Bhaskar, V., Gupta, Bishnupriya and Khan, Mushtaq (2006) Partial privatization and yardstick competition. Economics of Transition, Volume 14 (Number 3). pp. 459-477. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0351.2006.00265.x

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Abstract

We analyse the dynamics of public and private sector employment in Bangladesh, using the natural experiment provided by the partial privatization of the jute industry. The public sector had substantial excess employment of workers initially, but this excess was substantially eroded by the end of the period we studied. The extent of erosion differs between white-collar and manual worker categories, with excess employment persisting only in the former. Our findings suggest that partial privatization increases the efficacy of yardstick competition in the regulation of public firms, because heterogeneous ownership undermines collusion between public sector managers, and also makes excess employment more transparent to the general public.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Journal or Publication Title:	Economics of Transition
Publisher:	Blackwell Publishing
ISSN:	0967-0750
Official Date:	July 2006
Dates:	Date Event July 2006 Published
Volume:	Volume 14
Number:	Number 3
Number of Pages:	19
Page Range:	pp. 459-477
DOI:	10.1111/j.1468-0351.2006.00265.x
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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