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Perception and its objects

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Brewer, Bill. (2007) Perception and its objects. Philosophical Studies, Vol.132 (No.1). pp. 87-97. ISSN 0031-8116

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9051-2

Abstract

Early modern empiricists thought that the nature of perceptual experience is given by citing the object presented to the mind in that experience. Hallucination and illusion suggest that this requires untenable mind-dependent objects. Current orthodoxy replaces the appeal to direct objects with the claim that perceptual experience is characterized instead by its representational content. This paper argues that the move to content is problematic, and reclaims the early modern empiricist insight as perfectly consistent, even in cases of illusion, with the realist contention that these direct objects of perception are the persisting mind-independent physical objects we all know and love.

Item Type:

Journal Article

Subjects:

B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy

Divisions:

Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy

Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):

Perception, Object (Philosophy)

Journal or Publication Title:

Philosophical Studies

Publisher:

Springer

ISSN:

0031-8116

Official Date:

January 2007

Dates:

Date	Event
January 2007	Published

Volume:

Vol.132

Number:

No.1

Number of Pages:

Page Range:

pp. 87-97

DOI:

10.1007/s11098-006-9051-2

Status:

Peer Reviewed

Publication Status:

Published

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