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Tax competition reconsidered
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Dhillon, Amrita, Wooders, Myrna and Zissimos, Ben (2007) Tax competition reconsidered. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 9 (3). pp. 391-423. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00312.x ISSN 1097-3923.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00312.x
Abstract
In a classic model of tax competition, this paper shows that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much or too little public good provision. The key is whether there exists a unilateral incentive to deviate from the efficient state and, if so, whether this entails raising or lowering taxes. A priori, there is no reason to suppose the incentive is in either one direction or the other.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions | ||||
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Journal of Public Economic Theory | ||||
| Publisher: | Blackwell | ||||
| ISSN: | 1097-3923 | ||||
| Official Date: | June 2007 | ||||
| Dates: |
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| Volume: | 9 | ||||
| Number: | 3 | ||||
| Number of Pages: | 33 | ||||
| Page Range: | pp. 391-423 | ||||
| DOI: | 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00312.x | ||||
| Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
| Publication Status: | Published | ||||
| Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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