Brewer, Bill (2007) Perception and its objects. Philosophical Studies, Vol.132 (No.1). pp. 87-97. doi:10.1007/s11098-006-9051-2

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Abstract

Early modern empiricists thought that the nature of perceptual experience is given by citing the object presented to the mind in that experience. Hallucination and illusion suggest that this requires untenable mind-dependent objects. Current orthodoxy replaces the appeal to direct objects with the claim that perceptual experience is characterized instead by its representational content. This paper argues that the move to content is problematic, and reclaims the early modern empiricist insight as perfectly consistent, even in cases of illusion, with the realist contention that these direct objects of perception are the persisting mind-independent physical objects we all know and love.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Perception, Object (Philosophy)
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophical Studies
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0031-8116
Official Date:	January 2007
Dates:	Date Event January 2007 Published
Date of first compliant deposit:	15 December 2015
Volume:	Vol.132
Number:	No.1
Number of Pages:	11
Page Range:	pp. 87-97
DOI:	10.1007/s11098-006-9051-2
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published

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