UNSPECIFIED (2006) Can you teach old dogs new tricks? On complementarity of human capital and incentives. In: Conference on Emerging Markets Finance, London, ENGLAND, MAY 05-06, 2005. Published in: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND FINANCE, 25 (3). pp. 445-458.

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Abstract

Contract theory suggests that firm performance can be improved by appointing new managers and/or by introducing better incentives. Furthermore, these two changes should be complementary - their effects reinforce each other. Using data on privatized firms in the Czech Republic, this paper presents results that suggest complementarity between the appointment of new managers and introduction of incentives in a transition economy. The results also show that ignoring the complementarity may lead to the wrong conclusion that the effect of incentives is weak. Managerial incentives seem to work only after the new post-privatization managers are appointed. (c) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Journal or Publication Title:	JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND FINANCE
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCI LTD
ISSN:	0261-5606
Date:	April 2006
Volume:	25
Number:	3
Number of Pages:	14
Page Range:	pp. 445-458
Identification Number:	10.1016/j.jimonfin.2006.01.008
Publication Status:	Published
Title of Event:	Conference on Emerging Markets Finance
Location of Event:	London, ENGLAND
Date(s) of Event:	MAY 05-06, 2005
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/33364

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