Le Borgne, Eric and Lockwood, Ben. (2006) Do elections always motivate incumbents? Learning vs. re-election concerns. PUBLIC CHOICE, 129 (1-2). pp. 41-60. ISSN 0048-5829

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Abstract

This paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between office-holder and an electorate, where everyone is initially uninformed about the office-holder's ability. If office-holder effort and ability interact in the determination of performance in office, then an office-holder has an incentive to learn, i.e., raise effort so that performance becomes a more accurate signal of her ability. Elections reduce the learning effect, and the reduction in this effect may more than offset the positive "re-election concerns" effect of elections on effort, implying higher effort with appointment. When this occurs, appointment of officials may welfare-dominate elections.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Journal or Publication Title:	PUBLIC CHOICE
Publisher:	SPRINGER
ISSN:	0048-5829
Date:	October 2006
Volume:	129
Number:	1-2
Number of Pages:	20
Page Range:	pp. 41-60
Identification Number:	10.1007/s11127-006-0863-6
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/33013

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