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Do elections always motivate incumbents? Learning vs. re-election concerns
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Le Borgne, Eric and Lockwood, Ben (2006) Do elections always motivate incumbents? Learning vs. re-election concerns. PUBLIC CHOICE, 129 (1-2). pp. 41-60. doi:10.1007/s11127-006-0863-6 ISSN 0048-5829.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-0863-6
Abstract
This paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between office-holder and an electorate, where everyone is initially uninformed about the office-holder's ability. If office-holder effort and ability interact in the determination of performance in office, then an office-holder has an incentive to learn, i.e., raise effort so that performance becomes a more accurate signal of her ability. Elections reduce the learning effect, and the reduction in this effect may more than offset the positive "re-election concerns" effect of elections on effort, implying higher effort with appointment. When this occurs, appointment of officials may welfare-dominate elections.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
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Journal or Publication Title: | PUBLIC CHOICE | ||||
Publisher: | SPRINGER | ||||
ISSN: | 0048-5829 | ||||
Official Date: | October 2006 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 129 | ||||
Number: | 1-2 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 20 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 41-60 | ||||
DOI: | 10.1007/s11127-006-0863-6 | ||||
Publication Status: | Published |
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