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Approval voting: three examples
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De Sinopoli, Francesco, Dutta, Bhaskar and Laslier, Jean-Francois (2006) Approval voting: three examples. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 35 (1). pp. 27-38. doi:10.1007/s00182-006-0053-2
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0053-2
Abstract
In this paper we discuss three examples of approval voting games. The first one illustrates that a stronger solution concept than perfection is needed for a strategic analysis of this type of games. The second example shows that sophisticated voting can imply that the Condorcet winner gets no vote. The third example shows the possibility of insincere voting being a stable equilibrium.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions Q Science > QA Mathematics H Social Sciences |
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| Journal or Publication Title: | INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | ||||
| Publisher: | PHYSICA-VERLAG GMBH & CO | ||||
| ISSN: | 0020-7276 | ||||
| Official Date: | December 2006 | ||||
| Dates: |
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| Volume: | 35 | ||||
| Number: | 1 | ||||
| Number of Pages: | 12 | ||||
| Page Range: | pp. 27-38 | ||||
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00182-006-0053-2 | ||||
| Publication Status: | Published |
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