Can you teach old dogs new tricks? On complementarity of human capital and incentives
UNSPECIFIED (2006) Can you teach old dogs new tricks? On complementarity of human capital and incentives. In: Conference on Emerging Markets Finance, London, ENGLAND, MAY 05-06, 2005. Published in: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND FINANCE, 25 (3). pp. 445-458.Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2006.01.008
Contract theory suggests that firm performance can be improved by appointing new managers and/or by introducing better incentives. Furthermore, these two changes should be complementary - their effects reinforce each other. Using data on privatized firms in the Czech Republic, this paper presents results that suggest complementarity between the appointment of new managers and introduction of incentives in a transition economy. The results also show that ignoring the complementarity may lead to the wrong conclusion that the effect of incentives is weak. Managerial incentives seem to work only after the new post-privatization managers are appointed. (c) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
|Item Type:||Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HG Finance|
|Journal or Publication Title:||JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND FINANCE|
|Publisher:||ELSEVIER SCI LTD|
|Official Date:||April 2006|
|Number of Pages:||14|
|Page Range:||pp. 445-458|
|Title of Event:||Conference on Emerging Markets Finance|
|Location of Event:||London, ENGLAND|
|Date(s) of Event:||MAY 05-06, 2005|
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