Wooders, Myrna, Cartwright, Edward and Selten, Reinhard (2006) Behavioral conformity in games with many players. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 57 (2). pp. 347-360. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.006

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Abstract

In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to conform in their behavior to that of similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such conformity can be consistent with self-interest. We propose that this consistency requires the existence of a Nash or approximate Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the player set into relatively few societies, each consisting of similar individuals playing similar strategies. In this paper we characterize a family of games admitting the existence of such equilibrium. We also introduce the concept of 'crowding types' into our description of players and distinguish between the crowding type of a player-those characteristics of a player that have direct effects on others-and his tastes. With assumptions of 'within crowding type anonymity' and 'linearity of taste-types' we show that the number of societies can be uniformly bounded. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
Publisher:	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
ISSN:	0899-8256
Official Date:	November 2006
Dates:	Date Event November 2006 UNSPECIFIED
Volume:	57
Number:	2
Number of Pages:	14
Page Range:	pp. 347-360
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.006
Publication Status:	Published

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