Truth may seem then to be "a more modest being from which no disorder and nothing extraordinary is to be feared: a self-contented and happy creature which is continually assuring the powers-that-be that no one needs to be in the least concerned on its account; for it is, after all, only "pure knowledge"..." (Nietzsche quoted in Deleuze 1968a: 135). The image of thought affirms established values rather than creating new values. The new is called difference: it springs from a terra incognita.

In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze states that the only form of critique is 'to philosophise with a hammer'. Kant was, according to him, the first philosopher to engage in a total, positive and immanent critique. However "[t]here has never been a more conciliatory or respectful total critique" (1962: 89). By only

82 It is not within the scope of this thesis to assess the extent to which Deleuze's critique of the model of recognition is a criticism of both Cartesian philosophy, especially the Second Meditation, and the Kantian harmonious exercise of the faculties, or to evaluate the legitimacy of such a critique.
challenging claims to knowledge and truth, the values of knowledge and truth function unimpaired. Believing in that which it is criticising, this critique is critique as justification. Consequently Deleuze (quoting Nietzsche) asks: “Is this the announcement of the great politics?” (90).

Rather than measuring, judging and equalising life, thought must become the affirmative power of an active life, just as life would be the active force of thought (101). If knowledge legisitates, thought becomes subjected to it. Instead Deleuze, with Nietzsche and Spinoza, calls for a thought that goes to the limits of what it can do. “Thinking would then mean discovering, inventing, new possibilities of life” (101). Summarising the dogmatic image of thought, Deleuze says: we are told the thinker wants and loves truth, and thought, as thought, formally possesses truth; we are diverted from the truth because of passions like the body and sensuous interests; thinking truthfully is a method through which we ward off error (103). Truth is presented in abstraction apart from the real forces that engender thought. But thought is an activity, an activity that can be controlled by reactive forces that remain external to it. Hence, the established order and current values reign with impunity.

Truth, as we learned through Spinoza, must be evaluated in terms of a pluralist typology of modes of existence. We must ask ‘what use is philosophy?’. It may critique dominant mystifications, however if it does not challenge its own image of thought, and if it does not act against its time, what can its critical task be? Nietzsche and Deleuze say that philosophy is the Untimely. I refer the reader to the notion of conatus in Spinoza’s thought, a concept I explained in detail earlier. This concept demonstrates the way that thought is an activity, and never simply the exercise of a natural faculty. Nietzsche’s thought is a thought that is unequalisable: diaphora. It is a thought of difference and the disparate. “Truth depends on an encounter with something which forces us to think, and to seek the truth” (1964: 16).

Difference is crucified on the altar of the Same once it “becomes an object of
representation always in relation to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined opposition or a perceived similitude” (138). It is always mediated through recognition, distribution (répartition), reproduction and resemblance (138). Simondon’s philosophy of the pre-individual sought to challenge these presuppositions by developing another kind of thought and another kind of ethics. The postulate of recognition leads us to the predominance of a representational image of thought. Once an empirical figure is elevated to the status of the transcendental this is “at the risk of allowing the real structures of the transcendental to fall into the empirical” (154). Under the essential forms of representation the image is hierarchalised. The imperatives of this kind of image are: compare, calculate, identify.

V.i.x. an encounter with Proust

Deleuze’s short monograph on Proust and Signs is ostensibly a commentary on A la Recherche du Temps Perdu. Yet lurking in the pages of this book is the genesis of a new image of thought. Like C.S. Peirce, Proust proliferated a semiotics of signs. I want to concentrate on one particular aspect of the sign that shines through this text; the sign as disparate. This is an idea we are now familiar with. Involuntary memory is, for Deleuze, an example of a sign. It does not represent anything but is instead something which is and coexists with the present. Bergson called this memory the ‘virtual’, and Deleuze quotes Proust to explain it, “Real without being present, ideal without being abstract” (1964: 57). With involuntary memory we place ourselves immediately (without the mediation of representation) in the past. Involuntary memory (as in Zourabichvili’s examples) is effectuated through a shock or an encounter: that is, a sign.

The unstable opposition and qualitative transition that occurs in an encounter is the figure of a becoming-other. Proust’s work consists in establishing transversals that leap from one world to another without gathering the multiple into a unified whole, by affirming at once the unity of the multiplicity in all its fragments (112).

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81 Deleuze discusses these in great detail in his two cinema books.
A sign is a fragment that is a power of noncommunication and incommensurability. It is the force of the unequal. Noncommunication and incommensurability are distances, but they are distances that are affirmed. “Time is precisely the transversal of all possible spaces, including the space of time” (115). It circumvents the whole.

This idea of transversality allows the affirmation of distance in heterogeneity. Rather than effecting a unifying operation, viewpoints communicate but “remain noncommunicating according to their own dimension” (149). The bumblebee is a profane transversal creature that causes “partitioned sexes to communicate” (149). Difference is no longer suppressed with this idea of transversality, and the distance of unnatural couplings is affirmed. This understanding of the ‘disparateness’ and distance of differences allows difference to be grasped as difference.

V.x. swimming and thinking

Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter.

Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. (1968a: 139).

Often when a speaker poses a problem, she already has the answer. Similarly an objection raised seeks to elicit a desired (and agreeable) response on the part of the thinker. Indeed Deleuze thinks that discussions never go anywhere because everyone is always talking about different things trying to reconcile others to their views. It was for this reason he was acutely wary of discussions. “Questions are invented, like anything else. If you aren’t allowed to invent your questions with elements from all over the place, from never mind where, if people ‘pose’ them to you, you haven’t much to say” (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977: 1). Indeed strong advice is found in his assertion that “Every philosopher runs away when he or she hears someone say “Let’s discuss this” ” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991a: 28). The act of interrogation relies on both good sense and common sense.
Problems need to be invented; they do not exist ready-made. A problem is not just traced from a proposition. In *What is Philosophy?*, Deleuze and Guattari underline that propositions always refer to a state of affairs; i.e. they are referential. “The really great problems are posed only once they are solved” (1968a: 159). The disparity that the problematic encapsulates is an immanent disparity engendered by the tension of material conditions. Bergson's question was always how do we invent good problems and distinguish true problems from those that are peripheral and insignificant: for example, ‘why is there something rather than nothing’?  

While crediting Kant with inventing the problematic of the Idea, Deleuze maintains that the Kantian critique did not escape from the dogmatic image of thought (161). Ideas or problems are the differential elements in thought. The example Deleuze gives of this is swimming. Taking the Leibnizian description of the idea of the sea, Deleuze explains that it is “a system of liaisons or differential relations between particulars and singularities corresponding to the degrees of variation among these relations [...]” (165). To learn to swim involves conjugating “the distinctive points of our bodies with the singular points of the objective Idea in order to form a problematic field” (165). This is why Deleuze says that learning takes place in and through the unconscious.

Let us recall the example of swimming presented in chapter 3. Deleuze, this time speaking about Spinoza, suggested that swimming was the art of composition of relations. It involves a graduated and continuous alteration of the relations of one's body with those of the waves. This differential field is a problematic because there is a disparity, everything is not, nothing stays still. It is a turbulent 'model' of continuous disequilibrium, or a continuity of the discontinuous. Not only is the individual a set of differential relations, but the individual enters into different sets of differential relations that are transformed by the threshold points of pre-individual singularities.

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84 Deleuze discusses this in his first chapter of *Bergsonism* (1966a).
Similarly, "[w]e never know in advance how someone will learn: by means of what love someone becomes good at Latin, what encounters make them a philosopher, or in what dictionaries they learn to think" (165). We learn through signs; not through copying someone else doing something, but through a heterogeneity of relation (1964: 22). This art of experimentation does not discover but invents the potentials of the body and mind. However, if individuals are prevented by rigid pedagogical models or strict disciplinary apparatuses from even beginning this venture, thought slides back into a ruminating model of recognition, something between Bergson's cows and a memory operating through recognition. Our Conclusion will investigate another processual subjectivity that is not captured by these models.

In some ways Deleuze's work could be read as a radicalisation of the Aristotelian concept of phronesis, an improvisational, practical knowledge required in situations like sea-faring where chance could not be eliminated or mastered. *Techne*, the name for the other practical knowledge that Aristotle discusses, is concerned with mastery and domination, while phronesis is concerned with "sensitivity and attunement" (Dunne, 1993: 256). Detienne and Vernant, according to Joseph Dunne, develop this theme of cunning intelligence or *metis* in their work, arguing that "this whole field of intelligence was systematically suppressed in the official picture of the Greek mind which was painted by philosophers [...]" (257). Because of the heterogeneity of materials and circumstances at play these do not fall under any techne or set of percepts (259) and indeed no systematic body of knowledge can encompass them. These instances are not bound by general rules. It is in this way that phronesis can be likened to a praxis, in other words, "a kind of activity whose end is not outside it" (262). With phronesis there is no split between its 'possession' and its 'application'. It is because phronesis does not refer to an end external to itself, and its (good) action is its end, that the immanent ethics that

85 Unfortunately it is not within the scope of this thesis to explore in more detail the links between these ideas of phronesis and praxis and Deleuze's own 'thought without image'. I refer the reader to Joseph Dunne's excellent book *Back to the Rough Ground* for a discussion of these ideas that is both scholarly and thought provoking. Dunne does not, however, suggest the connections I am making.
Spinoza sets forth may be seen to echo with it. Reading Simondon’s critique of hylomorphism and atomism in the context of Deleuze’s image of thought helps to clarify this position. This brief discussion of phronesis as a knowledge that modulates in accordance with the situation helps us to understand one instance, in Aristotle, of a ‘thought without image’.

In Proust and Signs, Deleuze called the model of recognition an ‘objectivism’, suggesting that this tendency is natural, or at least habitual (1964: 26). He says, “We recognise things, but we never know them” (26). The art of experimentation that explores encounters falls prey to the easy facility of recognitions - it is easier to respond through cliché. ‘Objectivism’ operates by grouping tendencies together, and it also relies on voluntary memory that “recalls things and not signs” (28). Voluntary memory is a reconstitution of a present past. It is “relative to the present which it has been, but also to the present with regard to which it is now past” (56). Voluntary memory is a mediated memory proceeding through snapshots. These ideas resemble Bergson’s and Nietzsche’s idea of intelligence as an operation which strives to possess and control things. Through intelligence “we discover only what we have given ourselves, [...] we derive from things only that which we have already put there” (1964: 94). It verifies our prejudices. On the other hand, a sign is pre-objective and pre-subjective.

The something that gives rise to thought is “the being of the sensible. It is not the given but that by which the given is given” (1968a: 140). It is imperceptible, eluding the grasp of recognition and the operations of natural perception. This sensibility which can only be sensed is found at its limit, and this engenders a problem. Thinking is out of joint.

Plato’s Republic distinguished between that which is an encounter, and that which is recognised. Deleuze runs through a series of examples. Certain objects, such as a finger, can be identified, and recognised. However, at what stage is someone bald, or when does something turn from hot to cold? It seems to me that the genesis of Deleuze’s complex concept of becoming is found in seedling form
here. Becoming is a coexistence of contraries, it is not delimited but “the coexistence of more and less in an unlimited qualitative becoming” (141). Something soft is harder than something softer. Recognition tries to contain this 'mad becoming' by measuring and limiting its quality, relating it to something else (141).

Nonetheless, Deleuze questions whether this qualitative becoming is less a being of the sensible than simply a sensible becoming. He also doubts that reminiscence, something enveloped in the object (You are the image of...) could be the object of a true encounter. Finally, the instance of a pure thought that can only be thought is also criticised. The form of real Identity or the Same informs this thought of ‘Smallness that is nothing but small’ and so on (142). In this way Plato paved the way for philosophies of representation and the dogmatic image of thought.

This being of the sensible or that by which the given is given is intensity, or pure difference in itself. This is a difference that is not subordinate to the demands of opposition, resemblance, identity and analogy, which remain only effects produced by this difference. Communication is not then geared toward common sense and consensus but towards a communication of disparates, or differences of differences, effected through a 'dark precursor', or what Simondon called a crystalline germ. Antonin Artaud is given here as an example of an attempt to think something, rather than striving to orient thought in accordance with a model. “He knows that thinking is not innate, but must be engendered in thought. He knows that the problem is not to direct or methodically apply a thought which pre-exists in principle and in nature, but to bring into being that which does not yet exist [...] To think is to create - there is no other creation - but to create is first of all to engender ‘thinking’ in thought” (147).

Nietzsche told us that concepts do not fall from the sky, purified and polished. The idea that philosophy is the creation of concepts is, as we have seen, one of the main themes of What is Philosophy?. In chapters 3 and 4 we learned of
Spinoza's immanent ethics and Simondon's conception of transduction, both attempts to create new, more adequate, ways of thinking and acting. Deleuze's critique of a dogmatic image of thought is another attempt to open up other possibilities of thinking and existing. Breaking with a model of recognition is more than a philosophical problem because the image of thought dictates what can be thought (at a given time and place). By bolstering the set of values associated with the status quo the image of thought has ramifications beyond immediate philosophical concerns.

Remember how Tully critiques the main constitutional traditions for their conservatism, and their refusal to even think about inventing another constitutionalism that would no longer assimilate difference, and diversity and quell dissensus. Imagining possibilities is too often a simple extrapolation from the conditions of the present, constituting a supplement to that present through a retrospective illusion of what might have been (had things been otherwise). Creating the possible is, for Deleuze, gathering the forces of the unforeseeable future by opening up the possibility of things being otherwise. This is an ethics of the pre-individual.

In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari call the plane of immanence the image of thought. They say, “What thought claims by right, what it selects, is infinite movement or the movement of the infinite” (37). However, understandings of what is due to thought by right have varied greatly. The plane of immanence is pre-philosophical because concepts refer to a non-conceptual understanding. These are the internal conditions of philosophy since philosophy does not exist outside them (41). Creating concepts and constructing a plane of immanence is always an experimentation.

It is with Sartre's impersonal transcendental field that the rights of immanence, an immanence that is no longer an immanence to something or a Subject to which a field of immanence is attributed, are restored. This idea of an impersonal transcendental field crops up initially in The Logic of Sense and recurs in Immanence:
A NOMADIC IMAGE OF THOUGHT

a Life… (Deleuze’s last piece of writing). The idea that immanence is no longer immanent to something was one that Deleuze found intriguing, combining as it did with his theses on univocity. This field is, as we saw in the last chapter, both pre-subject and pre-object. It is pre-individual. He thinks it is a radical empiricism since it presents only events. According to Deleuze and Guattari, only one philosopher has understood that immanence is only immanent to itself: Spinoza (48).

Because Spinoza did not compromise with transcendence, Deleuze and Guattari call him the prince of philosophers saying, “[h]e discovered freedom exists only within immanence” (1991: 48). Our path is constantly beset by obstacles preventing us from understanding this. Maybe our propensity to simplify reality and follow dominant opinions thwarts this enterprise. Or maybe this thought is simply intolerable. They suggest that there are an (infinite) number of illusions that prevent us from grasping this difficult thought. Four of these illusions are named; we came across three of them in the last chapter on Spinoza. These are; the illusion of transcendence, the illusion of universals, the illusion of the eternal, and finally the illusion of discursiveness (where propositions are confused with concepts) (49-50). Given such difficulties it sometimes it seems as though we can only choose between transcendence and chaos (51).

I have alluded to a number of the silent postulates at the heart of the dogmatic image of thought. These “crush thought under an image which is that of the Same and the Similar in representation, but profoundly betrays what it means to think and alienates the two powers of difference and repetition […]” (167). I want to return now to some of the ideas expressed in previous chapters.

V.xi. culpable, complicit, co-opted?: philosophy versus capital

In chapter 1, I traced a series of examples of the way in which difference (as diversity) was assimilated to a model of the Same; a model that claimed to be neutral but was riven by a series of silent postulates. James Tully showed how these operated in the context of Canadian constitutionalism. Difference and
diversity had been silenced by the 'neutral' idealised model of the homogeneous nation-state. Fanon spoke to us of colonialism. He explained how the colonial enterprise engendered a manichean dialectics, whereby African colonial subjects were not only presented as differing from the ideal-type model of humanity, but also were portrayed as the absolute (and negative) difference from this model. The series of postulates formed a subterranean level of presuppositions that 'legitimised' a set of horrific practices.

In response, Gatens and Lloyd called for the invention of better collective imaginings that do not presuppose an homogeneous and self-identical nation-state. They argue that responsibility must be taken. Spinoza engaged in a critique of the postulates at the heart of abstract universals, as he sought to show how an immanent ethics might operate. He opposed a moralistic (hylomorphic) image of thought to an ethics of experimentation. By interrogating the pre-eminence given to the individuated individual, Simondon opened a space for us to think of the pre-individual and trans-individual dimensions of the human, in other words, the non-human becomings of the human. Finally, in this chapter we explored the ramifications of the postulates underlying the dogmatic image of thought, and ventured into a realm of disparity, dissensus and difference to proffer a new understanding of the possible. Does the question I have reiterated a number of times throughout this thesis still overshadow us? Does philosophy fall prey to the clutches of capital, legitimating its expansion? We can conclude that a thought without image, a rhizomatic, acentered, nomadic thought is not just a superb description of the mechanisms of global capitalism in the era of 'societies of control', but constitutes a transformation of modes of acting and thinking.

Modern philosophy's link with capitalism, therefore, is of the same kind as that of ancient philosophy with Greece: the connection of an absolute plane of immanence with a relative social milieu that also functions through immanence.


The immanent realisation of the axiomatic of capitalism in the form of the State
was discussed in chapter 2. A plethora of books and articles examining the power of multinational corporations over governments, and the close relationship enjoyed by these different organisations, seems to empirically validate this contention. However, philosophy is not just "an agreeable commerce of the mind, which with the concept, would have its own commodity, or rather its exchange value - which, from the point of view of a lively disinterested sociability of Western democratic conversation, is able to generate a consensus of opinion and provide communication with an ethic [...]" (99). We do not need any more communication. Societies of control centre upon filling intensive space with the crackles of communication. We do, however, need resistance (108).

Earlier I discussed Spinoza's concept of beatitudo, suggesting that it relates to Deleuze and Guattari's conception of philosophy as an absolute deterritorialisation. They say that it is philosophy that takes the relative deterritorialisation of capital to the absolute (99). They argue that it is like Adorno's Negative Dialectics and at this utopian moment "[...] philosophy becomes political and takes the criticism of its own time to its highest point" (99). Absolute deterritorialisation corresponds to a critical point which connects it with a "present relative milieu and especially with the forces stifled by this milieu" (100). Zourabichvili's article names this critical point as the creation of the possible. A correlative transformation of powers of activity relates to a Spinozistic ethics. The struggles against capitalism must continuously begin over, as earlier struggles are betrayed (100). The reterritorialisation that accompanies this absolute deterritorialisation is the reterritorialisation of philosophy on the concept.

Affirming the signs of the present is not sufficient. Transformation comes from the signs of the future: the disparate. "Thought thinks its own history (the past), but in order to free itself from what it thinks (the present) and be able finally to 'think otherwise' (the future)" (Deleuze, 1986: 119). The philosopher cannot

86 Resistance to the spatialisation of time is evident in Bergson's work which seeks to investigate time as duration and qualitative change. If time is understood only in relation to the present as present-past and present-future, it is difficult to understand how time can persist. Moreover, as Deleuze will repeatedly tell us the time of the event cannot be captured in
create a people. A people is created through intolerable circumstances. At this moment, a critical point is passed. This idea of a disparity or tension that leads to transformation was the central theme of the previous two chapters. This is the 'problematic'.

Spinoza's immanent ethics demonstrated a way of thinking about relationality that slipped between the discourses of liberalism and communitarianism. By reading Spinoza with Simondon, we sought to understand the processes of transformation that could lead to qualitative changes in existence. I showed how the centrality of the individual human is displaced in favour of the conception of the human as a part of nature, a singular point in a nexus of forces. I also demonstrated through Simondon why we cannot presuppose an individual subject but must trace the complex lines of processes of subjectification and individuation. One is always more and less than oneself. Doubtless, there was an anthropocentrism in these accounts; this is inevitable. Let us now try to understand more of the non-human becomings of the human, exploring some of the traits of an ecosophy.

these categories. It is always already/not yet. The event of a battle cannot be located either spatially or temporally. Deleuze sometimes calls this time a dead or sterile time, pure reserve. This complication of the conceptions of time is key to understanding the concepts of difference-in-itself as a pre-individual singularity. This is part of Deleuze's anti-phenomenology that seeks to undermine the centrality placed on processes of natural perception. This new subjectivity does not have the natural subject as its locus.
Chapter Six: Conclusion

An Ethics of the Pre-Individual
**VI.i. lily-livered liberals**

Do I contradict myself?  
Very well then I contradict myself,  
(I am large, I contain multitudes.)

Walt Whitman, 'Song of Myself', *Leaves of Grass*. (1855: 123).

I resist anything better than my own diversity [...]  

Walt Whitman, 'Song of Myself', *Leaves of Grass*. (1855: 63).

Liberals often fall prey to the allegation that according to them 'anything goes'. Rawls, for example, tries to subvert this by proposing a theory of justice premised upon the proposition that were reasonable persons to deliberate under a veil of ignorance, they could arrive better at an agreement as to how to weigh up different goods. Throughout this thesis I have sought to show that claims to neutrality and objective universality are always tainted by an initial set of (moral) postulates. But many might maintain that the key question continues to remain unanswered - how can we evaluate different cultural practices, and label them good or bad, moral or immoral? A problem with liberal tolerance is that it often deprives itself of a position to condemn atrocious practices, as it is sucked into the sceptics’ quagmire of cultural relativism. We need to be able to resist patriarchal and racist forms of social organisation. We need to be able to develop processes of singularisation that affirm and embrace alterity, without denying the possibility of an ethical evaluation of immanent modes of existence.

It was this difficult ethical question that I addressed in my chapter on Spinoza. An immanent ethics sounds like an oxymoron to many. What kind of an ethics could it be without principles and rules, or without a stringent deontological approach? Spinoza's conviction that we can have immanent criteria for evaluating modes of existence rested upon an understanding of the individual as necessarily relational, and as a degree of power - a *conatus*. Against an imperialistic thought he
sought local and singular solutions to problems. Ethics is not just a process of deliberating about actions. It is a process of becoming-active. Ethics, that is, ontology.

I contend that the most fruitful way to develop an immanent ethics is to understand the pre-individual and transindividual dimensions of the individual, and if Spinoza does nothing else, he certainly emphasises this point when he asserts that the human is a part of nature. Shifting the debate from the individual in this manner does not constitute semantic slippage, but engenders a critique of the postulates that provided a ground for that individual of ethics. Both deontological ethics and morality employ a conception of the human that is already individuated.87

Can embracing the complexity of humans, including their non-human becomings, really be considered another example of the postmodern proclivity for abstraction? We have learned that the individual is constituted by differential relations and a degree of power corresponds to these. Conatus is essence as activity. Before subject and object, we are all multiplicities. In fact, Deleuze and Guattari introduced the concept of multiplicity in an attempt to escape from allegiances to either subject or object. A multiplicity is "already composed of heterogeneous terms in symbiosis [...]"(1980: 249) and as it passes thresholds it is transformed. We cannot understand individual identities if we presuppose them. Rather than presupposing subject and object, we must try to understand their processes of emergence. We do this through developing a theory of affectivity.

Affects are pre-personal: they are becomings - passages that have a reality that is irreducible to their former or end states. The process of becoming-active involves organising encounters and composing relations so as to maximise active joyful

87 Peter Singer's large edited volume on Ethics does not, as far as I can see, contain so much as one reference to Spinoza. I believe this indicates the way that Spinoza's thinking is out of joint with the dominant traditions on ethics. An interesting and useful project would be to compare Spinoza's work with the dominant approaches to ethics and to show what makes it incompatible with them. To some extent (and largely implicitly since I do not refer often to specific ethical theorists) I have tried to do this in my thesis.
ethics of the pre-individual

affects. Since the individual is a necessarily relational being, an ethics premised upon a strictly autonomous and independent individual is inoperable in this context. Instead of classifying a being in advance and attributing a set of properties to it, a symbiotic approach promotes alliances, contagions and unexpected couplings. Ethics involves multiplying relations, and not just with other humans. An ethics of the pre-individual rails against the values of the dominant image of thought. It creates new values and new modes of valorisation: a heterogenesis resisting a tendency toward homogenesis.

Spinoza shows us that an ethics need not employ abstract principles that compare modes of existence. Seedlings of Marx's definition of human essence as activity, and his corresponding critique of alienation, can be found in the Ethics. That text aspires to create and cultivate the potentials of the human, tearing humans away from abstract essences, and those inflated towering images of themselves that dream of Man occupying a site somewhere between profane nature and sacred God. Through loving and accepting our finitude, we find eternity on earth.

Ethics involves developing immanent criteria to evaluate different modes of existence. It does this by examining whether an action involves a relative decomposition of relations, where a composition of relations might have been constructed. This is why an ethics must be one of experimentation; it is a process of becoming-active.

The shame of being human... For Deleuze and Guattari, "we also experience [this shame] in insignificant conditions, before the meanness and vulgarity of existence that haunts democracies, before the propagation of these modes of existence and of thought-for-the market, and before the values, ideals, and opinions of our time. The ignominy of the possibilities of life that we are offered appears from within. We do not feel ourselves outside of our time but continue to undergo shameful compromises with it" (1991a: 108). Throughout this thesis I have emphasised the importance not only of a resistance to the present, but the necessity to engage in a positive endeavour to construct other possibilities of living. As
with Deleuze and Guattari, this motivation stems from ethico-political concerns - the possibility of things becoming otherwise. My account of processes of individuation challenges the neo-liberal conception of the individual. Not only are we, as Deleuze and Guattari tell us, contemplations - contractions of air, water and minerals - the disparateness that is a part of our becoming means that no matter how rigidified, ossified and absolute our existences become, a singularity may qualitatively transform these modes of existence.

VI.ii. a critical freedom

Haecceities are simply degrees of power which combine, to which correspond a power to affect and be affected, active or passive affects, intensities.


It was Simondon who (inadvertently perhaps) drew out some of the key themes in Spinoza’s Ethics through his theory of processes of individuation. Like Spinoza he neither began with the individual or with a principle of individuation, but with a philosophy of force, of potentia. Although Spinoza did not articulate a theory of metastable being, he did develop a conception of differential relations and force that make it relatively easy to draw his philosophy close to that of Simondon, something Deleuze seemed to do in his seminars. Paradoxically, becoming becomes the model of being.

Deleuze always professed his allegiance to a philosophy of immanence. By positing an ontology that presented being as incompatible with itself, more than unity and more than identity, Simondon’s work profoundly influenced Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, allowing him to continue to develop a conception of univocal being in terms of power (potentia). If disparateness and disparity are primary in relation to identity, then alterity is a constitutive part of any system, without that system being shot through with lack. The possible of the possible is thus a dimension of any system. By understanding identity as secondary, Deleuze and Guattari developed ways of circumventing identities, transforming and disrupting them through the unnatural couplings they called becomings. If the
pre-individual and the transindividual are key dimensions of the individual (a term which is but an abstraction without the invocation of these aspects) the conditions for the production of the new can be activated by constructing a disparateness, by creating a possible to issue a transformation.

In the critical literature terms like 'pre-individual singularities' and 'difference-in-itself' are often introduced without being explained. It was important to me to situate these concepts rather than relying on tautologies such as 'difference-in-itself' differentiates itself. It was also crucial to show that the pre-individual is not just 'pre-' relative to the individual (like the cells in our bodies, or our ancestors) but expresses the reality of the potential energy of a metastable being. Pre-individual concerns the disparateness that is resolved through the inventive process of individuation, a process that is itself always relative. Deleuze calls this process - the actualisation of the virtual. Singularities are intensive and are not localisable. The pre-individual and the transindividual are dimensions of humans that reveal the non-human becomings of the human. The human spills over into other worlds.

VI.iii. pragmatics and incorporeals

In order to address the implications of an ethics of the pre-individual, I took issue with an identitarian image of thought that could not affirm difference and disparity. Here I tried to show that the image we have of what it is to think and to be may stifle the creation of other potential modes of existing and thinking. A hierarchical order that seeks to fit singularities into categories may be toying with concepts that are too baggy for their content. By developing an image of thought, or a thought without image, that could affirm difference, singularity, disparateness and dissensus without trying to force these into ill-fitting uniform concepts, we further our idea of an ethics of the pre-individual. Rather than an imperialistic thinking, we need to develop knowledges to deal with local and singular problems. Simondon’s idea of transduction and Deleuze’s thought without image show how this approach involves an investigation of the non-human or pre-
human world.

An example of how we might go about this is given in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Arguably, Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of an image of thought is extended to their observations on the pragmatics of language. According to them, it is a grave mistake to reduce the economy of language to signifying linguistics. The dominance of the signifier means that other semiotic fluxes have been silenced. All manner of a-signifying ‘sign machines’ are at play in the construction of subjectivities from genetic codes to sporting activities. Rather than concentrating on a formalistic account of language, Deleuze and Guattari draw out the non-discursive and implicit presuppositions that provide a ground for the functioning of language. For example the words ‘I swear’ undergo a continuous variation depending on whether they are spoken in the courtroom, by a teenager to her parents, to a lover, to a boss. What about your face? Are you too earnest? Are you fidgeting? Do you gaze at the floor? All of these signs transform the statement made.

The incorporeal transformations effected by the speech act depend on the collective assemblage of enunciation and the concrete machinic assemblage. Language is an anonymous murmur that speaks through us; this is why there is never an individual statement but only ever a collective assemblage of enunciation. This collective assemblage does not just refer to a wider social group but to a multiplicity including technological, economic, social and cultural components. Hence, dismissing racist and sexist language as ‘only words’ belies the sedimentation of practices and non-discursive presuppositions that gives these words a real transformational power. Different traits such as the timbre of a voice, or the shape of a nose may indicate a divergence from a standardised model of normality. Guattari thinks that there is a universal racism inherent in white capitalist faciality (1979: 91). Someone smiles too widely, a face is too old, or a particular set of features unleashes violence (Guattari notes the immediate and often hostile response to a face in the exclamations of ‘it’s a jew, an arab, a gypsy...’). Rather than affirming a multitude of differences, pre-personal singular
traits are forced into categories of recognition. To remedy such prejudices it is not sufficient to simply alter linguistic terms, but one needs to explore those hidden factors that pervade the social practices and the image of thought of a society, bringing them to visibility. On the one hand, this involves a struggle on the level of ‘molar’ identities which seek for recognition and this goes some way to altering the way in which a dominant order operates. On the other hand, a disparateness needs to be created to effect a qualitative transformation in modes of existence. I outlined this operation in chapter 5. In this way the capacity that an image of thought has to impose identities regardless of context is weakened. The ethico-political task is to invent creative instances that transgress pre-established schemas.

Those kinds of statements indicate the sedimentations of practices that oftentimes rest upon unspoken prejudices and assumptions about the groups of people they refer to. This is why Deleuze’s idea of the image of thought is so important. It exhorts us to never accept statements at surface value but to draw out the postulates that they rest on, especially when those people who make them profess their neutrality and objectivity. Our possibilities for acting and existing are limited by the image of thought of a given society. We need to develop new images of thought, or even a thought without image. Perhaps the acentred networks of the rhizome can provide ways of escaping an arborescent image of thought by bringing new connections into play, providing instead an image of thought that can cope with differences and singularities.

Guattari reveals himself to be close to Simondon and Spinoza in his understanding of the pre-individual, the individual and the transindividual. He develops these themes in a concrete way emphasising, as Simondon did, that the “non-human pre-personal part of subjectivity is crucial since it is from this that its heterogenesis can develop” (1992a: 9). Subjectivity is produced by the confluence of many forces, and cannot be reduced to a successive series of psycho-genetic stages. We do not know what we are. Just as an ethics of the pre-individual capsizes the stability of the individual, so too does it engender another thought of
subjectivity. Unlike in Heidegger’s work, the singularity of A Life is not revealed in the moment of dying. By thinking singularity aside from individuality in the process of becoming, lived existence can also be affirmed. I want to show now how Guattari brings together these concerns as he develops his concept of processual subjectivity.

VI.iv. subjectivity before the subject

I prefer a sense of progress that says ‘what are the possibilities we can develop out of the present?’


Subjectivity does not fall from the sky; it is not written in chromosomes that sectors of knowledge and work must end up with the atrocious segregations that humanity knows today.


A retrospective appraisal of Félix Guattari’s life leads René Schérer to conclude that his thought is dominated by one constant – by processes of subjectification. His molecular revolution consisted of an appeal for a triple ecology that extended from the natural, to the social and the mental. This is called an ecosophy (1994: 63).

Guattari’s logic is one of becomings and multiplicities. Indeed, Schérer claims that subjectification and multiplicity are a pair (63). A primary mistake has been to reduce a process of subjectification to an instance of subjectivity enclosed in the unity of the subject. Like Simondon, Guattari is more interested in exploring the process of subjectification that involves a transductive relation to the world, than viewing the subject in a static and identitarian way. Developing a subjectivity that does not rest on the ground of subject and substance is the aim of his philosophy. This is integrally bound up with an ethics which privileges the ‘minor’. Rather than speaking of the ‘subject’ he prefers to speak of components of subjectification, each working more or less on its own. (1989b: 36). These components do not
even necessarily pass through the individual.

Nicolas Bourriaud also claims that the notion of subjectivity is central to Guattari’s enterprises. He says that “[...] the ultimate finality of subjectivity is none other than an individuation that always remains to be conquered” (1994: 79). Guattari’s work is a massive attempt to denaturalise subjectivity. Nothing is less natural than subjectivity, nothing is more produced. “Subjectivity is the set of relations that are created between individuals and vectors of subjectification, be they individual or collective, human or non-human” (82).

In chapter 2 we looked at some of the ways in which subjectivities were produced and modelled. Our ethical choice now is to either reify, reduce and scientise subjectivity, or to try to grasp its processual nature. Guattari describes this choice in clear terms; “There is an ethical choice in favour of the richness of the possible, an ethics and politics of the virtual that decorporealises and deterritorialises contingency, linear causality and the pressure of circumstances and significations which besiege us. It is a choice for processuality, irreversibility and resingularisation” (1991a: 29).

Guattari wants to create a conception of a subjectivity that traverses and connects different domains. The identity of this subjectivity can only be understood as partial, and it does not know the traditional boundaries that theories of identity have been prone to adopt. Donna Haraway’s figure of the cyborg communicates some of its features. Writing against Western origin myths of unity, the cyborg occupies a partial and ironic place, where kinship with animals and machines is not something to be feared. Haraway tries to occupy a borderland between the self, an illusion of the autonomous One, and the other, which she sees as “multiple, without clear boundary, frayed, insubstantial. One is too few, but two are too many” (1991: 177). Negotiating this boundary is something we have tried to do by showing the danger of myths of purity of identity. Haraway calls for partial translations, and Deleuze and Guattari generate transversal communications, or becomings. Relations have their own reality over and above
But how is subjectivity produced? Guattari says this has nothing to do with a return to traditional systems of binary opposition like base-superstructure models. There is no fixed hierarchy of the semiotic registers that come to produce subjectivity. He points out that stock markets are very sensitive to changes in opinion, something made clear by the recent collapse in the stocks of new technology and web companies. Subjectivities are susceptible to conservative reterritorialisations which can have a massive impact on the subjective economies of millions of people. Given archaïsms and technological innovation can happily go hand in hand, Guattari thinks it is time “to forge a more transversal conception of subjectivity, one which permits us to understand both its idiosyncratic territorialised couplings (Existential Territories) and its opening onto value systems (Incorporeal Universes) with their social and cultural implications” (1992a: 4).

For instance, the impact of the semiotic productions of the mass media on subjectivities is enormous. Unfortunately, at the moment people appear to be condemned to a deadening influence of the mass media (5). This does not mean we should reject technological innovations, however. Guattari believes that subjectivities can work for better or for worse. The media need to be re-appropriated and re-singularised. Other possibles need to be created to bring us toward a post-media era.

In an interview with Olivier Zahm, Guattari states his belief that all societies aim to produce subjectivity. He says “I start from the idea that subjectivity is always the result of collective assemblages, which also imply not only a multiplicity of individuals, but also a multiplicity of technological, machinic, economic factors... a multiplicity of factors which we could call pre-personal sensations” (1992b: 49-50). For Guattari, processes of subjectification are not just delimited to the anthropological sphere, since they extend into becomings-animal, becomings-vegetable, the social field, the technological field and to other rich and
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heterogeneous domains. To try to contain these processes of subjectification within the social field is already reductionist.

With this approach he explicates a number of Simondon’s intuitions. The individual involves both pre-individual and trans-individual dimensions which modify and constitute it as they are modified in return. The human is not cut off from the mammals or microbes, from plants and minerals and rays of sunshine, from the technological formations that shape her possibilities of being, from the incorporeal universes of music and poetry, from the workplace, from media stereotypes. Subjectivity cannot be understood in isolation from these and many other factors.

Guattari emphasises the potential zones of resistance corresponding to a heterogenesis of subjectivity in contradistinction to the homogenesis of capitalist subjectivity, a subjectivity of generalised equivalence. He asks, “can we not find transversal connections between the practices of heterogenesis of the individual subjectivity and a recomposition of social life, undertaking an ethico-political responsibility for political objectives, including planetary and ecological ones” (1992a: 153). We can recompose subjectivity in many ways: looking at the television is important, but also gazing at the stars at night, accepting one’s finitude, through poetry and music, and in a million and one other ways (154). Guattari thinks that poetry is just as important as vitamin C.

VI.v. processes of emergence

Indeed, I think subjectivation has little to do with any subject. It’s to do, rather, with an electric or magnetic field, an individuation taking place through intensities (weak as well as strong ones), it’s to do with individuated fields, not persons or identities.


A ‘strangeness of being’ eludes us, muses Guattari quoting Wirkiewicz (1992a: 19). Drawing on the work of Daniel Stern, a psychologist, he proposes an
emergent subjectivity. Psychoanalytic approaches tended to centre on the effect of the family on the individual. Obviously parental figures are important in the world of the child, but she is not positioned solely in relation to them. Initially her world is a pre-personal, pre-individual one rich in vibrations, deep reds, gasps of laughter, rough surfaces and bitter tastes, and the child weaves these elements together and into herself creating tapestries and patterning herself and the world in an ongoing feedback of qualitative transformation. Rather than a unified self, there is a multiplicity of larval selves contracting sensations like habits. This is an autopoietic creation. Prior to the age of about two the emergent self does not fit into prepared categories such as self and other, male or female. Its relation with the world is more complex, pathetic and fusional. (Bergson once likened the world to more or less contracted vibrations that connected the infra-cosmic to the cosmic.)

Spinoza did not envisage Nature to be a pure, pristine wilderness; a prelapsarian Eden. Naturing Nature named an ontology of becoming, a process of production that did not oppose Man to Nature, but understood the human to be a part of nature. An ethics of the pre-individual does not map out individuated spheres in advance; constructing oppositions between nature, culture and technology is anathema to our analyses. Indeed the problem is to grasp complexity and heterogeneity in their movements rather than always trying to fit them into pre-existing categories. This is the aim of a transcendental empiricism.

Guattari developed an ecosophy that comprehends the psyche, the socius, and the environment. He draws our attention to the struggles for singularisation on the part of a wide variety of groups from the retired, to women's movements, to oppressed workers in the underdeveloped world. In addition, the virtual ecologies of aesthetic practices are also in danger of being destroyed by capitalist subjectivity. Since his death we have seen the proliferation of social movements that combine social justice issues with environmental concerns and creative enterprises. These emblematise a capacity to affirm differences while acting in concert. These grassroots movements speak for themselves.

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Political, environmental and mental ecologies are not opposed to one another because in order to address an environmental problem a new universe of values must be invented, and this means a new ethico-political engagement. A whole system of modelisation needs to be incarnated, in order to support this universe of values, comprised of different social and analytic practices (Guattari, 1996: 20). Rather than a totalitarian approach to identities, we need to affirm and respect heterogeneity and singularity. He says “Let’s get out of consensual politics and accept the alterity of the other, her difference; from this ethical movement that revives the other something may emerge” (23). When Simondon argued that we need to comprehend the process of individuation rather than conceiving of a reality comprised of individual and discrete identities, he made an ethico-political move in favour of dissensus and difference. Instead of a logic of exclusive disjunctions that can tell immediately who belongs in what categories, boundaries are made fuzzy, allowing us to “comprehend the articulation of different machinic, social, biological, neurological, ecological, etc. strata” (26).

Symbioses of different fluxes may be permitted to flourish once the individual is not delimited, classified, segregated and isolated in advance. As Spinoza said - we do not even know what a body can do. “Furthermore, if we consider the plane of consistency we note that the most disparate of things and signs move upon it: a semiotic fragment rubs shoulders with a chemical interaction, an electron crashes into a language, a black hole captures a genetic message, a crystallisation produces a passion, the wasp and orchid cross a letter...” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980: 69). Instead of beginning with individuated forms and contents, a pre-individual field is a field of singularities.

The conjunction AND brings together diverse fluxes like the ray of sunlight and minerals in the soil inventing new forms. Guattari’s processual subjectivity that does

88 See Guattari (1989a) and (1992a) for an account of his concept of modelisation. Rather than using a single or dominant manner of modeling reality, he wants to suggest a more pragmatic approach that can draw upon the pertinent features of different models depending upon the problematic to be addressed. See also p136 of this thesis.
not have the subject as its end is mirrored by Simondon’s process of individuation that view the unity and identity of the individual as but a limited phase in an ongoing process of singularisation from which individual and milieu emerge, but only relatively. What is real is the becoming and not the “supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980: 238). An inclusive disjunction makes a relation of the non-relation. It preserves heterogeneity. We create mutating existential territories that create cartographies of these dimensions.

In the final chapter of his book *Chaosmosis* Guattari turns to the idea of the ecosophic object. Through the media, biology, computers and telecommunications our mental coordinates are being destabilised. The underdeveloped world continues to suffer, the environment is being steadily contaminated, and as President Bush made so clear recently when he rejected the Kyoto Protocol, the system is incapable and unwilling to construct a “social economy adapted to the new technologies” (Guattari, 1991a: 119). Publicised ecological crises are “traced to a more general crisis of the social, political and existential” (119). How can we invent another image of thought? “[H]ow do we change mentalities, how do we reinvent social practices that would give back to humanity - if it ever had it - a sense of responsibility, not only for its own survival, but equally for the future of all life on the planet, for animal and vegetable species, likewise for incorporeal species such as music, the arts, cinema, the relation with time, love and compassion for others, the feeling of fusion at the heart of the cosmos?” (119-20).

Theories of ideology often ran up against the following objection - if the masses are suffering from ‘false consciousness’, if they do not know their own interests, why should they act any differently? Invoking a revolutionary vanguard, or even an organic intelligentsia, imposes a top-down order that claims to know what is best for the masses. Like Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari think that desire is primary. We are attracted to certain modes of existence, and this shapes our interests. Guattari says that we need to understand the modelisations of existence
that different people invest in. We need to be able to affirm dissensus in order, perhaps, to ‘rhizomatise’ that other modelisation, such as the support for the BNP or Le Pen. If we engage in an ideological standoff each position becomes ossified, rigid and incommunicado. By no means am I suggesting that support for the BNP is equally as valid as anti-racist action groups; however, the factors that lead people to support such groups are usually complex and often contradictory. Sometimes it is because people feel alienated that they are attracted to these kinds of organisations. What cause can it serve to exacerbate that alienation by isolating those supporters? Instead, we should try to understand, and potentially transform, those conditions that have led them to take such a position. As Lenny Bruce once said, liberals understand everything except people who don’t understand them.

VI.vi. an ethics of the pre-individual

In the midst of this state of affairs, a shaft of meaning must be discovered, that cuts through my impatience for the other to adopt my point of view, and through the lack of good will in the attempt to bend the other to my desires. Not only must I accept this adversity, I must love it for its own sake: I must seek it out, communicate with it, delve into it, increase it. [...] With it, responsibility emerges from the self in order to pass to the other.


An ethics of the pre-individual provides a different way of seeing, being in, and making the world. It does not turn a blind eye to oppressive practices, social formation, and the exercise of Power, but seeks to critique the manner in which these factors stifle potentia, the power to create transversal relations, and to enhance one’s power of thinking and existing through multiplying relations and forming commonalities of singularities.

Old social formations are not viewed with nostalgia by Deleuze and Guattari. Their negative appraisal of capitalism does not mean they cannot see the potentials unleashed by its movements, even as it ‘reterritorialises’ on the nuclear family and ethnic nation-state. The undecidability inherent to the capitalist axiomatics, due to its unquenchable desire for innovation, means that
'revolutionary fluxes' are both encouraged and contained. Opposing a capitalist homogenesis need not take place through a romantic myth of the local, or an appeal to a patriarchal family system. An ethics of the pre-individual does not fetishise the human but thinks before and beyond it to invent new possibilities of existence. It is through the impersonal dimensions of the human, those pre-individual and transindividual dimensions, that new singularities can be liberated, rupturing the melancholia of the 'one-dimensional man'.

By understanding the human to be a part of nature we can affirm the non-human and pre-human dimensions of the human. We no longer presuppose the human. Different spaces and rhythms are no longer dimensions that the individual moves through but they constitute the non-human becomings of the human, modifying abilities to affect and be affected, diminishing or increasing powers of existing and thinking. An ethics of liberation comprehends these pre-individual dimensions of the human, these components and factors that constitute the individual. Just as an ill-designed architectural space can dampen one's feelings of safety, one's contact with a community, a capacity for aesthetic pleasure and possibilities of movement, we find that many other factors like the media, technologies, biologies, music, financial markets, cultural practices, family relationships also serve as pre-individual vectors of subjectification. If we are trying to develop an ethics it cannot just concern human-human relationships because humans involve so many other dimensions. The ontology developed throughout this thesis cannot be separated from an ethics.

My first chapters concentrated heavily on the idea of Potestas; the ways in which people are prevented from multiplying relations and expanding their capacities to think and exist, prohibiting their rights to singularity. A commonality of singularities operates like the distributive smooth space of the commons. Countering the allegation that philosophy is enthralled to capitalism, I tried to show how capitalism, despite operating in an immanent fashion, blocks, co-opts and circumvents those potentials and becomings that threaten its fundamental premise of production for production's sake. Value systems other than the
pursuit of profit and economic efficiency need to regulate human social activities (Guattari, 1989b: 64). “What condemns the capitalist value system is that it is characterized by general equivalence, which flattens out all other forms of value, alienating them in its hegemony” (65). Patton argues that implicit in the Deleuzian ethic is a concept of critical freedom. This is characterised by its focus on “the conditions of change or transformation in the subject, and by its indifference to the individual or collective nature of the subject” (2000: 83).

Guattari wonders how we can speak of liberty in universes that do not know deliberating subjects. He asks what a machinic liberty might be? Like Spinoza, he thinks it is always a question of degree. First of all we need to accept that different assemblages, be they material, social or biological, are capable of ‘machining’ their own fate and creating complex and heterogeneous universes. We then need to nurture more unnatural couplings, since the subject and the machine are no longer separable from one another (1979: 165-6). By putting different codings from images and gestures to the social and political field into play, we embark on an experimentation on the real. Just as Simondon emphasised our non-individuated or de-individuated dimensions as he tried to explain the ethico-political force of the concepts of the pre-individual and transindividual, Guattari contends that an ethics based on the individual ignores complexity and heterogeneity. Qualitative transformations in modes of existence and social organisation can only be effected if we take a schizoanalytic approach that does not favour one theoretical approach, or system of modelisation, above all others. This is why he strives to develop an ecosophy.

Deleuze and Parnet tell us that there was never any question of opposing the State-form with a spontaneous dynamic. A logic of multiplicities develops different ways of organising or composing relations, creating symbioses and sympathies. No identities are preserved. There are no external references. A pragmatics precludes the intrusion of an overarching solution to our ills. There are no eternal truths. This radical democracy stretches beyond even Whitman’s horizons.
I celebrate myself, and sing myself,
And what I assume you shall assume,
For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you.

Walt Whitman, 'Song of Myself' Leaves of Grass. (1855: 63).

We need to love, and not fear, the unknown. We need an ethics and politics of singularity, an ethics and politics of the pre-individual. Through dissensus and disparateness we can create other possibles; we can precipitate a system into a state of disequilibrium; we can challenge the status quo - the dominant image of thought. Philosophy involves both critique and construction. We cannot tear down edifices to be left standing amongst the ruins. When asked about ethics in a seminar, Jacques Derrida declared 'we are all Abrahams'. Rather than hovering over that abyss, I have tried to engage the undecidability and risk involved in ethics in a positive way. Instead of concentrating upon the aporetic deliberation involved in making ethical decision, I have argued that ethics concerns practices of living. However, an immanent ethics means that we need to develop different conceptions of the human. Undoubtedly my account has been anthropocentric, but I have removed the human from its pedestal. I have not argued that microbes have as much a right to life as humans as radical ecologists sometimes do - nature involves both symbioses and destructions: our ethics is always relative to what is good for us. Anything else would be untenable.

But this by no means constitutes an implicit recommendation of neo-liberalism; the individual is not autonomous or independent but relational. Spinoza's ethics would not be functional if he presupposed the individuality of the individual; he emphasises processes of emergence and creation, our thresholds and limits, our powers of existing and acting. Our ethics involves multiplying relations thereby increasing our joyous affects. My focus has not been centred upon the individuality of the human, but on the non-human, pre-individual and transindividual, becomeings of humans - those processes of singularity. By refusing to make of the human an abstraction, I sought to show how an ethics of the pre-individual is not only an interesting and novel approach but a necessary one. Our anti-human humanism brings the human back down to earth.
Bibliography
In this bibliography the first date enclosed is the original publication date of the text. If I have consulted both the original language and the English texts, both are cited with the dates of the publications I have consulted. Page references are for the English version. For all texts that have not yet been translated, or if I do not cite the translation, quotations from them throughout the thesis should be understood to be my own translations. If at any other stage I have modified the English translation this is also noted. In-text references quote the original date of publication in the original language, and the page number of the English translation where existent. References to Spinoza refer to the time texts were written. In-text quotations are from the *Ethics* and from the letters. I refer the reader to the relevant part of the *Ethics* by naming the part (eg. II). I then abbreviate the following: proposition (pr.), scholium (sch.), corrollary (corr.), axiom (ax.), appendix (app.) and definition (d.). Page references are not given for the *Ethics*. For example (IV. ax) refers to the axiom in Part 4 of the *Ethics*. References to the letters are given as Ep, the number of the letter, and the page reference (eg. Ep. 27: 154).

Deleuze published a number of articles in journals which were then incorporated into his books. I do not quote the original publication dates for most of these individually, nor do I for any other collections of essays issued as a book rather than an edited collection. Any reference of the following sample format (21/1/74) refers to one of Deleuze's seminars given at Vincennes. No page reference is given since these seminars are at present only available online. The reader can find a list of all seminars hitherto transcribed at [www.imaginet.fr](http://www.imaginet.fr).


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