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Behavioral conformity in games with many players

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Wooders, Myrna, Cartwright, Edward and Selten, Reinhard (2006) Behavioral conformity in games with many players. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 57 (2). pp. 347-360. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.006

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.006

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Abstract

In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to conform in their behavior to that of similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such conformity can be consistent with self-interest. We propose that this consistency requires the existence of a Nash or approximate Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the player set into relatively few societies, each consisting of similar individuals playing similar strategies. In this paper we characterize a family of games admitting the existence of such equilibrium. We also introduce the concept of 'crowding types' into our description of players and distinguish between the crowding type of a player-those characteristics of a player that have direct effects on others-and his tastes. With assumptions of 'within crowding type anonymity' and 'linearity of taste-types' we show that the number of societies can be uniformly bounded. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
Publisher: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
ISSN: 0899-8256
Official Date: November 2006
Dates:
DateEvent
November 2006UNSPECIFIED
Volume: 57
Number: 2
Number of Pages: 14
Page Range: pp. 347-360
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.006
Publication Status: Published

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