Do elections always motivate incumbents? Learning vs. re-election concerns
Le Borgne, Eric and Lockwood, Ben. (2006) Do elections always motivate incumbents? Learning vs. re-election concerns. PUBLIC CHOICE, 129 (1-2). pp. 41-60. ISSN 0048-5829Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-0863-6
This paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between office-holder and an electorate, where everyone is initially uninformed about the office-holder's ability. If office-holder effort and ability interact in the determination of performance in office, then an office-holder has an incentive to learn, i.e., raise effort so that performance becomes a more accurate signal of her ability. Elections reduce the learning effect, and the reduction in this effect may more than offset the positive "re-election concerns" effect of elections on effort, implying higher effort with appointment. When this occurs, appointment of officials may welfare-dominate elections.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
|Journal or Publication Title:||PUBLIC CHOICE|
|Official Date:||October 2006|
|Number of Pages:||20|
|Page Range:||pp. 41-60|
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